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Tito Seeks To Refurbish Prestige and Reassert Influence

President Tito, one of the "fathers" and aspiring leaders of the nonaligned grouping who hosted the first nonaligned conference in Belgrade, intends that Yugoslavia play a leading, if not the leading, role at the second conference in Cairo. Yugoslav stress on the conference is understandable, in view of Belgrade's long-standing efforts and heavy involvement in the movement. At the height of its isolation from the Soviet bloc Yugoslavia seized upon the nonaligned grouping as a vehicle to gain prestige and international recognition. In Yugoslav estimation, the coveted leading role in the movement would provide it with the diplomatic leverage, not to mention prestige and publicity, it could not achieve on its own as a small Balkan country.

While always deeply involved, the Yugoslavs have been particularly active in the past year in regard to the nonaligned movement. They sought to counteract the threat posed by the Bandung movement, strongly backed by Peiping, of overshadowing the "Belgrade group" and even rendering the second proposed nonaligned meeting superfluous. In addition, Belgrade also exerted itself to counter Peiping's influence and anti-Yugoslav propaganda among the Afro-Asian nations. As a part of its effort, the Yugoslavs extended credits and embarked upon trips and other contacts involving Tito and other Yugoslav leaders. The recent trip by Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Pavicevic to the Middle and Far East -- as well as Tito's to Latin America in the fall of 1963 -- was intended, among other things, as an expression of continuing Yugoslav interest in strengthening the nonaligned movement.

The increased activity and interest of Belgrade was also a reflection of Yugoslav desire to reassert its influence and refurbish its prestige, which they might have felt were adversely affected among the nonaligned countries by the manner in which Tito went about effecting his rapprochement with the Soviet bloc after December 1962. It appeared at that time that the Yugoslav neutralist position had been compromised by Tito, who for a period of several months made no reference even to the term "nonaligned." However, after this interval of pro-Soviet imbalance, Tito made a studied effort to correct the equilibrium by gestures to both the nonaligned and other noncommunist countries.

At this time, Yugoslavia -- the only communist-ruled country besides Cuba scheduled to attend the conference -- evidently aspires to act as a bridge between the nonaligned small powers and the big powers and in so doing enhance its own international position. Also, as the only European full-fledged participant it can claim kinship to both the developed and developing nations. Finally, apart from political considerations and relationships, it also hopes to promote still further its commercial ties with the nonaligned.

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Yugoslav Position on Main Agenda Topics.

The Yugoslavs maintain that the conference should deal primarily with the broad questions of peace and coexistence, neocolonialism, disarmament, economic problems of the LDCs, and no doubt the general international situation. From all indications they plan to offer their own proposals for a world disarmament conference, suggest that the principles of peaceful coexistence be codified and submitted to the United Nations, and seek adoption of the Charter of the United Nations as the official program of the grouping.

Although evidence is contradictory, the Yugoslav delegation may also propose the creation of a permanent secretariat and/or standing conference of foreign ministers to insure the continuity of the non-aligned grouping. This proposal, which amounts to an institutionalization of the movement, clashes with traditional Yugoslav opposition to blocs. Moreover, it would run counter to Yugoslav professions and claims since 1955 that there has been no intention to create a third force or bloc between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Belgrade considers these topics to be more appropriate for discussion by a meeting purporting to be "nonaligned" than a number of aggravated specific problems (e.g., Malaysia) suggested by other participants. The Yugoslavs believe that their proposals would keep the meeting from floundering, while providing Belgrade with an opportunity to express its own deeply felt sentiments on world problems and producing a greater community of interest with both nonaligned and socialist countries -- with the least possible damage to Belgrade's ties with the West.

As to Yugoslav positions on the main agenda topics, Belgrade is likely to adhere to its traditional, well advertised formulations:

Peace and Coexistence: The Yugoslavs continue to "actively champion" the policy of "active peaceful coexistence." They are likely to continue efforts, initiated in 1960, to have the conference propose the codification of the principles of peaceful coexistence by the United Nations. The Yugoslavs can be expected to follow their line of full support for the UN and for its "universality," and they claim they will differ from both the Soviet and United States on the question of arrears on dues payments. They may also seek some form of endorsement of the recent Soviet proposal for United Nations peacekeeping operations.

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- 3 -

Neocolonialism: Having long opposed colonialism and supported efforts of newly emerging nations for their emancipation, Belgrade will undoubtedly support a thesis attacking neocolonialism, i.e., efforts of major powers to attach political strings to aid given developing countries, and no changes can be expected regarding the Yugoslav position. As one of the principal issues at the 1961 Belgrade Conference, it split that session into the moderate (e.g., India and Burma) and more militant (e.g., Indonesia and Ghana) participants. The Yugoslavs maintain that the subject has declined in importance since 1961, but they agree that it has to be considered in connection with self-determination and in view of all the current conflicts. The Yugoslavs will leave the initiative on this question to the African countries, but they intend to prevent the topic -- involving mainly South Africa, Southwest Africa, Rhodesia, and Portuguese territories -- from becoming the main theme of the conference. However, because of the issue's appeal to many participants, the Yugoslav delegation may decide to support a more militant approach, should it believe that as a result it could take a more moderate, less anti-US, position on other issues more directly related to US interests.

Disarmament and Nuclear Weapons. Yugoslavia is likely to continue its traditional support for general and complete disarmament (basically the Soviet position), as well as for conclusion of agreements on partial and gradual disarmament measures, which "under the current circumstances are realistic and feasible." The Yugoslavs have in the past also supported the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, among them the Balkans, Mediterranean, and Latin America, and the cessation of underground testing. They reportedly intend to "dramatize" the importance of the disarmament problem and have given assurances that they will strive to make suggestions acceptable to both East and West. It is possible, however, that the Yugoslavs will reiterate their criticism of United States policy, foreshadowed in their press attack on that part of the Democratic Party platform which calls for the United States to be the "mightiest armed force in the world."

The Yugoslavs, who have in the past called for the abolition of the Warsaw Pact, NATO, or any other military bloc, and have in recent years maintained that such blocs have tended to dissolve, will continue advocating abolition of military pacts and bases. However, they have privately informed us that Yugoslavia did not want either the US or USSR weakened to the advantage of the other.

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- 4 -

Economic Development of the LDCs. The Yugoslavs, who have long posed as champions of aid to the underdeveloped countries, will undoubtedly give especially strong support to this point, since they hold that the disparity of wealth and economic development between nations is one of the crucial international problems. For this reason they have utilized virtually every occasion to call upon the developed nations to render such aid, and have labored hard and long toward their objective at the recent UNCTAD Conference. Tito himself has placed heavy emphasis on this problem in his meetings with officials of other states, including United States and the USSR representatives.

The General International Situation. Belgrade is likely to continue to maintain, as it has in the recent past, that "in the past few years tension has eased in the world," but that the situation has recently "deteriorated" in the Gulf of Tonkin, Cyprus, Caribbean, and the Congo. The Yugoslavs are likely to praise the Moscow test-ban agreement, and in particular the "peaceful initiatives of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries," while giving some credit also to the United States. With respect to Southeast Asia the Yugoslav position is likely to be anti-US. Ever since Tito's open condemnation of United States policies on August 11 and subsequent strong anti-US campaign in the Yugoslav press, Yugoslavia has, however, somewhat muted its criticism.

Points of Discussion Opposed by Yugoslavs.

In attempting to work for a moderate tone in the conference, the Yugoslav delegation reportedly will oppose discussion of, and/or seek to avoid involvement in, narrow, controversial issues of limited regional interest. The Yugoslavs, hoping to keep the meeting viable and under control, argue that, with over fifty countries scheduled to participate, it would be inappropriate to include individual disputes on the agenda, not only because it would be technically impossible but also because it could cause the entire conference to flounder or fall apart.

The issues that Belgrade has been reportedly attempting to preclude from the agenda are: the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the Arab disputes with Israel. The Yugoslavs have indicated no wish that the Sino-Indian issue be tabled, but there is every reason to believe that they would continue their position of full support of India should the issue be brought under consideration. Belgrade reportedly also opposes the raising of certain issues bearing upon United States policies and interests. The delegation allegedly does not intend to support Cuba -- with which Yugoslav ties are not good and continue to deteriorate -- in its efforts to table consideration

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- 5 -

of United States-Cuban relations since, it is argued, this would turn the conference into an arena of struggle between small and large powers. Belgrade has allegedly attempted to convince the Cubans that raising this issue would not be in their interest, let alone the interest of the conference as a whole, that they would isolate themselves by bitterly attacking the United States, and that they would antagonize the attending Latin American countries.

Belgrade also intends to resist Indonesian attempts to exploit the meeting to promote its ambitions toward Malaysia. The Yugoslavs understand that Sukarno is interested in placing Malaysia on the agenda as a separate item, but are not certain as to his intentions regarding Vietnam, the tabling of which Belgrade also opposes as a separate issue.

The Yugoslavs, as a result of their recent economic agreement with Bonn, have given West Germany assurances that they would not lobby on behalf of East Germany, in particular would not raise or support any proposal encouraging its recognition by participating nations. Should the issue come under discussion, the Yugoslavs do not intend to go beyond their standard line that the existence of two Germanies should be recognized and that the German question has to be solved through negotiations by both parties on a basis of equality. However, they reserved their right to bring up their outstanding indemnification demands against the FRG, claiming that the issue is of world-wide importance since FRG non-payment "violated the United Nations and general legal and moral provisions."

Pro-Soviet Positions Expected.

In view of similar ideologies and foreign policy views -- and particularly the benefits Belgrade anticipates from the rapprochement with the Soviet bloc -- the Yugoslav delegation, as in 1961, can be expected to take pro-Soviet positions and praise Soviet policies and initiatives on a number of points, particularly peaceful coexistence. There is, however, no evidence that Belgrade wishes to lobby on behalf of Soviet -- as opposed to Yugoslav -- positions and interests. On the other hand, it is likely that it will offer support or defend certain Soviet policies if they should be attacked by participants under Peiping's influence. The Yugoslavs allege that they rejected Soviet pressure to lobby for GDR recognition, and the Yugoslav delegation was reportedly instructed not to get involved should the Sino-Soviet dispute become an issue. Bearing their own prestige in mind, they are also likely to exploit their rapprochement with the Soviet bloc for their own advantage with the nonaligned grouping.

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Anti-Western Tone Likely.

The Yugoslavs appear to be currently placing higher priority upon their objectives in the nonaligned community and the Soviet bloc than upon their relations with the West. The recent Congressional action denying Yugoslavia United States aid under Title I of PL 480 is likely to solidify such an attitude. Despite the fact that they have shown some eleventh-hour concern over damaging their Western ties and have assured us of their desire to exert a moderating influence at the conference, we believe that they will voice a number of anti-United States positions. These, however, are likely to be somewhat less objectionable than the startling anti-United States enmity displayed at the 1961 Belgrade Conference. Only in the event that Belgrade should feel, after gauging the sentiment of the majority of participants, that their leadership of the nonaligned were threatened, do we believe them likely to seize upon the anti-United States issue to bolster their standing.

Tito in recent speeches and the Yugoslav press have softened their anti-United States tone and have ceased to attack its policies directly. Moreover, adverse official reaction in Washington has prompted Belgrade to seek consultations with American officials for an exchange of views on the coming conference, which seems to indicate a new amenability on the part of the Yugoslavs in taking United States views and interests into consideration.

This diplomatic tight-rope act -- preserving their ties with the West while seeking leadership in an inherently anti-Western grouping -- is fraught with difficulties for Belgrade, if not presenting it with an insoluble dilemma. Such difficulty was encountered at the 1961 Belgrade conference, where Tito, following Yugoslav assurances of moderation vis-a-vis the West, in a one-sided manner roundly condemned the United States, but not the USSR, for nuclear testing. Available information indicates that the Yugoslavs are exerting their influence to keep off the agenda a number of issues bearing on United States and Western interests. It is apparently in this sense that the Yugoslav delegation hopes that its "constructive" cooperation with Nasser and the Indians will lead the conference to take a moderate tone. There seems to be an understanding by the latter that they can offer leadership, and serve as a restraining influence, especially on some of the new African countries.

Although on balance the Yugoslav positions will be anti-Western in tone, Belgrade is apparently of the opinion that it can indulge in such criticism without irretrievable damage to Western ties while advancing its standing among nonaligned countries.



UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON

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September 29, 1964

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Non-aligned Conf

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Special Assistant to the President
The White House

SUBJECT:

Conference of Non-Aligned Nations -
October 5

The purposes of this memorandum are: (1) To recommend a Presidential message to the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations ("Belgrade II") which opens in Cairo Monday, October 5; (2) to present ideas for the message, and (3) to inform you of our coverage plans.

1. We believe it important that the President send a message of greetings to the Conference. Khrushchev certainly, and possibly Mao, will do so. A Presidential message would not mean that we embrace or endorse the meeting; it would mean that we recognize it as a significant forum which can make a constructive contribution to the continuing discussion of key issues. The message might, at least in a small way, serve as a brake on anti-American debate and resolutions, and certainly would encourage moderate elements. It would not be incompatible with our quiet, diplomatic efforts to discourage participation by some nations.

Perhaps most importantly, it would strengthen the image of President Johnson with the leaders and people of the non-aligned nations. His image with them is not nearly as strong as was President Kennedy's; many of them, in fact, appear to believe that Mr. Johnson's attitude toward non-alignment is significantly different than that of Mr. Kennedy.

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2. A Presidential message might, among other things:

a. Take note of the first anniversary (October 7) of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and claim our share of credit for the treaty.

b. Reiterate the President's five points for disarmament, restate his determination to do what is necessary and go where desirable in the pursuit of peace, recall U. S. efforts toward disarmament since 1945, and perhaps remind them of Mr. Kennedy's American University speech (June 10, 1963) which had such a great, favorable impact on the non-aligned nations.

c. Suggest that there cannot be neutrals in the ongoing battles for peace, freedom of choice, economic development and social justice.

d. Remind them that two great warriors in these battles, Nehru and Kennedy, are no longer with us -- but their ideals live on, stronger than ever.

e. Urge constructive debate and resolutions, and

f. Reaffirm this Administration's tolerant view of genuine non-alignment, namely our belief in -- as President Kennedy put it -- "a peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future and their own system so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others."

3. We plan to give low-key coverage in our radio and press output. Since the commercial news services will probably devote a disproportionate share of their coverage to sensational, i. e. anti-American, statements, we will have our own correspondents in Cairo filing balanced reports for our use. USIA's Deputy Assistant Director for the Near East and South Asia, Mr. Gilbert Austin, will be present to give policy guidance to the USIA correspondents.

Carl
Carl T. Rowan
Director

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~~BATOR~~
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Research Memorandum

INR-45 September 28, 1964

~~MOODY~~
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Director of Intelligence and Research

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes
Subject: The Near Eastern and South Asian Countries at the Non-Aligned Conference

Thomas L. Hughes

Non-Aligned Conf

One of a series of six regional studies prepared at the request of the Undersecretary for Political Affairs, this paper considers the aims and probable positions of Arab and Middle Eastern countries attending the Cairo Conference of Non-Aligned States.*

ABSTRACT

Nasser, one of the progenitors of the Conference and its host, has the most prestige at stake in the success of the Conference. He will be torn between reinforcing his leadership of the Arabs by strong advocacy of their chosen issues and insuring a pleasant and successful Conference through moderation and flexibility: the latter aim is likely to prevail. India probably will emerge as one of the most moderate participants, with constructive or tolerable attitudes on a number of issues important to the US. Ceylon is primed with a number of cherished topics, some of which are controversial. A nuclear free zone in the Indian Ocean, a subject on which there are serious differences between Ceylon and India, has already been the subject of prior discussions between the two countries. Hence it will likely be introduced with qualifications that will make it weak and in-

* The countries here included are: the UAR, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Cyprus, India, Afghanistan, Ceylon and Nepal.

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determinate. The nuclear free zone as a general concept is attractive to the South Asians, but they are quite unclear as to its implications and therefore hesitant to back it strongly.

The Near Eastern and South Asian countries can be expected to make a major effort on the topic of military pacts and bases. Ceylon is expected to join Cyprus and the UAR in a wide-scale attack on the stationing of troops or prepositioning of weapons and installations outside national boundaries. Any or all existing overseas dispositions of the US and UK outside Europe, including those in Panama, Guantanamo, Vietnam and Aden may be specifically condemned. India may try to prevent floor discussion of the projected Indian Ocean Task Force or, if it does come up, will work unobtrusively to water down a possible resolution. India will also seek to confine discussion of the UN to broad generalities that avoid specific commitments to charter modifications. On the matter of divided countries, also potentially embarrassing to the US, opinions are too diverse even among the countries of this one region for a hard-hitting resolution.

Near Eastern and South Asian leaders, with the exception of Nasser, are unenthusiastic about setting up the Conference on a permanent basis, but only India is likely to take action to ward off this development. India will probably support such a proposal in principle, but will try to convince the others that subsequent conferences should be held not according to a rigid schedule but only at times when a widely felt need arises.

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A. The Arab States

Nasser will undoubtedly be the Arab spokesman at the Conference. Although the united Arab front is far from solid under the surface, Nasser made real concessions at the July "Arab summit" meeting and can face the Conference as unchallenged leader of his regional delegations.

Like most of the participants, the Arabs view colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism as evils peculiar to US and European behavior, but regard these terms as not applicable to their own, their friends' and the Communist countries' activities. With the same convenient double standard, they favor general and complete disarmament for the great powers but will not accept its application to themselves in the Arab-Israel context. Similarly, they do not consider the recently organized United Arab Command a "military bloc" in the pejorative sense; their deployment of troops and use of bases in each other's territory are beyond criticism because all Arabs are theoretically one nation or family, and such troops claim to be "at home," not on "foreign" soil.

Aside from the all-pervasive theme of anti-imperialism, however, the two main thrusts of UAR activity will be directed against military pacts and bases, and Israel.

1. Military Pacts and Bases

Nasser will want to get general endorsement of his program to evict the British from Aden and other points in South Arabia. He may inveigh against the "imperialist-directed" Iranian "plot" to dispute Arab control of the Persian ("Arab") Gulf and perhaps against CENTO. The Arabs are also likely to give strong support to Makarios on the Cyprus issue. Nasser may likewise raise the issue of the Indian Ocean Task Force, the subject of several recent, critical articles in the Cairo press. In general, the Arabs will strongly oppose all military alliances or base agreements outside Europe, in which the US and the UK are involved. Specifically, they would vote to condemn the maintenance of bases at Guantanamo and in Panama or Libya, if these cases were raised by other delegations.

The other Arab states are relatively indifferent to Nasser's anti-British campaign, but they are very much excited and concerned over Israel's project to divert water from the Jordan river to the Negev. Moreover, Nasser's often faltering leadership of the Arab states depends heavily on exploitation of their fears of Israel. He will therefore strive to identify Israel with "colonialism" and "imperialism" and brand it a threat to peace. However, Nasser is familiar with African and Asian resistance on this issue and will not drive it to the point of disrupting the Conference.

2. Coexistence, Racism

The Arabs will stress coexistence, peace, and security. They would support the Cuban idea of codifying coexistence principles. They will strongly oppose apartheid and racial discrimination, focussing mainly

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on South Africa and perhaps charging Israel with discrimination against its Arab citizens; they are not likely to press this charge against the US.

3. Nuclear Weapons and Free Zones

On nuclear matters, the Arabs will support the principle of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and abolition of such weapons. They are, however, receptive to the idea of inspection and controls. The UAR has reversed itself twice on nuclear free zone proposals but most recently, when Khrushchev visited Cairo this spring, accepted the nuclear-free Mediterranean concept. Arabs would probably vote unenthusiastically on zone proposals, perhaps in exchange for support on Israel.

4. Divided Countries

The UAR recognizes North Korea and North Vietnam, and blames the division on "imperialist" (U.S.) meddling, which alone prevents these nations from uniting and "determining their own fates." Germany, however, is an important exception. The UAR values West German economic and technical assistance, and wishes to keep West Germany from recognizing Israel. Consequently, it has not formally recognized East Germany, and would not support a resolution on German reunification on Communist terms.

5. U.N. Reorganization

In common with the other sponsors of the Conference, the UAR believes that the Western powers have wielded too much influence on the operations and decisions of the UN, although in general it supports that organization and its role in international affairs. The Arab states were cool to the old Soviet troika proposal, but they would support measures to increase the influence of the non-aligned nations in the UN.

6. Development and Neutralism

The UAR can be expected to point to itself as a shining example of a developing nation, whose methods are worthy of emulation and whose experience proves the wisdom of the non-alignment principle. It has taken the position that the advanced nations should divert their spending from armaments to large-scale assistance to the less developed countries on a multilateral basis, preferably through the UN, with "no strings attached." The UAR is also critical of the advanced Western nations for their unwillingness to correct terms of trade unfavorable to the primary producing countries.

B. South Asian Countries and Cyprus

The key roles among the South Asian group fall to India, as a leading and highly respected neutral, and Ceylon as a Conference co-sponsor. Indian self-confidence may be diminished somewhat by the absence of Jawaharlal

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Nehru, whose towering prestige among the neutrals gave him an advantage his successors will lack. Nevertheless, India will come to the conference well-briefed and anxious to make a maximum effort. And although India is not one of the prime movers at this particular gathering, its standing as the founder and moral pillar of Asian neutralism gives it considerable leverage.

India may introduce a resolution declaring that existing international boundaries should not be altered by force and endorsing Khrushchev's pronouncement to that effect. In so doing, India could win points indirectly against the Chinese Communists. Except on this matter, India will probably try to focus the deliberations at Cairo on a review of only the broader international issues and try to discourage the introduction of bilateral disputes and thorny local issues, a stand that will be most welcome to the Conference sponsors.

Ceylon's Prime Minister is concerned about what she regards as a trend in the movement of international tensions away from Europe toward Asia. At the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London, Mrs. Bandaranaike indicated Ceylon's alarm over the situation in Vietnam, Laos, and Malaysia; the involvement of the Great Powers in these local conflicts, she feels, increases the danger of a general war. She believes that Great Power involvement is reducing the local countries to the position of "instruments in essentially Great Power confrontations." As a result, she alleged smaller countries become less interested in seeking a solution on their own initiative, and less willing to negotiate their differences. Ceylon's position at the Non-Aligned Conference will very likely reflect this concern.

Nepal and Afghanistan will be relatively passive and equally anxious to avoid contentious issues. An Afghan Foreign Office official has said that Afghanistan will be "the most neutral neutral" at the conference. That Prime Minister Yusuf himself will attend, indicates that Afghanistan considers the meeting an important forum. The Nepalese delegation, which will be headed by King Mahendra, is expected to say little and to concern itself mainly with avoiding positions which might alienate India or Communist China.

Cyprus will be concerned primarily with its own problem and with the task of winning friends among the non-aligned nations. Its position will generally be more extreme and anti-US and UK than it was in 1961.

1. Colonialism, Neo-Colonialism, Imperialism

On these themes, which will suffuse all the discussions neither India nor Ceylon will exercise the restraining influence they had in the past. India tried at the 1961 Belgrade Conference to moderate the ultra-nationalistic stance of the emerging African nations, and subsequently felt the sting of African disapprobation. This time, itself more vulnerable to charges of cooperating too closely with the US and the UK, it may be less inclined to give counsel. Although Ceylon at Bandung in 1955 denounced "communist

colonialism" as well as the Western variety, the present government does not consider Soviet control of the Bloc countries to be "colonialism." However, Ceylonese officials have indicated distaste for the vague term "neo-colonialism" and have defended the necessity for newly independent countries to retain for a period of time some ties with the former colonial powers, particularly in the field of trade and economic assistance and even mutual security arrangements.

2. Codification of Coexistence Principles

The South Asian countries and Cyprus will support or at least acquiesce in the formulation of a set of "principles" of coexistence -- even India despite its realization, that a predatory neighbor will hardly be deterred by such a pronouncement. Ceylon is the most enthusiastic endorser: both the Bandung principles, based upon Panch Shila, and Khrushchev's proposals to renounce use of force in territorial disputes have official Ceylonese support. Afghanistan might demur if it thought that codification would undermine its policy of supporting self-determination for the Pushtu tribes of West Pakistan.

3. Racial Discrimination

All are prepared to condemn racial discrimination and apartheid. In this context, Ceylon feels deep concern for the rights of Buddhists in South Vietnam and might wish to include them in any motion on the subject. Afghanistan would go so far as to support expulsion of South Africa from the UN. All of the South Asian governments and Cyprus are on record as supporting economic sanctions against South Africa. Even Ceylon, which would suffer serious economic dislocation (South Africa takes approximately 5% of its exports, primarily in tea), would go along with a general agreement, though it is doubtful that Ceylon would follow through. The US is not likely to be singled out by these countries in the racial discussions, but neither will it escape criticism.

4. Disarmament

All of these countries support general and complete disarmament, the smaller states with emotional and unsophisticated fervor. India is an important exception, insisting on an orderly succession of steps subject to controls and verification. India may go to some lengths to try to tone down the more extreme demands for immediate and general disarmament without controls.

5. Nuclear Matters

The five countries are agreed on the prevention of dissemination of nuclear weapons, and their abolition. But the issue of establishing nuclear free zones is slightly more troublesome. A nuclear free zone in the Indian Ocean area, or at least embracing Ceylon, is Mrs. Bandaranaike's favorite topic and she will undoubtedly want to introduce it. India has supported

this concept in principle, but is gratefully aware of the protection of nuclear weapons afloat. India has tried to avoid mutual embarrassment by prior consultations with Ceylon. The Ceylonese, for their part, recently indicated that there may be some "practical problems" involved in obtaining conference support for such a proposal, and explained that the "free zone" would be directed against a "stockpiling" of nuclear weapons in the area and would not interfere with the transit of naval vessels through international waters or with "arrangements" involved in "mutual defense agreements" which several Indian Ocean littoral countries maintain with Western powers. The "explanation," vague and internally inconsistent, does not afford much of a clue to what the Ceylonese intend to do. Presumably, the Indians are preparing to support a modified Ceylonese initiative, but they might insist that its applications be contingent on Communist Chinese acceptance. The smaller area participants are likely to line up on India.

6. Military Pacts and Bases

India and the USSR apparently reviewed the issue during President Radhakrishnan's recent visit to Moscow. In the joint communique, India took the position that the withdrawal or at least a considerable reduction of foreign troops on territories of other countries and the dismantling of foreign military bases would facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament. Certainly, judging from past pronouncements, India feels the same way about military pacts.

For Cyprus, this is the key issue of the whole agenda. It will undoubtedly attempt to focus the conference's attention on its own dilemma, in order to win further support for the Greek Cypriot cause. Specifically, as it looks ahead to the UN General Assembly meeting later in the fall and lobbies for a resolution condemning the London-Zurich agreements and supporting Cypriot independence, Cyprus will strive for an explicit condemnation of the Turkish invasion "threat" and the "aggression" of August 1964, the "Anglo-American conspiracy" to undermine the independence and integrity of Cyprus, and Western efforts to "force" Cyprus to accept a Turkish presence on the island. In return for the continued support of the non-aligned nations, Cyprus will probably make a number of anti-Western statements and may be willing to follow the more "extreme" neutralists at the conference whose assertiveness Cyprus rejected in 1961. For example, Cyprus may support the UAR's position on Aden and the Arab-Israeli dispute (Makarios did not support Nasser on this question in 1961) and might favor the admission of Communist China to the UN, an issue on which Cyprus has generally abstained in the past. While Cyprus may not be willing to align itself with the most anti-Western of the non-aligned states meeting in Cairo (largely out of deference to Greece), it will not jeopardize its main interest in order to support a viewpoint acceptable to the West on any significant question.

Ceylon also attaches great importance to this subject. Press sources, not yet officially confirmed, have indicated that the GOC would initiate a conference protest against reported US-UK plans to establish a "military base" on one of the islands in the Indian Ocean (if the matter is not first

broached by the UAR). India may try to discourage others from raising the subject of the Indian Ocean Task Force; if unsuccessful, India may seek unobtrusively to water down the resolution. But in the end, should a condemnation of the Task Force develop a wide and strong consensus, India would reluctantly go along with the majority.

7. UN Role and Reorganization

There is general assent in this group to broadening the role of smaller nations in the UN. As Chairman of the Committee to review the UN Charter, the Afghan representative to the UN recommended the abolition of the Trusteeship Council and supported a resolution that every member of the UN be given at least five positions in the Secretariat. Ceylon is also committed to changes in the Charter to provide greater Afro-Asian representation on committees. India, however, would prefer to discuss the UN in broad terms and avoid specific problems in the implementation of UN resolutions and Charter amendments.

8. Divided Countries

India will almost certainly hew to the same position on the problem of the divided countries that it has held in the past, i.e., that such problems should be solved by negotiations between the parties concerned. It is not likely to respond favorably to calls for the reunification of North and South Korea, North and South Vietnam, and East and West Germany on terms put forward by the Communists. Cyprus will once again favor solving divided country problems by self-determination.

Ceylon vaguely avers that the question of divided countries should be "ultimately settled by unification" but has permitted trade and consular missions to be opened in Ceylon (without conferring diplomatic recognition) by North Korea, North Vietnam, and East Germany. Ceylon's equivocal position on this issue would probably lead it to support any general move to extend recognition to these countries, but it would not initiate or solicit such a proposal. It would favor any formula to ease tensions between divided countries, such as providing for free movement across frontiers. Nepal, whose position toward the divided countries is also equivocal, and Afghanistan out of its desire to offend no one, will finally side with the majority.

All of these countries believe that Communist China should be accommodated in the UN, but probably would prefer a "two Chinas" solution. Since this is unacceptable to the parties immediately concerned, they would seek to avoid the question.

9. Trade and Development

Predictably, India will have much to say about economic development and cooperation at the conference, and may offer technical assistance to the less developed non-aligned countries. Judging from its performance at UNCTAD,

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-7-

India may be expected to roll the drums for the creation of a new international trade body. Ceylon also wants an expanded, permanent trade body along the lines of UNCTAD or, as an alternative, periodic meetings of UNCTAD with a standing committee and a small permanent secretariat to function during the intervening periods.

Afghanistan might support very general resolutions on regional cooperation for economic development but will step warily on this issue because of her differences with her neighbor Pakistan.

Ceylon has supported the diversion of the cost of armaments to meet the needs of developing countries; India is naturally more cautious on this formulation. All would support calls for massive financial assistance to less developed countries, trade measures more favorable to raw-materials producers, and a system of preferences for the manufactured and semi-manufactured goods of the developing countries.

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State - RD - Wash., D.C.



**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Director of Intelligence
and Research**

Research Memorandum

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INR-43, September 28, 1964

Non-Aligned

To : The Secretary
 Through: S/S
 From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *Thomas L. Hughes*
 Subject : Far Eastern Representation and Positions in the Non-Aligned Conference

This paper assesses the probable positions which the five Far Eastern participants will take in the Non-Aligned Conference at Cairo. It is one of a series prepared at the request of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

ABSTRACT

Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia and Laos will be full members of the Cairo Conference. The Philippines will not formally participate because of its ties with the US, but may attend in an observer status. Malaysia has been excluded at Indonesia's request.

All four delegations will be headed by a prime minister or chief of state. Among the delegates, only President Sukarno is likely to play a prominent role or provide any leadership for the conference. Sukarno will probably seek to mediate Sino-Soviet differences and avoid being put in a position of jeopardizing his ties with either Moscow or Peiping. If an issue arises at the conference on which he is forced to make a choice, however, he will support Peiping. Prince Sihanouk, while using the conference as a platform for denouncing Thai, Vietnamese and United States aggression, will generally follow Sukarno's lead. Burma and Laos are unlikely to play more than passive roles.

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 By RG/JDA NARA, Date 4-10-06

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- 1 -

Attendance and Representation

The Far East will be represented at the Cairo Non-Aligned Conference by only four states: Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia and Laos. Two other countries, Malaysia and the Philippines, have sought participation but, if they attend at all, they will do so only as observers. The Republic of the Philippines is nominally excluded from participation because of its defense agreements with the United States, but there are reports that it may be represented by an observer. Malaysia, although it is formally non-aligned, has been black-balled by Indonesia and is unlikely to be represented.

It appears, however, that although the number of East Asian participants will be limited, the level of representation will be high. The Burmese delegation will be headed by the Prime Minister, General Ne Win, with the Foreign Minister, U Thi Han, serving as his alternate in the event that the Prime Minister, as is possible, is unable to attend for medical reasons. Furthermore, although information on the full membership is lacking, there are indications that leading diplomats from Burma's embassies will be present at the conference.

Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia will head his country's delegation. President Sukarno is leading the Indonesian delegation with Foreign Minister Subandrio as second in command. They will be accompanied by leaders of the three recognized political party groupings: Ali Sastroamidjojo, of the Indonesian Nationalist Party, Idham Khalid, of the Nahdatid Ulama and Aidit of the Indonesian Communist Party. The Laotian delegation will be headed by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and will include Foreign Minister Peng Phongsavan, both neutralist members of the coalition Vientiane government. Since there will be no delegation from Prince Souphanouvong's Pathet Lao faction, Communists in other delegations challenge Souvanna's right to speak for the country as a whole.

It is expected that President Sukarno and the Indonesian delegation will aggressively seek to dominate the conference proceedings in competition with such leaders as Nasser and Tito. Prince Sihanouk will be particularly active in using the conference as an international stage for carrying on his polemic against South Vietnam, Thailand, and the United States and for pressing his demands for an international conference to ensure Cambodian neutrality.

On the other hand, despite the strength of the Burmese delegation to Cairo, the Burmese are expected to play a very minor role in the proceedings. Burma has opposed all specialized conferences, regional, Afro-Asian or non-aligned, since the first Bandung Conference in 1955, and is participating only reluctantly in the Cairo meeting. There has been almost no preliminary planning in Rangoon, and the Burmese Foreign Office informed the American Embassy in Rangoon that the Burmese delegation planned "to play it by ear" after it arrived in Cairo.

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- 2 -

Laos can be expected to play a generally passive role. However, Souvanna may seek to use the occasion to muster support for the neutrality of Laos, and may even denounce North Vietnamese aggression.

Delegation Attitudes on Agenda Items

Burma: Since Burma plans to "play it by ear," we have little guidance on the probable positions its delegation will take. Its role will be conditioned by the most narrow, parochial, and isolationist international outlook. Burma may be expected to be reluctant to see the establishment of a permanent international organization for the non-aligned states. Burma avoids blocs and would see such an organization, regardless of what it were called, as leading to a bloc. Furthermore, the Burmese have long argued that they do not have the qualified personnel to spare from domestic matters for an international secretariat.

Burma can be expected to join with the other non-aligned nations in opposing colonialism, racial discrimination, nuclear tests and the dissemination of nuclear weapons. It will support general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, and the establishment of nuclear free zones even though it will argue that these are ultimate rather than immediate goals. It will urge the peaceful reunification of divided countries and criticize military pacts and the maintenance of troops and bases in foreign countries. Like Indonesia and Cambodia, Burma will support Chinese Communist representation in the United Nations to the exclusion of the Republic of China. Finally, the Burmese delegation may be expected to urge the strengthening of the United Nations' political and economic roles and to seek an expansion of economic development and cooperation on a multi-national basis.

Whatever the particular subject, the Burmese delegation will make every effort to avoid taking sides on issues reflecting the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Cambodia: Prince Sihanouk can be expected to be extremely vocal and enthusiastic in support of positions advocated by President Sukarno of Indonesia. Because he foresees ultimate Chinese Communist domination of Southeast Asia, he will probably side with Peiping interests on issues in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Nonetheless, he is reluctant to be forced into such a position.

Thus, beyond finding a new platform from which to denounce the aggressive intents of Thailand, South Vietnam and the United States and from which to appeal for an international conference to guarantee Cambodia's neutral survival, Sihanouk has little interest in the agenda items and will probably join with the extremist majority.

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Laos: As noted above, with the exception of vigorous pleas for Laotian neutrality including implicit or explicit criticisms of North Vietnamese intervention in Laotian affairs, Prince Souvanna Phouma and Foreign Minister Peng Phongsavan may be expected to play a passive role. Like the Burmese, however, they will not support extreme resolutions although they are unlikely to provide leadership in opposing them.

Indonesia: Indonesia originally preferred an Afro-Asian to a Non-Aligned Conference, feeling that the former had more prestige and would provide greater support for Indonesian policies. However, Indonesia obviously regards the Non-Aligned Conference as important, as is indicated by the high-powered delegation it has despatched.

President Sukarno will undoubtedly attempt to identify himself as a, if not the leader of the non-aligned nations. He strongly supports the establishment of a permanent organization for the non-aligned nations and will propose a series of on-going conferences in which Indonesia will hope to play a dominant role.

On specific agenda issues, Sukarno may seek a method of reconciling differences stemming from the Sino-Soviet controversy. Where a clash occurs on issues in dispute between Peiping and Moscow, however, he will favor Peiping's views. At the same time, on all issues he will be guided by what he considers to be Indonesian national interests rather than by ideological considerations. For example: Sukarno will down-grade discussions of general disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear dissemination as he desires more arms and nuclear weapons for Indonesia. At the same time he will support the establishment of nuclear free zones. Likewise, he will denounce military pacts while vigorously promoting regional political organizations, which include defense agreements among the "new emerging forces."

Sukarno will undoubtedly attack the United Nations' political and peace-keeping roles, although he will support multi-national economic development activities both within and outside the United Nations framework. In vigorously attacking colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism, he will identify these activities with the West and, seize the opportunity to attack Malaysia as the creature of Western imperialism.

Philippines: At this time it is still uncertain whether the Philippines will in fact be represented at the conference as an observer. However, if it is, and is permitted to speak on the floor of the meetings, its spokesman is likely to be the Philippine ambassador to Cairo, Juan Arreglado. Ambassador Arreglado represents the element in the Philippine government that favors closer alignment and identification with Indonesia in Southeast Asia and he is unlikely to play a role supporting United States or western interests.

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- ~~—~~ KOMINR-41, September 28, 1964
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- ~~—~~ REEDY
- ~~—~~ SAUNDERS
- ~~—~~ SATIN
- ~~—~~ SMITH, WM.



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Director of Intelligence
and Research

Research
Memorandum

non-aligned
Thomas L. Hughes

To : The Secretary
 Through: S/S
 From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes

Subject: Latin American Participation at the Cairo Non-Aligned Conference

This paper assesses the role of Latin America at the forthcoming Non-Aligned Conference. It is one of a series prepared at the request of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

ABSTRACT

Ten Latin American countries are reportedly planning to attend the second non-aligned conference, compared to the four which attended the first conference in Belgrade in 1961. Undoubtedly one motivation for most governments in attending is their desire to avoid an image of subservience to the US. Cuba, on the other hand, wants to portray itself as an independent "non-aligned" nation rather than a Soviet satellite, and to assert a leadership role in the "anti-imperialist revolution" of the underdeveloped countries. Only Cuba will send a delegate. The other Latin American countries will be represented by observers.

To some extent, most of the Latin American countries at the conference are expected to support anti-colonial and anti-western positions. Only Cuba, however, would back bitter attacks on the US and its allies. It is unlikely that any of the Latin American observers will walk out of the conference, thereby discrediting it, should these attacks develop. Yet the effect of violent controversy of any

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sort would be to reduce the prospects for Latin American support of the movement to establish a permanent organization of non-aligned countries. Moreover, a violent debate, especially if provoked or intensified by Cuba, could increase the possibility, unlikely at the present time, that a Latin American observer would publicly question Cuba's claim to non-aligned status.

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Favorable response to invitation

The following western hemisphere countries were invited to attend the chiefs-of-state level Second Conference of the Non-Aligned Nations to begin October 5 in Cairo: Cuba, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Trinidad, Uruguay, and Venezuela. While the plans of some countries are not yet firm, it appears that only Ecuador of the Latin American invitees definitely will not attend the Conference. Cuba will send President Dorticos as its delegate, and possibly Castro himself will put in an appearance. Dorticos will be the only Latin American Chief of State at the conference. The remainder of the invitees are expected to send observers, either at the ministerial or ambassadorial level.

Hemispheric attendance at the Second Non-Aligned Conference will be considerably greater than at the first such conference held in Belgrade in 1961. On that occasion, Bolivia, Brazil, and Ecuador sent observers and Cuba's President Dorticos participated as a delegate. Mexico and Venezuela were invited but declined. At the preparatory meeting for the Second Conference, held in Colombo in March 1964, Cuba was represented and Bolivia and Brazil attended as observers.

Reasons for attendance

One motive for accepting invitations to the conference is common to all of the hemispheric countries attending (except Cuba)--a desire to dispel the image of subservience to the dictates of the United States. This feeling is fairly strong among those nations which were not in favor of mandatory sanctions against Cuba both before and during the Ninth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers held in Washington July 21-26. By manifesting their independence of the US and associating with other--primarily underdeveloped--countries, the Latin countries may expect to gain leverage in dealing with the United States. Some are probably sincere in their hope that the "third force" concept of the non-aligned may contribute significantly to the easing of world tensions. Uruguay, Chile and Bolivia probably view attendance at the conference as a counterbalance at home for their recent compliance with the OAS resolution calling for a break in relations with Cuba. Venezuela feels it should attend because other important oil exporting nations (OPEC) will be there, and Venezuela must maintain cordial relations with them if they are all to agree on petroleum policies. Since neither Jamaica nor Trinidad are OAS members, they consider themselves formally unaligned and therefore see no inconsistency in attending. Both countries have expressed a particular interest in problems of trade and economic development that appear on the agenda.

Cuba's intentions at the meeting will be to portray itself to the world as an independent "non-aligned" nation, rather than a Soviet satellite, and to attempt to develop its imagined role as a leader of the "anti-imperialist revolution" among the underdeveloped nations. It will also view the conference as an opportunity to develop moral and material (trade) support helpful in alleviating the pressures of US-sponsored hemispheric isolation measures. The Cuban delegate might also hope to use the occasion to sound out Latin American delegates on

OCT 7 1964

the terms for improving Cuba's relations with the hemisphere, now at a new low.

Cuban role at the Conference

President Dorticos, the Cuban head of state who attended the 1961 conference was the obvious choice for Cuban delegate to the conference. Some reports indicate that Castro himself may attend, possibly as part of a rumored mid-October trip to Algeria.

Cuba's interest in pressing its claim to "non-aligned" status and its desire to take a position of leadership among underdeveloped countries in the "anti-imperialist revolution are goals that may be difficult to reconcile at the conference. Among the agenda issues, Cuba may be particularly interested in promoting UN codification of "coexistence principles", since earlier this year Cuba launched a determined "peace offensive" with the hope of achieving "coexistence status" with the US and Latin America. At the same time, Cuba will not hesitate to discuss colonialism and imperialism with special attention to the U-2 overflights which Castro claims are "humiliating" US violations of Cuban sovereignty. Cuba's natural inclination to adopt a vociferously anti-US position at the conference may be limited by "peaceful coexistence" considerations.

Another agenda item of high Cuban interest is that of foreign troops and bases. Cuba is quite anxious to get the US out of Guantanamo and it brought this question up at the last meeting. Problems of nuclear weapons and the UN are likely to be of lesser interest to Cuba, as it has not signed the nuclear test ban treaty and has refused to permit UN inspection in Cuba for offensive nuclear armed missiles.

Conference roles of other Latin American countries

None of the nine Latin American countries which are sending observers to the conference is known to have a definite strategy, although some have special interests to promote. In most cases it appears that the extent of participation at the conference by the Latin American observers will depend on individual predilections and impulses. Under the free-ranging rules of the conference observers may participate in virtually all activity except voting.

In general, the Latin American countries are expected to support anti-colonial positions. Argentina may regard the conference as a good forum for publicizing its claim to the Falkland Islands. If this subject is brought up, Venezuela may feel obliged by domestic considerations to raise its long-standing boundary dispute with British Guiana. Bolivia may try to use the conference to promote an international consensus about the principle that all countries should have an outlet to the sea. Several other countries (Chile, Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia) are on record as co-sponsors of a nuclear free zone for Latin America, and may give particularly strong support to proposals for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and prohibiting nuclear weapons tests. The Latin American participants can also be expected to encourage discussion of the responsibility of the industrialized nations for the trade and general economic progress of the under-

developed countries.

Should the conference degenerate into a sounding board for bitter attacks on the US and its allies, the Latin American observers would probably be reluctant to assume an attitude of public defense of these governments. However, Brazil and Venezuela might venture public statements at the conference and others might register their disapproval in public statements after the conference. Moreover, the effect of such violent controversy would be to reduce the prospects that the Latin Americans might support anticipated Yugoslav and Egyptian efforts to establish a permanent organization of non-aligned countries. If Cuba played a leading part in provoking or intensifying attacks on the US, it could increase the possibility, unlikely at present, that a Latin American observer would publicly question Cuba's claim to non-aligned status.

Argentina. The Illia Government, for domestic political reasons, has embarked on an international campaign to press its claim to sovereignty over the Falkland (or Malvinas) Islands ruled by Britain. Argentina may consider the conference a good forum for publicizing its claim -- perhaps in connection with the agenda item on colonialism.

Bolivia. It is not likely that Bolivia will take an active part in the Cairo conference, nor that the Paz Government expects anything of significant bearing on Bolivian affairs to come out of the meeting. However, it is possible that Bolivia may be planning to attempt to use the conference as a world forum in its quarrel with Chile over the the issues of an outlet to the sea and the Lauca River.

By sending an observer, the Bolivian Government is following its foreign policy line of "independence" and demonstrating to leftist political elements within the country that it does not preclude contacts with communist nations. Bolivia's official attitude toward this conference differs from its attitude toward the previous Cairo and Belgrade meetings, however. In late 1963, the Paz Government replied to a Yugoslav invitation to a non-aligned meeting that Bolivia was neither unaligned nor uncommitted since it is part of the Inter-American system. Bolivia agreed then to attend if all nations were invited who shared peaceful ideals, but only as an observer if only non-aligned countries were to be present. This was a clarification of Bolivia's previously professed policy of neutrality.

For any important impact to be made on the Cairo conference, Bolivia would have to be better represented at the meeting than is presently planned; one of the leftist intellectuals in government would have to be sent. Bolivia's observer, Ambassador to the U.A.R. Antonio Seleme, is, in effect, an exile who is thoroughly distrusted by Paz and the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR). Seleme, an Army brigadier general of Syrian origin, was Minister of Government in the regime that was toppled by the MNR revolution in 1952. His defection, with the National Police, to the MNR cause during the revolt helped insure its success, but Seleme lost his nerve during the course of the fighting and fled to asylum in a foreign embassy. Since then the government has been careful to keep him abroad in one official capacity or another. Seleme is pro-U.S. in outlook, but probably would not take a stand on questions before the conference without explicit instructions from La Paz.

Brazil. When Brazil was invited to attend the Non-Aligned Conference in Cairo, the country was still under the leftist regime of President Goulart. The practical effect of Brazil's then "independent" line in foreign policy was clearly anti-U.S. Attendance at the preliminary Colombo meeting demonstrated Brazil's independence of the United States, although the Brazilian delegation actually played a moderating role at this meeting.

With the advent of the Castello Branco regime, Brazil's foreign policy has been definitely reoriented toward the western democracies, and toward the United States in particular. The present administration does not regard Brazil as a non-aligned country, but it is very much aware of the persistence of nationalist feelings and is sensitive to accusations of subservience to the United States. This concern is made all the sharper by Brazil's recent vote against Castro's Cuba at the MFM.

The Brazilian government probably does not expect constructive results from the conference. It may feel, however, that its absence from the conference would weaken its relations with other underdeveloped countries with common interests and objectives.

In the event of attacks against the United States and its allies, Brazil will probably refrain from any dramatic or radical gestures, such as walking out, but may seek to explain the non-communist countries' position without giving the impression of partisanship.

Chile. The Alessandri Government's decision to send an observer to the non-aligned conference was probably based on two principal factors, one, a belief that the non-aligned conference might be able to make some contribution to world peace, and secondly, a desire to demonstrate, for internal political reasons, Chile's independence from the US in foreign policy following the break with Cuba. President-elect Frei has approved the Alessandri government's decision to send an observer to the conference.

Jamaica. After some disagreement within the Jamaican Government over whether it should attend the Non-Aligned Conference, Jamaica has decided to send its Ambassador to the UN, E.R. Richardson, as an observer. While Prime Minister Bustamante has on several occasions made public declarations of Jamaica's firm alignment with the West, and certainly does not consider Jamaica an unaligned country, the Government apparently believes participation would help dispel allegations that Jamaica is under the US thumb. Ambassador Richardson also believes that it would be worthwhile for Jamaica to find out whether the non-aligned group is serious, particularly in the economic field, or simply propagandistic.

Jamaica will probably wish to moderate any excessively anti-western tendencies at the conference and might conceivably express strong distaste should vigorous attacks on the US and its allies be launched.

- 5 -

Mexico. The Mexican observer, former Senate leader Manuel Moreno Sanchez, probably has few or no instructions concerning initiatives to be taken at the Non-Aligned Conference, and the Mexican role at the conference may be correspondingly limited. However, if the opportunity presents itself, the Mexican observer might attempt to moderate conference resolutions so that they offend no one, because of the belief that strong language and hostile declarations do not serve the cause of peace. Mexico rejects "systematic neutralism", believing that peace can be achieved more easily if inflexible positions are avoided and the "door is always kept open for negotiations and agreements."

Manuel Moreno Sanchez has been called "the Lyndon Johnson of Mexico" because he rose to prominence through election to the Mexican Senate and rapidly became the majority leader in that body. On Mexican domestic problems, he is part of the left wing of Mexico's dominant political party, but his views on specific international issues are unknown. He has shown great interest in international trade and cultural relations, having headed Mexican delegations to inter-parliamentary meetings in the US, Eastern and Western Europe, and the Far East during the last three years. He was a delegate at the 1962 Punta del Este Conference, where Mexico voted against expulsion of Cuba from the OAS, but his former admiration for the Castro regime has evidently cooled markedly since then.

Trinidad. The participation of Trinidad in the Non-Aligned Conference is influenced considerably by Prime Minister Eric Williams' interest in his country's relations with Afro-Asian and underdeveloped countries generally. This interest was displayed in an extensive tour taken by Williams in April 1964 during the course of which he had talks with Nkrumah, Tito, Ben Bella, and Nasser. Williams does not believe in the concept of non-alignment as a means of effective political action but thinks the so-called non-alignment grouping may come to have real meaning economically. Thus, he believes this group may become the foundation of the have-nots in the so-called North-South confrontation. He wants to know at first hand, therefore, the aims and plans of the non-aligned countries, especially in matters of trade and economic development, and wishes to ensure that the views and interests of the Caribbean in general and Trinidad in particular are taken into account.

Trinidad will be represented at Cairo by its UN Delegate and Ambassador to the US, Sir Ellis Clarke. It will probably be interested in moderating any excessively anti-western positions taken at the conference but would wish to avoid any action which might jeopardize its relations with the Afro-Asian countries.

Uruguay. Uruguay has designated its Ambassador in Cairo, Carlos Massones, to represent it at the Non-Aligned Conference. A career diplomat, he has been described as strongly anti-communist and pro-US.

Venezuela. Venezuela recognizes and accepts its alignment with the US and its allies and is generally cool toward the concept of neutrality or non-alignment. Its acceptance of an invitation to attend the conference, even in observer status

is, therefore, a significant departure from its normal policy. The decision to attend was based more on economic and domestic political considerations, however, than on any reappraisal of its position in the cold war. Venezuela feels it should attend the conference to improve its relations with the Arab oil exporting states that will be there. There also was pressure to attend from those elements within the governing Democratic Action Party who advocate an "independent" foreign policy, i.e., one which is less subject to US influence.

In large measure, Venezuela's role will depend on the personal predilections of its representatives at the conference. The Venezuelan observers (there will be two) have not yet been named. In general, however, considering the government's motives for going, it seems unlikely that Venezuela will play a particularly active role at the conference. With the exception of the question of economic development and cooperation, the government seems rather indifferent to most of the agenda items. If Argentina raises the Falkland Island controversy at the conference, Venezuela might feel obliged by domestic considerations to bring up its long-standing boundary dispute with British Guiana. It seems unlikely that Venezuela would introduce the issue without some goading, however, since it would probably consider the forum improper and the audience generally unsympathetic.

Although Venezuela would dislike being placed in the position of defending the US, if the conference degenerated into a vehicle for anti-western propaganda attacks, Venezuela would probably find some means of manifesting its displeasure. This gesture might take the form of a walkout but more likely would be a public expression, either at the conference or afterward, of the government's disappointment over the conference's failure to serve its announced purposes.

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GENERAL

GUIDANCE ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES FOR NONALIGNED CONFERENCE

The Second Nonaligned Conference (see NEA Section this issue) has on its agenda the following items related to disarmament: 1) general and complete disarmament (GCD); 2) prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests; 3) nuclear-free zones; 4) prevention of the dissemination of nuclear weapons and the abolition of all nuclear weapons; and 5) military pacts, foreign troops and bases.

We have outlined briefly the positions the Conference might take, or be asked to take, on these matters, the possible effects on our interests and where appropriate, what approaches might be made by the United States to influence the proceedings of the Conference. Our posts in the countries sending delegates or observers (with the exception of Latin American posts where we are attempting to dissuade Latin American countries from attending in any capacity) have been authorized at their discretion to acquaint friendly delegations of our views on these specific items, emphasizing the US desire to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and to achieve progress in arms control and disarmament. We assume the nonaligned recognize that they will be most effective if they avoid formulations favoring either the East or the West, and accordingly, we would hope they would avoid recommendations which have the effect of placing the West at a military disadvantage.

Following are the guidelines setting forth our position on these agenda items:

GCD - While we believe it unlikely that the Conference will treat in detail GCD, it is possible that endorsement may be sought for the Soviet "Gromyko proposal", known also as the "nuclear umbrella", or "minimum deterrent." (See CFR, July 15). The United States is opposed to this proposal which calls for drastic cuts in nuclear delivery vehicles at the beginning of the disarmament process while retaining small, unspecified numbers through the end of the disarmament process. (Our position calls for phased percentage reductions and the maintenance of military balance.)

Nuclear Test Ban - It is important that any declaration favoring a comprehensive ban, that is, one that would also prohibit underground testing, should include a reference to the need for effective verification.

Nuclear Free Zones - We would be disturbed by any language aimed at US foreign bases, ports of call for POLARIS submarines, or which would prohibit any sort of transport of nuclear weapons or the transit of ships or airplanes which might be carrying nuclear weapons through the land, waters, or air space of a nuclear-free zone. The United States has a firm policy neither to confirm nor deny the presence

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of the General Assembly -- up to \$10 million. Commitments and expenditures above this initial amount could be made by the SYG only after the General Assembly had adopted a financing resolution on the basis of a recommendation of the special finance committee.

The Soviet Union which also had introduced a working paper, reiterated its main thesis that the Congo and Middle East peacekeeping operations were "illegal" and that only the Security Council could initiate and authorize peacekeeping expenditures. The Soviet representative declared that the Soviet position on financing UN Peacekeeping operations was "unchanging and cannot be changed." It is our hope, however, that the reasonableness of the US proposals will strengthen our position in getting other countries to support us on Article 19.

Non-Aligned Conference - If the question of UN Financing and Article 19 is raised at the Cairo Non-Aligned Conference which convenes October 5, we hope that the Conference will take action to encourage the payment of UN arrearages and support articles 17 and 19 of the Charter. [In July 1964 the OAU passed a resolution which appealed to UN members to "fulfill their obligations" and recalled an earlier OAU resolution publicly acknowledging acceptance by the African states of "all obligations contained in the UN Charter including financial obligations."]

Since the vast majority of UN members support a strong General Assembly because it is the body where small powers have their greatest vote, and since members are fully aware that without the power to levy assessments as granted under Article 17 of the Charter, the General Assembly could degenerate into a debating society, we hope that the same members will also realize that strong support of the General Assembly's financial powers requires strong support of Article 19. For without the sanction of Article 19, it would be possible for any member to threaten the United Nations with a reduction of financial support each time the United Nations launched a major question that a member disliked. We believe the Non-Aligned Conference should indicate in an unmistakable way to states willfully in arrears that smaller states cannot allow the financial powers of the General Assembly to be weakened or eroded; that consequently Article 19 must be applied impartially even to great powers. The Conference could in this way be instrumental in persuading countries like the USSR to explore with other members possible ways to avoid collision with the United Nations and with its Charter on the financing issue.

of nuclear weapons on US ships or planes, and policies such as Ceylon's aimed at nuclear weapons, therefore effectively bar the entry of all US ships and aircraft. We doubt the usefulness of the international conference called for in the OAU Resolution, believing that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) at Geneva is the proper forum for consideration of such issues.

Non-Proliferation and/or Abolition of Nuclear Weapons - It is likely the Nonaligned Conference will urge agreement on a world-wide treaty in accordance with the OAU Resolution and the Irish Resolution (UNGA RES 1665 (XVI)). Apart from a call for an international conference to conclude an international treaty on this matter, the operative paragraphs of the Resolution adopted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at their July 17-21 meeting (see CFR, Aug. 12), accord with US objectives. The Nonaligned Conference probably will make an effort, whether Soviet-inspired or not, to include language clearly directed at prohibiting the MLF, which the Irish Resolution in our opinion does not do. We would strongly oppose any suggestion that MLF negotiations be suspended pending a non-proliferation agreement.

The United States regards as undesirable the suggestions contained in the Ethiopian Resolution (UNGA Resolutions 1683 and 1909) calling for a conference to sign a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons. We view the problem as one of aggression, not of weapons which might be necessary in defense.

Military Pacts - The Conference probably will pass a resolution aimed at military pacts and foreign troops and bases. Our position is that US bases and forces are in foreign countries at the request of the host country for our common defense. The exception is Guantanamo, where we have full treaty rights.

*
--Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 38, 9/16/64

GENERAL NOTE

President's ENDC Message

President Johnson has marked the ending of the current session of the ENDC by sending a special message to be read into the Conference record September 17.

In his message, the President told the Conference that "Peace is still the one item on your agenda and the leading item on the agenda of mankind." After pointing out that while this year has "brought more concrete proposals for safeguarded and realistic (arms control and disarmament) agreements than any other year since before World War II," he added that neither had it witnessed agreement on any of these proposals.

He concluded by saying: "The road to peace is not an easy

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one. The concrete gains so far achieved required long and diligent efforts. So will the accomplishments of tomorrow." And he called on each nation represented at the ENDC to continue at home its consideration of the proposals made at Geneva, and to return to the reconvened Conference prepared to take additional steps toward peace -- "Let us all contribute to building a safer tomorrow."

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NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

SECOND NONALIGNED CONFERENCE

The Second Nonaligned Conference will convene in Cairo October 5 at the chiefs-of-state level, following a preliminary Foreign Ministers' meeting scheduled to commence five days earlier. The preparatory meeting for this conference took place in Colombo, Ceylon March 23-28, and was attended by twenty-three of the twenty-five original non-aligned members.

Invitations for the Second Nonaligned Conference included the original members, the OAU countries, the participants in the Arab Summit meeting, the Angola Provisional Government, other provisional governments and "countries involved in national liberation movements," provided the Belgrade participants concur. Ten Latin American countries were included as invitees: Cuba, Jamaica, Trinidad, Brazil, Bolivia, Mexico, Chile, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Argentina.

US View - Except where the United States is involved in a system of defensive alliances, genuine nonalignment is not incompatible with present US interests. At the same time, Communists and so-called neutralists should be prevented from exploiting nonalignment concepts, slogans, and activities in such a way as to weaken present alliances, and to increase Communist prestige, influence and penetration. Thus the public and private explanation of our policy towards the Second Nonaligned Conference requires a different approach and emphasis in Latin America than in many parts of Africa and Asia.

Latin American Position - In this connection, the following are some of the grounds for opposing Latin American participation: 1) Members of the inter-American system, including the United States, are bound together by a body of agreements, including the Rio Treaty by which signatories agreed to regard an attack on one as an attack on all, and thus are clearly aligned. 2) Cuba's participation as representative of nonalignment in Latin America makes the presence of countries which have been the target of Castro's intervention, aggression, and subversion that much more incongruous, especially since the July 26 OAS Resolution resulted in ostracism of Cuba by all the American Republics (with the exception of Mexico). 3) If other Latin American countries attend they will be linked with Castro in ceremonies and communiques. 4) Other forums are available for discussion of agenda items of mutual interest among Africa, Asia, and Latin America, particularly through the United Nations and its affiliated agencies.

Guidance to US Missions - We have already set forth general guidance on the US position and rationale concerning the Second Non-aligned Conference. As the opening date draws near, and more information becomes available concerning the attendance and aims of various

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By AG/JDW, NARA, Date 4-10-06

FE NOTE

President Sukarno is scheduled to depart Djakarta on September 17, en route to the Cairo Nonaligned Conference by way of several European capitals. Foreign Minister Subandrio has characterized Sukarno's departure as prima facie evidence of the GOI's good intentions towards Malaysia, contending that the President would not leave the country if further military operations were contemplated. On September 16 Sukarno assured Ambassador Jones that the GOI plans no further military moves in the Malaysian dispute unless the British start something first.

We have emphasized to the Indonesians that, by employing force against Malaysia, and by implying that armed incursions will continue, the GOI has incurred the danger of hostilities with the Commonwealth and can expect no help from us. We are hopeful that the GOI's assurances may herald a return by Indonesia to a less militant posture in its confrontation policy towards Malaysia. Meanwhile, a threatened UK-GOI clash over transit of the Sunda Strait -- which Indonesia claims as national waters -- appears to have been averted for the time being. The UK has accepted an Indonesian explanation that the strait will shortly be used for Indonesian naval exercises, and has rerouted a carrier force originally scheduled to transit the Strait.

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delegations, we wish certain missions at their discretion to concentrate more specifically on acquainting local officials planning to attend the conference with our position regarding publicized agenda items. With over fifty delegations in attendance, most on the chief-of-state level, Cairo will be the focal point on the international scene, with certain personalities vying for pre-eminence of their respective views and interests in world media, if not the forum itself.

Agenda - If the First Nonaligned Conference in Belgrade in 1961 is any criterion, conference procedures will consist of: 1) an opening statement by each delegate; 2) messages to the conference; 3) special committee meetings in private; and 4) resolutions on specific agenda items. Many of these activities will proceed concurrently.

The first agenda item, "General Discussion of International Situation," could include any given situation. Specific agenda items of note are: 1) codification of co-existence principles by the United Nations; 2) colonialism, neo-colonialism, and imperialism; 3) racial discrimination and policy of Apartheid; 4) general and complete disarmament; 5) prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests; 6) nuclear free zones; 7) prevention of dissemination of nuclear weapons and abolition of all nuclear weapons; 8) military pacts, foreign troops and bases; 9) problems of divided countries. The agenda items represent the lowest common denominator on which the conference sponsors apparently felt the wide variety of delegations could hope for agreement. At the same time, they furnish ample opportunity for attacks on the West in general, and the United States specifically by leaders so disposed.

Problems for Friends - Although the United States will have friends at the conference who share or appreciate our views on various agenda items, we recognize the problem that will face them at a forum with inherent anti-West overtones and the "non-aligned" concept that gives license for negative attacks but allows little in the way of public support.

As was pointed out in general guidance, we look for responsible delegations to play a positive role in a constructive approach toward resolving the problems, not creating or exacerbating them. To the extent possible, therefore, it is felt that friendly delegations going to Cairo should be aware of US views on specific agenda items.

Specific Guidance - Posts in countries planning to have representatives at the conference will receive the following specific guidance on selected agenda items: 1) UN matters, including Chinese representation, Southern African Colonial and Racial Questions, UN financing and Article 19, and UNCTAD; 2) Detailed information regarding Disarmament subjects (see General Section this issue); 3) summary of the US position on selected items which may be discussed under "General Discussion of the International Situation" and "Problem of Divided Countries"; and 4) An INR Research Memorandum entitled: "Attendance

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the struggle of the peoples in Portuguese territories in Africa; and it denounces attempts at foreign intervention in the Congo.

The communique also pays attention to areas where inter-Arab cooperation needs to be sharpened notably in strengthening ties with emirates in the Persian Gulf, redoubling economic ties with the Maghreb, and in maintaining efforts to continue contacts with other countries to explain Arab issues. In this connection, the communique announces a decision to establish a joint Arab Council for Nuclear Research for Peaceful Purposes, to create an Arab Law Court, to maintain permanently a Working Committee created after Summit I to meet at the Prime Minister or Deputy Prime Minister level every four months, and to hold meetings at the Chief of State level in September of each year. The next Summit meeting will be at Rabat in September 1965.

Bilateral Decisions - At least two bilateral decisions were reached as an outgrowth of the Second Summit: 1) Nasser and Prince Faisal reached agreement on cooperating toward settlement of the Yemen dispute and issued a joint communique to this effect on September 14 (see note below). 2) Nasser and Iraqi President Aref announced on September 15 that the UAR and Iraq would merge their "political organizations." Rather than effecting a formal political union, we believe their intention is to channel political energies in both countries into one political organization -- the Arab Socialist Union, which was launched in Iraq on July 12.

Conclusions - When each aspect of Arab Summit II is examined, there may be apparent more myth than reality, but the moral and political effect should not be underestimated. While there was considerable papering over of cracks, there also was lively debate and resulting moral involvement of all 13 summit members in the final compromise decisions. Arab leaders have convinced themselves and their people there is an acceptable and workable course of action regarding Palestine that can somehow prevent Israel from consolidating the status quo. Although none of the decisions of the Second Arab Summit present cause for alarm, the preservation of a common front among the Arabs will accelerate the continuing general trend toward intensification of Arab-Israel tension.

*
--Current Foreign Relations, Issue No. 38, 9/16/64

NEA NOTES

UAR-Saudi Accord on Yemen

The essential points of the joint communique on Yemen issued by Nasser and Prince Faisal on September 14 are that both states are determined to cooperate with each other for solution of the dispute and that each will communicate with the Yemeni groups concerned in order to reach a peaceful settlement. The declared recognition that

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Director of Intelligence
and Research

Research
Memorandum

INR-34, September 4, 1964

no accepted copy
Thomas L. Hughes

BUNDY/SMITH
ALEXANDER
BRIDGEMAN
CHASE
DUNGAN
FORRESTAL
JESSUP
JOHNSON
KLEIN
SULLIVAN
COL. W.Y. SMITH

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes

Subject : Attendance at Non-Aligned Conference: Preliminary Survey

This annotated roster of invitees to the Non-Aligned Conference, compiled at the request of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, shows their intentions so far as known a month before the event. Where the head of delegation is known, or can be predicted with reasonable assurance, the list includes a brief sketch of his political inclination.

ABSTRACT

Sixty-four governments plus the Provisional Government of Angola have been invited to the Second Non-Aligned Conference convening October 5 at Cairo. The Yugoslav and UAR press, apparently trying to lead events, announce new acceptances daily and confidently predict an attendance of almost 60. Of the invitees about which some information is available as of September 4, however, 9 intend to send observers only; 33 will send full, working delegates, but not all will be heads of state as the sponsors had hoped; 2 have declined the invitation; and 14 are considering declining. Of the African countries, the most numerous regional grouping, only Ethiopia and Ghana have announced that they will go, although others certainly intend to do so. The picture changes nearly hourly. Judging from the experience of the first Conference in 1961, no preliminary list can be definitive. Some national leaders waited until the last minute or arrived late with great fanfare, for dramatic effect.

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Some accepted their invitations but, in the event, did not attend.

Even though the attendance may not be as large as the sponsors now claim, the conference is sure to be a propaganda success if only because it will be larger than the original Belgrade Conference which 26 attended* and 5 declined. Moreover, this fall the emotional atmosphere is headier and the restraining influences are fewer than in 1961. Conference leaders will be seeking to out-play in advance the forthcoming Second Bandung Conference; Nasser is in the midst of a campaign against foreign bases; Makarios, who in 1961 was a model of responsibility and restraint, will come in a very different mood to promote aims consistent with the conference theme and at variance with Western interests; and Nehru, a major influence for moderation, cannot be replaced with anyone of comparable stature. Because Moscow and Peking are at odds about the proper approach to newly-independent countries, the USSR is very much aware of the conference; it is highly unlikely that the Soviets will during this session make a mistake comparable to their resumption of nuclear tests during the 1961 meeting.

*Including the then Provisional Government of Algeria.

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Far East and South Asia Attendance at Second
Non-Aligned Conference - CAIRO, October 5

Invited	Intentions	Representative	Political leanings of representative
FAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA			
1. Afghanistan	Delegate	Unknown	
2. Burma	Delegate	Unknown	
3. Cambodia	Delegate	Sihanouk	Domestically anti-Communist, firm supporter of Chicom line on external issues
4. Ceylon	Delegate	Either: Mrs. Bandaranaike or N. Q. Dias	Prime Minister, Foreign and Defense Minister; left-leaning, mainly because of internal political pressure. Militant Bhuddist; civil servant; conservative
5. Cyprus	Delegate	Makarios Probably also: Dr. Vasos Lyssarides and Spyro Kyprianeou	Expected to make dramatic plea for support on Cyprus issue and to recruit UN support. Will take strong line against foreign bases. Personal physician and confidant of Makarios; more left-leaning than Kyprianeou. Foreign Minister; left-leaning but more moderate than Lyssarides. Will follow Makarios' line.
6. Indonesia	Delegate	Sukarno	Nationalist leader; neutralist, with current apparent leftist leanings.

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Far East and South Asia Attendance at Second
Non-Aligned Conference - CAIRO, October 5

- 2 -

Invited	Intentions	Representative	Political leanings of representative
FAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA (Continued)			
7. Laos	Delegate	Presumably Souvanna Phouma	Neutralist leader with sound knowledge of Communist machinations. Will probably take neutral posture but personally leans toward anti-Communism.
8. Nepal	Delegate	Kirtinidhi Bista	Foreign Minister; quiet; accommodating; not much of a thinker. Will probably follow India's lead. No known political prejudices.
9. India	Delegate	Prime Minister Shastri also Foreign Minister Swaran Singh	Moderate socialist; rather diffident; direct and articulate but not a dynamic personality; quiet but able debater. Within limits of Indian neutral line, leans toward West. Performed ably in other international meetings. May carry main burden of speaking.

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-3-
Latin American Attendance at Second
Non-Aligned Conference - CAIRO, October 5

Invited	Intentions*	Representative	Political leanings of representative
LATIN AMERICA*			
1. Argentina	Observer	Unknown	
2. Bolivia	Observer	Either: Antonio Seleme Vargas or Walter Garcia Agreda	Ambassador to UAR; opportunist of unsavory reputation; pro-U.S.; of Syrian extraction. Ambassador to Algeria; career military officer.
3. Brazil	Observer	Unknown	
4. Chile	Observer or delegate	Unknown	
5. Cuba	Delegate	Probably President Dorticos	Faithful Castro stalwart.
6. Jamaica	Observer	Richardson-Ambassador to UN	Serious, competent, career civil servant; Negro and somewhat color conscious.
7. Mexico	Observer	Unknown	
8. Trinidad	Observer	(Ministerial rank; unknown)	
9. Uruguay	Observer	Unknown	
10. Venezuela	Observer	Unknown	

* Some changes are likely in the expressed intentions of these countries as of September 4. In 1961 some Latin American governments reversed their early decisions, and some who accepted never arrived.

Near Eastern Attendance at Second
Non-Aligned Conference - CAIRO, October 5

Invited	Intentions	Representative	Political leanings of representative
NEAR EAST			
1. Iraq	Delegate	Unknown; possibly President 'Arif	Not a strong personality; devout Muslim. Will follow UAR lead.
2. Jordan	Delegate	Unknown; possibly King Husayn	Pro-West, dependent on US for financial assistance, but aspires to wide acceptability in Arab world.
3. Kuwait	Delegate	Unknown	
4. Lebanon	Delegate	Unknown; possibly President Charles Hilu	Newly elected President; pro-West, admirer of things French.
5. Saudi Arabia	Unknown	Unknown; but probably not Prince Faysal	
6. Syria	Delegate	Unknown; probably not Chief of State Amin al-Hafiz, but possibly Prime Minister Salah al-Bitar	Moderate member of the ruling, socialist Ba'th Party; bitterly anti-US on Israel policy; Arab nationalist but in conflict with Nasser.
7. UAR	Delegate	President Jamal Abd al-Nasser	Conference host; Arab nationalist; architect of "Arab socialism" in UAR; anti-British; strong advocate of "neutralist" concepts.
8. Yemen	Delegate	Unknown; probably President Abdullah al-Sallal, health permitting	Sallal is Yemen's first President; admirer and follower of UAR's Nasser.

Attendance at Second Non-Aligned Conference - CAIRO,
October 5 - Information to September 3, 1964

Invited	Intentions	Representative	Political leanings of representative
EUROPE			
1. Austria	Not attending		
2. Finland	Observer	Osmo Lennart Orkomies, Ambassador to UAR	Career FSO; politically colorless.
3. Sweden	Not attending		
EAST EUROPE			
1. Yugoslavia	Delegate	Not announced: probably Tito and Foreign Minister Koca Popovic	Conference Co-sponsor

Invited	Intentions*	Representative	Political leanings of representative
AFRICA			
1. Algeria	Delegate	President Ahmed Ben Bella	Radical leaning; close relations with Soviets and Nasser. Non-alignment open to question.
2. Burundi	Likely not attending		
3. Cameroon ¹	"		
4. Chad	"		
5. Central African Republic	"		
6. Congo (Brazzaville)	Delegate	Probably President Massamba-Debat	Leftward-leaning. Will support pro-east resolutions.
7. Congo (Leopoldville)	Likely not attending		
8. Dahomey	"		
9. Ethiopia	Delegate	Emperor Haile Selassie	Independent statesman; personally friendly to Tito, but suspicious of Nasser; sympathetic to the West on Cold War Issues.

*Speculative, except in the cases of Ghana and Ethiopia.

1. Might attend although no official confirmation.

Invited	Intentions*	Representative	Political leanings of representative
AFRICA			
10. Gabon	Likely not attending		
11. Ghana	Delegate	President Kwame Nkrumah	Radical; pro-East; can be expected to support strong anti-West resolutions.
12. Guinea	Delegate	Probably President Sekou Toure	Radical but will probably be more restrained on anti-West motions than Nkrumah.
13. Ivory Coast ¹	Likely not attending		
14. Kenya	Delegate	Possibly Prime Minister Kenyatta	Left of center, but not pro-East on cold-war issues.
15. Liberia	Delegate	President Tubman	Moderate, pro-West.
16. Libya	Delegate	Foreign Minister or Ambassador to Cairo	Moderate, even pro-West, but will follow ruling Arab-African consensus.
17. Malagasy Republic	Likely not attending		
18. Malawi	Delegate	Probably Prime Minister Kamuzu H. Banda	Moderate, but can be expected to support resolutions condemning remnants of colonialism in Southern Africa.

¹ Might attend although no official confirmation.

* Speculative, except in the cases of Ghana and Ethiopia.

Invited	Intentions*	Representative	Political leanings of representative
AFRICA			
19. Mali	Delegate	President Mobido Keita (if not on state visit to Communist China)	Radical; can be expected to support pro-East resolutions.
20. Mauritania	Delegate	President Mokhtar ould Daddah	Middle of the road on East-West issues.
21. Morocco	Delegate	Foreign Minister or Ambassador to Cairo	Moderate, pro-West but will avoid isolation on matters of indifferent concern to Morocco.
22. Niger	Likely not attending ¹		
23. Nigeria	Delegate	Foreign Minister or Ambassador to Cairo	Moderate, but will not want to take position contrary to strong African opinion.
24. Rwanda	Likely not attending		
25. Senegal	Delegate	President Leopold Senghor or Foreign Minister	Moderate who can be expected to support suggestions for reducing Cold War confrontations in Africa.
26. Sierra Leone	Likely not attending		

* Speculative, except in the cases of Ghana and Ethiopia

1 Might attend although no official confirmation.

Invited	Intentions*	Representative	Political leanings of representative
AFRICA			
27. Somalia	Delegate	Foreign Minister or Ambassador to Cairo ¹	Representatives will probably try to use conference to gain support for their territorial claims.
28. Sudan	Delegate	Foreign Minister or Ambassador to Cairo	Probably will lean towards support of pro-East resolutions, if this is Arab-African consensus.
29. Togo	Likely not attending		
30. Tunisia	Delegate	President Habib Bourguiba	Moderate, pro-Western inclined.
31. Uganda	Delegate	Probably Prime Minister Milton Obote	Left of center on cold war issues but non-aligned.
32. United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar	Delegate	Possibly President Julius Nyerere	Middle of the road, but will probably support a number of pro-East resolutions, especially on elimination of remnants of colonialism in Southern Africa.
33. Upper Volta	Likely not attending ²		

* Speculative, except in the cases of Ghana and Ethiopia.
 1. Prime Minister might attend
 2. Might attend although no official confirmation

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5. Right accorded through no official communication
I. Prime Minister might attend
* Speculation, except in the case of Spain and Britain.

33. Upper level likely not attending

Chairman
Secretary and
Public of
United

35. Delegate

Secretary Africa.
of members of committee in
sessions, especially on information
and a number of pro-East re-
middle of the day, but will probably

31. Uganda Delegate

Wilson Group
Probably Prime Minister

but non-attending.
level of center on cold war issues

30. Delegate

President Harry Truman

probably pro-Western inclined.

32. Logo likely not attending

China

is very different course.
of pro-East resolutions, it this
probably will turn towards support

38. Spain Delegate

Foreign Minister of Ambassador

to Berlin

Foreign Minister of Ambassador

for their territorial claims.
to use conference to help support
Representatives will probably try

39. Poland Delegate

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ADLINA

Typed

International

Representative

Washington Field Office

RECEIVED
M. S. C.



SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

23

July 30, 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KOMER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Bob:

In view of your interest in the subject matter I attach copy of guidance we have sent to field on the Second Non-Aligned and Second Afro-Asian Conferences.

I also attach copy of statement which President Kennedy addressed to Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade in September 1961.

Similar action this time should probably be considered.

Bill

William J. Jordan

Attachment:

As stated.

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By RG/cpl, NARA, Date 4-10-06

JUL 31 1964

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By R 6/30/14, NARA, Date 4-10-06

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ALL AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS
ALL POLADS

Department of State

Second Non-Aligned and Second Afro-Asian Conferences
CirTel 1695, March 14, 1964

SUMMARY:

Preparatory meetings held this Spring decided that the Second Non-Aligned Conference would be held at the chiefs-of-state level in Cairo in the first week in October 1964; and that the Second Afro-Asian Conference would take place at the chiefs-of-state level in March 1965 at an African site to be named. These are meetings on the government level and not to be confused with meetings sponsored by the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), a front organization of communists, radical leftists, and assorted anti-Western nationalists in which the communist influence is generally predominant.

Objective this airgram is (1) to bring all posts up-to-date on the pertinent facts concerning each conference; (2) to provide a current estimate of what each conference will mean to the United States; (3) to provide further guidance as to the public position and rationale which should be adopted toward these conferences; (4) to indicate in more detail the approach which might be taken with local officials in furtherance of our interests.

Department appreciates the useful and informative reporting on local attitudes toward, and preparations for, these conferences. Posts are urged to continue reporting pertinent information.

Specific

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M - RHWhite:fjm 7/28/64
(in draft) EUR-Mr. Friedman USIA-Mr. Hanson S/AL-Amb. Thompson
ARA-Mr. Lister P-Mr. Lisle FE-Mr. Watts INR-Mrs. Morehouse AF-Mr. Olds
NEA-Mr. Lee S/S-

JUL 31 1964

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- 2 -

Specific action suggested for all posts, except those in ARA, accredited to governments that plan to send representatives to either one or both conferences. ARA posts being furnished separate instructions re Second Non-Aligned Conference.

I. Second Non-Aligned Conference:

Pertinent details: The preparatory meeting for the second Non-Aligned Conference was held in Colombo, March 23-28. Twenty-three nations were represented on the ambassadorial level, including Cuba. Bolivia and Brazil attended as observers.

The conference will be held in Cairo during the first week in October, 1964. Foreign Ministers' meeting will precede main conference. The first agenda item could include any given situation -- "General Discussion of International Situation". Specific agenda items of note: (1) codification of co-existence principles by UN, (2) colonialism, neo-colonialism, and imperialism, (3) racial discrimination and policy of Apartheid, (4) general and complete disarmament, (5) prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests, (6) nuclear free zones, (7) prevention of dissemination of nuclear weapons and abolition of all nuclear weapons, (8) military pacts, foreign troops and bases, (9) problems of divided countries.

Invitations reportedly being sent to 69 countries. These include: 25 represented at the Belgrade Conference in 1961; the OAU countries; participants in the summit meeting of Arab states in Cairo in January; Angola provisional government; and other provisional governments and "countries involved in national liberation movements", provided Belgrade participants concur. Ten Latin American countries included as invitees -- Cuba, Jamaica, Trinidad, Brazil, Bolivia, Mexico, Chile, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina.

Participants at the March Colombo preparatory meeting: Afghanistan, Algeria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo, (Leopoldville), Cuba, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, U.A.R., Yemen, Yugoslavia, Bolivia (Observer), Brazil (Observer).

Estimate of Significance for U.S.

Although both conferences will furnish platforms for attacks on the West, and will propagate national liberation movements, developments since the two preparatory meetings reaffirm our previous estimate (discussed in Part II below) that the Afro-Asian conference will be considerably more detrimental to U.S. policy interests than the Non-Aligned Conference. This judgement is primarily based on the fact

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that neither ChiComs nor Soviets will be represented at the latter.

While not involved in these conferences, the U.S. Government is very much interested in any sincere and constructive effort to lessen world tensions and to strengthen independence in all parts of the world. Except where the U.S. is involved in a system of defensive alliances, genuine non-alignment is not incompatible with present U.S. interests (although such a concept certainly is inconsistent with the avowed goals of Communist governments and movements throughout the world). At the same time, Communists and so-called neutralists must be prevented from exploiting non-alignment concepts, slogans, and activities in such a way as to weaken present alliances, and to increase Communist prestige, influence and penetration. Thus, the public and private explanation of our policy towards the Second Non-Aligned Conference requires a different approach and emphasis in Latin America than in many parts of Africa and Asia.

In this latter connection, the following are some of the grounds for opposing Latin American participation:

1. Members of the inter-American system, including the U.S., are bound together by a body of agreements, including the Rio Treaty by which signatories agreed to regard an attack on one as an attack on all, and thus are clearly aligned. Further, Article 5 of the OAS Charter commits members to "political organization on the basis of effective exercise of representative democracy".
2. Cuba's participation as representative of non-alignment in Latin America makes the presence of countries which have been the target of Castro's intervention, aggression, and subversion that much more incongruous, especially since the July 26 OAS Resolution is expected to complete the hemispheric ostracism of Cuba.
3. If other Latin American countries attend they will be linked with Castro in ceremonies and communiques. This applies equally for any that feel the role of "observer" might be a compromise solution.
4. Other forums are available for discussion of agenda items of mutual interest among Africa, Asia, and Latin America, particularly through the United Nations and its affiliated agencies.

Since Latin American participation involves special problems, and because the Department wishes to coordinate further representations in that area, Latin American posts will be sent a separate instruction on this subject.

Educative

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Educative Diplomacy: In conversation with local officials, you may, in your discretion, point out the following: (Primarily for use with governments planning to have representatives at Conference).

--U.S. aware of importance (the country concerned) places on principles of non-alignment. It should be recalled that President Kennedy sent to Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Belgrade in 1961 a message which read in part:

"The peoples represented at Belgrade are committed to achieving a world of peace in which nations have the freedom to choose their own political and economic systems, and to live their own way of life, and since our earliest beginnings this nation has shared that commitment".

--U.S. certainly not averse to genuine non-alignment. Our friendly relations with many non-aligned nations throughout the world attest to this. U.S. feels, however, Cuban participation at Conference is a travesty on "non-alignment" label and tends to raise serious doubts as to real motives and validity of avowed conference objectives. Containment of Castro at such conference would be impossible; as entire world aware, he generates own dynamics and publicity.

--U.S. looks to (country concerned) to play positive role in conference among advocates of constructive approach and moderation.

--An objective Non-Aligned Conference, that considers the problems of our time in the spirit indicated, could form a basis for constructive approach which responsible governments in Africa and Asia could follow in other forums.

II. Second Afro-Asian Conference:

Pertinent Details: A Second Bandung meeting has been the subject of proposals for some time, particularly by Indonesia. Chou En-lai actively promoted the idea during his Asian-African trip and was successful in soliciting considerable support for such a meeting. The break Indonesia had been awaiting came on December 15, 1963, when Pakistan FM Ayub endorsed the idea.

The preparatory meeting for this conference was held in Djakarta, April 10-15, 1964. The official communique (Attachment "A") listed the 22 participants, the agenda for the second conference, and the fact

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- 5 -

that it will start on March 10, 1965, in an African capital to be named by the OAU, probably Algiers according to present indications.

Estimate of Significance for U.S.: As was pointed out above, the Second Afro-Asian Conference is expected to be considerably more detrimental to U.S. policy interests than the Second Non-Aligned Conference.

At the same time, the effectiveness of an Afro-Asian Conference will also be in question, mainly because the Soviet-Chicom quarrel already overshadows the preparations. Both Moscow and Peiping are trying to use this conference largely to increase their respective influence in the Afro-Asian world. The Soviets have apparently lost the first round but from their tactics it is obvious they are determined to be in attendance. At the preparatory meeting in Djakarta no agreement could be reached on Soviet participation, proposed by India and Ceylon. The opponents, led by the Chicoms, argued that the USSR is not an Asian nation. This question, in the interim, has been bitterly fought by both Communist sides, with the Soviets charging the Chicoms among other things with introducing the racial issue. The issue is clear: which one of the two chief Communist contestants is to have the major influence in Asia and Africa. (See CA's 11773, May 12, 1964 and 12605, June 2, 1964.) The Soviets are working hard to get such influential figures as Nasser and Ben Bella to support their participation in the Conference.

The Conference will certainly not benefit by this quarrel. Also, the Conference will have to cope with other differences (Indonesia and Malaysia, India and Pakistan, etc.) which will stand in the way of reaching unanimity in the proceedings.

Public Position and Rationale: Posts should avoid focusing specifically on the Second Afro-Asian Conference at this juncture. We should be careful not to give it undue recognition and publicity. We can presume that internal frictions which now plague the projected conference will magnify and furnish even more concrete points for exploitation in due course.

Educative Diplomacy: (Primarily for use with governments planning to have representatives attend) - In private conversations with local

officials,

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- 6 -

officials, you may in your discretion, warn against the inherent danger areas and pitfalls in a conference that is threatened by an inter-Communist squabble.

We should warn that all indications show that the participants in the Conference will become involved, either actively or as pawns, in a major international Communist power struggle which might widen the divisions between African and Asian nations and between nations of conflicting interests in each of the two areas.

It should be pointed out that most Afro-Asian nations will have an opportunity to discuss their problems at earlier Non-Aligned Conference in Cairo, and that a forum for Afro-Asian discussions also exists in the U.N.

If asked for advice by local leaders on which Conference to attend, you may point out that the two Conferences may be in conflict and that the risks of becoming an instrument of Communist designs are greater at the Afro-Asian Conference.

U.S. looks to responsible governments planning to attend the Afro-Asian Conference to play a constructive role in resolving international problems, and to offset the radical or negative approach which may be expected from some quarters and which would tend to exacerbate problems rather than solve them.

If question inclusion representative National Front for Liberation of South Viet-Nam at Second conference should arise, we believe favorable consideration, even as an observer, could give unwarranted international status to group which have no international standing and is merely subversive puppet of North Vietnamese authorities.

Attachment:

(A) Official Communique.

Group 3.

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ATTACHMENT A

OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE

Joint communique issued by the ministerial preparatory meeting for the Second Afro-Asian Conference

(Text) I: At the invitation of the government of the Republic of Indonesia and in accordance with the suggestion of the Afro-Asian conference held in Bandung in the month of April 1955 that the five sponsoring countries, in consultation with the participating nations, consider the holding of subsequent conference meetings, the representatives of the following Afro-Asian nations met in Djakarta from 10 to 15 April 1964 to make preparations for a second conference:

- 1--Afghanistan; 2--Algeria; 3--Cambodia; 4--Cameroon; 5--Ceylon; 6--the CPR; 7--Ethiopia; 8--Ghana; 9--Guinea; 10--India; 11--Indonesia; 12--Iran; 13--Iraq; 14--Liberia; 15--Morocco; 16--Nepal; 17--Pakistan; 18--the Philippines; 19--Syria; 20--Tanganyika; 21--the UAR.

Imbued with the Bandung spirit of Afro-Asian solidarity and guided by the Dasasila (10 Principles--ed.) adopted by the first Afro-Asian conference, consultations were held in a friendly manner.

II: It was unanimously reaffirmed that at this juncture in international developments, the convening of a Second Afro-Asian Conference is of paramount importance.

The first conference having been held in Asia, it was decided that the Second Afro-Asian Conference be held in Africa on 10 March 1965 at the level of heads of state and heads of government and that the selection of the government which will serve as host to the conference be left to the Organization of African Unity.

It was decided that a meeting of foreign ministers be held immediately before and in conjunction with the Second Afro-Asian Conference and that this meeting should pay special attention to the question of economic development and cooperation.

It was also decided to recommend that the governments of the countries invited to the Second Afro-Asian Conference who are represented at the U.N. Trade and Development Conference instruct their delegations in Geneva to convene a meeting at the close of the U.N. conference to review and evaluate its results in the light of the provisional agenda of the Second Afro-Asian Conference for the purpose of formulating

recommendations

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recommendations with regard to economic problems. Afro-Asian countries not represented at the U.N. conference should be invited to take part in a similar meeting.

III: In accordance with the spirit of the first Afro-Asian conference in Bandung in 1955 and taking into consideration the significant increase in the number of free states and countries in Asia and Africa since the holding of that conference and their increasingly important role in international problems, the meeting decided that the objectives of the Second Afro-Asian Conference would be as follows:

1--To promote and strengthen mutual understanding and friendship among the nations and peoples of Asia and Africa and further to exchange experiences and information for their common benefit.

2--To attain common understanding of the basic problems arising out of the revolutionary changes which have been taking place in all fields in the lives of the peoples in Asia and Africa in their struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism, for the achievement of full and complete national independence.

3--To search for appropriate methods to insure continuous and close cooperation among Afro-Asian countries for the development of Afro-Asian solidarity on the basis of equality, mutual respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs.

4--To make policies for the peaceful settlement of disputes and for the renunciation of threats or use of force in international relations.

5--To revive the spiritual heritage of the Asian and African peoples and to exploit fully their natural resources so as to utilize them for their moral and material advancement and the development of their national identities on the basis of political sovereignty, economic self-reliance, and cultural self-assertion.

6--To formulate guiding principles and to devise practical measures which will: A) further inspire the peoples of Asia and Africa in their continuing struggle against all forms of colonialism, racial discrimination and foreign economic exploitation; B) secure the restoration of their lawful rights of domicile to populations evicted from their ancestral homes as a result of imperialist and colonialist designs and also in violation of human rights; C) insure complete emancipation of countries which are still under foreign domination, thereby enabling

Asian and African countries to play their legitimate role in this changing world in a constructive and progressive manner toward justice, prosperity, and peace among nations, based on respect for basic human rights and international law.

7--To strengthen economic, social, and cultural cooperation among Asian and African countries as a means of consolidating and strengthening their independence and raising the standards of living of their peoples.

IV: In accordance with the objectives referred to above, it was agreed to adopt the following provisional agenda for the Second Afro-Asian Conference:

1--General review of the international situation in the light of the first Afro-Asian conference and an appraisal of Dasasila of Bandung.

2--Decolonization and the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism.

3--Human rights: A) racial discrimination and apartheid; B) genocide.

4--World peace and disarmament: A) strict international control; B) prohibition of all types of nuclear and thermonuclear tests; C) nondissemination of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons; D) creation of nuclear free zones; E) complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons.

5--The peaceful settlement of international disputes and the renunciation of threats or use of force in international relations: A) basic principles for the settlement of Afro-Asian disputes.

6--The strengthening of the United Nations: A) review of the U.N. Charter; B) observance of the principles and purposes of the U.N. Charter; C) implementation of U.N. resolutions by its members.

7--Economic development and cooperation: A) review of the results of the U.N. conference on trade and development, particularly those concerning the position of Afro-Asian countries vis-a-vis the industrialized countries; B) guiding principles for cooperation among Afro-Asian countries toward economic emancipation.

8--Cultural cooperation.

9--Peaceful

9--Peaceful coexistence: A)guiding principles of peaceful coexistence.

10--The desirability of the establishment of a permanent secretariat to facilitate effective cooperation among Afro-Asian nations.

V: It was decided that the following countries be invited to the Second Afro-Asian Conference:

1--All the 29 countries in Asia and Africa which participated in the Bandung Conference;

2--Countries in Africa which are members of the Organization of African Unity.

3--Countries in Asia and Africa which will become independent between now and the convening of the Second Afro-Asian Conference;

4--The following: Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, Cyprus, Kuwait, West Samoa, the Provisional Government of Angola.

Representatives of all national movement from non-selfgoverning territories recognized by the Organization of African Unity in Africa and from Asia which have not yet attained independence may attend the conference with the right to be heard and the host country is requested to provide facilities for their attendance. This provision also applies to South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Oman, Aden, and Palestine.

Concerning the composition of the Second Afro-Asian conference:

1--It was proposed that an invitation be extended to the Soviet Union. Some delegations supported and others opposed the proposal to extend an invitation to the Soviet Union. A number of delegations stated that they needed consultation with their governments. After discussion no consensus could be reached. Some delegations were of the view that the matter may be placed before the heads of states and governments at the Second Afro-Asian Conference for their consideration. Some other delegations were against submitting this matter to the heads of states and governments at the Second Afro-Asian Conference for their consideration. Therefore, no agreement was reached.

2--It was also proposed that an invitation be extended to Malaysia. In this case, it was hoped that the obstacles which prevented reaching an agreement on the invitation would be eliminated. In this case, an invitation should be extended as soon as possible. Some countries that

recognized

recognized Malaysia stated their position that Malaysia is fully entitled to an invitation and should be invited.

VI: The meeting unanimously expressed the hope that the Second Afro-Asian Conference, like the first conference held in Bandung, would make a significant contribution to the solidarity and complete emancipation of the Afro-Asian countries as well as to the growth of friendly cooperations among nations, the promotion of universal respect for human rights, and attainment of lasting peace.

VII: The participants expressed their deep appreciation of the initiative taken by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia in convening the preparatory meeting, the excellent arrangements made, and the gracious hospitality extended to them by the host government.

PRESIDENT SENDS MESSAGE TO CONFERENCE OF NONALIGNED NATIONS
AT BELGRADE

Following is the text of a message from President Kennedy which was read on September 1 at the opening session of the Conference of Nonaligned Nations meeting at Belgrade.

It is always encouraging when responsible world leaders join together to consider the problems that beset mankind. We recognize that most of the countries at Belgrade do not consider themselves committed on certain of the issues which confront us today. But we do know that they are committed to the United Nations Charter. The people of the United States share this commitment. We know that those gathering in Belgrade are committed to finding a way to halt the waste of the earth's resources in the building of the implements of death and destruction, and the people of the United States have constantly pledged themselves to this goal.

We believe that the peoples represented at this conference are committed to a world society in which men have the right and freedom to determine their own destiny, a world in which one people is not enslaved by the other, and in which the powerful do not devour the weak. The American people share that commitment. We have pledged the influence of this nation to the abolition of exploitation in all of its forms. The peoples represented at Belgrade are committed to achieving a world of peace in which nations have the freedom to choose their own political and economic systems, and to live their own way of life, and since our earliest beginnings this nation has shared that commitment.

All this and much more the leaders of Belgrade have in common. This and much more the people of the United States have in common with them. So for myself, and I am sure for the American people, I express the hope that their deliberations there will bring us all nearer these goals.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

- ~~BUNDY-SMITH~~
- ~~ALEXANDER~~
- ~~BELK~~
- Research Memorandum
- INR-8, February 11, 1964
- ~~DINGEMAN~~
- ~~DUNCAN~~
- ~~FOUNTAIN~~
- ~~JESSUP~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
- ~~KOMER~~
- ~~SALINGER~~
- ~~SAUNDERS~~

Non aligned
S.C.D.F.

TO : The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM : INR - George C. Denney, Jr.

SUBJECT: The Non-Aligned and Bandung Conferences: A Side-Soviet Tug-of-War

Preparations are under way for two summer conferences involving most of the countries of Asia and Africa, which have now acquired overtones of the contest between the Soviet Union and Communist China for predominant influence in these areas. We assess the chances of the conferences' taking place, their probable tone, and their possible effect on important issues confronting the US.

ABSTRACT

The ideas of a second meeting of the African, Asian and Near Eastern countries that convened at Bandung in 1955, and of a second round of the 1961 Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Nations have been broached annually for some time. Until recently, there was little interest in either proposal. When Chou En-lai on his recent trip through Africa and South Asia began actively promoting II Bandung, India and (very circumspectly) the USSR threw their weight behind the Non-Aligned meeting proposed by the UAR and Yugoslavia, in the vain hope of heading off II Bandung. It now seems almost certain that both conferences will take place, filling the summer and fall with a spate of anti-Western propoganda. II Bandung promises to be the more harmful from the US point of view. At the moment II Bandung has greater momentum; it may convene earlier and dim the lustre of the Non-Aligned

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3-year intervals.
Declassified 12 years after
date of origin.

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conclave, which is tentatively scheduled for September with a preparatory Foreign Ministers' session in May. The conferences will bracket the active election campaign period in the US, and their doings may be reflected domestically -- e.g. in new demands for limitations on foreign aid.

Three issues of importance to the US will be prominent topics at one or both of the conferences: Panama, the Indian Ocean Task Force, and Cyprus. Neither conference has the means of foreclosing any course of action that the US may choose to take on any of these matters. They can and will focus on them a withering drumfire of propaganda, effective in proportion as the issues remain unsettled at that time. At best, US motives will be systematically misconstrued; at worst, US plans could be hindered at a delicate point. The harm that may befall these immediate US concerns is a function more of the timing than the fact of the conferences, and it can be partly offset by alert diplomacy in the interim.

The CPR, especially in the wake of the French recognition, is likely to have a good deal of success campaigning for new recognitions and for a seat in the UN. At II Bandung, China and Pakistan probably will work together to mousetrap India on both Kashmir and the Sino-Indian quarrel, with consequent damage to India's prestige in Asia and to its standing as a leading neutral. This, too, is of real concern to the US, indirectly involved in both issues.

Yugoslavia, pursuing its ill-formulated concept of "world integration in favor of peace," is seeking to extend the association of non-aligned powers to others who "technically" have defense ties with the West. Tito has sent personal letters commending the Non-Aligned Conference to the

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Presidents of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, whom he visited last September-October. On the whole, however, Latin American interest in associating themselves with less-developed countries of other continents has declined since 1961 when several of them attended the first Belgrade Conference. Their response is likely to disappoint the sponsors. Of the European neutrals being considered for II Belgrade, only Finland thus far is considering sending an observer.

It is the new nations of Africa and South Asia that respond most enthusiastically to conference opportunities such as these. The prospect is that most of them will attend both meetings. Apart from the opportunity that such occasions always offer to rehearse all their grievances against the West, the cumulative result is likely to be a temporary increase in the popularity and influence of Communist China at the expense of India, the UAR and Yugoslavia (and, of course, the USSR). Both Communist powers stand to lose ground, of course, if the competitive aspect of the two conferences becomes so prominent that the smaller African and Asian states conclude that they have been exploited in the interest of Sino-Soviet infighting. But the Chinese will take great pains to dispel this impression. Their performance at the first Bandung Conference demonstrated how effective they can be in presenting an appearance of reasonableness, flexibility and charm.

In the longer run, the cumulative effect of both meetings will neither greatly help the communist giants nor severely injure the West. Such an open challenge from Peiping may stimulate a larger and more varied Soviet effort in these areas, initially in the sphere of economic and technical aid. But the selfish motives of the principal sponsors may be more easily

recognized in retrospect. Beyond this, the disparate participants will experience again their own individual and regional incompatibility and rediscover the fact that the shared experience of a colonial past is not, after all, an enduring bond of common interest.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Abstract	1
I. The Proposed Conferences	1
II. Major Protagonists and Their Motives	3
A. The Unaligned Group	3
1. UAR	3
2. USSR	4
3. Yugoslavia	5
B. The II Bandung Group	6
1. Communist China	6
2. Indonesia	7
C. Prospective Invitees	8
1. Asian Countries	9
2. Middle East and South Asia	12
3. African Countries	16
4. Latin America	17
5. Europeans	19
III. Special Issues and Problems	20
IV. Probable Outcome: Implications for US Policy	22
ANNEX A	24

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THE NON-ALIGNED AND BANDUNG CONFERENCES: A SINO-SOVIET TUG-OF-WAR

I. THE PROPOSED CONFERENCES

Two major conclaves proposed for the summer of 1964 are shaping up as competitive endeavors related to the Sino-Soviet contest for influence in Asia and Africa. These are the Afro-Asian or "Second Bandung" Conference, and the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations, also called "Second Belgrade" because it follows in the tradition of the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Nations of 1961. Both are projected as heads-of-state conferences, to be preceded by preparatory meetings at the foreign minister level.

The idea of a second Non-Aligned Nations Conference (II Belgrade) was first raised in a joint statement by Nasser and Mme. Bandaranaike on October 14, 1963, at the end of the latter's visit in Cairo. The suggestion was immediately welcomed by India, and Yugoslavia soon associated itself with the sponsorship. Organization has moved rather slowly, however; so far as is known no date for a preparatory meeting has been set, and the conference proper has been talked of as taking place in the fall, perhaps September. It could hardly be ready earlier. No agenda or other specifics have been tackled as yet.

An inter-governmental Afro-Asian meeting similar to the one held in Bandung in 1955 has preoccupied the Indonesians for several years, but until recently the idea was resisted by most of the leading participants at the 1955 conference. The break Indonesia had waited for came when Prime Minister Ayub of Pakistan, leaving Colombo after a visit on December 15, 1963, paid tribute to the "contribution" made by the Bandung Conference and proposed that another such meeting be convened during 1964. Bandaranaike agreed. Indonesian Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio hastened to welcome the suggestion in a press statement two days later. Since then, the Indonesians have reopened their campaign to stage such a conference, with the obvious approval and support of Communist China. The Second Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference (proposed title) will here be called II Bandung, to distinguish it from the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Movement (AAPSO),* with which it has nothing in common except their claim to be derived from the 1955 Bandung Conference.

*AAPSO, a "permanent" organization with headquarters in Cairo, sponsors recurrent "popular" Conferences of delegations ostensibly chosen by Afro-Asian Solidarity Committees in each of the member countries. A Communist-dominated Executive Committee sets policy between full conferences and a separately-administered Fund, located in Conakry, affords help to various "national liberation forces." Sino-Soviet infighting for dominant influence in this organization has been active and obvious. The UAR, one of its original sponsors, has been edged out of effective direction of the organization.

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- 2 -

Thanks to the organizing drive of the Indonesians in this and previous years, preparation for II Bandung is well ahead of the Non-Aligned Conference. Originally, its sponsors pushed for a foreign ministers' meeting in late February or early March but Chou En-lai's extensive trip, among other complications, may postpone the preparatory session about a month to the last of March or first of April. They are working toward a conference during the summer. While II Bandung has developed enough momentum to seem certain of accomplishment, it is just-possible that the sponsors of II Belgrade might pull back if they decide that they will look foolish in the wake of the Bandung session. Even now, this would occasion some loss of face, however. On February 10, Tito announced that foreign ministers would convene in Cairo in April or May to prepare for a full conference in September. At this stage, it seems almost certain that both conferences will take place.

At their inception, these meetings did not seem to be competitive. When Ayub spoke in Colombo, he fully intended to jab at Nasser and at India, and he probably also was aware that his gesture would please Communist China at no cost to Pakistan. Mme. Bandaranaike, however, apparently did not realize that she had made contradictory commitments. Ceylon and several other countries still deny that any conflict is involved, and Nasser at one point tactlessly suggested to Tito that the CPR be invited to the non-aligned parley! Indeed, in the early stages several leaders spoke of the two proposals as if they were only one, and probably were genuinely confused. The contest was not clear until Chou En-lai's press conference December 20 in Cairo. Responding to a routine and apparently innocent query about China's attitude toward the Non-Aligned Conference, he declared flatly that China, an aligned state, could not participate in a conference defined by that criterion. Thereafter, in his travels through Africa, Chou pushed participation in the II Bandung meeting to the point that the CPR has become openly identified as one of its sponsors. The USSR, ineligible to attend either conference but with the possibility of indirectly influencing II Belgrade through the Yugoslavs, has been carefully offhand in its endorsement and its prestige is less involved with the success of the Unaligned conclave. Nevertheless, an increasing air of rivalry, reflecting the Sino-Soviet tension, overspreads the preparations for the two meetings.

There is also a strange aura of shadow-boxing about the competition, because the behind-the-scenes principals -- the USSR and CPR -- do not wish to overstress their differences before this particular audience. Since both of them, in common with most of the prospective invitees, have approved the Bandung Principles, and since neither one wishes to offend the majority of participants who profess non-alignment, no one can speak out against or openly work to defeat either conference. The invitees on their part -- even those who would prefer that no such conference be held at all -- will feel constrained to attend for a variety of reasons: to promote or defend special interests, as in the case of India and Pakistan; to avoid stigma or isolation, as Turkey and Iran; to protect influence and commercial interest in the areas

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represented (Japan). In order to avoid offending any of the protagonists, or seeming to take sides in the controversy, most would attend both. (See Chart for prospective attendance pattern, Annex I.) Only if the countries solicited became convinced that both gatherings were "not genuine" (i.e., non-indigenous, not sincerely addressed to regional interests, and merely projections of the Sino-Soviet contest), and if they further had assurance that many others in their region would refuse to attend, would a substantial number of Asians or Africans decline their invitations. Even then, curiosity and the pleasure of taking part in large international gatherings might outweigh their pique at being used as pawns in the Sino-Soviet contest.

In addition to the two major Conferences, several lesser gatherings of Asians and Africans have been proposed. Nkrumah has suggested a second convention of the 1962 Colombo conferees on the Sino-Indian border situation (Ceylon, UAR, Ghana, Burma, Indonesia, Cambodia). It now seems likely that this group might meet concurrently with one of the larger sessions if they meet at all, since all of the Colombo powers would be attending both. Several of the groups subordinate to the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement also will hold forth this summer, notably the Afro-Asian Journalists in Algiers, possibly in April, and an Afro-Asian Trade Unions Conference in Bandung or Jakarta of uncertain date. The AAPSO organizations are "peoples' " conferences of delegates drawn from a welter of nationalist and leftist organizations and communist fronts. They have no governmental significance, and no connection with the conferences under discussion.

II. MAJOR PROTAGONISTS AND THEIR MOTIVES

A. The Unaligned Group

1. UAR

Nasser obviously would prefer to have only a non-aligned conference, in which the UAR would play a major role in the stage management, but he cannot afford to ignore II Bandung if the conference takes place. Nasser regards the 1961 Belgrade Conference as one of his major successes in the field of conference diplomacy and would like to repeat the experience. He has a very large stake in promoting the usefulness and respectability of non-alignment, on which his own political reputation is built. He will be gratified if the non-aligned grouping turns out to have wide representation, and will try to claim that the reduction in East-West tensions has been due chiefly to efforts of non-aligned leaders.

The UAR will be aware that if a preceding II Bandung ends on a note of revolutionary fervor, II Belgrade, to succeed, will have to maintain the zeal and elan. The only common denominator in a gathering of this kind is the theme of anti-imperialism, and Nasser will try to focus this against the principal targets of his own area policy, in particular Western support of Israel, the NATO base on Cyprus, and the UK presence in Aden and the Persian Gulf.

The UAR cannot stay away from II Bandung without abandoning its claim to leadership among African nations. While Nasser will do nothing to encourage a second Bandung, he (unlike Yugoslavia and India) will probably avoid trying actively to block it. If the Conference takes place, the UAR will want to participate. The conference comes at a time when Nasser has become convinced of the wisdom of maintaining balanced "neutrality" between the USSR and the CPR, as he has between the Communist world and the West.* He is distrustful of Chinese motives particularly in Africa. Nevertheless, he probably will urge other African and Asian countries to develop relations with China, at the same time privately warning them to be watchful. In return for CPR support of Arab positions, the UAR may support the Chinese position on issues that do not directly concern the Near East, such as Formosa.

2. USSR

Moscow badly needs a spectacular success with Africans and Asians -- one that will demonstrate to Khrushchev's opponents at home and elsewhere in the communist world that his approach to the less-developed countries has as much drawing-power as that of the Chinese. The Soviet leadership probably would not have chosen a neutralist conference in which it cannot participate directly as the testing-ground. At the same time, however, Moscow is sensitive to the aspirations of the neutralist countries, wants to exploit these aspirations for Soviet purposes, and certainly wishes, if possible, to avoid offending them. The Soviet tactic, therefore, is not openly to oppose any particular neutralist forum but to support instead the particular type of gathering which will best serve Soviet interests. In the present instance, in fact, they have expressed themselves in favor of both -- II Bandung when speaking to the Indonesians, and a nonaligned conference in the course of conversations with the Tanganyikan Government during Chou En-lai's tour of Africa.

Nevertheless, II Belgrade has all of the advantages from the Soviet point of view. It excludes the Chinese, and would be susceptible to influence by the Tito regime which, though independent and with its own special interests to pursue, now maintains the most cordial relations ever with the Soviets and ardently championed Soviet interests at the Belgrade nonaligned conference in September 1961. Unlike the Chinese, who have no such like-minded spokesman, the USSR can continue to maintain a benign posture toward both conclaves without openly committing itself to either. It prefers such neutralist anti-Western demonstrations to have a look of spontaneity; also, there will be less damage if the poorly-timed Non-Aligned gathering comes off badly.

*The development of UAR-CPR relations are discussed in detail in Research Memorandum RNA-4.

The Soviets will have sufficient advocates to plant their views at both councils. They probably will seek to have emphasized those anti-Western issues on which there will be wide consensus among the Afro-Asians, and which do not bring the Sino-Soviet split into sharp relief: e.g. the proposed US Indian Ocean task force, the Panama Canal issue, and the inevitable "political influence" that accompanies Western assistance. They will also wish to introduce their views on disarmament.

3. Yugoslavia

The Yugoslavs, although still no doubt subscribing to the "Bandung principles," now look with disfavor and, reportedly, even distress upon a second Bandung conference primarily because of its sponsorship in part by the Communist Chinese. They have charged that the chief aim of Chou's trip was to persuade Africans to support a new Bandung conference and prevent a nonaligned one.

The Yugoslavs have now given up their hope of heading off II Bandung altogether. They are already concerned that that session, which is nearly certain to come first, will rob II Belgrade of vitality by preempting the anti-imperialist and neo-colonialist issues, leaving the Unaligned grouping to a stale rehash, plus the more general issues -- disarmament, East-West tensions -- that have little appeal to the Afro-Asians. Despite vigorous diplomatic "politiking" denigrating the Chinese professions of peaceful coexistence as "hypocritical" and indicting their motives as "racist," the Yugoslavs are being outmaneuvered and are exercising less than a determining influence in the pre-conference negotiations. Even more disquieting is the fact that their close neutralist collaborators have taken tacks in different directions: Sukarno has remained undeterred in efforts in behalf of II Bandung, which is causing Belgrade particular concern; Nehru is committed, though reluctantly, to going to the meeting, while Nasser is pursuing his own tactical advantage with the Chinese. Yugoslavia is therefore under some pressure to come up with a "spectacular," to prevent loss of face. Its influence with the non-aligned and emerging countries is Yugoslavia's one claim to an independent foreign policy, and a great asset as well in its relations with the USSR. Yugoslavia will want at a minimum to maintain the momentum of the 1961 Belgrade Conference, to prevent open defections from among the countries who attended in 1961, and to preserve the lustre of "non-alignment" as a desirable policy. It may try to broaden the conference as much as possible to give the impression that nonalignment is gaining ground among Asian allies of the West and even in the Western preserves of Europe and South America. It has suggested that the conference might include Japan, Iran and the Latin American and Scandinavian countries.

Yugoslavia will argue that relaxation of cold war tensions makes non-alignment less risky than before, and will seek to dispel the notion that it may also be less profitable. There does not seem to be complete agreement among some sponsors of the Conference (UAR, Ceylon, India) with the

Yugoslav proposals that the scope of the conference be broadened to provide for additional subjects on the agenda and additional nations in attendance. The Yugoslavs hold that in addition to the topics of the 1961 conference -- peaceful coexistence, nuclear test-ban, disarmament, Germany and Berlin, aid to underdeveloped nations, and colonialism -- there also should be consideration of means by which nonaligned countries can contribute to international peace efforts. Under this heading, the Yugoslavs probably have in mind introducing some elaboration of the rather incoherent "new" concept of unalignment that was a feature of Tito's recent trip through Latin America, which stresses the theme "world integration in favor of peace." Informally, Yugoslavia hopes to use the conference to push its current salient foreign policy positions, including support of India and "exposing" the policies of Peiping.

B. The II Bandung Group

1. Communist China

To the CPR, a Bandung-type conference climaxing Chou En-lai's recent excursion in personal diplomacy represents a strong bid for influence based on normal intergovernmental relations in uncommitted Asia and Africa and perhaps also Latin America. If the first such gathering in which the CPR has evident interest (it may or may not be among the formal sponsors) results in the attendance of a large number of heads of state, China will already have a spectacular success: up to now, its approach has been limited to rather scruffy "popular" meetings with a high proportion of completely unrepresentative "delegations" made up of exiles and discredited malcontents. At II Bandung, the Chinese demeanor will be all sweetness and charm, grave attentiveness to others' views, moderation and dignity. Chou is intent on erasing the impression created by the Sino-Soviet dialogue that his regime is boorish and belligerent. He will point out that China, too, believes in coexistence, already embodied in the principles developed at the first Bandung gathering in 1955. Beyond this, he wants to cultivate the greatest possible number of contacts, and to leave an impression of reasonableness and sobriety. He will refrain from racist appeals and from direct attacks on the USSR while subtly conveying the idea that the CPR is a more dependable ally of nations in the throes of modernization, and one whose experience is more relevant to their problems. Aside from a new CPR image, the major Chinese line probably will be the evils and dangers of "colonialism, neocolonialism and imperialism."

Chou En-lai recognizes that a gathering of relatively sophisticated political leaders cannot be stage-managed in the blatant way that an aggregation of leftist organizations can. The conference managers will refrain from closed drafting committees, techniques to choke off debate, and similar means to force an artificial consensus. China is also aware that numerous local and regional quarrels will have to be vented in such a meeting, but such wrangling does not disturb the Communists. In their view, the business of teaching these countries that they do have large

areas of common interest with which the Communist world can identify and the West can not is a long, slow conditioning process. Each gathering, no matter how inharmonious, that rehearses their grievances under sympathetic communist guidance contributes to that process. In any case, the only such issue directly involving China is the Indian border impasse, and on this the Chinese seem resolved to take their lumps if necessary. They can reduce the impact by maneuvering to keep this matter off the formal agenda and by treating it with calm reasonableness.

On the nuclear test ban issue, of course, China could find itself virtually isolated. Most of the conferees have already adhered to the test ban agreement and most, including India, are building or modernizing their own military establishments and would not accept the Chinese formula of complete disarmament. If only because the Indians will want to raise it in defensive maneuver, the issue can hardly be kept off the floor although the Chinese will try to do so. The CPR no doubt is prepared to handle this matter, as they did at the Nicosia session of AAPSO, by clearly and firmly stating their position and maneuvering from the background to limit and soft-pedal the discussion. They will not seek a condemnation of the ban or press any other stand that would emphasize the difference of view from the other conferees.

2. Indonesia

To the Indonesian government, conferences such as the long-desired II Bandung are meant to further the image, both within Indonesia and in the international sphere, of Djakarta as an important capital of the Afro-Asian world. Consequently, Indonesian enthusiasm is largely conditioned by the Indonesian assumption that the conference will be held in Djakarta and Bandung. Indonesia can be expected to oppose violently any attempt to hold the conference in another country, and would probably attempt to organize a rival conference if another site were chosen. Indeed, about the only chance that II Bandung might still fail or not take place lies in a late wrangle over the site. Indonesia no doubt already has Chinese assent to its promoting of Djakarta and Bandung, as well as the precedent of the 1955 Bandung meeting. Moreover, China probably now has a large enough stake in a big, successful II Bandung to offer, through Indonesia, to pay travel expenses for the poorer countries who might be deterred by the distance.

Indonesia is aware of the ideological differences between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists, and is aware that the Chinese support the conference in hopes of advancing their own positions among African and Asian nations at the expense of the Soviets. However, Indonesia is not directly concerned with this dispute at present, and in order to further its own desire for an Afro-Asian conference is willing to act as catspaw for the Chicoms in organizing it. At the conference Indonesia will support the CPR in most of its program largely because of the strong "anti-colonialist" tinge of the program, including condemnation of Malaysia

as a "neo-colonialist" plot of the British. Indonesian attention will be absorbed in securing support for its Malaysia confrontation among the conference participants, and will seek to have the Malaysians and the British branded as aggressors.

Indonesia will try to stave off a Belgrade-type meeting as long as this seems feasible. Indonesian officials argue that the problems of the cold war are not currently as important as the problems of imperialism and colonialism which could be better discussed at a second Bandung conference. Nevertheless, Indonesia will probably not unconditionally reject a non-aligned conference and would reluctantly attend if one were held. At the non-aligned meeting Indonesia would seek to play a leading role and President Sukarno could be expected to remark on all the world's problems. Indonesia would attempt to have its "anti-colonialist" policies incorporated into the resolutions of the conference. If forced to take a position, it would very possibly adopt a viewpoint favoring the Chinese communists in any discussions reflecting the Sino-Soviet differences, prompted not only by its feeling of common objectives with the CPR, but also by its poor relations with India and its belief that India has slipped from its non-aligned position into the Western bloc.

C. Prospective Invitees

Clearly, both sets of sponsors are drawn in two directions on the question of whom to invite and whom to snub. On the one hand, there is temptation to assure harmony by limiting the invitations to more or less like-minded countries; on the other, there is the propaganda value of attracting countries hitherto aligned with the West. The latter motivation seems particularly strong with the Non-Aligned group, and is consistent with the Soviet desire to weaken Western defensive systems. It is also in accord with the new Yugoslav formulation of "world integration in favor of peace," under which the small nations must join, regardless of existing alignments and "membership in blocs," to pressure the US and Soviets into conserving peace, and possibly to propose a small-nation resolution in the UN to "ban war."* Some of the air of unreality that surrounds the conference preliminaries lies in the spectacle of both groups bending the criteria to suit these purposes. Thus, the sponsors of II Belgrade wish to reject the CPR because it is a self-declared aligned country, yet they are assuring Turkey, Iran, and certain South American countries that membership in "military blocs" need not debar them from participating! Similarly, the proponents of II Bandung may or may not feel it necessary to invite all of the 1955 participants including those normally friendly to the West such as Turkey and the Philippines. In a recent interview with Edgar Snow, Chou En-lai inferred that only African and Asian countries would be asked to II Bandung, although the Indonesians are known to have sounded out several Latin American countries. Both groups will probably omit those countries that they wish to stigmatize as Western puppets or hopelessly

*See RSB-1144, November 1, 1963 for statement on Tito's position.

"feudalistic" regimes. Saudi Arabia and the Shaykhdoms, Kuwait, Jordan, Israel, the Philippines, Turkey, South Korea and South Viet Nam are not likely to be invited to either one. Invitation lists are to be made up at the respective preparatory conferences; at this stage, we can only speculate who might be asked.

1. Asian countries

Although Burma was a sponsor of the original Bandung Conference and one of the "Colombo Powers," the present Revolutionary Government headed by General Ne Win has little interest in becoming involved in any international conference if it can be avoided. Burma will not press for convening a conference and would probably prefer to see the whole question dropped, or at least postponed. Burma will, nevertheless, undoubtedly be invited to any conference held and will probably attend rather passively. Burma's present mood is one of xenophobic isolationism. In addition, the 1955 conference was a disillusioning experience, costly in demands upon the time of its limited qualified personnel without compensating satisfactions.

Cambodia. Sihanouk would most probably attend either conference, but would prefer a II Bandung because of Chicom participation. Although he welcomes any forum as useful in expressing Cambodia's viewpoint on her trouble with SVN and Thailand, it is doubtful that he would attend any conference that has the active disapproval of Peking.

Laos, internationally neutralized by the 1962 Geneva Agreements, would probably accept an invitation to send a delegation to either a Non-Aligned or an Afro-Asian conference, or both, if they materialized. Pre-occupied with critical internal problems, however, the RLG would be unlikely to take an active role in preparations for such conferences. Its official delegation would probably be rather nondescript, and its impact on the proceedings negligible.

Even if invited, Malaysia would not accept an invitation to II Bandung as long as Indonesia continues "confrontation" and refuses to recognize Malaysia. It probably would not attend a conference held in a third country if Indonesian influence promised to be dominant. (Malaysia refused to attend the last meeting of ECAFE in Manila because it has no diplomatic relations with the Philippines.) During the first years of its existence, the Federation of Malaya seemed to have an inclination towards a neutral viewpoint in foreign relations. In the last two years, this appears to have changed somewhat. Malaya strongly condemned Chinese aggression against India late in 1962. Should it attend a Non-Aligned meeting in spite of its defense pact with the UK, it probably would continue to support India on the border question. Its position on Kashmir, where another Muslim country is involved, is less certain. The Malaysian Government would be alert to any evidence of communist sponsorship or influence, and would withdraw if the communist role became dominant.

The Philippine Government has a long-standing official policy of non-attendance at communist or communist front-sponsored conferences held in communist countries. In the past year, however, individual Filipinos, several of whom were of left-wing or Communist persuasion, have openly attended communist-tinged Afro-Asian meetings in Djakarta, and President Macapagal has addressed guarded greetings to such meetings largely in an effort to establish closer relations with Afro-Asian countries, particularly Indonesia. Because of Indonesian enthusiasm for II Bandung, therefore, the Philippines will be torn between its traditional pro-Western posture and its efforts to establish an independent Asian identity and to become more closely associated with Afro-Asian states. If invited, the Philippine Government probably will attend, fully aware of all the implications and pitfalls. The Philippines would probably not join in any condemnation of the Indian Ocean Task Force, since it reaps direct security benefits from the presence of the Seventh Fleet. Also the Philippines will endeavor to avoid being entrapped into resolutions sponsored by Communist countries, which are aimed primarily against Western military alliances. However, it will be more receptive to resolutions which concern vestiges of colonialism, neo-colonialism, etc. The Philippines could also be expected to be one of the leaders in endorsing Asian solutions to Asian problems, without Western interference.

If invited, the Philippines might give consideration to attending a Non-Aligned conference held in a neutralist country, but in the end would probably not attend.

Thailand, because of its membership in SEATO, ordinarily would not be eligible to attend a Non-Aligned conference. Under the present elastic rules, however, Thailand might be invited, but, given its present stand on neutralism, would probably not attend. It would almost certainly attend an Afro-Asian Conference even though it would recognize the probability that the conference would be manipulated to forward neutralist or bloc interests. The Thai would hope to moderate the extreme positions which might develop and to maintain its "Asian" identity. They would expound positions which would be favorable from our point of view but it is not likely they would assume a leading role.

Indonesia has invited Japan to attend II Bandung. Japan believes that such a conference is untimely but has refrained from taking a definite position, hoping to avoid having to choose between its association with the West, to which it has heretofore given priority, and its position as a member of the Asian-African community. The Japanese believe a conference can have few constructive results and is likely to be anti-West in tone and disruptive to stability in Southeast Asia. The government is aware of Communist China's leading role, and probably its motives, in organizing the conference. Japan probably hopes the conference will be postponed without Japan's having to take a firm position on attending. Japan would probably feel obliged to attend, and might even assist in preparations, if this appeared necessary to maintain acceptance by, and

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influence in, the Asian-African community. Japan would seek to play a moderating role, dissuading the conference from adopting an anti-West posture, without isolating itself from the majority of the other participants.

North Vietnam attended the first Bandung Conference and would most likely attend a II Bandung. Its relations with Communist China are very close, and Hanoi followed the lead of Peking in opposing the nuclear test ban treaty. However, North Vietnam is not a satellite, and whether it would unreservedly support Peking's views would depend on circumstances of the moment. Hanoi probably would try to obtain observer status for its protégé, the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. Similarly, it might seek a position for the Front at a Non-Aligned conference, but is itself unlikely to attend the latter. Although technically "non-aligned" militarily, Hanoi considers itself a bona fide member of the socialist bloc.

North Korea probably would accept invitations to either conclave or both, if tendered. The possibility of inviting Mongolia has been raised, and the non-attendance of these regimes may ultimately be traded for non-attendance of component states of the USSR.

[REDACTED]

2. Middle East and South Asia

India's size, its traditional role as the "arch-neutral," and the personal prestige of Prime Minister Nehru obviously make it a very important member of both the non-aligned and Afro-Asian groupings. Any international conference whether of the Bandung or of the Belgrade type needs the support, active participation, and if possible co-sponsorship of India, if it is to be of major status.

India does not wish to be a prime mover in the convening of a new conference of either type. In particular, India is firmly opposed to II Bandung, which would give both the Chinese Communists and the Pakistanis a forum for airing their grievances against India and for casting aspersions upon the genuineness of Indian non-alignment. The Indians probably fear that the "reasonable" Chinese approach on the border issue might induce the Colombo powers to revise their proposals along lines more favorable to China. In addition, Indian relations with Indonesia (the principal promoter of a second Bandung) have become strained on a variety of counts over the past few years. The Indian disenchantment with the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity movement, particularly with the chaotic meeting held in February, 1963, in Moshi, more or less carries over to Afro-Asian conclaves in general. They look upon these omnibus meetings as forums for Chinese invective against India and the USSR and are not interested in becoming involved in any more of them. In opposing II Bandung, India argues that there is no Afro-Asian unity at present and that such a conference would produce nothing but acrimony. Only with considerable reluctance has India tentatively agreed to participate in preparatory meetings. Nehru had indicated that India would not even attend a second Bandung together with China as long as the border dispute remained unsettled, but if a substantial number of non-aligned Afro-Asian states make known their intention to participate, India will feel obliged to attend in order to preserve its position within the Afro-Asian movement and to defend itself against Pakistan and China.

India has attached itself to the idea of an Non-Aligned Conference in part, at least, as a means of forestalling II Bandung. Nehru has spoken favorably several times of II Belgrade as a means of coalescing non-aligned opinion and bringing its force to bear in the détente atmosphere that has recently prevailed on the international scene. Nehru has been in personal contact with Nasser, Mrs. Bandaranaike, and Tito -- and perhaps other non-aligned leaders as well -- concerning the convening of II Belgrade and undoubtedly would serve as co-sponsor. The Yugoslavs have suggested New Delhi as the site of the conference; while the Indian reaction to this is not yet known, it would probably be favorable.

Thus far, India's prime concern with the preliminaries for a second Belgrade has been to ensure that the criteria of "non-alignment" are drawn so as to exclude both Pakistan and Communist China. India is also reportedly opposed to the inclusion of Cuba -- officially on the grounds that Cuba has become militarily aligned with the USSR, but also because of Castro's affinity to China.

By treaty, India is responsible for the foreign relations of both Bhutan and Sikkim. Recently, however, China has made direct approaches to Sikkim -- and perhaps also Bhutan -- playing on their desire for more sovereignty. India has rebuffed these attempts. There is a possibility that China will endeavor to have both invited to II Bandung as a means of embarrassing the Indians. Under Indian pressure neither state would respond to such an invitation even if it were tendered. The Chinese, however, could exploit the situation as a propaganda ploy.

Because of the importance to Ceylon of good relations with India, China, and the USSR, Ceylon feels constrained to tread a careful path lest it alienate any of the protagonists in the Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet disputes. Despite recent prodding by Pakistani President Ayub to enlist Ceylonese support for II Bandung, Mrs. Bandaranaike's response has been lukewarm. However, Ceylon would find it difficult to stay away from either meeting. In addition to its fear of being isolated, Ceylon would not want to lose any of the prestige accrued from its leadership in the concerted effort by six non-aligned nations (Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, Indonesia, UAR) to mediate the Sino-Indian dispute a year ago. Ceylon undoubtedly feels more affinity for the Non-Aligned Conference which, along with India, it has done more to propagate.

Nepal would undoubtedly be receptive to invitations to attend "neutralistic" conferences regardless of whether they might be of Belgrade or Bandung type. Conscious of its small size and its unavoidably close association with neighboring India, Nepal would welcome participation because of its desire to underscore its independent and sovereign status. It would not be likely to contribute significantly to conference proceedings and would take care to preserve its position of neutrality between India and Communist China.

The attitude of Pakistan has undergone a marked change since July 1962 when it rather reluctantly accepted Indonesia's invitation to be a conference co-sponsor. During the past six months Pakistan has become one of the foremost advocates of II Bandung. Moreover, during the past two months Pakistan has joined with Communist China in a vigorous attempt to thwart the efforts of the sponsors of the Non-aligned Conference. In Pakistan's view, the decision of the US and the UK to extend long-range military assistance to India brought to an end the era of close relations between Pakistan and the West. Frustrated in its efforts to utilize its ties with the US to implement its long-range policy of maintaining maximum political, military and psychological pressure on India, or to obtain a Kashmir settlement, Pakistan has undertaken to court India's number one enemy, Communist China, and those smaller countries in Asia which have some reason to fear and distrust India.

One of Pakistan's major long-range foreign policy objectives appears to be the diplomatic isolation of India through formation of an anti-Indian regional front. Pakistan, therefore, has a strong vested interest in securing wide support for II Bandung and is as keenly interested as Communist China in breaking the ties which bind India with the other non-aligned countries.

Hence Pakistan's main effort will be devoted to obtaining Afro-Asian support against India on the Kashmir dispute and to pointing up the alleged threat that India poses to the smaller countries in the South and Southeast Asian regions. Chou En-lai is due to visit Pakistan in February, and he may announce full support of Pakistan on Kashmir. Even if he does not, Pakistan's delegates may be expected to take the position that China is a peace loving nation which has been rebuffed by the Nehru government in its attempts to reach an understanding with India.

While Pakistan would not be expected to support extreme resolutions condemning Western imperialism, Pakistan will probably play down its alliance with the US. It probably would support resolutions reflecting dissatisfaction with the economic policies of the western countries. It may be expected also to emphasize its willingness to help mediate various Asian regional conflicts, particularly the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia. On the question of the Vietnamese conflict, Pakistan, as part of its overall aim to pursue a foreign policy independent of the US, might come out in favor of the De Gaulle proposal for an independent neutral Vietnam.

Turkey takes pride in its position as the guardian of NATO's southern flank and considers neutralism repugnant to its national interest. It is most unlikely that the Turkish government would alter its basic foreign policies even if it participates in neutralistic conferences, and it would probably decline to participate unless encouraged to do so by the West. The Turkish delegation to the 1955 Bandung Conference, representing the only NATO member present, considered its participation as a "duty" in order to answer attacks on the American policy of establishing various overseas bases, NATO and German rearmament.

Afghanistan, studiously cultivating neutralism, will probably agree to attend both conferences. The Afghans are aware of the way similar conferences have been used by Communist Bloc countries, but they appear convinced that the neutralists have an important role to play in reducing world tensions and see such conferences as useful forums. They customarily attend them all, whether genuinely neutralist or obviously pro-Communist. Afghan participation is usually rather indifferent and unenthusiastic. Some Afghans appear to regard such conferences as a rare opportunity to take a vacation outside Afghanistan.

The Afghans consider the principles of the 1955 Bandung Conference and the Declaration of the 1961 Conference of Non-Aligned Countries at Belgrade as important pillars of their foreign policy; Prime Minister Yusuf reaffirmed in his first policy speech in March 1963 that his government remained committed to these principles. Their stance at both of these conferences tended to be left-leaning but they held back from outright pro-Communist positions. Because of their desire to avoid taking a very active role at the conferences or to aggravate Sino-Soviet differences, the Afghan representatives will probably work for the adoption of relatively non-controversial neutralist formulations

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 15 -

and strive for the appearance of harmony. The Afghan apparently used the 1961 Belgrade conference to lobby privately for their view of the Pushtunistan question (i.e., the status of the Pushtuns in Pakistan) this tactic may be repeated, but it is unlikely to be pursued with much energy.

Iran feels that the divisive issues between prospective major participants at II Bandung are such that it would be difficult to play a "constructive," i.e., pro-Western, role at this time. Its reaction to II Belgrade is only slightly more favorable, and unless several other Western oriented Afro-Asian states agree to attend Iran is most unlikely to attend.

Neutralist sentiment is, however, important in Iran and therefore her primary motive for considering attendance at either conference is the desire to project domestically an appearance of independence. Secondly, Iran desires to avoid isolation from the Afro-Asian countries, and hopes to create the impression that its Western security ties do not mean subservience to her allies. To obtain these benefits Iran will not for the foreseeable future, however, sacrifice its special ties with the West.

Iran attended the 1955 Bandung Conference, but not the I Belgrade gathering. In the unlikely event it attends either of the upcoming conferences, it will align itself with the Pro-Western conferees and actively seek to counteract any effort to denounce Western powers en bloc. The Iranian government will work, for example, to insure that any condemnation of colonialism will be directed at colonialism in all its manifestations, including Communist. In order not to compromise its CENTO ties Iran will be ready stoutly to champion the right of any nation to individual and collective security measures. The Iranian government is aware in a general way of the issues involved in such conferences. It will seek out and heed the United States' views on both.

Basically pro-Western, Cyprus has followed a non-aligned policy in the hope of wearing down the Zurich-London restrictions on its independence. The Cypriot leadership tends to remain aloof from Asian-African propaganda exercises, yet it looks to these countries as a source of support for the Greek Cypriot cause of "self-determination," (i.e., revision of the Zurich-London commitments). The government has permitted but later disclaimed an informal appeal through the channels of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Movement for arms and volunteers in the event Turkey intervened militarily in Cyprus. If Cyprus is invited, the Turkish minority and the Turkish government will challenge Makarios' right to represent the country, and the Turkish Cypriot minority might demand to send its own delegation. The fact that they would be legally right under the London-Zurich agreement, however, would not persuade an audience of small and newly independent nations. Makarios, on his part, would gladly attend either conference or both to rally support for his desire to place his problem in the UN, where he anticipates more favorable handling than in NATO. Far from being deterred by the possible presence of Turkey, he would relish a chance to debate his case with the Turks before such an audience.

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Outside the UAR, the only Arab country likely to attend the Non-Aligned Conference is Iraq. The UAR, striving to isolate Syria, may contrive to deny it an invitation. The others would most likely be ruled ineligible for one reason or another. Iraqi President Arif, a newcomer little known either at home or abroad, is anxious to participate in any and all international gatherings, largely to build up his reputation domestically. He will be guided by Nasser and probably take little initiative.

The current antipathy between Nasser and the Ba'thi rulers of Syria has caused Syria to welcome the II Bandung proposal. Syria may even seek to join the sponsors. Since Iraq is also planning to attend and UAR cannot afford to stay away, the paradoxical result may be a larger Arab attendance (three to two) at II Bandung than at II Belgrade. Although Syria is anxious that Nasser's should not be the only Arab viewpoint to be heard, it probably will not play a large role in the proceedings.

3. African Countries

Of 34 independent African countries (excluding South Africa) only two -- Mali and Ghana -- have thus far officially committed themselves to participate in either conference.

Ghana has agreed to II Bandung, at the same time endorsing the "three continent" concept of adding South American countries.

Mali has said it would attend both.

In the event, nearly all African countries would probably accept invitations to both conferences. Some UAM states, for example, Malagasy, the Ivory Coast and Cameroon will have nothing to do with II Bandung so long as it is influenced by Peiping. Others, for example, Central African Republic, Gabon, and Chad might not attend either, more for lack of funds than for ideological reasons. They also probably believe that the conferences would be irrelevant to immediate African interests. The West African states display least interest in neutralist aggregations of either type. Senegal's President Senghor might use attendance at one or the other to show solidarity with other Africans or to show that Senegal (or perhaps the UAM collectively) is not a Western pawn. Sierra Leone might attend either or both at the request of India which it supports.

Some UAM countries, for example, Nigeria, Tunisia, Cameroon, Congo (Leopoldville), Ethiopia, Morocco, and Tanganyika, would have a strong preference for II Belgrade. Most of these have moderate regimes which would feel that their policies would be better served at a conference sponsored by Yugoslavia, the UAR, and/or India, rather than one in which Communist China had a strong voice. Yet they would not want to be isolated from nationalist, anti-imperialist movements, and would go with more or less reluctance to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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-17-

II Bandung. Others, for example, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Burundi, Algeria, and Zanzibar, would prefer II Bandung, where they anticipate a more militant and revolutionary stand on world issues, especially against remnants of colonialism in Southern Africa.

Libya would probably line up with an Arab-African majority but would tend to favor II Belgrade. In 1961 Libya was not invited to Belgrade since the strong Western influence in Libya handicapped its credentials as a non-aligned state. The Libyans were piqued by this and now would probably go out of their way to assure an invitation to any new conference of the non-aligned. Sudan has agreed to support II Bandung. However, since its foreign policy objectives could also be advanced by a Belgrade meeting, it will probably be receptive to an invitation to II Belgrade.

Ethiopia, because Emperor Haile Selassie considers himself one of the ranking world statesmen and has close personal ties with Tito, would probably favor II Belgrade as further enhancing the Emperor's prestige. He has, however, already announced support for II Bandung. Consequently, Ethiopia will probably be represented at both conferences. Withdrawal of British troops would have to precede the participation of Kenya, although it would wish to attend both meetings. The recent army mutiny may force Uganda to pay more attention to domestic rather than international affairs. If they feel free to go, Ugandan leaders would not be dissuaded by these events from their preference for II Bandung.

Tanganyika's performance depends on the retention of power by westward leaning Julius Nyerere, who probably favors II Belgrade; if extremists should take over, especially if they are oriented towards Peiping, Tanganyika would support II Bandung. Moving towards friendlier relations with Communist countries but still a member of the UAM, Rwanda might tend to follow the reactions of the other UAM countries. Burundi, also showing disturbing signs of moving Eastward, would probably favor II Bandung and in either setting would take a militantly anti-west line.

During the recent Chou En-lai visit to Algeria, Algerian officials gave their support to II Bandung. At the same time they said they would also attend II Belgrade. Algeria's admiration for Yugoslavia and Yugoslav socialist achievements is a significant factor in its decision to participate in a conference sponsored in part by Tito. The Algerians, however, do not wish to be excluded from an Afro-Asian conference which might support more militant positions on the remaining "colonial" problems in Africa.

4. Latin America

Major governments of the area took part in the first meeting of non-aligned governments at Belgrade in September 1961 and the related conference of less-developed countries at Cairo in July 1962. At the Belgrade meeting, the Cubans participated as delegates. Bolivia, Brazil, and Ecuador had official observers present. At the 1962 Cairo meeting, the Latin Americans were better represented. This meeting paralleled moves by the Latin American and other

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countries to promote a conference on the trade and development problems of the less-developed countries vis-à-vis the industrialized countries. Cuba, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela attended either as delegates or observers.

In the period since these conferences, Latin American interest has probably declined. In the fall of 1962 the UNGA voted to hold a UN Conference on Trade and Development, and subsequently the United States became more receptive toward the project, removing a main source of common interest between the non-communist Latin and the less-developed countries of other continents. Following the October 1962 missile crisis, if not before, the possibility of using Cuba as a hinge between Latin America and "neutralistic" non-hemisphere countries disappeared as Cuba became finally and unmistakably committed to the Soviet Bloc. There is always the possibility that governments seeking to exert pressure on US policy will try to use threats of non-alignment as a weapon. However, with the general loosening of international alignments in the past year, the meaning of "non-alignment" has doubtless become less clear and the position is probably less appealing.

President Tito has been the main exponent to Latin America of "neutralism," "non-alignment" and similar concepts. During Tito's visit to Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, September-October 1963, neither his person nor his political views stirred much response from either political leaders or the general public. Since the trip, however, President Tito has followed up with personal messages to the presidents of these countries. According to a February 7 statement by a Yugoslav official spokesman, the messages contained opinions on "certain most important international questions among which are the forthcoming conference of non-aligned and other countries which will endeavor to strengthen peace and independence."

Of the Latin American governments that attended the Belgrade and Cairo meetings and are therefore most likely to receive invitations to a non-aligned conference, there is current information regarding only Bolivia and Brazil. The Bolivian Government, in an aide-memoire of December 13, 1963 that apparently responded to Yugoslav soundings regarding participation in a second non-aligned conference, stated that it "...agreed with the Yugoslav Government that it is desirable to hold a conference of those progressive countries that fight for peace, for peaceful coexistence, for solutions to controversies by peaceful means, for the equality of rights among peoples and states, for the principles of self-determination and nonintervention, for total decolonization and, lastly but of equal importance, the elimination of differences between the developed countries and those in process of development." The Bolivian note commented that the stage of "non-alignment" has been passed and that all countries believing in these principles and not belonging to existing military blocs should come together. However, if the conference was a "non-aligned" meeting, Bolivia could not attend as a delegate because it is part of the inter-American system, and therefore is aligned. The Bolivian Government offered to attend a "non-aligned" meeting in observer status. The note also suggested that a

special category of "fraternal delegates" might be established with a voice but not a vote and with the right to adhere to conference resolutions, a provision that the Bolivians felt would give the aligned Latin Americans a more active part in the proceedings.

According to a Brazilian Foreign Office official, his government had not received an invitation to attend a Belgrade conference on non-aligned countries as of January 9, 1964, would not participate if invited, and had so informed the Indian Ambassador in response to recent soundings. This policy is, of course, subject to change through Cabinet shifts and the zigzags of President Goulart's political course. The Brazilian reaction could be more positive if the meaning of the conference were clearer. In particular if the conference had either the support or opposition of the US Government, the Brazilians might develop a more definite stand of their own. Meanwhile, because of the fuzziness of "non-alignment" as well as the changed international situation, Brazil will probably respond with less interest than in 1961-62 at the time of the Belgrade and Cairo meetings.

Cuba. The Castro regime has special problems about "neutralistic" conferences because of its dependence on Soviet aid and ambiguous, complex ties with Communist China. While Cuba will evidently not be invited to the Bandung-type meeting if attendance is limited to African and Asian governments, the Chinese Communists have given clear evidence of wishing to enlist the Cubans in support of their position. For example, in a move to broaden the Chinese-sponsored Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization to include Latin American, the Chinese Communists in 1963 proposed Havana as the site for a Three Continents Conference. In the circumstances, the Cubans will more than likely refuse an invitation to the Tito-Nasser meeting in order not to offend the Chinese Communists, and to avoid an appearance of favoritism to one side or the other.

5. Europeans

The most likely European countries to be considered (for II Belgrade only, of course) are Finland, Sweden, and Austria. Finland is so highly sensitive in regard to its absolute abstention from controversial international situations that it would not under any foreseeable circumstances participate in either gathering. It has expressed sympathetic interest in II Belgrade and will consider sending an observer. Sweden, suffering burned fingers from the episode of the Stockholm Peace Appeal, is extremely wary of "neutralist" meetings with Communist participation. And both Swedes and Austrians see Afro-Asian aggregations as messy, unpredictable and futile. However, both Sweden and Austria might be persuaded to go, as a service to the Western world, if it were urged upon them and if they concluded that their influence would really accomplish something. Semantics help in the Swedish case, since the Swedes currently regard themselves as "not neutral". An "Non-aligned" meeting, however, is more presentable to the Social Democrats, who define their role as a bridge between the communists and the West, and who would also be attracted by the conference's Yugoslav sponsorship.

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III. SPECIAL ISSUES AND PROBLEMS

Recent public statements by Chou En-lai may forecast the major theme to be pushed at II Bandung by the CPR: that undeveloped nations must rely primarily on their own resources in revolutionizing society and developing their economy. This spartan doctrine is not likely to be popular with any of the conferees, who want all the help they can get and are convinced that by getting it in carefully regulated amounts from both sides they can preserve their freedom of action. Few governments would be willing or able to undergo the starvation level of living that the Chinese accepted at the start of their "great leap". In fact, this line would only call attention to China's poverty and inability to offer economic aid which is one of the major weaknesses in China's contest with the USSR for influence with these regimes.

Neither conference would limit itself to economic discussion, however. Many political issues with anti-US overtones are likely to be raised or at least mentioned. Three that are particularly sensitive probably will come up at both meetings and would be well received by virtually everyone attending: CPR representation in the UN, the Indian Ocean Task Force, and the Panama Canal issue. China is sure to lobby for the UN seat and may bring it to a formal resolution (through some other delegation at II Belgrade also). Most of the invitees to either conference already believe that China should be in the UN. Neither the US nor nationalist China has the means to head off the issue in either getting. Finally, the French recognition will have made it much easier and more respectable for these smaller countries to vote their preference in this matter. If a wide consensus is shown in the conferences, a great many more Asian and African states will be encouraged to recognize the CPR, and accept diplomatic representation.

Panama can hardly escape mention, but it will become a prominent issue only if a number of Latin American countries attend: for the others, it has merely symbolic value. It will be loudest if Panama finds the means through a friendly Asian or African state to take its case before II Bandung and rally support for pressuring the US. On the other hand, wiser Latin American heads may realize that the middle of an American election campaign is a bad time to employ that tactic. And by late summer much of the heat may be out of this situation, particularly if by then negotiations are going along satisfactorily.

All of the Asians present at either meeting will doubtless know of the Indian Ocean Task Force in general terms. A rousing vote could be tallied in either body condemning such a force as provocative, inconsistent with the spirit of détente, and a threat to the independence of countries of the region. Beyond this, both conferences might try to bind member countries to refuse to base or service the Force; the UAR reportedly has already decided on this tactic as one of its major conference goals. Neither action would have any beyond the immediate propaganda effect. On this issue, a good deal will depend on the Indian attitude. In the II Bandung gathering, however, India is

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- 21 -

likely to be on the defensive under heavy pressure, and perhaps cannot afford to take a mild tone.

Several special-interest regional matters also are due to be raised, and some of these affect US interests at least indirectly. At II Bandung, where Pakistan will be present, India will have to face both the whole range of its quarrel with Pakistan, including Kashmir, and also the Chinese border imbroglio, which India itself means to raise. If China agrees to support Pakistan on Kashmir, as it may well do, India may be whipsawed between them. India is approaching this conference in a frustrated mood; it may lose a good deal of sympathy on this important issue by appearing angry and inflexible while the Chinese mildly protest that all they want is to negotiate. The quality, preparation and poise of the Indian delegation will be very important; it will be weaker for the probable absence of Nehru due to his illness, for no other Indian leader has comparable prestige among this group.

The Cyprus issue will almost certainly be raised at both conferences in terms embarrassing to both the US and NATO. Makarios' case -- stated as full independence, majority rule, and resort to the UN -- sounds so reasonable and appealing to such an audience that he would be sure to garner wide support. Should the Turks be present at II Bandung, they would come off a bad second in debate. If a NATO force is by then keeping peace in Cyprus, the NATO powers would be accused of conspiring to keep the problem out of the UN in order to prolong a "temporary" settlement. Even if Cyprus does not attend the conferences, the NATO countries will most likely be accused of using Turkey to provoke a situation in which they could reinstitute colonial occupation.

The Arabs will probably raise Palestine in routine fashion, but Nasser has learned not to press this issue against African resistance. A resolution attacking the British position in the Persian Gulf and Aden would fare better, and is nearly certain to be raised. Arab and African leaders may tangle over Zanzibar, where most Arabs believe that the new regime has abused its Arab populace. This issue, however, may be disposed of in the earlier OAU foreign ministers' meeting.

The accreditation of some East African states may raise difficulty. African spokesmen will be faced with a choice of turning down well-known nationalists such as Kenyatta, or condoning their recent request for British troops. The embarrassment is likely to be minor, however; there has been a notable lack of criticism throughout Africa over this nationalist lapse. Its effect has been diluted by the unquestionable nationalist reputation of the leaders concerned and by the fact that three countries were involved at the same time so that there was no isolated target. Nevertheless, the presence of three outstanding nationalists who have just unashamedly resorted to military help from an imperialist power will add complexity, at least, to the meetings.

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IV. PROBABLE OUTCOME: IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY

It now appears certain that neither conference can preclude the other and there is little or nothing the US can do to head them off. Even though a good many prospective invitees are indifferent or reluctant, most will feel compelled to attend not only one but both. The late summer, it appears, will be one long fallout of anti-US propaganda. This is sure to be no less troublesome because it will be more sophisticated and less vitriolic than the product of AAPSO-type conclaves.

Both the CPR and the USSR have potential spokesmen at both conferences and will have no trouble in getting their views presented whether or not they attend. Friends of the US, on the other hand, tend to recoil from these tendentious and wearisome propaganda exercises. US views are not likely to be heard, even as a minority presentation or in cloakrooms, unless we encourage some sympathetic countries to attend. Even so, the countries that could make a bold and effective presentation against the odds they will face (Japan, Philippines, Turkey) may not be among the invited.

The CPR will make another long stride toward breaking out of isolation and may establish some presence in many new parts of Africa and Asia. This may be the most damaging long-run effect of the summer. US strategy on Cyprus may be delayed or upset at a critical point, presenting a more immediate challenge. Other issues such as Kashmir may be sharpened toward crisis or made more intractable by the spate of propaganda. But no course of action that the US may choose to take toward any of them will be precluded or limited by the outcome of either session.

As to the residual effect, we are less convinced than the Chinese of the conditioning effect of such broadly-based gatherings. On past experience, it seems that the communist propaganda harvest, the sudden prominence and the accretion of influence are ephemeral. The several regions thrown together in a Bandung-type meeting discover most of all their lack of identity or of common interest. The more serious-minded tend to lose interest in these affairs: this effect will be compounded if the two 1964 meetings become more openly competitive so that the smaller nations become convinced that they are being used to further national aims of the communist giants. On the other hand, some of the anti-Western militants may come away persuaded, at least temporarily, that the CPR is a better spokesman for their grievances against the West than the USSR.

If the two meetings will not be disastrous from the US point of view, it is also true that they will be in no way helpful. But they will be unhelpful in differing degrees. Unfortunately, the relatively more innocuous Non-Aligned gathering seems least likely to prosper. Not only because of

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timing, but also because the more disparate group reduces the chance of effective resolutions, the Non-Aligned Conference may well have a stale and stagnant quality. This is the more likely because many wishful-thinking Asians and Africans believe that an East-West detenté has already arrived and that non-alignment is no longer as meaningful. Should this attitude gain ground as a result of an unsuccessful conference, Nasser's and Tito's ground for international leadership will be considerably eroded.

A highly successful II Bandung contrasted with a drab and lifeless II Belgrade would also affect the Sino-Soviet relationship. The USSR would be stung to greater endeavors in Africa especially. We could expect, as a starter, increased economic and technical assistance offers. At the same time, the Soviets might reconsider the usefulness of neutralism, always a suspect idea among communists. In proportion as they felt really challenged by the Chinese break-through, Soviet performance in undeveloped countries might become more active and also less predictable.

ANNEX A

PROBABLE ATTENDANCE AT II BANDUNG AND II BELGRADE CONFERENCES
(Based on information available through February 13, 1964)

- o Undecided
- ↔ Preference for one or other Conference
- ↓ Preference for neither: would prefer not to go
- * If invited

<u>II BANDUNG ONLY</u>	<u>BOTH</u>	<u>NON-ALIGNED ONLY</u>	<u>NOT LIKELY TO ATTEND EITHER</u>
CPR	Afghanistan	Bolivia } Observer	Austria
Japan ↓ o	Algeria	Yugoslavia) only	Brazil
North Vietnam	Burma ↓	Finland	Cent. Afr. Repub.
Pakistan	← Burundi	Malagasy	Chad
Philippines *	← Cambodia		Cuba
Syria	Cameroon →		Gabon
Thailand *	Ceylon		Iran
Turkey *	Congo (Leo) →		Malagasy
Zanzibar	← Congo (Brazza)		Malaysia
	Cyprus *		Mauritania
	Dahomey		Niger
	Ethiopia →		Sweden
	← Ghana		Upper Volta
	← Guinea		
	India ↓		
	← Indonesia		
	Ivory Coast ↓		
	Kenya		
	Laos		
	Liberia →		
	Libya →		
	← Mali		
	Morocco →		
	Nepal		
	Nigeria →		
	← North Korea		
	Rwanda		
	Senegal ↓		
	Sierra Leone →		
	Somalia		
	Sudan		
	Tanganyika →		
	Togo		
	Tunisia →		
	UAR →		
	← Uganda		
	← Zanzibar		

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SCHLESINGER

Intelligence Note
JAN 30 1964

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - George C. Denney, Jr. *h.c.d.l*
Subject: Cairo Announces Nonaligned Summit Conference

*Non-aligned
Conference*

The official Egyptian press reported January 29 on plans to hold a conference of leaders of nonaligned nations following UAR discussions with Yugoslavia and India. Tito is to visit Nasser soon; later a preparatory meeting will be attended by countries participating in the Belgrade Conference of 1961. Most probable locale for the conference is Cairo.

The Race Against Jakarta. The announcement does not set any dates, but it seems to indicate that a race has begun with the Indonesians, who have been organizing a rival Afro-Asian conference -- a successor to the Bandung meeting of 1955. The Indonesians are further ahead with their plans, and have scheduled a preparatory meeting for February. The Yugoslavs and Egyptians are worried that the "Bandung" meeting will occur first and steal the thunder from their "nonaligned" meeting.

Possible Setback to Peiping. Chou En-lai and Chen Yi, during their African tour, have been strenuously promoting the "Bandung" meeting. If Nasser and Tito manage to convene their conference first, and if it turns out successfully, this would be a defeat for Communist China.

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JAN 31 1964

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