

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo <i>more released 7-22-83 NLJ/RAC 107226</i>	Bowdler to Rostow Secret <del>sanitized 10-18-94 NLJ 92-39</del> <i>same sanitization 9/4/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-418</i> <i>same sanitization 10/8/19 per NLJ/RAC 17-9</i>	3 p 7/5/67	A
<del>#1a rpt</del>	<del>"Bolivia..." Secret <i>open 3-13-95 NLJ 95-6</i></del>	<del>3 p undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#1b rpt	"Public Safety" Secret <i>open 6/17/96 NLJ 95-4</i>	7 p undated	A
#1c memo	Intel memo Secret <del>exempt 10-6-95 NLJ 95-5 exempt NLJ/RAC 00-27</del> <i>exempt 12/2/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-419 exempt 10/8/19 per NLJ/RAC 17-9</i>	11 p 7/3/67	A
#2a memo	Bowdler to Rostow <del>sanitized 2-13-01 NLJ/RAC 00-28</del> Secret <del>exempt 10-18-94 NLJ 92-39</del> <i>more info released 9/4/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-418</i> <i>same sanitization 9/5/18 per NLJ 17-10</i>	2 p 9/6/67	A
#2c rpt	Interim Technical Report <del>exempt 12/2/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-419</del> Secret <del>exempt 1-12-93 NLJ 92-40</del> <i>exempt 1-29-01 NLJ/RAC 00-27</i> <i>exempt 10/8/19 per NLJ/RAC 17-9</i>	4 p [8/67]	A
#2d rpt	Inventory <del>exempt 12/2/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-419</del> Secret <del>exempt 1-12-93 NLJ 92-40</del> <i>exempt 1-29-01 NLJ/RAC 00-27</i> <i>exempt 10/8/19 per NLJ/RAC 17-9</i>	3 p [8/29/67]	A
#2e photo	PCI <del>exempt 1-12-93 NLJ 92-40 exempt 12/2/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-419</del> <i>exempt 1-29-01 NLJ/RAC 00-27</i> <i>exempt 10/8/19 per NLJ/RAC 17-9</i>	1 p undated	A
#2f photo	Secret <del>exempt 1-12-93 NLJ 92-40 exempt 12/2/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-419</del> <i>exempt 1-29-01 NLJ/RAC 00-27</i> <i>exempt 10/8/19 per NLJ/RAC 17-9</i>	1 p undated	A
#2h memo	Oliver to Kohler Secret <i>open 5-27-92 NLJ 92-38</i>	4 p 9/2/67	A
<del>#3 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President Secret <i>open 10-18-94 NLJ 92-39</i></del>	<del>4 p 6/24/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#4 memo	Rostow to President Confidential <i>open 11-1-94 NLJ 92-85</i>	1 p 6/28/67	A
#4a cable	Caracas 6765 Confidential <i>open 11-1-94 NLJ 92-89</i>	1 p 6/23/67	A
#5 rpt	Intel report Secret <del>exempt 10-6-95 NLJ 95-5</del> <i>exempt 1-29-01 NLJ/RAC 00-27</i> <i>exempt 12/2/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-419</i> <i>exempt 10/8/19 per NLJ/RAC 17-9</i>	5 p 5/19/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Intelligence File  
"Guerilla Problem in Latin America"

Box 2

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#6 memo <i>more info released 7-22-03 NLJ/RAC 02-229</i>	<del>Intel memo</del> <del>Secret</del> <i>sanitized 1-12-93 NLJ 92-40</i> <i>open 12/2/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-419</i>	<del>4 p</del> 6/14/67	<del>A</del>
#7 memo	<del>Intel Note 521</del> <del>Secret</del> <i>open 5-27-92 NLJ 92-38</i>	<del>3 p</del> 6/23/67	<del>A</del>
#9 memo	Intel memo <i>open 1-29-01</i> <del>Secret</del> <i>exempt 1-12-93 NLJ 92-40</i>	2 p undated	A
#10 memo	<del>Intel memo</del> <del>Secret</del> <i>sanitized 10-6-95 NLJ 95-5</i> <i>open 12/2/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-419</i>	<del>3 p</del> undated	<del>A</del>
#11 memo	From Sternfield to Chief, Western Hemisphere <del>Secret</del> <i>sanitized 10-6-95 NLJ 95-5</i> <i>more info released 12/2/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-419</i>	4 p 4/5/67	A
#12 memo <i>more info released 7-22-03 NLJ/RAC 02-229</i>	From Sternfield to Chief, Western Hemisphere <del>Secret</del> <i>sanitized 10-6-95 NLJ 95-5</i> <i>more info released 12/2/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-419</i> <i>more info released 9/5/18 per NLJ 17-10</i>	8 p 4/7/67	A
#13 memo	<del>Intel memo</del> <del>Secret</del> <i>sanitized 10-6-95 NLJ 95-5</i> <i>open 12/2/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-419</i> <i>more info released 9/5/18 per NLJ 17-10</i>	<del>4 p</del> undated	<del>A</del>
#14 cable <i>same as #1</i> <i>7-22-03 NLJ/RAC 02-229</i>	Intel Information Cable <del>Secret</del> <i>sanitized 1-12-93 NLJ 92-40</i> <i>more info released 12/2/13 per NLJ/RAC 12-419</i> <i>more info released 9/5/18 per NLJ 17-10</i>	2 p 5/25/67	A

FILE LOCATION  
 NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Intelligence File  
 "Guerilla Problem in Latin America"

Box 2

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Monday - July 5, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Our 4:30 pm Meeting on Subversion in Latin America

The purpose of the meeting is to look at what we are doing in seven countries -- Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru and Venezuela -- to strengthen their internal security capabilities and determine whether it is adequate.

From the country reports which DOD, [redacted] and AID/Public Safety have sent me (copies attached) I have tentatively reached these conclusions:

BOLIVIA:

DOD is helping train and equip a new Ranger Battalion. The Bolivian absorption capacity being what it is, additional military assistance would not now seem advisable.

Spt

[redacted]

AID/PS has a modest rural police program. Much more should be done now that Bolivia has re-established a civil police organization.

Recommendation:

- (1) That a variable of the Special Strike Force acceptable to the Country Team be established. It might be part of the new Ranger Battalion.
- (2) That we expand our rural police program.
- (3) That we discuss with Argentina and Brazil how they might help Bolivia should the situation deteriorate and Barrientos is willing to consider additional outside assistance.

✓  
✓

~~SECRET~~

SANTIZED  
Authority NLJ/RAC 11-9  
By CTS, NARA, Date 6/26/19

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

-2-

COLOMBIA

DOD, [ ] and AID/PS have good on-going programs.

CINCSO has asked for an emergency package: 5 choppers, 8 C-47s and equipment for one Signal Co. and 1 Recon. Batt.

AID/PS believes it could effectively do more in training rural police.

Recommendation: If funding levels do not <sup>now</sup> permit insurmountable problems, the CINCSO and AID/PS requests should be authorized.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The on-going programs of DOD, [ ] and AID/PS are going reasonably well. [ ] we would be in better shape.

Recommendation: No special measures seem necessary at this time.

ECUADOR

There is no active insurgency. We have modest DOD, [ ] and AID/PS programs in progress.

Recommendation: Present programs seem adequate. AID/PS would like to expand its rural police program by two advisors and \$150,000 for equipment. I understand the Country Team has recommended it. Sounds sensible to me, but I would like to hear State [ ] [ ] views.

GUATEMALA

In the year that Mendez Montenegro has been in power, Guatemala's internal security capabilities have steadily improved. Their own effort on the military, police and intelligence side has increased. DOD added \$1.0 million to MAP for helicopters and commo equipment. AID/PS supported police reorganization with \$324,000 in equipment. [ ]

[ ]

SECRET

-3-

AID/PS, while happy with progress made so far, wants to expand its rural police program with 2 advisers and \$100,000 for equipment.

Recommendation: We need the views of the Country Team and Washington agencies.

PERU

Peru's record in dealing with insurgency at the incipient stage is the best of the hemisphere. DOD, [ ] and AID/PS have on-going programs which are adequate for present Peruvian needs.

VENEZUELA

Over past years we have concentrated our effort here with good results. On the military side, we have done what Leoni wanted in expediting delivery of equipment for his 9 new Ranger Battalions.

[ ]  
[ ] AID/PS is pleased with its accomplishments with the urban police, but considers the rural police capability unsatisfactory.

AID/PS wants to add 2 rural police advisers. IRG/ARA has asked the Country Team for a reassessment of security in rural areas.

Recommendation: Until the Country Team report is in, the AID/PS request should wait.

WGB  
WGBowdler

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

DOD

NEJ 95-6

By 128, NARA, Date 3-7-95

BOLIVIA

Total MAP deliveries through FY 67: \$15 million. MAP levels: FY 67--\$3.4M; FY 68--\$2.4M. . . . Program (Percentage of Equipment Funded): Army--5 Infantry Battalions (100%, 95%, 90%, 85%, and 50%; all 100% end FY 69), 1 Airborne Infantry Company (100%), 1 Military Police Battalion (100%), 4 Engineer Companies (2 @ 95%, 2 @ 80%; all 100% end FY 69), 1 Infantry Battalion, and 1 Airborne Company in FY 69-70; Air Force--1 SAW/Strike Squadron (11 F-51's; 100% end FY 68) and 1 Transport Squadron (18 C-47's; 100%). . . . Since the insurgency outbreak in Southeastern Bolivia in March 1967, the US has provided only field rations, a few radios, and some cargo parachutes on an emergency basis. Delivery has been expedited on some programmed MAP items including three helicopters; and a USSOUTHCOM MPT is in country providing COIN training to the newly formed 2nd Ranger Battalion. . . . Approximate percentages of MAP units or equipment versus total combat inventory: Army--75% (only 50% of infantry units); Air Force--65% (F-51 follow-on support is GOB responsibility). US MilGp--49 (26 Officers; 23 EM).

COLOMBIA

Total MAP deliveries through FY 67: \$83 million. MAP levels: FY 67--\$8.1M; FY 68--\$5.2M. . . . Program (Percentage of Equipment Funded): Army--6 Infantry Brigades (89%; complete by FY 70), 1 Cavalry Brigade (74%; complete by FY 71), 1 Reconnaissance Battalion (95%; complete by FY 69), 1 Airborne Battalion (97%; complete by FY 69), 1 Engineer Combat Battalion (94%; complete by FY 70), 3 Engineer Construction Battalions (68%; complete by FY 71); Navy--5 River Gunboats (100%), 2 APD's (100%), 1 Marine BLT (98%; 100% FY 69), 4 100-foot PGM's by FY 69-70 (none presently approved); Air Force--1 Tactical Fighter Squadron (7 aircraft, 48%; complete by FY 72), 1 SAR Reconnaissance Squadron (4 aircraft, 55%; funds unavailable to complete), 1 SAW Reconnaissance Squadron (75%; complete by FY 71-72), 1 SAW Rotary Wing Squadron (16 helicopters, 90%; complete FY 68-72). . . . Emergency package requested by CINCSO now under study in OSD: 5 Helicopters (2 funded FY 67), 8 C-47's, equipment for 1 Signal Company and 1 Reconnaissance Battalion. . . . Approximate percentages of MAP units or equipment versus the total combat inventory: Army--90%; Navy--75%; Air Force--95%. US MilGp--63 (34 Officers; 29 EM).

GUATEMALA

Total MAP deliveries through FY 67: \$12.2 million. MAP levels: FY 67--\$1.2M; FY 68--\$1.2M. . . . Program (Percentage of Equipment Funded): Army--3 Infantry Battalions (42%; complete FY 71), 1 Airborne Infantry Company (100%), 1 Engineer Battalion (89%; complete FY 70); Navy--1 85-foot Patrol Craft, 2 40-foot Patrol Craft, 2 63-foot AVR's, 2 85-foot PGM Patrol Craft (0%; complete by FY 71); Air Force--1 SAW/Recon Squadron (8 T-33's and 5 B-26's), 1 SAW Composite Squadron (5 Cessna 180's and 3 H-19's), 1 Transport Squadron (6 C-47's and 1 C-54). . . . In May 1967, DOD added \$1.0M to the Guatemala FY 67 program by providing 3 UH-1D helicopters and \$149,000 for single side-band radios; and Guatemala purchased 5 APC's. . . . Approximate percentages of MAP units or equipment versus the total combat inventory: Army--30%; Navy--100%; Air Force--70%. US MilGp--25 (13 Officers; 12 EM).

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

VENEZUELA

The US has furnished \$7.0 million in training to Venezuela but has not provided grant aid in materiel. However, credit assistance for military equipment has been provided. Since 1956, Venezuela has purchased \$100M worth of US equipment, of which \$85M was under the Long Term Credit Agreement of 1956. They have purchased fighter aircraft, light bombers, troop transport, helicopters, patrol craft, communications, weapons, and ammunition. In April 1967, President Leoni requested that President Johnson help the Venezuelan Government obtain equipment for ten new Ranger-type battalions. DOD sent a special team to Caracas to assist the Venezuelans. DOD gave a special priority to the Venezuelans and all of the equipment will be delivered by July 1967. Size of MilGp: 76 (36 Officers; 40 EM).

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ECUADOR

Total MAP deliveries thru FY 67: \$34 million. MAP levels FY 67---\$3.0M; FY 68---\$2.8 M..... Program (percentage of equipment funded): Army--2 Infantry Brigades, 1 Cavalry Brigade (less heavy weapons and armor), 1 Airborne Infantry Company (all of foregoing at 100%), and 2 Engineer Battalions (76% & 40%; 100% FY 70). Navy--2 PCE and 2 PGM (100%), and one Marine Company (100%). Air Force--1 Strike Squadron (12 armed T-33's; 100%), 1 SAW Squadron (6 armed T-28's (100%), and 1 Transport Squadron (8 C-47's; 66%)..... No new MAP units are programmed. Ecuador will purchase 4 additional transport aircraft by end FY 69 to bring Transport Squadron to 100%.....Approximate percentages of MAP units or equipment versus the total combat inventory: Army--50%; Navy--35%; Air Force--55%. US MilGp--69 (30 Offs; 39 EM).

PERU

Total MAP deliveries thru FY 67: \$75 million. MAP levels FY 67---\$5.0M; FY 68---\$3.9M..... Program (percentage of equipment funded): Army--1 Ranger Brigade (100%), 5 Commando Companies (100%); and 4 Engineer Battalions (3 @ 90%; 85%; 100% FY 69). Navy--7 River Patrol boats (87%; 100% FY 68), 1 Marine Battalion (50%; 100% FY 69). Air Force--2 Strike Squadrons (12 F-86F & 11 F-80C; 75% no increase programmed), 1 SAW Squadron (14 B-26C & 7 F-47; 100%), and 2 Transport Squadrons (25 C-46/C-47; 100%).....Approximate percentages of MAP supported units or equipment versus total combat inventory: Army--15%; Navy--55%; Air Force--60%. US MilGp--66 (32 Offs; 34 EM).....The F-86 squadron was grounded for wing modification in the insurgency campaign of 1965-66; however, all other MAP units were committed and contributed greatly to the rapid government success.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Total MAP deliveries thru FY 67: \$19.1 million. MAP levels FY 67---\$3.1M; FY 68---\$3.0M..... Program (percentage of equipment funded): Army--1 Infantry Brigade (67%; complete by FY 71), 1 Engineer Battalion (50% complete by FY 71), 1 Infantry Battalion (0%; 25% by FY 72), 2 Artillery Battalions (0%; complete by FY 72). Navy--1 Patrol Ship Squadron, 5 ships (57%; complete by FY 72), 1 Coast Guard Squadron, 3 ships (38%; complete by FY 72). Air Force--SAW Squadron (88%; complete by FY 69), TAC Strike Squadron (25%; complete by FY 71), SAR/Recon. Squadron (50%; complete by FY 70-72), Light Transport Squadron, 9 aircraft (100%)..... Approximate percentages of MAP units or equipment versus the total combat inventory: Army--27%. Navy--53%. Air Force--70%. US MilGp--42 (27 Offs; 15 EM.)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

16

BOLIVIA PUBLIC SAFETY SITUATION

BACKGROUND: Police capability very low since the revolution in 1964, when the military disbanded the civil police and seized the police equipment, including commodities supplied by A.I.D. At that time, the U. S. terminated the Public Safety program which had been reasonably successful since it began in 1957.

Government of Bolivia has re-established a civil police establishment and requested assistance to improve and develop it. Country Team (CT) recommends a Public Safety program, ~~and~~ an in-country survey in June 1967 supports the CT. Problems: (1) As true during previous program, should recognize that police improvement will take time because Bolivian absorptive capacity is low; (2) Should be very careful as regards police-military cooperation and in collaboration between MAP and Public Safety assistance.

PERTINENT DATA: FY-67 Program: \$60,000 - 1 Advisor; 2 trained U. S.; weapons/ ammo (\$27,572); Area: 424,000 square miles (about same as Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana combined); Population: 4,200,000; Police Strength: 5,939; Police Distribution: 60% urban, 40% rural (2,356 in La Paz state); Ratio Police to 1,000 Population: 1.4; GNP: \$873,500,000.

REQUIREMENT: Obtain immediate approval to initiate program with the following resources:

*increased not approved*

In FY 68 - \$368,000 for: 3 advisors and 1 secretary (\$87,000); training in U. S. <sup>for</sup> (\$16,000); equipment\* (\$265,000).

(Note: Only \$22,000 requested of Congress for FY 68.)

In FY 69 - \$352,000 for: 3 advisors and 1 secretary (\$87,000); training in U. S. <sup>for</sup> (\$16,000); equipment\* (\$249,000).

\*vehicles, Arms/ammunition, riot-control

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 95-4  
By CB, NARA, Date 6-5-96

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

COLOMBIA PUBLIC SAFETY SITUATION

BACKGROUND: On initiation program (January 1963) police lacked adequate communications, firearms, and training in their use; had little ability to control violence; were poorly organized and duplicated functions. Today, the communications lack partially remedied; firearms deficiency resolved; effective riot control capability exists; police counterinsurgency task forces operating; two police patrol aircraft provided; some needed changes in organization and functional duplication; trained 302 in U. S. and 38,352 in country. Problem: Chronic fund shortage seriously reduces police capability rural areas.

PERTINENT DATA: FY-67 Program: \$478,000 - 8 advisors, 44 trained U. S., equipment (\$195,000); Area: 440,000 sq. miles (California, Arizona, Oregon, Washington combined); Population: 18.5 million; Cities over 200,000: 5; Police Strength: 31,573; Police Distribution: 59% urban, 41% rural; Ratio Police to 1,000 Population: 1.7; GNP: \$5,726,000,000; Per Capita GNP: \$325.

REQUIREMENT: FY 68 - \$699,000, an increase of \$369,000 above \$330,000 request to Congress ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~. This permits expansion rural areas by adding 2 Advisors to present 8 (reinstating position eliminated without consulting OPS and authorizing 1 additional position) and by adding \$150,000 for expanding rural tactical communications, and to replace old equipment used jointly by police and military. Also, will continue: training; ~~emphas~~ <sup>for 2 addl provinces</sup> <sub>come</sub> emphasis on urban operations, vehicle maintenance and intelligence; advise on planning/administrative police budgets.

*increased  
has not been  
approved*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC PUBLIC SAFETY SITUATION

**BACKGROUND:** With Public Safety assistance from mid-1962 to early 1965, an effective police force was developing. Virtually complete rebuilding necessary after 1965 revolt. **Progress:** (1) 2,507 trained in rural area, command training completed down through Majors, and there is a new Police Training School; (2) civil disturbance control group (800) developed; (3) national communications capability and new crime statistics unit established; (4) vehicle repair garage installed. **Problem:** Frequent changes of Chief of Police (appointment made on political rather than professional basis) and continued changes of Minister of Interior.

**PERTINENT DATA:** FY-67 Program: \$720,000 - 16 advisors, 38 trained U. S., equipment (\$309,000); Area: 18,000 square miles (about size of Vermont and New Hampshire combined); Population: 3,700,000; Police Strength: 8,700; Ratio of Police to 1,000 Population: 2.4; GNP: \$1,068,000,000; Per Capita GNP: \$274.

**REQUIREMENT:** Continue implementing CASP program IRG/ARA approved:

	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 69</u>	<u>FY 70</u>	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 72</u>
(in thousands)	\$761	\$831	\$780	\$780	\$300

*increased approval*

**TO DO:** (1) U. S. use influence to get professionally qualified Chief of Police; (2) establish proper chain of command and coordination; (3) establish mobile patrol in rural areas; (4) develop highway patrol service; (5) provide communications capability for patrol operations and increase efficiency of police communications net; (6) revamp investigation department and records and identification facilities; (7) train/retrain entire force in regular police duties including riot control; and (8) develop effective customs service and border patrol.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ECUADOR PUBLIC SAFETY SITUATION

BACKGROUND: Since inception (1959) program has helped create reasonably adequate police capability in urban areas and good coordination with military in riot control; however, capability rural areas remains very low. Police intelligence offices are operating in three cities. An inter-province communications network expanded, mobile radio patrol increasing. 224 trained in U. S.; 5,214 given in-country training that improved considerably. Vehicle maintenance facilities established. Problems: (1) Capabilities of Customs Police, responsible for customs, contraband and border control, seriously undercut by political maneuvers and budget reductions; (2) strength of police forces (5,610) needs increasing to provide for rural needs but this will be very difficult due to budget inadequacies that impede function of existing force.

PERTINENT DATA: FY-67 Program: \$248,000 - 6 Advisors, 15 train U. S., equipment (\$56,000); Area: 112,000 sq. miles (about size Nevada); Population: 5,400,000; Police Strength: 5,610; Ratio Police to 1,000 Population: 1.0; Police Distribution: Urban 79%, Rural 21%; GNP: \$1,208,000,000; Per Capita GNP: \$219.

*CT recommended increase not approved*

REQUIREMENT: FY 68: \$425,000, an increase of \$198,000 above the \$227,000 FY-68 request to Congress. Permits expansion in rural areas (as Country Team recommended) by adding 2 Advisors to present 6 and by providing an additional \$150,000 for equipment. Also will continue: (1) organizing and equipping police intelligence offices; (2) emphasis on effectiveness of inter-province communications network, of mobile communication capabilities, of vehicle maintenance and utilization, and of training; (3) attempts to revitalize Customs Police, increase police strength by 1,000, establish police career system, secure 5% annual budget increase for police operations.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

GUATEMALA PUBLIC SAFETY SITUATION

BACKGROUND: From 1962 until late 1966, the program (initiated 1957) was a holding operation due unwillingness GOG make organizational changes. GOG attitude since changed significantly: police forces reorganized and integrated; GOG purchased in U. S. \$175,000 worth vehicles this spring; GOG now plans increase police strength by 3,000 supported by purchase in U. S. of \$400,000 arms/munitions and budget for upkeep. We supported reorganization with \$324,000 worth equipment. We will provide training and advice for force increase. A city model precinct operation implemented; 7 police mobile training teams functioning; 176 trained in U. S.; 14,545 trained in country. Problems: (1) Traditionally inadequate police budget strained by: expanded and reorganized force, the need to raise police salaries, the development of rural capability; (2) military suspicion and domination of police. (Note: The IRG/ARA has asked Country Team for views and recommendations on police/military roles and requirements for U. S. assistance.)

PERTINENT DATA: FY-67 Program: \$567,000 - 4 Advisors, 63 train U. S., equipment (\$374,000); Area: 42,000 sq. miles (about size Tennessee); Population: 4,800,000; Police Strength: 5,141; Ratio of Police to 1,000 Population: 1.0; GNP: \$1,588,000,000; Per Capita GNP: \$337.

REQUIREMENT: FY 68: \$430,000, an increase of \$150,000 above \$280,000 FY-68 request to Congress. Permits expansion into rural areas with development of one model department by adding 2 Advisors to present 4 and by adding \$100,000 for communications, mobility, and other essential police equipment. Also, will continue: (1) advice on police organization and on establishment police career system; (2) develop effective capabilities in training, records, communications, criminalistics, and in control of borders, customs, and immigration; develop integrated equipment maintenance capability; (3) create coordinated police/military capability for controlling subversion/insurgency.

~~SECRET~~

PERU PUBLIC SAFETY SITUATION

BACKGROUND: From inception (1960) program has contributed to gradual development police capability now considered good in urban areas, not good in rural areas. Country-wide communications net and maintenance facilities being installed by joint GOP-US funding; mobile training teams operational; overall training and intelligence activities steadily improving; records management, manpower utilization and patrol operations increasingly efficient and reported crimes have decreased; model precinct developing; some organizational difficulties and functional duplication remedied; 130 trained in U. S.; 8,015 trained in country. Since mid-1965, the U. S. spent \$1.75 million (includes recent \$158,000 increase) to develop Special Police Emergency Unit (SPEU) for: quick reaction to contain violence at levels that would not require use armed forces; performing rural civic action; collecting intelligence. Problem: Insufficient (and faulty administration of) funds to operate, maintain, replace equipment; rural areas are particularly affected.

PERTINENT DATA: FY-67 Program: \$569,000 - 11 Advisors, 13 train U. S., equipment (\$243,000); Area: 514,000 sq. miles (about three times size of California); Population: 12,200,000; Police Strength: 28,000; Ratio Police to 1,000 Population: 2.2; GNP: \$4,281,000,000; Per Capita GNP: \$367.

REQUIREMENT: Continue CASP program approved by IRG/ARA:

	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 69</u>	<u>FY 70</u>	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 72</u>
(in thousands)	\$321	\$300	\$250	\$200	\$200

TO DO: (1) Advise on budgeting/administering 100% increase (from \$3.1 to \$6.2 million) in operational funds over four years; (2) complete model police station; (3) continue improve efficiency in training, records, manpower and equipment utilization, border and riot control; (4) complete installation country-wide communications net; (5) continue assist SPEU.

~~SECRET~~

VENEZUELA PUBLIC SAFETY SITUATION

BACKGROUND: From initiation in May 1962, the program tremendously successful through technical advice and training. GOV purchased all equipment. 149 trained in U. S., 10,000 in-country; communications center developed; automatic data processing installed for records; urban mobility raised to generally adequate level; strength of force increased; adequate riot-control capability created.

Problems: (1) The GOV tends to forget insurgent potential, and resources for police capability in rural areas are reportedly insufficient. (Note: IRG/ARA requested Country Team reassessment of CASP on Venezuelan and U. S. resources for security in rural areas.) (2) Political maneuvers debilitate police intelligence capability.

PERTINENT DATA: FY-67 Program: \$400,000 - 11 Advisors, 63 train U. S. Area: 352,000 square miles (about size Idaho, Utah, Wyoming, Colorado); Population: 9,000,000; Police Strength: 30,233; Ratio Police to 1,000 Population: 3.6; GNP: \$7,881,000,000; Per Capita GNP: \$843.

REQUIREMENT: FY 68 - \$403,000, an increase of \$50,000 above \$353,000 FY-68 request to Congress. Permits adding 2 Advisors (to present 11) to work exclusively in rural areas with National Guard. Also, will continue: (1) expand program into interior Venezuela through regional training and training of state and district agencies; (2) assistance for establishment national records center and a national medical-legal/criminalistics facility; (3) concentration on training in U. S. and in-country; (4) emphasis on police intelligence capability.

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

2/

*[Handwritten scribbles]*

*Subjects to others, 3d option  
in Kohler memo.*

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE |  
WASHINGTON

EO 13526 3.3(h)(2)

2a~~SECRET~~

Wednesday - September 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Captured Documents in Bolivia

CIA has made a preliminary technical analysis of guerrilla documents discovered by Bolivian security forces in early August 1967 (Tab A).

With respect to the documents relating to "Che" Guevara, its findings are:

- two of the passports bearing different names carry the same photograph and fingerprints.
- the fingerprints are identical to examples of prints of Guevara furnished to CIA [ ] in 1954 and [ ] in 1965. 3.3(h)(2)
- a CIA photo comparison analyst is of the opinion that the photographs are "most probably" photographs of Guevara in disguise.
- the passports show that Guevara most likely travelled legally from Madrid to Sao Paulo, Brazil at the end of October, 1966, and from there to La Paz on November 3, although the documents do not indicate arrival in La Paz.
- certain snapshots of what looks like Guevara in the jungle give no evidence of a montage.

The foregoing leads to a strong presumption that Guevara was in Bolivia, but it is still short of conclusive proof. The CIA report avoids drawing conclusions.

The Bolivians want our analysis of the documents to use in the Regis Debray trial to demonstrate Cuban involvement in the guerrilla movement. As explained in Covey Oliver's memo to Foy Kohler (Tab B), this raises questions about the wisdom of our furnishing the only analysis of the documents.

My view is that the nature of the documents and photos are such that they can be attacked as a CIA plant, particularly if we come out as the only authenticating source. This would tend to discredit the evidence

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED  
Authenticity NY 17-10  
By CTS, NARA, Date 5/18/18

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

-2-

and weaken the Bolivian case against Debray. The risk is reduced by having the Bolivians announce that they have captured these documents and ask several governments of countries where "Che" is known to have resided (Argentina, Peru, Guatemala, Mexico) or who have special analysis capabilities (Brazil and U.S.) to assess the documents.

In his memo to Kohler, Oliver outlines five options for handling our response to the Bolivians. He recommends the third option which corresponds to <sup>the</sup> course of action described in the preceding paragraph. I understand that Kohler and Helms endorse the third option. I have not heard Nitze's views yet.

I recommend -- subject to Peter Jessup confirming the concurrence of the other 303 Committee members -- that you approve the third option in the Oliver memorandum.

An info memo to the President based on the assumption of 303 approval is at Tab C.

WGB

WGBowdler

cc - Peter Jessup

#### Attachments

Tab A - Analysis of documents.

Tab B - Oliver memo to Kohler

Tab C - Info memo to President.

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

26

A

2G

B

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Bowdler

26

~~TOP SECRET~~ MEMORANDUM

TO : G - Mr. Kohler

FROM : ARA-- Covey T. Oliver

SUBJECT: Handling of Documents Relating to Cuban Intervention  
Captured in Bolivia

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 92-38  
By mg NARA, Date 5-26-92

In a meeting on September 1 of the IRG/ARA Committee on Counterinsurgency to determine (1) the validity of the documents in question and (2) the course of action to be followed, it was agreed that the documents could have rather broad ramifications and should therefore be considered at a higher level.

The Bolivian Government, specifically General Ovando, had instructed the Bolivian military courier who brought the documents to return before the resumption of the Debray trial with the most important documents and a report of their analysis which would provide answers to two questions:

1. Has Che Guevara been present in Bolivia?
2. Is there proof of Cuban participation in the guerrilla operations?

A response to General Ovando's request raises at least the following questions:

1. Does it involve us in the Debray trial in a way that

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

would hurt us and the Bolivians? The Communists, for example, may assert we fabricated the documents. The French press may charge we are out to get Debray, etc.

2. How much technical analysis should we provide? On all documents? On only some? In writing? Orally?
3. Should we encourage Bolivia to seek help elsewhere?
4. Can the documents be used in the OAS case of Venezuela vs. Cuba?
5. Should we counsel Bolivia to disclose some documents, but not all, since some of the documents provide additional intelligence leads that may be valuable?

Various alternatives were suggested for handling the problem. The possibility was noted that the return of the Bolivian courier with the documents and report could, if necessary, be delayed for a few days to permit adequate time for implementing whichever option were chosen. The 5 options considered were:

1. To return the documents with a technical report for the Bolivian Government to use at the trial, i.e., respond to the Ovando request.
2. Have the Bolivian Government publicly announce that it had captured certain documents, especially passports,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

and request the U.S. Government to provide experts on identification to analyze the documents.

3. To follow the same procedure as (2.) but for the Bolivian Government to direct its request to several countries including the U.S. Other possible countries include Argentina, where Guevara was born, Mexico, Peru, and Guatemala where he is known to have lived, and Brazil where among other places the passports were used.
4. To follow the same procedure as in (2.) but with the Bolivian Government request directed to the OAS and with member governments of the OAS being called on to assist on the verification as feasible.
5. To follow the procedure of (4.) but include the request that the OAS establish an investigating committee with the purpose of coordinating the efforts of member governments.

Of the various alternatives: The first has the deficiency of linking the U.S. too closely to the Debray trial. Alternative 2 also represents an unnecessary involvement of the U.S. on a bilateral basis. As between Bolivia calling on various countries individually and turning to the OAS for assistance, the latter would be preferable, if feasible, particularly since it would

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

coincide with the forthcoming meeting of the OAS Foreign Ministers to consider Cuban intervention in Venezuela. The evidence which has been found in the Bolivian case would generally strengthen the anti-Cuban case in the MFM. Finally, alternative 5 is preferable to 4 because it includes a formal OAS mechanism for dealing with the Bolivian issue.

However, the Bolivian Government has so far been unwilling to utilize the OAS machinery on its guerrilla problem or associate its case with the Venezuelan case. There is also the complicating problem that the OAS machinery may grind too slowly to meet Bolivia's needs.

Thus, I suggest we encourage Bolivia to follow alternative 3 on the passports and the false OAS documentation. We should ask the Bolivian Government to keep secret the documents on communications procedures for further study. Moreover, a preliminary analysis of them suggests that they would be useful publicly only if we were willing to disclose U.S. communications intelligence.

ARA/BC:WBroderick:nf  
RMSayre:ars 9/2/67

cc: Mr. Lister, Mr. Allen

~~SECRET~~

2i

C

~~SECRET~~

6/24/67

To understand these figures it is necessary to appreciate that each organized guerrilla can tie up 10-20 government soldiers. We do better in Viet-nam only because of airpower, mobility, firepower, etc.

3

For the

Mr. President, from Walt Rostow

As you requested, I had a good meeting this morning with CIA, State and DOD on the whole guerrilla problem in Latin America.

This is the boxscore:

Country by degree of urgency	Number of active guerrillas	Hard evidence of Cuban involvement
Bolivia	60-100	<u>Yes</u> : Cuban military officers among ranks, arms and training.
Guatemala	300	<u>Yes</u> : arms deliveries via Mexico.
Venezuela	400	<u>Yes</u> : arms, training, Cuban military personnel captured during infiltration mission, Cuban admission of operation.
Colombia	800	<u>Yes</u> : but only training in Cuba.
Dominican Republic	dormant	<u>Yes</u> : training, funds and special agents.
Ecuador	dormant	<u>Yes</u> : but only training in Cuba.
Peru	dormant	<u>Yes</u> : but only training in Cuba.

Sent to Rostow 6/24/67 CAP 67582

These are some further insights into the situation in each country:

Bolivia: We have put Bolivia on top of the list more because of the fragility of the political situation and the weakness of the armed forces than the size and effectiveness of the guerrilla movement. The active band numbers probably 50-60 but may run up to 100. CIA believes that "Che" Guevara has been with this group. There are indications that six other bands, totalling

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-39

By [signature], NARA, Date 10-12-94

~~SECRET~~

100-200 men may be organizing in other parts of the country. President Barrientos is hard/pressed in coping with the active band. If other fronts were successfully opened, the situation could get out of hand. The 17-man Mobile Training Team we have in Bolivia expects to have another Ranger Battalion trained by September 1.

The active movement has 8 top Bolivian Communist Party leaders in it who were trained in the Soviet Union. The owner of the farm which the guerrillas used as their training camp belongs to a man (Roberto Peredo) who visited Moscow in 1966. We know of six Cuban military officers in this band. We also know that they have radio contact with Cuba using the same procedures taught by the Soviets.

Guatemala: The guerrillas are divided into two organizations. The FAR -- 250 men -- has the backing of Castro. Last summer when President Mendez Montenegro took over, the guerrillas were making steady progress. With the death of FAR leader Turcios and strong pressure by the Guatemalan military, the guerrillas have been scattered and are on the defensive.

In September 1966, Mexican authorities uncovered an arms smuggling channel to Guatemalan insurgents. Documents found showed that over 4000 weapons had been sent. A Cuban Embassy officer was caught red-handed passing money to the smugglers.

~~SECRET~~

Venezuela: This is Cuba's primary target. After 1963 the guerrilla movement came to a virtual standstill while the Venezuelan Communist Party debated whether to pursue the peaceful or violent approach. The party split and Douglas Bravo led the activist faction into resumed guerrilla activity. Since mid-1966 his group (150-250 men) and the MIR group (100 men) have stepped up their campaign. Leoni responded by organizing 9 new Ranger Battalions which we are helping to train and equip.

Soviet-manufactured AK-13 weapons have been captured in Venezuela from guerrillas known to have landed from Cuba in July 1966. The boat and motors used are known to have come from Cuba. In May 1967 a Cuban/Venezuelan group landed from a Cuban fishing vessel. The Venezuelans escaped into the mountains, but two Cubans were captured and two killed.

Colombia: There are two guerrilla units operating, one responsive to Cuba and the other to the USSR. After a long inactive period, they resumed operations last February. So far the operations have consisted of sporadic hit-and-run raids. The Colombian armed forces, which are well-trained and disciplined, are putting pressure on them. President Lleras has moved quickly to improve intelligence collection, strengthen coordination between services and mount social programs in guerrilla areas. There is no Cuban presence in Colombia, but there is hard evidence of Colombians being trained in Cuba. The guerrillas do not represent an immediate threat to Lleras.

~~SECRET~~

Dominican Republic: There are no active guerrillas although there are indications that the Communist MPD and 14th of June Movement would like to open a front. The Dominican armed forces are keeping a close watch on their activities. Balaguer has given strong support to our efforts to help him develop special anti-guerrilla units. In recent months Dominican authorities have obtained documents from Cuban-trained agents showing that Cuba is furnishing money and training for guerrilla activities.

Ecuador and Peru: Cuba tried to start guerrilla activities in these two countries about two years ago. The movements were quickly put down, but they remain as potential trouble spots. Cuba continues to train nationals from both countries.

I have collected a full folder of background material which you may want to review.

I told my working group to make a careful review of what we were now doing in each country and meet with me again in one week to discuss additional measures which we might take to strengthen the anti-guerrilla capabilities of these countries.

W.W.R.

20

4

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

L

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, June 28, 1967  
3:55 p. m.

Mr. President:

The capture of 16 Communist terrorists in Caracas, reported in the attached cable, is good news; although it does not justify complacency about the threat to Venezuela.

*W. Rostow*  
W. Rostow

Caracas 6765

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 71292-85

By rs/jw, NARA, Date 11-94

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

4a  
WWR  
FYI  
WB

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

90  
Action  
ARA  
Info  
SS  
GPM  
SP  
SC  
SAH  
L  
H  
P  
USIA  
NSC  
INR  
CIA  
NSA  
DOD  
NIC  
AID  
PC  
RSR  
RSC

VZCZCE SB388E XX845R SA44 1  
RR RUEHC RULPAL  
DE RUESRS 6765 1742013  
ZNY CCCCC  
R 232007Z JUN 67  
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RULPAL/USC INCSO  
RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA  
RUESSD/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO  
RUESJO/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE  
RUESLN/AMEMBASSY LIMA  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CARACAS 6765

20339  
1967 JUNE 23 PM 5 35

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71992-89

By reg/iv, NARA, Date 11-1-94

1. MINISTRY OF INTERIOR PRESS CONFERENCE LAST NIGHT REVEALED DETAILS OF POLICE CAPTURE OF 16 COMMUNIST TERRORISTS IN CARACAS ACCOMPLISHED THIS WEEK. LEADERS OF GROUP HAD ESTABLISHED TERRORIST RECORDS. IMPRESSIVE VOLUME OF WEAPONS, FALN PROPAGANDA AND DOCUMENTS SIGNED BY HARD-LINE DISSIDENT LEADER DOUGLAS BRAVO AS RECENTLY AS JUNE 6 WERE ALSO TAKEN. GOV OFFICIALS JUBILANT OVER SUCCESSFUL ACTION AND ARE SPEAKING OF IT AS DECISIVE BLOW TO TERRORIST MOVEMENT. ACTION COMMENCED WITH ARRESTS TERRORIST LEADER RAUL CHIRINOS AND HIS CHILEAN GIRLFRIEND. FROM THEM DIGEPOL ACQUIRED LEADS WHICH LED TO ARREST OF SEVERAL MORE WHO IN TURN PROVIDED INFORMATION WHICH CULMINATED IN TOTAL OF 16 CAPTURES.

2. WITH RECENT SUCCESSFUL ARREST MIR TERRORIST LEADERS AMERICO MARTIN AND LEONET CANALES JUNE 9, AND DIMINUTION COMMUNIST VIOLENCE OVER PAST TWO MONTHS, THERE IS WIDE-SPREAD TENDENCY TO ASSUME END OF COMMUNIST INSURGENCY MAY BE IN SIGHT. OUR OWN TENTATIVE ESTIMATE IS THAT BADLY SPLIT COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IS DELIBERATELY DISENGAGING FROM ANY INITIATIVES IN EFFORT TO REBUILD ITS CAPABILITY. THIS ACTION IS COMPOUNDED BY FACT HEAVY RAINS HAVE NOW BEGUN; BACHILLER MOUNTAIN AREA AND YARACUY THEATER OF OPERATIONS VIRTUALLY UNINHABITABLE IN RAINY SEASON. FORMER AREA, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS SIMILAR SEASONAL PATTERN OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITY GOING BACK OVER PAST FIVE YEARS. POLICE AUTHORITIES HERE AGREE THAT LIKELIHOOD INCREASED URBAN TERRORISM IS NOW ENHANCED BY RETURN OF SIGNIFICANT NUMBER GUERRILLAS FROM THE MOUNTAINS TO CARACAS DURING THIS PERIOD AND POLICE HAVE STEPPED UP PREVENTIVE ARRESTS, ETC. THUS, WHILE SUCCESSES HAVE BEEN SCORED, IT IS CLEARLY PREMATURE TO INTERPRET THIS AS A FUNDAMENTAL DEFEAT FOR TERRORIST THREAT.

GP-3  
BERNBAUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

6/

14 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : CUBAN-INSPIRED GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN BOLIVIA

CUBAN SPONSORSHIP OF BOLIVIAN GUERRILLAS

1. In the first six months of 1967, reports have been received indicating the presence of seven distinct guerrilla groups in Bolivia, located in widely separated parts of the country, as shown on the attached map. To date, only one of these, located north of Camiri in the Department of Santa Cruz, has gone into action. Presumably the others are in various stages of training. Their presence poses a grave threat to Bolivian stability.

2. It has been evident from the outset that Cuba has played a key role in the initiation, implementation and execution of guerrilla activity in Bolivia. As early as January 1966, when Rene Roberto Olivares Garcia, a leader of the pro-Soviet Communist Party of Bolivia (PCB/S) was in Cuba for guerrilla training, Cuban leaders told him that they were convinced that guerrilla warfare will expand throughout Latin America and eventually will succeed in overthrowing unpopular governments. Subsequent reports have proved that the Cubans trained scores of Bolivians both in Cuba and in Bolivia, supplied the guerrillas with large sums of money, modern automatic weapons, munitions, radio equipment, medical supplies. These facts combine to attest to a carefully prepared plan for widespread guerrilla activity.

3. Ernesto "Che" Guevara according to several reports from different sources, is personally directing Bolivian guerrilla activities and has been physically present with the guerrillas in Bolivia. A number of other Cuban military officers have been positively identified as members of the guerrilla band north of Camiri. These include: Lt. Leonardo Tamayo Nunez, Comandante Antonio Sanchez Diaz, Captain Gustavo Ricardo Machin Hoed de Beche, Comandante Jose Nivaldo Cauce Perez and Captain Roberto Sanchez Barthelomey.

INABILITY OF THE BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT TO COPE WITH THE GUERRILLAS

4. In the 10 weeks since the outbreak of guerrilla activity, the government of Rene Barrientos Ortuno has repeatedly demonstrated its total inability to cope with the guerrillas. Despite persistent rumors, the Government, blinded by its phobia

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 12-419

By LLB NARA, Date 10-23-2013

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

regarding the political threat of the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), refused to admit the possibility of guerrilla warfare in Bolivia until early March 1967. After considerable prodding, Army patrols began to follow up reports of groups of bearded strangers in southeast Bolivia. On 23 March, an Army patrol stumbled into a guerrilla hideout. The guerrillas reacted immediately, killing one officer, five men and one civilian guide. In addition, they wounded five men and took 21 prisoners. The prisoners were released after the guerrillas had treated the wounded, interrogated the officers and men, and stripped them of their weapons, equipment and clothes. In subsequent clashes, the Army fared no better. The guerrillas repeatedly escaped virtually unscathed, enriched by the spoils of battle, while the Army suffered mounting loses in dead and wounded, even when MAP-trained troops were engaged.

5. The Army is handicapped by the fact that most officers have been trained in traditional warfare and have no comprehension of guerrilla tactics. The majority of the men are raw recruits with little or no training. All are unfamiliar with the terrain. Officers are arbitrarily assigned to squads, and frequently issue orders to soldiers not even under their command, causing endless confusion. Soldiers are demoralized by the lack of food, medical facilities, faulty weapons, and the terrifying ferocity of guerrilla attacks from the dense jungle. Communications between field headquarters and the Army Command in La Paz are extremely unreliable. This means that literally no one in the Army Command has an accurate understanding of events in the guerrilla area. This is aggravated by the fact that officers reporting on skirmishes do not hesitate to distort the facts to cover their own ineptitude. At the high command level, the President and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces differ sharply on tactics to be used to combat the guerrillas. Barrientos, who is an Air Force general, favors bombing; a thesis Army General Alfredo Ovando Candia rejects on the grounds that it is impossible for the pilots to spot targets through the thick undergrowth. Each tends to blame the other for failure to deal effectively with the situation. These differences have served to widen the already existing breach between Barrientos and Ovando.

INSTABILITY OF THE BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT

6. The Government's failure to eliminate the guerrillas has encouraged opposition political parties, student groups and labor agitators to become restive. MNR signs of reunification, unruly student demonstrations, agitation in the larger mines and continued costly clashes with the guerrillas have collectively

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


-3-

caused Barrientos to declare a state of siege effective 8 June 1967. There is no reason to assume, however, that the emergency powers now available to Barrientos would enable him to cope with the situation if additional outbreaks of guerrilla activity occur in various parts of Bolivia simultaneously. Should this happen, it is probable that drastic changes would take place in the already weakened Bolivian governmental structure to the point where significant advances could be made by the extreme left. This could lead to a government composed of a loose coalition of leftist parties. Both President Juan Carlos Ongania, of Argentina and President Eduardo Frei, of Chile agreed at the Summit Conference in Uruguay in April 1967, that if Barrientos is overthrown and replaced with a left-wing leader like Juan Lechin Oquendo, they will intervene with their armed forces.

7. It is possible that the Soviet Union will recognize the possibilities of aggravating the situation in Bolivia as a means of drawing world attention away from their humiliating defeat in the Middle East. By supporting the Bolivian guerrillas through Cuba, they could help bring down the Bolivian Government; spread guerrilla activities into the five countries bordering Bolivia; reinforce their relations with Cuba; attempt to provoke the United States into unpopular action in Latin America--while concealing their own direct participation.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



Base 56288 5-67

1. Area where Fidel Castro reportedly is ready to launch guerrilla warfare.
2. Camp composed of Bolivians, Peruvians, Brazilians and Colombians on Maniquí River.
3. 30-40 man group located around Mururata, 45 miles NE of La Paz.
4. PCB/S band in the Alto Beni region (approximate location).
5. PCB/S band in Chapare region (approximate location).
6. Guerrilla groups in the Huanuni mines. (70)
7. Guerrilla group led by Alcebiades Velardi (approximate location).
8. 60-100 man guerrilla band north of Camiri, the only group to have clashed with the Bolivian Army to date.

14 June 1967

~~SECRET~~

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE ~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~  
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

*Intelligence*  
*Note* - 521

June 23, 1967

To : The Acting Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : INR - George C. Denney, Jr. *A.C.D.*  
Subject: Crisis Management in Bolivia: Government Flounders but Keeps its Footing

Bolivia's crisis continues, but it now seems evident that the unrest among western tin miners has not sparked a general movement of opposition to the government. President Barrientos' efforts to strengthen his political position by negotiations with the Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB) have come to naught, and the Huanuni tin miners have declared the Huanuni area a "free territory." Nevertheless, Barrientos has taken no drastic actions (e.g. violent repression of the miners) thus far, and he has retained the support of the military. Moreover, there are no signs of a coalescence of the several elements in the population capable of seriously threatening public order; the guerrillas in southeastern Bolivia, the miners in the west, students, opposition political groupings of the left. The cumulative total of adverse factors in the present crisis creates a somewhat more somber impression than do the same factors examined individually. The crisis could clearly sharpen as a result of largely unpredicable events, but the general outlook is no worse -- and in some respects slightly more hopeful -- than it was last week.

The guerrilla movement. The Bolivian armed forces have found it difficult to retain contact with the guerrilla force and are still a long way from stamping out the movement. There have been rumors of possible new guerrilla "fronts", but such reports seem somewhat overdrawn and unrealistic in view of the small size of the guerrilla movement, estimated to number about 60 members. We have seen no evidence of successful recruiting efforts by the guerrillas. The Soviet-oriented Bolivian Communist Party

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 92-38

By *mg* NARA, Date *5-26-92*

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

(PCB) is reported to have set up "classroom training" for party members in guerrilla warfare, but this is unlikely to add to the government's problems in the immediate future.

The present guerrilla movement can probably evade and harass the counterinsurgent forces for an indefinite period, but it does not in itself and at its present size constitute a serious threat to the government.

The unrest in the mining areas. The best efforts of extreme leftist agitators have apparently failed to spark any massive, violent move against the government or to weld the miners to the guerrillas. The focus of miner discontent is situated in Huanuni, where miners have declared a "free territory." They made similar declarations during periods of unrest in 1964 and 1965 and are probably seeking leverage to get concessions from the government, including lifting the state of siege. Nevertheless, the rank and file miners seem little inclined to cooperate with the guerrillas, despite the urging of extremist leaders.

The miners are rumored to have received arms, possibly from sources in Chile, but the rumors are unconfirmed. Marxist parties in Chile have expressed support for the Bolivian guerrilla movement but there is no evidence that the Chilean extreme left has attempted or intends to provide material support either to the insurgents or the miners. The effective Chilean military and police forces would undoubtedly make every effort to block the movement of arms into Bolivia.

Political opposition and students. Leftist opposition groups would like to take advantage of the guerrilla movement and miner discontent to improve their own position. However, these groups are at odds among themselves, generally ineffectual, and subject to considerable harassment and some repression by the government. Bolivian university

and high school students sympathize with the tin miners and to some extent, probably, with the guerrillas, but the students have remained quiet during the present crisis. We see no indications of impending student moves to show solidarity with either the miners or guerrillas.

The short-run outlook. President Barrientos reportedly hopes to engage in "personal dialogue" with the tin miners later this month. His chances of effecting a relaxation of the present tension seem good. Making concessions on pay and working conditions to the miners would cause difficulties for the national mining corporation, COMIBOL, but at the same time would likely undercut the efforts of extremist mine leaders to radicalize miner discontent in the direction of support for the guerrillas. The greatest danger in the short term would lie in the coalescence of groups or movements capable of violence. If the government should take harshly repressive measures against the miners, that coalescence might occur. However, Barrientos has not authorized such measures thus far and his chances of avoiding drastic action seem somewhat better than even.

*Tri-Continental Conference  
Habana - Jan 1966*

SPEECH BY SHARAF R. RASHIDOV,  
HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION,  
DELIVERED ON JANUARY 6, 1966 1/

*note p 71*

On behalf of the Soviet people, we extend hearty greetings to the participants in this history-making conference of representatives of Asian, African and Latin American peoples who are fighting - against imperialism and colonialism, for freedom and independence, for peace and social progress.

I am happy to convey fraternal greetings from the peoples of the Land of Soviets to the freedom-loving people of Cuba, and we wholeheartedly thank the government and people of Cuba for their fraternal hospitality and for all they have done to convene this conference.

It is significant that this forum of the peoples of three continents is meeting in Havana at a time when the Cuban people and the entire progressive humanity is observing the seventh anniversary of the victory of the glorious Cuban Revolution. We are witnessing the magnificent achievements of the Cuban people in the creation of a new social system, its progress in civilian construction and in the strengthening of the defence of their free motherland. As a free nation, Cuba -- the first socialist state on the American continent -- symbolizes the invincibility of a people fighting for liberation from imperialist oppression and working for socialism. We congratulate our dear Cuban brothers on the occasion of their great revolutionary holiday -- Liberation Day - and wish them every success in building a socialist society. On this solemn day all Soviet people declare once again: we are always with you, our dear Cuban friends; we are with you on a day of trial, and on a day of joy and jubilation, in the common effort and in the common struggle for the triumph of socialism.

First of all I wish to stress that the Soviet delegation has come to this conference with the objective of facilitating in every way the unification of the anti-imperialist forces of the three continents to lend still greater scope and still greater effectiveness to our common struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism - headed by the United States of America. Our attitude is clear to all and we do not intend to enter into polemics. The rostrum of our conference should be the rostrum of unity, not dissention.

1. Photocopy of English version published by the Tricontinental Conference, in Havana.

Dear friends:

We are participants in a remarkable event in the history of the national liberation struggle of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples. The anti-imperialist struggle with its requirements of staunch unity of the fighting forces has led the people of our continents to realize the urgency of even closer unity and even greater coordination in our struggle against the common enemy imperialism, and first of all, against U.S. imperialism. The peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America in their drive for united action join hands for militant solidarity and revolutionary friendship. The Soviet delegation wholeheartedly supports the suggestion about the establishment of a three continent solidarity organization at this Conference.

We are living in a great epoch. One after another we see the collapse of the pillars of a system based on exploitation and violence, on national oppression and social inequality. The crumbling of imperialism's colonialist system is a vivid expression of the great worldwide historical process of liberation of the peoples from all types of oppression.

However, we must not forget for a single moment that colonialism--a mortally wounded and agonizing of prey-- has not been destroyed. It is trying to prolong its criminal life. It is resorting every means trying to preserve itself in Angola and Mozambique, in the so-called "Portuguese" Guinea and in Spain's domain in Africa, in the South of Arabian Peninsula, Aden, North Kalimantan, in the islands of the Caribbean basin and the Pacific ocean, and in other parts of the world.

Addressing you from this lofty rostrum we declare: there should be no place for colonialism on earth: it should be completely wiped off the face of the earth, once and for all. Sacred is the right of the peoples to fight for the complete destruction of colonialism and neo-colonialism using all means at their disposal, Soviet people has always supported people's wars, the armed struggle of the oppressed peoples and has been rendering them every possible support and assistance.

It took the colonialists several centuries to establish their colonialist system. But to undermine it and then to crush it, it took only several decades of a joint struggle by the peoples after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the defeat of fascism in World War Two, after the victories of the Chinese Revolution and the national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The swift historical struggle sweeping away the colonialist system is predetermined by the courage and heroism of the oppressed peoples themselves, by the might and united action of all anti-imperialist forces.

The Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement represent an important milestone in the history of the anti-imperialist struggle. Born in the battels against imperialism, in fraternal unity with the world-wide movement for peace and security, on union with the forces of democracy and socialism, this movement has grown in the past eight years into a mighty force of our day. It has become an important mobilizing and organizing factor of the growth and consolidation of the anti-imperialist forces. One of the strongest of its facets is that it has never been a closed shop. It sought to be strengthening its ties with the worldwide anti-imperialist front, and in particular with the peoples of Latin America.

In its turn, the desire of solidarity and unity on the part of Latin American peoples has glorious traditions of long standing-dreams for such unity were cherished during the struggle for independence by great Latin American patriots, as Simon Bolivar, José de San Martín, José María Morelos and others. The very same dignified aims inspired the glorious son of the Cuban peoples thinker and fighter José Martí. What insight there is in José Martí's firm belief that America, struggling for freedom and independence, should encourage everything that brings the peoples closer together and hate everything that divides them. How true these words of the great Cuban revolutionary ring today.

The reactionaries have repeatedly set up obstacles to block the unification of the liberation movements of the three continents. But despite all intrigues of colonialists our unity has become an indisputable factor, a vivid proof of which is the current-Conference.

The winning of national independence by the majority of Asian and African peoples and the revolutionary upsurge in many Latin American countries has brought the liberation movements of the three continents closer together, both as regards their content and the objectives. This is what forms a real basis for effective solidarity the need of which has been motivated by life itself and which has become the motto of the first Conference of the three continents.

We express our appreciation to the people of the United Arab Republic and to President Gamal Abdel Nasser for the invitation to hold the Second Three Continent Solidarity Conference in Cairo.

We are meeting at a time when the international situation has deteriorated gravely. Losing one position after another imperialists are resorting to extremely reactionary actions including armed intervention in an attempt to stop the national and social liberation of the peoples.

In their aggressive actions against the freedom loving peoples, the imperialist powers are bound up by a mutual conspiracy despite the contradictions existing among them. They are striving to coordinate their efforts, are working out joint plans of -- struggle against socialism and the national liberation movement. The main headquarters of imperialist conspirators and the foundation of the worldwide military and strategic system of imperialism is the NATO.

The West German imperialism, which has become one of the main -- accomplices of the USA in the struggle against the liberation -- forces of the world, is beginning to play an increasing part -- within the NATO framework. The F.R.G. is closely cooperating -- with the Portuguese and South Africa racists, it supplies them -- with weapons, grants big loans, concludes secret agreements with the Israel against the Arab states. The main threat stems from US imperialism -- the main force of the entire imperialist camp.

In Asia imperialism's policy of piracy is especially evident in -- American criminal, aggressive war against the heroic people of Vietnam. The United States is subjecting to ~~raiding~~ air -- assaults the villages and towns of North Viet Nam, killing civilians, burning crops, destroying factories, plants and communications.

The Soviet peoples resolutely condemn US aggression against the Vietnamese people and express their solidarity with their heroic struggle against present-day barbaric forces.

Today a wave of mass meetings, rallies and demonstrations are -- taking place throughout the Soviet Union speaking at which workers, farmers, employees and representatives of intellectuals express -- their anger and protests against the disgraceful and dirty war -- waged by American imperialists in Viet Nam.

The Soviet Union is supplying the most modern weapons to the -- fraternal people of Viet Nam so as to enable them to repulse -- U.S. aggression. We are doing everything for the earliest delivery of Soviet military supplies--aircraft, missiles, artillery, -- munitions and other means-- to the Vietnamese freedom fighters.

Since the commencement of the barbaric air raids on the civilian towns and villages of Viet Nam have shot down more than 800 U.S. aircraft. Some time ago a New York weekly Time had published some lamentations of one U.S. Airforce major who said that U.S. planes come under fire at all altitudes. He stated that when -- they fly low over the ground they come under the fire of small -- arms and the anti-aircraft guns. When they fly somewhat higher they are immediately attacked by the missiles. And that to fly -- at higher altitudes means to run into the MIG fighter planes.

We, Soviet people are happy that the victory of our Vietnamese - brothers over the aggressors is facilitated also by the combat - equipment which is being enthusiastically built by the workers - of the Land of Soviets at hundreds of factories.

The Soviet people believe that a settlement in Viet Nam can be - achieved in accordance with the program put forward by the National Liberation Front on March 22, 1965 and in the resolution of North Viet Nam's National Assembly. I wish to inform the Conference that on December 9, 1965 the USSR Supreme Soviet had stated that it - fully shares this stand of the North Vietnamese government and of the National Liberation Front of South Viet Nam.

The USSR Supreme Soviet has urged the parliaments and governments of all countries to undertake the necessary efforts to make the - United States of America discontinue its aggression in Viet Nam - and to give the Vietnamese people a possibility to settle for -- themselves their internal affairs.

By indulging in hypocritical talk about negotiations, U.S. imperia lists are trying to distract attention from the escalation of -- their aggression, are trying to lull the world public opinion. - Soviet people consider it imperative to join efforts in order to give real and effective assistance to the people of Viet Nam. In order to make the solidarity with the Vietnamese people even more effective, the Soviet delegation proposes to launch an extensive -- world wide campaign of moral and material support to the fighting people of Viet Nam. We suggest the establishment of an Internation al Fund. The Soviet people will make a considerable contribution of this Fund.

A broad and a powerful mass movement of protest against the dirty war waged by American imperialists in Viet Nam, the demand of an - immediate discontinuation of this war and of the withdrawal of the troops of the USA and its allies from Viet Nam and of a settlement in Viet Nam on the basis of the Geneva agreements --all this should become the practical goal of the mass struggle of millions upon - millions of honest-minded people throughout the world.

As it escalates its military operations, the USA is stepping up -- the hostilities against Laos. U.S. aircraft are bombing and --- strafing regions controlled by the patriotic forces of Laos. At the same time, Saigon puppet troops, instigated by the Pentagon, - are carrying out bandit raids on Cambodian territory. The ruling circles of Thailand are becoming more and more involved on the - side of the reactionaries and imperialists in this struggle. All this indicates that the USA intends to spread the flames of war - over the entire peninsula of Indochina.

To repulse the rampant American aggressors in South-East Asia is a burning issue and an urgent task of all anti-imperialist forces.

If progressive mankind fails today to stop the international piracy of the USA in Viet Nam, if it fails to stop the armed interference of imperialists in the internal affairs of countries and peoples striving for freedom and independence, then tomorrow the same fate may be the lot of any country, any nation of the world, America's imperialists aggression in Viet Nam as an impudent challenge to the entire national-liberation movement, to all freedom-loving peoples in the world.

But the Vietnamese people are not alone. They are fighting for a just cause, and we are confident that they shall be victorious.

The imperialists are trying to stifle the liberation movement in Africa, too. The intervention and interference in the Congo's affairs, the economic and political support of Portuguese colonialists and of South African and South Rhodesia racists, the conspiracies against the lawful governments of African countries that have taken the road of independent development, the fanning of contradictions among them to undermine African unity --all this, is far from being the complete list of the crimes perpetrated by the imperialists on the African continent.

The colonialists recently committed another crime against the African peoples. With the connivance and virtual backing of Britain and the USA, the racist clique of Ian Smith proclaimed the so-called independence of Southern Rhodesia to perpetuate the colonialist regime, based on inhuman oppression of four million Zimbabwe peoples by a racist minority. The usurpation of power by racists in Southern Rhodesia aims to consolidate this stronghold of imperialism in Africa. This is nothing but the beginning of the ominous imperialist plan aimed at preserving the rule of the colonialists and racists in Southern and Central part of the African continent. The ruling circles of Britain will not escape responsibility for this crime against the Zimbabwe people, against all African peoples.

Persistently striving to totally liquidate colonialism and racism, the Soviet government has reaffirmed its readiness to cooperate with the African states in giving comprehensive, joint support to the Zimbabwe people in their just struggle for genuine national independence.

The U.S. imperialists have openly interfered in the affairs of the Dominican Republic and have sent their troops there to use arms in preventing the Dominican people from deciding their own future. The Dominican people, however, are relentlessly continuing their gallant struggle which will bring about the triumph of its just cause. We declare that the Soviet people stand firmly on the side of the Dominican patriots. The Soviet people, together with all the peoples of Latin America, Asia and Africa, resolutely demand the immediate withdrawal of the U.S. and other intervention forces from the Dominican Republic.

The imperialists are openly encouraging and supporting coup d'etats bringing reactionary pro-imperialist regimes into power. Behind the false and evil pretext of combatting communism they are trying to legalize their intervention and interference in the internal affairs of the Latin American countries. The disgraceful resolution of the House of Representatives in the U.S. Congress aims at justifying this gross violation of the fundamentals of international law. The plans for establishing an "inter-American task force" pursue the same goal.

The Soviet people have profound sympathy with the courageous struggle of the peoples of Latin America, who are striving to uphold their national sovereignty and achieve the implementation of their national and social aspirations.

We express fraternal solidarity with the armed struggle waged by the patriots of Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, Guatemala for freedom against the puppets of imperialism.

We express our solidarity with the struggle of the people in British, French and Dutch Guianas and the Antilles, with the struggle of the people of Puerto Rico. We are certain that the struggle of these peoples will lead them to their cherished goal, national independence.

We voice our complete solidarity with the liberation movements of the peoples of South Arabia, Aden and Oman and with the just struggle of the people of North Kalimantan for national independence.

We express solidarity with the people of Korea fighting for the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea, for the reunification of their country. We condemn the anti-popular complot between the South Korean puppets of the USA and Japanese imperialists. We voice our solidarity with the Japanese people demanding the liquidation of American war bases and opposing the military treaty with the USA. We express solidarity with the people of Cyprus struggling to consolidate their national independence and sovereignty against the intrigues of NATO and for the abolition of imperialist war bases.

Soviet people express solidarity with the struggle of Arab peoples for the undeniable, lawful rights of Palestine Arabs. They resolutely condemn the subversive activity of Zionist circles in Israel, directed against the national liberation movement and serving the interests of international imperialism.

We express the solidarity with the struggle of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, the so-called Portuguese Guinea, the Congo, the so-called French Somali, Mauritius and Equatorial Guinea.

We support the gallant people of South Africa, who are waging an unbending struggle in most difficult conditions against racism, for national freedom and democracy. We support the struggle of the peoples in South West Africa, Bechuanaland, Swaziland and Basutoland against racism and colonialism, against the criminal policy of apartheid.

Dear friends:

Now that in the majority of Latin American, Asian and African countries the old colonialist regimes have been liquidated, the colonialists are resorting to new forms of imperialist oppression and enslavement. Colonialism is being replaced by neo-colonialism. Neo-colonialism is no myth; it is an active force that today has become the main danger for the liberated countries. Its aim is to use new methods and modified forms to economically shackle the liberated peoples in "invisible bonds" that are no lighter, than the old bonds.

"To attain these goals, the imperialists have set up a arsenal of means of the most varied types. These include: military and political blocs like SEATO, CENTO and others linked to NATO and backed by the imperialist powers; unequal bi-lateral agreements of military, political and economic nature; imposing pro-imperialist regimes by military coups, bribing and blackmail; deep and varied economic penetration with the objective of ensuring complete control for foreign monopolies.

One of the main sectors of the national liberation movement is the struggle of the developing countries for economic independence. The gaining of political independence in itself cannot automatically liquidate the economic positions held by imperialism. These positions are determined by the sway of foreign monopolies which have captured the natural resources in the majority of Asian, African and Latin American countries, by the aftermath of colonialism -- a backward agrarian structure in the economy of the liberated countries -- by their subservient position in the world capitalist division of labour, their extreme dependence on exports of raw materials and imports of the main types of industrial goods.

Falling back on reactionary and pro-imperialist regimes and taking over the economies of former colonies and semi-colonies, the neo-colonialists are trying in every way to drive the social and economic development of the Asian, African and Latin American countries in a direction reflecting the interests of the imperialist monopolies, instead of the interests of the peoples of these countries.

It is quite obvious that under such circumstances more attention must be given to the question broadening- economic cooperation, mutual assistance and to exchanging experience and coordinating the economic efforts of the countries in the three continents - against imperialists. The working out and implementing of a common policy towards private foreign investments, marketing key - raw materials and food products, customs and currency-financial questions, facilitates the earliest achievement of economic independence.

Dear friends:

Our delegation here represents the public and the different nationalities inhabiting the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a country where socialism has triumphed, a country laying the material and technical foundation of communism. Socialism is increasingly winning the minds and hearts of millions of people. - Many peoples of Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin American march - under the banner of socialism and are unfolding their struggle - to implement its ideals. We firmly believe that socialism is the near future of all the peoples in the world.

Following the behests of Lenin, the Soviet Union is consistently working for world peace and the security of the people. We believe that relations between sovereign states with different social structures should be based on peaceful coexistence, However it is quite clear that there is no peaceful existence, nor can there be peaceful coexistence between the oppressed peoples and their oppressors -the colonialists and the imperialist, between - the imperialist aggressors and their victims. The struggle for - peace is inseparable from the struggle against colonialism, ---- against imperialist aggression and against encroachments on the freedom of the people and the sovereignty of nations.

The policy of our country is based on loyalty to the ideals of - freedom and independence, a consistent struggle against all oppressions enslavement and injustice. Throughout the course of - its history, the Soviet Union, in following the behests of great Lenin, has been sacredly fulfilling its international duty, giving all-around support to the peoples struggling against colonialism and imperialism, for their national and social liberation,

The peoples raising in the heroic struggle against imperialism, - no matter in what corner of the Earth this may take place, may - be certain that the Soviet people will always be on their side,

With its might the Soviet Union is tying down the main forces of the imperialist powers, and by so doing, it is making it much -- easier for all peoples to struggle for freedom, independent ---- development and social progress. On their part, the Soviet people highly value the revolutionary support they have been receiving for decades from progressive forces of other Asian countries, from the countries of African and Latin America.

At all international forums, including the United Nations Organization, the Soviet Union has been working in close contact and full understanding with the representatives of the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America who are fighting against imperialism, consistently upholding the cause of freedom and independence of those peoples.

The cooperation and mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and other countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, has many forms. They envelope different spheres of life - political, economic and cultural. We are happy that the factories built with Soviet assistance are becoming leading enterprises in the young national countries, and that with our cooperation, the energy of powerful rivers in Asia and Africa is being harnessed to serve man.

We are happy that thousands of young people are being trained at our universities and colleges and upon their return to their homes in Asia, Africa and Latin America they will become active participants in the national rebirth of former colonies and semi-colonies, and become active workers for social progress.

More than 600 national economic enterprises, about 100 educational centres which the USSR has built or is in the process of building in the developing countries, the several dozens of thousands of specialists who received training in the USSR and the support by military weapons to the peoples and countries fighting for their independence against imperialist attacks such is the real contribution of the Soviet Union to the great cause of liberation and national rehabilitation of former colonies and semi-colonies.

The imperialists realize full well what an insurmountable force they face in the solidarity and unity of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples. That is why they are trying to generate differences and arguments in our ranks, and they rub their hands in glee when these differences and arguments turn into conflicts and when they succeed in preventing a settlement of these conflicts.

These imperialist and neo-colonialist intrigues must be checked resolutely. Of decisive importance in this respect is to unite all the revolutionary forces of our days: the peoples of socialist countries, the peoples waging the national liberation struggle, the international democratic and labour movement. At the base of solidarity of these three powerful anti-imperialist forces lies a profound community of goals and the need of mutual assistance. Those are the main forces which we wish to form an alliance to act in complete unity. Our common goal is freedom, independence, peace, democracy, social progress. Our common enemy is the world imperialism headed by the U.S. imperialism. We should counter the treacherous plots of imperialism aimed at splitting our movement by a time tested weapon - by building up solidarity, unity and fighting ability of our great movement.

This point was aptly put by the leader of revolutionary Cuba, Comrade Fidel Castro: "Disunity before the enemy has never been a revolutionary and wise strategy".

At the basis of the solidarity movement of the people of the three continents we must place the unbreakable desire for unity that continuously strengthens our cohesion regarding the main goal of our movement - the struggles against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, the struggle for peace, freedom independence and social progress.

Our Conference should unite the anti-imperialist forces into a single movement of the peoples of three continents and hoist the militant spirit of Havana as its banner.

The Soviet delegation proposes also, to proclaim, in commemoration of the First Solidarity Conference of the peoples of Asia-Africa and Latin America, an International Week of Solidarity of the peoples of the three continents in the struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism and to observe this Week annually from January 3rd. to January 10th.

The Soviet delegation issues an urgent appeal to all the national organizations and movements represented at this Conference to unite in the struggle for this great goal. May this Conference be a new step on this road; may it multiply and strengthen the unity of our ranks and give now strength to the liberation struggle throughout the world.

~~SECRET~~

JULIO DE PENA VALDEZ  
JAVIER BALTISTA MEJIA GOMEZ  
MR - 154

1. Dominican Republic

a. On Christmas Day 1966, Fernando Arturo de la Rosa, Dominican Communist, while returning to the Dominican Republic from a WFTU Conference in Budapest, was arrested in Caracas. De la Rosa was carrying numerous documents, sewn into the lining of his coat, which belonged to members of the Central Committee of the Dominican Communist Party. The documents included a report on the situation in Santo Domingo to the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, notes on meetings with Manuel PINEIRO Losada, chief of the Cuban Intelligence Service, records of Cuban training promised the Dominican Communist Party, and a list of Dominican CP members trained in Cuba. In the report to the Cubans, the Dominican CP said that it was preparing for revolution in the D.R. by transferring arms to new bases of support, caching arms in safe sites, giving military training to CP members, and penetrating the Dominican Army.

b. In January 1967, Dominican authorities detained three Dominicans at the airport as they were preparing to leave. A secret compartment in one of their bags contained reports on recent developments in the Dominican Communist Parties addressed to the Communist Party of Cuba and North Vietnam. Signed documents proved that the Dominican Communists were receiving financial aid from Cuba. Also found in a concealment device were copies of a letter addressed to the Cuban Communist Party and the Cuban Government requesting training for Dominican Communist Party members and photographs of a "classified" map of the Dominican Republic.

c. Jose Ignacio MARTE Polanco, a member of the Dominican Marxist Leninist Popular Movement, was arrested in the D.R. in May 1967. After being trained as a clandestine communicator in Cuba, Marte returned to the D.R. and served as communicator for a clandestine espionage net. He was also involved in the counterfeiting of revenue stamps and forging government checks to collect funds for subversive activities. When arrested, agent communications materials were found in his home including miniature code books and one-time pads similar to those which are known to be used by the Soviets.

2. Venezuela

a. Venezuela is well known as Cuba's primary target for subversion in Latin America. Soviet-manufactured AK-13 weapons have been captured in Venezuela from guerrillas known to have landed in Venezuela from Cuba in July 1966. The boat and motors are known to have come from Cuba.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ / RAC 00-27

By cb, NARA Date 1-24-01

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-2-

b. In May 1967 a Cuban/Venezuelan group landed at Machurucuto from a Cuban fishing vessel. The Venezuelan rebels were about to join guerrillas in the eastern mountains. They were supported by Cubans, known members of the regular armed forces and security services. Two Cubans were captured and two killed in this landing.

3. Bolivia

There is now a guerrilla movement active in Bolivia which is supported by the Bolivian CP. Eight top PCB leaders involved in this movement were trained in the Soviet Union. (Roberto PEREDO, whose farm north of Camiri is used as a base by the guerrillas, visited Moscow in 1966.) By their own admission, PCB guerrilla warfare experts working with the Cubans, are attempting to build an active front in Bolivia modeled after the Venezuelan FLN. We know of six Cubans who are engaged in these activities and of Communists from other countries such as Ciro Roberto Busto, liaison man from Argentine Communists, and Jules Regis Debray, French Marxist theoretician who is close to Castro. These Bolivian guerrillas are known to have had radio contact with Cuba using the same procedures as taught by the Soviets.

4. Mexico

a. Mexico is well known as a focal point for Cuban/Soviet machinations. Through Mexico City, requests for training, the funding and supply of various Latin American Communist Parties and movements are serviced by the Cuban and Soviet installations. Travel to Cuba for guerrilla training for Latin Americans is arranged and financed by the Cuban Embassy in Mexico.

b. In September 1966, the Mexican authorities uncovered an arms smuggling channel which had been providing weapons to Guatemala insurgents. Documents found indicated that over 4,000 weapons were sent via this channel. Julian LOPEZ Dias, a Cuban assigned to the Embassy in Mexico, was known to have been involved in the smuggling channel. LOPEZ was returned quietly and quickly to Havana.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Attachment No.  
To BOOK DISPATCH # 6089

10

Evidence of Cuban Violations of Venezuelan Sovereignty

There is abundant evidence of Cuban inspired and supported attempts to overthrow the existing constitutional system in Venezuela by means of armed insurgency. Terrorism in Venezuela had to all intents and purposes been suppressed in 1965 when Cuba stepped in with support which renewed it. The defection of Douglas Bravo from the orthodox Communist Party of Venezuela occurred with the connivance of Cuba and after firm promises of help had been received by Bravo from Havana.

The most significant instances of Cuban intervention in Venezuela, many of which are public knowledge, are as follows:

1. The famous arms cache found on the Paraguana Peninsula in November 1963.
2. The Cubans promised to increase aid to the Venezuelan "revolution" at the Havana Conference of Communist Parties in December 1964. The Conference agreed that the Latin American Communist movement would be mobilized to support the Venezuelan "revolution."
3. The Tri-Continental Conference in Havana in January 1966 was called to organize aid to revolutions in Latin America, including Venezuela. One of the vice-presidents of the Conference was a Venezuelan, Pedro Medina Silva, former naval officer, who has the title of Supreme Commander of the (orthodox) Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN).
4. In the lengthy articles in Sucesos Para Todos, of Mexico City in December 1966 and January 1967, the dissident FALN leaders, Douglas Bravo, Luben Petkoff, and others, were interviewed and photographed. The Cuban press replayed the articles in great detail and Havana Radio broadcast them in several languages.
5. Since 1965 there has been a FALN headquarters in Havana and representatives of both the PCV and the MIR have been stationed there.
6. Numerous news and propaganda broadcasts from Havana Radio over the past years have reported favorably on the Venezuelan guerrillas while attacking the Leoni government and the Venezuelan Armed Forces.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 12-419

By LUJ NARA, Date 10-23-13

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

7. PCV documents and pronouncements have in the past year contained protests to the Communist Party of Cuba charging interference in the internal affairs of the Party. The PCV accused the Cubans of aiding Douglas Bravo to set up a rival FALN.

8. The PCV has been attempting to organize a conference of Latin American Communist Parties to condemn Cuba for interference in the affairs of these parties.

9. The landing made at Tucacas, Falcon, in July 1966 was organized and supported by the Cubans. Luben Petkoff, who headed the landing, called Cuba an ally in the Sucesos para todos article and broadly hinted at Cuban help for the landing.

10. Cuban responsibility for the landing at Machurucuto, Miranda, on 8 May 1967, was admitted by the Communist Party of Cuba on 18 May.

11. Responsibility for the kidnapping and murder of Julio Iribarren Borges, brother of the Venezuelan Foreign Minister, in March 1967 was acknowledged by Elias Manuitt, Bravo lieutenant, in an announcement made in Havana shortly after the crime.

12. In his now famous speech of 13 March 1967 Fidel Castro castigated the Communist Party of Venezuela for abandoning the "armed struggle" and expressed his support for the dissident Communist insurgents led by Bravo. He said "Las circunstancias exigen abordar un tema de esta indole. Se trata de los problemas de Venezuela, de los problemas del movimiento revolucionario venezolano, de las imputaciones del gobierno titere de Venezuela contra nuestra revolucion, de las acusaciones de la seccion oficial derechista del Partido Comunista de Venezuela... "Cuba solo tiene una responsabilidad, la de haber hecho una revolucion y estar dispuesta a llevarla hasta sus ultimas consecuencias. Si esa es la responsabilidad de Cuba, nosotros asumimos esa responsabilidad..."

"Proclamamos una vez mas nuestra simpatia y nuestra solidaridad sin vacilacion alguna con los guerrilleros que combaten en las montanas occidentales, con los que combaten en las montanas de El Bachiller, con los combatientes que en las ciudades desafian la represion y la furia de la tirania. Nosotros solo reconocemos como representantes de los pueblos a los revolucionarios...."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

On 18 May 1967 the Communist Party of Cuba expanded on this theme, saying: "Pero no se pretenda que nos interesa eludir ninguna responsabilidad... Nuestro Partido y nuestro pueblo no rehuirán, por tanto, su responsabilidad revolucionaria ante el mundo ni rehuirán el combate, con sus consecuencias y sus sacrificios, en cualquier forma y en cualquier campo que el imperialismo decida entablarlo contra nosotros...."

"Nos acusan de querer subvertir el orden en este continente y nosotros, efectivamente, proclamamos la necesidad histórica de que los pueblos subviertan el orden establecido...."

"Nos acusan de predicar el derrocamiento revolucionario de gobiernos establecidos en América Latina y nosotros, efectivamente, creemos que todos los gobiernos oligárquicos...servidores del imperialismo y cómplices de sus crímenes, deben ser barridos por la lucha revolucionaria de los pueblos...."

"Nos acusan de ayudar al movimiento revolucionario y nosotros, efectivamente, prestamos y prestaremos ayuda cuantas veces nos lo soliciten, a todos los movimientos revolucionarios...."

13. During October and November 1966 terrorist attacks in Caracas reached the highest peak since 1963 and the Bravo forces claimed credit for these crimes.

14. The Cuban commitment to Bravo was under scored in a letter dated 8 January to Bravo from the Union of Young Communists (UJC) of Cuba, published in the Havana press. It attacked the PCV and concluded by station, "We stand with you for whatever and whenever you need us, ready to fight physically in the same trench."

15. Radio Habana on 16 May 1967 gave publicity to two previously unpublicized bombings in Caracas near the U.S. Embassy and the Sears store and gave credit to the Douglas Bravo Terrorist organization for carrying them out, thus proving Cuban complicity.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Fide  
BA

5 April 1967

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Chief, Western Hemisphere Division  
**SUBJECT:** Status of Insurgency in Venezuela

1. For your information, there has been a marked increase in insurgency activity, particularly in Western Venezuela and the Bachiller Mountains (60 miles south of Caracas), during the months of February and March 1967. Insurgent activities do not in themselves appear to constitute an immediate threat to the stability of the Government of Venezuela (GOV), but they have reached the stage where the Venezuelan Military is badly overextended in its attempts to cope with the guerrilla threat. It is believed that the Venezuelan Military would be hard pressed to meet the challenge of increased guerrilla activities in the Bachiller Mountains or the resurgence of guerrilla warfare in Eastern Venezuela, where the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and the Orthodox Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) respectively are reportedly building up. (See attached map)

2. Strength of the various guerrilla and terrorist groups is estimated as follows: (a) Douglas Bravo (dissident) FALN, approximately 150-250 well armed men. They operate almost exclusively in Western Venezuela, but have a small terrorist unit in Caracas. (b) MIR, approximately 100 guerrillas. Total support estimated as being from 1,500 to 2,000 persons, 60% of whom are estimated to be students at the Central University of Venezuela (UCV) in Caracas. MIR possesses an additional support/intelligence network in Caracas of 20-30 men. (c) Orthodox FALN, military arm of the PCV, can call on approximately 160 guerrillas spread over Venezuela. Their principal force is located in Western Venezuela and Caracas, in addition to reported efforts to build up strength in the East. Orthodox FALN guerrillas are not known to be engaging in terrorist activities or to be combatting Venezuelan military forces. (d) MIR - splinter group, approximately 20-25 persons located in Caracas. Their raison d'etre is urban terrorism and it is

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED  
Authority: NLI 17-10  
By: CTS, NARA, Date: 5/14/18

~~SECRET~~

suspected that they provide urban support to the Douglas Bravo FALN in addition to carrying out their own isolated terrorist acts.

3. The Douglas Bravo FALN and the MIR both receive funds and logistical support, independently of one another, from Cuba and are apparently well equipped and trained. It is estimated that 20 to 30 of the Bravo FALN guerrillas have received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba, Vietnam, or elsewhere in the Bloc and that there are some Cuban nationals fighting with them. The Minister of Interior informed Station representatives that he estimated that there were 8 to 10 Cubans in the Bravo group. A Station agent, who recently received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba, reported that approximately 30 of the 100 MIR guerrillas received training in Cuba, but that no Cubans are presently included in the MIR guerrilla units. Recent reporting indicates that the Orthodox FALN is short of funds and trained personnel but that it possesses adequate weapons. It has yet to be seen whether the recent resumption of foreign (presumed Soviet) funding of the Orthodox PCV will filter down to the Orthodox FALN.

4. In summary, guerrilla forces total approximately 430 to 485 men distributed as shown on the attached map as well as in Caracas itself. The fact that the Douglas Bravo FALN and the MIR are significantly the most active of all guerrilla groups and that the remainder are relatively quiescent can be largely attributed to lack of organization and to the facts that all guerrillas are not yet under arms and active on a full time basis. This latter situation could be altered either by infusion of a few key leaders or by significantly increasing the external supply of arms and money to the remaining groups. It is interesting to note that, other than suspected collaboration between the Bravo FALN and the smallish urban MIR splinter group, the various guerrilla and terrorist organizations have to date refused to assist one another or to coordinate their activities.

5. At the present time, the Venezuelan Army is totally committed to the pursuit of the Douglas Bravo FALN guerrillas in Western Venezuela and the MIR in the Bachiller Mountains (see attached map). In the event of serious increase of guerrilla activities in either the Bachiller Mountains or resurgence in Eastern Venezuela, the Venezuelan Military would be logistically and materially hard pressed to meet the challenge. All reserve divisions have been committed to the battle against the Bravo FALN and the MIR and virtually all transportation

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3.3(h)(2)

capabilities have been transferred in support of those efforts. [redacted] have been informed by the Chief of the Joint Operations Command (JOC), the central coordinating point for counterinsurgency operations, that the Venezuelan Military is experiencing great difficulty in communications between field elements (platoon and battalion) in active pursuit of guerrilla forces in the Andean Mountain ranges and that this weakness is being successfully exploited by the guerrillas. This latter communications difficulty is compounded by the problems the Venezuelans are currently having with a large number of Alouette helicopters which the Venezuelans recently purchased from the French Government. These helicopters are apparently incapable of lifting meaningful loads of men or material off the ground and possess communications equipment which is incompatible with the U. S. communications gear being used by Venezuelan ground forces.

6. Venezuelan Military dissatisfaction with the progress of the counterinsurgency effort has largely been manifested by increasing determination within the professional officers corps to have Minister of Defense, General Florencio GOMEZ, removed from his present position. GOMEZ is blamed for the Alouette helicopter purchase, for his lack of vigor in counterinsurgency operations, and for failure to support military pleas for increased armament and supplies for the counterinsurgency effort. Recent reporting indicates that GOMEZ will be replaced in the near future.

7. In summary, while total guerrilla strength is estimated to total approximately 430-465 men, it is presently disorganized and divided within itself. The most active guerrilla groups are the Bravo FALN (in the west) and the MIR (in the Bachiller Mountains). These guerrillas are presently being contained by the Venezuelan Military, but at the cost of total military involvement. In the event of further guerrilla outbreaks, there is a good possibility that the military would be incapable of successfully meeting the threat.

Lawrence M. Sternfield  
C/WE/3

Attachment as stated.

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - addce  
1 - Memo chron  
1 - SA

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



Landing Areas

**Bravo FALN**  
**Orthodox FALN**  
**MIR**  
Representatives of all three in Caracas

~~SECRET~~

*No Cuban verification  
TRAINING in Cuba*

EO  
13526  
3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~

12

7 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Western Hemisphere Division


SUBJECT : Status of Insurgency in Colombia

1. On 27 February 1967 the pro-Cuban Army of National Liberation (ELN) initiated their first attack since January 1965, when the Colombian Government carried out what has been considered a successful program of containing Communist subversion. Immediately thereafter, Colombian Communist guerrilla groups began to intensify their attacks in what may will be a coordinated effort between the ELN and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the guerrilla arm of the Moscow-line Communist Party of Colombia. Traditionally the 200-300 member ELN guerrilla force has operated in the northern region of the Department of Santander, while 500 FARC guerrillas, and a reserve force of 500, have operated in the south in the Department of Tolima, with self-defense groups in Viota, Medellin del Ariari and Sumapaz.

2. Since the ELN attacked a police outpost at Vijagual in the Department of Santander on 27 February a new wave of terrorism has been feared. On 31 March a prominent citizen of Pereira, capitol of the Department of Risaralda was kidnapped. The Chief of the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) is concerned that this action may mark the beginning of a new wave of kidnappings such as those that plagued Colombia in early 1965 and led to the deaths or unsolved disappearances of several prominent Colombians.

3. There is conflicting information as to whether or not the two guerrilla groups are coordinating their actions. One report was received concerning the existence of a joint command under the leadership of "Tiro Fijo" (Manuel Marulanda), commander of the FARC; with a member of the ELN second in command; a member of the PCC in charge of political activity; and an ELN member responsible for agitation and propaganda. Other reports suggest that the ELN and FARC may be coordinating their guerrilla actions, while retaining allegiance to separate commands. Still other reports indicate that the FARC may be acting independently of the PCC in an effort to get on the "Cuban supported handwagon." Two separate sources have reported that the PCC is at the breaking point with Castro because of Cuban support to the ELN, as well as to the PCC's own guerrilla forces, the FARC.

~~SECRET~~



SANITIZED  
Authority NJ 17-10  
By CTS, NARA, Date 5/14/18

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

4. Following is a chronology of the attacks: (see attached map).

- A. 27 February - At 6:00 a.m. a force of 100 ELN guerrillas attacked the police outpost at Vijagual in the northern part of Santander, killing five police and wounding one. Shouting "Viva Camillo Torres" the guerrillas were led by Ricardo Lara Parda, and Paula Gomez, both ELN leaders. The guerrillas were well-armed with grenades, submachine guns and revolvers. After wiping out the police post, the attackers rounded up the townspeople, herding them into a soccer field where they harrangued them for about 2½ hours on the repressiveness of the oligarchy, the police, the army and yankee imperialism, and promising the people better jobs, education, wages, and homes after the "liberation". According to surviving witnesses, the attackers also shouted "Viva Fidel Castro" as they attacked. Cuban complicity in this attack is also shown by an ELN statement entitled "The ELN is Now Consolidated; the Enemy Knows What This means" which appeared in the 19 March English-language weekly summary of the Cuban Communist Party Organ Granma, which published the Spanish language version of the article on 14 March. A copy of the article is attached. The article claims;
- (a) The ELN guerrilla forces have become stronger and have consolidated control over a vast area from where they can open up actions of greater magnitude.
  - (b) As the ELN grows stronger and consolidates its positions, other revolutionary movements such as the veteran guerrillas who are fighting under the leadership of Manuel Marulanda ("Tiro Fijo") strike out at and destroy government forces, and show even greater strength in combat.
  - (c) By the joint effort of all these forces, the "great repressive apparatus" (i.e. the Colombian Government and Army) is being demolished. The article urges workers, students and peasants to take up arms and make a decisive, frontal attack on the regime.
- B. 3 March - An unknown number of FARC guerrillas ambushed an Army patrol in Algeciras, Department of Cauca, killing about 15 soldiers. This group was believed to be led by Oscar Reyes of the FARC.

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

- C. 9 March - Eighty heavily-armed ELN guerrillas, shouting "Viva Camilo Torres", attacked a train between Barrancabermeja and Puerto Claya in Santander, killing five railroad police and three civilians. One railroad car was derailed by dynamite.
- 10 March - The Colombian Government began a mass roundup of subversive arresting more than 200 persons, some of whom were later released. This actinn wasd directed primarily at known members of the PCC, but the Govern-ment is also planning to initiate a now roundup of lesser known subversive /members of the ELN, FARC and the Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC)/sometime after mid-April. President Carlos Lleras Restrepo will decide when this roundup will begin, in coordination with the chief of liaison of the DAS.
- 20 March - ELN leaders Tulio Bayer, Fabio Vasquez, and Victor Medina Moron were reported to have recently returned to Colombia from Cuba; the ELN was said to be planning an attack before the long Easter weekend which begins on 23 March in the Jamudi zone in southern Valle.
- D. 22 March - An Army patrol was ambushed by an unknown number of guerrillas in the Department of Valle, near the border of Quindio. The instigators of the 22 March attack were not known, but were believed to be FARC rather than members of the ELN. A portion of the FARC had recently moved to this area. The Department of Valle lies between Quindio and Cauca, where the PCC reportedly has allowed the FARC to open up two pre-viously dormant fronts. There are FARC fronts in the Department of Quindio, headed by Cirgo Trujillo Castano; and in the Department of Cauca; in the areas of Marquetalia; Rio Chiquito; and the Department of Sandander. In addition there are seven dormant fronts, including the Atlantic Coast, and the Departments of North Santander, Valle and Antioquia. Cirjo Trujillo's group in Quindio reportedly has seven detachments, each with about 80 men.
- E. 28 March - Eight members of an Army patrol were killed in a guerrilla ambush in the vicinity of Colorado, near Cartago in western Colombia. Six guerrillas were later killed in a counterattack. Reports from the zone of hostilities indicated that the rebels were ELN and FARC insignia. This attack brought to 28 the number of soldiers who had been killed in the guerrilla attacks.

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-4-

31 March - A prominent citizen of Pereira was kidnapped, an incident which has not been publicized to date, but like the 22 and 28 March incidents occurred near the Quindio area.

5. The Liberal Party president charged in the Senate on 29 March that intensified guerrilla warfare in Venezuela, Bolivia, Colombia and other Latin American countries is part of a technically planned plot against the American summit conference. The ELN statement in Granma suggests, however, that the Lleras Government is the target. The article propagandizes... The oligarchy has placed one of its most distinguished defenders in the office of President. This has not been able to hold back the struggle now underway, nor will it prove effective in holding it back.

6. Two separate informants in the PCC have predicted that the Government arrests and the declaration of martial law may well drive the PCC to carry out more attacks and kidnappings and to intensify violence. Meanwhile, President Lleras remains determined to keep Communists whom he considers dangerous under detention. The President has stated that if he had waited to make the arrests the problem of subversion would only have become more difficult, and more of a problem to combat. President Lleras admitted on 21 March that he had been stretching the law somewhat in arresting the PCC leaders, and he thought a good tactic to keep the Colombian people, especially politicians, from attacking him for his action would be to exploit the international ramifications of Colombia's guerrilla problem. In this Lleras plans to follow the lead of the Venezuelan Government, and he hopes to work out a joint strategy with Venezuela to blame Cuba for guerrilla outbreaks in both countries.

7. Meanwhile, the situation described in this memorandum has not brought the Colombian Government to the point where it might fall, but the government could be in for some bad times if Castro is willing and able to sustain the guerrillas. Fortunately, the military in Colombia fully supports the democratically-elected government and would not be pushed into overthrowing it to protect public order unless the government seemed to hinder security measures and let things get completely out of hand, which it is not expected to do. However, the government will have to continue with the program it has already begun to suppress subversion, concentrating in particular on tight control over guerrilla strongholds. Persons already arrested will have to be interrogated and prosecuted, captured documents must be reviewed, and efforts must be made to improve intelligence collection to keep

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~


the pressure on the guerrillas.

Lawrence M. Sternfield  
C/WH/S

Attachment:  
Copy of Map

Distribution:  
Orig & 1 - C/WH3  
1- Memo File  
1-ELN  
1-PARC

~~SECRET~~



COLOMBIA

FILE 12.4, 12.5

ELN DELEGATION ISSUES STATEMENT ON VIJAGUAL FROM HAVANA -- Havana, Granma, 19 Mar 67

[An ELN statement titled "The ELN Is Now Consolidated; The Enemy Knows What This Means" appeared in the 19 March 1967 issue of the English-language weekly summary of Granma. The same item originally appeared in the 14 March issue of the Spanish language daily, Granma, organ of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party. The statement, issued by the "Delegation of the ELN of Colombia" is signed by Francisco Gonzalez and datelined Havana, 5 March 1967.]



HE Camilo Torres Restrepo Front of the National Liberation Army (ELN) operates in the northern region of the Department of Santander, Colombia.

On Monday, February 27 of this year, a guerrilla contingent of that front occupied the town of Vijagual at 5:30 a.m. after a battle in which they took the military garrison. With the battle cry of "Viva Camilo Torres!" the guerrilla fighters opened fire on government troops, killing and wounding eight enemy soldiers, and seized all arms and military equipment of the post. The guerrilla forces did not suffer a single casualty.

For more than an hour the guerrilla forces occupied the town of Vijagual; they held a meeting with the peasant populace where they explained the objectives of the struggle. The oligarchic government quickly dispatched military reinforcements to the scene of these events.

On the following day, Tuesday, 28, our forces went into battle against these reinforcements, inflicting serious damage on them. The ELN showed high combat morale and increased capacity to take the offensive. The ELN's latest successes in guerrilla action took place just one year after the death in combat of guerrilla commander Camilo Torres, and only two years after the founding of the ELN, when the town of Simacota was taken.

One year ago our forces and the Colombian people suffered the irremediable loss of our beloved leader. The government took advantage of this loss by unleashing a full-scale military and political offensive against our organization, with the belief that we had been defeated for all time. They thought that the death of Camilo meant the death of the National Liberation Army.

However, in a very short time a new front was opened up bearing the name of the guerrilla priest. It went through its baptism of fire when it completely wiped out an enemy patrol in the Marta region of Girón municipal district. Guerrilla actions continued and won more and more support that passed. The followers of under the leadership continued

For the people of Colombia, who are tacking and overcoming hardships of all kinds, Camilo Torres has not died; their leader will remain alive in the spirit of combat displayed by the ELN until their nation is liberated.

When we undertook this struggle, we realized that it would be a hard fight and that many would fall along the way. Camilo too was aware of this when he took up arms, and he explained this to the people. They have understood this very well, and have given their full support — in both material and human terms — to the growing guerrilla movement. The government, as well as those vacillating elements who draw back in the face of difficulties, are intimidated by difficulties, now see that nothing and no one can hold back the growth of the guerrilla movement, the upsurge of a far-reaching war of liberation.

This guerrilla action at Vijagual marks a new stage in consolidation for the National Liberation Army. The combat strength reached there marks a turning point which can soon be more clearly analyzed. The ELN guerrilla forces have become stronger. They have consolidated control over a vast area from which they can open up actions of greater scope. The enemy's plans for liquidating the guerrilla forces have gone up in smoke. And the enemy knows all too well what to expect next.

This consolidation stems from growing peasant backing. Guerrilla influence has spread in these zones, and the armed contingents have increased support from the peasant base by their political-military work. Peasants have been organized into logistic networks. Even more important, they have enlisted in the guerrilla ranks on a great scale, and now are the majority in the fighting forces. This sector of the Colombian population has rapidly captured the idea that the only way out for them is to take up arms. The peasants have taken their places on the side of revolution, joining in the struggle wholeheartedly and without vacillation. Without this — without this great peasant support — no guerrilla force could ever survive for very long. The ELN's assistance and support from the rural population shows up clearly in its increased fighting strength and expanded bases of

PRESERVATION COPY

(cont)

Moreover, national prospects open up as the movement in the countryside grows stronger. The National Liberation Army has expanded and strengthened its influence among workers and students in the cities. It is only logical for increased support and heightened combat strength of guerrilla forces in rural regions to be accompanied by an upsurge of revolutionary awareness in urban areas. Vijagual clearly indicates that for workers, students, and peasants the only choice is to take up arms and make a decisive, frontal attack on the regime. The taking of this town demonstrates our people's determination to fight resolutely for liberation.

The oligarchy has placed one of its most distinguished defenders in the office of President. This has not been able to hold back the struggle now underway, nor will it prove effective in holding it back. It is true that the character of a leader at a given moment is of significance in the course of history; but in this case, Lleras is not so eminent a personage as some people claim, nor is he going to do anything, because he is the representative of a minority, unpopular and backward class. Lleras' policies will always be those of the oligarchy, a class which is not about to do anything to hurt its own interests. In Colombia, there is an urgent need to begin "an accelerated process of development" — as phrased by some members of the bourgeoisie — in order to meet the minimal needs of the population.

But this minority class is bound hand and foot to imperialism. Moreover, in its many years of government it has shown its total inability to take such action. The question in our country is not one of men, but of classes: an exploiting, discredited minority is pitted against an exploited majority who are becoming aware of the answers.

The oligarchy is trying to build up a series of myths around Lleras. We believe that revolutionaries have a duty not to help those myths gain ground; revolutionaries must expose and destroy them. This can be done by making the matter clear to people, trusting in them and persevering in the struggle. Otherwise, vacillating positions come into the picture; and as Camilo pointed out, "Once the road to Revolution has been taken, any vacillation is treason." Our enemies can be forced to retreat only by hitting out hard against them.

Proof of this can be seen in the ever-increasing wave of guerrilla activity throughout the nation. Thus, as the ELN grows stronger and consolidates its positions, other revolutionary movements, such as the veteran guerrillas who are fighting under the leadership of Manuel Marulanda, strike out at and destroy government forces and show even greater strength in combat. By the joint efforts of all these forces, our people's forces, the great repressive apparatus which is the main crutch of the system is being demolished.

As progress is made on the national front, similar great and encouraging advances are being made throughout the continent and the world. We feel that our struggle is bound to the impressive and heroic fight of the Vietnamese patriots, who are standing up to the most powerful imperialist force: the United States. Our struggle is the same as that being waged in Venezuela by the heroic combatants of Falcón, under the command of Douglas Bravo, and the fighters on the Ezequiel Zamora Front in the Bachiller Mountains; our struggle is the same as those waged by the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) of Guatemala.

We are certain that from our continent will surge a giant popular army which will seal the fate of our common enemy.


The ELN combatants at Vijagual have once again made clear their anti-imperialist stand. Their victory is a reflection of solidarity with the heroic people of Viet Nam and the peoples of Asia and Africa. It is a reflection of solidarity with Cuba — which signifies so much for Latin America — and with all peoples who are in the front lines of the anti-imperialist struggle and who defend the right to forge a nation which may live in an honorable peace.

We combatants of the National Liberation Army, organized into the José Antonio Galán and Camilo Torres Restrepo fronts, under the leadership of Fabio Vázquez and Víctor Medina, avow our decision to fight on to victory, fulfilling our watchword of: **NOT ONE STEP BACKWARD. LIBERATION OR DEATH!**

Francisco González, Delegation of the National Liberation Army (ELN), of Colombia

Havana, March 5, 1967.

Certain islands of the Archipelago de San Andrés y Providencia (13°00'N 81°30'W) and the Isla de Malpelo (3°58'N 1°35'W) belonging to Colombia are not shown on this map.



- International boundary
- Internal administrative boundary
- ⊕ National capital
- ⊙ Internal administrative center
- Railroad
- Road

0 50 100 150 Miles  
 0 50 100 150 Kilometers

COLOMBIA.

LEGEND

- ELN ATTACK
- FARC ATTACK
- ATTACKERS UNKNOWN

- A - Vijagual, North Santander
- B - Algeciras, Huila
- C - Between Barrancabermeja and Puerto Olaya, Santander
- D - Quindio - Valle Border Area
- E - Combined Attack of ELN-FARC, Cartago, in Western Colombia

PRESERVATION COPY

ATTACHMENT TO: BOOK DISPATCH - 6089

1. General

Certain activities are common to all the countries in which Cuba has been operating and deserve separate mention. Among these are:

a. Training. Headquarters estimates that Cuba has trained at least 2,500 Latin Americans in guerrilla warfare, urban terrorism, or Marxist theory since 1959. While many of those trained early in the program were well known Communist Party leaders or nationalist activists, the recent trend seems to be to choose lesser known persons and those from the interior regions. This makes it easier for the Cubans and the interested organization to hide the travel and returns trained fighters with a knowledge of and acceptance by the natives of the guerrilla areas.

b. Transportation. In order to train those selected for the courses mentioned above, the Cubans have organized clandestine travel mechanisms to get the students from their countries to Cuba and return. While it is sometimes difficult to identify who is travelling to Cuba - and for what purpose - it need only be pointed out that there are enough flights in an average week (from Mexico, Prague, Madrid, and Moscow) to carry in hundreds of passengers and most students do travel by air.

c. Propaganda. The Cuban government uses all its radio and press assets to sell the revolutionary line throughout the world. Radio Havana operates on the 16, 19, 31, 49 and 25 meter bands in short wave and, at night, uses many medium wave band used at other hours by stations throughout the Caribbean. The programs are given in Spanish, Portuguese, English, Quechua, Aymara, and Guarani. The Indian language broadcasts were increased considerably just after the first news was released of guerrilla activities in Bolivia. The Cuban government press, in addition to telling the news at home is used to present the Cuban line to interested and sympathetic readers throughout the hemisphere. They thus become aware of subversive actions in other countries and are themselves incited to action. Since these reports and indications of the Party line are constant both in the press and radio, the faithful listener or reader becomes conditioned by them to believe what Cuba wants him to believe.

d. Cuban Declaration of Support of Subversive Activities. The quotations given below clearly show that

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 12-419

NARA, Date 10-23-13

By ULS

the Castro government will support armed uprisings in any country in Latin America and are not, as is the case in many of Castro's remarks, tying in Latin American governments with the United States.

(1) 26 de julio de 1965: Acto celebrado en Santa Clara, Provincia Las Villas, en celebracion del duodécimo aniversario del ataque al Cuartel Moncada "La lucha guerrillera es un arma formidable, ;pero como arma revolucionaria! La lucha guerrillera es un arma formidable para luchar contra la explotacion; para luchar contra el colonialismo; para luchar contra el imperialismo.

"La revolucion en America Latina, al igual que en Africa y al igual que en Asia, y al igual que en cualquier parte del mundo..., es inevitable. Con Cuba o sin Cuba.

"Con revolucion cubana o sin revolucion cubana. Naturalmente que la revolucion cubana le ha dado impulso, le ha dado, en primer lugar, el ejemplo, la solidaridad, el aliento moral, y ese ejemplo ya no hay manera de aplastarlo....

"Mas nosotros no por eso le decimos a los pueblos de America Latina: esperen, no hagan la revolucion porque nosotros vamos a correr peligro, no, nosotros exhortamos a los revolucionarios de America Latina a luchar.

"Exhortamos a los revolucionarios de America Latina a seguir nuestro ejemplo y corremos gustosos los riesgos; mostramos a los pueblos de America Latina la posibilidad de la revolucion y las amenazas y los peligros y los riesgos no nos importan.

(Summary: Guerrilla warfare is a formidable weapon, but as a revolutionary weapon... Revolution in Latin America...is inevitable. With or without Cuba. Naturally Cuba has given it impulse, example, and solidarity. We do not tell the people of Latin America: Wait, don't start a revolution because we would run a risk, no, we call on Latin American revolutionaries to fight. We call upon them to follow our example and we will gladly take the risks.)

(2) 2 de enero de 1966: Concentracion en la Plaza de la Revolucion, La Habana "Y esa delegacion podra ser muy fecunda y muy util independiente-mente de cuales fueren sus resultados, habra algo de por si muy util y es el contacto entre tantos hombres y mujeres de distintas partes del mundo, el contacto entre dirigentes revolucionarios de los movimientos revolucionarios de todo el mundo, que ya de por si dara abundantes frutos, aumentara la solidaridad y la ayuda general o bilateral, significara un saldo muy positivo y en cuanto a nosotros aqui delante de nuestro pueblo y en nombre de nuestro pueblo, lo que nosotros no ocultamos, con Cuba cualquier movimiento revolucionario en cualquier parte del mundo, podra contar con su ayuda incondicional y decidida.

(Summary: As for us, here, in front of our people and in the name of our people, we say that which we do not hide, any revolutionary movement in any part of the world can count on Cuba for its decided and unconditional support.)

(3) 16 de enero de 1966: Clausura de la Tri-continental. "Entendemos igualmente que las vinculaciones establecidas, los nexos que se han creado entre los movimientos que en el mundo luchan contra el imperialismo y los organismos que se han creado, jugaran un papel incuestionable en el apoyo, en la solidaridad y en el incremento de la lucha revolucionaria.

Y por eso decimos y proclamamos que con combatientes cubanos podran contar el movimiento revolucionario en cualquier rincon de la tierra.

(Summary: And therefore we say that revolutionary movements in any corner of the world can count on Cuban fighters. We feel that if the fight is started on a large scale it will take on more violent proportions. And when this is understood the only correct thing to do is prepare yourself for when the fight starts.)

(4) 13 de marzo de 1966: Universidad de la Habana. "Nosotros podemos decir: derramese tanta sangre de los pueblos como sea necesaria para hacer la revolucion. Derramese si es necesario la sangre de todo el pueblo para defender la revolucion. Pero jamas decir: lamentamos que se haya derramado, no se haya derramado una gota mas de sangre, sobre todo de sangre innecesaria."

(Summary: We can say: draw as much blood as is necessary to make the revolution. If necessary draw all the blood the people have to defend the revolution.)

~~SECRET~~

-4-

(5) 29 de agosto de 1966: En la ciudad de La Habana "Nosotros tenemos una politica internacional, esa politica entrana riesgos, no enganamos a nadie. Y nuestra linea, nuestra direccion es de plena solidaridad con el movimiento revolucionario y sabemos que eso implica riesgos, pero no enganamos a nadie."

(Summary: We have an international policy which entails risks. That policy is one of complete solidarity with the revolutionary movement.)

~~SECRET~~

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**  
**Intelligence Information Cable**

• ROUTINE  
IN

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

14

STATE DEPT DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC

*EXO DDT*

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Sec. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~  
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

CITE [Redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

~~SECRET~~

DIST 25 MAY 1967

COUNTRY CUBA/LATIN AMERICA

DOI 15-24 MAY 1967

*07 09 Z*

SUBJECT CUBAN PLANS TO EXPAND GUERRILLA WARFARE IN LATIN AMERICA.

ACQ 24 MAY 1967

FIELD NO.

[Redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

1. AN [Redacted] EMBASSY IN LATIN AMERICA RECEIVED INFORMATION<sup>3.3(h)(2)</sup> BOTH FROM ITS GOVERNMENT AND HAVANA THAT FIDEL CASTRO IS READY TO LAUNCH GUERRILLA WAR IN GUATEMALA AND IN THE AREA WHERE THE BORDERS OF BRAZIL, PERU, AND BOLIVIA MEET. THE EMBASSY CONSIDERS THIS AS "REALLY SERIOUS AND IMPORTANT."

2 (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THE ABOVE REPORT, WHILE FRAGMENTARY, SHOULD BE READ AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF GREATLY INCREASED MANIFESTATIONS OF INSURGENCY IN LATIN AMERICA SINCE FEBRUARY 1967. WHILE CASTRO'S

5  
4  
3  
2  
1

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

(dissem controls)

PRESERVATION COPY

**SANITIZED**  
Authority NLI 17-10  
By CTS NARA, Date 5/14/84

IN

[Redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/  
NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY  
(classification) (dissem controls)

INTEREST IN GUATEMALA IS WELL KNOWN, THE OPENING OF A NEW GUERILLA FRONT IN THE PERU-BOLIVIA-BRAZIL BORDER REGION WOULD BRING INSURGENCY INTO AN AREA PREVIOUSLY UNAFFECTED.)

3. ~~FIELD DISSEM~~: NONE.

[Redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

5  
4  
3  
2  
1

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/  
NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY  
(classification) (dissem controls)

5  
4  
3  
2  
1