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October 9, 1964

*Non-aligned  
Conf*

Mac -

I've spent a good part of this week reading the speeches at the non-aligned conference. Here were 44 countries and 11 observers (virtually all recipients of US aid in one form or another) and not a really friendly reference to the US. A few countries, India in particular, tried to maintain a balance by not picking up the more obviously slanted slogans of the majority, but great talk about imperialism, colonialism, and neo-imperialism was, by and large the order of the day. Cyprus, Aden, Guantanamo, SEA were repeatedly cited as examples of how "the old established forces" (to use Sukarno's phrase) were trying to maintain their sway. All in all, any reasonable observer of this conference would conclude that though colonialism is practically dead, flogging the dead horse is still the favorite sport of over half of the globe. Of course the Soviets and Chinese have made massive efforts to promote this line of thinking, but essentially it springs from the anti-colonial revolution itself.

I cite this phenomenon neither in sorrow nor in anger, but as clear evidence of the magnitude of the problem we face. However much we tell ourselves of the rightness of our cause and the purity of our intentions, this is simply not believed by most leaders of the third world. With a few of the more sophisticated (e.g. Tito, Nasser, Shastri) we have made some impact but even they hesitate to fly against the prevailing wind. This attitude pattern among the LDC's is one of the critical obstacles we face over the next generation.

Yet it is impossible to argue with the proposition that we do not yet have either the policies or the programs to deal effectively with this crucial problem over time. Among other things, we simply don't descend into the arena. True, we make great speeches back here, but we don't follow through enough to make sure they are listened to out there. Our diplomacy, and perhaps even our information operations, are too passive. Few of our diplomats attempt to engage the leadership in the LDC's in a continuing dialogue. We don't accentuate the positive enough; nor do we bridle enough at irresponsible noises. How do we expect these types to know we think they're leaning too far East if we don't keep telling them so?

Second, we've simply failed to get across the positive themes so necessary to altering the attitudes of the third world. The process of decolonization is practically over (though we'll be coping with the problems it's created for the next 100 years). Yet to listen to the din you'd think it had hardly begun. While the problem will be easier once such vestigial remnants as the Portuguese hangers-on, etc. are disposed of, we ought to start

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *IG/SUV*, NARA, Date *4-10-00*

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now vigorously proclaiming that the period of colonialism is indeed over--  
so why all the shouting?

All this adds up to need for a more vigorous diplomacy and propaganda effort, along with turning around the downward slide on foreign aid. How to get this should be high on our agenda for November-December.

Action needed. You recall my earlier thought that we need, not another task force or committee, but a solid pitch to LBJ from you, Rusk, and McNamara on imperatives of reversing trend in foreign aid.

Let me now suggest a complementary gambit. As preliminary to above, why doesn't Bundy group write a little "task force" report of its own to LBJ on the general subject of "What do we do about Afro-Asia 1965-72?" Far from a long list of specifics, I'd envisage a quite brief memo with punch.

This need not overlap much with Kayson Task Force, because foreign aid will necessarily be buried in their omnibus effort. In fact, my real concern is that with 11 task forces bidding for new spending, foreign aid might get lost in the shuffle. What say?

R. W. Komer

cc: ~~Governor Harriman~~  
~~Carl Rowan~~

*Buchalk*  
*Thomson*

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(Rocovon)  
Carl,

October 1, 1964

*Non-aligned  
Conf*

Here's the draft OK'ed by Secretary Rusk. It's actually a Bill Jordan effort, but does hit most of your points. Any ideas on how to make it sing a bit more.

R. W. Komer

Att: Suggested Message from the President to the Second Non-aligned Conference in Cairo (att. to Rusk memo to Pres. 9/30/64)

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October 1, 1964

Mac -

Here's the proposed LBJ message to 5 October Cairo Conference. It must go out, I'd say, no later than Saturday evening here, to get proper billing in Cairo.

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I've edited Rusk draft (really Bill Jordan's unchanged), suggested a brief add-on on disarmament, and included three paras. suggested by Carl Rowan (who sent you a memo on this)-- one on test ban anniversary, one mentioning Kennedy-Nehru, and a closing peroration.

All add-ons are bracketed for ease of reference. I favor all but last. Rowan's test ban para. may duplicate other planned statement but I see no harm in this. None of add-ons are controversial.

RWK

*Approved by Pres  
10/2/64*

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October 1, 1964

**MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE PRESIDENT**

Secretary Rusk proposes that you send the attached message to the Non-Aligned Conference opening in Cairo Monday. Carl Rowan also urges one, and has contributed some suggestions.

This is the first such conclave since Belgrade in 1961. Some 60-odd nations will attend as members (including many heads of state) or observers.

President Kennedy sent a message to Belgrade, partly in order not to leave the field to Khrushchev and Mao. We have the same problem this time. Moreover, we have more or less friendly relations with almost all attendees (Cuba is the chief exception). By being positive and friendly toward the conference, we hope to reduce any unfriendly noises from it (there will inevitably be some). We have already done a good deal of quiet lobbying to get our views across. As drafted, the message doesn't expose us at home, and should get good play abroad.

R. W. Komer

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

McGeorge Bundy

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Att. Rusk Memo to President  
9/30/64, subj. Presidential Msg  
to Second Non-Aligned Conference

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By R6/STW, NARA, Date 4-10-06

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REVISED DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE SECOND

NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE IN CAIRO

Peace in our troubled world is the hope of all men of good will.

All governments that would faithfully serve their people, that would strive to realize their dreams, must have the unwavering quest of peace as a primary concern. So the delegations gathered in Cairo have an opportunity in their deliberations to help advance this great common cause of mankind.

Clearly, you have recognized the opportunity--and the challenge-- by making the safeguarding and the strengthening of world peace your first order of business. Every positive step taken to settle international disputes peacefully--or to eliminate their causes before they reach crisis proportions--brings us all closer to the goal we share.

Komer

[As you all know, the United States had been in the forefront of those seeking to strengthen world peace through sensible and safeguarded measures of disarmament. We pledge ourselves anew to this great task.]

The United States also enjoys friendly and mutually beneficial relations with virtually all nations represented at your conference. The United States shares with your peoples the same basic values and aspirations-- for human rights and the dignity of the individual, for freedom from all forms of exploitation or domination by outside forces, for the right of each nation, in every area of the world, to develop political and economic systems of its own choosing, and to realize its own dreams in its own way.

Unfortunately, these legitimate national aspirations are still denied to many peoples. Unfortunately, aggression often masks itself in new forms of imperialism while attacking the imperialism of the past. Unfortunately, the centuries-old problems of poverty, illness and illiteracy continue to afflict a high percentage of the human race.

The United States has joined with most of you in the past in trying to overcome or alleviate these difficult and complicated problems through peaceful means. We hope to continue and expand this cooperation in the future.

*Roman*  
[A year ago this week, one of our most important accomplishments-- the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty--went into effect. We Americans are proud of the role that President Kennedy and the United States Government played in obtaining that Treaty. It was a great step forward--but it was not enough. We will not be satisfied until the awesome power of the atom is harnessed for peace alone, and men can live out their lives with some assurance that they will not be suddenly obliterated in the night.

*Roman*  
[The architect of that treaty, John F. Kennedy, is no longer with us. We mourn his loss, and work to make real his dreams for a better world. Another great peacemaker, Jawaharial Nehru, has also been taken from us, but his visions for a better world were never more alive-- in America and around the world.]

We Americans live in a diversified society. We are a nation of many minority groups--from almost every land and from every conceivable background. For this reason, we cherish as a guiding principle the right of men and of groups to hold diverse views so long, of course, as the expression of those views does not interfere with the security or the welfare of others.

We defend that principle to the utmost among ourselves. So do we support and respect its application in our relations with all responsible governments.

Finally, we greet you as fellow members of the United Nations which has done so much to guard the peace and to point the way to a better world order. There we join together in a parliament in which the strong and the weak, the rich and the less prosperous, the old and the new nations share the floor, the platform and the responsibility in common cause. These are rights to be cherished by us all as we sustain and strengthen our organization to better serve us all--this year, next year, and into our common future.

*Rowan*  
I take pleasure in greeting you on this occasion. It is the hope of my government that thoughtful, constructive deliberations on your part will lead us nearer to equitable solutions of some of the many problems which perplex mankind in this sixth decade of the Twentieth century. I

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Director of Intelligence  
and Research

BUNDY-SMITH  
PATOR  
*Research*  
Memorandum

INR-50, November 16, 1964

To : The Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *Thomas L. Hughes*  
Subject : The Non-Aligned Conference at Cairo

- BOWMAN
- CHASE
- FORRESTAL
- JOHNSON
- KEENY
- KLEIN
- KOMER
- MOODY
- REEDY
- SAUNDERS
- SAYRE

Although overshadowed by important world events, the Cairo non-aligned conference gave important indications of the strains and stresses within the non-aligned camp and of the likely future development of the non-aligned movement. This paper analyzes the various issues dealt with by the conference and the attitude and reactions of the participating countries.

ABSTRACT

The recent non-aligned conference in Cairo aimed at cementing bonds of common interest among the non-aligned nations that would survive the immediate meeting. Although the conference did not overcome the cleavages between moderates and extremists and did not come to grips with problems raised by the fundamental changes in the world scene (such as the disappearance of bipolarization and the Sino-Soviet quarrel), organized non-alignment may have a more promising future than it had before the Cairo Conference.

At the Cairo Conference African leaders played a more prominent role than at earlier conferences and several of the extremist leaders came from African countries. Those delegations which inclined toward Western views were more isolated than before and at times were put under heavy pressures. More than in 1961, moderate delegates tended to yield to demands for "unity" and for placing the success of the conference above substantive differences. The sponsors,

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By *RC/JL* NARA, Date *4-10-06*

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downgrading and  
declassification

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Tito and Nasser, maintained a middle ground, although not consistently; Nasser, more than Tito, endeavored to please both sides. The communique agreed to by the conference generally contains the points which Tito and Nasser desired to have covered and in language acceptable to them. However, by reserving all discussion for closed sessions and, so far at least, by not revealing reservations expressed by a number of countries on specific items, the conference managers succeeded in presenting to the outside world a picture of considerably greater harmony than actually existed. The countries most satisfied with the outcome of the conference were those such as Cyprus and Cuba -- which achieved the parochial aims they were primarily interested in. The moderates were often discomfited, but they have nonetheless concluded that they must be present at future conferences.

The Conference had a generally anti-Western tone. The U. S. and the U. K. came in for adverse comment on several occasions, while no communist country was directly criticized. The resolutions on the principal agenda items (colonialism, racial discrimination, peaceful coexistence, disarmament, the UN, and economic development and cooperation) generally endorsed positions that Western nations had resisted. Resolutions such as those supporting independence for Cyprus, endorsing admission of Communist China to the UN, and adopting the Arab view on the Palestinian question may in the UN context cause concern. Many, however, were not as extreme as numerous and vociferous delegates demanded or as the West might have feared. Often they are very general in their terms; some embody useful positive aspects, such as the endorsement of the limited test ban treaty; and others are restrained by association with UN principles.

In most cases the impact of the Conference resolutions, taken by themselves, even those strongly critical of the West, probably will not be great, since most of the participants do not feel bound by the actions of the Conference and are not likely to change their national policies. Moreover, the propaganda impact of the Conference was eroded by disagreeable quarrels, by the dramatic diversion afforded by the Tshombe incident at the opening, and by the events of October 15-16, which immediately followed and overshadowed the Conference.

The Soviet Union appears to be satisfied with the outcome of the conference and ready to continue its support of non-alignment. As presently constituted, the non-aligned movement should be regarded as useful from the Soviet Union's point of view. A change in the USSR's attitude is unlikely, unless there should be a sharp reversal in the Soviet Union's overall policy toward the non-communist world including the non-aligned countries. Communist China and Indonesia, the latter generally regarded as the spokesman of the Communist Chinese at the conference, have professed to be satisfied with the outcome of the meeting. Nevertheless, Indonesia did not achieve recognition of its "new emerging forces" concept and its split with Yugoslavia was brought out into the open.

The Cairo Conference did not achieve the formal institutionalization of the non-aligned movement desired by the UAR, Ceylon, and the Soviet Union. There is, however, a definite prospect of future meetings. In these meetings the Africans, including the African extremists, are likely to play an increasingly prominent role. The cleavage between moderates and extremists did persist at the Cairo meeting, notwithstanding outward appearances of unity, and is likely to continue. However, the recent conference has shown that small, moderate countries can in the name of unity be pulled along by the advocates of extreme positions to agree to positions they dislike.

## I. The Conference and Its Predecessors

The spirit of Bandung is often cited as inspiration for both the 1961 Belgrade Conference and the recent Cairo session. These meetings differed, however, in concept, in base of attendance, in the intent of their sponsors, as well as in the quality and tone of proceedings. The countries represented at Bandung in 1955 came on a geographic basis. Because the communist sponsors -- especially the CPR -- were interested in establishing contacts in newly-independent Asian and African countries, and in exploring the thoughts and feelings of leaders from the areas, no effort was made to limit discussion or avoid controversy.

The Belgrade Conference, by contrast, attempted to gather together "like-minded" countries. One of its aims was to increase the prestige and weight in world affairs of the non-aligned countries and particularly of the conference's sponsors, Yugoslavia and the UAR. In the context of the nuclear confrontation between the Soviet and US super-powers, a detached role for the smaller nations made good sense to many of the non-aligned. The meeting floundered, however, in a score of unanticipated local and regional controversies that left most participants smarting and frustrated. In consequence, the outcome of the gathering was not fully satisfactory to its sponsors and even less so to the USSR.

The Cairo gathering aimed at cementing bonds of common interest that would survive the immediate meeting. The concept of non-alignment, however, has been undergoing changes. The world is no longer bipolar, the Soviet-Chinese quarrel particularly has added a new dimension to non-alignment. Furthermore, Africa has become increasingly important, several of the more extreme leaders at the conference represented African countries, and Sino-Soviet competition in Africa loomed in the background. The Cairo Conference did not come to grips with the fundamental changes in the world scene, nor did it overcome the cleavages between moderates and extremists. Nevertheless, organized non-alignment has a more promising future than it had before the conference.

Largely because of CPR approaches to Africa, the USSR had made certain adjustments to the non-aligned position as early as last April. The subsequent near-identity between the Conference doings and the current Soviet line resulted less from a "non-aligned drift to the left" -- in most respects, their positions were little different than in 1961 -- than from the fact that the USSR deliberately adapted itself, notwithstanding its old reservations about non-alignment.

The USSR supplied the missing definition of the role of the non-aligned; by finding common ground, it began what is apparently a deliberate attempt to reorient the movement. In May, Pravda suggested that non-alignment could be a good thing. To be non-aligned, a country need only to steer clear of great-power military alliances; it does not have to be disinterested or hold in equivalent regard the communist world and the "imperialist oppressors." Tito's

address to the conference and Soviet commentaries both emphasized that the non-aligned countries had found a common cause in anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. The Soviets regarded this position as a basis of an important "consistency of views" between themselves and the non-aligned countries. They also noted approvingly that the conference had taken correct positions in spite of efforts by the Chinese to create dissention.

After the Soviet change of government an authoritative article by "Observer" in Pravda of October 25 expressed continued approval of the conference and its accomplishments. Its appearance when interest in the conference was waning probably indicates that the new Soviet leaders wished to emphasize that for the present at least there would be no basic change in Soviet attitudes toward non-alignment and peaceful coexistence. However, the article did reveal a shift of emphasis. Instead of belaboring the Chinese for their backstage role, it accused imperialist powers of allegedly attempting to impose their own incorrect definition of non-alignment upon the conference (i.e., as impartiality toward and equal treatment of imperialist and social states), and of creating dissension by turning capitalist non-aligned states against socialist ones.

## II. Leadership and Conference Management

### A. Pro-Western Influence Waned

A comparison of the conferences of 1955, 1961, and 1964 points up a decline in the quality of leadership and a waning of pro-Western influence. Careful preselection of subjects and screening of invitations left the few leaders present who were inclined toward Western points of view more isolated than before and they were under heavy pressure. But even more than in 1961, they tended to yield to demands for "unity," placing the "success" of the conference above substantive differences. When Liberian President Tubman tried to introduce a more moderate line on the Congo, Ben Bella, Nasser, and Sukarno forced him to yield by threatening to break up the conference and blame it on "imperialist" pressures if he did not change his position. Many more delegates than in 1961 were wholly preoccupied with local concerns and unaware of the tenor of the communique as a whole; a few admitted afterward that they scarcely read other portions of the document.

### B. Organizers Attained Most Aims

The conference's organizers, Tito and Nasser, achieved most of what they had hoped for from the meeting, although not without some disappointments. They built an ongoing organization, even if it was not formally institutionalized; they put their joint imprint upon it and individually added to their stature as leaders. Their leadership was slick, experienced, tough, but empty of new or creative approaches.

The economic considerations that Tito had hoped to emphasize excited little interest; the economic section of the communique is merely a rehash of the newer countries' position in UNCTAD; it reads as if it had been tacked on at the end of the document as an afterthought. The belligerently anti-Western and pro-CPR minority faction led by Sukarno proved strong enough to force the conference to take account of some of its views. In the process, Tito's personal quarrel with Sukarno was both aggravated and exposed to a world-wide audience. It would have received more attention had it not been overshadowed by the Tshombe fiasco. Tito was more direct than any other speaker except Shastri in censuring Peiping. On October 6 his address commented on the need "to resist all other attempts to divide nations on a racial basis," referred to "various forms" of interference in the Congo, and condemned "harmful" concepts placing peaceful coexistence in opposition to the liberation struggle. On October 11 he expressed satisfaction that the majority of delegates spoke against "negative tendencies" in the socialist world and said that the conference would offer support to "correct development" in the international workers' movement. On receiving news of the change in Moscow, Tito reportedly feared that he, as well as Nasser, might become a casualty of the new government's efforts to heal the rift with Peiping.

Nasser gained prestige with the Arab public for the strong resolution he achieved on Palestine. And most of the press in participating countries, focussing on the growth of the non-aligned movement in numbers and influence, adds to the reclame of Nasser as host and of Cairo as international headquarters of the "revolutionary third force." Moreover, the insistent focus on imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism succeeded, in spite of all the ill-concealed differences, in establishing a feeling of common interest across regional borders that was not present at the end of the 1961 conference. On the other hand, Nasser's handling of the Tshombe affair, even though he was merely executing decisions taken by the African group, probably cost him some personal esteem. Most conferees blamed him personally for the bad publicity occasioned by his "maladroit" handling of the affair. Others, especially the Indians, felt that security was over-zealous, press arrangements cumbersome, and that the attempts to suppress reservations would damage the conference in the end. Also, public reaction in the UAR was unexpectedly negative. Ordinary Cairenes, in the grip of an economic pinch, found this fourth big international show in a year excessive and grumbled about the cost and inconvenience occasioned by it.

Tito and Nasser emerged as "moderates" in the context of the 1964 conference. They were not consistently so in performance, however. Tito sought to graft into the economic thinking the communist equation between Western economic assistance and neo-colonialism. Too, Tito's emphasis on strong Yugoslav and nonaligned support for the national liberation movements -- especially his October 10 remark to African insurgent leaders that "soldiers cannot fight without arms" -- suggests Belgrade's willingness to supply arms to insurgents in certain situations. This willingness apparently stems from

increasing concern over Chinese inroads among these movements and corresponding lessening of Yugoslav prestige. Belgrade's position clashes with its basic moderation and might create difficulties for its relations with the West. Nasser fought actively for tough resolutions on Cuba, Cyprus, and on questions of bases and overseas military deployment. Richardson, the Jamaican delegate, afterward remarked how closely Nasser worked with Sukarno, Keita and Nkrumah to "run the show." These departures from his intention to avoid friction may have been quid pro quo's for the statement on Palestine, or a part of Nasser's effort to exert leadership acceptable to the militant faction as well as to the relative moderates among the conferees. The stands taken by Nasser were also in line, however, with UAR general policy stance on these issues.

Indian Prime Minister Shastri made his international debut to a mixed reception. Some observers felt that the Indians were "humiliated" in committee by a clique of Indonesians and extremist Africans. Most observers, however, felt that Shastri, while not as impressive as Nehru, handled himself adroitly and did an effective job. His performance was well received by the Indian press. Indian delegates took some satisfaction from airing their case against the CPR, which was their major concern at the conference, but they could draw only slight comfort from the final communique.

#### C. "Winners" and "Losers"

One of the most striking features of the conference, obscured in the European and American press by the Tshombe affair, was the emergence of the militant African leaders as spokesmen for the non-aligned nations. Ben Bella of Algeria, Keita of Mali, Toure of Guinea, and Nkrumah of Ghana were energetic, tireless and extremely vocal exponents of the farthest-left wing of non-alignment. They frequently presented views similar to those voiced by Sukarno who was generally believed to represent Chinese interests at the meeting.

The conference "losers" were unquestionably Sukarno and 'Arif of Iraq. Except for support on a number of issues by the four extremist Africans, Sukarno was isolated at the meeting. Some of the speakers openly attacked Indonesian incursions into Malaysia. And although he succeeded in getting some tougher language into the final statement, Sukarno's "new emerging forces" concept was completely ignored. 'Arif seems to have made a bid for non-Arab support, using uncharacteristically radical language. But his performance was so gauche that other Arabs could not conceal their distaste.

#### D. Conference Management

Tito and Nasser had the conference all planned in advance -- the communique is said to follow closely their basic drafts -- but up to now they seem to have escaped the repercussions that strong-handed manipulation produced in 1961. This rather numb acceptance may turn into a more negative reaction after second thoughts. The methods used were largely the familiar communist techniques for producing false impressions of consensus. Delegations that were expected to be friendly to the West were undermined and their influence

negated by early conference gossip labelling them as the "voice of the US" (Liberia), "voice of France" (Senegal), or "voice of the UK" (Nigeria). Compliance was demanded in the name of unity, and holdouts were pressured mercilessly. One Arab participant complained that an atmosphere of blackmail overhung the session. If so, the Arabs were not above contributing to it: they are said to have threatened to bar Senegalese Muslim pilgrims from coming to Mecca if Senegal did not support the Arab wording on Palestine.

Dissent and controversy were concealed by throwing all discussion into closed sessions of the Foreign Ministers while the set speeches by heads of delegation were going on. Press access to the delegates was limited by security routines.

The conference managers went to some length to conceal from the press the fact that reservations were expressed on some items, notably the CPR admission to the UN. Although the delegates were promised that reservations would be published in a separate document, these reservations have neither been issued nor been mentioned in government-directed UAR media. Indeed, trickery may have been used to circumvent some reservations. Several countries reportedly accepted without reservation the language on American-Cuban relations under the impression that it was to be in an "appendix" rather than a full resolution, although this does not appear from a reading of the final communique. Of nine original reservations on the Palestine resolution, the only two that were not withdrawn (Burma and Nepal) were lost, according to one account, when they were not recorded due to a parliamentary "slip" in procedure.

Finally, the draft communique was introduced for ratification by the heads of delegation at the last moment, and pushed through with scant time for reading and none for discussion. In fairness, it must be admitted, that this was partly due to the time lost in coping with Tshombe. On some issues the Chairman apparently produced a "unanimous" vote by announcing that a measure would be adopted "if no objection was heard," and immediately declaring it "accepted" before any dissent could be voiced.

### III. Issues and Performance

The working sessions were so tightly held that even now it is not possible to reconstruct a reliable picture of voting patterns, let alone motivations. Most of the information that has come to light is biased by the self-congratulation with which most delegations postured before their public and by their wish, when speaking to US observers, to put their own countries' contributions in a favorable light. It was an open secret that the meeting divided early between militant, strongly anti-Western radicals and relative moderates, with the sponsoring countries more or less in the middle. Tito was dignified and consistent; Nasser endeavored to be popular with both sides; Shastri, except for direct attacks on China, was more restrained than either. The radical-moderate

division hardened in the course of the meeting. Ill-feeling is likely to persist and extend to other relationships between the several countries unless it is tempered, in an effort to ameliorate Soviet-Chinese relations, at the March meeting of the Bandung powers where the pro-Chinese countries will star.

The fragmentary information available gives the following lineup of countries on some of the agenda items:

Anti-Colonialism; anti-imperialism. The primary emphasis on this item and particularly the language calling for concerted action for the liberation of countries still under foreign domination, justifying resort to force by colonized people, and condemning South Africa, Portugal and the present Rhodesian government, are the work of African delegates in the Foreign Ministers' session. However, even the radical Africans would not go along with Sukarno's contention that coexistence is not possible until imperialism and neo-colonialism are eradicated. And the statement on the sovereign right of new countries to disposition of their natural resources is a considerable watering-down of the Indonesian position on economic imperialism. Much of the language of the anti-colonial section was initiated by Guinea, supported by Sudan, Ghana, Mali, Algeria and Cuba. Ghana, Algeria, and Mali pushed forward the focus on anti-imperialism in every discussion, even when it was somewhat out of context. Indonesia and Cuba joined them on selected issues.

Peaceful Coexistence. This item follows substantially the Yugoslav formulation, with some additions by India. In the recommended Codification of Coexistence Principles, a number of exceptions were raised to take account of special interests. The passage dealing with respect for established frontiers including the peaceful settlement of border disputes was opposed by Cambodia, Somalia, Afghanistan, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco. Somalia insisted on specific mention of its dispute with Ethiopia; Afghanistan had the Pushtun question in mind; Syria pointed out that many borders of new countries were set by the former colonial powers; Saudi Arabia was mindful of a number of unsettled border issues with rulers on the fringes of the Arabian Peninsula; Morocco probably had in mind its troubles with Algeria as well as Spanish Morocco. Jordan maintained that border disputes, some of them between participating countries, should be settled in a regional context.

Self-determination had its major impetus from Cyprus. India and Ethiopia recorded modifications: neither would accept a definition "which gave it application to a sovereign state, or part of one, or to a section of a people or nation." The caveat was obviously addressed to minority problems. Cambodia spoke to approve the modification, and in its post-conference statements at home the Cambodian government took credit for obtaining the amendment. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Laos reportedly opposed the resolution as stated.

Bases and Foreign Troops. Cyprus was joined by the UAR in fighting for this item. Only Afghanistan spoke out against Cyprus, out of expressed concern for its Muslim co-religionists on the island, and it allegedly filed a lone reservation on the Cyprus item.

The statement on Guantanamo was put forward by Ben Bella, whose collaboration with Cuba was conspicuous throughout the discussion, and by Keita. It was Mali that proposed direct talks between Cuba and the U.S., but Toure reportedly modified the proposal to say that differences should be worked out "within the framework of peaceful coexistence," language much less specific than the original draft. Jordan argued that it was presumptuous to so direct a major power, and apparently the African moderates thought so without voicing their dissent: several mentioned Cuba as a serious problem, but most conferees opposed condemnation of the US. India reportedly regretted specific mention of both Guantanamo and Puerto Rico, which it felt would be unhelpful to its relations with the US, but remarked to some of the smaller countries that it was useless to try to blunt the drive behind these statements. The Arabs sat mute on the discussion of the "blockade" of Cuba, fearing that a protest would open the question of their boycott of Israel. The Afghan delegates say that they lobbied unsuccessfully for more moderate language on Cuba.

Cuba's presence was generally acquiesced in. While several participants, including the UAR, had said in advance that Cuba's membership among the non-aligned was an embarrassment, apparently they did not care to openly question the decision of the Foreign Ministers' meeting on invitations. Nevertheless, the Cubans were not ostracized at this meeting as they were in 1961. They mingled freely, were reportedly received with warmth by the CPR-leaning countries, encountered some reserve but no open hostility, and probably are right in their jubilant conclusion that they have "arrived" among the non-aligned. By and large, the Cubans limited themselves to Cuban issues: Roa's October 24 statement that Cuba worked hard to accentuate the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial positions of the conference was hardly justified in practice.

China Representation in the UN. On this issue, the pace was forced again by the African radical group. The resolution as stated was supported during the Heads of State meeting by Ben Bella, Toure, Nkrumah, Keita, Abbud (Sudan), Kawawa (Tanzania), and Apithy (Dahomey). Cameroon, Chad, Senegal, and Libya stated reservations on this issue in the Foreign Ministers' meeting but withdrew them later. Lebanon, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Laos also took reservations and maintained them through the final session. Liberia went along with the majority on the assumption that its UN vote would not be compromised anyway; Togo and Sierra Leone have also said that they do not intend to be bound by this resolution, and so have the more moderate Arab countries and India.

Divided Countries. This ~~tough~~ discussion was in the main a joust between Indonesia and Yugoslavia. Most of the smaller countries stayed on the sidelines, apparently feeling that this issue with its great-power involvements was

too hot to handle. Sukarno's open and persistent challenge on this item reportedly caused personal hostility between him and Tito. It does not now seem likely to be repaired during his forthcoming visit to Belgrade, and may further damage the already poor bilateral relations with Yugoslavia. Indonesia may thus be further isolated among the CPR-inclined Asians.

Congo (Leopoldville) and Exclusion of Tshombe. Apparently even Nasser was willing to accept Premier Moise Tshombe as the Congo (Leopoldville) representative at the Non-Aligned Conference, but the strident opposition of several Africans, in particular Ben Bella, forced the conference to exclude him. By threatening to walk out of the conference should Tshombe appear, Ben Bella gained the support of other conference leaders. Only Nigeria, Senegal, and Liberia supported Tshombe, arguing that the composition of a delegation was the sole responsibility of the country concerned and any action designed to force changes in that composition would constitute interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Although the conference action was directed at Tshombe himself and not at the right of his country to send a representative, it set a precedent that could cause difficulties in the future. Moreover, it was a clear indication of the general tone of opposition (expressed privately later by Senghor, Tubman, and other moderate Africans) to US involvement in the Congo.

Nuclear Proliferation. This item emerged about as the Indians wanted it, except that they failed to win approval for a call upon Communist China to cease testing because action was blocked by Indonesia, Tanzania, Zambia, and several other African countries. The statement on peaceful uses of atomic energy was a Sudanese initiative, supported by Liberia. The discussion of nuclear testing revealed the near-universal African concern. In his speech to the Heads of State meeting, Mali President Keita demanded: "Why then not stop all nuclear explosions? Why not destroy all stocks of atomic and thermonuclear weapons? ...this is a terrifying problem." He was supported by Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Algeria, the Central African Republic, and other African nations who lauded the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as a partial step toward the disarmament aims expressed by the 1961 Belgrade Conference. Discussion of Nuclear-free Zones was confused, each of the proponents being interested only in his particular region. Nuclear transit and positioning was mainly the concern of Ceylon, which also introduced the critical remark on the US-UK Indian Ocean deployment. The latter stand had UAR support; India apparently was pulled along on these points further than it wished to go, but did succeed in having some language excised that would have been more specific and hence more troublesome to the US.

Disarmament. The item stands essentially as India drafted it.

On aid to liberation movements, Mali took the lead, aided by vigorous lobbying on the part of unofficial observers representing several insurgent or exile groups. Tito was prompted to hint on October 10 that national liberation movements could expect more help from Belgrade, and the Soviet press immediately took satisfaction in this proof that help for insurgency was

not a monopoly of the Chinese. Both the Yugoslav and Soviet statements, however, stop short of any explicit promises.

The Arab proposal on Palestine met with initial criticism from moderate West Africans, Ethiopia and Tanzania. Chad, Liberia, Togo, Tanzania, probably Senegal and possibly Cameroon and Ethiopia tried to change the phraseology to endorse the Palestinians' right to "self-determination" without any reference to "their homeland." However, Ben Bella, Toure, Libyan Crown Prince Hasan ar-Ridha, and Mauritanian President Daddah demanded support of Palestine "liberation," Daddah decrying the "nightmare" of Israel which "seeks to strangle" Arab Palestine. Finally, according to one African delegate, "in deference to our UAR hosts and in return for support on the colonialism issue, we had to compromise and give the Arabs something." Several apparently have assured Israel that their bilateral relations will not be affected. Afghanistan strongly supported the Arab position on Palestine and extended recognition and best wishes for success to the Palestine Liberation Organization.

#### IV. Post Conference Reactions

Because local issues could not be kept out of the conference, there was more log-rolling than in 1961, a factor which weighed in favor of the numerous Africans and of the militant faction, which could often prevail by threatening to defeat particular issues desired by small groups or single countries. On the other hand, the conference management was ready to allow these special-interest resolutions to pass for the sake of harmony. Cuba is a case in point. In consequence, the countries most satisfied with the conference outcome are the smaller countries whose single, local aim was unexpectedly achieved. Cyprus regards the support achieved at the conference as a moral victory. Cuba is elated at the "capital defeat for the North American warmongers" and the vindication it feels it achieved.

Generally, pro-Western and moderate countries found small satisfaction at the meeting, but most of them have ruefully concluded that they must be present at future conferences. Only a section of the Indian press is saying openly that real national interests are not served by such conferences which might better be abandoned: Were this the prevalent Indian view it would be highly significant, but there is no sign at present that this is either the majority or the government's viewpoint.

Among the African moderates, the conference has been followed by some consternation at the drive and effectiveness of the radical group. There have also been recriminations stemming from the moderates' lack of coordination. Senghor was indignant that Nigeria had not even sent its Foreign Minister, leaving Senegal to bear the brunt of the anti-Westerners' attacks. Some have commented that the Conference "was not really non-aligned" and expressed dismay at its anti-Western tone, but these comments are private. The moderate Africans, too, are aware of the bad legal precedent set by the exclusion of Tshombe, and some delegates have publicly denied that this exclusion was by

unanimous decision. In spite of their critical attitude, moderate Africans are talking vaguely merely of concerting the means of doing better next time, and not of quitting the conference.

The Arabs, Nasser included, profess to be appalled at the pressure of the extremists and are looking about for ways to make the next session more manageable. King Husayn has suggested an effort to recruit more European neutrals to offset Africa's numbers. The Arabs characteristically attribute opposition on the Palestine issue to unexpectedly heavy Israeli influence in Africa, which they will try to remedy by in turn influencing some African leaders. There is no question of the conference's continuance among the Arabs, but their evaluation of its usefulness varies directly with their regard for Nasser. King Husayn described it as undignified, somewhat petty, and immensely boring.

The Far Eastern participants and Ceylon have claimed that the conference supported their national objectives. Malaysia seized the occasion of its exclusion to define non-alignment in such a manner as to prove that it should be included. Communist China, Indonesia, and Cambodia have all found reason for satisfaction even though in the main the conference did not support the positions they sought. The Laotian government took the opportunity to draw non-aligned attention to North Vietnamese infiltration and subversion -- and Prince Souvanna Phouma has ignored the conference since. The Burmese, who were irritated by the conference members' efforts to imply that all resolutions were unanimously adopted, have stressed Burma's reservations. Perhaps the most amazing reaction has been the about-face of Cambodia's Sihanouk, who deprecated the conference before it met and snubbed it in an insulting fashion from Peiping by declining his invitation when he was supposed to be en route to Cairo to attend. Delighted with the conference's action on the seating of China at the UN, on Indochina, and on the protection of ethnic minorities, Sihanouk later hastily claimed personal credit for his delegation's performance, even authorship of its speech. Cambodia is the first country to take action in deference to the conference recommendations by announcing the end of its relations with South Africa and Portugal.

Among the Latin American observers, there has been no official comment and little public interest. Except for Venezuela's attack on Cuba, their attendance was largely perfunctory. Only the conservative press of Chile and Brazil has been openly critical, or suggested that South Americans would do well not to attend. In general the tendency of some Latin American states toward limited cooperation with the non-aligned countries, mainly on grounds of common economic interests, does not seem to have been greatly affected one way or the other by the results of the conference. They are probably neither more nor less receptive to overtures for such cooperation than they had been before the Conference.

V. The Future of Non-Alignment

The disconcerting ease with which the smaller, moderate countries were manipulated and their willingness to go the course again, point to some dangers for the future, even though the immediate effect of the conference on national policies will be small. If the present drift continues, non-alignment will, indeed, acquire a definition and content slanted toward Communist-world propaganda, if not policy lines. And the apparent lack of firmness and political acumen on the part of the moderates to defend their real views in such meetings, might eventually extend to their conduct on actual issues, in the UN and elsewhere, which is precisely the result the USSR would like to see. By now, the disinclination to continue the conferences, openly expressed in 1961, has vanished, and the concept of non-alignment has, in fact, achieved added importance for the African representatives. The conditioning process, though with a slightly different orientation, will be augmented by the Second Bandung Conference and possible future meetings of Chinese Communist sponsorship. The compelling effect of various pressures, at times exerted through an artificial unanimity, is illustrated by the reaction of Liberian President Tubman, a seasoned politician and long-time friend of the US. Shaken by his steamroller treatment at the Conference, he told the US Ambassador that he found such strong and universal sentiment at the Conference against the US role in Congo that he must reconsider Liberia's Congo policy. And partly as a result of the same phenomenon, Ethiopia hinted that it may recognize the CPR shortly after the US elections.

The conference had a largely anti-Western tone and the US and UK came in for direct criticism while no communist country was named in a critical context. Also, a number of the resolutions were aimed directly at Western positions and policy lines. Some of these may cause concern in the near future, such as those supporting Cyprus and the admission of Communist China in the UN. In general, however, the likelihood that no major changes in the policies of most participants will occur as an immediate result of the Conference probably mitigates considerably the impact of the resolutions unfavorable to the West. If, however, as may well happen, extremist positions gradually influence the policy lines of moderate countries, more serious dangers to Western interests may arise in the longer run.

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NOV 5 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Telegram from President  
Nasser to President Johnson

There is enclosed an official translation of a courtesy message from President Nasser to President Johnson thanking him for his statement to the Second Non-Aligned Conference. The original cable was forwarded from the White House for translation and recommendation. The Department recommends no reply.

W. Herbert Gordon,

*fr*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

As stated.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 19679  
T3/R-IV  
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WN6 111 VIA RCA

CAIRO 2159 OCTOBER 22, 1964

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

87P YOUR MESSAGE TO THE SECOND CONFERENCE OF THE CHIEFS OF STATE OF THE NONALIGNED COUNTRIES WAS APPRECIATED AND HIGHLY VALUED. I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXTEND TO YOUR EXCELLENCY AND YOUR NOBLE PEOPLE, IN THE NAME OF MY COLLEAGUES AND IN MY OWN, OUR SINCERE GREETINGS AND GOOD WISHES FOR THE PROGRESS AND CONTINUED PROSPERITY OF YOUR COUNTRY IN A WORLD IN WHICH PEACE, SECURITY, AND FRIENDSHIP WILL PREVAIL.

GAMAL ABDEL NASSER

CHAIRMAN OF THE SECOND CONFERENCE OF THE  
CHIEFS OF STATE OF THE NONALIGNED  
COUNTRIES



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Director of Intelligence  
and Research

Research  
Memorandum

INR-48, October 13, 1964

To : The Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : INR - George C. Denney, Jr. *h.c.d.*  
Subject: The Non-Aligned Conference: Preliminary Assessment

- BUNDY/SMITH
- BATOR
- BOWMAN
- BRUBECK
- CHASE
- FORRE...AL
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- KLEIN
- KROWER
- SANDERS
- SAYRE

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How the Great Powers Fared

USSR Came Off Best - The main themes of the Conference, anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, provided grounds on which the USSR could identify and sympathize with the conferees. Accordingly, the USSR appears to occupy a "middle ground" along with the Conference moderates, Yugoslavia, the UAR and (on most issues) India, with the "colonialists" (including the US) and Peiping representing the opposite poles.

- But not without criticism - Soviet policies, but not the USSR by name, were mildly criticized when the communique called on all UN members to "render all assistance necessary" to the UN to maintain its peace-keeping role. Another resolution called on advanced nations to freely share scientific and space knowledge.

US and UK were adversely named, while no communist country was directly criticized. The UK was "condemned" for colonialism in Oman; the US was merely "invited" to negotiate with Cuba and "urged" to evacuate Guantanamo.

Communist China the loser. Indonesia -- and, by implication, the CPR -- was conspicuously snubbed. The resolutions as a whole reflect the moderate (Yugoslav) position; only two minor passages may have been worded in deference to Sukarno, who was active and loudly vocal throughout the meeting.

Organized Non-Alignment Has a More Promising Future as a result of the Conference. Although the delegates turned down the permanent structure with secretariat wanted by the USSR, UAR and Ceylon, they substituted an agreement to consult at the UN at heads-of-delegation level. If this process works well at the next General Assembly, it presumably will have become an established custom for future sessions. There was no specific proposal for periodic conferences, but many remarks throughout the meeting inferred or took for granted future sessions. Delegate reactions are not yet in, but chances are good that these countries can be reassembled. Despite much wrangling that did not appear on the surface, disillusionment with the Conference as a vehicle meeting national and regional needs probably is not greater than in 1961. The South East Asians may be least inclined to follow up. Burmese and Cambodian attendance was at lower

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By RGS/SDW, NARA, Date 4-10-06

OCT 22 1964

rank than before, and Sihanouk, from Peiping, displayed calculated rudeness toward the Conference. In this case, increased CPR influence accounts in part for his behavior.

Offsetting Factor: Militants vs. Moderates. This cleavage, reflecting in part the Sino-Soviet differences, may extend and intensify as the group seeks to work together in the UN setting. To the extent that it does become more prominent, the ideological difference could split the grouping, or at least disrupt its ability to work together and define common positions. Indonesia, Guinea and Mali led the relatively extreme faction. The Sino-Soviet quarrel was not heard except in this indirect fashion.

UN a Prominent Feature. The final communique adverts again and again to the UN Charter or resolutions, drawing its legitimacy on almost every stand from the UN ( and somewhat reinterpreting UN principles in the process). The Conference went on record as desiring a greater voice for the new countries in the UN, but was not specific as to manner of reorganization. This section of the communique is diffuse and sounds like a compromise.

#### Issues of Special US Concern

Congo. Conference resolutions on the Congo follow closely the earlier formulations of the Organization for African Unity, which gains enhanced prestige as a result. No one accused the US of complicity in the Tshombe incident, which was ignored in the final statement. Secretary Rusk's press statement on Tshombe was carried without comment by Cairo's semi-official al-Jumhuriya

Nuclear Issues. A most interesting and significant development was the adoption by the participants of a self-denying ordinance, pledging to neither produce, acquire nor test nuclear weapons, and to develop nuclear energy only for peaceful ends. Incidentally, Israeli reaction, concentrating on the Conference's strong resolution on Palestine, completely ignores the UAR adherence to this pledge, which may indicate that Israel's worried protestations about UAR development of unconventional weapons may be more for effect than from genuine fear.

The nuclear powers were called on to obtain from proliferation, end production and gradually reduce stockpiles of nuclear weapons. In an implied slap at Communist China, the Conference urged that all powers not signatories of the Test Ban Treaty should adhere, and meanwhile should refrain from testing. It desired the extension of the Treaty to testing in all forms.

Nuclear-Free Zones. An inconclusive sometimes ambiguous statement on this issue may indicate considerable disagreement behind closed doors. The final resolution has a permissive effect: the nuclear powers are called on to respect those areas that may be declared denuclearized by the respective peoples. The conference as a whole does not go on record as recommending or endorsing any particular nuclear-free area. It does recommend that no member country permit nuclear weapons to be carried into, stockpiled in, or deployed via its territories

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( a policy essentially based on the Ceylonese position). A further recommendation against placing nuclear weapons under command of non-nuclear nations could embarrass the MLF concept, although perhaps not intended for that purpose.

Disarmament. The communique demands general and complete disarmament under full international control (i.e. the same position taken at Belgrade in 1961.)

Facts and Bases. This is the sharpest section toward the US, which is named in the context of Cuba. In addition, the Indian Ocean Task Force concept is condemned, although no country is named. Foreign military bases or stationing of troops on the territories of other countries "against the expressed will of those countries" are called "... in practice, a means of bringing pressure on nations and retarding their emancipation and development ..." The conferees undertook not to become parties to great-power alliances.

Racial Issue: Apartheid. Not even by implications was the US criticized on this score. The entire section, very strong in tone, was directed at the Republic of South Africa. The Conference recommended sanctions ranging from boycott measures and severance of diplomatic and consular relations to implied expulsion from the UN.

Divided Nations; Colonial Areas. On these issues, the Conference was notably cautious. It approved the use of force by liberation movements where the colonial power does not move fast enough toward granting independence, and it ringingly restated the right of all peoples to full sovereignty without any qualification. On the other hand, it promised only moral and political support for freedom movements except in the case of Portuguese overseas territories. In the rollcall of areas awaiting self-determination and independence (South Rhodesia, S.W. Africa, Palestine, Aden, Oman, British Guiana), Puerto Rico is included for the first time. But the Falkland Is. escaped mention in the final document. The statement on Indochina amounted to cautioning participating countries not to "rock the boat." The Viet Nam statement calls for an end to all foreign interference, and although its form follows the usual communist presentation, it at least leaves the situation no harder to live with than before. The resolution on Laos merely calls on all countries to keep the existing agreement.

Cyprus represents a complete victory for Makarios. Outside intervention "except for UN" is deplored, and the communique restates the entire Greek Cypriot line: independence, unity, and removal of the British bases.

Palestine. In a ringing, but apparently less than unanimous, statement, the Arabs by dogged effort, won an unexpected victory on Palestine and the "inalienable right" of refugee return.

Economic Development occupied far less conference time than many had hoped, and appears almost as an afterthought in the final document. The economic passages follow essentially the line taken by the less developed countries at UNCTAD.

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Matters Not Stated: Bandung II. The Sino-Indian dispute, never openly mentioned, was obviously on everyone's mind just below the surface. Tantalizing but unconfirmed hints have leaked out that the chances of Second Bandung were badly damaged by this Conference, even that Algeria may withdraw its invitation to be host to that conference next March.

Little or nothing is yet known of the atmosphere or work of the closed sessions, the voting and debating positions of delegates in camera, or their several reactions to the meeting's outcome. Their present attitude toward continuing the association will be no guide to its future, however. That much is proved by the very fact of the present session, following the generally negative impressions after the 1961 conference.

It Could Have Been Worse. Lacking the "inside" information yet to come, an overall assessment must be tentative. At this point, it seems to have been a far more restrained performance than the US had reason to expect. From the US point of view, the agreed Conference positions present some problems (MLF, Indian Ocean Force, Cyprus), but may offer useful leverage in some other situations (international controls on disarmament, Test Ban adherence, some others). The greatest danger the Conference poses to US policies lies in the potential it has created of an ongoing association in the UN. The next General Assembly should give a measure of the strength and direction of this phenomenon, and also an indication of the extent to which the conferees feel themselves to be bound by the Conference decisions.

Again from the US point of view, high marks should be given to Shastri and to the Indians generally. Shastri's work, while not the flamboyant and dominant performance that Nehru would have given, was highly effective both before and during the session. The Indians were largely responsible for those modifications that made the most extreme proposals tolerable to the US. Both the moderation and the effectiveness of their work is confirmed by the angry jibes it has received in the CPR (and also Pakistani) press.

## UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

12 October 1964

## TEXT OF RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY NONALIGNED CONFERENCE

Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 11 October 1964--L

(Text) Cairo--The resolutions of the second conference of heads of state or government of nonaligned countries were adopted last night and announced here today. Following is the official full text of the declaration: The second conference of heads of state or government of the following nonaligned countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Cyprus, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, the United Arab Republic, the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, Yemen, Yugoslavia, and Zambia was held in Cairo from 5 to 10 October 1964. The following countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Finland, Jamaica, Mexico, Trinidad, Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela were represented by observers. The secretary general of the Organization of African Unity and the secretary general of the league of Arab states were present as observers.

The conference undertook an analysis of the international situation with a view to making an effective contribution to the solution of the major problems of concern to mankind in view of their effects on peace and security in the world.

To this end, and on the basis of the principles embodied in the Belgrade declaration of September 1961 the heads of state or government of the above countries proceeded in an amicable, frank, and fraternal atmosphere to hold detailed discussions and exchange views on the present state of international relations and the predominant trends in the modern world. The heads of state or government of the participating countries note with satisfaction that nearly half of the independent countries of the world have participated in this second nonaligned conference. The conference also notes with satisfaction the growing interest and confidence displayed by peoples still under foreign domination, and by those whose rights and sovereignty are being violated by imperialism and neocolonialism, in the highly positive role which the nonaligned countries are called upon to play in the settlement of international problems or disputes.

The conference expresses satisfaction at the favorable reaction throughout the world to this second meeting of nonaligned countries. This emphasizes the rightness, efficacy, and vigor of the policy of nonalignment and its constructive role in the maintenance and consolidation of international peace and security. The principles of nonalignment, thanks to the confidence they inspire in the world, are becoming an increasingly dynamic and powerful force for the promotion of peace and the welfare of mankind.

The participating heads of state or government note with satisfaction that, thanks to the combined efforts of the forces of freedom, peace, and progress, this second nonaligned conference is being held at a time when the international situation has improved as compared with that existing between the two (blocs?) at the time of the historic Belgrade conference.

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The heads of state or government of the nonaligned countries are well aware, however, that, despite the present improvement in international relations, and notwithstanding the conclusion and signature of the treaty of Moscow, sources of tension still exist in many parts of the world.

This situation shows that the forces of imperialism are still powerful and that they do not hesitate to resort to force to defend their interests and maintain their privileges. This policy, if not firmly resisted by the forces of freedom and peace may jeopardize improvement of the international situation and the relaxation of tension which has occurred, and constitute a threat to world peace. The policy of active, peaceful coexistence is an indivisible whole, it cannot be applied partially, in accordance with special interests and criteria.

Important changes have also taken place within the Eastern and Western blocs, and this new phenomenon should be taken into account in the objective assessment of the current international situation.

The conference notes with satisfaction that the movements of national liberation are engaged in different regions of the world, in a heroic struggle against neocolonialism and the practices of apartheid and racial discrimination. This struggle forms part of the common striving for freedom, justice, and peace.

The conference reaffirms that interference by economically developed foreign states in the internal affairs of newly independent or developing countries, and the existence of territories which are still dependent, constitute a standing threat to peace and security. The heads of state or government of the nonaligned countries, while appreciative of the efforts of the U.N. conference on trade and development, and mindful of its results, nevertheless note that much ground still remains to be covered to eliminate existing inequalities in the relationship between industrialized and developing countries.

The heads of state or government of the nonaligned countries while declaring their determination to contribute to the establishment of just and lasting peace in the world, affirm that the preservation of peace and the promotion of the well-being of peoples are a collective responsibility deriving from the natural aspirations of mankind to live in a better world.

The heads of state or government have arrived in their deliberations at a common understanding of the various problems now facing the world, and a common approach to them. Reaffirming the basic principles of the declaration of Belgrade, they express agreement on the following points: concerted action for the liberation of the countries still dependent, and elimination of colonialism, neocolonialism, and imperialism. The heads of state or government of the nonaligned countries declared that lasting world peace cannot be reached so long as unjust conditions prevail and peoples under foreign domination continue to be deprived of their fundamental right to freedom, independence, and self-determination.

Imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism constitute a basic source of international tension and conflict because they endanger world peace and security. The participants in the conference deplore that the U.N. declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples has not been implemented everywhere and calls for the immediate unconditional, complete, and final abolition of colonialism.

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At present a particular cause of concern is the military or other assistance extended to certain countries to enable them to perpetuate by force colonialist and neocolonialist situations which are contrary to the spirit of the U.N. Charter.

The exploitation by colonialist forces of the difficulties and problems of recently liberated or developing countries, interference in the internal affairs of these states, and colonialist attempts to maintain unequal relationships, particularly in the economic field, constitute serious dangers to these young countries. Colonialism and neocolonialism have many forms and manifestations. Imperialism uses many means to impose its will on independent nations. Racial discrimination, economic pressure, interference, subversion, intervention and the threat of force are neocolonialist devices against which the newly independent nations have to defend themselves. The conference condemns all colonialist, neocolonialist, and imperialist policies applied in various parts of the world.

Deeply concerned with the rapidly deteriorating situation in the Congo, the participants: 1) support all efforts being made by the Organization of African Unity to quickly bring peace and harmony to that country; 2) urge the ad-hoc commission of the Organization of African Unity to shirk no effort in the attempt to achieve national reconciliation in the Congo and to eliminate the existing tension between that country and the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) and the Kingdom of Burundi; 3) appeal to the Congolese Government and to all combatants to cease hostilities immediately and to seek, with the help of the Organization of African Unity, a solution permitting national reconciliation and the restoration of order and peace; 4) urgently appeal to all foreign powers presently interfering in the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly those engaged in military intervention in that country, to cease such interference which infringes the interests and sovereignty of the Congolese people and constitutes a threat to neighboring countries; 5) affirm their full support for the efforts being made to this end by the Organization of African Unity's ad-hoc commission of good offices in the Congo; 6) call upon the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to immediately discontinue the recruitment of mercenaries and to expel all mercenaries of whatever origin who are already in the Congo in order to facilitate an African solution.

The newly independent countries have, like all other countries the right of sovereign disposal regarding their natural resources and the right to utilize these resources as they deem appropriate in the interest of their peoples without outside interference.

The process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible. Colonized peoples may legitimately resort to arms to secure the full exercise of their right to self-determination and independence if the colonial powers persist in opposing their natural aspirations.

The participants undertake to work unremittingly to eradicate all vestiges of colonialism, and to combine all their efforts to render all necessary aid and support, whether moral, political or material, to the people struggling against colonialism and neocolonialism. The participating countries recognize the nationalist movements of peoples struggling to free themselves from colonial domination as being authentic representatives of the colonial peoples, and urgently call upon the colonial powers to negotiate with their leaders.

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Portugal continues to hold in bondage by repression, persecution and force, in Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea and the other Portuguese colonies in Africa and Asia, millions of people who have been suffering far too long under the foreign yoke. The conference declares its determination to ensure that the peoples of these territories accede immediately to independence without any conditions or reservations. The conference condemns the government of Portugal for its refusal to recognize the inalienable right of the people of those territories for self-determination and independence in accordance with the U.N. Charter and the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

The conference 1) urges the participating countries to afford all necessary material support--financial and military--to the freedom fighters in the territories under Portuguese colonial rule; 2) Takes the view that support should be given to the revolutionary government of Angola in exile and to the nationalist movements struggling for the independence of the Portuguese colonies and assistance to the special bureau set up by the OAU in regard to the applications of sanctions against Portugal; 3) Calls upon all participating states to break off diplomatic and consular relations with the Government of Portugal and to take effective measures to suspend all trade and economic relations with Portugal; 4) Calls upon the participating countries to take all measures to compel Portugal to carry out the decisions of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The countries participating in the conference condemn the policy of the racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia, which continues to defy the charter and the resolutions of the United Nations in that it denies fundamental freedoms to the people by acts of repression and terror.

The participating countries urge all states not to recognize the independence of Southern Rhodesia if proclaimed under the rule of the racist minority, and instead to give favorable consideration to according recognition to an African nationalist government in exile, should such a government be set up. To this effect the conference states its opposition to the sham consultation through tribal chiefs envisaged by the present minority government of Southern Rhodesia.

The conference deplores the British Government's failure to implement the various resolutions of the United Nations on Southern Rhodesia, and calls upon the United Kingdom to convene immediately a constitutional conference to which all political groups in Southern Rhodesia would be invited, for the purpose of preparing a new constitution based on the "one man, one vote" principle instituting universal suffrage and insuring majority rule.

The conference urges the Government of the United Kingdom to call for the immediate release of detainees in Southern Rhodesia.

The conference reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of southwest Africa to self-determination and independence and denounces the Government of South Africa for its persistent refusal to cooperate with the United Nations in the implementation of the pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly.

It urges all states to refrain from supplying in any manner or form any arms or military equipment or petroleum products to South Africa and to implement the resolutions of the United Nations.

The conference recommends that the United Nations should guarantee the territorial integrity of Swaziland, Basutoland, and Bechuanaland, and should take measures for their speedy accession to independence and for the subsequent safeguarding of their sovereignty.

The participants in the conference call upon the French Government to take the necessary steps to enable French Somaliland to become free and independent in accordance with paragraph five of resolution 1514 of the United Nations.

The conference appeals to all participating countries to lend support and assistance to the liberation committee of the Organization of African Unity.

The conference condemns the imperialistic policy pursued in the Middle East and, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations decides to: 1) Endorse the full restoration of all the rights of the Arab people of Palestine to their homeland and their inalienable right to self-determination; 2) Declare their full support to the Arab people of Palestine in their struggle for liberation from colonialism and racism.

The conference condemns the continued refusal of the U.K. Government to implement the U.N. resolutions on Aden and the protectorates, providing for the free exercise by the peoples of the territory of their right to self-determination and calling for the liquidation of the British military base in Aden and the withdrawal of British troops from the territory.

The conference fully supports the struggle of the people in Aden and the protectorates and urges the immediate implementation of the U.N. resolutions which were adopted on the basis of the wishes expressed by the people of that region.

The countries participating in the conference condemn the continued armed action waged by British colonialism against the people of Oman who are fighting to attain their freedom.

The conference recommends that all necessary political, moral, and material assistance be rendered to the liberation movements of these territories in their struggle against colonial rule.

The conference condemns the manifestations of colonialism and neocolonialism in Latin America and declares itself in favor of the implementation in that region of the right of peoples to self-determination and independence.

Basing itself on this principle, the conference deplors the delay in granting full independence to British Guiana and requests the United Kingdom to grant independence speedily to that country. It notes with regret that Martinique and Guadelupe, and other Caribbean islands, are still not self-governing. It draws the attention of the ad hoc decolonization commission of the United Nations to the case of Puerto Rico and calls upon that commission to consider the situation of these territories in the light of resolution 1514 of the United Nations.

Respect for the right of peoples to self-determination and condemnation of the use of force against the exercise of this right: The conference solemnly reaffirms the right of peoples to self-determination and to make their own destiny. It stresses that this right constitutes one of the essential principles of the U.N. Charter, that it was laid down also in the charter of the Organization of African Unity, and that the conferences of Bandung and Belgrade demanded that it should be respected, and in particular insisted that it should be effectively exercised.

The conference notes that this right is still violated or its exercise denied, which results in a continued increase of tension and the extension of sources of war in many regions of the world. The conference denounces the attitude of those powers which oppose the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination.

It condemns the use of force and all forms of intimidation, interference, and intervention which are aimed at preventing the exercise of this right.

Racial discrimination and the policy of apartheid: The heads of state or government declare that racial discrimination--and, particularly its most odious manifestations, apartheid--constitutes a violation of the universal declaration of human rights and of the principle of the equality of peoples. Accordingly, all governments still persisting in the practice of racial discrimination should be completely ostracized until they have abandoned their unjust and inhuman policies. In particular, the governments and peoples represented at this conference have decided no longer to tolerate the presence of the Republic of South Africa in the community of nations. The inhuman racial policies of South Africa constitute a threat to international peace and security. All countries interested in peace must therefore do everything in their power to insure that liberty and fundamental freedoms are secured to the people of South Africa.

The heads of state or government solemnly affirm their absolute respect for the right of ethnic or religious minorities to protection, in particular against the crimes of genocide or any other violation of a fundamental human right.

Sanctions against the Republic of South Africa:

1--The conference regrets to note that the Pretoria government's obstinacy in defying the conscience of mankind has been strengthened by the refusal of its friends and allies, particularly some major powers, to implement U.N. resolutions concerning sanctions against South Africa.

2--The conference therefore: a) Calls upon all states to boycott all South African goods and to refrain from exporting goods, especially arms, ammunition, oil, and minerals to South Africa; b) calls upon all states which have not yet done so to break off diplomatic, consular, and other relations with South Africa; c) requests the governments represented at this conference to prohibit aircraft and vessels proceeding to or from South Africa from flying over their territory or using their airports or ports, and to discontinue all road or railway traffic with that country; d) demands the release of all persons imprisoned, interned or subjected to her restrictions on account of their opposition to the policy of apartheid;

3--Invites all countries to give their support to the special bureau set up by the Organization of African Unity for application of sanctions against South Africa.

Peaceful coexistence and the codification of its principles by the United Nations: Considering the principles proclaimed at Bandung in 1955, resolution 1514 adopted by the United Nations in 1960, the declaration of the Belgrade conference, the charter of the Organization of African Unity, and numerous joint declarations by heads of state or government on peaceful coexistence; reaffirming their deep conviction that, in present circumstances, mankind must regard peaceful coexistence as the only way to strengthen world peace, which must be based on freedom, equality,

and justice between peoples within a new framework of peaceful and harmonious relations between the states and nations of the world;

Considering the fact that the principle of peaceful coexistence is based on the right of all peoples to be free and to choose their own political, economic, and social systems according to their own national identity and their ideals, and is opposed to any form of foreign domination; being convinced that peaceful coexistence throughout the world cannot be fully realized unless the imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism are liquidated; deeply convinced that the absolute prohibition of the threat or use of force, direct or disguised, the renunciation of all forms of coercion in international relations, the abolition of relations of inequality and the promotion of international cooperation with a view to accelerating economic, social, and cultural development, are necessary conditions for safeguarding peace and achieving the general advancement of mankind;

The heads of state or government solemnly proclaim the following fundamental principles of peaceful coexistence:

1--The right to complete independence, which is an inalienable right, must be recognized immediately and unconditionally as pertaining to all peoples, in conformity with the charter and resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly. It is incumbent upon all states to respect this right and facilitate its exercise.

2--The right to self-determination, which is an inalienable right, must be recognized as pertaining to all peoples. Accordingly, all nations and peoples have the right to determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development without intimidation or hinderance.

3--Peaceful coexistence between states with differing social and political systems is both possible and necessary. It favors the creation of good-neighborly relations between states with a view to the establishment of lasting peace and general well-being.

4--The sovereign equality of states must be recognized and respected. It includes the right of all peoples to the free exploitation of their natural resources.

5--States must abstain from all use of threat or force directed against the territorial integrity and political independence of other states. A situation brought about by the threat or use of force shall not be recognized, and in particular the established frontiers of states shall be inviolable. Accordingly every state must abstain from interfering in the affairs of other states, whether openly, or insidiously, or by means of subversion and various forms of political, economic, and military pressure. Frontier disputes shall be settled by peaceful means. Moreover they declare that it is the duty of states not to recognize any situation brought about by the threat or use of force in violation of the provisions of the U.N. Charter.

6--All states shall respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of the human person and the equality of all nations and races.

7--All international conflicts must be settled by peaceful means, in a spirit of mutual understanding and on the basis of equality and sovereignty, in such a manner that justice and legitimate rights are not impaired. All states must apply themselves to promoting and strengthening measures designed to diminish international tension and achieve general and complete disarmament.

8--All states must cooperate with a view to accelerating economic development in the world, and particularly in the developing countries. This cooperation--which must be aimed at narrowing the gap, at present widening, between the levels of living in the developing and developed countries respectively--is essential to the maintenance of a lasting peace.

9--States shall meet their international obligations in good faith in conformity with the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

The conference recommends that the General Assembly of the United Nations adopt, on the occasion of its 20th anniversary, a declaration on the principles of peaceful coexistence. This declaration will constitute an important step toward the codification of these principles. Respect for the sovereignty of states and their territorial integrity; problems of divided nations:

1--The conference of heads of state or government proclaims its full adherence to the fundamental principle of international relations, in accordance with which the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, great and small, are inviolable and must be respected.

2--The countries participating in the conference, having for the most part achieved their national independence after years of struggle, reaffirm their determination to oppose by every means in their power any attempt to compromise their sovereignty or violate their territorial integrity. They pledge themselves to respect frontiers as they existed when the states gained independence. Nevertheless, parts of territories taken away by occupying powers and converted into autonomous bases for their own benefit at the time of independence must be given back to the country concerned.

3--The conference solemnly reaffirms the right of all peoples to adopt the form of government they consider best suited to their development.

4--The conference considers that one of the causes of international tension lies in the problem of divided nations. It expresses its entire sympathy with the peoples of such countries and upholds their desire to achieve unity. It exhorts the countries concerned to seek a just and lasting solution in order to achieve the unification of their territories by peaceful methods without outside interference or pressure. It considers that the resort to threat or force can lead to no satisfactory settlement, cannot do otherwise than jeopardize international security.

Concerned by the situation existing with regard to Cyprus, the conference calls upon all states in conformity with their obligations under the charter of the United Nations, and in particular under article 2, paragraph 4, to respect the sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity of Cyprus and to refrain from any threat or use of force or intervention directed against Cyprus, and from any efforts to impose upon Cyprus unjust solutions unacceptable to the people of Cyprus.

Cyprus, as an equal member of the United Nations, is entitled to and should enjoy unrestricted and unfettered sovereignty and independence, and allowing its people to determine freely, and without any foreign intervention or interference, the political future of the country, on the basis of the principle of self-determination, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

The conference, considering that foreign pressure and intervention to impose changes in the political, economic, and social system chosen by a country are contrary to the principles of international law and peaceful coexistence, requests the Government of the United States of America to lift the commercial and economic blockade applied against Cuba.

The conference takes note of the readiness of the Cuban Government to settle its difference with the United States on a normal footing, and invites these two governments to enter into negotiations to this end and in conformity with the principles of peaceful coexistence and international cooperation.

Settlement of disputes without threat or use of force in accordance with the principles of the U.N. Charter:

1--As the use of force may take a number of forms, military, political and economic, the participating countries deem it essential to reaffirm the principles that all states shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.

2--They consider that disputes between states should be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the charter on the bases of sovereign equality and justice.

3--The participating countries are convinced of the necessity of exerting all international efforts to find solutions to all situations which threaten international peace or impair friendly relations among nations.

4--The participating countries gave special attention to the problems of frontiers which may threaten international peace or disturb friendly relations among states, and are convinced that in order to settle such problems, all states should resort to negotiations, mediation, or arbitration or other peaceful means set forth in the U.N. Charter in conformity with the legitimate rights of all peoples.

5--The conference considers that disputes between neighboring states must be settled peacefully in a spirit of mutual understanding, without foreign intervention or interference.

Taking into account the principles set forth above and with a view to restoring peace and stability in the Indochina peninsula, the conference appeals to the powers which participated in the Geneva conference of 1954 and 1962:

1--To abstain from any action likely to aggravate the situation which is tense in the Peninsula;

2--To terminate all foreign interference in the internal affairs of the countries of that region;

3--To convene urgently a new Geneva conference on Indochina with a view to seeking a satisfactory political solution for the peaceful settlement of the problems arising in that part of the world, namely: a) insuring the strict application of the agreements on Laos, b) recognizing and guaranteeing the neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia, c) insuring the strict application of the 1954 Geneva agreement on Vietnam and finding a political solution to the problem in accordance with the legitimate aspirations of the Vietnamese people to freedom, peace, and independence.

General and complete disarmament; peaceful use of atomic energy, prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests, establishment of nuclear free zones, prevention of dissemination of nuclear weapons, and abolition of all nuclear weapons:

The conference emphasizes the paramount importance of disarmament as one of the basic problems of the contemporary world and stresses the necessity of reaching immediate and practical solutions which would free mankind from the danger of war and from a sense of insecurity.

The conference notes with concern that the continuing arms race and the tremendous advances that have been made in the production of weapons of mass destruction and their stockpiling threaten the world with armed conflict and annihilation. The conference urges the great powers to take new and urgent steps toward achieving general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The conference regrets that despite the efforts of the members of the 18-nation committee on disarmament, and in particular those of the nonaligned countries, the results have not been satisfactory. It urges the great powers, in collaboration with the other members of that committee, to renew their efforts with determination with a view to the rapid conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

The conference calls upon all states to accede to the Moscow treaty partially banning the testing of nuclear weapons and to abide by its provisions in the interests of peace and the welfare of humanity.

The conference urges the extension of the Moscow treaty so as to include underground tests, and the discontinuance of such tests pending the extension of the agreement.

The conference urges the speedy conclusion of agreements on various other partial and collateral measures of disarmament proposed by the members of the 18-nation committee on disarmament.

The conference appeals to the great powers to take the lead in giving effect to decisive and immediate measures which would make possible substantial reductions in their military budgets.

The conference requests the great powers to abstain from all policies conducive to the dissemination of nuclear weapons and their byproducts among those states which do not at present possess them. It underlines the great danger in the dissemination of nuclear weapons and urges all states, particularly those possessing nuclear weapons to conclude nondissemination agreements and to agree on measures providing for the gradual liquidation of the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

As part of these efforts, the heads of state or government declare their own readiness not to produce, acquire, or test any nuclear weapons, and call on all countries, including those who have not subscribed to the Moscow treaty, to enter into a similar undertaking and to take necessary steps to prevent their territories, ports, and airfields, from being used by nuclear powers for the deployment or disposition of nuclear weapons. This undertaking should be the subject of a treaty to be concluded in an international conference convened under U.N. auspices and open to accession by all states. The conference further calls upon all nuclear powers to observe the spirit of this declaration.

The conference welcomes the agreement of the great powers not to orbit in outer space nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction and expresses its conviction that it is necessary to conclude an international treaty prohibiting the utilization of outer space for military purposes. The conference urges full international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space.

The conference requests those states which have succeeded in exploring outer space, to exchange and disseminate information related to the research they have carried out in this field, so that scientific progress for the peaceful utilization of outer space be of common benefit to all. The conference is of the view that for this purpose an international conference should be convened at an appropriate time.

The conference considers that the declaration by African states regarding the denuclearization of Africa, the aspirations of the Latin American countries to denuclearize their continent, and the various proposals pertaining to the denuclearization of areas in Europe and Asia are steps in the right direction because they assist in consolidating international peace and lessening international tensions.

The conference recommends the establishment of denuclearized zones governing these and other areas and the oceans of the world, particularly those which have been hitherto free from nuclear weapons, in accordance with the desires expressed by the states and peoples concerned. The conference also requests the nuclear powers to respect these denuclearized zones. The conference is convinced that the convening of a world disarmament conference under the auspices of the United Nations to which all countries would be invited would provide powerful support to the efforts being made to set in motion the process of disarmament and for securing the further and steady development of this process.

The conference therefore urges the participating countries to take, at the forthcoming General Assembly of the United Nations, all necessary steps for the holding of such a conference and of any other special conference for the conclusion of special agreements on certain measures of disarmament.

The conference urges all nations to join in the cooperative development of the peaceful use of atomic energy for the benefit of all mankind and, in particular, to study the development of atomic power and other technical aspects in which international cooperation might be most effectively accomplished through the free flow of such scientific information.

Military pacts, foreign troops, and bases: The conference reiterates its convictions that the existence of military blocs, great power alliances, and pacts arising therefrom has accentuated the cold war and heightened international tensions. The nonaligned countries are therefore opposed to taking part in such pacts and alliances.

The conference considers the maintenance or future establishment of foreign military bases and the stationing of foreign troops on the territories of other countries, against the expressed will of those countries, as a gross violation of the sovereignty of states, and as a threat to freedom and international peace. It furthermore considers as particularly indefensible the existence or future establishment of bases in dependent territories which could be used for the maintenance of colonialism or for other purposes.

Noting with concern that foreign military bases are in practice, a means of bringing pressure on nations and retarding their emancipation and development, based on their own ideological, political, economic, and cultural ideas, the conference declares its full support to the countries seeking to secure the evaluation of foreign bases on their territory and calls upon all states maintaining troops and bases in other countries to remove them forthwith.

The conference considers that the maintenance at Guantanamo, Cuba, of a military base of the United States of America, in defiance of the will of the government and people of Cuba and in defiance of the provisions embodied in the declaration of the Belgrade conference, constitutes a violation of Cuba's sovereignty and integrity.

Noting that the Government of Cuba expresses its readiness to settle its dispute over the base of Guantanamo with the United States in a normal way, the conference urges the U.S. Government to negotiate the evacuation of this base with the Cuban Government.

The conference condemns the expressed intention of imperialist powers to establish bases in the Indian Ocean, as a calculated attempt to intimidate emerging countries of Africa and Asia and an unwarranted extension of the policy of neocolonialism and imperialism.

The conference also recommends the elimination of the foreign bases in Cyprus and the withdrawal of foreign troops from this country, except forces stationed there under U.N. resolutions.

The United Nations: its role in international affairs, implementation of its resolutions and amendment of its charter: The participating countries declare: The U.N. organization was established to promote international peace and security, to develop international understanding and cooperation, to safeguard human rights and fundamental freedom, and to achieve all the purposes of the charter. In order to be an effective instrument, the U.N. organization must be open to all states of the world. It is particularly necessary that countries still under colonial domination should attain independence without delay and take their rightful place in the community of nations.

It is essential for the effective functioning of the United Nations that all nations should observe its fundamental principles of peaceful coexistence, cooperation, renunciation of the threat or the use of force, freedom and equality without discrimination on grounds of race, sex, language, or religion.

The influence and effectiveness of the United Nations also depends upon equitable representation of different geographical regions in the various organs of the United Nations and in the service of the United Nations.

The conference notes with satisfaction that with resolution 1991, the General Assembly has taken the initial positive step toward transformation of the structure of the United Nations in keeping with its increased membership and the necessity to insure a broader participation of states in the work of its organs. It appeals to all members of the United Nations to ratify as speedily as possible the amendments to the charter adopted at the 18th session of the General Assembly.

The conference recognizes the paramount importance of the United Nations and the necessity of enabling it to carry out the functions entrusted to it to preserve international cooperation among states.

To this end, the nonaligned countries should consult one another at the foreign minister or head of delegation level at each session of the United Nations.

The conference stresses the need to adapt the charter to the dynamic changes and evolution of international conditions.

The conference expresses the hope that the heads of state or government of the state members of the United Nations will attend the regular session of the General Assembly on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the organization.

Recalling the recommendation of the Belgrade conference, the conference asks the General Assembly of the United Nations to restore the rights of the CPR and to recognize the representatives of its government as ~~the~~ legitimate representative of China in the United Nations.

The conference recommends to the state members of the United Nations to respect the resolutions of the United Nations and to render all assistance necessary for the organization to fulfill its role in maintaining international peace and security.

**Economic Development and Cooperation:** The heads of state or government participating in this conference: Convinced that peace must rest on a sound and solid economic foundation; that the persistence of poverty poses a threat to world peace and prosperity; that economic emancipation is an essential element in the struggle for the elimination of political domination; that respect for the right of peoples and nations to control and dispose freely on their national wealth and resources is vital for their economic development;

Conscious that participating states have a special responsibility to do their utmost to break through the barrier of underdevelopment; believing that economic development is an obligation of the whole international community; that it is the duty of all countries to contribute to the rapid evolution of a new and just economic order under which all nations can live without fear or want or despair and rise to their full stature in the family of nations; that the structure of world economy and the existing international institutions of international trade and development have failed either to reduce the disparity in the per capita income of the peoples in developing and developed countries, or to promote international action to rectify serious and growing imbalances between developed and developing countries;

Emphasizing the imperative need to amplify and intensify international cooperation, based on equality, and consistent with the needs of accelerated economic development; noting that as a result of the proposal adopted at Belgrade in 1961 and elaborated in Cairo in 1962, the U.N. conference on trade and development met in Geneva in 1964; Considering that while the Geneva conference marks the first step in the evolution of a new international economic policy for development and offers a sound basis for progress in the future, the results achieved were neither adequate for, nor commensurate with, the essential requirements of developing countries; support the joint declaration of the 77 developing countries made at the conclusion of that conference and pledge the cooperation of the participating states to the strengthening of their solidarity; urge upon all states to implement on an urgent basis the recommendations contained in the final act of the U.N. conference on trade and development and in particular to cooperate in bringing into

12 October 1964

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UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

existence as early as possible the new international institutions proposed therein, so that the problems of trade and economic development may be more effectively and speedily resolved;

Consider that democratic procedures which afford no position of privilege, are as essential in the economic as in the political sphere; that a new international division of labor is needed to hasten the industrialization of developing countries and the modernization of their agriculture, so as to enable them to strengthen their domestic economies and diversify their export trade; that discriminatory measures of any kind taken against developing countries on the grounds of different socio-economic systems are contrary to the spirit of the U.N. Charter and constitute a threat to the free flow of trade and to peace and should be eliminated; affirm that the practice of the inhuman policy of apartheid or racial discrimination in any part of the world should be eliminated by every possible means including economic sanctions;

Recommend that the target of economic growth set for the development decade by the United Nations should be revised upwards; that the amount of capital transferred to developing countries and the terms and conditions governing the transfer should be extended and improved without political commitments, so as to reinforce the efforts of these countries to build self-reliant economies;

That a program of action should be developed to increase the income in foreign exchange of developing countries and, in particular, to provide access for primary products from developing countries to the markets of industrialized countries, on an equitable basis and for manufactured goods from developing countries on a preferential basis;

That the establishment of a specialized agency for industrial development should be expedited; that members of regional economic groupings should do their utmost to insure that economic integration helps to promote the increase of imports from the developing countries either individually or collectively; that the recommendation of the U.N. conference on trade and development to convene a conference of plenipotentiaries to adopt an international convention to insure the right of landlocked countries to free transit and access to the sea be implemented by the United Nations early next year, and that the principles of economic cooperation adopted by the U.N. conference on trade and development in relation to the transit trade of landlocked countries be given consideration;

Call upon participating countries to concert measures to bring about closer economic relations among the developing countries on a basis of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual assistance, bearing in mind the obligations of all developing countries to accord favorable consideration to the expansion of their reciprocal trade, to unite against all forms of economic exploitation, and to strengthen mutual consultation;

Call upon the members of the "77" developing countries, who worked closely together at the U.N. conference on trade and development of 1964 in Geneva, to consult together during the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in order to consolidate their efforts and harmonize their policies in time for the next conference on trade and development in 1966;

Convinced that progress toward disarmament increases the resources available for economic development; support proposals for the diversion of resources now employed on armaments to the development of underdeveloped parts of the world and to the promotion of the prosperity of mankind.

Cultural, scientific, and educational cooperation and consolidation of the international and regional organizations working for this purpose: The heads of state or government participating in the conference: considering that the political, economic, social, and cultural problems of mankind are so interrelated as to demand concerted action;

Considering that cooperation in the fields of culture, education, and science is necessary for the deepening of human understanding, for the consolidation of freedom, justice, and peace, and for progress and development; bearing in mind that political liberation, social emancipation, and scientific advancement have effected fundamental changes in the minds and lives of men; recognizing that culture helps to widen the mind and enrich life, that all human cultures have their special values and can contribute to the general progress, that many cultures were suppressed and cultural relations interrupted under colonial domination, that international understanding and progress require a revival and rehabilitation of these cultures, a free expression of their uniqueness and national character, and a deeper mutual appreciation of their values so as to enrich the common cultural heritage of man;

Considering that education is a basic need for the advancement of humanity and that science not only adds to the wealth and welfare of nations but also adds new values to civilization; appreciated the work of the international and regional organizations in the promotion of educational, scientific, and cultural cooperation among nations;

Believing that such cooperation among nations in the educational, scientific, and cultural fields should be strengthened and expanded; recommend that international cooperation in education should be promoted in order to secure a fair opportunity for education to every person in every part of the world, to extend educational assistance to develop mutual understanding and appreciation of the different cultures and ways of life through the proper teaching of civics, and to promote international understanding through the teaching of the principles of the United Nations at various levels of education;

Propose that a free and more systematic exchange of scientific information be encouraged and intensified and, in particular, call on the advanced countries to share with developing countries their scientific knowledge and technical knowledge so that the advantages of scientific and technological advance can be applied to the promotion of economic development; urge all states to adopt in their legislation the principles embodied in the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights; agree that participating countries should adopt measures to strengthen their ties with one another in the fields of education, science, and culture; express their determination to help, consolidate, and strengthen the international and regional organizations working in this direction.

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**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE**  
**DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH**

To : The Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *TH*

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OCT 7 1964

Subject: The UAR Role in Congolese Representation at the Cairo Non-Aligned Conference

Inconsistent OAU Attitudes toward Tshombe. In July, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Foreign Ministers' meeting in Cairo indicated to the Leopoldville Congolese Government (GOCL) that President Kasavubu, but not Prime Minister Tshombe, would be welcome as its representative at the imminent July OAU Chiefs of State meeting in Cairo. The GOCL withdrew from the meeting, thus avoiding the issue of representation. In September, on the other hand, the OAU Foreign Ministers' meeting at Addis Ababa accepted Tshombe as head of the GOCL delegation, a position which was later hedged by the OAU Ad-Hoc Commission on the Congo meeting in Nairobi.

UAR Avoids Taking Lead Against Tshombe. The lead against Tshombe at Cairo in July and in the Ad-Hoc Commission in September was taken by various North and Black African "activist" states, but not by the UAR. Neither is the UAR known to have opposed Tshombe's presence at the OAU Foreign Ministers' meeting in Addis Ababa in September. The UAR was also not instrumental in promoting the Ad-Hoc Commission's decision to ask the US to cease military aid to the GOCL.

UAR's Role Primarily that of an Intermediary. The UAR, however, at the

GROUP 3  
Downgraded at 12 year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *RG/jpk* NARA, Date *4-10-06*

OCT 8 1964

Non-Aligned preparatory meeting in Cairo on September 23, is reported to have joined Yugoslavia and Guinea in taking the lead against Tshombe's representing the GOCL at the Non-Aligned Conference. Nasser joined Tito and Mrs. Bandaranaike on October 4 in sending a cable to Kasavubu, telling him that it was the attitude of the "permanent committee of ambassadors in Cairo and a number of heads of state or government" that Tshombe should not take part in the Conference. In inviting Kasavubu personally to attend the Conference, the three leaders voiced the hope "that this attitude will not be interpreted to mean an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the Congo." Nasser, at the instance of the Foreign Ministers' political committee on October 4, sent a similarly worded cable to Kasavubu. In both cables, Nasser's role appears as that of an intermediary transmitting the consensus of the delegates.

The Issue Becomes Confused. The UAR, in an effort to preserve its role as an intermediary and to avoid the appearance of unilateral action against Tshombe, tried to place the responsibility for keeping him out of the Conference on the Conference and the GOCL itself. It issued a visa to Tshombe and his entourage, but apparently did not expect Tshombe to go after the telegrams sent to Kasavubu on October 4. The UAR's refusal to let Tshombe's plane land in Cairo on October 5 was a hasty reaction to his unexpected appearance. Its decision to close its embassy in Leopoldville appears to have been primarily in expectation of GOCL retaliation against this move. The GOCL then cordoned off the UAR and the Algerian Embassies in Leopoldville. After Tshombe arrived in Cairo on October 6, the UAR kept him away from the Conference and at first encouraged him to leave; later it made him a virtual hostage pending the safe evacuation of the UAR Embassy personnel to Brazzaville.

The UAR May be Drawn into Open Confrontation with GOCL. The UAR finds itself in an awkward position as a result of pressures from other non-aligned states, its own hasty reaction, and the GOCL's countermoves in this rapidly developing situation. Nasser is confronted with a disruption of the unity of the conference of the very type he has tried hard to avoid. Nasser's efforts to avoid any appearance of intervention in the affairs of another African state may now be jeopardized. Nasser, prone to react strongly to any affront to the UAR, may now feel inclined to oppose any Congolese government in which Tshombe plays a prominent part. Such a development could mean that the UAR might again become deeply involved with Congolese dissidents -- as it was during the Gizenga regime in Stanleyville (1960-61) -- and would support an intransigent position towards Tshombe in the councils of the OAU.

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

- ~~BUNDY/SMT.~~
- ~~ALEXANDER~~
- ~~BRUBECK~~
- ~~CHASE~~
- ~~DUNGAN~~
- ~~FORRESTAL~~
- ~~JESSUP~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
- ~~KLEIN~~
- ~~ROMER~~
- ~~SAUNDERS~~
- ~~COL. W.V. SMITH~~



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
 Director of Intelligence  
 and Research

*Research Memorandum*

INR-40 October 2, 1964  
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 N.S.C.  
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To : The Secretary  
 Through: S/S  
 From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes

*Thomas L. Hughes*

Subject: The Non-Aligned Conference, the Communist Powers and the US

This paper, one of a series of six prepared for the office of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, analyzes the Conference in terms of its relationship to the Sino-Soviet quarrel, its probable treatment of selected issues important to the US, and the image it may reflect in the US election campaign.

ABSTRACT

The Non-Aligned Conference, despite its name, is not a gathering of countries detached from great power struggles. On the contrary, it has become a grinding political contest for prestige and influence among the developing nations in which both of the communist giants have a stake, although they will not themselves appear. Their protagonists, however, are acting from mixed motives. Yugoslavia, more than any other country present, will express views to Soviet liking, although acting primarily in its own interest. Yugoslavia suspects that Sukarno plans to introduce a criterion that would rule out its future attendance, perhaps at Communist Chinese prompting but also out of personal desire to challenge the established leadership of the movement. And against the background of communist-world infighting, local figures, pursuing regional or wholly personal aims, try

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 By RE/JDL, NARA, Date 9-10-06

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to thwart great-power manipulation or else turn it to their own ends. Such personalities as Nasser and Ben Bella, Nkrumah and Keita desire personal aggrandizement and the assertion of a particular regional personality.

Under the stimulus of Chinese rivalry, the USSR seems to have abandoned its earlier reservations about non-alignment and is working hard at all diplomatic levels to promote a successful meeting. It apparently has also acceded to Nasser's earlier desire to institutionalize the movement as a recurring conference with a permanent secretariat. This change of heart may be prompted by a probably vain hope of precluding the CPR from similar conference-building on the foundation of a Second Bandung next spring, whose membership would exclude even the indirect influence the Soviets can exercise through Yugoslavia. In an on-going organization the USSR could work to shape the members' attitudes on important issues. Among the delegates there is much reluctance but no firm opposition to the permanent conference idea.

The principal sponsors, the UAR and Yugoslavia, seem to have decided to run a tightly controlled conference emphasizing broad generalities and burying thorny local issues. They hope by this means to insure decorum, achieve an appearance of broad consensus, and make the conference appealing to potential new adherents. In this they probably can succeed at the cost of bruised personal and national feelings that may mar the conference aftermath. Serious issues that could disrupt the entire plan have been swept under the rug, however, and there is an outside chance that, in the general anti-imperialist euphoria, some may force their way into open discussion. Tshombe's right to represent Congo, the suitability of Cuba's presence among the non-aligned, and Sukarno's desire to challenge the established leader-

ship are the most potentially explosive of these.

Anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, the only common denominators in this diverse group, will be the constant theme. And if they are expounded with what we may regard as reasonableness during the formal sessions, they may yet explode in the corridors or before the press. The conference as pictured for nationalistic local audiences in the participating states, and for propaganda purposes by the USSR, will no doubt be more shrill and more specifically anti-US than the actual proceedings. This in turn could cause some embarrassment coming, as it does, in the midst of US and on the eve of British election campaigns. India apparently intends to introduce a proposal on the lines of Khrushchev's call for the abrogation of force in settling border disputes, or perhaps even endorsing his statement. The USSR, knowing this, could then show "proof" of how the emerging countries rely on its example. Over the whole range of the agenda, however, no government has shown a more understanding attitude toward US views during the pre-conference diplomacy than India.

Of serious problems facing the US, none will be made insoluble as a result of the conference, but our actions in the Congo and in Vietnam, our planned deployments in the Indian Ocean and our role in the Cyprus crisis will likely be given a critical airing, and may for a while following the Conference be subject to propaganda attacks and concentrated scrutiny.

### Yugoslav Intentions

Yugoslavia's overriding concern is to produce a meeting devoid of acrimony, and at the end an appearance of broad consensus, even if it has to be somewhat innocuous. It is bending every effort to exclude controversial and parochial issues, and has prepared topics for discussion -- e.g. a world disarmament conference, and linking the purposes of the non-aligned nations to the United Nations Charter -- that will lead the discussion into broad generalities. At the same time, the Yugoslavs will want to have enough spice in their presentation to maintain their claim to leadership among the non-aligned, and enough of the classic communist (Moscow) positions not to be accused, then or later, of "revisionism." For Yugoslavia, like the other sponsors, wishes to keep any hint of the Sino-Soviet quarrel and its dialectic, which is distasteful to most of the participants, out of the proceedings.

The long-standing Yugoslav objections to forming the Conference into an ongoing organization seem to have been overcome. The UAR, Ceylon, and a few others have ardently wished for some time to institutionalize the movement; lately this seems to be the Soviet desire as well. The pressure for permanent organization is rapidly becoming the most important, though unannounced, purpose of the gathering, and Yugoslavia's strategy of maximum blandness serves this end admirably. Significantly, the Yugoslav foreign office is now reported to be calling this the "new Non-Aligned Conference" instead of "Second Belgrade," the common usage during the early preparatory phase.

### Soviet Position

Although the Yugoslavs are not mere stand-ins for the USSR, and indeed have designs of their own for their non-aligned relationships, their pattern for handling the conference fits neatly with the present Soviet attitude. After dubious and hesitant acceptance of Belgrade I, the USSR has clearly come to accept the concept of neutralism and an organization of the non-aligned as a useful, if limited, device for influencing emerging nations. The stimulus for this change came from the threat of Communist Chinese competition, plus a series of conversations between Khrushchev and Nasser during the former's May visit to Cairo that reached a satisfactory common ground toward neutralism and its future direction. On May 8, the USSR re-defined its attitude in the lead article of Kommunist, which talked extensively about the Cairo visit under the headline "The Alliance of the Forces of Socialism and of the National-Liberation Movement:"

Occasionally rightist-nationalist leaders of some new nations attempt to take in relation to the Soviet Union the same position they take toward imperialist states. They justify their policy by describing it as neutralism. But the concept of present-day neutralism differs fundamentally from classical bourgeois neutralism, which in fact presupposes an impartial attitude toward two mutually hostile groups. Positive neutralism -- is a negative reaction by young states toward the splitup of the world, at the initiative of imperialist powers, into military blocs. Therefore, the

policy of non-alignment presupposes only the non-participation in military blocs and alliances, and not an impartial treatment of the friends and protectors of peace on the one hand, and enemies and aggressors on the other.

(The article of course made it clear that the USSR would insist on a "neutralism" with a pro-Soviet bias.)

#### Soviet Objectives for the Organization

The USSR hopes that the Conference, especially if it can be given permanent structure, will serve several important ends: 1) Generate the image of growing dynamic body of newer states with a substantial consensus contrary to many US positions and policies. They hope for a bandwagon psychology that would see non-alignment as the "coming thing" -- the fashionable and ultimately and only respectable stance for new developing countries. 2) Discredit military alliances by identifying them with "imperialism," bases, and foreign presence, thus making alliances with great powers too politically embarrassing to permit of new adherents, and eventually eroding existing alliance systems. 3) Crystallize the non-aligned movement around a membership within which (in contrast to the grouping based on Bandung) they have at least indirect influence and from which the CPR is excluded. 4) provide a means for conditioning the attitudes of the "member" countries vis-a-vis both the West and Peiping. The ill-defined posture of non-alignment would gradually, over a series of such meetings, be given substance, strongly biased toward Soviet views. The full-time lobbying of the permanent secretariat, if one is created, would be used to marshal favorable votes on selected issues in the UN and other international forums. The experience of some international front-groups suggests that this method is far from fool-proof. Yet the USSR has had considerable long-range success in using the social pressure generated in such gatherings to nudge reluctant but passive members into commitments they would not otherwise make.

Soviet propaganda treatment in the last few weeks has emphasized high-level talks about and statements favorable to the conference, meanwhile repeating transparently related themes (anti-imperialism: offers of arms to national liberation movements) without direct mention of the Conference. The Soviet effort has been less than maximum, but this handling does not reflect disinterest where the USSR obviously has a real stake; rather, it probably stems from reluctance to reveal the extent of their backstage management, and allows for detachment if the conference should fail or take an unexpected tack.

#### The Chances of Permanent Organization

Although some of the countries attending would be reluctant and many others indifferent toward the formation of a permanent conference organization, no one at this point seems ready to put up a spirited fight to head off such a development. It is clear that the USSR, through the conference sponsors, is willing to underwrite expenses, thus removing the main objection of the poorer

countries to periodic conferences. Indirect subsidy would also insure a favorably-oriented Secretariat, and possibly more sympathetic delegations when conference representation inevitably slipped below top governmental levels.

Of course, disinterest in an ongoing organization might turn to opposition if the conference were unexpectedly stormy, or if the participants should recognize in the effort to sign them up a counter-measure to the upcoming Second Bandung Conference, hence an incident of the Sino-Soviet contest in which they do not want to become involved. The Indonesians, or possibly the Ceylonese, might persuade a good many of the conferees not to commit themselves before Bandung II next spring, lest the Chinese be offended. Or the Conference managers might tip their hand by being too emphatic in suggesting that next spring's Bandung II would be superfluous. But, given the predilection of new-country leaders to join in multilateral exercises, there is no reason to believe that a non-aligned organization in fact would be preclusive, as the conference sponsors and the Soviets hope. If pressure or inclination is strong, the Asians and many Africans probably would take the obvious alternative of joining both Conferences. Participation in both would project the Sino-Soviet competition more openly and to that extent diminish the usefulness to the USSR and the attractiveness to the new-country participants of an organization of Non-aligned countries.

#### The Conference Atmosphere and the Press

A heady aura of anti-imperialism and nationalist assertiveness overhangs this meeting. The conference themes, well chosen for their broad appeal to all of the invitees, also have a high emotional content for most of them. Among the chief delegates are a number of fiery individuals who need to make strong, propagandistic speeches for home consumption, and to whom such a platform is an irresistible invitation to wild oratory. Presumably the conference managers will have the formal sessions under firm control but it is quite likely that if tendentious views are suppressed by a ready gavel they will then be aired off the floor, at press conferences and social functions. Moreover, a number of observers from far-left organizations (including the World Peace Council) are to be present, with the right to speak. Some will doubtless address the conference and all will be lobbying and mingling with the delegates and the press. Moreover, the Conference management has no objection to anti-Western proposals provided they will not cause dissention among the conferring states. The invitation list was so drawn that only one side of certain controversies (e.g., Malaysia, Angola) will be represented.

The cumulative impression the conference will make is likely to be a good deal noisier and more intransigent (and more hotly anti-

US) than the formal words of the delegates or the final conference statement. This image is likely to be reinforced by the propagandistic reporting the conference will have in many of the participating countries, even though the Cairo coverage by government order, should be relatively restrained. Also if the conference goes well, the USSR and pro-Soviet bloc countries will mount a major propaganda effort around its anti-imperialist character, featuring the discussion and probable adoption of a declaration endorsing (or echoing) Khrushchev's statement that existing international boundaries should not be altered by force. By playing up the extent to which these countries disavow the imperialist world and seemingly follow the guidance of the peace-loving USSR, Moscow and its friends can score points against both the US and the Chinese.

Probable Outcome

Paradoxically,, a calm and well-oriented meeting, while emitting oratory less offensive to American and European ears, nevertheless would increase the chances of a continuing series of such conferences and the dangers of eventual communist guidance. On the other hand, a fractious, ill-disciplined gathering, because largely a contest in the rhetoric of anti-imperialism, might produce a greater propaganda fallout during the session but would also diminish the conferees' sense of accomplishment, prevent any finding of common ground, and tend to discourage repeat performances.



Possible Controversies

Some delegations still insist on presenting matters that the conference sponsors would prefer to leave untouched in the interest of harmony. Desire to play to the grandstand and the general anti-imperialist sentiment may open the door to some others. Among the contentious issues likely to reach the floor are:

"New Emerging Forces" concept. By insisting on this dialectic which is ill defined and poorly received by all of the other conferees, Sukarno is seeking to put his personal stamp on the proceedings and openly challenging the leadership established by this and the preceding Belgrade conference. But the Yugoslavians could not accept a definition through which they would no longer be able to take part in African-Asian affairs (and which will therefore appear to them to be a Chinese instigation).

Disarmament and inspection. A probable majority of the conferees, for whom India is spokesman, strongly support adequate guarantees. On the subject of inspection Cuba is, of course, extremely sensitive. Yugoslavia reportedly is trying to keep Cuban-US relations out of the discussion, but the Cubans may insist on being heard.

Congo, UN Peacekeeping Role. In the present state of uncertainty over Congolese representation, the course of this discussion is unpredictable. Many of those present would be reluctant at this point to defend the Tshombe regime, or any solution not originated by Africans. At the same time a number of African states view Tshombe as a legitimate Prime Minister. Most Africans view a UN expeditionary force as interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Yugoslavia, on the other hand, may present a proposal for a UN peacekeeping force similar to the recent Soviet proposal.

Cuban Attendance. The definition on non-alignment and eligibility to attend the conference -- deliberately befogged to accomodate a wider range of recruits -- has become such a sensitive matter that the preparatory session buried it by voting to invite two international organizations by roster instead of considering individual countries. To raise this point is to challenge the basis and validity of the entire conference, and every effort will be made to see that it does not come up, or at least not openly. The South American observers, who have the best right to force this issue, apparently are content to rest behind their observer status. However, should one of them take up the challenge and be silenced or evicted, it would cause some commotion, possibly even a South American walkout. The decision to challenge, however, would most likely be a spur-of-the-moment response to just the right stimulus to regional honor at the right emotional moment.

Lesser frictions that are probably controllable short of upsetting the conference include the Arabs' desire for a strong anti-Israeli statement, two nuclear-free zones ideas, and echoes of the Sino-Soviet dispute itself. Nasser is aware that the Africans do not accept his views on Israel and his desire to have the conference success probably will take precedence over Arabism. Only the Ceylonese are concerned about a nuclear-free Indian Ocean, and India has already tried to induce them to modify their proposal; the nuclear-free Africa concept, which Nasser will not accept if Israel is excluded, could easily be set aside on the ground that it already is pending in the UN. Overtones of the Sino-Soviet dispute undoubtedly will be heard, (from, among others, Mali, Indonesia and Tanganyika-Zanzibar), but Yugoslavia, and the UAR, and nearly all African countries will try to keep communist world infighting from disrupting the conference. The more assertive national leaders may bridle at the discipline imposed in the effort to keep to sweeping generalities and on schedule.

On the whole, areas of disagreement and hurt personal or national pride seem, at this point, more likely to cause sulking and sour after-thoughts than to blow up the conference. Most of the delegates who will be unhappy over the tenor and direction of the affair are people who probably would not put up a spirited floor fight. Unless the meeting gets out of control and falls into open wrangling, or degenerates into a sustained, bitter attack on the US and its NATO allies, they are more likely to nurse their reservations in silence. Except for the unlikely event of a walkout, the conference will be a "success." Indeed, the agenda items are so broad and amorphous that it will not be hard to find some formulation for each heading that will be generally acceptable, even if some favored specific issues are played down or ignored. And a relatively innocuous final statement would better suit the aims of those who want to perpetuate the conference and attract wider adherence. Sponsors such as the UAR, anxious to launch an organization with minimum US-European opposition, could also claim credit for constructive leadership in toning down verbal excesses from the floor; they already point out that the conference is preferable to a Communist Chinese-oriented one.

Issues most sensitive to the US With anti-imperialism the least -- indeed the only -- common denominator holding this group together, the whole range of US policies in Asia and Africa will take a verbal beating. Harrangues on the following subjects would hit US policies or plans at a difficult juncture:

Bases. We can expect criticism and possible condemnation of most US military dispositions outside continental US and Europe, including Guantanamo and possibly also Panama and Libya. The projected Indian Ocean Task Force is due to be brought up by both the UAR and Ceylon unless India succeeds in deflecting the issue.

Divided Countries: US actions in Congo and Vietnam may be castigated as interference in their internal affairs, although again India is working for a more generalized statement. A diffuse and troublesome declaration on reunification of divided countries may result from opinions too diverse to permit a hard-hitting resolution.

UN peacekeeping role. The Yugoslavs reportedly are readying a variant of the Soviet-sponsored UN proposal which may be plausible enough to appeal to this group.

Cyprus The conference may endorse Cypriot allegations of an imperialist "plot" to undermine its integrity and independence. The meeting might go so far as to condemn NATO bases on Cyprus and the Turkish overflight.

Cuba will find few friends at the conference, but might draw a consolation prize in the form of an attack on air surveillance. Other Cuban desiderata are likely to find little support.

The Conference and the US Press. In a sensitive election period news media, even without partisan inclinations, could easily see the conference as a US failure on a wide front, and a Soviet propaganda coup -- even, by extension, a Soviet victory. But the outlook is not all black. To the extent that newsmen are aware of the background of this meeting and the projected Bandung II, and portray them as foci of Communist great-power contest, there will be some relief from a picture in which the US, by name or by implication, is almost always at the center in the role of villain. News stories that point up traces of the Sino-Soviet controversy underlying much of the discussion will help to educate the conferees as well as the general public. Bruised personal and national egos and expressions of disillusionment with the proceedings may also find their way into print, even if not to the conference floor.

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Following Presidential message from the President to the  
Second Non-Aligned Conference should be delivered soonest Presi-  
dent Nasser as host and Chairman initial session. Advise date  
and time message will be made public in order appropriate  
embargo may be placed on its release here: TAEYI - We see advan-  
tage earliest release in order not appear follow in wake mes-  
sages from communist countries.

(BEGIN TEXT)

Peace in our troubled world is the hope of all men of good  
will. All governments that would faithfully serve their peo-  
ple, that would strive to realize their dreams, must have the  
unwavering quest of peace as a primary concern. So the dele-  
gations gathered in Cairo have an opportunity in their deliber-  
ations to help advance this great common cause of mankind.

You have recognized this opportunity--and this challenge--  
by making the safeguarding and the strengthening of world peace  
your first order of business. Every positive step taken to

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- ...BATOR
- ...BELK
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- ...JESSUP
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- ...KOMER
- ...MCODY
- ...RENDY
- ...SAYRE
- ...SMITH, V

Drafted by: M - RFWwhite:fjm 10/2/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Secretary M - William J. Jordan

NEA - Mr. Lee WH - Mr. Komer S/S - Mr. Christensen P - Mr. Lisle

OCT 7 1964  
FORM 8-63 DS-322

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By R6/SDV NARA, Date 4-10-06

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settle international disputes peacefully--or to eliminate their causes before they reach crisis proportions--brings us all closer to the goal we share.

As you all know, the United States has been in the forefront of those seeking to strengthen world peace through sensible and safeguarded measures of disarmament. We pledge ourselves anew to this great task.

The United States enjoys friendly relations with nearly all nations represented at your conference. The United States shares with all your peoples the same basic values and aspirations--for human rights and the dignity of the individual, for freedom from all forms of exploitation or domination by outside forces, for the right of each nation, in every area of the world, to develop political and economic systems of its own choosing, and to realize its own dreams in its own way.

Unfortunately, these legitimate national aspirations are still denied to many peoples. Unfortunately, aggression often masks itself in new forms of imperialism while attacking the imperialism of the past. Unfortunately, the centuries-old problems of poverty, illness and illiteracy continue to afflict a high percentage of the human

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race.

The United States has joined with most of you in the past in trying to deal with these difficult and complicated problems by peaceful means. We hope to continue and expand this cooperation.

A year ago this week, one of our most important accomplishments--the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty--went into effect. We Americans are proud of the role that President Kennedy and the United States Government played in obtaining that Treaty. It was a great step forward--but it was not enough. We will not be satisfied until the awesome power of the atom is harnessed for peace alone, and men can live out their lives with assurance that they will not be suddenly obliterated in the night.

John F. Kennedy is no longer with us. We mourn his loss, and work to make real his dreams for a better world. Another great peacemaker, Jawaharlal Nehru, has also been taken from us, but his visions for a better world were never more alive.

We Americans live in a diversified society. We are a nation of many minority groups--from almost every land. For this reason, we cherish as a guiding principle the right of men and of groups to hold diverse views so long, of course, as the expression of those

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views does not interfere with the security or the welfare of others.

We defend that principle among ourselves. We support and respect its application in our relations with all responsible governments.

Finally, we greet you as fellow members of the United Nations, which has done so much to guard the peace and to point the way to a better world order. There we join together in a parliament in which the strong and the weak, the rich and the less prosperous, the old and the new nations share the floor, the platform and the responsibility in common cause. These are rights to be cherished by us all as we sustain and strengthen our organization to better serve us all-this year, next year, and into our common future.

(END TEXT)

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White House plans release Presidential message to Non-aligned Conference noon Washington time October 4 for use Monday papers unless Embassy Cairo has serious objections.

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Clearances

NE - Mr. Davies  
(in substance)

H - Mr. White (in substance)  
P - Mr. Greenfield (in substance)

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FROM CAIRO ACTION IMMEDIATE SECSTATE 1127, OCTOBER 3, 6 PM,  
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DEPTEL 1871.

MESSAGE DELIVERED PRESIDENCY ON 215 HOURS CAIRO TIME, OCTOBER 3.

PRESIDENCY AND DEP PM HATEN INFORMED EMBASSY INTENDS RELEASE  
MESSAGE LOCAL AND FOREIGN NEWS MEDIA 1800 HOURS CAIRO TIME,  
SUNDAY, OCTOBER 4, UNLESS WE RECEIVE WORD FROM APPROPRIATE  
UAR AUTHORITIES THAT ANOTHER RELEASE TIME PREFERABLE.

WILL CABLE DEPT ACTION IMMEDIATE AS SOON AS MESSAGE RELEASED  
OR IF RELEASE TIME CHANGED.

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OCT 7 1964

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OCTOBER 2, 1964  
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By RC/201, NARA, Date 4-10-06

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~~COL. W.Y. SMITH~~

TO: IBS - Mr. Weyl  
IPS - Mr. Sayles  
IMS - Mr. LeClair  
ICS - Mr. Vogel  
ITV - Mr. Ehrman

FROM: IOP + John Pauker *JJP*

News Policy Note No. 48-64

Second Nonaligned Conference--October, 1964

More than 50 nations will be represented, many of them by their chiefs of state, at the Second Nonaligned Conference (SNAC) in Cairo, starting October 5 and lasting a week or ten days. It will follow a meeting of foreign ministers which will decide the SNAC agenda.

The first agenda item is expected to be a general discussion of the international situation. Other agenda items may be: (1) U.N. codification of coexistence principles; (2) colonialism, neocolonialism, and imperialism; (3) racial discrimination and apartheid; (4) general and complete disarmament; (5) nuclear weapons tests, nuclear-free zones, and a ban on proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as on the weapons themselves; (6) military pacts and foreign bases; (7) problems of divided countries; (8) economic development and cooperation.

If SNAC follows the pattern of the 1961 conference in Belgrade, the proceedings will consist of (1) an opening statement by each delegation, (2) messages to the Conference, (3) special committee meetings, (4) adoption of resolutions. Most of the Conference will be open, and a good part is expected to be televised.

In the U.S. view, SNAC will be useful if it results in a greater awareness of the complexities of world problems and in acceptance of international responsibilities. On the other hand, it may become a platform for propaganda against the U.S., her allies, and the alliances to which she belongs. Active Cuban participation, an anomaly in a "nonaligned" context, is an almost certain guarantee of anti-U.S. attacks. "Observers" with the right to speak will represent a number of other Latin American countries; the U.S. sought to discourage their attendance on the grounds that membership in the Organization of American States is manifest alignment.

TREATMENT

The commercial media are likely to focus on controversial and sensational aspects of SNAC. For our part, we want to offset hostile propaganda and sensationalism at SNAC with (1) corrective news and feature materials incorporating U.S. policy positions without, however, suggesting U.S. antagonism toward the Conference, (2) balanced coverage which will take full account of constructive debate and resolutions and the words and actions of individual delegations and delegates which run counter to propaganda against the U.S. and the West.

You are

OCT 6 1964

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You are already providing program materials setting forth, without direct reference to SNAC, the U.S. position on issues which may elicit anti-U.S. propaganda at the Conference. If President Johnson sends a message to the Conference, it will establish the tone of subsequent Agency output on SNAC. A Presidential message will not mean that the U.S. embraces or endorses SNAC; it will mean that the U.S. recognizes it as a significant forum which can make a constructive contribution to continued international discussion of key issues. If there is a Presidential message, we want to use it to strengthen the image of Mr. Johnson among the leaders and people of nonaligned nations.

Our output on SNAC should be objective in tone, moderate in volume. Throughout, it should be designed to remind audiences that the U.S.:

(1) Does not oppose genuine nonalignment. On the contrary, the U.S. advocates "a peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future and their own system so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others" (JFK).

(2) Has friendly relations with most of the nations at SNAC.

(3) Respects the views and policies of all nations as long as they do not lead to interference with the rights and security of others.

(4) Is at one with her allies in discerning the advantages of defensive alliance against aggression, and in determination to maintain existing mutual security arrangements of the sort for which the U.N. Charter provides.

(5) Has traditionally approved of, and often taken part in, international gatherings to strengthen world peace through discussion of common problems.

(6) Hopes that all SNAC actions will be in accord with the aims and spirit of the U.N. Charter.

Cautions:

We want to avoid (1) the impression that the U.S. regards itself as the primary target of SNAC; (2) following the lead of commercial coverage from Cairo, instead of which we rely on materials with built-in guidance which the Agency coverage team in Cairo will provide; (3) more attention to anti-U.S. statements than the minimum required for credibility; (4) more than minimal reference to delegations representing "provisional governments" or "national liberation movements."

Additional guidelines:

We hope that moderate delegations will be able to play a constructive role at SNAC and, in some measure, blunt the impact of anti-U.S. attacks. During the Conference, use moderate or friendly statements as opportunities to detail the U.S. position on such issues as:

(1) Nuclear-Free Zones: The U.S. has stated that such zones are desirable if (a) the initiative comes from the area concerned; (b) the zone includes all the states

of the

of the area, particularly any whose nonparticipation would make the zone ineffective; (c) there are provisions for verification. The U.S. holds that such zones are not appropriate for areas where nuclear weapons are required for security and, consequently, where such zones would upset the military balance of power.

(2) Military Pacts and Foreign Bases: The U.S. maintains bases or forces in foreign nations with the agreement of the host country, and only for defense against Communist aggression. (The one exception is Guantanamo, where the U.S. has full treaty rights.) The U.S. needs mobility in the face of Communist forces which have a large land mass base. Reduction of U.S. troops and bases abroad without a corresponding reduction of the Communist threat would be contrary to the interests of the U.S., her allies, and the nonaligned countries themselves. It would also be contrary to the concept of balance in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles which the U.S. and the Soviet Union negotiated and the United Nations General Assembly endorsed in 1961. The U.S. hopes that eventually the political and military threat to freedom in the world will end, making foreign bases unnecessary.

(3) Prohibition of all Nuclear Weapons Tests: The U.S. is firmly committed to seek agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The USSR has refused to make available scientific evidence to support its contention that national means are sufficient to detect and identify underground tests. The U.S. has spent millions of dollars attempting to improve methods of detection and identification of underground tests, but the nature of some seismic events cannot be determined and on-site inspection remains necessary.

(4) Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: The U.S. firmly opposes the proliferation of national nuclear capabilities. In accordance with this policy, and with a U.N. ("Irish") resolution (UNGA Res. 1665 XVI), the U.S. has negotiated privately with the USSR to reach agreement pursuant to the terms of that resolution. Pending agreement, U.S. Delegate Foster told the ENDC at Geneva on February 6, 1964, that the declared U.S. policy is to take no action inconsistent with the terms of the "Irish" resolution. The MLF will not constitute proliferation of national nuclear capabilities but, in fact, has the inhibition of such proliferation as one of its objectives. The U.S. stated its position on MLF in notes to the USSR on May 13, 1963 and August 28, 1964.

For more complete elaboration of U.S. policy on possible SNAC agenda items, see:

State's CA-1212 of July 30, 1964.  
DEPCIRTEL 468 of September 11, 1964.  
State's CA-2861 of September 11, 1964 (SECRET).  
DEPCIRTELS 472 and 474 of September 12, 1964.  
DEPCIRTEL 549 of September 25, 1964.

For summary of background information and policy guidance on SNAC, see Current Foreign Relations (SECRET) No. 38, September 16, 1964, pp. 12-14, 25, 26-27.

Special Area Considerations:

Latin America: Through diplomatic channels the U.S. discouraged Latin American participation

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-4-

participation in the Cairo Conference. Nevertheless a number of countries from the area will attend as "observers." The U.S. position was that as members of the Inter-American system, including the Rio Treaty, such countries are bound together by a series of agreements; Cuba's participation is a travesty of the term "nonaligned"; other forums are available for discussion of SNAC agenda items. In view of this, we want to play down the Conference in output to Latin America. We do not want to attack the meeting or cast doubt on the sincerity of the Latin Americans attending as "observers"; however, the incongruity of the presence of Communist Cuba is a legitimate subject for attributed and original comment.

Africa: On such issues as disarmament and nuclear testing, seek opportunities to contrast the position of the African states and the U.S. with that of Communist China. Should the question of Congo-OAU relationships arise, follow existing guidance.

#### BACKGROUND

Invitations to the Second Nonaligned Conference were reportedly sent to 69 countries, including the 25 countries represented at the 1961 Belgrade meeting; the OAU countries; participants at the January 1964 Arab summit meeting; the Angola provisional government and other provisional governments and "countries involved in national liberation movements," provided the Belgrade participants concur; 10 Latin American countries, including Cuba which was invited on the basis of its attendance at the first nonaligned conference.

A realistic comparison cannot be drawn between the Cairo meeting and the first nonaligned conference. The latter took place immediately after the USSR resumed nuclear testing, and it is unlikely that the USSR will commit a similar blunder this time. In addition, the international situation has changed considerably since the 1961 gathering--there has been a relative easing of tensions, the Sino-Soviet split is deeper than ever, and a limited nuclear test ban treaty has been signed. On the other hand, the absence of Nehru and the presence of the Cubans could lend encouragement to extremists.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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SEP 30 1964

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10/1/64 w/ draft memo

W. J. [unclear]  
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~~Confidential~~  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

12a 5004  
For actual msg  
see clipped  
,87/ D Cairo  
September 30, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to the Second  
Non-Aligned Conference

I attach a draft of a message which I suggest be sent to President Nasser in his capacity as host to the Second Non-Aligned Conference. I understand such a message would be read at the opening session of the Conference on October 5 and become a part of the Conference records.

The reasons for sending a message are as follows: (1) a Presidential message was sent to the first Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade in September 1961; (2) our general approach to genuine non-alignment is positive in tone; (3) in failing to send a message we would be playing directly into the hands of both the Soviets and Chinese Communists; (4) our Ambassadors are under standing instructions to discuss this Conference in a positive manner and to urge strong steps of moderation be taken at Cairo to resolve problems in a responsible way.

In preparing the message we have been guided by the following principles: (1) the message should be friendly, factual and yet firm in setting forth the U.S. position concerning the opportunity which the Conference offers for a positive contribution to world affairs; (2) it is addressed primarily to the advocates of moderation at the Conference rather than those who may choose to use this forum for purely subjective purposes by making extreme charges against parties not represented, although it is hoped that the message will have a favorable impact on the latter; (3) it tries to avoid a threatening or lecturing tone and does not explicitly attempt to offset the heavy play that Soviet leaders have recently given the subject.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By RG/jmk, NARA, Date 4-10-06

*Dean Rusk*  
Dean Rusk

Attachments:

1. Draft message.
  2. 1961 Text.
- ~~Confidential~~

9/30/64

SUGGESTED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE SECOND NON-ALIGNED  
CONFERENCE IN CAIRO

Peace in our troubled world -- that is the hope of all reasonable men, of all men of good will. Any government that would faithfully serve its people, that would strive to realize their dreams, must have the unwavering quest of peace as a primary concern. The delegations gathered in Cairo have an opportunity in their deliberations to help advance this great common cause of mankind. Clearly, you have recognized the opportunity -- and the challenge -- by making the safeguarding and the strengthening of world peace your first order of business. Every positive step taken to settle international disputes peacefully -- or to eliminate their causes before they reach crisis proportions -- brings us all closer to the goal we share.

The United States enjoys friendly and mutually beneficial relations with virtually all nations represented at your conference. The United States shares with your peoples the same basic values and aspirations -- for human rights and the dignity of the individual, for freedom from all forms of exploitation or domination by outside forces, for the right of each nation, in every area of the world, to develop political and economic systems of its own choosing, and to realize its own dreams in its own way. Unfortunately, these legitimate national aspira-

tions are still denied to many peoples. Unfortunately, aggression masks itself in new forms of imperialism while attacking the imperialism of the past. Unfortunately, the centuries-old problems of poverty, illness and illiteracy continue to afflict a high percentage of the human race.

The United States has joined with ~~many~~<sup>most</sup> of you in the past in trying to overcome or alleviate these difficult and complicated political and economic problems through peaceful means. We hope to continue and expand this cooperation in the future.

Americans live in a diversified society. We are a nation of many minority groups -- from almost every land and from every conceivable background. For this reason, we cherish as a guiding principle the right of men and of groups to hold diverse views so long, of course, as the expression of those views does not interfere with the security or the welfare of others. We defend that principle to the utmost among ourselves. So do we support and respect its application in our relations with all responsible governments.

Finally, we greet you as fellow members of the United Nations which has done so much to guard the peace and to point the way to a better world order. There we join together in a parliament in which the strong and the weak, the rich and the

less prosperous, the old and the new nations share the floor, the platform and the responsibility in common cause. These are rights to be cherished by us all as we sustain and strengthen our organization to better serve us all -- this year, next year, and into our common future.

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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1961 TEXT

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Origin

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Info:

SENT TO:

ACTION: CIRCULAR PRIORITY 349

VERBATIM TEXT

SS

JOINT STATE/USIA MESSAGE

G

Re Belgrade Conference President will make following statement at press

SP

conference August 30:

ARA

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Qte "It is always encouraging when responsible world leaders join together to consider the problems that beset mankind.

NEA

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SAL

P

"We recognize that most of the countries represented at Belgrade do not consider themselves "committed" on certain of the issues which confront us today. But we know that they are committed to the United Nations Charter.

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

RMR

"The people of the United States have constantly pledged their earnest commitment to this goal.

AF

"We believe that the peoples represented at this conference are committed to a world society in which men have both the right and the freedom to determine their own destiny -- a world in which one people is not enslaved by another, in which the powerful do not prey on the weak.

"The American people share that commitment and we have pledged the influence of this nation to the abolition of exploitation in all its forms.

"The peoples represented at Belgrade are committed to achieving a world of peace in which nations have the freedom to choose their own political and

Drafted by:

P:OTRowan:NEA:NE:JRBarrow:fn

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

G - U. Alexis Johnson

Clearances:

NEA-Mr. Meyer (draft) NE-Mr. Strong (draft) AF-Mr. Ferguson (draft)

S/P - Mr. McGhee (informed) ARA-Mr. Woodward (draft) EUR-Mr. Davis (draft)

FE-Mr. McConaughy (informed) IO-Mr. Cleveland (draft)

White House-Mr. Schlesinger S/S - Mr. Velozes

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FORM 2-59 DS-322

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By R/S/N NARA Date 4-10-06

9/30/64

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and economic systems, to live their own way of life.

"Since 1776 this has been one of our fundamental purposes.

"All this and much more the leaders at Belgrade have in common. This and much more the people of the United States have in common with them.

"So for my self, and I am sure for the American people, I express the hope that the deliberations there will bring us all nearer these goals." Unqte

Embassies London, Paris, Bonn and Rome should immediately convey text to Fonoff stating that while USG maintaining its "hands off" policy with ~~XXXXXX~~ respect Belgrade conference it was deemed desirable make public statement of this type in interest of encouraging moderate and constructive Belgrade resolutions. Embassy Belgrade should also convey text to President Tito in capacity of host of Conference. Other addressee missions authorized in their discretion provide text to governments to which they accredited.

USIS should make appropriate dissemination.

- |         |           |             |            |                |      |
|---------|-----------|-------------|------------|----------------|------|
| ACTION: | Amembassy | ACCRA       | Amembassy  | MEXICO CITY    | RUSK |
|         | "         | ADDIS ABABA | "          | MOGADISCIO     |      |
|         | Amconsul  | ALGIERS     | "          | NEW DELHI      |      |
|         | Amembassy | BAGHDAD     | "          | NICOSIA        |      |
|         | "         | BAMAKO      | "          | PARIS          |      |
|         | "         | BEIRUT      | "          | PHNOM PENH     |      |
|         | "         | BELGRADE    | "          | QUITO          |      |
|         | "         | BONN        | "          | RABAT          |      |
|         | "         | CAIRO       | "          | RANGOON        |      |
|         | "         | COLOMBO     | "          | RIO DE JANEIRO |      |
|         | "         | CONAKRY     | Amlegation | TAIZ           |      |
|         | "         | DJAKARTA    | Amembassy  | TUNIS          |      |
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|         | "         | LONDON      |            |                |      |

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**INCOMING TELEGRAM**

*Department of State*

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Action

Control: 1556

Rec'd: September 2, 1961  
5:45 pm

1961 SEP 3 AM 7 41  
MESSAGE CENTER  
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NEA

Info

FROM: Belgrade

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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SP

NO: 364, September 2.

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USIA

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INR

CIA

NSA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

RMR

PRIORITY

Belgrade Conference

President's message to Belgrade Conference was read to conference this morning by Secretary General Mates immediately before message from Khrushchev. Specific mention made President's Message received here August 30.

KENNAN

RA:14

*JRB*

96.1-BE/9-261

Note: Mr. Barrow (NEA) informed 5:20 pm 9/2/ CWO-JRL

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NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL		DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R		

13  
*Non-aligned Conf*  
October 1, 1964

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. Robert W. Komer  
The White House

SUBJECT:

Presidential Message --  
Non-Aligned Conference

REFERENCE:

Your Note of October 1, 1964

We like the Jordan draft, in which we are suggesting several minor editorial changes and two important additions: a reference to the Test Ban Treaty, and an invoking of the names of Kennedy and Nehru.

The reasons for these additions are set forth in my September 29 memo to Mr. Bundy. The astonishing emotional reaction to President Kennedy's death in all of the non-aligned countries demonstrated the high regard in which they held him. We believe it would do the President a great deal of good to invoke the Kennedy name, and no harm at all to invoke the name of Nehru, fallen leader of the neutralists.

The Test Ban Treaty anniversary date gives us, it seems to me, a golden opportunity to claim our share of credit for it. As you know, the Treaty is enormously popular with these countries. The possibility of a Chinese nuclear test in the atmosphere makes mention of the Treaty all the more useful.

Carl T. Rowan

Enclosure:

Revised draft of Suggested Message by  
the President to the Non-Aligned Nations  
Conference in Cairo, October 5.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

OCT 1 1964

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE SECOND  
NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE IN CAIRO - OCTOBER 5

Peace in our troubled world [- that] is the hope of all  
[reasonable men, of all] men of good will. Any government that  
would faithfully serve its people, that would strive to realize  
their dreams, must have the unwavering quest of peace as a  
primary concern. That quest is the primary concern of my  
government.

You who are gathered in Cairo have an opportunity in  
your deliberations to help advance this great common cause of  
mankind. Clearly, you have recognized the opportunity -- and  
the challenge -- by making the safeguarding and the strengthening  
of world peace your first order of business. Every positive step  
taken to settle international disputes peacefully -- or to eliminate  
their causes before they reach crisis proportions -- brings us  
all closer to the goal we share.

The United States enjoys friendly and mutually beneficial  
relations with virtually all nations represented at your conference.  
The United States shares with your peoples the same basic values  
and aspirations -- for human rights and the dignity of the individual,  
for freedom from all forms of exploitation or domination by outside

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forces, for the right of each nation, in every area of the world, to develop political and economic systems of its own choosing, and to realize its own dreams in its own way.

Unfortunately, these legitimate national aspirations are still denied to many peoples. Unfortunately, aggression masks itself in new forms of imperialism while attacking the imperialism of the past. Unfortunately, the centuries-old problems of poverty, illness and illiteracy continue to afflict a high percentage of the human race.

The United States has joined with most of you in trying to overcome these difficult and complicated political and economic problems through peaceful means. We hope to continue and expand this cooperation in the future. ~~(and we welcome your suggestions)~~

A year ago this week, one of our most important accomplishments -- the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty -- went into effect. We Americans are proud of the role that President Kennedy and the United States Government played in obtaining that Treaty. It was a great step forward -- but it was not enough. We will not be satisfied until the awesome power of the atom is harnessed for peace alone, and men can live out their lives with some assurance that they will not be suddenly obliterated in the night.

The architect of that treaty, John F. Kennedy, is no longer with us. We mourn his loss, and work to make real his dreams for a better world. Another great peacemaker, Jawaharlal Nehru, has also been taken from us, but his visions for a better world were never more alive -- in America and around the world.

<sup>We</sup> Americans live in a diversified society. We are a nation of many minority groups -- from almost every land and from every conceivable background. For this reason, we cherish as a guiding principle the right of men to hold diverse views so long, of course, as the expression of those views does not interfere with the security or the welfare of others.

We defend that principle to the utmost among ourselves. So do we support and respect its application in our relations with all nations.

Finally, we greet you as fellow members of the United Nations which has done so much to guard the peace and to point the way to a better world order. There we join together in a parliament in which the strong and the weak, the rich and the less prosperous, the old and the new nations share the floor, the platform and the responsibility in common cause. These are rights to be cherished by us all as we sustain and strengthen our organization to better serve us all -- this year, next year, and into our common future. I take

4.

I take pleasure in greeting you on this occasion. It is the hope of my government that thoughtful, constructive deliberations on your part will lead us nearer to equitable solutions of some of the many problems which perplex mankind in this sixth decade of the Twentieth century.

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14



**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Director of Intelligence  
and Research**

*Handwritten signature: Thomas L. Hughes*

- ~~BUNDY-SMITH~~
- ~~ALEXANDER~~
- ~~BATOR~~
- ~~BELK~~
- ~~BRUNSON~~
- ~~CHASE~~
- ~~FORRESTAL~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
- ~~KEENE~~
- ~~KLEIN~~
- ~~KOMER~~
- ~~MOODY~~
- ~~REEDY~~
- ~~SAUNDERS~~
- ~~SAYRE~~
- ~~SMITH, WM.~~

*Research Memorandum*

INR - 44 - September 29, 1964

To : The Secretary  
 Through: S/S  
 From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes  
 Subject: Non-Aligned Africans at "Second Belgrade" in Cairo

This paper, one of a series prepared at the request of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, assesses the role of expected African participants in the Second Non-Aligned Conference.

ABSTRACT

The majority of the 22 African participants and observers expected to attend the Second Non-Aligned Conference from October 5-9, will try to avoid being drawn into international Communist-Free World or Sino-Soviet arguments. Algeria's President Ahmed Ben Bella, Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah, Guinea's President Sekou Toure, and Mali's President Modibo Keita will, at the same time, play a reasonably active, pro-Soviet role on broad Cold War issues. Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and possibly President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia will be important leaders of the more moderate group. But on issues of racial discrimination, colonialism, a denuclearized zone for Africa, and trade and aid policies of the developed countries there will be a strong consensus among the African participants in the Non-Aligned Conference.

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 E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
 By RG/JW, NARA, Date 4-10-06

OCT 1 1964

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-1-

Reasons for Attending.

The majority of the African participants and observers going to the Second Non-Aligned Conference from October 5-9 in Cairo probably do not plan to engage in polemics. For the most part they will attend because: (1) they were invited by Nasser and Tito, the co-sponsors, and know that other heads of state will be present; (2) they want to demonstrate their belief in "non-alignment" in a way which will command the attention of the Cold War antagonists and strengthen the position of the "Third World"; (3) they have various national interests which they wish to further or protect; and (4) some of them, aware of plans for a "Second Bandung" conference next year at which the influence of Communist China will be strong, will want to participate in the present conference so as to find common ground in advance. Moreover, certain African leaders (e.g., Emperor Haile Selassie, Kwame Nkrumah, and Ben Bella) who see themselves as rival leaders of the African non-aligned states will be seeking to reinforce their own standing.

Most, if not all, of the African representatives will arrive in Cairo without any predetermined plan of action for the conference agenda. The agenda may in any case be reorganized at the preliminary October 1 meeting of the foreign ministers. The African attitude toward such questions as disarmament, nuclear testing and the dissemination of nuclear weapons, divided countries, and the role of the UN will probably follow the lines of the July summit conference of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) where the principal concern was with eradicating colonialism and racial discrimination, particularly in the southern third of Africa.

African Countries Expected to Attend

Twenty-two African countries, the Angola Provisional Government, and Northern Rhodesia (soon to become independent Zambia) apparently are planning to attend the Cairo conference. Eight others have not yet stated their plans; three of the four Entente countries (Ivory Coast, Niger, and Upper Volta) and, of course, the Republic of South Africa will not attend. The expected participants, and their delegations' leaders, are as follows:

Algeria, President Ahmed Ben Bella

Angola Provisional Government, President Holden Roberto

Cameroon, President Ahmadou Ahidjo

Central African Republic, President David Dacko and Minister of State  
Marcel Douzima

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Congo (Brazzaville), President Massamba Debat  
Congo (Leopoldville), Prime Minister Tshombe (possibly)  
Dahomey, (delegation not yet determined)  
Ethiopia, Emperor Haile Selassie  
Ghana, President Kwame Nkrumah  
Guinea, President Sekou Toure  
Kenya, Minister of State Murumbi  
Liberia, President William V. S. Tubman  
Libya, Crown Prince Hasan-al-rida and Prime Minister Mahmud Muntasir  
Malawi, Ambassador to Ethiopia B. Katanga  
Mali, President Modibo Keita  
Mauritania, President Moktar Ould Daddah  
Morocco, Foreign Minister Ben Hima (probably)  
Nigeria, Minister of State for External Affairs, Nuku Bamali  
Senegal, Foreign Minister Doudou Thiam  
Sierra Leone, Foreign Minister Rogers-Wright  
Somalia, President Aden Abdullah Osman  
Sudan, President Ibrahim Abboud (probably)  
Togo, Vice President Antoine Meatchi and Foreign Minister Apedo-Amah  
Tunisia, Prime Minister Mongi Slim (probably)  
Uganda, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Samuel Odaka  
United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, Second Vice President  
Rashidi Kawawa and Foreign Minister Oscar Kambona  
Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) Prime Minister Kenneth Kaunda (as observer)

Several of these countries may decide not to come or may send different representatives than those named. Some of the five African states to which invitations have been sent and whose intentions are still unknown -- Burundi, Chad, Gabon, Malagasy, Rwanda, -- will probably attend.

Libya's King Idris has indicated that he himself will not come because he was not invited to the first Belgrade Conference. President Ibrahim Abboud of the Sudan will come only if a sufficient number of African heads of state will be present.

#### Congo (Leopoldville) Attendance.

Congo (Leopoldville) took part in the 1961 Belgrade Conference and attended the preparatory meeting for the forthcoming conference which was held at Colombo last March. However, on September 23 the members of the conference's preparatory committee (Algeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Iraq, the UAR, and Yugoslavia) met in Cairo and reported unanimous agreement that Prime Minister Tshombe's presence at the conference would cause embarrassment and impair the conference activities. President Kasavubu received this news angrily and said that, if invited, he would attend the Cairo conference and would take Tshombe with him if the latter could spare the time. While it seems unlikely that Tshombe will find the time, his appearance could cause certain African states (possibly Mali, Algeria, and Ghana) to walk out in protest.

#### Sino-Soviet Conflict.

Both President Massamba Debat of Congo (Brazzaville) and President Modibo Keita of Mali are visiting Communist China on their way to the Non-Aligned Conference. While neither will unequivocally reflect Peiping's views, after their return they may give more sympathetic consideration to the CPR position. In any case, they as well as the other African representatives would prefer not to take sides on the Sino-Soviet dispute.

#### "General Discussion of International Situation"

This topic, listed as the first item on the conference agenda, should give each delegation an opportunity to express its support of the Third World as an independent entity. Many will point out that "non-alignment" does not, however, mean "non-engagement," and that this is why the conference has been called. There will probably be references to the signing of the limited

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and to the emergence of independent Algeria and several other African nations since the 1961 meeting -- all of which were major concerns of that session.

Support for the United Nations.

The 1961 Belgrade Conference demanded broader participation in the UN for the new nations. Ghana and Mali at that meeting favored a reduction in the power of the Secretary-General. At this session the majority of Africans will call for support of the UN, but will probably not go so far as to urge that France and the USSR pay their assessments for past UN peace-keeping operations.

Anti-Colonialism, Imperialism, and Racial Discrimination.

These will be the major subjects of interest to the Africans. At the 1961 conference Nkrumah was their chief spokesman, demanding the liquidation of all colonialism by September 1, 1962. At that conference the major issues were support for the liberation of Algeria and Angola; the Portuguese in Angola, and the white minority regimes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia will certainly be roundly condemned at the current meeting. Algeria, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Congo (Brazzaville) and Guinea will presumably be the most vocal on these issues, and will probably lead a motion to censure Portugal (similar to that passed by the OAU summit conference in July).

Disarmament, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Testing.

In most cases African attitudes toward the complex problems involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons are not precisely formulated. They would agree that nuclear testing is deplorable, and that disarmament of the major powers must be encouraged, but the position of most African states will probably reflect their absence of focus on these matters. Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Liberia can be expected to take moderate positions and to carry along a number of the African delegations. The first two are members of the 18-nation disarmament commission in Geneva.

Nuclear Free Zones.

Representatives of the 33 OAU members in New York have recently submitted a formal request to the UN Secretary-General for a General Assembly item on a "Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa." The UAR has, however, made it clear that it would not want to enter into such an agreement unless Israel were also bound by it. At the Cairo conference the denuclearization of Africa will probably be discussed, and the African states will try to win conference support for their resolution despite the UAR's reservations.

### Military Pacts, Foreign Troops, and Bases

The African states support the elimination of foreign military bases from all countries, but most would prefer to express this attitude in generalities since many countries have a foreign presence which they do not wish to embarrass. For example, there are US military facilities in Morocco, Ethiopia and Libya; French installations or troops in Senegal, Niger, Chad, Ivory Coast, and Cameroon. If Cuba presented a resolution to expel the US from Guantanamo -- certainly a possibility since they will be present -- the Africans would probably support a resolution in which the US was not a specific target. There would also be strong African support for a general resolution opposing foreign intervention in the Congo similar to those passed at the Addis and Nairobi OAU meetings.

### Divided Countries

The position of the German Federal Republic on the question of recognizing the East German regime is known and generally accepted by African states. There is unlikely to be any shift at Cairo. On the question of recognizing North Korea and North Vietnam, only the radical states would give open support. With regard to the CPR most Africans favor a "two Chinas" policy.

### Economic Development

This is a matter of concern to every African state, but there is unlikely to be serious consideration of this question at Cairo. There may be some resolutions on the need for more economic aid with less strings attached, measures to improve terms of trade with developed countries, and on strengthening the roles of various international organizations in this sphere.

### Permanent Organization

If a proposal is made at the conference to create some sort of permanent secretariat for the non-aligned nations, it is likely to be supported by a majority of the African states despite their numerous other commitments. A factor contributing to this position may well be the general disappointment felt by the less developed countries over the results achieved by the UN Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva last spring and a consequent desire to find a common voice for their feelings.

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- ~~ROMER~~
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- ~~SAUNDERS~~
- ~~SAYRE~~
- ~~SMITH, WM.~~

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**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE**  
**Director of Intelligence**  
**and Research**

*Research Memorandum*

INR-42, September 29, 1964

To : The Secretary  
 Through: S/S  
 From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *Thomas L. Hughes*  
 Subject: Yugoslavia and The Cairo Non-Aligned Conference

This paper assesses Yugoslavia's role at the Cairo nonaligned conference. It is one of a series prepared at the request of the Undersecretary for Political Affairs.

ABSTRACT

President Tito, one of the "fathers" and aspiring leaders of the nonaligned grouping and host of the first nonaligned conference, is seeking to play a leading, if not the leading, role at the second conference in Cairo. Over the past year the Yugoslavs have been notably active among the nations expected to participate in the conference. They were evidently motivated by the desire to reassert their influence and refurbish Belgrade's nonaligned posture, potentially adversely affected by the manner in which Tito went about his rapprochement with Khrushchev after December 1962.

The Yugoslavs maintain that the conference should deal primarily with the broad questions of peace and coexistence, neocolonialism, disarmament, economic problems of the LDCs, and the general international situation. From all indications they plan to offer their own proposals for a world disarmament conference, codification of the principles of

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coexistence by the United Nations, and adoption of the Charter of the United Nations as the official program of the nonaligned. Although evidence is contradictory, they may also propose creation of a permanent secretariat and/or standing conference of foreign ministers of the non-aligned grouping, a proposal which clashes with Yugoslavia's vaunted traditional opposition to blocs.

The Yugoslav delegation reportedly will try to oppose consideration of, and avoid involvement in, narrow controversial issues; among them are: Arab moves against Israel, Cuban-United States relations, Indonesian-Malaysian relations, and the Sino-Soviet dispute. Belgrade is not likely to lobby on behalf of recognition of East Germany.

In view of similar ideologies, close foreign policy views and the recent rapprochement with the Soviet bloc, the Yugoslav delegation will undoubtedly assume a friendly attitude to the USSR. There is, however, no evidence that Belgrade wishes to lobby in behalf of Soviet positions and interests -- as opposed to those of Yugoslavia.

Although on balance the Yugoslav positions at the conference will be anti-United States in tone, we do not expect outbursts of the type that characterized their performance at the 1961 Belgrade Conference. Unless forced by the consensus of the conference into more radical positions, Belgrade is likely to try to exert a moderating influence on the more anti-United States participants. The Yugoslavs, however, appear currently to be placing a higher priority upon their objectives in the nonaligned community and the Soviet bloc than upon their relations with the West.

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The Yugoslavs have recently indicated a new amenability in taking United States and West German views and interests into consideration and hope that their "constructive" cooperation with Nasser and the Indians will lead the conference to take a moderate tone. Available information indicates that the Yugoslavs are exerting their influence to keep the agenda free of a number of issues bearing on United States and Western interests. It is in this sense, apparently, that the Yugoslav delegation hopes its "constructive" cooperation with Nasser and the Indians will result in a moderate tone at the conference.

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