

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	John P. Roche to Walt Rostow classified CONFIDENTIAL	1p 5/20/68	A
#1b memo	John P. Roche to William P. Bundy classified SECRET	1p 5/17/68	A
#4 memo	John P. Roche to the President re-reviewed + "C" upheld 7/3/13	1p 10/11/67	C
#7 memo	John P. Roche to the President classified SECRET re-reviewed + "C" upheld 7/3/13	1p 9/26/67	A
#10 memo	John P. Roche to Walt Rostow open 7/3/13 [C removed per RG/RJ]	1p 6/27/67	C
#11 memo	John P. Roche to the President open 7/3/13 [C removed per CA]	1p 7/20/67	C
#12a memo	John P. Roche to the President classified SECRET	1p 6/6/67	A
#15 memo	John Roche to AM Embassy Saigon classified CONFIDENTIAL	1p 3/15/67	A
#17 memo	John P. Roche to the President classified SECRET	3p 5/1/67	A
#17a memo	John P. Roche to Walt Rostow classified SECRET	1p 3/16/67	A
#17b report	re Vietnam - Secret 1p	undated	A
#20 memo	John P. Roche to the President classified SECRET	1p 4/17/67	A
#20a memo	From Z. Brzezinski classified SECRET	3p 4/13/67	A
#22 memo	John P. Roche to the President classified SECRET	4p 3/27/67	A
#22d memo	Saigon's A-480 page 3 classified CONFIDENTIAL	1p No date	A
#23 memo	John P. Roche to the President classified SECRET (duplicate of #22)	4p 3/27/67	A
#23d memo	Saigon's A-480 page 3 classified CONFIDENTIAL	1p No date	A
#24a memo	John P. Roche to the President open 7/3/13 [C removed per CA]	1p 3/30/67	C
#28 memo	John P. Roche to the President classified SECRET	1p 2/9/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Name File, folder "Roche Memos"

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#32a memo	SEC STATE WASHDC to AMEMBASSY PARIS classified SECRET <i>open 11-13-02</i>	1/31/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Name File, folder "Roche Memos"

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1a
J. Roche, Esq.

Sir:

I don't like the way the cable summarized the import of Article 7 of the Final Declaration myself. I did a lot better in "The Path to Vietnam" QV.

However, it is water way over the dam -- and I think rightly so -- to try to separate the Final Declaration from the French/DRV agreement. Half of the violations we normally cite rest on the Final Declaration, no one would understand that subtle a distinction, and the elections provision -- interpreted in my scholarly "Path" way, or perhaps in any other -- will never be picked up by NVN or haunt us in any way we can't cope with by use of the Manila Communique position on reunification.

So let Saville Davis make a foolish statement if he wants. It won't hurt us, and the more we pin doves down to free elections, the better.

WPB

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 17, 1968

1 le
~~SECRET~~

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY WILLIAM P. BUNDY

By sheer accident, I had just drafted the enclosed letter to the Christian Science Monitor when I came across the enclosed cable. I wanted you to clear the letter, and it can perhaps serve as a means of clarifying and coordinating our views on the "principles of Geneva 1954."

The quotation at (A) in your cable is from the "Final Declaration." (B) is from the actual agreement between the French and the DRV.

In my judgment, we should not under any circumstances get tied in with the "Final Declaration" and I would suggest that INR get its categories straightened out.

Regards

J.P.R.

John P. Roche

Enclosures

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *ja/ctm*, NARA, Date 10-10-06

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 17, 1968

DRAFT ^{1c}

Dear Sir:

I have been out of town and only just today had the opportunity to read your issue of May 10, 1968. I was, to put it mildly, stunned by the inaccuracy of Saville Davis' lead article from Paris. Because of the high regard I have for Davis' reportage, I suspect that some mistake must have occurred in transmission or in editing.

To be precise, after quoting a "high American official" on the prospects for negotiations, the story continues: ~~(without quotes)~~

The basis for an equitable settlement is admittedly present as the conference opens. It is free elections in South Vietnam.

Point No. 7 in the 1954 Geneva Declaration, signed by North and South Vietnam, Communist China, and the Soviet Union among others, reads:

"The conference declares that ... the settlement of political problems ... on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity, and territorial integrity, shall permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot."

Exchanges continue

These were to be held under international inspection. Since the Geneva agreements now have been accepted in advance by both sides, as a basis for negotiation, it appears that an accord is not impossible, however difficult to achieve.

This statement is incorrect at a number of points:

1. The only agreements signed at Geneva in 1954 were military arrangements between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Hanoi) and the French.
2. The so called "Final Declaration" was in essence a philosophical postscript which nobody signed.
3. South Vietnam was not involved in signing anything at Geneva.
4. Article 7 of the unsigned "Final Declaration" expressed a wish for "fundamental freedoms" for the "Vietnamese people." Thus, to the extent that this document has any meaning, it would involve free elections in North and South Vietnam.

Therefore, when Davis says that the "basis for an equitable settlement is . . . free elections in South Vietnam," he may be expressing a personal revelation, but certainly not a historical fact.

The "principle of the 1954 Geneva Agreement" was something quite different: It was a territorial settlement of a civil war in which the Communists south of the 17th parallel were to "regroup" in the North and the non-Communists north of that line regroup in the South.

Two states were thus created in Vietnam -- and, indeed, in 1957 both were proposed for membership in the United Nations by the Soviet Union.

I am sorry to set these out in such detail, but the mythology of Geneva, 1954 has to be examined from time to time by those with a concern for mere facts.

Sincerely yours,

Editor
Christian Science Monitor
7 **N**orway Street
Boston, Massachusetts

John P. Roche
Special Consultant to
the President

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2

March 7, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President

The enclosed letter from my friend (and yours) Irving Kristol-- who wrote the great article in the Times Magazine a while back defending our role in the cold war--speaks for itself.

I agree completely, and read it to Walt who said he would reopen the matter with the spooks, who hate to have intelligence material brought out.

Since the fact that we were reading their mail has been in the newspapers, I see no purpose in holding back material which can knock this "credibility" issue over the head.

I urge you to take a personal interest in this matter.

John P. Roche

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3

October 20, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR

Walt Rostow ✓

no

This little item should be leaked to the press.

J.P.

John P. Roche



Department of State

TELEGRAM ^{3a}

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PAGE 02 HONG K 02283 200852Z

SUBJECT: PEKING ACCUSES LIU SHAO-CHI OF SEEKING DENTENTE IN SINO-US RELATIONS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

1. ARTICLE IN OCT 16 PEOPLE'S DAILY (PD) BLASTED LIU SHAO-CHI (REFERRED TO THROUGHOUT AS "CHINA'S KHRUSHCHEV") FOR ERRORS IN FOREIGN POLICY, PARTICULARLY TOWARD US.

2. ACCORDING NCNA, ARTICLE REFUTED STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO LIU THAT ONCE "US IMPERIALISM" WITHDREW TROOPS FROM TAIWAN CHINA WOULD DEVELOP FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH US. PD CHARGED THIS WOULD BE "ADVOCATING NATIONAL EGOISM" BY

PAGE 3 RUMJDH 2283 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
GIVING PRIORITY TO CHINA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS, AT COST OF "BETRAYING PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM," AND FAILING TO HONOR CHINA'S PLEDGE TO HELP ALL "OPPRESSED PEOPLE AND NATIONS" TO TO FIGHT "US IMPERIALISM." PD SAID CHINESE PEOPLE "DETERMINED TO LIBERATE TAIWAN" BUT AT SAME TIME THEY OPPOSE "US IMPERIALIST AGGRESSIN" NOT ONLY AGAINST CHINA BUT AGAINST "PEOPLE OF ALL OTHER OUNTRIES." PD CLAIMED CHINESE PEOPLE FRIENDLY TO US PEOPLE BUT CONSIDER "US IMPERIALISM" THEIR "SWORN ENEMY." CHAIRMAN MAO CITED TO EFFECT "US IMPERIALISM MOST FEROCIOUS ENEMY OF PEOPLE OF WORLD" AND "ITS NATURE WILL NEVER CHANGE."

3. LIU ACCUSED OF MAKING "REACTIONARY STATEMENT" BY REFFERING TO SINO-US RELATIONS AS "DISPUTE" WHEN "DISPUTE" IS NEUTRAL WORD WHICH DOES NOT INDICATE WHICH SIDE IS JUSTIFIED." HIS ALLEGED ATTEMPTS TO ENCOURAGE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH US DISPARAGED AS PLOT TO GET CHINESE PEOPLE TO SELL OUT THEIR REVOLUTIONARY ACHIEVEMENTS.

4. COMMENT: PD ARTICLE PRESUMABLY NOT SO MUCH COMMENTARY

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 HONG K 02283 200852Z

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ACTION EA 19

INFO EUR 25, NEA 19, GPM 03, SC 01, RSC 01, USIA 12, H 02, NSC 10, L 03,
INR 07, P 04, CIA 04, DOD 01, SP 02, SS 20, SAH 03, NIC 01, NSA 02,
ACDA 17, RSR 01, /157 W

P R 180300Z OCT 67 ZFG
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3760
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 654
AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA 523
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 132
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 287
AMEMBASSY LONDON 725
AMEMBASSY MANILA 1107
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 577
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 526
AMEMBASSY PARIS 483
AMEMBASSY RANGOON 144
AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI 127
AMEMBASSY SAIGON 1667
AMEMBASSY SPDGAPORE 376
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI 1223
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1094
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 283
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 65

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 HONG K 02283 200852Z

PAGE 4 RUMJDH 2283 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS FURTHER ATTEMPT TO SMEAR
LIU SHAO-CHI, ACCUSING HIM OF ERROR, CONNIVING AND HERESY
IN FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS, AS PART OF SYSTEMATIC MAOIST
CHARACTER ASSASSINATION OF HIM. SIGNED BY APPARENT PENNAME
(WANG HUNG-YEN), ARTICLE WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE AUTHORITATIVE
IF BY COMMENTATOR OR OBSERVER OR AS EDITORIAL.

5. HOWEVER, WHATEVER ITS UNDERLYING PURPOSES, ARTICLE
CONSTITUTES FIRST PEKING COMMENTARY ON SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS SINO-US
RELATIONS IN LONG TIME. FROM THIS VIEWPOINT MOST STRIKING ASPECT
IS ITS IMPLICIT REJECTION OF CHICOM POSITION TAKEN PRIVATELY AT
WARSAW TALKS (AND PUBLICLY WITH RELEASE OF THEIR
STATEMENT AFTER 131ST MEETING IN SEPT 1966), NAMELY THAT
US WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM TAIWAN AND TAIWAN STRAITS
ARE MAJOR PREREQUISITES FOR EASING OF TENSION AND IMPROVE-
MENT BI-LATERAL RELATIONS. NOW PEKING SEEMS TO SAY US
"IMPERIALISM" CAN NEVER CHANGE, CHINESE PEOPLE MUST ALWAYS
FIGHT IT, AND THERE NO PROSPECTS FOR DETENTE WITH USG
IN ITS PRESENT FORM UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES.
MARTIN

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October 11, 1967

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President

I am collecting ammunition for the assault on Emmet John Hughes and talked this morning to Henry Kissinger--who has been Governor Rockefeller's foreign policy aide for almost a decade.

Kissinger wasted some government money discussing Hughes' character, but after he had his therapy (and I learned a couple of new scatological expressions), he told me that he had breakfast with Governor Rockefeller yesterday and that the latter:

- 1) was outraged by Hughes' behavior;
- 2) taught Kissinger the new scatological expressions which had impressed me so much;
- 3) has not in any way, shape or form altered his support of Vietnam.

Kissinger told me this in "absolute confidence." I assume (knowing Henry well) that this means that he has not told more than a dozen people, but I would appreciate it if you would cover him if you do any backgrounding on the subject.

John P. Roche

bcc: Walt Rostow

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 25, 1967

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President

There were two headlines from the ADA Board and I hardly need to suggest to you their relative significance.

1. "ADA Repudiates Dump-Johnson Movement"
2. "Galbraith Flays Administration"

My associates and I won every structural vote and lost every rhetorical one: a trade I will put up with any time.

Structurally speaking, ADA absolutely banned any support for anti-Johnson delegates by chapters or officers of the organization. (This overruled decisions taken by locals in Northern California and the District.)

Just to nail it down, we voted to repudiate any third party efforts.

We rammed this realism down Rauh's throat with a frank threat by the labor people to walk out and split the organization wide open.

Rauh had to pay off his nut friends, so he took his revenge in Galbraith's windy, slightly precious resolution. I bounced my thirty votes off Galbraith once--just to keep him loose--but we contented ourselves with "hunkering up" and letting the breeze blow on by. It has blown itself out by now.

The configuration of the meeting was interesting. There were about 90 members present.

About 20 in the nut fringe, 40 in Rauh's center lump, and 30 with me. On structure Rauh went with me; on issues, he went with the nut fringe. Thus we beat the "Dump Johnson" resolution 76-12; but when I tried to clean up Galbraith's language, all I got was 31 votes.

✓ Rauh memo
5
S

Arthur Schlesinger and Richard Goodwin were there, cooing like doves, in the Rauh caucus. Schlesinger made a little speech about how nice it was to have such unity, in particular how nice it was to have me there. I was deeply moved.

The late Allard K. Lowenstein was left a querulous, bitching, pleading casualty. We staked him over the ant hill--even Schlesinger and Goodwin helped drive in the stakes--and left him trying to explain to anybody who would listen that he had really won. He offered his resignation as a Vice Chairman: nobody offered either to accept it or reject it. He was ignored.

In short, the ADA in substance repudiated the Schlesinger-Goodwin Resolution passed in May, smacked down any efforts to use the organization to elect anti-Johnson delegates, and said that opposition should be centered on the peace plank in the national platform. This was reinforced by the defeat by at least a 3-1 majority of a resolution that ADA should "explore the possibility of alternative candidates"!

There is now going to be a lovely intestine brawl between the peace nuts and the Rauh entourage. I plan to stand (with my faithful thirty) on the sidelines and throw some gasoline on the fire every time it threatens to die down.

The first dash of high octane should come shortly via Evans and Novak.



John P. Roche

6
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Walt -

Those boys are
really in "take off" -

John

→ MR. JOHN ROCHE ⁶⁰
from the desk of **ABBOTT WASHBURN**

9/29/30

Do these thoughts,
in general, make
sense to you and
Walt?

A.W.

WASHBURN, STRINGER ASSOCIATES, INC.
4622 BROAD BRANCH ROAD, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

9-29-67

ROCHE
66

THOUGHTS ON COMPLEXION OF COMMITTEE

Bipartisan. Membership, if possible, should be 50-50 Democrat and Republican. If there are co-chairmen, one should be Republican and one Democrat. In this regard it would be helpful to have both Presidents Truman and Eisenhower as members. I have a date to see DDE at Gettysburg next Tuesday, October 3. The fact that Omar Bradley and Lucius Clay have already accepted will be helpful. If for any reason he should decline, I will ask for a letter to Senator Douglas in support of the Committee's objectives which can be made public. (Perhaps the same procedure could be followed with former President Truman.) I have spoken with Mary Lord, who accepted with enthusiasm and will be as helpful as she can in lining up key women. She will be in Washington next Tuesday, October 3, and will have some time available that afternoon.

Geographic representation. The Committee should include some good names from the mid-west and west coast. Otherwise it will be vulnerable as purely the voice of the east-coast establishment. Also in this regard, in my view, it would be preferable to have the national headquarters in Washington rather than in New York with its Madison Avenue connotations. It would be better to have a small headquarters, starting in a modest way, rather than something that looks well-heeled, plush, and underwritten by firms with Pentagon contracts.

Youth. Because the objection is so strong among young adults, the Committee should include the names of leaders in their twenties, articulate, both men and women. One good possibility is Charles Antell, the current National President of the Jaycees. Also, as stressed at our September 25 meeting there should be strong Negro representation. (How does Carl Rowan stand?)

Tone. The stance of the Committee should be positive, educational, constructive, and low-key at first -- eschewing flag-waving, emotional patriotism, atrocity pictures, attacks on draft-card burners, mass rallies and the like. Its output, both printed and verbal, should be factual, rational, persuasive, informative.

Literature and published materials. Pamphlets would be many, small, mailable, dignified -- in the format, perhaps, of the Fund for the Republic materials. One by Roscoe Drummond on his return from Vietnam; Bill Bundy's excellent address at the University of Maryland; a special monograph by Allan Nevins, if possible, relating our Vietnam stand to our other historical

in Berlin, Iran, Greece-Turkey, ~~etc.~~
stands against aggression, etc.

Basic appeal. In speeches, seminars, TV appearances, advertisements, and literature -- the spokesmen for the Committee will explain why it is in our own national interest to continue to resist communist aggression in Vietnam, and urge the public to become better informed about the issue. The individual citizen will be invited to get in touch with the Committee for literature and other assistance to that end. But there should be no attempt to build mass membership, or to set quotas.

Local groups. The Committee would be enormously strengthened by the formation of loosely affiliated local groups in 35 or 40 key communities throughout the United States. The groups, in each case, need not be large but would be composed of respected, influential local leaders. The chairman of each group would be a member of the national Committee. An experienced public relations executive, donating his services, could work closely with the chairman, e.g., Oliver Gale working with Neil MacElroy in the Cincinnati area. This would assure maximum public impact for the Committee in each of the 35 or 40 communities.

Goal. To build a ^{firm} intelligent base and provide a persuasive voice for the great body of our citizens in the "silent center", and to raise a banner to which they can repair.

- Abbott Washburn

~~SECRET~~

September 26, 1967

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~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President

I spent an hour this morning with Sol Sanders, former Far Eastern Bureau Chief of U.S. News who is home for a year's leave. Sanders was in Indochina in 1950, was the last western correspondent to get out of Hanoi when Ho moved in, and has been based in Saigon for the last decade. He is an old personal friend and a vigorous supporter of United States policy.

Sanders says the United States press in Vietnam is simply despicable--really "sick." He gave me a number of examples featuring the New York Times, Washington Post, and, above all, the TV networks.

However, his strongest complaint was about the current role of Barry Zorthian--who is having a private fight with MACV and consistently heaps cynical abuse on our performance. Zorthian is, of course, the "cynical top official" who is featured in so many background stories from Saigon (e.g., the one on Hilsman in Newsweek a while back).

Sanders says that Zorthian is a "festering sore" in the Mission and should be removed as rapidly as possible.

John P. Roche

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 07-4
By il, NARA, Date 8-28-07

~~SECRET~~

bcc: Walt Rostow

TO:

WALT ROSTOW

FROM:

W. MARVIN WATSON
9/12/67

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 13, 1967

TO: Marvin Watson

FROM: Harry McPherson

To Rostow

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

86
14

September 12, 1967
Tuesday - 11:15 a.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT

John Roche was one of the earliest and most determined proponents of the election process in Vietnam. He told me today that he would very much like to be included on the delegation going to Thieu's inauguration. I think it would make sense to send him along; he is an acute observer and I believe it helps us to have him involved in Vietnam affairs.

Harry

Harry C. McPherson, Jr.

yes _____
no _____
see me _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

9

Aug. 9, 1967

MEMO FOR MR. ROSTOW

Subject; Attached

It would be useful to me to get a
feel for academic thinking on Asia.

I think John Roche and I should go;
he agrees.

Bill

WJJorden

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 9, 1967

~~WJ~~ 9a
WJ
what do
you think?
WJ

MEMORANDUM FOR

Walt Rostow

I took the initiative a few months ago to get a serious conference going on the "Future of Freedom in Asia."

Bob Scalapino agreed to convene it; we picked about fifteen of the best, most responsible Asian scholars (ranging from Reischauer to George Taylor in ideological complexion); got them to agree to a common date for the session (a truly remarkable feat!); booked Harriman's bungalow at Tuxedo; and now (see enclosed letter) it is set to go.

I persuaded Leo Cherne to raise the money and, in return, Freedom House collects brownie points as sponsor.

To avoid entanglement in academic politics, I have left the selection of those attending entirely to Scalapino. There are some ruffled feathers around, but this helps ensure credibility. There are no "bureaucrats," but I think it would be worthwhile, and nice, if Al Jenkins attended on an off-the-record basis. If you agree, I will see to it.

John P. Roche

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

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SANTA BARBARA • SANTA CRUZ

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94720

210 Barrows Hall
August 4, 1967

Professor A. Doak Barnett
East Asia Institute
Kent Hall
Columbia University
New York, New York 10027

Dear Doak:

Both the date and the place for the fall conference on Asian policy are now firm. We will begin with a dinner on Friday evening, October 20 and conclude Sunday afternoon, October 22. The sessions will be held in Tuxedo, New York. It now looks as if almost all of the original invitees can be present. John Roche, Leo Cherne and Harry Gideonse will also attend, and a small group of top journalists and commentators may come on an off-the-record basis.

Several participants have suggested that we could maximize the limited time and reach a higher level of discussion if some advance plans were undertaken. I suspect that they are right. May I suggest, therefore, the following format:

First, with respect to schedule - On Friday evening after dinner we will open the sessions with a discussion on Northeast Asia focusing upon Japan and Korea; Saturday morning will be devoted to the subject of China--Nationalist and Communist; Saturday afternoon we will take up Southeast Asia, spilling over to Sunday morning if necessary, and including South Asia to the extent feasible. The remainder of Sunday will be devoted to a discussion of our general Asian policy--economic, political, and military. Various members of our group have had extensive experience in one or several of the specific regions noted above. On an informal basis, therefore, I would like to suggest certain priorities of responsibility--and possibly some advance homework. It would seem logical to ask Reischauer, Lockwood and Morley to take the lead in connection with the Friday evening talks; Barnett, Pye and Scalapino to assume some responsibility for China on Saturday morning; Pauker, Pye, Sacks, von der Mehden, and Wilson to take the lead in connection with the talks on Southeast Asia--with all of us participating in the discussions on general Asian policies. Naturally, the non-specialists will pitch in with their own views at all sessions and feel perfectly free to advance their own policy theories and recommendations.

Professor A. Doak Barnett

- 2 -

August 4, 1967

It might be helpful if we could circulate in advance certain recent statements, speeches, or proposals, that any of you have made--or are now prepared to draft--concerning these matters. I know that some of you have been actively engaged in work, and others have ideas, that have not yet been transmitted to paper. Anything--from a one-page memo to a 20-page manuscript--would be useful and if sent to me in advance could be circulated to members of the group. This would greatly facilitate communications and give us positions from which to launch the dialogue.

I am entirely receptive to additional suggestions and/or amendments from any and all of you. In the meantime, I look forward to seeing you in October.

As ever,

Robert A. Scalapino
Professor of Political Science

RAS:sh

P.S. I shall be in Asia myself between September 8 and October 11.

R.A.S.

bcc: John Roche ✓
Leo Cherne
Leonard Sussman

Same letter sent to all participants.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10

June 27, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR

Walt Rostow ✓

Bill Jorden and I have discussed the absurdity of sending Harold Kaplan off to R&R in Brussels. If they can't find any real use for his talents here in Washington, he would be the ideal guy to replace Zorro as head of JUSPAO. (In my judgment, Zorro has been in the islands too long. Why not send him to Brussels?)

J.P.R.

John P. Roche

rec'd
7-20-67
445 pm

MEMORANDUM

(2)

S
11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 20, 1967

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President

I have learned from one of my British agents that there is a real campaign underway to get Harper & Row to postpone fall publication of Svetlana Stalin's memoirs in the interest of "detente."

Allegedly Yuri Zhukov--the Pravda correspondent--told Arthur Schlesinger that publication would mar the 50th anniversary of the Soviet Revolution and play into the hands of the "Kremlin hawks." It is further alleged that little Arthur raised the issue with Ambassador Thompson and with Harper & Row.

(Zhukov was the guy who started the story that we were about to invade North Vietnam which Schlesinger and Goodwin used to panic the ADA board into passing that silly resolution.)

My friend (who covers Schlesinger rather closely and tells me he is currently on Onassis' yacht in the Aegean) also said that Schlesinger had told friends in England that he (A. M. S.) and Goodwin (with a third guy I have never heard of named Clark) were trying to talk Secretary McNamara into resigning.

This is all double and triple hearsay, but I have known this man for years and he has rarely been wrong--he told me about the Profumo scandal months before it became public property.

Needless to say, I think the ideal way to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution would be to announce the defection of Kosygin. I hope our government does not get mixed up in such a silly business.

John P. Roche

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S
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 21, 1967

MEMO FOR MR. ~~H~~OSTOW

Walt:

I have been in touch with John
on this and am looking into it
further with friends in Virginia.

Bill
WJJordan

~~SECRET~~

~~WJ B~~ 12a
WJ

June 6, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President

For essentially theological reasons, I have never believed that people like to live in dictatorships. The newspapers, and the academic commentators, always say that a Nkrumah, a Ben Bella, a Sukarno are deeply loved by the masses--until the day after they are overthrown.

I believe this is relevant to North Vietnam. We have, I think, assumed too readily the popularity of Ho's terror regime. Perhaps the time has come to launch a covert political warfare attack on Ho's legitimacy.

This would be a form of escalation and would have to be done with great care. The fundamental line should be "Save the D.R.V. from the insane military adventurism of Ho and his clique." By implication, it could be suggested that Ho is a Chinese stooge who has refused to accept reasonable peace terms supported by the U.S.S.R. at Chinese instigation.

In short, why not try to turn the knife of Vietnamese nationalism against those in Hanoi who continue the suicidal, unnecessary war?

John P. Roche

bcc: Walt Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 72J 84-148
By LW, NARS, Date 3-19-84

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 6, 1967

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President

Text: Isaiah 26, 10: "If favor is shown to the wicked, he does not learn righteousness; in the land of uprightness he deals perversely. "

Some years ago I wrote that politics is the art of knowing when not to compromise. Listening to McCloskey yesterday, and reading the State Department's Staff Summary today, I was appalled to realize that there is real underground sentiment for kissing some Arab backsides.

This is, in my judgment, worse than unprincipled--it is stupid. (And my pro-Israeli convictions are irrelevant to this point--I took exactly the same position on Castro and Nkrumah.)

The Arabs have to hate us--and the rougher the Israelis are on them, the more they will hate us NO MATTER WHAT WE DO.


--They must create the myth that the United States, not Israel singlehanded, clobbered them.

The net consequence of trying to "sweet-talk" the Arabs is that they have contempt for us--and we alienate Jewish support in the United States.

I am not suggesting for one second that our Middle Eastern policy should be determined in terms of domestic political considerations.

But there is no reason why we shouldn't collect the domestic bonus that will fall in our lap for following a sound policy.

Which brings us back to a question once (perhaps erroneously) attributed to you: "Whose State Department is it?"


John P. Roche

April 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR

Marvin Watson

This puts the ball back in Romney's court. He obviously thinks that "peace with amnesty" is his great contribution to the Vietnam debate. It is, of course, the same as the "National Reconciliation" program we have been pushing.

His speech is going to land with a dull, mushy thud. Let's not do anything by way of publicizing it.

John P. Roche

I want to express my great pleasure at Governor Romney's strong endorsement of the Administration's position on Vietnam.

It is particularly heartwarming that the Governor has refused to permit the war to become an issue between him and the President. As he says,

"The Hanoi leaders may be holding out in the desperate hope that America will tire of the struggle, that our purpose will falter, that disillusionment and discord here at home will somehow induce us to abandon our friends and dishonor our commitments by pulling back or pulling out.

"That is a false hope--and I for one will not contribute to it. I have repeatedly said that I will neither give encouragement to Hanoi's aggressive course, nor undermine our President in sincere efforts to bring peace to Vietnam."

A careful reading of Romney's speech indicates his full acceptance of the following fundamentals of Administration policy.

1. "It is unthinkable that the United States will withdraw from Vietnam."

2. "massive military escalation... is tempting but wrong."
3. "Vietnam does not stand by itself in international affairs."
4. "Our military effort must succeed. I believe that we must use military force as necessary to reduce or cut off the flow of men and supplies from North Vietnam, to knock out enemy main force units, and to provide a military shield for the South. We must give our gallant fighting men our full support."
5. "We must stand immovably against all pressures which would preclude a just peace."
6. "The government of South Vietnam would be willing to negotiate a 'peace with amnesty' [where] all citizens would be allowed to participate in the political process, provided they abide by the groundrules."
7. "The United States is the most powerful nation the world has ever seen. But we are not omnipotent."
8. "The 'other war' is primarily their [the Vietnamese government's] war."
9. "America's major objective and contribution must be a just peace."

10. "Let us get on with the task. Let us be ready to move our dreams and our beliefs in freedom from the drawing boards to the conference table."

There are a few minor differences of opinion (for instance, with President Eisenhower's present views on our commitment), a few confusing statements ("Vietnam is a name that boxes the compass"), and, here and there, he threw a partisan morsel to his lions.

But in overall terms the Governor deserves the gratitude of the American people for maintaining our great tradition that "politics stops at the water's edge."

Sent to State [cloud] LD x at 151220
TO S/S - Mr. Walsh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

F 3/15/67
S 15

TO AMEMBASSY SAIGON
FOR LABOR ATTACHE FROM JOHN ROCHE

Vietniks are working hard in American labor unions to undermine the position of the AFL-CIA in support of United States policy.

It would be extremely useful to our friends in the trade union movement if the CVT would address an appeal for support to the American unions, thanking United States for aid to free trade unionism in Vietnam and urging continued defense of fundamental freedoms denied under Communist dictatorship.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 07-4
By isl, NARA, Date 8-28-07

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

16

S

May 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR

Walt Rostow

When the attached letter appeared, I was denounced for--of all things--"covert anti-Semitism."

However, I still stand by the sentiments--including a fortiori the last paragraph.

J.P.R.

John P. Roche

Clipping from
The New York Times

Date September 23, 1965

INTERNATIONAL EDITION

**Peking's Ambitious
Agenda Explored**

To THE EDITOR:

Only a paranoid would confuse Chinese Communist intentions with Chinese Communist capabilities—at least in 1965—but it is extremely important for us to realize the comprehensive nature of their ambitions. Fortunately the Red Chinese leadership is extremely frank. They have detailed their historical agenda—and in a fashion such as to demonstrate the patent absurdity of treating the Vietnamese action as a simple, local "civil war."

On Sept. 5 in Damascus, for example, Marshal Chen Yi conveyed to his hosts of the Syrian Arab Republic the full support of Red China in the Arab campaign to extirpate Israel.

"The Chinese Peoples Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic," he stated, "will cooperate . . . in support of the struggle of peoples in Vietnam, Congo, the Dominican Republic, and the people of Palestine in their opposition to imperialist aggressions, the protection of national independence, and action to achieve the rights of the people." He added that "the attitudes of the Syrian Arab Republic and China are identical in fighting imperialism and colonialism."

'Attitudes Identical'

The Damascus paper Ath-Thawraw on Sept. 8 clarified whatever ambiguities Chen Yi's statement might have contained. "China's attitude in backing the Palestinian Arabs' rights in the occupied land and in considering the Zionist occupation part of the imperialist presence and an aggressive base which must be eradicated and destroyed is identical to the attitude of revolutionary Syria towards the question of the revolutionary Vietnamese people, who are exposed to the worst types of American imperialist aggression . . . The two attitudes—the Chinese attitude toward the Palestinian question and the Syrian attitude toward the Vietnamese question—express in form and content the nature of Syrian-Chinese relations."

The defense of the autonomy of South Vietnam may be a "dirty little war," but it must be understood in the context of a worldwide pattern of aggression employing "national liberation movements" and guerrilla warfare. Like the Vietcong, a "Palestine Liberation Front" could be largely composed of authentic local types, Palestinian Arab refugees; like the Vietcong, they would unquestionably have their own private scores to settle, in this case with the Israelis; but the fact remains that the "civil war" they might initiate would be fundamentally at the service of a foreign coalition dedicated to the destruction of freedom.

With all due respect to my friends in the peace-in-Vietnam ambiance, I would hope that our response to such a threat to Israel would echo our commitment to defend the integrity of South Vietnam.

JOHN P. ROCHE
Brandeis University
Walham, Mass.
Sept. 16, 1965

(Professor Roche was national chairman of Americans for Democratic Action from 1962 to 1965.)

~~SECRET~~

17

40

May 1, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President

I don't know whether it makes me a hawk, a dove, or a penguin, but for a year or more I have had very serious doubts about our Vietnamese strategy.

I don't think we have taken a "hard" enough line on what is really required to achieve our objectives.

--I have no objection to bombing North or South so long as we realize that air power in anything short of a nuclear context is merely mobile artillery.

--What has distressed me is the notion--(expressed time and again by the Air Force boys)--that air power would provide a strategic route to victory;

--And the parallel assumption that by bombing the North we could get a cut-rate solution in the South and escape from the problems of building a South Vietnamese army.

I raised the question of the rebuilding of ARVN in several memos to you last fall. Regrettably, I could write the same memos today. There are about 650,000 South Vietnamese under arms (in various categories), but we have still not done the job we did in Korea. Or even started to do it.

And the lead-time remains the same--stretched into the future--and the same argument seems to be employed against reforming ARVN--namely, that it will require too much lead-time.

As you know by now (I hope), I am not intellectually or temperamentally inclined to play "Rover Boy with the Joint Chiefs." But I do know that if I were a professional military man, I would be making demands upon you that would be contrary to the political strategy you have laid down for Vietnam.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 07-4

By il, NARA, Date 8-28-07

~~SECRET~~

Essentially the very concept of "limited war" runs against the grain of a dedicated military professional.

--And I don't blame him for this in the slightest. He is not trained, or paid, to think about political considerations.

(In this connection, I had a very interesting talk with General Clay in Bad Godesberg. I asked him why we had not insisted on land access to Berlin in 1945. He said that F.D.R. had not so instructed Ike, and that anyone who blamed Ike for the decision (me among others) was a "dumb son of a bitch." Ike, he said, was paid to make military decisions--and made one. Those of us who didn't like the decision, should blame F.D.R. and Truman. I am not in the habit of admitting that I am a "dumb son of a bitch," but in fact Clay was absolutely right.

The simple military answer to the war in Vietnam is "destroy the enemy," and they could do a very good job of it if you turned them loose, doubled or tripled our commitment, authorized nuclear weapons, etc., etc.

In essence, they are like doctors who have a cure for pneumonia but not for a common cold--they therefore have a vested interest in the patient getting pneumonia.

To all of this you can correctly say "So what?" So let me try to set out what seems to me the outlines of an effective strategy.

1. Our problems in the South, while sponsored and buttressed from the North, cannot be solved in the North unless we are prepared to abandon the strategy of limited war.

2. Specifically, we must win the war on the ground in the South. Ky and others have advocated an "Inchon landing" around Dong Hoi. Perhaps they should meditate on Anzio rather than Inchon--the analogy, in my judgment, is far more exact. Even by MACV's figures (which I profoundly mistrust--see my note to Walt at Tab 1), only a small percentage of the PAVN is in the panhandle.

3. At the risk of sounding banal, the war in the South can be won either by one to two million United States troops or by 500-750,000 United States troops and a well-trained ARVN.

4. The key to "pacification" is not winning the hearts and minds of the peasantry. " All they want is peace and quiet. The key to pacification is the capacity to pacify, q. e. ., to beat the hell out of the guerillas and thereby convince the peasants that the VC is a loser. Like others in the world, peasants love a winner, and are much too smart to pick a winner by reading one of Zorthian's seven billion leaflets.

5. The decision to win the war in the South does not necessarily involve cessation of bombing. But I would suggest that a utility study of bombing should accompany it. When I was in Saigon, I asked a high ranking Air Force officer who was two sheets to the wind why they had flown 350 sorties the day before. He said: "We have to fly 1.2 sorties per plane per day--weather permitting. Last week we were down to 1.16, but yesterday brought it up. The goddamned Navy was up to 2.25 last week. "

There may be something to this, but more fundamentally the problem is that the Air Force does not want to do the job that needs doing. For example, in South Vietnam the most useful mobile artillery are helicopters and prop aircraft (the A-1 for example). Every time an Air Force General sees a prop-plane, he has an esthetic shudder: he wants jets--beautiful jets. Jets are beautiful, but they are lousy mobile artillery in terms of close ground support.

6. Finally, the constant pressure to do something must be resisted. Sometimes the only thing on the shelf worth buying is time. Assuming as I do that nothing in the limited war range will force Hanoi to negotiate (and that total war is out of the question), we have a force in Vietnam that can buy time and hopefully do something with it, namely, make ARVN into an army.

John P. Roche

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

17a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 16, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

Walt Rostow


The enclosed from Lodge's weekly disturbs me.

In one sense, it is hilarious. Can one conceive of an average of last year's "reasonable assumptions" reflecting contemporary "monthly variations"?

What is serious is that if this formula got to the press, it would reinforce the "credibility gap" and play right into the hands of those critics who assert that all statistics on Vietnam are cooked.



John P. Roche



JPR

You are correct.
A number of us
have been fighting
this problem.
The key is: MACV
intelligence wants
to keep every order
of battle as high
as possible

W

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLI-CBS 28

By is, NARS, Date 6-25-84

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS/CBS 12

By ics, NARS, Date 12-29-83

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~~SECRET - NODIS~~

- 6 -

Comment:

The above illustrates the need of the revolutionary development teams to consolidate and make durable the results achieved by the military. Clearly this concept is proving itself and will be worth all that it has cost in money and trouble. Without it, our military successes might be mere flashes in the pan. This explains attacks on revolutionary development teams described in paragraphs below.

1 { Another interesting item in Mr. Hart's study is the mention of an alleged falling off of Viet Cong recruitment. I, therefore, asked Mr. Hart how it was that MACV's figure of 7,000 young males being impressed into the Viet Cong continues to stand without change.

The answer was:

2 { "MACV's estimate of 7,000 a month is not a current figure revised monthly on the basis of new evidence. There is not enough information available on a monthly basis on which to base such an estimate. The figure is calculated from limited data on the basis of some reasonable assumptions, which gives a figure of 82,840 Viet Cong recruited in South Vietnam in 1966. Division by 12, gives a monthly average of 6,903, which is rounded to 7,000. This monthly average is projected into this year in the absence of sufficient data to make a specific new estimate of each month. By its very nature, it does not show monthly variations."

In my last meeting with Ky, I said that one of my advisers spoke of the great headway being made against the "hard cores." Yet, my American military advisers said there was no diminution in Viet Cong impressment of young males. I asked Prime Minister Ky how he reconciled these two apparently contradictory statements. He said that he thought both statements might be correct -- that it was possible for 7,000 young males to be impressed every month, but that they were impressed -- not recruited voluntarily -- by terror and constraint. They would, therefore, said Ky, never be any good as guerrilla fighters. There is probably a good deal of psychological truth in this.

All of the above indicated to me that some changes are under way, but we are not yet able to measure them accurately. And, while it appears to be reflected in more open roads, it has not reflected itself in greater safety for local law enforcement officials. I have never seen a subject which more stubbornly resists our search for truth.

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

18



May 1, 1967

S

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President

You may recall Professor Samuel H. Beer of Harvard as my predecessor as National Chairman of A. D. A. who wrote a rather famous letter to all Democratic Convention delegates in 1960.

Now he has written another letter to some guy who is preparing an article on "The Intellectuals and Vietnam" and it is really an incredible document. (enclosed)

Beer has frankly set out the real guts of the Bobby Kennedy position, and I am immensely indebted to him for the candor of that last paragraph.

John P. Roche

18a

April 28, 1967

Mr. William H. Honan
269 West 11th Street
New York, New York 10014

Dear Mr. Honan:

Thanks for your letter of the 23rd.

You asked my views on Viet-Nam. I parted company with the Administration some time ago. In the spring of 1965 I was persuaded that we could do the job with the initial 200,000 troops. Events of the next year showed that we had made a very bad miscalculation. The enemy is much tougher than we supposed.

As a result the costs of the war, tangible and intangible, have gotten to the point where they outweigh the benefits that the U.S. or the world could expect to realize from its continuation at the present, or a higher, level of intensity.

I regret that we have not been able to win a military victory. Perhaps we have done enough to achieve our main goal, i.e., a stable settlement protecting some millions of people in South Viet-Nam from having a communist regime imposed upon them. I am skeptical of our chances of getting the other side to negotiate. It is quite possible, for instance, that if we were to stop bombing the North, the other side would make no really helpful response. This is, however, the kind of risk we should be ready to take. In war, as well as in peace, one often takes risks (and may suffer losses) for the sake of a possible gain.

If this particular tactic does not work, we shall have to look for other decent means of extricating ourselves. That may involve some perfidy toward the people we have undertaken to protect. The situation does not lend itself to morally ideal solutions.

Sincerely yours,

Samuel H. Beer

SHB:mar

May 2, 1967



MEMORANDUM FOR

The President

I had lunch today with Stuart Alsop who is doing a piece on the "McCarthyite" tactics of the Vietniks.

In the course of lunch, I told him a little about Bill Jordan's and my adventures with Norman Cousins and he got very interested in doing a study of "non-facts" about negotiations.

This seems to me very important. Day in, day out we get clobbered about who said what to whom in Rangoon in 1964, etc., etc.

While third parties concerned would have to be protected, it would be in the national interest (as I see it) to give a responsible journalist like Alsop access to the "peace files" and at least get our side on the record.

I told Alsop to get in touch with Bill Jordan, but I just want to urge that something like this be given very serious consideration.

John P. Roche

bcc: Walt Rostow
Bill Jordan
George Christian

~~SECRET~~

file 20

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 17, 1967

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~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President

The other day you asked me about Z. K. Brzezinski, Professor of Government at Columbia University, who is currently on the Policy Planning Staff at State.

I told you that I consider Zbig one of the sharpest, toughest-minded "intellectuals" (if I dare use that word!) in the country.

Recently he sent me a memo he prepared on detente which I think is cogent and wise--it is enclosed.

As you suggested, I will try to find a good time to get him in to see you.

J.P.R.

John P. Roche

*Walt
Mr. P ~
give me comment -
J.P.R.*

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *pc*, NARA, Date 10-10-06

Transferred to handwriting file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

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~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

April 13, 1967

FROM: S/P - Z. Brzezinski

SUBJECT: The US--the Soviet Union--and Detente

It is my view that the Soviet leadership has concluded that the United States is so eager for a detente that the Soviet Union can afford to pursue with impunity a relatively hard-nosed, conservative foreign policy, without jeopardizing those aspects of detente that are in the Soviet interest. The effect is to reduce Soviet willingness to seek genuine accommodation.

US Policy From the Soviet Perspective:

From the Soviet point of view, the war in Vietnam appears to have increased US eagerness to cultivate cooperative relations with the Soviet Union. This condition, Soviet leaders might reason, can be exploited to stimulate European fears of US-Soviet "complicity". At the same time, it reduces the pressures on the Soviet Union to accommodate with the West which otherwise the Sino-Soviet dispute might have generated.

The Vietnamese war--even though it creates risks--has thus some very definite advantages for the Soviet Union. It gives the Soviet Union a free hand for a policy of dividing the Europeans from the United States and of isolating China, while at the same time remaining the object of US efforts to improve US-Soviet relations.

Indeed, a Soviet policy-maker might well conclude that the present US posture gives the Soviet Union maximum opportunity to have its cake and eat it too:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 07-3
By isl, NARA, Date 6-28-07

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1. The appearance of intensive US cultivation of the Soviet Union (ranging from the NPT to the handling of the Svetlana Stalin case) stimulates fears in Europe of US-Soviet condominium;
2. The probability of US military disengagement from Europe reawakens European security fears;
3. Extensive US involvement in Asia ties down US military and fiscal resources, it makes the US less inclined to become involved in an arms race with the Soviet Union, and it reduces the US capacity for domestic reforms and foreign aid;
4. Continued US hostility towards China keeps alive the possibility of a US-Chinese conflict, thereby deflecting in part Chinese hostility from the Soviet Union.

Soviet Policy:

To exploit the US posture as the Soviets see it, the Soviet Union need not make any basic sacrifices or changes in its policy. It suffices to make occasional peaceful noises about Vietnam, while providing North Vietnam with sufficient aid to keep the war going; to reach those agreements with the US that are in Soviet interest; to keep the door ajar to other agreements that the US desires but for which the Soviet Union is not ready; to engage in bilateral negotiations with the West Europeans, thereby stimulating a Western rivalry in detente.

Recommendation:

-- That in our public posture, without diluting the basic policy of peaceful engagement as outlined by the President in his October 7th speech, we lay greater emphasis on the Soviet stake in a US-Soviet and East-West detente and on the negative consequences for the Soviet Union of negative Soviet responses to our efforts to improve relations;

-- that we indicate publicly our suspicion that the Soviet Union wishes to keep alive the Vietnamese war for its own selfish motives and that it is this Soviet unwillingness to promote a peaceful settlement--and not the war itself--that is the real obstacle to detente;

-- that we adopt a posture of ambiguity towards China (through such indirect acts as suggesting a shift of the US-Chinese talks from Warsaw to a more secluded venue);

-- that in East-West initiatives we lay greater stress on multilateral forms of cooperation and not on bilateral US-Soviet relations.

S/P:ZBrzezinski:lm 4/13/67

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13

MEMORANDUM

Roche
21

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 23, 1967

Rec'd
350
3-24-67

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President

2

My hypothesis about Ho's curious behavior received some fortification this morning when the enclosed AIR GRAM came in from Bill Sullivan.

J.L

John P. Roche

ORIGIN/ACTION

EA-8

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 27 VIET S
XL POL 27 LAOS

FOR RM USE ONLY

RM/R	REP	AF
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A-233

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO : BANGKOK, HONG KONG, MOSCOW, PARIS, SAIGON, CINCPAC

FROM : Amembassy VIENTIANE


DATE: March 15, 1967

SUBJECT : Remarks of Soviet First Secretary to French Newsmen re Viet Nam

REF :

There is enclosed a memorandum of conversation between an Embassy officer and Michel BORRI, an Italian national who is resident correspondent for Le Figaro, concerning Borri's recent conversation with Soviet First Secretary Georges N. Davydov, during which Davydov made some interesting remarks about Laos, Viet Nam, and Soviet policy. Borri is a staunch anti-Communist who is a reliable reporter. Davydov is one of the more congenial and communicative members of the Soviet Embassy in Laos.

SULLIVAN



Enclosure:

As stated

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In Out

FORM 62 DS-323

Drafted by:

POL:MSPratt:ms

3/15/67

Contents and Classification Approved by:

POL:NAVeNotes

Clearances:

USIS:RJohnson

DCM:ECSwank

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21a

Enclosure No. 1
Vientiane's A-233

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

1

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Recent Conversation with Soviet First Secretary

PARTICIPANTS: Michel BORRI, Correspondent for Le Figaro
Mark S. Pratt, Political Officer, Embassy Vientiane

PLACE & DATE: Vientiane, March 13, 1967

1. Borri said he had a long conversation with Georges Davydov, First Secretary at the USSR Embassy, about the situation in Viet Nam and Laos. Davydov said that recently the Chinese had insisted on putting on a demonstration of the overseas Chinese in Hanoi in front of the USSR Embassy. The DRV Foreign Ministry called a press conference at the Foreign Ministry for the same time as the demonstration so that all the journalists would be tied up there and would not be able to cover -- or even to know about -- the demonstration.
2. Davydov said that there was a struggle going on among the leaders of the Lao Dong (and also the NLHS), and the pro-Chinese group was gradually losing out. This would not take place overnight, but would be a slow process. It was obvious to most of the DRV's leaders now that China was not able to provide massive aid, and also that the Americans were not a paper tiger which one could bait as one liked. The Soviet Union was also not prepared to underwrite any adventurous policy on their part as they had made clear to the DRV years ago. It was not the USSR which had suggested the direct confrontation with the US, and the DRV could not expect the USSR to underwrite such a Chinese-type policy. The gradual elimination of these pro-Chinese elements would permit a gradual move towards a more reasonable accommodation with reality.
3. Davydov used as one illustration of the change in Hanoi the behavior of the DRV Chargé. When the Chinese Ambassador was leaving for his cultural revolution in Peking, there was a reception at which they were all present. The DRV Chargé greeted the Russians warmly, and he was subsequently severely attacked by the Chinese for doing so. He turned a deaf ear. This showed to Davydov that the CPR was very concerned to see the North Vietnamese moving closer to the USSR, and in turn the North Vietnamese were prepared to risk the displeasure of Peking as they turned towards the USSR.

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March 27, 1967

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President

I have been following the negotiation sequence very closely and have reached the conclusion that we are no longer fighting a "war" in Vietnam--we are fighting a "negotiation."

This is not intended as a cute play on words--on the contrary, it has serious consequences for American policy.

At the risk of boring you, let me set out the assumptions on which this is based:

1. Ho Chi Minh is not just a radical nationalist like Toure, Castro, or Sukarno. He is a dedicated Leninist, the last of the first generation of the Communist International.

2. He is therefore not a simple-minded Vietnamese chauvinist who, for example, will "not negotiate under pressure." I was in the Air Force too long to believe all I read about the effectiveness of bombing. But the view that Ho will not negotiate until we stop bombing is nonsense.

--it might be true of Castro, who is basically a romantic Latin fascist, a "petty-bourgeois sentimentalist" in Communist jargon;

--but Ho--like Lenin at the time of Brest-Litovsk--would negotiate in cold blood for whatever goals he considers realistic--even if bombs were coming down his chimney.

3. The behavior of a dedicated, intelligent Leninist is highly predictable. I never doubted that Khrushchev would pull the missiles out of Cuba in October 1962 (see my letter to the then Senator Humphrey at Tab A).

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 84-128

By ics, NARS, Date 7-17-84

~~SECRET~~

4. A good Leninist looks on the use of force as merely a variety of politics. He never adopts an inflexible "unconditional surrender" position, but is always ready to alter the timetable if the costs of overt aggression become too high.

5. On the basis of various statements that have been emerging from Hanoi over the past six months, as well as articles in Hoc Tap, and other Communist organs in Hanoi, I am convinced that Ho knows that the road to victory in South Vietnam by overt aggression is closed.

6. He is therefore willing to shift from overt war to negotiations, with the latter in no way compromising his determination to someday "unify" Vietnam. Negotiations are a weapons system at which Ho is an expert (see his performance between the French and the Chinats from 1946-49 or his 1949-53 moves with the French).

7. This willingness to shift gears created trouble for Lenin and has undoubtedly created internal difficulties for Ho. My guess is that he released the exchange of letters to show the hard-liners he is still tough. There is probably a "negotiate-now" faction in Hanoi and he rhetorically disassociated himself from them.

8. But the real issue is Ho's authority: his capacity to free himself from factional control and be completely "opportunist"--in Lenin's use of the word, i. e., maintain the right to seize the utilize any opportunity that arises.

9. Assuming that Ho has adopted a tactic of negotiation (no Leninist looks on negotiations as valuable in themselves), but does not think now is the time to move, the release of the exchange of letters makes sense in terms of maintaining his freedom of maneuver.

10. Under what circumstances can we expect him to actually implement this tactic of negotiation?

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And you might well lie awake nights worrying about the "inscrutable Americans."

J.P.
John P. Roche

22a

TAB
A

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 30, 1962

Mr. John P. Roche
5643 South Dorchester
Chicago 37, Illinois


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Sincerely,


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1341 CONNECTICUT AVENUE NORTHWEST
WASHINGTON 6, D. C. DECATUR 2-7754

From: 5643 South Dorchester
Chicago 37, Illinois

Personal

Senator Hubert Humphrey,
Senate Office Building,
Washington 25, D.C.



22b
AMERICANS FOR
DEMOCRATIC
ACTION

October 25, 1962

Dear Hubert:

I have refrained from putting out any statements on the Cuban crisis for two reasons: first, since the night after the Czech coup, when I lay awake in a sweat, I have known that sooner or later this confrontation was in the cards; and, second, because I have been convinced for a decade that Khrushchev has not taken us seriously. (You may have seen my letter to the Times on his "too liberal to fight" crack) However, I would like to pass on my views to you in the hope that if you find them useful you will pass them further.

What the President has got to remember is that Khrushchev has never been educated on the underlying vitality of our dedication to freedom. Stalin got stopped cold by Truman and Dean Acheson, but Khrushchev came in during the catatonic years of American policy. My guess is that it took that shrewd bastard about five minutes to size Eisenhower up as a dope and Dulles as a rhetorician with a fundamentally isolationist orientation who if it came down to risking Chicago or New York to save Berlin would wench. I suspect Khrushchev read Dulles' account of his trips to the brink in the Satevpost with some amusement — it was probably news to him. So while Dulles played with paper doll alliances, Khrushchev took off on the fun threatening "hails of rockets" as if he were alone in the power world (which he was).

Now the Soviets have no Gotterdammerung Complex, and confronted by a stonewall they will, I am convinced, back up. In the course of backing up, they will let fly ferocious imprecations. But Khrushchev has never before had this educational experience and it is going to be tough for him to crawl back — I hope we will make it rhetorically easy for him (those boys take rhetoric far more seriously than we do) to do so.

The reason I emphasize this is that JFK seemed to react personally to the Cuban build-up just as he did to the steel price rise. He seemed to feel an American boy's sense of fury at being double-crossed whereas I (for instance) would take it for granted that Khrushchev would double-cross us and plan on that basis. At this point, I would feel no particular need to rub Khrushchev's nose in his sin: he got caught, has got to back up, and if we can help him off the hook by various techniques so much the better. Why, for example, could the arms quarantine not be enforced by UN inspection teams operating from US ships — it is the quarantine, not the glory of our navy, that is essential. Etc.

This is a bit chaotic, but I hope you get the sense of my views. Between you and me, I was relieved to learn that Dean Acheson was back on the field. This is no time for on-the-job training.

Yours hastily,

John P. Roche

1 month before Cuban Crisis

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1962.

Letters to

'Too Liberal to Fight'

Soviets Believed Confident That We Will Not Strike First

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

No recent pronouncement of Khrushchev's has struck me so ominously as his casual remark to Robert Frost that the Americans are "too liberal to fight." As you quite rightly pointed out in your Sept. 15 editorial, this could indicate that the Soviet Premier is engaged in the same erroneous process of underestimating the vitality of democratic societies which led Hitler to his fatal miscalculations.

It also lends strong support to the position which a number of us have taken over the years that Soviet policies toward the West are based on cold calculation rather than on fear. The Soviets, in other words, have been pushing a hard bargain not because they are afraid of a preemptive strike, but because they are confident the United States will not strike first. They are confident that we are not the aggressors their propaganda makes us out to be, for the simple reason that if we were, they would have been obliterated at the time we held a nuclear monopoly.

I opposed the notion of a preventive war at the time Bertrand Russell was advocating it, and I am in a fundamental sense proud that the Soviets can make this calculation. But at the same time Khrushchev should not make the tragic error of assuming that because we are not capable of the immoral savagery of preventive war we have abandoned our ideals and turned survival into a theory of politics.

Stressing Our Values

Obviously we want to survive, and — as President Kennedy recently pointed out — heroic poses are a cheap political technique. But whatever the risks, and however great our inner palpitation at the thought of the possible consequences, we must make it clear to the Russians that we stand for certain values which are not negotiable.

In short, while we will not rush to fight, neither will we flee our obligations in the false hope that we can thereby survive. Indeed, the growth of a survival mentality may, ironically, in pragmatic terms contribute to the possibilities of destruction by encouraging Khrushchev to adventurism. And on the fundamental level, to turn survival into the touchstone of national policy is to betray both the ideals which have lighted our tortuous path from barbarism and the brave men and women who have over the centuries been martyred in the cause of freedom.

JOHN P. ROCHE,

Morris Hillquit Professor of Labor and Social Thought, Brandeis University; National Chairman, Americans for Democratic Action.

Washington, Sept. 16, 1962.

~~SECRET~~

WJ

23

Let's talk

March 27, 1967

~~SECRET~~

We have talked

WJ

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President

I have been following the negotiation sequence very closely and have reached the conclusion that we are no longer fighting a "war" in Vietnam--we are fighting a "negotiation."

This is not intended as a cute play on words--on the contrary, it has serious consequences for American policy.

At the risk of boring you, let me set out the assumptions on which this is based:

1. Ho Chi Minh is not just a radical nationalist like Toure, Castro, or Sukarno. He is a dedicated Leninist, the last of the first generation of the Communist International.

2. He is therefore not a simple-minded Vietnamese chauvinist who, for example, will "not negotiate under pressure." I was in the Air Force too long to believe all I read about the effectiveness of bombing. But the view that Ho will not negotiate until we stop bombing is nonsense.

--it might be true of Castro, who is basically a romantic Latin fascist, a "petty-bourgeois sentimentalist" in Communist jargon;

--but Ho--like Lenin at the time of Brest-Litovsk--would negotiate in cold blood for whatever goals he considers realistic--even if bombs were coming down his chimney.

3. The behavior of a dedicated, intelligent Leninist is highly predictable. I never doubted that Khrushchev would pull the missiles out of Cuba in October 1962 (see my letter to the then Senator Humphrey at Tab A).

~~SECRET~~

4. A good Leninist looks on the use of force as merely a variety of politics. He never adopts an inflexible "unconditional surrender" position, but is always ready to alter the timetable if the costs of overt aggression become too high.

5. On the basis of various statements that have been emerging from Hanoi over the past six months, as well as articles in Hoc Tap, and other Communist organs in Hanoi, I am convinced that Ho knows that the road to victory in South Vietnam by overt aggression is closed.

6. He is therefore willing to shift from overt war to negotiations, with the latter in no way compromising his determination to someday "unify" Vietnam. Negotiations are a weapons system at which Ho is an expert (see his performance between the French and the Chinats from 1946-49 or his 1949-53 moves with the French).

7. This willingness to shift gears created trouble for Lenin and has undoubtedly created internal difficulties for Ho. My guess is that he released the exchange of letters to show the hard-liners he is still tough. There is probably a "negotiate-now" faction in Hanoi and he rhetorically disassociated himself from them.

8. But the real issue is Ho's authority: his capacity to free himself from factional control and be completely "opportunist"--in Lenin's use of the word, i. e., maintain the right to seize the utilize any opportunity that arises.

9. Assuming that Ho has adopted a tactic of negotiation (no Leninist looks on negotiations as valuable in themselves), but does not think now is the time to move, the release of the exchange of letters makes sense in terms of maintaining his freedom of maneuver.

10. Under what circumstances can we expect him to actually implement this tactic of negotiation?

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United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D. C.

23a

October 30, 1962

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5643 South Dorchester
Chicago 37, Illinois


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From: 5643 South Dorchester
Chicago 37, Illinois

Personal

Senator Hubert Humphrey,
Senate Office Building,
Washington 25, D.C.



236
AMERICANS FOR
DEMOCRATIC
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October 25, 1962

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1 month before Cuban Crisis

23c

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1962.

Letters to

'Too Liberal to Fight'

Soviets Believed Confident That We
Will Not Strike First

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JOHN P. ROCHE,

Morris Hillquit Professor of Labor and Social Thought, Brandeis University; National Chairman, Americans for Democratic Action.

Washington, Sept. 16, 1962.

Send to Walt Rostow for his
confidential information.

24

LBJ/mf
3-30-67
5:50p

rec'd
3/30/67
2:00p

MEMORANDUM

24a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 30, 1967

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President

I picked up a rumor at State the other day that Len Unger is to be Graham Martin's replacement in Bangkok.

If true, this distresses me to the point where I feel impelled to stick my nose in where perhaps it doesn't belong. I work for you--and leave that determination in your hands.

I have had a great deal of contact with Unger over the past six months. He is an able, dedicated man who, in my judgment, lacks one fundamental characteristic: cold decisiveness (or even hot decisiveness). This judgment is based on my own experience in committees with him and in private discussion.

It is predictable that the minute Martin (who has run that Mission like a Marine platoon) leaves, all the characters who lacked the guts to tackle him will be out to get his successor. My hunch is that Unger would be overwhelmed, and the Mission would degenerate into a collection of autonomous baronies.

Let me add that I have no candidate.

SL
John P. Roche

25

March 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President

I spent about four hours last night meditating and speculating on the problem of Ho's releasing your letter.

A number of explanations come to mind but by a process of exclusion I ended up with the hypothesis that the key to what is otherwise a quite irrational act (and Ho is the last of the first-generation Leninists and hardly irrational) is a fierce internal brawl in the Lao Dong.

From this viewpoint, Ho's statement could be considered a rhetorical pay-off to Le Duan and the pro-Chinese "hawks."

This raises the question: Why did he feel impelled to do it?

Hypothetical answer: Because he has been denounced by them for moving towards negotiations. By this rhetorical gesture he covered his flank.

The thing to watch for--if this hypothesis has any merit--is a shift in the party apparatus in Hanoi.

--One of the oldest Leninist tactics is to endorse the opposition's position and then--after proper preparation--break their organizational back.

In summary, I suspect Ho (a complete realist) is in favor of negotiations, found himself confronted by powerful opposition in the Party, endorsed the opposition's view in order to consolidate his organizational strength, will now move (using the old salami tactic) to neutralize his enemies within the Party, and may write you another letter.

Never overestimate the monolithic character of a Communist Party--and don't forget the two letters that turned up in the 1962 Cuban crisis.

bcc: Walt Rostow

John P. Roche

VOLUME TWO ON AGREEMENT

Odds on Iceland and Bulgaria today are very dim.

1. Iceland

Penfield, who is leaving Iceland today, advised that it is constitutionally impossible to get agreement today. Llkely time would be Monday. Earliest possible time would be late tomorrow, and that is dubious.

2. Bulgaria

A flash agreement cable was dispatched, but because of the time difference could not have arrived before evening there. Extremely doubtful that anything possible at a minimum before tomorrow, but we'll have to wait for a response before any better judgment is possible.

John Macy has been advised.

Evidently the hope was announcement at 4 p.m. today.

JR

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

27

March 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President

I spent about four hours last night meditating and speculating on the problem of Ho's releasing your letter.

A number of explanations come to mind but by a process of exclusion I ended up with the hypothesis that the key to what is otherwise a quite irrational act (and Ho is the last of the first-generation Leninists and hardly irrational) is a fierce internal brawl in the Lao Dong.

From this viewpoint, Ho's statement could be considered a rhetorical pay-off to Le Duan and the pro-Chinese "hawks."

This raises the question: Why did he feel impelled to do it?


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--One of the oldest Leninist tactics is to endorse the opposition's position and then--after proper preparation--break their organizational back.

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Never overestimate the monolithic character of a Communist Party--and don't forget the two letters that turned up in the 1962 Cuban crisis.

Handwritten initials in dark ink, appearing to be 'J.P.R.' with a stylized flourish.

John P. Roche

Rec'd
2-9-67
H 35P

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

(23)
28
done ✓
✓

~~SECRET~~

February 9, 1967

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President

k

Sometime next month, I suspect, U Thant will report to the United Nations that the economic boycott has made no particular dent on Rhodesia.

At that point there will probably be some more high rhetoric and then a decision to wait a little longer to make a firm evaluation. This gives us six months, perhaps, to determine how far we want to ride with "liberating" Rhodesia.

Ambassador Goldberg's communication to the Post (in reply to Dean Acheson) was a moral trumpet blast which could justify all sorts of escalatory measures. I have been assured, on the other hand, that we do not intend to climb on the escalator.

If--as I hope--the latter is the case, a good fall-back position should be developed with appropriate moral underpinning.

At the risk of sounding pessimistic, I doubt whether State has done anything along this line--or even believes it is necessary to do anything.

--When I discussed this recently with someone over there, he blandly assured me there was no problem: the French would veto any demand for military intervention.

--This strikes me as a hell of a way to formulate foreign policy. Suppose the perverse French decide to abstain?

Walt
see me
NL

J.P.R.
John P. Roche

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 07-4
By isl, NARA, Date 8-28-07

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

7

Joe Clark 29

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Revised
to Watson

January 4, 1967
2:00 p.m., Wednesday

k

Mr. President:

All letters with 100 signatures (such as the "student letters" in the Times) are, of course, put-up jobs.

There is nothing un-American about a put-up job, but I think it would be unwise to exaggerate the impact on a pretty knowledgeable public of a letter 5 kids probably composed and 95 signed to get their names in the Times as "leaders of their generation."

Thus, I think a direct response would be a mistake.

There are two alternatives I favor:

1) I think that you should spend half an hour on television in an informal setting with a commentator you can trust (Howard K. Smith is my candidate) quietly exploring the issues in Vietnam.

ack

This would be far more effective than a hortatory or exhortatory formal speech. And it would be far wider in scope than a mere reply to critics.

2) A "Presidential Paper" should be prepared in which you express your views on the whole posture of U. S. foreign policy. It should be a concise, perhaps 2,500 word document. I believe this too would be better than a formal set speech.

Sub U
tighten
up

Walt
I like this

John P. Roche

A

Walt
BIC
ROCK
GET A PAPER

Walt:

30

Get ahold of the doctor and see what he
has to say.

LBJ:mary s

2/8/67

7:17p

MEMORANDUM

30a

(2)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 7, 1967

Rec'd
2-7-67
11:50
AM

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President

There is now a major industry devoted to inventing quotes-- mostly on Vietnam--by John Kennedy, Adlai Stevenson and others who are in no position to object.

Schlesinger and Goodwin are expanding Kennedy's views full time while Clayton Fritchey has the Stevenson franchise.

I think it is time some good columnist (Alsop, Howard Smith, Drummond) took off after this outrageous manipulation of the distinguished dead.

JL

John P. Roche ✓

31
February 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR

Larry O'Brien

This is to follow up on our discussion of last Friday.

It seems to me that we must start with the presumption that the worst alternative may occur--in this instance, that the war in Vietnam will not be settled before the 1968 election.

Assuming that the war will not in itself be an issue (except for a few peace types), but that it will provide a psychological background for the campaign, we can anticipate what I have called the "Korean whipsaw": On Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, we will be the war party; on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays, the party of appeasement.

The major problem that we have never tackled has been supplying our people on the Hill, and elsewhere, with the kind of materials they can use to defend our Vietnam policy. Long before I came down here, I was arguing for such a program and, over the last six months, I have continued. Inevitably, the baby is eventually dumped on the State Department's doorstep.

And the State Department, in my considered judgment, is simply incompetent to do the kind of job we need. They have all kinds of material, and plenty of talent, but for reasons which defy rational explanation, the two can never coincide.

Therefore, we must do the job ourselves and I would urge that very strong consideration be given to immediate creation of a small group to get this enterprise launched. I would recommend as a first step that we pull Harold Kaplan out of the Public Affairs office at State, bring him over to the EOB and tell him to lay out the job prospectus. Kaplan was in Saigon a year or two and did an outstanding job there in the Public Affairs Section--he is an extraordinarily bright guy and a facile writer. Undoubtedly, he will need some research assistance but we could get a better idea of how much after talking to him.

John P. Roche ✓

cc: Walt Rostow
Joe Califano

X
rec'd
2-1-67
11450J

To contact ✓

32

file

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 1, 1967

For the President:

The enclosed cable is worth reading in the event you missed it.

The injection of Bobby Kennedy into this delicate situation could create additional problems.

J.L.

John. Roche

SECRET

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE WORKING
NOT NATH. SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12958,
SEC. 1.1(e)

BY DCW ON 8-11-83

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Roche

32a

12

~~SECRET~~

SUMMARY

Action

EA

NNNNVZCZCFHE403VV HPA844

PP RUEHC RUMJIR

DE RUFNCR 11501 0312150

Info

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~~SECRET~~ PARIS 11501

EUR

SUBJECT: TRINH STATEMENT

IO

P

USIA

DURING ONE AND A HALF HOUR TALK WITH SENATOR KENNEDY JAN 31, QUAI'S ASIAN DIRECTOR MANAC'H REPEATED (C.F. EMBTEL 11463) THAT STATEMENT BY NORTH VIETNAMESE FONMIN NGUYEN DUY TRINH TO EFFECT THAT TALKS BETWEEN DRV AND US COULD BEGIN PROVIDED US WOULD STOP UNCONDITIONALLY AND DEFINITELY BOMBING OF DRV IS IMPORTANT NEW DEVELOPMENT. MANAC'H SAID THAT HE HAD RECENTLY DISCUSSED STATEMENT WITH DRV REP PARIS MAI VAN BO AND AS RESULT OF THIS CONVERSATION FRENCH BELIEVE THAT DRV MAY BE AGREEABLE TO APPROACHING SOLUTION VIETNAM PROBLEM IN DIFFERENT MANNER THAN HERETOFORE. INSTEAD OF HOLDING TALKS ON VIETNAM AS A WHOLE,

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

NIC

RSR

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 11501 ~~SECRET~~

NORTH VIETNAMESE MAY BE THINKING IN TERMS OF DIVIDING PROBLEM INTO THREE PARTS OR AS MANAC'H CALLED IT, "SLICES." (1) US-NORTH VIETNAMESE RELATIONS, (2) US-SOUTH VIETNAMESE RELATIONS, AND (3) US RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM AS WHOLE. RECENT STATEMENT BY DRV FOREIGN MINISTER MAY BE INDICATION THAT DRV WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS FIRST "SLICE", THAT OF US-NORTH VIETNAMESE RELATIONS PROVIDED US STOPS BOMBING DEFINITELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY OF NORTH VIETNAM. THIS, MANAC'H *THOUGHT* WOULD ALSO BE FACE-SAVING MANNER FOR DRV TO HOLD TALKS WITHOUT INSISTING ON 4 POINT PROGRAM AS BASIS FOR DISCUSSION WHICH REMAIN APPLICABLE FOR DISCUSSION OF VIETNAM AS A WHOLE. MANAC'H SAID HE IS HAVING FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH MAI VAN BO ON THURSDAY FEB 2 AT WHICH TIME HE WILL TRY TO CLARIFY WHETHER THIS INTERPRETATION CORRECT.

GP-3. BOHLEN

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By *ctm*, NARA, Date 10-21-02

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

33

January 25, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR

Walt Rostow

Samuel Eaton of ARA called up last week and asked to see me. He came over yesterday and spent about an hour explaining his "philosophy" and giving me a memo (which Bill also received).

At the risk of sounding unkind, I still don't know what his "philosophy" is; what he said sounded to me like an attempt to cover himself in the event the "summit" did not work out.

However, it was St. Paul, I believe, who said, "Suffer foreign service officers gladly." In that spirit of caritas I listened, nodded, and said nothing except to thank him for his concern and promise to convey his views.

They are hereby conveyed.

AL
John P. Roche

cc: Bill Bowdler