

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
01	cable	The Hague 5408 open 11/17/11 per NLJ 09-355	C	2	5/22/68	A
03	memo	C. Johnson to Bundy open 11.16.09 NLJ 09.295	PCI	2	10/9/64	A
04	ltr	Seaborg to Bundy	S	2	10/8/64	A
04a	memo	SecNavy to AsstSecDef open 11/17/11 per NLJ 09-355	S	2	9/3/64	A
04b	memo	Rickover to SecNavy [Near duplicate of #7] open 11/17/11 per NLJ 09-355	S	1	9/3/64	A
04c	rpt	"Comments of Manager, Naval Reactors..." [Near duplicate of #7a] open 11/17/11 per NLJ 09-355	S	1	9/3/64	A
05a	draft	"Regarding other Allies..." [Partial duplicate of #6a]	C	1	[10/64]	A
07	memo	Near duplicate of #4b open 11/17/11 per NLJ 09-355	S	1	9/3/64	A
07a	rpt	Near duplicate of #4c open 11/17/11 per NLJ 09-355	S	1	9/3/64	A
07b	rpt	"Comments of Manager, Naval Reactors..."	S	7	9/3/64	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of Charles E. Johnson

Folder Title "NUCLEAR - Nuclear Submarines, Technical Aid in the Field of"

Box Number 038

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Page 2

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12	ltr	C. Anderson to the President	C	3	9/15/64	A

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Initials



Department of State

file
TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 THE HA 05408 221537Z

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ACTION EUR 20

INFO GPM 04, NSC 10, SP 02, SS 20, RSC 01, L 03, CIAE 00, INR 07, NSAE 00,
DODE 00, AEC 11, RSR 01, /079 W

R 221500Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2520

- POWDLER
- BUDGET
- DAVIS
- EDEN
- GIBBSURON
- HAMILTON
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- JORDEN
- KEENE
- LEONHART
- ROCHE
- SAUNDERS
- TAYLOR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ THE HAGUE 5408

JOINT EMBASSY/DEFENSE MESSAGE
SUBJ: NUCLEAR PROPELLED SUBMARINES
REF: HAGUE A-663

1. IN REFERENCED AIRGRAM NETH NAVY STATE SECY VAN ES EXPRESSED TO ME CONTINUING DUTCH INTEREST IN ACQUIRING NUCLEAR PROPELLED SUBMARINE AND RAISED TWO QUESTIONS: ONE WHICH I WOULD APPRECIATE GUIDANCE IN REPLYING TO HIM: (A) IS IT POSSIBLE THAT NUCLEAR SUB OF SKIPJACK CLASS MIGHT BECOME AVAILABLE, NOW OR IN FUTURE, FOR SALE TO NETH AND AT WHAT COST? (B) IS IT POSSIBLE FOR NETH NAVY OFFICERS TO MAKE ORIENTATION VISIT TO U.S. NUCLEAR SUB?

2. AS BACKGROUND CONSIDERATION IN DEVELOPING REPLY, I MIGHT NOTE THAT NETH DEFENSE BUDGET RESTRICTIONS APPEAR TO MAKE HYPOTHETICAL ANY POSSIBILITY THAT NETH MIGHT BE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING PURCHASE OF NUCLEAR SUB IN NEAR FUTURE EVEN IF ONE SHOULD BECOME AVAILABLE. I NEED NOT STRESS OBVIOUS POLITICAL AND MILITARY BENEFITS OF HOLDING OPEN SUCH A POSSIBILITY, HOWEVER REMOTE, OR AT LEAST NOT CLOSING DISCUSSION THIS SUBJECT ABRUPTLY AT THIS TIME.

3. AS FOR FAMILIARIZATION AND TRAINING VISIT TO U.S. NUCLEAR SUBMARINE, WE ARE NOT AWARE OF CONDITIONS GOVERNING SUCH VISITS. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS THAT MIGHT DERIVE FROM SUCH VISIT IN TERMS OF IMPRESSING UPON DUTCH NAVY SOME OF THE REALISTIC CONSIDERATIONS

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 09-355
By *isl*
NARA, Date 11-15-11



Department of State

TELEGRAM

23

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PAGE 02 THE HA 05408 221537Z

THAT OWNERSHIP AND OPERATION OF SUCH A VESSEL ENTAILS

4. WOULD APPRECIATE GUIDANCE SOONEST.

GP-4 TYLER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C E Johnson

2

October 16, 1964

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Senator Anderson:

The President asked me to answer your letter of September 15 on the possibility of our giving technical aid in the field of nuclear submarines to The Netherlands, and perhaps to other nations. I have had a good look at this matter and I find that while the question has been considered within the Department of Defense, no encouragement has been given to anyone in the Dutch Government. In fact, informal Dutch inquiries about U. S. willingness to lend assistance were answered in the negative last summer through diplomatic and military channels.

I can also assure you that the field representatives of the Departments of State and Defense are well aware that both the law and Administration policy prevent any unauthorized discussion of sensitive kinds of nuclear cooperation with other governments, except with the approval of the President. No such approval is likely in the present instance unless and until there is a sharp change in our estimate of the importance of protecting the security of our submarine nuclear technology.

Sincerely,

McGeorge Bundy

The Honorable Clinton P. Anderson
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

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*Cop to
Jeff Kitchin - State
W G Howard - DOD
Dwight Ank - AEC*

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By NARA, Date 3-2009

3
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October 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Mac --

John McNaughton has submitted the attached draft reply for your signature to Senator Anderson's letter to the President of September 15, on the subject of U. S. assistance to the Netherlands on nuclear submarine construction. McNaughton's transmittal is also attached.

In the file is a letter from Glenn Seaborg, the burden of which is that we could be more emphatic in our denial that there is any hanky-panky with the Dutch or other Allies, and also should be responsive to Anderson's proposal for a Presidential directive. Seaborg attaches some correspondence between Nitze and Rickover that is worth scanning. Rickover's views are summarized in three short paragraphs that I suggest you read if you don't have time to scan the entire correspondence. I find him to be interesting and convincing on this subject.

Dick Bowman reports that General Goodpaster is satisfied with the draft reply although he "thinks it a Navy matter." I told Bowman to tell the Joint Staff that nuclear matters can never be strictly Service concerns and always have political-military implications of the highest importance. It was for that reason that the draft was requested of the Department of Defense and the attention of the Chiefs was directed to Senator Anderson's letter.

I think the draft is acceptable because it makes the two major points that everybody thinks should be made:

(1) We have made no commitment to the Dutch or any other Allies and are not encouraging them to think that we intend to give them assistance on the construction of nuclear submarines.

(2) This does not mean that the situation may not change in the future so that it will be necessary to change our policy.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 09-245
By *id*, NARA, Date 8-11-09

I recommend that you adopt the McNaughton draft with the following three paragraphs added at the end:

"You are absolutely correct in your understanding that the Administration's philosophy and policy is to prevent the further development of independent national nuclear forces. Any specific proposals will be looked at against this policy background and there would have to be a preponderant U. S. national security advantage before this Administration would support a proposal contrary to our continuing and historic policy.

"In view of the assurances I have received from the Department of State and Department of Defense concerning the activities of their respective representatives, I can see no need for a Presidential directive at this time. If it appears that the Administration's policy is being misunderstood or ignored in the field by U. S. representatives dealing with our Allies I know that Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara will know how to cure the condition.

"You may be assured that this Administration will not make binding commitments to other countries on these matters in advance of full consultation with the responsible Congressional leaders."

I have not tried this language on McNaughton. If you concur I will inform him. Moreover, I have not talked with Seaborg or Palfrey on this matter because I agree with McNaughton that AEC does not have any substantive knowledge in this specific matter. Their concern is largely prompted by the politics of dealing with JCAE and I believe that the new language I have proposed will take care of their concerns.

Charles E. Johnson

P.S. Since dictating this I have talked to AEC & they concur in the draft letter as it has been amplified by me.

1964 3 SEP

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

Subj: Nuclear Submarine Capability for Netherlands Navy (C)

We have learned from several sources that we may expect to be approached within a few months by the Netherlands Government on the subject of U. S. assistance with the Royal Netherlands Navy nuclear submarine program.

There is considerable to be said in favor of assisting the Netherlands in acquiring a nuclear submarine capability. Both JCS and NATO force goals call for one SSN. Netherlands submariners are highly competent operators of conventional submarines, and training to equal proficiency in nuclear submarines could be undertaken easily. The necessary expenditures for a nuclear submarine appear well within the capability of the country, as part of a recently announced program of revised defense spending.

As you know, there has been a long-standing interest in nuclear submarines on the part of the Italians. At the first hint in the newspapers in June that the Netherlands might seek help in this field from the United States the Italian interest came alive again. It seems quite possible that a decision to assist the Netherlands and not Italy could have a serious effect on U.S.-Italy relations. This could perhaps be ameliorated somewhat by an offer to provide assistance to the government of Italy in some other area of interest. A decision to assist Italy as well as the Netherlands would greatly increase the risk of compromise of valuable information because of Italy's looser security control.

On the other hand, it should be possible to provide a less attractive alternative for both the Italians and the Dutch by offering to help them with the fundamentals, even to the point of constructing a plant or a complete submarine in this country. This plant and/or submarine could be designed and tailored to preserve for ourselves those characteristics which we have reason to believe the Soviet Union does not have. Alternatively, it should be possible to establish a time-phased program of nuclear submarine cooperation with the Netherlands, and Italy if necessary, in which the delivery of sensitive components would be deferred until the end of a five-year period. This would greatly lessen the security risks involved.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

By isl NLJ 09-355
NARA, Date 11-15-11

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-2-

We should not fail to consider the capability of France to furnish nuclear submarine assistance to the Netherlands during the remainder of the 1960's, or the likelihood that the Netherlands might, in fact, turn to France as an alternative source.

While I realize full well that such alternative plans of action might be difficult to accomplish, and would undoubtedly meet with considerable resistance, the day may well come when technologies comparable to those which we are so carefully preserving will be achieved by others.

The Chief of Naval Operations has identical views.

Before any decision is made on this matter, it would be wise to obtain the views of Admiral Rickover. By copy of this correspondence, Admiral Rickover is requested to submit these views.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

CC: VADM H. G. Rickover, USN(Ret.)

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

3 SEP 1964

SUBJECT: US ASSISTANCE WITH THE NETHERLANDS NUCLEAR SUBMARINE PROGRAM

By copy of your memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs dated August 21, 1964, you requested my views on the subject of US assistance with the Royal Netherlands Navy nuclear submarine program.

I am opposed to giving the Netherlands information on US nuclear submarines. In accordance with your request, I am forwarding herewith my comments on this subject. My views are substantially the same as they were in 1960, when the subject of United States aid to the Netherlands nuclear submarine program was put before the Congress. At that time Congress concluded against giving such assistance.

In view of the interest and responsibility of the Atomic Energy Commission in this matter, I am sending a copy of your memorandum of August 21 and my comments of September 3 to the Chairman, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission.

/s/ H. G. Rickover
H. G. Rickover
Manager, Naval Reactors
Division of Reactor Development

Enclosure:

Comments of Manager, Naval Reactors, USAEC,
on US Assistance in the Netherlands
Nuclear Submarine Program

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
By nlj 09-355
NARA, Date 11-15-11

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4c

COMMENTS OF MANAGER, NAVAL REACTORS, USAEC
ON US ASSISTANCE IN THE NETHERLANDS NUCLEAR
SUBMARINE PROGRAM

SUMMARY

3 SEP 1964

I am opposed to giving the Netherlands information on US nuclear submarines. Such assistance would increase the risk of our naval nuclear propulsion plant information falling into the hands of the Russians, thus increasing the grave threat of Russian submarines to the security of the United States--a threat against which we are particularly vulnerable and against which we have no adequate defense.

No significant advantage to the US would result from assisting the Netherlands to acquire one nuclear submarine as compared with our placing an additional US nuclear submarine, US manned, in the NATO fleet. In fact, such a move would be a distinct disadvantage to the US in that other NATO allies--particularly those who are experiencing difficulty with independent development of nuclear submarines--would press for a similar aid. We would be in a poor position to turn them down.

In addition, our experience with the British DREADNOUGHT project has amply demonstrated that the effort necessary to provide the required technical information and support to a foreign country is much greater than was generally realized. Providing the Netherlands and others with nuclear submarine information or equipment would seriously hamper our own naval nuclear program, already severely strained because of the limited number of trained and experienced technical personnel.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
By isl NLJ 09-355
NARA, Date 11-15-11

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2124

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

5

FROM THE DESK OF
COMMISSIONER
Palfrey

10/9/64

Mr. Johnson:

Attached is a copy of
the revised 2nd page of the
letter to Senator Anderson.

*Did not
use*



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

In reply refer to
I-14487/64

6 OCT 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES E. JOHNSON
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Draft Reply to Senator Clinton P. Anderson's Letter to
the President

Attached is a draft reply for Mr. Bundy's signature to Senator
Clinton P. Anderson's letter to the President regarding US assist-
ance in the field of nuclear submarine cooperation with the
Netherlands and other Allies.

Secretary Nitze and Mr. Kitchen's office concur in the draft.
Dr. Sesborg's office has not coordinated since they do not have
any substantive knowledge in this specific matter.

We have not addressed Senator Anderson's suggestion to issue a
directive setting forth the administration's policy regarding the
transmittal of nuclear warship technology to foreign nations.

SIGNED

John T. McNaughton
Assistant Secretary of Defense

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6a

DRAFT

Dear Senator Anderson:

The President has asked me to reply to your 15 September letter which raised the question of the US providing technical aid to the Netherlands and possibly to other Allies for the production of nuclear submarines.

As regards the Netherlands, the situation is as follows: The Netherlands Defense Minister announced to Parliament on 24 June 1964 that its future defense plans included the construction of nuclear ASW submarines. Following this announcement, informal Dutch queries about US willingness to lend assistance were answered in the negative through diplomatic and military channels. The subject of Dutch nuclear submarines was again brought to public attention at The Hague in September when the defense budget for 1965 was submitted to Parliament. A newspaper report at that time erroneously stated that the Defense Minister's transmittal note to Parliament indicated that two nuclear submarines were to be constructed with US help. As I say, the press story was mistaken. The United States was not specifically linked with the Dutch nuclear submarine program in either of the two official communications to the Dutch Parliament.

I can assure you that no representative of the Department of State or the Department of Defense has encouraged the Netherlands Government to include nuclear submarines in its recently presented defense budget or to seek assistance from the United States.

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By ~~422/78~~ NARA, Date 3-2009

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As regards other Allies, I am not aware of any recent comparable specific interest in nuclear submarine propulsion. The same general considerations applicable to assistance to the Netherlands in this field would also be applicable to other Allies, and I reiterate that US representatives are not encouraging requests for any technical aid in the field of nuclear submarines.

This does not mean, however, that we can avoid related defense responsibilities of equal seriousness. Effective national security planning requires that the strategic capabilities of the United States and its Western Allies be analyzed on a continuing basis. No reasonable hypothesis drawn from these forces, either now available or projected in the future, can be exempted from analysis. When the Netherlands Defense Minister announced that plans included the construction of nuclear ASW submarines, it became clear that the advantages and disadvantages of US assistance to the Dutch should be examined.

I can assure you that current studies on possible US assistance are carried out strictly within a contingency planning framework with no prejudice to a decision for or against assisting a foreign nation.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Clinton P. Anderson
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

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This document consists of ~~10~~ pages
Copy No. ~~4~~ of ~~8~~ Series ~~A~~

1 of 1, Series B

3 SEP 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

SUBJECT: US ASSISTANCE WITH THE NETHERLANDS NUCLEAR SUBMARINE PROGRAM

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I am opposed to giving the Netherlands information on US nuclear submarines. In accordance with your request, I am forwarding herewith my comments on this subject. My views are substantially the same as they were in 1960, when the subject of United States aid to the Netherlands nuclear submarine program was put before the Congress. At that time Congress concluded against giving such assistance.

In view of the interest and responsibility of the Atomic Energy Commission in this matter, I am sending a copy of your memorandum of August 21 and my comments of September 3 to the Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

H. G. Rickover
H. G. Rickover
Manager, Naval Reactors
Division of Reactor Development

Enclosure:
Comments of Manager, Naval Reactors, USAEC,
on US Assistance in the Netherlands
Nuclear Submarine Program

cc: Chairman, USAEC

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
By *isl* NLJ 09-355
NARA, Date 11-15-11

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COMMENTS OF MANAGER, NAVAL REACTORS, USAEC
ON US ASSISTANCE IN THE NETHERLANDS NUCLEAR
SUBMARINE PROGRAM

SUMMARY

3 SEP 1964

I am opposed to giving the Netherlands information on US nuclear submarines. Such assistance would increase the risk of our naval nuclear propulsion plant information falling into the hands of the Russians, thus increasing the grave threat of Russian submarines to the security of the United States--a threat against which we are particularly vulnerable and against which we have no adequate defense.

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In addition, our experience with the British DREADNOUGHT project has amply demonstrated that the effort necessary to provide the required technical information and support to a foreign country is much greater than was generally realized. Providing the Netherlands and others with nuclear submarine information or equipment would seriously hamper our own naval nuclear program, already severely strained because of the limited number of trained and experienced technical personnel.

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By id NLJ 09-355
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Form AEC-126
(July 14, 1947)

U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
CLASSIFIED MATERIAL RECEIPT

POSTAL REGISTRY NO.


DATE MAILED

October 7, 1964

TO
Mr. Charles Johnson
Senior National Security Council Mbr.
Room 368, Exec. Off. Bldg.
Washington 25, D.C.

FROM
Dwight A. Ink
Assistant General Manager
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Room B-310, Wash., D.C.

INSTRUCTIONS:

1. Original of this receipt to be signed personally by recipient and returned to 
2. Duplicate to be retained by recipient.
3. Triplicate to be retained by sender in suspense file.
4. Avoid Identifying Material Below in Any Manner Which Might Necessitate Classification of This Receipt.

DESCRIPTION (CHECK OR INDICATE)	DATE OF DOCUMENT LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL	FROM—	REFERENCE OR FILE NO.	ADDRESSED TO—
Ltr. _____ Rpt. _____ Dwg. _____ Other <u>Memo</u> Nature of copy: SO _____ CC _____ TC _____ PC _____ Other _____ Number of enclosures and attachments: _____	9/3/64	H.G.Rickover Re: Netherlands Submarine Program	copy 1 of 1, Ser.B.	THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

CERTIFICATE

I have personally received from the sender the material, including enclosures and attachments, as identified above. I assume full responsibility for the safe handling, storage, and transmittal elsewhere of this material in full accordance with existing regulations.

DISPATCHED

SIGNATURE OF COURIER

SIGNATURE OF RECIPIENT

Lawrence E. Geyer

DATE RECEIVED

DATE RECEIVED

Oct. 7, 1964

September 29, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. W. J. HOWARD
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

I am sending this to you as a matter of information. It was referred to John McNaughton for action because in this instance it appears that the political-military considerations are most important. You, however, from living with JCAE on a daily basis can help McNaughton phrase the draft letter in the most appropriate manner.

Charles E. Johnson

9/29/64

NOTE FOR COL. BOWMAN

Dick --

Will you please make sure that Gen. Goodpaster knows about this letter so that he can tie in with McNaughton on the drafting of the reply for Bundy's signature.

Charles E. Johnson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 28, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN T. McNAUGHTON,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE - INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

Would you please undertake a draft reply for Mr. Bundy's signature in cooperation with Mr. Kitchen and Dr. Seaborg, to whom I have also sent copies of the incoming letter together with a copy of this transmittal note?

It would be appreciated if we could have a draft by the end of the week, if possible, or not later than Tuesday, October 6. I would be glad to discuss this matter by telephone or in your office if that would be helpful.

Charles E. Johnson

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Copies to
Jeff. Kitchen, State
Dr. Seaborg, AEC
Sping. Keeny, OSI
Col. Bowman, NSC
Jack Howard, DOD 9/29/64

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By *cbm/ry* NARA, Date 3-20-09