

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
12	agenda	Defence Review Suggested Agenda <i>open 4/9/18 per 2/18</i>	S	1	1/26/66	A
12a	report	Defence Review <i>open 4/9/18 per 2/18</i>	S	10	1/26/66	A
12b	memo	re Four Power Defence Arrangements <i>open 4/9/18 per 2/18</i>	S	4	1/24/66	A
12c	memo	re Defence of Libya <i>open 4/9/18 per 2/18</i>	S	2	1/24/66	A
24	cable	CAP 65879 [Dup. #27, this file; #139, 155, NSF, Files of Komer, "Pakistan - Ayub Visit," Box 45] [Dup. #61, 111, NSF, HOS Correspondence, "M.O.D., 8/65-12/31/66," Box 11; #105, 107, NSF, HOS Correspondence, "UK, Wilson, Vol. 2," Box 9 - SANI 1995] <i>open 12/14/12</i>	TS	4	12/12/65	A
27	cable	CAP 65879 [Dup. #24, this file; #139, 155, NSF, Files of Komer, "Pakistan - Ayub Visit," Box 45] [Dup. #61, 111, NSF, HOS Correspondence, "M.O.D., 8/65-12/31/66," Box 11; #105, 107, NSF, HOS Correspondence, "UK, Wilson, Vol. 2," Box 9 - SANI 1995] <i>open 12/14/12</i>	TS	5	12/12/65	A
32	memo	to Komer [Exempt per RAC, 8/01] <i>open 5-1-07 NW07-8</i>	S	1	10/26/65	A
32a	report	Intelligence Brief [Sanitized per RAC, 5/03]	S	10	10/65	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer

Folder Title "UNITED KINGDOM - Jan. 1964 - Mar. 1966"

Box Number 53

Restriction Codes

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Initials

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50	memo	Hughes to the Acting Secretary, REU-68 <i>OPEN 7-6-07 NLJ/RAC 07-16</i>	S	20	12/4/64	A
51	report	Special Report [Exempt per RAC, 5/03]	S	9	10/30/64	A
53	memo	Hughes to the Acting Secretary, REU-57 <i>OPEN 7-6-07 NLJ/RAC 07-16</i>	S	30	10/8/64	A
55	cable	Home to the President, T. 277/64 [Dup. #13, 14b, NSF, HOS Correspondence, "UK - PM Home Correspondence, 12/20/63-8/5/64," Box 8] [Dup. #107, NSF, Files of Komer, "India-Pakistan, 12/63-3/66," Box 26] <i>OPEN 3/4/08 NLJ/RAC 07-17</i>	S	4	7/22/64	A
56	cable	Deptel 105 to London [Dups. #19, 20, 21a, 21b, 21g, NSF, HOS Correspondence, "UK - PM Home Correspondence, 12/20/63-8/5/64," Box 8] [Poss. Dup. #249, NSF, Files of Bundy, "Chron, 7/64," Box 3] <i>OPEN 4/9/18 per RAC 2/18</i>	S	3	7/5/64	A

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8/16/2006

Initials

file
/ OK

February 17, 1966

MEMO FOR JUANITA ROBERTS

From a search of central files, I note that the White House apparently made no reply to the last previous letter from Mrs. Jarvey, but referred it to State. I also notice from the letters that these people haven't met the President since 10 years ago. Nor does the letter ask anything which requires a reply.

I suggest either (a) ignoring it; (b) sending it to George Reedy who apparently met them sometime ago; or (c) sending it to State as was done last time.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR BUNDY & BATOR

January 26, 1966

2 file
UK

The big remaining issue on the UK defense review seems to be the extent of future British presence in the Suez-Singapore area. I won't argue the minor aspects (e. g. evacuation of Aden, Africa, etc.). But it seems to me that our larger response must be based on the fact that, viewed globally, the one area where the US itself is militarily weakest is the Indian Ocean area. An even greater vacuum here 1968-75, because of gradual drawdown of the modest UK presence, is worrisome.

Despite our natural current focus on Southeast Asia and Indonesia, it's essential to look ahead and anticipate many new problems over the next decade in Burma, South Asia, Iran, Arabian Peninsula, and East Africa. Though we are increasingly able to deploy US forces there quickly, the Indian Ocean is the area farthest from the US. Moreover, we have to worry not only about the actual threats in this vast area but a likely decline of confidence in western support on the part of Indians, Paks, Burmese, Persians, etc., if the UK withdraws further.

So I see real advantage in attempting to keep a mobile UK carrier force in the Indian Ocean, whether based in Singapore or Australia. Even one carrier would have real flexibility to meet situations throughout the area (conventional even more than nuclear). If the UK doesn't maintain at least a carrier on station, I predict that the pressures on us to set up an Indian Ocean squadron will increase. No matter how we slice the pie, it would be far more expensive if we had to fill the power vacuum in the Indian Ocean area than to keep the UK there.

This leads to the question of what we could offer in order to encourage HMG to maintain such a force. For example, need we charge such a high price for selling secondhand carriers? Even giving them to the British under ship loan or some such device would be cheaper than maintaining US carrier task force in the Indian Ocean. A US contribution to Indian Ocean island bases or to the Australia base project might also seem sensible in this connection.

In sum, my basic point is that looking ahead for the ten years 1966-75 someone (either the US or UK) is likely to have to maintain some flexible sea/air power in the Indian Ocean. It would be far cheaper to subsidize HMG than to wake up a few years from now to find that we must substitute for the power vacuum its drawdown of forces creates.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (A55)

By jml/bm, NARA, Date 8-16-06

RWK

~~SECRET~~

3/ file

Friday, 5:00 p.m.
January 14, 1966

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here's the latest from Wilson on Rhodesia. He's clearly anxious to keep you fully in the picture, partly because you've been more sympathetic than the rest of the USG and partly because he may want more help later.

WK
X S/Ph

This message is only to fill you in on the Commonwealth Conference and Wilson's visit to Kaunda, both of which went well. Now that most Commonwealth Africans agree to let Wilson have more time, the pressures from the radical Africans should be blunted for a while.

Perhaps the key point is the Wilson and Kaunda agreement that Zambia should not cut its economic links with Rhodesia till at least mid-February. When this happens, however, airlift demands will go way up. Also of note is that Wilson is quietly trying to position himself to use force for the final kill.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By ng/bm, NARA, Date 8-16-06

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, January 11, 1966
6:15 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Wilson has sent you another message from Lagos (Tab A), where he's attending the Commonwealth meeting on Rhodesia. He asks that you join him in calming down Zambia's Kaunda, since Zambia is itching to cut off economic relations with Rhodesia. If it does so prematurely, Zambia will be hurt a lot more than Rhodesia, and great pressure will be put on the UK (and us) for a truly massive airlift and other emergency stops to keep Zambia afloat.

4
7
UK
+ Zambia (?)
+ C.D.

So it's clearly in our interest for you to join Wilson in urging Zambian restraint. We've already been advising just this, but your own word is needed now for weight. However, our proposed message is phrased more cautiously than Wilson desired, because we want to avoid giving Kaunda any notion that the US intends to play a larger role than we are presently or that the US is highly confident that Wilson's strategy will work. About the most that's prudent is to stress the importance of close coordination with the UK, and to urge Zambia not to jump the gun.

At Tab C is a brief reply to Wilson simply telling him the gist of your message to Kaunda.

Approve

See me _____

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

cc: McGB
RWK

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

kg/ctm NARA, Date 8-16-06

PRESERVATION COPY

MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM PRIME MINISTER HAROLD WILSON
DATED JANUARY 11, 1966

1. In my last message on the Rhodesian problem, I said I would keep you informed about how I get on in Lagos. Now that I am here, I am hopeful that with a modicum of luck we should get through this meeting all right. But having spoken to Malcolm MacDonald, who is here from Lusaka, it appears that the situation in Zambia is far from good. I have therefore decided, at very considerable inconvenience that it would be right for me to pay a brief visit to Kaunda to try to get him on the rails again.

2. The facts of the situation are these. At the right moment, the closing of the Zambia border with Rhodesia could be of decisive influence in giving Smith a coup de grace but it is essential that this card should be played at the right time. If it is played too early before the Smith regime and Rhodesian opinion are convinced that the game is up and before we have taken all the necessary steps to see that Zambia could survive the few weeks of final collapse in Rhodesia and possible cut off of supplies from the copper belt, this key move in the whole process could ruin Zambia without overthrowing Smith. The timing is therefore of the essence. Kaunda, who is understandably, in a very nervous frame of mind, is threatening to close the border before we are ready for it, before he can survive it and before it will be really effective in terms of bringing Smith down.

3. My main objective in going to Lusaka will be therefore to try and steady him and to get our strategy better coordinated. There are in addition other things to discuss with him. I plan to be in Zambia on Wednesday evening and Thursday morning. It would be an immense help to me if you felt able, before my arrival, to send a personal message to President Kaunda through your Ambassador in Lusaka saying that I have explained our strategy fully to you, expressing your confidence that economic sanctions were working, that the crunch with Smith might be approaching but that it was essential in everybody's interests to get the timing of the final sanction of closing the Rhodesia border with Zambia right; and that you would hope that he, Kaunda, and I would reach agreement on this in everybody's interest. He simply must be made to realize that the vast efforts which you and we are making at great cost to ourselves need to exert their maximum effect but that given time they should put Zambia in a position where she could safely administer the final blow.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority ERUS U010011, # 5026
By *M* NARA, Date 8-29-05

PRESERVATION COPY

Telegram

ACTION Lusaka
Repeated Info London

Text of letter to President from Prime Minister Wilson is being sent to you by separate telegram. Following is text of letter from President to President Kaunda:

"Prime Minister Wilson has told me of his plan to visit with you at the conclusion of the Commonwealth Conference now being held in Lagos, which I hope will have been successful in developing practical ways to aid in ending the Smith rebellion and advancing majority rule in Rhodesia. I am mindful of the problems that you face, as described recently by your Foreign Minister during his visit to Washington. So I very much hope that in your discussions with the Prime Minister, who is working so hard to find a solution to the problem posed by the Smith regime, the two of you will continue to coordinate closely.

"I continue to believe that, as Ambassador Good has already suggested, it would be harmful if the border between Zambia and Southern Rhodesia were closed before Zambia is prepared, as a result of the programs now being carried out, to meet the situation. Timing is particularly important in a situation as delicate and complex as this one.

"We are, as you know, continuing to make progress here in supplementing the airlift of petroleum to Zambia as well as in tightening restrictions on our trade with Southern Rhodesia.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *kg/bm*, NARA, Date 8-16-06

PRESERVATION COPY

"With all best wishes,

Lyndon B. Johnson"

Please deliver text of foregoing to Kaunda prior to Wilson's arrival.

FYI, a message along these lines was requested by Prime Minister Wilson in order to back his attempt to keep Kaunda in line. We are willing to support him by counselling prudence but do not wish to give Kaunda any encouragement that if and when Zambia breaks all economic ties with Rhodesia, the US is committed to massive support. END FYI.

~~SECRET~~

January 11, 1966

AmEmb Lagos

Please deliver following message to PM Wilson.

FROM PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER

I have read with great interest your latest message and am weighing in at Lusaka in an effort to steady Kaunda. In this message I underlined the importance of close coordination with you, particularly in avoiding premature severance of economic ties with Rhodesia.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *sp/cbm*, NARA, Date 8-16-06

~~SECRET~~

January 7, 1966

*uK
x Plod*

Mac:

Reply to Wilson. Poor Tom Mann got in a Rusk/Ball bind which forced us into some quick negotiating. So I gather I missed you by two minutes last night.

At any rate, here's the draft. I'd have sent it up myself but Alice seemed emphatic that you wanted to do so in the morning.

RWK

5a

~~SECRET~~

January 7, 1966

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER WILSON

It was most considerate of you to share your thoughts on the Rhodesian crisis again on the eve of your departure for Lagos. We on this side certainly appreciate the delicacy of the situation you face, as well as the problem of supplying Zambia while applying sanctions to the Smith regime. After your meeting in Lagos, I shall look forward to getting your latest estimates and plans. There may be serious difficulties ahead, particularly as to whether the African states will sit still long enough to permit sanctions to bring Smith down.

My best wishes for every success at Lagos.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~SECRET~~

October 18, 1965

Wright Rhodes

Mac -

An apparent Springsteen vs. AF feud is clogging our response channel on Rhodesia.

When AF tried Sunday to get a public noise made in Rhodesia (in response now to the UKHC appeal that Ian Smith was misrepresenting our position), it was refused clearance on the ground that we'd already made our position clear privately to Smith. This misses the whole point--our deterrent impact (such as it is) depends now on getting Smith's own public to worry.

Similarly, CRO in London is a lot slower than the poles (shades of Zanzibar). So I see merit in opening the Bundy/Oliver Wright channel a bit wider (after all, it was their initiative).

Would you consider the attached?

RWK

Attach. Draft cable Bundy to Wright re SRhod 10/18/65

*Not sent
Bundy revised*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 99-300 (#190)

By is/ctm, NARA, Date 8-16-06

6a

~~SECRET~~

October 18, 1965

TO OLIVER WRIGHT FROM McGEORGE BUNDY

Many thanks for your thoughtful fill-in on Rhodesia. Since--as you so clearly indicate--the whole purpose of the exercise is to deter Smith and company from taking the fatal leap, the actions you have in train make great sense.

As the President said, we are prepared to back your hand. Is there anything further you'd like to have us do? We find the signals we get through channels from CRO a bit confusing, since they seem to display far less sense of urgency than I gather is felt where you sit. We have a similar problem here, so if as and when quick responses are needed let us know by this route too.

[Your latent fears about the opposition are worrisome. My own hunch would be that if Smith senses the possibility of division in your own House, he might be much more inclined to gamble that the PM's slim majority will make him hyper-cautious in actually reacting to UDI or that a Tory victory soon would provide surcease. So this is one case where tough Tory noises in Salisbury might be just as important as those from HMG. All this is just the unofficial thinking of some of us here, but we hope the Tories won't prove your Achilles heel.]

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 99-300 (*190a)
By is/bm, NARA, Date 8-16-06

2 file

WK

~~SECRET~~

June 15, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

It would be most useful if Bruce could weigh in on your behalf with Harold Wilson just before the Commonwealth Conference opens Thursday.

Attached message cleared by Rusk hits two key items. First, it asks the PM to help us in getting our moderate friends to forestall a rout at the Afro-Asian Conference. Second, it gently invites Wilson to use your weight as well as his in urging Ayub and Shastri to compromise their differences. We are quite worried over the chances of a flare-up (cable on Indian pitch to Rusk is attached).

If you agree to this message, it should go out tonight. Bruce will handle with discretion.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

Att: To New Delhi 2590, 6/15/65

~~SECRET~~

March 26, 1965

8
W K
+ N.M.

McGB:

Harriman had 40 minutes with Harold Wilson Wednesday afternoon and wanted me to be sure to report. Naturally most of the talk was on Vietnam, as Niko Henderson told me Thursday we got "gassed in Washington."

Wilson told Harriman he was less embarrassed by the gas issue than by Taylor's reported remark and by the comment that our boys were just flying around looking for appropriate targets. However, Harriman and Phil Kaiser both think Wilson and Stewart have stood up "magnificently" so far against their own left wing in supporting us on Vietnam. As George Thomson put it, Wilson's slim majority makes it hard for him to manage the 3 or 4 proto-Communists plus 3 or 4 "fuzzy" left-wingers without whom he can't stay in business.

However, Wilson assured Harriman that (1) he wouldn't take any moves on Vietnam without consultation with the US; (2) he could understand why we had to escalate to negotiate but thought offering more of an "olive branch" would be useful; and (3) we were missing a chance to drive a wedge between the USSR and the Chicoms.

Harriman and Kaiser both thought Wilson seemed very relaxed. He commented that Labor had done only unpopular things since it came into office but this paradoxically seemed to be improving its popularity. Wilson cited a new poll indicating a 9 per cent increase in Labor's popularity. He was also pleased with the Liberal victory in the latest bi-election.

All this may be old hat, but I promised I'd report.

RWK

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By kg/cbm, NARA, Date 8-16-06

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

July 23, 1964

Mac -

Fine! Note the few minor add-ons I suggest. In fact LBJ may not be fully aware that as result of tough bargaining we got Indians to cut their 5-year defense plan by \$600 million without in fact committing any more than same level of aid (\$50 million) previously given.

uk

RWK

*Sent - See JBJ
to Home 7/24/64*

9a

July 23, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach an answer from Prime Minister Home to your message of July 4 about India and Pakistan. The Prime Minister reports that he didn't make much progress, and at the bottom of page 1 he makes a suggestion that is likely to strike a sympathetic chord in your mind: that we should review the scale of our aid to India's defense effort. I have asked Bob Komer to have another hard look at this, and he asked me in turn to tell you that we already intend to make such a review as a result of your instructions. Meanwhile, however, we do not want to encourage the British to any leak that would suggest a major change in our policy toward India. So our reply to Home should be careful, and I attach a draft answer at Tab A for your approval.

McG. B.

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

JUL 23 1964

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

Dear Friend:

Thank you very much for your thoughtful letter of July 22. It is a great help to have this full and clear account of your discussions with Ayub. And it is also very good to hear that the Commonwealth Conference went so well.

I am not surprised that you found the Pakistani position so stiff, and it is clear that we will simply have to keep working on them. Meanwhile, I do agree that it is important to keep the level of our assistance to India ^(as well as Pakistan) under careful review, and I have asked my people to take a further hard look.

Our experience over the last year and a half suggests that the more closely

we work with the Indians, the more their own sense of need can be moderated. *As matter of fact, we believe that in our recent military aid talks we managed to get* and I see every advantage in trying to make further progress in this direction if possible.

The Indians to moderate their appetites to a significantly large extent,

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *rg/ebm*, NARA, Date *8-16-06*

JUL 23 1964

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

July 23, 1964

10

uk

X India map

Mac -

Fine! Note the few minor add-ons I suggest. In fact LBJ may not be fully aware that as result of tough bargaining we got Indians to cut their 5-year defense plan by \$600 million without in fact committing any more than same level of aid (\$50 million) previously given.

RWK

att. me & B draft LBJ
to & Home

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By rg/bm, NARA, Date 8-16-06

Bob,

If my memory is correct the Marchioness
"pushes like mad" --- and I cannot believe
the President would have or even should
have a minute for them, but -----
have you any suggestions or recommendations?

mjdr
2/15

WK 11

To Ruth - 2/15

Reply to Juanita
Roberts by Ruth
2/17/66

Juanita --

Thought I ought to let you see this one.

Mary
Mary Rawlins

From: Dasturji Dr. Jai Pray, M.A., Ph.D.

8
ea
encd
more imp.

The Mayflower

11a

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036



February 10, 1966.

My dear President Johnson,

You will be happy to know that my sister the Marchioness of Winchester and I are here on a visit & will be in Washington till the middle of March, when my sister leaves for England and I for India. You may not remember but my sister and I had the pleasure of meeting with you in the Senate ten years ago when we were invited by Columbia University on the occasion of its Bicentenary, & three years ago the Marchioness had the pleasure of greeting you in your Vice-President's Office at the Senate. We were happy to catch a glimpse of you at the Memorial Service for our dear & personal friend Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri at the Washington Cathedral. Always having a deep interest in worthy causes the Marchioness is doing her bit for the American Heart Association, & is invited tomorrow to a special ceremony for raising funds for it.

Looking forward to have the joy of having a glimpse of you again at the I.C.C. Breakfast, a fraternal occasion for me as a Spiritual Head of the Parsees in India, & with our warmest regards to you, Mr. President, and to the First Lady,
P.S. - I send the enclosed, thinking that it may interest you. Y.P.

Respectfully yours,
Jai Pray.

The Most Honorable the Marchioness of Winchester, Premier Marchioness of England, has just arrived from London and is paying a brief visit here. The Marchioness is accompanied by her brother Dasturzada Dr. Jal Pavry, Spiritual Head of the Liberal Zoroastrian World Congregations.

The present visit of the Marchioness and the Dasturzada to the United States is in fulfilment of a long-cherished wish to make a cross-country journey from San Francisco to New York, passing through a number of States and many Cities, so as to obtain a better understanding of life and culture in America and to feel its very essence - a country which they know so well and a nation they love, having spent five happy years at Columbia University, which was in the early twenties. Though they have visited America since, it has been mainly to New York and Washington to attend important international gatherings and conferences.

The Marchioness, former Miss Bapsy Pavry, has Order of Merit of Iran (1955). She is daughter of the late Most Rev. Khurshedji Erachji Pavry, High Priest of the Parsees in India. She is a member of the Council of World Alliance for International Peace Through Religion, and of various international organisations for promoting friendly relations between nations. She was married to the 16th Marquess of Winchester in July 1952. The Marquess died in June 1962.

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DEFENCE REVIEW

SUGGESTED AGENDA FOR TALKS IN WASHINGTON ON 27 JANUARY

1. Opening statement by the Foreign Secretary on the foreign policy background to the Defence Review proposals.
2. Statement by the Defence Secretary on strategy, force structures and weapons systems.
3. Equipment questions.
4. Financial burdens in relation to global defence responsibilities.
5. Libya and the Mediterranean.
6. Indo-Pacific arrangements.
7. Other areas, as required; i.e. Middle East, Caribbean, South Atlantic.
8. Procedure for further discussions.

THE UNITED KINGDOM DEFENCE REVIEW

Aide Memoire by Her Majesty's Government

Her Majesty's Government have reached a stage in the review of their defence programme at which they wish to discuss with the United States Government and with the governments of Australia and New Zealand, the major conclusions they have provisionally reached about the objectives of future defence strategy and the revision of the long term structure and deployment of U.K. forces. These conclusions are subject to further consideration by Her Majesty's Government in the light of the views which our allies may express on our proposals.

2. The Prime Minister explained to the British Parliament on December 21 1965 that the British Government had decided to continue to maintain a world-wide defence role, particularly in order to fulfil those commitments which, for reasons of history, geography, and Commonwealth association, the United Kingdom was best fitted to undertake. He also emphasised that this role would have to be exercised within fixed limits of cost, both financial and in terms of the real resources allocated to the purpose. This note sketches the main outline of the conclusions of the review relating to the changes in U.K. forces and their deployment.

Defence resources

The defence review has been conditioned by the urgent need to reduce the financial strain on resources, especially in foreign exchange, and on the manpower of the Services. On assuming office in October 1964 Her Majesty's Government inherited a
defence

-2-

defence programme forecast to cost some £2400m. in 1969/70 (at 1964 prices), an increase of £400m. above the level of the Defence Estimates for 1964/65. It was decided that a programme of this size would require more resources and more foreign exchange than the country could afford if it were to regain its economic health. A target of £2000m. for 1969/70 was therefore set.

4. A parallel objective has been the reduction in over-stretch from which U.K. forces are suffering. While there has been some reduction in political commitments during recent years, our military tasks arising from the remaining commitments have increased; and the military capability of those whom our commitments may require us to fight has been increasing faster than our own. Although the increased mobility of the Services has enabled them to cover many commitments with forces sufficient to meet only a small proportion of our total commitments, the difficulties of over-stretch are increasing. On several occasions recently we have had no strategic reserve units available in Britain because they were all either on, or had just returned from, emergency operations. Some of our political commitments may involve us in a scale of conflict which requires more men or more sophisticated forces for a longer time than we can afford within a limited

... and light of these factors, and of the review which has been made of future commitments and the planned capabilities of our forces, the provisional pattern....

pattern of deployment is as follows.

Nuclear Forces

6. The planned force of Polaris submarines has been reduced from five to four. No further change is proposed. We have examined the possibility of stationing this force in the Indo-Pacific area. This could not be done before 1973 at the earliest, and to suggest any change in our plans now might hamper the development of proposals for the control of nuclear forces in Europe. We do not, therefore, intend to take this possibility further, at least for the present. We do, however, in any case intend to retain East of Suez a nuclear capability by means of land-based and (so long as we have the carrier force) sea-based aircraft.

Europe

7. Our land forces in Germany not only form a contribution to NATO, but are also a source of reinforcements to meet emergencies in other parts of the world. We have undertaken not to reduce them unilaterally; and we recognise the strong political and military reasons for not making large reductions at the present time. We do not, therefore, plan to make any early change in the size of the British Army of the Rhine. But the maintenance of these forces, added to our other overseas defence responsibilities, imposes a severe financial strain, particularly on the balance of payments; this now amounts to about £90m. a year in Deutschmarks. We must, therefore, find some further means of lightening the burden.

. We

-4-

8. We cannot, however, afford to maintain our air forces in Europe without any change. It is essential that we should be in a position to use our resources in the most balanced way, given our tasks outside as well as inside Europe. Subject, therefore, to consultation with our allies, we plan to make a reduction in the strike, reconnaissance, and ground attack capability of the Royal Air Force actually based in Germany.

The Mediterranean

9. We plan to make reductions in the forces in the Mediterranean. No raval forces or maritime patrol aircraft would be maintained permanently there. This would mean that we could not meet our Category 'A' contribution to SACEUR in the Mediterranean, which consists of a destroyer squadron or four ships and a mine counter measures squadron of six ships.

10. We are prepared to retain a small force in Libya (though we should have preferred to withdraw altogether); but we cannot continue with a commitment to reinforce it rapidly enough if it is attacked. We therefore wish to discuss with the U.S. Government the possibility of a closer arrangement for sharing in the present defence commitment to Libya. We can then make economies elsewhere in the Mediterranean. In Cyprus the R.A.F. forces would be retained to provide nuclear support to CENTO; but the land forces would be reduced to those necessary to protect the R.A.F. base at Akrotiri. It would be possible for the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area to be given up if further examination showed that this would be desirable. Malta

would

would be reduced to a staging post with an R.A. F. reconnaissance squadron; the major NATO Headquarters should remain there. (S)

11. At Gibraltar a garrison, airfield and other facilities will be retained, but there may be minor savings in naval facilities. The dockyard will continue to operate.

12. The total land forces in the Mediterranean would be reduced from about 7 major units to between 2 and 3 major units.

Middle East

13. We must expect to withdraw our forces from Aden when the colony becomes independent at the end of 1968; we shall then expect to have no obligations to, or defence facilities or forces in, Aden or the South Arabian Federation. British forces will remain in the Persian Gulf and be increased, after withdrawal from Aden, by a second battalion, a second ground attack squadron and a long range maritime patrol squadron. The forces to be provided will suffice to meet commitments to the Persian Gulf States other than the Kuwait commitment in its present form. We plan to discuss with the Ruler of Kuwait the limitation of our commitment there to the provision of air support, unless he gives us adequate warning for the move to Kuwait of reinforcements of land forces from the United Kingdom or the Far East.

The Indo-Pacific Area

The Indo-Pacific Area(a) Hong Kong

14. A garrison of the present size will be retained, together with some coastal minesweepers. No aircraft will be provided.

(b) Naval Forces

15. The Royal Navy's aircraft carrier force is not required for operations in the Atlantic or the Mediterranean and is of only marginal significance in the Middle East. The case for continuing with carriers and their fixed-wing aircraft rests on the needs of the Indo-Pacific area. It has become clear that there is no way of accommodating a viable carrier force throughout the 1970s within a defence budget of £2000m. without a most drastic reduction in our land and air forces. This is because we must commit ourselves to a new cycle of heavy capital expenditure on replacement carriers (including the immediate ordering of a new aircraft carrier (CVA.01) and on new aircraft for the Fleet Air Arm if we should wish to keep carriers through the 1970s and perhaps beyond. At present, however, the carrier force provides a flexible and powerful deterrent. We therefore intend to maintain a carrier force as long as we can without heavy new capital expenditure. The existing carriers should be able to remain in service until about the middle 1970s and, although recruitment of sufficient naval aircrew will become increasingly difficult from about 1970 onwards, we would hope to maintain an effective force up to about 1975. In the intervening period we intend to provide some additional ships and weapons for the Royal Navy, primarily to strengthen its capability in guided weapons, and also to increase the front line of the R.A.F. for maritime tasks.

/(c)....

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(c) Land Forces (other than in Hong Kong)

16. Our plans for the forces in the Far East have been based on the assumption that the confrontation of Malaysia by Indonesia will have ended. So long as the confrontation commitment remains, we shall continue to play our present part in countering it. But when its end has been achieved, we intend to reduce the land forces in the area to a total of about 7 major units (including Commandos). This would enable us to retain our present amphibious capability in the Far East, and to continue to make a contribution to the Commonwealth brigade at present based in Malaysia. In the plans drawn up at the beginning of 1962, before confrontation began, the force structure proposed for the Far East apart from Hong Kong assumed the reduction of land forces to 9 major units.

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(d) Air Force

17. Air forces on the scale required will continue to be provided.

(e) Deployment of Forces

18. We fully appreciate the value of our present bases in Singapore and Malaysia; but, if we are not able to remain indefinitely in Singapore (and it is our present assessment that we may not be able to do so), we should be able to retain a military capability in South East Asia only insofar as our allies had helped us to prepare facilities in Australia from which we could then operate. For this reason we now wish to explore with the United States and Australian Governments what would be involved in providing facilities in Australia to support the force levels we envisage after confrontation has come to an end.

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(f) Capabilities

19. With forces of the size and type which are planned for the Indo-Pacific area, together with the reinforcements that will be practicable from the United Kingdom, we shall have a

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The following information since received from London supplements that in paragraph 19 of the Aide Mémoire by Her Majesty's Government on the United Kingdom Defence Review already communicated: -

United Kingdom Ministers consider that we might be able to redeploy to Australia on the naval side one or two attack carriers (or in the mid-70s one or two cruisers), two commando ships/landing ships assault, fourteen destroyers and frigates, six submarines, including some nuclear powered, and appropriate afloat support; this would necessitate some 3,500 shore based personnel and over 1,000 civilians. The land forces would comprise a commando, and six or seven army units totalling with support some 12,000 to 13,000 men. Air forces would be two squadrons of strike aircraft, five of fighters or ground attack, up to three of maritime aircraft and medium and short range transports totalling about 115 to 130 aircraft and some 9,000 men.

With the compliments of
THE BRITISH EMBASSY

(D. V. Bendall)

25 January, 1966

The Hon. Francis Bator,
Executive Office Building.

~~SECRET~~

military capability comparable with that planned for the area before confrontation compelled us to change our redeployment plans. We should not be able to sustain a long term involvement in large scale holding campaigns of the present Borneo type. Nor should we be able to sustain alone full scale operations against a country like Indonesia that receives continuous accessions of modern Soviet equipment. In fact the combined Commonwealth forces could not conduct operations that involved a substantial threat to our naval and land forces outside manageable range of aircraft operating from established airfields, unless as part of a combined operation with our U.S. allies. What we can and wish to do is to build up with our allies a joint system of planning and organisation of forces, including effective strike forces, that would provide a useful deterrent and, if necessary, a hard hitting force of all arms in the event of direct aggression by Indonesia. But in such an event early action by air strike forces would be essential. Against wider threats, deriving from Chinese expansion, such forces would enable us to maintain with little change our force declarations to SEATO, and we should also be able to contribute them to other allied operations. We shall be able to discharge our remaining responsibilities in dependent territories. (See Supplement)

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Caribb. 2

Caribbean and South Atlantic

20. We plan to withdraw our forces from the Caribbean, except for a company in British Honduras and a frigate. We hope to make arrangements with the South African authorities to retain the use of facilities under the Simonstown agreement without having to maintain a naval presence there. We plan to retain an ice patrol vessel in the Falkland Islands and the Antarctic.

/Africa....

Africa

21. The nature of the requirements we may have to meet in Africa is not clear, but the Rhodesian situation, which could develop into a long term commitment, has illustrated the extent to which we might be involved. We must plan to retain a limited capability for taking military action in Africa - in case, for example, it is necessary to provide some assistance on a small scale to an African Government or we are required in some emergency to evacuate British subjects. The forces required for this purpose would come from the reserves held in the U.K.

The Strategic Reserves

22. The paragraphs above summarise the main changes planned in deployment overseas. It is fundamental to our strategy that we shall rely to the maximum extent on the possibility of reinforcement from the strategic reserve in the U.K. and, for serious emergencies, from Germany. In deciding the size of forces to be retained in the U.K. we have to allow for the need to reduce the over-stretch of our forces by making the full provision needed for the roulement of units, and for the unexpected. We plan to retain a capability to provide concurrently from the Strategic Reserve up to one brigade for limited war and three infantry battalions for internal security operations world-wide. A substantial airlift will be available to move these forces at short notice. Royal Navy and R.A.F. forces based in the U.K. will also be available for overseas reinforcement.

UNITED KINGDOM MEMORANDUM

FOUR POWER DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC AREA

Britain does not have great material interests to protect in South East Asia, though we have a much more substantial economic stake in Australia. In any case, experience shows that a military presence in itself does not necessarily serve to protect such interests. On the other hand, we accept fully the Western interest in containing Chinese influence and helping to sustain the integrity and independence of the free countries of the area. We are conscious that the United States, Australia and New Zealand feel strongly that we should go on playing a significant part in the defence of the area. We believe that, whilst within our limited defence budget our defence expenditure in this area must be limited to £185 million a year, we can continue to make a valid contribution there to these Western interests in general and with particular reference to our Commonwealth partners. We shall wish to discuss how this contribution can best be used. We have our own idea of the kind and size of the British force contribution which would be most effective and we should like to discuss this also with our allies. Our planning, which is related to the target year 1969/70, has been based on the following assumptions:-

- (a) "Confrontation" will have been brought to an end in circumstances permitting a viable political relationship to be established between Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia;
- (b) We should like to stay in Singapore and Malaya as long as this would be to the general advantage of ourselves and our allies, but we must recognise that there are various factors which will make our tenure uncertain. Her Majesty's Government are determined to continue to make a contribution to the defence of this area even after it may be necessary to leave Singapore and Malaya;
- (c) The British forces in the area will no longer be capable of conducting ground operations independently of our allies against sophisticated opposition, e.g. Indonesia;
- (d) Australia and New Zealand will still wish to be associated with an active defence arrangement to safeguard their integrity against Chinese pressure and, in the case of Australia, against Indonesian pressure, including an eventual threat to New Guinea;
- (e) The United States will likewise desire a continuing British military presence in the Indian Ocean area.

Victorian?

includes signals from London

pin the down

2. The task of containing China will be long. Even assuming the present fighting in Viet Nam has been brought to a successful end, Communist subversion, inspired and directed by China, will continue to threaten the area, coupled with the possibility of direct Chinese aggression, for example against India. In these /circumstances

circumstances, we have to consider what will be the best way of encouraging resistance to this threat amongst the countries of the area. It seems probable that Thailand and the Philippines will remain in SEATO for the foreseeable future, though Thailand's "Western" orientation can only be expected to survive so long as effective Allied ground and air forces can be brought rapidly to her defence. But our long term aim should be to build up a group of ostensibly non-aligned states, with sufficient economic strength and political individuality to resist Chinese political or subversive pressure; in which case a Western military presence on the Asian mainland may in the long run prove counterproductive. This type of long-term solution could, however, only hope to be viable if there was a sufficiently powerful Western force available in the background to give the countries of the mainland in particular the feeling of real support against a Chinese military threat if they wanted it. Clearly in such a situation there will be different degrees of "non-alignment" in different countries, and the likelihood of their wishing to obtain Western defence help will vary from case to case. But it is virtually certain that most of them will wish to be non-aligned and they could not hope to be regarded as such so long as there is a Western military presence on their soil. Nor will they wish to be members of a Western defence organisation. On the other hand, some of them may wish to have ties with each other, and this we should welcome. ✓

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3. In addition to the general consideration mentioned above, the United Kingdom believes, quite apart from the financial considerations involved, that in the 70s it will no longer be possible to continue to retain British or Western bases in Malaysia and Singapore. If therefore a British defence contribution to the area is to be maintained, it will be necessary for alternative facilities to be provided elsewhere. Australia seems to be the only possible site. The nature of the facilities likely to be required depends on the exact type of force. Apart from the more general and joint objectives described below, the United Kingdom force would have independent responsibility for the remaining British colonial territories in the area, e.g. particularly Hong Kong and Fiji. In addition to Asia, there might be requirements for peace-keeping activities in Africa. It might prove desirable for these also to be dealt with from facilities in Australia (or from the United Kingdom) together with such staging arrangements in the Indian Ocean Islands, including an airfield at Aldabra, as may prove necessary.

4. The extent and nature of the joint political and military machinery which will be needed cannot yet be determined with precision. Joint studies will be needed to outline the geographical and military scope of the operations which might have to be undertaken by forces based in Australia, the extent to which such operations might be undertaken jointly or severally, and the nature of the joint machinery for planning, command and control which might fit the operational requirements thus outlined.

5. We have no fixed ideas on the kind of machinery required, but the following ideas might usefully be discussed:-

(a) Joint machinery for the production of the necessary contingency plans and for enabling consultation to take place in an effective manner. This would include the joint provision of intelligence; ✓

(b) Consultation about all contingencies and emergencies; ✓

/(c)

- 5) Joint command and supply machinery to be employed in appropriate cases.
6. If machinery of this kind was set up it could examine the contingencies likely to arise in the whole area from Africa through Southern and South East Asia to New Zealand and estimate what type and size of forces might be required to deal with them. It might be found that in some cases, e.g. small scale peace-keeping operations on the East Coast of Africa, if the need for this should occur, the United Kingdom forces could operate independently as in the past. It might be found in other cases on the Asian mainland, e.g. India, that the principal contingency was armed attack from China, and that effective intervention would require from the outset a major United States contribution. Another type of operation could be the defence of Australian territory in New Guinea against attack from Indonesia. This might, at least initially, be dealt with by a joint British, Australian and New Zealand force.
7. The United Kingdom Aide Mémoire on the Defence Review describes the capabilities which the United Kingdom forces could provide to the joint effort.
8. One of the most difficult cases could be that of a renewed Indonesian threat against Malaysia if the political agreement which had resulted in the ending of confrontation were to break down after withdrawal from Singapore. With the limited size of the proposed United Kingdom force, it would no longer be possible for the forces available to the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand to get into a full scale counter-confrontation posture by land. Although Malaysia and Singapore might well wish to retain some guarantee of continuing support during a fairly long transitional period until they are satisfied about their relations with Indonesia, it seems most unlikely that this could happen in circumstances which would enable us to offer Malaysia and Singapore any subsequent guarantee against Indonesia. The general conclusion seems to be that, if after the ending of confrontation we are required to withdraw from Singapore, it would be necessary to make it clear to Malaysia and Singapore that they could not expect a return to the same sort of military protection as is now afforded them. A stable future for them would in these circumstances depend on the maintenance of reasonable relations between both of them and Indonesia. This will no doubt be easier if Indonesia manages to evolve some more reasonable and anti-Communist régime.
9. Nevertheless it should also be recognised that the United Kingdom's existing links with some of the territories in the area are in themselves a form of contribution to the kind of four power organisation under discussion. They help to give the territories some degree of confidence and reassurance in resisting subversion and external pressure. It might therefore be unwise to abandon altogether previous bilateral commitments of this kind where their continuance in some form could serve the joint interest. In the case of Malaysia and Singapore, for example, a continuing limited commitment to provide air and naval support during a transitional period might fall into this category and would probably be within the power of the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand forces forming part of the joint defence organisation; although in the event of Indonesia making a deliberate

/attack

attack upon Malaysia and/or Singapore, after we had withdrawn from our previous bases, our only effective means of checking her might be to carry out major air strikes on Indonesian bases.

10. From the studies referred to above would develop the contingency plans for the joint defence system, and the contributions required from each participant in each case would be established in the light of them. The decision to put any of these plans into effect would be taken jointly after consultation.

Foreign Office

24 January, 1966.

UNITED KINGDOM PROPOSALS FOR THE DEFENCE
OF LIBYA

The United Kingdom commitment to Libya, contained in the 1953 Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, is to go to the immediate aid of Libya in the event of an external attack, and to concert with the Libyan Government if an attack is threatened. There is no provision in the Treaty for unilateral termination before 1973 and termination then, or at any later date, requires one year's advance notice by the party seeking termination. It seems unlikely that this commitment will continue after 1973 and its continuation up to that date necessarily depends partly on future developments in Libya itself. Nevertheless, it must be assumed that whilst the King of Libya reigns and rules he will expect a firm commitment to the defence of Libya to continue.

2. At the Anglo/American talks on Libya in London in March 1965 it was agreed that major continuing attention to Libya was justified, because the independence, stability and economic welfare of Libya are of major importance to the West. President Johnson has since given a tangible expression of this understanding by sending a confidential letter to the King containing an assurance of United States support for Libya's independence.

3. Her Majesty's Government recognise that their commitment should continue, but the need to achieve economies in British defence expenditure, especially overseas, and the high cost of providing on an independent basis for the defence of Libya, have together compelled Her Majesty's Government to consider whether this end could not be achieved with greater economy by entering into a joint effort. On the assumption that the intention of the United States Government is to earmark forces to back up President Johnson's assurance to the King, it should be possible for both Governments to work out a joint plan for the defence of Libya which would avoid duplication of effort and expense.

4. The United Kingdom proposes therefore that Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government should agree to support each other in providing military assistance to Libya in the event of an attack on that country and should enter into joint planning to give effect to that agreement. To this joint plan, the United Kingdom would be prepared to contribute the forces required to safeguard a point of entry at Tobruk and El Adem, where we would add an armoured reconnaissance squadron to the infantry company and R.A.F. complement which are already there, and strike and reconnaissance support from airfields in Cyprus and Malta. The United Kingdom assumes that the United States forces required would not exceed those already available either in the Mediterranean area or by planned reinforcement. The United Kingdom proposes that such an agreement should be recorded - perhaps in the form of an agreed minute - and that it should be subject to periodic or ad hoc review at the request of either party.

5. If these proposals are agreeable it would be for consideration what should be said to the King to persuade him that practical measures had been taken which would result in better protection for Libya than hitherto. The United States Government might wish to consider, for example, whether they

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are in a position to make any further commitments to Libya beyond the existing Presidential assurance. The United Kingdom suggests that the two Governments might consider instructing the British and United States Ambassadors to explain to the King, orally and in private, that both Governments, being equally determined to ensure the continuing independence of Libya, propose to put this common determination into practical effort by working out a joint plan for the defence of Libya.

6. The United Kingdom is convinced that if these proposals are acceptable their implementation would enable both the United Kingdom and the United States to maintain a close political association with Libya; to protect the considerable British and American investment in the Libyan oil industry and the availability of Libyan oil to the West; to help prevent the subordination of Libyan national policies to those of the United Arab Republic; and, on the American side, to help ensure the continuing tenure of the Wheelus Air Base.

Foreign Office, S.W.1.

24 January, 1966.

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Healey Visit

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EXDIS.

SUBJECT: UK DEFENSE REVIEW - WASHINGTON MINISTERIAL TALKS
DISCUSSIONS WITH MINDEF. HEALEY BY EMBOFF ON DEF REVIEW
REVEALED FOLLOWING HIGHLIGHTS:

1. FOREIGN EXCHANGE: HEALEY DESCRIBED FOREIGN EXCHANGE
IMPLICATIONS OF DEF REVIEW AS THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM HE
IS ENCOUNTERING IN SESSIONS OF CABINET DEFENSE AND OVERSEAS
POLICY COMMITTEE (DOPC). PROBLEM NOT LIMITED TO GERMANY/BAOR
BUT INVOLVES WHOLE RANGE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE EXPENDITURE,

PAGE 2 RUEHLL 544C/1 ~~SECRET~~
INCLUDING AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT FROM US. HEALEY EXPECTS DISCUSS
THIS PROBLEM DURING WASH TALKS. (COMMENT: IT WAS NOT CLEAR
WHETHER HE PLANS RAISE SUBJECT DURING PLENARY SESSIONS OR
SEPARATELY WITH SEC MCNAMARA. WE HAVE CLEAR IMPRESSION HEALEY
FEELS HE NEEDS SOMETHING MORE SOLID IN TERMS OF US PROCUREMENT
IN UK THAN SIMPLY "INVITATION TO SUBMIT TENDERS ON AUXILIARIES".
HE HAS SOME IDEAS ON POSSIBILITIES SUCH AS AMMO FOR VIET NAM AS
RESULT HIGHLIGHTING OF THIS ITEM IN PRESS REPORTS ON VIETNAM
SUPPLEMENTAL; POSSIBILITY EXTENDING MCDONNELL SUB-CONTRACTS
WITH UK FIRMS FOR BRITISH F-4 ASSEMBLIES AND COMPONENTS TO
COVER F-4 RPRODUCTION FOR US WHERE UK PRICE COMPETITIVE WITH
US PRICE; AND PROSPECTS OTHER 3RD COUNTRIES, ARMAMENTS DEALS
SUCH AS SAUDI ARABI.)

3. F-111: HEALEY FULLY EXPECTS HAVE DECISION ON F-111
IN TIME FOR WASH TALKS. WHILE HE HAVING HIS DIFICULTIES IN
DOPC, HE FEELS HE IS SUCCEEDING IN HIS EFFORTS LINE UP
SUPPORT FOR F-111 BUY. HIS RELUCTANCE BE POSITIVE ON PRO-
SPECTS OF SUCCESS STEM FROM FACT THAT GEORGE BROWN HAS BEEN
ABSENT FROM DOPC MEETINGS TO DATE, BUT LIKELY PARTICIPATE THIS
WEEKEND AND THAT PRIMIN HAS NOT REVEALED HIS POSITION. (COMMENT:

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 99-293 (#67)
By is/etm, NARA, Date 8-16-06

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JAN 26 1966

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-2- 3430, JANUARY 21, FROM LONDON (SECTION ONE OF TWO).

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FROM OTHER SOURCES WE UNDERSTAND THAT TWO OF THREE BACKROOM ADVISERS TO PRIMIN ON DEFENSE MATTERS, GEORGE WIGG AND CHALFONT, ARE PRO-F-111, WHILE SOLLY ZUCKERMAN IS UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT F-111.)

3. EUROPE: HEALEY REITERATED NO PLANS TO ALTER BAOR BUT REMARKED THERE WOULD BE SOME SLIMMING OF RAF. EXPRESSED INTEREST IN HEARING WHAT IDEAS SEC MCNAMARA HAD IN MIND WHEN HE MENTIONED "ECONOMIES IN GERMANY" TO PRIMIN. (COMMENT: MAINTENANCE OF BAOR RELATED IN HEALEY'S THINKING TO STRATEGIC RESERVE ROLE FOR OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD.)

4. FAR EAST: HEALEY PREFACED REMARKS BY SAYING THAT IN GENERAL POLITICAL ISSUES RELATING TO OVER-ALL DEFENSE REVIEW, UK POSITION WAS FLEXIBLE AND HE ANTICIPATED NO PROBLEMS IN WASH. IN SINGAPORE, THERE NOW AGREEMENT TO ABANDON RIGID LINE BRITS FOLLOWED IN SEPT QUADRIPARTITE TALKS. THEY HAVE CONCLUDED THEY SHOULD STAY IN SINGAPORE AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. IF LEE ASKED THEM TO LEAVE THEY WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE TO DO SO. HEALEY, HOWEVER, REASSURED BY RECENT LEE SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS AND HE MORE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT UK POSITION IN SINGAPORE. NEVERTHELESS, THERE STILL NEED TO PLAN

PAGE 4 RUEHLL 544C/1 ~~SECRET~~

FOR ALTERNATIVE FACILITIES IN AUSTRALIA. THESE WILL REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE TIME CONSTRUCT. IF SUCH FACILITIES NOT AVAILABLE WHEN BRITS FORCED LEAVE SINGAPORE, THEY WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO WITHDRAW FROM AREA. (COMMENT: HEALEY APPEARED QUITE RELAXED ABOUT FAR EAST ISSUE GIVING IMPRESSION IT WILL BE RESOLVED TO SATISFACTION US. NOTED SYMPATHETICALLY PROBLEMS OF US IN VIET NAM AND INDICATED THERE NO DESIRE COMPLICATE LIFE FOR US. COMMENTED NO INTENTION ARGUE FOR US TAKING ON ADDITIONAL COMMITMENTS IN ORDER EASE BRIT PROBLEMS.

5. AUSTRALIA: HEALEY FEELS THAT HE WILL HAVE PROBLEMS IN CANBERRA AS RESULT RECENT MINISTERIAL CHANGES. HOPES TO EXPLORE MATTER WITH US AS TO HOW TO HANDLE AUSTRALIANS TO INCREASE DEFENSE EFFORTS BUT STRESSED NEED TO AVOID APPEARANCE OF GANGING UP BY US AND UK. (COMMENT: WE UNDERSTAND HEALEY SENDING ADVANCE PARTY OF OFFICIALS TO CANBERRA TO CONTACT AUSTRALIAN OFFICIALS FOR PURPOSE OF GETTING READING ON ATTITUDES OF NEW MINSITERIAL LINEUP.)

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-3- 3430, JANUARY 21, FROM LONDON (SECTION ONE OF TWO).

6. FORCE STRUCTURE: HEALEY INDICATED HE WILL BE PREPARED TO OUTLINE IN GENERAL TERMS FORCE STRUCTURE HE ENVISAGES TO SUPPORT COMMITMENTS. REMARKED HE WILL BE VERY INTERESTED IN US

PAGE 5 RUEHLL 544C/1 ~~SECRET~~
REACTION BUT CAUTIONED THERE ONLY ROOM FOR ADJUSTMENTS WITHIN TOTAL. HAS RECEIVED STAFF PAPER ON SUBJECT WITH RECOMMENDATION IT BE GIVEN IN ADVANCE TO US, BUT HE UNDECIDED ON GROUNDS IT "BLOODY AWFUL". IN RESPONSE TO URGING HE MAY REWRITE IT IN ORDER GIVE US AN ADVANCE COPY. (COMMENT: HARDMAN LATER TOLD US ABOUT DRAFT PAPER AND READ OUT, ILLUSTRATIVELY, FOLLOWING HEADINGS - "NUCLEAR ELEMENT", "CARRIERS", "LAND FORCES", "AIR DISPOSITIONS". COMMENTED HE HAD HAD NO REACTION FROM HEALEY ON IT. HOPES TO HAVE PAPER APPROVED BY HEALEY AND DOPC OVER WEEKEND. ADM. HENDERSON, HEAD OF BDS, IS NOW IN LONDON AND LEAVES FOR WASH ON MONDAY, AND HARDMAN'S THOUGHT IS TO HAVE HENDERSON BRING IT TO WASH FOR US. AMB DEAN HAS REPORTED US DESIRES HAVE PAPERS FOR TALKS AT LEAST 48 HOURS IN ADVANCE.)

7. CABINET CONSIDERATION: OTHER THAN F-111 DECISION, HEALEY SAID STEWART AND HE HOPE HAVE APPROVAL OF "TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS" BY DOPC PRIOR DEPARTURE WEDNESDAY. DOPC MEETING TODAY, SATURDAY AND SUNDAY ON DEFENSE REVIEW ISSUES. ONLY AFTER RETURN FROM WASH AND CANBERRA WILL RECOMMENDATIONS BE SUBMITTED TO FULL CABINET TO EFFECT HMG POLICY DECISION. BRUCE -
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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC (3430) PRIORITY
RUEKDA/DOD WASHDC 414 PRIORITY
STATE GRNC

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~~SECRET~~ JAN 21 SECTION TWO OF TWO

EXDIS

8. NUCLEAR SHARING: HEALEY EXPRESSED HOPE THAT PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR SHARING WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT COME UP DURING WASH TALKS. IT BEING HANDLED OTHER CHANNELS AND APT CONSUME TOO GREAT PREPARATION LIMITED TIME.

9. GENERAL: FROM OTHER SOURCES WE UNDERSTAND FONOFF PREPARING PAPERS ON 4-POWER SECURITY SYSTEM, LIBYA AND POSSIBLY "POLARISES EAST OF SUEZ" AND MIDDLE EAST. THOUGHT IS TO GET THESE APPROVED BY DOPC OVER WEEKEND AND MAKE THEM AVAILABLE TO US IN ADVANCE. GP-3. BRUCE
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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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 P SUBJ: UK PRESS ON DEFENSE REVIEW

Stewart Healey Visit

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- BUNDY-SMITH
- BATOR
- BOWDLER
- BOWMAN
- CHASE
- COOPER
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- KEENE
- KOMEI
- MOODY

USIA
 NSC ALTHOUGH PRESS COMMENT ON DEFENSE REVIEW AT LOW LEVEL PAST
 INR WEEK, TODAY BOTH TIMES AND ECONOMIST BROKE OUT WITH EDITORIAL
 CIA ASSESSMENTS IN ANTICIPATION STEWART-HEALEY VISIT WASHINGTON.
 NSA ECONOMIST SEES WASHINGTON TALKS CENTERING AROUND MEANS OF
 DAC ACCOMPLISHING POLICY, ALREADY AGREED BETWEEN WILSON AND PRESIDENT
 E JOHNSON, THAT UK WILL REMAIN EAST OF SUEZ "IN MORE PLACES AND
FOR MORE YEARS THAN MANY PEOPLE THOUGHT SIX MONTHS AGO."
 RSR TIMES, ON OTHER HAND, VIEWS VISIT AS WAY OF TESTING IDENTIFIED

PAGE 2 RUDSC 548C UNCLAS
 CHOICES AGAINST US AND AUSTRALIAN OPINION, BUT WITH ULTIMATE STRATEGIC AND TECHNICAL DECISIONS STILL TO BE MADE. SAYS FAR EAST STRATEGY -- "ONCE COMMITMENT TO DEFEND MALAYSIA AGAINST INDONESIAN CONFRONTATION BECOMES UNNECESSARY" -- AND QUESTION OF DEPLOYMENT NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE TWO CRUCIAL ISSUES WHICH REMAIN UNSOLVED.

ACCORDING ECONOMIST, INDONESIAN CONFRONTATION IMPLIES THAT BRITISH WILL HAVE TO STAY IN SINGAPORE, WITH AUSTRALIAN AS FALL-BACK POSITION "IF THIS EVENTUALLY BECOMES IMPOSSIBLE." UK ALSO LIKELY TO STAY IN SINGAPORE "BECAUSE IT HAS GOOD RELATIONS WITH LEE KWAN YEW WHILE AMERICANS HAVEN'T ." ON OTHER SIDE OF INDIAN OCEAN, SAYS ECONOMIST, DIEGO GARCIA COULD SERVE AS STAGING POST AND JUMPING-OFF POINT FOR OPERATIONS EAST AFRICA.

BOTH EDITORIALS AGREE THAT PERSIAN GULF POSITIONS LIKELY BE KEPT TO PROTECT SHEIKDOMS AND KUWAIT. ACCORDING ECONOMIST, "ADEN NOW APPEARS EXPENDABLE", BUT WHILE TIMES AGREES IT WILL BE REDUCED, SAYS TRANSITIONAL PERIOD TO SAUDI INDEPENDENCE AND POSSIBILITY MILITARY ACTION RHODESIA EXPECTED REQUIRE CONTINUED PRESENCE ADEN

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-2- 3434 January 21 From London

UNTIL 1968. TIMES ALSO SAYS MALTA AND LIBYA BE "SEVERLY PRUNED", YIELDING UP THREE BATTALIONS.

BOTH ARTICLES AGREE HEALEY WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT IF NOT

PAGE 3 RUDSC 548C UNCLAS

IMPOSSIBLE TO MEET TARGET OF 2,000 MILLION POUND DEFENSE BUDGET IN 1970 -- ECONOMIST BECAUSE IT SEES FEW BIG CUTS EAST OF SUEZ AND ALL UK COMMITMENT THERE "OPEN-ENDED", AND TIMES BECAUSE GOVT HAS ADOPTED "SEEMINGLY OPEN-ENDED COMMITMENT TO PATROL INDIAN OCEAN AND AFRICAN COAST."

NEITHER EDITORIAL SEES MAJOR CUTS IN EUROPE. "MOST THAT CAN BE EXPECTED APPEARS BE NATO'S ACQUIESCENCE IN STILL GREATER USE OF BAOR AS WORLDWIDE STRATEGIC RESERVE", SAYS ECONOMIST. MORE POSITIVELY, TIMES ASSERTS "RHINE ARMY WILL BE MILKED OF UNITS WHENEVER GLOBAL OPERATIONS OVERWHELM BRITISH-BASED STRATEGIC RESERVE."

ON WEAPONS, ECONOMIST THINKS IT "BOTH INEVITABLE AND RIGHT THAT RAF SHOULD GET ITS STRIKE AND RECON AIRCRAFT IN SHAPE OF AMERICAN F-111." ARGUES F-111 CONVENTIONAL BOMB CAPABILITY MAKES IT SUITABLE AS PARRY TO INDONESIANS AND FOR SUPPORT INDIA AGAINST THREAT FROM BEYOND HIMALAYAS, AND AS LONG-RANGE RECON AIRCRAFT IT ALSO FILLS BILL IN EUROPE. SAYS SEEMS TO BE GOVT'S INTENTION BUY MINIMUM NUMBER (60) F-111'S AS INTERIM SOLUTION UNTIL ANGLO-FRENCH STRIKE AIRCRAFT COMES ALONG IN 1973. BUT F-111 PUT IMPLIES DITCHING ADMIRALTY'S PET PROJECT FOR NEW CARRIER AS REDUNDANT. "EVEN BUYING CUT-PRICE SECOND - HAND AMERICAN CARRIER SEEMS UNLIKELY --

PAGE 4 RUDSC 548C UNCLAS

PARTICULARLY AS ONLY US CARRIER FOR SALE WOULD NEED LONG AND EXPENSIVE REFIT."

TIMES SEES F-111 VS. CARRIER "DEADLOCK" AS EVIDENCE INTER-SERVICE RIVALRIES. "STILL DOMINATE HIGHEST DEFENSE COUNCILS", AND AS MAJOR CAUSE OF SLOW-DOWN IN PACE OF DEFENSE REVIEW. BUT MORE FUNDAMENTALLY, TIMES REGARDS IDEA THAT DEFENSE REVIEW COULD BE BROUGHT TO TIDY CONCLUSION AS MISCONCEPTION WHEN THERE CAN, IN FACT, BE NO FINALITY.

BEHIND HEALEY'S SUBSEQUENT VISIT AUSTRALIA, SAYS ECONOMIST, SHOULD LIKE UK PRESSURE FOR GREATER AUSTRALIAN EFFORT SEA, AND RECOGNITION THAT WITH BEST WILL IN WORLD, SINGAPORE MAY BECOME

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-3- 3434 January 21 From London

IMPOSSIBLE AS BASE INDIAN OCEAN OPERATIONS. "PROPOSAL FOR JOINT US, UK, AUSTRALIAN BASE IN NORTHERN AUSTRALIA IS VERY MUCH IN THE INTERESTS OF AUSTRALIA ITSELF."

ECONOMIST CONCLUDES THAT IF BRIT PRESENCE EAST OF SUEZ IS TO CONTINUE, THERE WILL BE MORE DIRECT AMERICAN FINANCIAL AID THAN SO FAR. THIS SHOULD INCLUDE AMERICAN HELP FOR THE WEST-ABOUT ROUTE TO SE ASIA ACROSS PACIFIC. UK WILL ALSO BE SEEKING AGREED ANGLO-AMERICAN POLICY ON WHETHER INDONESIA IS TO BE REGARDED AS DISTRUPTIVE INFLUENCE IN AREA OR AS BARRIER CHICOM EXPANSION.

PAGE 5 RUDSC 548C UNCLAS

"IF THE AMERICANS WANT CONTINUED BRIT PRESENCE, AS THEY BADLY DO, THERE MUST BE GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF WHO IS CONTAINING WHOM AND WITH WHAT AIM IN MIND."

IN SEPARATE TIMES STORY TODAY, NAVAL CORRESPONDENT STATES "ON BEST AUTHORITY" THAT UK WILL NOT BUY SECOND-HAND CARRIER FROM US. SAYS SPECULATION ON CARRIER BUY HARDENED WHEN ROYAL NAVY TEAM VISITING US MADE SOUNDINGS ON PURCHASE, BUT DECISION DELAYED WHILE DEFENSE REVIEWERS ARGUED WHETHER CARRIER NEEDED. ORISKANY OR SHANGRI-LA WERE CONSIDERED AS LIKELY ACQUISITIONS TO FILL STOP-GAP ROLE WHILE UK BUILT NEW CARRIER. BUT DEMANDS OF VIETNAM WAR, SAYS TIMES, APPEAR TO HAVE RAISED STRONG DOUBTS THAT UK WILL BUILD NEW CARRIER.

TIMES CORRESPONDENT ASSERTS FEELING IN WHITEHALL SEEMS TO BE THAT DEFENSE REVIEW HAS DISPANSED WITH ANY NEW CARRIER.

UK PRESS COVERAGE NEW DRIVE PUSHING MIRAGE-SPEY INSTEAD
F-111 REPORTED SEPTEL. BRUCE

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File UK



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

January 14, 1966

I-20416/66

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: UK Defense Review

PARTICIPANTS:

British Side

Ambassador Sir Patrick Dean
Admiral Sir Nigel Henderson, British Defense Staff
Mr. David Bendall, Counselor

United States Side

Secretary McNamara
Mr. Adam Yarmolinsky, DASD(ISA)

TIME: January 14, 1966, 3:30 pm

PLACE: Office of the Secretary of Defense

Ambassador Dean said that he had come in under instructions to inquire if there were any questions that Secretary McNamara wished to put to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense in advance of their meeting as scheduled for January 27 to discuss the UK Defense Review. Secretary McNamara replied that he had no specific questions but rather hoped that the British side could table an agenda in advance with papers laying out the facts and issues. Ambassador Dean replied that he had a paper to deliver on proposed changes in the UK commitment in Libya which he handed to the Secretary (copy attached).

Libya file

Secretary McNamara said that we were vitally concerned with the Far East area. He understood that the UK might not be prepared to table other papers in advance of the meeting and if not, we would understand, but he hoped that they would be able to show us in advance at least their present base and force structure and to present some proposed alternatives, perhaps laid out in tabular form.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By rg/etm, NARA, Date 8-16-06

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEARS INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AT 13 YEARS.
DOB DIR 3.10

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Admiral Henderson agreed that the UK had never in fact produced force structure and base organization tables and that they might be useful. Secretary McNamara added that it would also be useful to have written statements of the UK's current strategy and of alternative strategies being considered. Ambassador Dean responded that he could certainly inquire whether this material could be made available. Mr. Bendall pointed out that the Foreign Secretary had been away the last two weeks and there was a problem of time in providing papers in advance. Secretary McNamara said he would like to have at least 48 hours in which to consider the papers before the meeting, particularly in view of his time problems during that week, in light of the Congressional hearings scheduled. He said that he regarded the decisions as vital for us and almost the foundation for our foreign and defense policy in the area over the next decade.

Admiral Henderson pointed out that the UK strategy, if not force structure, for the area would be dictated by financial limitations. Secretary McNamara replied that he understood that strategy was limited by force structure, especially when there was an overall financial limitation, and that it was necessary and desirable, therefore, to work out the strategy from the force structure rather than vice versa. He said that if he knew the base and force structure he could work out the strategy that could be supported by it.

Ambassador Dean then raised the question of procedure for the meeting. Secretary McNamara said he would devote whatever time was necessary but he did not think more than one day would be needed. He hoped that the number of people present would be kept quite small, and he was thinking no more than six would be needed from the U. S. side. A smaller number would make it easier to get to the heart of the problem and the participants would be freer to deal with the delicate issues involved. Ambassador Dean agreed. Admiral Henderson asked what U. S. military would be present. Secretary McNamara replied that would depend on what information was available. Secretary McNamara said that anything the Defense Minister could give to us on their decision on F-111's would be particularly helpful. Mr. Bendall inquired whether any U. S. studies had been initiated in advance of the meeting. Secretary McNamara replied that it was not worthwhile to do so until we could see more clearly what the UK had in mind. We don't know enough about the UK navy and naval requirements. Based on our initial examination, we can look to eventual replacement of the Singapore base with a base in Australia, but we don't understand the operational effect of this shift or the extent to which the UK could shift from sea-based to land-based air if it moved out of Singapore. He saw substantial foreign exchange savings and some cost savings by land basing, especially the sharing of joint facilities with the Australians. He also saw a possibility of sharing U. S. Polaris bases for a price less than that of starting from scratch, provided that such arrangements were militarily and politically feasible. He felt that any studies we might do of these arrangements should be joint studies. It

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would be quite difficult for us to initiate proposals rather than to comment on UK proposals. Our end objective remains the same: to insure that British forces remain in the Far East. The U. S. has a tremendous interest in that area but we don't know enough facts to know how to coordinate our forces. Mr. Bendall suggested that in joint planning the UK would put more emphasis on the western end of the area and the U. S. on the eastern end. Secretary McNamara reiterated that we think in terms of forces and bases, especially when strategy must be tailored to financial limitations. The U. S. is accustomed to beginning with strategy and then moving to base and force structure and costs, but in any event, all three must be integrated.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Prepared and Approved by

AY
Adam Yarmolinsky
January 14, 1966

Distribution:

Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
Jeffrey C. Kitchen, G/PM (State)
Robert Komer, The White House
DASD/FE
DASD/NATO
Director, ER
Director, Policy Planning Staff

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

14

1/14/66

Bob:

Will you please do a commentary on
this for the President's night reading?

McGB

ck
Xs/Ph

JAN 14 1966

*See Rwk'd
Pres 1/14/66*

Friday, January 14, 1966 - 11:20 AM

MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM PRIME MINISTER WILSON

I am now back in London after my round Africa safari having seen all seven African heads of government with whom we are in relations, the only notable omissions being of course Nkrumah and Nyerere. It has been well worth while and I think my Commonwealth and African constituencies are now quiescent at least for the time being.

The Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting at Lagos went in the end far better than I could reasonably have hoped. The meeting itself was not without its moments, particularly my debate with Field Marshal Margai of Sierra Leone about an opposed landing in Rhodesia on the first day and a very rewarding closed session at the end of the second day when only heads of government were present without their advisers and in the course of which I was able to take them pretty fully into my confidence both about present policies and future objectives. As you will have seen from the communique the Commonwealth as a whole have re-affirmed their recognition that Rhodesia is a British responsibility and while in a sense I have had to account to them for that responsibility, they are now content to let me discharge it for the time being in my own way. There were some members -- a minority I am glad to say -- who still hankered after the use of force: but the Commonwealth collectively has agreed to give sanctions a fair run. Your own decision on asbestos and lithium could not have been better timed to make maximum impact. The meeting was I think a victory for moderation. It has strengthened the Commonwealth vis a vis the extremists of the Organization of African Unity and it has held at least for the time being, the position in the United Nations on Chapter VII. It has added to the prestige of the sound moderate leaders like Abubakar above all, I have avoided being pressed any further than my public position in the House of Commons. The price of this has been the very modest one of the establishment of two committees to meet in London and an undertaking to meet the Commonwealth again if, by July, sanctions have still not succeeded in their objective, to that extent time has been gained. All in all commonsense and realism prevailed.

I then went on to Lusaka where I have had very good meetings with Kaunda, both privately and with his ministers. Your own very helpful message had eased my path for me.

I had two main objectives: first, to secure Kaunda's agreement that plans for the quck kill (the closing of the Zambian frontier with Rhodesia) should be carefully coordinated between Zambia and Britain, Kaunda is no longer suicidal and I managed not only to secure acceptance that we should not

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- 2 -

proceed to the second front before mid February, but I also have a fair prospect of getting their agreement, that even when the Zambian frontier is closed to Rhodesian industrial goods, coal will be exempt, with all that that means in airlift terms. This date of mid February is the earliest at which, on the best expert advice, it would be prudent to contemplate delivering the death blow to illegality. Even so it may mean that Zambia will be reduced to a care and maintenance basis for a period of indeterminate length.

My second objective was to try and persuade Kaunda to accept British forces in Zambia so that at the right moment, they would be ready to move into Rhodesia either invited or unopposed. On this I think I have got Kaunda away from his insistence on placing troops across the Zambezi and though he has not yet agreed to accept a Commonwealth presence on the Zambian side of the frontier with Rhodesia, he is now, I think, at least more ready to contemplate something along lines I could accept. All in all, he is a bit more relaxed, much more ready to give sanctions a chance, and does at least accept that we really mean to bring Smith down. He does of course feel himself very exposed economically and, politically, he finds it very difficult to accept a position in which Zambia, for purely practical reasons, is forced to take up a less uncompromising attitude than his fellow Africans towards commercial ties with Rhodesia, because of the inevitable interdependence of the two neighbor economies. For the time being, however, I think we have got him on the rails again.

In Nairobi I had an hour meeting with Kenyatta, and found him as usual wise, relaxed and completely sympathetic, both on sanctions and on the inevitability of gradualness towards majority rule in the reconstruction period.

As you will have seen, the Commonwealth Secretary did not in the end manage to get to Salisbury to see the Governor. But as I indicated in my earlier message, I can play at home the difficulties about personal safety and recognition as usefully as if he had gone in. My qualms about the Governor remain, home African and world fronts now in tolerable order -- and I realize of course that the most overworked phrase in this message has been for the time being -- I can now concentrate on the internal Rhodesian situation.

All in all, the past week has been time well spent. The situation has of course been transformed by the oil sanctions and the working of the Zambia airlift. In consequence the Commonwealth in general and Commonwealth Africans in particular now accept Britain's responsibility and good faith

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- 3 -

and this means that we can now make the running ourselves. The point of major difficulty which lies ahead is how to translate economic hardship in Rhodesia into a political readiness to capitulate. For this the Europeans in Rhodesia will have to be given some assurances for their future as well as evidence of continuing and growing hardship if they persist in rebellion. The time is approaching therefore when I shall have to make a public statement on our peace aims. This I shall probably have to do before Parliament reassembles during the last week of January. This will have to be accompanied by a further tightening of the sanctions screw in order to demonstrate that we are not peace-making from weakness. You have experience in such strategy. I will be in touch with you again.

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Komer
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MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
T 33
1300 ZULU

UK

JANUARY 14, 1966

MESSAGE BEINGS

I AM MNOW BACK IN LONDON AFTER MY ROUND AFRICA SAFARI HAVING SEEN ALLSEVEN AFRICAN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WITH WHOM WE ARE IN RELATIONS, THE ONLY NOTABLE OMISSIONS BEING OF COURSE NKURUMAH AND NYERERE. IT HAS BEEN WELL WORTH WHILE AND I THINK MY COMMONWEALTH AND AFRICAN CONSTITUENCIES ARE NOW QUIESCENT AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING.

THE COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS MEETING AT LAGOS WENT IN THE END FAR BETTER THAN I COULD REASONABLY HAVE HOPED. THE MEETING ITSELF WAS NOT WITHOUT ITS MOMENTS, PARTICULARLY MY DEBATE WITH FIELD MARSHAL MARGAI OF SIERRA LEONE ABOUT AN OPPOSED LANDING IN

RHODESIA ON THE FIRST DAY AND A VERY REWARDING CLOSED SESSION AT THE END OF THE SECOND DAY WHEN ONLY HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WERE PRESENT WITHOUT THEIR ADVISERS AND IN THE COURSE OF WHICH I WAS ABLE TO TAKE THEM PRETTY FULLY INTO MY CONFIDENCE BOTH ABOUT PRESENT POLICIES AND FUTURE OBJECTIVES. AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM THE COMMUNIQUE THE COMMONWEALTH AS A WHOLE HAVE REAFFIRMED THEIR RECOGNITION THAT RHODESIA IS A BRITISH RESPONSIBILITY AND WHILE IN A SENSE I HAVE HAD TO ACCOUNT TO THEM FOR THAT RESPONSIBILITY THEY ARE NOW CONTENT TO LET ME DISCHARGE IT FOR THE TIME BEING IN MY OWN WAY. THERE WERE SOME MEMBERS - A MINORITY I AM GLAD TO SAY - WHO STILL HANKERED AFTER THE USE OF FORCE: BUT THE COMMONWEALTH COLLECTIVELY HAS AGREED TO GIVE SANCTIONS A FAIR RUN. YOUR OWN DECISION ON ASBESTOS AND LITHIUM COULD NOT HAVE BEEN BETTER TIMED TO MAKE MAXIMUM IMPACT. THE MEETING WAS I THINK A VICTORY FOR MODERATION. IT HAS STRENGTHENED THE COMMONWEALTH VIS A VIS THE EXTREMISTS OF THE OAU AND IT HAS HELD AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING, THE POSITION IN THE UN OR UNITED NATIONS ON CHAPTER VII. IT HAS ADDED TO THE PRESTIGE OF THE SOUND MODERATE LEADERS LIKE ABUBAKAR ABOVE ALL, I HAVE AVOIDED BEING PRESSED ANY FURTHER THAN MY PUBLIC POSITION IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. THE PRICE OF THIS

HAS BEEN THE VERY MODEST ONE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TWO COMMITTEES TO MEET IN LONDON AND AN UNDERTAKING TO MEET THE COMMONWEALTH AGAIN IF, BY JULY, SANCTIONS HAVE STILL NOT SUCCEEDED IN THEIR OBJECTIVE, TO THAT EXTENT TIME HAS BEEN GAINED. ALL IN ALL COMMONSENSE AND REALISM PREVAILED.

I THEN WENT ON TO LUSAKA WHERE I HAVE HAD VERY GOOD MEETINGS WITH KAUNDA, BOTH PRIVATELY AND WITH HIS MINISTERS.

YOUR OWN VERY HELPFUL MESSAGE HAD EASED MY PATH FOR ME.

I HAD TWO MAIN OBJECTIVES. FIRST, TO SECURE KAUNDA'S AGREEMENT THAT PLANS FOR THE 178: (8)

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Authority FRUS, Vol. XXIV, # 528
By *lg* NARA, Date 8-29-05

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RPT

I HAD TWO MAIN OBJECTIVES: FIRST, TO SECURE KAUNDA'S AGREEMENT THAT PLANS FOR THE QUICK KILL (THE CLOSING OF THE ZAMBIAN FRONTIER WITH RHODESIA) SHOULD BE CAREFULLY COORDINATED BETWEEN ZAMBIA AND BRITAIN, KAUNDA IS NO LONGER SUICIDAL AND I MANAGED NOT ONLY TO SECURE ACCEPTANCE THAT WE SHOULD NOT PROCEED TO THE SECOND FRONT BEFORE MID FEBRUARY BUT I ALSO HAVE A FAIR PROSPECT OF GETTING THEIR AGREEMENT, THAT EVEN WHEN THE ZAMBIAN FRONTIER IS CLOSED TO RHODESIAN INDUSTRIAL GOODS, COAL WILL BE EXEMPT, WITH ALL THAT THAT MEANS IN AIRLIFT TERMS. THIS DATE OF MID FEBRUARY IS THE EARLIEST AT WHICH, ON THE BEST EXPERT ADVICE, IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO CONTEMPLATE DELIVERING THE DEATH BLOW TO ILLEGALITY. EVEN SO IT MAY MEAN THAT ZAMBIA WILL BE REDUCED TO A CARE AND MAINTENANCE BASIS FOR A PERIOD OF INDETERMINATE LENGTH.

MY SECOND OBJECTIVE WAS TO TRY AND PERSUADE KAUNDA TO ACCEPT BRITISH FORCES IN ZAMBIA SO THAT AT THE RIGHT MOMENT, THEY WOULD BE READY TO MOVE INTO RHODESIA EITHER INVITED OR UNOPPOSED. ON THIS I THINK I HAVE GOT KAUNDA AWAY FROM HIS INSISTENCE ON PLACING TROOPS ACROSS THE ZAMBEZI AND THOUGH HE HAS NOT YET AGREED TO ACCEPT A COMMONWEALTH PRESENCE ON THE ZAMBIAN SIDE OF THE FRONTIER WITH RHODESIA, HE IS NOW, I THINK, AT LEAST MORE READY TO CONTEMPLATE SOMETHING ALONG LINES I COULD ACCEPT. ALL IN ALL, HE IS A BIT MORE RELAXED, MUCH MORE READY TO GIVE SANCTIONS A CHANCE, AND DOES AT LEAST ACCEPT THAT WE REALLY MEAN TO BRING SMITH DOWN. HE DOES OF COURSE FEEL HIMSELF VERY EXPOSED ECONOMICALLY AND, POLITICALLY, HE FINDS IT VERY DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT A POSITION IN WHICH ZAMBIA, FOR PURELY PRACTICAL REASONS, IS FORCED TO TAKE UP A LESS UN-COMPROMISING ATTITUDE THAN HIS FELLOW AFRICANS TOWARDS COMMERCIAL TIES WITH RHODESIA, BECAUSE OF THE INEVITABLE INTERDEPENDENCE OF THE TWO NEIGHBOUR ECONOMIES. FOR THE TIME BEING HOWEVER I THINK WE HAVE GOT HIM ON THE RAILS AGAIN.

IN NAIROBI I HAD AN HOUR'S MEETING WITH KENYATTA AND FOUND HIM AS USUAL WISE, RELAXED AND COMPLETELY SYMPATHETIC, BOTH ON SANCTIONS AND ON THE INEVITABILITY OF GRADUALNESS TOWARDS MAJORITY RULE IN THE RECONSTRUCTION PERIOD.

AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN, THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY DID NOT IN THE END MANAGE TO GET TO SALISBURY TO SEE THE GOVERNOR.

775 - 8

BUT AS I INDICATED IN MY EARLIER MESSAGE, I CAN PLAY AT HOME THE DIFFICULTIES ABOUT PERSONAL SAFETY AND RECOGNITION AS USEFULLY AS IF HE HAD GONE IN. MY QUALMS ABOUT THE GOVERNOR REMAIN, HOME AFRICAN AND WORLD FRONTS NOW IN TOLERABLE ORDER - AND I REALISE OF COURSE THAT THE MOST OVERWORKED PHRASE IN THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN FOR THE TIME BEING - I CAN NOW CONCENTRATE ON THE INTERNAL RHODESIAN SITUATION.

ALL IN ALL THE PAST WEEK HAS BEEN TIME WELL SPENT. THE SITUATION HAS OF COURSE BEEN TRANSFORMED BY THE OIL SANCTIONS AND THE WORKING OF THE ZAMBIA AIRLIFT. IN CONSEQUENCE THE COMMONWEALTH IN GENERAL AND COMMONWEALTH AFRICANS IN PARTICULAR NOW ACCEPT BRITAIN'S RESPONSIBILITY AND GOOD FAITH AND THIS MEANS THAT WE CAN NOW MAKE THE RUNNING OURSELVES. THE POINT OF MAJOR DIFFICULTY WHICH LIES AHEAD IS HOW TO TRANSLATE ECONOMIC HARDSHIP IN RHODESIA INTO A POLITICAL READINESS TO CAPITULATE. FOR THIS THE EUROPEANS IN RHODESIA WILL HAVE TO BE GIVEN SOME ASSURANCES

FOR THEIR FUTURE AS WELL AS EVIDENCE OF CONTINUING AND GROWING HARDSHIP IF THEY PERSIST IN REBELLION. THE TIME IS APPROACHING THEREFORE WHEN I SHALL HAVE TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON OUR PEACE AIMS. THIS I SHALL PROBABLY HAVE TO DO BEFORE PARLIAMENT REASSEMBLES DURING THE LAST WEEK OF JANUARY. THIS WILL HAVE TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY A FURTHER TIGHTENING OF THE SANCTIONS SCREW IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE THAT WE ARE NOT PEACE MAKING FROM WEAKNESS. YOU HAVE EXPERIENCED IN SUCH STRATEGY. I WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU AGAIN.

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE ENDS

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~~SECRET~~

Jan 13, 1966

*cy for
Mr Komer*

via private wire to London

For: Mitchell or Wright

From: McGeorge Bundy

cut

file 16

IN the confusion surrounding our State of the Union message,
I am not sure we passed the word yesterday that the President
did send a message to our man in Lusaka giving general support
to the Prime Minister's position.

We have the Prime Minister's further message this morning,
and the President asked me to send thanks for the Prime Minister's
thoughtfulness in keeping him so fully informed.

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cc: Komer, Ben Read

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *ng/cbm*, NARA, Date *8-16-06*

JAN 13 1966

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Please type
copy to Komer +
to Raul

PMUK 001/12

11.30 ZULU JANUARY 12, 1966

1966 JAN 13 00 27

FROM PRIME MINISTER

TP PRESIDENT

~~SECRET~~

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BEGINS

THIS IS JUST TO LET YOU KNOW THAT SINCE MY LAST MESSAGE, KAUNDA HAS AGREED TO SEE ME IN LUSAKA. I SHALL NOW BE DEFINITELY BE GOING THERE TOMORROW.

I AM, HOWEVER, RATHER DISQUIETED ABOUT ACTIVITIES OF CERTAIN OF OUR MAVERICK M.P.S IN SALISBURY WHICH WOULD CERTAINLY LEAD IF ALLOWED TO GO UNCHECKED TO PRESSURES FROM PARLIAMENTARY OPINION THAT WE MUST NEGOTIATE WITH SMITH. THERE ARE ALSO SOME INDICATIONS THAT THE GOVERNOR AND BEADLE MAY BE THINKING ALONG THESE LINES TOO. FOR REASONS WHICH I AM SURE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND, I CANNOT REGARD SMITH AND HIS REGIME AS PEOPLE TO WHOM ONE COULD POSSIBLY ENTRUST THE FUTURE OF RHODESIA, ALTHOUGH I DO NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT ONE RHODESIAN FRONT MIGHT BE REPRESENTED IN ANY ADVISORY OR EXECUTIVE COUNCIL THAT MIGHT BE SET UP AFTER THE REBELLION IS AT AN END. I HAVE REPEATEDLY MADE IT CLEAR THAT I REGARD SMITH'S FUTURE ROLE AS LIMITED TO DISCUSSING WITH THE GOVERNOR THE MECHANICS OF BRINGING THE REBELLION TO AN END.

FACED WITH THESE DIFFICULTIES IN MY BRITISH AND RHODESIA CONSTITUENCIES I HAVE DECIDED TO ASK THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY TO GO ON TO SALISBURY AFTER OUR MEETING WITH KAUNDA IN ZAMBIA. HIS OVERT MISSION WILL BE THE STRICTLY LIMITED ONE OF HOLDING CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GOVERNOR: HIS PRIVATE ONE OF KEEPING THE GOVERNOR ON THE RAILS: HE WILL NOT ASK TO SEE SMITH BUT WILL NOT REFUSE TO SEE HIM IF SMITH ASKS BUT ANY MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE AT GOVERNMENT HOUSE IN FORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD KEEP KNOWLEDGE OF THIS PROPOSAL ON A STRICTLY NEED TO KNOW BASIS UNTIL IT BECOMES PUBLIC.

IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE REGIME MAKES DIFFICULTY ABOUT THE ZAIRC AFTER LANDING. EITHER WAY I HAVE MY PARLIAMENTARY CRITICS: AND IF THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GETS IN WE HAVE THE ADDED BONUS OF PROPER TALKS WITH THE GOVERNOR.

THINGS MIGHT HAVE BEEN WORSE HERE ALTHOUGH WE ARE NOT OUT OF THE WOOD YET. ABUBAKAR HAS BEEN AS HELPFUL AS HE CAN BE, BUT WHATEVER THE OUTCOME, I AM SURE I WAS RIGHT TO COME. I SHALL BE DROPPING IN ON KENYATTA ON MY WAY BACK.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 (#61)

By dm/cba NARA, Date 8-16-06

MESSAGE ENDS.

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RECEIVED
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11.30 ZULU JANUARY 12, 1966 1966 JAN 13 00 27

FROM PRIME MINISTER

TP PRESIDENT

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~~SECRET~~

BEGINS

THIS IS JUST TO LET YOU KNOW THAT SINCE MY LAST MESSAGE, KAUNDA HAS AGREED TO SEE ME IN LUSAKA. I SHALL NOW BE DEFINITELY BE GOING THERE TOMORROW.

I AM, HOWEVER, RATHER DISQUIETED ABOUT ACTIVITIES OF CERTAIN OF OUR MAVERICK M.P.S IN SALISBURY WHICH WOULD CERTAINLY LEAD IF ALLOWED TO GO UNCHECKED TO PRESSURES FROM PARLIAMENTARY OPINION THAT WE MUST NEGOTIATE WITH SMITH. THERE ARE ALSO SOME INDICATIONS THAT THE GOVERNOR AND BEADLE MAY BE THINKING ALONG THESE LINES TOO. FOR REASONS WHICH I AM SURE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND, I CANNOT REGARD SMITH AND HIS REGIME AS PEOPLE TO WHOM ONE COULD POSSIBLY ENTRUST THE FUTURE OF RHODESIA, ALTHOUGH I DO NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT ONE RHODESIAN FRONT MIGHT BE REPRESENTED IN ANY ADVISORY OR EXECUTIVE COUNCIL THAT MIGHT BE SET UP AFTER THE REBELLION IS AT AN END. I HAVE REPEATEDLY MADE IT CLEAR THAT I REGARD SMITH'S FUTURE ROLE AS LIMITED TO DISCUSSING WITH THE GOVERNOR THE MECHANICS OF BRINGING THE REBELLION TO AN END.

FACED WITH THESE DIFFICULTIES IN MY BRITISH AND RHODESIA CONSTITUENCIES I HAVE DECIDED TO ASK THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY TO GO ON TO SALISBURY AFTER OUR MEETING WITH KAUNDA IN ZAMBIA. HIS OVERT MISSION WILL BE THE STRICTLY LIMITED ONE OF HOLDING CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GOVERNOR: - HIS PRIVATE ONE OF KEEPING THE GOVERNOR ON THE RAILS: HE WILL NOT ASK TO SEE SMITH BUT WILL NOT REFUSE TO SEE HIM IF SMITH ASKS BUT ANY MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE AT GOVERNMENT HOUSE IN FORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD KEEP KNOWLEDGE OF THIS PROPOSAL ON A STRICTLY NEED TO KNOW BASIS UNTIL IT BECOMES PUBLIC.

IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE REGIME MAKES DIFFICULTY ABOUT THE ZAIRC AFT LANDING. EITHER WAY I HAVE MY PARLIAMENTARY CRITICS: AND IF THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GETS IN WE HAVE THE ADDED BONUS OF PROPER TALKS WITH THE GOVERNOR.

THINGS MIGHT HAVE BEEN WORSE HERE ALTHOUGH WE ARE NOT OUT OF THE WOOD YET. ABUBAKAR HAS BEEN AS HELPFUL AS HE CAN BE, BUT WHATEVER THE OUTCOME, I AM SURE I WAS RIGHT TO COME. I SHALL BE DROPPING IN ON KENYATTA ON MY WAY BACK.

MESSAGE ENDS.

DECLASSIFIED (461)

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

~~SECRET~~

By *cbm/brm* NARA, Date *8-16-06*

~~SECRET~~
PRESERVATION COPY

Wilson
2 LBJ
1/13/66

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

18
Cable 05700
W.K.
Zombie
Cable

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

40
Origin
SS
Info

ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS 1445 ~~MINUTE~~
~~XXXX~~ Amembassy LUSAKA 1194 FLASH
INFO: Amembassy LONDON 4003
Please deliver following message to Prime Minister

JAN 12 2 40 PM '66

EXDIS

Wilson from President to Prime Minister.

QUOTE: I have read with great interest your latest message steady and am weighing in at Lusaka in an effort to ~~stay~~ steady Kaunda.

In this message I underlined the importance of close coordination with you, particularly in avoiding premature severance of economic ties with Rhodesia. Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

BALL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By ag/ckm, NARA, Date 8-16-06

L.B.J.
to
Pm Wilson
1/12/66

Drafted by:
Text rec'd from WH:pp 1/12/66

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

~~S/S - Mr. Humphreys~~
N - Mr. Mann

Clearances:

AF - Mr. Fredericks

S/S - Mr. Humphreys

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~~SECRET~~

JAN 13 1966

RECEIVED
WHCA

PMUK 001/11
05.45 ZULU JANUARY 11, 1966.
FROM PRIME MIINISTER
TO PRESIDENT
SECRET

1966 JAN 11 05 57

W.K.
Konin

MESSAGE BEGINS

IN MY LAST MESSAGE ON THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM, I SAID I WOULD KEEP YOU INFORMED ABOUT Y HOW I GET ON IN LAGOS. NOW THAT I AM HERE, I AM HOPEFUL THAT WITH A MODICUM OF LUCK WE SHOULD GET THROUGH THIS MEETING ALL RIGHT. BUT HAVING SPOKEN TO MALCOLM MACDONALD, WHO IS HERE FROM LUSAKA, IT APPEARS THAT THE SITUATION IN ZAMBIA IS FAR FROM GOOD. I HAVE THEREFORE DECIDED, AT VERY CONSIDERABLE INCONVENIENCE THAT IT WOULD BE RIGHT FOR ME TO PAY A BRIEF VISIT TO KAUNDA TO TRY TO GET HIM ON THE RAILS AGAIN.

2. THE FACTS OF THE SITUATION ARE THESE. AT THE RIGHT MOMENT, THE CLOSING OF THE ZAMBIA BORDER WITH RHODESIA COULD BE OF CEE DECISIVE INFLUENCE IN GIVING SMITH A COUP DE GRACE BUT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THIS CARD SHOULD BE PLAYED AT THE RIGHT TIME. IF IT IS PLAYED TOO EARLY BEFORE THE SMITH REGIME AND RHODESIAN OPINION ARE CONVINCED THAT THE GAME IS UP AND BEFORE WE HAVE TAKEN ALL THE NECESSARY STEPS TO SEE THAT ZAMBIA COULD SURVIVE THE FEW WEEKS OF FINAL COLLAPSE IN RHODESIA AND POSSIBLE CUT OFF OF SUPPLIES FROM THE COPPER BELT, THIS KEY MOVE IN THE WHOLE PROCESS COULD RUIN ZAMBIA WITHOUT OVERTHROWING SMITH. THE TIMING IS THEREFORE OF THE ESSENCE. KAUNDA, WHO IS UNDERSTANDABLY, IN A VERY NERVOUS FRAME OF MIND, IS THREATENING TO CLOSE THE BORDER BEFORE WE ARE READY FOR IT, BEFORE HE CAN SURVIVE IT AND BEFORE IT WILL BE REALLY EFFECTIVE IN TERMS OF ~~BRINGING EE~~ BRINGING SMITH DOWN.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS.VolXXIV,#526
By *18* NARA, Date 8-29-05

3. MY MAIN OBJECTIVE IN GOING TO LUSAKA WILL BE
THEREFORE TO TRY AND STEADY HIM AND TO GET OUR STRATEGY
BETTER CO-ORDINATED. THERE ARE IN ADDITION OTHER
THINGS TO DISCUSS WITH HIM. I PLAN TO BE IN ZAMBIA
ON WEDNESDAY EVENING AND THURSDAY MORNING. IT WOULD
BE AN IMMENSE HELP TO ME IF YOU FELT ABLE, BEFORE MY
ARRIVAL, TO SEND A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA
THROUGH YOUR AMBASSADOR IN LUSAKA SAYING THAT I HAVE EXPLAINED
OUR STRATEGY FULLY TO YOU, EXPRESSING YOUR CONFIDENCE
THAT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WERE WORKING, THAT THE CRUNCH
WITH SMITH MIGHT BE APPROACHING BUT THAT IT WAS
ESSENTIAL IN EVERYBODYS INTERESTS TO GET THE TIMING
OF THE FINAL SANCTION OF CLOSING THE RHODESIA BORDER
WITH ZAMBIA RIGHT: AND THAT YOU WOULD HOPE THAT HE,
KAUNDA, AND I WOULD REACH AGREEMENT ON THIS IN
EVERYBODYS INTEREST. HE SIMPLY MUST BE MADE TO REALISE
THAT THE VAST EFFORTS WHICH YOU AND WE ARE MAKING AT GREAT COST
TO OURSELVES NEED TO EXERT THEIR MAXIMUM EFFECT BUT THAT
GIVEN TIME THEY SHOULD PUT ZAMBIA IN A POSITION WHERE
SHE COULD SAFELY ADMINISTER THE FINAL BLOW.

MESSAGE ENDS
05.50 ZULU

JWF
The stronger the better.

Expressed to Kaunda
Such a best to
Miss Kaunda

ONE OR TWO MINOR CORRECTIONS PLS

0
IN PARA 2 LINE 9 SUR IVE SHOULD READ SURVIVE
AT END OF SAME LINE COLLAPS SHOULD READ COLLAPSE
TIO

IN PARA 3 LINE 14 LAST WORD SHOULD BE HE
IN IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING LINE PLEASE ERASE FIRST
TWO LETTERS IE MR WHICH I EXED OUT SO NEXT LINE
SHOULD COMMENCE WITH KAUNDA

copy to R. W. Komer

20

Friday, January 7, 1966
1:15 pm

CK

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message from Prime Minister Wilson

Here is a message just in from Prime Minister Wilson on Rhodesia. It gives us a better account than we have had before, though our people are still less optimistic than the Prime Minister.

I don't think it needs a formal answer, although Wilson would obviously be pleased to have one.

McG. B.

Draft answer _____

Send an acknowledgement through the Prime Minister's office _____
s

Let it be _____

PAGE 002/7

16.15 ZULU JANUARY 7

FROM PRIME MINISTER

TO PRESIDENT

RECEIVED
WICA

1966 JAN 7 16 48

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

T. 20/66

MESSAGE BEGINS:

IN MY EARLIER MESSAGE TODAY, I MENTIONED THAT DROUGHT IN RHODESIA WAS PRESENTING SMITH WITH PROBLEMS AND MIGHT HAVE REPERCUSSIONS ON OURSELVES.

MY COLLEAGUES AND I DISCUSSED THIS FURTHER THIS MORNING AND IT IS CLEAR THAT THE DROUGHT IS PREVALENT THROUGHOUT CENTRAL AFRICA. WE HAVE THEREFORE DECIDED THAT IT WOULD BE RIGHT, ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS, TO PREVENT STARVATION AND ON PRACTICAL GROUNDS TO PREVENT STARVATION LEADING TO RIOTING AND BLOODSHED TO SEE WHAT WE CAN DO TO HELP. AS WE ARE PROPOSING TO PRESS SANCTIONS ON RHODESIA ON OTHER FIELDS, WE MIGHT APPEAR TO BE INCONSISTENT: BUT I THINK THAT OPINION GENERALLY WOULD DRAW THE NECESSARY DISTINCTION.

I HAVE THEREFORE THIS MORNING BEEN IN CONTACT BY TELEPHONE WITH BOTH BOB MENZIES AND MIKE PEARSON AND WE HAVE AGREED TO LOOK INTO THE POSSIBILITIES OF A JOINT COMMONWEALTH INITIATIVE TO RELIEVE THE FAMINE. IF WHEAT IS A SUITABLE SUBSTITUTE FOR THE FAILURE OF MAIZE, THEN BOTH AUSTRALIA AND CANADA WILL BE ABLE TO HELP FROM THEIR OWN STOCKS: WE SHOULD OF COURSE MAKE A FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION. IF MAIZE IS ESSENTIAL, THEN WE MAY HAVE TO MAKE THIS A COMBINED OPERATION BRINGING YOU IN. BUT YOU HAVE DONE SO MUCH ALREADY THAT WE SHALL NOT DO SO UNLESS IT IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. I KNOW THAT FAMINE IN INDIA IS IN ALL OUR MINDS.

I SHALL BE LETTING IT BE KNOWN, INFORMALLY, THIS AFTERNOON THAT MENZIES, PEARSON AND I ARE IN TOUCH ON THIS PROBLEM.

MESSAGE ENDS

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, Vol. xxiv, # 523
By dem, NARA, Date 8-16-06

PRESERVATION COPY

January 7, 1966
9:45 A.M.

5
21
WK

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM PRIME MINISTER WILSON

Before I set off for this rather extraordinary Commonwealth meeting at Lagos, I thought I would let you know how I see things developing in Rhodesia. I need hardly tell you that I have very considerable qualms about going: but I have decided that it would be more harmful to absent myself than to be present. Faced with this choice of evils, I have decided it was right to go: first, because I think it is in all our interests to try and keep the Commonwealth together and secondly because I am sure that we must do all we can to maintain the prestige and standing of moderate African leaders like Abubakar.

When we last met I told you that I thought that the euphoria of independence and of Christmas would carry the Smith regime over into the New Year, and that they would thereafter start to suffer from post-hogmanay gloom. Thanks to your Administration's ready agreement to join with us in an oil embargo and to help us with a consequential airlift to Zambia and to fairly general support throughout the free world for what we are doing, this is precisely what is now happening. With the introduction of petrol rationing, the dolce vita of the European population is starting to come to an end. Responsible business leaders are forecasting considerable European unemployment before long. Added to that there is severe drought in Matabeleland where the maize harvest has failed (though this throws up further problems) which we are looking into. Two Johannesburg papers, originally pro-Smith, are now saying he cannot win: the South African Government is cautiously neutral and the Portuguese seem to be hedging their bets.

As economic difficulties begin to press upon the regime, I think we shall find that, administratively, they will not have the experience or competence to deal with it. Indeed, the evidence is now starting to accumulate that many thinking people in Rhodesia realize that the Smith regime cannot win. It is only a matter of time before more and more people come to realize that life can only get worse and that the alternative of returning to constitutional rule is better than any prospect that Smith has got to offer. It is tempting but unwise to try and put a date to the turning point, and I will not attempt to do so: but I personally am convinced that it will come and that it could come sooner than we think.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS. Vol XXIV, #522
By *h* NARA, Date 8-29-05

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

I am therefore totally convinced, privately, that we have Smith on the run, and that it will not be long before this becomes clear publicly. It may soon be wise to start thinking of peace terms. While we want to bring Smith down and bring him down quickly, we must be able to discredit Smith utterly if we are to make sense of the reconstruction period. There can be no question of negotiating with Smith as equals. But this does not mean that we should not be thinking of methods of restoring the rule of law in Rhodesia and we are hard at work on this. As soon as our ideas are clearer I will be in touch with you again. Any public announcement of our peace aims will need very careful timing: I cannot afford to lose my African audience by giving them any reason to think that we are weakening in our resolve to bring Smith down: equally I must make a statement early enough to give the Europeans hope for better things if they reject Smith. The problem of my four constituencies is always with me.

The next immediate hurdle is of course the Lagos meeting. Now that, with your help, and with that of all our allies and friends, sanctions are clearly beginning to bite, I am more hopeful of being able to turn discussion into constructive channels than I was when Abubakar first made his proposal and visited London before Christmas.

I shall have to give our Commonwealth partners a very frank account of what we are doing and try to make them share my own conviction that this rebellion will be brought to heel. There will also be some talk about Zambia's problems. I shall, moreover, have to listen to some fairly severe lectures on the need to introduce one man one vote at the earliest possible moment. But I am resolved not to give way to demands for the use of force at once and I shall at this stage be able to do no more than listen to their advice about how to handle matters in the future. It would be fatal to spell out in detail our ideas for constitutional development. It would be bound to offend one or more of my constituencies. If I can keep the Africans quiet for a few more weeks and avoid senseless action in the Organization of African Unity and embarrassing initiatives in the United Nations the visit will have been worthwhile.

I will let you know how I get on and keep you in touch with my thinking for the future. My people were in touch with yours about the details of current strategy and tactics. I am much encouraged by your resolute support. We shall win.

~~SECRET~~

02461

TELEGRAM Department of State

URGENT COMSEC
CLASSIFIED TO

SECRET

ACTION: AmEmbassy LONDON PRIORITY
INFO: USUN for Ambassador Goldberg
TOSEC 77

1788
Koma
Cables
X S/Plod 161
XAK

OCT 5 9 13 PM '65

EXDIS

Following message sent October 5 to Prime Minister

Wilson from the President:

QUOTE: We agree that the Southern Rhodesia affair could quickly become a calamity, with potentially serious damage to Western interests. We also agree that deterring Smith from any fateful step is by all odds the best course open to us.

If you see fit, we would be glad if you would tell Smith when you see him that we as well as you would take a very poor view of UDI, and that we would necessarily have to oppose it ~~when~~ vigorously.

We would also be prepared, as you suggest, to approach Smith directly along the above lines, either through our Charge in London or by calling in the Rhodesian minister attached to your Embassy here. And if deterrance is our prime objective, it may be better for us to convey our views before your decisive

LBT
to Wilson
10/5/65

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol. XXIV, # 476
By SA NABA, Date 8-29-05

Drafted by: _____
Text recv'd from WH 10/5/65
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: S/S - Lawrence S. Eagleburger

S/S - Mr. Read
EUR - Mr. Reneville

SECRET

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~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

meeting with Smith, rather than after. We will do this promptly if you wish. Should negotiations fail, we would certainly be prepared to make our views public in an appropriate way.

I am glad that our two governments are in close touch, since it is important to coordinate our efforts with yours in dealing with this unhappy problem. END QUOTE

END.

BALL

SECRET-EXDIS

PRESERVATION COPY

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Handwritten: 23
15527

003

80
Origin
SS
Info

ACTION: AmEmbassy LONDON 3031 PRIORITY

Nov 29 8 40 PM '65

EXDIS

Handwritten: OK / XS photo

Handwritten: Letter in dated 11/29/65

White House has received following message to President from Prime Minister:

QUOTE I was very glad to have a talk with Bob McNamara and George Ball last week about the various problems that confront us. I am much looking forward to discussing all these matters with you when we meet on December 17.

George Ball told me that you have now asked Gilpatric to return to your service to take charge of the whole of the Rhodesia operation. This is just to say that we should be very glad to see him just as soon as he has got his eye in.

On that subject, as you may know, Malcolm MacDonald has just spent a few days in Zambia with Kenneth Kaunda and has brought back with him a whole series of requests. Kenneth Kaunda, understandably, is in a very apprehensive and jumpy mood: He desperately wants to be sensible and statesmanlike but he is

Drafted by: S/S: HBTompson: idp 11/29/65

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: S/S - Benjamin H. Read

Clearances: White House - Mr. Smith

S/S - Mr. Humphreys

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: FRUS, Vol. XXIV, # 580
By: *[Signature]* NARA, Date: 8-29-05 **SECRET**

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~~SECRET~~

under great pressure from his own extremists who want him to take energetic but suicidal action against the Smith regime and from the Organization of African Unity who are pressing him to allow Zambia to be used as a base for African inspired operations against Rhodesia.

In these circumstances, he has asked me to provide a British military presence in Zambia. He has two requests: First, a detachment of British troops to take over and guard the Kariba installations on the Rhodesian side of the frontier and secondly an RAF presence in Zambia to deter the Rhodesia Air Force and to pre-empt the O.A.U. He also has made a great number of economic requests.

We considered these requests this morning. We decided to decline to mount the Kariba operation, not least because Smith may well have mined the installations and an operation by us might well accelerate what we want to avoid. We decided to meet the second request by sending a squadron of Javelins to Ndola. The operation, which has been planned on a contingency basis for some time, will start today and should be completed by Tuesday or Wednesday of this week. The Javelins will go into Ndola, the radar environment to Lusaka and men of the RAF regiment will go to both airfields and possibly to ^{Livingstone}~~Livingstone~~ as well to guard against sabotage etc. We

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~~SECRET~~

shall thus be in occupation of all the main airfields in Zambia. We have made it a condition of acceding to this request that Zambia will invite no other foreign forces into the country without our agreement. At the same time H.M.S. Eagle, which sailed from Singapore some ten days ago, is off Dar-es-Salaam able to cover this operation, and provide a second strike in the highly unlikely case of its being necessary.

Let me make it quite plain that the purpose of this operation is entirely defensive. Its main purpose is to reassure Kaunda and pre-empt a hostile (eg. Ghanaian or U.A.R.) African presence which might well develop communist overtones. It should also indicate to the Smith regime that we are in earnest and it should enable Kaunda to resist further pressures from the more extremist of his African friends who incidentally, seem to be the more extreme the further they are away from the scene. Kenyatta and Nyerere are both being very reasonable and moderate in this whole business. I do not expect that Smith will react violently, but we are ready for him if he does. Nor do I think that this will make him react on the copper front: This would be a two-edged weapon for him, and one of the rebel ministers on television only last night emphasized Rhodesia's interest

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

in normal relations with Zambia.

But ~~MM~~ we are well aware that a defensive military presence in Zambia, valuable though it will be, will not of itself quell this rebellion. The economic measures which we and our friends have so far taken may well do the trick, but they will take time and will not start to bite until after Christmas. We have therefore decided to go for the quick economic kill. The Chancellor of the Exchequer will ~~MMX~~ be turning the financial screw more tightly: We shall add all agricultural commodities, minerals and metals to tobacco and sugar on the list of prohibited imports and hope that all other importing countries will do the same. Sir N. Kipping, former Director-General of the EX F.B.I., has been out to Zambia, and has a plan for replacing Zambia's imports from Rhodesia from other sources. We shall also want to talk to the principal suppliers about cutting out exports to Rhodesia of economically important commodities.

There remains the question of oil sanctions. Here action by Britain alone, even if it were thought desirable, would not be effective without international backing. This is a subject which we want to discuss with your people in the first instance, and discuss very quickly, so I hope you will agree to send Gilpatric to talk to George Brown, who is in charge of the whole economic side of our

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

operations, as soon as possible. Meanwhile we shall take advantage of the presence here of Tom Mann to talk all these measures over with him as well as the contingency plans to keep Zambia going if relations between her and Rhodesia deteriorate.

Overriding everything is my awareness which I know that Kenneth Kaunda shares, that unless we in Britain deal promptly with this rebellion and if possible without force, there is a danger of a racial war in Africa with all that that means for the free world. It is therefore encouraging that not only Kaunda, but Kenyatta, Nyerere and Obote as well, should be taking the ^{view} ~~XXXXXXXX~~ that it is only the presence ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ of British forces in Central Africa which can avert this catastrophe.

You will, of course, realize the relevance of all this to our East of Suez role, on which McNamara will no doubt report to you.

UNQUOTE END

RUSK

ME KA PMUK 401/10 1205 DEC 12 14 07

MESSAGE TO WASHINGTON
PERSONAL 1345 ZULU DEC 12
IMMEDIATE
~~TOP SECRET~~

HANDLE AS EXDIS

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT FROM PRIME MINISTER

~~TOP SECRET~~

PERSONAL FOR

BEGINS

I HAVE RECEIVED THE MESSAGE FROM AMBASSADOR BRUCE ABOUT PRESIDENT AYUB KHAN'S DISCUSSIONS WITH YOU NEXT WEEK.

I HAD A LONG TALK WITH AYUB KHAN ON SATURDAY MORNING BEFORE RECEIVING AMBASSADOR BRUCE'S MESSAGE, AND HAD IN FACT WITHOUT KNOWING EXACTLY WHAT LINE YOU WOULD BE TAKING SPOKEN TO HIM VERY CLOSELY ON THE LINES OF YOUR MESSAGE. I HAD TOLD HIM THAT SO FAR AS BRITAIN WAS CONCERNED, AND I FELT THE U.S. WOULD TAKE THE SAME LINE, WE COULD NOT TAKE SIDES IN THE SUB-CONTINENT ON THE KASHMIR ISSUE BUT WOULD DO ANYTHING IN OUR POWER, PROVIDED THERE WAS GOOD WILL ON BOTH SIDES, TO SECURE A SOLUTION. I HAD ALSO SUGGESTED TO HIM THAT, WHILE I HAD NOT BEEN IN TOUCH WITH YOU IN ANY WAY AND WAS ONLY SPECULATING ABOUT YOUR VIEWS, THE U.S. WOULD BE VERY IMPATIENT OF ANY LONG DRAWN OUT ATTACK ON THE INDIAN POSITION. I ALSO SAID THAT I FELT THAT YOU WOULD BE EQUALLY IMPATIENT WHEN MR. SHASTRI COMES IF HE WERE TO SUBJECT YOU TO A LONG ATTACK ON PAKISTAN.

Handwritten notes:
RK
Ayub Khan
Vivek
copy

EQUALLY I WARNED HIM VERY STRONGLY THAT BOTH WE AND YOU WERE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PAKISTAN DRIFT INTO THE CHINESE ORBIT. I FELT, AND TOLD HIM THIS, THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE EXTREMELY INTOLERANT OF ANY SITUATION IN WHICH EITHER INDIA OR PAKISTAN FELT THAT THEY COULD WASTE THEIR SUBSTANCE IN RIOTOUS ARMAMENT EXPENDITURE AND COUNT ON AMERICAN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION TO KEEP THEIR POPULATION ALIVE. I POINTED OUT WHAT I HAVE HEARD THAT ON PRESENT TRENDS AMERICAN FOOD SHIPMENTS TO THE SUB-CONTINENT BY 1970 COULD REPRESENT HALF OF TOTAL AMERICAN FOOD PRODUCTION: IN OTHER WORDS, THAT EVERY TON OF FOOD PRODUCED BY YOUR FARMERS FOR AMERICAN CONSUMPTION WOULD BE MATCHED BY ANOTHER TON PRODUCED FOR CONSUMPTION IN THE SUB-CONTINENT, SUPPLIED NOT ON COMMERCIAL TERMS BUT IN THE WORDS OF THE IMMORTAL ISAIAH WITHOUT MONEY AND WITHOUT PRICE. CLEARLY NO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT COULD ENVISAGE SUCH A DEVELOPMENT, PARTICULARLY IF INDIA AND PAKISTAN WERE INHIBITING THEIR OWN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND FOOD PRODUCTION PROGRAMMES THROUGH A CONCENTRATION ON SELF-DESTRUCTIVE ARMAMENTS. CRITICISING HIM FOR HAVING AT INDIA'S MOMENT OF MORTAL DANGER WHEN FACED WITH CHINESE ATTACK THREE YEARS AGO, I CONDEMNED HIM FOR WHAT WE ALL FELT THAT PAKISTAN WAS PREPARED TO DO - TO MAKE MISCHIEF AT INDIA'S EXPENSE BY LINKING WITH CHINA.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS.032R.053.003/7
By JC, NARA, Date 11-6-12

I RECEIVED AMBASSADOR BRUCES MESSAGE ONLY AFTER HE HAD LEFT ME ON SATURDAY MORNING, BUT I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY OF A DINNER PARTY FOR AYUB TO TAKE HIM ASIDE AND SPEAK TO HIM FOR OVER AN HOUR ALONE. I REPEAT THE WORD ALONE BECAUSE I BELIEVE THAT WHILE HE, AYUB, IS BASICALLY SOUND HE IS SUBJECT TO STRONG PRESSURES FROM HIS ADVISERS, PARTICULARLY BHUTTO, WHOM I REGARD AS ONE OF THE MOST EL MEN GOD EVER CREATED. AYUB, AND I AM GLAD YOU TAKE THIS VIEW, IS A MAN OF GREAT INTEGRITY BUT HE IS BASICALLY A SIMPLE AND DEEPLY PATRIOTIC SOLDIER AND CAPABLE OF BEING PUSHED AROUND BY UNSCRUPULOUS POLITICIANS OF THE BHUTTO VARIETY. I SPENT THE HOUR REHEARSING HIM IN THE REALITIES OF THE DISCUSSIONS HE WILL BE UNDERTAKING IN WASHINGTON WITH YOU, USING OF COURSE THE MATERIAL WHICH AMBASSADOR BRUCE HAD GIVEN ME.

HE TOOK ALL THIS EXTREMELY WELL. HE DOES NOT INTEND TO BORE YOU WITH A LONG RECITAL OF INDIAS SINS. HE DOES NOT, I THINK, WANT TO ARGUE ABOUT ALLEGED INCONSISTENCIES IN AMERICAN POLICY AND I THINK I HAVE SATISFIED HIM THAT UNITED STATES POLICY HAS BEEN CONSISTENT, IS DEEPLY CONCERNED WITH PAKISTANS WELL BEING ON THE BASIS OF NEUTRALITY BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN, BUT HAS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF STRONG FEELINGS IN CONGRESS AND AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION THAT IT IS UNREALISTIC TO KEEP PAKISTAN AFLOAT BY MASSIVE AID PROGRAMMES AT THE VERY TIME WHEN PAKISTAN APPEARS TO BE MOVING INTO THE CHINESE ORBIT AND IS NOT ABOVE SNIDE CRITICISMS OF AMERICAN POLICY BOTH IN RELATION TO THE SUB-CONTINENT AND MORE WIDELY.

AYUB TOOK THESE POINTS VERY MUCH ON BOARD. HE STRESSED TO ME LAST NIGHT, AS HE HAD DONE IN THE MORNING, THAT PAKISTAN IS A SMALL COUNTRY WITH THREE VERY LARGE NEIGHBOURS. FIRST, RUSSIA, WHO THOUGH NOT IMMEDIATELY CONTIGUOUS IS AT ONE POINT ONLY 17 MILES AWAY. SECOND, INDIA, WHICH WHILE WE MAY THINK OF LITTLE ACCOUNT MILITARILY IS REGARDED BY AYUB AS A PERMANENT MILITARY THREAT AND AS A COUNTRY NOW DETERMINED TO OBLITERATE PAKISTANS INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE. THIRD, CHINA. I THINK AYUB IS PROBABLY GENUINE ABOUT THIS BUT I AM NOT SURE THAT ALL HIS CLOSEST ADVISERS ARE.

AYUB STRESSED MORE THAN ONCE THAT HE AND HE ALONE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR BRINGING PAKISTAN INTO THE SYSTEM OF WESTERN ALLIANCES, TO SOME EXTENT IN THE FACE OF CRITICAL PAKISTANI PUBLIC OPINION. I THINK HE WANTS TO CONTINUE ON THIS BASIS BUT HE STRESSED THAT PUBLIC OPINION IN PAKISTAN IS STRONGLY ANTI-AMERICAN AND MY COLLEAGUES RECEIVED EVIDENCE OF THIS FROM OTHER PAKISTAN MINISTERS ACCOMPANYING HIM DURING THE PERIOD WHILE I WAS SPEAKING TO AYUB ALONE. I EXPRESSED TO AYUB VERY FRANKLY MY ANXIETIES ABOUT BHUTTO. HE TOOK THIS VERY WELL BUT SAID THAT BHUTTO DOES REPRESENT PUBLIC OPINION IN PAKISTAN. I SUGGESTED THAT BHUTTO WAS PLAYING ON THESE FEELINGS RATHER THAN REPRESENTING THEM AND WAS, TO SOME EXTENT, CREATING THEM. I SAID THAT WE REGARDED AYUB AS THE BOSS IN PAKISTAN. WE WERE CONVINCED OF HIS INTEGRITY AND LOYALTY BUT THAT OUR ATTITUDE SO FAR AS THE U.K. WAS CONCERNED WOULD BE VERY MUCH CHANGED IF HE WERE EVER REPLACED BY PAKISTANI POLITICIANS OF THE BHUTTO VARIETY. I INDICATED THAT THIS MIGHT BE THE AMERICAN VIEW ALSO. HE SPOKE SOMEWHAT DEPRECATINGLY OF BHUTTOS INTRINSIC SIGNIFICANCE BUT KEPT ON REPEATING THAT HE REPRESENTED A POWERFUL STRAIN OF PRO-CHINESE AND REPRESENTATIVE OPINION.

THERE IS NO DOUBT NOW THAT HE WILL ENTER THESE TALKS WITH YOU CONVINCED, AS I HAVE TOLD HIM THAT THEY ARE OF HISTORIC SIGNIFICANCE BELIEVING PERHAPS FOR THE FIRST TIME AFTER MY TALK THAT THEY WILL BE CONDUCTED WITH THE UTMOST GOOD WILL ON YOUR SIDE AND RECOGNISING THAT THEY WILL BE PRODUCTIVE IF THEY ARE CONDUCTED ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE BILATERAL

SINCE HE PROFOUNDLY BELIEVES THAT INDIA, WHICH HE REGARDS AS AN INCHOATE AND DISORDERED POLITICAL SYSTEM, IS DETERMINED TO DESTROY PAKISTAN, ANYTHING YOU CAN SAY ON THE LINES INDICATED TO ME BY AMBASSADOR BRUCE, THAT YOU ARE CONCERNED WITH THEIR NATIONAL INTEGRITY, WILL BE OF THE HIGHEST VALUE. I THINK I HAVE PUSHED HIM OFF ANY IDEA THAT WHAT HE WILL BE DISCUSSING WITH YOU IS THE KASHMIR SITUATION AND HE RESPONDED TO OUR OWN VIEWS ON THIS BY NOT PRESSING UNDULY THE KASHMIR PROBLEM ON US. I STRESSED THAT WE WERE CONCERNED WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF SEPTEMBER 20 AND I DO NOT THINK HE WILL BE SURPRISED IF YOU LAY YOUR MAIN EMPHASIS SO FAR AS KASHMIR IS CONCERNED ON THIS ASPECT OF THE QUESTION. I URGED HIM NOT TO UNDERRATE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FACT THAT INDIA IS NOW MOVING INTO A PRE-ELECTION SITUATION WHICH WILL NOT BE RESOLVED UNTIL AFTER THEIR ELECTIONS IN 1967. I EMPHASIZED THAT THESE ELECTIONS WOULD BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF THE FATHER-FIGURE OF NEHRU AND THAT SHASTRI WAS BOUND TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THE ALMOST INTOLERABLE PRESSURES OF VISCERAL, IRRATIONAL INDIAN POLITICS, AMONGST WHICH WE MUST NOT UNDERRATE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ANTI-BRITISH AND ANTI-AMERICAN LOBBIES.

BOTH IN THE MORNING AND IN MY EVENING DISCUSSION, HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF A COHERENT ANGLO-AMERICAN APPROACH TO THESE PROBLEMS. HE IS GOING TO TASHKENT BUT IS NO MORE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS THERE THAN WE ARE. HE WAS A LITTLE SORE THAT WE, THAT IS BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES, OR ALTERNATIVELY BRITAIN AND THE COMMONWEALTH, HAD NOT TAKEN AN EARLIER INITIATIVE. I EXPLAINED THAT WE WERE AT GREAT PAINS TO ENSURE THAT U THANTS AND THE OVER-RIDING SECURITY COUNCIL INITIATIVE SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT OF WAY. AND THAT WHEN RUSSIA TOOK AN INITIATIVE WE COULD HARDLY OBJECT, BUT THAT WE WERE NOT GOING TO SET UP COMPETING MEDIATORY EFFORTS. I THINK THAT IF TASHKENT FAILS, WHICH IS LIKELY SINCE KOSYGIN WILL DO NO MORE THAN ACT AS HOST, WE MAY HAVE TO CONSIDER WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE A NEW INITIATIVE EITHER BY THE UNITED STATES WITH STRONG BRITISH SUPPORT OR POSSIBLY WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH. THIS, HOWEVER, WE CAN LEAVE UNTIL AFTER TASHKENT AND I SHALL HAVE THE CHANCE TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS WITH YOU NEXT WEEK.

INDEPENDENT MEDIATION IS PROBABLY NOT THE ANSWER. I STILL RECALL THE TRAUMATIC EXPERIENCE AT THE RANN OF KUTCH NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH PROBABLY PROVIDED THE RIGHT TECHNIQUE FOR A SOLUTION THOUGH IN THAT CASE WE WERE DEALING WITH A STRIP OF UNOCCUPIED TERRITORY UNDER WATER NOT OF THE YEAR, WHOSE ONLY SIGNIFICANCE RELATED TO MILITARY PATROLLING RIGHTS AND TO THE ELEMENT OF FACE INVOLVED IN THESE RIGHTS. KASHMIR ON THE CONTRARY, APART FROM ITS HISTORIC SIGNIFICANCE, INVOLVES THE RIGHTS OF MANY MILLIONS OF HUMAN BEINGS OF STRONG POLITICAL AND INDEED RELIGIOUS VIEWS. PAKISTAN CANNOT RELINQUISH THEIR CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF THE KASHMIR PEOPLE AND THERE ARE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS WHICH THEY CAN QUOTE. EQUALLY INDIA IS CONCERNED WITH KASHMIR, PARTLY ON MILITARY GROUNDS BECAUSE OF THEIR COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE CHINESE BORDER, BUT EQUALLY BECAUSE THEY FEEL THAT ANY CONCESSION HERE WOULD MEAN THE BEGINNING OF THE BREAK-UP OF THE INDIAN UNION.

MY PRIVATE TALK WITH AYUB ENDED WITH A STRONG REITERATION ON MY PART OF WHAT I SAID TO HIM EARLIER THAT NEITHER PAKISTANI INTERESTS NOR WORLD PEACE COULD EVER BE SERVED BY A SITUATION IN WHICH PAKISTAN MOVED INTO THE CHINESE SPHERE OF INFLUENCE AND INDIA INTO THE RUSSIAN. IT ENDED EQUALLY WITH A STRONG ASSERTION ON HIS PART, AND HE WENT SO FAR AS TO ASK ME TO COMMUNICATE THIS TO YOU, THAT HE WAS UNIQUELY AND UNPOPULARLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF PAKISTAN WITH OUR ALLIANCES AND THAT HE WAS UNDER THE STRONGEST PRESSURE AT THE PRESENT TIME ON THESE MATTERS.

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WE HAVE TO REMEMBER THAT AYUB, WHOM I REGARD AS A MAN OF GREAT INTEGRITY, BUT ESSENTIALLY A PATRIOTIC MAN WHOSE HORIZONS ARE TO SOME EXTENT LIMITED BY HIS MILITARY BACKGROUND, IS GREATLY CONCERNED WITH THE QUESTION OF ARMS SUPPLIES. INDIA IS A MUCH MORE POWERFUL COUNTRY AND HAS HER OWN INTERNAL MEANS OF ARMS MANUFACTURE AND THE PROSPECT OF SUBSTANTIAL SOVIET SUPPLIES. IT IS TO OUR JOINT INTEREST AND INDEED IN THE INTEREST OF WORLD PEACE THAT PAKISTAN SHOULD NOT BECOME DEPENDENT ON CHINESE SUPPLIES AND I FEEL THAT HIS PRESSURE ON YOU IN RESPECT OF SUPPLIES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT WILL, IN HIS MIND, GO BEYOND THE KASHMIR QUESTION AND WILL BECOME A TEST OF THE VALUE TO PAKISTAN OF THE PAKISTAN/U.S. RELATIONSHIP AND EQUALLY A TEST OF THE VALUE OF THEIR CONTINUED MEMBERSHIP OF THE ALLIANCES IN WHICH WE ARE CONCERNED.

I HAVE DICTATED THIS MESSAGE TO YOU IN GREAT FRANKNESS IMMEDIATELY AFTER SAYING GOODNIGHT TO AYUB.

THINKING IT OVER, I BELIEVE MY DESCRIPTION OF BHUTTO IS PROBABLY AN UNDERSTATEMENT. I AM EXTREMELY PLEASED TO HEAR THAT THE LIKLIHOOD IS THAT YOU WILL BE TALKING TO AYUB ALONE, AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH YOU CAN BE AS FRANK AS I AM SURE YOU HOPE AND INTEND TO BE DEPENDS ON THE ABSENCE FROM YOUR TALKS OF SOME OF HIS CLOSEST ASSOCIATES. BUT AS I HAVE EMPHASIZED TO HIM 20 TIMES TONIGHT, HE IS THE BOSS AND ANYTHING YOU AND I CAN DO TO BRING THIS HOME TO HIM, AND TO EMPHASIZE THAT HIS RELATIONS WITH YOU AS WITH US DEPEND ON HIM STAYING BOSS, IS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO RESUMING THIS DISCUSSION WITH YOU NEXT WEEK AFTER YOUR TALKS WITH AYUB HAVE BEEN CONCLUDED.

~~TOP SECRET~~

PERSONAL FOR

MESSAGE ENDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Read 25

RECEIVED
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL (Attachment)

1965 DEC 17 PM 4 25

December 17, 1965

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

MAH

Enclosed for the information and files of Mr. Komer is a copy of a memorandum of conversation between Mr. Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs and Mr. David V. Bendall, Counselor, British Embassy dated December 10, 1965 re UK Defense Review.

Attachment:

Stated above.

CONFIDENTIAL (Attachment)

DEC 17 1965

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: December 10, 1965

SUBJECT: UK Defense Review

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. David V. Bendall, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Politico-Military Affairs

COPIES TO:	S	EUR - Mr. Leddy	DOD/ISA - Mr. Finkelstein
	U	EUR/BNA	White House - Mr. Komer
	G	Amembassy London	G/PM - Mr. Kitchen
	M	FE/SPA	G/PM - Colonel Lindjord
	S/S	NEA - Mr. Davies	

17

DEF 1 UK
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POL
UK-US

Mr. Bendall came in on a fishing expedition regarding the US position on the British Defense Review for the meeting between the President and the Prime Minister, December 17.

I told Bendall the initial play was really up to the British; they had avoided official level talks prior to the meeting of the principals and, in general, our recommendations to the President would be to listen and learn what the Prime Minister had on his mind. We had been prepared to raise some questions in the recent meeting between Mr. McNamara, Mr. Ball, Mr. Healey and Mr. Stewart in London, but British preference and the limited time available had militated against such a discussion. In the circumstances the British would have to play their cards and then the process of consultation and response could begin.

Bendall said numerous British contacts around Washington, including those by British military service representatives, had led the Embassy to the tentative conclusion that there was "less concern" on the American side regarding any possible consequences arising from British defense retrenchment. I

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said I could not see any justification for this conclusion. The attention of the American Government had been largely centered on the fighting in Vietnam and the problems which flowed from this. We were also entering the phase of final decisions on our national budget and there was, understandably, a preoccupation with our defense budget in particular. However, we still were alert to the implications of any British defense changes and, of course, felt very strongly the British should maintain most of their present defense posture.

I told Bendall we understood the British were tentatively thinking of follow-up discussions at the Ministerial level around the last week of January, the 25th having been mentioned. This was in the form of an informal inquiry regarding Mr. McNamara's availability on or about that date. Therefore, this aspect rested largely with Defense. Speaking personally, it would be useful to have such follow-up conversations earlier in January and not wait for over a month after the initial contact. Bendall replied that the Embassy's information was the UK Government was thinking of "early in the latter half of January."

Bendall then said that, while the British position was "really firmly in the hands of the Ministers and probably the Prime Minister", and that the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence staffs did not know what the Prime Minister's tactics would be, it was his estimate that the Prime Minister's exposition to the President would largely center on the long-run political prospects in the Far East and the consequent role of Singapore. What the Prime Minister probably would suggest would be development of a common political appraisal and estimate of future developments. He then might indicate that the British believed their tenure in Singapore was necessarily limited and that there should follow UK, American, Australian, and New Zealand discussion of how to deal with the area security problem over the next decade.

I remarked that the U.S. Government recognized the desirability of a longer term political appraisal; that we realized an approximately agreed assessment of the

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security situation was necessary before there could be a useful discussion of military requirements in detail, and that it would be useful eventually to bring Australia and New Zealand into the dialogue. However, the British should not expect the President, in the meeting with the Prime Minister, to respond in detail on these matters.

Bendall said that, speaking personally, as far as the Foreign Office was concerned it probably was better that the conversations would open at the Prime Ministers level since it appeared Healey and the Ministry of Defence wanted to do less than the Foreign Office believed should and could be done regarding maintaining Britain's overseas commitments and capabilities. However, he said he would raise with Ambassador Dean the desirability of inquiring of London if the Embassy could not be informed regarding specific topics the Prime Minister intended to raise so that there might be a little more substantive discussion and perhaps more response from the US side. I said I did not wish to comment on this. It appeared the British leaders desire to play the hand the other way and this is clearly their prerogative. In any case, there now was relatively little time before the talks, and I did not think the British should expect definitive replies.

I remarked that the UK Government had undertaken not to announce its decisions with regard to its defense review until after consultations with the US. I was puzzled therefore as to why the British should propose the follow-up Ministerial-level discussions for late in January if they still intended to put forth their White Paper on Defense in early February. Bendall slid over this but did say the White Paper presumably would reflect UK efforts to develop a more flexible force posture which could be deployed more easily and rapidly to world trouble spots. The question to be dealt with between the UK and the US he thought was where the British should plan to use such forces and where, under conditions of increased coordination with the US, these might be most effective.

CONFIDENTIAL

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-4-

Bendall said that if the British did withdraw certain types of units such as nuclear-capable aircraft from a place like Aden, how might the US help in maintaining a local nuclear deterrent. I said I had never heard of a "local" nuclear deterrent being considered by the British except in the Indonesia-Malaysian confrontation and, frankly, I thought it meaningless there. If the British were trying to separate this concept from the concept of some type of nuclear "guarantee"--say for India--then this could only be sorted out by detailed discussions of the type we were willing to undertake. I remarked that British nuclear submarines might operate in the Indian Ocean in terms of targetting both the USSR and China and simultaneously provide a nuclear guarantee for the Subcontinent. Bendall said that if such a submarine operation were related to the F-111's, which he believed the British really intended for use outside of Europe, the net result would be a type of parity between the UK and Germany by virtue of the British not utilizing any nuclear forces in a European context. I said this was an interesting proposition but that priority was currently being given in American policy to a formula under which a British and American matching weapon system contribution to NATO could be opened to German financing and, hopefully, later German participation. Bendall said he understood this.

Bendall closed the conversation by saying he gathered the US now intended to have another generation of manned bomber. I said I thought this quite likely but frankly had no knowledge which would confirm it.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
~~SECRET~~
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

December 15, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT W. KOMER
THE WHITE HOUSE

FROM: NEA - Rodger P. Davies *RPD*
Jms

SUBJECT: The U.S. and the British Balance of Payments Problem *UK x m w*

Following is the check list you requested of U.S. actions in the Near East which have had the effect of helping the British with their balance of payments problem:

1. In Saudi Arabia, we have agreed to participate in the sale of a joint U.S./U.K. air defense package, for which the Saudis have opted in preference to an exclusively American package. The British component of the joint package, consisting of supersonic interceptors and related ground control systems, will have a value of approximately \$250 million.

2. In Jordan and Lebanon, we have stayed out of the competition for the sale of supersonics and have urged the governments of those countries to meet their military jet aircraft needs from Western European sources. In both cases, to enhance the salability of the British offers we have authorized the U.K. to inform the governments concerned that we are prepared to help improve their air defense capabilities through the sale of Hawk missiles. The British price tag for the supersonics Jordan and Lebanon wish to acquire is approximately \$130 million and \$50.6 million, respectively. It is still far from certain, however, that they will find the means to finance such purchases.

3. We continue to coordinate reductions in budgetary support for Jordan with the U.K., thus assuring that the British share whatever savings are effected in the outflow of payments for this purpose. For 1966, the British share of those savings will be \$280 thousand.

4. We have refrained from urging the Government of Jordan to take administrative measures to redirect Jordan's imports from traditional suppliers (such as the U.K.) to the U.S. An attempt was made to do this in 1962, but was quickly rescinded. Since that time, the U.K. has had free access to the Jordan market in spite of the large budget support payments from the U.S. compared with the relatively small U.K. budget support.

5.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *rg/cbm*, NARA, Date *8-16-06*

~~SECRET~~
GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

DEC 16 1965

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-2-

5. We intend to turn down an Israeli request to purchase in the United States equipment for the conversion of their Centurion tanks to diesel power, and to suggest that Israel direct this request to the U.K. (provision for such conversion was contained in the U.K.-Israeli Centurion sales agreement).

6. We have virtually eliminated ourselves as primary suppliers of aircraft and other significant military equipment to Israel, thus improving - at least hypothetically - the British competitive position for sales in the Israeli market.

7. We continue to urge the U.A.R. to pay fair compensation for the nationalization of the assets of foreign companies. Compensation, if paid, would bring a balance of payments benefit to the U.K. through payments to British stockholders in Shell.

~~SECRET~~

NOTE: HANDLE THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE AS NODIS RPT NODIS

27

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 032R 053 003/7
By JC, NARA, Date 11-6-12

*UK
Ayub Khan*

EEA458
OO WTE10
DE WTE 684

FROM: MR. KOMER
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP65879

~~T O P S E C R E T~~ PERSONAL FOR

FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM WILSON INDICATES THAT WE CONNECTED WELL IN LONDON. WILSON GOT ACROSS THE WORD, NO DOUBT PARTLY BECAUSE HE EXPECTS TO PRESENT HIS OWN BILL SHORTLY.

DESPITE ITS LENGTH, AM SENDING THIS AS GOOD SUNDAY READING. THE ONLY HOOKER IS FOURTH FROM LAST PARAGRAPH, WHERE WILSON'S PLEA ON RESUMING ARMS SUPPLIES IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO UK'S OWN DESIRE NOT TO LOSE A MARKET. MY HUNCH IS THAT AUYS WOULD BE QUITE SATISFIED WITH A STATEMENT THAT WE WOULD CONSIDER SOME RESUMPTION AFTER SHASTRI VISIT IF PAK BEHAVIOR JUSTIFIED.

WOULD YOU LIKE A BRIEF THANK YOU TO WILSON, ADDING THE NOTE THAT YOU WILL GIVE HIM A RETURN FILL-IN WHEN HE COMES HERE?

MESSAGE FOLLOWS:

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT FROM PRIME MINISTER

BEGINS

I HAVE RECEIVED THE MESSAGE FROM AMBASSADOR BRUCE ABOUT PRESIDENT AYUB KHANS DISCUSSIONS WITH YOU NEXT WEEK.

I HAD A LONG TALK WITH AYUB KHAN ON SATURDAY MORNING BEFORE RECEIVING AMBASSADOR BRUCES MESSAGE, AND HAD IN FACT WITHOUT KKNOWING EXACTLY WHAT LINE YOU WOULD BE TAKING SPOKEN TO HIM VERY CLOSELY ON THE LINES OF YOUR MESSAGE. I HAD TOLD HIM THAT SO FAR AS BRITAIN WAS CONCERNED, AND I FELT THE U.S. WOULD TAKE THE SAME LINE, WE COULD NOT TAKE SIDES IN THE SUB-CONTINENT ON THE KASHMIR ISSUE BUT WOULD DO ANYTHING IN OUR POWER, PROVIDED THERE WAS GOOD WILL ON BOTH SIDES, TO SECURE A SOLUTION. I HAD ALSO SUGGESTED TO HIM THAT, WHILE I HAD NOT BEEN IN TOUCH WITH YOU IN ANY WAY AND WAS ONLY SPECULATING ABOUT YOUR VIEWS, THE U.S. WOULD BE VERY IMPATIENT OF ANY LONG DRAWN OUT ATTACK ON THE INDIAN POSITION. I ALSO SAID THAT I FELT THAT YOU WOULD BE EQUALLY IMPATIENT WHEN MR. SHASTRI COMES IF HE WERE TO SUBJECT YOU TO A LONG ATTACK ON PAKISTAN.

PRESERVATION COPY

EQUALLY I WARNED HIM VERY STRONGLY THAT BOTH WE AND YOU WERE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PAKISTAN DRIFT INTO THE CHINESE ORBIT. I FELT, AND TOLD HIM THIS, THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE EXTREMELY INTOLERANT OF ANY SITUATION IN WHICH EITHER INDIA OR PAKISTAN FELT THAT THEY COULD WASTE THEIR SUBSTANCE IN RIOTOUS ARMAMENT EXPENDITURE AND COUNT ON AMERICAN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION TO KEEP THEIR POPULATION ALIVE. I POINTED OUT WHAT I HAVE HEARD THAT ON PRESENT TRENDS AMERICAN FOOD SHIPMENTS TO THE SUB-CONTINENT BY 1970 COULD REPRESENT HALF OF TOTAL AMERICAN FOOD PRODUCTION: IN OTHER WORDS, THAT EVERY TON OF FOOD PRODUCED BY YOUR FARMERS FOR AMERICAN CONSUMPTION WOULD BE MATCHED BY ANOTHER TON PRODUCED FOR CONSUMPTION IN THE SUB-CONTINENT, SUPPLIED NOT ON COMMERCIAL TERMS BUT IN THE WORDS OF THE IMMORTAL ISAIAH WITHOUT MONEY AND WITHOUT PRICE. CLEARLY NO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT COULD ENVISAGE SUCH A DEVELOPMENT, PARTICULARLY IF INDIA AND PAKISTAN WERE INHIBITING THEIR OWN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND FOOD PRODUCTION PROGRAMMES THROUGH A CONCENTRATION ON SELF-DESTRUCTIVE ARMAMENTS. CRITICISING HIM FOR HAVING AT INDIA'S MOMENT OF MORTAL DANGER WHEN FACED WITH CHINESE ATTACK THREE YEARS AGO, I CONDEMNED HIM FOR WHAT WE ALL FELT THAT PAKISTAN WAS PREPARED TO DO - TO MAKE MISCHIEF AT INDIA'S EXPENSE BY LINKING WITH CHINA.

I RECEIVED AMBASSADOR BRUCE'S MESSAGE ONLY AFTER HE HAD LEFT ME ON SATURDAY MORNING, BUT I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY OF A DINNER PARTY FOR AYUB TO TAKE HIM ASIDE AND SPEAK TO HIM FOR OVER AN HOUR ALONE. I REPEAT THE WORD ALONE BECAUSE I BELIEVE THAT WHILE HE, AYUB, IS BASICALLY SOUND HE IS SUBJECT TO STRONG PRESSURES FROM HIS ADVISERS, PARTICULARLY BHUTTO, WHOM I REGARD AS ONE OF THE MOST EL MEN GOD EVER CREATED. AYUB, AND I AM GLAD YOU TAKE THIS VIEW, IS A MAN OF GREAT INTEGRITY BUT HE IS BASICALLY A SIMPLE AND DEEPLY PATRIOTIC SOLDIER AND CAPABLE OF BEING PUSHED AROUND BY UNSCRUPULOUS POLITICIANS OF THE BHUTTO VARIETY. I SPENT THE HOUR REHEARSING HIM IN THE REALITIES OF THE DISCUSSIONS HE WILL BE UNDERTAKING IN WASHINGTON WITH YOU, USING OF COURSE THE MATERIAL WHICH AMBASSADOR BRUCE HAD GIVEN ME.

HE TOOK ALL THIS EXTREMELY WELL. HE DOES NOT INTEND TO BORE YOU WITH A LONG RECITAL OF INDIA'S SINS. HE DOES NOT, I THINK, WANT TO ARGUE ABOUT ALLEGED INCONSISTENCIES IN AMERICAN POLICY AND I THINK I HAVE SATISFIED HIM THAT UNITED STATES POLICY HAS BEEN CONSISTENT, IS DEEPLY CONCERNED WITH PAKISTAN'S WELL BEING ON THE BASIS OF NEUTRALITY BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN, BUT HAS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF STRONG FEELINGS IN CONGRESS AND AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION THAT IT IS UNREALISTIC TO KEEP PAKISTAN AFLOAT BY MASSIVE AID PROGRAMMES AT THE VERY TIME WHEN PAKISTAN APPEARS TO BE MOVING INTO THE CHINESE ORBIT AND IS NOT ABOVE SNIDE CRITICISMS OF AMERICAN POLICY BOTH IN RELATION TO THE SUB-CONTINENT AND MORE WIDELY.

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PRESERVATION COPY

AYUB STRESSED MORE THAN ONCE THAT HE AND HE ALONE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR BRINGING PAKISTAN INTO THE SYSTEM OF WESTERN ALLIANCES, TO SOME EXTENT IN THE FACE OF CRITICAL PAKISTANI PUBLIC OPINION. I THINK HE WANTS TO CONTINUE ON THIS BASIS BUT HE STRESSED THAT PUBLIC OPINION IN PAKISTAN IS STRONGLY ANTI-AMERICAN AND MY COLLEAGUES RECEIVED EVIDENCE OF THIS FROM OTHER PAKISTAN MINISTERS ACCOMPANYING HIM DURING THE PERIOD WHILE I WAS SPEAKING TO AYUB ALONE. I EXPRESSED TO AYUB VERY FRANKLY MY ANXIETIES ABOUT BHUTTO. HE TOOK THIS VERY WELL BUT SAID THAT BHUTTO DOES REPRESENT PUBLIC OPINION IN PAKISTAN. I SUGGESTED THAT BHUTTO WAS PLAYING ON THESE FEELINGS RATHER THAN REPRESENTING THEM AND WAS, TO SOME EXTENT, CREATING THEM. I SAID THAT WE REGARDED AYUB AS THE BOSS IN PAKISTAN. WE WERE CONVINCED OF HIS INTEGRITY AND LOYALTY BUT THAT OUR ATTITUDE SO FAR AS THE U.K. WAS CONCERNED WOULD BE VERY MUCH CHANGED IF HE WERE EVER REPLACED BY PAKISTANI POLITICIANS OF THE BHUTTO VARIETY. I INDICATED THAT THIS MIGHT BE THE AMERICAN VIEW ALSO. HE SPOKE SOMEWHAT DEPRECATINGLY OF BHUTTO'S INTRINSIC SIGNIFICANCE BUT KEPT ON REPEATING THAT HE REPRESENTED A POWERFUL STRAIN OF PRO-CHINESE AND REPRESENTATIVE OPINION.

THERE IS NO DOUBT NOW THAT HE WILL ENTER THESE TALKS WITH YOU CONVINCED, AS I HAVE TOLD HIM THAT THEY ARE OF HISTORIC SIGNIFICANCE BELIEVING PERHAPS FOR THE FIRST TIME AFTER MY TALK THAT THEY WILL BE CONDUCTED WITH THE UTMOST GOOD WILL ON YOUR SIDE AND RECOGNISING THAT THEY WILL BE PRODUCTIVE IF THEY ARE CONDUCTED ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE BILATERAL U.S./PAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP AND NOT IN THE HOPE OF INVOKING AMERICAN ASSISTANCE IN THE STRUGGLE WITH INDIA ON THE KASHMIR QUESTION.

SINCE HE PROFOUNDLY BELIEVES THAT INDIA, WHICH HE REGARDS AS AN INCHOATE AND DISORDERED POLITICAL SYSTEM, IS DETERMINED TO DESTROY PAKISTAN, ANYTHING YOU CAN SAY ON THE LINES INDICATED TO ME BY AMBASSADOR BRUCE, THAT YOU ARE CONCERNED WITH THEIR NATIONAL INTEGRITY, WILL BE OF THE HIGHEST VALUE. I THINK I HAVE PUSHED HIM OFF ANY IDEA THAT WHAT HE WILL BE DISCUSSING WITH YOU IS THE KASHMIR SITUATION AND HE RESPONDED TO OUR OWN VIEWS ON THIS BY NOT PRESSING UNDULY THE KASHMIR PROBLEM ON US. I STRESSED THAT WE WERE CONCERNED WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF SEPTEMBER 20 AND I DO NOT THINK HE WILL BE SURPRISED IF YOU LAY YOUR MAIN EMPHASIS SO FAR AS KASHMIR IS CONCERNED ON THIS ASPECT OF THE QUESTION. I URGED HIM NOT TO UNDERRATE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FACT THAT INDIA IS NOW MOVING INTO A PRE-ELECTION SITUATION WHICH WILL NOT BE RESOLVED UNTIL AFTER THEIR ELECTIONS IN 1967. I EMPHASIZED THAT THESE ELECTIONS WOULD BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF THE FATHER-FIGURE OF NEHRU AND THAT SHASTRI WAS BOUND TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THE ALMOST INTOLERABLE PRESSURES OF VISCERAL, IRRATIONAL INDIAN POLITICS, AMONGST WHICH WE MUST NOT UNDERRATE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ANTI-BRITISH AND ANTI-AMERICAN LOBBIES.

BOTH IN THE MORNING AND IN MY EVENING DISCUSSION, HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF A COHERENT ANGLO-AMERICAN APPROACH TO THESE PROBLEMS. HE IS GOING TO TASHKENT BUT IS NO MORE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS THERE THAN WE ARE. HE WAS A LITTLE SORE THAT WE, THAT IS BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES, OR ALTERNATIVELY BRITAIN AND THE COMMONWEALTH, HAD NOT TAKEN AN EARLIER INITIATIVE. I EXPLAINED THAT WE WERE AT GREAT PAINS TO ENSURE THAT U THANTS AND THE OVER-RIDING SECURITY COUNCIL INITIATIVE SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT OF WAY. AND THAT WHEN RUSSIA TOOK AN INITIATIVE WE COULD HARDLY OBJECT, BUT THAT WE WERE NOT GOING TO SET UP COMPETING MEDIATORY EFFORTS. I THINK THAT IF TASHKENT FAILS, WHICH IS LIKELY SINCE KOSYGIN WILL DO NO MORE THAN ACT AS HOST, WE MAY HAVE TO CONSIDER WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE A NEW INITIATIVE EITHER BY THE UNITED STATES WITH STRONG BRITISH SUPPORT OR POSSIBLY WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH. THIS, HOWEVER, WE CAN LEAVE UNTIL AFTER TASHKENT AND I SHALL HAVE THE CHANCE TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS WITH YOU NEXT WEEK.

INDEPENDENT MEDIATION IS PROBABLY NOT THE ANSWER. I STILL RECALL THE TRAUMATIC EXPERIENCE AT THE RANN OF KUTCH NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH PROBABLY PROVIDED THE RIGHT TECHNIQUE FOR A SOLUTION THOUGH IN THAT CASE WE WERE DEALING WITH A STRETCH OF UNOCCUPIED TERRITORY UNDER WATER MOST OF THE YEAR, WHOSE ONLY SIGNIFICANCE RELATED TO MILITARY PATROLLING RIGHTS AND TO THE ELEMENT OF FACE INVOLVED IN THESE RIGHTS. KASHMIR ON THE CONTRARY, APART FROM ITS HISTORIC SIGNIFICANCE, INVOLVES THE RIGHTS OF MANY MILLIONS OF HUMAN BEINGS OF STRONG POLITICAL AND INDEED RELIGIOUS VIEWS. PAKISTAN CANNOT RELINQUISH THEIR CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF THE KASHMIR PEOPLE AND THERE ARE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS WHICH THEY CAN QUOTE. EQUALLY INDIA IS CONCERNED WITH KASHMIR, PARTLY ON MILITARY GROUNDS BECAUSE OF THEIR COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE CHINESE BORDER, BUT EQUALLY BECAUSE THEY FEEL THAT ANY CONCESSION HERE WOULD MEAN THE BEGINNING OF THE BREAK-UP OF THE INDIAN UNION.

MY PRIVATE TALK WITH AYUB ENDED WITH A STRONG REITERATION ON MY PART OF WHAT I SAID TO HIM EARLIER THAT NEITHER PAKISTANI INTERESTS NOR WORLD PEACE COULD EVER BE SERVED BY A SITUATION IN WHICH PAKISTAN MOVED INTO THE CHINESE SPHERE OF INFLUENCE AND INDIA INTO THE RUSSIAN. IT ENDED EQUALLY WITH A STRONG ASSERTION ON HIS PART, AND HE WENT SO FAR AS TO ASK ME TO COMMUNICATE THIS TO YOU, THAT HE WAS UNIQUELY AND UNPOPULARLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF PAKISTAN WITH OUR ALLIANCES AND THAT HE WAS UNDER THE STRONGEST PRESSURE AT THE PRESENT TIME ON THESE MATTERS.

WE HAVE TO REMEMBER THAT AYUB, WHOM I REGARD AS A MAN OF GREAT INTEGRITY, BUT ESSENTIALLY A PATRIOTIC MAN WHOSE HORIZONS ARE TO SOME EXTENT LIMITED BY HIS MILITARY BACKGROUND, IS GREATLY CONCERNED WITH THE QUESTION OF ARMS SUPPLIES. INDIA IS A MUCH MORE POWERFUL COUNTRY AND HAS HER OWN INTERNAL MEANS OF ARMS MANUFACTURE AND THE PROSPECT OF SUBSTANTIAL SOVIET SUPPLIES. IT IS TO OUR JOINT INTEREST AND INDEED IN THE INTEREST OF WORLD PEACE THAT PAKISTAN SHOULD NOT BECOME DEPENDENT ON CHINESE SUPPLIES AND I FEEL THAT HIS PRESSURE ON YOU IN RESPECT OF SUPPLIES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT WILL, IN HIS MIND, GO BEYOND THE KASHMIR QUESTION AND WILL BECOME A TEST OF THE VALUE TO PAKISTAN OF THE PAKISTAN/U.S. RELATIONSHIP AND EQUALLY A TEST OF THE VALUE OF THEIR CONTINUED MEMBERSHIP OF THE ALLIANCES IN WHICH WE ARE CONCERNED.

I HAVE DICTATED THIS MESSAGE TO YOU IN GREAT FRANKNESS IMMEDIATELY AFTER SAYING GOODNIGHT TO AYUB.

THINKING IT OVER, I BELIEVE MY DESCRIPTION OF BHUTTO IS PROBABLY AN UNDERSTATEMENT. I AM EXTREMELY PLEASED TO HEAR THAT THE LIKLIHOOD IS THAT YOU WILL BE TALKING TO AYUB ALONE, AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH YOU CAN BE AS FRANK AS I AM SURE YOU HOPE AND INTEND TO BE DEPENDS ON THE ABSENCE FROM YOUR TALKS OF SOME OF HIS CLOSEST ASSOCIATES. BUT AS I HAVE EMPHASIZED TO HIM 20 TIMES TONIGHT, HE IS THE BOSS AND ANYTHING YOU AND I CAN DO TO BRING THIS HOME TO HIM, AND TO EMPHASIZE THAT HIS RELATIONS WITH YOU AS WITH US DEPEND ON HIM STAYING BOSS, IS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO RESUMING THIS DISCUSSION WITH YOU NEXT WEEK AFTER YOUR TALKS WITH AYUB HAVE BEEN CONCLUDED.

MESSAGE ENDS

DTG: 121603Z DEC 65

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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ACTION: Amembassy LONDON 3246

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Info

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EXDIS

The following message from the President was transmitted today to Prime Minister Wilson:

QUOTE: Thank you very much for your thoughtful message on the Rhodesian situation. I cannot express too strongly my admiration for the calm but forceful way ~~ex~~ you have taken personal responsibility of this complex and difficult problem.

Within the limits imposed on us by Vietnam, we intend to give our utmost support for your ~~effe~~ efforts to reach an acceptable solution in Rhodesia. As you know, our people are tightening the economic noose. We have established administrative machinery for controls on exports and will put these into effect in tandem with yours. We are asking our importers to restrict the shipment of Rhodesian goods to our shores, though total value of these imports last year amounted to only \$11 million. We will recognize the authority of the ~~new~~ newly-appointed Board of Governors of the Rhodesian Bank. And we are prepared to talk with our oil companies about

LBJ
To
Prime
Minister
12/8/65

Drafted by:

Text rec'd from White House

Telegraphic transmission and

S/S - John P. Walsh

classification approved by:

12/8/65

Clearances:

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Authority FRus. Vol XIV, # 504
By *[Signature]* NARA, Date 8-29-05 **SECRET**

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

DEC 9 1965

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termination of shipments to Rhodesia, ³²⁴⁶ depending on the outcome of your analysis of this particular dilemma.

We all hope that these measures will produce the desired objective. At the moment, however, we here feel that it is hard to be certain of favorable results in a short period of time. Because of this, we are convinced that the maintenance of Zambia-Katanga copper exports must take a high place in our planning. Our long-term interests indicate that the only sensible course of action is that which avoids strangling the Zambian economy and dislocating world copper markets for any substantial period of time.

The efforts involved and the possible dangers, both economic and political, are so great that I think we should, as you suggest, arrange to have our people get together before our meeting on December 17. Although Roswell Gilpatrick will not be available for this, George Ball has himself organized a group within his own office at the State Department which is acting as a focal point for the Rhodesian situation. They are presently discussing with your representatives measures in East Africa and at the UN in the coming difficult weeks and going over the ~~the~~ Rhodesian items to come up at our meeting -- to which I look forward with great pleasure.

END QUOTE.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
RECEIVED
MCGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE
~~SECRET~~ (Attachment)

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1965 DEC 4 AM 4 12
December 3, 1965

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Handwritten signature/initials

Handwritten mark

Enclosed for your information and files is a copy of a memorandum of conversation between the Under Secretary and British Ambassador Sir Patrick Dean dated November 16, 1965 re India and Pakistan.

Attachment:
S/S 18919

~~SECRET~~ (Attachment)

DEC 6 1965

(Drafting Office and Officer)
11/21/65

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

White House 29a

Approved in U:
11/24/65

Memorandum of Conversation

10919

Approved in M:
12/2/65

DATE: November 16, 1965

TIME: 3:30 p.m.

Under Secretary's
Conference Room

SUBJECT: India and Pakistan

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S. - Acting Secretary Ball
M - Mr. Mann
AID - Mr. Bell
NEA - Ambassador Hare, Mr. Handley, Miss Laise
Defense - Assistant Secretary John T. McNaughton
EUR - Mr. Stoessel
IO - Mr. Sisco

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

U.K. - White House - Mr. Komer, Deputy Special Assistant to President
Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador
Mr. Cyril S. Pickard, Superintending Under Secretary for Asia and
Atlantic Division, CRO
Mr. Ronald H. Belcher, Under Secretary for Asia Division of Ministry
of Overseas Development
Mr. Nigel C. C. Trench, Counselor, British Embassy

Mr. Ball opened the meeting with an expression of U.S. gratitude for the visit of the delegation from the U.K. He said events on the subcontinent are hard to read but of great importance to both of us. He, therefore, welcomed the U.K. views.

Sir Patrick Dean led off for the British delegation. He reported that Britain regards the matters of policies toward India and Pakistan as extremely important and serious. They had just completed a thorough policy review in which their High Commissioners from New Delhi and Karachi had participated. The U.K. now faces certain fundamental decisions. They realize that the U.S. will not be able to make its own policy decisions at once. However, the U.K. situation is different; some decisions have been taken and others will have to be made soon. Nevertheless, the U.K. was most desirous of consulting with the U.S.

As the U.K. sees it on the subcontinent, it is not clear how disengagement of forces is going to be secured. So long as this exists, relations with the West will be difficult. Each country thinks it has won a victory; neither is amenable to advice or pressure. The U.K. thinks it possible both countries will accept economic conditions on foreign aid but will not accept political conditions. Rather, Pakistan would turn to China; India would be prepared to do without Western aid and to accept economic stagnation and greater dependence on Russia.

Britain is in a vulnerable situation. It has an investment of £350 million and an export market of £120 million tied up in the subcontinent. The real question turns on how to apply pressures without driving the two countries to extremes. There may

be a chance

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be a chance of emotions cooling down if some machinery for negotiations is established to carry things along until after the 1967 elections in India.

The U.K. proposes to continue to suspend military aid but will review this when and if withdrawals are begun. It will withhold export licenses on the sales of certain lethal weapons but it is prepared to allow the export of selected military and paramilitary items. The U.K. has a long way to go to restore its influence in India and it desires to retain an influence in Pakistan. This is important as a means of enabling the U.K. to induce both countries to pursue the path of reason.

Sir Patrick Dean indicated that this summarized the points made in a paper which the British proposed to hand over to us.

Mr. Ball acknowledged that the problem is to bring about a disengagement. He agreed that what has emerged is that both countries think they have won. India is more cocky and filled with moral pride; the Paks, although they gave a good account of themselves, see the vulnerability of their situation. It appears that the pro-China group may have overplayed its hand. Mr. Ball observed it is difficult to be evenhanded because the effect of apparent evenhandedness may be just the opposite. For example, the resumption of U.K. sales will work in favor of India. Pakistan recognizes they are highly dependent on us and are rather frightened. If the U.S. chooses not to move and the U.K. moves ahead, the political implications could be adverse to the West.

Mr. Ball stated that the U.S. posture is to take a very hard look at the very important but complicated situation which exists on the subcontinent. Before continuing to pour very large resources into a subcontinent that makes development difficult for itself by its actions, we would want some assurance both on the political side and on economic measures for self-help. We have had difficulty explaining to Congress why we were pouring our diminishing surplus stocks into an India that isn't moving toward self-sufficiency. To continue to do so may be doing them a disservice. Pakistan has done better on this score but we still face the problem of whether it is prudent and wise to provide resources to two nations which are more obsessed with each other than with their own development. These are the questions which need answering.

The difference, as Mr. Ball saw it, between the U.S. and the U.K. approach is one of timing - how soon we should move and what should be the understandings connected with these moves. Mr. Ball noted that the U.S. is expecting Shastri and Ayub over. He anticipates that the visits would take place before February. We are very much looking forward to having frank talks. Out of these we will have a clearer view of what we can expect of each other. We are not keen on rushing back and putting resources into an area where we don't know what is going to happen. The Acting Secretary expressed the hope that the U.S. and the U.K. could have sufficient agreement on requirements to move together. In the

light of this,

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light of this, resumption of sales of military equipment by the U.K., particularly components for the Gnats, frankly concerns us and it will intensify Pakistan anxieties. Therefore, it seems desirable to reach some common conclusions on timing.

Mr. Pickard noted that the U.K. had never stopped sales and the Paks have been pressing to keep the sales channel open. Thus the question for the U.K. is not one of what to resume but of what to stop. He indicated that the amount of sales involved in the applications since September 6 are about £5-6 million. The U.K. has no specific figures for what is involved prior to this period because its present licensing policy was introduced only on September 15 in response to the Indonesian situation. A great deal of the U.K. supplies moved forward as unlicensed because they are involved in joint projects such as the Leander frigates, tank production and aircraft. Altogether these joint industrial projects are worth hundreds of millions of pounds and if Britain were to fail to keep them going it could wreck the industrial productive capacity of India. He noted that it had been hard to get the full story on the extent and flow of USSR aid. The U.K. had had some reports indicating that the Russians had stopped their flow of arms during the fighting and it remained to be seen whether they would go beyond existing commitments.

Under Secretary Mann commented that our basic quandary was about the wisdom of large-scale aid in what may be a lull between two wars. Mr. Pickard responded that we would be examining later in detail the situation that existed in India and Pakistan but what it all added up to was: in Pakistan Ayub has created a problem with his own public; in India we have a different India to deal with. It is nationalistic and unprepared to contemplate anything but toughness on the international scene. As Mr. Pickard saw it, the real problem is what options are open to us. The U.K. reading was a gloomy one. The Paks might be irrational and move toward China. India may willingly embrace economic stagnation. He said it is like a poker game. The frightening thing is that both countries may take action to plunge the subcontinent into chaos. Once that happens, we can't retrieve the situation.

Mr. Ball agreed that we wished to avoid such a prospect but the question is one of timing as to when it is in our best interests to move.

Mr. Bell noted that there was a major difference with respect to the effectiveness of economic aid to the two countries. Pakistan was doing better than India. As a minimum, discussions between us and India and Pakistan must be resumed at the point of supporting the Bank's efforts to improve economic performance.

Mr. Pickard agreed that this was understood in the U.K. Economic conditions are possible but not political conditions which are much more difficult. Mr. Bell queried in what category Mr. Pickard would put the requirement to

limit the

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limit the size of the defense budget. Mr. Pickard thought this fell on the side of an economic requirement. Mr. Bell said the heart of the matter was the legitimate question of how we can be assured that resources will contribute to peaceful development of the subcontinent. Such assurances envisage progress toward a peaceful resolution of differences but it is recognized that results cannot be expected in a hurry. He thought this was on the agenda before resumption of aid. In the meantime, food is continuing. He queried how the U.K. regards the question of a political framework.

Mr. Pickard's answer was that the U.K. faced commitments which were different from those of the U.S. There is a matter of degree; U.K. aid is dispensable. Therefore, the U.K. does not have the same leverage. He believed that the U.K. performs a function in keeping things ticking over. If the delay on our part extended too long, things on the subcontinent might otherwise split at the seams. This approach, of course, did not apply to military aid which the U.K. continues to suspend. However, the U.K. does not consider that the resumption of their sales will adversely affect Pakistan. Indeed the Pakistanis have accepted the U.K. position and have urged them to keep the sales channel open rather than the other way around. What the Paks want is for the U.S. to come along; they know the U.K. policy won't help or hurt the Paks very much. At the same time, the U.K. feels it cannot overlook the Chinese problem that India faces and does not want to cripple Indian production. The main reason the U.K. wishes to go forward with this sales policy, particularly components for the Gnat production, is that to halt such sales would have a catastrophic effect on British interests in India. Ambassador Hare commented that to the extent that India gets the better end of this policy, things are made very difficult for the U.S. Yet from our point of view, unless there is some form of political improvement, aid resources go down a rat hole. This is not a political condition but a recognition of political fact. Mr. Pickard acknowledged this but said the problem is that one wants to see political settlement but one doesn't want to drive the two countries to extremes in pressing for it.

Mr. Komer thought the U.K. approach emphasized the risks, whereas the U.S. looks more at the opportunities in the present situation. He noted it is hard to make a case that our past policy has been successful, and we may now have an opportunity to settle several things, namely: 1) re-ordering our strategic priorities; 2) getting Kashmir on the back burner; 3) getting the Paks to pull back from the Chicom drift; and 4) getting the Indians to use their external assistance more wisely. To the extent that the U.S. and the U.K. assume different policies, we weaken the impact. He queried whether the problem wasn't one of taking certain tactical losses in the interests of a larger pay-off in protecting our over-all investment. Mr. Pickard responded that there is no difference between the U.S. and U.K. on objectives. However, the U.K. feels that its actions are less a factor because U.K. policy does not give it the same opportunity as the U.S. He did not argue that the U.K. is

concerned

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concerned with profits. Rather, the U.K. considers that leverage cannot be exercised except in a reasonable political climate; otherwise, pulling the lever may only break the lever. The U.K.'s concern, therefore, is to create a situation where leverage will work. In this circumstance, different policies may be advisable.

Mr. Bell wondered whether the U.K. approach wouldn't have just the reverse effect of what we both sought. Mr. Pickard replied that we were dealing with people who react impulsively and illogically. In Pakistan, in particular, the regime is aware of its dilemma but has created a situation in which Ayub may not be able to take the country with him. Therefore, if the U.S. were, for example, to insist on a political requirement such as public renunciation of the Chicom tie, this would not be possible for Ayub to accept. Mr. Belcher added that strings on aid is a highly emotional issue. If the U.K. were to try to do so there would be an outburst against the U.K. What we face is a difficult problem in that while future prospects of significant aid are dim under conditions prevailing in the subcontinent, strings attached to specific amounts of aid are dangerous. He saw it difficult to use aid as an instrument of diplomacy.

In reply Mr. Ball stated that the U.S. is not proposing to link specific amounts of aid to specific requirements, but the President worries about how long we are going to be taken for granted. In particular, we wonder whether these two countries are taking the economic measures needed to turn our aid to good account and not to allow it to become a crutch. Secondly, we want to know what their intentions are about resolving their differences so that fighting is not resumed. Thus, we have to be satisfied that our aid is doing some good. What we are looking for in the visits is the kind of conversations that makes it clear that we are anxious to help but not in a way to do them a disservice.

Sir Patrick Dean queried the UN situation. Mr. Sisco responded that the picture was not encouraging. The Indians opposed the Brazilian General suggested by the Secretary General to negotiate the withdrawals, but they have left an opening for another General (other than General Nimmo). U Thant is looking for one who can carry out the assignment. There was nothing new on political negotiations. Mr. Mann queried whether there had been any discussion of what could be the basis for a possible political settlement or for a deep freeze. To this Mr. Pickard replied that we had had such discussions in 1963 but now the Indian position is more rigid and the Pakistani public opinion more aroused. He saw little hope for any such discussions in the short term and only a glimmer after the 1967 elections in India.

Mr. Ball closed the meeting, noting that our purpose was to convey the general atmosphere as a preliminary to detailed discussions. He hoped that no action would be taken which would exacerbate the anxieties or support the smugness of either party.

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Authority FRUS, Vol. XXIV, #488
By NARA, Date 5/19/05

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MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT

I AM NOW BACK IN LONDON AFTER A WEEK IN RHODESIA AND I SHALL BE MAKING A STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT THIS AFTERNOON. I HAVE ASKED OUR AMBASSADOR TO LET YOU HAVE THE FULL NEXT OF THE STATEMENT WHICH SETS OUT PRETTY FULLY THE POSITION WE HAVE NOW REACHED.

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MONDAY

IT WAS AN EXHAUSTING AND IN MANY WAYS A DEPRESSING WEEK, DEPRESSING BECAUSE SO MANY PEOPLE HAVE THEIR MINDS IN BLINDERS AND THEY ARE WRAPPED UP IN COCOONS OF SELF-DELUSION WHICH IT IS TERRIBLE DIFFICULT TO PENETRATE. TO BE IN SALISBURY WAS TO HAVE THE SENSATION OF BEING PRESENT AT THE FIFTH ACT OF A GREEK TRAGEDY. I TRIED EVERY METHOD TO PERSUADE THE AFRICAN NATIONALISTS BOTH TO WORK TOGETHER AND TO WORK THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION: BUT TO NO EFFECT. MODERATE EUROPEAN OPINION, REPRESENTED BY BUSINESS AND FINANCE, IS PARALYSED BY A SENSE OF HELPLESSNESS BEFORE IMPENDING DOOM AND, WHAT IS WORSE, SUBJECT TO THE PERSONAL INTIMIDATION WHICH SAPS THEIR WILL. SMITH HAS QUITE A NICE LITTLE POLICE STATE IN EMBRYO THERE. THE GOVERNMENT HAVE CONTROL OF TELEVISION AND RADIO, ALTHOUGH THE PRESS IS STILL FREE. MOST OF SMITHS CABINET ARE IMPERVIOUS TO ARGUMENT AND DIVIDED ONLY ON WHETHER THEY SHOULD COMMIT SUICIDE NOW OR LATER

SUBJECT TO THE PERSONAL?

Prime Minister #488 11/1/65

ONE THING IS CERTAIN AND THAT IS IF I HAD NOT OFFERED ON THURSDAY, OCTOBER 21 TO GO TO RHODESIA, U.D.I. WOULD HAVE BEEN WITH US ON FRIDAY, OCTOBER 22. BUT I FEAR THAT THE MOST I MAY HAVE ACHIEVED IS THE RESPITE OF A LITTLE MORE TIME BEFORE SMITH AND HIS CABINET GO OVER THE BRINK. BUT TIME IS THE MOST PRECIOUS COMMODITY OF ALL IN THIS PROBLEM.

PRESERVATION COPY

MY CHIEF PURPOSE WAS THEREFORE NOT TO NEGOTIATE, ALTHOUGH I HAD MANY HOURS OF TOUGH DISCUSSIONS WITH SMITH AND HIS COLLEAGUES, BUT TO SEE WHETHER, AS A LAST HOPE, THERE WAS ANY CHANCE OF CHANGING THE POLITICAL CLIMATE AND FINDING SOME LAST MINUTE FORMULA WHICH WOULD GIVE SMITH PAUSE AND GIVE THE MODERATES OF ALL RACES SOMETHING TO SUPPORT. HENCE MY TALKS WITH EVERY CONCEIVABLE REPRESENTATIVE BODY TO WHOM I GAVE THE CARROT AND STICK TREATMENT; I HAD TO GET HOME TO THEM BOTH THE TRAGIC CONSEQUENCES OF U.D.I. AND THE FACT THAT NO ONE WAS FACED WITH A SIMPLE CHOICE OF U.D.I. OR MAJORITY RULE TOMORROW: THERE WERE MANY ALTERNATIVES. HENCE THE PROPOSAL FOR A ROYAL COMMISSION, WHICH GIVES THEM A WAY OUT IF THEY HAVE THE WILL TO TAKE IT.

QUITE FRANKLY, THERE ARE SO MANY GADARERE MINDS IN RHODESIA,.....
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AND THAT GOES FOR MOST OF SMITHS CABINET, IF NOT TOTALLY FOR SMITH HIMSELF, THAT I DOUBT WHETHER GOOD SENSE HAS MUCH CHANCE OF PREVAILING. SO WHILE I AM HOPING FOR THE BEST IT IS ONLY SENSIBLE TO PREPARE FOR THE WORST. THE WORST MAY COME QUITE QUICKLY BUT WE ARE QUITE READY FOR IT.

NOVEMBER 1, 1965

(Drafting Office and Officer)

11/22/65

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

McGEORGE CONNORS

1-Komer
2-Pet.

White House

DATE: November 16, 1965
TIME: 4:45 p.m.
PLACE: Ambassador Hare's Office

COPY FILED-PBR

31 / 1965 DEC 1 11 AM 11-19-65

SUBJECT: U.S./U.K. Talks on India and Pakistan

- PARTICIPANTS:**
- U.S. - Ambassador Hare (NEA)
 - Mr. Handley (NEA)
 - Miss Laise (SOA)
 - Mr. Hoopes (DOD/OASD/ISA/NESA/MPR)
 - Mr. Farr (AID/AA/NESA)
 - Mr. Meyers (G/PM)
 - Mr. Buffum (IO/UNP)
 - U.K. - Mr. Cyril Pickard, Superintending Under Secretary for Asia and Atlantic Division, CRO
 - Mr. Ronald H. Belcher, Under Secretary for Asia Division of Ministry of Overseas Development
 - Mr. Brian Gilmore, U.K. Embassy

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INDIA

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the U.K.

Mr. Pickard thought the agenda for the continuing talks might be the paper which had resulted from the U.K. policy review. In addition, he wanted to talk more about military sales and the time frame of U.S. thinking. Mr. Pickard then began a review of the U.K. situation as regards its military and economic policies. He felt there was some misunderstanding of our differing circumstances. In the economic field, present U.K. commitments and its constitutional processes, required certain steps for the U.K. but the U.K. may end up in step with the U.S. and facing the same sort of dilemma by the year's end. In the military field, Mr. Pickard pointed out we are in a different situation altogether. He then reviewed the history. In 1947 the Indian Army was U.K.-equipped. At partition the balance was three to one between India and Pakistan. Since that time the U.K. has sold equipment to both sides. The situation changed in 1954-55 when Pakistan went over to the U.S. Only minor stuff is purchased by the Paks from the U.K., but the U.K. has developed a quite substantial relationship with India industrially with such joint projects as producing tanks, frigates and transports. One problem is, when do industrial supplies become armament? Until September 15, practically none of this was licensed. Licensing was introduced in relation to Indonesia. At the time of fighting, the U.K. examined its commercial shipments and held things up largely because of the contraband snafu. After the fighting stopped, they then faced a dilemma of whether to stop military sales as a policy. To do so after the fighting had stopped when they had not done so during the fighting would be interpreted by India, in particular, as a deliberate political act. Nevertheless,

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the U.K. has decided to stop certain things from going to India or Pakistan -- weapons, ammunition, armored vehicles, combat aircraft and spares -- and will so inform the two countries no matter what the contractual situation is. Pakistan has protested any break in commercial supplies and the U.K. does not expect any reaction when shipments are resumed to India. Since September 6, India has asked for aircraft spares but the U.K. will not license new shipments except for transport. This will be reviewed when paragraph 1 of the Security Council resolution is complied with. The same position applies to munitions and tank spares, both of which the Indians want. The U.K. is also holding out on any promises regarding the tanks and Hunters ordered by the Indians prior to September 6, although they have not revoked the licenses. The decision on this will relate to compliance with the Security Council resolution and will be made nearer the time for the actual shipments to take place.

The Gnats represent a special problem. The U.K. holds the last key in the form of a number of components; denial of this would bring an outcry and the political cost to the U.K. in India would be great. The U.K. dilemma is that to help India on this project is illogical, but to deny them help will have such political effects as to give the U.K. pause. The U.K. is interested in what the U.S. is going to do with the Paks. If the U.S. position is rigid, the Pak Air Force will be grounded and this will put terrific pressure on Ayub. If the U.S. is considering flexibility to avoid collision in Pakistan, then the U.K. would be interested in knowing about it. Mr. Pickard thought that Pakistan is working toward a crisis over military supplies. The present consultations in Pakistan are creating pressures that may not wait until Ayub gets here. The U.K., therefore, wants to be assured of what the U.S. position is going to be.

Ambassador Hare stated that the U.S. has not changed its policy. As we see it the U.K. proposed action will create problems for the U.S. and we wonder if it will not, in fact, create problems for the U.K. Mr. Pickard responded that the same policy applied to both countries even though the effect might be different. He doubted that Pakistan would make an issue since they don't want stoppage of commercial sales. Ambassador Hare queried whether the Paks didn't realize that their precarious situation would be made more so by the U.K. action. Mr. Pickard thought the question to be one of the time frame. If the U.S. doesn't resume support in six months, Pakistan will have gone to China. The U.K. action on the Gnats will not affect this decision within such a short time frame. What is driving the Paks up the wall is not what the U.K. is doing with India, but what the U.S. is doing to Pakistan.

Mr. Hare pressed Mr. Pickard on why the U.K. has to make this decision within the next few months. Mr. Pickard stated, for one thing, the steam is up in India; the Gnat assistance is aimed at the Chinese threat. Secondly, the U.K. is concerned with the balance between the military and political

situation.

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situation. U.S. suspension of military supplies won the war for India and improved the U.S. position in India. If the U.K. were to follow the same policy, however, it would have the opposite political effect in India. Thirdly, it matters a great deal to the U.K. not to be regarded as an unreliable source of supply. Mr. Pickard stressed that the U.K. is not prepared to follow this politically unpopular policy. It is only consulting the U.S. on the question of the Gnats. Mr. Pickard again stated that the U.K. understands the U.S. in not resuming military aid but thinks we must relax on sales because (a) pressure on Ayub will reduce the possibility of successful talks and (b) the present situation will lead to increasing apprehension over Indian aggression.

Ambassador Hare came back to the position that it is hard to escape the fact that the U.K. action does not parallel that of the U.S. and could have a serious effect on what the U.S. is trying to do. The U.K. posture is business, part way as usual, and the U.S. posture is more firm in the hope of achieving a new start. Again Mr. Pickard reminded the group that the U.K. is not embarking on a new policy. Ambassador Hare noted that the present U.S. policy is creating an imbalance. We are supplying food to India, which is what they most need. We have not continued support to Pakistan in what they most need. The U.K. policy will not help. He queried how it would bring India around and what would be the effect on the Paks? Mr. Pickard stated that if the U.K. interfered with Gnat production by withholding components, this will further reduce U.K. influence in India. The effect of providing components will be nil on Indian power in the near future. The effect on its total power even in the long run is marginal. Thus, the military significance of going ahead on the Gnats is small but the political significance of failing to go ahead is great. With regard to Pakistan they have not objected, and the proposed U.K. policy will not affect Pakistan's attitude toward the U.K. The U.S. is going to face a critical point long before January.

Mr. Hoopes asked what would be the effect of the U.K. decisions on India within the next 60 days? Are we clear that only the Gnat components are the lethal weapons? Mr. Pickard responded that it depends on how you define "lethal" weapons. The U.K. is not supplying things which are militarily significant. The U.K. did not issue new licenses for such equipment after September 6 but at the same time it did not revoke the old ones. Hunters are not due for delivery until March and the decision about delivery will have to be made some time before then. Gnat components are compressors, etc. The Indians are already sufficiently doubtful of U.K. intentions that the U.K. High Commission in Delhi has reported the Indians are setting about making their own components. Regarding the effect of the U.K. decisions, Mr. Pickard thought the withholding of lethal stuff will adversely affect the Indians. He admitted there was much illogicality in what the U.K. was proposing to do about the Gnats but it was the U.K. way of trying to steer a path through the military and political facts of life. All the decisions have been taken except

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that on the Gnats. The pros and cons on this issue were so evenly balanced that the Cabinet Ministers sought a reading of U.S. policy.

Mr. Hoopes remarked that all the U.S. would want is postponement. In reply Mr. Pickard stated that the U.K. does not want to undermine the U.S. efforts but as the U.K. sees it, a decision to go ahead with the Gnats will not have an adverse effect in Pakistan, but to hold up the Gnat components would have a major effect in India. The Indians are agitating at this moment for a statement of U.K. policy; debate is going on in the Cabinet and pressures are rising. Mr. Pickard would predict that a major political row between the U.K. and the Indians would not forward U.S. objectives and could not make U.S. conversations easier. Indeed, it might make them harder because it would add to the general Indian bitterness with the West. Ambassador Hare re-emphasized that the lack of parallelism causes us problems. Mr. Pickard stated he would report U.S. views faithfully at once. What bothers the U.K. is that the current Lok Sabha debate may lead to action supporting India's leaving the Commonwealth. They want to clarify their position with the Indians without delay.

In response to a question as to how essential it was to spell out their policy on Gnats to the Indians at this time, Mr. Pickard said that when they communicated their policy to the Indians the first question would be to know its effect on the Gnat production. At present Gnat production is three to five per month. Additional components would only enable them to maintain this rate of production. The alternative would be a decline in the rate of production until the Indians learn to make their own components. Again, Mr. Pickard stressed that the sin from the Pakistani point of view is not what the Indians purchase from the U.K. but that its ally, the U.S., is not enabling it to acquire spares.

Mr. Pickard said the U.K. was most concerned about how the U.S. assesses what is going on in both countries, but particularly in Pakistan and how we see all the contingencies. Miss Laise responded that our assessment is that the situation will hold until the visits, so long as it is credible that the visits will take place. Mr. Pickard thought this was possible in the case of India but thinks things have reached a critical state in Pakistan. He did not know what is going on in the discussions now taking place in Rawalpindi. He thought that Ayub's people may demand a great deal of him as the price of any visit to the United States, particularly military assistance and guarantees.

In closing Mr. Belcher emphasized that in the period until the visits it is desirable to avoid decisions that would upset the present delicate situation and Mr. Pickard agreed that both of us should avoid making any difficulties prior to the meetings. However, he stated it is clear the U.S. and the U.K. differ in their assessment on the likely effect of a do-nothing policy.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

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OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE

26 OCT 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert Komer
Deputy Special Assistant to
the President for National
Security Affairs
The White House

SUBJECT : UK Defense Review--Problems
and Prospects

1. The British Labor Government is currently engaged in a reappraisal of the military posture it will assume during the next five years. Thus far no clear-cut policy shifts have emerged. Attempts to balance military commitments against plans to reduce military expenditures have resulted only in clarifying Britain's basic need either to choose between its Commonwealth and its European commitments or to reduce expenditures on both to such an extent that neither will be adequately fulfilled.

2. The attached Intelligence Brief discusses the problems facing the British and the prospects for the current defense review. I believe you will find it of interest.

Ray S. Cline

RAY S. CLINE
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachment
CIA/RR CB 65-64

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By isl, NARA, Date 3-28-07

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CIA/RR CB 65-64
October 1965

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INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

UK DEFENSE REVIEW: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Office of Research and Reports

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OCT 27 1965

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Authority RAC-NLJ-032-053-3-2

By cbm NARA, Date 8-16-06

WARNING

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~UK DEFENSE REVIEW: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

The British Labor Government -- hard pressed to maintain its overseas military commitments in the face of domestic and international economic pressures -- is currently engaged in a careful reappraisal of the military posture it will assume during the next five years. Attempts thus far to balance its military commitments against its plan to reduce military expenditures have resulted only in clarifying Britain's basic need either to choose between its Commonwealth and its European commitments or to reduce expenditures on both to such an extent that neither will be adequately fulfilled.

At the present time, no clear-cut policy shifts have emerged from the defense review. Some savings have been announced, resulting from specific decisions on procurement of equipment, but these savings alone will not meet the economy goals set by the government. On the larger issue of whether to devote its resources to Europe or to the Commonwealth -- in effect, Southeast Asia -- it still appears that the United Kingdom will make every possible effort to avoid the appearance that a specific decision has been made. Troop reductions will probably occur, both in the Army of the Rhine (BAOR) and in the Far East, and some BAOR units may be earmarked as reserves for contingencies in Southeast Asia, but Britain will probably maintain its military presence, however diminished, in both areas.

In negotiations with its allies and Commonwealth partners on defense matters, Britain can be expected to emphasize expanded financial offset agreements* and increased cost-sharing in order to keep troop reductions to a minimum. Cutbacks in British force levels in the Far East may also be accompanied by planned redeployment to new facilities in Australia and the Indian Ocean for which the United States, Australia, and New Zealand will be urged to provide much of the required investment.

1. Goals of the Defense Review

The British Labor Party, shortly after taking office in October 1964, began a review of the nation's military policy and posture. The wide

* Offset agreements are arrangements to alleviate UK foreign exchange losses that result from deployment of UK forces in foreign countries. The offsets are achieved primarily by purchases of UK military equipment by the country in which UK forces are stationed.

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scope of UK military commitments, the chronic balance-of-payments deficit, and the mushrooming costs of modern weapons systems were the principal factors lending impetus to the review. The primary objective of the review is to reduce estimated military expenditures to approximately the current level of £ 2 billion during the next few years. The Conservative Government had projected a defense budget for fiscal year (FY) 1969/70 of about £ 2.4 billion. This estimate was arrived at by projecting defense expenditures along lines of present military programs and force levels. The Labor Government, however, hopes to hold defense expenditures at the current level of about £ 2 billion through FY 1969/70. To maintain this level of defense expenditures, the original estimate of the Conservative Government for FY 1969/70 will have to be reduced by about £ 400 million. This cut in turn will necessitate reducing military programs and forces to below their present levels. 1/

The military review is not yet completed, and the results are not due to be made known until some time after the end of the current calendar year. Major decisions pertaining to such problem areas as Singapore and Aden will then have to be discussed with allies of the United Kingdom. Some decisions, however, have already been made and are being implemented. These decisions pertain mostly to purchases of equipment and to certain development programs -- areas where immediate savings could be realized. The TSR-2 aircraft development program has been canceled and the United Kingdom is considering the F-111A, the Buccaneer, and the Mirage IV as possible replacements. An option has been taken on the F-111A, but so far the option has not been exercised. The Labor Government also canceled the fifth Polaris submarine of the five scheduled to be produced.

The Labor Government estimates that decisions taken so far will result in annual savings of about £220 million -- slightly more than half of the targeted annual savings of £400 million. Most of the savings

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already achieved relate to purchases of equipment, development programs, and cost effectiveness applications. The remaining reduction must come mainly from troop reductions and redeployment of forces, based on a reevaluation of overseas military commitments. ^{3/} Such action would have long-term consequences and would necessitate painful decisions by the end of 1965. The decisions on reduction and redeployment will be strongly influenced by the success of other efforts to reduce the serious balance-of-payments deficit and by the possible consequences of the recent separation of Singapore from the Malaysian Federation.

2. Overseas Military Commitments

The British commitment to maintain military forces in the area east of Suez includes the bases at Aden, Hong Kong, and Singapore as well as troops stationed throughout Malaysia to ward off the infiltration of Indonesian terrorists into that country. Also included is the Royal Air Force staging base at Gan. The total annual cost of maintaining these bases is approximately £ 300 million, and the foreign exchange loss resulting from these expenditures is about £ 100 million. ^{4/} The United Kingdom also has military commitments in Europe and in Commonwealth countries in Africa and South America and bases in Libya, Cyprus, and Malta. The British forces in Germany consist of about 62,000 men. Commonwealth commitments to former colonies in Africa provide for military assistance in maintaining or restoring order and in defending the young republics whenever this assistance is requested. British presence in the general area of the Indian Ocean is necessary if commitments to Africa and Southern Asia are to be honored. The following tabulation shows the worldwide disposition of UK troops ^{5/}:

<u>Area</u>	<u>Number of Personnel</u>
Germany	62,000
Mediterranean	23,000
East of Suez	88,000 ^{a/}
Of which:	
Malaysia	50,000
United Kingdom	241,000
Other	9,000
Total	<u>423,000</u>

a. Excluding 14,000 Gurkhas.

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The political situation in the area east of Suez is unstable, particularly in Malaysia and Aden. The recent withdrawal of Singapore from the Malaysian Federation creates a problem for the United Kingdom which could have serious consequences relative to maintaining the British military base in Singapore. Business interests in Singapore, largely Chinese, are pressing the government to reestablish trade relations with Indonesia. Indonesia is willing to reopen such ties with Singapore, provided the British military base there is closed down and the British pull out. Although the present government of Singapore has not been willing to agree to such terms, the pressure from the Chinese merchants will probably continue to mount. Furthermore, an increase in confrontation activities is expected from the Indonesians,* and additional fragmentation of the Malaysian Federation is possible. 6/ Before the separation of Singapore from Malaysia, the British had considered giving up the base at Singapore over a period of 10 to 15 years. The present situation in Malaysia could speed up the evacuation timetable considerably and may make the UK base untenable beyond 1970.

The military base at Aden is the other large British facility east of Suez, and the only remaining major base between Gibraltar and Singapore. The British would like to remain in Aden and retain it as one of the chain of bases running from the Persian Gulf, across the Indian Ocean, to Australia. The political situation in Aden is tenuous, however, and it is impossible at this time to judge the outcome of the problem that the British face there.

Should it be necessary to evacuate the bases at either Singapore or Aden, or both, the most likely alternative would be the establishment of island bases in the Indian Ocean and possibly a base in the northwest portion of Australia. Plans for joint US-UK development of bases in the Indian Ocean -- for limited purposes at first -- are under study, and negotiations for the purchase of island real estate are being carried on with the local governments concerned. Although the cost of developing the island bases in the Indian Ocean would be substantial, provisions of the current studies call for most of the financing of the project to be borne by the United States. The British hope that a base established

* This British expectation was reported before the attempted coup in Indonesia. The effect that the attempted coup will have on Indonesian-Malaysian relations is uncertain at this time. It is unlikely, however, that anti-Malaysian feeling -- compounded by the UK presence in Mal Malaysia -- will vanish completely, regardless of the outcome of the internal conflict in Indonesia.

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in the northwestern part of Australia would be jointly financed with the Australians. The great advantage for the United Kingdom in such a joint project would be the obvious precedent that would be established for sharing the costs of military bases in the area east of Suez. Such assistance from the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, and perhaps from other allied countries, would go a long way in relieving the strain generated by British commitments in the area east of Suez.

3. Foreign Exchange Losses and Overseas Military Operations

The deficit in the British balance of payments in 1964 was about £750 million. 7/ Slightly less than half of this deficit, about £300 million, resulted from overseas military operations. 8/ The Labor Government is committed to reducing the balance-of-payments deficit and has taken steps to restrict the growth of domestic demands for imports, improve the balance of trade, and cut the net capital outflow, all of which are designed to reduce the deficit resulting from non-military transactions. Reducing the deficit caused by overseas military operations is the problem that must be faced by the military reviewers. The government has had limited success in obtaining offset agreements with certain countries, particularly Germany, on whose territory British forces are stationed, but even with these agreements the large deficit continues. The foreign exchange loss to the United Kingdom in West Germany alone is about £85 million, despite the existence of an offset agreement with the West Germans. 9/ It thus appears that the only other way to reduce foreign exchange costs resulting from overseas military commitments is to reduce the level of commitment and to lower the number of personnel in the armed services who are stationed overseas. Moving troops from overseas bases to the United Kingdom, however, would result in major increases in military expenditures for barracks, married quarters, and support facilities at home. While reducing foreign exchange costs, such an action would increase the strain on the national resources of the United Kingdom. The Secretary of State for Defense, Denis Healy, argues that reduction of the number of troops overseas should be accompanied by dismissal of those troops from the service and reducing the size of the armed forces. 10/

It is probable that the British Government will decide to reduce the level of forces that support its overseas commitments. At the same time, a greater effort will be made to solicit assistance from allied countries in sharing the burden of maintaining bases in Europe and the Far East. In addition, the British probably will try to expand

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the offset agreements which they now have with certain countries, although little success can be expected from this particular effort. Sizable troop reductions probably will be made eventually in West Germany, although some forces will remain there as a reserve for operations in other parts of the world. Some cutback in force levels also may occur in the Far East. A redeployment of reduced numbers of troops to joint US-UK facilities in the Indian Ocean is likely, and joint financing of future operations east of Suez with its allies will be urged by the United Kingdom.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~Sources:

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2. Defense. 5 836 0829 65, 29 Jul 65. U.
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7. Economic Trends, No. 137, Mar 65. U.
8. State, London. Airgram A-433, 17 Aug 65. U.
9. New York Times, 5 Aug 65, p. 1. U.
10. State, London. Airgram A-385, 12 Aug 65. U.

Analyst:Coord:~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

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PERSONAL FOR MCGEORGE BUNDY FROM WRIGHT

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT FROM PRIME MINISTER WHICH WILL BE COMING TO YOU VIA THE EMBASSY

MESSAGE BEGINS

I WAS MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE MESSAGE WHICH SECRETARY RUSK SENT TO ME WITH YOUR AUTHORITY FOR DELIVERY TO MR SMITH IF I THOUGHT IT HELPFUL.

2. AFTER THREE DAYS OF INTENSIVE DISCUSSION HERE, WITH THE GOVERNMENT, WITH THE AFRICAN NATIONALIST LEADERS, NKOMO AND SITHOLE, AND WITH EVERY REPRESENTATIVE BODY OF OPINION INCLUDING THE CHURCHES, BUSINESS, THE FINANCIAL COMMUNITY AND THE DEFEATED OPPOSITION, NOT TO MENTION EX-PRIME MINISTERS OF RHODESIA, I HAVE COME TO THE RELUCTANT CONCLUSION THAT A MESSAGE FROM YOU DELIVERED THROUGH ME WOULD NOT HAVE THE NECESSARY IMPACT.

3. THE SITUATION IS BLEAK. ALTHOUGH I HAVE TRIED EVERY METHOD OF PERSUASION THE AFRICAN NATIONALISTS ARE PREPARED NEITHER TO WORK TOGETHER NOR TO MAKE ANY MOVE FROM THEIR EXTREME POSITION TO ANY EXTENT NECESSARY TO WIN EVEN A BREATHING SPACE. THE GOVERNMENT ARE IMPERVIOUS TO ARGUMENT AND ARE COLLECTIVELY LIKE A SUICIDE ON A WINDOWSILL WAITING TO JUMP. MODERATE EUROPEAN OPINION IS PARALYSED BY A SENSE OF HELPLESSNESS BEFORE IMPENDING DOOM, AND SUBJECT TO PERSONAL INTIMIDATION WHICH SAPS THEIR WILL TO OPPOSE. THE GOVERNMENT IS MANIPULATING THE ORGANS OF PUBLICITY SUCH AS RADIO AND TELEVISION ALTHOUGH THE PRESS IS STILL FREE.

4. ALTHOUGH I HAVE THE SENSATION OF WITNESSING THE FINAL ACT OF A GREEK TRAGEDY. THERE IS JUST THE SLIGHTEST CHANCE THAT CATASTROPHE MAY BE AVOIDED. I HAVE TODAY PULLED OUT ALL THE STOPS IN WORKING ON SMITH AND HAVE PUT TO HIM A REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE TO A U.D.I. WHICH NO RATIONAL MAN COULD REFUSE, NAMELY A ROYAL COMMISSION. THE TERMS OF REFERENCE WOULD BE TO SEEK THE HIGHEST COMMON FACTOR OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN ALL SHADES OF OPINION IN RHODESIA ON THE TERMS FOR INDEPENDENCE. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, A MESSAGE DIRECT FROM YOU TO MR. SMITH DELIVERED THROUGH YOUR CONSUL GENERAL HERE IN SALISBURY WOULD BE OF INFINITELY GREATER VALUE THAN A MESSAGE DELIVERED THROUGH ME. TO MAKE ITS MAXIMUM IMPACT IT SHOULD PREFERABLY BE DELIVERED BY 9.00 A.M. SALISBURY TIME, TOMORROW FRIDAY. SINCE I HAVE FOUND SOME DOUBT HERE IN SALISBURY NOT ONLY IN GOVERNMENT CIRCLES, BUT ALSO MORE GENERALLY, ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES TO A U.D.I., I HOPE THAT YOUR MESSAGE MIGHT STATE YOUR POSITION IN UNEQUIVOCAL TERMS. EVEN THIS MAY NOT DO THE TRICK: BUT WHEN I THINK OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO DETER THIS SUICIDAL GOVERNMENT, I BELIEVE THAT NO MEANS OF PRESSURE SHOULD BE NEGLECTED.

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Authority FRUS, Vol. 14, #485
By ky NARA, Date F-29-05

EUR/BNA-TMJudd/rdk
(Drafting Office and Officer)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Approved in U 10/21/65

Memorandum of Conversation

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1- Komer
2-Ret.

Part 3 of 3

1965 OCT 26 PM 5 44
DATE: October 15, 1965
Time: 11:30 a.m.
Place: The Under Secretary's office

SUBJECT: Southern Rhodesia

PARTICIPANTS: The Under Secretary
Jacob Myerson, Special Assistant, U
Thomas M. Judd, EUR/BNA

Duncan Sandys, Member of Parliament

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Mr. Sandys raised the question of Southern Rhodesia and said he assumed the U.S. would not support the use of force. The Under Secretary replied that we would not. There might be a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly for some type of UN force.

Mr. Sandys said that such a force would get a bloody nose. Mr. Ball agreed that force was not the answer. Mr. Sandys said he was not absolutely sure Smith would go for UDI. He really already had what he wanted.

The Under Secretary said that if a Commonwealth Mission were organized, it could play a useful role. Mr. Sandys said he did not think Smith would receive such a mission. However, Smith seemed to be worried.

The Under Secretary indicated the strong political support the US was giving HMG on the Rhodesian problem. We had made a strong demarche to Smith in London and Ambassador Goldberg had made a vigorous statement in New York.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By sp/tem, NARA, Date 8-16-06

OCT 27 1965

White House

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(Drafting Office and Officer)

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2-Rit

Approved by S 10/28/65 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

Part 3 of 6

DATE: October 11, 1965
TIME: 1:00 p.m.
PLACE: The Secretary's Dining Room

SUBJECT: India/Pakistan

UK

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Under Secretary Ball
Mr. McGeorge Bundy, White House
Assistant Secretary Leddy
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
Deputy Assistant Secretary Stoessel
J. Harold Shullaw, Director, BNA

U.K.
Michael Stewart, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador
Sir Paul Gore-Booth, Permanent Under-Secretary of State
Lord Chalfont, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
The Viscount Hood, Deputy Under-Secretary of State
Denis A. Greenhill, Assistant Under-Secretary of State
Michael N.F. Stewart, Minister, British Embassy

COPIES TO: (See page 2)

The Secretary emphasized the strength of feeling in the country as a whole on the question of aid to the sub-continent in the light of the India/Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. He noted that last year approximately one-third of our total aid had gone to the sub-continent, approximately \$1 billion. The Foreign Secretary indicated some concern at the political consequences if the US delays the resumption of economic aid to India and Pakistan. The Secretary mentioned that food shipments in the pipeline were not being interrupted but that we needed something to justify resumption of economic aid. He expressed the view that it would be necessary for President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri to have frank talks with President Johnson as a necessary precedent to consideration of resumed aid. He noted that if it were awkward for these two leaders to come to Washington for this purpose they could find an occasion to go to the UN and then make a side trip to Washington. Mr. Bundy remarked that President Ayub had been using the excuse that he could not come to the US unless he went to London and the UK was opposed to his carrying out his previous plans for a state visit at this time. Sir Paul Gore-Booth said he thought the UK could help on this since there was no reason why Ayub could not visit London for a few days even though it was obvious a state visit in present circumstances is not possible. Another point raised was the question of whether or not it would be safe for Ayub to leave Rawalpindi in view of the threat to his position from his opponents.

The Secretary said that he did not believe the Indians were really convinced of their argument that self-determination in Kashmir would necessitate application of the same principle to other parts of India. He thought that this was

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an argument used by the Indians but that in fact the principle being applied was "what India wants India gets". Sir Paul expressed the opinion that neither the Indian nor the Pakistani defense ministers were yet prepared to recognize the facts of the situation, namely, that disaster for both was in store if the military conflict were continued.

There was agreement that the UN must continue its efforts to promote a political solution of the Kashmir dispute. The Foreign Secretary said that he detected a lessening of Soviet interest in pursuing its initiative to mediate the dispute.

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Memorandum of Conversation

Approved in S,U,G 10/19/65
Part 4 of 6

1965 OCT 25 PM 5 21

DATE: October 11, 1965
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Place: The Secretary's Office

SUBJECT: Southern Rhodesia

U.S.

PARTICIPANTS: Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Under Secretary Ball
Ambassador Thompson
Assistant Secretary Leddy
Ambassador Bruce
J. Harold Shullaw, Director,

COPIES TO: BNA
Assistant Secretary Sisco
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Fredericks

U.K.

Michael Stewart, Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs
Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador
Sir Paul Gore-Booth, Permanent Under-
Secretary of State
The Viscount Hood, Deputy Under-Secretary
of State
Denis A. Greenhill, Assistant Under-
Secretary of State
Michael N.F. Stewart, Minister, British
Embassy
Lord Chalfont, Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs

Copies to: See page 3

The Foreign Secretary outlined the political and economic measures which the UK proposed to take in the event of a Southern Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence. He prefaced his summary with the statement that the UK would employ military force only in the unlikely circumstance that the situation in Southern Rhodesia deteriorated to the point where the Southern Rhodesian authorities themselves requested it.

If UDI is announced the UK will: 1) dismiss all Southern Rhodesian ministers; 2) end Commonwealth preferences; 3) exclude Rhodesian tobacco exports to the UK; and, 4) call immediately for a meeting of the Security Council. In the UN the UK will seek a resolution welcoming the measures which it has taken and calling on all members to assist the UK in making these measures effective. The object, Mr. Stewart said, would be to head off wilder action which might otherwise be taken in the UN.

The Foreign Secretary said that unfortunately some of the economic measures and possible Rhodesian retaliatory action against Zambia might undo some of the good work which has been done, with U.S. help, to strengthen sterling. He said that the UK hoped if financial difficulties for sterling arise from the economic measures taken, that the U.S. will give further help. He estimated the potential strain on sterling resulting from possible UK measures and SR retaliation at as much as £200 million. He said he was making this point at the request of the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

If Smith does not make an early declaration of independence, the UK will wait

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two or three weeks and then try to get a constitutional conference organized to draw up a new constitution. The Foreign Secretary said that it is not clear to what degree Smith has been moved by world-wide opposition to UDI.

Secretary Rusk asked whether economic sanctions would require legislative action in the UK. Mr. Stewart replied that legislation would not be necessary since action could be taken on the grounds of rebellion against the Crown.

The Under Secretary said that the practical economic measures we can take without Congressional action are limited. We can apply export controls against SR but are doubtful that it would be very effective since there are alternative sources of supply for the commodities involved. So far as imports are concerned, we cannot apply the Trading with the Enemy Act in the absence of a state of war or the declaration of a national emergency. The only possibility we can see at this time would be action pursuant to a resolution by the Security Council under Article 41 of the Charter. The US could help the UK on tobacco through medium-term commodity credits. It was our understanding, however, that in view of the level of tobacco stocks in the UK, there would be no immediate problem. We could not help with respect to the sugar quota which would require legislative action and this would be controversial in Congress.

Mr. Leddy asked if the UK believed that economic sanctions would force Southern Rhodesia to change its political stance, and observing that economic sanctions had not been historically effective for this purpose. The Foreign Secretary replied that he would hope so but it would take time. Meanwhile, white-black relations would be exacerbated throughout Africa.

The Secretary and Under Secretary, referring to the estimate of 200 million pounds sterling loss in the first year, if Zambian copper exports were cut off, gave the UK representatives no encouragement regarding the willingness of the US to give additional support to sterling in these circumstances.

Sir Paul Gore-Booth pointed out that Southern Rhodesia can easily cut off power to Zambia. Furthermore, Zambia itself may make it inevitable that Southern Rhodesia will take action against it. The Under Secretary asked if Zambia could be kept under control so that it did not provoke Southern Rhodesian retaliation. The Foreign Secretary said he hoped so. A further difficulty would arise if Southern Rhodesia expelled laborers from Zambia and Malawi.

In discussing the Portuguese attitude both the Secretary and the Foreign Secretary expressed doubts that Portugal would recognize Southern Rhodesia immediately. Also it was doubtful that South Africa would give early recognition.

/The Secretary

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The Secretary expressed concern that a two-thirds majority might be found in the General Assembly for a peacekeeping force. Mr. Stewart agreed and said it would be difficult for the UK to oppose such a proposal without encouraging the colored races of the world to turn against the Western powers.

In discussing possible airlift requirements for assuring the continuation of Zambian copper exports, Mr. Fredericks said a survey indicated that as much as 100,000 tons of copper would have to be brought out and coal brought in. The Secretary said he was skeptical of the estimates of the carrying capacity of the railroads and thought they were probably low. He said the US would be reluctant to call on military air transport to transport coal and copper when commercial transport was available. Secretary McNamara endorsed this view.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

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Part 6 of 6

1965 OCT 25 PM 5 21

DATE: October 11, 1965
TIME: 10:00 a.m.
PLACE: Secretary's Office

SUBJECT: South Africa in the UN

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Under Secretary Ball
Ambassador Thompson
Assistant Secretary Leddy
Ambassador Bruce
Assistant Secretary Sisco
J. Harold Shullaw, Director, BNAU.K.Michael Stewart, Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs
Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador
Sir Paul Gore-Booth, Permanent
Under-Secretary of State
Lord Chalfont, Minister of State
for Foreign Affairs
The Viscount Hood, Deputy Under-
Secretary of State
Denis A. Greenhill, Assistant
Under-Secretary of State
Michael N. F. Stewart, Minister,
British Embassy
John E. Killick, Counselor, British
Embassy

COPIES TO:

The Secretary said we had attempted to avoid getting on to the slippery slope of sanctions in dealing with the South African problem in the UN. We have applied restrictions on arms sales but France has continued to sell to South Africa. A head of steam is building up among the Africans, but we have sought to hold off UN action until the International Court of Justice renders its decision.

Assistant Secretary Sisco said that the UN General Assembly is on record in favor of sanctions but the US and the UK have disregarded the expressed views of the Assembly. In the Security Council we have succeeded in keeping recommendations somewhere between Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.

The Foreign Secretary said that the UK was also opposed to sanctions, that the state of the British economy would not permit such action. In response to the Secretary's question about a parallel with Southern Rhodesia the Foreign Secretary replied that the difference lay in the fact that South Africa is a state and Southern Rhodesia, in the event of UDI, would be in rebellion.

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By ry/cbm, NARA, Date 8-16-06

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10/19/65

Memorandum of Conversation

McGEORGE DONOY'S OFFICE

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Part 5 of 6

1965 OCT 25 PM 5 2

DATE: October 11, 1965
TIME: 10:00 a.m.
PLACE: Secretary's Office

SUBJECT: UN Membership (Maldives, etc.)

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Under Secretary Ball
Ambassador Thompson
Assistant Secretary Leddy
Assistant Secretary Sisco
Ambassador Bruce
J. Harold Shullaw, Director, BNA

U.K.:

Michael Stewart, Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs
Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador
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Lord Chalfont, Minister of State
for Foreign Affairs
The Viscount Hood, Deputy Under-
Secretary of State
Denis A. Greenhill, Assistant Under-
Secretary of State
Michael N. F. Stewart, Minister,
British Embassy

COPIES TO:

The Secretary said we are concerned at the prospect of numerous "mini-states" becoming voting members of the UN even though they are too small to pay their expenses or to carry any responsibilities in the organization. The Foreign Secretary expressed similar concern and said that there are about twenty UK possessions which may be seeking UN membership after independence. There are a number of ways of tackling the problem -- group membership for a number of small states with a single spokesman, a link with a UN member who would speak on their behalf and various forms of associate membership. The Foreign Secretary said criteria should be established for a state's membership on the basis of size, population, ability to pay its subscription and the extent to which it is involved in the affairs of its region.

The Secretary suggested the possibility of associate membership with no vote, nominal dues and the right to be heard in matters affecting its interests. Assistant Secretary Sisco said that since the UN Secretary General had referred to the problem in his Annual Report it might be possible to encourage him to take the lead in seeking a solution. The Foreign Secretary said the UK would not encourage further applications for UN membership by other small states acquiring their independence from Britain without prior discussions with the US, the Soviets and others. It was agreed that the subject might be discussed with Colonial Secretary Greenwood during his visit later this month.

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MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE PRIME MINISTER 12 36

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BEGINS:

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT RHODESIA. I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR SUPPORT IN THIS, AS IN SO MANY OTHER MATTERS. SO FAR, WE HAVE NOT DONE MUCH MORE THAN STATE OPENING POSITIONS, BUT I EXPECT THE CRUNCH TO COME WHEN SMITH COMES TO SEE ME TOMORROW, THURSDAY.

*PM
10/16/65*

AS YOU SAY, DETERRENCE IS OUR MAIN OBJECTIVE AND, IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF YOU WERE ABLE TO MAKE YOUR ADMINISTRATIONS VIEWS KNOWN TO SMITH BEFORE MY DECISIVE MEETING WITH HIM. MAY I LEAVE IT TO YOU TO JUDGE THE BEST WAY OF DOING SO. PERHAPS YOU WOULD CONSIDER USING BOTH TECHNIQUES. I WILL KEEP YOU IN TOUCH WITH DEVELOPMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

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By *ryj/cou* NARA, Date *8-16-06*

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MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE PRIME MINISTER 12 36

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END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~