

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 report	Komer - UAR/Israeli Missile Race - Tab A S 1 pp <i>open 11/3/02</i>	<del>5/29/64</del>	<del>A</del>
#2 memo	Komer to Jernegan S 1 pp <i>open 11/3/02</i>	<del>3/12/64</del>	<del>A</del>
#3 memo	RWK to Mac <i>Sanitized 6-23-04 NLJ 04-3 Dup #357, Papers of Komer, Box 4, Chron Jan-Jun 64</i> S 2 pp <del>exempt NLJ 032-032-1</del>	3/10/64	A
#4 report	Talking Points for Eban <i>open NLJ 00-215 9/18/01</i> S 1 pp [dupl. #100, NSF Country File, Israel Vol I] [dup #43, NSF Files of Komer, "Israel Security, 12/63-3/66" BX 31] + #15, Komer, "UAR Missile" "nuclear" Box 53	3/5/64	A
#5 memo	RWK to Mac <i>open 10/30/03</i> S 1 pp	<del>3/4/64</del>	<del>A</del>
#6 report	Komer - UAR/Israeli Missile Problem S 2 pp <i>open 6-23-04 NLJ 04-7</i>	<del>2/13/64</del>	<del>A</del>
#7 note	Dept of State Intelligence Note 22 S 2 pp <i>open 6-23-04 NLJ 04-6</i>	<del>1/10/66</del>	<del>A</del>
#8 memo	Dept of State Research Memo RNA-43 S 8 pp <i>sanitized 9-24-04 NW/RAC 04-2</i>	9/1/65	A
#9 cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 2 pp <del>exempt NLJ 032-032-1</del> <i>exempt 4-27-07 NLJ 04-5</i>	6/28/65	A
#10 cable	Circular 2217 S 1 pp <i>open 9-24-04 NW/RAC 04-2</i>	<del>5/13/65</del>	<del>A</del>
#11 cable	Circular 1254 S 1 pp <i>open 10/30/03</i>	<del>5/6/65</del>	<del>A</del>
#12 cable	Deptel 1112 to Tel Aviv C 1 pp <i>open 10/30/03</i>	<del>4/29/65</del>	<del>A</del>
#14 report	Egyptian-Israeli Missile Race S 1 pp <del>exempt NLJ 032-032-1</del> <i>exempt 4-27-07 NLJ 04-5</i>	3/12/65	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, FILES OF ROBERT KOMER, "Israel Sec. (Missile Devel.) & Sale of HAWKS, 1964-65-3/66", box 32

RESTRICTION CODES

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#14a diagram	Intelligence Summary Diagram S 2 pp <i>exempt NY 032-032-1</i>	3/12/65	A
<del>#15 cable</del>	<del>Deptel 833 to Tel Aviv</del> <del>C 1 pp</del> <i>open 10/20/03</i>	<del>2/27/65</del>	<del>A</del>
#16 report	DOD Intelligence Information Report S 4 pp <i>Sanitized 9-24-04</i> <del>exempt NY 032-032-1</del> <i>HW 09-4</i>	12/31/64	A
#17 memo	Davies to Talbot S 1 pp <i>sanitized 11/3/02</i>	11/24/64	A
#17a letter	Harman to Rusk TS 3 pp	11/19/64	A
#17b report	The Role of the Cubic Corporation ... TS 2 pp <i>exempt NY 032-032-1</i>	n.d.	A
#17c report	Recruitment of German ... TS 2 pp <i>exempt NY 032-032-1</i>	n.d.	A
<del>#18 report</del>	<del>I. The Israel Air Force ...</del> <del>C 1 pp</del> <i>open 9-24-04 HW/BACD 9.2</i>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>A</del>
#18a letter	Davies to Gazit C 1 pp	11/4/64	A
#18b letter	Gazit to Davies C 1 pp	11/3/64	A
#19 memo	<del>Read to Bundy</del> <i>open 9/17/07</i> <del>C 1 pp</del>	<del>6/4/64</del>	<del>A</del>
#19b letter	Levy to Feldman PCI 2 pp	5/7/64	A
#19c report	Low-Grade Inertial Navigation System PCI 3 pp	5/7/64	A

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#20 memo	Military-Economic Intelligence Memorandum S 17 pp <i>exempt NY 032-032-1</i>	n.d.	A
<del>#21 letter</del>	<del>Davies to Barbour</del> <del>S 1 pp</del> <i>open 10/30/03</i>	<del>3/31/64</del>	<del>A</del>
#22 memo <i>exempt 4-27-07 NLJ04-5</i>	Cline to Komer S 1 pp <i>exempt NY 032-032-1</i>	3/27/64	A
#22a memo <i>exempt 4-27-07 NLJ04-5</i>	Memorandum S 5 pp <del><i>exempt NY 032-032-1</i></del> [dupl. #112a, NSF Country File, Israel Vol 1]	3/26/64	A
#23 memo <i>exempt 4-27-07 NLJ04-5</i>	Current Intelligence Memorandum S 2 pp <del><i>exempt NY 032-032-1</i></del>	1/15/64	A

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5/29/64

TAB A

*Israeli Missiles  
+ War-Heads  
+ Estab'd*

THE UAR/ISRAELI MISSILE RACE

The UAR Threat? Unable to get Soviet SSM's, Nasser had a few expatriate German scientists design two "homegrown" missiles, one a copy of the French Veronique sounding rocket, the other similar to the old German V-2. Neither has much guidance or warhead capacity, and we think Nasser is building some mostly for prestige reasons.

Israeli intelligence, however, has blown this threat up out of all proportion (just as our Air Force intelligence did with the Soviet bomber and then ICBM threat).

1. Israel claims UAR will have 1,000 missiles by 1969-70. Our NIE estimate is a few hundred at the outside. We don't see why Nasser would or could spend the huge sum needed to produce so much junk.

2. Israel first claimed UAR would have nuclear warheads, but we knocked this down by showing UAR nuclear capability as nil. Then Israelis talked radioactive wastes, but we showed this technically infeasible. Now it's "nerve gas". We say UAR can't produce it.

3. So we come down to an HE warhead. From our extensive know-how on calculating missile attacks, we can show that even giving UAR missiles greater payload, greater accuracy, greater number than Israel itself estimates, the UAR couldn't achieve military results.

4. Israelis then fall back on two psychological arguments. First, the Israeli electorate demands a counter to UAR missiles. We answer that the GOI should publicize how feeble UAR missile threat is. Second, Israelis claim their quick mobilization system might be upset during the first crucial 48 hours. DIA's demolition of this claim is appended.

Israel's Missile Program. The feebleness of the UAR threat adds to our suspicions Israel may be using it as cover to acquire a delivery system of its own. The Israelis know longer-range missiles have little military use without nuclear warheads. If Israel doesn't plan on nuclear warheads, then it is wasting an awful lot of money to drop a few thousand pounds of high explosive on Cairo.

At any rate, the risks to us from Israel going nuclear (undermines our whole non-proliferation policy) are matched by the risks to Israel (Arab pre-emption or Arab alliance with Moscow). This is why we feel so strongly we must try to head Israel off.

Attach. Memo dtd 5/28/64 for DepAsstSecDef(ISA)  
subj. Israeli Estimate of UAR Missiles (sgnd  
Frankel)

R. W. Komer

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority NLT RAC 032-032-1-1  
By QD NARA Date 9-19-02

~~SECRET~~

*See in Missile*  
*X Canal*  
*X near Missile*

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Authority NLS RAC 032-032-1-2  
By JP, NARA, Date 9-17-02

~~SECRET~~ - CANE

March 12, 1964

2

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK JERNEGAN

As I mentioned yesterday, the only kind of tacit arms limit which I see as having any chance of acceptance by both Israel and the UAR is a missile/nuclear trade-off. What I have in mind is the Egyptians telling us privately that they do not intend to build more than 60-100 of their present missile types. The Israelis in turn reassure us that they don't intend to go nuclear, and will not deploy SSMs.

I gather Secretary Rusk commented that there seemed to be little advantage to Israel in giving up something it had, i. e. a nuclear potential, for similar Egyptian self-denial of a non-existent nuclear potential. I think he's dead right. The only symmetrical deal would be for the UAR to deny itself something that Israel fears in return for Israel denying itself what worries the UAR most.

When it comes to verification, this is already taken care of on the Israeli side by our arrangements for private inspection. On the UAR side, I suspect that we could almost do without verification and rely on intelligence sources (could a 1000 or even a 500 missile force be hidden in Egypt?). But if we want even greater reassurance, why couldn't a few men in civilian clothes, speaking German and acting like Germans, be taken through Egyptian missile plants every year or so.

If the above approach commends itself, the time to try it out is now. Since the Israelis could hardly object to our using as leverage something they had already promised us (nuclear self-denial), the problem is in Cairo. I suspect that Nasser might just see merit in a proposition which (1) involves no public action or declaration; (2) increases his confidence that Israel won't go nuclear (since the US would have an even more powerful incentive, in Nasser's eyes at least, for preventing this); and (3) entails only minimal inspection. We ought to make this probe before there is any tanks decision, because along with the prospect of tanks, UAR self-denial would be a powerful added argument for dissuading Israel from going the missile route.

The chief flaw I see in this proposition is that it might give Nasser an exaggerated impression of the value of his missile force, certainly as a deterrent and possibly for preemption. I think we could offset this by (1) pointing out that Israel will go the missile route too, which greatly reduces the value of his deterrent; and (b) we don't see his missiles as being much of a military threat for many, many years, so he's not being asked to give up much. Why don't we do a prompt scenario along these lines?

*cc: megb*

R. W. Komer

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March 10, 1964

*2 Missiles  
+ Is see  
warhead  
3*


Mac -

Since Israeli tank/missile matter may come up at lunch today, here's some ammo. US intelligence community has done some pretty thorough estimates.

Mid-range SSMs not much good without nuclear warheads. UAR has no nuclear potential, so it's crude home-made SSMs of little real military value. Israelis, on other hand, not only going for a much better missile but now have a functioning breeder reactor.

Entire manner in which Israelis secretly built Dimona, haggled with us about inspection, and now won't let us reassure Nasser adds to suspicion Israelis going step-by-step toward nuclear deterrent.

*3.3 (b)(1)  
(6)*



Little difference in US and Israeli estimates of feebleness of two present UAR missiles (very poor guidance, if any; very small warhead capacity). Our SNIE 30-4-63 of this December says their military value is "trifling", and estimates that UAR "unlikely to deploy more than a few hundred SSMs over next five years", and the figure could well be substantially less."

However, Israelis "estimate" Nasser will build 900-1000 by 1969-70. We see program of this size costing UAR fantastically, and even so, of little military value. Israelis admit missiles couldn't damage military targets but claim attack on this scale during first 48 hours could disrupt vital Israeli mobilization. DOD says this nonsense and so does SNIE 30-4-63. Could UAR salvo 1000 SSMs in three weeks much less two days? Rowan, who's studied matter, is categorical on this issue (and we know missilry, Israelis don't).

*3.3 (b)(1)  
(6)*

Israel on other hand seems to be going for a much better French missile with a 1500 lb. payload and a half mile CEP, which our people say makes most sense with a nuclear warhead

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NLJ 04-3  
By cbm, NARA, Date 6-14-04

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2.

One simply cannot avoid the conclusion that, even if Israel hasn't finally decided on a nuclear/missile deterrent, it is certainly putting itself step-by-step in the best position to do so (indeed, why should it decide now). One can easily grasp Israeli logic--an absolute deterrent like this makes sense in a way. But it will certainly create problems for Israel and for us.

RWK

Attach.

(1)

(2)

(3) Cy. 14 SNIE 30-4-63 dtd 12/4/63, subj. The UAR Missile Program and its Implications for Israel

(4) *ISA paper 11/8/64: (w/ Egypt) SSA  
Characteristics & Capabilities of Israeli  
Air Fields*

3.3(b)(1), (6)

~~SECRET~~

March 5, 1964

TALKING POINTS FOR EBAN

1. We see that it's 1964 and we're in another push for something for Israel. Bad tactics to push LBJ too hard.

2. Controversy over US commitment to Israel's security quite similar to that with France. DeGaulle welcomes our commitment but professes not to quite trust us. We in turn don't trust DeGaulle not to commit us via his force de frappe. So uneasiness on both sides is inevitable in such a relationship.

3. We troubled that our repeated efforts to explain our concern over risks of a ME missile race don't even seem to register in GOI. Confirms our suspicions either Israelis up to something (nuclear) or haven't thought problem through.

4. We think Israeli estimate of UAR missile capability grotesque (like USAF estimates of Soviet bombers in mid-50s). Nasser simply couldn't build an effective missile force (let him waste the money).

5. But an Israeli capability would force Nasser's hand. He'll go to USSR for good missiles or even accept Soviet bases. So Israel will be worse off than before.

6. Eshkol's negative to Johnson request he let us reassure Nasser about Dimona (read Tel Aviv 919 attached) an example of how Israelis may fail to realize distinction between deterrence and provocation. Eshkol says "let 'em be a little scared" but this is precisely what pushes them into renewed efforts and new ties with Moscow.

7. We've noted Peres' remarks to Institute of Strategic Studies that Israel way out ahead militarily and time on Israeli side. We agree with his military estimate which makes us less worried about rushing to fill Israeli military requests.

8. US determined to maintain good relations with Arabs, for obvious reasons. We sometimes wonder if unremitting Israeli pressures on us aren't really aimed at compromising these relations by bringing us down so overtly as Israel's partisan. Such a policy would be extremely short-sighted. US policy in the mid-Fifties helped bring Soviet arms and influence into the area. To compromise US/Arab relations leaves Arabs no choice but Moscow. Then we'll have a real arms race.

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NJ 00-215  
By SJ, NARA, Date 4-13-01

*Jan. 23, 1964*  
*X Do Sec*  
*X Israel* 4

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Is Missiles  
x Israel  
✓ Do Sec 5  
2/25

Mac -

March 4, 1964

Israeli Problem. Harriman's lunch with Eban was quite relaxed (Eban, our most sensible Israeli and given to British understatement). But the old crocodile did his duty; he mentioned the risks in a missile buildup, stressing he thought it a great mistake to escalate when the threat was Nasser's non-missiles. He also thought it a mistake for Eshkol not to let us reassure Nasser on Dimona (read Tel Aviv 919). Eban made the usual responses, urging we not tie missiles and tanks together. WAH (with admitted slight indiscretion) said he personally felt we should quietly clue Israelis a bit more on how we could come to their help in a pinch, but that our military shied away from anything smacking of joint planning.

Harriman, like myself, has hoped that worst of Jordan Waters crisis would be over before we had to decide on tanks. But Eban indicated there were some delays and that Israelis hoped just to slide gradually into diversion without any big issue coming to a head (I hope they're right).

Rusk's session with Eban was mostly generalities on E-W problems. Jernegan says he didn't give away anything though he was more "sympathetic" on Israel's tank needs than Jernegan at least liked.

Attached is last memo I sent to President summarizing case on missiles. It was a Tab in original Eshkol/Nasser package, but I'm not sure he read it because only approved Eshkol letter ever came back to me. It may still be worth his reading.

RWK

Att: The UAR/Israeli Missile Problem  
dtd 2/13/64

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 10-9-03

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*Doug Bundy*

February 13, 1964

*Free Israeli Missiles  
X use missile  
6*

THE UAR/ISRAELI MISSILE PROBLEM

Superficially, the Israeli position seems unassailable. Since the UAR is allegedly building up a huge missile stockpile, Israel needs a counter-deterrent. So Israel apparently plans to buy a large number of French SSMs (despite repeated probes, it won't tell us a word of its plans).

But we see a basic difference between UAR and Israeli missile plans. We're convinced (SNIE 30-4-63) that the UAR's crude rockets, without any hope of nuclear warheads, will pose very little threat to Israel, even on the worst assumptions. However, Israel's acquisition of much superior French SSMs, together with its existing nuclear potential, would critically affect the arms balance in the area. We fear that Israel is moving step by step toward an independent nuclear capability, and that the Arabs will see this all too clearly. The consequences could be serious:

1. Nasser has said flatly that if Israel seemed to be going nuclear, he might have to launch a pre-emptive attack. Israel's Dimona reactor has just gone critical. When this leaks, and then knowledge of Israeli missiles, it might in a period of peak Arab hostility over the Jordan Waters, trigger irrational Arab moves.

2. Even if this is unlikely, Israeli escalation of the arms race into a new dimension will force the Arabs to re-insure further with Moscow. They'll certainly seek better missiles and more arms from the USSR. The USSR is unlikely to give them nuclear warheads, but it could offer Soviet-manned missile bases (a la Cuba).

3. Israeli acquisition of a missile capability will be highly expensive, and in our view, wasteful. Why should Israel waste its own money this way while seeking economic and now military aid from us?

4. Our whole stand against nuclear proliferation will be adversely affected.

So Israeli acquisition of French SSMs is highly dangerous, and to be opposed just as we've opposed an Israeli nuclear capability. Therefore, we ought to use Israel's interest in tanks as a lever to dissuade it from this course.

We may not succeed, but it seems well worth the try. At the minimum we may be able to get limitations on Israel's missile buildup and renewed

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NLJ 04-7  
By *cbm*, NARA, Date 6-14-04

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By *[Signature]*, NARA, Date 9-17-02

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2.

assurances it won't go nuclear. In any event, such an effort gives us a chance to hold off on tanks till the moment of maximum political advantage, i.e. not too long before the 1964 elections; indeed, our relations with the Arabs may be at such low ebb by then that we ought to leave ourselves the option of postponing the tank issue till 1965 (we held the line on HAWKS from 1959 to 1962).

Talking missiles should not create undue domestic repercussions: (1) we're already tabbed as so pro-Israeli because of our Jordan Waters stand (and will become even more so) that no one will be able to say we're being pro-Arab; (2) American Zionists, like most Americans, are opposed to nuclear proliferation.

The scenario we envisage would be triggered by your reply to Eshkol. We would follow it up by talks here and in Israel designed both to air our concerns and to sort out the tank problem. Then you could either decide on tanks by your June meeting with Eshkol, or continue the dialogue with him then. While highly sympathetic to Israel's tank needs, I see our pro-Israeli stance as so clear that we can afford to stay flexible on this issue for some time.

R. W. KOMER

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

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JAN 11 9 19 AM '66  
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*Intelligence Note* - 22

January 10, 1966

13

To : The Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *TH*  
Subject: Israeli and UAR Missile Revelations

*Is Missile*

Finney Springs Skeleton from Franco-Israeli Closet. John Finney's article in the January 6 New York Times on a French agreement to supply medium-range surface-to-surface missiles to Israel revives a subject broached by the Beirut press last May at the time of Franco-Lebanese arms negotiations. It was denied by the French at the time and it soon faded out in the general atmosphere of Franco-Arab rapprochement. The French government has again denied that it has agreed to supply such missiles or nuclear warheads to Israel, but says that French firms are cooperating with Israel in research and development on missiles. Israel has labelled the Finney article as "without foundation."

French Press Comes Closer to Mark. The French government denial is technically correct in that it is not the Diamant, as stated by Finney, that is being developed in France for Israel. Also, it is true that the missile is being developed by private French concerns, though with French-government knowledge and approval. Well-informed Le Monde on January 8 correctly identified the (MD-620) missile being developed for Israel as an "extrapolation" of the Topaze, which is the propulsion section of France's Diamant satellite-launching vehicle. There is no concrete evidence, however, to corroborate Le Monde's belief that there is Franco-Israeli collaboration on a nuclear warhead. The range of the MD-620 missile is

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NLJ 04-6

By *cbm*, NARA, Date *6-14-04*

JAN 11 1966

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500 Kilometers, not miles, as stated by Finney.

Times Reports US "Rocket Experts" Helping UAR. Hedrick Smith on January 10 published an article in the New York Times describing the UAR rocket program and stating that two US "experts" were secretly working on it. The article is essentially correct as far as the US angle is concerned, although Schmidt (better known as Hoepfner) and Hicks are believed to be technicians rather than "experts" and the article does not make it clear that they have no official US status. However, we have no evidence that the UAR is getting instruments from East Germany, as the article claims. The UAR missile program has indeed been plagued by trouble and it is believed to be far behind that of Israel.

Private Enterprise Provides Buffer for French, but Israel Still Embarrassed.

In stressing the private aspect of French missile collaboration with Israel, France probably hopes to minimize the effect of this publicity on its relations with the eastern Arabs in particular. Nevertheless, these stories can be expected to rub some of the newly-acquired bloom off of Franco-Arab, especially Franco-UAR, relations, although no Arab reaction has yet been received. Israel may come off worse than France, since the publicity will cut much ground out from under the propaganda campaign that Israel has been waging against the UAR's missile program and Arab arming in general. The UAR probably will be less affected, since it has been much less secretive about its missile program. Franco-Israeli collaboration probably is no news to Nasser, but he can be expected to use these new press reports as further justification for continuing to devote part of his already-strained economic resources to his own missile program.

*Research* 8/  
*Memorandum*

**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE**  
**DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH**

RNA-43 September 1, 1965

*Is missile*  
*Kotler*

28

To : The Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : INR - George C. Denney, Jr. *h.c.d.h.*

Subject: Probable Arab Reaction to French Supply of Missiles to Israel

In view of the possibility that Israel might acquire MD-620 surface-to-surface missiles from France in 1967 or 1968 we have attempted to estimate the probable Arab reaction and to assess the related question of [REDACTED]

3.3(b)(4)(6)

ABSTRACT

The UAR, which is well aware of French collaboration with Israel on missile development, would attempt to lead the Arab reaction to French delivery of missiles to Israel. Depending on circumstances, the UAR might try to pressure France into supplying it with similar missiles or technical help or, alternatively, to lead an Arab campaign of reprisal against France. France probably would be most reluctant to accede to the UAR's demands, and on balance we believe that it is questionable whether the UAR could muster enough Arab support either to induce France to comply or to retaliate effectively against it. The UAR might also approach the USSR or Communist China for missile help, but token assistance probably is the most that it would receive from these sources.


The Syrians might provide the most violent reaction against the West and it is likely that they might approach the USSR for similar missiles; the Iraqis' reaction probably would be much less strong, though they too might seek missiles from the USSR. We do not believe that the Soviets would accede to such a request in either

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By *lis*, NARA, Date 9-13-04

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case. In Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon there would be an outcry against France and in some cases against the West in general, but the regimes of these states would not seek to take the lead in the Arab reaction. The North African reaction generally would be less vigorous than that of any of the eastern Arab states.



3.3 (b)(4)(6)

## I. MISSILES

### A. The UAR

1. Nasser's Reaction and Available Alternatives. Nasser no doubt would view with grave concern the prospect of Israel's acquisition of missiles from France and would feel it necessary for the UAR to have a like capability in order to prevent Israel from acquiring a decisive military advantage over the UAR. His course of action would be conditioned by the stage of development of the UAR missile program at that time. The UAR displayed in 1962 two surface-to-surface missiles (the Conqueror and the Victor) which, it claimed, could hit targets "south of Lebanon." This claim supplied Israel with the impetus to acquire missiles. A third, untested UAR missile (the Pioneer) was displayed in 1963. Available information indicates that UAR missiles are not likely to be deployed before 1967 at the earliest. Moreover, the recent departure of West German scientists from Egypt could adversely affect the missile program and push the deployment date well beyond 1967.

If, upon Israeli receipt of the missiles, the UAR missile program still was not operational or was not likely to become operational very soon, the UAR might approach the French government for similar missiles or, at least, technical help as the price for not pressuring the Arab League to take sanctions against France. The UAR might be inclined to take this course if the French had informed it privately beforehand and if the delivery to Israel were not publicized. Alternatively, Nasser might appeal to the Soviet Union or Communist China to supply missiles or technicians to help him complete his missile program. On the other hand, if the UAR missile program were progressing satisfactorily or if Nasser had assurances from the USSR or China on missile deliveries, he might decide to denounce the French action and attempt to bring the other Arab states into line with the UAR's anti-French moves. Nasser's inclination to take this course would be increased if the missile delivery to the Israelis presented him with a public challenge.

A UAR appeal to any outside power for missiles or extensive technical aid to counter an Israeli acquisition of French missiles would amount to an admission that Nasser's 1962 claim to have an operational missile had little basis in fact. Nasser might, however, regard the needs of UAR security as outweighing this prestige factor.

2. Possible UAR Request for French Assistance. The reception which the French would be likely to accord a UAR request for missiles or technical help would depend largely on the state of relations between France and the UAR on the one hand and on the state of inter-Arab relations on the other. The latter would have an important and perhaps decisive influence on Nasser's ability to bargain successfully with the French. It is difficult to foresee what the state of inter-Arab relations will be in 1967-68. However, as long as Boumediene and Bourguiba remain in power in Algeria and Tunisia, the UAR is not likely to have much influence in the Maghreb. An attempt by Nasser to force these states into an anti-French stance probably

would serve only to exacerbate the split in Arab solidarity already made evident by the West German issue and by Bourguiba's challenge to Nasser's leadership on the Palestine controversy. Even among the eastern Arab states the response to a UAR demand for anti-French moves is uncertain. Particularly if a lasting Yemen settlement is not reached by that time, Saudi Arabia probably would not follow the UAR lead. Jordan and Lebanon for various reasons of their own are likely to be reluctant to contemplate radical anti-French measures. Iraq might well be less susceptible to UAR influence and Syria, if the present leadership continues, may be very vocal in its condemnation of France but may not wish to accept the UAR's leadership because of its general hostility toward Nasser. However, unless Nasser is able to mobilize the other Arab states, particularly the North African ones, which appears unlikely, any attempt to exert pressures upon France on the missile issue would probably have little effect.



3.3 (b)  
(4)(6)

The USSR has been very careful not to fan the fires of the Palestine dispute, since this would distract the UAR from its anti-Western campaign, which is of more direct interest to the USSR. For this reason, and possibly because of concern about escalation, the USSR would be cautious about giving Nasser such missiles to use against Israel. Moreover, the USSR is reluctant to provide the Arabs with types of weapons it has not supplied to its East European clients, unless there are overriding considerations in terms of Soviet interests. Much would depend on Nasser's position in Africa at that time, on the relative Soviet and Chinese positions in Africa, and on Nasser's attitude toward Communists in the UAR and in the area as a whole. One of the USSR's major interests in the UAR is the relative ease of access it affords to Africa. If Nasser's influence with the African states were growing, and especially if it looked as though the Chinese Communists were effectively challenging the USSR in the UAR or in the rest of Africa, Soviet leaders might feel that they had a very high stake in preserving their influence in the UAR. But even if the USSR felt constrained to respond sympathetically to a UAR request, it would be unlikely to extend more than token assistance in a missile program.

4. Possible Approach to Communist China. Communist China might be capable of providing the UAR with a very few simple surface-to-surface missiles by 1967 or 1968, but could only do so at some expense to its own missile program. China probably will not be in a position to provide missiles in any numbers to the UAR or any other countries until well after 1970. The Chinese would be unwilling to divert scarce technical manpower resources, and would be reluctant on security grounds to make sensitive information available to a foreign power. On the other hand, they would not want to close the door summarily on such a request. Any support that actually materialized would probably be minimal. It might involve the export of such hardware and technicians as Peking could spare without revealing critical technology or jeopardizing the development of its own missile program, or allowing UAR technicians access to non-sensitive parts of the Chinese missile programs.

Chinese Communist reaction to a request for assistance would depend in large part on the status of the Soviet-Chinese competition for influence in Africa. The Chinese Communists have shown a readiness to support the Arab position on the Palestine issue in an effort to gain Arab friendship; moreover, they have attempted to undercut Soviet influence in the area by going further in their support of the Arabs than the Soviets are willing to do. For this reason, the Chinese Communists might decide to assist the UAR to the extent they could, but such assistance would be unlikely to be more than minimal at best.

B. Iraq

Iraq's reaction would be conditioned by its existing relationship to the UAR, a relationship that fluctuates almost from week to week. Moreover, the present weak and unpopular government may well have disappeared by then and its successor is not now predictable. Even if the 'Arif regime holds on, however, it would have achieved somewhat greater independence of the UAR, so that Iraq's reaction need not be merely a reflex of Nasser's. Iraqi officers, through the UAC, would be likely to know of the Israeli acquisition well in advance, and Iraq's willingness to be guided by the UAR in these circumstances would depend on its army's assessment of whether Nasser were in a position to provide a realistic defense for the Arab world -- in other words, on the current status of Egyptian missile development and/or plans for acquisition of a comparable weapon. Iraq divested itself of Soviet-manufactured SAM's in 1963, both because of the expense and because of unwillingness to admit the continuing Soviet presence necessary to operate them in the present stage of Iraqi expertise. The populated areas of Iraq would be outside the range of the Israeli MD-620 missile (i.e. approximately 310 miles) and the Iraqis probably would feel under less pressure than Syria, for example, to acquire countervailing missiles. Even if they did approach the USSR, however, we do not believe it likely that the Soviets would supply missiles.

C. Jordan

The intensity of reaction in Jordan to news that Israel had taken delivery of the MD-620 missile would be governed by factors such as the situation along the borders with Israel and the status of Jordanian relations with the other Arab states. In any event, there would be considerable stir. The government would probably voice concern for Jordanian security and would appeal to the US for countervailing arms, even though it probably would not expect to receive them. If the news became public, the government would probably issue statements attacking the West generally and France in particular for arming Israel. The Palestinian-dominated press in Jordan would bitterly criticize the West, with the Jordanian government coming in for a share of the blame. In areas where Palestinians are concentrated, street demonstrations would be possible. The intensity of public reaction will be largely influenced by prevailing popular attitudes toward Husayn's regime.

D. Saudi Arabia

The Saudi government, like most other Arab governments, would be greatly influenced in its reaction to the news of French missile deliveries to Israel by

Nasser's attitude, by the existing climate of relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAR, and by reactions of such independent Arab leaders as Bourguiba.

The Saudis would follow Nasser's lead to the extent that this was necessary to maintain Arab solidarity, but any conformity beyond this point would depend on the over-all cordiality of their current relations with the UAR and on other Arab reactions. In general, the Saudis would probably be reluctant to follow Nasser completely because of their long-standing hostility to his claim for Arab leadership. Some degree of independence in their attitude can therefore be expected. They would almost certainly be less anti-Western and "anti-imperialist" in their reaction.

The Saudi reaction to the news of the missiles would, nevertheless, be adverse because the Saudis support the standard Arab policy of hostility to Israel. The Saudis might break relations with the French, although this would depend on where French-Saudi relations stood at the moment. The Saudis might even decide to contribute money to a common Arab fund, if one were set up or re-activated in response to the news of the missiles. They probably would not be overly generous in contributing, however. Being less directly involved in Arab-Israeli tensions, and having their main population centers well beyond the range of the MD-620, the Saudis probably would try to maintain the necessary appearance of Arab solidarity while keeping concrete action to a minimum.


The Saudi government would not support a Nasser attempt to turn to the USSR or Communist China for missiles to counter the Israeli acquisition. King Faysal feels that Nasser already leans too heavily on the Communist powers. Actually, such a move by Nasser would place Faysal in something of a dilemma, since the anti-Communist and anti-Israeli lines are both strong elements of his policy, with the former possibly being stronger than the latter. Faysal would probably react by trying to lead other Arab states in a counter-move that could be pictured as both anti-Israeli and anti-Communist. He might, for example, charge that Nasser was using the Israel issue to drag the Arabs into the Soviet camp in the Cold War, and this charge might well find support among other Arab states.

#### E. Syria

Syrian reaction to the acquisition of French-made missiles by Israel would probably be the strongest in the Arab world, especially if the current Damascus regime were still in power. Syria's reaction would be heightened by the fact that Damascus would be well within the range of the Israeli missiles. Syria would mount an intense propaganda campaign against the West in general, but might center its most virulent attacks on the United States, for Syria has tended to view all developments in the area that are not to its liking as US-instigated. If Syria continues to remain isolated from the other Arab countries, it would at the same time berate their leaders, and especially Nasser, for not having been sufficiently militant in dealing with the Israeli threat to the Arabs. Furthermore, it is entirely likely that Syria, either in a coordinated Arab action or alone, would seek to acquire a missile capability of its own, probably from the USSR. However, it is unlikely that the USSR would accede to a Syrian request for missiles.

F. Lebanon

Lebanon would greatly fear the introduction of an offensive missile system in Israel. Not only is Lebanon militarily weak, but it would feel that its efforts at keeping its border with Israel free from serious incidents over many years had gone unrecognized and unrewarded. More basic would be the inevitable dichotomy in Lebanon's area policies -- the need to give solid support on such an important Arab question while at the same time avoiding deep involvement because of domestic political considerations. This duality would be reflected by the Beirut press: the Muslim-owned, pro-UAR papers would join an Arab chorus of loud criticism of the West, and the Christian-owned press, although not in favor of a missile-equipped Israel, would implore the Lebanese government not to be led down the path of ruin by the irresponsible actions of other Arab leaders. The government itself would dutifully voice concern and protest to the US and France; meanwhile it would probably privately seek reassurances from France and a security guarantee from the United States.



3.3 (b)(4)(6)

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INDICATE:  COLLECT  
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*Is m...*  
**SUMMARY**

10

85  
Origin

ACTION: CIRCULAR 2217

NEA  
Info

May 13 7 39 PM '65

Department Circular 2154; Tripoli's 1000 to Department

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**FYI AND NOFORN:** According to reliable information, agreement was reached early 1963 whereby French Dassault aircraft company would provide Israel with solid fuel, inertially guided, two-stage surface-to-surface missile with maximum range of 250 to 300 nautical miles. Deployment expected 1967-68.

030

Re query in Tripoli's 1000 concerning possible Israeli purchase other military material, Department has no knowledge anything definite. However, we continue to encourage Israel to satisfy its legitimate defense requirements in Western Europe to extent possible. **END FYI AND NOFORN.**

Department does not wish to take any initiative on this subject but does wish resist any attempt to give impression we are in conspiracy with French to provide Israelis with surface-to-surface missiles. Therefore, if any Arab officials raise subject and request comments on Beirut press story, posts should make clear we have consistently opposed introduction of surface-to-surface missiles into Near East.

- BUNDY-SMIT
- BATOR
- BOWDLER
- BOWMAN
- CHASE
- COOPER
- HAYNES
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- KEENE
- KLEIN
- LINDSEY
- MURPHY
- RADDERS
- THOMSON

**FYI.** We have made distinction between SSM's and SAM's such as the Hawk. **END FYI.**

**ACTION:** TRIPOLI  
TEL AVIV  
PARIS

**INFO:** BEIRUT  
BAGHDAD  
TAIZ  
CAIRO  
DAMASCUS  
RASAT

ALGIERS  
JIDDA  
TUNIS  
AMMAN  
KUWAIT  
LONDON

BALL.

GP-3

END

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:ANNyerges:rf:5/13/65

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

William J. Handley

NEA - ~~William J. Handley~~

Clearances:

NE - Mr. Davies	NR - Col. Bunte	P. - Mr. Wright	QASD/PA - Capt. <del>MENE</del>
MC - Mr. Sipes	G/PM - Mr. Myers	AFN - Mr. Stookey	Merene
P/PG - Mr. Dillon	WE - Mr. Beigel	DOD/OSD - Mr. Evans	INR - Mr. Brown

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC04-2

By no, NARA, Date 9-13-04

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INDICATE:  COLLECT  
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85

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109

MAY 6 7 55 PM '65

- BUNDY-SMITH
- BATOR
- BOWDLER
- BOWMAN
- CHASE
- COOPER
- HAYNES
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- KEENE
- KOMER
- MOODY
- REEDY
- SAUNDERS
- THOMSON

Origin NEA ACTION: CIRCULAR 2154

Info:

- SS
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- SAH
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- AF
- EUR
- IO
- P
- USIA
- NSC
- INR
- CIA
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- DOD
- DAC
- MC

Beirut newspaper AL HAYAT reports May 6 Israel has ordered ground-to-ground missiles from France to catch up in the rocket race with Egypt. Identified French missiles as MD-620's and ~~MD-620's~~ they had been tested for Israeli officers last month on rocket range on French coast. Claimed range of missiles was 310 miles--enough to reach Cairo or other neighboring Arab countries. Deliveries would be made toward the end of this year. Among possible explanations accuracy / ~~accuracy~~ of details suggests story could be Israeli plant timed to coincide with Israel Independence Day parade. This would be logical follow on to French newspaper report December 6, 1964, that France in cooperation with Israel tested ground-to-ground ballistic missile in Sahara. In addition to obvious Independence Day impact, purpose might be to pave way and ease reaction to later disclosure missile deliveries.

Comments addressees requested. For time being Department proposes make no comment.

RUSK

ACTION: TEL AVIV  
BEIRUT  
CAIRO  
PARIS

INFO: ALGIERS TUNIS  
AMMAN TRIPOLI  
BAGHDAD LONDON  
DAMASCUS  
JIDDA  
KUWAIT  
TAIZ  
RABAT

GP-3

END

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:HERussell:rvc:5/6/65

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - John D. Jernegan

Clearances:

NE - Mr. Davies      ~~NEA/P~~ AF - Mr. Higgins      EUR - Mr. Amitay  
NEA/P - Mr. Ellison      INR - Mr. Spain

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State Dept. Guidelines

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

By jc, NARA, Date 10-9-03

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

16812

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Handwritten signature*

12

APR 29 7 08 PM '65

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- Info
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- SAH
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- USIA
- NSC
- INR
- CIA
- NSA
- DOD
- AID
- MC

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV 1112  
Your 1375

It is true that Hawk missile production is being phased out. Research and development, as usual in such matters, is continuing and an improved version is a possibility in future years if feasible or desirable.

is  
Above information ~~is~~/FYI. However, if pressed by GOI officials, Embassy may use information to counter any impression an improved version is in the cards for the foreseeable future. Embassy should refrain from responding to press articles on this subject.

GP-3

END

- BUNDY SMITH
- BATOR
- BOWDLER
- BOWMAN
- CHASE
- COOPER
- HAYNES
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- KERRY X
- KLEIN
- KOMER
- MOODY
- REEDY
- SAUNDERS
- THOMSON

RUSK

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

Phillips Talbot

NEA:NE:ANNyerges:rvc:4/28/65

NEA - ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Clearances:

NE - Mr. Symmes  
OSD/ISA - Mr. Evans (sub)

NR - Col. Bunte  
OSD/ILN - Mr. Stevens (sub)

G/PM - Mr. Warren (info)

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State Dept. Guidelines

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FORM 8-63 DS-322

By jc, NARA, Date 10-9-03

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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AID  
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RR RUEHCR RUEKDA  
DE RUQMVL 280A 19/1406Z  
R 191403Z ZEA  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 1334  
INFO RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 305  
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 238.  
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 123  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY CAIRO ?  
RUQMDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 237  
RUQMJR/AMCONGEN JERUSALEM 288  
RUFHDN/AMEMBASSY LONDON 250  
RUFHPA/AMEMBASSY PARIS 207  
RUEKDA/DOD WASHDC UNN  
RUCJHK/POLAD CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA UNN  
STATE GRNC  
BT

15601  
April 19, 1965  
12:07 a.m.

*Hawks*

- BUNDY-SMITH
- BATOR
- BOWMAN
- CHASE
- COOPER
- HAYNES
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- KEENE
- KIEN
- KOMER
- MOODY
- REEDY
- SAUNDERS
- SAYRE
- THOMPSON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE APRIL 19

ARMS SUPPLIES

1. PRESS ON 19TH GAVE WIDE COVERAGE RECENT ARRIVAL HAWK MISSILES. AT WHAT AMOUNTED TO INFORMAL IMPROMPTU PRESS CONFERENCE AT SCENE OF UNLOADING FROM SHIP PRIMIN ESHKOL MADE REMARKS REPORTED BY MOST PAPERS ALONG FOLLOWING LINES: "IN VIEW OF ALL TALKS AND WHISPERS WE HEAR AROUND US, WE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE GOOD FOR PUBLIC TO KNOW ISRAELI ARMY NEITHER SLUMBERS NOR RESTS...HAWKS WILL GIVE BETTER PROTECTION TO OUR CITIES AND FACTORIES. VERY FACT OUR CFN 19 1. 19TH

PAGE TWO RUQMVL 280A  
ENEMIES KNOW WE HAVE THEM WILL "SERVE AS DETERRENT...HAWKS WILL NOT BE LAST ADDITION TO OUR ARSENAL. EVERY WEAPON HAS ITS TASK. WE HAVE OTHER ARMAMENTS -- NOT ONLY FOR DEFENSE BUT ALSO FOR ATTACK...THERE ARE SOME THINGS THAT WE DON'T SHOW -- BECAUSE OF THE EVIL EYE."

ESHKOL ALSO DESCRIBED AS HAVING MADE FREQUENT REFERENCE TO "TERRIFIC COST" OF HAWKS.

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RMR

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-2-1334, April 19, from: Tel Aviv

2. ON SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT TANGENT, HAARETZ APRIL 18 CARRIES SPECIAL REPORT FROM LE MONDE CORRESPONDENT IN NEW YORK ABOUT STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT OF 13TH ON ARMS SUPPLIES TO FIVE ME COUNTRIES. ARTICLE ALLUDES TO NY TIMES THEORY THAT STATEMENT INTENDED FUZZ UP FOCUS ON JORDAN AND ISRAEL. ARTICLE THEN GOES ON TO LIST WHAT EACH BENEFICIARY, APART FROM IRAQ, DESIRES. IT SAYS ISRAEL WANTS TO COMPENSATE FOR M-48 TANKS IT IS NOT GETTING FROM BONN NOW, AND WISHES TO FEEL SECURE THAT, WHENEVER ITS NEIGHBORS RECEIVE PARTICULARLY LARGE CONSIGNMENTS OR SPECIALLY NEW TYPES OF ARMS, ISRAEL CAN TURN SOMEWHERE FOR REDRESS OF BALANCE. AS FOR JORDAN, ARTICLE CONTINUES, IT HAS FOR LAST YEAR OR SO BEEN REQUESTING LARGE QUANTITIES OF ARMS, INCLUDING TANKS OF KIND ISRAEL HAS BEEN RECEIVING. TOTAL VALUE OF ARMS SUPPLIES BEING DISCUSSED AMOUNTS TO  
CFN 2. 18 13TH M-48

PAGE THREE RUQMVL 280A

ABOUT 75 MILLION DOLLARS. SAUDI ARABIA AND LEBANON WANT FIGHTER PLANES. BARBOUR

BT

CFN 75

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be based on or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: ISRAEL and FRANCE

8. REPORT NUMBER: IR 1 849 0165 64

2. SUBJECT: (U) Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missile

9. DATE OF REPORT: 31 Dec 64

10. NO. OF PAGES: 4

3. ISC NUMBER:

11. REFERENCES: DIRM 4E3d(1)

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 15 Nov - 16 Dec 64

12. ORIGINATOR: USAIRA, Tel Aviv, Israel

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Tel Aviv, Israel & Paris, France. Nov - Dec 64

13. PREPARED BY:

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 3

7. SOURCE: X and French Source

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

3.3(b)(3)

15. SUMMARY:

(S) This report furnishes latest information which provides clues that Israel and France have carried out joint experiments on surface-to-surface missiles, and that Israel will begin acquiring such missiles from France early in 1966.

PASS TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND OSD/ISA.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 04-04  
By ics, NARA, Date 9-13-04

*From Mr. Daniels*

1. (S) According to a French source's conversation with a reliable American source, Israel will begin receiving surface-to-surface missiles from France early in 1966. Additional evidence reported by a French newspaper and other sources indicates that joint French/Israeli experiments on surface-to-surface missiles may have taken place sometime in November, probably in France.

2. (S) Background.

3.3(b)(1)

JAN 28 1965

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PT  
HM  
HEI

## DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

3.3 (b)(1)

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. IR 1 849 0165 64  
PAGE 2 OF 4  
ORIGINATOR  
USAIRA, Tel Aviv, Israel

(Leave

3. (S) Source's Report. Relayed to AIRA via USAF channels is the following intelligence information.

a. France will begin supplying surface-to-surface missiles to Israel in early 1966.

b. Out of 50 missiles to be delivered, 25 will be buried in hills and 25 will be mobile.

c. The missiles will have conventional warheads interchangeable with nuclear warheads.

d. The type of guidance system and whether the missiles to be delivered in 1966 are currently operational types was not divulged.

e. Some missile hard stands will be on the back side of a hill located 5 miles from Tel Aviv near an airport.

4. (S) Comments:

3.3 (b)(1)

a. Source of information. [REDACTED] considered completely reliable rates this information as accurate. AIRA considers this information as probably true since it fits in with previous clues on this subject.

b. Information. That the French will begin supplying surface-to-surface missiles to Israel in 1966 is compatible with the best estimates. AIRA estimates, however, that the numbers cited represent only the "first slice" in Israel's procurement program, with follow-on slices dependent upon success of the missile and final decision on whether or not to pursue the nuclear road. Additionally, the Israelis might be thinking that a token missile force will be deterrent enough to preclude Egyptian use of missiles.

5. (S) Possible Location of Israeli hard stands. The above source also reports that, according to the information divulged, some of the hard stands will be on the back sides of a hill located five miles from Tel Aviv near an airport. Source rates this information as less reliable than the preceding information.

6. (S) Comments: The closest hills answering to the above description are two sand-dune hills, one of which is off-limits to other than Israeli military personnel, located approximately 1.8 miles north of Sde Dov Airport (Coord: 320631N-344642E) and approximately 5 miles north of the center of Tel Aviv. The "off-limits" hill is the site of what appears to be a Communications Center, also housing some radar in its complex. (See IR1849014964). See sketch below. [REDACTED]

3.3 (b)(1)


CONTINUATION SHEET

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 1 849 0165 64  
PAGE 3 of 4  
ORIGINATOR  
USAIRA, Tel Aviv, Israel

(Leave)



7. (U) French News Release on SSM Test. The following news release from the French publication, COMBAT, dated 8 Dec 64, is of interest.

"No Israeli has participated in testing of ground-to-ground French rockets, declares the War Ministry, without however denying the recent atomic tests in the Sahara.

The information which was published yesterday, concerning the tests - carried out by French technicians - in the Sahara, of a ballistic ground-to-ground missile, were followed by a denial of the War Ministry.

"The War Ministry does not deny that such a test has in effect taken place, but does deny that Israelis have taken part in it."

8. (C) Comment: It is possible that the reporter took for granted that the recent test of a French atomic device in the Sahara and the supposed test of the ballistic missile took place in the same location. It is more probable that a ballistic missile test did take place in November, and that the location was Franca. Previous estimates within the US intelligence community was that such a test might take place in the Isle de Levant in November 1964. An Israeli Air Force team, headed by IDF/Air Force Deputy Commander Aluf Mishne Mordechai Hod, spent the whole month of

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## DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 1 849 0165 64  
PAGE 4 OF 4  
ORIGINATOR  
USAIRA, Tel Aviv, Israel

November 1964 in Europe, first to France, then to England and returning to France again. This team was "billed" as an evaluation team, which according to Hod, evaluated the British Buccaneer aircraft for possible purchase. This same team could have observed and "evaluated" the missile test if it did take place.

9. (C) Additional. Report from American Embassy Paris provides additional information on this subject. (See Paris EMBTEL 3523, 15 Dec 64). According to this message: Sanguinetti (Vice Pres Nat'l Assembly Defense Commission) told an Embassy Officer, on Dec 15, 1964, that there have been joint experiments on ground-to-ground ballistic missiles carried out by France and Israel, but the location of such experiments is unknown. Sanguinetti also pointed out that France had no intention of making available nuclear warheads to Israel.

10. (C) Comments: Sanguinetti, according to the EMBOFF, is an influential member of the Defense Commission and is in a position to have the above information.

11. (C) After writing above, AIRA discussed contents with AAIRA Paris. Latter was of opinion that the ballistic missile test was delayed and may have been tested in early December. Colonel Hod scheduled to return from his trip to Europe at end of November, delayed his return, remaining in Paris an extra week (into early December). This may have a connection with the missile test.

HFR

~~SECRET~~

This document consists of 1 page. No. of copies 3, Serial

MEMO - Mr. Talbot

November 24, 1964

RE - Rodger P. Davies

17

Briefing Notes for Luncheon with

November 24, 1 p.m.

- 1) By letter from the Foreign Minister to the Secretary, Israel has charged that over the past four years the Cubic Corporation has provided the UAR with telemetric and ground-tracking equipment and technicians to maintain and help operate it. Company experts reportedly consult periodically with Egyptian officials on the UAR missile program.
- 2) Israel also charged that the UAR has recruited 30-50 German experts employed by firms such as Fritz Hellige of Freiburg, a subsidiary of the U.S. concern Litton Industries, to work on gyro and inertial guidance systems.
- 3) Israel has requested the U.S. to take immediate steps to stop this indirect flow of American missile know-how to the UAR.
- 4) Embassy Bonn reports that a Litton Industries source confirmed the departure for the UAR of a group of technicians from the firms of Hellige and Enth. He did not believe the Hellige people could build a complete inertial system, but could do a good job on gyros and accelerometers.
- 5) The Litton source also reported investigation by French-Israeli intelligence of the hiring of Hellige and Plath people for work in Egypt.
- 6) An Israeli official told Litton that 12-14 men from Hellige had left for Egypt since the beginning of October. A group of 35-40 more Hellige recruits were expected by January. He knew nothing of recruitment at Plath.
- 7) The Israeli official said Israel had informed both the Department and the NSC.

NKA:NE:HERussell:av

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED  
Authority NY 032-032-1-11  
By J, NARA, Date 9-11-02

Called Davies 13 Nov.

18

Israel  
Sec -  
Air

~~Confidential~~

1. The Israel Air Force is seeking tactical training in methods such as Quarter Attack, Head on Attack, High Altitude Attack, Dead line Astern Attack.

2. It is true that the Israel Air Force has no F-102's but its need for the course is explained in point 1 above. The lack of U.S. equipment in the Israeli Defense Force has not, in the past, disqualified Israeli participation in U.S. Army courses as is instanced by the presence of Israeli personnel in Armored Courses in Fort Knox and Artillery Courses in Fort Sill.

3. As to the aspect of secrecy, the same system of clearance as applied in the case of the Israeli personnel prior to participation <sup>in</sup> the USAF Hawk training could be used in the present case.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 04-02  
By ms, NARA, Date 9-13-04

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Israel and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of his note No. EG/1650 of September 24, 1964, requesting one space for an Officer of the Israel Defense Forces in course No. 112500D - Interceptor Pilot Training (F-102).

Since Israel currently does not have F-102 aircraft, the need for the instruction is not apparent, and therefore the request is declined.

Department of State,

Washington, October 26, 1964

EG / 1870

18d

The Ambassador of Israel presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and referring to the eligibility of the Government of Israel for reimbursable military assistance under the provisions of Section 507 of the Mutual Security Act of 1961, has the honor to submit a request for the allocation from the Department of the Air Force, of one space for an Officer of the Israel Defense Forces, at present attending the United States Air Command and Staff College at the Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, for the following courses: -

No. 112500B - Interceptor Pilot Training (F-102); Page  
C-10-12 of AFR 50-5, July 1963, refers.

SEP 24 1964



S/S 8235

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

*O.K.  
Returned to  
Bromley Smith 6/8/64.  
19*

June 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Suggested Reply to Raytheon  
Company Regarding Sale of  
Missile Equipment to Israel

*I had  
missile*

Enclosed is a suggested reply to a letter of  
May 7, 1964, from the Raytheon Company to Mr. Myer  
Feldman concerning Israeli interest in procuring  
a surface-to-surface missile guidance system.

*Robbins*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Suggested Letter to Raytheon Company.
2. Letter from Raytheon Company.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *sp/cls*, NARA, Date *8-23-07*

JUN 5 1964

5074  
19a

SUGGESTED DRAFT LETTER TO RAYTHEON COMPANY

Dear Mr. Levy:

Thank you for your letter of May 7, 1964, concerning Israeli interest in a guidance system for short-range missiles under development by Raytheon. It is most unlikely that we could respond affirmatively to a request for a license to export equipment of the type described. It has been the firm policy of the United States Government to avoid contributing to the missile development capability of any foreign nation. Except for ground-to-air missiles, we have applied our policy without differentiation as to what constitutes offensive and defensive missiles. Likewise, we have made no differentiation between short-range and long-range ground-to-ground missiles. I do not believe that any arrangement with Raytheon's affiliate in Rome would make it possible for us to alter our basic position in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

JUN 5 1964

~~Mr. Komer~~

March 31, 1964

*I. Missile*

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL  
~~SECRET~~/NOFORN

Dear Wally:

As you know, we want to dissuade the Israelis, if at all possible, from going ahead with their apparent intention to acquire missiles. To provide background for your educative discussions with Israeli officials, I am enclosing a number of studies and papers on Israel and U.A.R. advanced weapons capabilities. I believe you will find them useful aids in marshalling arguments against the Israeli case.

Sincerely,

Rodger P. Davies

Enclosures:

1. SNIE 30-4-63.
2. Israel Advanced Weapons Capabilities.
3. U.A.R. Advanced Weapons Capabilities.
4. U.A.R. SSM Characteristics & Capabilities Against Israeli Airfields.
5. U.A.R. Missile Program: Costs.
6. SNIE 30-2-63.

The Honorable  
Walworth Barbour,  
American Ambassador,  
Tel Aviv.

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN

NEA:NE:ANNyerges:rmv:4/1/64

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS.032.032.000/18  
By jc NARA. Date 10-9-03

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

APR 2 1964