

V-1

Form + extent of rioting

5-1 The report of the Newark Police Department contains an itemized list of every reported sniping incident to which the Newark police, the state police, or the National Guard were sent to investigate. A total of 235 incidents were investigated, occurring as follows: July 13, one incident; July 14, 43 incidents; July 15, 92 incidents; July 16, 75 incidents; July 17, 23 incidents; July 18, one incident. The police report acknowledges that there are duplications in the list and some incidents not directly related to the riot, in addition to numerous false alarms. Ex. 24.

V-I Form + extent of riot

51

On the first night of the riot, following the arrest of the taxicab driver, Negroes in the area threw stones, bricks, and bottles at the police station, at passing automobiles, and at onlookers. Some Molotov cocktails were thrown at business establishments, and stores in the vicinity of the police station were looted. Thereafter, "during the rioting rampaging Negroes set fires, looted stores, and committed robbery and acts of vandalism. Heavy sniper fire began in the late afternoon of July 14, 1967, directed principally at police and firemen." FBI Ex. 2, p. 44.

51

The area involved escalated from 8 blocks to an area roughly estimated at 10 square miles. FBI Ex. 2, p. 44.

VI Local police participation

(Number in Police Department)

6a The Newark Police Department presently has 1,407 policemen, which is 179 short of authorization. The department has been chronically short since 1958. TR 773, Spina.

VI Local Police
A. Numbers

6A According to the FBI, the entire force of
1,350 men in the Newark Police Department participated
in putting down the riot. FBI Ex. 2, p. 45.

VII State Police / National Guards

A. Authority to call

7 A

New Jersey has a statute which permits the State Police to be brought into a municipality only when the governing body of that city formally makes the request of the Governor. Tr. 235, Sills.

State Police / National Guard

B. Decision to call in { Why
When
How many

7 B Prior to the time that the Mayor officially requested State assistance from the Governor, State Police observers reported that the situation was practically out of control with looting and pillaging. Tr. 285, Kelley.

7 The State Police were informed as early as 8:35 p.m. on July 13 (~~12-13~~) by the acting Police Chief in Newark that he was expecting trouble. At 10:10 an inspector of the Newark Police requested State Police assistance and was informed that it could be provided only when the Mayor requested it of the Governor. A series of telephone exchanges between the State Police and the ~~National Guard~~ followed, but the Police Chief of Newark reports (sometime after midnight) that he was over ridden by Mayor Addonizio "who decided at this time to go it alone that night" Tr. 266-67 Kelley

The State Police activated the National Guard Army at the that time.

5 & 7 B The Attorney General was first advised that the trouble was brewing in Newark at 8:45 P.M. on Thursday, July 13. At 10:15 p.m. he was advised by the State Policeman in charge of division headquarters that things did not look good but Newark still said they could control the situation. Similar advice was repeated until 2:30 A.M. Friday when the Governor informed him that the Mayor of Newark had just advised him that he could no longer control the situation and that he was requesting the State Police. Tr. 234-35, Sills.

7 B In deciding whether and when to call in State Police, a local police department must consider the fact that if the city has been under tension for several days and policemen have been working 12 hour shifts for that period, they are tired and under tension, and the question is how long can they go under such strain. In addition; the city must pay them overtime, which is costly. Tr. 287, Kelley.

State Police / National Guard

C. Time lag before arrival

7 C

Governor Hughes received a phone call from the Mayor requesting State Police and National Guard at ^{about} 2:30 a.m. on Friday, July 14 (apparently)

State Police and National Guard were activated at the same time). The State Police ~~(National Guard?)~~ ^{also} apparently were in Newark by ^{about} 5:00 a.m.
Tr. 267,269 Kelley

VII. State Police / National Guards
B. Numbers

7B

According to the FBI, 350 State Police and 2,300 National Guardsmen participated in putting down the riot. FBI Ex. 2, p. 45.

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Newark was described as an area of "cooperative responsibility" in its relationship to the State Police — that is, the State's role is one of cooperative responsibility where there are organized police departments. Tr. 264, Kelley.

In contrast to full responsibility where there are no police departments.

8 A

When the National Guard and State Police were called in, Col. Kelley "theoretically" was in command. He gave orders to the commanders of the National Guard. Tr. 296-97, Kelley.

8 B

The National Guard and State Police had worked out in advance that the State Police would be in command. Tr. 298, Kelley.
In the event both were called up.

8

The State Police worked cooperatively with the National Guard in Newark. "We were married". Apparently they ~~State Police and National Guard~~ worked closely on communications, organizations and in the command post. Tr. 280 Kelley

8 C

Part of the "marriage" of the State Police and National Guard involves the use of teams, a state policeman and a national guardsman, who use the same radio and the same car and cooperate on arrests — the actual arrest being made by the State Trooper who is familiar with such procedures. Tr. 284, Sills.

8 C

The State Police gave the National Guard the role of containing the riot area. Tr. 297, Kelley. Kelley utilized mobile patrols, consisting of two State Police cars and a National Guard car under the command of a State Police sergeant. Tr. 297, Kelley.

State Police are not the same wave length with the Newark Police. "They did many things that we did not know about until much later". Tr. 281 Sills

II. State Police / National Guard arrival

A. Effect on tension

9 A

Sills believes that generally there is less resentment in New Jersey against the State Police than against local police — although he is not so sure about that attitude after Newark and Plainfield. It is difficult to evaluate the effect of the State Police on attitudes in Newark because by the time the State Police arrived "everything was past the question of what was going to cause more trouble". If the State Police had arrived earlier in the evening, it might be possible to reach a judgment as to their effect on attitudes and resentment. Tr. 288, Sills.

B. Policy

9B1

[None of the witnesses was willing to generalize on the question of what is the proper amount of force to apply.]

Colonel Kelley said that their are many complications to any particular situation. He noted that they did not have mobs as such in Newark, although they did have looting. The State Police used mobile patrols and kept people moving. Tr. 271-72. Kelley

Attorney General Sills has no guidelines to recommend on the amount of force to use; it is a matter of judgment. Tr 286, Sills

Attorney General Sills and Ylvisaker emphasized that the proper amount of force depends on the circumstances. Sills seems to say that Newark called for more force than Plainfield (where they released some of the prisoners to relieve tension). Ylvisaker suggested that there may be different amounts of force called for at different stages of a riot: A minimum show of arms at the point when tensions are beginning to rise to avoid

(provocation, and a prompt exhibit of force at the point at which the incident has occurred and a small number of people have started to break windows and create "anarchy". He also emphasized the importance of having forces like Colonel Kelley's on an immediate stand-by basis at the point where the local police may be overwhelmed. In Newark when the mob scene subsided, it was followed by the stage of sniper fire. Ylvisaker also emphasized the delicate question of over-escalating, *escalating* the need to weigh it carefully, "and remember that the return to normalcy in the community is the best security of all. Maybe if you wait too long and over-escalate, you may never get back to the return to normalcy of the people in the street." Tr. 272-76 Sills, Ylvisaker

9 B 1 In the previous summer, when there was an outbreak in Jersey City, State officials deliberately held back uniformed State Police although they did send in observers to give technical assistance to the Jersey City Police Department. They believe that had they sent in uniformed State Police on that occasion, it would have aggravated the situation. Tr. 286, Sills.

State Police / North Guard

B(3) Specific orders

9 B 3

[Col. Kelley did not state what the specific orders were to men in the field.] He commented that some of them were fired upon and returned fire. Tr. 297, Kelley.

X.

Deat' / Injuries

Lofton said that "a large number of the 26 people killed in Newark, were killed inside of the premises, and a lot of people injured were injured inside of premises." He believes that ~~these~~ deaths and injuries occurred this way because police sprayed buildings with machine gun fire, purportedly to route out snipers, but really in retaliation. } Tr 377, Lofton.

X Deaths/Injuries

10 The report of the Newark Police Department contains an itemized account of the information then known about each of the deaths occurring during the rioting. There were 23 deaths attributed to gunshot wounds directly connected with the riot; one death caused by an automobile collision involving a fire truck; 3 additional deaths had little or no relationship to the riot (a heart attack, an overdose of narcotics, and a fratricide). Ex. 24.

I Deaths/Injuries

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There were 25 deaths: 2 white persons, (a police officer & a fire captain) and 23 Negroes.

There were 1,259 injuries, including 62 law enforcement officers. FBI Ex. 2, p. 44.

XI

Property damage -

Lofton believes (based on sworn affidavits given to the Legal Services project) that some of the property damage was done by law enforcement officers in retaliation against the Negro community. The premises marked "paul brother" were left intact by rioters, but many were smashed up before it was over, allegedly by law enforcement officers. Tr 376, Lofton.

XI.

Property damage

11

The great losses in property in Newark were primarily in the area of theft and looting; there was not a great deal of damage from burning.

Liquor stores and furniture stores, among others, were prime targets of the looting.

A store marked with the sign "soul brother" may or may not have been looted; apparently the sign did not guarantee immunity.

Certain types of businesses--e.g., gasoline stations--were not touched during the rioting. TR 659-60, Ginsburg.

(Comments on Commissioners' trip to Newark)

XI Property damage



11

Insured property losses were estimated at \$15 million. Uninsured losses were estimated at \$15-\$30 million. Approximately 300 fires occurred during the period of rioting, and 60 false alarms were reported. FBI EX. 2, p. 44.

12

The persons involved in the hostilities were a "very, very small minority of the Negro population" in the central ward. TR 376, Lofton.

Lofton's testimony also ^{is} ^(there were in fact) indicates that his sources of information said that people in the area ^{that} were doing the sniping, but perhaps no more than 15 of them. TR 375, Lofton.

[Note: ~~Lofton's testimony indicates that~~ Lofton's meaning seems to be that it was ^{a small number of} people in the area who were doing the sniping, with no outsiders involved.]

12 Dr. Garrett thinks that it was the "so-called hard inner core of Negro" who actually took part in the riot. [Clearly Dr. Garrett meant to include in that group the kids, ages 13-16, to whom he talked on different occasions during the riot.] Points that Dr. Garrett made about the kids were: their explanation for rioting was that they are "just tired. We are not going to get pushed around any more." (TR 720); the kids were absolutely not afraid, life meant nothing to them, (TR 724), they had nothing to lose and might be better off dead (TR 722, 728).

"The kids were not doing the looting. The kids were tearing the screens down, the kids were breaking the windows. But the older people were bringing the little kids and doing the looting. The kids were just running up and down the streets, just bent on total destruction, and I mean to the point of just running by, over, and through." TR 728, Dr. Garrett.

12 [By implication, Dr. Garrett suggested that the young kids, with whom he was in the most contact during the riot, did not have guns. He recounted an incident in which a group of kids, some 13 years old, had expressed to him their frustration at not having guns available. TR 728-29, Garrett.]

12 It was difficult to separate the real rioters from the general community "because everyone at a certain point joined in for one reason or another." It was not until Friday morning that anyone was killed, and that is when the firing started to take place; "that is when you separated the real hard-core rioters from the rest of the community." There is no way to tell to what extent the young people were really involved. TR 729, Addinizio.

19

12
(poverty
workers)

The FBI was informed by the Director of Police of Newark that the assistant personnel manager of United Community Corporation was in the Negro crowd that gathered at the police precinct station the first night of the disorder and urged the crowd not to heed speakers who were attempting to calm the situation. (The FBI report also noted an earlier incident, in May 1967, in which UCC had hired two vehicles, one with a loud speaker, to encourage people to attend protest meetings at City Hall, protesting the proposed new medical school. FBI Ex. 2, p.46.

12 Ylvisaker

Ylvisaker does not believe, but has no evidence, that "outsiders" started any of the New Jersey riots. It is possible, but again he has no evidence, that once the disturbance began, "there was communication, and some movement of a very small group of people, but fairly well organized." TR 373, Ylvisaker

13

13

In terms of evidence to support the presence of outsiders, Ylvisaker, in suggesting that there might have been a small group of well-organized people present once the disturbance began, said that he had no evidence of it. He had never talked to one of those persons nor seen one; he had never heard of anyone who had seen one--"I guess I have a few exceptions to that." TR 373, Ylvisaker

~~He observed that~~ in these ^{"act"} circumstances some people may be mistaken for outsiders, who are actually local people, simply because their conduct is alien to the normal pattern. TR 372, Ylvisaker

~~He also observed that~~ Sniping could have been conducted by as few as 10 or 20 people in Newark, possibly some of whom came from the outside. Tr 373, Ylvisaker

Ylvisaker believes that the "next round" would involve substantially greater numbers of outsiders. TR 374, Ylvisaker

~~The testimony of~~

James Blair, (with Department of Community Affairs) is not clear. He testified that on Wednesday night (~~probably means Thursday night~~) the rioting was localized. On Thursday night, when the rumor spread that the cab driver had died, it ceased to be localized. "We had people coming from Montclair, East Orange, some people coming in from Jersey City. And I would say at the height of the riot, I would say over 2,000 people were surging around the city in various parts" [~~does he mean~~ 2,000 people from outside of Newark?] Tr. 289, Blair.

188

13 Referring to the estimated 2,000 people from outside the riot area who moved in, Sills doubted that they were attracted by looting. He attributed it to "general unrest" - the restlessness of people who see these things on television which serves as a "spark" - their "mobility", the kind of response that gathers crowds around a highway accident. TR 300-01, Sills.

13 Col. Kelley assumes that most of the people in the rioting were inhabitants of the riot area. Tr. 288, Kelly

13 As to whether or not the rioting was organized, Col. Kelly suggested that crossfire, to which the State Police were subjected, is inevitably organized. Sills agreed that there was some organization to the sniping. TR 305, Kelly, Sills.

13 Lofton, who was in the Newark riot area ^{about} continuously, saw "no evidence of the kind of movement of people from outside the Negro community in Newark -- and there is a very distinct Negro ghetto in Newark -- coming from other areas." TR 375, Lofton

13 Lofton ~~also indicated that~~ his information, which he considers good, is that "there were in fact people in the area that were doing the sniping, but a very small fragment segment of these persons," perhaps 15, were engaged in sniping. TR 375, Lofton.

21

Outsiders
Organization

13

"There is no evidence to date indicating prior organization, planning, or conspiracy in the Newark riot. However, after the riot had begun, several subversive organizations injected themselves into the situation." The Progressive Labor Party (a "Marxist-Leninist pro-Communist-Chinese organization") was represented by 10 persons who picketed the Newark Police Station on July 15, insisting on the release of all prisoners and removal of the National Guard. On July 16, 35 persons from New York City representing the Youth Against War and Fascism (a Trotskyite organization) staged a demonstration at Newark City Hall, passing out leaflets and carrying placards denouncing police action and demanding withdrawal of the National Guard. On July 15 an official of the Communist Party, USA, issued a statement at a press conference in New York blaming Newark officials for the riot and charging a genocide attack against Negroes.

Two individuals arrested during the riot were identified as affiliated with the Nation of Islam, "an all-Negro semi-religious organization which advocates a doctrine of violent hatred of the United States Government and the white race." Among those arrested was Leroi Jones, a Negro playwright and Black Nationalist who advocates violence.

Of those arrested only 20 persons gave out-of-state addresses, 14 of them in New York City. FBI Ex. 2, pp. 45-46.

XIV Non-participating residents

14 B & C Still's ^{poverty} agency met with the Governor on Friday evening or Saturday morning to call attention to the fact that all stores in the neighborhood had been sacked, and the people could not buy milk or food. They got 170 tons of food from the Governor's office and another 30 tons from other sources and distributed it to the people. There was the only agency in Newark doing anything about the problems caused by the riot. They also provided doctors and medical services. Tr. 261-62, Still.

Add Miller 379-80

XIV - Non-participation

C. Who helped

14C

Some of the churches helped/distribute food during the riots. (The Commissioners visited a Catholic church, which apparently had done a good job in this respect.) "TR 659, Ginsburg. (Comments of Commissioners' trip to Newark.)

XII

Communication with the subjects

A. With active rioters

15 A Ylvisaker doubts that the small hard core of the disconnected were talking to anyone. He knows of no one talking to the snippers or to the kids who congregated on the street corners night after night. TR 307, Ylvisaker.

15 A Neither Col. Kelley nor Lofton (who was continuously in the area during the rioting) was able to identify anyone who emerged as a leader of the riot. Tr. 290-91, Kelley, Lofton.

B. *Work other residents
(establishing communication)*

15 C During a riot a number of people come forward claiming to be the leaders to whom officials should talk. It is a very difficult judgment, especially for newcomers, to decide with whom to negotiate the return to normalcy (probably no one can *actually* turn off the riot at that stage). Tr. 291, Ylvisaker.

15 C ~~XXXXXXXX~~ Ylvisaker ~~emphasized~~ emphasized the difficulty of determining what residents of the riot area should be brought in to discussions with officials. The State Community ~~Relations~~ ^{Relations} Department worked closely with the Attorney General and the police for just that reason: it has ~~contacts~~ ^{contacts} in the community which could be used. Politics remains a factor, primarily the politics of Establishment (those officially or unofficially tied to the local government) versus anti-Establishment, who have more credibility in a large part of the community but whose participation alienates City Hall. *In 306-07, Ylvisaker*

15 C In establishing communication, the Governor's staff consciously avoided Negroes with Establishment ties because they did not represent the people that the Governor was trying to reach to put an end to the riot. TR 308-09, Spinelli.

B. With other residents
(establishing communication)

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15 C & D In attempting to establish lines of communication, the Governor's staff, being strangers in Newark turned to Mr. Lofton (Director of Legal Services in Newark), who gathered a group of about ten people who met with Gov. Hughes from about 1:00 A.M. to 4:30 A.M. Saturday. Most of the group consisted of people from the poverty organization (UCC). It included Mr. Still, Mr. Richardson, a former Democratic Assemblyman who had fallen out with the Establishment. The meeting took place in Lofton's apartment on the fringe of the riot area. At the meeting grievances were aired, and cooperation elicited from the group. No promises were made. The group agreed to attempt to enlarge itself and hold a further meeting on Saturday morning for the explicit purpose of mobilizing people to go into the riot area to quiet things down. Tr. 292-94, Van Ness.

15 C

~~Still's agency put out a flier ^{poverty} ~~urging the people to cool it and stay in their houses.~~ ^[unclear?] Ylvisaker noted that the poverty group (UCC) had served as one of the few means of communication between the city and the community. Tr. 262-63, Still, Ylvisaker.~~

15 D A second meeting with state officials took place at Noon Saturday with the group enlarged to 50 people. This group apparently organized a total of some 300 people who went into the riot area on Saturday afternoon with green armbands, attempting to pass out literature and persuade people to quiet down. Tr. 294, Van Ness.

15 E The reception accorded the 300 persons who went into the riot area with green armbands to attempt to persuade people to quiet down was generally favorable. There were a few instances of conflict with the Newark police who may not have gotten the message. Some residents could not understand the role being played by the green armbands, but generally they were received well. An important factor was that they were people from that very community. Tr. 294-96, Van Ness.

15 E An example of the effectiveness of communication with residents in the troubled area was cited involving neither Newark or Plainfield. New Brunswick was experiencing disorder when their newly elected woman Mayor went right into the area where about 150 kids were creating violence and talked to them and listened to them night after night. The real violence never broke out. TR 313, Ylvisaker.

16 . .

[Sills indirectly ^{ascribed.} describes a role to television
by suggesting that seeing the action on television
sparks people, who are restless initially, to go to
the riot area. TR 300-01, Sills]

17

In Ylvisaker's view (once the riot is controlled), it is important to create a return to normalcy as quickly as possible. The relatively quick pull-out of the National Guard and State Police in Newark contributed to the return to normalcy. Tr. 277
Ylvisaker

The State Police and National Guard? Apparently moved out of Newark in part on July 16 when they were summoned to Plainfield. On the 17th or 18th they moved out of Newark entirely.
T.R. 269, Kelly.

~~State~~

Probably Ylvisaker and
Attorney General

18 (Newark)

Some 1400 people were arrested in Newark and were deposited around at armories and schools and other places. The Newark officials called on the VERA Institute of Justice in New York, which has been running the Manhattan Bail Project, and which made available one of their men to put into effect the point system. The point system is a method for determining release based on a combination of factors such as past record, the evaluation of a minister or employer, the severity of the charge, and so forth. It was used effectively in Newark. T.V. 360, Ylvisaker

Evaluating the
risk of releasing
an arrested
man

XVIII Arrests

Number ; Charges

18A A total of 1,456 persons were arrested, including 1,383 Negroes, 23 Puerto Ricans, and 50 white persons.

18B Records of the Essex County Prosecutor's Office (as of July 26) showed that of the persons arrested 934 were charged with indictable offenses. Indictments had been returned against 717, and 69 were dismissed.

Release

18C and D Most of those arrested in Newark have been released on bail, their own recognizance, or in the custody of their attorneys or parole department. (8-1-67)
FBI Ex. 2, p. 45.

~~VIX~~

Aftermath

A Specific results

19A

The State of New Jersey has instituted a training program for members of local police departments which is to be supervised by ^{the} State Police. TR 379, Spinelli.

B. Tensions, attitudes

19B (Newark)

Lofton's view is that the ~~immediate~~ aftermath ~~(and perhaps continuing to date although Lofton's comments are not as clear on this point)~~ was a buildup of very hostile feelings toward the white community. What started as a revolt against conditions in Newark began to take on the dimensions of a true race riot in terms of black against white. This is attributable largely to the conduct of the law enforcement officers, apparently of all levels in taking what the people believed to be retaliatory action. For example, Lofton's evidence is that businesses which had been marked "soul brother" and which had been left in tact by the rioters were destroyed by law enforcement officers; a large number of the people killed in Newark were killed inside of buildings and were thought to be innocent victims--probably ^{of the} technique of spraying buildings with machine ~~in~~ gun fire. TR 376-78, Lofton.

XIX

After's 'sth

(Police Department)

19b

Nine policemen have quit the Newark department since the riot, three of whom are sergeants and one, a lieutenant. Director Spina did not indicate whether this was an unusually high figure nor whether it was attributable to the riot. TR 773, Spina.

24

AA Consider on Springfield - ...
D. Cordon

20 D Col. Kelley used the National Guards on the borders of the riot area at the street corners and critical intersections to cordon off the area. Col Kelley felt that the cordon was effective in preventing infiltration from other sections of the city and in preventing spreading of the riot into other sections of the city. Tr. 289-90, Kelley.

F. Curfew

20 F Col. Kelly endorses curfews. TR 304, Kelly.

G. Snipers

(17) & 20 G Ylvisaker suggested that we may not have developed any military tactics which are effective against sniper fire from high rise buildings. The only way to stop it may be to withdraw the target and thus remove provocation, leaving the ghetto to a kind of self-policing. Tr. 276-77 Ylvisaker

XX Specific Techniques

Curfew

20F

The FBI report notes that during curfew police prevented the flow of vehicular traffic into Newark and barred all persons except those with legitimate business from the 10-square mile riot area. [The report implied that the curfew kept down the number of outsiders who came into the area during the riot.]
FBI Ex. 2, p. 46.

JAC
22

EXHIBIT NUMBER 13

NEW JERSEY RIOT CHRONOLOGY

6 copies

Some Preliminary Signs of Discontent

- May 22 NEWARK A Newark Planning Board meeting to consider a blight declaration for the proposed State Medical School ended in inaction and disorder when Colonel Jeru-Ahmed Hassan, self-described leader of Black Man's Army of Liberation, a few of his sympathizers, and other objectors blocked the proceedings with a noisy protest.
- May 23 NEWARK A meeting of the Newark Board of Education broke up without taking action when a large group of Negroes staged a filibuster. They were protesting the appointment of James T. Callaghan, a white Councilman, as secretary of the School Board. They felt Callaghan was being appointed in preference to a better-qualified Negro candidate.
- June 12 NEWARK A blight hearing on the site of the proposed New Jersey College of Medicine and Dentistry was adjourned following a five-hour marathon session in which one speaker was arrested and another staged a four-hour and 20 minute filibuster. The hearing, scheduled after an earlier one was disrupted by disorder, was held for the purpose of having the site declared blighted and thus eligible for Federal funds. More than 250 spectators appeared to protest the proposed Medical College on the grounds that as many as 20,000 Negroes would have to be displaced from their homes.
- June 28 NEWARK A group of 450 residents, predominately Negro, again prevented the Board of Education from naming a new school board secretary when they jammed the City Hall Council Chamber in a chanting, stamping protest. The Negro community had been vigorously campaigning to give the post to Wilbur Parker, the city's budget director, and the first Negro certified Public Accountant in New Jersey. As a result of the demonstration, the Board adjourned without naming a new secretary. But there were no serious incidents or arrests.
- July 8 EAST ORANGE A brick-throwing incident erupted at Fourteenth Street and Sixth Avenue at the Newark-Orange boundary when two East Orange patrolmen attempted to quiet a group of residents sitting on the front porch. Nineteen persons, including nine policemen from Newark and East Orange were injured. Twelve persons were arrested by East Orange police on charges of resisting arrest, assault on a police officer, fighting, and using loud and abusive language. According to police, the two officers asked the estimated 10 persons seated on the porch to lower their voices. The residents began taunting the policemen and both men were struck to the ground. With this, Newark police crossed the street to assist the patrolmen as large crowds of neighborhood residents gathered. Soon after, bricks, blocks and other objects were thrown from homes in the area, police said. East Orange police said the two officers were sent to the porch after neighbors complained of loud noise. Eleven of those arrested identified themselves as Black Muslims. An emergency session of the city council was held after the arrests. Residents of the area charged police brutality. The Muslims complained they had been beaten after they were handcuffed.

THE OUTBREAK

July 12 NEWARK At about 9:40 P.M. at the corner of 15th Avenue and 9th Street, John W. Smith, a 40 year old Negro cab driver, was arrested by Newark police for tailgating and charged with assault and battery on a policeman. Smith was jailed, but false rumors spread throughout the city's predominately Negro and low-income Central Ward that he had been beaten to death by the two policemen that arrested him. A crowd of some 200 angry Negroes gathered outside the Fourth Precinct police station. Several Negro and white community leaders attempted to quiet the crowd. When a gasoline filled bottle was thrown against the police precinct building, Newark police burst out the front door and dispersed the crowd using flying-wedge techniques. Soon after, disorder sprung up and scattered looting was reported. By 3:00 a.m. quiet had been restored to the area.

July 13 NEWARK Crowds again gathered outside the station house for an announced rally. When the Director of the Newark Human Rights Commission told the demonstrators that the city would soon name the first Negro police captain, members of the crowd threw bottles and rocks at the station. After about 45 minutes Newark police again rushed out of the station armed with night sticks. They scattered the crowd, which then began breaking into stores. By midnight police in four of Newark's five Wards reported looting. At about 12:30 a.m. policemen reported they were being shot at. About 1:00 a.m. (July 14), Mayor Addonizio and Police Director Spina ordered police to return fire if necessary. At 2:20 a.m. the Mayor asked Governor Hughes by telephone to send State police and National Guard troops to Newark. The first troopers began arriving about 5:00 a.m. and set up headquarters in Newark's Roseville Avenue Armory. Under the direction of Colonel David B. Kelly, the superintendent of State Police, the troopers and National Guard took over the riot control operation. One man was killed and 350 injured.

July 14 NEWARK By afternoon, guardsmen were ordered to form a perimeter around the riot area which included about one-third of the city (the area between Central and Clinton Avenues and Washington Street north to near the Town of Irvington). At about 5:00 p.m. vehicular traffic was halted within the area. Governor Hughes imposed a curfew on the entire city. At first scheduled to begin at midnight, it was later advanced to 10:00 p.m. All liquor stores and bars were ordered closed. But shooting was wide spread throughout the city that night and by early the next morning (July 15) police reported 16 dead, 15 Negroes and one white policeman.

July 14 PLAINFIELD An estimated 175 Negro youths marched for more than two hours Friday evening in the West End Negro ghetto. They tossed rocks at police cars and broke several windows. The march apparently started at a hamburger stand in the ghetto. They marched to the business district where they were turned back by police. No arrests were made.

July 14 RAHWAY A garbage can was thrown through a store window. Extra firemen were summoned for duty and police alerted for trouble but nothing else developed. Taverns were shut down early in Rahway and four other neighboring municipalities.

July 15 NEWARK The battle between snipers and the police and National Guardsmen continued Saturday night. By Sunday, police counted 23 dead, more than 1,100 injured and 1,200 arrested.

July 15 PLAINFIELD More than 100 young Negroes attended a meeting in a new teen center with Mayor George Hetfield, two Negro councilmen and the Plainfield recreation commissioner to discuss grievances. The grievances included complaints of police brutality, inaccessibility of the Mayor and of other city officials to Negro youths, broken promises on swimming pools, and opposition to the public schools' "tracking" system. About a quarter of the youths walked out after 90 minutes; loud explosions, sounding like firecrackers, were heard minutes after the walkout. Later in the evening, violence erupted again as bands of youths roamed the West End, firebombing and looting. 38 persons were arrested, mostly Negroes in late teens and early twenties, but including 10 white motorcyclists, 3 of whom had baseball bats. Eight fires and five false alarms occurred in the 14 block riot area.

July 15 ELIZABETH Police reported a Molotov cocktail scorched a gymnasium wall in a local high school this afternoon.

July 15 EAST ORANGE Police dispersed a crowd of 100 white youths for throwing stones and bricks at passing cars occupied by Negroes and whites on South Orange Avenue. Police discovered five fire bombs, and were called to disperse several crowds. Display windows were smashed in the business district.

July 15 MONICLAIR Police dispersed gangs of Negro youths who smashed windows and stoned cars along Bloomfield Avenue. Police reported some looting from the stores. Damage was reported light, losses were small and arrests were few.

July 15 JERSEY CITY Police reported a Molotov cocktail was tossed into a taxi as isolated acts of violence spread throughout the city. Roving gangs of Negroes shattered store windows in the Greenville and Lafayette sections.

July 16 NEWARK Sniping continued as the police count of dead rose to 25 Sunday night.

July 16 PLAINFIELD An estimated 300 Negro youths gathered Sunday afternoon in a park for a meeting, allegedly to air grievances and seek a way to "cool it." But county park police ordered them out. Looting and marauding resumed in the evening. A white policeman, John Gleason, was fatally beaten when he tried to fend off a clash between groups of white and Negro youths. The white youths fled and Gleason was surrounded by the Negroes. He drew his weapon, there was a scuffle, the gun discharged and hit a Negro youth. The youths attacked Gleason, shooting him with his own weapon (according to some published reports), beat him to death. During the night, more than 100 persons were arrested. Twelve were wounded. Thieves

broke into a gun factory in nearby Middlesex and took 46 carbines and 500 rounds of ammunition. Governor Hughes sent in State troopers and National Guardsmen to bolster Plainfield police. The Mayor declared a curfew and closed taverns and liquor stores.

July 16 EAST ORANGE Police arrested three white men who allegedly fired a shot from their car at a Negro youth. They were charged with assault with a deadly weapon, carrying concealed weapons and discharging firearms within the city limits. Also, four Negro youths were arrested for allegedly throwing two bricks through a local liquor store. Earlier in the evening police dispersed bands of white and Negro youths near Newark's Vailsburg section which borders East Orange.

July 17 NEWARK At a noon press conference Governor Hughes announced reports that the rioting and looting had apparently ended. About three hours later the Governor lifted the emergency restrictions and curfews and State police and National Guardsmen were moved out.

July 17 PLAINFIELD The city remained tensely quiet as state and city officials negotiated a "truce" with spokesmen for Negroes: law officers would withdraw from within the West End to the perimeter, and 12 arrested persons would be released without bail, in exchange for voluntary surrender of guns by rioters. A planned house-to-house search for stolen carbines was temporarily called off.

July 17 NEW BRUNSWICK A mob of 250 Negro youths roamed the streets at about 9:00 p.m. breaking windows and looting several stores. Police charged the mob and made several arrests. Shortly later, two hundred Negroes marched on the police station in protest. They were met by Mayor Patricia Sheehan who appealed to the demonstrators to return to their homes. The crowd dispersed.

July 17 RARITAN A Molotov cocktail was reported to have caused a small fire. Police also reported other scattered incidents.

July 17 JERSEY CITY Police concentrated on breaking up gathering crowds, as reports of tense situations filed in. Freddie Lee Jones who was seriously burned by a Molotov cocktail late Saturday night died at the Medical Center. Jersey City police reported 40 arrests on charges ranging from looting to possession of Molotov cocktails. Jersey City Mayor Thomas J. Whelan continued to maintain beefed-up police patrols in all parts of the city.

July 17 PATERSON Police reported rock and bottle throwing incidents and firemen chased false alarms.

July 17 ELIZABETH Trouble broke out in the predominantly Negro Elizabethport section when gangs of youths tossed bottles and Molotov cocktails. Sporadic incidents of looting and vandalism were reported but no arrests were made.

July 18 PLAINFIELD A cleanup campaign started in the riot area and plans were made for emergency food distribution. The City was quiet. No police, State troopers or guardsmen entered the West End section.

July 18 NEW BRUNSWICK For the second time in two days, Mayor Shoehan met a crowd of 150 which had gathered outside police headquarters demanding jobs, recreational facilities, and higher wages. Heeding the crowd's pleas, the Mayor ordered an inspection of the police cells to demonstrate that none of those arrested were being held there. She also ordered the police pulled back. When no prisoners were found in the cells, the crowd went home. Only three arrests were made.

July 18 ELIZABETH Quiet returned to the city's Elizabethport section as a special Peace-Keeper Corp entered the area. The Peace-Keepers consisted of Negro residents who patrolled the area wearing Peace-Keeper arm bands and breast sashes and urging people to "cool it." There were a few sporadic incidents but police reported no violence, injuries or shooting.

July 18 PATERSON Police reported a small fire was started at dawn today by a Molotov cocktail. Some rock throwing was also reported, but there was no curfew and no call for police help.

July 19 PLAINFIELD Governor Hughes declared a state of emergency. The Governor apparently learned that the community would not return the stolen guns, however, and reactivated the two-day-old proclamation of emergency, and authorized a house-to-house search in the troubled area. Three guns were recovered in the two-hour search, two of which were found by a woman in her back yard. Some houses were reported entered while occupants were not at home; some troops reportedly broke into locked trunks and upset furniture. When the search ended, tensions appeared to be rising again.

July 20 BRIDGETON Police arrested a Negro at the Fair grounds at 11:45 p.m. Shortly after the arrest, police said four gangs of 30 Negroes each began stomping through the streets. Police were called in to restore order. Windows were reported broken in several businesses but police reported no looting. Later, two other Negroes were arrested on disorderly conduct charges.

July 21 ENGLEWOOD Violence broke out when a gang of Negro youths threw rocks shattering plate glass windows in a local food market. The incident took place in the city's largely Negro fourth Ward, causing four days of sporadic sniping, arson and bottle throwing. Mayor Austin N. Volk declared a state of emergency. More than 200 arrests were made by Englewood police and about 250 reinforcements from neighboring Bergen County towns.

July 24 BRIDGETON Three fire bombs were thrown at stores, doing negligible damage and one fire, which police believed was started intentionally, caused \$1,000 damage to a grocery store.

July 25 SOMERVILLE In the early morning hours stones and bottles were thrown at passing cars by Negro youths and garbage cans were overturned. A juvenile and a 21-year-old man were arrested.

July 30 ENGLEWOOD Mayor Volk lifted the state of emergency that he first imposed nine days before. There had been four consecutive nights of comparative quiet.

CITY	Population	Total # of families \$3000 or less	% of males 14 and over unemployed	# of families on NYC Jan 1967	Criminal arrests as % of persons 18 & over	Substandard Housing by %	1965 Per Room Rental Costs New Housing	% of persons 25 and over with 8 yrs or less education	Infant deaths per 1,000 1965	% population change 1960-66	% of children on A.D.C. - 12/66
NEWARK	xx 471,650 (42,000)	xx (4,500) xx 14,204	xx (10%) xx 7%	5,585	xx (15%) xx 5.8	xx (41) xx 25	32.20- 115	xx (47) xx (37)	39.4	- 1.9	30.3
PLAINFIELD	xx 49,150	xx 1285	xx 3.7	158		xx 13.7	37.80- 76.67	xx 18	23.5	+ 8.4	7.9
NEW BRUNSWICK	xx 43,720	xx 1137	xx 5.6%	218		xx 18.0	28.70	xx 28	23.9	+ 8.9	15.9
ENGLEWOOD	xx 27,000	xx 70	xx 5.5%	57		xx 8.4	32.60	xx 15.4	34.3	+ 3.6	5.2
PASSAIC	xx 57,270	xx 2274	xx 7.2	262		xx 17.6	35.-110	xx 17	22.0	+ 6.1	11.5
EAST ORANGE	xx 77,860 (7655)	xx 2314	xx (6.6) xx 3.5	405	xx 1.6	xx (133) 11	39.20- 83.33	xx (23.9) xx 15	39.8	+ 0.8	15.0
JERSEY CITY	xx 270,440	xx 10,653	xx 4.46%	1,334		xx 15.7	36.67- 86.67	xx 47.7	24.6	- 2.1	15.2
PATERSON	xx 141,110	xx 7,091	xx 5.2%	1,092		xx 20.8	28.67- 53.50	xx 16	33.7	+ 3.1	16.4
TRENTON	xx 110,610 (54,357)	xx (2,456) xx 4,611	xx (9.1) xx 16.42	818	xx (9.7) xx 4.2	xx (24.3) xx 16.1	30.- 105	xx (33.6) 32.9	31.1	- 3.1	19.2
CAMDEN	xx 116,050 (14,988)	xx (1,322) xx 5,431	xx 12.3 xx 6.1	1,223		xx 50+	30.00	xx (54.7) 34.2	31.6	- 0.9	26.7
STATE AVERAGE	6,959,650	431,072	11.47%	31,162		11.6	37.72	xx 1,000,000 xx 2.5%	23.3	+ 14.7	95301

* = 1960 Census
 ** = Current Estimate
 () = Model City Area

Title I (Elementary and Secondary Education Act)

School Year 1965-66

<u>City</u>	<u>Families Receiving ADC</u>	<u>Total No. of Children</u>	<u>Allotments of 150,000 or More</u>
Newark	8,454	17,441	5,019,345
Jersey City	1,952	5,485	1,578,528
Camden	2,129	4,260	1,225,985
Paterson	1,417	3,826	1,101,085
Trenton	1,439	3,216	925,533
Atlantic City	901	2,454	706,237
Elizabeth	723	1,873	539,031
Bayonne	197	896	255,133
Passaic	347	823	236,851
East Orange	117	818	235,412
Plainfield	271	813	233,973
Perth Amboy	183	734	211,238
Union City	87	732	210,552
Vineland	99	762	202,029
New Brunswick	287	691	198,863
Bridgeton	95	642	184,761
Orange	156	613	176,415
Long Branch	199	583	167,762
Asbury Park	185	537	154,543

	A.	B.	C.	D.
	*Approx. Total Population Under 18	% of A. On ADC	Actual Number of Children Receiving ADC - (Nov. 66)	Actual Number Receiving Disability Old Age Assistance And ADC
STATE	2,103,166	5.5	92,995	246,254
Essex	280,900	12.1	34,068	52,047
Atlantic	52,800	8.8	4,669	7,704
Camden	136,800	5.9	8,146	12,082
Mercer	83,000	5.9	4,944	7,387
Hudson	181,500	5.3	9,714	15,227
Passaic	130,100	5.1	6,650	10,244
Ocean	36,400	4.5	1,648	2,627
Monmouth	117,010	4.3	5,126	8,290
Cumberland	36,700	4.0	1,491	2,449
Salem	21,200	3.2	683	1,214
Gloucester	50,100	2.7	1,389	2,272
Sussex	17,500	2.6	456	888
Union	167,000	2.3	3,915	6,104
Somerset	50,700	1.9	1,008	3,656
Middlesex	160,900	1.8	3,040	4,947
Hunterdon	18,450	1.8	359	679
Warren	20,900	1.5	313	660
Morris	93,100	1.0	1,017	1,781
Bergen	265,000	.8	2,233	4,300
Cape May	143,100	.3	499	936
Burlington	77,100	.2	1,627	2,760

*Population of those under 18 is approximately 1/3 of each county's total population: Cape May lowest (29.4%) and Gloucester highest (37.2%). State-wide under 18 population averages 14.1% of total population.

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Families Earning \$3,000 and under
In 21 New Jersey Counties
1960 Census

Economic Characteristics

<u>Counties</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Number of Families</u>	<u>Families Under \$3,000</u>	<u>Percentage Under \$3,000</u>
Cape May	48,555	12,696	3,296	26.0
Atlantic	160,800	41,825	9,635	23.0
Ocean	108,241	29,088	5,918	20.4
Cumberland	106,850	27,179	5,268	19.4
Salem	58,711	14,687	2,398	16.3
Warren	63,220	16,778	2,727	16.2
Sussex	49,255	12,774	1,968	15.5
Monmouth	334,401	83,901	12,028	14.3
Hunterdon	54,107	14,117	2,024	14.3
Gloucester	134,840	34,536	4,634	13.4
Essex	923,545	242,735	31,203	12.9
Hudson	610,734	164,812	20,964	12.7
Passaic	406,618	109,824	13,495	12.3
Mercer	266,392	66,447	7,645	11.5
Camden	392,035	100,849	11,332	11.3
Burlington	224,499	50,684	5,687	11.2
Middlesex	443,856	110,156	8,847	8.0
Somerset	143,913	36,623	2,880	7.9
Union	504,255	135,129	10,480	7.7
Morris	261,620	65,817	4,561	7.0
Bergen	780,255	210,529	13,454	6.4

6076782

180,444

Families Earning \$3,000 and under
14 New Jersey Cities
50,000 Population & Over
1960 Census

<u>Cities</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Number of Families</u>	<u>Families Under \$3,000</u>	<u>Percentage Under \$3,000</u>
Atlantic City	50,541	14,755	4,945	33.8
Newark	405,220	103,780	19,662	19.0
Camden	117,155	29,363	5,431	18.4
Paterson	145,403	38,657	7,091	18.3
Trenton	114,167	27,465	4,617	16.8

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- Families Earning \$3,000 and under
14 New Jersey Cities
50,000 Population & Over
1960 Census - continued

<u>Cities</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Number of Families</u>	<u>Families Under \$3,000</u>	<u>Percentage Under \$3,000</u>
Passaic City	53,963	14,796	2,274	15.4
Jersey City	276,101	73,381	10,053	13.7
Elizabeth	107,698	28,792	3,604	12.3
East Orange	77,259	20,451	2,314	11.4
Bayonne City	74,215	20,032	2,203	11.0
Irvington Town	59,379	17,640	1,912	10.8
Clifton City	82,084	23,102	1,686	7.3
Bloomfield	51,867	14,603	948	6.5
Union City	52,180	14,774	829	5.6

Newark celed a hub for 'black revolutionaries'

#20

Recommended

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Louis E. Lomax, recognized as one of the nation's most perceptive Negro journalists, came to Newark to look into the city's black power structure.

The author of 'The Reluctant African' and 'The Negro Revolt,' Lomax enjoys the confidence of both Negro militants and moderates. A resident of California, he is intimate with the problems of Watts; and before coming to Newark, he investigated the riot-torn situation in Detroit.

Today's article is the first in a series based on his interviews with more than 100 persons in Newark's Negro community.



Photo by David Becker

Willie Wright, center, talks to Louis Lomax, left, and Charles Mayberry, chairman of UCC Area Board 7

By LOUIS E. LOMAX

Newark has become the hub of black power and revolutionary activity in America, particularly along the East Coast and the Mid-West.

- * ● Black power revolutionaries from Detroit were in Newark when that city erupted in July. They departed for their hometown to aid in carrying out an even greater holocaust.
- * ● Revolutionaries from Newark were in Peekskill, N.Y., and New Haven, Conn., as "observers" when those cities broke with riots. The same is true for Syracuse, N.Y.
- * ● Not only were Newark's black revolutionaries in Plainfield when that city erupted but there was a direct connection between the arms stolen in Plainfield and the cache of machine guns and carbines now resting in a Newark slum basement.
- Black power militant H. Rap Brown made a clandestine visit to Newark shortly before he was arrested on a federal gun charge in New York. Much soberer, more determined and less flamboyant black revolutionaries in Newark lectured Brown for carrying the carbine that led to his all-but-ludicrous arrest three nights later.
- Newark's black revolutionaries are the most sought-after "consultants"

in the nation. Just last week a caravan of 25 black revolutionaries from Washington, D.C., motored to Newark's black power headquarters along South Sixth Street for "advice and assistance."

* Needless to report, Newark's black revolutionaries played a significant role in the burning, looting and shooting that scarred their own town. They are, of course, actively planning another rebellion.

The central figure recently emerged in the black revolutionary activity. He is Willie Wright. There is some air of mystery about Wright; and there are those who believe he is a front man for others behind the scenes. But whatever the case, he is the visible and articulate figure.

A 36-year-old college drop-out, Wright has carried a vendetta against the white man that traces back to the time the city fathers of Albany, Ga., took 18 city blacks of choice land from his grandfather 20 years before Willie was born.

Wright is employed as an engineer with the Pennsylvania Railroad but has not reported for work in weeks. His employers have not called him; he has not called them. He does not know if he still has a job; he does not care. Willie Wright is now a full-time revolutionary.

Wright and his followers are totally open about their plans and it is equally clear that other cities may expect the

(Please turn to Page 17)

(Continued from Page One)

same kind of black revolutionary activity.

This is the pattern: Newark, like many American cities, is arming itself with anti-riot equipment, including armored vehicles; the Negro revolutionaries are arming themselves with machine guns, carbines, hand grenades and small cannon. It is almost certain that another uprising would bring about a type of white-black confrontation that has been absent from the scores of ghetto explosions in the past three years.

EXCEPTIONAL UNITY

Moreover — and in this, Newark is somewhat of an exception — the Newark black community, regardless of class, exhibits a unity of thought and support unparalleled in recent Negro history.

One does not have to dig very deep into Newark's black skins to verify



Mrs. Bertha Shippley: "No, it's not over"

these facts. The citizens of the ghetto literally explode with anger, despair and information. So poised and reserved a man as James A. Pawley, the 62-year-old executive director of the Essex Urban League, uttered the same words that are being shouted by the wild-eyed revolutionaries:

"I must say," he told me, "that the recent riot was the best thing that ever happened to Newark. Now maybe some of the things that should have been done years ago will get done. I don't condone riots, but I must say, regardless of the cost, it is good for Newark that the riot happened."

"Hell no!" he fired back when I asked if he felt that the riot was over. "No, it is not over. Nothing has changed for the better. Matter of fact, things are worse. The change is yet to begin."

"Of course it is not over," Sally Carroll, president of Newark NAACP and a court-room aide to the county sheriff, said. "One stupid move and here we go again."

"No, brother, no, it is not over yet," said the Reverend Levin West, a 29-year-old Reformed Church minister in the ghetto. "It is a long way from being over."

"Over like hell!" snapped Mrs. Bertha Shippley, a member of Area Board 2 of the poverty program and a



Photos by David Bookler

Arthur Bey fills out report after tour behind radio cars with Community Black Patrol

district leader in the Central Ward. "No, it's not over."

MILITARY CONFRONTATION

The loudest, clearest voice of them all is that of Willie Wright, the president of the United Afro-American Association (UAAA). Wright proudly admits that he is an out-and-out revolutionary, that he has no faith in the justice of the "white man's system." He sees no way out for the ghetto masses other than a direct military confrontation with "whites."

"Look," Wright said calmly, "some 30 or more of our black brothers and sisters are dead. They must get avenged."

"Some 1,500 of our black brothers and sisters are in jail or under indictment. They must be given amnesty."

Two hours after Willie Wright made these comments to me he addressed some 200 people attending a meeting of the trustees board of the United Community Corporation (UCC).

"Yes, I called for black men in Newark to arm themselves," Wright told his fellow trustees. "Now I want to add to that; I say we should arm ourselves with cannons, machine guns, bazookas, anything we can get our hands on. And if you don't know how to get some heavy weapons, call my office and I will tell you where to go and how to get them!"

Not only did the people cheer — save for the few white members of the board, that is — but they voted unanimously to keep Wright on the board despite the fact that the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) had issued a veiled hint that all poverty funds to Newark would be cut off if Wright was not removed.

"Honey," a woman board member

whispered to me, "I ain't always been with Willie but I sure God am with him now."

This unprecedented black unity was forged in the final hours of the July uprising. Unlike their Detroit brothers, the Newark looters and arsonists systematically spared every Negro-owned business. Then the state police came in the night and fired bullets through the windows of Negro stores and shops in the area.

"I respect law and order," a Negro barber said to me as we toured his bullet-ridden shop, "but now that the police have turned out to be just as lawless as the looters — if not more so — I have to join the black power people. They are the only protection I have. These policemen shot up my place for no reason at all."

"Yes, I saw them do it," he replied in answer to a question. "I live right upstairs over the shop. I peeped out of the window when I heard the shots. They started firing from across the street. Then they got out of the car, came over here, busted my window with the butts of their guns; then they broke in the door and entered. Yes, I saw them do it. I got their license number."

"Look, brother," he continued, "I'm a veteran; I'm active in the American Legion. That picture over there on the wall shows you that I am a color bearer. I haven't fired a gun since I left the Army. But I'm ready now. The next time I'm going to leave some dead white cops in the street."

BOY SHOT

And a little 11-year-old black boy came roaring down Sixth Street on his bike. "Mr. Wright," he yelled to Willie, "Mamma wants to see you."

"This boy was shot during the rebellion," Willie said to me. "Show Mr. Lomax your arm." The lad took off his shirt. The bullet had gone through his left arm near the elbow and lodged in the skin of his chest.

"You can feel the bullet if you want to, mister," the boy said to me. "It's still in there. They told me at the hospital to come back after school starts and they will take it out."

I felt the bullet sealed in the child's skin.

"Mr. Wright," the boy insisted, "Mama wants to see you; she wants you to come tell her what to do about this here bullet in me."

It was long after twilight in Newark. "Go home and get some sleep, son," Willie Wright said. "Tell your mother I'll be there. I'll tell her what to do about the bullet, what to do about every damn thing else that is wrong in this filthy, rotten town."

NO SLEEP

The boy went home to his mother and to sleep. But Willie Wright did not sleep that night. Instead, his office was a hive of revolutionary activity:

- A Negro girl from Cleveland walked in saying she had just arrived by bus. She was once a worker for CORE, but things are now dead in Cleveland and she wanted to come to Newark, "where the action is." Willie Wright put her to work, typing anti-white leaflets.

- A 19-year-old high school dropout, a youth now studying to be a butcher but with the soul of a poet, rushed in to read his latest ode to the revolution.

- An unwed mother of four gathered the revolutionaries around her to read an essay she had written called "How to Apply the Teachings of Malcolm X to the Immediate Destruction of the White Man."

Then a squad of youths, all between 14 and 19 began to leave Wright's office and fan out through the ghetto; they wore black helmets marked "CBP," Community Black Patrol. Their assignment was to follow the police, to report every half hour and record evidence when the police abused black citizens.

It was about then that the totally unorganized gathering of revolutionaries settled down to a two-hour discussion of Malcolm X's thoughts, how to implement the words and dreams of their patron saint.

'IT'S THE SYSTEM'

A woman walked in and said she and her three children were hungry. Willie Wright saw to it that she was fed. But before she sat down to eat Wright asked her, "Do you know why you are hungry?"

The woman didn't know, except to say that she didn't have a job, that she had not yet been certified for welfare.

"It's the system," Wright taught her: "The white man's system. He put it together this way to make sure black people go hungry."

Then Willie Wright turned to me. "This is why we can't let these white people rebuild their stores. They cheat and gouge; they keep our people in debt and hungry."

It was well after 2 o'clock in the morning. The Black Community Patrol



Photo by Sid Freshwick

The Rev. Levin B. West goes over a program with younger members of his congregation

came in and reported that the white man was not abusing black men that night. The small fan in the office failed to stave off the heat and the total intense involvement of the revolutionaries polluted the air with a moral smog that was unbearable. Shortly after 2:30 a wild discussion erupted over the relative merits of Mao Tse-tung, Malcolm X and Jomo Kenyatta.

The small room that is Willie Wright's office — was — packed — with anguished revolutionaries waiting for the day of bloodletting.

The mind and spirit quiver during

such a moment. The only salvation is flight.

And as my cab made its way down Springfield Avenue toward my hotel we passed a store that had been entered

TOMORROW: The interlocking directorate

and destroyed during the riot. The place was now boarded up. But on the clapboards there was a sign:

"We are moving to another location. Thank you for fifty years of prosperity."

Key 'revolutionaries' in poverty program

This is the second in a series of articles by noted Negro journalist Louis E. Lomax on 'black revolutionaries' in Newark.

By LOUIS E. LOMAX

There has been heated debate across the nation over the relationship between the poverty program and the ghetto uprisings. Newark offers a classic study of this issue.

The United Community Corporation (UCC) plans and directs the funding of all poverty programs in Newark. The final decisions for UCC are made by a 93-member board of trustees, three fourths of whom are Negroes. Following the federal guideline that poverty programs must have "maximum participation of the poor," the Newark board is inevitably made up of people who feel they have been deeply wronged by society. They are openly suspicious of what they call "the system" and "the establishment." They are not all black power advocates and revolutionaries. But they lend an affirmative ear to what the revolutionaries are saying. Few of them are apt to publicly denounce what the revolutionaries are doing. Further, the key revolutionaries in Newark are themselves members of the UCC board of trustees.

IGNORED OEO

Willie Wright, the black power potentate, not only is a member of the board, but has served as its first vice president.

A Negro businesswoman who offered Wright an alibi if he needed one is a member of the board.

Charles Mayberry, a semi-retired packing-house worker who said the riot was the same kind of understandable activity the labor movement employed years ago, is a member of the board.

The Reverend Levin West, who has yet to condemn the riot, is also a member of the board.

Timothy Still, one of the Negro leaders who attempted to disperse the crowd before the riot, is president.

And Oliver Lofton, the lawyer now handling the case of cabbie John Smith and scores of others arrested during the uprising, is not only a member of the board, but the director of the UCC Neighborhood Legal Services.

The relationship between the UCC and the revolutionary movement takes several forms and is visible on as many levels.



Photo by Sid Prestwick
Timothy Still, UCC president, chats with John Aponte at the Hayes Homes

First there is the level of policy making. Seldom has Willie Wright failed to carry the vote on an important policy issue. During the third week in August, more than a month after the uprising, the UCC board met in a white heat and did the following:

- They unanimously voted to ignore the Office of Economic Opportunity's suggestion that Wright be suspended from the board because of his inflammatory statements. More, they cheered when Wright restated his call for Negroes to take up arms and then went on to say that black men should arm themselves with heavy weapons — machine guns, cannons, carbines, bazoo-

(Please turn to Page 6)

The Newark situation seems to be this: Many people have been able to get jobs working directly with the poverty program central office by first contacting certain black power advocates. The relationship seems to be that of a ward heeler who can obtain city jobs for people in return for their political loyalty.

This also applies to people who work on state and federal projects in the ghetto itself. After all, Mrs. Bertha Shippley, who said the riot should have happened a long time ago, is not only a

district leader in the Central Ward but she works as a first-aid attendant at the Hayes Park West swimming pool, a county, state, and federally funded project. There are also facts like these:

Olen Bradley, 33, and Tommey Rudolph, 22, are director and assistant director respectively of a play street project funded by the poverty program. This program was run jointly with the Newark Police Athletic League until the PAL dropped its sponsorship last week. Bradley was arrested during the uprising and charged with looting and receiving stolen goods. Rudolph was also arrested during the rebellion and charged with assault and battery, resisting arrest and disturbing the peace. Both men deny the charge. Bradley insists he was simply standing on the streets watching the looting when the police came along, arrested him, and then insisted that he pick up looted goods lying on the ground and confess that he did the looting. Rudolph, a six-foot-four, 200-pound fullback who is now in the process of transferring from

TOMORROW: 'Bigger and Better' riots

Virginia State College to Michigan State on a football scholarship, declares that he was outside the riot area attempting to cash his paycheck when the police arrested him for no reason whatsoever.

Charles McCray, an employee of the UCC central staff, was arrested along with Lerol Jones, the black power playwright, and charged with illegal possession of firearms. Every evidence is that residents of a Negro block called police and reported that two men were riding through their street firing pistol shots from the window of a Volkswagen. The police set up a roadblock that netted McCray and Jones in a Volkswagen.

There are those who charge that facilities of the UCC are being used to mimeograph material for the black power group and that UCC workers are using government telephones to urge citizens to sign a petition calling for general amnesty for those arrested during the riot. These charges will be all but impossible to disprove. For there must be some explanation for the memorandum issued by Donald Wendell, the acting director of the UCC, saying that UCC workers are forbidden to use work time and poverty program facilities for such activity.

BACKLASH AGAINST UCC

It is also true that the UCC is weathering a tremendous backlash from the riot. Mrs. Rene Stark, who is charged with obtaining on-the-job training for unemployed people who come into the UCC office, told me that white businessmen all but spit epithets at her when she asks them to hire and train Negro workers. "Why should I hire them so they can burn down my place from the inside, rather than have to break it?" is the general reaction Mrs. Stark

Nor is this all. Donald Wendell, to put it mildly, is boiling mad because of the treatment he received at the hands of the poverty program area directors in New York and the top poverty officials in Washington during the Willie Wright controversy.

The blunt summary is that it is all but impossible to assemble a governing body of the Negro poor without embracing those who are so disillusioned that they no longer have faith in the American way of life. There is not a formal organization tie between the poverty program in Newark and the black power advocates. They are interlocking relationships. There is in Newark, and in every other major American city as well, a kinship of irrational anguish between black power advocates and those who work for the poverty program. They will do whatever they can, with whatever public or private facilities at their command, to aid what they deem to be a black-oriented cause. It is the kind of silent and powerful unity exhibited when Negroes call each other "brother." It is the kind of ghetto dynamics Dr. Nathan Wright describes when he says, "America has driven Negroes crazy. Now they want to indict us for sedition when we do crazy things."

kas, and hard grenades. And when Wright said any black man who didn't know where to find these arms could call his office and he would give them immediate aid in their search, nobody blinked. After all, anybody who knows anything about the black community of Newark also knows that such heavy arms are cached in the ghetto and ready for distribution.

• Then, even to my astonishment, the board voted Wright's resolution that the board go on record as calling for city and state officials to give general amnesty to "all of our black brothers and sisters arrested during the rebellion."

This last motion was carried by a five-vote margin, 22 to 17, but the debate on the motion as well as an analysis of the final votes reveal volumes.

Attorney Oliver Lofton made an impassioned "law and order" speech against the motion. He will be forgiven by the revolutionaries because they realize he must act out a law-and-order role in the courts.

Walter Dawkins, the fiery director of a federally funded "uplift" program called "Blazer," also opposed the motion on the ground that its passage would mean all poverty money for Newark would be cut off. Dawkins raised his first funds with the aid of Willie Wright long before the poverty program went into effect. He will not be forgiven.

The Reverend Levin West, the clergyman who sat on his porch and saw looters returning home, laden with ill-gotten gain, spoke and voted against the motion. He will be forgiven. After all, his church owns the building that houses Willie Wright's rent-free office.

Kenneth Gibson, a Negro and former candidate for mayor of Newark, voted against the motion for general amnesty. He will not be forgiven.

WHITES FRIGHTENED

Thomas Edwards, the Negro business agent for the all-black Asphalt Workers Union Local 699, also voted against the motion. He will not be forgiven.

Equally revealing was the impassioned and nervous speech against the amnesty motion delivered by Edward A. Kirk, an "admitted" white Anglo-Saxon Protestant. "I know you, Willie Wright," he said, his face flushing. "I like you; but the truth is white people are frightened by you. They are afraid you are out to burn this town down. I cannot support this motion for amnesty."

But when the role was called, Edward Kirk, like most of the white board members and some of the Negroes, abstained. Thus it was that a city-wide poverty board that dispensed upwards of \$2 million in tax money went on record asking a general amnesty for all of those arrested during the Newark uprising, some of who are indisputably guilty. And they all sat silent as Willie Wright attacked Lyndon Johnson and Sargent Shriver as "carpet baggers."

Another level of involvement between the poverty program and the black power advocates relates to employment — who will get jobs with the local program, and which programs will get funded. The local leader of the poverty program in Nashville, Tenn., appeared before a recent Senate hearing and swore that a black nationalist school operating in his town was not funded by poverty program money. He returned home only to discover that he did not know what was going on, that the school in question was, in part at least, receiving federal money.

Negro leaders threatened: The

(Continued from Page One)

one must set down the facts of pre-riot Newark, the truth about the riot itself, and then examine what has occurred in its wake.

ETHNIC GROUPS

As to pre-riot Newark one only has to list all the grievances of ghettos across the nation—housing, joblessness, political powerlessness, police brutality. Unlike the other ghetto risings that have enflamed the nation, the Newark equation involves a direct confrontation between two distinct ethnic groups within the American society, the Negroes and the Italians.

"I recognized the Italian cop who arrested me," Negro playwright Leroi Jones said to me. "I told him I knew him from high school; he called me a 'black nigger animal' and busted me on the side of my head. I know the wop S.O.B., we were classmates. But this ain't nothing new, man," he went on. "We been in a-kicking fight with these wop cats for years. These wop mothers took this town from the Irish; now, baby, we going to take it from them!"

EVERYONE KNEW


Everybody knew Newark was going to explode. Only a few of the trusted revolutionaries knew when, where, and how. Certain hard facts can be reported without violating confidences of those who wish their revolution to be reported provided names and activities which could lead to criminal arrests are omitted:



Photo by John Gibson
Councilman Calvin West (right) tours Newark with NAACP president Roy Wilkins

* At least two months before the riot erupted, revolutionaries from outside Newark came to town and shared certain pre-revolutionary chores with the Newark group. One Negro political leader spotted the strangers during several public meetings that were called to debate the controversial urban renewal program. Alarmed by the presence and

activities of the strangers, the Negro official prepared a detailed statement, names and dates, which he gave to Police Director Dominick A. Spina. He, in turn, fired off a six-page telegram to all major state and local officials in which he detailed his fears that Newark was about to erupt.



Associated Press Wirephoto
PLANNING PROTEST—H. Rap Brown, chairman of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, sprawls in chair at conference announcing a work-stopping "peace-in" to be held Oct. 21-22 at the Pentagon in Washington to protest the Vietnam war. At right is Rt. Rev. Charles Owen Rice of Pittsburgh, also part of the National Mobilization Committee to End the War, self-described as a coalition of "blacks, women, students, workers, hippies, draft resisters, clergy and political organizations."

voices of dissent remain muffled

Spina was more correct than even he knew. The riot was scheduled to occur—and this will go recorded as one of the ironies of modern American history—on the very night it did take place, but at a different location and at a different time. The plan, to put it bluntly, was to spread destruction along Broad Street. The thinking was that the police would be so concentrated downtown—that the looters, and this is one of the key elements in the revolutionary scheme, would be able to carry out an unhampered rape of stores along the Negro sections of Springfield Avenue.

The plan was actually in motion, revolutionaries were already on Broad Street initiating the first phase of the scheme when Negro cab driver John William Smith got himself involved in a fracas with the police at a point some three miles from Broad Street. Smith was carried into the police station under conditions that caused alarmed Negro onlookers to spread the word that he had been killed by the police. Other Negro cabbies got the word and used their radios to call upon all Negro cab drivers to come to Broad Street for a demonstration. Negro cabbies arrived along Broad Street in droves; so did the police. This sudden and unexplained activity on Broad Street caused the revolutionaries to abandon their plans and flee to the security of the ghetto.

By then angry Negro citizens, most of them with no knowledge of what was actually occurring, took matters into their own hands. The initial confrontation between the police and black people was spontaneous. Even the leaders of the revolution stood in amazement as people began to pelt the police station house with rocks and fire bombs. The revolutionaries had only to urge on the anger, give it a sense of direction and leadership. The result was the four days of rioting.

A few Negro leaders attempted to disperse and calm the crowd during the initial stages of the uprising. It is doubtful that they could have succeeded. Even so, they abandoned their efforts after the police came out of the station house when the crowd failed to disperse.

NAACP President Sally Carrol was in Boston for her organization's national convention when the riot erupted. "I thought of coming home," she said. "But I knew the people would not listen to me. There was nothing I could do."

"I was also in Boston," Councilman West said. "I talked with my deputy and I considered coming home the first night of the riot. But even if I had come, the people would not have listened to me. I did come home on Friday (the third night of the uprising) and I did what I could. But I would not have been able to stop what happened."

Irvine Turner, Newark's other Negro councilman, was ill when the riot occurred and did not appear in the streets. I went to Turner's office in the ghetto hoping to get his comments. The office was closed; no one was there.



Photo by Sid Prestwick

Sally Carroll at her desk in Newark NAACP headquarters

"Honey, you trying to find Turner?" a Negro woman who lives next door asked me. When I told her I was indeed looking for the councilman, his constituent allowed this:

"He ain't there; that office is a sham."

But there are those who feel that

Planes alert for riot duty

WASHINGTON (UPI)—The Air National Guard has ordered 40 of its big transport planes on standby alert for anti-riot duty, it was disclosed yesterday. Meanwhile, some state Air National Guard commands are making anti-riot plans of their own.

The Guard has ordered restricted duty for the transport planes—mostly C121 Constellations and C97 Stratocruisers capable of carrying 100 men each—to assure prompt movement of Army National Guardsmen from summer training camps if they are needed to put down civil disorder.

An Air National Guard spokesman, in revealing the nationwide plan, said the order was dated Aug. 14 and will remain in effect until the Army National Guard's 17-day summer training sessions end next month.

The spokesman said most of the Air Guard's 25 troop transport group were ordered to place two planes and two crews each on a 12-hour alert basis, out the 40-plane plan is for use only on orders from national headquarters.

Newark's Negroes had strong leadership, for good or for bad, during the uprising. "When the riot really got going," one of Newark's wealthiest and best-known Negro business women told me, "I called Willie Wright. When I found out what was going on I felt Willie might need an alibi; I am not a black power advocate, but I knew somebody was giving direction to this thing. I called Willie and told him that if he needed an alibi, I would swear that he was in my home visiting with me and my family when the riot occurred. As I told you," she concluded, "I am not a black power advocate; but if Willie needed an alibi, I was willing to risk everything to give him one."

Willie Wright was on the streets, in the vicinity of the police station when the confrontation between the people and the police exploded into a riot. I insisted that Willie Wright give me a statement for the record.

"Of course I didn't do it," Wright said as he flashed a big smile, his gold front tooth reflecting the glow of a Springfield Avenue street light. "But," he added, "this is not to say that all of what happened was unplanned, without direction and leadership."

It can also be reported that Newark's revolutionaries were congratulating themselves for having staged the biggest ghetto revolt to date. Then, as one of the top leaders of the rebellion put it, some of the out-of-town revolutionaries explained for Detroit where they helped set off a holocaust that made Newark's uprising look like a tea party.

REVIEW 'MISTAKES'

But even the revolutionaries admit it was quite a tea party; they bemoan the fact that the destruction occurred in the Negro community rather than at the seat of white economic power along Broad Street as planned. By sifting the ashes the revolutionaries are discovering their mistakes, they are instituting plans designed to make certain that

TOMORROW: The anguished dialogue

these errors do not recur. If there is to be a fire yet another time in Newark, the revolutionaries will have the support of normally responsible Negro businessmen who are enraged almost to the point of paranoia because, according to them, State Police deliberately and without reason riddled with bullets and then ransacked their shops.

I doubt one could persuade a single Negro of influence in Newark to mount a ghetto platform and tell the people that the first riot was wrong, that they should not do it again.

And the white man who is now touring Newark's Negro ghetto, blaring from a loudspeaker mounted on a car that the police are the friends of the people, that the people should support law and order as well as their local police, is viewed by the black masses as the funniest white-face minstrel of the century.

NEGRO LEADERS THREATENED

Voices of dissent remain muffled

By LOUIS E. LOMAX

In Newark, one hears few voices of Negro dissent concerning the "black revolution" and these voices turn out to be muffled and apologetic.

"I'd say the riot was wrong," NAACP Newark President Sally Carrol said. "I'm sorry about the rupture of black-white feelings and relationships in our town. I think we can correct the evils without burning, killing, and looting."

Then she paused for a long moment and gazed into her cocktail. "But, on the other hand," she added, pensively, "we of the NAACP have been trying to do that for 50 years, haven't we? And nothing has happened."

Calvin West, Negro councilman-at-large, uttered the loudest and strongest voice of dissent. "The riot was wrong, it got us nothing; we will never get anything accomplished by burning down Newark. We Negroes can take Newark through the legitimate political process perhaps in 1970, certainly by 1974."

This is the third in a series of articles by noted Negro journalist Louis E. Lomax on 'black revolutionaries' in Newark

But even as Calvin West spoke he conceded that approximately 60 per cent of the potential Negro voters have failed to register, that the hot-breath revolutionaries have no intention of waiting for a system they don't believe in to produce results, that West himself has already been threatened by the revolutionaries.

Calvin West is not alone; every major Negro political official or appointee in Newark has been threatened.

The expectation was that Newark's Negro clergy would issue a strong call for law and order, for non-violence. But for the Reverend B.F. Johnson, this call for peace and tranquility has not come forth. The revolutionaries held a meeting to decide whether Reverend Johnson should be threatened, perhaps phys-

ically "dealt with." "The consensus was," one black power leader told me, "that Johnson is such an Uncle Tom and fool that he isn't worth the risk and the bullet it would take to kill him. We decided to let him talk; nobody listens to him anyway."

In contrast to Reverend Johnson is Dr. Nathan Wright, Episcopalian clergyman and Harvard-trained "urbanologist." Waving a copy of his book, "Black Power and Urban Unrest," Wright told me: "Non-violence has failed; the only thing the white man in Newark will respond to is the threat of violence and the certain promise that the threat is not an empty one." Then Wright went on to suggest more sophisticated forms of revolutionary violence. The revolutionaries are developing other tactics than the crude maneuver of playing cowboy and Negro in the middle of Newark.

To clearly understand the tragedy,

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Playwright Leroi Jones (left) discusses black power with Louis Lomax

Photo by David Butler



Willie Wright
"We are not going to wait that long..."

The bone of contention:

This is the fourth in a series of articles by noted Negro journalist Louis E. Lomax on 'black revolutionaries' in Newark

By LOUIS E. LOMAX

The determined ambition of Newark's black leadership, moderate and revolutionary, is to get their people "where the goodies are." Newark is typical; all across America the black masses are in hot, and sometimes revolutionary, pursuit of the "goodies" that are so abundant in this republic. The "goodies" range from color television sets to well-paying jobs to the political power that will allow the black masses to participate in the decisions that determine what will happen in their town. It is the sharp difference of opinion concerning

how these goodies shall be obtained that imperils Negro unity and the black power movement itself.

The rift is best seen if one compares the statements of Calvin West, Newark's Negro councilman-at-large, and Willie Wright, an admitted leader of the black revolutionary movement.

West: "I know damn well inequities exist in this town. But if black people register and vote, we can control the town, probably in 1970 and certainly by 1974. I have every intention of taking over Newark and I don't want to preside over a pile of ashes."

Wright: "We are not going to wait that long for something we don't believe will happen in the first place. The white man controls the Democratic Party in this town — and that is the only party that could put a black man into power;

How to get the 'goodies'

they are not going to give real power to a Negro within that framework of an organization that is built for and run by white people.

"If we get a Negro mayor he will be a white man's flunky like that fool black mayor in Flint, Michigan, who had to resign when he discovered that the white powers were not about to bow to the wishes of black people on so simple an issue as open housing. How can we put trust in a system that installs a black man as mayor and then refuses to pass a law guaranteeing that the mayor of the town can buy a house in a place of his own choosing!"

Who then will prevail?

"Willie Wright is a complete fool; a nobody; one of those black leaders created by the press," a stunningly beautiful and mini-skirted Negro secretary at

City Hall shouted at me. "Nobody follows him; how many Negroes does he have?"

"That is not true," Sally Carrol, president of Newark's NAACP, interposed. "I don't know how many Negroes Willie has behind him, but he does influence the people who are ready to take this town apart."

Then Miss Carrol cast a stern eye at Calvin West who was calmly sipping a scotch and soda as he reclined on the sofa across the room. The white hostess, a member of the board of the NAACP, was obviously stunned as Sally Carrol continued, "you say Willie doesn't have many members in his organization. True! But how many black people follow Calvin? He has just admitted that he

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Calvin West
'I don't want to preside
over a pile of ashes'

(Continued from Page One)

could not have stopped the riot. I have thousands of members in my NAACP branch but I could not have stopped the riot. I don't speak for the people who are rioting and looting. Willie does."

This encounter could have occurred — and is occurring — between black leaders in white liberal living rooms all over the nation. It is a dialogue of the impotent, a tragic second-act confrontation between those who are as incapable of controlling the behavior of the black masses as the black masses have been of controlling their own destinies. It was well after 2 o'clock in the morning when Sally Carrol got around to articulating the gut issue:

"Look," she said, "Willie Wright and the revolutionaries have yet to tell us what they are for; but they have made it crystal clear, no bones about it, that they are not going to tolerate any longer what they now suffer, what they are against."

There are other voices that must be heard before one makes a determination. I called a Negro member of the Newark public school system and a woman who had brought me to Newark twice to lecture for the Urban League Guild.

"I don't know what I can tell you," she said. "Besides, my time is terribly limited. I teach here, as you know, but I have no knowledge of what is going on here. I simply have little or no contact with the kind of people you are trying to understand. Besides," she continued, "my daughter—you remember her, how brilliant and talented she is — has just



Dr. Nathan Wright during recent Black Power conference in Newark.

returned from Europe. I made sure she was not educated here, so she knows less about Newark than I do. But, as I was going to tell you about how limited my time is, some of my daughter's friends are coming here for something of a reunion — they were all together in Europe, you know — and our calendars are just jammed. Perhaps if you drop by tomorrow at eleven we can have a short chat. But I simply have nothing to tell you."

I hung up the phone. I got the whole picture. And sitting across the desk from me at that moment in Willie Wright's office was a brilliant, 17-year-old Negro girl who had graduated from Arts High

just last June. A major midwestern university has given the girl a four-year scholarship as a result of that institution's search for "responsible" Negroes to further integrate its almost lily-white campus. The young woman is not only a totally dedicated black revolutionary but she has detailed plans about "upsetting" that staid and stolid college community within days after her arrival there.

Then there is Dr. Nathan Wright, the theoretician and intellectual luminary of the black power movement. Dr. Wright not only headed up the recent black power national conference in Newark, but his next book is titled "Ready to Riot." Frequently reminding an interviewer of his doctorate from Harvard, Dr. Wright gives a sermon or a lecture, depending upon his swiftly changing moods, to a question.

Dr. Wright assails the Episcopal Diocese of Newark for hiring him as an "urbanologist" and then "refusing to listen to a damn thing I have to say." He then deals the poverty program a gut blow by charging that they hire ignorant and untrained people to carry out a program that requires the utmost in brains and experience.

"How in the hell," he exploded, "can you build a bridge by taking the money allocated for the bridge and dividing it among people who need the bridge but don't know how to build it?"

Wright's thesis is that nothing short of a revolutionary approach can correct poverty; that revolution is a function of the middle class, of people with trained brains; that the poor and the illiterate cannot possibly make critical decisions

concerning the poverty program; that anybody who spreads poverty money among the poor for their services as planners of poverty programs should have their heads examined. This, of course, would anger Willie Wright. The one thing that could possibly stay Willie Wright's revolution would be for massive amounts of money and political power to be given to the poor, and largely un-

TOMORROW: Questions for America

educated, black masses. And that these masses, in some visionary form of the nation's town meetings of the early 18th Century, be allowed to determine their own destinies.

The Willie Wrights and the Nathan Wrights (they are not related) of this nation suffer each other. They in a sense desperately need each other. Together they have more influence in the black ghetto than the orthodox Negro leadership. But one day soon they must meet and deal with their deep differences over who will run the black power community. For the moment they share the unity that undergirds all crises. Yet as the two men look at each other, an observer cannot but wonder what each of them is really thinking. My own conclusion to their private thoughts is best expressed in a quatrain Dr. Nathan Wright delights in quoting:

"As I was walking up the stair
I met a man who wasn't there.
He is not there again today.
Oh how I wish he would go away."

The summing up: We're in grip of revolution

By LOUIS E. LOMAX

This nation — whether it chooses to admit it or not — is now in the grip of a revolution. The flaming disorders that have enveloped our land are not accidental. True, these disorders are set in motion by unplanned and quite normal confrontations between police and the people of the black ghetto. From that point on, however, a highly trained and totally militarist group of revolutionaries who have been poised and waiting in the

Last of a series

wings move in and give the event a totally destructive direction.

The poor and the greedy, who have not the slightest notion of what is occurring, develop a sense of obligation and loyalty to the organized snipers and arsonists who keep the police at bay while they steal.

The Negro middle class is being battered into line by a combination of threats from the black power people and the overreaction of the white police. In Detroit, Negro plainclothes policemen reportedly were pistol-whipped by white

police while trying to fish their credentials from their pockets.

As to the pattern of threats against middle-class Negroes the record is quite clear. This will come as a grave shock, but the fact is that the Urban League office in Newark was set on fire by a Molotov cocktail seven days before the uprising occurred. James Pawley, the league's executive director, uses a nice ploy when he says that the fire bomb was thrown by an imaginative youth who had somehow gotten a copy of mimeographed directions as to how to make such a bomb. Pawley suggests that the Negro youth probably got the instruction sheet from the Newark Chamber of Commerce where Police Director Spina had made a speech and distributed copies of the sheet as an example of what is being circulated in the black ghetto.

Assuming Mr. Pawley believed his own explanation, one must then ponder why he called the leader of the black power movement and asked, "Who would bomb such a dedicated organization as the Urban League?" As Mr. Pawley well knew, the bomb was a warning to all Negro civil rights groups

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THE SUMMING UP: Nation in the grip of a

(Continued from Page One)

to get in line and shut up.

One is hard put to say just who is to blame for the tragedy now etched in the ashes of our major cities. Are the revolutionaries alone to blame? Or could it be that a giant portion of the blame must be shared by those who knew what was coming and refused to act? And the Newark police decision to purchase armored vehicles against the day of yet another uprising has provided black power with a psychological bazooka they could neither buy nor loot.

The blunt truth is the black revolutionaries are not out to kill white people as individuals. "We are not out after you," Charles Mayberry comforted his white neighbor of 15 years. "It is the system the revolutionaries are attempting to bring down."

And Dr. Nathan Wright is the author of the book "One Bread, One Body," a prize-winning Christian polemic the ultimate thesis of which is that all men are one in the eyes of Christ. Nathan Wright bragged to me that he was neurotic. It was then that he commented that America had driven Negroes crazy and now wants to indict them for sedition when they do crazy things.

The writer who is a social critic must at least consult history. The replies are not calculated to make one happy. There is not a single revolution recorded there on which the means (killing people) justified the end (the attainment of a socio-economic or political ideal). Yet the America against which the black revolutionaries are now in full rebellion is the product of precisely such a revolution. But must the Ameri-

can Negro travel this route? Morality aside, will it achieve his goals? Can the black power revolutionaries be stopped?

These men and women completely believe that the task of every revolutionary is to make a revolution that cannot be stopped. It is hardly a libel to recall that Stokeley Carmichael issued a call for black revolution from Havana and that H. Rap Brown addressed an epistle of war to his followers "behind enemy lines" from a federal jail in New York. In Newark, Willie Wright has long since put his affairs in order; he expects to be dead at the white man's hands before the year is out.

But the black revolutionaries are wrong. Scores, perhaps hundreds, of innocent and well-meaning people, black and white, are almost certain to be

killed before this exercise in black anguish runs its course.

The only hope I see for Newark and for the nation lies in the reassertion of sane but militant Negro leadership. But this time the white power structure must be willing to rapidly make sincere and far-reaching changes.

Such men as Martin Luther King, Roy Wilkins, and Whitney Young can save Newark and the republic provided they are given the meaningful victories that will lure the black masses from the brink of revolutionary disaster.

Nobody can save Willie Wright and H. Rap Brown. They don't wish to be saved; they have elected their course and would be deeply disappointed if they did not die the martyr's death.

But we can save our nation. A nation that assigns its sons to die in Vietnam

revolution

and in pursuit of the moon can occupy its ghettos and correct the inequities that exist there if it so chooses.

But do we care enough, do we have the moral brains to understand that the most mortal and immediate enemy of the nation is in the black revolutionary's office rather than in Hanoi? Are we willing to make the commitment of human concern, involvement and money to the fight against the residuals of racism that we are committing to fight against communism?

The answers to these questions, much more than the intense revolutionary plotting of the black power advocates, will determine when — and if — black revolutionary smoke will belch to the skies and further sully the American dream.



Dr. Nathan Wright with his book

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a young Negro,
he said:

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