

APPEARANCE OF THE CITY OF DETROIT
BEFORE
THE PRESIDENT'S
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL
DISORDERS

*Open 5/84 Kerner Commission
(NACCD) Series No. 4, Box 23*

~~Handwritten scribble~~

APPEARANCE OF THE CITY OF DETROIT

BEFORE

THE PRESIDENT'S

NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

Jerome P. Cavanagh, Mayor
August 15, 1967
Washington, D. C.

APPEARANCE OF THE CITY OF DETROIT BEFORE THE
PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDER

A. Statement by Mayor Jerome P. Cavanagh and
Film Presentation

*1 copy
sent
to Detroit*
✓ B. Sequence of Events

✓ C. What We Have Done In Detroit
Recommendations
Conclusions

D. Attachments

Remarks by Mayor Jerome P. Cavanagh before the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Tuesday, August 15, 1967, 10:00 A. M.

I would like to preface my remarks today by pointing out to the members of this distinguished committee that this is not the first time I have appeared in Washington or before a major public forum to speak about the crisis in the American city or in my own city of Detroit.

For the last five years I have repeatedly raised my voice and I have repeatedly warned that the American cities today are in a state of crisis so deep and so abiding that our national destiny is threatened.

A year ago, I told the Ribicoff Committee, "we must make sure that everyone in this nation begins to think about the larger questions -- begins to realize that the warfare on our city streets is as important to our national destiny as some consider the warfare in Southeast Asia."

This same theme was echoed in my presidential address to the National League of Cities last November.

I have served as a member of the National Advisory Committee on Area Redevelopment, National Citizens Committee for Community Relations, and several special advisory committees to President Johnson dealing with urban affairs.

In 1963, I warned the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials at their national convention that cities face a tragic situation that is nothing less than a national shame.

Last November, I told the Conference of National Organizations that "our treatment of the Negro has been a national disgrace. Our laws, our customs and our attitudes are changing now. I only hope they change fast enough to match the impatience of so many forgotten Americans."

I have said repeatedly at the White House and in Congress that we are at a time in our country's history when the cities should be breaking out of their shackles and they are not.

It is acknowledged by objective observers that Detroit has used federal programs with great effect, that it has progressive leadership in the school system and in City Hall, and that its relations with the Negro community are among the best in the country.

In a study just released of school systems in six major cities, Detroit was cited as having "the more open participatory system encouraging wider public participation." The same study highly praised the policies of School Superintendent Norman Drachler who is with us here today.

Still we have to conclude that we have not done enough.

I told the United States Conference of Mayors in a presidential address just two months ago that "our problem is quite clearly that the great social and physical programs for rebuilding our cities and for upgrading the quality of American life are still regarded largely as frills" and that "instead of moving up cities on the national scale of priorities, we seem to be slipping."

In April before the National Institute of Public Affairs I warned that everything in this nation is not going to be all right. My words that night were "I do not mean to preach blood and thunder here tonight. But there is a good deal of thunder that can be heard and blood has already spilled."

Since that night in April, much more blood has spilled.

How many warnings does this nation need? How many times must we mayors go before Congress, before the Administration, before the leaders of this nation with our simple message that we are all in the urban boat and that that boat is full of holes?

Let us now turn our attention to the Detroit problem.

We should begin today with a brief description of Michigan and Detroit and a bit of Michigan riot history.

First, of Michigan's approximate 8 million citizens, roughly 10 percent are Negroes. About 70 percent of all Negroes in the state live in the Detroit Metropolitan Area where roughly half of the state's population is centered.

Detroit's Negro population today -- in the city itself -- is estimated at over 600,000 out of 1.6 million people. Detroit is surrounded by an extensive group of suburbs -- there are about 200 separate units of government in the Metropolitan Area. The suburbs now contain the bulk of the metropolitan area population. Only a handful have any Negro residents.

Detroit is a flat city, divided roughly in half by Woodward Avenue and -- much like Los Angeles -- is primarily filled with single-family homes.

In 1943, Detroit was the scene of a major race riot. It was a riot of an entirely different nature than the riot in July of this year. In 1943, 34 people were killed, property damage was limited to \$2 million dollars. There were very few fires and looting was limited. The riot lasted two days and was finally put down by federal troops. It was characterized by mobs of whites and Negroes attacking individuals and crowds of the other race. Frequently individuals were chased by mobs and badly beaten or killed. It was sparked by false rumors in the Negro community. There were instances of pitched gun battles between mobs and police.

which?

In recent years, there have been outbreaks of a racial nature in a number of Michigan cities including Lansing and Benton Harbor.

For the most part, Detroit remained calm.

At 8:30 p.m. Tuesday, August 9, 1966, Police arrested four men for loitering at the intersections of Pennsylvania and Kercheval Streets on Detroit's lower east side. A crowd of 75 to 100 gathered. Windows were broken but there were no verified incidents of looting. There was some attempted fire bombing but none of it succeeded. There was no sniping.

Police reinforcements converged upon the area.

At 10 p.m. Police organized a sweep of the area and disbursed crowds. The Police were on full alert and four-man scout cars patrolled the area intensively. The outbreak was in an area of only minor stores and largely single-family homes. Though there were a number of small incidents the first night, few arrests were made.

The next night, the streets had been cleaned by the DPW, stores boarded up and a good summer rain fell. Civilian peace patrols were active and the second night there were 43 felony arrests by Police. There were no deaths, few injuries and arrests totaled just under 60. By the end of the third night, August 11, things were quiet.

Early in the incident a car was stopped with several people inside who were members of an extremist Negro organization. The car contained guns and ammunition and was heading toward the Pennsylvania-Kercheval neighborhood.

A detailed study of the Pennsylvania-Kercheval incident has been submitted to this Committee as part of our overall report.

With this brief background, let us take a look at the tragic events in July, 1967 in Detroit.

I think it should be emphasized from the beginning that both the incident last year in Detroit and this year's tragedy are part of a national picture of deep discontent in American cities today.

The explosion that ripped Detroit had many points of origin over a long, long period of time. It has its links with events of recent years in Washington, D. C. ; in Birmingham and Tuscaloosa, Alabama; in Jackson, Mississippi; in Cambridge, Maryland; in Kansas City, Missouri; in the Watts district in Los Angeles; in Harlem and Bedford Stuyvesant in New York City; on the South Side in Chicago and in the cotton fields of Louisiana and Texas.

The fact is that up to date in 1967 alone, there have been disturbances of major proportions -- ranging from major incidents to riots-- in 59 cities of the United States -- cities containing almost half the population of the United States -- in the East, the South, the Midwest, the Southwest and the Far West. Some of these eruptions were more violent than others. Last year the count was 37 cities.

There has been no discernible relationship between the location or degree of violence in these disorders to social or economic or governmental factors. If there was a pattern, it was a crazy quilt.

(more)

It is clear from our experience that you cannot extinguish a single flame in a general fire. You must extinguish the entire fire, and damp down all the sparks and ignition points.

The explosion in Detroit was one flame in a nationwide fire. A spark fell in Detroit, and an ignition took place. Newark seemed to set the sparks flying, but the elements of combustion were there before Newark. Detroit itself dropped sparks on a half-dozen other Michigan cities. But the elements of combustion were there for many, many years.

Every city has its individual aspects -- its strengths and its weaknesses. We thought we were in a stronger position in terms of human relations than many other cities. Every outside observer agreed that we were. And I believe we were. But the difference wasn't deep or fundamental enough to forestall the catastrophe.

We in Detroit discovered to our sorrow that we were not, in the words of the poet, John Donne, "an island." We were a part of the nationwide phenomenon of these eruptions. The places where they occurred were almost incidental, just as the incidents which ignited them were almost always accidental.

There is a widespread belief that the rioting in Detroit was the work of conspirators, that police need more power to crush rebellions and that the great social programs which had been so successful in Detroit are now bankrupt failures.

(More)

what is that on?

I would say from the evidence we have now that the influence of the conspirators was very small.

relationship between police & people of the ghetto

I would say that Detroit needs more police officers but that our present laws are adequate to cope with riot situations.

I would say that social programs are still very relevant and very much needed.

In the remarks to follow, we will touch on all of these matters but it is important to understand from the beginning that there are no single answers or easy assumptions to make about Detroit's riot. Such simplistic approaches are too often part of American thinking.

The basic issue in Detroit is the same issue which is bringing this nation to its most frightening domestic crisis since the Civil War. And it is the same Civil War issue -- race -- around which most of the rioting swirls.

But before getting to this larger picture, let us take a look at the factors involved in Detroit's riot.

what?

The riot began spontaneously and fed on the images from a hundred other cities. It quickly exploded beyond the capacity of the police to handle and roared out of control.

It did not start -- as some might assume -- from a specific, justified grievance in the Negro community. There was no overt act of police brutality.

Sunday AM
July 23rd

The riot began with an ordinary raid at 3:45 a. m. on an illegal after-hours drinking establishment -- a blind pig, as it is called in Detroit. It was on 12th Street, a street busy with Saturday night celebrators at that hour. The crowd was jovial as the 83 persons arrested in the blind pig were being transported to the police station.

usually 15-25 - brought
83

There is no record that the police were unduly rough, profane or impolite in handling the arrests. It took an hour to get all those arrested into paddy wagons and during that time the crowd on 12th Street grew to about 200. As the last police car was leaving the scene, a stone or brick was thrown through the rear window of a scout car. Police did not stop but drove away.

Of course this had not been the first time this summer that a large group had congregated during an arrest or raid. But this time the crowd did not go home. ^{hot night?} Instead it began looting nearby stores. Other police cars arrived, were stoned, and left without making arrests. A detailed chronology of the riot events will be presented to the Commission later in the course of this submission.

At this point let me make a few personal observations:

I cannot and would not affirm that everything I did, or which was done in my name and by my authority, during the hours of destruction and violence, was in every respect the best that could have been done.

(More)

Hindsight is a great instructor. I have learned much from it. Yet, I cannot honestly say today that under the circumstances of the hour, and with the information that I had at the time --- with rumors having almost the authority of facts -- that I could have done much better than I did.

Moreover, I am not sure that even such improvements as hindsight recommends would have made any major difference in the results.

Could the Milwaukee pattern have been applied to Detroit? Perhaps. But it rained hard in Milwaukee the next night, as it did in Detroit in 1966 when we had trouble, and in both cases, rain greatly dampened the danger. Yet it rained in Newark without effect.

The main object of the city's efforts to head off summer riots had been to remove instances of community friction. The Mayor's Summer Task Force was organized to keep an eye on trouble spots, report danger, deal promptly with grievances and dispel rumors. For example, three weeks before the riot there was an unusual multiple car accident at a nearby intersection. Nineteen persons were hurt in the accident and word quickly spread that an injured Negro man was denied a place on a crowded ambulance and that his seat had been given to a white woman less seriously injured. City employees picked up the rumor quickly, found out the truth -- that the white woman was pregnant -- and spread the word throughout the nearby community. That particular tumult died.

(more)

Also, along with the Summer Task Force in the Mayor's Office, the city had a wide range of summertime activities at 589 recreation locations, an increased number of swimming pools in operation and a full range of poverty programs which included employment, job training, education, work experience, family counseling and similar programs. Of course, none of these programs was in operation early Sunday morning when the blind pig was raided.

It should be pointed out that most of these programs were funded at levels that were well below recognized need in the city.

Also, a package of summer programs had been funded but these programs were late in starting because of a delay in funding and did not go into operation until July 17. The Labor Department also has funded under the Urban Areas Employment Program a massive drive for employment among slum dwellers. However, this program is not in full operation as yet.

The Mayor's Summer Task Force was in operation with an Early Warning System on the street. That Early Warning System had helped dispel a number of rumors, including the 19-injured traffic accident I referred to earlier. It should be noted that there was no advance warning from this Early Warning System when the riot broke out.

(More)

The Police Department had a well-developed and battle-tested riot plan which had been praised and used as a model by departments all over the nation. The department also was barely recovering from a bitter labor dispute in which more than 1,000 policemen had called in sick as part of a strike action. What effect this labor dispute may have had on the attitude of police the first morning of the riot is unknown. But consideration of it should not be dismissed.

*what if
do you
think
bad?*

We have said that Detroit's riot did not start from a specific incident which might arouse the passions of a mob. It also should be made clear that it did not start from the work of revolutionaries who belong to the black extremist movements.

✓
✓

Extremist groups exist in Detroit and have for some time. They were involved deeply in the 1966 incident. But this year, from all the information we have, they cannot be credited with causing the explosion. In fact, the discussions among the extremists were that 1968 was the year for Detroit.

The people out on 12th Street early Sunday morning when the blind pig was raided were people of no distinct class. There were some drunks, some drifters, some middle class and perhaps even some wealthy, some hustlers, some petty gamblers, some factory workers, some prostitutes -- just night people out for a late bite to eat or for a little vice-related activity or on their way home. These people had no direct connection with the extremists as far as we know.

(more)

Those who came and swelled the crowd to 200 apparently were residents from the large number of apartment buildings near 12th Street. There is still no evidence that there was a significant number of extremists among this group.

Police have arrested one young man for goading that crowd into action. But for one or two persons to be able to turn a friendly crowd into a group of looters points to the fact that the seeds of the powder keg must have been present. There was a common atmosphere which extremists and non-extremists breathed.

That common atmosphere is the quality of life for many if not most of those who inhabit the Negro, Puerto Rican and Mexican-American ghettos in our cities across the country. These people have had the shared experience of slum living -- not just by the quality of their housing conditions, but by the quality of their living conditions. I mean the overall conditions of degradation, disorganization and poverty -- in which the young grow up without hope of legitimately sharing in the supposed fruits of the affluent society -- that affluent society within their sight but beyond their reach.

It is this slum atmosphere of the ghetto which breeds and cultures the extremists -- the militant haters, social outlaws and demagogues who regard the violation of law and violence as their only way of making their mark and obtaining their share.

(More)

It is this atmosphere which was present on 12th Street in Detroit that early Sunday morning, and elsewhere in Detroit in the succeeding hours and days. As far as our information now goes, it just happened to ignite and to explode.

Detroit's experience was that there was no incident and no rallying point. As Bayard Rustin recently observed, "Although it may be of some interest to search for a pattern, no very profound purpose is served by concentrating on who struck the match. There are always matches lying around. We must ask why there was also a fuse and why the fuse was connected to a powder keg."

We can conclude that in Detroit, the matches indeed were lying around.

Let us take a look at what happened when the match was lit.

The early scenes you will see on this film -- the first few seconds -- will give you a taste of the crowd that was on the street Sunday morning about eight or nine a. m.

FILM

You have seen the pictures and heard some of the sounds of the rioting. This is neither the most dramatic nor the most complete picture of what went on. But I think it gives you a realistic sense of riot action.

The early pictures of the rioting and looting -- the beginnings early Sunday morning showed a high percentage of young men. We will submit to you copies of news pictures taken at that time. Look at the faces. You will see mostly young men.

55-60%
SD 10 m d a 25

These young men are the fuse. For the most part they have no experience in real productive work. For the most part, they have no stake in the social arrangements of life. For the most part they have no foreseeable future except among the hustlers and minor racketeers. For the most part, they are cynical, hostile, frustrated and angry against a system they feel has included them out. At the same time, they are filled with the bravado of youth and a code of behavior which is hostile to authority.

The extremists, of course, always turn up. They are the unchosen leaders of potential rioters.

When a substantial number of people in a community come to feel that law and order is their enemy and their oppressor, that community is in danger. Such groups exist in most of our communities today.

In our case, it seems clear that it was not until looting became widespread and was joined in by whites and Negroes alike, with almost a carnival spirit, that the riot got out of hand.

(More)

And by that time, it was not just young rebels any more. They led but were followed by housewives and well-dressed men in good cars. Some of these men had stood for a time protecting stores and yelling at looters, but then gave up and joined the looting themselves.

Again I emphasize: There was no specific, justified grievance which sparked the outbreak. The city had made a maximum effort to use all possible resources over a long period of time to lessen tension between the races and to improve housing, education and jobs for the Negro community.

But it is obvious that what we did could not prevent a significantly large percentage of our population from feeling alienated enough to violate society's laws.

The powder keg these young men ignited is the social background. This social background is simply that for the overwhelming majority of the Negro population, oppression and segregation are still too much a part of life. It is true that there have been changes in these patterns in recent years and in Detroit of all northern American cities, those changes have perhaps been the most meaningful and the most far ranging. But despite this, it is clear that a significant number of the American white middle class has never accepted the Negro as a neighbor, as a fellow worker or as a contributing member of American society.

(More)

This constant arm's length treatment does feed back through the entire fabric of the Negro community and creates the social background of estrangement and frustration that make up the larger powder keg.

As for those who feel that the total answer to the situation -- to the dangers whose manifestations we have seen -- is simply more guns, clubs and force, they are wrong, catastrophically wrong.

Of course, the increased availability and more effective use of peace-keeping forces is vital and essential.

But those who cherish the thought that the situation, nationwide, can be dealt with simply by sterner measures of force and repression are deluding themselves.

Repression without channels of release is a Molotov cocktail. It takes only one match to set it off, and then its destructive effects can spread everywhere.

I am not sure how much there is to be learned from a prolonged consideration of the fine details of the actions taken, or not taken, under riot conditions.

To speculate on what might have happened if a particular action had been taken or not been taken at a particular moment is rather vain and without major significance.

What if a particular policeman or National Guardsman had done, or not done a particular act at a particular moment?

(more)

What if a particular looter had done or not done a particular act, at a particular moment, such as breaking a window or snatching the first loot out of a window?

What if the police had refrained from raiding the blind pig early Sunday morning, or if there had been only 50 instead of 83 people arrested, and if police action had taken only fifteen minutes instead of an hour -- the time required for the crowd to gather?

To ask and answer such questions is as useless, in my judgment, as to suggest that if yesterday were Saturday instead of Monday, today would be Sunday, rather than Tuesday and none of us would be at this hearing.

However, a broad examination is important and leads to important conclusions.

For example, the National Guard needs more training and a much greater degree of integration, as this Commission has already recommended. Until these recommendations are implemented the National Guard cannot be considered an effective force in these situations. I have some concrete suggestions which I will make toward the end of this presentation.

But first let me turn to a concise chronology of events in the course of the riot.

B

Sunday,
July 23, 1967

2:00 p.m.

*Why so many
murdered rumors
- connections?*



Mayor Jerome P. Cavanagh requests 200 Michigan State Police be sent to Detroit. Detroit General Hospital on emergency standby alert. All H.R.D. centers operating Mayor's Summer Task Force establishes intelligence liaison with D. P. D. Begins to coordinate non-police functions of municipal government.

4:20 p.m.

National Guard is committed.

5:25 p.m.

First contingent of National Guardsmen arrive at Central High School, Tuxedo and LaSalle

6:13 p.m.

Gen. Moore receives authorization to activate the National Guard

6:57 p.m.

National Guard soldiers begin appearing on street

7:45 p.m.

✓ Mayor issues proclamation instituting a curfew: 9:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.

8:45 p.m.

50 National Guardsmen moved from Central High School into 13th Precinct. 822 called from Grand Rapids, 800 called from Flint, 100 called from metropolitan Detroit

9:07 p.m.

Sniper fire 1600 block Seward

Police call helicopter in area

10:25 p.m.

Gas stations ordered closed

Sunday,
July 23, 1967

11:00 p.m.

Emergency shelter, food,
clothing machinery started

11:59 p.m.

Governor declares Detroit,
Highland Park and Ham-
tramck state of public
emergency

SEQUENCE OF MAJOR EVENTS - HIGHLIGHTS

DETROIT RIOT

Monday,
July 24, 1967

- 12:25 a. m. Walter Grzanka, 45, of 641 Charlotte, a white looter, became the first known victim of the riot. He was shot by Hamid Audish Yacoub, 30, owner of the Temple Market, 2844 Fourth Street, where Grzanka was looting.
- 2:00 a. m. Mayor Cavanagh requested that activity in downtown Detroit be curtailed to only those things absolutely essential on Monday.
- 3:00 a. m. Mayor Cavanagh and Governor Romney announced they had requested 5,000 federal troops. Mayor Cavanagh said, "We would much rather be over-committed than undercommitted."
- 4:15 a. m. Detroit Police Headquarters Command Post Activity Log said Governor Romney announced he planned a "reevaluation" of the federal troop request with key people from the field advising him before the final, formal, official request for troops was relayed to Washington.
- 6:05 a. m. Air intelligence reported fires still raging on 12th Street and Calvert, on 12th Street and Clairmount to W. Grand Boulevard, north of Grand River and McGraw and north of W. Grand Boulevard and east of the John C. Lodge Freeway. Another large fire was burning on Trumbull two blocks south of Merrick. Gen. Simmons of the Michigan National Guard was asked to call Gen. Johnson, chief of staff of the United States Army in Washington, D.C.

Monday,
July 24, 1967

HIGHLIGHTS

6:45 a. m.

Mayor Cavanagh activated plans for city provision of emergency food and shelter for those displaced by the riot.

7:00 a. m.

Detroit Police reported more than 400 persons were injured since midnight.

8:30 a. m.

Governor Romney sent telegrams to President Johnson and United States Attorney General Clark recommending immediate deployment of 5000 federal troops to Detroit.

Governor Romney also called Attorney General Clark with the recommendation about troops deployment.

He said, "I am joined in this recommendation by Mayor Cavanagh."

9:40 a. m.

Widespread looting almost citywide.

10:30 a. m.

Governor Romney read to the public a telegram from President Johnson in reply to the request for federal troops. Governor Romney said looting and sniping were increasing. He added that he expected the federal troops to arrive at Selfridge Air Force Base sometime in the afternoon.

Monday,
July 24, 1967

HIGHLIGHTS

11:25 a.m.

Notice posted: "Recorder's Court Criminal Division, 1321 St. Antoine Street, will be open 24 hours a day until further notice for arraignment on the warrant in both felony and misdemeanor cases. All felony trials, preliminary examinations and arraignments on the information are adjourned until further notice. All Recorder's Court jurors and witnesses are excused from attending court until further notice. (Signed) Per Vincent J. Brennan, Executive Judge."

1:20 p.m.

✓ Undersecretary of the United States Army Cyrus Vance arrived at Selfridge Air Force Base and departed immediately for Detroit Police Headquarters.

2:00 p.m.

Cyrus Vance met with Mayor Cavanagh, Governor Romney, Detroit Police Commissioner Girardin and other officials in Girardin's office for a briefing on the situation.

Monday
July 24, 1967

HIGHLIGHTS

4:17 p. m.

Air intelligence reported 23 fires now burning west of Woodward and six fires burning east of Woodward.

6:36 p. m.

News conference with Mayor Cavanagh, Governor Romney and Cyrus Vance.

Governor Romney said he felt the situation was more hopeful tonight because: (1) the United States Army was at Selfridge Air Base and available, (2) Efforts toward combating the riot were now better organized, (3) There were about three times as many troops on the street as there were the night before, and (4) There was a rising desire on the parts of people in the community to see the rioting ended.

He said, "Last night we were scrambling."

He said he was hopeful he could lift the curfew by Tuesday morning.

He said this was not primarily a civil rights disturbance but rather lawlessness and hoodlumism by Negroes and whites.

Mayor Cavanagh said he saw some hopeful signs today he did not see yesterday.

Monday
July 24, 1967

HIGHLIGHTS

p. m.

He said, "I hope tonight we restore sanity and order to our community and people can go back to work tomorrow."

He also said there still were large numbers of persons on the streets in trouble areas.

p. m.

Damon Keith said there was an urgent need for federal troops on the streets of Detroit.

He said this was not a race riot.

p. m.

Cyrus Vance announced the movement of three batallions of soldiers of the United States Army from Selfridge Air Force Base to the State Fairgrounds. This included 1800 men.

p. m.

Cyrus Vance said Mayor Cavanagh had committed all Detroit Police and Governor Romney had committed all State Police and National Guard. He said that at the request of Cavanagh and Romney, Gen. Throckmorton was directed to commit federal troops and assume command of the guard. Vance said he had discussed the situation with the President who requested a cessation of the lawlessness.

Monday
July 24, 1967

9:15 p. m.

Sniper fire along 12th Street.
Beginning of intensified sniper
fire.

HIGHLIGHTS

Detroit Police request a minimum of 108 additional men to blockade 12th Street from W. Grand Boulevard to Clairmount. Detroit Police Inspector Deluca said he had only seven or eight men on reserve. All others were committed.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - HIGHLIGHTS

Monday
July 24, 1967

10:22 p. m.

Heavy sniper fire pinned down police and National Guard at Lycaste and Charlevoix and at Fairview and Goethe.

10:30 p. m.

National Guard sent to assist police and other guardsmen pinned down by sniper fire.

11:12 p. m.

Sniper fire still heavy.

Additional armor requested by police.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - HIGHLIGHTS

Tuesday,
July 25, 1967

12 midnight		✓ National Guard federalized under command of Gen. Throckmorton.
12:20 a. m.	5th Precinct under heavy sniper fire.	
12:50 a. m.	Snipers shooting at fire fighters at Mack and St. Jean.	
1:04 a. m.	Looting along Grand River.	
1:10 a. m.		Gen. Throckmorton reported federal troops patrolling Detroit's East Side under orders to use minimum force necessary to quell disturbance.
1:17 a. m.		Direct communication lines were now operational between Detroit and the Pentagon.
1:30 a. m.	Looting on Field.	
1:45 a. m.	Sniper fire continuing in 5th Precinct.	✓ Gen. Throckmorton announced Detroit now divided for command purposes with federal troops on the East Side and the National Guard on the West Side.
1:50 a. m.	Small arms fire along Boston Boulevard.	
2:10 a. m.	Sniper fire aimed at firemen in Oakland-Alger area.	
2:40 a. m.	Sniper activity at Linwood and Virginia Park.	
2:45 a. m.	Large fire in progress and sniper fire increasing at Linwood and Montgomery.	
4:30 a. m.	Looting and sniping continuing in 5th Precinct.	

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - HIGHLIGHTS

Tuesday
July 25, 1967

8:00 a. m.

Gov. Romney read statement signed by him, Mayor Cavanagh, and Cyrus Vance urging businesses to resume operation where possible despite the continuing official state of emergency including prohibition of gasoline sales, closing of bars and other places of amusement and continuance of the 9 p. m. to 5 a. m. curfew.

9:12 a. m.

Vance announced Gen. Throckmorton in overall charge of all local, state and national forces in Detroit.

10:00 a. m.

Gov. Romney modified the state of emergency order to permit gasoline sales of five gallons or less to private customers from 12noon to 5 p. m with the gas being dispensed into vehicle tanks only.

Gov. Romney announced some State Police were being sent from Detroit to other Michigan cities to quell disturbances there.

Mayor Cavanagh announced he might seek to have Detroit federally designated as a disaster area.

1:45 p. m.

Gen. Moore in command of the National Guard west of Woodward the 82nd Airborne in charge of area East of Woodward.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS-HIGHLIGHTS

Tuesday
July 25, 1967

3:15 p. m.

Detroit Police Inspector DeLuca reported State Police planned to withdraw from Detroit.

3:45 p. m.

Looting along East Jefferson at Algonquin.

4:17 p. m.

Fifty National Guardsmen sent from Southeastern High School staging area to 1st Precinct to help guard prisoners.

6:16 p. m.

Fire raging in the 3300 block of Harrison between Myrtle and Vernor.

7:15 p. m.

Detroit Edison and City of Detroit Public Lighting Commission emergency crews repeatedly fired upon by snipers as they tried to get into the Atkinson-Collingwood-12th Street-14th Street area.

8:50 p. m.

Federal troops on Detroit's East Side divided commands with one unit covering the area east of Woodward and south of the Edsel Ford Freeway and the other unit covering the area east of Woodward and north of the Edsel Ford Freeway. Overall command of the troops was located at the State Fairgrounds.

9:10 p. m.

Sniper fire heavy along Lawton. Police officers reported wounded. Other police pinned down.

Police patrol wagon with machine guns pinned down by sniper fire in the Lawton-Hazelwood area.

9:15 p. m.

Police officer shot at Lawton and Hazelwood.

9:15 p. m.

Police officer shot at Lawton and Gladstone.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - HIGHLIGHTS

Tuesday
July 25, 1967

9:25 p. m.		Detroit Police Inspector DeLuca said only two men were in reserve at the Herman Kiefer Hospital Command Post.
9:50 p. m.	Sniper Fire reported at Lawton and Taylor and also at Linwood and Pingree.	Two tanks sent from Central High School staging area to Lawton and Taylor pinned down by sniper fire.
10:05 p. m.		All police ordered out of the area between West Grand Boulevard, Dexter, Clairmount and Woodrow Wilson. National Guard ordered to sweep the area between West Grand Boulevard, Dexter, Clairmount and Woodrow Wilson.
10:29 p. m.	Sniper firing an automatic weapon at Commonwealth and Merrick.	
11:40 p. m.		Mobile radio systems out of order.
11:50 p. m.		All radio systems now back in service.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - HIGHLIGHTS

Wednesday,
July 26, 1967

- 12:10 a.m. Mayor's Summer Task Force becomes receptor of rumors which are passed along to the Detroit Police Department.
- 12:33 a.m. National Guard reported two persons fatally shot while attempting to run blockade at West Warren and Lawton. Automatic weapons confiscated.
- 12:34 a.m. Police Superintendent Reuter re-affirms department's position on use of firearms.
- 1:20 a.m. Tanya Blanding, 4, killed by National Guardsman firing at suspected sniper.
- 2:01 a.m. Helen Hall, staying at Harlan House Motel, shot by sniper while looking out her fourth floor window.
- 6:00 a.m. United Community Services initiated a missing persons service.
- 7:30 a.m. Emergency shelter, food and clothing services functioning well. Plan to phase out excess distribution centers.
- 8:30 a.m. Gov. Romney extended gasoline sale hours to 5:30 a.m. to 9:00 p.m.
- Mayor Cavanagh, Gov. Romney, Mr. Vance and Gen. Throckmorton agreed troops now on streets adequate for the job.
- Mayor Cavanagh urged people to return to work.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - HIGHLIGHTS

Wednesday
July 26, 1967

9:15 a. m.

Mayor's Summer Task Force received first complaints of food price gouging.

10:15 a. m.

Detroit Police and National Guard escorted Detroit Edison linesmen through damaged areas to make repairs.

11:00 a. m.

Gov. Romney issued an appeal against price gouging.

12:05 p. m.

Judge Vincent Brennan announced 90 percent of the riot arrests involved charges of entering without breaking, 5 percent violation of curfew, 5 percent assault with a deadly weapon, carrying deadly weapons or possessing stolen property.

4:30 p. m.

Mr. Vance toured Detroit's East Side and found all quiet there.

5:00 p. m.

Detroit Common Council passed price control ordinance.

6:00 p. m.

Gov. Romney read statement reimposing curfew.

7:45 p. m.

Police patrols returned to the area bounded by Woodrow Wilson, Dexter, Clairmount and West Grand Boulevard.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - HIGHLIGHTS

Thursday
July 27, 1967

Early a. m.

Mr. Vance discussed President Johnson's message about health, food and safety needs with Gov. Romney and Mayor Cavanagh.

Mr. Vance announced assignment of responsibility to the 4th Army Infantry Division for the 1st, 7th, and 13th Detroit Police Precincts. He said the 82nd and 101st Airborne Division were being withdrawn to assembly positions.

Michigan State Police were all withdrawn from Detroit for re-assignment to regular duties.

11:55 a. m.

Mr. Vance proposed to lift curfew as of this date with gasoline service re-instated and places of entertainment allowed to re-open but with no liquor sales.

1:20 p. m. Citizens called to request the curfew be reimposed.

Rumors persisted.

7:15 p. m.

Gov. Romney reimposed the curfew.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - HIGHLIGHTS

Friday
July 28, 1967

11:00 a.m.

Gov. Romney announced the state of emergency would continue with restrictions unchanged for the weekend.

4:15 p.m.

Plans announced for the 82nd Airborne Division to depart the Command post at 5:00 a.m., July 29, 1967, for stand-by duty at Chandler Park. The National Guard was scheduled to move into the Southeastern High School staging area when the Army evacuated.

5:00 p.m.

*See
CRA report*

All police precincts were advised Police Commissioner Girardin approved observation of precinct stations by members of the Civil Rights Commission.

8:15 p.m.

Prisoner Information Center opened at Police Headquarters.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - HIGHLIGHTS

Saturday
July 29, 1967

11:00 a.m.

Gov. Romney announced 1,400 prisoners were released as of 6:00 a.m. He also announced the ban on sale of alcoholic beverages would continue but that the curfew was extended to 11:00 p.m.

5:40 p.m.

Mayor Cavanagh announced emergency bonds would be issued to provide funds to pay policemen, firemen and other city employees who worked overtime during the disorder.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - HIGHLIGHTS

Monday
July 31, 1967

8:21 a. m.

Curfew revised to
12 midnight to 5:30 a. m.
with sale of alcoholic
beverages permitted
from 7:00 a. m. to
12 midnight.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - HIGHLIGHTS

Tuesday
August 1, 1967

12:05 p. m.

Curfew restrictions lifted.

4:00 p. m.

It was announced the
National Guard would be
pulled off the streets by
9:00 p. m.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - HIGHLIGHTS

Wednesday
August 2, 1967

5:35 p. m.

It was announced the National Guard would leave Detroit at 12 noon, Friday, August 4, 1967.

6:42 p. m.

Vice President Hubert Humphrey arrived, Detroit City Airport.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - HIGHLIGHTS

Thursday
August 3, 1967

8:55 a. m.

Perimeter defense of
Detroit Police Headquarters
removed.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Sunday,
July 23, 1967

3:30 a. m.		"Blind Pig" at 12th and Clairmount raided
	Crowd gathers at 12th and Clairmount, drawn by police vehicles and activity	
4:30 a. m.	Crowd grows to about 200-- seemingly friendly	Police depart from area, removing all prisoners and vehicles
5:10 a. m.	First rock thrown at police car - - Crowd gathers strength with rising sun	Police begin staging at Herman Keifer. Street patrol strength of D. P. D. 99 scout cars city-wide, including five one-man cars attached to M. T. B. Total personnel 14 lieutenants, 25 sergeants, 272 patrolmen (193 on streets)
6:00 a. m.		Mayor Cavanagh, police officials, Fire Department officials all have been notified and all are aware of potential trouble
7:00 a. m.		State Police, Wayne County Sheriff, Col. Dryden of Michigan National Guard, F. B. I., Wayne County Prosecutor and Department of Public Works alerted
7:50 a. m.	Crowd very large, 3000 estimated, looting begins. Rock and bottle throwing becomes increasingly intense	Police attempt to clear 12th Street
8:00 a. m.	Fire in store at 12th and Clairmount	Fire Department responds and douses fire
8:30 a. m.	Crowd seems to be increasing in size and ferocity	Communication trailer set up at Herman Keifer Hospital

Sunday,
July 23, 1967

9:00 a. m.	Crowd on 12th between Clairmount and Hazelwood is estimated at between 8000 and 9000	Police attempt to seal off 12th-Clairmount area. H. R. D. has 30 people on street generate intelligence and quell rumors
9:33 a. m.		292 patrolmen now on duty plus TMU and PSU. Community leaders walk 12th Street to calm crowd and diminish tension
10:00 a. m.	Crowd does not respond to pleas of community leaders, etc., to disband	
10:30 a. m.	Crowd growing more hostile, looting escalates	Sanders School opened for use as Police Department Command Post. Police are now under heavy barrage of rocks and bottles. Twelve patrolmen with shotguns respond to "officer in trouble run." Six men arrested while looting
12:45 p. m.		Four patrolmen to hospital injured by rocks
1:50 p. m.	Fire burning, 12th and Taylor. Crowd pelts firemen with rocks and bottles	Police shield firemen
2:00 p. m.		Mayor Jerome P. Cavanagh requests 200 Michigan State Police be sent to Detroit. Detroit General Hospital on emergency standby alert. All H. R. D. centers operating. Mayor's Summer Task Force establishes intelligence liaison with D. P. D. Begins to coordinate non-police functions of municipal government.

Sunday,
July 23, 1967

3:00 p. m.

360 Michigan State Police
arrive at Armory,
15000 W. Eight Mile Road.
Gen. Noble Moore, Captain
Stillson and Lt. Martini
arrive at D. P. D. headquarters

3:23 p. m.

Rioting and looting begin on
Linwood between Clairmount
and W. Grand Boulevard.
Fires spread on 12th

Fires out of control on
Linwood at Gladstone

4:20 p. m.

National Guard is committed

4:30 p. m.

All Fire Department personnel
ordered to report to duty

5:00 p. m.

Mayor Jerome P. Cavanagh
meets community leaders
at 10th Precinct

5:20 p. m.

Rioting and looting at Dexter
and Davison, Grand River and
Lothrop

5:25 p. m.

First contingent of National
Guardsmen arrive at Central
High School, Tuxedo and
LaSalle

5:33 p. m.

Looting and rioting Grand
River and Joy Road, Oakland
and Goodwin

5:45 p. m.

Rioting and looting, Oakland
and Westminister

6:00 p. m.

Rioting and looting, 14th and
W. Grand Boulevard

6:13 p. m.

Gen. Moore receives
authorization to activate the
National Guard

6:15 p. m.

Looting on Washington Blvd.
(Downtown Detroit)

Perimeter defense established
at D. P. D. headquarters

Sunday,
July 23, 1967

6:57 p. m.		National Guard soldiers begin appearing on streets
7:45 p. m.		Mayor issues proclamation instituting a curfew: 9:00 p. m. to 5:00 p. m.
7:49 p. m.	Looting at Hamilton at Webb	
8:02 p. m.		All police furloughs cancelled.
8:05 p. m.		National Guard had 4 tanks, two armored 'personnel carriers' available west side Armory
8:30 p. m.	Rioting and looting at Michigan and Junction, Livernois and 7 Mile Road	
8:40 p. m.	Rioting and looting at Livernois and Fenkell	
8:45 p. m.		50 National Guardsmen moved from Central High School into 13th Precinct. 822 called from Grand Rapids, 800 called from Flint, 100 called from metropolitan Detroit
8:50 p. m.		Police have arrested 119 persons in riot related activities
9:07 p. m.	Sniper fire 1600 block Seward	Police call helicopter in area
10:10 p. m.	Rioting and looting, Forest at Mt. Elliott	
10:25 p. m.		Gas stations ordered closed
10:30 p. m.		Police garage temporary holding facility for prisoners
10:35 p. m.	Rioting and looting, Kercheval and Pennsylvania	

Sunday,
July 23, 1967

10:48 p. m.	Sniper fire, 12th and Taylor	
11:00 p. m.		Emergency shelter, food, clothing machinery started
11:08 p. m.	Looting Chrysler, Brewster and Brush	
11:30 p. m.		Automatic weapons moved into Central High School staging area
11:45 p. m.	Looting at Monterey and Petoskey	
11:59 p. m.		Governor declares Detroit, Highland Park and Hamtramck state of public emergency
12:00 p. m.	27 police injured	

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Monday,
July 24, 1967

Midnight

Detroit Police Department has on the street 23 lieutenants, 50 sergeants and 601 patrolmen

12:01 a. m. Sniper fire in the Woodward-Clairmount area

12:10 a. m.

West Side Precinct men sent to Central High School staging area for deployment. East Side Precinct men sent to Herman Kiefer Hospital staging area

12:14 a. m.

Ferndale Police Department informed Detroit Police Department it was keeping a full-strength watch along Eight Mile Road

12:25 a. m. Walter Grzanka, 45, of 641 Charlotte, a white looter, became the first known victim of the riot. He was shot by Hamid Audish Yacoub, 30, owner of the Temple Market, 2844 Fourth Street, where Grzanka was looting

12:30 a. m.

Twenty National Guardsmen moved from Central High School staging area to the 2nd Precinct. Another 20 moved to the 1st Precinct and another 20 to the 13th Precinct

1:05 a. m.

Ten National Guardsmen requested moved to Recorder's Court to assist with 130 prisoners being transferred from the 13th Precinct.

1:17 a. m.

Two additional tanks arrived at Central High School staging area

Monday,
July 24, 1967

1:55 a. m.

Fifty National Guardsmen dispatched to the 5th Precinct. Southeastern High School was ready at this time for use as a staging area for the east side

2:00 a. m.

Mayor Cavanagh requested that activity in downtown Detroit be curtailed to only those things absolutely essential on Monday.

2:10 a. m.

Fire raging on the east side. Firemen request protection for men and equipment at Kercheval and Sheridan

2:14 a. m.

More fires in the Davison area

2:20 a. m.

Another 20 National Guardsmen were sent from Central High School into the 7th Precinct

2:45 a. m.

Four hundred National Guardsmen arrived at the East Side Armory. One-half were sent to Central High School and one-half were sent to Southeastern High School

3:00 a. m.

Mayor Cavanagh and Governor Romney announced they had requested 5000 federal troops. Mayor Cavanagh said, "We would much rather be over-committed than undercommitted.

3:02 a. m.

Southeastern High School staging area became operational with 17 Detroit Police officers and 20 National Guardsmen

3:08 a. m.

Fires reported along Brush Street

Monday,
July 24, 1967

3:24 a. m. Snipers fired on firemen at Grand River and Pacific

3:25 a. m. Ten National Guardsmen ordered transferred from the 1st Precinct to the Recorder's Court to assist with 130 prisoners being transferred there from the 13th Precinct

3:30 a. m. A National Guard tank returned to Central High School from a run at Second and Blaine

3:38 a. m. National Guard announced permission from Gen. Moore was necessary before any automatic weapon, such as machine guns, could be fired

4:15 a. m. Detroit Police Headquarters Command Post Activity Log said Governor Romney announced he planned a "reevaluation" of the federal troop request with key people from the field advising him before the final, formal, official request for troops was relayed to Washington

4:20 a. m. Gen. Moore of the Michigan National Guard authorized his men to make straight line patrols on major thoroughfares without an accompanying police officer.
Forty-man National Guard units ordered to patrol Grand River between W. Grand Boulevard and Meyers, and Linwood between W. Grand Boulevard and Davison

Monday,
July 24, 1967

5:30 a. m.

Heads of all City departments called and instructed not to operate Monday unless it was absolutely necessary.

6:05 a. m.

Air intelligence reported fires still raging on 12th Street and Calvert, on 12th Street and Clairmount and along Clairmount to W. Grand Boulevard, north of Grand River at McGraw and north of W. Grand Boulevard and east of the John C. Lodge Freeway. Another large fire was burning on Trumbull two blocks south of Merrick

Gen. Simmons of the Michigan National Guard was asked to call Gen. Johnson, chief of staff of the United States Army in Washington, D. C.

6:45 a. m.

Mayor Cavanagh activated plans for city provision of emergency food and shelter for those displaced by the riot

7:00 a. m.

Detroit Police reported more than 400 persons were injured since midnight

8:30 a. m.

Governor Romney sent telegrams to President Johnson and United States Attorney General Clark recommending immediate deployment of 5000 federal troops to Detroit.

Governor Romney also called Attorney General Clark with the recommendation about troops deployment.

He said, "I am joined in this recommendation by Mayor Cavanagh."

9:00 a. m.

Mayor Cavanagh reported he and Governor Romney took another tour of the riot area and found the rioting to be contained at the moment.

Monday,
July 24, 1967

- 9:03 a. m. Negro gang gathered in an alley at Iroquois and Harper.
- 9:30 a. m. Governor Romney made public his telegrams to Washington requesting federal troops.
- Mayor Cavanagh said in a news conference that "at no time was an order issued that police were not to use weapons available to them." He said policemen would have to use professional, individual judgment about the extent of force necessary in each individual incident.
- 9:40 a. m. Widespread looting almost citywide.
- 10:00 a. m. Sniping and burning intensified on the East Side in the Mack-McClellan area, along Kercheval and at intervals along Gratiot
- 10:13 a. m. Widespread looting on Woodward Avenue between Peterboro and Sproat.
- 10:15 a. m. Fires reported along Woodward Avenue National Guardsmen on patrol along Woodward Avenue from the Detroit River to Seven Mile Road
- 10:30 a. m. Governor Romney read to the public a telegram from President Johnson in reply to the request for federal troops. Governor Romney said looting and sniping were increasing. He added that he expected the federal troops to arrive at Selfridge Air Force Base sometime in the afternoon.

Monday,
July 24, 1967

10:40 a. m. Gangs were reported gathering
at a shopping center at Harper
and Van Dyke

11:25 a. m.

Notice posted: "Recorder's
Court Criminal Division,
1321 St. Antoine Street, will
be open 24 hours a day until
further notice for arraignment
on the warrant in both felony
and misdemeanor cases. All
felony trials, preliminary
examinations and arraignments
on the information are adjourned
until further notice. All
Recorder's Court jurors and
witnesses are excused from
attending court until further
notice. (Signed) Per Vincent
J. Brennan, Executive Judge. "

11:45 a. m. Looting reported at Seven Mile
Road and Telegraph

Some looting on Dexter where
the area was jammed with sight-
seers.

11:50 a. m. Store windows broken on
Evergreen at Kendall and Acacia

12:10 p. m. Police reported the situation
was out of control in the 5th and
7th Precincts at this time with
the trouble moving into the 15th
Precinct. Van Dyke was considered
a critical spot at this point.

12:30 p. m. Crowds reported unruly in the
Kercheval-Belvedere-McClellan
area.

1:05 p. m. Looting reported at Harper-Van Dyke,
Grand River-Trumbull and Chene-
Ferry areas.

Monday,
July 24, 1967

1:15 p. m.	Twenty-four hour protection requested for the three Civil Defense emergency centers.	
1:20 p. m.		Undersecretary of the United States Army Cyrus Vance arrived at Selfridge Air Force Base and departed immediately for Detroit Police Headquarters.
1:30 p. m.	Looting at Charlevoix and Mt. Elliott. Gang of youths gathered at Townsend and Ferry.	
1:45 p. m.	Hazel Park Clinic at Eight Mile Road and Dequindre closed by rioting in the area. Looting along Iroquois. Bank building on fire at Grand River and Lothrop. Air intelligence reported a large fire burning on Fenkell, six blocks east of Livernois.	
1:50 p. m.	Davison continued to burn.	
2:00 p. m.	Looting at Iroquois and Gratiot.	Cyrus Vance met with Mayor Cavanagh, Governor Romney, Detroit Police Commissioner Girardin and other officials in Girardin's office for a briefing on the situation.
2:05 p. m.		Fire Department reported two companies now fighting the fire on Fenkell near Livernois.
2:10 p. m.	Looting at Grand River and McGraw Fire at Grand River and W. Grand Boulevard.	Fire Department was fighting this blaze at Grand River and W. Grand Boulevard.

Monday,
July 24, 1967

2:10 p. m.
(continued)

Police officer in trouble at Charlevoix and Mt. Elliott after having shot a man.

Help was sent to assist the policeman in trouble at Charlevoix and Mt. Elliott. No further injuries were reported.

2:20 p. m.

Looting along Jefferson Avenue at Algonquin began for the first time.

2:55 p. m.

Fire set at Charlevoix and Mt. Elliott. A hardware and an apartment building were burning.

3:00 p. m.

Looting at Iroquois and Gratiot and along the 8600 block of Gratiot.

Police cars radioed for help at Woodward and Charlotte.

3:05 p. m.

Negroes were throwing bricks at whites at John R and Alfred.

3:25 p. m.

Fire at a supermarket near W. Grand Boulevard and 12th Street.

3:30 p. m.

Juvenile Court Judge James Lincoln requested 50 National Guardsmen to guard the Juvenile Detention Home.

3:55 p. m.

Officers at the 10th Precinct requested relief of prisoner overflow.

Police Commissioner Girardin began to attempt to procure Ft. Wayne for use as a staging area.

4:07 p. m.

A gang of boys about 20 years old gathered on Montclair between Warren and Canfield.

Monday,
July 24, 1967

- 4:10 p. m. Looting along Division.
- 4:17 p. m. Air intelligence reported 23
fires now burning west of
Woodward and six fires burning
east of Woodward.
- 4:25 p. m. There now were 1100 National
Guardsmen and 1000 soldiers
of the United States Army at
the Southeastern High School
staging area.
- 4:40 p. m. Police and National Guardsmen
arrested five persons at Mack
and Lillibridge.
- 4:50 p. m. Officials of Clawson and Royal
Oak informed Detroit officials
they planned to impose a
curfew identical to Detroit's.
- 5:08 p. m. Thirty National Guardsmen were
sent from the Central High
School staging area into the
12th Precinct.
- Col. Lindquist and 400
National Guardsmen by this
time had set up a headquarters
at Eastern High School and
were patrolling Mack Avenue.
- 5:20 p. m. Looting and gunfire on Mack
and Baldwin. Twenty National Guardsmen
were dispatched from South-
eastern High School into the
5th Precinct.
- A convoy of five cars containing
Mayor Cavanagh, Governor
Romney, Cyrus Vance, Attorney
General Frank Kelley and others
left Police Headquarters for a
tour of the area.

Monday,
July 24, 1967

5:30 p. m.

Cars and trucks from City departments were ordered delivered to the Herman Kiefer Hospital Command Post and staging areas at Central High School and Southeastern High School.

The 10th Precinct again requested prisoner relief.

5:45 p. m.

Twenty additional National Guardsmen were sent from the Southeastern High School staging area into the 5th Precinct.

5:50 p. m.

Officers at the 1st Precinct advised the 10th Precinct it could accommodate 100 to 150 additional prisoners and authorized the transfer.

6:00 p. m.

Thirty National Guardsmen were sent from the Central High School staging area into the 13th Precinct.

6:22 p. m. Sniping at Davison and John R.

6:30 p. m. Looting on East Warren and at Iroquois and Georgia.

6:36 p. m. Looting at Joy Road and Wyoming.

p. m.

News conference with Mayor Cavanagh, Governor Romney and Cyrus Vance.

Monday,
July 24, 1967

p. m.

Governor Romney said he felt the situation was more hopeful tonight because: (1) The United States Army was at Selfridge Air Base and available, (2) Efforts toward combating the riot were now better organized, (3) There were about three times as many troops on the street as there were the night before, and (4) There was a rising desire on the parts of people in the community to see the rioting ended.

He said, "Last night we were scrambling."

He said he was hopeful he could lift the curfew by Tuesday morning.

He said this was not primarily a civil rights disturbance but rather lawlessness and hoodlumism by Negroes and whites.

Mayor Cavanagh said he saw some hopeful signs today he did not see yesterday.

He said, "I hope tonight we restore sanity and order to our community and people can go back to work tomorrow."

He also said there still were large numbers of persons on the streets in trouble areas.

Damon Keith said there was an urgent need for federal troops on the streets of Detroit.

He said this was not a race riot.

p. m.

Monday,
July 24, 1967

p. m.

Cyrus Vance announced the movement of three batallions of soldiers of the United States Army from Selfridge Air Force Base to the State Fairgrounds. This included 1800 men.

p. m.

Cyrus Vance said Mayor Cavanagh had committed all Detroit Police and Governor Romney had committed all State Police and National Guard. He said that at the request of Cavanagh and Romney, Gen. Throckmorton was directed to commit federal troops and assume command of the guard. Vance said he had discussed the situation with the President who requested a cessation of the lawlessness.

7:03 p. m.

Bombing threats received at Boulevard General Hospital.

7:20 p. m.

Twenty National Guardsmen sent from the Southeastern High School staging area into the 5th Precinct.

7:27 p. m.

Detroit Fire Department requested 20 National Guardsmen to provide security for men and equipment at Warren and Lawton.

7:30 p. m.

Gangs in cars reported driving along Burt Road between Plymouth and West Chicago.

8:15 p. m.

Large crowd at fire at auto body repair shop at Gratiot and Rohns. Area had been the scene of looting throughout the day.

Firemen at the scene of the fire at Gratiot and Rohns.

8:38 p. m.

Looting at Van Dyke and Gratiot.

Monday,
July 24, 1967

8:58 p. m.	Looting at Harper and St. Cyril.	
9:04 p. m.	Looting at Conner and Freud.	
9:15 p. m.	Youths stealing cars from a used car lot at Livernois and Fullerton.	State Police at Livernois and Fullerton.
	Sniper fire along 12th Street	Detroit Police request a minimum of 108 additional men to blockade 12th Street from W. Grand Boulevard to Clairmount. Detroit Police Inspector Deluca said he had only seven or eight men on reserve. All others were committed.
10:00 p. m.		Detroit Police authorized to order 30,000 30/30 caliber ammo.
10:12 p. m.		Twenty National Guardsmen sent from the Central High School staging area to the 13th Precinct.
10:22 p. m.	National Guard pinned down at Dexter and Collingwood.	
	Fires burning along Gratiot.	
10:25 p. m.	Heavy sniper fire pinned down State Police in the area of Lycaste, Hilger and Charlevoix.	
10:30 p. m.	Reported gang fights at Fenkell and Ward near Meyers.	Sixteen National Guardsmen sent to assist State Police pinned down in the area of Lycaste, Hilgar and Charlevoix.
11:05 p. m.	Police pinned down by snipers at Fairview and Goethe.	Tanks en route to Fairview and Goethe.

Monday,
July 24, 1967

11:12 p. m.

Two police task forces pinned down in the area of Lycaste, Hillger and Charlevoix by rifle fire. Two half-tracks sent to rescue them now were pinned down at Fairview and Goethe.

Police Deputy Superintendent Nichols requested additional armor.

11:17 p. m.

Many police pinned down by snipers at Mack and St. Jean.

11:30 p. m.

Tear gas dispatched to Southeastern

11:44 p. m.

Sniper fire on Forest between Moran and Meldrum.

11:58 p. m.

Heavy fire against tanks.

One tank and two armored personnel carriers with 15 men were dispatched from Central High School by the 17th Precinct. It was reported to be under heavy fire.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Tuesday,
July 25, 1967

12 midnight

Detroit Police Department strength at this time included 31 lieutenants, 90 sergeants and 891 patrolmen.

By this time, the National Guard was federalized under the command of Lt. Gen. John Throckmorton, 82nd Airborne Corps Commander.

12:15 a. m.

The noon shift of police was relieved of duty and held in reserve.

12:20 a. m.

The 5th Precinct station was under heavy fire at this time.

Gunfire had subsided at the 7th Precinct station.

12:50 a. m.

Snipers were shooting at fire fighters at Mack and St. Jean.

12:53 a. m.

Gen. Throckmorton left the State Fairgrounds and proceeded to the West Side Armory.

1:00 a. m.

The Second Deputy Commissioner of the Detroit Police Department authorized the ordering of 50,000 rounds of .00 buckshot.

1:04 a. m.

Looting continued along Grand River.

1:10 a. m.

The noon-to-midnight shift of the Detroit Police held in reserve was now excused from duty by order of the Superintendent.

Tuesday,
July 25, 1967

1:10 a. m.
(continued)

Gen. Throckmorton reported that federal troops now were patrolling the streets of the East Side of Detroit under orders to use the minimum force necessary to quell the disturbance.

Gen. Throckmorton said the federal troops were only using M-16 rifles, M-79 grenade launchers and tear gas but no tanks.

Direct communication lines were now set up between Detroit and the Pentagon.

1:17 a. m.

1:30 a. m.

Looting on Field.

1:45 a. m.

Detroit Police reported sniper fire continuing in the 5th Precinct.

It was announced at this time that Detroit was being divided for command purposes with the federal troops on the East Side and the National Guard on the West Side.

1:50 a. m.

Small arms fire along Boston Boulevard.

2:10 a. m.

Firemen being shot at in the area of Oakland and Alger.

2:40 a. m.

Sniper activity at Linwood and Virginia Park.

2:45 a. m.

Large fire in progress and sniper fire increasing at Linwood and Montgomery.

Tank now at Linwood and Montgomery.

4:30 a. m.

Looting and sniping continuing in the 5th Precinct.

Tuesday,
July 25, 1967

8:00 a. m.

Governor Romney read a statement signed by Mayor Cavanagh, Cyrus Vance and himself urging businesses to resume operations today. He said there was no change in the official state of emergency, however, and that gasoline sales were still prohibited, bars and other places of amusement were still officially closed and the curfew was still in effect.

8:30 a. m.

Roger Wilkins, director of the federal community relations commission, was now in Detroit.

9:07 a. m.

Detroit Police transferred 215 prisoners to Southern Michigan Prison at Jackson via five City of Detroit buses. They were under a security guard consisting of 20 National Guard units and 10 Detroit Police patrolmen escorted by two State Police cars.

9:12 a. m.

It was reported that John F. Williams, director of sales (government and export) of Remington Arms Company, Bridgeport, Connecticut, had issued to Detroit 30,000 rounds of .30 - .30 caliber hardball ammunition and 50,000 rounds of .00 shotgun shells. The ammunition was expected to arrive at 6:01 a. m., Wednesday, July 26, 1967, via Emery Express lines at Detroit City Airport.

Tuesday,
July 25, 1967

9:12 a. m.
(continued)

At about this time, Cyrus Vance announced Gen. Throckmorton was in overall charge of all local, state and national forces in the city. He said Governor Romney was still in immediate charge of State Police and Mayor Cavanagh was still in immediate charge of Detroit Police. Vance said all law enforcement agencies seemed to be working well together.

10:00 a. m.

Governor Romney modified his curfew orders to permit gas stations to open from 12 Noon to 5:00 p. m. with sales limited to five gallons sold to private customers only with the gas being dispensed into vehicle tanks only.

Governor Romney announced some State Police were being sent from Detroit to other cities outstate to quell disturbances there.

Mayor Cavanagh said he might seek to have Detroit federally designated as a disaster area. He thanks the President for his obvious concern for Detroit.

Cyrus Vance said federal troops would remain in Detroit Tuesday night.

Gen. Throckmorton reiterated his policy of using the minimum force necessary to quell the disturbance.

Tuesday,
July 25, 1967

10:55 a. m.

Police and/or military escorts were provided for Detroit Edison workmen in the riot area.

1:05 p. m.

Four National Guardsmen were provided at 12th Street and West Grand Boulevard on a 24-hour basis.

1:17 p. m.

A. T. & T. called in to make repairs on direct line from Detroit to the Pentagon following an interruption of service. The Army provided a pack set in the interim period.

1:45 p. m.

Detroit Police reported Gen. Moore had command of the National Guard working west of Woodward with the 82nd Airborne operating east of Woodward.

1:50 p. m.

A crowd of 200 to 300 persons was reported gathering at 12th Street and Spruce.

Arrangements were under way to transfer 80 male prisoners to Southern Michigan Prison, another 250 to the Ingham County Jail and another 300 to Milan. Federal penitentiary before 6:00 p. m.

Two Detroit Police detectives depart for Washington with fingerprint cards to check with FBI records.

2:00 p. m.

Authorities at the 14th Precinct requested National Guard assistance for an eight-man police detail guarding City of Detroit buses.

2:30 p. m.

Army personnel dispatched to guard vital telephone installations.

Tuesday,
July 25, 1967

3:05 p. m. A sniper was reported on an apartment roof at 12th Street and Webb.

A National Guardsman was reported to be on the roof of the same apartment building at 12th Street and Webb where a sniper was spotted.

Officers at the Herman Kiefer Hospital Command Post requested an aerial survey of rooftops in the area, checking for snipers and/or wounded law enforcement officers.

3:15 p. m.

Air intelligence reported no snipers or law enforcement officers spotted on rooftops in the area near 12th Street and Webb.

Detroit Police District Inspector Deluca reported State Police planned to withdraw from Detroit.

3:45 p. m. Looting along East Jefferson Avenue at Algonquin.

3:50 p. m. Crowds harrassing employees of Metropolitan Hospital.

4:00 p. m.

Detroit Police transferred 250 prisoners from the 10th Precinct to Police Headquarters via five buses. The 10th Precinct was, at this time, filled to capacity.

4:17 p. m.

Fifty National Guardsmen were sent from the Southeastern High School staging area to the 1st Precinct to help guard prisoners

5:15 p. m.

The Emergency Air Freight Department at Detroit Metropolitan Airport reported a shipment of 7000 pounds of ammunition was scheduled to arrive at Metro Airport.

Tuesday,
July 25, 1967

5:20 p. m.

Fifteen National Guardsmen were dispatched from the Southeastern High School staging area to guard the State liquor store at Cass and Milwaukee.

6:16 p. m.

Fire raging in the 3300 block of Harrison between Myrtle and Vernor.

6:40 p. m.

A crowd was reported gathering near a burned-out store at West Warren and 24th Street.

7:15 p. m.

Detroit Edison and City of Detroit Public Lighting Commission emergency crews were repeatedly fired upon by snipers as they tried to get into the Atkinson-Collingwood-12th Street-14th Street area.

8:25 p. m.

Col. Fredrick Davids of the Michigan State Police arranged for an escort for prisoner buses to the Ingham County Jail at midnight.

8:50 p. m.

Federal troops on Detroit's East Side had, by this time, divided commands. One unit was covering an area east of Woodward and south of the Edsel Ford Freeway. The other unit was covering an area east of Woodward and north of the Edsel Ford Freeway. The overall commander of the federal forces was stationed at the State Fairgrounds.

Fifty-eight National Guardsmen were ordered to various fire stations in the area.

Tuesday,
July 25, 1967

9:10 p. m.	Sniper fire was heavy along Lawton. Police officers were reported wounded and others were pinned down.	Police patrol wagon with machine guns pinned down by sniper fire in the area of Lawton and Hazelwood.
9:15 p. m.	Police officer shot at Lawton and Hazelwood.	
9:17p. m.	A second police officer shot at Lawton and Gladstone.	
9:25 p. m.		There were only two men in reserve at the Herman Kiefer Hospital Command Post as this time according to Police Inspector Deluca.
9:50 p. m.	Sniper fire reported at Lawton and Taylor and also at Linwood and Pingree.	Two tanks sent from the Central High School staging area to Lawton and Taylor were pinned down by sniper fire.
		Support was dispatched to Linwood and Pingree.
10:01 p. m.		Detroit Police Deputy Superintendent John F. Nichols reported the city law enforcement division was operational with personnel west of Woodward directing requests for help to the Central High School staging area and personnel east of Woodward directing requests for help to the Southeastern High School staging area.
		The 82nd Airborne advised authorities its personnel would be assigned to mobile units which were assigned to combined patrols with police units.

Tuesday,
July 25, 1967

10:05 p. m.	Sniper fire extremely heavy in the area between West Grand Boulevard, Dexter, Clairmount and Woodrow Wilson.	All police were ordered out of the area between West Grand Boulevard, Dexter, Clairmount and Woodrow Wilson.
		National Guard ordered to sweep the area between West Grand Boulevard, Dexter, Clairmount and Woodrow Wilson.
10:14 p. m.	Shooting reported on Chippewa on the northwest side.	
10:29 p. m.	Sniper firing an automatic weapon at Commonwealth and Merrick.	
11:00 p. m.		The police order was reread at this point withdrawing all police from the area bounded by Dexter, Clairmount, Woodrow Wilson and West Grand Boulevard until more National Guard forces are assigned to the area for support.
11:05 p. m.		National Guard moved into the area bounded by Dexter, Clairmount, Woodrow Wilson and West Grand Boulevard.
11:06 p. m.	Paint shop burning and firemen under sniper fire at Grand River and Joy Road.	
11:40 p. m.		Mobile radio systems out of order.
11:50 p. m.		All radio systems now back in service.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Sunday
July 30, 1967

2:00 a.m.

2,300 troops to encamp
at Chandler Park.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Monday
July 31, 1967

8:21 a. m.

Curfew hours now from
12 midnight to 5:30 a. m.
Alcoholic beverages may
be served from 7 a. m. to
12 midnight.

12:30 p. m.

Superintendent Reuter
advises that effective
12 midnight the Detroit
Police Department will return
to light hour duty. No leave
days, no furlough.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Tuesday
August 1, 1967

12:05 p. m.

Curfew restrictions lifted.

4:00 p. m.

National Guard units
pulled off streets by
9:00 p. m.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Wednesday
August 2, 1967

5:35 p. m.

National Guard to pull out
12:00 noon Friday, August 4,
1967.

6:00 p. m.

Vice-President Hubert Humphrey
to arrive at Detroit City
Airport 6:42 p. m.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Thursday
August 3, 1967

8:55 a.m.

Perimeter defense of
Detroit Police Headquarters
removed.

CHARGES AGAINST FEMALES ARRESTED DURING
THE DETROIT RIOT (FROM JULY 23rd thru AUGUST 1)

Breaking and Entering -----	328
Entering w/o Breaking (Looting)-----	209
Larceny from Building -----	83
Curfew -----	65
Possession of Stolen Property -----	29
Robbery Armed-----	20
Assault to Murder -----	17
Attempt Robbery Armed -----	12
Carrying Concealed Weapon -----	11
Larceny from Person -----	10
Viol. State Narcotic Law -----	11
Felonious Assault -----	9
Simple Larceny -----	5
Arson -----	5 ✓
Incite to Riot -----	5 ✓
Sniping -----	5 ✓
Loitering Place Illegal Occupation -----	4
Accosting & Soliciting -----	4
Attempt Larceny -----	3
Violate US Code -----	3
Drunk -----	8
Larceny from Auto -----	1
Possession Burglary Tools -----	1
Fraud -----	2
Larceny by Trick -----	1
Unlawfully Driving Away Auto -----	1
Viol. State Liquor Law -----	1
Uttering & Publishing -----	1
Violate Probation -----	1
Possession Explosives -----	1
Traffic -----	6
	<u>862</u> TOTAL

ANALYSIS OF PRIOR POLICE RECORDS OF PERSONS ARRESTED
DURING THE DETROIT RIOT (FROM JULY 23rd thru AUGUST 1)

MEN

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PREVIOUS ARRESTS</u>	<u>NO PREVIOUS ARREST</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
7-23	558	548	1106
7-24	1408	1223	2631
7-25	389	352	741
7-26	169	203	372
7-27	116	125	241
7-28	136	84	220
7-29	162	178	340
7-30	162	97	259
7-31	129	97	226
8-1	<u>107</u>	<u>102</u>	<u>209</u>
TOTAL	3336	3009	6345

WOMEN

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PREVIOUS ARRESTS</u>	<u>NO PREVIOUS ARREST</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
7-23	66	135	201
7-24	105	330	435
7-25	22	43	65
7-26	14	26	40
7-27	5	8	13
7-28	10	6	16
7-29	6	24	30
7-30	2	17	19
7-31	9	9	18
8-1	<u>20</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>25</u>
TOTAL	259	603	862

RACE AND AGE OF PERSONS ARRESTED DURING
THE DETROIT RIOT(FROM JULY 23rd thru JULY 31, 1967)

<u>AGE</u>	<u>WHITE</u>	<u>NEGRO</u>	<u>MEXICAN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
17	29	238		267
18	24	243		267
19	22	240		262
20	73	288	3	364
21	30	283	1	314
22	26	262	1	289
23	28	285		313
24	35	272		307
25	27	234		261
26	13	200	1	214
27	33	307		340
28	34	273		307
29	51	252		303
30	8	142	1	151
31	11	122	2	135
32	13	112		125
33	15	115		130
34	5	103		108
35	7	100		107
36	10	90		100
37	7	104		111
38	6	86		92
39	10	76		86
40	5	83		88
41	5	68		73
42	8	75		83
43	4	51		55
44	6	52		58
45	1	46		47
46	3	50		53
47	3	43		46
48	4	25		29
49	1	26		27
50	6	26		32
51	2	26		28
52		17		17
53	1	28		29
54	2	18		20
55		11		11
56	2	11		13
57	1	16		17
58	1	5		6
59	3	12		15
60 & over	<u>13</u>	<u>38</u>		<u>51</u>
	588	5154	<u>9</u>	5751

JUVENILES DETAINED DURING
THE DETROIT RIOT (FROM JULY 23rd thru JULY 31, 1967)

Entering Without Breaking with Intent to Steal
(Looting)

<u>Age</u>	<u>Negro</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>Total</u>
			320
10	6	1	
11	10	0	
12	19	1	
13	32	1	
14	48	2	
15	84	3	
16	<u>110</u>	<u>3</u>	
	309	11	

Violation of Curfew

<u>Age</u>	<u>Negro</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>Total</u>
			97
10	0	0	
11	1	0	
12	2	0	
13	4	0	
14	14	0	
15	15	5	
16	<u>46</u>	<u>10</u>	
	82	15	

Possession Stolen Property

<u>Age</u>	<u>Negro</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>Total</u>
			75
10	3	0	
11	0	0	
12	0	0	
13	4	0	
14	11	0	
15	16	0	
16	<u>46</u>	<u>0</u>	
	75	0	

Breaking and Entering Business Place

<u>Age</u>	<u>Negro</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>Total</u>
			77
10	0	0	
11	3	0	
12	5	0	
13	4	0	
14	15	0	
15	25	1	
16	<u>23</u>	<u>1</u>	
	75	2	

JUVENILES DETAINED DURING
THE DETROIT RIOT (FROM JULY 23rd thru JULY 31, 1967)

PAGE 2

Larceny from Store

<u>Age</u>	<u>Negro</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>Total</u>
10	0	0	9
11	0	0	
12	0	0	
13	1	0	
14	3	0	
15	4	0	
16	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	
	9	0	

Incite to Riot

			<u>Total</u>
			11
10	0	0	
11	0	0	
12	0	0	
13	1	0	
14	0	0	
15	2	0	
16	<u>8</u>	<u>0</u>	
	11	0	

Attempt B & E Business Place

			<u>Total</u>
			6
13	1	1	
14	1	0	
15	1	0	
16	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	
	5	1	

B & E Coin Box

			<u>Total</u>
			5
10	1	0	
11	2	0	
15	1	0	
16	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	
	4	1	

Carrying Concealed Weapons

			<u>Total</u>
			4
14	1	0	
15	1	0	
16	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	
	3	1	

JUVENILES DETAINED DURING
THE DETROIT RIOT (FROM JULY 23rd thru JULY 31, 1967)

PAGE 3

Felonious Assault

<u>Age</u>	<u>Negro</u>	<u>White</u>	<u>Total</u>
14	0	1	8
15	0	2	
16	<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>	
	1	7	

Arson

			<u>Total</u>
			2
15	1	0	
16	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	
	1	1	

INV. Sniping

			<u>Total</u>
			2
16	1	1	

Carrying Concealed Weapon

			<u>Total</u>
			2
13	1	0	
15	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	
	2		

Simple Larceny

			<u>Total</u>
			2
14	1		
16	<u>1</u>		
	2		

Police Witness

			<u>Total</u>
			1
14	1		

Interfering with Police Officer in the
Performance of his Duty

			<u>Total</u>
			1
16	1		

Total Negro Boys =	583
Total White Boys =	<u>39</u>
Total =	622

STATISTICAL DATA: Detroit Civil Disorder

Source: Detroit Police and Fire Departments

Produced by Department Report & Information Committee

<u>TIME</u>	<u>Monday</u> <u>July 31</u> <u>12 noon</u>
FIRES	
Total to date	1682#
ARRESTS	6892
INJURIES	
In custody	139
Detroit Police	91 +
State Police	4
National Guard	19
U. S. Army	0
Firemen	29
Civilians	104
TOTAL	386
DEATHS	
By fire	3
Shot by:	
Detroit Police	14
Guardsmen	3
U. S. Army	1
Pvt. Guards	1
Civilians	4
Snipers	2
Undetermined +	8
Other Causes	4
TOTAL	40 43

+ Most of these bodies are recovered from areas where sniping had occurred. Includes accumulated injuries unreported.

Fire activity appears normal.

C

What we have done in Detroit

Detroit has moved effectively and swiftly to make the best use of existing federal programs. Last August in testimony before the Senate Operations subcommittee conducting hearings on the problems of the cities I testified and submitted details of federal grants received or pending during the period from July, 1962 to July, 1966. Since that time \$61 million in additional federal grants have been received in a variety of programs from an urban areas job contract to expansion of health services for residents of poverty areas (Summary attached).

We have done a great deal. There is so much more to be done. In the course of my testimony before the Ribicoff Committee I said: "I know how inadequate so many of our programs are, and this is why I find it difficult, to accept (compliments) because I know right down on the streets that as much as we try, we really don't get down to the streets. In all of our agencies and among all of our people, we really aren't too sure what is happening."

We have programs to combat poverty, youth employment and adult employment projects, manpower development skills training centers, juvenile delinquency control activities. No one has tried harder to listen to the people on the streets and to translate their views into programs. Community relations programs have been backed by strong executive orders and special training for police personnel.

It is clear to me that despite our massive efforts there is an underclass in our urban society who have not been reached and for whom there are few programs which touch them and give them hope ✓

Since the riot a number of specific steps have been taken to meet the emergency needs of the riot victims including provision for food, shelter, clothing and the like. The private agencies and individuals have responded magnificently to meet these needs. (Damage assessment chart).

Within city government I have set up a Mayor's Development Team to assure coordination of our efforts as a city government in meeting emergency needs and to work with others who are similarly concerned about blueprinting the future shape of our city. (Submit Executive Order #17 and chart)

We must throw away the textbook as we do this planning. We must increase our efforts to involve the community as we do this planning. We must have some way of reaching the militant as well as those who have given us hope. We must work with the citizens resources committee -- New Detroit -- chaired by Mr. Joseph L. Hudson, Jr. as it seeks to involve the private sector and encourage innovation by all levels of government.

Recommendations:

In everything that has been said today, we have emphasized the role of the federal government in helping to create the "livable" city. Local government has a role and a responsibility and there is increasing evidence of an awakening in the state halls and by businessmen.

We must take firm measures to assure the maintenance of law and order;

We must meet the emergency needs caused by the extensive damage running into hundreds of millions of dollars and to relieve the suffering of the innocent victims of the riots;

We must eliminate the causes of civil disorder.

1. To restore law and order we must modernize our techniques for dealing with mob action, adopt the latest scientific devices, revamp our plans for dealing with civil disorder by planning for a more effective and fluid governmental response. I have requested planning assistance from the Secretary of the Army (letter attached) and support federal legislation which will grant aid directly to the cities in training, equipping and paying police

What specific plans are in view?

officers. There is the need for a federal riot police force to be located in our major cities and to be a part of the local police. I have asked Governor Romney to consider the formation of National Guard Riot Battalions located in the metropolitan areas to provide skilled and speedy response to civil disorders.

2. We must frankly face up to the need to consider and accept a new principle on which to base federal programs and appropriations -- the principle of reparation for long-standing injustice dating back to the generations preceding ours. I mean the injustice of pervasive discrimination, and of the denial of equal educational, vocational and professional opportunity for advancement and progress. This has gone on for years and is still with us. The price they have paid for these generations of injustice is incalculable. Now the nation must, I believe, begin to make reparation -- for the deeds of past generations, and of our own.

The principle of reparation is recognized in international law. In recent years the West German Republic made very substantial deliveries of goods and equipment to many countries in Europe and most recently to Israel -- in the name of the living and in the name of the dead. I am not talking about individual reparations in money. Even in international reparations, the world learned by bitter experience that money alone neither pays for the injuries of the past nor buys a secure future. I am talking about reparations in the form of special work training programs, special educational programs, special community construction and reconstruction programs, including both housing and business, involving efforts, not only by government, but by business, by private and public organizations, by the schools and the universities.

3. We must reorder our national priorities and place the needs of our cities high on the national agenda so that the Reparations Principle can have

meaning and effect. It is just as important to our national destiny that we deal with the causes of warfare on the streets of America as it is to conduct a war in southeast Asia.

4. We must reorganize the federal establishment -- the departments and agencies -- to make them more responsive to urban needs and to assure a coordinated effort which emphasizes innovation. We know we must write a new textbook for the Two Americas with which we are faced. Block grants to cities will provide flexibility and fix responsibility where it belongs, right in the community. The funds available must be of the magnitude which will have an impact on the problems. To propose to conduct a war on all the influences blighting our urban society with a bow and two arrows will merely heighten tensions and lead to further explosions.

5. We must learn much more about our problems and encourage urban research and innovation. It is pathetic that we should spend so much money on attempting to find cures for the ills besetting the body and yet have done so little to seek cures for the ills of our urban society.

6. We must engage in massive programs to encourage private enterprise to create jobs in slum areas and to train slum dwellers. This may take the form of specific tax incentives, tax credits or fast amortization of factories or other enterprises in the slums. We provide tax credits for pollution control devices but we have not provided similar credits for business investments which can help to eliminate pollution and stifling of the human spirit.

7. For those who would otherwise not be employed, there is the need to emphasize the role of the public employer as the employer of last resort. There are many things which should be done to make our cities more beautiful and more habitable. Cities do not have the funds to begin to do all that must be

done, yet they can provide meaningful jobs for those who will not be able to get

*Ghetto
+ "labor"*
a job in the private market. This could be done through a Reconstruction and Urban Public Works Act which would combine training with public sector activities, and designed to emphasize employment of ghetto area residents.

8. In a variety of ways we can make it possible for our nation to use the potential female labor force by creating a network of day care service centers for children which will use the time to advantage by giving a meaningful experience rather than just caring for them.

9. We must take steps to provide insurance and re-insurance for those who are willing to invest in or live in "high-risk" areas -- America's ghettos. Of the \$144 million direct loss during the Detroit riots, estimated by the State Insurance Commissioner, only \$84 million was insured. Getting insurance to rebuild or to create a new environment in the slums will be increasingly more difficult. Disaster insurance and re-insurance is presently available for crops and for loss from natural disasters. It should be extended to cover riot damage.

10. We must assure to each child in America that he will get the same quality education -- and it must be of a high quality -- no matter where he lives, in the slums or in suburbia. The urban school situation is a national disgrace for it emphasizes the inequality which affluence has made possible. Public education must be equal, quality education.

11. There should be established an Urban Development Fund and an Urban Development Corporation to create the financial underpinning and the management capabilities needed to create the "livable" city. The fund could be a revolving one which encourages investments in low cost housing, technological innovation, slum area based industries and creative solutions. It should be a risk-taking activity and should lean heavily on the genius of American enterprise to support their investments through the use of the Urban Development Corporation.

12. Encouragement of new firms and Negro business enterprises in slum areas will provide employment, reduce tensions, stimulate personal ambition among Negro youths and provide a more stable community base.

13. The need for decent housing is obvious, yet for the slum dweller it seems beyond his reach. A low cost housing program which emphasizes home ownership is needed and it must be designed to make it possible for people on welfare to make the payments. The technology exists. The barriers created by the building trades will have to be overcome. The necessary subsidy will have to be provided.

14. The health problems of slum dwellers are not being met by existing medical facilities. A vast expansion of neighborhood comprehensive treatment and emergency care centers will eliminate the existing imbalance.

15. The deep resentment of those who take advantage of the slum dweller's lack of sophistication in handling money, in selling shoddy goods, in overcharging for what he gets is a source of discontent. A consumer services and consumer protection program which is tailored to eliminate this situation is required.

16. There is an urgent need for a census to be conducted of the major cities of America in order to reveal the facts about unemployment, dilapidated housing and to count every resident of the inner city. Criticism has been leveled about the past census missing too many of these residents.

17. To achieve the goals set forth above will require the mobilization of public opinion through exercise of leadership by the President of the United States and the great weight of his office.

CONCLUSION

We have gone over a great deal of material very quickly today. My purpose in appearing here was to inform you of the needs of Detroit which are the needs of America's cities.

The cry from the ghetto can no longer go unheeded. While some may think that they have responded to this cry, the response has been small and slow in relation to the magnitude of the needs.

You have learned something about Detroit and its people. We have described the riot and attempted to identify the causes. We have tried to convey the sense of urgency which possesses us. This urgency must grip the conscience of this nation and of its leaders.

We have made specific recommendations to aid you in meeting the President's charge to this commission.

We have tried to answer the three basic questions:

---What happened?

---Why did it happen?

---What can be done to prevent it from happening again and again?

Our recommendations place great emphasis on the last of the three questions.

Detroit has been called a city of hope in the past--hope that the problems of our cities could be solved, that the urban sprawl could be managed.

That hope still lives. But fulfilling that hope is not just Detroit's problem. It is the nation's. It will take an aroused nation, mobilizing all its resources, to solve this problem, It exists coast to coast and border to border.

Stokely Carmichael has called me an "idiot" for saying that the Negro problem could be solved in a capitalist society.

I still maintain it can be solved. We must do it. The future of this nation hangs in the balance.

#####

D

TABLE OF ATTACHMENTS

**FEDERAL PROGRAMS IN THE DETROIT AREA
JULY 1, 1962 TO AUGUST 1, 1967**

**FEDERAL PROGRAMS IN THE DETROIT AREA
JULY 1, 1962 TO AUGUST 1, 1967 -
FUNDED THROUGH CITY DEPARTMENTS**

**MAYOR'S DEVELOPMENT TEAM -
MISSION AND ORGANIZATION**

**NEW DETROIT COMMITTEE -
MEMBERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION**

LETTER TO SECRETARY OF THE ARMY RESOR

CITY OF DETROIT - DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

**STATISTICAL DATA - SELECTED CENSUS TRACT AREAS
CITY OF DETROIT - 1960 CENSUS**

**STATISTICAL PROFILE OF CITY OF DETROIT RESIDENTS
LIVING IN SUBSTANDARD AND PUBLIC HOUSING - 1964**

**STATISTICS - UNEMPLOYMENT, POPULATION BY RACE,
AND HOUSING**

FEDERAL PROGRAMS IN THE DETROIT AREA, JULY 1, 1962 TO AUGUST 1, 1967
(In Thousands of Dollars)

	<u>Requested</u>	<u>Grant</u>	<u>Pending</u>	<u>Denied</u>
Planning, research, and demonstration grants:				
Riverfront Master Plan Study	150	150	-0-	-0-
Community Renewal Program	2,119	2,064	-0-	55
Central Business District Study	504	504	-0-	-0-
Active Community Teams	150	150	-0-	-0-
Community Action for Detroit Youth	200	200	-0-	-0-
PPBS Implementation	40	40	-0-	-0-
Sub-Total	<u>3,163</u>	<u>3,108</u>	<u>-0-</u>	<u>55</u>
Economic Opportunity Programs:				
Work Experience Program, Title V	8,000	8,000	-0-	-0-
Community Action Programs	91,029	47,726	23,303	20,000
Sub-Total	<u>99,029</u>	<u>55,726</u>	<u>23,303</u>	<u>20,000</u>
Manpower Training Programs:				
Manpower Development and Training Act Programs	28,500	28,500	-0-	-0-
Youth Employment Project	420	420	-0-	-0-
Sub-Total	<u>28,920</u>	<u>28,920</u>	<u>-0-</u>	<u>-0-</u>
Education Programs:				
National Defense Education Act	5,477	5,477	-0-	-0-
Vocational Education Programs	6,124	6,124	-0-	-0-
Elementary and Secondary Education Act	23,412	23,412	-0-	-0-
Higher Education Act	112	112	-0-	-0-
Sub-Total	<u>35,125</u>	<u>35,125</u>	<u>-0-</u>	<u>-0-</u>
Health Programs:				
Pre-school, Children, and Adolescent Program	5,436	5,436	-0-	-0-
Intensive Immunization Program	644	644	-0-	-0-
General Health Programs	254	254	-0-	-0-
Maternal and Child Health Programs	92	92	-0-	-0-
Food Stamp Program	28,449	28,449	-0-	-0-
Sub-Total	<u>34,875</u>	<u>34,875</u>	<u>-0-</u>	<u>-0-</u>

Federal Programs in the Detroit Area, July 1, 1962 to August 1, 1967
(In Thousands of Dollars)

-2-

	<u>Requested</u>	<u>Grant</u>	<u>Pending</u>	<u>Denied</u>
Housing Programs				
Housing and Urban Renewal	104,290	36,455	67,835	-0-
Building Demolition Program	3,364	2,014	-0-	1,350
Sub-Total	<u>107,654</u>	<u>38,469</u>	<u>67,835</u>	<u>1,350</u>
Water and Air Pollution Control:				
Sewage and Pollution Control Program (HEW)				
Program (HEW)	1,060	1,060	-0-	-0-
Basic water and sewer facilities	340,000	2,500	337,500	-0-
Air Pollution Control Program	409	409	-0-	-0-
Sub-Total	<u>341,469</u>	<u>3,969</u>	<u>337,500</u>	<u>-0-</u>
Mass Transportation:				
Transportation and land use study				
study	3,096	2,220	1,876	-0-
DSR mass transit study	200	200	-0-	-0-
Bus-stop shelter construction	260	260	-0-	-0-
New buses & terminal building	10,120	10,120	-0-	-0-
New buses & two-way radios	830	-0-	830	-0-
Sub-Total	<u>14,506</u>	<u>12,800</u>	<u>1,706</u>	<u>-0-</u>
Recreation Programs:				
Acquisition of Park lands	683	232	451	-0-
Purchase of recreation equipment	27	-0-	27	-0-
Swimming pool construction	221	-0-	221	-0-
Project Restore-Senior Citizen Recreation	20	20	-0-	-0-
Sub-Total	<u>951</u>	<u>252</u>	<u>699</u>	<u>-0-</u>
Cultural Programs:				
Art Institute Extension Services	90	90	-0-	-0-
Library Book Purchases	64	64	-0-	-0-
Library Construction (Wilder Branch)	100	100	-0-	-0-
Library Metropolitan Service Ext.	125	125	-0-	-0-
Sub-Total	<u>379</u>	<u>379</u>	<u>-0-</u>	<u>-0-</u>

Federal Programs in the Detroit Area, July 1, 1962 to August 1, 1967
(In Thousands of Dollars)

-3-

	<u>Requested</u>	<u>Grant</u>	<u>Pending</u>	<u>Denied</u>
Miscellaneous Programs:				
OLEA - Applications of new science to law enforcement	130	-0-	130	-0-
Model Cities Planning	427	-0-	427	-0-
Family Service Center	2,061	-0-	2,061	-0-
Urban Beautification	1,082	309	682	91
Public Facilities Construction under APWA	18,680	15,550	-0-	3,130
Civil Defense Program	833	790	43	-0-
Project "Return"	150	150	-0-	-0-
Sub-Total	<u>23,363</u>	<u>16,799</u>	<u>3,343</u>	<u>3,221</u>
GRAND TOTAL	<u>689,434</u>	<u>230,422</u>	<u>434,386</u>	<u>24,626</u>

NOTE: In many instances the formal application for funds is revised or completely eliminated as a result of informal discussions with the Federal agency. This practice tends to deflate the "requested" and the "denied" totals.

GR:rm

8-14-67

FEDERAL PROGRAMS IN THE DETROIT AREA, JULY 1, 1962 TO AUGUST 1, 1967
(in thousands of dollars)
FUNDED THROUGH CITY DEPARTMENTS

F. Planning research and demonstration grants:	<u>Requested</u>	<u>Grant</u>	<u>Pending</u>	<u>Denied</u>
Riverfront Master Plan Study	150	150	-0-	-0-
Community Renewal Program	2,119	2,064	-0-	55
Central Business District Study	504	504	-0-	-0-
Active Community Teams	150	150	-0-	-0-
Community Action for Detroit Youth	200	200	-0-	-0-
P.P.B.S. Implementation	40	40	-0-	-0-
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
SUB-TOTAL	3,163	3,108	-0-	-0-
Economic Opportunity Programs:				
Community Action Programs	91,029	47,726	23,303	20,000
Manpower Training Programs:				
Youth Employment Project	420	420	-0-	-0-
Health Programs:				
Pre-school, children, and adolescent program	5,436	5,436	-0-	-0-
Intensive Immunization Program	644	644	-0-	-0-
General Health Programs	254	254	-0-	-0-
Maternal and Child Health Programs	92	92	-0-	-0-
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
SUB-TOTAL	6,426	6,426	-0-	-0-
Housing Programs:				
Housing and Urban Renewal	104,290	36,455	67,835	-0-
Building Demolition Program	3,364	2,014	-0-	1,350
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
SUB-TOTAL	107,654	38,469	67,835	1,350
Water and Air Pollution Control:				
Sewage and Pollution Control Program (HEW)	1,060	1,060	-0-	-0-
Basic Water and Sewer Facilities	340,000	2,500	337,500	-0-
Air Pollution Control Program	409	409	-0-	-0-
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
SUB-TOTAL	341,469	3,969	337,500	-0-
Mass Transportation:				
D.S.R. Mass Transit Study	200	200	-0-	-0-
Bus-stop Shelter Construction	260	260	-0-	-0-
New Buses and Terminal Building	10,120	10,120	-0-	-0-
New Buses & Two-way radios	830	-0-	830	-0-
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
SUB-TOTAL	11,410	10,580	830	-0-

FEDERAL PROGRAMS IN THE DETROIT AREA, JULY 1, 1962 TO AUGUST 1, 1967

(in thousands of dollars)
FUNDED THROUGH CITY DEPARTMENTS

	<u>Requested</u>	<u>Grant</u>	<u>Pending</u>	<u>Denied</u>
Recreation Programs:				
Acquisition of Park Lands	683	232	451	-0-
Purchase of Recreation Equipment	27	-0-	27	-0-
Swimming Pool Construction	221	-0-	221	-0-
Project Restore - Sr. Citizen Recreation	20	20	-0-	-0-
SUB-TOTAL	<u>951</u>	<u>252</u>	<u>699</u>	<u>-0-</u>
Cultural Programs:				
Art Institute Extension Services	90	90	-0-	-0-
Library Book Purchases	64	64	-0-	-0-
Library Construction (Wilder Branch)	100	100	-0-	-0-
Library Metropolitan Service Ext.	125	125	-0-	-0-
SUB-TOTAL	<u>379</u>	<u>379</u>	<u>-0-</u>	<u>-0-</u>
Miscellaneous Programs:				
O.L.E.A. - Applications of new Science to Law Enforcement	130	-0-	130	-0-
Model Cities Planning	427	-0-	427	-0-
Family Service Center	2,061	-0-	2,061	-0-
Urban Beautification	1,082	309	682	91
Public Facilities Construction - under A.P.W.A.	18,680	15,550	-0-	3,130
Civil Defense Program	833	790	43	-0-
Project "Return"	150	150	-0-	-0-
SUB-TOTAL	<u>23,363</u>	<u>16,799</u>	<u>3,343</u>	<u>3,221</u>
GRAND TOTAL	<u><u>586,264</u></u>	<u><u>128,128</u></u>	<u><u>433,510</u></u>	<u><u>24,626</u></u>

8/14/67

City of Detroit

EXECUTIVE OFFICE

JEROME P. CAVANAGH
Mayor

August 3, 1967
EXECUTIVE ORDER #17

TO ALL DEPARTMENT HEADS, BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS:

Effective today, the Mayor's Development Team, headed by Richard Strichartz, Coordinator, and Fred Romanoff, Deputy Coordinator, will be responsible for the following:

To coordinate city departmental activities to assure that the appropriate measures are taken to restore public and community services and alleviate hardship.

To coordinate long-range planning by city departments in creating a blueprint for the social and physical redevelopment of the city.

To act in a liaison capacity with the "New Detroit Committee" and to coordinate all city agencies in their relationships with other governmental and private entities as they affect the carrying out of the Mayor's Development Team's assignments.

All departments will submit to the Mayor's Development Team, 1108 City-County Building, the following information by August 8, 1967:

1. A description of all departmental activities to date concerning the recent civil disorder. This information should contain available data and the evaluation of same.
2. Short-range plans for departmental participation in the restoration and redevelopment due to the recent civil disorder.

All departments will submit to the Mayor's Development Team the following information by August 15, 1967:

Long-range plans for departmental participation in the restoration and redevelopment due to the recent civil disorder.

All departments will cooperate to their fullest extent in providing information, personnel and other needs requested by the Mayor's Development Team.

JPC:de


Mayor

MAYOR'S DEVELOPMENT TEAM

COORDINATOR
R. STRICHARTZ

DEPUTY COORDINATOR
F. ROMANOFF

INFORMATION SERVICES
J. TRAINOR

COMMUNITY SERVICES
H. JOHNSON

BUSINESS SERVICES
ARTHUR YIM

ADM. ASS'T AND LIAISON ACTIVITIES
J. KANTERS

LONG-RANGE PLANNING
J. WILEY

EMERGENCY PLANS

PHYSICAL FACILITIES
DAVE CASON

SOCIAL SERVICES
BURT BRADLEY

RECONSTRUCTION LOANS
INSURANCE CLAIMS
FINANCIAL GRANTS
PERSONAL LOANS
LEGAL AID

NEW DETROIT COMMITTEE
STATE & FEDERAL AGENCIES
CONTRIBUTIONS

MODEL CITY PROGRAM
COMMUNITY RENEWAL PROGRAM
PERMANENT HOUSING
MANPOWER DEV. & JOB TRAINING
RESEARCH STUDIES & REPORTS

DEBRIS CLEARANCE
SECURE DAMAGED STRUCTURES
IDENTIFY UNSAFE STRUCTURES
RESTORE STREET LIGHTING & UTILITIES
PEST CONTROL

TEMPORARY HOUSING
HEALTH AND SANITATION
FOOD AND DRUG INSPECTION
FOOD DISTRIBUTION & REOPENING STORES
COUNSELING
EMPLOYMENT
CLOTHING

CITY OF DETROIT
NEW DETROIT COMMITTEE

CHAIRMAN: J. L. HUDSON, JR., PRESIDENT
J. L. HUDSON CO.

MEMBERS:

JOHN ARMSTRONG, PRESIDENT
DARIN AND ARMSTRONG

LENA BIVENS
FEDERATION OF ADC MOTHERS

PAUL M. BORMAN, PRESIDENT
BORMAN FOOD STORES

MRS. GERALD BRIGHT, ADMINISTRATIVE VICE-PRESIDENT
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF DETROIT

ED CAREY, PRESIDENT
DETROIT COMMON COUNCIL

THE VERY REV. MALCOLM CARRON, PRESIDENT
UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT

WALKER L. CISLER, CHAIRMAN
THE DETROIT EDISON COMPANY

WILLIAM M. DAY, PRESIDENT
MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY

NORMAN DRACHLER, SUPERINTENDENT
DETROIT PUBLIC SCHOOLS

MAX M. FISHER, CHAIRMAN
UNITED FOUNDATION

HENRY FORD, II, CHAIRMAN
FORD MOTOR COMPANY

LORENZO FREEMAN, HEAD
WEST CENTRAL ORGANIZATION

HANS GEHRKE, JR., CHAIRMAN
GREATER DETROIT BOARD OF COMMERCE

WILLIAM GASSETT, PRESIDENT
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

MEMBERS:

DELOS HANLIN, CHAIRMAN
OAKLAND COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS
AND PRESIDENT,
MICHIGAN ASSOCIATION OF COUNTY SUPERVISORS

NORVEL HARRINGTON, CHAIRMAN
INNER-CITY STUDENT ORGANIZATION

ALVIN HARRISON, HEAD
AFRO-AMERICAN UNITY MOVEMENT

NORMAN HILL, CHAIRMAN
MACOMB COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

ROBERT HOLMES, VICE-PRESIDENT
INTER-NATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS

RICHARD F. HUEGLI, MANAGING DIRECTOR
UNITED COMMUNITY SERVICES OF METRO. DETROIT

ARTHUR JOHNSON, DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT
DETROIT PUBLIC SCHOOLS

DR. WILLIAM B. KEAST, PRESIDENT
WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY

DAMON KEITH, CHAIRMAN
MICHIGAN CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION

SEN. EMIL LOCKWOOD, MAJORITY LEADER
THE MICHIGAN SENATE

WILLIAM A. MC CLINTOCK, PRESIDENT
MICHIGAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION

RALPH T. MC ELVENNY, PRESIDENT
MICHIGAN CONSOLIDATED GAS. COMPANY

JOHN S. PINGEL, PRESIDENT
ROSS ROY, INC.

CURTIS POTTER, MAYOR
ROYAL OAK

REV. FATHER ROBERT POTTS, SECRETARY
CITIZEN'S COMMITTEE FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY

MEL RAVITZ, CHAIRMAN
WAYNE COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

MEMBERS:

WALTER P. REUTHER, PRESIDENT
UNITED AUTO WORKERS

JAMES M. ROCHE, PRESIDENT
GENERAL MOTORS

REP. WILLIAM A. RYAN, MINORITY LEADER
MICHIGAN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ROBERT TENDAL, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NAACP

LYNN A. TOWNSEND, CHAIRMAN
CHRYSLER CORPORATION

MRS. JEAN WASHINGTON
TENTH PRECINCT POLICE COMMUNITY RELATIONS COMM.

STANLEY J. WINKELMAN, PRESIDENT
WINKELMAN BROTHERS APPAREL, INC.

JACK WOOD, SECRETARY-MANAGER
DETROIT AND WAYNE COUNTY BUILDING TRADES COUNCIL

"NEW DETROIT" COMMITTEE
39 Members

STANDING COMMITTEES

COMMUNICATIONS

SUBCOMMITTEES

- Detroit's Image
- Press Relations
- Inter-Communication

COMMUNITY SERVICES

SUB COMMITTEES

- Health
- Social Services
- Recreation
- Public Order

EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT

SUBCOMMITTEES

- Pre-Job Training
On-The-Job Training
- Education and Cultural Development
- Employment
Job-Development
Job-Placement

LEGAL AND FINANCE

SUB COMMITTEES

- Legal Services
- Finance and Insurance

REDEVELOPMENT

SUBCOMMITTEES

- Cleanup
- Emergency Housing for the Homeless
- Commercial Redevelopment
- Urban Physical Planning and Long Range Housing

August 11, 1967

Secretary Stanley R. Resor
Secretary of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C. 20310

Dear Secretary Resor:

The recent civil disturbance in the City of Detroit has focused our attention on the critical need for a new approach to planning for community response to this type of disorder.

It now seems apparent that a military type of operations plan would most closely parallel our needs. Assignment and deployment of forces, protection of vital services, identification of material and communication needs, and reaction to fluid situations are all part of the problem we have recently faced.

I have directed that an Emergency Plan be constituted under the guidance of the best professional talent available for the task. The recommendation of my staff is that the services of one or more individuals be secured for a period of approximately three months. The activity will work under the direction of my office.

The names of several Armed Services officers have been suggested, with the thought that a temporary return to active duty status may be appropriate to the peculiarities of the assignment. A list of these names is attached.

The assistance of your office in this matter is considered vital to our city.

Sincerely yours,

Mayor

cc: Richard Strichartz
Coordinator, Mayor's Development Team
Jack Moskowitz
Deputy Asst. Secretary of Defense

Suggested Names to Direct Emergency Plan Study

General Bruce Clark, Ret.

Major General William P. Yarborough

Major General Bob Glass

General Paul. Freeman, Ret.

Lieut. General Thomas W. Dunn, Ret.

Lieut. General James L. Richardson, Ret.

Lieut. General Frederick (Ted) Brown, Ret.

Lieut. General William F. Train, Ret.

Lieut. General Harvey H. Fischer, Ret.

CITY OF DETROIT
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

Type of Structure	Demolished or to be Demolished	Damaged ^{1/}	Total
1-Family Dwellings	23	11	34
2-Family Dwellings	32	3	35
Multiple Dwellings	23	10	33
Commercial Buildings	117	72	189
Private Garages	<u>9</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>11</u>
	204	98	302
Living Units ^{2/}	390	216	606
Number of Stores Looted (In HRD Target Areas Only)			770

^{1/} Generally speaking, the buildings included in this category can be repaired.

^{2/} Living Units include 1 and 2-family dwellings, apartments, and legally rented units.

NOTE: The City of Detroit Assessors Office estimates the loss in assessment as a result of the riot at approximately \$11,000,000 - \$7,500,000 of personal property assessment and \$3,500,000 of real property assessment. Generally speaking, assessed valuation represents 50% of market value. The State of Michigan Insurance Commission estimates the total loss in the riot-torn areas of the City from fire, looting, business interruption and all other causes at \$144,000,000, of which only \$84,000,000 is covered by insurance.

JPK/vf
8-14-67

SELECTED STATISTICAL DATA

1960 Census


City of Detroit *

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>Selected Census Tract Areas</u>	<u>Balance of City</u>	<u>Total City</u>
Population	529,563	1,140,581	1,670,144
Non-White Population	321,309	165,865	487,174
Percent Non-White Population	60.6	14.6	29.2
Number of Families	132,022	369,738	501,760
Number of Families With Income Less Than \$3000	38,829	41,886	80,715
Percent of Families With Income Less Than \$3000	29.5	11.3	16.1
Males 14 and Over in Civilian Labor Force	128,252	324,259	452,511
Number of Males 14 and Over Who Are Unemployed	21,301	24,855	46,156
Percent of Males 14 and Over Who Are Unemployed	16.6	7.7	10.2
Females 14 and Over in Civilian Labor Force	63,762	163,143	226,905
Number of Females 14 and Over Who Are Unemployed	8,855	12,020	20,875
Percent of Females 14 and Over Who Are Unemployed	13.9	7.4	9.2
Persons Under 21	221,569	382,588	604,157
Number of Persons Under 21 Receiving A.F.D.C.	10,836	3,060	13,896
Percent of Persons Under 21 Receiving A.F.D.C.	4.9	0.8	2.3
Persons Aged 65 and Over	48,324	110,041	158,365
Persons Aged 65 and Over Receiving Old Age Assistance	7,866	6,704	14,570

<u>Item</u>	<u>Selected Census Tract Areas</u>	<u>Balance of City</u>	<u>Total City</u>
Percent of Persons 65 and Over Receiving Old Age Assistance	16.3	6.1	9.2
Number of Families Receiving Direct Relief	7,244	2,289	9,533
Percent of Families Receiving Direct Relief	5.5	0.6	1.9
Number of Persons 25 Years Old and Over	293,446	698,372	991,818
Persons 25 and Over With Less Than 8 Years of Education	100,592	135,201	235,793
Percent of Persons 25 and Over With Less Than 8 Years of Education	34.3	19.3	23.8
Number of Street Crimes (1964)	13,764	12,230	25,994
Street Crime Rate per 1000 Persons (1964)	2.6	1.1	1.6

* See attached map of City

ATTACHMENT TO TABLE OF SELECTED STATISTICAL DATA



STATISTICAL PROFILE OF CITY OF DETROIT
RESIDENTS LIVING IN SUBSTANDARD
AND PUBLIC HOUSING - 1964^(a)

HOUSING	TOTAL
Individuals living in substandard and public housing.....	173,000
Individuals living in substandard housing.....	142,000
Households in substandard housing.....	36,300
Public housing households.....	8,000
Households with six or more people.....	11,100
Households with two or more people.....	36,700
Households with one person only.....	7,600
White households.....	14,700
Non-white households.....	29,600
Homeowner households.....	15,400
Households with unhealthy living conditions.....	17,400
Households with overcrowded living conditions.....	8,700
Households with poor housekeeping standards.....	5,000
Households residing in Detroit more than 10 years.....	39,000
Households with annual income less than \$3,000 who lived in present home less than one year.....	3,000
Householders who like present neighborhood.....	21,000
EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING	
Household heads employed or partially employed.....	22,000
Household heads unemployed but employable.....	9,100
Household heads not in labor force.....	12,600
Household heads with part time employment only.....	2,300
Household heads employed in the low-paying occupations.....	12,100
Youth 18-21 not employed and not in school.....	4,000
Household heads with less than sixth grade education.....	13,200
Household heads with some kind of vocational training.....	3,900
Household heads who want vocational training.....	7,200
INCOME	
Unemployed household heads with annual income under \$3,000.....	14,800
Employed household heads with annual income under \$3,000.....	4,200
Employed household heads with annual income between \$3,000 and \$6,000 per year.....	11,700
Employed household heads with annual income over \$6,000.....	5,300
Employed household heads who would not give information on income.....	1,400
FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS	
Households with one or more children.....	22,400
Negro families with one or more children.....	15,700
Number of one parent families.....	2,900
Number of stable one parent families.....	160
Number of one parent families with severe and complex problems.....	1,900
Children under 18 years of age.....	81,700
Households with children 12-17.....	14,100
Households with school dropout problems.....	2,400
Households with other school problems.....	5,600
Households with children six to eleven.....	15,400
Households with school problems.....	4,700
Households with pre-school children.....	13,500
Households needing some form of day care service.....	4,400

HOPES AND ASPIRATIONS	TOTAL
Households with children who lack any positive aspirations for their children.....	2,600
Households with children who have some specific goals for their children.....	9,000
Households with children who have no specific goals for their children.....	13,400
CONDITIONS AND PROBLEMS	
Households receiving public assistance.....	9,800
Households needing more financial assistance.....	8,300
Households needing legal aid.....	6,100
Households with adults having chronic health problems.....	25,000
Households with adults with some serious physical impairment.....	13,500
Households with adults with chronic health problems untreated.....	6,200
Households with adults with serious physical impairment untreated..	4,300
Households with children having serious physical impairments.....	4,600
Households with children having untreated physical impairments.....	1,300
Households with children not innoculated.....	5,800
Households with children under 10 years, wanting family planning service.....	3,400
Households with adult emotional and behavior problems.....	9,900
Households with children having emotional and behavior problems....	4,300
Households with mentally retarded children.....	2,100
Households in which children have a visual problem.....	11,600
Households which had contact with a voluntary agency.....	4,300

(a) Based on data obtained from interviews by Greenleigh Associates.

UNEMPLOYMENT STATISTICS

<u>Date</u>	<u>Detroit Metropolitan Area</u>	<u>State of Michigan</u>	<u>National</u>
Sept. '66	2.8%		
Oct. '66	2.2%		
May, '67	4.0%		
June, '67	4.8%	5.1%	4.6%
July, '67	6.1%		

Unemployment in the Inner Core City Area (basically Model City). Survey by University of Windsor and Wayne State for Department of Labor taken October, 1966.

White males 4.9%
 White females 5.2%
 Non-White males 7.2%
 Non-white females 17.6%

"Riot-induced" claims for unemployment compensation through Friday, August 11, 1967 - 1203 claims.


Source: Michigan Employment Security Commission 8/14/67.

POPULATION BY RACE: 1960 CENSUS

	<u>State of Michigan</u>	<u>City of Detroit</u>
White		
Number	7,088,013	1,182,970
Percent	90.6	70.8
Non-White		
Number	736,952	487,174
Percent	9.4	29.2
Total		
Number	7,824,965	1,670,144
Percent	100.0	100.0

CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSING UNITS: 1960 CENSUS

	<u>City of Detroit</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Sound	474,761	85.8
Deteriorating	63,786	11.6
Dilapidated	14,651	2.6
All Housing Units	553,198	100.0



GRAYLING
201 MILES TO DETROIT

SAGINAW

ELINT

GRAND RAPIDS

LANSING

PONTIAC

SELFIDGE FIELD

22 MILES to Detroit

DETROIT

SERVICES SERIES

*** COMMUNITY PLANNING
AND CIVIL DISTURBANCES**
experience report 108 ✓



COMMUNITY RELATIONS SERVICE
U. S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS

manila

INTRODUCTION

During 1966, nearly 40 cities experienced serious racial incidents and civil disturbances. While the underlying social and economic aspects of such problems are the basis for most of the material published by the Community Relations Service, the problems of handling eruptions of violence themselves have provoked many inquiries from Mayors. This Experience Report is designed to share recent procedures used in a violent situation in Detroit.

Detroit's approach to the possibility of civil disturbance is two-pronged — prevention and preparation. Lines of communication to the various communities have long been established and detailed, flexible strategies have been developed for dealing with such emergencies.

When the city experienced three days of civil disorder early in August, 1966, the value of this approach became apparent. In some other places the end of a disturbance has signaled the enforcement of a fragile peace at the expense of good community relations. In Detroit the basic trust of area residents in their city government was never lost. This Experience Report describes the manner in which this basic trust was earned during the course of the incident itself — and through the broad array of social services which the city had brought to the community. The Conference would welcome comments.

June, 1967

THE INCIDENT

Tuesday, August 9

The incident began at 8:30 in the evening with a routine police action. A four-man police cruiser approached a group of men loitering near an intersection. The group was asked to disperse. When three of the men refused to move, the officers attempted to issue them loitering tickets. The three men refused to identify themselves and began to shout for help, stirring up a belligerent crowd which had begun to gather. At this point the cruiser radioed for aid in removing the three individuals from the scene. A segment of the crowd, numbering 75 to 100 people, became increasingly unruly and additional police cars were dispatched to the scene. The disturbance spread and rocks and bottles were soon being thrown at private and police cars along a half-mile stretch of the street. While the troubled area soon expanded to include a much larger area, most of the activity focused in a three by twelve block section.

The Headquarters Command Post was activated by the Police Commissioner at 10:05 p.m. and was fully functional by 10:30. The afternoon shift of the Police Department was held over as a reserve force and the entire 4,600-man department was put on a twelve-hour, two-shift operation. Some of the reserve forces were moved to the area of disturbance and a district inspector assumed command. Patrol wagons (each containing a squad of police and riot equipment) and the Tactical Mobile Unit converged upon an intersection just outside the area of disturbance. The Tactical Mobile Unit is a special section of the Crime Control Department. The men of this unit are highly trained and drive specially equipped, highly mobile and distinctively marked patrol cars. The Motor Commando Division, a specially trained unit for mob control, was committed and then withdrawn to a reserve position.

The area was patrolled through the night by four-man police cars. Throughout the entire operation police officers maintained high standards of professionalism by refusing to be goaded into provocative action by the objects and insults which were hurled at them. Area bars and liquor stores were closed and Belle Isle, an adjacent island park, was sealed off as a precautionary measure. Meanwhile, the Police Intelligence Section kept a detailed log of all information pertaining to disorder in the area as well as similar information for the entire city. The Intelligence Section's constant surveillance of extremist organizations enabled police to intercept an automobile laden with large quantities of weapons.

In observance of procedures outlined in the Police Department's manual on mob control, no mass arrests for petty offenses were made that night. This was to prevent the emergence of a mob hero and was also consistent with the Mayor's desire to treat the matter as an incident rather than as a riot and to use the greatest possible restraint consistent with public safety.

Within hours after the occurrence of the initial incident, the Detroit Commission on Community Relations had dispatched three men to the area and was attempting to establish a continuous flow of communication between neighborhood people and city authorities. The Director of the Commission immediately contacted the press wire services in order to minimize any distorted inflammatory reporting of the incident. He then met with police officials to discuss police reactions to the recent events.

From about 10:00 p.m. until 3:30 a.m. there were periodic reports of disorder throughout the general area. Although approximately twenty windows in the area were broken, there were no verified reports of looting. The only fire bomb thrown caused no damage. There was only one verified shooting.

The Second Day — Wednesday, August 10

On the following morning critiques were presented and, after some minor changes had been implemented, a plan of action was formulated for the coming night. Early that morning refuse trucks moved

into the area to clean up the streets, and broken store fronts were boarded over. Businesses were asked to remain open as an expression of confidence and to promote the feeling that conditions would quickly return to normal. The Mayor's office established a Press Release Center adjacent to the Police Command Post. The Center had the task of providing the press with accurate, detailed information and minimizing the risk of dangerous, sensational reporting.

Employment opportunities and recreational facilities have been two of the area's greatest needs. Officials of the Mayor's Committee for Total Action Against Poverty (TAP) met that morning and took immediate steps to relieve some of the pressure of these needs. That same day a new store front recreation center was opened and a team was sent in to recruit workers for the Neighborhood Youth Corps. At the same time TAP's ties of communication with area leaders were activated so that everyone concerned would have a chance to air his views and discuss his complaints.

The Commission on Community Relations assigned twenty additional staff members to the neighborhood, making contact with some of the more dissident elements in the population and conducting extensive interviews. Individual meetings were held with newspaper officials in order to stress again the importance of an accurate and unemotional news coverage. Officials of the Commission then met with the Mayor to discuss the advisability of a public statement, treatment of the news media, and the feelings of area residents as reported by the staff in the field.

The strategy employed, aided by a summer rain, limited disturbances on the second night. Nevertheless, there were numerous incidents of malicious destruction of property and attempted fire bombings. The special police procedures which were initiated on the previous day had now reached a high degree of efficiency and 43 felony arrests were made in the area. Police continued to refrain from making arrests for petty offenses.

The Third Day — Thursday, August 11

On Thursday morning, the third day, TAP sent forty people into the field to promote its programs and to communicate the intent of the City to respond to the needs of its citizens. An information clearing house was set up in TAP's nearby Community Action Center to deter the spreading of the numerous rumors that such a crisis situation provokes.

On the same day a meeting of 150 community leaders was held under the auspices of the Community Relations Commission. TAP officials were also present. It was immediately apparent that Police Department and general city procedures were widely supported by the community. The disturbances were attributed to a small minority whose behavior was not condoned. The meeting proved useful in defining local issues and areas of community responsibility.

Perhaps the most meaningful innovation to emerge from that meeting was the establishment of "peace patrols." These consisted of local residents who volunteered to walk the streets urging young people to stay indoors. They agreed not to provoke incidents by stopping and arguing and, in the event of some misunderstanding, to allow themselves to be quietly arrested. Their duties were clearly described and related to police activities so as to avoid confusion and interference.

Thursday passed in relative calm. Only fifteen arrests were made in the area and damage to property was negligible.

Through the Weekend

Although the additional patrols were continued through Friday night, the disturbances had by that time entirely subsided. A reduction in forces began on the following day, Saturday, August 13, and by Monday the entire special police operation was ended.

COMMUNITY SOCIAL SERVICES

Detroit's double approach of prevention and preparation is much more than a response to the threat of social conflict. It attacks the root causes of discontent and disorder and seeks to remove, as much as possible, any source of irritation.

The city had demonstrated its interest in the special needs of low-income and minority group areas by responding with a full range of social services. In the course of working toward the common goal of preventing and ameliorating social ills, great progress has been made in relieving tensions among the city's less privileged citizens. The numerous programs of city agencies, as described below, undoubtedly had great influence both in preventing the occurrence of civil disturbances and, when they did occur, in minimizing their intensity and their duration.

TOTAL ACTION AGAINST POVERTY

The Mayor's Committee for Total Action Against Poverty is the local public agency administering Federal anti-poverty funds and was one of the first such agencies to be formed in the country. The TAP program was designed to provide a coordinated community-wide attack on poverty enlisting the services of all existing social agencies. The unique problems and needs of particular neighborhoods are interpreted by the area advisory committees which are composed of local leadership. The area where the disturbances occurred had been one of the original community action target areas.

TAP maintains Community Action Centers and sub-centers in problem areas throughout the city. In order to bring its services to the people, area residents are contacted both door-to-door and through a system of referrals from other social agencies, such as the ADC and the Welfare Department. Once a citizen comes to TAP for one of the available services, he is informed of, and exposed to, all other available services as well.

TAP's comprehensive health services include programs of immunization, physical examination, and screening for hospital admission. A complete range of marital, family, and vocational counseling programs is provided. Recruitment programs for the Neighborhood Youth Corps and the Job Corps camps offer the individual an opportunity to escape a defeating environment. Homemaker services, including home economics education, day care, and emergency care, are available to the housewife and mother. In addition, residents are kept informed of those regular services of other departments which are available to them.

A crucial part of this total program is the development of a healthy, direct relationship between the citizens and his city. In terms of prevention, this kind of relationship reduces the occurrence of tension and hostility and lessens the probability of recourse to violence.

In terms of preparation, TAP's grassroots relationship to the community has enabled it to develop an extensive communications network with neighborhood organizations and community leaders. Its staff received special informal and formal training, employing such classroom techniques as role playing and the simulation of crisis situations, so that it would know how to react when confronted with hostility and conflict. Efforts had also been made, in cooperation with the Police Department and city schools, to devise means of communicating with area youths under crisis conditions.

The Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC), administered by TAP, has been a significant factor in easing the problem of unemployed youth and thereby reducing community tension. It provides a work experience program for high school drop-outs, ages 16-21. The youths are taken from families of a specified low economic level as determined by the Department of Labor. They are placed with government agencies for on-the-job training and are urged to attend high school or vocational classes. While

in the program they are regularly contacted by counselors who work with them to improve their work habits and help them with personal problems. After completion of the program, Youth Corps trainees are either placed in jobs by the Michigan Employment Security Commission, or are directed into a training program such as that of the Adult Youth Employment Project. The confidence gained by the high school drop-out in acquiring work experience and working to solve his own problems is an immeasurable asset in overcoming a bad start.

The Adult Youth Employment Project (AYEP), now also administered by TAP, was designed to find new ways to assist large numbers of youths to make the transition from school to work and has been expanded to include adults as well. The AYE volunteer after two weeks of orientation and testing, receives a complete physical examination. Remedial health work is performed by a volunteer professional staff and nutrition and personal grooming programs are designed to correct any other deficiencies the volunteer may possess. He then enters an individually oriented program of on-the-job training and practical classroom instruction in the field of his choice. The project has been very successful. Eighty-five percent of 1,400 people served by the project have been placed in jobs upon completion of the program.

THE COMMISSION ON COMMUNITY RELATIONS

The Commission on Community Relations has worked since 1953 to identify and remove inter-group tensions wherever they occur. Its programs are designed not merely to respond to isolated disturbances or cases of wrongdoing, but to effect basic changes in institutional patterns of discrimination. These goals are sought in close and constant communication with the representatives of all the diverse interests of the urban community.

The Commission's education division works closely with the Board of Education, an autonomous body, in order to assure equal educational opportunities for all citizens. Its housing division is charged with the enforcement of city ordinances designed for the prevention of blockbusting and other practices detrimental to neighborhood welfare. The housing division also helps organize community councils for the purpose of stabilizing populations and raising neighborhood morale.

In the area of employment the Commission on Community Relations had worked on the enforcement of the anti-discrimination clause in city contracts as well as in getting more minority group participation in apprentice programs.

The Commission's field staff maintains liaison with both TAP and the Detroit Police Department. It investigates complaints at their source, contacts civil rights groups, and attends meetings and demonstrations. The staff works closely with the Mayor's office to interpret for city government the information it collects and to help resolve problems brought up by social action groups.

Through the Coordinating Council on Community Relations, a group of 76 social service organizations, the Commission works toward achieving broad community support for its programs.

In order to respond to protest and conflict, the Commission on Community Relations has sought to develop a creative relationship between social action groups and city government, a relationship in which both sides could be free to express their needs and seek constructive solutions.

THE DETROIT POLICE DEPARTMENT

The Detroit Police Department had been maintaining an open door policy at all department levels and its citizens complaint bureau operating in liaison with the Michigan Civil Rights Commission and

the city's Commission on Community Relations had been working to resolve any problems in the field of civil rights or human relations.

The Police Department's policy of integration has long been in effect for both the uniformed and detective divisions and has been continually emphasized in the Department's recruitment program. The Department's public relations program required each precinct commander to hold frequent meetings with the community leaders of his area in order to establish and perpetuate good, close relationships between the Department and local communities.

The major key to the city's efforts in successfully handling the disturbance was the action of the citizens who lived in the area. Led by the 5th Precinct police-community relations committee which had been established three years earlier and which had built during this period a strong rapport between police officers and residents of the community, efforts were launched an hour after the initial incident to alert citizens by telephone to stay indoors and to keep children, especially teen-agers off the street. The 5th Precinct committee was of invaluable assistance in dispelling rumors, preventing curious on-lookers from congregating and in establishing the "peacepatrols."

Human relations training had been an important part of the Police Academy curriculum. In addition, officers who worked in areas populated by low income groups were given special training on the subject. This important program was financed by an Office of Economic Opportunity grant of \$200,000 administered through the Mayor's Total Action Against Poverty Committee (see CRS Experience Report, *Police-Community Relations Training in Detroit*, Experience Report # 106, Services Series). The rationale for such a program was that a large number of racial incidents involve abrasions that occur between police officers and members of minority groups. The program was also based on the concept of a professional police department, one which entails a heightened sensitivity to the public service nature of police work.

Under the program which ran to October, 1965, 1,800 police officers from inner city precincts had received 20 hours of in-service training in human relations and professional police work. They were informed of new interpretations of the law which guard the citizen's constitutional rights and were confronted with hypothetical cases involving interracial human relations problems. Each case contained elements of racial, social, cultural and economic conditions that have been known to be factors in previous police-community relations problems. An additional grant was sought this year for the program.

Plans fixing possible courses of action and drawing the lines of responsibility in the event of a major disorder had been carefully formulated. A centralized headquarters setup was designed to become operational in case of trouble and a procedure was established for the submission and evaluation of local disorder plans. A special training manual was prepared by the Police Department and issued to command officers. This manual outlined tactics to be employed by the Department as a whole and described the methods to be used in training officers to respond competently and professionally in the event of such an emergency.

In the field, the Detective Bureau, as a regular policy, investigated all rumors of impending riot in order to determine their significance and to prevent their further spreading. Potentially dangerous organizations were kept under constant surveillance by both Department personnel and informants.

OTHER CITY AGENCIES

Other city departments had also been doing their part in making the city's presence felt in the neighborhoods. The Department of Parks and Recreation has had an augmented summer program designed to provide thousands of children with additional recreation facilities, and a large staff devoted

to sports competition and instruction as well as play leadership. At the same time, TAP's Operation Champ provided additional play facilities.

The Commission on Children and Youth has the task of evaluating local conditions affecting children and youth and advising the Mayor and the Common Council of their findings.

The Detroit Committee for Neighborhood Conservation and Improved Housing, composed of 27 city department heads and 67 citizens, has had an ongoing program of working with block clubs and community councils. Its function has grown beyond the area of housing to open an important channel of communication between neighborhood residents and the city government.

CONCLUSION

The lack of response on the part of the majority of disturbance area residents to the incitements of a volatile minority was most significant. It points up the usefulness of a thoughtful, integrated response to civil emergencies and reflects the average citizen's appreciation of a city government which is sensitive to the needs of the local community. Several features stand out in Detroit's handling of this incident:

- (1) The confidence which had been gained locally through the work done and the social services instituted at the neighborhood level.
- (2) The numerous ties of communication which had been maintained allowing people to let off steam when necessary and, during the disturbances, to work with officials in getting control of the situation.
- (3) The professionalism and preparedness of the Detroit Police Department in dealing with disturbances of this kind.
- (4) The measured response to violence. The city administration and the Police Department refused to panic.
- (5) The efforts made to control the spread of dangerous rumors.
- (6) The early steps taken to avoid the hazards of sensational news dispatches.
- (7) The quick response of city departments with new programs to meet the needs of area citizens.

PARTIAL CHECKLIST . . .

Based on Detroit's experiences over the past three years, here is what other cities may wish to consider as they develop plans to alleviate the threat of civil disturbances:

1.

Establish permanent channels of communications on key racial problems among the city's top business, labor, industrial, religious, educational and civil rights leadership. Such a group should have the continuing responsibility of exploring problems of equal opportunity in housing, employment, education and police-community relations and of providing top-level, civic impetus for positive changes in these areas. Detroit's Citizens Committee for Equal Opportunity has carried out this function since 1963 and functions as a civic counterpart to the city's official Commission on Community Relations.

2.

Establish police-citizen councils in each precinct or district in the city. These groups should be chaired by an elected civilian, should include a steering committee composed of representative neighborhood residents (block club presidents, PTA chairmen, local businessmen, etc.) and should meet at least once each month with the precinct command officer and his staff, to discuss mutual problems of law enforcement, neighborhood conservation, etc.

3.

Institute in-service training programs in human relations for all police officers assigned to low-income or minority group neighborhoods. Training should deal frankly and realistically with race relations, implications of judicial decisions for law enforcement procedures and professional police work. Copies of Detroit's in-service training program are available on request.

4.

Provide an effective, internal mechanism within the local police agency for receiving and investigating citizens complaints, with appropriate disciplinary measures for officers found to be guilty of misconduct. In all cases,

citizens who file a complaint should be given notice of the findings concerning the complaint, what action was taken if the complaint is found valid and, if the complaint is invalid, the reasons for such a finding.

5.

Establish a clearing house for receiving and investigating any reports of persistent rumors, pockets of community tension or other possible signs of widespread community unrest which might lead to a racial outbreak. In most cities, the community relations commission can fulfill this responsibility. It is imperative that such a clearing house agency keep in close contact with police, municipal parks and recreation officials, settlement and neighborhood organization workers so that the city's total social climate can be accurately assessed.

6.

Community service agencies should be urged to program their facilities to the maximum extent during the summer months, especially during the evenings and on weekends. Detroit discovered in 1964, much to its dismay, that most social service agencies operate a minimum program during the summer, permitting key staff people to leave on vacation and assigning other staff to out-of-city camp or institute programs. Detroit now requests a special appropriation from its United Fund to subsidize special social agency programs for youth between June and September.

7.

Encourage the creation of imaginative programs for working with the city's youth, especially those between 14-21 years old. Detroit's Youth Service Corps — Junior Police Cadet program which involves youths working under police supervision in non-technical law enforcement duties (e.g. finding abandoned cars, malfunctioning traffic signals, broken street and traffic signs, etc.) has proved to be an effective way of improving relations between police officers and youth.

U. S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS

1707 H STREET, N.W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

Telephone 298-7535

