

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
02	memo	RWK [Komer] to Mac [Bundy] (duplicate #31, Files of Komer, Bowles, 11/3/63-1965, box 13) <i>Open 7/10/14 per NLS/RAC 12-360</i>	S	1	8/11/64	A
04	memo	Komer to the President (dup. #42 and 43, NSF, CF, Pakistan, vol. 2, box 151; #20, Files of Komer, Pakistan 12/63-1964, box 46) <i>Dup. #494, Papers of Komer, Box 4, Chron July-Dec 64</i>	S	1	7/14/64	A
11	memo	Komer to the President (dup. #71, Files of Komer, India 12/63-1964, box 23 - SANITIZED 2003; #16c, NSC Hist., So. Asia, box 24; #4, IMTF, Taylor Trip, box 30; #64, Files of Komer, Pak 12/63-1964, Box 46) <i>Dup. #22, Papers of Komer, Chron 7/63-12/63, Box 3</i>	S	1	12/23/63	A
12	memo	duplicate #11, this file	S	1	12/23/63	A
20	memo	Komer to Mac [Bundy] (dup. #23a, IMTF, Taylor Trip to India & Pak, box 30; #64a, Papers of Smith, NSC Standing Grp. Mtgs, vol. 2, box 28; #54a, Files of Komer, Bowles 11/3/63-1965, Box 13) <i>Dup. #82a, Papers of Komer, Chron 7/63-12/63, Box 3</i>	S	5	12/5/63	A
21a	report	re military assistance to India and Pakistan - EXEMPTED March 2004	S	1	[1/66]	A
21b	report	Pakistan - EXEMPTED March 2004 <i>Open 12/8/06 NLW 06-255</i>	S	1	[1/66]	A
21c	report	India - EXEMPTED March 2004 <i>Open 12/8/06 NLW 06-255</i>	S	1	[1/66]	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer
Folder Title "MAP - India/Pakistan (December 1963 - March 1966)"
Box Number 41

Restriction Codes
 (A) Closed by Executive Order 13292 governing access to national security information.
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7/31/2006 *JC*
 Initials

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22a	report	Renewing Military Assistance, India and Pakistan - EXEMPTED March 2004 (Duplicate #22b, this file)	S	3	12/11/65	A
22b	report	duplicate #22a, this file	S	3	12/11/65	A
22d	report	re military assistance - Pakistan (duplicate #22e, this file)	S	1	[12/65]	A
<i>open 12/8/06 NLS 06-255</i>						
22e	report	duplicate #22d, this file	S	1	[12/65]	A
22g	report	re military assistance - India (duplicate of #22h, this file)	S	2	[12/65]	A
22h	report	duplicate of #22g, this file	S	2	[12/65]	A
27	memo	Solbert to Komer - EXEMPTED March 2004 (duplicate #47, Files of Komer, MAP-India, box 41) <i>open 5/16/2012 per NLS # 11-74</i>	S	2	6/16/65	A

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7/31/2006

Initials

~~SECRET~~

July 9, 1965
11:15 am

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

MAP for India and Pakistan. Attached is a longish memo from Secretary McNamara describing our current programs. It breaks down into three categories: (a) FY 65 and prior programs still undelivered--roughly \$50 million for Pakistan and \$70 million for India; (b) FY 66 programs (roughly \$40 million for Pakistan and \$50 million for India), which have not yet been approved by DOD and passed as firm to the recipients; and (c) various other requests such as Ayub's recent plea for submarines, F-104s, and tanks. There are also certain dollar credit sales, which I presume we would not want to interfere with (e. g. the sale of \$8 million in ammo to the Paks which you recently approved).

There are political risks in holding up MAP. It has traditionally been most sensitive to the Paks, who regard it as essential vis-a-vis India, and whose military are a major political force. As to the Indians, we could spook them to buy more from the USSR. There is also a real question of whether we want or need to hit either Paks or Indians harder than we have already, lest we trigger an open confrontation by pushing too hard.

Thus there is a case for continuing business as usual, except for continuing to hold off on key items such as F-5s for India and F-104s or submarines for the Paks.

A second alternative would be to handle MAP as you have economic aid: (a) continue with deliveries under FY 65 and prior grant programs for which the funds have been appropriated and commitments in effect made; (b) defer telling either we approve the FY 1966 programs, on the grounds that the funds have not yet been appropriated; (c) simply not respond on major additional requests until we have better indications as to the future attitudes of India and Pakistan.

We are not recommending any action till we can get the views of State and Defense. In the meantime, however, DOD will hold off telling the Paks and Indians about any FY 66 program approvals.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, UNK, #145
By *[Signature]* NARA, Date 8-8-05

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

August 11, 1964

2
Pak Prop
India x Bowles

Mac -

Here is Rusk's soft answer to Bowles' complaint that we were passing Indian military info to Paks. It says same thing as my side wire cable two weeks ago. We did not pass any dope on Indian plans or forces, only on US aid.

RWK

Attach. Read/Bundy Memo 8/10/64, subj. Reply to Amb. Bowles' Ltr re Furnishing Paks w/Indian MilDefInfo.

SECRET

July 30, 1964

Mac -

Chet is grossly overdoing this. We did not tell Paks anything like what he alleges in his best "react before reading" mood. I told him so in polite side wire answer (which I didn't feel I needed to bother you about).

Chet has fallen into the habit of a private reclama to us every time he doesn't get what he wants from State. However understandable, this can be a nuisance; it could also be embarrassing (McCone no doubt reads this mail). Chet's 18 July letter to you is in reclama category. I'll do up a short answer from you (and a longer one from me) which will gently tell him to relax till the election.

RWK

SECRET

Attach. Ltr Bowles to McGB 7/21/64 att.
cys Bowles ltrs to Rusk and McNamara re
passing Indian mil info to Pak and Turkey

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ93-243(#140)
By ju/rs NARA, Date 8-8-05

3
Judea Pak map
X Bowles

4a

~~SECRET~~

ANTI-US STATEMENTS

Bhutto to National Assembly on 22 June: "Time has come for Pakistan to undertake reappraisal of its foreign policy and review her political and military commitments."

--In the same speech: US "could not claim to have pursued global interests if they came into conflict with interests of her allies." A nation must choose between "having a system of alliances and betrayal of allies."

Ayub interview with London Daily Mail: "During the Dulles-Eisenhower era US policy had moral content but now Americans do not hesitate to let down their friends. Today American policy is based on opportunism and is devoid of moral quality. Pakistan...has been let down by politicians she regarded as friends."

--On Vietnam: American agglomeration of power on the periphery of China increases the risk of another Korea type war."

--Reports indicated that the Pak cabinet 28 June discussed withdrawal from CENTO and SEATO.

--Ayub in broadcast to the nation: US aid to India posed a "grave threat to the security of smaller nations on the periphery of India. Who can they turn to if the US continues to follow its present policy?"

--On 9 July Paks, without consulting us announced support for 14-nation conference on Laos.

--Ayub in Iran and Ankara suggested forming a purely regional association, presumably to replace CENTO.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Authority State letter 5/31/77 (-42c)

By rag/jc. NARA. Date 7-27-06

~~SECRET~~

February 18, 1964

5
India/Pak map

Jim -

Here, scribbled right on the drafts, are my preliminary suggestions. Hope they'll be helpful. I'll of course want to take another look when you get DOD changes. To protect all concerned in light of NSAM, formal WH clearance is desirable in this case.

R. W. KOMER

Attach. (1) draft cable to Delhi re five year MAP for India; (2) draft cable to Karachi re MAP to India and Pakistan

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *rg/jc* NARA, Date 7-27-06

~~SECRET~~

February 7, 1964

⁶
Jedra / Pal map
x NSAM

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

President signed this NSAM (279) after crossing out inked out portion on first page. Accordingly, we retyped first page and used old second page with his signature at suggestion of McGB. Memo had come back with notation by Walter Jenkins that "President doesn't want to mention figures." Original of this notation in McGB files.

R. W. KOMER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By rlc, NARA, Date 7-27-06

~~SECRET~~

February 7, 1964

Walter,

Attached is revised India/Pakistan NSAM omitting the sentence on dollar figures. I hope we can get quick signature, since this has been hanging fire quite a while.

Old version also attached.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

7 file
India/Pak map
x India map
x Pak map

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By gjc, NARA, Date 7-27-06

7a
file

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 279

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Military Assistance to India and Pakistan

I have no objection to going forward with exploratory approaches looking toward possible five year MAP programs for India and Pakistan under the conditions described in the Secretary of State's 16 January memorandum to me.

However, I do not believe that we should yet discuss MAP levels with either country. Until we have a clearer idea of the prospects for the FY 1965 aid program, it seems to me premature to indicate to India or Pakistan how much military aid they might be able to count upon, regardless of how tentatively we put it. Instead, we should indicate to both governments that they should prepare austere minimum five year programs. Then, as their plans mature and as we get a better reading on Congressional attitudes, we can make a final decision on what MAP to provide.

Furthermore, in the course of these discussions I desire that the following precautions be observed:

1. We should make clear to both countries what we expect of them in return for prospective long-term military aid. As to India, we particularly want it to hold foreign exchange diversions from development to defense to a reasonable level, lest we end up indirectly helping finance an excessive defense effort via aid which we provide for quite another purpose.
2. In the case of Pakistan, our MAP help should be appropriately linked to satisfactory performance with respect to its alliance obligations and to our intelligence facilities.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS. Vol. 46, # 13
By NJ NARA, Date 8-8-05

~~SECRET~~

Page Two

3. Both governments must be made to understand that no irrevocable five year MAP commitments can be undertaken by the US, both because aid levels each year will depend on Congress and because our actual aid each year will depend on continuing Pakistani and Indian performance.

4. Our approaches to India and Pakistan should be timed for optimum impact. For example, I do not believe that we should initially approach Pakistan until we have assessed the results of the Chou En-lai visit.

With these caveats, I approve proceeding along the lines of the Secretary of State's 16 January proposals.

cc: The Administrator, AID
The Director of Central Intelligence

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
January 30, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a revised NSAM embodying your instructions to me on India/Pakistan MAP. Also attached are the original 16 January recommendations of Rusk and McNamara.

I have given the first paragraph a positive tone so that the NSAM will not be wrongly interpreted to mean that you are in fact rejecting the Rusk/McNamara/Taylor proposals. I think this important. But note that it only says DOD can plan on this basis, nothing more (it is doing so now).

The next paragraph makes clear your point to me that we cannot decide now, or tell India and Pakistan, how much MAP we will give them. Instead they should come up with their own austere five-year programs, and we will then decide how much we can do.

The remainder of the NSAM is the same cautionary language I have put in all drafts.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By rgj, NARA, Date 7-27-00

8
India/Pakistan
map

~~SECRET~~

*File Pak
India
map*

8a

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Military Assistance to India and Pakistan

I have no objection to going forward with exploratory approaches looking toward possible five year MAP programs for India and Pakistan under the conditions described in the Secretary of State's 16 January memorandum to me. Nor do I object to internal planning within the Executive Branch on the basis of a MAP level of around \$50 million annually for India and \$40 million for Pakistan.

However, I do not believe that we can yet discuss with either country these MAP levels. Until we have a clearer idea of the prospects for the FY 1965 aid program, it seems to me premature to indicate to India or Pakistan how much military aid they might be able to count upon, regardless of how tentatively we put it. Instead, we should indicate to both governments that they should prepare austere minimum five year programs. Then, as their plans mature and as we get a better reading on Congressional attitudes, we can make a final decision on what MAP to provide.

Furthermore, in the course of these discussions I desire that the following precautions be observed:

1. We should make clear to both countries what we expect of them in return for prospective long-term military aid. As to India, we particularly want it to hold foreign exchange diversions from development to defense to a reasonable level, lest we end up indirectly helping finance an excessive defense effort via aid which we provide for quite another purpose.
2. In the case of Pakistan, our MAP help should be appropriately linked to satisfactory performance with respect both to its alliance obligations and to our intelligence facilities.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol xxv, #13
By My NARA, Date 8-8-05

~~SECRET~~

Page Two

3. Both governments must be made to understand that no irrevocable five year MAP commitments can be undertaken by the US, both because aid levels each year will depend on Congress and because our actual aid each year will depend on continuing Pakistani and Indian performance.

4. Our approaches to India and Pakistan should be timed for optimum impact. For example, I do not believe that we should initially approach Pakistan until we have assessed the results of the Chou En-lai visit.

With these caveats, I approve proceeding along the lines of the Secretary of State's 16 January proposals.

cc: The Administrator, AID
The Director of Central Intelligence

LBJ:RWK/jk 1-30-64

9
Full Pak
Judicial Map
January 29, 1964

~~SECRET~~
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Tab A is a revised NSAM for your signature embodying your latest instructions to me on India/Pakistan MAP. The first paragraph is stated positively so that the bureaucracy doesn't wrongly conclude you are rejecting the Taylor proposals. However, the next two paragraphs clearly make your point that we should tell India and Pakistan to come up with their own five year plans, and that we will only then decide what we will do.

However, I hope you will permit me to argue once more for the earlier version of the NSAM (Tab B):

A. A statement of our five-year MAP intentions (not a commitment) is the best card we have to play in the crucially important game of swinging India further toward the West and repairing our relations with Pakistan. It is also our best means of getting a handle on Indian and Pak policy by posing certain conditions for our aid.

B. These aims are of such importance as to warrant \$90 million annually of whatever MAP we can get from the Congress. Surely 9% of the billion dollar MAP we want for FY 1965 is worth investing in two of the key countries in the Free World. This is less than we've spent in FY'63 and FY'64. Even if MAP got cut to \$600 million, couldn't we sustain with Congress the argument that India/Pakistan are worth this much of the smaller pie? India/Pak aid, large as it is, was not an issue in last year's aid fight.

C. If you accept these premises, the issue becomes one of how to get the most for our money. Here I fear that asking both countries to come up with their own plans first will result in highly inflated requests from both Paks and Indians. They both have insatiable appetites. We will then cut these down to size, but in the process much goodwill will be lost.

D. Equally important, if we state our all-important conditions at the time we ask for their five-year program, and then have to cut back their requests, some of our conditions may go down the drain too.

E. Therefore, I would argue that a firm proposal on carefully prescribed terms to India and Pakistan would achieve more in those countries, create less backbiting, and cost no more ultimately.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By ryk, NARA, Date 7-27-06

R. W. KOMER

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

10
Rusk Paky
Indea/Map
January 21, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol XXV, # 8
By RG NARA, Date 8-8-05

Tab A is Secretary Rusk's proposal on how to handle MAP for India and Pakistan. It is based on Taylor's recommendations following his December trip, and concurred in by McNamara and Bell.

In essence, they say let's put the bee on the Indians to come up with a sensible five-year anti-China program, telling them that if it is satisfactory India can plan on around \$50 million MAP per annum from us. Bowles thinks this sum much too small given the strategic stakes involved (Tab B). State, Bundy and I wanted to go a bit more his way; even with only \$1 billion annual MAP we could easily find another \$10 million by marginal cuts in other countries which are far less important. But we caved when DOD was adamant on \$50 million.

We'd also work out a 5-year plan with the Paks, as a means of protecting our Pak assets. Of course, neither proposal really involves a big new outlay we wouldn't be undertaking otherwise. As long as we have a MAP, we'd presumably want to invest so much in India and Pakistan. So all that is really proposed is to package our MAP in five-year terms rather than annual increments in order to maximize the needed impact and get the most leverage.

Moreover, we suggest in both cases only an opening gambit. Then we check our bets until we see their responses. And even if both agree to our terms, we'd make clear there can be no irrevocable five-year "commitments." We'd of course declare our Executive Branch intent, but make clear it is dependent on annual Hill action and Pak/Indian performance.

The options are to: (1) remand the proposal again for further study if you have reservations; (2) simply delay action further on grounds that time is still not ripe; (3) approve going ahead with initial approaches. The chief reasons arguing for (3) are to get a handle on the Indian buildup and to show India, now in disarray over Nehru's illness, that we're still backing it against China. The post-Nehru leadership could be far more pro-US than Nehru. These are big stakes. And if we go ahead with India, we also want to protect our flank with the Paks.

You could either have a meeting or, in view of inter-agency agreement, just sign off along the lines of Tab C (which embodies certain cautionary words I think you'd want).

Attach.

Tab A - Rusk Memo to Pres. 1/16/64

Tab B - Delhi's 2140

Tab C - NSAM

R. W. KOMER

~~SECRET~~

10a

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Military Assistance to India and Pakistan

I generally approve the lines of action proposed in the Secretary of State's 16 January memorandum to me on this subject. However, in proceeding to work out a meeting of minds with India and Pakistan, I desire that the following precautions be observed:

1. In approaching both governments, we should make clear what we expect of them in return for prospective long-term military assistance. As to India, we particularly want it to hold foreign exchange diversions from development to defense to a reasonable level, lest we end up indirectly helping finance an excessive defense effort via aid which we provide for quite another purpose.
2. In the Pakistani case, our MAP help should be appropriately linked to satisfactory performance with respect both to alliance obligations and to our intelligence facilities.
3. Both governments must be made to understand that no irrevocable five-year MAP commitments can be undertaken by the US, both because aid levels each year will depend on Congress and because our actual aid each year will depend on continuing Pakistani and Indian performance.
4. Our approaches to India and Pakistan should be timed for optimum impact. For example, I do not believe that we should initially approach Pakistan until we have assessed the Chou-En-lai visit.

cc: The Administrator, AID
The Director of Central Intelligence

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By ryl/r, NARA, Date 72706

~~SECRET~~

LBJ:RWK:jk

*RWK
India/Pak*

HH

13

December 12, 1963

~~SECRET~~

FOR TAYLOR FROM BUNDY

President much interested in modified Bowles proposal, but desires postpone any decisions until he has benefit of your views and what you have learned in Delhi and Karachi. He desires you to probe deeply on size and nature of likely Indian force buildup, though of course without any commitments on our part at this point.

President also desires that you discuss the military aspects of the modified Bowles proposals as outlined in meeting you attended last Friday with Ambassadors Bowles and McConaughy, so that we may have a better feel for their views. Now that Chou-en-lai visit to Pakistan has surfaced, he further hopes that you will repeat our views as to unfortunate nature of this visit, as a follow-up to his own talk with Bhutto.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *gjk*, NARA, Date 7-27-06

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

December 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached paper from Rusk, McNamara, and Bell recommends a major initiative toward India. Its genesis was a proposal by Bowles that since we were probably going to be giving India substantial military aid against the Chicomcs anyway, why not package it in such a way as to get the maximum from the Indians? So he suggested trading an informal indication of our longer-term MAP plans for Indian assurances that they would limit their own buildup, not divert too much from development to defense, and not lean too heavily on Soviet military aid. We fear Khrushchev may be coming to India shortly with some military goodies, so would like to start moving first.

The chief risk is a tough Pakistani reaction, unless we handle the transaction with skill. But we cannot afford to give the Pakistani a veto on our Indian policy, when we have a major opportunity to move India closer to us. Moreover, to mollify the Paks we would plan on a similar long-term MAP commitment to them, if they undertook to behave themselves vis-a-vis Peiping.

This thoughtful paper speaks for itself; we urge that you approve it. In fact, we'd go somewhat further than cautious State and DOD--perhaps to as high as \$65 million MAP a year including high performance aircraft, if needed as an added sweetener to get the Indian response Bowles hopes to get. We propose a meeting to discuss this enterprise with you at 11:00 Thursday.

McGeorge Bundy

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

Attach. Rusk Memo to President, subj. Next Steps on MilAid to India and Pak

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority FRDS 2163, Vol. X16, #342
 By sg NARA, Date 8-8-05

~~SECRET~~

December 10, 1963

Law
Dud/Pak
15

MAC -

Why not show Bowles' eloquent Delhi 1822 and McConaughy's Karachi 1113 to President, saying these are good background for proposal we'll be bringing him this week. If you like, I'll do a covering chit.

I hope you could also say we lean in Bowles direction, seeing major opportunity to move India further our way and forestall Soviets (note Chet's concern lest Nikita suddenly make long-rumored trip to Delhi with goodies in his pack). Nikita may just have to travel to counter Chou's trip; we think he's going to Cairo, so why not Delhi.

We've modified Chet's blue sky ideas to protect our Pak flank, which limits force of Karachi 1113 criticism: (1) on force goals we intend to hold India back more than it suggests; (2) contrary to Karachi 1113, holding India's own military procurement abroad to far less than '\$170-190 million per year' is one of key features of Bowles proposal; (3) worst of all, idea of tying our military aid to some major move on Kashmir would not only be futile but put us back in same hopeless box out of which we've just climbed. We all share Karachi's fear of an adverse Pak reaction, but Walter's solution (e.g. give 104s to Pakistan now and not to India, concerted effort to break Kashmir deadlock) are just not real. Nonetheless, new proposals will call for cautious tactics, avoiding premature showing of our cards, which he suggests.

R. W. KOMER

Bob:
He won't read it ahead of time--
Let's organize meeting and try 1 paper
to be available night before.
McG.B.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *jeff*, NARA, Date 7-27-06

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

December 10, 1963

*16
RWK
India Pak*

McGB -

Here's draft India/Pak paper which I personally rewrote and is now being piloted through State-DOD top level. Am sending it over on the off-chance you may get calls from WPB or someone.

It's a longish paper but this is a tricky two-country problem. So I've included fair amount of explanation.

Yemen paper (including draft letter to Faysal) should also be ready by Wednesday. I urge we meet on both India/Pakistan and Yemen before end of week which means preferably Thursday. However, I am not sure Yemen meeting is necessary (perhaps just Rusk, Talbot, you and I could handle). Shall I lay on Thursday India meeting or will you? Should I send papers to LBJ Wednesday night even if you aren't here? Will he pay attention if they don't come from you? To cover this bet, what say I draft a covering notes for your signature? Pardon my confusion.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

Attach. Rusk Memo to President, subj.
Next Steps on MilAid to India and Pak
Copy No. 41

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *rg/p*, NARA, Date 7-27-06

~~SECRET~~

17
RWK

McGB:

December 6, 1963

The brief for Taylor's India-Pakistan visit is also on SG agenda for today. Only issues worth discussing are:

1. Taylor's Tone in Pakistan. We've been too apologetic to Paks, especially in volunteering all sorts of reassurances. Now, with LBJ's reaction to Chou visit as our guide, Taylor should rebut vigorously Pak pressure treatment he'll inevitably get. We should do like UK did to Bhutto last October, e. g. Indian threat is "nonsense". A little pep talk useful here.

2. Reassurances. Instead of offering these as "concessions" we should cite them as "examples" of how we mean it when we say we'll defend Paks if Indians attack!

1. Joint planning. Taylor prefers Harriman/Komer line of unilateral description of US capabilities including Ninth Fleet rather than actual joint planning against India. We should describe this at SG.

2. Joint exercises. We plan a few of these to show Paks how we could get out in a hurry.

3. Ninth Fleet. We should build up our description of how helpful it could be.

R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By gjk, NARA, Date 7-27-06

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority see FRUS 61-63, vol. 19 #342

By jc. NARA. Date 7-27-06

18

~~SECRET~~/DRAFT

December 9, 1963/4:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Next Steps on Military Aid to India and Pakistan

Proposal for India. Ambassador Bowles proposes that we make a five-year military assistance commitment to India in exchange for Indian decisions to limit their force levels, hold down procurement of military equipment from the Soviet Bloc, hold to a minimum diversion of foreign exchange from economic development, exercise restraint in relations with Pakistan, and cooperate with us in the containment of Communist China (see Enclosure 1).

The Departments of State and Defense and AID have studied these proposals and agree that if we could reach some such understanding with India, it would be well worthwhile. A steady long-term policy of military cooperation with India would do much to stabilize our relationship and thus serve the US political aim of pulling India closer to the US. Indian decisions to settle on moderate force levels would hold down Indo-Pak tensions. Excessive Soviet penetration of the Indian military would be prevented. Major diversions of foreign exchange from economic development, to which we are so heavily committed, would be avoided (over the past three years India has spent an average of \$95 million of its own foreign exchange for defense; estimates indicate this figure may go as high as \$160 million for Indian fiscal year 1964. This would put real pressure on the Indian development program). Since we are probably going to provide substantial MAP to India over the next several years anyway, we ought to maximize the leverage we get from it by proceeding

along the above lines.

We believe, however, that we should stop somewhere short of as explicit a commitment as Ambassador Bowles suggests, and should approach it more cautiously, rather than laying all our cards on the table at the outset. Such cautious tactics would leave us greater freedom of action to gauge the likely Pakistani reaction and to find out whether the Indians would indeed be sufficiently responsive before deciding how much of our own plans to divulge. Nonetheless, we would go ahead now with the preparation of a five-year MAP program for India in the \$50-60 million annual range, so that we would be prepared, if the timing were ripe and the Indian response to our initial probes satisfactory, to divulge our longer term plans.

Proposal for Pakistan. In the years since 1954, we have established a pattern of military assistance to Pakistan which is essentially the one which we are now suggesting for India. We have agreed to modernize and maintain five and a half divisions and to modernize the Pakistan air force. The latter has come to mean that eventually we will replace the obsolescent F-86 squadrons with supersonic aircraft. (Pakistan already has one squadron of F-104s which we delivered in 1961.) We have [in a series of Aides-Memoire] told the Pakistanis from time to time of the quantities of certain types of equipment we were planning to deliver to meet our commitments. By providing this level of support, we were able to persuade the Pakistanis to limit their overall force goals and the diversion of their foreign exchange to military expenditures.

~~SECRET~~

3.

One reason for caution about moving ahead too fast in revealing to India our longer term MAP plans is that these might leak prematurely to Pakistan and cause a violent reaction before we had laid the necessary groundwork. To mitigate the Pakistani reaction we had thought of providing them too, at roughly the same time, with an indication of our longer term MAP intentions, perhaps over the next three years. We've been planning on around \$40 million annually in continuing MAP. As with India, we would also attach conditions to this program, particularly that it is predicated upon our clear understanding that Pakistan will not go too far with China.

Unfortunately Chou En-lai's coming visit to Pakistan leads me to believe that now is the wrong time to talk with Ayub about longer term MAP, or any MAP at all. However, as we chart our course in the troubled waters of US-Pakistan relations during the months ahead I believe it important that we be prepared to give Ayub a clear signal of our continued willingness to support Pakistan unless its conduct impairs our ability to do so. To this end, we should also prepare a three/five year MAP program for Pakistan for use if and when the timing seems ripe.

~~SECRET~~

4.

Recommendations. In order to permit us to move ahead with both India and Pakistan, but with appropriate tactical flexibility, I recommend with the concurrence of Bob McNamara and Dave Bell that you make the following decisions:

India.

1. That we develop an internal plan, not to be disclosed to the Indians as yet, for a program of military assistance in support of Indian forces to meet the Chinese threat to be accomplished over a period of five years.

The JCS determined on December 3 that India required 12 divisions and two independent brigades together with supporting units and three squadrons of night/all weather fighters to meet this threat. (We are now supporting the conversion of six divisions into effective mountain divisions and have told the Indians that we will convert two more if funds are available.)

2. That the above program include helping convert those Indian ground forces which are required to meet the threat from China into effective mountain divisions with supporting elements; that we continue to assist India develop its logistic capacity to support these forces along the China border; and that we continue to help India meet a part of its defensive needs against China through domestic production.

3. That the program include continued support to the Indian Air Force, including radar, communications and air transport. However, we would leave open the question of supersonics and postpone for the present a decision on supplying these to India or Pakistan.

~~SECRET~~

5.

4. That the above plans be developed within a range of \$50-60 million in MAP annually, leaving for subsequent decision the precise five-year program level.

5. That our willingness to extend and thereafter continue such long-range assistance will rest upon satisfactory understanding that the Government of India will: limit its overall forces to reasonable levels; limit procurement of arms from the Soviet Union, avoid excessive diversion of foreign exchange to defense expenditure and exercise restraint in its relations with Pakistan. Such United States action would also rest on continued United State-Indian agreement on the political and military implications of the Chinese threat.

6. That, as to the tactics of negotiation with India, we proceed on the following careful, step-by-step basis:

a. At this point, we would only authorize Ambassador Bowles to say that we were considering longer-term plans for military aid to India. Before we could firm these up we needed a better understanding of proposed Indian defense, plans, force ceilings, resource allocations, procurement from third countries, etc. over the next several years. We need tell the Pakistani nothing at this point.

b. General Taylor would reinforce this line during his visit to India (16-18 December) and probe Indian intentions.

c. Depending upon Indian responsiveness, we would be prepared at an appropriate time to divulge to India our longer term MAP intentions. The specificity of what we say at that time would depend on the extent

6.

of the understandings the Indians were prepared to reach with us along the lines of para. 4 above, ~~(and the situation in Pakistan.)~~ We would in no case, of course, make a firm commitment but only state our intentions, the carrying out of which would be dependent on Indian performance and US appropriations. We would simultaneously inform Pakistan (since we are already planning to pick up a total of 10 Indian divisions by 1965, informing the Pakistani that we only intended to support 12 over five years should on balance reassure rather than frighten them).

7. Pakistan. That we similarly develop an internal US plan for a possible three-five year MAP package for Pakistan within the context of our present commitments. This plan should include the provision of two more squadrons of supersonic aircraft.

8. That we not divulge this, or even our FY 1965 annual MAP program, until we are further satisfied as to Pakistani intentions vis-a-vis their alliance obligations; but that we be prepared, if circumstances seem ripe, to divulge this program at such time as we divulge our long-term Indian program.

9. That any three/five-year Pakistan MAP program we predicated on clear understandings that Pakistan will place acceptable limits on the development of its relations with Communist China and will fulfill the basic requirements of its alliance relationship with us.

~~SECRET~~

7.

Since we plan to move ahead with India in stages, I hope to be able to recommend to you that we move towards longer-range military delivery schedules for Pakistan before or when we disclose the full dimensions of our Indian package to Nehru. Max Taylor will drive home to Ayub the dangers of his present course with China when he is in Karachi on 19-20 December. Upon his return we shall take another look at the whole problem of containing Communist aggression on the subcontinent. Since Pakistan sees its so far limited relations with Communist China as serving its national interest just as India sees relations with the USSR as serving its national interests, it is perhaps too much to hope that we can develop unlimited security relationships with either country. Yet if we can move ahead, albeit somewhat jerkily in each country, I believe these proposals for military assistance to India and Pakistan will advance our strategic objective of resisting Communist pressure in the area without placing intolerable strains on our relations with either country. Moreover, the course we propose, though not ideal, seems best calculated to reduce the possibility that the Sino-Soviet dispute will be fought out in the subcontinent.

DEAN RUSK

RWK

~~SECRET~~

December 6, 1963

RECAP OF MAIN ISSUES FOR SG

I. Bowles proposal (key issue is to get OK in principle)

- A. Should we go for multi-year commitment if we can get what Bowles proposes?
- B. Annual size of MAP (DOD reluctant go above \$50 million.)
- C. Supersonics for Pakistan and India
- D. Tactics and Timing (per Delhi 1757)

II. Taylor brief (big issue is Bowles proposal above)

- A. Tone (not too apologetic)
- B. Joint planning vs. unilateral description of US capabilities.
- C. Joint exercises

III. Yemen (next steps since UNYOM dies shortly)

- A. Can we afford to shift to pro-Saudi course?
- B. How can we get Faysal to hold off resuming aid?
- C. What to do about our squadron.

R. W. KOMER

~~SECRET~~

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21

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

29 January 1966

Mr. Robert Komer
White House

Bob:

Tim Hoopes asked that I get the attached
into your hands this morning.

*Initials
map*



JONATHAN D. STODDART
Deputy Director
Near East and South Asia Region

~~SECRET~~

Upon removal of attachments
this document becomes
UNCLASSIFIED

21-8

~~SECRET~~

PAKISTAN

The undelivered MAP (grant) balance from FY 66 and prior year programs is about \$59.0 million. The phased programs follow.

PHASE I - \$7.1 Million

(\$ Millions)

Commercial - Spare parts for 5 C-130 a/c .1 (cash sale)
- 2 commercially-configured C-130 a/c for PIA 7.0 (cash sale)

PHASE II - \$29.3 Million

non-lethal { Selective training .7 (grant)
Trucks, trailers and misc wheeled vehicles 6.3 (cash sale)
Communications gear for existing forces 5.6 (cash sale)
Automotive spares (less tanks, APC's, SP howitzers) 2.0 (cash sale)
Naval spares .5 (cash sale)
Other support equipment (e.g., engineer, quartermaster, construction, medical and training) and supplies 14.2 (cash sale)

PHASE III - \$33.5 Million

Spare parts for F-86, F-104, RT-33 a/c and helicopters ^{a/} 1.0 (cash sale)
14 Trainer a/c, 1 C-130 a/c and AGE 15.5 (grant)
Additional training 1.8 (grant)
A/C engine overhaul (C-130's, trainers and helicopters) .4 (grant)
Spare parts for combat vehicles (tanks, APC's, SP howitzers) 1.8 (grant)
? War reserve ammo 11.5 (grant)
? 560 Sidewinders 1.5 (grant)

CUMULATIVE TOTAL

\$69.9^{b/}

a/ No spares for B-57 a/c to be sold or provided at this time.

b/ Based on the above phasing, there would still be some \$26 million available from the undelivered FY 66 and prior programs. This amount could be applied to the FY 67 program, which for planning purposes (Table 36) is set at \$25 million.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 06-255
By sil, NARA, Date 11-7-06

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210

INDIA

The undelivered balance from FY 66 and prior year programs is \$94.3 million MAP (grant) and \$113.1 million of MAS (credit). The phased programs follow.

PHASE I - Less than \$350,000

(\$ Millions)

Remaining components for 600 AN/PRC - 25 radio kits	*a/	(credit sale)
Impact shipment of 4 tractors and 12 dump trucks for <u>Nepal E-W Highway</u>	.3	(grant)

PHASE II - \$46.3 Million

Machine tools for Defense Production	12.0	(credit sale)
{ Resume CONUS training (less combat air training)	1.5	(grant)
? { Star Sapphire communications and mapping projects	16.8	(grant)
{ Border roads construction, end-items and spares	10.0	(grant)
Construction items and spares	.4	(credit sale)
Medical and signal spares, aircraft support vehicles, C-119 engines	5.6	(credit sale)

PHASE III - \$109.1 Million

Previously Planned Credit Sales

1. Dodge 1-ton truck negotiations	5.0
2. Ambajhari ammunition production facility	25.0
3. Bridging equipment	5.2
4. Ammunition for existing forces, modernization of ordnance factories	15.0
5. 6000 AN/PRC-25 radios	5.0

Previously Planned Grant Projects

1. QM signal and combat engineer end-items	24.9
2. AF ground support equipment, ammunitions, selective force modernization	29.0

CUMULATIVE TOTAL

\$155.8 Million ^{b/}

a/ Less than \$50,000

b/ The foregoing program absorbs all but \$12.3 million of grant monies from FY 66 and the prior year undelivered balances. In addition, a residue of \$46.4 million in credit availabilities remains from the same period. These amounts could be applied to the FY 67 program, which for planning purposes (Table 36) is set at \$47.0 grant plus \$50 million in credit sales.

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NLJ 06-255

By isl, NARA, Date 11-7-06

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

11 December 1965

MEMO FOR Mr. Robert Komer - White House

Attached is the proposed short paper for the President designed to give him a feel for the probable dimensions of resumed military aid to Pakistan and India. I hope it is responsive.


JWH

Townsend Hoopes
Deputy

*India-Pak map
(Resumption)*

DEC 11 1965

22c



PHASED MILITARY ASSISTANCE RESUMPTION, PAKISTAN

(Phases I-III support existing forces; Phase IV replaces attrition items except for armor, combat a/c; Phase V reconstitutes forces; Phases III-V postulated on basis of MAP funding; this is arbitrary and programs could be all sales or a MAP/Sales mix)

<u>Content</u>	<u>Value (\$ Millions)</u>
I. 90-day level of spare parts for 5 C-130 a/c	.1 (cash sale)
II. 90-day level of spare parts for 80 F-86F, 9 F-104A/B, 6 RT 33A, 10 Helicopters	.9 (cash sale)
III. Wheeled vehicles, engine and quartermaster equipment, communications gear to support existing forces (includes 925 trucks, $\frac{1}{4}$ -5T)	20.0 (MAP)
IV. Attrition replacement items, trainer a/c; one C-130 a/c; 560 Sidewinders; automotive spares, ammo (NB - no tanks or combat aircraft).	44.8 (MAP)
V. Selective force modernization	19.0 (MAP)

Summary of Funding Resources
(\$ millions)

	<u>FY 65 and Prior</u> <u>Undelivered Balance</u>	<u>FY 66</u> <u>(Planned)</u>	<u>FY 67</u> <u>(Planned)</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
MAP	41	18 ^{1/2}	25	84
Applied to Phased Pak Illustrative Program	41	18	25	84

1. \$ 9 million funded under CRA for training and spares but undelivered.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By mg/k, NARA, Date 7-27-06
11-7-06

PHASED MILITARY ASSISTANCE RESUMPTION, PAKISTAN

(Phases I-III support existing forces; Phase IV replaces attrition items except for armor, combat a/c; Phase V reconstitutes forces; Phases III-V postulated on basis of MAP funding; this is arbitrary and programs could be all sales or a MAP/Sales mix)


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MAP	41	18 ^{1/2}	25	84
Applied to Phased Pak Illustrative Program	41	18	25	84

1. \$ 9 million funded under CRA for training and spares but undelivered.

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22-8

PHASED MILITARY ASSISTANCE RESUMPTION, INDIA

(Phase I provides spare part support for U.S. equipment previously provided and engineer end items; Phase II provides for training, air defense and resumption of modest credit sales; Phase III provides more extensive force improvement through MAP and credit; Phase IV involves selective modernization.)

<u>CONTENT</u>	<u>VALUE (\$ millions)</u>
I. Border Roads construction end items and spares; medical and signal spares; air refueling units; C-119 engines.	22.1 (MAP)
Construction end items and spares	.4 (credit)
SUB-TOTAL	\$22.5
II. Resume CONUS and in-country training (less combat a/c); Star Sapphire Communications System and mapping projects	18.3 (MAP)
Resume Dodge truck negotiations; release PRC-25 radios for export	5.0 (credit)
SUB-TOTAL	\$23.3
III. Quartermaster, signal and combat engineer end items	24.9 (MAP)
Bridging equipment, conclude Ambajhari ammunition production factory contract	30.2 (credit)
SUB-TOTAL	\$55.1
IV. Air Force ground support equipment; ammunition (all types); selective force modernization	29.0 (MAP)
Ammunition and modernization of existing ordnance factories; other projects	27.5 (credit)
SUB-TOTAL	\$46.7

DECLASSIFIED NLJ 06-255
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *g/jc*, NARA, Date 7-27-06
11-7-06

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Summary of Funding Resources
(\$ millions)

	<u>FY 65 and Prior Undelivered Balance</u>	<u>FY 66 (Planned)</u>	<u>FY 67 (Planned)</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
MAP	65.3	29 ^{1/}	47	141.3
Credit	63.1	50	50	<u>163.1</u>
		TOTAL:		\$304.1
Applied to Phased Indian Illustrative Program				
MAP	65.3	29	0	94.3
Credit	63.1	0	0	<u>63.1</u>
		TOTAL:		\$157.4 ^{2/}

1. \$8.7 million funded under CRA for training and spares but undelivered.
2. \$147 million balance available for additional force modernization (F-5 tactical aircraft, etc.) if political and military considerations warranted.

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PHASED MILITARY ASSISTANCE RESUMPTION, INDIA

(Phase I provides spare part support for U.S. equipment previously provided and engineer end items; Phase II provides for training, air defense and resumption of modest credit sales; Phase III provides more extensive force improvement through MAP and credit; Phase IV involves selective modernization.)

<u>CONTENT</u>	<u>VALUE (\$ millions)</u>
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IV. Air Force ground support equipment; ammunition (all types); selective force modernization	29.0 (MAP)
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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By ry/jc, NARA, Date 11-7-06

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Summary of Funding Resources
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Authority NLJ.032.041.002/6

By jc NARA, Date 7-26-06

17 OCT 1955
Indo / map
23

Key Decision Dates for MAP-MAS for India and Pakistan

<u>Date</u>	<u>Items</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Now	Common use MAP equip- ment <u>in CONUS</u>	Delivery suspended; items being identified and located. High priority items probably already being diverted.	ODMA believes it may already be too late to save many common use items; MAP peculiar equip- ment to be placed in MAPOM and held. Defense will have to set very high priority to permit early recovery of many items for Indian, Pakistan programs.
20 October	Common use MAP equip- ment items <u>overseas</u>	Delivery suspended; items being identified and located.	After 15-20 days common use items will begin to be reallocated to other users. A number of items will probably remain available for deliv- ery to India or Pakistan for as long as 2-3 months. MAP peculiar equip- ment to be placed in MAPOM and held.
30 October	Ambajhari Ordnance contract with Lummus Company	Contract neg. under- way. Contract should be signed or cancelled on 10-30	GOI has paid \$2.5 million (10%) down payment. Cancellation would cause US to pay this back, as well as \$2.5 million paid by GOI against FY 64-65 credit program.
15 November	Star Sapphire Systems: Request for technical proposal (RFTP)	To be issued 15 Nov	Decision to post- pone issuing RFTP on schedule would cause completion date for system to slip from current target of 12/30/67

OCT 12 1955

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Items</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Indefinite	Radios, component parts from RCA	Work progressing on order; 8 Oct decision to be made by RCA as to whether to proceed.	Charges being incurred daily through continued production, storage of end items. USG may have to pay.
Indefinite	MAS items being procured directly from Services by both countries	Delivery stopped by OSD in a.w. MAP cut off	AF has requested guidance re outstanding sales cases on which more than \$1 million has been paid by Paks; other services have been asked to develop similar data.
Indefinite	Reconditioned machine tools for India (value-- \$250,000)	DSA now storing tools as they come out of rehab	Rehab storage costs will be lost if alternate disposal cannot be arranged; Indian ammo production would be seriously hurt if US machine tools being taken from USG industrial inventory, procured or reconditioned are not available.

Prepared By: John A. Reed, Jr.
OASD/ISA/NESA
7 October 1965

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24 1- Kover 8/24
2- Ref.

This document consists of 2 pages. Copy no. 2 of 16 copies. Series A.

New Delhi, India,
August 19, 1965.

~~SECRET~~ AND PERSONAL
OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Handwritten signature: J. Edgar Hoover

Dear Mac:

I am enclosing a memorandum on the question of military aid to India and Pakistan, which we must all agree is one of the most complex and difficult problems on our Asian agenda.

Although it is not my direct concern, I would like to suggest that in establishing our future plans in regard to Pakistan and India we should distinguish clearly between the criteria by which we allocate economic assistance on the one hand and military assistance on the other.

Pakistan has used our economic aid with considerable skill and the Pakistan economy is moving ahead in a satisfactory manner. Under these circumstances to reduce this particular assistance because of political differences would be widely misunderstood not only in Pakistan but elsewhere.

The military aid situation in both Pakistan and India, however, is a very different matter. Our military programs have deep political overtones which we cannot be expected to ignore. Inevitably they must be based on assumptions as to how our equipment will be used, and these assumptions are essentially political.

For instance, the primary purpose of military aid to India is to

enable

Mr. McGeorge Bundy,
Special Assistant to the President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

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Authority NLS 00-286 (#137)

By CB/KC. NARA. Date 7-27-06

~~SECRET~~

AUG 24 1965

enable India to fight the Chinese who are our principal enemy in Asia and whom the Indians also greatly fear and dislike. However, the Pakistanis, who profess friendship for the Chinese, have made it clear that the military equipment we give them is to be used against India, a democratic country which carries our primary hopes for increased stability in Asia.

In any event, I hope you will have an opportunity to read this memorandum and that it may contribute to the general discussions which I know are under way.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Enclosure:

Memorandum.

~~SECRET~~

24a

August 19, 1965

MEMORANDUM

OBSERVATIONS ON MILITARY AID TO THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT

by Chester Bowles

During my recent consultations in Washington I was told that basic decisions in regard to United States military aid to the subcontinent would be forthcoming once the foreign aid program gets through Congress and the President's desk is reasonably cleared of more urgent business.

This memorandum briefly describes the development of the US military aid program in India, analyzes the present problems and opportunities and suggests a specific course of action.

Background to the Present Situation

In the fall of 1962 our prompt response to India's defense needs following the Chinese attack, contrasted with Soviet ambivalence, set the stage for a wholly new and favorable political and military relationship between the United States and the largest and potentially the most influential of the non-Communist unaligned nations.

As the actual fighting came to a halt the Indians with a belated understanding of the inadequacies of their national security system began to think in terms of a five year military defense plan. In the early spring of 1963 an Indian delegation visited the United States to seek our assistance in carrying out this plan. For three reasons we failed to respond:

1. Reluctance to upset US-Pak relations with particular concern for our installations at Peshawar;
2. The widely held assumption (which turned out to be erroneous) that because of ideological ties with Communist China the Soviets would refuse to assist India in building her defenses in any significant degree, and that consequently the Indians had no source of military equipment but the United States;
3. The assumption that we could use India's urgent need for modern military equipment as a lever to force the Indians to settle

the

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Authority NLS 93-244 (#36a)
By HW/K NARA. Date 7-27-06

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-2-

the Kashmir dispute.

The possibility of assistance to India's Five Year Defense Plan at some future time was, however, not ruled out. In a final meeting before coming to India in June 1963 President Kennedy requested me to explore privately and informally what we could expect from the Indian Government in return for a moderate United States five year commitment to Indian defenses (conditioned on the availability of funds from Congress).

A few days before President Kennedy died in November 1963 I reported my findings which were based on extensive talks with all key members of the Indian Government including the defense establishment and Prime Minister Nehru. If the United States were prepared to provide India with \$75 million of military assistance annually for five years, it was my belief that the Indian Government could be expected at that time to:

- (a) place a moderate ceiling on their army and air force levels;
- (b) agree to a similar ceiling on their foreign exchange expenditures for defense purposes;
- (c) restrict their military purchases in the USSR and other Communist countries to a limited assortment of unsophisticated and undramatic weapons; and
- (d) consult with us informally on the political and military implications of a Chinese takeover in Southeast Asia and in particular on how India might cooperate in the defense of Burma.

In March 1964, we received word from Washington that \$50 million in grant aid and \$50 million in loans would be made available for military equipment to India on a tentative five year basis subject to negotiations on the specific items.

This budget in our opinion was fully adequate to India's needs. However it soon became clear that we had not yet fully come to grips with the key questions, i.e., the kind of equipment which India needed most and our willingness to provide it, in view of the probable reactions in Pakistan. Inevitably, there were further delays as these questions were explored in Washington, Karachi and New Delhi.

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-3-

In the meantime the Indians, concerned over their inability after sixteen months of discussion to secure a clear response to their requests for long term assistance (particularly in air defense), had become convinced that the Pakistanis possessed some kind of veto power over the size and character of U.S. military aid to India. The GOI had therefore undertaken serious negotiations with the Soviets who, contrary to our earlier assumption, were now showing a major interest in India's military defense.

By late May 1964 after the most intensive discussions the State Department and the Pentagon reached tentative agreement on what I believe to be a fully adequate Indian military aid program. In spite of these delays and the more forthcoming attitude of the Soviets it would in my opinion enable us in large measure to achieve the political-military objectives in India which had appeared to be within our grasp the previous November. However, the day before the key decision was to be made in regard to aircraft, Nehru died and it was decided to postpone a full discussion with the Indians until we got a clear sense of the attitude of the new Indian Government.

In August when no further word was forthcoming from us, Defense Minister Chavan went to Moscow with a lengthy shopping list which included a final request for the MIG 21s to which the Soviets predictably responded in a forthright manner.

Once again in January 1965 the Indians came to us with an urgent request for six squadrons of F-5s, a request to which we have thus far not reacted. If we are unwilling to provide these planes under our military assistance program, I believe that the GOI will first attempt to buy them directly from Northrup; failing this, they will seek the more advanced longer range MIG 21s from the USSR which they seem to believe will be forthcoming.

In the meantime, after a long effort to persuade us and the British to support the Indian navy, the GOI has sent a delegation to Moscow to complete negotiations for Soviet submarines and patrol craft.

Implications

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Implications of the Present India-USSR Military Relationship

In considering the advancement of US interests in South Asia two points seem to me particularly relevant:

(1) for the long haul the major political threat to U.S. interests in the Subcontinent may not come from China but from Russia, and

(2) with skilled political handling, a reasonable commitment of U.S. resources, and a bit of luck China's aggressive posture in regard to India can become an important element in bringing about a close and highly advantageous association between India and the U.S.A.

At the moment, however, the situation is in flux. With the steadily worsening relations between the Soviet Union and China in the last two or three years and the failure of Moscow-directed Communist parties to subvert the new post-colonial governments of Asia and Africa, the USSR is now making a determined effort to establish close working relationships with the more strategically-placed non-communist governments regardless of their ideology. Since India is by all odds the most promising Asian counterweight to Chinese expansion and potentially the most important of the nonaligned nations, it has been given a very high priority in the new Soviet strategy.

It is no doubt assumed that if India can be developed into a kind of Asian Yugoslavia with economic and political policies that are generally responsive to the USSR, the Soviets could lay the basis for a major breakthrough in this crucial area. Eventually it might be assumed that this would lead to a greatly expanded Soviet-influenced bloc which could come to exercise a dominant role in the United Nations, create further deep divisions in the western alliance and gradually isolate the U.S.A.

From our vantage point in New Delhi the Soviets appear to be following this strategy with considerable skill, a significant commitment of resources, and at the moment with rather disquieting results.

In pursuit of this policy the Soviet Union has thus far provided India with well over a billion dollars in credits for economic

development

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development. Even more significant from the standpoint of Soviet political objectives may be the increasing amount of military assistance which already totals \$293 million, not counting the new naval equipment which will be announced soon.

However, this sum although substantial is still less than Soviet commitments to either Syria or Iraq (with combined populations little larger than Calcutta's) and a fraction of that given to the UAR (with a population less than half that of the state of Uttar Pradesh). In view of India's key strategic importance to the Soviets we therefore may expect further increases in the availability of Soviet defense funds as opportunities unfold.

According to one intelligence source (NBB-2337 Secret NOFORN), Shastri, during his recent visit to Moscow, became convinced that he could expect very nearly unlimited economic and military assistance from the USSR. Shastri confided to the source that Kosygin, Mikoyan and Brezhnev had promised to fill whatever gap in economic assistance might result from reductions in aid given by the United States and other Western nations, and that the Soviets would render direct assistance in case Pakistan attacked India. Shastri had the impression that a similar assurance applied even to an attack on India by China. Shastri also asserted that the Soviets would agree to train Indian forces in large enough numbers to give India a first-class military machine, although he and the Cabinet would not accept this offer.

Furthermore, Indian officials assert that the Soviets place no political strings on the equipment which they turn over to the GOI. According to L.K. Jha, Kosygin told Shastri in Moscow that India as a major nation is entitled to its own foreign policy and defence establishment and that consequently the military equipment provided by the USSR is India's to use as it sees fit.

Although this green light approval may be considered irresponsible in today's explosive world, it has great public appeal in any newly independent country including India.

There is no way of knowing whether the Soviet leaders actually gave Shastri such assurances. For now it is important, however, that Shastri genuinely thinks they did, an impression which was

clearly

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clearly conveyed in the secret letter he sent to Chief Ministers of the States upon his return (NBD 7083 Confidential NOFORN).

In the meantime our own position in the three Indian armed forces continues to be steadily eroded because of our inability under the present ground rules to give the Indians what they want and need.

The impact within the Indian Government of the Soviet strategy which combines political support for India, skilled flattery of Indian leaders, and major commitments of the kind of economic and military assistance which India wants most - without strings - is substantial. This is increasingly so within the normally pro-U.S. Indian military which now largely (and not too happily) looks to the USSR for airplanes, naval craft, tanks, SAMs and other sophisticated equipment.

Moreover, this trend is paralleled by a disturbing change in the attitudes of the Indian people. In February 1963, a public opinion poll revealed that 63% of all Indians considered the United States India's "best friend" while only 7% so referred to the Soviets. In June of this year the same question resulted in a stand-off between the United States and the USSR of 32% to 32%.

At the same time, our downgrading of India's defense needs, our rejection or avoidance of her requests for more sophisticated weapons and our minimizing of the Chinese threat to India in the hope that this may slow down India's requests for U.S. equipment appear to have gained us neither influence nor respect in Karachi.

Although this adds up to a worrisome situation, it is important nevertheless to keep our perspective. Almost invariably the Indians have first attempted to procure specific items of military equipment either from the US or other Western nations before turning to the USSR. Even today most senior Indian defence officials and military men would greatly prefer a closer relationship with the United States.

The Indian public generally still feel a deep sense of gratitude for the support we gave them in 1962 and there is a nagging suspicion among thoughtful observers that a shift in Chinese attitudes at some

future

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future time may again bring China and Russia together, possibly at India's expense.

Present Status of U.S. Military Aid to India

At the Nassau meeting in November 1962 we and the British each agreed to give India \$60 million worth of defense equipment, of which 90% has now been delivered.

Since then, in addition, we have agreed to deliver \$260 million worth of equipment of which only 15% has been delivered.

The commitment which we made in June 1964 (contingent upon available appropriations from Congress) calling for \$50 million of grant aid and \$50 million in credit sales for each year of the Indian five year Defense Plan (1964 - 1969) has three more years to run.

However, as a practical matter we are approaching a crossroads in regard to future U.S. military shipments to India. Although we have given a certain amount of equipment to nine Indian mountain divisions, India with some assistance from us has been steadily increasing its own production of such basic army items as artillery, machine guns, rifles, armored cars, tanks, ammunition, etc. With respect to the more sophisticated weapons which the Indians can not yet produce, the Soviets have been willing to provide them while we have thus far refused.

They have been pressing us for fighter aircraft for nearly three years, with a specific outstanding request for six squadrons of F-5s to provide close air support to the Indian army and to interdict Chinese supply lines in Tibet.

Under our present criteria, it is difficult to see any significant continuing role for United States military aid to India. Because India is unable to get the equipment from us that it wants and needs, the GOI will be progressively less inclined to put up with inconveniences and restriction inherent in our present program.

This means that whatever leverage we had hoped to have on

Indian

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Indian military policy, including our control over the foreign exchange which India budgets for military purposes, may be expected to diminish as the Soviet Union emerges as the major supplier of India's equipment while posing openly as a political supporter of India against Pakistan and covertly as a supporter even against China.

Policy Choices Before Us

In this complex situation we have a number of options open to us in regard to military aid to India:

1. We can continue along the present lines, i.e., providing India with the military equipment which is least subject to criticism by Pakistan. This would enable us to postpone a bit longer the basic policy decisions which sooner or later must be made in regard to U.S. priorities in South Asia.

In the context of the Asian confrontation which flows inevitably from the current struggle in Vietnam, it is difficult to see how this postponement can be justified. If we continue along this road we must accept the probability of increased Soviet influence in sensitive political areas here in India with little hope of improving our position in Pakistan.

2. We can decide to get out of the military assistance field both in Pakistan and India as rapidly as our present commitments can be met. This has a certain appeal in that we would appear to be cutting a Gordian knot. However, by pulling out of the military assistance field at this stage we would open the door even wider to an increasingly close military-political association between the USSR and India.

3. We can make the basic political decision which, although difficult, is in my view essential if we are to slow the creeping influence of the Soviets and establish a sound and fruitful relationship with India. Such a decision would include the following elements:

A. China, being the major threat to Asia's political stability, must be contained and our U.S. military aid programs to nations

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on the periphery of China must be focussed on this objective;

B. In a military sense India is by all odds the greatest source of anti-communist manpower that would be available in the event of a major Asian land war;

C. In a political sense democratic India is at least as important to us as it is to the Soviet Union as a balance to China in Asia, and potentially an increasing source of democratic influence and political stability among the nonaligned countries;

D. India with a reasonable amount of western assistance is politically and economically viable;

E. Our continued refusal adequately to support the Indian military has thus far won us no kudos in Karachi and will win us none in the future;

F. We should therefore continue our present five year \$50 million grant and \$50 million sales assistance to India, subject each year to Congressional approval and appropriations, while at the same time opening the door to India's procurement under this program of the weapons that it genuinely needs for its defense, including F-5s;

G. We should face up to the inevitable adverse reaction from Pakistan, doing everything possible to cushion its resentment through our massive economic assistance program on which the Pakistan economy is largely dependent;

H. We should place a high priority on covert and overt moves that will further India's position against China and thereby associate Indian political and military leaders psychologically and materially with us in the containment of China, switch their focus away from Pakistan and ultimately perhaps create the atmosphere which will make possible the rapprochement which is so important to both countries.

CONCLUSION:

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CONCLUSION:

This enormously complex situation is not subject to simple, painless solutions. We must choose between difficult alternatives.

In my opinion, the overriding consideration should be India's vast size, increasing industrialization, democratic commitment and political weight in Asian and world affairs.

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INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

July 7, 1965

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*India/Pakistan Prof
Khal has a
copy*

Dear Bob:

I enclose herewith several copies of a list of the future decisions with respect to military assistance items for India and Pakistan. The dates, as you can well understand, are not entirely precise since our timetable is somewhat flexible on most of these decisions.

Sincerely,

Peter

Peter Solbert
Deputy

Mr. Robert Komer
Executive Office Bldg.

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JUL 8 1965

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INDIA AND PAKISTAN
FUTURE U.S. DECISIONS

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Estimated Timing of Decision in 1965</u>
<u>A. Pakistan</u>	
1. Decisions whether to deliver FY 1965 and prior year MAP items	Any time before shipment
2. Open discussions between Paks and MAAG concerning FY 66 MAP	July
*3. Decision to notify Paks as to final approved program for FY 66 subsequent to Congressional passage of MAP appropriations and approval of re-programming made necessary by any Congressional action.	July - August
4. Decision whether to supply additional F-104 A/Bs	August - September
5. Admiral Khan's request for 3 submarines (made May 1965)	Any time - ship loan legislation required
6. Decision as to additional grant aid or credit sales items (President Ayub's request for submarines, aircraft and tanks made in June 1965)	Any time - ship loan legislation required
7. Decision whether to proceed with ARPA Project	About October
8. Decision as to mobility exercise scheduled for January - February 1966	Prior to 1 August
9. Decision as to delivery of ammunition under cash sales contract made June 1965	From September on, depending on items
<u>B. India</u>	
1. Decisions whether to deliver FY 1965 and prior year MAP items	Any time before shipment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By ry/jc, NARA, Date 7-27-06

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JUL 8 1965

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<u>Subject</u>	<u>Estimated Timing of Decision in 1965</u>
*2. Decision to notify Indians of content of FY 66 grant aid program subsequent to Congressional passage of MAP appropriations and approval of reprogramming made necessary by any Congressional action	July - August
3. Continue discussions as to content of FY 66 credit sales	July - August
4. Decision to notify Indians of content of FY 66 credit sales	August - September
5. U.S. decision whether to supply F-5 aircraft and support HF-24 aircraft (considered primarily as a credit sale item)	August - September
6. Decision whether to proceed with ARPA Project	About October

* It is normal policy not to notify countries of program level or content until line item funding is accomplished, except where firm commitments have been made.

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INDIA AND PAKISTAN
FUTURE U.S. DECISIONS

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Estimated Timing of Decision in 1965</u>
A. <u>Pakistan</u>	
1. Decisions whether to deliver FY 1965 and prior year MAP items	Any time before shipment
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*3. Decision to notify Paks as to final approved program for FY 66 subsequent to Congressional passage of MAP appropriations and approval of re-programming made necessary by any Congressional action.	July - August
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8. Decision as to mobility exercise scheduled for January - February 1966	Prior to 1 August
9. Decision as to delivery of ammunition under cash sales contract made June 1965	From September on, depending on items
B. <u>India</u>	
1. Decisions whether to deliver FY 1965 and prior year MAP items	Any time before shipment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By rg/jc, NARA, Date 7-27-06

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JUL 8 1965

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<u>Subject</u>	<u>Estimated Timing of Decision in 1965</u>
*2. Decision to notify Indians of content of FY 66 grant aid program subsequent to Congressional passage of MAP appropriations and approval of reprogramming made necessary by any Congressional action	July - August
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INDIA AND PAKISTAN
FUTURE U.S. DECISIONS

Subject Estimated Timing of Decision in 1965

A. Pakistan

- 1. Decisions whether to deliver FY 1965 and prior year MAP items Any time before shipment
- 2. Open discussions between Paks and MAAG concerning FY 66 MAP July
- *3. Decision to notify Paks as to final approved program for FY 66 subsequent to Congressional passage of MAP appropriations and approval of re-programming made necessary by any Congressional action. July - August
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B. India

- 1. Decisions whether to deliver FY 1965 and prior year MAP items Any time before shipment

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By rg/jc, NARA, Date 7-27-06

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<u>Subject</u>	<u>Estimated Timing of Decision in 1965</u>
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By (auto att) & memo of Puck

5 JUL 1965

Judith P. Map

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Pakistan and India

Set forth below is a catalogue of actions with respect to the Military Assistance Programs for Pakistan and India which could be suspended or deferred. Where appropriate I have indicated the probable impact of specific actions. This memorandum does not, however, address the political wisdom of undertaking such actions.

I. Pakistan

A. Commitment. Our MAP commitments to Pakistan are basically to meet initial equipment deficiencies in the force base we agreed to support in 1954 and to maintain and assist in modernizing these forces, funds permitting. We do not have a precise dollar commitment to Pakistan, although it costs about \$20-25 million a year to "maintain" Pakistan's armed forces out of a total program of about \$40 million. MAP grant aid for Pakistan has averaged \$52.5 million over the period FY 1960-64 and is programmed at \$38.2 million and \$40 million in FY 65 and FY 66 respectively.

B. Deliveries of FY 1965 and Prior MAP. Undelivered items under grant military assistance for Pakistan totaling about \$50 million are scheduled for delivery over the next twenty-four months. Pakistan is aware of the proposed delivery dates for most of these undelivered items. The Major items scheduled for delivery in FY 1966 are one light liaison-type aircraft, 88 armored personnel carriers, 36 howitzers, and 473 trucks and trailers and a variety of communications equipment. The delivery of any or all of these items could be deferred or cancelled.

Deferral of these items, while slowing down Pakistan's force improvement program, would not have an appreciable impact on their military capabilities (they already have approximately 90% of their required howitzers, 95% of their trucks and trailers, and 80% of their communications equipment). Replacement items could probably be secured from third countries, though it would put a strain on the Pakistan budget and drain foreign exchange.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *rg/jc*, NARA, Date 7-28-06

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DOWNGRADED AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DDI 017 500.10

Doc Ref Cont No. 3657

There is about \$11 million in undelivered spare parts and support-type items. Since U. S. logistics support is the lifeblood of the Pakistan armed forces, deferral or cancellation of these items would have a very serious impact as Pakistan would find it extremely difficult to locate new suppliers, establish new supply pipelines, etc. It would probably render ineffective the 12 Pakistani F-104s and 6 C-130s in a matter of weeks and the larger F-86 fleet (102 aircraft) in a few months. The Army might be able to maintain its operational capabilities for as long as six months in peace time.

C. FY 1966 MAP. The FY 1966 program has been approved by the Country Team and is currently being reviewed in DOD. It totals \$40 million, of which \$21.5 million is to maintain and operate the MAP-supported forces and \$18.5 million for force improvement. Major items include 2 C-130s, 13 T-33s, 3 T-37s, and 4 ASW aircraft; 152 M-113 APCs, 38 M-48 tanks, and 554 trucks. Most of these items would be delivered after FY 66. We have not revealed the contents of the FY 1966 program to Pakistan, although the GOP will expect such information within a few weeks. We can defer discussions with the Pakistanis of all or a portion of the FY 66 program. Cancellation or deferral of major items in the FY 1966 program would in due course have a serious impact on the Pakistan military in that old, obsolete equipment would not be replaced and Pakistan's military capabilities would decline (they presently have a substantial shortfall of tanks and armored personnel carriers). As regards the deferral of spare parts and support-type items, the same comments apply here as in FY 1965 and prior programs.

D. Training. There are 37 Pakistan military students presently undergoing or scheduled for training in the U. S., under the FY 65 MAP, all but six of whom will have completed their training by 1 January 1966. There are 109 students scheduled for FY 1966 MAP training. Here again we can curtail or cancel the training program.

E. Future Aircraft. In April 1964 we told Pakistan that we would provide some additional F-104 A/B aircraft in CY 1966 "if the political climate was right at the time." The possibility of programming F-5 aircraft as future replacement for the F-86s has also been mentioned to the Pakistanis. We can continue to defer discussions of these items which are very important to the future of the Pak Air Force.

F. Other Associated Issues

1. Military Cash Sales. Under the terms of a 1951 agreement,

Pakistan is authorized to make cash purchases of military items. In June 1965 the U. S. agreed to process \$9 million in cash sales requests from Pakistan for ammunition and miscellaneous items. Deliveries of these items could be deferred.

2. Military Credit Sales. The Pakistanis have inquired about a possible credit sales arrangement for military items and the Country Team has been considering a program totalling \$100 million over three years. We could continue to defer any action on this.

3. Recent Pakistan MAP Requests. In May 1965 we received a letter from Admiral Khan requesting three additional submarines (they now have one), and in June Ayub told Ambassador McConaughy that Pakistan had requirements for additional submarines, tanks and aircraft. The Ambassador told Ayub that additional MAP was not an appropriate topic for discussion at this time. We could continue to take this position or even reject these requests outright.

4. Mobility Exercise. The Pakistanis were informed in April that we have a mobility exercise (about division size) scheduled for Pakistan in January - February 1966. We can suspend this exercise at any time between now and the end of the year.

5. Multi-Year Planning. The Pak military have expressed a strong desire for multi-year MAP planning, at least for major end items, to provide a sounder basis for their own military planning. We could continue to refuse to discuss MAP except on a year to year basis.

11. India

A. Commitments. Our MAP commitments to India stem from the decision to assist India against the ChiCom attacks of 1962. A subsequent 1964 Memorandum of Understanding formalized the U. S. intent to continue support of India's efforts to improve its military forces in the face of possible renewed ChiCom aggression. The Memorandum committed the U. S. to provide approximately \$50 million in military grant aid in FY 65 and a credit sales program of \$10 million in FY 64 and \$50 million in FY 65. Without commitment by the U. S., the Memorandum permits India to plan on approximately \$50 million grant aid and \$50 million credit sales annually from the U. S. through FY 69, provided India keeps their foreign exchange defense expenditures within a ceiling of \$1.432 billion in the period through 30 March 1969.

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B. FY 1965 and Prior Year Undelivered MAP/Military Credit Sales. India has undelivered grant military assistance totaling approximately \$70 million, scheduled for delivery over the next twenty-four months. Major items to be delivered in FY 66 are C-119 aircraft spares, army communications equipment, air defense communications equipment and engineer construction equipment. India is aware of the undelivered MAP items and is informed of delivery dates as soon as USNSMI can provide a forecast (usually six months ahead).

The credit sales program undelivered balance (FY 64 and 65) totals approximately \$58.5 million. Projected credit sales delivery dates are known to the Indians and delivery delays would be noticeable.

The general impact of deferring MAP end-item deliveries on India's military capability would be modest, except for the air defense communications system, due to India's foreign procurement source options and the fact that U. S. assistance represents a relatively small portion of their total defense requirements. The suspension of delivery of spares would also be less significant than with Pakistan. For example, the U. S. does not support any tactical aircraft in India. In the air transport field the Indian C-119s are supported by a large stockpile of spares and the Indians also have Russian transports.

Deferrals on the credit sales side would have a more serious impact on Indian military preparedness as plans to develop the Ambajhari Ordnance factory and to modernize eight existing ordnance plants are dependent on U. S. support. Deferral of support of ordnance plant modernization could have a major effect on Indian plans for self-sufficiency by 1969.

Delivery of all or a portion of the MAP grant or sales items could be deferred.

C. FY 1966 MAP/Military Credit Sales. The content of the FY 66 grant aid program has been discussed with the Indian Ministry of Defense and is now in the process of review in Washington. The Indians have expressed a desire to include F-5 aircraft in FY 66 MAP. Although discussions with the Indians have been initiated on the FY 66 credit sales program, they have since withdrawn their proposals for further revision. The subject of aircraft for India (F-5s or support of the locally developed HF-24 aircraft) has not been discussed with the Indians as a U. S. decision on this matter has been deferred. CINCPACSEA has been instructed not to discuss major items of FY 66 MAP or FY 66 credit sales with the GOI until further notice. We can continue to defer discussions of all or a major portion of these items.

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D. Training. There are 69 Indian military students programmed for training in the U. S., of which seven will have completed their training by 1 January 1966. Fourteen additional students are programmed for courses subsequent to 1 January 1966. These training programs could be curtailed or cancelled.

III. Initial Funding of FY 66 under Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA)

It is anticipated that FY 66 funding authority for current operating costs for India and Pakistan will be issued about 10 July 1966 under CRA. These operating costs cover: training, requisition authority for spare parts, technical assistance costs, certain overhaul costs, etc. We could defer the funding of any of these items. Withholding of this FY 66 funding would immediately become apparent to the host country.

IV. Other Military Programs

The Advanced Research Projects Agency has proposed a program of mutual cooperation in the military research area between the U. S. and India and also between the U. S. and Pakistan. MAP may fund a part of the cost. Discussions with the Pakistanis and Indians on these programs could be deferred or suspended.

Signed
ROBERT S. McNAMARA

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CLASSIFIED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5800.10

UNDELIVERED BALANCE STATUS AND FORECAST
30 JUNE 1965

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By mg/k, NARA, Date 7-27-06

() Quantity
\$ - Thousands

PAKISTAN

Item/Category	Estimated Undel Dollar Balance FY 65/Prior	FORECAST DELIVERIES			
		1st Qtr FY 66	2d Qtr FY 66	2d Half FY 66	After FY 66
OH-13H Helicopter (1)	\$ 39	-	-	-	(1) \$ 39
OL-E Aircraft (2)	64	-	-	(1) \$ 27	(1) 37
T-37C Aircraft (1)	145	-	-	-	(1) 145
C-130B Aircraft (1)	1,992	-	-	-	(1) 1,992
Aircraft Grd Hlbg Eq	144	25	25	29	65
Acft Spares & Mods	9,608	<u>1,640</u>	1,540	2,918	3,510
Tank, 90mm, Med (47)	1,265	-	-	-	(47) 1,265
APC M113 (88)	2,534	-	-	(88) <u>2,534</u>	-
How, SP, 105mm, M52A1 (18)	2,070	(18) <u>2,070</u>	-	-	-
How, SP, 155mm (18)	2,943	-	-	(18) 2,943	-
Trucks & Trailers (1,236)	4,861	(374) <u>2,278</u>	(36) 335	(63) 182	(763) 2,066
Rifles, Carbines C30 (36,249)	1,544	-	-	-	(36,249) 1,544
Howitzers, towed (18)	291	-	-	(18) 291	-
Other Weapons	269	-	-	-	269
Ammo, Cal 50 and under	1,546	-	1,207	339	-
Ammo 60-155mm	3,917	-	931	-	2,986

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See A.

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PAKISTAN UNDEL BALANCE STATUS (CONT.)

<u>Item/Category</u>	<u>Estimated Undel Dollar Balance FY 65/Prior</u>	<u>1st Qtr FY 66</u>	<u>2d Qtr FY 66</u>	<u>2d Half FY 66</u>	<u>After FY 66</u>
Air Munitions	1,128	25	25	248	880
Naval Munitions	352	-	-	-	352
Other Ammo	979	-	-	37	942
Communications Equip	2,519	238	100	500	1,681
Support Equip	6,796	913	933	1,813	3,137
Spares and Supplies	2,421	411	300	600	1,110
Services	<u>1,982</u>	<u>600</u>	<u>737</u>	<u>225</u>	<u>420</u>
TOTAL MAT & SVCS (Excl'd trng)	\$ 49,409	\$ 8,175	\$ 6,108	\$ 12,686	\$ 22,480

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FX 66 MAP

Pakistan

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2 July 65

Operating Costs

Training	505
Maintenance Spares	5,844
Attrition and Training Ammo	7,001
Miscellaneous	<u>4,012</u>
Sub-Total	17,362

Investment Costs

Material	18,520
Services	<u>5</u>
Sub-Total	18,524

Supply Operations

4,100

TOTAL

39,986

Significant Items

	<u>Qty</u>
Aircraft Cargo C-130B	2
Aircraft Trainer T-33A	13
Aircraft Trainer T-37B	3
Aircraft ASW	4
Carrier Personnel Armored	152
Tanks Medium	38
Trailers	399
Trucks 1/4 Ton	512
Trucks 3/4 Ton	1
Trucks 2-1/2 Ton	1
Trucks 5 Ton	40
Rifles	1,295
Machine Guns	150

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By gjc, NARA, Date 7-27-06

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1965 DELIVERY SCHEDULE - PAKISTAN

<u>Item</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Delivery from Order Accept.</u>
1. 76mm Ammo	\$1,300,000	15 mos.
2. 40-90-106mm Ammo.	4,800,000	18 mos.
3. 40mm Ammo	N.C.	MAP transfer
4. Metal Links for 30mm Ammo	400,000	10 mos.
5. Manufacturing Info on 2.75 Ammo	N.A.	4 to 6 mos.
6. Incandescent Lamps	700	2 mos.
7. Aircraft Ammo	1,540,000	1 to 10 mos.
8. Parachutes	34,522	In country
	<u>\$8,075,322</u>	

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By rg/lr NARA, Date 7-27-06

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() Indicates quantity
\$ Thousands

UNDELIVERED BALANCE STATUS AND FORECAST
30 JUNE 1965

INDIA

Item/Category	Estimated Undel Dollar Balance FY 65/Prior	FORECAST DELIVERIES							
		1st Qtr FY 66	2d Qtr FY 66	2d Half FY 66	After FY 66				
Acft Grd Hdlg Equip	1,381	200	400	781	-				
Acft Spares and Mods	6,821	1,397	1,200	2,403	1,821				
Misc Boats & Craft	501	-	-	473	28				
Howitzer, 75mm(pack) (105)	1,177	-	(105)	1,177	-				
Other Weapons	297	-	-	196	101				
Ammo	1,925	-	-	1,742	183				
Trucks & Trailers (243)	2,601	(100)	957	(71)	738	(55)	642	(17)	264
Communications Equip(Army)	5,319	-	-	-	3,289	-	-	2,030	
Troposcatter System (AF)	14,161	-	-	-	8,078	-	-	6,083	
Radar Eq & Other Commo Eq(AF)	3,238	-	-	-	2,201	-	-	1,037	
Construction Equip	14,301	-	-	-	3,842	-	-	10,459	
Support Equip	11,028	1,003	1,600	4,000	4,425				
Spares and Supplies	4,398	227	200	649	3,322				
Services	2,160	-	113	300	1,747				
TOTALS	\$ 69,308	\$ 3,784	\$ 5,428	\$ 28,596	\$ 31,500				

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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By rg/jc, NARA, Date 7-27-06

26
p

~~SECRET~~

26e

FY 66 MAP

India

(\$ Thous)

2 July 65

Operating Costs

Training	1,162
Maintenance Spares	5,937
Attrition Items and Training Ammo	866
Miscellaneous Maintenance	<u>2,175</u>
Sub-Total	10,140

Investment Costs

Material	25,659
Services	<u>8,202</u>
Sub-Total	33,861

Supply Operations

5,000

TOTAL

49,001

Qty

Rifle, 57mm, recoilless	27
Mounts Machine Gun	27
Truck 2 1/2 T Dump	24
Wheeled Tractors	124
Tractor, full track, light	167
Tractor, full track, medium	109
Tractor, full track, heavy	20
Radio Sets, AN/CRC-39	28
Radio Sets, AN/CRC-40	14
Radio Sets, AN/CRC-10	25
Radio Sets, AN/CRC-95	235
Mines, anti-personnel	175,000
Simulator, radar	2
Power Units, PE-75	92
Generators, 2 KW	34
Sweeper, rotary, snow	24

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By ry/jc, NARA, Date 7-27-06

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26f

1964 DELIVERY SCHEDULE - INDIA
(Undelivered Items)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Delivery</u> (Projected fm 1 Jul 65)
1. UHF Communications Equip	\$1.0 M	8-10 mos.
2. Machine Tools for Modernization	7.0 M	4-24 mos.
3. Radios AN/ARC-51 + spares	.07M	12 mo.
4. Machine Tools for HF-24 Production	1.4 M	4-24 mos.
Total	<u>\$9.47M</u>	

1965 DELIVERY SCHEDULE - INDIA
(Undelivered Items)

1. Machine Tools for Ambajhari	\$22.5 M	8-24 mos.
2. Dodge Truck Power Wagons	5.4 M	4-6 mos.
3. Radios AN/PRC-25	4.9 M	3-6 mos.
4. Machine Tools for Modernization	4.0M	4-24 mos.
5. Miscellaneous Items	12.2 M	4-20 mos.
	<u>\$49.0 M</u>	

Prepared by: Mr. Josef Hoenig
OASD/ISA/ILN
1 July 1965

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By kg/jc, NARA, Date 7-27-06

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

~~SECRET~~

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

27

16 JUN 1965

In reply refer to:

I-23945/65

India/Pak

Mr. Robert W. Komer
National Security Council
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Bob:

In the event a requirement develops to stall or slow down our military assistance efforts for India and Pakistan, the following measures can be adopted:

A. India

1. Continue to delay the decision on the F-5 aircraft and the support of the HF-24. For an immediate impact, provide GOI a negative answer.
2. Delay approval of FY 66 MAP which is soon to be reviewed at DOD level. (Already coordinated with GOI).
3. Delay approval of FY 66 \$50 million credit sales program which is currently being coordinated with GOI. We could also reduce the amount of this program. For immediate impact at source, we could break off or slow down current coordination meetings between USMSMI and GOI on the subject.
4. Delay or stop all shipments of funded MAP and credit sales items. Reasons can be given such as use of U.S. MAS equipment in the Rann of Kutch (106 RR, ammunition), violations of Kashmir Cease Fire Line, menacing troop deployments in the Punjab and along the East Pakistan border, or Bombay Port conditions.
5. Delay delivery of selected MAP or credit sales items, being careful to select those which will not result in increased costs to the U.S., e.g., storage costs or broken contracts.
6. Hold up on approval of cash sales requests.

B. Pakistan

1. Continue to withhold information on additional F-104 A/Bs and

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 v. 12511-76
NARA. Date 2/16/12

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JUN 16 1965 By JeeG

~~SECRET~~

not initiate discussions on F-5s.


2. Delay discussions with the GOP on FY 1966 MAP.
3. Do not take up GOP bid for credit sales.
4. Do not answer or reject outright, Admiral Khan's request for additional submarines.
5. Delay delivery of ^{MAS} ~~REP~~ items. Those currently pending are:

<u>Number</u>	<u>Note Dated</u>	<u>Item(s)</u>	<u>Cost (millions)</u>
1	26 Feb.	76mm ammunition	1.3
2	18 March	Manufacturing particulars, 2.75mm ammo	*
3	26 March	40mm, 90mm, 106mm ammunition	4.8
4	26 April	76mm ammunition-duplicate of Feb case	--
5	30 April	Incandescent lamps	*
6	11 May	40mm ammunition	0.1
7	13 May	Metal links for .30mm ammunition	0.4
8	2 June	Aircraft ammunition	1.5
9	10 June	Oral request to purchase 421 parachutes already in Pakistan, shipped as overage to earlier sales case	*
10	10 June	76mm ammunition	*

* Less than \$50,000

C. A delivery schedule of major items consigned for delivery to India and Pakistan from July-December 1965 is being developed and will be provided immediately upon completion.

Sincerely,



Peter Solbert
Deputy Assistant Secretary

~~SECRET~~

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

TYPE OF DOCUMENT

Cable _____

Letter _____

Memo _____

Other _____

DATE 8/10/64

FROM Read

TO Bundy

NUMBER _____

SUBJECT Reply to Ambassador Bowles' Letter
Regarding Furnishing Pakistanis with
Indian Military Defense Information.

SEE Bowles

~~Confidential~~

29

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : White House - Mr. Kernen

DATE:

7/22
[Signature]

FROM : C.C. Laise

[Handwritten signature]

SUBJECT:

As per your request to Jim Grant, I am sending along the talking paper we sent to Peter Solbert for use with General Ismail Khan.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By rj/k, NARA, Date 7-27-06

JUL 23 1964

29a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY OF U.S. ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO INDIA
AS A RESULT OF DISCUSSIONS WITH THE INDIAN DEFENSE MINISTER
IN MAY 1964

A. Total Cost

- 1. FY 1964 MAS \$10 million additional credit sales (10 years, 3%)
- 2. FY 1965 MAP \$50 million grant aid
- 3. FY 1965 MAS \$50 million credit sales (10 years, up to 3%)

B. General Comments

- 1. FY 1965 MAS program agreed to only after full agreement with GOI on ceiling for Indian foreign exchange procurement of defense items over five year plan. Ceiling substantially below that proposed by GOI, average annual rate under ceiling does not exceed actual rate for past two years, and applies to all foreign procurement: US MAP and MAS, Soviet credits, Commonwealth aid, Indian purchases with own resources. Thus we have assurance that external purchases will not be inflated; that if procurement is increased from one source it will be reduced correspondingly from another source.
- 2. FY 1965 MAS list not yet agreed upon, but a major expenditure to be Ambajhari ordnance plant. It will produce ammo components for mountain divisions. Credits largely to be directed for acquisition from private firms for items not in US military inventory. Motivation for large credits: direct Indian purchases to US to help US balance of payments rather than other sources where they would otherwise be made.
- 3. Purchases to have same restrictions as grant aid: for defense against threat of Chinese Communist aggression, not opening door to items which would be denied under grant aid ground rules.

4. Fifty

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *rg/jc*, NARA, Date 7-27-06

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not automatically declassified.

JUL 23 1964

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

4. Fifty million dollar credit will enable India to obtain military equipment from the US which is militarily necessary but not included in MAP. Immediate effect is to ease somewhat foreign exchange outflow, thus reducing diversion of foreign exchange resources from economic development. MAS credit terms better than those from commercial suppliers, and prices likely be somewhat lower because of advantage bulk procurement through DOD.
5. No understanding reached on Indian air defense requirements. Subject being examined further. Whether we do anything on US supply of combat aircraft will depend on a number of factors including whether Indians go ahead with the projected MIG deal.

C. Types of Assistance

1. FY 1964 and 65 MAS
 - a. Vehicles and communications equipment.
 - b. Equipment for modernization of Indian ordnance factories.
 - c. Engineering study and equipment for new Ambajhari ordnance plant.
2. FY 1965 MAP
 - a. Equipment for one more mountain division.*
 - b. Follow-up items to divisional and corps headquarters of units already receiving US assistance.*
 - c. Spares for C-47's, C-115's and C-121's.
 - d. Continued support for Indian mountain divisions.
 - e. Radar and air defense communications equipment.

f. Equipment

NOTE: The equipment for these mountain divisions is equipment suitable for mountain warfare and does not include such items of equipment not required for mountain warfare as medium tanks, self-propelled artillery or medium and heavy artillery (as supplied to Pakistan). Relatively little shooting hardware provided beyond size of 57 mm. recoilless rifle.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

- f. Equipment for constructing border roads.
- g. Limited defense production assistance.

3. FY 1964 MAP

Consisted primarily of

- a. Engineer equipment for corps troops.
- b. Modernizing two additional mountain divisions.*
- c. Supply of airfield operation equipment.
- d. Overhaul of C-119 engines.

* See NOTE on Page 2.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

BKS:

1. We should make noted change on p.2. Doesn't make sense now. Drafter says OK. Date July 8, 1964
2. State hoped to make this stand in lieu of memcon since it covers the ground. Is that OK? Would take care of your Mr. McGeorge Bundy problem below. The White House
3. Otherwise OK, though of course we have no way to check because ~~HHS~~ no White House. The enclosed is for White House staff clearance prior to transmission. present, unless someone upstairs.

Handwritten initials and date:
D Sanders
Cly
July 8, 1964

Handwritten initials: HHS

Signature of Benjamin H. Read
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary



Enclosure:

Handwritten signature: India map

Jul 9 - 1964 Telegram to Amembassy Karachi.

Handwritten signature: Sanders

This should have stock sentence saying "based on

SECRET - EXDIS
CLASSIFICATION

undisclosed memcon" etc. BKS

300
/~~SECRET~~

Ambassy KARACHI

INFO: Ambassy NEW DELHI
Ambassy LONDON
CINCSTRIKE FOR POLADDECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By JC, NARA, Date 7-28-06
(see FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, #63)

EXDIS

Following presentation President Ayub's letter to President July 7 (Septel), Ambassador Ahmed highlighted following points of concern to GOP: It wanted President Johnson personally to know depth of Ayub's concern over US arms aid. Pakistan had hoped aid would come to an end as Communist Chinese threat to India now greatly reduced; instead US military assistance to India has been doubled and an understanding reached on a long term aid. This US action has upset balance of power on subcontinent and eroded Pakistan's ^{ability to meet} treaty obligations.

President asked Ambassador Ahmed if this ^{was} reason Ayub has not answered US request for Pakistan contribution to Viet Nam. President recalled earlier Ayub offer to send troops to Laos and said he thought that Ayub would have come forward at least to show Pakistan flag in Viet Nam. Ambassador was uninformed but assumed an answer to US request would be coming. He noted Pakistan cannot station troops in Viet Nam because of Indian threat. Defensively, Ahmed pointed out India was non-aligned, had made no contribution to any free world effort, and when militarily strong

NEA:SOA:WLSimmons/cd 7-8-64

NEA - Mr. Talbot

S/S -
White House -

SOA - Miss Laise

~~SECRET~~

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other flimsy work copies before delivery to Telegraph Branch

Ambassy KARACHI

~~SECRET~~

strong would eventually oust US presence in subcontinent and Asia. Ambassador said Ayub hoped President with his own understanding of situation/would take steps to ~~reconsider~~ meet Pakistan's concerns.

President promised he would carefully study Ayub's letter but went on to state that he did not share Ayub's feeling that because we are helping India, Pakistan should ignore its alliance obligations. He felt this would not be in Pakistan's interest, though, of course, it was up to Ayub to determine what is in Pakistan's best interests. Ambassador Ahmed said that Ayub did not say he was leaving pacts. President said he inferred Ayub had something in mind, and in support of this pointed out specific reference in letter to "reconsidering its commitments to allies." President also noted statement that India's smaller neighbors might be forced to seek protection of China. Ambassador Ahmed said this might well happen if US policy of arming India was not changed. He did not say Pakistan would do this, however; rather, he noted situation now prevailing in Nepal, Burma, Ceylon, Sikkim and Bhutan.

Emphasizing that he was a great admirer of Ayub and held deep affection for Ayub's people, President told Ambassador he does not rpt not agree with Ayub about necessity of U.S. following course of action which Ayub recommends. President concluded ^{soberly} ~~that~~ in light of ^{way} ~~that~~ Ayub feels we might be coming to point where we too would have to re-evaluate situation. This troubled him deeply because there are no people for whom he has greater affection than Pakistanis. In closing President again asked Ambassador to convey his warmest regards to Ayub when Ambassador sees him in London.

Following

~~SECRET~~

3

Ambassy KARACHI

~~SECRET~~

Following meeting Ambassador Ahmed asked Assistant Secretary Talbot what interpretation to put on President's statement about re-evaluation. Talbot told Ahmed he thought President had hoped GOP would recognize how hard we have tried to take Pakistan's views into consideration during this period. Talbot reminded Ambassador of previous conversations on our military aid to India and stated it was inaccurate and a distortion to say, as Ayub letter did, that we have doubled our arms aid to India. Fifty million dollar credit sales program represents only a diversion to US of Indian overseas procurement. Furthermore, we have actually delivered more firepower to Pakistan than to India since 1962. He hoped Ambassador could help Ayub see these matters in perspective.

GP-1

End.

~~SECRET~~

From: Field Marshal
Mohammad Ayub Khan,
N.Pk., H.J.

President's House,
Rawalpindi.
1st July 1964.

Handwritten notes:
Sada Pak Map
Pakistan
Sent Karachi
Sept 205
31

My dear President Johnson,

I am asking my Ambassador to call on you and apprise you of the likely repercussions of the recent decision of your Administration concerning military aid to India. I think the time has come for me to make a personal approach to you.

We have, over the last two years, repeatedly represented to the United States Government the dangers implicit in their policy of massive arms aid to India. From the very beginning we have held the view that the arming of India on the scale chosen by the United States was uncalled for. Time has proved that we were right. It must now be clear to everyone that China does not plan to invade India and there is no likelihood of recrudescence of even a limited arms conflict between India and China.

On the other hand, this aid imperils the security of Pakistan, your ally; it prevents an Indo-Pakistan rapprochement over Kashmir which immobilises the bulk of their armed forces in a dangerous confrontation; it must lead to an arms race between India and Pakistan and thereby place a crushing burden on their economies. Surely this is no way of preventing the inroads of Communism into the sub-continent - if this is the United States objective. On the contrary, it would facilitate them.

Further, by continuing to build India's armed might, the United States might well force India's smaller neighbours - already deeply mistrustful of India - to seek the protection of China.

In short, the policy the United States is following in this area is self-defeating.

Stamp:
AYUB
T/LB
2.1.64

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Authority FRUS, Vol XXV, #60
By NARA, Date 8-8-05

JUL 8 - 1964

The foregoing considerations have been put before the United States Government time and again. If I am restating them, it is because I have a feeling that these considerations have not been given the weight they deserve.

On May 26 my Foreign Minister explained to Ambassador McConaughy Pakistan's growing concern at the continued arming of India. He also stated that if this policy continued, Pakistan would be compelled to reconsider its commitments to her allies.

Your Government has since decided not merely to continue to arm India; it has offered India twice as much arms aid in FY 1965 as in previous years. India has also been given to understand that she may expect to receive military aid of this order for the next five years.


Not to mention the timing of previous decisions to arm India which have all contributed towards complicating Indo-Pakistan relations, the present decision, in particular, has been singularly ill-timed. Latterly, we were moving towards a relaxation of tension in our relations with India. There was some hope that the Shastri Government recognised the importance of improving relations with Pakistan and, to that end, might be willing to settle the Kashmir dispute. That hope has now been rudely shaken.

This latest manifestation of US Administration's resolve to continue to give long term military aid to India has caused deep misgivings in Pakistan. Faced with the resultant growing

peril to our security, because of the enormous Indian arms build up with US support, I am writing to you in the hope that you will please look personally into the issues I have mentioned and take suitable corrective action in the interest of Pakistan-United States relationship which has so far been cordial and warm. And to my way of thinking very little effort is required to maintain it so. I am saying this as I have belief in your wisdom and sagacity. I also believe that this is not only necessary in the interest of Pakistan but also very much in the global interest of the United States relating to Asia.

With warm personal regards,

Yours sincerely,



His Excellency Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of United States of America,
Washington, D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

38

Bob Komer

This is the memo
sent DOD. No
reply as yet - may
be most

Jim Hunt

This document contains 8 pages
No. 1 of 8 Copies, Series B

~~SECRET~~

Handwritten signature and initials

Bear Bob:

We may be close enough to agreement on the contents of a comprehensive U.S. air defense package for India so that it would be worthwhile for us to try to set them down in writing. My objective is to secure Executive Branch agreement on this now. As you probably know, for the immediate present we are deferring presentation of any comprehensive air package in order to avoid introducing a jarring note during the Indo-Pak honeymoon which seems to be in process. In this regard I might add that Pak Foreign Minister Bhutto has already publicly criticized our recent announcement to the press of additional military assistance to India at a time when Pakistan is trying to improve its relations with India. He has done this despite the obvious restraint imposed by his government on critical press reaction to the announcement.

So that we will be in a position to move when the time is ripe--and we have our eyes very much on possible Soviet moves and the timing of any Indian military mission to Moscow--I suggest an air package on the following order:

1. F6A's. Three squadrons of (72) F6A's. (We have, of course, already discussed these with the Indians. I should express our strong view that we should not go in with the F6A's alone but that they should be only a part of a comprehensive package.)

2. HF-24. If our feasibility studies are positive, we would be willing to provide technical assistance in adapting a Western engine to the HF-24 airframe, and other technical assistance in developing this airplane into an operational Mach 2 interceptor.

3.

The Honorable
Earhart S. McManura,
Secretary of Defense.

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Authority FRVS 64-68, 60125-58

By je NARA, Date 7-28-06

~~SECRET~~
GROUP 3

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not automatically declassified.

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~~SECRET~~

-2-

3. Emergency. If, after a year or so of joint efforts to develop the F-24, this aircraft does not seem likely to become an operational Mach 2 interceptor, we would be prepared to help the Indians find suitable Western alternatives. We now see our way clear to offering some 36 of these. We would tell the Indians this when we present the comprehensive air package. If the Indians should come back and say that this package is not responsive to their desire for some sort of domestic assembly--which the MIG deal would permit--I should hope that we would be prepared to look most closely into what could be done to meet this point.

For planning purposes I believe we need now an Executive Branch determination that these 36 aircraft could be F-104G's, although I would hope that we would get the Indians to settle on some other interceptor, such as the F34 or F-104 A/B. (We have gone beyond the 24 F-104's which you suggested as we don't believe we could sell the package at this level; at 36 we would have something which would give us a chance with the Indians. We would not expect in any event that deliveries of U.S. supersonics to India over the next five years would get ahead of deliveries to Pakistan.)

I am particularly persuaded that this entire package, including individual components such as the F6A's, should be offered only on the condition that India drop its plans for obtaining MIG 21's beyond rounding out a single squadron of no more than 24 aircraft. Our position with Pakistan would be greatly weakened if the Indians were able to secure substantial combat air assistance from both blocs. Furthermore, I am greatly concerned regarding the reaction on the Hill should we help the Indians with combat air while they build up their stock of MIG 21's. Reaction on the Hill may be hard enough to deal with after an Indian MIG deal even if we do not help the Indians in the combat air field.

I hope you agree that we can move forward with our planning on this basis.

Sincerely,

Dean Rusk

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

India/Pak map ✓
x India map
x Pak map
33

~~SECRET~~

February 8, 1964

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 279

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

NSAM
279

SUBJECT: Military Assistance to India and Pakistan

I have no objection to going forward with exploratory approaches looking toward possible five year MAP programs for India and Pakistan under the conditions described in the Secretary of State's 16 January memorandum to me.

However, I do not believe that we should yet discuss MAP levels with either country. Until we have a clearer idea of the prospects for the FY 1965 aid program, it seems to me premature to indicate to India or Pakistan how much military aid they might be able to count upon, regardless of how tentatively we put it. Instead, we should indicate to both governments that they should prepare austere minimum five year programs. Then, as their plans mature and as we get a better reading on Congressional attitudes, we can make a final decision on what MAP to provide.

Furthermore, in the course of these discussions I desire that the following precautions be observed:

1. We should make clear to both countries what we expect of them in return for prospective long-term military aid. As to India, we particularly want it to hold foreign exchange diversions from development to defense to a reasonable level, lest we end up indirectly helping finance an excessive defense effort via aid which we provide for quite another purpose.
2. In the case of Pakistan, our MAP help should be appropriately linked to satisfactory performance with respect to its alliance obligations and to our intelligence facilities.

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Authority FRUS, Vol. 40, # 13
By Ag NARA, Date 8-8-05

FEB 10 1964

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THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

Page Two .

3. Both governments must be made to understand that no irrevocable five year MAP commitments can be undertaken by the US, both because aid levels each year will depend on Congress and because our actual aid each year will depend on continuing Pakistani and Indian performance.

4. Our approaches to India and Pakistan should be timed for optimum impact. For example, I do not believe that we should initially approach Pakistan until we have assessed the results of the Chou En-lai visit.

With these caveats, I approve proceeding along the lines of the Secretary of State's 16 January proposals.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'W. J.', is located in the center-right of the page.

cc: The Administrator, AID
The Director of Central Intelligence

cc:

Mr. Bundy
Mr. Komer ✓
Mr. Johnson
NSC Files

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~~SECRET~~

34

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

*Push map
India*

39

January 16, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Military Assistance to India and Pakistan:
General Taylor's Report

I have reviewed with General Taylor the results of his trip to India and Pakistan. He has come back with excellent ideas about future military assistance to those two countries. These supplement and refine the basic approach worked out by the Standing Group and embodied in my recommendations to you of December 11.

General Taylor would fix responsibility on the Indians for coming up with a satisfactory five-year defense plan which would limit their force goals, hold down procurement from the Soviets and hold to a minimum the diversion of their resources from economic development. Within such a plan it would be up to the Indians to set the priorities among the competing needs of their own services. Such a plan might include a limited number of high performance aircraft from Free World sources.

I believe the foregoing course of action would permit us to follow the roughly parallel course with India and Pakistan on high performance aircraft which we believe to be quite essential for political reasons.

I recommend that you authorize us to proceed along the lines of my proposal to you as refined by General Taylor's findings.

To move this matter ahead, the following steps are in order:

1. Inform the British and other Commonwealth aid donors fully about our military assistance planning for both India and Pakistan and obtain their continued cooperation and participation.

2. Tell the Indians that:

- we are willing to provide longer run military assistance if they work out a satisfactory five-year defense plan, as defined above;

this

~~SECRET~~

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Not Automatically Declassified.

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Authority FRUS Vol. XXV #3
By *M. J. ...* NARA, Date 8-8-05

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- 2 -

- this plan would assume a mutually acceptable political framework (i.e., Indian policies towards Pakistan and China);
- for the purpose of preparing their plan they could use a planning figure of about \$50 million MAP annually from the United States which, of course, is subject to Congressional appropriations; Gut
- we look to them to make the initial decision on priorities among the competing needs of their services, bearing in mind that an acceptable plan must not excessively strain Indian resources;
- we intend to continue with an interim program over the next year at roughly current levels while they work out their plan.

3. Tell the Pakistanis that:

- we are willing to support a satisfactory five-year Pakistani military plan within a mutually acceptable political framework (i.e., fulfillment by Pakistan of its obligations to CENTO, SEATO and the United States);
- we are willing to work with the Pakistanis in developing the priorities of this plan;
- we want to resume discussions looking towards the expansion of our facilities.

4. Keep both the Indians and Pakistanis generally informed of our assistance activities in each country. General Taylor has already done much of this job with Ayub, drawing a surprisingly mild reaction. However, a long-term military program for India, including possibly some supersonics, and the provision of additional supersonics to Pakistan will very possibly create an initial storm in each country about our policy in the other. We shall have to find ways of riding this out.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

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14 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KOMER

Attached is JCS document JCSM 15-64, dated 13 Jan 64, which may be of interest to you. As Mr. Bundy directed on 19 November, please read this document for "background only," in the sense in which the press understands that term. Any compromise of source could dry up this potentially useful channel of information overnight.

Please return the attached document to Smith, Room 376A EOB, in a sealed envelope, not later than 21 January 1964.

W. Y. SMITH

Attachment
a/s

Robert Mop
Judith Mop
Robert Mop
35

JAN 14 1964

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35a
Ken



~~SECRET~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

JCSM-15-64
13 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Next Steps on Military Aid to India and Pakistan (U)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 23 December 1963, subject as above, which forwarded his recommendations on military aid to India and Pakistan based on his recent visits to those countries. These recommendations are summarized as follows:

a. The United States should indicate to the Government of India a willingness to embark on parallel military planning provided that the Government of India first produce a satisfactory five-year plan for its military forces on the assumption that the United States would contribute from \$50 to \$60 million per year. This plan should be developed with the Government of India provided the Indians will:

- (1) Limit their force goals.
- (2) Hold down procurement from the Soviet Bloc.
- (3) Hold to minimum diversion of foreign exchange from economic development.
- (4) Exercise restraint in relations with Pakistan.
- (5) Cooperate with us in the containment of Communist China.

Pending completion of such a plan, the United States would offer an interim one-year program of about \$50 million.

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of 3 pages series

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By je, NARA, Date 7-28-06

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b. Concurrently, the United States should indicate to Pakistan its willingness to engage on parallel terms in five-year military planning under similar assumptions of continued US aid. This offer should include provision of two additional squadrons of supersonic aircraft and should be contingent on continued fulfillment by Pakistan of its alliance obligations. The United States also should seek Government of Pakistan concurrence in a joint mobility exercise involving the proposed Indian Ocean Task Force.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the foregoing recommendations subject to the following comments:

a. Both India and Pakistan should understand clearly that assumptions as to the magnitude of US military assistance are not firm commitments but are subject to review of their plans by the US Government and to availability of funds for military assistance world-wide.

b. In view of decreasing military assistance funds available, a planning assumption of not more than \$50 million per year for each country is preferred. This ceiling should provide for reasonable development of Indian and Pakistani forces within force goals previously recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. While recognizing the need for modernization of the Pakistani fighter force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their view that the requirement should be met by means other than withdrawing F-104A or B aircraft from the US Air Force inventory without suitable replacement.

d. The proposed joint mobility exercise with Pakistan and the status of the Indian Ocean Naval Task Force are under separate consideration and comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be provided separately.

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3. It is suggested that the Secretary of Defense request Presidential approval of the recommendations of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject to the foregoing comments.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Signed

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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India / Pak Map

36

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

TYPE OF DOCUMENT Cable

Letter

Memo

Other

DATE 12/63

FROM

TO NUMBER

SUBJECT General Taylor's Visit
to India & Pakistan

SEE India / Pak - Taylor Visit

~~SECRET~~

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info EIB060
PP RUEHCR
DE RUSBAE 798A 19/1625Z
P 191612Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY NEWDELHI
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUQVAM/AMEMBASSY KARACHI
STATE GRNC
BT

1963 DEC 19 PM 1111

John Map

~~SECRET~~ SECTION ONE OF THREE

ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 1943 KARACHI 701 FROM NEWDELHI DEC 19, 10 P.M.

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

KARACHI FOR GENERAL TAYLOR
DEPTEL 1241

A. IN REFTTEL GEN TAYLOR WAS ASKED BY PRESIDENT TO DISCUSS MILITARY ASPECTS OF "MODIFIED BOWLES PROPOSALS" WITH ME DURING HIS VISIT HERE. I ASSUME THAT THIS REFERS TO MEMO TO PRESIDENT ENTITLED "NEXT STEPS ON MILITARY AID TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN" OVER SECRETARY'S SIGNATURE. BECAUSE I DID NOT SEE COPY UNTIL EVENING DEC 18 I WAS UNABLE TO OFFER MY VERBAL COMMENTS TO CFN 1943 701 19 10 1241 18

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 798A ~~SECRET~~
GEN TAYLOR BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE EARLY DEC 19. THIS MESSAGE CONSTITUTES MY COMMENTS ON OVERALL ANALYSIS REQUESTED BY THE PRESIDENT. SINCE IT MAY BE OUR LAST OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT BEFORE FINAL DECISION IS MADE IN WASHINGTON I SHALL STRIVE TO PRESENT BALANCED SITUATION AS WE SEE IT. AT GEN TAYLOR'S SUGGESTION I AM SENDING COPY TO HIM IN KARACHI.

B. MEMO TO PRESIDENT SEEMS TO AGREE WITH MY PROPOSALS ON FOLLOWING THREE IMPORTANT POINTS:

1. DESIRABILITY AND POSSIBILITY OF MAKING FIVE YEAR MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMITMENT IN REGARD TO US FUNDS CONTINGENT ON CERTAIN INDIAN DECISIONS IN REGARD TO MILITARY FORCE LEVELS, MILITARY PURCHASES FROM BLOC COUNTRIES, MODERATE USE OF INDIAN FOREIGN EXCHANGE FOR MILITARY USE, CONTINUING RESTRAINT IN REGARD TO PAKISTAN, CLOSER POLITICAL INTERCHANGE IN REGARD

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Authority State Dept. 2-11-76 NSC. Ltr. 5-10-76 (#101)
By *W. W. NARA*, Date *8-8-05*

DEC 20 1963

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-2- 1943, DECEMBER 19, 10 PM: FROM NEW DELHI

TO CONTAINMENT OF CHINA THROUGHOUT ASIA, AND AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.

2. NECESSITY FOR TREATING INDIAN DEFENSE QUESTIONS IN TERMS OF SUBCONTINENT BALANCE WHICH ENTAILS ALSO OFFERING LONG-TERM MILITARY AID COMMITMENT TO PAKISTAN.

3. DANGERS INHERENT IN LETTING POLITICAL-MILITARY SITUATION ON SUBCONTINENT MERELY DRIFT.
CFN798B

PAGE THREE RUSBAE 798B ~~S E C R E T~~

C. MEMO TO PRESIDENT EITHER DISAGREES WITH OR SEEKS TO MODIFY MY PROPOSALS ON FOLLOWING POINTS:

1. IT WOULD SUBSTITUTE A \$50-\$60 MILLION MAXIMUM US COMMITMENT FOR \$75 MILLION WHICH WE PROPOSED AS MINIMUM. (IF BRITISH AGREE TO CONTRIBUTE ON ANNUAL BASIS TOWARD INDIAN DEFENSE THIS AMOUNT COULD BE SUBTRACTED FROM MY RECOMMENDED \$75 MILLION FIGURE.)

2. IT WOULD SUPPORT FORCE GOALS AT A 12 DIGZHION AND 35 SQUADRON LEVEL RATMZR THAN HIGHER LEVELS RECOMMENDED IN MY PROPOSAL.

3. IT SUGGESTS THAT TIMING OF PRESENTATION TO BOTH INDIA AND PAKISTAN BE LEFT UNCERTAIN AND SUBJECT IN SOME DEGREE TO PAK REACTION; SENSE OF URGENCY WHICH WE FEEL HERE IS DOWNGRADED.

4. QUESTION OF SUPERSONICS FOR INDIAN AIR FORCE IS LEFT OPEN WHILE SUPERSONICS FOR PAKISTAN APPEAR TO BE ACCEPTED AS PRIOR COMMITMENT.

D. WITH THESE AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT IN MIND I SHALL OUTLINE OUR CONVICTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN FOLLOWING TERMS:

CFN \$50-60 YJT 75 12 35

PAGE FOUR RUSBAE 798A ~~S E C R E T~~

1. IF WE ARE TO CARRY ON MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS WITH GOI IN REGARD TO INDIAN DEFENSE PERFORMANCE IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE INFORM THEM AT OUTSET THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO PROVIDE CERTAIN LEVEL OF MILITARY SUPPORT FOR FIVE YEAR PERIOD IN

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-3- 1943, DECEMBER 19, 10 PM: FROM NEW DELHI

ADDITION TO OUR PRESENT ECONOMIC SUPPORT. ONLY BY LETTING THEM KNOW WHAT US GOVT IS PREPARED TO DO UNDER ACCPETABLE CONDITIONS CAN WE PERSUADE GOI TO CREATE REALISTIC PLAN WHICH PROPERLY INTEGRATES ARMY AND AIR FORCE OBJECTIVES AND THEN RELATES THOSE OBJECTIVES TO OVERALL ASSISTANCE WHICH MAY BE EXPECTED FROM US AND OTHER NATIONS AND TO AMOUNTS OF INDIAN FOREIGN EXCHANGE WHICH ARE TO BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR DEFENSE.

2. OUR STATEMENT OF GENERAL INTENT IN REGARD TO MAGNITUDE AND TIME SPAN OF US ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE QUALIFIED BY FOLLOWING SEVEN CONDITIONS: (A) THAT THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN POLITICAL SITUATION GENERALLY; (B) THAT INDIANS PROCEED TO DEVELOP INTEGRATED MILITARY PLAN IN CONTEXT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN, ON PHASE-BY-PHASE BASIS, PREFERABLY OVER FIVE YEAR PERIOD; (C) THAT INDIANS AGREE THEY WILL NOT REPEAT NOT ACCEPT MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM SOVIET BLOC IN

PAGE FIVE RUSBAE 798B ~~SECRET~~
AMOUNTS OR CATEGORIES WHICH WOULD CREATE DIFFICULTIES FOR US IN REGARD TO SECURITY RISKS, POLITICAL CRITICISMS OR DRAIN ON INDIAN ECONOMIC RESOURCES; (D) THAT INDIANS UNDERTAKE TO LIMIT THEIR OWN FOREIGN EXCHANGE EXPENDITURES TO AMOUNTS WHICH WILL NOT JEOPARDIZE PRESENT DEVELOPMENT EFFORT; (E) THAT INDIANS CONTINUE TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN REGARD TO PAKISTAN; (F) THAT INDIANS ENGAGE IN CLOSER POLITICAL INTERCHANGE WITH US ON CHICOM THREAT IN ASIA, AND (G) THAT CONGRESS CONTINUE TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS REQUIRED TO FINANCE OUR ANNUAL CONTRIBUTION.

3. US DECISION IN REGARD TO FORCE GOALS WHICH WE ARE PREPARED TO SUPPORT SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY IN INDIA AND POTENTIALLY THROUGHOUT ASIA WHICH WAS PROVIDED BY CHINNESE AGGRESSION LAST FALL, AS WELL AS PURE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS TO MEET FUTHER CHINESE THRUST. WHEAT WE ARE PROPOSING IS POLITICAL-MILITARY BARGAIN WITH INDIAN GOVT DESIGNED TO PREVENT ESCALATING ARMS RACE BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND INDIAN WHILE GIVING INDIA ABILITY TO BLOCK FURTHER CHINESE AGGRESSION AND SENSE OF CONFIDENCE IT IS CAPACITY TO DO SO. THIS BARGAIN IF CONSUMMATED WILL ALSO SERVE TO PROTECT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FROM OUTSIDE DIVERSIONS OF INDIAN FOREIGN EXCHANGE FOR DEFENSE SPENDING AND PREEMPT POLITICAL-MILITARY SITUATION GENERALLY FROM USSR.

GP-3.
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION TWO OF THREE

ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 1943 KARACHI PRIORITY 701 FROM NEWDELHI
DEC. 19 10 P.M.

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KARACHI FOR GENERAL TAYLOR

DEPTEL 1241

IF AGREEMENT CAN BE SECURED WE WILL HAVE LAID BASIS FOR
BREAKTHROUGH THAT HOLDS GREAT POTENTIAL PROMISE TO OUR EFFORTS
TO ESTABLISH A REALISTIC POWER BALANCE THAT DOES NOT DEPEND
WHOLLY ON A US POWER CONGRONTATION WITH CHINESE. WE THEREFORE
MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT NOT ONLY PURELY MILITARY REQUIREMENTS
CFN 1943 701 19 10 1241

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 798B ~~SECRET~~
BUT ALSO POLITICAL FACTOR WHICH MAY REQUIRE SUPPORT OF A FEW
ADDITIONAL UNITS TO MAKE THESE AGREEMENTS A REALITY.

4. IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT GENERAL ADAMS AND GENERAL
TAYLOR BOTH FELT THAT 16 REGULAR DIVISION ALREADY APPROVED BY
GOI PLUS 5 SMALLER TERRITORIAL DIVISIONS PROPOSED BY GENERAL
CHAUDHURI ARE NOT TOO FAR OUT OF LINE WITH INDIAN NEEDS. I
BELIEVE WE SHOULD AGREE TO SUPPORT FORCES OF THIS GENERAL
ORDER OF MAGNITUDE WITH SAME TYPES OF EQUIPMENT ALREADY PRO-
VIDED FOR SIX DIVISIONS, PHASED PERHAPS IN THREE STAGES,
I.E. FIRST 12 REGULAR DIVISIONS, THEN ADDITIONAL REGULAR
DIVISIONS, AND FINALLY RELATIVELY INEXPENSIVE EQUIPMENT FOR
TERRITORIAL DIVISIONS.

5. GOI PLANS FOR IAF ARE VERY UNCLEAR. WE UNDERSTAND THAT
IAF HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO EXPAND TO 45 SQUADRONS PLUS 5

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-2- 1943, December 19, 10 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF THREE) From
New Delhi.

HELICOPTER UNITS. IT WOULD SEEM TO US, HOWEVER, THAT US/UK SUPPORT OF ABOUT 42 SQUADRONS PLUS 5 HELICOPTER UNITS, THOUGH CAUSING REDUCTION IN CURRENT IAF EXPANSION PLANS, MIGHT MEET GOI NEEDS, PARTICULARLY IF US/UK PROVIDE THREE SQUADRONS OF SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT.

6. FOR REASON SOME OF WHICH APPEAR TO BE MILITARILY SOUND AND OTHER RELATED LARGELY TO POLITICAL PRESTIGE, INDIANS ARE
CFN 16 12 45 5 5 42

PAGE THREE RUSBAE 798B ~~SECRET~~
DETERMINED TO ADD SOME HIGH-PERFORMANCE AIRCRAFT TO THEIR AIR FORCE. THEY CAN PROCURE THESE PLANES FROM RUSSIANS, EVENTUALLY FROM OUR OWN PRODUCTION (WITH BRITISH OR SOVIET ASSISTANCE), OR FROM BRITISH OR US.

IN MY OPINION INDIAN AIR FORCE DEPENDENCE EXCLUSIVELY ON SOVIET TYPE SUPERSONICS WITH HIGH PRESTIGE VALUE WOULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO US POLITICAL AND MILITARY INTERESTS IN SOUTH ASIA. TO PRODUCE THEM HERE IN INDIA WOULD BE COSTLY AND INEFFICIENT. THEREFORE SUPERSONICS SHOULD BE ACCEPTED AS AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN OUR FIVE YEAR PACKAGE PROGRAM. IF INDEED WE HAVE ALREADY DECIDED TO "REPLACE OBSOLESCE F-86 SQUADRONS WITH SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT" IN PAKISTAN, AS STATED IN MEMO TO PRESIDENT, PROVISION OF SOME SUPERSONICS TO INDIA IS POLITICALLY ESSENTIAL.

ACTUAL NUMBER OF SQUADRONS COULD, HOWEVER, BE CONDITIONED ON INDIA'S DECISION IN REGARD TO PROCUREMENT OF MISSILES FROM SOVIET UNION. FOR INSTANCE, IF MISSILE DELIVERIES FROM USSR ARE NOT INCREASED BEYOND PRESENT EXPECTATION OF ONE COMPLEX, WE AND/OR THE BRITISH COULD PROVIDE THE THREE SQUADRONS WHICH THEY ARE SEEKING; IF MISSILE PROCUREMENT FROM THE USSR IS EXPANDED, WE COULD CUT TO ONE SQUADRON.

7. AS IN CASE OF SUPERSONICS, GOI HAS DECIDED TO GIVE HIGH

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-3- 1943, December 19, 10 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF THREE) From
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PAGE FOUR RUSBAE 798B ~~SECRET~~
PRIORITY TO DEFENSE PRODUCTION, A CAPITAL INVESTMENT OVER A
PERIOD OF YEARS OF \$200 MILLION IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE ALONE
APPEARS TO BE UNDER CONSIDERATION. OUR WILLINGNESS TO ALLOCATE
U.S. FUNDS FOR THIS EFFORT WITHIN AN ANNUAL CEILING SHOULD BE
BASED ON INDIA'S IMPROVING HER PRESENT DEFENSE PRODUCTION
PERFORMANCE AND ON THE ARTHUR D. LITTLE RECOMMENDATIONS
WHICH SHOULD BE AVAILABLE BY FEBRUARY.

IN GENERAL WE SHOULD DISCOURAGE INDIANS FROM MAKING
SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS WHICH CAN EASILY BE SECURED ABROAD.
AT SAME TIME WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT GENERAL DECISION TO
MOVE AHEAD HAS BEEN MADE AND THAT A STRONG CASE CAN BE MADE
FOR SUPPORT OF SOME INDIAN PRODUCTION. FOR INSTANCE INDIANS
ESTIMATE THAT COST OF IMPORTING ONE YEAR'S SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION
WILL PAY FOREIGN EXCHANGE COST OF CONSTRUCTION PLANT
CAPABLE OF PRODUCING THE SAME AMOUNT ANNUALLY. WE SHOULD ALSO
RECOGNIZE FACT THAT INDIA'S ABILITY TO BECOME SELF-SUFFICIENT
IN DEFENSE PRODUCTION OF RELATIVELY UNSOPHISTICATED ARMY
EQUIPMENT WOULD TAKE MANY YEARS, AND OF MORE

AIR FORCE EQUIPMENT EVEN LONGER. ^{SOPHISTICATED} THUS GOI WILL REMAIN
DEPENDENT ON EXTERNAL SOURCES FOR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR
FORSEEABLE FUTURE AND OUR ABILITY TO EXERCISE SOME INFLUENCE
CFN \$200 MILLION

PAGE FIVE RUSBAE 798B ~~SECRET~~
OVER INDIAN DEFENSE EFFORT WILL CONTINUE.

8. IN ADDITION TO MILITARY EQUIPMENT WHICH WE WILL AGREE TO
PROVIDE UNDER PROPOSED PLAN, WE SHOULD FIND SOME MEANS OF
SUPPLYING INDIA WITH \$25-30 MILLION WORTH OF METALS REQUIRED
FOR ITS DEFENSE PRODUCTION. THIS WILL ENABLE US TO REDUCE
INDIAN FOREIGN EXCHANGE EXPENDITURES FOR DEFENSE PURPOSES
BY EQUIVALENT AMOUNT. VERY METALS INDIA MOST DESPERATELY
NEEDS ARE ONES IN WHICH WE HAVE LARGEST SURPLUS IN STRATEGIC
STOCKPILE INVENTORY. AGREEMENT WHICH I SUGGEST WOULD CALL
FOR PAYMENTS IN RUPEES AND INCLUDE PROVISION THAT INDIANS
WOULD NOT REDUCE THE \$300 MILLION OR MORE WHICH THEY NOW
SPEND FOR METALS FOR THEIR DOMESTIC ECONOMY.

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-4- 1943, December 19, 10 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF THREE) From
New Delhi.

9. FINALLY I DEEPLY BELIEVE THAT FURTHER DELAY IN HOLDING
SUBSTANTIVE MEETINGS WITH INDIANS IN REGARD LONG-RANGE PROGRAM
WILL INVOLVE SUBSTANTIAL POLITICAL RISK. IN INDIAN VIEW
THEY HAVE BEEN STRIVING SINCE BHOOHALINGAM MISSION LAST
SPRING TO FIND OUT WHAT WE ARE WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE TO
LONG-RANGE DEFENSE PROGRAM. WE HAVE HELD BACK BECAUSE OF
COMBINATION OF REASONS, PRINCIPAL ONE OF WHICH HAS BEEN HOPE
THAT PAKS WOULD COME TO ACCEPT SITUATION VIS A VIS INDIA
AND THAT WE COULD GO FORWARD WITH CREATING ANY GREAT DIFFI-
CULTIES IN RAWALPINDI.

CFN \$25-30 \$300

GP-3.

BOWLES

BT

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION THREE OF THREE

-ACTION PRIORITY DEPT (1943) PRIORITY KARACHI 701 FROM NEWDELHI
DECEMBER 19, 11 P.M.

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KARACHI FOR GENERAL TAYLOR

DEPTEL 1241

10. DURING THIS PERIOD, INDIAN CONCERN IN REGARD TO U.S. ATTITUDES HAS BEEN INCREASED BY CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS WHICH FORCED US TO PULL BACK FROM WHAT MOST INDIANS FELT TO BE AFFIRMATIVE DECISION BY ADMINISTRATION IN REGARD TO BOKARO. CFN 1943 701 19 11 1241

PAGE TWO RUSBAE 798C ~~SECRET~~

ALTHOUGH GOI IS IN EXCELLENT MOOD RIGHT NOW AS EVIDENCED BY THEIR RESTRAINT IN REGARD TO SERIES OF PAK PROVOCATIONS, THEIR OUTSPOKEN POSITION IN RESPECT TO CHINA AND THEIR OBVIOUS DESIRE TO COOPERATE WITH U.S. IN BROADEST SENSE, FURTHER DELAY FOLLOWING TAYLOR VISIT WILL ENABLE MENONITE OPPOSITION TO TURN SITUATION TO OUR DISADVANTAGE WITH DANGER THAT USSR WILL MOVE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OUR CONTINUING UNCERTAINTY.

KHRUSHCHEV COULD WELL USE A SUCCESS OF SOME KIND, PREFERABLY ONE THAT COULD BE HAD AT MINIMUM COST. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD NOT BE SURPRISING IF HE SHOULD DECIDE THAT SINCE SOVIET RELATIONS IN REGARD TO CHINA REMAIN UNPROMISING, THAT TIME HAS COME FOR HIM TO ACCEPT LONG POSTPONED INVITATION FOR VISIT TO INDIA, POSSIBLY TO COINCIDE WITH CHOU EN-LAI'S STATE VISIT, TO PAKISTAN, AND TO ANNOUNCE FROM DELHI

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-2- 1943, DECEMBER 19, 11 PM (SECTION THREE OF THREE), FROM:
NEW DELHI

PLATFORM THAT SOVIET UNION HAS DECIDED TO BUILD ANOTHER STEEL PLANT COMPARABLE TO BOKARO, TO AGREE TO MAJOR MISSILE DEFENSES FOR THE LARGER NORTH INDIAN CITIES, AND THEN TO THROW IN SOME MIG 21'S TANKS, ETC. FOR GOOD MEASURE. EVEN HALF OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT ALREADY DELIVERED BY SOVIETS TO INDONESIA COULD HAVE A PROFOUND EFFECT HERE UNDER THESE CONDITIONS.

PAGE THREE RUSBAE 798C ~~SECRET~~
SUCH A MOVE BY KHRUSHCHEV WITH EVEN PARTIAL GOP ACCEPTANCE WOULD SET IN MOTION A MOST UNFAVORABLE CYCLE OF EVENTS IN CONGRESS AND WITH MUCH OF US PUBLIC. INDIA WOULD BE PICTURED AS DRIFTING OVER TO SOVIET CAMP WITH KRISHNA MEMON STEALING BACK INTO CENTER OF STAGE.

THUS A POLITICAL SITUATION WHICH IS REMARKABLY PROMISING AT PRESENT MOMENT COULD BE SWITCHED WITHIN MATTER OF WEEKS INTO ONE WHICH WOULD SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZE OUR INTERESTS IN INDIA AND I MAY ADD THOSE OF PAKISTAN AS WELL. I AM NOT CALLING "WOLF". THE SOVIET-CHINESE BEHAVIOUR AT MOMENT IS HIGHLY UNPREDICTABLE AND THIS COULD DEVELOP INTO A MOST TEMPTING OPPORTUNITY FOR THE USSR.

11. IN LAST FEW MONTHS WE HAVE CONSULTED FULLY WITH PAKS AND THEY HAVE EVERY REASSURANCE WE CAN GIVE THEM IN REGARD TO THREAT THEY FEEL INDIAN MILITARY BUILDUP CONSTITUTES TO THEIR SECURITY. I BELIEVE WE MUST NOW MOVE AHEAD IN INDIA-- A NATION THAT WE HAVE BEEN PRESSING FOR LAST TEN YEARS TO FACE UP TO CHICOM DANGER IN ASIA AND WHICH AT LONG LAST APPEARS TO HAVE SEEN THE LIGHT.

E. LET ME ADD THAT HAVING SERVED MY TIME ON RECEIVING END

PAGE FOUR RUSBAE 798C ~~SECRET~~
IN WASHINGTON I AM KEENLY AWARE OF COMPETING "URGENCIES" WHICH CLAMOR FOR ATTENTION. I AM ALSO AWARE OF PRIORITY GRIP EXERTED BY OLD SITUATIONS ON PRESENT FUNDS. NEVERTHELESS IF WE CAN AFFORD TO SPEND \$170 MILLION MORE THIS YEAR FOR DEFENSE OF TURKEY, \$70 MILLION MORE FOR DEFENSE OF IRAN,

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-3- 1943, DECEMBER 19, 11 PM (SECTION THREE OF THREE), FROM:
NEW DELHI

AND \$140 MILLION MORE FOR DEFENSE OF SOUTH KOREA, WE SHOULD
BE ABLE TO FINANCE \$75 MILLION ANNUALLY NEEDED FOR DEFENSE
OF INDIA AND TO EXPLOIT THE MAJOR OPPORTUNITY WHICH WAS
CREATED BY THE CHINESE ATTACK LAST YEAR.

GP-3.

BOWLES

BT

CFN \$170 \$70 \$140 \$75 3

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December 10, 1963

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

McGB - By ry/jc, NARA, Date 7-27-06

Here's draft India/Pak paper which I personally rewrote and is now being piloted through State-DOD top level. Am sending it over on the off-chance you may get calls from WPB or someone. *Also to get your reaction before you go away Wednesday.*

It's a longish paper but this is a tricky two-country problem. So I've included fair amount of explanation.

Yemen paper (including draft letter to Faysal) should also be ready by Wednesday. I urge we meet on both India/Pakistan and Yemen before end of week which means preferably Thursday. However, I am not sure Yemen meeting is necessary (perhaps just Rusk, Talbot, you and I could handle). Shall I lay on Thursday India meeting or will you? Should I send papers to LBJ Wednesday night even if you aren't here? Will he pay attention if they don't come from you? To cover this bet, what say I draft a covering notes for your signature? Pardon my confusion.

(A) *one joint sig* + *I'll say it's coming.*
RWK
RWK
(B) *This is a thin paper - see changes as noted*

~~SECRET~~

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map

Indecon Pak

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *je*, NARA, Date *7-28-06*
(see FRUS 61-63, vol. 19, #342aH.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Next Steps on Military Aid to India and Pakistan

Proposal for India

Ambassador Bowles proposes that we make a five-year military assistance commitment to India in exchange for Indian decisions to limit their force levels, hold down procurement of military equipment from the Soviet Bloc, hold to a minimum diversion of foreign exchange from economic development, exercise restraint in relations with Pakistan, and cooperate with us in the containment of Communist China. He believes that there is a reasonable chance that India will make these decisions, if our offer is good enough. (See Enclosure 1)

The Departments of State and Defense and AID agree that if we could reach some such understanding with India, it would be well worthwhile. A steady long-term policy of military cooperation with India would do much to stabilize our relationship and serve our long-term political aim of pulling India closer to the United States. Indian decisions to settle on moderate force levels would hold down Indo-Pak tensions. We would achieve some preclusion in fact, and excessive Soviet penetration of the Indian military would be prevented. Major diversions of foreign exchange from economic development, to which we are so heavily committed, would be avoided. (Over the past three years India has spent an average of \$95 million of its own foreign exchange for defense; estimates indicate this figure may go as high as \$160 million for Indian FY 1964. This would put real pressure on the Indian development program.) Since we will probably provide substantial MAP to India over the next several years anyway, we ought to maximize the leverage we get from it by proceeding along the above lines.

down right!

We believe, however, that we should stop somewhere short of as explicit a commitment as Ambassador Bowles suggests, and should approach it more cautiously, rather than laying all our cards on the table at the outset. Such tactics would leave us greater freedom of action to gauge the likely Pakistani reaction, and to find out whether the Indians would indeed be sufficiently responsive, before

deciding how

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Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

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deciding how much of our own plans to divulge. Nonetheless, we would go ahead now with the preparation of a five-year MAP program for India in the \$50-60 million annual range, so that we would be prepared, if the timing were ripe and the Indian response to our initial probes satisfactory, to divulge our longer term plans.

Proposal for Pakistan

In the years since 1954, we have established a pattern of military assistance to Pakistan which is essentially the one which we are now suggesting for India. We have agreed to modernize and maintain five and a half divisions and to modernize the Pakistan air force. The latter has come to mean that eventually we will replace the obsolescent F-86 squadrons with supersonic aircraft. (Pakistan already has one squadron of F-104s which we delivered in 1961.) We have told the Pakistanis from time to time of the quantities of certain types of equipment we were planning to deliver to meet our commitments. By providing this level of support, we were able to persuade the Pakistanis to limit their over-all force goals and the diversion of their foreign exchange to military expenditures.

One reason for caution about moving ahead too fast in revealing to India our longer term MAP plans is that these might leak prematurely to Pakistan and cause a violent reaction before we had laid the necessary groundwork. To mitigate the Pakistani reaction we might provide them too, at roughly the same time, with an indication of our longer term MAP intentions, perhaps for the next three years. To this end, we should also prepare a three-five year MAP program for Pakistan for use if and when the timing seems ripe. We've been planning on around \$40 million annually in continuing MAP. As with India, we would also attach conditions to this program, particularly that it is predicated upon our clear understanding that Pakistan will not go too far with China.

Unfortunately Chou En-lai's coming visit to Pakistan leads me to believe that now is the wrong time to talk with Ayub about longer term MAP. However, as we chart our course in the troubled waters of U.S.-Pakistan relations during the months ahead, I believe it important that we be prepared to give Ayub a clear signal of our continued willingness to support Pakistan unless its conduct impairs our ability to do so.

Recommendations

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Recommendations

In order to permit us to move ahead with both India and Pakistan, but with appropriate tactical flexibility, I recommend with the concurrence of Bob McNamara and Dave Bell that you make the following decisions:

India

1. That we develop an internal plan, not to be disclosed to the Indians as yet, for a program of military assistance in support of Indian forces to meet the Chinese threat to be accomplished over a period of five years. The JCS determined on November 23 that India required 12 divisions and two independent brigades together with supporting units and three squadrons of night/all weather fighters to meet this threat. (We are now supporting the conversion of six divisions into effective mountain divisions and have told the Indians that we will convert two more if funds are available.)

2. That the above program include helping convert those Indian ground forces which are required to meet the threat from China into effective mountain divisions with supporting elements; that we continue to assist India develop its logistic capacity to support these forces along the China border; and that we continue to help India meet a part of its defensive needs against China through domestic production.

3. That the program include continued support to the Indian Air Force, including radar, communications and air transport. However, we would leave open the question of supersonics and postpone for the present a decision on supplying these to India or Pakistan.

4. That the above plans be developed within a range of \$50-60 million in MAP annually, leaving for subsequent decision the precise five-year program level.

5. That our willingness to extend and thereafter continue such long-range assistance will rest upon a satisfactory understanding that the Government of India will: limit its over-all forces to reasonable levels; limit procurement of arms from the Soviet Union; avoid excessive diversion of foreign exchange to defense expenditure; and exercise restraint in its relations with Pakistan. Such United States action would also rest on continued United States-Indian agreement on the political and military implications of the Chinese threat.

6. That,

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*Let's like
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than this
Why not
wait so that
if necessary we
could throw
them into
scale, by
our decision,
later in
negotiation?*

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6. That, as to the tactics with India, we proceed on the following careful, step-by-step basis:

a. At this point, we would only authorize Ambassador Bowles to say that we were considering longer term plans for military aid to India. Before we could firm these up we needed a better understanding of proposed Indian defense plans, force ceilings, resource allocations, procurement from third countries, etc. over the next several years. We need tell the Pakistanis ~~nothing~~ at this point.

b. General Taylor would reinforce this line during his visit to India (16-18 December) and probe Indian intentions.

c. Depending upon Indian responsiveness, we would be prepared at an appropriate time to divulge to India our longer term MAP intentions. Exactly what we say at that time would depend on the extent of the understandings the Indians were prepared to reach with us along the lines of paragraph 5 above. We would in no case, of course, make a firm commitment but only state our intentions, the carrying out of which would be dependent on Indian performance and United States appropriations. We would simultaneously inform Pakistan. (Since we are already planning to pick up a total of 10 Indian divisions by 1965, informing the Pakistanis that we only intended to support 12 over five years should on balance reassure rather than frighten them.)

Pakistan

7. That we similarly develop an internal U.S. plan for a possible three-five year MAP package for Pakistan within the context of our present commitments. This plan should include the provision of two more squadrons of supersonic aircraft.

8. That we not divulge this until we are further satisfied as to Pakistani intentions vis-a-vis their alliance obligations; but that we be prepared, if circumstances seem ripe, to divulge this program at such time as we divulge our long-term Indian program.

9. That any three-five year Pakistan MAP program be predicated on clear understandings that Pakistan will place acceptable limits on the development of its relations with Communist China and will fulfill the basic requirements of its alliance relationship with us.

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Since we plan to move ahead with India in stages, I hope to be able to recommend to you that we move toward longer range military delivery schedules for Pakistan before or when we disclose the full dimensions of our Indian package to Nehru. Max Taylor will drive home to Ayub the dangers of his present course with China when he is in Karachi on 19-20 December. Upon his return we shall take another look at the whole problem of containing Communist aggression on the subcontinent. Since Pakistan sees its so far limited relations with Communist China as serving its national interest, just as India sees relations with the U.S.S.R. as serving its interests, it is perhaps too much to hope that we can develop unlimited security relationships with either country. Yet if we can move ahead, albeit somewhat jerkily in each country, I believe these proposals for military assistance to India and Pakistan will advance our strategic objective of resisting Communist pressure in the area without placing intolerable strains on our relations with either country. Moreover, the course we propose, though not ideal, seems best calculated to reduce the possibility that the Sino-Soviet dispute will be fought out in the subcontinent.

Dean Rusk

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