

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

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Control: 27356
Rec'd: MAY 28, 1965
12:57 PM

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- COOPER
- HAYNES
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- KEENY
- KILIN
- KOMER
- MOODY
- REEDY
- SAUNDERS
- THOMSON

FROM: NEW DELHI

ACTION: SECSTATE PRIORITY 3487

INFO: KARACHI 796
LONDON 897
CALCUTTA 674
CINCMEAFSA UNNUMBERED
DOD UNNUMBERED
BOMBAY UNNUMBERED
MADRAS UNNUMBERED

DATE: MAY 28

RANN OF KUTCH

BRITISH TELL US THAT HICOM FREEMAN SAW SHASTRI AND OFFICIALS LATE MORNING MAY 27 TO CONVEY NEW FORMULATION OF CEASE FIRE AGREEMENT AND HORTATORY MESSAGE FROM WILSON. FREEMAN ALSO HAD IN HIS POCKET DRAFT AGREEMENT FOR MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT ELSEWHERE ON BORDERS, CONCEIVED AS SEPARATE BUT SIMULTANEOUS OPERATION, BUT DISCUSSION WENT SO BADLY HE NEVER BROUGHT IT OUT.

IN SUM, FREEMAN'S REPORT TO CRO (ALSO REPEATED WASHINGTON AND KARACHI) SAID THAT SHASTRI HAD SAID THAT LATEST BRITISH SUGGESTION IS IRRELEVANT AND, SHASTRI, HAS REACHED LIMIT OF CONCESSIONS. HE CAN NOT REPEAT NOT ENTER INTO ANY AGREEMENT WHICH DOES NOT REPEAT NOT PROVIDE FOR RESTORATION OF STATUS QUO ANTE IN RANN OF KUTCH. ONLY WITH SUCH PROVISION COULD HE AGREE TO ADJUDICATION OF BORDER DISPUTE THERE. ALTHOUGH LATEST BRITISH PHRASEOLOGY ON PATROLLING ISSUE IS INGENIOUS, ITS DETAILS ARE LESS ACCEPTABLE THAN EARLIER, VAGUER VERSION. AS FOR MILITARY CONFRONTATION ELSEWHERE ON BORDERS, HE WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR INDIAN ARMY "ACTING WITH DISCRETION".

FREEMAN REPORTED HE HAD PERSUADED SHASTRI TO THINK ABOUT IT FURTHER BEFORE GIVING DEFINITIVE REPLY AND HE IS STILL DOING SO.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *5-21-04*

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-2- 3487, MAY 28, FROM NEW DELHI

IT LOOKS VERY MUCH, HOWEVER, AS IF SHASTRI'S SPEECH AT NEHRU COMMEMORATIVE MEETING (EMBTTEL 3477) CONTAINS ALL THE ELEMENTS OF HIS REPLY. (INCIDENTALLY, RE SECRETARY'S COMMENT AT PRESS CONFERENCE MAY 26, ON BRITISH EFFORTS TO ARRANGE A CEASE FIRE AND RESUMPTION OF POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS OF DIFFERENCES DIVIDING INDIA AND PAKISTAN, SHASTRI IS NOT REPEAT NOT CONSIDERING A PACKAGE DEAL.)

SHASTRI HAS THUS REAFFIRMED COMMITMENT TO PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNTRY THAT THERE WILL BE NO REPEAT NO DISENGAGEMENT OUTSIDE OF RANN OF KUTCH WITHOUT RESTORATION IN RANN OF STATUS QUO ANTE JANUARY 1, 1965, AND HE PROBABLY HAS UNTIL PARLIAMENT REASSEMBLES IN AUGUST TO REDEEM THIS COMMITMENT. IF THERE IS NO FORMAL CEASE FIRE AND RESTORATION OF STATUS QUO BY THEN, SAME PARLIAMENTARY PRESSURES WHICH PUSHED SHASTRI INTO PRESENT POSITION WILL BE RESUMED WITH INCREASED FERVOR.

OUR READING OF THE TEA LEAVES SUGGESTS HOWEVER THERE IS STILL PERIOD OF GRACE BEFORE ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT ON RANN OF KUTCH AGAIN BECOMES ACUTELY DANGEROUS. DURING THIS PERIOD, THERE IS POSSIBILITY THAT CONTINUED BRITISH EFFORTS ON PRESENT LINES WOULD SEE BOTH SIDES DIGGING IN EVEN DEEPER, WHEREAS PAUSE MIGHT ENABLE THEM PERCEIVE ELEMENTS OF CEASE FIRE AGREEMENT TO BE REACHED PERHAPS AT LONDON COMMONWEALTH MEETING.

THERE IS SOME ELBOW-ROOM BUILT INTO SHASTRI'S DEPARTURE NEXT WEEK ON VISITS TO OTTAWA, LONDON AND ALGIERS (EMBTTEL 3443), AND THERE IS NO REPEAT NO HINT THAT HE IS THINKING OF POSTPONING HIS TRAVELS.

FURTHER, GOI IS MOUNTING MAJOR EFFORTS ON DIPLOMATIC FRONT FOR ALGIERS CONFERENCE (EMBTTEL 3470). THESE EFFORTS WOULD BE SEVERELY TARNISHED BY ARMED CLASH BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN. IN THIS CONNECTION JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER'S APPEAL (EMBTTEL 3445), FOLLOWING CEYLON APPEAL, AT LEAST CONVEYS TO GOI (AND PERHAPS GOP) THAT OTHERS WITH WHOM THEY WANT TO WORK AT ALGIERS

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-3- 3487, MAY 28, FROM NEW DELHI

DO NOT REPEAT NOT WANT TO BE DISTRACTED THERE BY INDO-PAK TROUBLES. IMPACT OF THIS POINT WOULD BE INCREASED IF OTHER FRIENDLY AFRO-ASIAN NATIONS WERE SIMILARLY TO APPEAL FOR PEACE.

RE MILITARY CONFRONTATION, WE CONTINUE CONVINCED THAT INDIA'S LEADERSHIP, MILITARY AND POLITICAL DOES NOT REPEAT NOT WANT WAR WITH PAKISTAN. DOUBT ABOUT CHINESE IS PART OF THIS ATTITUDE. NEVERTHELESS, POSSIBILITY OF ACCIDENT REMAINS AS LONG AS CONFRONTATION PERSISTS.

ADDING IT ALL UP, WE SEE PERIOD OF DELAY OR FURTHER NEGOTIATION UNTIL JULY AS TOLERABLE IN INDIA, WITH POLITICAL PRESSURES MOUNTING DANGEROUSLY AND INCREASINGLY RESISTANT TO MILITARY RESTRAINT THEREAFTER. IF PAKISTAN WANTS TO HOLD SHASTRI GOVERNMENT'S FEET TO THE FIRE, GOP HAS ONLY TO WAIT AND KEEP THE ANTE HIGHER THAN INDIANS CAN MEET IN THE MEANTIME.

GP-3.

GREENE

BAP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1-Romer
2-Rat.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

May 19, 1965

*India-Pak
(Rann of Kutch)*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: British Efforts to Work Out a
Cease-Fire Agreement With
Pakistan and India on the Rann
of Kutch Dispute

Recommendation:

That you approve the enclosed draft reply to President Ayub's letter to you about the Rann of Kutch.

Discussion:

The British are now at a crucial point in their efforts to bring the Indians and Pakistanis to an agreement on the Rann of Kutch dispute which would lead, hopefully, to a final settlement. Prime Minister Shastri returns on May 19 from his Soviet trip and the British expect then to have a further go at both sides. Since Pakistan agreement is the main sticking point at present, the British join with us in thinking that it is both urgent and desirable for us to weigh in now with President Ayub in support of their proposals. The British have been carrying the major burden of this effort and they have told us that a letter such as I am suggesting would be most helpful at this moment.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

Enclosure: *

Draft letter to President Ayub

~~SECRET~~

*Pres w/ Rusk
5/19/65
copy memo*

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Authority NLS 88-162 (26e)
By slisp. NARA. Date 5-21-04

1299a

5/22/65 - 2:05

p. m.

Mr. Komer:

Ruth Booth says State wants to make a correction in this draft letter, if it is not too late.

One word to be changed is at the end of first paragraph - "I am making an early reply." Change "early" to "interim".

Pls. let her know if she should advise someone else other than you, or if you will take care of it.

*ell lab
er*

T.

1296

~~SECRET~~

PROPOSED TELEGRAM

VERBATIM TEXT

ACTION: Amembassy KARACHI PRIORITY
Amembassy Office RAWALPINDI PRIORITY

INFO: Amembassy NEW DELHI
Amembassy LONDON

LIMDIS

Deptel 1309; London's 5541 Info Karachi 155

Transmit urgently following letter from the President
to President AYUB:

QUOTE: Dear Mr. President:

I have received and carefully studied your urgent
letter of May 11. Since I so fully agree with you as to
the gravity of the situation, I am making an early reply.

In all candor, we find it difficult to attempt to
judge the merits of the Pakistan and Indian positions on
the Rann of Kutch, but we are of course concerned that our
military assistance should not be used by either country
to settle this issue by force. There can be no question
as to the terrible consequences of a war between your two
countries.

~~SECRET~~

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Authority NSC 8-8-80 Hr.

By jcl/op NARA. Date 5-21-04

~~SECRET~~

-2-

countries. So the most important thing, as you say, is to move as quickly as possible toward defusing and settling this dangerous issue by the only sensible method available, i.e., by peaceful means.

Such a method is at hand in the proposals of Prime Minister WILSON. My understanding is that both sides have now reached the point where there is essential agreement on the fundamentals of these proposals. I therefore urge you, as a friend and ally, to go the extra mile if this is needed. Since speedy agreement on these proposals cannot help but lead to an improved atmosphere in the Rann and elsewhere along your borders with India, it strikes me as the quickest and surest road to the reduction of tensions which I know you seek.

Sincerely yours, Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE.

GP-3.

END

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FILE COPY

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy KARACHI 1297

NEA
Info

INFO: Amembassy LONDON 7284
Amembassy NEW DELHI 2394
CINCMEAFSA
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India - Pakistan (Rann)
⊗ Pakistan

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Deptel 1288 rptd London 7228 New Delhi 2369

EUR

Following is text of letter to President from President AYUB on Rann of Kutch

FE

Kutch developments handed to Secretary by Ambassador G. AHMED May 11

IO

(unnecessary words omitted):

NSC

INR

QUOTE Dear Mr. President,

CIA

I write to inform you of grave situation that has arisen in sub-

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continent as result India's aggressive actions recent months: First, the forcible occupation Pakistan's enclave Dahagram, then an aggressive march into disputed territory Rann of Kutch and now concentration virtually entire striking power Indian armed forces Pakistan borders. Dahagram restored to us only after Indians came to realise that their action wholly untenable and it impossible for them continue stay there; India's attempt take over disputed Kutch territory by force foiled only by counter military measures which we, under circumstances, compelled take, and, now, we too have had deploy our forces in defensive positions on India-Pakistan border to meet threat that arises from India's latest action.

2. As you know Kashmir has been prime source this conflict between India

- BUNTYSSALEM
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- MASTERS
- MURPHY
- RILEY
- SANDERS
- THOMSON

*Copy to 4087
5/11/65*

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Authority FEWS 64-68 Vol 25 of 120
By JC NARA, Date 5-19-04

Drafted by: NEA/SOA:LBLaingen:dam 5/12/65

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Phillips Talbot
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Clearances:
SOA - Mr. Cameron
S/S - Mr. Rattray
White House - Mr. Saunders

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and Pakistan. Even as I write, reports pouring in from Srinagar and other places Indian-occupied Kashmir of wholesale arrests Kashmiri leaders and firing by Indian forces on unfortunate Kashmiri people whose only crime is that they struggling free themselves Indian military yoke and are protesting against imprisonment by India for third time their leader SHEIKH ABDULLAH. This is yet another instance India's cynical disregard need for peaceful settlement her disputes with Pakistan on just and honourable basis.

3. This same attitude is demonstrated by Indian stand in regard Kutch dispute. Here again, as in case Kashmir, GOI now claims that disputed territory is Indian territory. In actual fact dispute concerning this territory has been previously discussed between India and Pakistan on several occasions--latest in 1960 when two Governments agreed that pending further consideration this dispute, neither side would disturb status quo. India accuses Pakistan of aggression in Kutch. In fact it was India that moved large forces into disputed territory during months January-April this year, established forward military posts therein and carried out full-scale land, sea and air manoeuvres in its vicinity, thus forcibly demolishing status quo. It was on April 8 when Indian forces attacked Pakistan out-post at Ding in endeavour complete military take over of territory to present Pakistan with fait accompli that Pakistan forces went into action for first time, and it was on April 19 after patiently watching India's aggressive actions in Kutch for three and half months that Pakistan forces went into disputed territory for first time. Subsequent military developments in Rann known your Government.

4. Foiled in her attempt seize disputed territory/force, Indian Prime
by

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Minister proceeded publicly threaten Pakistan that India would attack Pakistan other points our border her own choosing if we refused accept solution dictated by India. These were: cease-fire and return status quo ante, which meant that India would stay in possession disputed territory while we would have to clear out, and that dispute would be settled only on basis that border needed be demarcated and there no territory in dispute. We could scarcely be expected accept such demand at point gun.

5. Even in face this I have exercised greatest restraint. On April 29 I stopped our troops in Rann from exploiting favourable tactical situation when after capture Biar Bet they were in position cut right through to Indian forces 24th parallel and destroy from rear the two Indian Brigades located disputed territory. Furthermore on April 30 I unilaterally ordered our troops in Rann not to do anything that might aggravate situation, which ultimately led to de facto cease-fire there. All this done in face considerable opposition and in hope India may thus be convinced of our sincere desire settle disputes by sensible method available, i.e., by peaceful means.

6. Following these truculent declarations India has massed practically entire Indian Army and Air Force, including all Indian armour, on Pakistan's borders in offensive formations. Pakistan has naturally had to deploy own forces in defensive positions to meet this new threat. We have also informed Security Council of threat to peace that has thus arisen this region.

7. The armies of Pakistan and India now stand poised against each other. Situation one of utmost gravity. A trial of armed strength between India and

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Pakistan will be war without frontiers. It could engulf entire six hundred million people this subcontinent with all its terrible consequences. But we trust that even at this late hour it may be possible for Indian leaders pause and consider where India's true interests lie and that she may refrain from seeking military decision.

8. As you know Mr. President we have time and again warned your Government that arming of India by U.S. on scale on which it has proceeded during last two years could only lead to situations such as the present, that India would be encouraged settle her disputes with Pakistan by force, that she was building two armies--one allegedly to fight Chinese and other to contain Pakistan--but that when she found a suitable opportunity she would employ both these armies against Pakistan. Your Government continued believe that India had no such aggressive intentions, and has continued arm India even though Chinese military threat has receded. admittedly/~~XXXXXXXX~~ While defending this policy spokesmen of your Government have time and again reminded us of American assurances come to our assistance in event aggression. At one time Mr. HARRIMAN even expressed surprise to our Ambassador that Pakistan should not have been satisfied with those assurances. That India should have followed her aggressive action in Rann of Kutch by proceeding mass against Pakistan practically her entire army--and a large part of forces allegedly facing China--regardless of your diplomatic persuasions to contrary, and that the two countries should now be on brink war confirms fears we have repeatedly expressed about unwisdom arming an/~~XXXXXXXX~~ aggressive and unreliable India.

9. Explaining the explosive situation arising out of massing Indian troops

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our borders we have suggested to your Ambassador that your Government consider reminding Mr. SHASTRI of existence American assurances in event aggression against Pakistan in hope that such reminder may help deter Mr. Shastri and the other fire-eating Indian leaders from involving subcontinent in war which could do irreparable damage to cause freedom and peace this region. ~~UNQUOTE~~

With warm personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

Mohammad Ayub Khan UNQUOTE

GP-4.

END

BALI.

NOTE: POUCHED BY OCT.

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Authority Group 4
By je NARA, Date 5-21-04

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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May 12, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Romer
Paul

Subject: Letter from President Ayub of Pakistan
to the President dated May 11

Enclosed is a letter dated May 11, 1965, from Pakistan President Ayub to the President on the situation arising from the dispute between India and Pakistan over the Rann of Kutch. The letter was delivered to the Secretary by Pakistan Ambassador G. Ahmed on May 11.

The letter sets forth in detail and in strong terms Pakistan's position on the background and nature of the fighting in the Rann of Kutch. It notes that the armies of Pakistan and India now stand poised against each other and that the situation is one of utmost gravity. President Ayub's analysis of the developments that led to this situation, of course, conflicts sharply with the Indian version.

As the Secretary indicated to the Ambassador, we are strongly supporting the current British efforts to work out a cease fire and agreement on steps leading to a settlement and we hope that both sides will exercise the greatest moderation and prudence in order not to jeopardize these efforts.

We will follow up this memorandum with our recommendations for handling President Ayub's letter.

John P. Walsh

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Original letter from
President Ayub dated
May 11, 1965.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *5-21-04*

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

MAY 12 1965

Ayub
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EMBASSY OF PAKISTAN
WASHINGTON, D. C.

AMBASSADOR OF PAKISTAN

May 11, 1965.

My dear Mr. Secretary,

I have received the following message from the President of Pakistan for transmission to the President of the United States:

Begins " Dear Mr. President,

I write to inform you of the grave situation that has arisen in the sub-continent as a result of India's aggressive actions in recent months : First, the forcible occupation of Pakistan's enclave of Dahagram, then an aggressive march into disputed territory of the Rann of Kutch and now concentration of virtually the entire striking power of the Indian armed forces on Pakistan borders. Dahagram was restored to us only after the Indians came to realise that their action was wholly untenable and it was impossible for them to continue to stay there; India's attempt to take over disputed Rann of Kutch territory by force was foiled only by counter military measures which we, under the circumstances, were compelled to take, and, now, we too have had to deploy our forces in defensive positions on the India-Pakistan border to meet the threat that arises from India's latest action.

2. As you know Kashmir has been the prime source of this conflict between India and Pakistan. Even as I write, reports are pouring in from Srinagar and other places in Indian-occupied Kashmir of wholesale arrests of Kashmiri leaders and firing by Indian forces on the unfortunate Kashmiri people whose only crime is that they are struggling to free themselves of Indian military yoke

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Authority ERHS 04-68-101-25-420

By jc NARA, Date 5-19-01

and are protesting against the imprisonment by India for the third time of their leader Sheikh Abdullah. This is yet another instance of India's cynical disregard of the need for a peaceful settlement of her disputes with Pakistan on a just and honourable basis.

3. This same attitude is demonstrated by the Indian stand in regard to the Rann of Kutch dispute. Here again, as in the case of Kashmir, the Government of India now claims that the disputed territory is Indian territory. In actual fact the dispute concerning this territory has been previously discussed between India and Pakistan on several occasions - the latest in 1960 when the two Governments agreed that pending further consideration of this dispute, neither side would disturb the status quo. India accuses Pakistan of aggression in the Rann of Kutch. In fact it was India that moved large forces into the disputed territory during months of January - April this year, established forward military posts therein and carried out full-scale land, sea and air manoeuvres in its vicinity, thus forcibly demolishing ^{the} status quo. It was only on April 8th when the Indian forces attacked a Pakistan out-post at Ding in an endeavour to complete a military take over of the territory to present Pakistan with a fait accompli that the Pakistan forces went into action for the first time, and it was on April 19th after patiently watching India's aggressive actions in the Rann of Kutch for three and a half months that Pakistan forces went into the disputed territory for the first time. Subsequent military developments in the Rann are known to your Government.

4. Foiled in her attempt to seize the disputed territory by force, the Indian Prime Minister proceeded publicly to threaten Pakistan that India would attack Pakistan on other points of our border of her own choosing if we refused to accept solution dictated by India. These were : a cease-fire and return to status quo

ante, which meant that India would stay in possession of the disputed territory while we would have to clear out, and that the dispute would be settled only on the basis that the border needed to be demarcated and there was no territory in dispute. We could scarcely be expected to accept such a demand at the point of the gun.

5. Even in face of this I have exercised the greatest restraint. On April 29th I stopped our troops in the Rann of Kutch from exploiting a favourable tactical situation when after the capture of Biar Bet they were in a position to cut right through to the Indian forces on the 24th parallel and destroy from the rear the two Indian Brigades located in the disputed territory. Furthermore on April 30th I unilaterally ordered our troops in the Rann of Kutch not to do anything that might aggravate the situation, which ultimately led to a de facto cease-fire there. All this was done in face of considerable opposition and in the hope India may thus be convinced of our sincere desire to settle disputes by the sensible method available i. e., by peaceful means.

6. Following these truculent declarations India has massed practically the entire Indian Army and Air Force, including all Indian armour, on Pakistan's borders in offensive formations. Pakistan has naturally had to deploy her own forces in defensive positions to meet this new threat. We have also informed the Security Council of the threat to peace that has thus arisen in this region.

7. The armies of Pakistan and India now stand poised against each other. The situation is one of the utmost gravity. A trial of armed strength between India and Pakistan will be a war without frontiers. It could engulf the entire six hundred million people of this sub-continent with all its terrible consequences. But we trust that even at this late hour it may be possible for the Indian

leaders to pause and consider where India's true interests lie and that she may refrain from seeking a military decision.

8. As you know Mr. President we have time and again warned your Government that arming of India by the U.S. on the scale on which it has proceeded during the last two years could only lead to situations such as the present, that India would be encouraged to settle her disputes with Pakistan by force, that she was building two armies - one allegedly to fight the Chinese and the other to contain Pakistan - but that when she found a suitable opportunity she would employ both these armies against Pakistan. Your Government continued to believe that India had no such aggressive intentions, and has continued to arm India even though the Chinese military threat has admittedly receded. While defending this policy spokesmen of your Government have time and again reminded us of American assurances to come to our assistance in the event of aggression. At one time Mr. Harriman even expressed surprise to our Ambassador that Pakistan should not have been satisfied with those assurances. That India should have followed her aggressive actions in the Rann of Kutch by proceeding to mass against Pakistan practically her entire army - and a large part of forces allegedly facing China - regardless of your diplomatic persuasions to the contrary, and that the two countries should now be on the brink of war confirms fears we have repeatedly expressed about the unwisdom of arming an aggressive and unreliable India.

9. Explaining the explosive situation arising out of the massing of Indian troops on our borders we have suggested to your Ambassador that your Government consider reminding Mr. Shastri of the existence of American assurances in the event

of aggression against Pakistan in the hope that such a reminder may help to deter Mr. Shastri and the other fire-eating Indian leaders from involving the sub-continent in a war which could do irreparable damage to the cause of freedom and peace in this region.


With warm personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

Mohammad Ayub Khan. " Ends.

I should be grateful if the above message is conveyed to the President.

Please accept, Mr. Secretary, the assurances of my highest consideration.



(G. Ahmed)

The Honourable
Dean Rusk,
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

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Intelligence
Note

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MAY 11 9 29 AM '65

MAY 10 1965

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes

Subject: Soviets Maintain Neutrality in Rann of Kutch Dispute

TASS Statement. A TASS statement issued May 8 provides further evidence of Soviet reluctance to take sides in the dispute between India and Pakistan over the Rann of Kutch border. It calls upon both sides to exercise restraint and to settle the dispute peacefully, through direct talks and with "due consideration for the interests of both sides." It also bestows evenhanded Soviet blessings on both Shastri and Ayub Khan for making statements favoring a negotiated settlement of the dispute.

The Indians may find disturbing two nuances in the TASS statement. Although there is praise for India's policy of nonalignment, the wording does not specifically identify Shastri with this policy. Secondly, in referring to the "need for a peaceful settlement of the Indo-Pakistani border conflicts" the statement seems to go beyond the Rann of Kutch dispute and to point to the desirability of a more general settlement of other border disputes between the two countries, including perhaps Kashmir.

Soviet Neutrality Can be Used Two Ways. The issuance of the TASS statement on the eve of Shastri's visit to Moscow may be designed to let the Indians know that Moscow will not give all the

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Downgraded at 3 year
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after 12 years

MAY 20 1965

support they desire on this issue. Moscow may hope thereby that it can bring pressure to bear on the Indians to secure their endorsement of Soviet views of other international issues, including the Vietnam crisis. At the same time, Moscow may feel that the Indian-Pakistani quarrel must be dampened because it is playing into Chinese hands. Only a few days earlier, Peiping had taken Pakistan's side in the Rann of Kutch dispute.

Moscow's neutrality in the dispute will come as a blow particularly to pro-Soviet Indians who had been belaboring the US for not supporting India in the dispute. Although Moscow will probably argue that its position was motivated by a genuine concern for India's national interests, and that India should avoid the possibility of a hostile Sino-Pakistani encirclement, such argumentation will make little impression on the Indians.

NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

J.P. Rowan 132

DE FACTO CEASEFIRE IN RANN OF KUTCH

A de facto ceasefire has remained in effect in the Rann of Kutch since April 30. On May 5, the British informed us they had succeeded in persuading the Indians and Pakistanis to make simultaneous public announcements that both have agreed to take no action to aggravate the situation in the disputed area while the British continue their diplomatic efforts to arrange a formal ceasefire and to establish a framework for negotiations (see CFR No. 17, April 28). Prime Minister Wilson will follow up with a statement in Parliament. The latest UK proposals to settle the dispute have elicited encouraging preliminary responses from the GOI and GOP, both indicating they would study the proposals further and respond formally. The British are reasonably optimistic regarding eventual acceptance of their proposals but recognize that much work remains to be done.

Although Indian troop concentrations were reported on other frontiers, our Ambassador at New Delhi believes that the Indian Government does not plan retaliatory action elsewhere, at least for the present. The British share this assessment. In his talk with our Ambassador at Karachi on May 4, President Ayub reaffirmed that the GOP had agreed in principle to arbitration of the Rann of Kutch and would accept an arbitral award even if it is unfavorable. However, Ayub took an extremely tough posture toward the Indians in the event they attack Pakistan in a new area.

MAP Equipment - Ayub freely acknowledged that MAP equipment was used in the Rann of Kutch, noting that MAAG knows forces committed to the area are MAP-supported. He reversed an original decision on his part not to allow MAAG visits to the front and personally arranged for a MAAG inspection trip for May 6. A similar earlier inspection on the Indian side did not reveal Indian use of MAP equipment.

Meanwhile, reports from New Delhi emphasize the depth of Indian feeling over the use of MAP equipment in Kutch by the Pakistanis. Having repeatedly emphasized to the GOP our opposition to its use of MAP equipment in the Kutch disputes, we are now considering what our next move with the Pakistanis on this issue should be. We believe our approaches to the GOP on this question have at least buttressed British efforts to bring about a ceasefire.

*

--Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 18, 5/5/65

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date *5-21-01*

xx

Sub-Turk

NEA NOTES

Greek-Turkish Relations

Greece and Turkey look to the NATO ministerial meeting as an important catalyst in moving the Cyprus problem nearer a solution or at least toward meaningful negotiation. Greece has been particularly active in trying to smooth the way for talks in London and has taken the initiative in arranging for the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers to meet there privately on May 10. The Greek Foreign Minister has asked the Secretary to give special attention to this meeting with the hope that it might lead to negotiations on substance. Turkey, in addition to saying it is prepared for private talks with the Greeks, has made public and private statements on its plans to discuss the Cyprus question in the North Atlantic Council meeting. Turkish public statements and several private conversations with us emphasize the exceptional importance Turkey attaches to these meetings in terms of its Cyprus policy.

--Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 18, 5/5/65

Cyprus Confrontation Averted

Turk-Cypriot leaders agreed on May 3 to permit UNFICYP inspection of the buildings in the previously demilitarized zone along the Green Line (see CFR No. 17, April 28). As a result, the Cypriot Government lifted the restrictions on movement of Turk-Cypriots in and out of the Turkish quarter of Nicosia. Earlier, most of the GOC road blocks and check points had been dismantled in the southern two-thirds of the island. One other confrontation has been averted. Construction of a dirt road between Temblos and St. Hilarion by the Turk-Cypriots had caused both the Greek and Cypriot Governments concern that the GOC's ability to defend itself against a Turkish invasion would be lessened and that the Nicosia-Kyrenia enclave would be expanded. The difficulty appears to have been ameliorated, however, by the deployment of a UN platoon on the road for the purpose of denying its use to anyone other than unarmed civilians.

Greek Domestic Politics

On April 29, Andreas Papandreou, son of the Prime Minister, was reappointed Alternate Minister of Coordination, a position he resigned under fire last November for alleged mishandling of a government contract. His return to the Cabinet is likely to cause some discord in the government. First, it will intensify the struggle for succession to party leadership between him and Finance Minister Mitsotakis. Secondly, a three-way struggle for control of the country's economic policy will probably ensue between the younger Papandreou, the Finance Minister, and Coordination Minister Stephanopoulos. Some observers also expect Andreas Papandreou to press for a more leftist trend in government policy. It is expected, however, that the Prime Minister will be able to maintain control over the situation.

Greece

Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 18, 5/5/65

133

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES STRIKE COMMAND
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA
Office of the Political Advisor
33608



Handwritten signature: India Rann

29 April 1965

Dear Bob:

Enclosed is a non-military solution to the Rann of Kutch problem, as developed by our Chief Scientist, which may be ingenious and which, in any event, warrants consideration and further investigation.

Your reactions, whether pro or con, would be appreciated. I am also sending a copy of this memorandum to Turner Cameron.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Handwritten signature: Henry C. Ramsey

Henry C. Ramsey

1 Encl
as

Robert W. Komer, Esquire
Executive Office Building
Room 372
Washington 25, D. C.

Handwritten note:
I do hope to see
you when I'm up
next & to be
briefed by a person
who really knows
what is going on -
Cheers - HCR

MAY 3 1965

133a

Office of the Political Advisor
33608

29 April 1965

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Robert W. Komer, Esquire
Executive Office Building
Room 372
Washington 25, D. C.

MAY 3 1965

133^b

Office of the Chief Scientist

STRSC

28 April 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff

SUBJECT: Rann of Kutch - A Possible Technical Approach to the Problem

1. As I understand it, the Rann of Kutch is an inland sea during the wet season, but dries up in the dry season. India claims the northern littoral as the border, but Pakistan claims the middle of the inland sea as the border.

2. One useful way of keeping the two countries from fighting over this rather useless piece of land would be to have a permanent inland sea there. I think a water resources development project aimed at making the Rann of Kutch a permanent sea could do this.

3. If the main water loss is by evaporation, there are chemicals that can be spread on the water to reduce up to fifty percent of the evaporation loss. These chemicals, primarily long-chain aliphatic alcohols, acids and esters, are not toxic to animal and plant life, and allow oxygen to pass. Thus, aquatic life would survive, and the water could be used for irrigation, drinking, fisheries development, and perhaps even for power generation.

4. The cost of such a film treatment seems to be less than \$10 per acre-foot saved per year. An acre-foot is the amount of water needed to cover one acre of land to a depth of one foot, or about 325,000 gallons. I have no idea of the size of the Rann of Kutch, but I suspect it is large enough to hold a great amount of water. This means the total bill for such a program would be large, and suggests that any project would require international cooperation and funds.

5. Other sources of water loss include drainage by outflowing streams, which is cheap to remedy with dams or fills, and loss through soil permeability. This latter source might be important in the Rann of Kutch. While the technology of reducing water loss through the soil

MAY 3 1965

STRSC

28 April 1965

SUBJECT: Rann of Kutch - A Possible Technical Approach to the Problem

is less developed than other water management techniques, it is feasible. The costs need careful study, but water losses through soil probably could be controlled for a few hundred dollars per acre-foot saved. This is still a bargain.

6. I believe the economic benefits of such a water conservation program would be significant. Additionally, the studies and planning needed would get the Indians and Paks together to talk, would provide a face-saving way to resolve the problem, and could help to begin cooperative efforts between India and Pakistan. The payoff for them is water, new lands opened up for agriculture, industrial development, and a way out of the current border conflict. For the US and UK, it provides a way to get the two parties talking and stop fighting. The idea of a joint water development program for the Rann of Kutch may thus be a key to achieving desirable objectives for all parties concerned.



cc to:
POLAD

R. N. HAZELWOOD
Chief Scientist

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By je, NARA, Date 5-21-04

NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

RANN OF KUTCH CONFLICT

India (K)
Pak 1
134

For the first time since the Kashmir cease-fire of 1948, military forces of India and Pakistan are engaged in organized conflict in the Rann of Kutch area. We see considerable risks and dangers in the situation if hostilities should continue. The dispute has assumed major political significance, particularly in New Delhi, and could have serious implications for our policies and programs in the subcontinent.

Heavy fighting between regular army forces has taken place intermittently since mid-April in the disputed territory along the West Pakistan-Indian frontier near the Arabian Sea. The terrain gives Pakistan a military advantage. India has played up the magnitude and significance of the fighting. The GOI is under strong domestic pressure to avert a military setback. Both sides have agreed on the desirability of a ceasefire and negotiations, but they have been unable to agree on determining disposition of the troops following a ceasefire. Both sides have privately indicated to us a willingness to submit the border issue to the International Court of Justice, but they say they do not intend to resort to the United Nations at this juncture. The Indians have indicated that the good offices of a friendly country might be in order.

US Position - While we have sought to avoid being drawn into the dispute, we have urged restraint and a ceasefire on both sides. We have expressed strong concern to the Pakistanis over alleged use of MAP equipment in the disputed area and have noted this could jeopardize our MAP program. To the Indians we have expressed our concern over possible Indian retaliation elsewhere on the border. We explored with the British in London whether they might lead a Commonwealth effort to find a formula for a ceasefire. HMG subsequently instructed the UK High Commissioners in Pakistan and India to urge President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri to intervene personally to discuss and arrange an immediate ceasefire.

Background - The area in dispute, extending out from the old fort of Kanjarkot, lies on the northern edge of the Rann of Kutch, a desolate area in Western India on the Arabian Sea. It is alternately salt flats and tidal basin. (The inundation lasts from June to November.) The area was admitted by both sides to be in dispute at the time of the Indo-Pakistani border negotiations of 1960. It was agreed at that time that further discussions would be held to explore the validity of the conflicting claims, but so far as we know these have not taken place.

The current difficulties apparently began in January 1965, when the Indians became aware that Pakistani border police were patrolling below the Indian claim line. India lodged a protest and increased its own patrolling activity. In mid-February, Pakistani forces dug

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themselves in around Kanjarkot, which may have been previously unoccupied, although Ayub claims that Pakistan has "long" occupied the area, manned strong points, and shifted defense responsibility from border units to the army.

During April, a series of incidents has occurred with both sides blaming the other. The Pakistanis, enjoying a militarily superior position, have moved forcefully against Indian outposts near the border fort of Kanjarkot and most recently staged a "preemptive" attack at Biar Bet, deeper within the disputed area. The Indians have been mainly on the defensive but, according to Pakistan, have established outposts within undisputed Pakistani territory.

Both sides allege that the other has employed armor. The Indians have denied the charge and we have no evidence to support it. Pakistan has stated that while tanks are deployed in the Rann area, military leaders have strongly denied reports that these tanks have been employed in combat. The Pakistani unit concerned, according to our Embassy at Karachi, is MAP-equipped. Casualties have been reported by both sides, shooting continues between patrols and strong points, and public opinion--especially in India--has been aroused sharply.

Pakistani patrolling south of Kanjarkot may have been going on for quite some time without the Indians knowing it. There is little doubt, however, that Pakistani occupation of Kanjarkot would have upset a long-standing status quo. The Indian response of occupying other posts near the frontier brought the latent crisis to a head.

It will probably not be possible to determine who began firing, and since the area involved is in dispute between Pakistan and India, it is difficult to ascertain that either side committed aggression against the territory of the other.

--Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 17, 4/28/65

BOURGUIBA EVOKES VIOLENT REACTION

Arab Israeli

A major policy statement by President Bourguiba in Tunis on April 21, in which he reiterated his proposals for direct negotiations between the Palestine Arabs and Israel, has evoked a violent reaction on the part of eastern Arabs. Bourguiba's first mention of a fresh Arab approach to the Arab-Israel dispute occurred in a press conference March 6 in Jordan-held Jerusalem. There he called for a peaceful solution on the basis of a rational approach, including specifically "cooperation with the Jews." In subsequent press interviews early in April he reiterated his proposal; he is quoted in one as calling for a return to "legality within the UN Palestine partition decision of 1948." It should be noted, however, that the principal (and abortive) UN Palestine partition resolution was in 1947, and that there were no less than 18 UN resolutions on Palestine in 1948, so that we are not yet certain what he meant.

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--Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 17, 4/28/65

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Ayub
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Research Memorandum

RNA-15, April 26, 1965 136

RECEIVED
H. S. C.

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *Thomas L. Hughes*
Subject: The Situation in the Rann of Kutch

APR 27 9 14 AM '65

W. J. ... 14
India ...

The following memorandum presents background information on the conflict-
ing Indian and Pakistani positions on the Rann of Kutch, and reviews the
military situation and its implications.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 5-21-04

ABSTRACT

The recent crisis in the Rann of Kutch is based upon conflicting Indo-
Pakistani territorial claims. Pakistan claims that the international border
should run through the middle of the rann (a salt flat which is inundated
from June to November); India claims the entire rann and will not now admit
that a dispute exists, although in 1960 such an admission was made.


It is impossible to determine the genesis of the recent flare-up or to
allocate blame. The Pakistanis enjoy a tactically favorable position which
they have exploited. Both sides have committed elements of their army,
Neither side has used aircraft; the Indians have not used tanks, but it is
not clear whether the Pakistanis have actually used the tanks available to
them in the area.

Prospects for negotiations are not bright. If the fighting can remain
localized, the dispute could probably be settled bi-laterally. The Indians
especially are under strong psychological pressure to assert themselves,
however, and civil and military leaders have suggested the possibility of
retaliating against Pakistan elsewhere, where India enjoys a tactical advantage.

Pakistan, for its part, is unlikely to relinquish a chance to "lean" on India
effectively.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

APR 27 1965



24TH PARALLEL

TO CHHAD BET -- 25 MILES

Mud flat mostly covered with salt water from June to November



69°00' 27/1000yds. N.

245,000yds. E.

246

247 15'

248

249

30' 250

251

LINE 25 441

1. The Area in Dispute (See Map Attached)

The area in dispute -- the Rann of Kutch -- is a salt desert (rann) that lies between Pakistan and India at the edge of the Arabian Sea. From June to November each year, the Rann is inundated. The traditional British-drawn boundary between the Pakistani state of Sind and the Indian state of Kutch runs just along the northern edge of the Rann of Kutch, although the alignment is not fully agreed upon; Pakistan claims that it runs south of Kanjarkot. The principal dispute arises from Pakistan's claim that the international boundary should run much further south through the middle of the Rann of Kutch, roughly along the 24th parallel.

A previous skirmish occurred at Chhad Bet in 1956. Both India and Pakistan recognized the fact of the dispute at a general conference on boundary matters held in January 1960 (the Indian negotiator was Swaran Singh), and agreed that further negotiations on the subject would be held. Prime Minister Nehru, however, subsequently contended in the Indian parliament (August 1960) that there was in fact no dispute, and no further Indo-Pakistani talks on the subject seem to have been held.

The Rann of Kutch is uninhabited and has not usually been considered to be of much value. Pakistan -- with the assistance of the Sun Oil Company -- is now exploring for oil nearby, and it is possible that oil may be present in the rann.

2. The Evolving Conflict

According to the Indians, the immediate origins of the present fighting go back to January 1965, when the Indians became aware that Pakistani border police were patrolling south of the traditional Sind-Kutch boundary. The Indians protested and increased their own patrolling activity. In mid-February, Pakistani forces occupied the old mud fort at Kanjarkot. According to the Indians, this occupation was a provocative act. Pakistan, on the other hand, claims that India began to occupy posts in the rann in January, thus forcing Pakistan to respond and move into Kanjarkot which, they also claimed, they had "long" occupied anyway.

There is no way to assess the truthfulness of the two versions. The Indian version is reminiscent of the situation in which they became involved with the Chinese Communists in 1962 in Ladakh. There too, they discovered too late that opposing forces were active in Indian-claimed territory and moved aggressively to undermine the enemy position, only to find that they were in a tactically difficult position. It is also impossible to determine whether the Pakistani move into Kanjarkot significantly altered an existing situation. It is likely that Pakistani patrols had, over the years, moved through Kanjarkot and occasionally

occupied it for brief periods. Even though Kanjarkot may lie south of the traditional Sind-Kutch border, it is virtually isolated from Indian territory -- at least during the annual inundation of the rann, and very likely Indian forces reached it only seldom.

After the initial flurry of activity in late January, the Kutch border situation was largely dormant through February and March; the attention of the two countries was diverted to the east, where the dispute over the Dahagram enclave was in progress. Sometime before April, however, both sides built up the forces available to them in the Sind-Kutch area, manned a number of strong points, and shifted defense responsibility from border units to the army (India on April 11, Pakistan -- according to Ayub -- shortly thereafter.)

3. The Present Military Situation

The tactical situation is distinctly favorable to Pakistan. It has fairly good access to the combat area (the nearest railhead is 50 miles away.) India must cross an inhospitable salt flat which will become impassable when inundated by the Arabian sea. The terrain is reportedly not suitable on either side for the employment of tanks. The Pakistanis claimed that the Indians did use tanks, but have subsequently admitted that the vehicles involved were armored cars. India has in turn alleged that Pakistan employed tanks; Pakistan admits that tanks have been moved into the general area, but denies that they have been used. Thus far there is no confirmation of the Indian charge.

Both sides have agreed not to use fighter aircraft near the scene of the fighting.

Pakistani forces engaged are from infantry and armored units, at least some of which are MAP-supported. The Pakistani military does not seem to be overly concerned about the hostilities and is no doubt confident of its tactical superiority. The Indian army, on the other hand, is loath to fight in Kutch. Ever since January, senior army officers have been extremely disturbed at the prospect. Nevertheless, additional forces, in the form of a paratroop brigade and artillery, have had to be allocated to the Kutch area. The paratroops would presumably be useful when the rann area becomes impassable overland. High-level Indians, both civilian and military, have indicated that they would prefer to put counter-pressure on the Pakistanis by action at some other part of the border; one logical place would be in East Pakistan, where the Indian Army has overwhelming local superiority.

On 25 April, the Indians charged that Pakistan had ordered mobilization, which Pakistan promptly denied. New Delhi has alerted its own armed forces, and a cabinet meeting on 26 April was to decide whether or not India should mobilize.

Beginning in early April, a somewhat confused series of armed clashes brought the crisis to a head. According to the Pakistanis, the Indians moved into strong points which appear to be on undisputed Pakistani territory, northwest of Rahim-ki Bazaar, and built an airstrip at Chhad Bet. Pakistan allegedly launched an attack on the Indian outpost at Sardar, fighting occurred between patrols and strong points of both sides, and significant casualties were reported. Most recently, Pakistan has moved to establish a salient into the rann, attacking "preemptively" the Indian position at Biar Bet. The fighting on 23-24 April appears to be connected with this Pakistani move, and the front now extends for about 55 miles, from Kanjarkot to Chhad Bet. A lull followed the April 23-24 actions, and as of the morning of 26 April, sporadic fighting was reported.

4. Prospects for Negotiations

Both sides have filed their briefs with the United Nations and have been engaged in sparring over negotiations. The Pakistanis offered a cease-fire which India accepted in principle on April 15, but which has never been implemented. India now demands the restoration of the status quo ante, including Pakistani evacuation of Kanjarkot. The Pakistanis on their part demand a complete demilitarization of the area between the two claim lines. This is unacceptable to India, which stoutly denies that there is any legitimate dispute -- except perhaps over the exact location of their claim line around Kanjarkot. Both sides -- but especially India -- have made the issue a matter of national prestige. India sees the uncomfortable parallel to the conflict with China in 1962, and neither civil nor military leaders are willing to be accused of similar weakness.

The Pakistani move to establish a salient is clearly designed to force India to engage in negotiations. Pakistan sees a parallel with the situation in Kashmir, where India has managed to solidify a cease-fire line generally acceptable to it, and refuses to negotiate. With the coming monsoon season, it will be extremely difficult for the Indians to reduce the Pakistani salient militarily, at least until next winter. Thus Pakistan has found an area in which it can "lean" on India fairly effectively, with little danger to its own tactical position.

As in other similar instances it is impossible to allocate blame. India would probably be unwilling to admit a UN presence in the area, since India denies the existence of a legitimate dispute. However, if the situation can be localized, it could probably be settled through the usual machinery of bilateral negotiations which Pakistan and India have used in similar situations in the past. The major danger at this point, however, is that India will become frustrated and retaliate elsewhere on the Indo-Pakistani border, with the attendant risk of widespread hostilities.



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

April 24, 1965

1704

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1-Komer
2-Ret.

India-Pakistan

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Fighting in the Rann of Kutch Between
India and Pakistan

Enclosed is a memorandum surveying the background and implications of developments in the Rann of Kutch. The highlights are:

-- Indo-Pak border negotiations in 1960 could not sort out the conflicting claims in this sector of the border, but both countries acknowledged that there was a dispute.

-- Hard evidence on what is actually taking place is limited. The present train of events began in January of this year when Indian patrols discovered that Pakistani posts had been established in area claimed by India.

-- The terrain gives Pakistan a military advantage which it appears to have exploited in the escalating series of incidents that have occurred in recent weeks.

-- Regular military units have recently been deployed by both sides.

-- Pakistan is bringing in troops from MAP-supported units.

-- There is danger that the fighting will intensify and spread.

-- The dispute has assumed major political significance in both Delhi and Rawalpindi, and has serious implications for our policies and programs in the subcontinent. Both parties are seeking to draw us into an emotion-laden dispute at a difficult time in our relationships with both countries.

Benjamin H. Read
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Memorandum on the
Rann of Kutch Dispute.

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

Authority FRYS 67-08, vol. 25, # 107
By jc NARA, Date 5-9-01

APR 26 1965

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

137a

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

Rann of Kutch Dispute

Background

The area in dispute, extending out from the old fort of Kanjarkot, lies on the northern edge of the Rann of Kutch, a desolate area in Western India on the Arabian Sea. It is alternately salt flats and tidal basin. (The inundation lasts from June to November.) The area was admitted by both sides to be in dispute at the time of the Indo-Pakistani border negotiations of 1960. It was agreed at that time that further discussions would be held to explore the validity of the conflicting claims, but so far as we know these have not taken place.

The current difficulties apparently began in January 1965, when the Indians became aware that Pakistani border police were patrolling below the Indian claim line. India lodged a protest and increased its own patrolling activity. In mid-February, Pakistani forces dug themselves in around Kanjarkot, which may have been previously unoccupied, although Ayub claims that Pakistan had "long" occupied it. Both sides have since built up the forces available to them in the area, manned strong points, and shifted defense responsibility from border units to the army.

During April, a series of incidents has occurred with both sides blaming the other. The Pakistanis, enjoying a militarily superior position, have moved forcefully against Indian outposts near the border fort of Kanjarkot and most recently staged a "preemptive" attack at Biar Bet, deeper within the disputed area. The Indians have been mainly on the defensive but, according to Pakistan, have established outposts within undisputed Pakistani territory.

Both sides allege that the other has employed armor. The Indians have denied the charge and we have no evidence to support it. Although firm proof is lacking, there are reports supporting the Indian claim that Pakistan has moved armor to the Kutch area and that it may be engaged in action. The unit concerned, according to Embassy Karachi, is MAP-equipped. Casualties have been reported by both sides, shooting continues between patrols and strong points, and public opinion--especially in India--has been aroused sharply.

Pakistani patrolling south of Kanjarkot may have been going on for quite some time without the Indians knowing it. There is little

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Authority FRUS 6908, vol. 25 # 107

By JC. NARA, Date 5-19-01

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Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

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-2-

doubt, however, that Pakistani occupation of Kanjarkot would have upset a long-standing status quo. The Indian response of occupying other posts near the frontier and, reportedly, building an airstrip nearby brought the latent crisis to a head.

It will probably not be possible to determine who began firing, and since the area involved is legitimately in dispute between Pakistan and India, it is difficult to ascertain that either side committed aggression against the territory of the other. (All action thus far has, however, been much closer to the Indian claim line than to that of Pakistan.)

Both sides have engaged in sparring over negotiations to ameliorate the situation. The Indians accepted a Pakistani cease-fire offer on April 15, but it has never been implemented. The Pakistanis demand a demilitarization of the entire disputed area as a precondition to talks, and the Indians would require a restoration of the status quo ante, including Pakistani withdrawal from Kanjarkot. Pakistan claims that Kanjarkot is not within the disputed area and India would be understandably loath to evacuate all the way down to the 24th parallel, so the prospects for a ceasefire and negotiations are dim.

Political Implications

a) India: In an atmosphere colored by India's military humiliation by the Chinese in 1962, strong public resentment over Pakistan's developing relationship with Peiping and the hurt feelings over the postponement of Shastri's visit, the already beleaguered GOI cannot afford domestically to be gotten the better of by Pakistan in a military confrontation. The Indian Foreign Secretary has told our DCM that "the country is in no mood to take any more pushing in the Rann of Kutch and the GOI may be constrained to retaliate elsewhere, where conditions are more favorable to Indian forces". The GOI's domestic political discomfort is increased by aspects of the Kutch dispute which are analogous to the pre-1962 situation in Ladakh--eg. the belated discovery by Indian patrols of foreign military posts in a neglected area of Indian-claimed territory.

Even before the activation of the Kutch dispute, the moderate Shastri government proved to be most vulnerable politically to charges of weakness and indecision. Pakistan's apparent utilization of U.S.-supplied MAP equipment in the dispute further complicates the situation domestically for the GOI by providing additional grounds for criticism to extremists of both the left and right who can exploit traditional Indian resentments over U.S.-Pakistan security agreements of the 1950's and India's acceptance in 1962 of more rigid constraints on the use of U.S. military equipment.

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b) Pakistan: The Kutch dispute, occurring in an area of Pak military superiority, provides the GOP with several opportunities. Diplomatically, it provides Pakistan an opportunity to damage Indo-U.S. relations, through the use of MAP equipment in a situation where there is some ambiguity over the justification of its use. Additionally, the Kutch dispute provides Pakistan, in the weeks just before Bandung II, with an opportunity to brand India as an aggressor in Afro-Asian eyes. This objective will be further advanced if Pak actions in Kutch cause India to retaliate elsewhere, especially if India should move into an area generally recognized as Pak territory. Domestically, the Kutch confrontation enables the GOP to score over India, despite India's overall military superiority, particularly in Kashmir and along the East Pak border.

Finally, Pakistan undoubtedly calculates that India's response to the Kutch situation will lend a plausibility to the basic Pak contention that India would use its military strength enhanced by our military assistance to intimidate Pakistan and stick to an intransigent policy on Kashmir, rather than in combatting Communist China.

c) United States: The fighting in Kutch, particularly Pakistan's probable use of MAP equipment, has propelled us once more into the center of a subcontinental dispute at a moment when our leverage in both countries is at a low point. Our relations with India, already exacerbated by the postponement of Shastri's visit, will be further strained by public charges of Pakistan's use of MAP equipment. Moreover, our problems with the GOI will be complicated by the fact that we have imposed more stringent conditions on Indian use of MAP equipment (i.e. only against Communist China) than the conditions imposed on Pakistan. This discrepancy may assume exaggerated significance in view of the fact that the Soviets have imposed no conditions whatsoever on use of the military assistance they have supplied to India. This complicating aspect of the situation may be highlighted by Shastri's imminent departure for Moscow in an atmosphere of resentment over the postponement of his visit to the United States.

In recent years, India's preoccupation with the China threat has led the GOI to rely heavily on our ability to restrain Pakistan whenever Indo-Pak tensions have threatened to get out of hand. In the present situation, the Indians have indicated they would like help in promoting a ceasefire.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

4

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Control: 15147
Rec'd: APRIL 18, 1965
12:13 AM

FROM: KARACHI
ACTION: SECSTATE 1971
INFO: NEW DELHI 687
LONDON 603
BOMBAY 62
DATE: APRIL 18
REF: EMBTEL 1970

India (R of K)

- BUNDY
- BATOR
- BOWMAN
- CHASE
- COOPER
- HAYNES
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- KEENE
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IN LAST APRIL 15 CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT AYUB, I EXPRESSED STRONG CONCERN AND DISAPPROBATION AT SUCCESSION OF INFLAMMATORY INCIDENTS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND INDIA, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO RANN OF KUTCH FIGHTING. I SOUGHT AND RECEIVED ASSURANCES FROM AYUB THAT PAKS HAD NOT GONE BEYOND AND DID NOT INTEND TO GO BEYOND THEIR TRADITIONAL PATROL ROUTES IN DISPUTED AREA. AYUB SAID THAT OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING RESULTED SOLELY FROM INDIAN RESORT TO FORCE IN THIS AREA FOR FIRST TIME.

PAKS HAD NOT CHANGED PATTERN OR STRENGTH OF THEIR PATROLS. IT WAS GOI WHICH HAD ABRUPTLY CHALLENGED THE ESTABLISHED AND TACITLY ACCEPTED SETUP WITHOUT EXPLANATION, FOR REASONS WHICH COULD BE SURMISED.

AYUB SAID INDIAN EXPRESSION OF WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT CEASE FIRE IS PREDICATED ON ESTABLISHMENT OF "STATUS QUO ANTE." HE WAS VERY SUSPICIOUS OF INDIAN DEFINITION OF "STATUS QUO ANTE." ALMOST CERTAINLY THEY HAD IN MIND A STATUS WHICH HAS NEVER EXISTED IN THIS AREA OF LONG-STANDING ILL-DEFINED BORDERS BETWEEN SIND AND KUTCH.

PRESIDENT SAID CATEGORICALLY THAT KANJARKOT FORT IS ON PAK SIDE OF DE FACTO LINE AND HAS LONG BEEN MANNED BY PAKS WITHOUT

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines

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By *jc*, NARA, Date *5-21-04*

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-2- 1971, APRIL 18, FROM KARACHI

CHALLENGE, AND WAS NOT NEWLY ESTABLISHED. HE EXPRESSED PAK DETERMINATION TO HOLD IT AND MANIFESTED CALM CONFIDENCE THAT PAKS HAVE CAPABILITY TO DO SO. HE CONFIRMED THAT PAK REGULAR ARMY FORCES ARE IN AREA IN RESPONSE TO INDIAN DEPLOYMENT OF REGULAR ARMY FORCES OPPOSITE.

PRESIDENT SAID THE ISSUE WAS NOT THE VALUE OF A FEW SQUARE MILES OF MARSHLAND, WHICH WAS WORTHLESS, BUT MAINTENANCE OF PRINCIPLE OF RESISTANCE TO INDIAN PROVOCATIONS AND INTRUSIONS. THERE WAS A LONG STRING OF SUCH INCIDENTS CREATED BY INDIANS, AND THE LIST WOULD BECOME MUCH LONGER IF PAKS DID NOT REACT FIRMLY TO EACH INFRACTION.

PRESIDENT SAID PAK FORCES WOULD NOT USE ANY MORE FORCE THAN WAS NECESSARY TO REPEL FORCE RESORTED TO BY INDIAN SIDE.

I SAID THE ACCUMULATION OF DANGEROUS INCIDENTS -- ALONG KASHMIR CEASE FIRE LINE, IN DAHAGRAM ENCLAVE, AND IN RANN OF KUTCH -- WITH A MOUNTING ROLL OF CASUALTIES AND DESTRUCTION, CREATED A TINDER BOX SITUATION WHICH WAS PLAINLY UNACCEPTABLE. THE OBLIGATION TO MAKE A SUPREME EFFORT TO CURE IT RESTED HEAVILY ON ALL WHO HAD ANY RESPONSIBILITY.

THE PRESIDENT AGREED EMPHATICALLY THAT SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE TO RELIEVE THE WORSENING SITUATION AND THAT IT WAS A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY.

GP-3

MCCONAUGHY

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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action RR RUEHCR
DE RUSBKP 0968 17/0805Z
R. 170745Z ZEA

NEA FM AMEMBASSY KARACHI
Info TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC (1965)
INFO RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 683

SS RUFHDM/AMEMBASSY LONDON 600

G RUEKDA/DOD INN

SP RUCJHK/CINCMEAFSUIPN

SAH STATE GRNC

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EUR APRIL 17

IO P CINCMEAFSA FOR POLAD

USIA NSC EMBTEL 1936

INR RANNOF KUTCH INCIDENT

NSA AID EMBASSY BELIEVES FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS ON RANNOF KUTCH BORDER
PC INCIDENT CAN NOW BE MADE:

OPR 1. IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE BLAME FOR ACTUAL ATTACKS IN FACE
RMR CONFLICTING CLAIMS FROM GOI AND GOP WHICH DO NOT EVEN AGREE
ON DATES OF LARGER SKIRMISHES.
CFN 1965 683 600 1936 1.

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1965 APR 17 AM 4 21

India (R of K)

- BUNDY-SMITH
- BATOR
- BCWMAN
- CHASE
- COOPER
- HAYNES
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- KEENEY
- KLIEN
- KUMER
- MOODY
- REEDY
- SAUNDERS
- SAYRE
- THOMSON

PAGE TWO RUSBKP 0968 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. DESPITE GOI TERRITORIAL CLAIMS IT HAS RECOGNIZED EXISTENCE OF BORDER DISPUTE IN AREA. JOINT INDO-PAK COMMUNIQUE ISSUED IN JAN 1960 AT END OF GENERAL SHEIKH-SWARAN SINGH TALKS ON WEST PAK-INDIAN BORDER RECOGNIZED DISPUTE AND AGREED TO FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AFTER EVIDENCE TO BACK UP CONFLICTING CLAIMS EXCHANGED. GOP MAPS ISSUED AS EARLY AS 1951 SHOW PAK CLAIM RUNNING ROUGHLY ALONG 24TH PARALLEL.

3. MAIN PAK CONCERN APPEARS TO BE PRESSURE OF INCREASED GOI FORCES, INCLUDING REGULAR ARMY UNITS, IN AREA THEY CONSIDER LONG UNDER THEIR DE FACTO CONTROL AND OF LITTLE REAL VALUE TO GOI. THIS POSITION STRENGTHENED BY LOCATION OF INCIDENTS. ACCORDING GOI HIMMIN NANDA STATEMENT TO LOK SABHA APRIL 7, NEW PAK POSTS LOCATED "ABOUT 1,300 AND 2,000 YARDS" INSIDE BORDER CLAIMED BY GOI. THEY STILL SOME 16 MILES INSIDE BORDER CLAIMED BY PAKS. GIVEN FACT THAT GOP HAS NOT ACCEPTED GOI BORDER CLAIM, IT APPEARS PROBABLE THAT THEY HAVE BEEN IN PRACTICE OF PATROLLING

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By *jc*, NARA, Date *5-21-04*

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-2- 1965, APRIL 17, FROM: KARACHI

FEW THOUSAND YARDS BEYOND LINE CLAIMED BY GOI BUT WELL WITHIN TERRITORY CLAIMED BY GOP. IT ALSO APPEARS THAT SUBSTANTIAL GOI FORCES HAVE RECENTLY BEGUN TO OPERATE IN UNPOPULATED AREA WELL INSIDE DISPUTED TERRITORY.
CFN 2. 1960 1951 24 3. 7 1,300 2,000 16

PAGE THREE RUSBKP 0968 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. IN CONTRAST TO DAHAGRAM SITUATION, PAKS HAVE UNTIL RECENTLY NOT PLAYED UP RANN OF KUTCH INCIDENT AND HAVE BEEN SURPRISED BY HIGH LEVEL EMPHASIS ON AREA IN NEW DELHI. UNTIL BHUTTO STATEMENT APRIL 15 (EMBTTEL 1962), THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE IN PAK PRESS OTHER THAN OFFICIAL STATEMENT BY MFA SPOKESMEN. HOWEVER, NOW CLEAR BOTH PAKS AND INDIANS VIEW THEIR PRESTIGE AT STAKE, MAKING SETTLEMENT OF INCIDENT MORE DIFFICULT TO WORK OUT.

5. AT PRESENT POINT, WE SENSE BOTH INDIANS AND PAKS FUMBLING FOR FACE-SAVING FORMULA TO WORK OUT CEASE-FIRE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS. AS IN DAHAGRAM AND OTHER INCIDENTS, CHANCES ARE GOOD THAT THEY WILL WORK SOMETHING OUT SINCE WE DOUBT EITHER INTERESTED IN ESCALATING FURTHER THEIR CONFLICT OVER THIS BARREN DESERT LAND.

6. PAKS ALMOST CERTAINLY USING MAAG EQUIPMENT IN ARA. PAKS ALSO CLAIMED U.S. EQUIPMENT CAPTURED FGM IA IN AREA AND OFFERED SHOW US BROWNING MACHINE GUN TO ARMA APRIL 15. (SEE EMBTEL 1936). UNDER CIRCUMSTANCE SURROUNDING LOCATION OF INCIDENTS, PAKS COULD CLAIM THEY USING MAAG EQUIPMENT TO DEFEND BORDERS.
CFN 4. 15 1962 5. 6. 15 1936

PAGE FOUR RUSBKP 0968 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7. FINALLY, IT IS CLEAR THAT IN PRESENT TENSE AND HOSTILE ATMOSPHERE ON SUBCONTINENT, PERIODIC INDO-PAK BORDER INCIDENTS, WHICH AT ONE TIME WERE DISPOSED OF AT LOWER LEVELS WITH LITTLE FLURRY, NOW ASSUMING FAR GREATER SIGNIFICANCE AND ENGAGING PRESTIGE OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS. POTENTIALLY MOST SERIOUS ASPECT OF RANN OF KUTCH INCIDENT IS THAT BOTH SIDES FELT COMPELLED FOR REASONS WE FEEL LARGELY OF PRESTIGE TO BRING IN REGULAR MILITARY FORCES RATHER THAN LEAVING SPARRING AS IN PAST TO BORDER CONSTABULARY.

GP-3.
MCCONAUGHY

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BANN
USE OF
MAP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

SANITIZED

Research 141
Memorandum

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Stack Dept. 3/28/78: QSD 5/23/78
By: JH NARS, Date 6/14/78

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TNR - OLC with 10
DD concurrence

RNA-20, May 13, 1965

To : The Acting Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *Thomas L. Hughes*

SANITIZED COPY

Subject: Alleged Use of US-Supplied Military Equipment by India and Pakistan
in the Rann of Kutch


Both Pakistan and India have charged that the other has used US equipment, provided with safeguards under military assistance programs, in the fighting in the Rann of Kutch. The alleged use of US-supplied equipment has led to considerable bitterness, particularly on the Indian side, and both parties have challenged the effectiveness of US Government safeguards. In the following memorandum, we examine the evidence presented by both India and Pakistan and the reports of US military officials who visited the scene of action.

ABSTRACT

The only fact that emerges with certainty from mutual Pakistani and Indian allegations concerning the use of US-supplied military equipment is that Pakistan, by its own admission, did use some unspecified articles. US-provided vehicles, communications equipment and 106 mm recoilless rifles with ammunition were observed by US MAAG personnel on the Pakistan side of the front, and were probably used. Although US-supplied tanks were in the area, there is no proof that Pakistan used them in combat, as the Indians have claimed.

A US-made jeep and a 106 mm recoilless rifle and ammunition were observed by US personnel on the Indian side; these were probably used, but it is not

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certains. Pakistani claims that the Indians used other US-manufactured artillery may be true, but are unsubstantiated.

From the available evidence it appears that both sides used some MAP equipment, but probably on a small scale. This equipment is provided for "legitimate self-defense." In order to establish which side is in violation of the military aid agreements, it has to be determined who was the aggressor in the Rann of Kutch. Such a determination has not been made and may never be made. In any event, the Rann of Kutch fighting has raised for the first time major problems connected with the alleged use of MAP equipment in fighting between the regular military forces of the two countries.

Indian photographs, allegedly taken during a Pakistani attack at Biar Bet on April 24, show M-48 tanks in a sandy terrain. Since most of lower Sind has sandy terrain, the few photos provided so far cannot be pinpointed and therefore do not constitute proof that Pakistan committed tanks to the battle at Biar Bet. India also claimed that its troops damaged several Pakistani tanks but has not submitted photos of damaged tanks. Instead, India sent photos of a burning Dodge truck. Indian photos also show a jeep-mounted recoilless rifle.

On May 6 and 7, General Ruhlen (Chief of MAAG, Pakistan) visited the Pakistani side in the combat area and observed the following equipment that he believed had been used in battle by the Pakistanis: the "normal complement" of wheeled vehicles (1/4-ton, 1-ton and 2 1/2-ton -- the latter with trailers), communications equipment in infantry units, and approximately 30-40 recoilless rifles (106 mm). In addition, he estimated that 100 to 200 rounds of 106 mm ammunition had been used. The equipment observed by General Ruhlen thus corresponds with some of the MAP equipment known to be in the 8th Division. He noted that no US small arms were in the area and saw no evidence that any other US-supplied equipment had been used.

With regard to the use of tanks General Ruhlen stated that visible tank tracks stopped a mile or more short of Biar Bet. Since it was difficult to distinguish even large pieces of equipment at long range -- even during the daytime -- he thought that the Indians might have mistaken a jeep for a tank. General Ruhlen also opined that action in the Kutch area had been relatively minor, involving only two or three company attacks with different troops at different times and places.

Alleged Use of US Equipment by India

India has denied using MAP equipment in the Rann of Kutch. On April 30 India invited US officers to visit the Rann for the express purpose of showing that India was not using MAP equipment. On May 1 General Tibbets (Chief, ISMMI) and Lt. Colonel Williams (Assistant Army Attache) toured positions of their own choosing in the Rann. They reported only one jeep of US origin, and a 106 mm recoilless rifle with M-8 spotter rifle mounted on an Indian-assembled jeep. They were satisfied that the Indian Army was not employing MAP material in Kutch, but believed the jeep and rifle were of MDAP origin. They were convinced that it would be impractical for the Indians to maintain separate logistic systems for US and non-US equipment, and ruled out the possibility that US equipment might have been concealed. They also felt it most unlikely that India used tracked vehicles in the area since no tracks were visible.

Pakistan has alleged that the Indian 50th Paratroop Brigade used US-supplied

75 mm Pack Howitzers and 106 mm recoilless rifles while operating in the Rann of Kutch. They have sent photos of equipment allegedly captured from the Indians at Biar Bet. These photos show ammunition and ammunition crates of US manufacture, with the crates showing the handclasp insignia. Some of the crates were labeled "FUZE DUMMY" and "EMPTY PROJECTILE" which suggests training equipment with no combat value.

During his tour of the Pakistan side on May 6 and 7, General Ruhlen observed and photographed the following equipment which Pakistani officers say they captured from the Indians:

1 jeep-mounted 106 mm recoilless rifle with M-8 spotter rifle. Jeep was Indian-assembled. Jeep bore markings of Indian 50th Paratroop Brigade.

Several dozen boxes 106 mm heat ammo, all marked with clasped hand symbol of US aid. Shipping directions to ammo depots Gungate, Bombay and Pulgaon.

At least 100 rounds, located in various former Indian gun positions, of 75 mm Howitzer ammo, projectiles as well as complete rounds with fuzes.

According to US military officers in New Delhi, US MDAP sales to India have included 354 recoilless rifles (106 mm) with 53,000 rounds of ammunition for these weapons. One hundred and five Howitzers (75 mm) in India all are of US origin; Britain delivered 21 of these in 1963, but it is uncertain how many of the others were provided under MDAP. The US has sold 154,000 rounds of 75 mm ammunition to India under MDAP. The 50th Paratroop Brigade has about 24 Howitzers (75 mm). There is no first-hand evidence that these were used during that unit's operations in Kutch; however, the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence Bureau has provided General Ruhlen with 50th Paratroop Brigade Gun Books allegedly taken from Indian positions which suggest that India was using 75 mm Howitzers acquired in September 1963. These documents could have been forged, and no judgment can be made on their validity at present.

Conclusions

Only Pakistan has admitted using US-supplied equipment. General Ruhlen's estimate of the material actually used is probably reliable, although since seven days elapsed between the battle and his visit, we cannot rule out the possibility that the Pakistanis might have hidden some equipment.

There is no basis on which to conclude that the Pakistanis actually used tanks in the battle; certainly General Ruhlen's observations would indicate that they had not. Enjoying the tactical advantage, Pakistan may not have needed tanks at all, and only kept them in reserve. While it is possible that the Pakistanis might have successfully obliterated tank tracks nearer to Biar Bet, there is no

[REDACTED]

evidence that this was done. Pending receipt of further evidence, especially Indian photographs which would pinpoint the location of the Pakistani tanks, the Indian charge can only be regarded as "not proven."

It is likely that the Indians used the jeep and jeep-mounted recoilless rifle observed by General Tibbets and they may have used the 75 mm Howitzers allotted to the 50th Paratroop Brigade. There is no suggestion that they used other US-supplied equipment, aside from that allegedly captured by the Pakistanis and shown to General Ruhlen, although it is of course possible that they may have concealed some.

Out of the welter of accusations flying between Karachi and New Delhi, only one fact emerges as indisputable, that is the Pakistani use of some MAP-supplied equipment (not, however, tanks). Whether this equipment was used in violation of agreements with the US depends upon whether or not the Pakistanis acted in self-defense, or aggressively. No determination has been made as to the aggressor in the Rann of Kutch conflict (and such determination may never be made). If the Indians utilized any US-supplied equipment "aggressively" they would be guilty of violating their commitment, and if they used any equipment at all procured under MAP after 1962, they would be guilty of violating their undertakings to the US to use such equipment only against Communist China.

In sum, there is a case to be made that both sides did, in varying degrees, use US equipment, but probably not on a very large scale. Indeed, the fighting for Biar Bet appears in retrospect to have been much smaller-scale than was originally thought. Whatever the scale involved, indeed, whatever the truth of the matter, the Battle of the Rann of Kutch has served to open up the entire thorny question of restrictions on the use of US equipment by both India and Pakistan, and brought into the open the mutual fears that have long centered on this equipment.

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ANNEX: RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF US MILITARY EQUIPMENT

UNITED STATES - PAKISTAN

Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. Entered into force May 19, 1954.Article I, Section 2.

"The Government of Pakistan will use this assistance exclusively to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defense, or to permit it to participate in the defense of the area, or in the United Nations collective security arrangements and measures, and Pakistan will not undertake any act of aggression against any other nation. The Government of Pakistan will not, without the prior agreement of the Government of the United States, devote such assistance to purposes other than those for which it was furnished."

UNITED STATES - INDIA

Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. Effected by exchange of notes of March 7 and 16, 1951. Entered into force March 16, 1951.

"The Government of the United States of America understands the Government of India is prepared to agree to use of such items as may be provided to foster international peace and security within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations through measures which will further the ability of nations dedicated to principles and purposes of the Charter to participate effectively in arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in support of those purposes and principles; and, moreover, that the items to be provided by the Government of the United States of America are required by the Government of India to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defense or permit it to participate in the defense of the area of which it is a part, and that it will not undertake any act of aggression against any other state."

Agreement supplementing the Agreement of March 7 and 16, 1951, as amended. Effected by exchange of notes November 14, 1962. Entered into force November 14, 1962.

". . . In response to requests from the Government of India, my Government is prepared to furnish assistance to the Government of India for the purpose of defense against the outright Chinese aggression directed from Peking now facing your country. It is the understanding of my Government that, with regard to the defense articles made available to the Government of India under special arrangements to be concluded between representatives of our two Governments, and including defense articles provided between November 3 and November 14, 1962, the Government of India considers the assurances contained in the Agreement effected by the exchange of notes of March 7 and 16, 1951, to be applicable. . ."

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Approved in S
5/17/65

Memorandum of Conversation

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DATE: May 8, 1965

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SUBJECT: Use of U.S. Arms in Rann of Kutch

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
His Excellency B. K. Nehru, Ambassador of India
NEA - William J. Handley, Deputy Assistant Secretary
NEA/SOA - David T. Schneider, India Desk

Rann

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NEA White House

Ambassador Nehru came in at his request to discuss Indo-Pakistan relations. The Ambassador said he did not want to discuss so much the pros and cons of the Kutch issue as the question of the use of U.S. arms by Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch. He said that there was "incontrovertible proof" that Pakistan had used U.S. tanks against India in the Rann. The Ambassador presented the Secretary with nine pictures of tanks, trucks and soldiers which he said had been taken at Biar Bet by a low flying aircraft. The Ambassador read from a Reuters report which said that President Ayub had indicated Pakistan was using U.S. arms and was entitled to the use of all arms in its possession. He said that the Pakistani units involved in Kutch were MAP-supplied units. Summarizing his position, the Ambassador said it was "incontrovertible" that Pakistan had taken action against India to alter the status quo in the Rann and had used U.S. arms in controvention of U.S. assurances to India given by President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, and Ambassador Bunker.

The Secretary said we had expressed our position on use of U.S. equipment quite strongly to both India and Pakistan. Ambassador Nehru asked what the Secretary meant by both sides. India had not used U.S. equipment. The Secretary said Pakistan claims to have captured U.S.-made 106 mm recoilless rifles. Our inspectors who visited the Indian lines, however, have not seen such equipment. It was on the basis of the claims of both sides that we made statements to both India and Pakistan.

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By je NARA. Date 5-19-04

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Continuing, the Secretary informed Ambassador Nehru that we did not have the full story yet from our military observers but Pakistan had not denied it had used U.S. equipment. We had made it clear to Pakistan that we were not willing that such equipment be used. We have expressed our views strongly--very strongly. When the Pakistanis raised the question of our assurances to them in connection with a possible Indian retaliatory attack, we replied that we considered such a question hypothetical. We believe our representations have had something to do with the Pakistani decision not to escalate hostilities further in the Rann. We hope the British peace efforts will succeed in taking this dispute out of the military area to the conference table.

Ambassador Nehru said that while India hopes the Kutch question will be resolved, a more important question of principle is involved. U.S. assurances to India had been the foundation of Indian defense policy. If these assurances were eroded, it would be a very serious matter. The Secretary asked what Ambassador Nehru would have us do. At first, the Ambassador said this was not for him to say except that, as far as India was concerned, the U.S. reaction had been inadequate. When further pressed by the Secretary, he said an adequate action would be to tell Pakistan that the U.S. would not provide any more arms. He said he was without instructions on this point, however. The Secretary suggested the alternative of stopping use of U.S. arms in the Kutch area. Ambassador Nehru commented, "If you can."

The Secretary asked Ambassador Nehru what he could say about Indian troop movements. Indicating he did not know the details on this subject, the Ambassador said what movement had taken place was of troops without U.S. arms. He then returned to the theme that Indian defense policy was based upon the assumption that U.S. assurances were enforceable, mentioning that a substantial part of the GOI had been committed to this belief. He said he had argued with the Finance Minister years ago against increased defense expenditures on the grounds that U.S. assurances would be carried out.

The Ambassador said one aspect of the problem regarding U.S. assurances was public and political. Mentioning a Selig Harrison article in the Washington Post and a speech by A. B. Vajpayee in Parliament, he described the great criticism of the U.S. in India for permitting Pakistan to use U.S. arms in violation of U.S. assurances. He then charged that the U.S. was merely equating India with Pakistan saying, "Every time Pakistan hits us, you must hit both sides." The Secretary referred to reports he had heard of the movement of Indian mountain divisions, which he thought were MAP supplied. Mr. Handley noted that the 50th para brigade which India had used in Kutch had been furnished limited MAP equipment, but that it was not known if it had taken any MAP items with them.

The Secretary

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The Secretary said that the test of the adequacy of our actions with Pakistan was the result, i.e., the end of the fighting. Ambassador Nehru said, however, something also must be done in public to help take care of India's Parliamentary problem. The Secretary responded that what we say publicly should be related to the British peace effort. Ambassador Nehru agreed we should do nothing to interfere with that.

Looking to the future, the Secretary said we would get complete information on use of U.S. equipment shortly. Our people have already visited Indian forces and report they had not found any U.S. equipment. We have not had any report from the Pak side, but we suppose our inspectors will find U.S. arms. Then we will go to the Pak Government and ask that our understandings be complied with. At what point this becomes public depends upon the British peace-making effort.

Mr. Handley said that we had spoken most strongly to Pakistan, as Ambassador Bowles has told the GOI. The Ambassador responded that Pakistan's use of the equipment nonetheless went on. When Mr. Handley pointed out that the proof of the effectiveness of our action was the cessation of hostilities, Ambassador Nehru said that India had also stopped and Pakistanis were still in Indian territory. The Secretary countered by saying that MAP equipment was not being used today to fire on Indians. Terming this a good argument but unsatisfying, the Ambassador said the credibility of U.S. assurances is in question and must be re-established. The Secretary repeated that the effectiveness of U.S. assurances and the cessation of hostilities were very closely related. The test of our fulfilling our assurances is in what happens. Taking issue with the Secretary, the Ambassador said the test was not whether the fighting stopped, but was whether Pakistan was prevented from using U.S. equipment. Under present circumstances, Pakistan can use the equipment at some other place again. The Secretary responded that if the Ambassador was suggesting that we take punitive action far beyond what is needed, such a break with Pakistan, he should know we will not do this. The Ambassador replied he was not asking this and agreed with the Secretary that what we do is our problem regarding which he could not advise us.

Mr. Handley asked that since the GOI knows we have taken a very strong position with Pakistan and this had had a favorable result, was there anything that could be done in Delhi to tone down the public reaction? The Ambassador dismissed this question by saying that he did not believe his Government considered the U.S. has taken adequate measures. The Prime Minister had said as much. When the Secretary asked what the result of the British effort would be, the Ambassador replied that it would succeed but only because India would make compromises.

Returning to

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Returning to the subject of U.S. assurances, the Secretary said our objective was to end the fighting; then the question of use of U.S. equipment would not arise. If the problem of use of U.S. equipment came up again, we would deal with it at that time. The Ambassador replied this was not enough. It would not give India any assurance regarding the future. The Secretary said he should think that the cessation of the fighting was a demonstration that we considered our commitments to both India and Pakistan seriously.

The Ambassador reacted strongly to this comment asking why the U.S. insists on considering India and Pakistan together. India observes its commitments scrupulously; to equate it with Pakistan was wrong. One party has obeyed the law, the other has not. Why this equation? The Secretary again asked about Indian troop movements. He ended the conversation saying that we had made representations to both sides on the basis of charges made by both India and Pakistan. We would continue to try to get more information regarding use of U.S. arms. Ambassador Nehru concluded saying India had given full facilities to U.S. observers who had found no U.S. equipment. Therefore, the U.S. should not equate India and Pakistan when "the other side" is guilty.

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Rann of Kutch

Embtel 2125 reports Ayub's confirmation to you that Pak forces committed in Kutch are MAP supported and that they of course using whatever equipment they have, regardless of origin. Since we previously made it perfectly clear that we are unwilling to have MAP-supplied equipment used in Kutch, Ayub's at some point/ statement makes it essential that we go back to Paks/and insist that they remove this equipment from the disputed area. Our failure to take this step will adversely affect our credibility with the Paks and further aggravate our problems with the Indians, not to mention complications that could ensue here.

We are preparing instructions for approach to Paks which will be subject ~~/instructions for formal approach to Paks will be subject of a later message./~~
~~/message/~~ We are well aware that negotiations this passage will be difficult. First consideration is obviously timing, since it is imperative that we do nothing that could jeopardize current British efforts on cease fire and subsequent steps. In this respect, RUHLEN's trip to Kutch area gives us basis for moving ahead without, however, requiring immediate formal approach to Paks. Our expectation would be that actual withdrawal could be

Drafted by: NEA/SOA:LBLaingen/TCCameron, Jr. Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: Phillips Talbot

Clearances: ag 5/6/65

NEA - Mr. Handley
OSD/ISA - Mr. Murray (draft) G/PM - Mr. Warren (Draft) NR - Col. Bunte (draft)
L/NEA - Mr. Wehmeyer (draft) BNA - Mr. Judd (draft)
AA/PC(AID) - Mr. Arrill (draft) ~~SECRET~~
(informed)

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 5-21-04

~~SECRET~~

phased in with progress in British efforts and enforced withdrawal in any event by both sides because of weather in next two weeks. This would provide necessary ~~for~~ face-saving for Paks.

As we see it, however, even if Paks do pull out their forces in accordance British formula, we will still want to make it ~~clearly~~ ~~clear~~ ~~clearly~~ ~~clear~~ clear to Pakistan it should not have used our equipment Kutch in ~~the~~ disputed area. In meantime, and as way of informally preparing ground with Paks for our representations on use of MAP equipment, we believe you and General Ruhlen as well should continue to make known deep concern felt here over inappropriateness use of MAP in Kutch and very considerable problems this could create for future MAP.

Embassy London should let CRO know how our thinking is developing.

GP-3.

END.

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

144

BUNDY-SMITH
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 BOWLER
 BOWMAN
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 HAYNES
 JESSUP
 JOHNSON
 LINDSEY
 MURPHY
 ROSEN
 TERRY
 WALKER
 WHITNEY
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~~SECRET~~

4
 Action PP RUEHCR
 DE RUSBAE 103 04/0615Z
 NEA P 040610Z ZEA

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1965 MAY 4 AM 3 21

Info FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
 TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3137
 SS INFO RISBKP/AMEMBASSY KARACHI PRIORITY 687
 G RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 777
 SP STATE GRNC

P R I O R I T Y

SAH ~~SECRET~~ MAY 4

L
 H WE BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL THAT DEPT UNDERSTAND DEPTH OF EMOTIONAL AND POLITICAL REACTION HERE IN INDIA IN REGARD TO USE OF US ARMS BY PAK FORCES AND APPARENT ABSENCE OF US OFFICIAL PROTEST. IT MUST BE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS REACTION IS NOT CONFINED TO EXTREMISTS OF LEFT OR RIGHT WHO, OF COURSE, HAVE BEEN MOST OUTSPOKEN. IT IS EXPRESSED AT ALL LEVELS OF INDIAN SOCIETY INCLUDING RESPONSIBLE PRO-AMERICAN INDIVIDUALS IN GOVERNMENT OFFICES AND SOME OF OUR WARMEST SUPPORTS IN LOK SABHA AND THE PRESS. 080

DOD IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT THAT WE UNDERSTAND THE REASONS FOR THIS CONCERN. SINCE WINTER OF 1954 WHEN US-PAK ARMS AGREEMENT WAS FIRST ANNOUNCED, STEADY ACCUMULATION OF MODERN HEAVY US EQUIPMENT BY PAK ARMY HAS CREATED DEEP SENSE OF FEAR THAT SOME DAY THIS EQUIPMENT WOULD BE TURNED AGAINST INDIA. THIS FEAR HAS BEEN FED BY SOME MILITARY ESTIMATES THAT THIS EQUIPMENT WOULD ENABLE PAK ARMY TO STRIKE SOUTH AS FAR AS DELHI EVEN THOUGH THEY MIGHT ULTIMATELY BE WORN DOWN AND DEFEATED OVER A PERIOD OF TIME.

BECAUSE WE HAVE RECOGNIZED THESE FEARS AS REAL WE HAVE BEEN STRIVING FOR ELEVEN YEARS TO EASE THEM. FOR INSTANCE, SEC DULLES GAVE CATEGORICAL ASSURANCES TO INDIA THAT IF PAKISTAN VIOLATED AGREEMENTS WE WOULD PROMPTLY TAKE A STRONG POSITION IN SUPPORT OF INDIA AND SO DID PRES EISENHOWER IN PERSONAL MESSAGE TO PRIMIN NEHRU.

MOREOVER IN THE LAST ELEVEN YEARS A SUCCESSION OF US AMBASSADORS HAVE ONE BY ONE REPEATED THESE ASSURANCES. FOR INSTANCE, ON INNUMERABLE OCCASIONS FOLLOWING MY RETURN AS AMBASSADOR IN 1963 I HAVE ASSURED INDIAN CABINET OFFICIALS AND MEMBERS OF PRESS THAT INDIANS NEED HAVE NO FEAR OF PAK USE OF US SUPPLIED MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN AN ATTACK AGAINST INDIA BECAUSE OUR REACTION WOULD BE PROMPT AND VIGOROUS IN INDIA'S BEHALF.

BECAUSE THESE ASSURANCES WERE TAKEN VERY SERIOUSLY BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF GOVERNMENT OUR PRESENT POSITION IN VIEW

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 By g, NARA, Date 5-21-04

~~SECRET~~

-2- 3137 MAY 4 FROM NEW DELHI

OF DEMONSTRATED USE OF US EQUIPMENT BY PAKS IN RANN OF KUTCH IS DIFFICULT. IN AN EFFORT TO EASE THE CURRENT FEARS AND RES-
ENTMENT WE HAVE TOLD KEY PRESS REPRESENTATIVES ON AN OFF THE
RECORD BASIS THAT OUR GOVERNMENT VIEWS THE SITUATION WITH
GREAT CONCERN AND HAS WARNED THE GOP AGAINST MISUSE OF OUR
ACUIPMENT. THIS HAS HELPED TO SOME DEGREE IN TEMPERING THE
PUBLIC CRITICISM.

HOWEVER PAK PRESS AND GOVT HAVE SPECIFICALLY DENIED THAT WE
HAVE QUESTIONED PAK USE OF US MILITARY EQUIPMENT OR EVEN THAT
WE HAVE REQUESTED CLEARANCE FOR US OFFICERS TO CHECK ON USE OF
SUCH EQUIPMENT IN RANN OF KUTCH AREA -- A PERMISSION FREELY
GRANTED BY THE INDIANS.

WE DO NOT, RPT. NOT, SUGGEST CRACKDOWN ON PAKISTAN OVER THIS
ISSUE UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. THE SITUATION MAY BE SETTLING
DOWN AND A DRAMATIC MOVE BY US MIGHT INDUCE THEM TO DEMON-
STRATE THEIR FREEDOM OF ACTION BY STARTING TROUBLE ELSEWHERE.

HOWEVER, IF WE ARE TO PROTECT OUR HUGE INVESTMENT IN INDIAN
GOOD WILL AND CONFIDENCE BUILT UP OVER PERIOD OF YEARS WE
CANNOT AFFORD WHOLLY TO IGNORE OUR PAST COMMITMENTS.

WE THEREFORE URGE STATEMENT IN LOW KEY BY HIGH US AUTHORITY
ASSERTING: (A) THAT PROTEST HAS BEEN MADE TO PAK GOVT AND (B)
THAT WE WOULD VIEW FURTHER USE OF OUR EQUIPMENT WITH SERIOUSNESS.
(NOTE: A STATEMENT BALANCING THE PAKS WHO HAVE USED OUR EQUIPMENT
AND THE INDIANS WHO HAVEN'T WOULD MAKE THE SITUATION HERE
EVEN WORSE.)

FOLLOWING STATEMENT FROM WASHINGTON WE CAN POINT OUT ON BACK-
GROUND BASIS THAT WE HAVE DELIBERATELY KEPT OUR RESPONSE IN
LOW KEY BECAUSE WE HAVE NOT WANTED TO AGGRAVATE SITUATION,
BUT THAT CESSATION OF PAK MILITARY MOVEMENTS IN ITSELF REFLECTS
THE FORTHRIGHT POSITION WE HAVE TAKEN.

MAY I ADD THAT IN THIS SITUATION MY OWN PERSONAL CREDIBILITY
AS WELL AS THAT OF USG IS VERY MUCH AT STAKE.

GP-3.

BOWLES

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

145

87

CONFIDENTIAL

Action

Control: 1933
Rec'd: May 3, 1965
4:01 p.m.

NEA

Info

FROM: Karachi

SS

ACTION: Secstate 2112

G

SP

INFO: New Delhi 761

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ISA/DOD

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CINCMEAFSA

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DATE: May 3

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CINCMEAFSA FOR POLAD

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NSA

Embassy telegram 2096

IGA

AID

Rann of Kutch

MC

RMR

1. Significant MAP items furnished 8th PAK division as follows:

(A) 900 wheeled vehicles (not counting 1/2 tonners) of which 541 are 2 1/2 tonners; balance 1 ton/shop vans, etc.; (B) 648 one quarter tonners; (C) 210 RKT launchers, 3.5 inch (G) 131 recoilless rifles 106 MM; (H) 5 tanks M-47, latter used for transition training and at Quetta, but 24th CAV consisting of 45 tanks M-48 recently transferred from 10th DIV; (I) no M-1 rifles yet issued to 8th division; (J) British 25 and 5.5 pounders not yet replaced by U.S. 105 and 155 howitzers.

2. 51st brigade of 8th division has following MAP equipment which is included in above figures: (A) 52 trucks, all types, (less 1/2 ton); (B) 73 one quarter ton; (C) 61 small arms, (machine guns and RKT launchers); (D) 23 recoilless rifles; (E) 113 radios.

GP-3.

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By *jc*, NARA, Date *5-21-04* MCCONAUGHY

RMA-16

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- BUNDY-SMITH
- BATOR
- BOWDLER
- CHASE
- COOPER
- HAYNES
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- KEENE
- KLEIN
- LINGNER
- MOODY
- REEDY
- SKIDMORE
- THOMPSON

John Paul

147

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

46

CONFIDENTIAL

Action NNNNOTZ QSA062SBA708

NEA DE RUSBKP 55 01/1330Z

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Info FM AMEMBASSY KARACHI

SS TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2096
11450 AMEMBASSY NEWDELHI PRIORITY 752

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G RUFHON/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 661

SP RUEKDA/DOD PRIORITY UNN

SAH RUCJHK/CINCMEAFSA PRIORITY UNN

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P C O N F I D E N T I A L MAY 1

HP Rana

- BUNDY-SMITH
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- BOWDLER
- BOWMAN
- CHASE
- COOPER
- HAYNES
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- KEELY
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- KUMER
- MOODY
- REEDY
- SANDERS
- THOMSON

USIA CINCMEAFSA FOR POLAD

NSC RANN OF KUTCH

1. IN DETERMINING HOW MUCH MAP EQUIPMENT WAS USED BY PAK FORCES IN RANN OF KUTCH WORTH NOTING THAT PAK UNITS IN AREA MAINLY DRAWN FROM 8TH DIVISION. THIS UNIT HAS RECEIVED LESS MAP EQUIPMENT THAN ANY OTHER MAP-SUPPORTED PAK DIVISION SINCE GHQ ASSIGNED IT LOWEST PRIORITY.
CFN 2096 752 661 1 1 8TH

RMR

PAGE TWO RUSBKP 55 C O N F I D E N T I A L

(A) TRANSPORT IS ALMOST ENTIRELY MAP, INCLUDING JEEPS AND TRUCKS.

(B) SMALL ARMS ALMOST ENTIRELY BRITISH.

(IX) SIGNAL AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT SPLIT ABOUT 60-40 US AND BRITISH.

2. ARTILLERY USED BY PAKS IN RANN, SOME ARTILLERY UNITS BEING ASSIGNED TO 8TH DIVISION FOR THIS PURPOSE, IS ALMOST ENTIRELY BRITISH 25 POUNDERS AND FIVE POINT FIGGS* ALTHOUGH SOME MAP 155 HOWITZERS MAY HAVE BEEN SENT INTO AREA.

3. MAJOR MAP SUPPLIED WEAPONS ARE APPROXIMATELY 45 M-48 AND 12 M-24 TANKS ATTACHED TO 8TH DIVISION AND SENT INTO THE AREA OF OPERATIONS. (ORIGINAL ESTIMATE HAD BEEN 36 M-48S.) HOWEVER, EMBASSY HAS BEEN SOLEMNLY AND REPEATEDLY ASSURED THAT THE 12 M-24 TANKS WERE WITHDRAWN BECAUSE THEY WERE UNDER-POWERED AND THAT THE M-48 TANKS HAVE NOT BEEN USED IN COMBAT. NEVERTHELESS, QUESTION OF PAK USE OF TANKS IN RANN OF KUTCH STILL

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Authority ED 116525CC SA&D

By scj/B. NARA. Date 5-21-04

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-2- 2096, MAY 1 FROM KARACHI

OBSURE AND MISSION CONTINUES EFFORT TO ASCERTAIN FACTS.

4. LISTING OF MAP EQUIPMENT PROVIDED 8TH DIVISION AND SPECIFICALLY TO 51ST BRIGADE OF 8TH DIVISION BEING SENT AIRMAIL.

GP-4 MCCONAUGHY

BT

CFN 60-40 2 25 8 155 3 45 48 12 24 36 48 12 24 48 4 8

* AS RECEIVED.

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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

148

SUMMARY

83
Action
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Info
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~~SECRET~~

Control: 26996
Rec'd: April 30, 1965
4:34 p.m.

FROM: Rawalpindi
ACTION: Secstate IMMEDIATE 43
INFO: New Delhi IMMEDIATE 14
London IMMEDIATE 8
CINCMEAFSA IMMEDIATE Unnumbered
DOD IMMEDIATE Unnumbered
Karachi Unnumbered
DATE: April 30
DEPTEL 1230 and 1231 and Rawalpindi's 42 to Department.

Handwritten signature

- BUNDY-SMITH
- BATOR
- BOWMAN
- CHASE
- COOPER
- HAYNES
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- KEENE
- KLIEN
- KROMER
- MOODY
- REEDY
- SHANDLER
- SAYRE
- THOMPSON

031

1. Just after I left my noon meeting April 30 with Foreign Minister Bhutto, he requested me to see him again at 4 p.m. When I returned for second meeting, I found Foreign Minister Bhutto and Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed noticeably agitated. Bhutto explained that they had received, just after my noon call, message from Ambassador G. Ahmed reporting his conversation with Talbot on April 27 (DEPTEL 1217) at which Talbot had set forth our position that MAP equipment not to be used in disputed areas (DEPTEL 1200). Bhutto pointed out question had profound implications for GOP since bulk of its military equipment is MAP-supplied and probably any military action by India against Pakistan would be launched from or against disputed area, such as Kashmir or Rann of Kutch. Paks under this reasoning could not use MAP where it would be needed and would be in impossible position.

2. I clarified our position in accordance with DEPTEL 1230 stressing that we were not laying out rigid generalized rule necessarily applicable to all disputed territories. We would expect to make determination on each issue based on merits or case. In case of Rann of Kutch we considered facts and circumstances murky, legitimate self-defense not established, and therefore use of MAP equipment by either side not justified.

/Situation

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Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, #114
By jc NARA, Date 5-9-04

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- 43, April 30, From Rawalpindi

Situation here readily susceptible to settlement without dangerous resort to force and cease-fire should be pursued. Furthermore, question of use of MAP equipment in Rann of Kutch area would be merely academic point if cease-fire achieved. At later points in conversation, I hammered away at this point in order to emphasize necessity of Paks agreement to cease-fire.

3. Bhutto and Aziz Ahmed were at once relieved by clarification that no far-reaching generalized principle automatically to all disputed areas had been set up, and still deeply concerned by implications of our postulation as applied to Rann of Kutch situation. Two main points made by Bhutto and Aziz Ahmed in commenting on our position re use of MAP equipment were: (a) Before US attempted to make unilateral decision as to whether legitimate self-defense involved in Rann of Kutch or in other areas, further extensive consideration facts and full consultations between us should be held. (b) Since most Pak military equipment MAP-supplied, while Indians not dependent to any comparable extent on US sources, Paks would be more heavily penalized by US withholding from both sides, and Indians would be emboldened if Paks relatively disadvantaged. Under present circumstances in Rann of Kutch, GOP would be forced to withdraw all its forces one-sidedly, since they mainly MAP-supplied, while Indians not thus handicapped.

4. Aziz Ahmed also presented Pak justification that use of MAP in Rann of Kutch in fact "legitimate self-defense" involving defense of territory properly claimed by GOP and wrongfully attacked by India. He pointed to following facts: (a) GOP maintained post at Chad Bet until 1956, at which time Indian forces came in with air cover and took over post by force, which GOP did not resist; (b) in 1960 when territorial dispute last discussed, it was agreed that neither side would disturb status quo; (c) beginning in January 1965 India in fact disturbed status quo by establishing a series of new posts in disputed territory and by moving in first police and then strong military forces; and (d) GOP did not move troops into disputed area until 18 April after Indians hit Pak post at Ding preemptorily, demanded Pak evacuation of Kanjarkot and took over other posts.

/5. In reply,

~~SECRET~~

-3- 43, April 30, From Rawalpindi

5. In reply, I stressed first that facts still murky, given strong Indian presentation of its conflicting position, that US taking openminded position in absence of basis for judgement, that pressing objective at moment is to achieve cease-fire, and that problem involved in this case clearly dictated closer consultations at early stage on any comparable threatening situation in future. I assured Paks that, in taking stance on Rann of Kutch, we are applying terms of standing agreement to particular existing situation rather than redefining this agreement or establishing any general restriction indiscriminately applicable to all disputed territories.

6. Bhutto came back to question he raised at earlier meeting on US assurances, drawing analogy between US determination on use of MAP equipment and US determination on whether aggression involved. He recalled that, during his discussions with Under Secretary Ball in Washington in October 1963, he had foreseen the very possibility that, in a murky situation, aggression could not be readily determined and that our assurances to GOP on aggression by India would be difficult to invoke quickly enough to help Pakistan. For this reason, Bhutto said, he had urged further definition and strengthening of our assurances. Instead, the US reaction in the Rann of Kutch crisis would appear to confirm Pak misgivings and to dilute the force and dependability of US assurances. Bhutto urged an early response to his inquiry of this morning on US reaction in event Indian threats of retaliation carried out. He also proposed that urgent problem of right to use MAP equipment be accorded further exhaustive consideration and analysis by two governments, even its far-reaching implications.

7. I told Bhutto that I was doubtful that reply would be received to his question about US assurances before he left for London evening May 2 but this was matter he might take up with Secretary at London. I also indicated again that it seemed unlikely that we would be able comment on hypothetical situations relating to recent Indian vague threats which we hope and believe India will not carry out. Bhutto argued that current Indian threat not hypothetical given statements made by Shastri and other recent Indian actions.

8. During discussion, in response my pressing on need for immediate cease-fire, Bhutto reiterated that Paks prepared for

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-4- 43, April 30, From Rawalpindi

cease-fire as outlined to UK. He also informed me of gist of Ayub reply to Wilson letter of April 30 setting basis for "de facto" cease-fire. He informed me that Pak forces have been restrained from taking further action so as not to aggravate situation further in Rann of Kutch area. Pak forces in area are therefore not taking advantage of superior military position which would now permit them readily to reach 24 parallel, and to take over Chad Bet and cut off whole GOI force from its line of retreat.

Comment: It quite clear at conclusion our meeting, which lasted almost one hour, that Bhutto and Aziz Ahmed quite shaken by definition of our position in context of actual Rann of Kutch situation, and also in context of how it might affect US MAP support and defense assistance in event of future fuzzed over aggression by India.

9. I would not recommend immediate response to Bhutto reassuring GOP on effectiveness of past assurances against aggression, since a little uncertainty on their part for next few days could provide the additional leverage needed to achieve cease-fire. However, I do not think that we can postpone providing these reassurances very long without risking very serious damage to our position here. At same time, I strongly urge that GOI be reminded immediately of the standing explicit US assurances to Pakistan as a further deterrent against an Indian contemplation of retaliatory action against Pakistan in another area, such as East Pakistan.

GP-3

MCCONAUGHY

AL/1

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 4/30/65, 5:50 p.m.

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, CIA, 7:30 p.m., 4/30/65

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

16288

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INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

49-S

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy KARACHI IMMEDIATE 1230
 Rawalpindi Office IMMEDIATE 60

INFO: Amembassy LONDON IMMEDIATE 6887
 Amembassy NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 2263
 CINCMEAFSA IMMEDIATE

- BUNDY/SMITH
- BATOR
- BELK
- BOWMAN
- COOPER
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- KLEIN
- KROGER
- ROBERTS
- SKYRE
- THOMSON

APR 29 12 33 PM '65

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Rann of Kutch

Karachi's 2056

Judith Rann

056

Regret any confusion our position on use of MAP equipment in Rann of Kutch. Deptel 1200 gives our legal view in first three sentences; last sentence is political conclusion reached here on basis of circumstances relating specifically to Rann of Kutch situation. In other words we are not determining that legitimate self-defense is never possible in case of a disputed frontier. What we are doing, on basis legal view first 3 sentences Deptel 1200, is making political decision that, unwilling permit under present circumstances, USG/~~approves~~ use MAP equipment in Rann of Kutch dispute by either side.

In presenting case to GOP you should emphasize that an important factor in assessing what constitutes legitimate self-defense is willingness of a contesting party to cooperate in/^{reaching} cease-fire and restoring status quo ante as basis for peaceful settlement of dispute.

GP-3

End

RUSK

Drafted by: L/NEA: DWehmeyer	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - William J. Handley
NEA: SOA: CCLaise; bld 4/29/65	
Clearances: L - Mr. Kearney	DOD/ISA - Mr. Stoddard

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

By jc, NARA, Date 5-24-04

43

~~SECRET~~

Action
NEA

VV MJB073A996

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1965 APR 29 AM 3 58

Info
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RR RUEHCR
DE RUSBAE 1390 27/1545Z
R 271414Z ZEA

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FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

SP

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 3061

SAH

INFO RUSBKP/AMEMBASSY KARACHI 647

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RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON 740

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RMR

DURING OUR DISCUSSION THIS MORNING, PRESIDENT RADHAKRISHNAN PLACED CONTINUED EMPHASIS ON THE USE OF UNITED STATES WEAPONS BY THE PAKISTANIS IN THE RANN OF KUTCH. HE REGALLED PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S ASSURANCES TO NEHRU IN 1954 THAT WE WOULD NOT PERMIT THE USE OF US EQUIPMENT BY THE PAKISTANIS AGAINST INDIA AND NOTED THAT THIS ASSURANCE HAD BEEN REPEATED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS.

HOWEVER, PAKISTAN HAD NEVER LEFT ANY DOUBT IN ANYONE'S MIND ABOUT THE FACT THAT THEIR ADVERSARY WAS INDIA AND NOT THE USSR OR CHINA AND IN VIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS THE USG NOW HAD A

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 1390 ~~SECRET~~
CLEAR OBJECTIVE TO LIVE UP TO ITS ASSURANCES. FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE THE UNITED STATES REACTION TO THIS SITUATION WOULD HAVE A PROFOUND EFFECT IN INDIA.

TO THIS I REPLIED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS CORRECT IN HIS STATEMENT THAT WE HAD GIVEN ASSURANCES THAT WE WOULD TAKE FIRM ACTION IF THE PAKS SHOULD USE US WEAPONS AGAINST INDIA EXCEPT IN THE CLEARLY EVIDENT CASE OF SELF DEFENSE. HOWEVER, THE PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE OF THE USE OF US EQUIPMENT HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY OUR EMBASSY ONLY LAST EVENING AND HAD BEEN PROMPTLY SENT TO WASHINGTON. SINCE THE SITUATION WAS BEING CONSIDERED BOTH IN WASHINGTON AND WITH THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT IN KARACHI THERE IS NOTHING FURTHER I COULD SAY AT THE MOMENT.

THE PRESIDENT THEN ASSERTED THAT INDIA HAD EVERYTHING TO LOSE AND NOTHING TO GAIN FROM A PROLONGATION OF THE PRESENT BITTERED SITUATION. THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS HE SAID WAS A CEASE-FIRE IN THE RANN OF KUTCH THEN A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE BORDER WHICH DIVIDES THE TWO COUNTRIES.

~~SECRET~~

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SANITIZED

Authority State Sec 8/11/76

By rmg, NARS, Date 10/4/76

-2- 3061, APRIL 27, FROM NEW DELHI

AS A MATTER OF HISTORY THE QUESTION OF BORDER DEMARCATION IN THE RANN OF KUTCH SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO BECOME AN ISSUE SINCE THE OLD BORDER BETWEEN SIND AND KUTCH WAS AFFIRMED

PAGE THREE RUSBAE 1390 ~~SECRET~~

IN THE RADCLIFFE REPORT OF 1947. HOWEVER, IN 1960 SWARAN SINGH NOT KNOWING THIS BACKGROUND HAD INADVERTENTLY REFERRED TO IT AS UNDEMARCATED. ALTHOUGH NEHRU HAD CORRECTED THIS STATEMENT THE FOLLOWING DAY THE GOI WAS NOW FACED WITH A PRACTICAL SITUATION WHICH CALLED FOR A SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES. ONCE THIS WAS BEHIND THEM THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD PROCEED TO SETTLE THE PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES, ENCLAVES AND FINALLY KASHMIR.

HAVING WELCOMED THIS COMMENT AS THE FIRST POSITIVE STATEMENT FROM EITHER GOVERNMENT IN MANY WEEKS I EXPRESSED THE FEAR THAT POLITICAL LEADERS IN BOTH COUNTRIES MAY BE TEMPTED TO DIVERT PUBLIC ATTENTION FROM SUCH MUNDANE PROBLEMS AS HIGH PRICES, INADEQUATE HOUSING AND SCHOOLS, ETC. BY CHAUVANISTIC CALLS FOR NATIONAL UNITY AGAINST FOREIGN AGGRESSORS. HISTORY IS FULL OF GRIM REMINDERS THAT EVEN THE BEST INTENTIONED GOVERNMENTS CAN FINALLY LOSE CONTROL OF THEIR OWN POLICIES ONCE THEY ALLOW PUBLIC OPINION TO GET OUT OF HAND.

AS FAR AS NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONCERNED THE KEY QUESTION IS HOW CAN THEY MOST EFFECTIVELY BE LAUNCHED? FOR OBVIOUS REASONS THE USG HAS NO DESIRE TO BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED. WOULD IT NOT

PAGE FOUR RUSBAE 1390 ~~SECRET~~

BE POSSIBLE FOR THE UAR, IRAN OR SOME OTHER ASIAN COUNTRY ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH INDIA AND PAKISTAN TO PLAY A USEFUL ROLE?

THE PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF A THIRD PARTY WOULD BE NECESSARY ONLY IF DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN NEW DELHI AND RAWALPINDI FAILED. THE PRIMARY NEED NOW IS FOR NEGOTIATION AT A HIGH LEVEL BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. IN THIS REGARD THE PRIME MINISTER HAD ALREADY MADE IT CLEAR TO THE GOP THAT HIS REMARKS IN THE PARLIAMENT IN REGARD TO THE KANJARKOT FORT HAD

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-3- 3061, APRIL 27, FROM NEW DELHI

NOT BEEN INTENDED AS A CONDITION IN ADVANCE OF NEGOTIATIONS.
THE NEXT STAGE, THE PRESIDENT SAID, WAS FOR THE TWO PARTIES TO
FORESEE THE DANGERS OF THEIR PRESENT COLLISION COURSE AND THEN
GENUINELY SEEK ANSWERS WHICH WOULD ALLOW BOTH TO GO THEIR OWN
WAY IN DIGNITY AND PEACE.

GP-3.

BOWLES
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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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QSA639SOA398KPA646
CO RUEHCR
DE RUSBKP 1750 29/1345Z
O 291340Z ZZZM
FM AMYXBASSY KARACHI
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2073
INFO RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 736
RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 643
RUEKDA/DOD WASHDC IMMEDIATE UNN
RUCJHK/CINCEAFSA IMMEDIATE UNN
STATE LRJ
BT
SECRET APRIL 29

1965 APR 29 AM 11 00

- BUNDY/SMITH
- BATOR
- BELK
- BOWMAN
- COOPER
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- KLEIN
- LOMER
- SAUNDERS
- SAYRE
- THOMSON

CINCEAFSA FOR POLAD
RANN OF KUTCH

John Rann of Kutch

1. FROM PRESS REPORTS, EYE WITNESS ACCOUNTS BY US CORRESPONDENTS, AND CONVERSATIONS WITH PAKS (ALL REPORTED SEPARATELY), FOLLOWING POINTS ON RANN OF KUTCH FIGHTING SEEM INDICATED:

A. NO SEPARATE EVIDENCE AS YET THAT TANKS WHICH DEPLOYED IN RANN OF KUTCH AREA BY GOP HAVE BEEN COMMITTED TO ACTION, BUT PAK UNITS IN RANN OF KUTCH AREA HAVE SOME MAP EQUIPMENT, MAINLY WHEELED TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND ALSO HAVE CONSIDERABLE BRITISH EQUIPMENT, PRINCIPALLY RIFLES, LIGHT AND MEDIUM FIELD ARTILLERY (SEE ARMA'S 00107).
CFN 2073 736 643 1. 0107

RMR

DIA-25x1

PAGE TWO RUSBKP 1750 ~~SECRET~~
ARMA HAS EXAMINED PHOTOS BROUGHT BACK FROM BIAR BET BY [REDACTED] WHO CLAIMED AND REPORTED THEY PICTURES OF TANKS. ARMA CONCLUDES THEY ARE NOT RPT NOT TANKS AND PROBABLY ARE ARMORED CARS OF BRITISH ORIGIN.

DIA-25x1

B. ON BASIS PHOTOS SHOWN TO MILITARY ATTACHE AND TO BE PROVIDED US SOONEST (SEE KARACHI ARMA'S 00112) AND EYE WITNESS ACCOUNTS, PAKS HAVE APPARENTLY CAPTURED US MILITARY EQUIPMENT UTILIZED BY GOI FORCES INCLUDING 106 RECOILLESS RIFLES AND AMMUNITION. WE ARE FORWARDING FURTHER DETAILED INFORMATION AS AVAILABLE.

~~SECRET~~

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No Objection To Declassification 2001/08/09 : NLJ-032-026-2-15-3

SANTIZED

Authority NLJ-032-026.002/15
By je NARA, Date 5-18-01

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-2- 2073, APRIL 29, FROM KARACHI

C. PAKS INFLICTED HEAVY LOSSES ON INDIAN FORCES AND ARE NOT ONLY IN CONTROL OF BIAR BET SALIENT BUT APPARENTLY IN POSITION TAKE OVER MOST OF DISPUTED TERRITORY IF THEY DESIRE. PAKS, HOWEVER, FOR PRESENT RESTRICTING MILITARY ACTION TO RETENTION OF SALIENT AS MEANS IMPROVING BARGAINING POSITION IN SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING DISPUTED AREA.

D. PAKS EXTREMELY CONCERNED BY INDIAN THREATS TO ATTACK IN OTHER AREAS AND HAVE APPARENTLY PLACED ALL MILITARY FORCES ON ALERT.

2. REQUEST INFORMATION WHETHER 106 RECOILLESS RIFLES WERE SUPPLIED UNDER MAP TO GOI OR OBTAINED BY OTHER MEANS; WE NOTE IN DLEHI'S ARMA CX-83-65 (PARA 3) THAT COAS CHAUDHURI STATED PAK TANKS KNOCKED OUT BY 106'S.
CFN 00112 106 2. 106 CX-83-65 3 106'S

PAGE THREE RUSDKP 1750 ~~SECRET~~

3. ANTICIPATE PAKS LIKELY MAKE STRONG APPROACH TO US ON INDIAN USE OF US MAP EQUIPMENT. APPRECIATE GUIDANCE.

GP-3.
ECCONAUGHY
ET
CFN 3. GP-3

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/SO 11:28 AM, 4/29/65.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA 11:45 AM, 4/29/65.

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

SECRET

15220
Phillips
1530
1276
6845
India
Mar 27 7 34 PM '65
039

84

Origin

SS

Info

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 2246
Info: Amembassy KARACHI "
Amembassy LONDON "
CINCMEAFSA for POLAD and J-7

Ref New Delhi's 3037 Info Karachi 639 London 732 CINCMEAFSA UNN.

LIMDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM TALBOT

You will see from reporting telegrams that in our meetings with B.K.Nehru and G. Ahmed today we have made quite clear our legal position on use of MAP equipment in disputed territory. We have made strong representations to Paks both here and in Karachi that use of MAP equipment is improper. Department spokesman today clarified situation regarding Indian complaint that Paks using US equipment (see septel). We hope this will hold off Jha at least for time being.

- BUNDY-SMITH
- BATOR
- BOWMAN
- CHASE
- COOPER
- HAYNES
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- KEENE
- KLEIN
- KOMER
- MOODY
- REEDY
- SAUNDERS
- SAYRE
- THOMSON

It seems to us most important immediate objective should be ceasefire. Consequently, while we will continue to make it unmistakably clear to Paks that use of US equipment is unacceptable, we do not wish to take further step while British at critical stages of effort for ceasefire.

FYI It seems best that we not consider suspension MAP to Pakistan at this stage. It is my opinion ;if we ~~RECOMM~~ come to this there will be considerable sentiment here that we should apply same policy both ~~px~~ countries. END FYI. END MESSAGE. GROUP 73c

RUSK

Drafted by: NEA:SOA:DTSchneider:bts 4/27/65

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

NEA - Phillips Talbot

Clearances:

SOA - Mr. Cameron

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

SECRET

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *5-21-04*

154

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

46
Action

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Info

23945

1965 APR 28 PM 12-22

TTQSA471SBA256

OO RUEHCR
DE RUSBKP-1649 28/1425Z
O 281415Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY KARACHI
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2056
INFO RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 634
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 725
RUCJHK/CINCMEAFSA IMMEDIATE UNN
RUEKDA/DOD WASHDC IMMEDIATE UNN
STATE GRNC
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041

~~SECRET~~

APRIL 28 SECTION ONE OF TWO

CINCMEAFSA FOR POLAD

LIMDIS

DEPTEL 1200 AND EMBTEL 2040.

- ~~BUNDY-SMITH~~
- ~~BATOR~~
- ~~BOWMAN~~
- ~~CHASE~~
- ~~COOPER~~
- ~~HAYNES~~
- ~~JESSUP~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
- ~~KEENE~~
- ~~KLIEN~~
- ~~KUMER~~
- ~~MOODY~~
- ~~REEDY~~
- ~~SHANDERS~~
- ~~SAYRE~~
- ~~THOMSON~~

1. AS MY TELEGRAMS HAVE MADE CLEAR, I AM ENTIRELY IN ACCORD WITH VIEW THAT IT IS INDEFENSIBLE FOR MAP EQUIPMENT TO BE USED IN AN IMPROPER OR QUESTIONABLE MANNER AND HAVE TAKEN THIS POSITION VERY STRONGLY WITH GOP IN DISCUSSING RANN OF KUTCH DISPUTE. NEVERTHELESS, I BELIEVE IN THIS RANN OF KUTCH SITUATION WE ARE ON UNTENABLE GROUNDS WHEN WE SEEK TO MAKE OUR CASE BY ASSERTING NEW AND RESTRICTIVE LEGAL INTERPRETATION OF "LEGITIMATE SELF DEFENSE" KEYED TO BOUNDARY CONCEPT, RATHER THAN TO FACTS AND MERITS OF THE MATTER.
CFN 2056 634 725 1200 20'6 1.

PAGE TWO RUSBKP 1649 ~~SECRET~~
DETERMINATION SET FORTH IN DEPTEL 1200 HAS MOST SERIOUS POLITICAL, LEGAL, AND INDEED INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND I RECOMMEND THAT IT BE RECONSIDERED URGENTLY EVEN THOUGH IT HAS ALREADY BEEN TRANSMITTED BY DEPT TO GOI AND GOP AMBASSADORS. CORE OF PROBLEM IN ALL THREE AREAS IS EFFECT OF DOCTRINE SET FORTH THAT MAP EQUIPMENT CANNOT BE USED IN DISPUTED BORDER AREAS.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS-001R-151.002/11
By jp, NARA, Date 3-21-14

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-2-2056, April 28, from: Karachi (Section 1 of 2)

2. POLITICAL AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS. IMPLICATIONS OF NON-USE OF MAP EQUIPMENT IN DISPUTED AREAS ARE MOST FAR REACHING FOR PAKS. FIRST, LARGE PORTIONS OF PAK BORDER REMAIN DISPUTED IN ONE SENSE OR ANOTHER AS FOLLOWS: (1) MANY PARTS OF EAST PAK BORDER ARE STILL UNDEFINED; (2) ALONG WEST PAK-INDIAN BORDER KASHMIR CEASE FIRE LINE AND RANN OF KUTCH ARE DISPUTED AREAS; (3) AFGHAN BORDER IS DISPUTED IN SENSE THAT GOA HAS NEVER RECOGNIZED DUGIKJ LINE; AND (4) EVEN CHICOM BORDER IS ESTABLISHED ONLY BY PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT WHICH NOT RPT NOT RECOGNIZED BY GOI. SECOND, PROBABILITY IS GREAT THAT ANY CONFLICT INVOLVING USE OF PAK FORCES IN LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENSE WILL ARISE IN DISPUTED, RATHER THAN CLEARLY DEFINED BORDER AREAS.
CFN 12002. (1) (2) (3) (4)

PAGE THREE RUSBKP 1649 ~~SECRET~~

THUS, AS GOP ARMED FORCES ARE HEAVILY MAP SUPPORTED, EFFECT OF OUR POSITION IS TO INFORM GOP THAT IT MUST DEVELOP SECOND MILITARY FORCE WHICH DOES NOT RPT NOT USE MAP EQUIPMENT TO DEFEND ITS EXTENSIVE DISPUTED BORDERS. THIRD, EFFECT OF LEGAL POSITION IS TO GIVE INDIANS VERY DISTINCT ADVANTAGE VIS-A-VIS PAKISTAN. AGAINST TWO NON-MAP SUPPORTED PAK DIVISIONS IN EAST PAKISTAN AND AZAD KASHMIR, INDIA HAS LARGE ELEMENTS OF ARMED FORCES UNSUPPORTED BY MAP TO DISPOSE ON DISPUTED BORDERS AND WOULD HAVE OPEN INVITATION TO SUPPLY PRESSURES ON THESE BORDERS WITH PAKS SEVERLY HANDICAPPED TO RESPOND. EVEN WITHOUT SUCH FURTHER RESTRICTION, PAKS HAVE BEEN IN MILITARILY DISADVANTAGEOUS POSITION AT EVERY POINT ON BORDER EXCEPT RANN OF KUTCH, PARTICULARLY IN EAST PAKISTAN, AND INDIANS HAVE GAINED ADVANTAGE FROM THIS.

3. STATED LEGAL POSITION ON MAP EQUIPMENT ALSO HAS CRUCIAL IMPLICATIONS IN TERMS US GUARANTEES TO PAKISTAN AGAINST AGGRESSION.
CFN 3.

PAGE FOUR RUSBKP 1649 ~~SECRET~~

IF IT IS OUR POSITION FOR PURPOSES OF MAP EQUIPMENT THAT WE CANNOT DETERMINE IN EFFECT WHETHER "LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENSE" IN INVOLVED IN A BORDER DISPUTE, THEN IT MUST BE EQUALLY TRUE THAT WE WILL ALSO NOT BE IN A POSITION TO MAKE THIS DETERMINATION IN RELATION TO OUR GUARANTEES TO PAKISTAN AGAINST AGGRESSION BY INDIA INTO DISPUTED AREAS. HEREOFRE OUR GUARANTEES WOULD NOT BE EFFECTIVE AS TO DISPUTED BORDER AREAS, WHERE POSSIBILITY OF AGGRESSION IS GREATEST.

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-3-2056, April 28, from: Karachi (Section 1 of 2)

4. AS I POINTED OUT IN EMBTEL 2040, EFFECT OF THIS LEGAL POSITION WILL BE TO LEAD PAKISTAN INEVITABLY TO LOOK ELSEWHERE FOR MILITARY SUPPORT AND GUARANTEES AGAINST AGGRESSION, THUS OPENING WAY FOR SWEEPING POLICY REORIENTATION BY PAKISTAN WMD PROVIDING CHICOMS WITH GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE IN AND EXPAND THEIR INFLUENCE HERE.

5. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS. LEGAL POSITION ADOPTED, IN OUR VIEW, APPEARS TO CREATE UNILATERALLY A COROLLARY TO MAP AGREEMENT WHICH NOT EVEN IMPLIED IN PRESENT AGREEMENT. WE FIND NO RECORD THAT IN PAST PAKS WERE EVEN INFORMED OR WARNED THAT LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENSE DID NOT INCLUDE USE OF MAP EQUIPMENT IN AREAS WHERE FRONTIER DISPUTED.
CFN 4. 2040 5.

PAGE FIVE RUSBKP 1649 ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

WE DOUBT THEY WOULD HAVE SIGNED AGREEMENT ON THIS BASIS. ON OTHER HAND AGREEMENT DOES CLEARLY IMPLY THAT "LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENSE" MUST BE BONA FIDE AND THEREFORE MUST, IF NECESSARY, BE JUSTIFIED. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT WE HAVE A LEGITIMATE RIGHT IN RANN OF KUTCH AND IN OTHER SUCH INCIDENTS TO REQUEST AND REQUIRE SUCH JUSTIFICATION FROM GOP IF THERE IS ANY DOUBT. WE RECOGNIZE THAT FACTS IN SUCH BORDER DISPUTES AT BEST ARE DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE, BUT OUR READING OF THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT IS THAT IF RIGHT OF LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENSE IS EXERCISED IN BORDER AREAS THERE IS NO LEGAL LIMITATION ON PAK USE OF MAP EQUIPMENT. THEREFORE, IT SEEMS TO US THAT, LEGALLY, OUR INQUIRY IN ANY CASE INVOLVING USE OF MAP EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO QUESTION OF WHETHER LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENSE INVOLVED. DIFFICULTY OF MAKING THIS FINDING DOES NOT WARRANT OUR MAKING OUR OWN NEW LEGAL RULES. IF WE ARE UNABLE IN ANY GIVEN CASE TO ASCERTAIN THE TRUE FACTS ON WHICH TO BASE AN INFORMED TECHNICAL JUDGMENT BUT ARE CONVINCED THAT FOR OUR OWN REASONS CONTINUED US MAP SUPPORT IS INTOLERABLE, WE SHOULD TAKE WHATEVER RESTRICTIVE ACTION OUR INTERESTS REQUIRE.

MCCONAUGHY

BT

Note: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 1:00 p.m. 4/28/65
Passed to White House & CIA at 1:15 p.m. 4/28/65

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

46
Action
SS
Info

VV EUB537HEB043
OO RUEHCR
DE RUSBKP 1649 28/1450Z
O 281415Z ZEA
FM (AEMBASSY KARACHI)
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATEWASHDC IMMEDIATE (2056)
INFO RUFHDN/AEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 634
RUSBAE/AEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 725
RUCJHK/CINCFSA IMMEDIATE UNN
RUEKDA/DOD WASHDC IMMEDIATE UNN
STATE GRNC
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24110
April 28, 1965
1:54 p.m.

043

APRIL 28 SECTION TWO OF TWO

LIMDIS

BUT WE SHOULD JUSTIFY THE ACTION AS A POLITICAL POLICY DECISION, AND NOT ALLEGE TECHNICAL VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT UNLESS WE CAN STRICTLY PROVE IT TO THE SATISFACTION OF ANY REASONABLE MAN.

6. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS. MAP EQUIPMENT IS BEING SUPPLIED NOT ONLY TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN BUT TO OTHER COUNTRIES ALSO ENGAGED IN DISPUTES WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS, INCLUDING BORDER DISPUTES. WE WOULD ASSUME THAT GENERAL DOCTRINE SET FORTH IN DEPTEL 1200 WOULD OF NECESSITY APPLY EQUALLY TO THESE COUNTRIES. FAR-REACHING IMPLICATIONS OF THIS ACTION IN THIS BROADER FIELD MAY MERIT FURTHER CONSIDERATION.
CFN 2056 634 725 6. 1200

PAGE TWO RUSBKP 1649 ~~SECRET~~

7. FOREGOING DOES NOT IMPLY WE SHOULD ACQUIESCE IN USE OF OUR MAP IN RANN OF KUTCH FIGHTING. WE CAN AND SHOULD SEEK OUR OBJECTIVE BY ORTHODOX DIPLOMATIC TACTICS HAND-TAILORED TO THIS SPECIFIC SITUATION RATHER THAN BY RELIANCE ON GENERALIZED AND RIGID LEGAL FORMULATION OF QUESTIONABLE VALIDITY WHICH CAN CAUSE DIFFICULTIES FOR US ELSEWHERE AS WELL AS IN THE INSTANT CASE.

GP-3.
MCCONAUGHY
BT
CFN 7. GP-3

Note: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 1:57 p.m. 4/28/65
Passed to White House & CIA at 2:40 p.m. 4/28/65

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"legitimate self-defense."

Our larger concern is to bring this situation to an end before it assumes importance of another Kashmir, creating deep ^{frictions} ~~frictions~~ between two nations. We earnestly hope both countries can find way to arrange cease fire.

Ambassador said he was not familiar with latest Karachi talks. However as he understood it Bhutto's April 15 statement and GOP's letter to Security Council stood as basis Pakistan's position. He recalled that area above 24th Parallel was regarded in pre-partition days as part of Sind. Therefore in his view not correct to say that this territory disputed and question of use of MAP equipment in disputed territory did not arise. What was important was to define what is disputed territory.

He continued that war talk had been coming from Indian side. Indian allegations of Pakistani mobilization have been categorically denied while GOI has admitted to mobilization. Ambassador noted Ayub's Dacca speech and contrasted President's peaceful remarks with Indian statements relating alleged Pak casualties. Looking at it from Washington, Kashmir incidents, Dahagram and Rann of Kutch seemed to fall into pattern of planned Indian aggression.

Ambassador stated that this is a case where U.S. should firmly come to Pakistan's aid. He recalled Under Secretary BALL's assurances of U.S. assistance to Pakistan in event of Indian aggression. Pakistan obviously cannot match India in duplicity. Already India has presented better case internationally than Pakistan. Ambassador asked for Talbot's views on what U.S. would do.

Talbot said that in first instance cease fire should be arranged. He said

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it should not be beyond ingenuity of disputants to find way to bring prompt end to fighting, particularly since both countries are in agreement on desirability of cease fire as well as negotiations to resolve impasse. Following cease fire both sides might set up machinery to settle disputes of this type.

Ambassador commented that such machinery does exist with regard to West Pakistan-Indian frontier. Pakistan certainly wants peaceful solution but Indian charges of Pakistan wanting to broaden the conflict and ~~INDIAN CHARGES OF~~ Chinese-Pakistan collusion indicate opposite view holds for India.

Ambassador said that apart from tanks he was not aware of what other MAP equipment may be in use. He thought that it might be useful to examine "at leisure" 1961 Kennedy-Ayub Communique which he believed had extended scope of use of MAP equipment.

Talbot closed by noting U.S. can foresee very serious consequences both on subcontinent and outside unless there is cessation in present hostilities.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

155

- BUNDY-SMITH
- BATOR
- BOWMAN
- CHASE
- COOPER
- HAYNES
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- KEENE
- KROMER
- MOODY
- REEDY
- SAYRE
- THOMSON

45
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BA141KPA461

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DE RUSOKP 1562 27/155 0Z
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FM AMEMBASSY KARACHI
TO RUEHCR
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FM AMEMBASSY KARACHI
TO RUEHCR/SENSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2040
INFO RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 718
RUCJHK/CINCFEAFSA IMMEDIATE UNN
STATE GRNC
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~~SECRET~~ APRIL 27

Jadav (R3)

CINCFEAFSA FOR POLAD.

LIMDIS

EMBTEL 2039.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Fews 64-68, vol. 25 # 111

By je NARA, Date 5-19-04

1. EVENTS RELATING TO RANN OF KUTCH CLASH SEEM TO BE PROPELLING US TOWARD MILESTONE IN US RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AND INDIA. THANKS TO NEEDLESSLY BELLIGERENT AND SELF-CENTERED ACTIONS OF BOTH COUNTRIES, NOT ONLY ARE WE FACED WITH A MAJOR CRISIS IN INDO-PAK RELATIONS, BUT JOY CRISES IN US-INDIAN AND US-PAK RELATIONS. IMMEDIATE ISSUES ARE OF COURSE FIGHTING IN RANN OF KUTCH AND USE OF MAP EQUIPMENT THERE BY PAKS.
CFN 2040 718 2039 1.

PAGE TWO RUSBKP 1562 ~~SECRET~~
BUT, IN FACT, MUCH BROADER ISSUES INVOLVING OUR POSITION ON SUBCONTINENT ARE ACTUALLY AT STAKE. RANN OF KUTCH HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT US AND UK CANNOT SAFELY REMAIN ALOOF FROM INTRAMURL INDO-PAK DISPUTES ALTHOUGH THEY ARE NOT OF OUR MAKING. US ASSISTANCE IS SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN ENHANCED MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF BOTH COUNTRIES. IN CASE OF PAKISTAN FIVE AND ONE-HALF OF ITS SEVEN AND ONE-HALF DIVISIONS ARE MAP SUPPORTED. IN THE CASE OF INDIA, US MILITARY AID AND US ASSISTANCE IN DEFENSE PRODUCTION AREA SERVE INDIRECTLY IF NOT DIRECTLY TO UPGRADE APPRECIABLY INDIA'S ABILITY TO SUSTAIN OPERATIONS LIKE RANN OF KUTCH ENGAGEMENTS. THIS BROADEST CONTEXT OF ISSUE POSED BY

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-2- 2040, APRIL 27 FROM KARACHI

RANN OF KUTCH IS HOW TO AVOID FRUSTRATION OF US EFFORTS, UNDERTAKEN IN BOTH COUNTRIES AT ENORMOUS COST, WHICH WOULD SURELY RESULT FROM ENLARGED AND PROLONGED HOSTILITIES.

2. REGARDLESS OF MERITS INDIA'S CLAIM THAT PAKS ARE EMPLOYING MAP EQUIPMENT IN RANN OF KUTCH FOR AGGRESSION OR PAKISTANI CONTENTION THAT ITS ACTIONS ARE JUSTIFIABLE DEFENSIVE REDCTKYES TO INDIAN ENCROACHMENTS DISRUPTING LONG ESTABLISHED EQUILIBRIUM IN UPPER HALF OF RANN, PRESENT SITUATION IS NOT TOLERABLE FOR US IN TERMS OUR ESSENTIAL INTERESTS IN SUBCONTINENT.
CFN 2.

PAGE THREE RUSBKP 1562 ~~SECRET~~

WE ARE FACED THUS BY A MOST CRUCIAL DILEMMA. TO WITHDRAW MAP SUPPORT FROM PAKISTAN, HOWEVER, JUSTIFIABLE IN THE ABSTRACTBF WOULD BE TO OPEN HERE A PANDORA'S BOX OF OUTRIGHT NEUTRALISM AND SWEEPING POLICY REORIENTATION. MAP IS LIFEBLOOD OF PAK NATIONAL SECURITY. IF PAKS ARE CUT OFF FROM MAP BECAUSE OF ITS USE IN DISPUTES WITH INDIA, WHERE FACTS (OTHER THAN SHARED CULPABILITY BOTH SIDES) HAVE ALWAYS BEEN ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO SORT OUT AND WITH INDIANS STILL BENEFITTING FROM US MILITARY EQUIPMENT WHILE STILL NOT ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON IT, PAKS WILL CONSIDER THAT THEY HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO LOOK ELSEWHERE FOR MILITARY SUPPORT AND GUARANTEES AGAINST AGGRESSION. IN OUR VIEW, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO OVER-ESTIMATE THE EMOTIONAL IMPACT OF THIS ISSUE IN PAKISTAN, OR THE ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE AMERICAN PRESENCE HERE, INCLUDING WITHOUT DOUBT STATUS OF OUR SPECIAL FACILITIES, THAT WOULD FLOW FROM A RUPTURE OF THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. YET, TO DECLINE TO CONTROL IN SOME EFFECTIVE WAY, IMPROPER OR QUESTIONABLE PAK EMPLOYMENT OF MAP EQUIPMENT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO DEFEND NOT ONLY BEFORE CONGRESS AND IN INDIA, BUT IN TERMS OUR ABILITY TO EXERCISE INFLUENCE THROUGH MAP ON PAKS.

PAGE FOUR RUSBKP 1562 ~~SECRET~~

3. WE SEE NO CLEAR ANSWER TO THIS DILEMMA. TO MOVE ALL THE WAY TO EITHER OF THESE ALTERNATIVES WOULD HAVE FAR-REACHING OMINOUS IMPLICATIONS, FORCING RIRY CHOICE BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKSTAN WE WISH TO AVOID. IN THE CASE BEFORE US, WE CONSIDER THAT THE ONLY COURSE WE CAN READILY LIVE WITH IS OFICH MAKES THE CHOICE UNNECESSARY IN PRESENT INFLAMED CIRCUMSTANCES: -- OBTEN ON OF EITHER REVERSION TO 1960 ARRANGEMENTS IN RANN OF KUTCH,

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-3- 2040, APRIL 27 FROM KARACHI

INCLUDING AGREED GROUND RULES, OR AN IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL CEASE FIRE. WE MIGHT THUS AVOID INVOLVEMENT IN MERITS OF CASE OR NEED FOR DECISION FOR THE PRESENT ON THE MAP ISSUE-- ALTHOUGH WE PROBABLY MUST FACE UP TO LATTER OVER LONGER RUN. WE URGE FULL WEIGHT OF US GOVERNMENT BE PUT BEHIND BRITISH GOOD OFFICES EFFORT (EMBTTEL 2033), BOTH HERE AND IN DELHI.

4. *TO REINFORCE THIS EFFORT*, PAKS MUST BE ADMONISHD AGAIN AT HIGHEST LEVEL THAT US MAP PROGRAMS, APART FROM LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS, CLEARLY JEOPARDIZED AS A DEFENSIBLE PRACTICAL PROPOSTION BY CONTINUATION OF RANN OF KUTCH FIGHTING. I BELIEVE I CAN GET THIS ACCROSS TO PRESIDENT AYUB IN A FORM THAT HE WILL COMPREHEND WITHOUT UNDUE RESENTMENT.

CFN 3. 1960 "(33 4.

PAGE FIVE RUSBKP 1562 ~~SECRET~~

AT SAME TIME, RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONCOCTION AND VIGOROUS STIRRING OF RANN OF KUTCH WITCHES' BREW RESTS EQUALLY ON PAK AND INDIAN SHOULDERS. OUR WARNINGS TO GOP THEREFORE SHOULD BE MATCHED WITH SIMILAR EMPHATIC WARNING TO GOI, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW GOI THREATS TO EXTEND CONFLICT TO OTHER AREAS, APPARENT INDIAN INTEREST IN COMPOUNDING OUR DIFFICULTIES IN PAKISTAN, AND INDIAN EXPLOITATION OF MRER SOVIET TIES. BOTH GOP AND GOI MUST BE FACED WITH FACT THAT AID TO BOTH WILL BE IMPERILED IF THEY DO NOT BUCKLE DOWN TO BUSINESS OF ARRANGING IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE.

GP-3.

MCCONAUGHY

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O 4/27/65 AT 1:22 PM
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, AND CIA AT 1:50 PM

~~SECRET~~

157

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

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Action
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15 APR 25 PM 2 34

MXTQSA089SBA9 13KPA314
OO RUEHCR
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FM AMEMBASSY KARACHI
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2016
INFO RUEKDA/DOD WASHDC IMMEDIATE UNN
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEWDELHI IMMEDIATE 614
RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 614
RUCJHK/CINCFSA IMMEDIATE UNN
STATE GRNC
ET
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ APR 25

John 11/3

- BUNDY-SMITH
- BATOR
- BOWMAN
- CHASE
- COOPER
- HAYNE
- JESSIP
- JOHNSON
- KEENE
- KLIEN
- KOMER
- MOODY
- REEDY
- SAUNDERS
- SAYRE
- THOMSON

CINCFSA FOR POLAD

RANN OF KUTCH

FOLLOWING INFORMATION CONCERNING ALLEGED USE OF TANKS BY PAKISTAN WITH REGARD TO RANN OF KUTCH CONFLICT HAS BEEN OBTAINED BY

[REDACTED] LOCATED AT RAWALPINDI FROM [REDACTED] RECIPIENTS REQUESTED TO PROTECT US AND PAK SOURCES.

DIA-25x1

1. [REDACTED] THAT AS OF 0900 APRIL 25:

DIA-25x1

(A) 24TH CAVALRY (FORMERLY TANK REGIMENT OF 10TH DIVISION WITH HEADQUARTERS LAHORE) HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED TO 8TH DIVISION (WHOSE COMMANDING GENERAL, GENERAL TIKKA KHAN IS IN CHARGE OF PAK FORCES IN RANN OF KUTCH). 24TH CAVALRY WHICH HAS 36 M-48 TANKS HAS MOVED INTO RANN OF KUTCH AREA. EXACT LOCATION NOT GIVEN. UNIT HAS NOT BEEN EMPLOYED AT PRESENT. CFN 2016 705 614 25 1 0900 25 24 10 TIKKA KHAN 24 26 48

PAGE TWO RUSBKP 1410 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(B) 23RD CAVALRY (FORMERLY TANK REGIMENT ON 8TH DIVISION WITH HEADQUARTERS PUETTA) IS TO BE EXCHANGED WITH 24TH CAVALRY AND THEREFORE WILL BECOME PART OF 10TH DIVISION. THIS IS ROUTINE ROTATION OF UNITS IN PAK ARMY DIVISIONS AND PLANNED ABOUT TWO MONTHS AGO. 23RDCAVALRY HAS 36 M-4 (WWII-SHERMAN) TANKS. CGS STATED THAT ONE SQUADRON OF TWELVE M24 (LIGHT) TANKS HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN DEPLOYED TO AREA BUT WERE FOUND TO BE UNSUITABLE DUE TO NATURE OF TERRAIN, LACK OF ENGINE POWER, AND ENGINE FAILURES.

CONFIDENTIAL

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No Objection To Declassification 2001/08/09 : NLJ-032-026-2-17-1

SANTIZED

Authority NLJ-032-026-002/17

By jc NARA, Date 5-18-09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 2016, APRIL 25, FROM KARACHI

(C) 12TH LANCERS (PART OF 1ST ARMORED DIVISION WITH HEADQUARTERS KARIAN) IS STILL IN ITS GARRISON LOCATION. 12TH LANCERS HAS 36 M-24 (LIGHT) TANKS.

(D) 15TH LANCERS (RECONNAISSANCE REGIMENT, WHICH EQUIVALENT TO US BATTALION WITH HEADQUARTERS LAHORE ALSO STILL IN GARRISON WITH EXCEPTION OF ONE SQUADRON (12 TANKS) WHICH MENTIONED ABOVE. 15TH LANCERS HAS 36 M-24 (LIGHT) TANKS.

CFN 23 8 24 10 23 36 M-4 CGS M24 12 1 12 36 M-24 15 12 15
36 M-24

PAGE THREE RUSBKP 1410 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

(E) [REDACTED] STATED THAT DMO (DIRECTOR OF MILITARY OPERATIONS) AND VICE CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF WERE IN OPERATIONS AREA.

(F) [REDACTED] REPORTED AS PERSONAL OBSERVATION THAT ALL PAK SENIOR COMMANDERS STILL IN RAWALPINDI ATTENDING ANNUAL COMMANDERS CONFERENCE ARE PLAYING GOLF, STICKING TO ORIGINAL SCHEDULE AND IN GENERAL ENJOYING THEMSELVES. NO REPEAT NO OUTWARD INDICATIONS OF ANXIETY OR OF MAJOR MILITARY PREPARATIONS.

(G) MAAG INSPECTION TEAM MAKING SCHEDULED INSPECTION AT QUETTA, WHERE 8TH DIVISION, LESS 51ST BRIGADE, IS LOCATED HAS BEEN AT QUETTA SINCE APRIL 21. TEAM REPORTS NO UNUSUAL ACTIVITY OR TROOP MOVEMENT THERE.

2. EMBASSY COMMENT: THIS INFORMATION SUGGESTS THAT AS OF NOW
CFN 51 8 21 2

PAGE FOUR RUSBKP 1410 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

PAK CLAIM THAT NO TANKS HAVE BEEN USED IN ACTUAL OPERATIONS PROBABLY ACCURATE. ESTIMATED THREE SQUADRONS (36 TANKS) OF M-48S ARE BEING DEPLOYED IN OPERATIONS AREA AS ARMORED RESERVE FOR USE AT SHORT NOTICE IF SITUATION WARRANTS.

3. FOR DELHI: WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING RUN-DOWN OF DISPOSITION AND COMPOSITION INDIAN FORCES RANN OF KUTCH SIMILAR TO ABOVE.

MCCONAUGHY

BT

CFN 36 M-48-3

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 2:57 PM, 4/25/65.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 3:15 PM, 4/25/65.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY

158

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

4

~~SECRET~~

Action

CONTROL: 20497

NEA

REC'D: APRIL 24, 1965

FROM: NEW DELHI

3:40 A.M.

Info

SS ACTION: SECSTATE IMMEDIATE 3016

G

SP INFO: DOD IMMEDIATE UNNUMBERED

SAH CINCMEAFSA IMMEDIATE UNNUMBERED

L KARACHI IMMEDIATE 629

H LONDON IMMEDIATE 718

EUR

DATE: APRIL 24

FE

IO

P

USIA

DOD PASS DIA

NSC

INR AT 1100 HOURS 24 APRIL DEPUTY CHIEF USMSMI AND ACTING ARMY

NSA ATTACHE WERE CALLED TO THE OFFICE OF GENERAL CHAUDHURY,

AID COAS IA.

PC

OPR COAS PREFACED HIS REMARKS WITH, "GENTLEMEN, I AM FACED WITH A
OC CRISIS." HE THEN GAVE A CONDENSED BRIEFING OF THE RANN OF KUTCH
RMR SITUATION. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE LATEST DEVELOPMENT WAS THE
ATTACK OF POINT 84 (2415N-6940E) AT BIARBET BY PAK ARMOR EMPLOYING
CHAFFEE TANKS IN SQUADRON FORCE. HE STATED HE HAD IRREFUTABLE
EVIDENCE OF THIS ACTION AND THAT THE UNIT WAS FROM C SQUADRON
OF EITHER 12TH OR 15TH LANCERS. COAS STATED THAT HE
POSITIVELY DID NOT HAVE ARMOR IN THE AREA AND DID NOT INTEND TO
EMPLOY ANY. HE EXPLAINED THAT TO DO SO WOULD REQUIRE A LONG
RAIL MOVE, FOLLOWED BY A LONG ROAD MARCH, AFTER WHICH HIS TANKS
WOULD BE USELESS. THE GENERAL THEN MADE TWO POINTS:

1. IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD STATED
THAT IF EITHER INDIA OR PAKISTAN USED MAP EQUIPMENT AGAINST THE
OTHER THE U.S. WOULD "INTERVENE".

/2. THAT IF/

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Authority Stat 8-11-76
By jdrg NARA. Date 5-18-04

~~SECRET~~

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030

- BUNDY-SMITH
- BATOR
- BOWMAN
- COCHRAN
- HAYNES
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- KEENEY R
- KLIEN
- KOMER
- MOODY
- REEDY
- SAUNDERS
- SAYRE
- THOMSON

NAVY DING 2-18-01
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED
EXEMPTION FROM THE GDS

~~SECRET~~

15 APR 1971

-2- 3016 APRIL 24 FROM NEW DELHI

2. THAT IF THE TANK ATTACKS CONTINUE AND HE SUSTAINED CASUALTIES, HE WAS SURE THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD DEMAND GOI RETALIATORY ACTION.

IN ANSWER TO ARMA QUESTION, COAS STATED THAT THE 18 PT-76 TANKS WERE IN AHMEDNAGAR BEING UNCRATED BUT THAT HE HAD NO INTENTION OF EMPLOYMENT THEM.

IN ANSWER TO QUESTION OF DEPUTY CHIEF USMSMI REGARDING PHOTOGRAPHIC PROOF OF PAK TANK, COAS DIRECTED L/GEN. KUMARAMANGALAM, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, TO HAVE IAF OBTAIN ACTUAL PHOTOS. ADDITIONAL EXPLANATION WAS GIVEN THAT IAF AND PAK AF HAVE AGREEMENT NOT TO EMPLOY FIGHTER AIRCRAFT WITHIN 10 MILES OF BORDER.

GOI CALLED A MEETING OF THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE OF THE CABINET AT 0900 HOURS THIS MORNING AND HAS ANOTHER SCHEDULED FOR 1200. COAS HAD TOLD EMERGENCY COMMITTEE THAT HE WOULD BRIEF U.S. ATTACHE.

IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS COAS STATED THAT IA AND PAK REGULAR TROOPS ON PATROL HAD FIRED ON EACH OTHER. ACTIVE EXCHANGE CONTINUES ALONG WIDENED FRONT. ACTIVE FRONT IS NOW 30 MILES IN LENGTH FROM 2410N-6935E.

COAS STATED HE THOUGHT THAT HE COULD KEEP TANK ACTION OUT OF PRESS UNTIL TOMORROW.

BOWLES

JCM

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-0 3:45 A.M. APRIL 24
PASSED WHITE HOUSE 4:15 A.M. APRIL 24
PASSED CIA 4:20 A.M. APRIL 24 (PER S/S-0)

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Department of State
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158a

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

SUMMARY 28

4

~~SECRET~~

20489

Action
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DE RUSBAE 1226 240815Z
Z 240810Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY NEWDELHI
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3015
INFO RUEKDA/DOD FLASH UNN
RUCJHK/CINCPACFLT SA FLASH UNN
RUSBKP/AMEMBASSY KARACHI FLASH 628
RUFHDN/LONDON FLASH 717
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~

APRIL 24
DOD PASS DIA

IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM REPORTS IN DETAIL APPEAL BY GENERAL CHAUDHURY FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE IN RESTRAINING ESCALATION OF WHAT HE DESCRIBES AS ATTACK BY PAK TANKS OF U.S. ORIGIN REINFORCED BY INFANTRY IN RANN OF KUTCH, WE ARE FOLLOWING UP URGENTLY WITH MEA IN EFFORT GET PRECISE PICTURE OF GOI INTENTIONS IN WHAT COULD BE GRAVE CONFRONTATION. ALSO CONSULTING WITH BRITISH.

ANYTHING EMBASSY KARACHI CAN GIVE US ON THE FACTS WILL HELP.

COMMENTS ON POSSIBLE ACTION WILL FOLLOW AS SOON AS PICTURE A LITTLE SOLIDER.

BOWLES
BT
CFN 3015 628 717 24

APR 24 AM 3 23
BUNDY-SMITH
BATOR
BOWMAN
CHASE
COOPER
HAYNES
FLASH
JOHNSON
KEENEY R
KLIEN
KOMER
MOODY
REEDY
SAUNDERS
SAYRE
THOMSON

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 3:26 a.m., April 24.
Passed White House at 3:35 a.m., April 24.
Passed CIA 3:50 a.m., April 24, per S/S-0.

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Authority State 8-11-76
By jcl/g NARA. Date 5-18-04

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159

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

45

~~SECRET~~

Action
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O R 241315Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY KARACHI
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2014
INFO RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 703
RUEKDA/DOD WASHDC UNN
RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON 612
RUCJHK/CINCMEAFSA UNN
STATE GRNC

20719

105 APR 24 AM 9 42

~~SECRET~~ APRIL 24

CINCMEAFSA FOR POLAD

REF: DELHI'S FLASH 628 AND 629

25x1A

1. ONLY INFORMATION AS TO TANKS WHICH WE HAVE ARE ██████ REPORTS NPL 2322 AND 2323, APRIL 21, STATING THAT THREE SQUADRONS TOTALING 36 N-48 MAAG-PROVIDED TANKS EN ROUTE BS RAIL FROM LAHORE TOWARD RANN OF KUTCH AREA, DATE OF CLAIMED MOVEMENT APRIL 20 TO 21 AND ONE SQUADRON REPORTEDLY SENT SEVERAL DAYS EARLIER. PRESUMABLY ANY SUCH TANKS WOULD HAVE BEEN UNLOADED AT RAIL TERMINAL BADIN, APPROXIMATELY FIFTY MILES FROM RANN OF KUTCH AREA OF CONFLICT.

FN 2014 703 612 628 629 1. 2322 2323 21 36 48 20 21

PAGE TWO RUSBKP 1388 ~~SECRET~~
EMBASSY HAS NO INFORMATION THAT ANY TANKS HAVE PROCEEDED TO RANN OF KUTCH AND ██
STATED CATEGORICALLY APRIL 21 TO SENIOR MISSION OFFICER THAT NO TANKS BEING USED BY PAKS IN THIS AREA AND FURTHERMORE THAT TERRAIN WAS NOT SUITABLE FOR TANK OPERATIONS. EMBASSY WILL ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN FURTHER INFORMATION SOONEST.

25x1X

2. ON INDIAN CLAIMS THAT PAKS MISUSING MAP EQUIPMENT, SHOULD BE NOTED THAT MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT OF MAY 19, 1954, BETWEEN US AND PAKISTAN STATES (ARTICLE I, PARA 2) THAT "THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN WILL USE THIS ASSISTANCE EXCLUSIVELY TO MAINTAIN ITS INTERNAL SECURITY, ITS LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENSE, OR TO PERMIT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND MEASURES, AND PAKISTAN WILL NOT UNDERTAKE ANY ACT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST ANY OTHER NATION." PAKS WOULD CERTAINLY MAINTAIN THAT USE OF MAP EQUIPMENT IN CIRCUMSTANCES OBTAINING IN RANN OF KUTCH DISPUTED AREA NOT VIOLATION OF MAP AGREEMENT.

~~SECRET~~

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SANITIZED *see letter 2-28-78 letter and*
Authority RAC-NLS DDI-151-2-1
By iss, NARA, Date 12-5-01

~~SECRET~~

-2- 2014, APRIL 24, FROM KARACHI

3. AS INDICATED ABOVE, WE WILL SEEK INFORMATION FROM PAKS AS TO CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION IN KUTCH, PARTICULARLY IN AREA BETWEEN 24TH PARALLEL AF PAK DE FACTO PATROL LINE.
CFN 21 2. 19, 1954 2 3. 24

PAGE THREE RUSBKP 1388 ~~SECRET~~
OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT PAKS ARE CONCERNED LEST INDIAN STEPS TO CONSOLIDATE MILITARY POSITION IN THIS AREA PREJUDICE PAK POSITION IN ANY SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS FOR AGREED BORDER, BEARING IN MIND THAT PAKS PROPOSED TO INDIANS IN 1960 BOUNDARY BASED ON 24TH PARALLEL. FOR THIS REASON AS WELL AS TO GIVE THEMSELVES SOME KIND OF A CARD FOR A CEASE-FIRE INVOLVING MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM DISPUTED AREA, PAKS MAY HAVE CONCLUDED MORE POSITIVE PAK MILITARY ROLE IN DISPUTED AREA SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN.

GP3.
MCCONAUGHY
BT
CFN 1960 24

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 9:50 AM, 4/24/65.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 10:00 AM, 4/24/65.

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

13757 ¹⁶⁰

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

SUMMARY

~~SECRET~~

46

Origin
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ACTION: Amembassy ~~KARACHI~~ IMMEDIATE 1195
Amembassy New DELHI IMMEDIATE 2222
INFO: CINCMEAUSA IMMEDIATE
Amembassy LONDON IMMEDIATE 6778

APR 24 9 00 AM '65

- ~~BATON~~
- ~~BOWMAN~~
- ~~CHASE~~
- ~~COOPER~~
- ~~EDWARDS~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
- ~~KEENE~~
- ~~KLIPP~~
- ~~MOORE~~
- ~~MOODY~~
- ~~REEDY~~
- ~~ROBERTS~~
- ~~SAYRE~~
- ~~THOMPSON~~

India (R.B.K.)

Delhi's 3015 repeated Karachi 628

Since Paks have already confirmed to us that their forces have attacked in Biar Bet area and that this well within disputed area (Karachi's 2003 repeated Delhi 699), and since you report that these are MAP supplied forces, you should seek appointment soonest with Foran Minister or Foran Secretary to express our strong concern over what appears be worsening situation Rann of Kutch. You should recall assurances given you by Ayub (Karachi's 1971 repeated Delhi 687) that Paks had not and did not intend to go beyond traditional patrol routes in disputed area/ that Pak forces would not use any more force than necessary to repel force resorted to by Indian side. Moreover Ayub recognized something had to be done to relieve worsening situation and that Pakistan shared responsibility for this. Pak action confirmed by MFA Director Akhund would appear inconsistent with these assurances and we must now ask what Pak intentions are.

039

In making representations you should cite accusation re use of MAP equipment made by General Chaudhri and seek confirmation. Since we assume there little doubt that accusations well founded, believe you should sound

Drafted by: NEA; SOA; LBL; Ingen; CCL; Laise

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

NEA - William J. Handley

Clearances: 4/24/65
DOD/ISA - J. Stoddard (substance) *WCL*

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FORM 8-63 DS-322 Authority ERus 64-68 w/25 #109

By *J* NARA. Date 5-19-04

~~SECRET~~

~~MA~~
warning that use of our MAP equipment in this type of situation could jeopardize MAP program.

You should also say that we are expressing our strong concern over Kutch situation to Indians.

For Delhi:

In whatever followup steps Embassy takes with MEA noted reftel, assume Ambassador will register our increasing concern. Ambassador should inform MEA we are making representations to GOP.

Agree with Delhi on importance of coordinating closely with British, who we would hope also bringing their influence to bear on both parties.

GP - 3 End

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

161

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~
Classification

82

- Origin
- L
- Info
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- EUR
- NEA
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- USIA
- NSC
- INR
- CIA
- NSA
- DOD
- IGA
- AID

ACTION: AmEmbassy KARACHI IMMEDIATE 1204

INFO: AmEmbassy NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 2227

" LONDON IMMEDIATE 6758

CINCMEAFSA IMMEDIATE

APR 24 5 02 PM '65

091

Deptel 1195 to Karachi rptd New Delhi 2222 info London 6778, Cincmeafsa Unn.

For your information and use in talks with GOP, following is US legal position regarding use of-MAP equipment in disputed territories in Rann of Kutch:

MAP equipment furnished with clear understanding it required for internal security, legitimate self defense or collective defense area. In connection use where frontier disputed, USG manifestly cannot unilaterally determine where border is for purpose establishing rights or wrongs of use equipment obtained under MAP agreements. On other hand, we believe it is

~~that because of uncertainty of boundary and uncertainty as to just what events have transpired;~~

equally apparent/neither GOP nor GOI has either legal or political capability assuring us that such equipment being used in fact/maintain "internal security" or for "legitimate self-defense".

In circumstances, USG is not willing that MAP equipment should be used by either country in connection such disputed areas where even error in good faith by ~~XXXX~~ recipient country may result in equipment being outside area legitimate self defense and internal security.

GP-3.

END.

- ~~BUNDY-SMITH~~
- ~~BATOR~~
- ~~BOWMAN~~
- ~~CHASE~~
- ~~COOPER~~
- ~~HAYNES~~
- ~~JESSUP~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
- ~~KENY~~
- ~~LIEN~~
- ~~KOMER~~
- ~~MOODY~~
- ~~REEDY~~
- ~~SAUNDERS~~
- ~~SAYRE~~
- ~~THOMSON~~

Drafted by: L: DWehmeyer: NEA/SOA:
DTSchneider: nrs: 4-24-65

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - William J. Handley

RUSK

L - Mr. Meeker (draft)

DOD/ISA Mr. Murray (subs)

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~~SECRET~~

Classification

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

068
163

- BUNDY-SMITH
- BATOR
- BOWMAN
- CHAMBERS
- COOPER
- HANLEY
- JENSEN
- JEWELL
- KEENE
- KETNER
- KOCMER
- MOODY
- REEDY
- SANDERS
- SAYRE
- THOMSON

INDICATE: COLLECT
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88-81

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ACTION: Amembassy ~~NEW~~ DELHI 1904

INFO: Amembassy KARACHI 990
Amembassy KATHMANDU 208
Amembassy LONDON 5669

MAR 11 6 53 PM '65

Indian Embassy Minister Banerjee called on Deputy Assistant Secretary

Handley March 11 and stated orally that on December 31, 1964 Indian forces had recovered unspecified number of rifles from Pakistanis approximately 200 yards inside ceasefire line in URI sector. Rifles bear markings QUOTE U.S. 4 MK 18303821 UNQUOTE. Banerjee asked Handley to have matter looked into to determine whether rifles had been supplied to Paks under MAP. Handley agreed to have check made to determine whether markings identifiable as that used on MAP equipment.

Banerjee explained that several questions on this subject have been tabled in Parliament and GOI anticipates sharp questioning in wake of Ayub visit to Communist China. Banerjee said his inquiry enables GOI take position that matter has been brought to attention of USG.

Handley took occasion to inform Banerjee that ~~legal~~ determination has been made here that there no rpt no legal obstacle to our using MAP to assist Indian Border Roads Organization (BRO) construct Nepal East-West Highway. Before proceeding further with discussions, we now awaiting word from GOI as to whether Indians plan use PWD or BRO in East-West Highway construction.

GP-3
END.

Drafted by: NEA:SOA:AALakeland;bts	3/11/65	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - William J. Handley
Clearances: XXXXXXXXXXXX		DOD/ISA - Col. Miller (substance)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines

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By jc, NARA, Date 5-21-04

629
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

H. Colle
2. Return
Dec. 26

Mr. Smith:

Mr. O'Donnell is away right now but I wonder if someone from your shop could make a recommendation on this so he can take it up on his return.

Ordinarily, we would send this to State but the writer specifically asks that this not be done.

H. Colle

India - Poll
Placed
Returned to
Kenneth O'Donnell
with Rivk memo 12/26/64.

164

DEC 26 1963

PRESERVATION COPY

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY
MINNESOTA

627
WILLIAM CONNELL
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

W. Connell

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D.C.

December 20, 1963

164a

MEMORANDUM

For: Walter Jenkins

From: Bill Connell

Could you take this up with the President at an opportune time, Walter? Singh will be here through most of January.

120 x 1963

PRESERVATION COPY

164 b

J. W. FULBRIGHT, ARK., CHAIRMAN

JOHN SPARKMAN, ALA.	BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, ILL.
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, MINN.	GEORGE D. AIKEN, VT.
MIKE MANSFIELD, MONT.	FRANK CARLSON, KANS.
WAYNE MORSE, OREG.	JOHN J. WILLIAMS, DEL.
RUSSELL B. LONG, LA.	KARL E. MUNDT, S. DAK.
ALBERT GORE, TENN.	
FRANK J. LAUSCHE, OHIO	
FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO	
STUART SYMINGTON, MO.	
THOMAS J. DODD, CONN.	
GEORGE A. SMATHERS, FLA.	

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

December 20, 1963

CARL MARCY, CHIEF OF STAFF
DARRELL ST. CLAIRE, CLERK


The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I call to your attention the attached letter and item from the New York Times. The letter is self-explanatory.

I hesitate to press this matter, even though Mr. Singh is a very important person and a great friend of the United States. He has a host of friends here in Congress, including Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Mundt, Gore, Douglas, and others. He is truly a very responsible man, but I realize how hard-pressed you are for time. If there is a chance for Mr. Singh to be squeezed in for a moment, I think you would find it helpful.

Respectfully,


Hubert H. Humphrey

121-6163

N INDIAN VISITS LD HAUNTS HERE

Singh Tells of Changes in Face of Homeland

along-familiar figure on Man-
tan's upper East Side is back
town. As usual, he is full
the latest developments in
a, seen with a new perspec-
since he moved back there
1959' to retire.

J. Singh, an unofficial In-
spokesman as founder of
India League of America
its president until it was
ntinued on his retirement,
a four-week visit "to re-
contacts and friendships"
and in Washington.

was interviewed at India
and Crafts, Inc., the shop
17 East 54th Street where
carried on an import busi-
during the years when In-
was transformed from a
ish dominion to a sovereign
e. He lived here as a busi-
man from 1926 until his re-
ment.

All the tall, urbane figure
strong features who
med the American political
social world in the nine-
forties and fifties, he will
6 on Oct. 6. As a member
he youthful generation that
ated for Indian self-rule 40
s ago under the leadership
andhi and Jawaharlal Neh-
now Prime Minister, he is
scious of differences in atti-
between young Indians to-
and the youths of four dec-
ago.

Generations Contrasted

the "impatience" of young
le in India today, he said
ringly:

They want to go forward,
aise the living standard of
people, to do much bigger
s at a much faster pace
our generation."
r. Singh said he was "some-



The New York Times

REPORTS ON CHANGES: J. J. Singh, who headed old India League of America.

times staggered at our prob-
lems"—450 million people strug-
gling to lift themselves econom-
ically "by their bootstraps."

Mr. Singh has had a chance
to observe contemporary India
not only from his home in New
Delhi but also during travels
all over the country on one of
his latest voluntary missions—
a successful campaign to get
more than a million signatures
on a petition calling for the end
of nuclear testing.

Villagers Fear Fallout

He dealt with "student com-
munities" and "what intrigued
me most — the villagers." He
said they had displayed a lively
awareness of the dangers of nu-
clear fallout.

Another of Mr. Singh's activi-
ties in retirement has been to
serve as secretary of the India-

Pakistan Conciliation Group,
which seeks a better under-
standing between the peoples of
India and Pakistan.

Mr. Singh, a Sikh, was born
in Rawalpindi, now the capital
of Pakistan, and spent his
"whole youth" in the provinces
of British India that became
part of Pakistan.

He owns a town house on
East 61st Street that for many
years was a meeting place for
Indians and Americans who had
diverse interests but found a
common ground in their inter-
est in one another. At dinner
parties there, Mr. Singh liked
to seat everyone in a huge circle
after the meal, then start a
general and often controversial
discussion by posing a provoca-
tive question.

Practice Continues

He has continued this prac-
tice in the spacious living room
of the two-story home he built
in a New Delhi suburb appro-
priately called Friends' Colony.

Since his return to New Del-
hi four years ago, he has been
active socially and on the
fringes of the turbulent Indian
political scene. Besides his other
activities, he was an unofficial
intermediary in the tension two
years ago between the Govern-
ment and political leaders of
the Sikh community, who were
agitating unsuccessfully then
for a separate state within In-
dia.

Mr. Singh is married to the
former Malti Saxena, whom he
wed in 1951 when her father,
R. R. Saxena, was Indian High
Commissioner to Canada. They
have two sons, neither of whom
spoke any Indian language when
the family moved to New Delhi
in 1959. Mr. Singh told friends
at that time that one of the
reasons he was returning to In-
dia to live was so that his sons
could learn at first hand about
their country.

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INDIA-PAKISTAN CONCILIATION GROUP

101 Friends Colony, New Delhi 14

17 7 East 54th Street
New York 22, N.Y.

December 11, 1963

Chairman:

JAYA PRAKASH NARAYAN

Executive Committee:

RAJKUMARI AMRIT KAUR

A. AFFADORAI

C. C. DESAI

B. SHIVA RAO

COL. B. H. ZAIDI

J. J. SINGH

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S. SHAMSUL HASAN

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JOHN LINTON

P. S. LOKANATHAN

S. L. POPLAI

SRI PRAKASA

BHIMSEN SACHAR

K. SANTHANAM

UJJAL SINGH

Senator Hubert Humphrey
Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C.

Dear Hubert,

So much has happened since I saw you in Washington.

I do not have to tell you how grief-stricken both my wife and I have been at the tragedy that has struck not only the people of the United States but people all over the world. And I cannot say that we have gotten over it as yet.

India has mourned this loss as deeply as any other country. I have received many letters where the writers - mostly men - have not hesitated in saying that many times they wept.

I have today received a letter from our Finance Minister, Mr. P. T. Krishnamachari whom you met when he was here a few months ago. In his letter he has said: "Believe me that the feeling of regret and loss of a friend has been spontaneous and almost universal in India."

Hubert, perhaps, this is not quite the right time for me to make this request but I am going to make it.

I know that your relationship with President Johnson is excellent. Do you think you could arrange that I have the privilege of calling upon him?

I know that upon my return to India and with my previous experience in this country where I stayed for 35 years, I will be besieged with one question: Do you know President Johnson? What kind of a man is he?

PRESERVATION COPY

I would like to be able to tell both the official world and the non-official world that I have had the privilege of meeting President Johnson and how wonderfully well he is carrying on with his duties in this crisis.

Also I would like to tell him something about India-Pakistan relations which, as you know, in my capacity as Secretary-of the India-Pakistan Conciliation Group is my immediate and deep concern.

President Johnson will be siezed with this problem before long. I would like to be able to tell him that our Group and many others in India are dedicated to the cause of creating friendly relations with the people of Pakistan.

I do not want to make a request to see President Johnson through official sources.

I feel that having worked for more than two decades for creating better relations between the people of India and the people of the United States, I do not have to ask the Indian Ambassador to arrange this meeting, though Ambassador Nehru is a very good friend of mine. Nor do I want to go through the State Department even though I know Dean Rusk very well. As a matter of fact, I spent very fruitful time with him when I was in Washington a few weeks ago.

That is why I am writing this letter to you with a hope that, as my old friend you can arrange this as an unofficial visit without any publicity.

I am enclosing herewith a story which appeared in the New York Times soon after my arrival here. If President Johnson's secretary or secretaries would want to know something more about me then you could send them this cutting. Or better than that, you could send them a copy of the Congressional Record where you made that most glowing and wonderful speech about me on the floor of the Senate. (Feb-March 1959)

Lastly, I will be here until the first week of January and then I will be returning to India.


Any day, any time the President could see me for a few minutes, I will fly down to Washington.

I know you will do your best.

With warm regards from my wife and myself
to both you and Mrs. Humphrey,

Yours as ever,

J.J. Sinch

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of several overlapping loops and a long vertical stroke, positioned to the right of the typed name 'J.J. Sinch'.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 20, 1963

TO: Mr. Komer

Should this go to State, and does it
need a reply?

McG. B.

orig. returned
to McG B with
HHS memo 12/21/63

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India - Pak
+ Pakistan



AMBASSADOR OF PAKISTAN

PRIVATE & PERSONAL.

EMBASSY OF PAKISTAN
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Dec. 17, 1963

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Agut
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12/17/63

Private and Personal message from Field Marshal
Mohammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, to
Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United
States.

I am deeply touched by your warm references to our
friendship and expressions of your personal regard for me,
which my Foreign Minister has conveyed to me. I want you
to know that I have always held you in the highest esteem and
affection and that my personal relations with you will continue
to be marked by the same close friendship and understanding
as hitherto. I have often recalled, with great joy and gratitude,
the many quiet, endearing gestures of kindness and the genuine
warmth of the hospitality that you and Lady Bird so graciously
showered on me during my stay in your Texan home.

Please be assured that in the discharge of the very
heavy responsibilities that God has placed on you, not only my
best wishes but also my prayers for your success will be with
you always.

You are probably aware of how deeply concerned I have
been during the last one year over the course of United States policy
towards India and its dangerous impact on Pakistan's security.
This policy inflicts not only a grievous hurt on Pakistan -- a
friend and ally of the United States; it will not help achieve
United States objectives in this region. Time and again, during
the last 16 years, we have suffered from Indian treachery. Can
any one in America seriously believe, knowing India's past
record, that she would behave differently towards the United

PRESERVATION COPY

States? I cannot help feeling that the United States has let down a friend in pursuit of a mirage.

I am comforted by the knowledge that as soon as you have had time to study this subject, you will bring to bear on it your great capacity for a dispassionate, realistic and severely practical approach, and that if the interests of the United States and of your friends demand a change, you have the courage to effect it.

As to our relations with China, I would request you not to get needlessly perturbed but to have faith in our ability to protect not only our own national interests but also those of the free world in the dealings we must necessarily have with our Communist neighbours.

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON



19153

December 18, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Indo-Pakistan Relations

Indo-Pak

In view of the major decisions presently pending concerning military assistance to India, we thought you would be interested in an assessment of current Indo-Pakistan relations. The paper, which is enclosed, concentrates on the developments since October.

We have concluded that in the future Indo-Pakistan relations will be tense but, at this stage, serious hostilities appear unlikely. We have also concluded that the most that the United States can do in the present atmosphere is to try to exercise a moderating influence and that no initiative on Kashmir is possible at this time.

Benjamin H. Read
for Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Report entitled
"Indo-Pakistan Relations".

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 61-63, vol. 19, #343

By [Signature] NARA, Date 5-19-01

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GROUP 3

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DEC 19 1963

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Indo-Pakistan Relations

A. The Situation

Over the last year the external pressures upon India and Pakistan, at a time when both governments are in a relatively weaker internal position, have resulted in a hardening of the position of each country toward the other and a consequent exacerbation of tensions, exemplified in the following:

1. Recent Pakistan Actions

Pakistan has used all media and available opportunities (bilateral discussions, CENTO and SEATO meetings, U.N., etc.) to emphasize its fear of India and conviction that a militarily strengthened India will be aggressive. In October the Pakistan Government mounted a sustained propaganda and diplomatic campaign charging India with misusing western arms assistance and taking actions in Kashmir which are contrary to U.N. resolutions. On the diplomatic level Pakistan delivered a series of aide-memoire to us and the U.K., exchanged bitterly worded notes with India and lodged letters of protest with the U.N. A virulent anti-Indian press campaign and vitriolic statements by Pakistan leaders supported the diplomatic moves. The principal thesis of these efforts was that India's actions had proven Pakistan's contention about Indian aggressive intentions. Also, we have received intelligence reports which indicated that Pakistan was considering causing trouble of some sort along the Kashmir border or within Kashmir. In the last few weeks there has been a decrease of overt indicators of immediate trouble in Kashmir, although the Pakistan press has periodically returned to the attack. Also, we continue to receive reports of the distribution of arms to civilians in the cease-fire line area. Foreign Minister Bhutto, who was out of the country in October, has informed us that he is strongly opposed to the current tactics of the GOP and would exercise his influence to prevent extreme reaction to inconsequential Indian "provocations".

More recently Pakistan has requested India to close a branch office of the Indian Deputy High Commission in East Pakistan charging it was used for subversive activities. This policy toward India has been accompanied by a continuing series of steps to normalize Pakistan's relations with Communist China, India's enemy. Most recently, Pakistan has agreed to a state visit by Chou En-lai and Chen Yi in February 1964.

2. Indian

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By jc NARA. Date 5-19-01

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2. Indian Actions

Nehru's Lok Sabha speech on Kashmir in August withdrew the "concessions" offered during the earlier bilateral talks and virtually slammed the door on third party mediation.

On October 4, 1963 the outgoing Prime Minister of India held Kashmir, Ghulam Bakshi, made certain proposals which, if adopted, would constitute further steps toward the integration of Kashmir into the Indian Union. While the Bakshi proposals thus far have not been implemented, an action of this nature is a red flag to Pakistanis and was the immediate stimulant for the Pakistani campaign. Later in the month the GOI replied to a Pakistan note of protest in a particularly insulting manner and a letter to the U.N. Security Council was provocative. The Indian press did not reach the high pitch of the Pakistan press but it did add to the over-all tense atmosphere.

On November 27, Home Minister Nanda told Parliament that Kashmir was "fully integrated" into India and, that while there was no present GOI intention to repeal Article 370 of the Indian Constitution which accords a special status to Kashmir, Nanda indicated that Article 370 undoubtedly would be further diluted by additional changes in consultation with the Kashmir government. He indicated that the GOI approved the nomenclature changes proposed by Bakshi on October 4. Supplementing Nanda's remarks, Nehru told Parliament November 27 that the "process of gradual erosion of Article 370 is going on" and should be allowed to continue.

India has continued to expel sizeable numbers of Muslims from Assam and Tripura into East Pakistan and has taken a hard line on negotiations with Pakistan on this problem. However, on November 13 Home Minister Nanda announced that special judicial tribunals were being formed to review expulsion cases to assure that no errors were made. Moreover, agreement reportedly has been reached with Pakistan for diplomatic and ministerial talks on the Muslim evacuee problem. This may be jeopardized by Pakistan's action to close India's branch office in East Pakistan.

During recent conversations with Ambassador Bowles, Indian leaders have stated that India will follow a policy of restraint in its relations with Pakistan. Prime Minister Nehru has reiterated this assurance in his recent letter to the President. In addition, Indian officials both in New Delhi and Washington have informed us that the GOI would be pleased if the United States repeated its security assurances to Pakistan regarding aggression by India. The Indians state that they hope and assume that this would have a quieting effect on the Pakistanis.

B. U.S.

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B. U.S. and U.K. Response

In Washington and in Karachi and New Delhi, we have urged both India and Pakistan to act with restraint, to avoid provocative actions, and to make full use of the U.N. Observers in Kashmir if trouble ensued. We also informed the governments that our position on the Bakshi integration proposals is governed by the U.N. Security Council resolutions. With respect to the Pakistani charges of Indian misuse of western military aid, we have intentionally refrained from making any formal reply to Pakistan so as not to encourage spurious charges, but we have quietly urged the GOI to take great care that equipment is not misdirected to units facing Pakistan. We have closely coordinated the substance of our response with the U.K. which in London and in Karachi and New Delhi has followed a parallel line. The British have emphasized to Pakistan that provocative acts on its part could undermine Pakistan's legal position on Kashmir.

C. U.N. Observer Group Action

General Nimmo, the head of the U.N. Military Observer Group in Kashmir, has reported that there has been a substantial increase in incidents in the last eighteen months and he has requested six additional military officers to bolster his current force of 34 people. Although the U.N. Secretariat has for several months been attempting to find a replacement for the DC-3 transport aircraft previously furnished the Group by the Italian Government, General Nimmo has recently expressed interest in obtaining instead smaller aircraft or helicopters to increase the observation capability of the Group. We have asked our Mission in New York to consult informally with the Secretariat to obtain the latter's clarification of its requirements so that we may explore ways we and others might assist to resolve this question.

D. Analysis of Current Maneuvers

1. Pakistan

a. In an exchange of views a few weeks ago in London, CRO considered that the GOP's genuine concern about the Indian threat and its exaggeration for tactical purposes are so intertwined, even in the minds of Pakistan's leaders, that it is difficult to determine the relative weight of each factor. We agree with this assessment.

b. Pakistan's

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b. Pakistan's strong reaction to the Bakshi proposals and subsequent Indian statements signalling further integration of Kashmir into India was automatic; for domestic reasons alone the Government had to put up a strong front. It is also possible that India's actions gave an opening to the "hardliners" within the GOP, such as Foreign Secretary Ahmed, to press their viewpoint.

c. The actions taken by Pakistan in the last few months have been directed as much against us as India. They are a reminder that Pakistan is not reconciled to United States military assistance to India, that the Kashmir issue is not dormant, and that Pakistan has the capacity to exacerbate tensions any time it wishes.

d. Pakistan's actions are also indicative of its basic attitude, or modus operandi toward its neighbors, namely, that the only way to get results is to apply strong pressure. This approach was used against Afghanistan during 1961-1963 and has always been applied in cycles to India. As Ayub puts it, Pakistan's policy is to "lean against India". At the same time Pakistan is seeking to enlist on its side the power of other nations, particularly the United States, but also including Communist China, to bring pressure to bear on India to resolve the disputes on terms favorable to Pakistan.

2. India

The Indian Government is determined to avoid an appearance of weakness vis-a-vis Pakistan. Many influential Indians suspect that Pakistan has secret agreements with Communist China and are fearful of coordinated pressure against India. Consequently, India is not disposed to negotiate or to be forthcoming with Pakistan. The Indian assessment of the October tension was mixed. Moreover, as is the case in Pakistan, the GOI for domestic reasons must periodically demonstrate its ability to be firm with Pakistan. The official Indian position has been that the Pakistanis were playing to the gallery in preparation for General Taylor's visit and that India's best course was to ignore or play down Pakistani protests and act with restraint. A second viewpoint within the GOI was that the Pakistanis might well cross the cease-fire line in order to dramatize the Kashmir issue with a possible serious escalation of the conflict.

The GOI has told us that they favor a strengthening of the U.N. Observer group and a broadening of their terms of reference to include police as well as military action on the cease-fire line.

E. Conclusion

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E. Conclusion

1. Indo-Pakistani relations will involve a fairly constant stream of insults in both directions, disposition to play up the border incidents that have been increasing in numbers over the years, and a heating up of other disputes; but at this stage serious hostilities appear unlikely.

2. The policy the United States should follow should be based on our recognition that geography, history, and our limited capability rule out the possibility of early solutions to any of the problems that underlie the Indo-Pak discord, desirable as this development may be. Therefore, our most constructive contribution is to play a consistent moderating role. This entails the following courses:

- a. Refrain from getting drawn into the dispute or taking sides;
- b. Make known to both countries that we expect restraint and as necessary point out what the requirements of restraint are in specific situations;
- c. Support an effective U.N. observer operation;
- d. Undergird our selective and limited military assistance given to both countries for defensive purposes with sufficient political safeguards to avoid an arms race;
- e. Continue to maintain that Kashmir is not an obsolescent issue but refrain from United States initiatives on the Kashmir issue in the present climate; seek to get the Pakistanis to realize the adverse effect of their current posture toward the Chicomos on the resolution of this issue and to persuade the Indians of the unwisdom of treating the Paks as though they are allied with the Chicomos;
- f. Conduct quiet explorations through nongovernmental groups to determine whether it is possible to develop noncontroversial areas of cooperation within Indian and Pakistan society and attitudes receptive to finding rational solutions to the whole range of Indo-Pak problems.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

December 4, 1963

*India Pak
Yemen*

MEMORANDUM FOR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
STANDING GROUP

Two problem areas on which we shortly confront decisions are Yemen and the complex of India/Pakistan issues which bear on General Taylor's trip to India/Pakistan.

Before these questions go to the President, I think it advisable that we meet Friday, December 6th, at 5:00 PM, to thrash out any unresolved issues in order to have for the President either an agreed recommendation or clearly stated alternatives.

On Yemen, the issues for discussion seem to be: (1) what action we should take prior to the likely end of UNYOM on January 4th; and (2) should we withdraw our air squadron from Saudi Arabia.

The India/Pakistan issues include: (1) the modified Bowles proposal for longer term military aid to India; and (2) the brief for General Taylor, particularly the nature of the reassurances he will be authorized to offer Pakistan.

I understand that State and Defense have prepared position papers and recommendations on each of the above; these should be the drafts for discussion.

McGeorge Bundy

McGeorge Bundy

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 5-19-01

~~SECRET~~