



FIRE DEPARTMENT

CITY OF NEW YORK

MUNICIPAL BUILDING
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10007

OFFICE OF
CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT

August 23, 1967

TO: HON. ROBERT O. LOWERY, FIRE COMMISSIONER.

RE: Newark Fire Problem During Civil Disorder.

The report on the Fire Incident in Newark should be read in conjunction with the report from Detroit which is in more detail because of greater time devoted to its study and the greater amount of information available at this time.

Fire Problem -

The Newark Incident followed the more common pattern with the fire problem following by one or more days the police incident that generally triggers the disturbance. It was also conventional in that the rioting only took place at night with the daylight hours relatively calm.

An arrest on Wednesday, July 12th, was followed by large scale fires on Thursday night, July 13th. The incident continued through Saturday night. The Newark Fire Department did not release any figures on the number of buildings involved. However, the presentation by Chief Redden described a series of separate incendiary fires of considerable proportion but of less concentration and magnitude than the Detroit incident. The area of origin consisted generally of stores. Of significance were the fires occurring in the downtown area of the city including a 3 story 150 x 150 furniture store fire which due to the rapidity of total involvement was credited to a fire bombing. Further details will be provided in Newark's report of the incident. In general, although a serious and frightening problem, it was not as critical as was Detroit. The Newark Fire Department directed the fire operations from a central command post located in proximity to the troubled area. Although apparatus responded in a convoy, they did not assemble at the command post but rather rendezvoused on the perimeter and then proceeded. The convoy consisted of the customary Battalion Chief, 2 Engine Companies and 1 Ladder Company. The police force was not capable of controlling the rioters' behavior but they did do their best to protect the firemen. Unfortunately, they were too few in number. National Guard assistance was delayed in forthcoming and was not provided until after the death of Captain Patrick Moran of the Newark Fire Department on Saturday night, July 15th.



FOXY THE FIREFIGHTER SAYS: "90% of all fires are preventable"

The tactics employed were similar to those used in Detroit. Outside attacks with heavy stream, no overhauling and the rapid withdrawal from the troubled area. This involves a calculated risk of rekindles, however, the risk is preferable to allowing simultaneous fires to go uncovered or to expose firemen any longer than necessary to the danger of personal injury from assault or sniper fire.

Assaults on Firemen -

~~Sniper fire and intense missile throwing occurred on Friday night and continued until Sunday. Some fire houses could neither respond or be evacuated. Personnel were directed to remain in the cellar of quarters until conditions permitted evacuation. Snipers and missile throwers were reported to have used high rise public housing as vantage points. Housing Authority Police should be invited to the next Police-Fire Conference to coordinate the securing of these buildings, particularly at sites chosen for Fire Department Command Posts.~~

On Saturday an automobile with New York license plates was reported to have directed gunfire at buildings as it sped through the street before crashing. One bullet is thought to have struck the sprinkler system and activated the water flow alarm. Captain Moran responded with his unit and climbed a ladder to gain entry. He returned to the street where he was shot through the side. An artery was severed and he bled to death. Newark advocates flak jackets for each man. We have contacted several agencies of government and several manufacturers to identify what is available, what protection it affords and its feasibility under our operating conditions. Further information in this area will be available in the near future.

Other injuries were of a nature that the men were able to remain on duty although under normal conditions medical leaves would have been granted.

Water Supply -

Water supply presented no problem although hydrants in the areas adjacent to fire areas were opened by people to reduce pressures. These were quickly closed and the problem solved.

Manpower -

Newark had a partial recall during the night only. They normally operate with 25 Engine Companies. 10 of these are two pumper-units, each of which were divided into 2 separate units. 4 reserve pumpers were also activated. The coverage proved adequate. Emergency organization and manning were continued through Sunday, July 22nd.

Communications -

Communications were disrupted by a large number of false alarms

Hon. Robert O. Lowery
Fire Commissioner.

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which continued into August. It was suspected that radio channels were being monitored. To avoid giving advance information regarding movement and response of apparatus, telephone circuits were used as much as possible.

Other areas covered under the Detroit Report, but not discussed here, were omitted because they were not significant factors in the problem.

John T. Chagnon
CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT

JTO'H:JJB:wja

Newark, New Jersey

Model Cities Program -- Planning Grant

Newark, the "downtown" of northern New Jersey, will use the grant to develop a plan for a neighborhood west and north of the central business district.

The Model Neighborhood area accounts for 30 percent of the city's substandard housing, 30 percent of its unemployed, and 20-25 percent of the public assistance load. Half of the area's sixth grade students are at a reading level one-and-a-half years below the national norm.

Basic objective of the planning is "to attack and drastically alter within five years the basic nature of the designated area through an infusion of first-class facilities and closely coordinated services."

Within this goal, Newark is aiming for 5,000 units of rehabilitated housing, 5,000 units of new housing (80 percent of these in the low or moderate income range), a 50 percent reduction of crime within three years, construction of a major multi-purpose center for coordinating social service planning, a doubling of the available recreation space, and establishment of an employment coordination link utilizing the city's computer system.

Among the features to be explored by the planning grant to Newark is the development of a "great high schools" system, which will locate a comprehensive and fully integrated school in the Model Neighborhood.

Also contemplated is development of a comprehensive high school with a built-in 13th and 14th year program and the wide use of non-institutional settings for the schooling of children in the early grades.

The city also foresees the creation of a major police aide unit, using neighborhood personnel where possible as part of the Police Department.

For further information:

Mayor Hugh J. Addonizio
City Hall
Newark, N. J. 07102

Project Number: MC-NJ-001

Received by
Scales from N.9
ADL
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File

David F. Stahl

October 16, 1967

NEWARK RIOTS

The break-down of snipping cases reported during the Newark Riot was as follows:

<u>Date</u>	<u>No. of Cases</u>
7/13/67	1
7/14/67	43
7/15/67	92
7/16/67	75
7/17/67	23
7/18/67	1
TOTAL	<hr/> 235

NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

I. BACKGROUND

A. Demography and General Ghetto Problems

Newark has a population of approximately 410,000 persons. Conservative to liberal estimates establish the non-white population in Newark to be 48% to 58%. Newark also has the fifth largest number of Puerto Ricans among all American cities. The non-white public school population is approximately 75%. Between 1950 and 1960 Newark had a net population decrease of approximately 34,000 persons; however, during this period, white population exodus was almost equalled by Negro immigration, primarily from the rural South. As a result, Negro population is largely unskilled and has not participated significantly in Newark's highly competitive industrial labor market.

Among major American cities Newark contains the highest percentage of substandard housing, highest crime rate, and the most crime per 100,000 population. Newark is second among major cities in population density, second in infant mortality, second in birth rate, seventh in absolute number of drug addicts, and its unemployment problems make it one of five cities qualifying for special assistance under the Economic Development Act.

Schools in Newark are fraught with overcrowding, high rate of scholastic failure, truancy, disciplinary problems, dropouts and teacher turnover. De Facto school segregation is prevalent. In 1966 the public school population was 60% Negro and 15% Puerto Rican.

Last year Newark had an annual average unemployment rate of 8.2% as compared to 4.4% for New Jersey and 3.8% for the nation. The average unemployment rate for non-whites in 1965 was 8.3% as against a rate of 4.1% for whites. The medium income of non-white families (\$3,839) was 44% below that of white families (\$6,858).

Over 80% of Newark's housing is 40 or more years old, a large portion being substantially deteriorated. Most of the housing is frame construction. Approximately 8% of the total housing supply is public housing. This housing is unsightly, poorly maintained, and perpetuates ghetto living.

Newark has the highest maternal and infant mortality and VD rate in the country as well as the highest TB rate; it ranks seventh in the total number of drug addicts. Thirteen point seven percent of the total Newark population was receiving some form of public assistance as of September, 1966.

The 1967 tax base in Newark is \$4,162; the tax base for the ring of suburbs surrounding Newark is \$7,619. However, the City of Newark has relatively high service requirements -- \$186 per capita for municipal functions, whereas the ring expenditures are \$89 per capita. Health and welfare expenditures account for 20% of the city's budget; typical suburban outlays vary from 1.2% to 3.7% of total municipal expenditures. General assistance to needy persons in New Jersey is primarily a municipal responsibility. In 1964-65 the State Government's share of State and local taxes was 29.9%, lowest among the 50 States. This factor accounts for constant efforts on the part of Newark city officials to obtain Federal funds.

B. Political Background and Situation

The political organization in Newark is sophisticated from the standpoint of the white Irish-Italian community. For example, of the ten city office holders, including the Mayor, there are five Italians, two of Irish ancestral background, one Jew and two Negroes who are controlled by the Mayor. The Police Director is Italian and the Police Chief is Irish. In spite of the large population, Negro political power is negligible because of the lack of astuteness. Negroes have been appointed to various high city posts but are not given the authority to effect significant changes in the lives of the ghetto dwelling Negroes. On the other hand, the police department is without a Negro captain or above. Of the 1,400 man police force, only 240 members are Negro.

From time to time, various Negroes emerged as leaders in the Negro community. They have been systematically absorbed by the Administration. Things are different now. Negro militancy is now a condition of Negro leadership in the ghetto. This militancy does not, however, necessarily have to take the form of violence in order to be acceptable to the "people." The target, now, of the great majority of Negro leaders is City Hall. The city administration is viewed as being unable to do no right. As a result of the constant friction between the city and the Negro "grass root" community enthusiastic efforts are being made to recall Mayor Addonizio. (Incidentally, harassment tactics are now beginning in an effort to reduce the effectiveness of the recall.) Coupled with the recall campaign is a massive Negro voter registration drive. However, success is doubtful inasmuch as there are fewer non-whites of voting age in Newark than whites of voting age.

Obviously the Mayor's image in Newark has been damaged. He is reacting vindictiveness; this is worsening the chances for harmonious Negro-white relations. Mayor Lindsey's recent unannounced tour through

Newark's riot area was met with the Mayor's patent displeasure. Governor Hughes' "take-over" during the violence has widened the State-City gap. Addonizio is now almost virtually dependent upon the Federal Government if he is to continue to dominate the city's affairs. Incidentally, the Federal Government has been good to Newark; more Federal funds have been poured into the city than any city its size in the nation. Last week a \$4.3 million Labor Department Concentrated Employment Program was launched.

C. Past History of Discontent and Unrest Prior to the Riot

1. Police-Community Relations

There is a growing hostility between the Negro ghetto population and the police department. On Saturday, July 7, there was an incident in which 10 or 11 Muslims were allegedly beaten by police from the Newark and East Orange police departments, creating a new tension in the Newark community. This was as potentially "explosive" as the Smith incident. However, the news of the event was not circulated or publicized to a great extent in the Newark ghetto community. A hearing was scheduled with the East Orange city council on July 12 (the date of the beginning of the Newark crisis period). The controversial police-community review board issue has been a major significance and prominence in the area since 1965. Community leaders, as evidenced in their statements (attached), have vocalized their concern about the police department policies and procedures, especially in the ghetto area. This has been true in spite of a special OLEA police-community relations program which was initiated last year. The community feels that it has no recourse on the police issue in that the police officers and other city officials, including the police court Judge James Dell Maur, have condoned the alleged policies and procedures of the department as it relates to police malpractice.

2. Newark Medical - Dental School Site Proposal

Early in the spring of this year, the community became concerned about the proposed Newark Medical - Dental School site and the city's plan to turn a 14-square block residential slum area over to the Medical School. Originally the community was in favor of a 40-acre site; but its position was reversed when it was disclosed that the city administration intended to give 150 acres to the Medical School without an adequate plan for the relocation of some 700 families now resident in the area. Furthermore, the city had not consulted the people resident in the community. The area, which is already one of blight, is to be razed; the persons forced to move would be absorbed into the already deplorable slum areas of the city. The issue became so intense that public speeches were made by community leaders to the effect that overt efforts were taken to see that the program was halted. Appeals were made throughout the community to see that the site selection

of the Medical School would be changed.

Numerous public hearings have been heated; they have been a critical factor in keeping the mood of the Negro community tense. There was a strong degree of cohesiveness among all segments of the Negro community on this issue. This is new in Newark in view of past divisiveness among Newark's Negroes.

3. Mayorial Nomination of a White Secretary to the Newark Board of Education

In May of this year, Mayor Addonizio announced that he was proposing to the Board of Education the appointment of City Councilman James Callahan for the office of School Board Secretary. Callahan, according to the Negro community, is highly unqualified for the position, which pays \$22,500 per year. As soon as the Mayor made his nomination, various open meetings were held by members of the Newark community, voicing their opposition and proposing the appointment of Wilbur Parker, a Negro CPA who they felt had superior qualifications. Not only did the Negro community question the Mayor's nomination of Callahan, but many influential persons did, as well. This resulted in a considerable amount of pressure on the administration. Discussions at some of the public school board meetings became so heated that order had to be restored in the chambers. The hostile attitude of concerned persons in the community had been voiced in private and through the public news media. Civil rights groups have actually been at loggerheads with the administration about the proposed appointment and have kept the issue in the forefront of the total community. As a result, the resignation of the present School Board Secretary has been delayed indefinitely. The significance of this dispute is that the Negro community and the city administration are far apart. The result is the circulation of recall petitions to recall Mayor Addonizio.

II. THE RIOT

A. The Riot - Triggering Incident of July 12, 1967

On July 12, approximately 8:00 P.M. John William Smith, 40 year old Negro cab driver, was stopped in the heart of the Newark Negro district by Newark police officers, Vito Pontrelli and John DeSimone for "tail-gating" a police vehicle. The officers alleged that Smith became abusive during their interrogation and hit them while they were trying to effect an arrest. An altercation ensued in which Smith allegedly received several fractured ribs. Smith was taken to the Fourth Precinct police station, which is across from a large Negro public housing project, the Hayes Homes. At the Fourth Precinct Station officers were observed by people from the housing project scuffling with Smith as he was being taken into the station. A large crowd gathered after word had gone out in the community that Smith had been brutally beaten. Tension mounted in the community as the crowd gathered. Several community leaders, were called; Robert Curvin, civil rights leader, Don Wendell, local anti-poverty worker, and Timothy Still local anti-poverty board President, attempted to calm the crowd and approached Newark Inspector Melchion, who has been called to the precinct after it was apparent that the community was irritated about the manner of Smith's arrest. A group of citizens requested the Inspector to let them see Smith in person. The Inspector agreed and the citizens talked with Smith, who stated that he had been beaten by the officers and that he was in pain. The group asked the Inspector if Smith had received medical treatment and were told by the Inspector that he did not know. Melchion asked the Lieutenant in charge whether Smith had had medical treatment. The Lieutenant told the Inspector that Smith had not asked for treatment. The Inspector then ordered Smith be taken to the Beth Israel Hospital for medical treatment. Prior to seeing Smith, the community leaders expressed their concern to the Inspector concerning the hostile attitude of the crowd, and also complained about the officers' treatment of Smith, which had occurred in full view of members of the community. The Inspector questioned both of the officers involved and read the arrest report, which included a statement to the effect that Smith had been obstreperous and abusive to them while effecting the arrest, that he had torn their trousers, and that it had been necessary to forcibly restrain him. The Inspector observed that neither of the arresting officers' trousers were torn and called this to the attention of the arresting officers, advising them to correct their report to this extent.

While community leaders were conferring with the Inspector inside the station, the crowd outside was hollering and becoming angrier. Police

Officers, on the other hand, were calling racial epithets out of the station windows at the crowd, creating an even more tense situation. During this time, the community leaders stated that the officers were becoming increasingly hostile inside the station; officers demanded permission of the Inspector that they be permitted to go out and forcibly disperse the crowd. Hostile racial slurs continued among the officers.

Citizen leaders, noticing the attitude of the officers and their hostility, prevailed upon the Inspector to keep the police inside the station while they made attempts to quiet and disperse the group. The Inspector agreed.

Robert Curvin, Timothy Still and Don Wendell, along with Oliver Lofton, Director of the Newark Legal Services Project, who had arrived after the original group had gone into the station, tried to assure the crowd that action would be taken to see that the arresting officers' actions received the proper attention. The crowd, at first, seemed to accept this. However, its size began to grow in magnitude and while speeches were still being made, molotov cocktails were thrown at the precinct building. This resulted in more racial epithets and slurs by the officers inside, who had, meanwhile, helmeted themselves. This ultimately resulted in the officers rushing out of the precinct in an effort to disperse the crowd. The crowds scattered, but from the perimeter came more bricks and stones which were being thrown by young people of the area. The leaders pled with the Inspector to restrain the officer's actions in dispersing the crowd. He agreed; however, he insisted that a small contingency of officers be allowed to remain outside to protect the precinct station. This being done, future attempts were made by the community leaders to contain the crowd. Efforts were then initiated to get the crowd to formulate a march. About this time, a caravan of approximately ten taxi cabs arrived in the area spreading the rumor that Smith was dead. The crowd was assured by Oliver Lofton that Smith was very much alive, and the leaders proceeded to go on with their organizational march in an effort to divert the anger and hostility of the crowd away from the police station. A portion of the crowd assembled in march form in the street to the north of the station. The groups began chanting "we shall not be moved." At this time, the officers again rushed from the station and proceeded to forcibly disperse the crowd, using racial epithets, slurs, and degrading terms. The crowd began reacting angrily to the officers, and bricks and bottles besieged the police station, breaking the windows and creating a volatile situation. During this confrontation with the officers, a liquor store, one block north of the station, was broken into and looting began. Reinforcements arrived, but by this time sporadic rioting and burning had begun in several areas near the police station. Later that night and early the next morning the riot condition appeared to subside.

On Thursday, July 13, the tension in the community was intense, in spite of city officials' statements to the effect that the incident the previous night was an isolated one. During the day, city officials and community leaders had met in an effort to forestall any further riotous activity. Leaflets, announcing a formal protest demonstration, were distributed throughout the community, calling for a "police brutality protest rally." At approximately 8:00 P.M. on this date a protest march was initiated and speeches were made by some community leaders, including James Threatt, Executive Director of the Newark Human Rights Commission. He pled for orderly conduct and tried to assure the crowd that "justice will be done." On this occasion, Dominic Spina, the Director of the Newark Police Department, was present to back up the community leaders' statements. It was during this period that rocks and bottles again started hitting the precinct station. The police officers inside the station ran from the building and forcibly dispelled the crowd with alleged "force and hostility" which created the riotous state that prevailed for the next three days. Sporadically during that night and the subsequent days, fires, rioting and looting prevailed. On Thursday night, July 13, Newark police were placed in command. The National Guard and State police were mobilized.

B. Facts and Observations - CRS Investigation

During the night of July 13, 1967 and early morning of the 14th, Newark police fought with rock throwing rioters. Three Negroes, including one woman were shot to death by police. Three hundred and fifty persons were injured and 425 arrested on this night. Hundreds of stores were looted throughout Newark's ghetto areas. Governor Hughes called in approximately 300 State Troopers and 2,500 National Guardsmen while Mayor Hugh Addonizio ordered a midnight curfew. During the early morning hours on July 14, 375 State Troopers arrived with 2,600 National Guardsmen. Friday afternoon, July 14, Governor Hughes set the Mayor's curfew forward to 10:00 P.M.

Rioting continued Friday night during which seven more persons were shot to death; all but one (Newark Police Officer) were Negro. Early this evening State Police cordoned off a 10 square area to prevent all persons from entering and residents from leaving the riot areas. Arrests as of July 14 climbed to 800.

Called by the Mayor at 2:30 A.M., July 15, Governor Hughes arrived in Newark at 5:00 A.M. and established an emergency headquarters in the Roseville National Guard Armory before beginning his tour of the city at 7:00 A.M. From this point on, the Governor took over not only riot control, but conducted secret negotiations with militant civil rights leaders to the exclusion of the Mayor. By July 15, close to 1,000 persons had been arrested for riot-connected offenses.

After Governor Hughes' tour of the riot area on July 15, he issued a statement that the city was in "open rebellion" and that the "criminal insurrection" was "a gross injustice to a fine city and a fine Mayor." He further stated that any means should be employed to stop the widespread looting.

The death toll rose rapidly after this. Negroes were shot inside their homes from the spray of police gun fire which was often indiscriminate, according to witnesses. About half of the casualties were killed because they were suspected of looting or were in an area where police were moving against looters. Activity that appeared to draw fire of police or National Guardsmen included running and speeding through controlled areas. Despite widespread reports of sniping, only two of the Newark deaths were attributed to sniper fire.

Widespread destruction of Negro owned businesses in the riot area that remained unharmed during the violence was witnessed by numerous area residents on the part of Newark Police, State Troopers and National Guardsmen. These witnesses, approximately 265, have sworn to same in affidavits.

The following is an analysis of arrest reports obtained from the Newark Police Department for the period beginning Wednesday evening, July 12, 1967 (subsequent to the arrest of John Smith) until Monday afternoon, July 17, 1967 (when Governor Richard Hughes declared end of emergency that had been imposed by proclamation Friday, July 14, 1967).

NEWARK RIOTS - JULY 12 - 17, 1967

ANALYSIS OF ARREST REPORTS

RESIDENCE:

<u>COUNTY</u>	<u>CITY</u>	
ESSEX:.....Total - 1406	Newark	1336
	E. Orange	41
	Montclair	5
	Milburn	2
	Belleville	3
	S. Orange	4
	W. Orange	2
	Orange	9
	Nutley	2
	Irvington	1
	Bloomfield	1
	Total - 70	
UNION:.....Total - 15	Fanwood	1
	Union	3
	Elizabeth	8
	Plainfield	2
	Scotch Plains	1
HUDSON:.....Total - 8	Jersey City	3
	Hoboken	5
BERGEN:.....Total - 4	Hackensack	3
	Lyndhurst	1
MIDDLESEX:.....Total - 3	New Brunswick	2
	Edison	1
PASSAIC:.....Total - 5	Passaic	5
SUSSEX:.....Total - 1	Franklin	1
MORRIS:.....Total - 2	Morristown	2
BURLINGTON:.....Total - 1	Fort Dix	1
OTHER:.....Total - 20	Brooklyn (NY)	7)
	Manhattan (NY)	4)
	Staten Island (NY)	1) Total - 14
	Long Island (NY)	1)
	Jamaica (NY)	1)
	Detroit (MICH)	1
	Florida	2
	Virginia	1
	Georgia	1
	S. Carolina	1

TOTAL ARRESTS:.....1465

SEX

Male - 1319
Female - 146

RACE

Negro - 1394
White - 50
Puerto Rican - 21

AGE

18 & under - 355
19 - 25 - 489
Over 25 - 621

OFFENSE:

Breaking, entering, larceny;)	
Looting; Possession Stolen Goods;) 1071	
Receiving Stolen Goods)	
Carrying concealed weapons 47)	
Possession explosives 3) Weapons - 91	
Possession firearms 41)	
Assault with intent to kill 5)	
Assault & battery on police officer 14) Assault - 46	
Assault & battery 27)	
Resisting Arrest 12)	
Threatening Police Officer 4) Interference with	
Interference with Police Officer 4) Police - 20	
Malicious Burning 12	
Rape/Possession stolen auto 2	
Auto Larceny 8	
Possession Narcotics 12	
Glue Sniffing 1	
False Pretenses 1	
Disorderly persons 28)	
Loitering 24) Disorderly persons - 174	
Creating Disturbance 27)	
Violation of Curfew 95)	
Contempt of Court 5	
Desertion 2	
Impersonation of Armed Forces	
Personnel 1	
Serving Alcohol when prohibited 1	
False Reports 1	

OFFENSES CONT'D.

Unlicensed driving; No registration	5
Possession & transportation untaxed cigarettes	3
Juvenile Delinquency	1
Material Witness	8

ARRESTS FOR OFFENSES INVOLVING WEAPONS/EXPLOSIVES--#91

SEX:

Males.....90
Females..... 1

AGE:

18 & under..... 6
19 - 25.....25
Over 25.....60

RESIDENCE:

New Jersey.....73
Out of State.....18

RACE:

Negro.....74
White.....11
Puerto Rican..... 6

*OF THOSE ARRESTED ON WEAPONS/EXPLOSIVES CHARGES - ARRESTS FOR OFFENSES INVOLVING FIREARMS - 41.

AGE:

18 & under..... 2
19 - 25.....10
Over 25.....29

NEWARK POLICE

DEPT. RECORD:

Prior Conviction.... 5)
Prior Arrest..... 2) Total - 18
Undetermined
Disposition.....11)

* Only those arrest reports which specifically indicate firearms have been included. Note that 47 arrests were made for concealed and deadly weapons charges, some of which may involve firearms.

III. POST - RIOT EFFECTS AND ATTITUDES

Police misconduct both before and during the riot emerged as the issue of greatest concern to the Negro community. The Newark violence began with the police department. In spite of many eye-witnessed acts of police beatings and assaults upon Negroes, there have been no police officers convicted. The Negro community appealed to the Newark City Council in 1965, after a Negro had been shot to death by a white police officer, to review cases of police brutality. They asked for a police review board but local police protests prevented its establishment. According to many, the police are seeking revenge against Negroes generally for their vocal accusations of police brutality

Hostile attitudes toward welfare caseworkers in Newark is prevalent. To most Negroes on welfare, caseworkers badger welfare recipients and "strip them of all dignity." They feel that all rights are lost once one becomes a welfare recipient.

The city administration helped to fan the poor white-Negro relations after the riot. At his news conference on July 18, 1967, Mayor Addonizio said, "Some outsiders were arrested who have participated in the riot. We're convinced also that this was a planned situation." The Mayor further charged that organizers of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) inflamed conditions by printing leaflets calling for an organized protest Wednesday (July 13) night at the Sixth Precinct station. Newark's Police Director, Dominic Spina, blamed city anti-poverty workers for the riot. Neither the Mayor's conclusions nor those of the Police Director were substantiated by advocates of their theories to this day.

There is evidence that the ghettos of Newark will become a ghost town for business, leaving residents stranded without commercial services due to fear and bitterness on the part of many Newark merchants whose stores were looted and damaged during the riot. Another factor contributing to the withdrawal of merchants is the cancellation of insurance policies by casualty companies.

#6 6

Field Community Tension Factors Report
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY
May 15, 1967

Misc Rpt.

1. There has been growing unrest among several of the indigenous leaders or representatives because they were not consulted in the preparation of the city's Model Cities application and the Labor Slum Employment Program application. Several rallies are in the planning stages to protest this lack of involvement. The view taken by many such persons is that they would prefer no programs rather than ones in which they played no role. The prevailing feeling is that the city administration is endeavoring to get the maximum political mileage out of both programs to the detriment of the poor.

* A Colonel Hassan Jeru-Ahmed, Commanding Officer, Black Star Regiment of the Blackmen's Volunteer Army of Liberation, has taken up temporary residence in Newark. Colonel Hassan claims to have money, men, and weapons and is in Newark to assist the "black people" wherever he is needed. More information is currently being developed on Colonel Hassan. Colonel Hassan has spoken at two recent CORE meetings. He is described as highly articulate and persuasive.

2. The Model Cities and Labor Slum Employment applications were prepared under the auspices of City Hall. Representing the poor and disadvantaged minority groups was William Wolfe, Executive Director of the United Community Corporation, the local community action agency. Mr. Wolfe is not trusted by the indigent population; as a result, little dialogue between Wolfe and the poor takes place. As a result, Wolfe is not attuned to the needs, desires, and aspirations of the poor and they know it.

The community action agency, United Community Corporation, is about to experience a revolution led by its community action component. The area board directors are thoroughly disgusted with UCC because of its lack of concern for the poor. As a result, the agency is not effective in the community. The business community has likewise lost faith in the UCC; all their programs have reportedly had difficulty getting off the ground.

3. Summer recreational programs will be severely curtailed this summer. The City is not in a position to compensate for approximately \$340,000 in Federal summer funds which it received last year.

There are several labor manpower programs currently operational; success is moderate. The exception is the Business and Industrial Coordinating Committee (BICC) which has some labor funding. Its programs can be characterized as highly successful.

Community services can be judged more adequately by community protests. The League of Welfare Mothers is regularly protesting various aspects of the welfare system which is about average, at best. A police-community relations program financed by an OLEA grant has had moderate success. It probably will not have a significant impact on overall police-community relations in Newark.

5. The city administration tends to underplay most ghetto tensions. There is an effort on the part of the city to discount much of the ghetto unrest. The business community has been relatively responsive to ghetto tensions mainly through the BICC. The mass media, for the most part, accurately portrays ghetto tensions. Reporting is fair and complete.
6. Discussed in preceding paragraphs.
7. CRS should make contact with OEO and HUD to see that the disadvantaged play a more meaningful role in the formation and administration of Federal programs in Newark. There is much concern in this regard and it is probably the most critical tension-producing factor in Newark.

Lawrence S. Hoffheimer

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Field Community Tension Factors Report

NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

May 29, 1967

Several significant incidents have occurred since the last tension factors report. The Black Liberation Center, SNCC headquarters, was gutted by fire. I received a telephone call from Colonel Hasan, who claims to be the Commanding Officer of the Black Man's Liberation Army, that the Liberation Center had been burned. He claimed the origin of the fire was suspected arson. I also spoke with Donald Malafronte, assistant to the Newark Mayor. He checked with local authorities and said that the fire was set at various spots inside the Liberation Center by unknown arsonists. No suspects were reported. Colonel Hasan said that he had received several telephone threats of a bombing prospect a few days before the fire occurred.

Two significant protests, both of which appeared to be gaining momentum, have occurred in recent days in Newark. Both protests are led by the militant civil rights and ghetto leaders and appear to signify an organized effort. The first protest concerns the appointment of Charles Calahan by the Mayor to a lucrative school board position. The position pays approximately \$25,000 per year with life tenure provisions. Calahan is a white political ally of the administration and the Negro groups are pushing a Negro Certified Public Accountant for the same position. It is quite clear that the Negro is more qualified for the job and that the appointment of Mr. Calahan by the administration would cause great disturbances in the community. As a result, at the open school board meeting, the Negro militants broke up the meeting. The second protest of significance is that concerning the blight hearings attendant to the proposed site of the Newark Medical and Dental School in the heart of a Newark Negro ghetto. This meeting likewise was postponed after a considerable amount of property was damaged.

The Concentrated Employment Program in Newark still has not been approved in Washington because of local in-fighting concerning program coordination and program responsibilities. The grassroots groups have opposed it because they have not been given a meaningful policy role.

It is apparent that the militant grassroots groups are gaining unison. The executive director, deputy executive director, and program director of the Newark Community Action Agency were suspended by the agency board of directors. The board of directors were opposed to these persons because of their failure to give meaningful program responsibilities to ghetto residents. This matter is being watched closely.

I think the most significant thing to note about the climate in Newark is the feeling of potential victory among the hard core militants and grassroots groups. Their past splintering is almost nonexistent now.

Lawrence Hoffheimer

FIELD COMMUNITY TENSION FACTORS REPORT

Newark, New Jersey

August 15, 1967

Since the disturbances in mid-July, several significant occurrences have transpired in Newark.

- 1. The Committee of Concern was formed. This group is co-chaired by Malcolm Talbott, Vice President of Rutgers University and a former law professor and Oliver Lofton, (Negro) Executive Director of the Newark Legal Services Project. Lofton formerly worked as a special assistant to former Assistant Deputy Attorney General Joseph Dolan. Lofton is also a member of Governor Hughes' newly formed Blue Ribbon Commission which is studying the causes of the Newark riot. The Committee has among its members several high executive type corporate officials from the Greater Newark area and is interested in "jobs, education, housing, welfare and police-community relations." CRS has been assisting the committee on a consultative basis as a result of a request for such assistance directed to CRS in Washington.

The future productiveness of this group is pessimistic in the opinion of CRS inasmuch as little "grass root" interest has been generated thus far, by the committee. Some action (by the Committee) is needed now if it is to be saved.

- 2. OEO in Washington issued a release about ten days ago suspending Willie Wright, the Vice President of the local anti-poverty agency (United Community Corporation) for alleged statements that he made advocating violence. The UCC reported that Washington OEO had no power or authority to suspend or otherwise discipline a non-salaried, duly elected anti-poverty board member.

The UCC Board President, Timothy Still said the Board's Executive Committee would study the situation and if the reported statements on Wright were true, the Board would take appropriate action. No action was taken. As a result, Theodore Barry, Assistant Director of OEO for Community Action, is expected in Newark on August 16, 1967, to deal with the matter on the scene. Action taken by OEO against Willie Wright which is not supported by sufficient evidentiary basis could have a provocative effect in the Negro community.

3. Governor Hughes, through his Commissioner, Paul Ylvisaker of the Department of Community Affairs, is trying to re-design the medical-dental school site which has been the source of recent protests in the Negro community. Mr. Ylvisaker is meeting with resistance from the Newark Medical Dental School Board and the Newark Mayor, Hugh Addonizio.
4. Police-community relations remains one of Newark's major problems. No action has been hinted by the city that would discipline any police officer whose misconduct was observed during the disturbance. Isolated police harassment incidents are reportedly occurring with significant regularity in the Negro community.
5. Recall petitions have been printed and are now being circulated throughout the City of Newark in an effort to recall Mayor Addonizio. Approximately 25,000 signatures are needed to place the recall issue on the ballot; this will probably be achieved. Simultaneously, a voter registration drive is being waged in the Negro wards. Mayor Addonizio, of course, is reacting as though the Negro community has turned on him and rejects the concept of grass root citizen participation. His response, however natural, is producing a much more volatile situation in the city.

Tensions are still high in the Negro community; this results primarily from the fact that there has been little recognition by anyone as to what the riot was all about and as to the root causes of it. Some hope appeared shortly after the disturbances were ended because of the nationwide interest generated into Newark. However, since Detroit went up shortly thereafter the attention that had been focused on Newark quickly dissipated and never returned. As a result despair is ever present.

Lawrence S. Hoffheimer

Feb - R. J. T.

2

CIVIL DISTURBANCE IN NEWARK, NEW JERSEY
JULY 12 - 17, 1967

The period of time covered by this analysis is from Wednesday Evening, July 12, 1967, subsequent to the arrest of John William Smith, until Monday Afternoon, July 17, 1967 when Governor Richard J. Hughes declared the end of an emergency that had been imposed by proclamation on Friday, July 14, 1967.

The scope of this analysis is limited because of the time factor and detailed evaluations have still to be made; reports on arrests have been obtained from the Newark Police Department.

Number of Dead: 26	Number of Injured: 1,200
Number of Persons Arrested: 1,465	Firearms seized: 60
Property Damage : \$30m	Law Enforcement Personnel involved: 4,700 (City & State Police, National Guard)

Arrest Analysis

Male : 1,319	Female : 146
Negro : 1,394	White : 50 Puerto Rican : 21
18 years and under : 355	19 years and under 25 : 489 Over 25 : 621

Newark Police Department Records indicate that of those arrested, 296 had prior convictions, 60 had been arrested before and 284 persons had "undetermined disposition " notations. A total of 640 persons.

Origin of those arrested: City of Newark: 408 Other N. J. Cities: 122
Other States : 935

States contributing 50 or more to Arrest figures : Alabama:70 Florida:59
Georgia : 147 North Carolina : 200 South Carolina : 128 Virginia : 101

Offenses: Against Property : 1,071 Involving Weapons : 91 Assault : 46
Interference with Police : 20 Disorderly Persons : 174

Offenses involving Firearms : 41 of whom 2 were under 18, 10 under 25 and 29 over that age. Eighteen of this group had prior Police Records.

Offenses involving Weapons : 90 males and 1 female were arrested, of these 74 were Negro, 11 White and 6 Puerto Rican. 73 of this group were residents of New Jersey and 60 over the age of 25.

10

Preliminary Analysis of Statements Concerning
Law Enforcement During Newark Riots

Prepared for the Use of the
Newark Human Rights Commission
By the Newark Legal Services Project

A. The Statements: The following analysis is based upon the first 225 statements given to Newark Legal Services Project attorneys, law students or VISTA workers assigned to Newark Legal Services Project. For the most part, the statements were given by apparently law abiding people who had nothing to do with the riots, looting or any other form of lawlessness. They include the owners of small businesses. They include people who have lived in Newark for many years who spent the period of disorder in or about their apartments or going to or from their jobs, families or friends. It is possible that explanations or refutations can be given to some of the 225 statements, but in their totality, they present enough material to require a thorough investigation.

Method: Newark Legal Services Project has taken the statements from the persons giving them and has had them typed in affidavit form. It is now in the process of hearing the persons who gave the statements review them and swear to them. Where it appears that an identifiable law enforcement officer has committed a crime, the person interviewed is asked to turn the data over to governmental authorities such as the FBI or the Prosecutor. All the material is being reviewed, studied and analyzed to determine what remedies are available.

In general, the statements suggest that there are

fair forms of conduct on the part of law enforcement personnel which have aroused the ghetto community, namely: (i) personal indignities inflicted upon Negroes, (ii) physical violence inflicted upon Negroes, (iii) indiscriminate shooting and (iv) deliberate destruction of Negro property.

B. Personal Indignities: Twenty-one statements described personal indignities inflicted upon Negroes by law enforcement people. They did not include those situations where the personal indignities were accompanied by violence against the person. These indignities included use of unprintable names when referring to or addressing Negroes, abusive language, threats of killing or bodily injury, abusive searching of the person, false arrests on trumped up charges, stripping a young boy and sending him out into the streets naked, and minor physical mistreatment which did not cause substantial injury. The statements attributed such actions to the following agencies:

Newark Police alone	11
State Police alone	7
National Guard alone	2
State Police and National Guard	1

C. Physical Violence: The physical violence inflicted upon Negroes is described in forty-five statements, each given by a person who was a victim of such violence or given by a person who saw such violence being committed.

The statements attributed such violence to the following agencies:

Newark Police alone	29
---------------------	----

State Police alone	2
National Guard alone	1
State Police and Newark Police	6
State Police and National Guard	1
Newark Police and National Guard	2
Unspecified	4

The violence consisted of hitting victims with rifle butts, fists or blackjacks, shooting, stomping or beating victims. It was committed against men, women and children. The actions took place on the street, in patrol cars and at the station house.

D. Indiscriminate Shooting: There are 86 statements which describe indiscriminate shooting by law enforcement personnel. It should be noted that many of these statements describe the same event or series of events. It should also be noted that there are not included in these statements those which involved deliberate shooting which was intended to destroy Negro property.

The indiscriminate shooting included random shooting in the air, shooting at houses and into doors and windows, spraying housing projects with bullets, shooting down streets and at cars, shooting at or around groups of people, including children at play.

Such conduct was attributed to the following agencies by the following number of statements:

Newark Police alone	21
State Police alone	32
National Guard alone	8
State Police and Newark Police	2

State Police and National Guard	13
Newark Police and National Guard	0
Unspecified	10

Among the injuries and deaths caused by such shooting were the following: James Sneed was shot in the side while fixing his car. Carl Green, a child, was shot in his right eye as he entered his home. His sight is gone in that eye. Ricardo Alicia was shot in his neck and shoulder while in the home of a friend. Rebecca Brown was killed in her apartment. An unknown man carrying a six-pack of beer was shot. Jasper Harley was shot in the thigh. An unidentified man was shot while telephoning in a telephone booth. Emerson Moss' 10-year-old son was shot and killed while riding in the back seat of his father's car. A mother of ten children was shot and killed in her apartment. One man was shot in the arm and another in the stomach when the Newark Police fired at a peaceful group of people standing with Father Drazel, Rector of Newark's House of Prayer. Cornelius Murray, Jr., was shot and killed as he tried to get to his car. Mrs. Abraham was shot and killed as she searched for her son on the street. Issac Harrison was fatally shot and his son Virgil wounded as they walked along the street. All of the above shooting was done by law enforcement personnel.

E. Destruction of Negro Property: Eighty-four statements describe the deliberate destruction of Negro property. Most of these (78) involved the destruction of business properties, which were identifiable because the words "Soul" or "Soul Brother" or "Soul Sister" had been

written on the windows. Five incidents involved damage to apartments and their contents and two involved thefts of property.

Most of the destruction was effected by shooting into store windows or by smashing the windows with rifle butts. There are statements which describe jeeps or police cars slowly driving along a street and systematically shooting each store identified as a Negro store. In some cases, areas where no stores, white owned or Negro owned, had been injured, the windows of all Negro stores were smashed by law enforcement personnel.

The types of businesses subjected to this treatment were a record shop, a funeral parlor, luncheonettes, restaurants, bars and grilles, TV and appliance stores, furniture stores, a photography shop, beauty parlors, a pet shop, a pool room, a laundromat, a dry-cleaning store, a grocery, a tailor shop and a general contractor's office.

The agencies to whom these actions were attributed were the following:

Newark Police alone	3
State Police alone	37
National Guard alone	7
State Police and Newark Police	6
State Police and National Guard	4
Newark Police and National Guard	2
State and Newark Police and National Guard	2
Unspecified	23

III Incident

#16
19

NEWARK FILE: REPORT OF NEWARK POLICE DEPARTMENT ON
INCIDENT LEADING TO RIOT AND CERTAIN ASPECTS OF RIOT
(EX. 24)

3 A copy of the detailed police report describing the incident that led to the Newark riot is filed with the Commission as Exhibit 24.

Briefly summarized; John W. Smith, a taxi driver, was observed by two police patrolmen tailgating the police car. When stopped, at 9:30 p.m. on Wednesday, July 12, Smith used obscene language, would not enter the police car when advised he was under arrest, hit one policeman in the mouth, had to be forced into the car, continued struggling, had to be dragged from the car at the Fourth Precinct Station House and carried into the station. He was charged with Assault and Battery, Resisting Arrest, and use of loud and abusive language. At 11:05 p.m. Smith was removed from the Fourth Precinct Station to a hospital, where he was treated, and then taken to a cell at police headquarters.

The medical reports (which are not fully legible) appear to confirm the summary in the police report that (1) Smith was found to have a cracked rib but no head injury; (2) one of the policemen had a superficial cut on his lip, and the other had a knee abrasion.

By 10:15 p.m. a crowd of from 200-300 people had gathered at the Fourth Precinct Station House, chanting for Smith's release (note that Smith was not stopped until 9:30 p.m.). The crowd grew in size, and the first firebomb was thrown at the station house at 11:40 p.m. The crowds in that area were finally dispersed at 4:30 a.m. on Friday. A second gathering had taken place in front of City Hall, where approximately 25 taxicabs had converged, discharging their drivers and passengers who were also protesting the incident.

Smith apparently was not questioned until 11:15 a.m. Friday in the presence of two members of the Newark Human Relations Commission, who were also permitted to speak privately with Smith. Smith was issued a traffic summons for following too close with his auto, for driving while on the revoked list, and for driving on the wrong side of the street. The municipal court magistrate, before whom Smith was taken at 12:30 p.m. Friday, referred the matter to the Essex County Grand Jury, and set bail at \$1,000 for Assault and Battery and \$250 for driving while on the Revoked List. Smith was released in the custody of his lawyer at 7 p.m. on July 13. Later he was indicted for Assault and Battery on police officers. He did not appear to answer traffic charges. Ex. 24.

V-I . Form + content of rioting

5-1

The report of the Newark Police Department contains an itemized list of every reported sniping incident to which the Newark police, the state police, or the National Guard were sent to investigate. A total of 235 incidents were investigated, occurring as follows: July 13, one incident; July 14, 43 incidents; July 15, 92 incidents; July 16, 75 incidents; July 17, 23 incidents; July 18, one incident. The police report acknowledges that there are duplications in the list and some incidents not directly related to the riot, in addition to numerous false alarms. Ex. 24.

X Deaths/injuries

10

The report of the Newark Police Department contains an itemized account of the information then known about each of the deaths occurring during the rioting. There were 23 deaths attributed to gunshot wounds directly connected with the riot; one death caused by an automobile collision involving a fire truck; 3 additional deaths had little or no relationship to the riot (a heart attack, an overdose of narcotics, and a fratricide). Ex. 24.

NEWARK

9/15/67

Current Activities - The AUSA reports that extremist activity still remains as evidenced by the distribution of leaflets containing a photograph of James Rutledge's mutilated body accompanied by a call for Negroes to engage in violence. A suit is pending in this city whereby the plaintiffs are attempting to have a receiver appointed to run the police department, claiming that the authorities in the police department are unable to quell police brutality. Eight hundred and one persons were indicted as a result of the rioting. The vast majority of those indicted were released on either low bail or personal recognizance.

Recent Violence - None reported.

Evaluation - The AUSA feels that the relationship between the Negro community and the city administration appears to be unchanged between them and no significant steps have been taken to resolve problems which the Negro community feels underlie the racial tensions here.

Coming Events - None reported.

57)

NEWARK

7/14/67

Current Activities - AUSA reports that the controversy concerning the appointment of a successor to the secretary of the Board of Education was terminated upon the announcement by the present secretary that he has withdrawn his resignation.

The Planning Board has terminated its blight hearings concerning the location of the medical school in Newark, although it was apparent that opponents were attempting to prolong the hearings by submitting a long list of possible speakers. When the announcement that the hearings were ended was made, there appeared to be no serious protest. Opponents of the school site have announced that they will continue court action to block any action by the city to approve the destruction of the largely Negro neighborhood in which the school will be located.

Small scale demonstrations have been held by local welfare recipient groups with little public response.

Recent Violence - AUSA reports that on July 8, in the early morning, fighting broke out in East Orange in an area contiguous with Newark. The trouble started when two East Orange policemen went to a private residence for the purpose of answering a report that its occupants were creating a disturbance. The two officers were confronted by ten Negroes who refused to cooperate. Newark police who were standing across the street within the boundaries of Newark went to the assistance of the East Orange policemen. Fighting erupted, resulting in serious injury to one policeman and the necessity for medical treatment of others. Approximately 9 policemen were involved and 11 Negroes were arrested. Numerous reports of police brutality were expressed by the local chapter of CORE and NAACP. However neither the AUSA nor FBI have received any complaints as yet.

Evaluation - AUSA states that there appears to be no immediate potential for continued violence in the area. He feels that if there is no immediate response to the recent violence mentioned above, the uneasiness should disappear. However, the Newark and East Orange police are on a standby basis.

The issues of the medical school and the Board of Education appointments which only recently inflamed the Negro community have subsided, but the possibility of violence cannot be overlooked.

Current Events - AUSA feels that the cancellation of George Wallace's appearance in the city has greatly reduced the possibility of violence resulting from a confrontation of extreme conservatives and the representatives of the Black Power movement, who are

scheduled to hold a conference on July 20 in Newark. There have been no indications of violence directly associated with the National Conference on Black Power, but the AUSA is closely monitoring the reaction of the Negro community to that meeting.

14
7/7/67

Current Activities - AUSA reports that the critical situation surrounding the appointment of a Secretary to the Board of Education has subsided due to the announcement by the current Secretary, Arnold M. Hess, that he is withdrawing his resignation. Meetings immediately preceding his announcement were marked by disturbances resulting from Negro support of William Parker and opposition to the mayor's candidate, James T. Callaghan. At one point there were indications that Stokely Carmichael would attend the meeting scheduled for June 27, but he never showed up. Predictions of rioting came from Robert Curven, local CORE President, George C. Richardson, former Democratic Assemblyman from Essex County, and Colonel Hassan Jerud Ahmed of the Black Man's Volunteer Army of Liberation. Due to Hess' action, however, the issue seems to be postponed if not resolved.

The terms of three members of the Board of Education expired on June 30. The names of five Negro candidates were submitted to the mayor who appointed one Negro, Dr. Ernest Wyman Garrett and reappointed two white members. There appears to be no adverse reaction to the new appointments by the Board.

AUSA reports that Fred Means, head of local teacher's organization, has voiced complaints concerning alleged discrimination in hiring personnel for the local Head Start Programs. At present there seems to be no reaction in the Negro community to that accusation.

The Planning Board hearings concerning the proposed location of the medical school in Newark are continuing, and it appears as though the strong Negro opposition is winning.

A long list of speakers has been submitted in an apparent attempt to force the Planning Board to cut off the debate, but the Planning Board has continued its hearings and the crowds in attendance have grown progressively smaller. July 10 has been set as the final date for the submission of statements in opposition to the proposed location of the medical school.

The city of Newark in conjunction with the United Community Corps, the local anti-poverty agency, has set up a 4.3 million dollar program directed at solving unemployment problems in the areas of Newark where unemployment is most critical.

Recent Violence - AUSA states that except for sporadic outbreaks of violence in largely Negro neighborhoods, unrelated to any issues mentioned above, there has been no substantial violence in the area.

Evaluation - AUSA feels that with the Board of Education problem apparently resolved, there remain two areas subject to agitation which could result in trouble. They are the meeting of the National Conference on Black Power coupled with the speech of George Wallace which are scheduled for July 22, and the Planning Board's meeting concerning the location of the medical school in Newark, which would appear to be in a status quo until at least July 10.

Coming Events - AUSA reports that former Essex County Assemblyman George C. Richardson has submitted an application to the Police Commissioner for a permit to picket the Hotel Robert Trent in downtown Newark on July 27, at which time George Wallace is scheduled to speak. The Police Commissioner is currently reviewing the application to determine the possibility of violence as a result of such picketing.

The National Conference on Black Power which is scheduled to meet at the same time in a hotel in close proximity with the Robert Trent has indicated its position will be to ignore Wallace's presence. Adam Clayton Powell has announced that he might attend the National Conference on Black Power.

6/30/67

15

Current Activities - AUSA reports that the Newark Planning Board, which is considering a location of a medical school, is continuing its hearings with no present indication of a termination date. There have been no incidents occurring at recent meetings, where numerous speakers indicated strong opposition to the medical school site. Although "Colonel" Hassan of the Black Man's Volunteer Liberation Army attends most meetings, his activities have not been of an inflammatory nature recently. On June 23, the Superior Court, Chancery Division, denied an injunction which was sought by Newark's Anti-Poverty Agency in an attempt to terminate the hearings.

The Board of Education meetings are also continuing with the purpose of electing a secretary to the Board of Education. James T. Callaghan, who has the support of the city administration, appears likely to be elected. Wilbur Parker, who has the strong support of Negro groups in Newark, is Callaghan's opponent. The election is to take place on June 27, at which time a large Negro turnout is anticipated. The State Attorney General, Arthur Sillo, has been asked to intervene in order to assure that the meeting will be conducted in an orderly fashion, but has expressed the belief that the Newark Police will be able to handle the situation. It should be noted also that on June 30 the terms of the three members of the Board of Education will expire. Names of the Negro candidates for these three positions have been submitted to the city.

Recent Violence - None reported.

Evaluation - AUSA feels that the tension generated by both the Planning Board and the Board of Education issue has abated somewhat during the past week. However, the election of Callaghan to the Board of Education or an abrupt end to debate on the medical school issue could spark a violent reaction among Negroes, who have thus far attempted to utilize lawful channels to express opposition to the position taken by the city administration.

Leading Events - AUSA reports that a meeting of the Board of Education is scheduled for June 27.

Ex-Governor Wallace of Alabama is scheduled to speak in Newark on July 22. On the same night, a meeting of the National Conference on Black Power is scheduled at a nearby hotel. Although there has not been any overt threat of violence, the volatile nature of the situation is obvious.

6/23/67

16

Current Activities - AUSA reports that a meeting of the Planning Board is scheduled for June 28, concerning the location of the Medical School in the downtown Newark area. The Planning Board has established the policy of permitting an unlimited number of speakers to address that body concerning the Medical School question. However, the Board ~~does~~ require prior notification of the names of each speaker and has limited each to one-half hour with an additional ten minutes for summary. Thus far the list of speakers has grown to around 200, which indicates that the opponents of the Medical School are attempting to force the Planning Board to cut off the debate.

Recent Violence - None

Evaluation - AUSA states that an election was held within the group which is primarily responsible for the opposition to the Medical School, resulting in leadership which is considered to be more moderate. AUSA feels it is too early to determine at this time whether there will be a tactical change in its opposition to the construction of the Medical School.

Coming Events - The Planning Board has scheduled more meetings in an attempt to resolve this problem.

NEWARK

Justice Dept 17
Gannett
Project 6/16/67 #4

Current Activities - The AUSA reports that currently there are two areas which have engendered public protest. These are:

- (1) The nomination of a certain James A. Callaghan to succeed a retiring Secretary of the Newark Board of Education; and
- (2) The hearings by the Newark Planning Board to determine that the proposed New Jersey College of Medicine site is a blighted area.

With regard to the nominating of Callaghan, the AUSA reports that the Negroes feel that this is a political deal by the Mayor. The Negro leaders objected to Callaghan's lack of background in educational matters and referred to his personal educational background [no college education]

In line with their recent demands for more supervisory and top administrative positions in the Newark School System, the Negroes have recommended that a Negro, William Parker, the City Budget Director be considered for the position. Parker is a Certified Public Accountant and a graduate of Cornell University.

At a recent Board of Education meeting, there was an overflow crowd of Negro leaders, both of the Nationalist and so-called Conservative types. There was considerable disorder. No final decision has yet been made as to the nomination of Callaghan.

The AUSA reports that the second more explosive area of protest concerns the location of the New Jersey College of Medicine and Dentistry in Newark.

The Bureau has advised that on the April 2, 1967 issue of the Newark Sunday News, there was an article concerning Clinton Hobson Boy. The article indicates that Boy is running the Black Liberation Center in Newark to protest the erection of the new medical school. This center has on its windows signs and posters concerning "Operation We Ain't Gonna Move."

The AUSA reports that the primary objection of some of the Negro Civil Rights and Negro political leaders have been that this is an attempt by the establishment to cut into Negro voting power by dislocating Negro voters and to build a wall around the areas now occupied by Negroes, thus in effect, creating a "Negro Ghetto."

At the Planning Board's meeting which began on Monday, June 12, a well organized Negro group led by former Democratic Assemblyman George Richardson, conducted a four hour filibuster. The meeting was then adjourned until Tuesday. On Tuesday, the meeting was interperced

with outbreaks of shouting, and threats were made that violence would occur if the city went ahead with plans to locate the medical school in this area.

In the meeting which occurred on Tuesday, it was discovered that the Newark Police were taping the proceedings. After an uproar, the tapes were turned over to the Newark Human Rights Commission. They then visited the U.S. Attorney's Office and requested them to keep the tapes. However, it was decided that this Office did not have the authority to keep the tapes, and the parties boxed, sealed and mailed the tapes to themselves, the purpose being that no one would tamper with them.

Recent Violence - None reported.

Evaluation - The AUSA reported that with the continuation of the Planning Board's meeting, uneasiness would probably follow. Negro leaders have vowed that violence would break out this summer if a medical school is built in Newark.

The Bureau indicates that as each day passes, tension grows.

Coming Events - There will be more meetings of the Board of Education and Planning Board with the hope of ironing out the difficulties. If these difficulties cannot be properly settled, then violence may erupt.



CS

STATE OF NEW JERSEY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ARMORY DRIVE, P. O. BOX 979
TRENTON, N. J. 08625

22 August 1967.

SUBJECT: Operational Report, Newark, N.J., Period 14 thru 17 July 1967

TO: Chief,
National Guard Bureau
Washington, D.C. 20310

SECTION 1

1. The Chief of Staff, Major General James F. Cantwell, received a telephone call at the Camp Grounds, Sea Girt, New Jersey from Governor Hughes, 140255 July 1967. The Governor stated that a riot was occurring in Newark, New Jersey, that he had ordered in the State Police, and directed General Cantwell to order the National Guard to duty in accordance with prearranged plans.

2. To provide adequate and immediate direct support to the State Police, three brigade headquarters and headquarters companies, four infantry battalions, one reconnaissance battalion, one artillery battalion and one MP company were ordered mobilized at home stations, effective 140330 July 1967. Criteria for selection of units was battalion strengths, mobility, location and retaining an available reserve of unmobilized NJARNG forces for employment in any of several other potential trouble areas in the State.

3. General Cantwell and Colonel W.R. Sharp, (Director, Operations and Training, Department of Defense,) departed Sea Girt by aircraft via Newark Airport and State Police pickup, arrived at pre-planned Command Post, Cavalry Armory, Roseville Avenue, Newark, New Jersey, at 0430 hours. Other needed personnel present at Sea Girt departed for Newark by sedan. Superintendent of State Police was present at Command Post and Governor Hughes arrived approximately 0500 hours.

4. A daylight (140730 July) area reconnaissance by the Governor, The Chief of Staff, DOD, N.J., the Superintendent, N.J. State Police, the Mayor of Newark, accompanied by principal staff members and senior executives of the City and County, showed the trouble zone consisted of an area 36 blocks by 24 blocks extending from the Newark City line on the west to High Street and Elizabeth Avenue on the east and from Central Avenue on the north to Lyons Avenue on the South, with the greatest volume of disorder centered along three principal east-west through streets - South Orange Avenue, Springfield Avenue and Clinton Ave. (See map - Incl 1).

CS

22 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report, Newark, N.J., Period 14 thru 17 July 1967

5. Following the reconnaissance, the command group (The Governor, The Chief of Staff DOD NJ, The Superintendent NJ State Police) in coordination with city police and civil authorities decided on the following operational plan:

a. Seal off the trouble area by employing NJARNG to establish road blocks at each street intersection of the perimeter; permit free entrance and exit to pedestrians; deny entrance to vehicular traffic except for bonafide area residents and employees of essential industry and services in the area; vehicular entrance permitted at 19 selected identification check points (see map Incl 1) on the perimeter manned by Newark Policemen familiar with the area; vehicles to be searched on entering. This required 137 road blocks and check points. Road blocks to be posted by a minimum of three (3) Guardsmen and check points manned by at least one (1) Policeman and two (2) Guardsmen.

b. Establish NJARNG dismounted patrols of one squad (10 to 12 men per squad) per block on Clinton Ave. and Springfield Ave. from the intersection of South 10th Street east to High Street on each of the two avenues to protect private property from further loss or damage. (See map Incl 1). This required 39 Squads.

c. Establish on each of Clinton Ave. and Springfield Ave. two (2) twenty five (25) man NJARNG motorized patrols to provide mobile support forces for the dismounted patrols in 4b above. The motorized patrols were to move along the street covering each from the west city line east to High Street. (See map Incl).

d. Establish and employ joint NJ State Police - NJARNG motorized patrols to patrol the perimeters of seven sectors (See map Incl 1).
Patrol consist:

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Personnel</u>
1 State Police Sedan	3 State Trooper 1 Newark Policeman (Guide)
1 1/4 ton 4X4	3 EM NJARNG
1 2½ Ton 6X6 (to transport prisoners)	2 EM NJARNG 2 State Troopers (Arrest team)
1 State Police Sedan	2 State Troopers 1 EM NJARNG

CS

22 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report, Newark, N.J., Period 14 thru 17 July 1967

Two patrols per sector boundary. Direction of patrol movement to alternate in adjacent sectors. Patrols provide support to dismounted street patrols and road blocks in sector and to move to trouble spots within sector on order. (See map Incl 1).

e. Retain small, mobile reserve in each brigade task force and NJ State Police for emergency employment.

6. The trouble area was divided into two sub areas with Bergen Street running north to south as the sub area boundary.

7. HHC 2d Bde, 50th Armd Div with 5/117 Cav and 2/112 Arty attached was assigned the West Sub Area to execute tasks 4a, b, d and e above, and HHC 3d Bde, 50th Armd Div with 1/113 Inf and 2/113 Inf attached was assigned the same tasks in East Sub Area. 50th MP Co was assigned task 4c above in direct support of each brigade in sub area concerned.

8. Mobilized units (-HHC 1st Bde, 1/114 Inf, 2/114 Inf) moved from home stations and closed in assembly areas in Newark and East Orange by 141000 July, and were generally in place and executing missions by 141200 July.

9. Movement to assigned positions was slowed by dense traffic jams on east-west and north-south through streets caused by debris littered streets, curiosity seekers and normal through traffic. This was effectively reduced by execution of assigned tasks.

10. HHC 1st Bde with 1/114 Inf and 2/114 Inf was ordered to move from home stations in southern New Jersey to assembly areas in Westfield and West Orange; to complete the move and be prepared for employment in the Newark Area by 141730 July. This was accomplished without incident.

11. The operation achieved its purpose of ending looting, burning and other disorders generally by nightfall. However, during the night of Friday-Saturday, 14-15 July, Guardsmen, State Troopers, Newark Policemen and Firemen and citizens were subjected to numerous attacks by snipers in the areas along Clinton Avenue and Springfield Avenue, Bergen Street, Belmont Avenue and several other widely scattered areas of the city. The fire was delivered from apartments and roof tops of high-rise public housing apartments and other vantage points. It was brief in time length and deliberately or otherwise inaccurate. Choice targets of attack were firehouses, fire-fighting equipment, police stations, the city hospital, police cars and mobile patrol vehicles. Searches of areas from which snipers operated indicated the snipers were probably relatively few in numbers and moved away quickly when fire was returned and resumed operations from a new location - a guerrilla type activity carried on in the midst of a relatively friendly population. Sniping continued into the daylight hours of Saturday, 15 July.

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12. At 150001 July an Engineer Bn, an Armor Bn, and an Artillery Bn were directed to mobilize at home stations and prepare for employment in the Newark area. These units were moved to assembly areas in the vicinity of Newark closing in by 150500 July.

13. The 2d and 3d Brigades were relieved in place by the 1st Bde with 1/114 Inf, 2/114 Inf (-), 2/50 Armor, 3/112 Arty, and the 104th Engr Bn attached effective 160600 July.

14. In addition to the tasks set forth in par 4 above, NJARNG forces supported Newark civil authorities in providing security details for fire fighting equipment, public utilities repair equipment, fire houses and mobile fire equipment, an improvised auxiliary county jail, the city hospital, warehouses of foodstuff, liquor, medicines including drugs and supermarkets not yet molested; a water reservoir and in putting down numerous small attempts at looting in widely scattered locations throughout the city.

15. Information of the situation and knowledge of the area gained during operations and the stabilization of the situation by Sunday morning permitted the establishment of permanent areas of responsibilities to commands, standardization of patrols and provision for more responsive mobile reserves within each area. This system insured continuity of all operations and more effective command supervision of and within sub area and sector levels. This plan was implemented by 1700 hours Sunday 16 July to remain effective for the duration of the emergency.

16. The operations during the night of Saturday-Sunday repeated those of the preceding night, with an added mission of organizing rooftop details of one State Trooper and four selected National Guard riflemen to be emplaced on selected rooftops commanding the areas from which the most frequent sniper fire had been received. These numbered fourteen (14) positions shown on map, Incl 1. In response to indications of probable attempts at disturbances in the quiet northern sector of Newark, the New Jersey State Police organized roving patrols of the area and the 3d Bde employed a motorized patrol of Broadway from Bloomfield Avenue on the south to the Newark City line on the north. (See map Incl 1.) Broadway is a shopping area.

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17. Disturbances and sniper fire decreased markedly on Saturday-Sunday night and further on Sunday-Monday night to the point where on Monday it was the opinion of the Governor that the State Police and the NJARNG were no longer required to support the civil authorities in Newark. All engaged troops were withdrawn except the 50th MP Company, and had returned to home stations by 172230 July 67. Elements of the 102d Cavalry Regiment Headquarters and one Squadron stationed in Essex County were ordered to active duty at West Orange to discharge additional missions as they might arise in Newark, Plainfield and other threatening areas. The 50th MP Company was dispatched to Plainfield for immediate support of the New Jersey State Police in that area.

18. Of significant value in controlling the activities of the disturbing elements in the City of Newark was the proclamation and curfew order issued by the Governor of New Jersey on 14 July. This action closed all places dealing in alcoholic beverages, prohibited movement of vehicular traffic during the hours of 2200 and 0600; prohibited civilians being on the streets between 2300 and 0600; prohibited possession of alcoholic beverages, narcotics, fire arms or explosives of any kind, and ordered the State Police and NJARNG to take any and all measures to quell disturbances and outbreaks of violence, to secure areas within the City of Newark and generally to take all actions necessary to implement and effectuate his regulations.

19. Lessons learned in this operation:

a. While great reliance must be made on local civil authorities for initial intelligence, knowledge of the existing situation, information of the area, guides for movement into and about the area, requests for specific types of support and close coordination of operational activities; these are not always readily available and their unavailability serves as a serious obstacle to rapid formulation and implementation of plans.

b. Although the DOD-NJ and NJARNG commanders had established close personal and professional relationships with commanders and staff personnel of the New Jersey State Police over a period of two years preceding this operation, and plans had been jointly prepared for use of the NJARNG in direct support of the State Police, the execution of plans was delayed by a reluctance of local authority to recognize the full extent of the difficulty until damage had been done over a wide area and the difficulty encountered in getting intelligence quickly from local authorities already heavily committed. Future planning must emphasize the necessity for local authorities providing supporting forces with prompt intelligence.

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c. The community being aided, and adjoining communities with similar problems, become anxious at such times and attempt to overcome deficiencies in equipment required in this type emergency (gas masks, rifles, carbines, armored vests, ammunition, radios, vehicles, etc.) They solicit aid from a wide variety of federal agencies all of which are usually replied to by referring the requestor to The Chief of Staff, Department of Defense-NJ. Sometimes the ambitious person works from this channel and higher governmental echelons at the same time. This adds to the general confusion. It is suggested that efforts be made to advise community civilian officials that their requests for support will achieve a more rapid response if they are addressed initially to The Chief of Staff (The Adjutant General) for evaluation, and subsequent appropriate channeling. This will place all requests in one channel to be made to the federal agencies from one source. Further, it is urged that communities be encouraged to evaluate their equipment status for public safety operations in a civil disturbance environment involving guerrilla-sniper tactics, and where required, take early action to remedy deficiencies disclosed.

d. The early issuance of strong unmistakable proclamations of emergencies and compatible orders by civil authorities restricting sales of alcoholic beverages, weapons, ammunition, movement of vehicles and persons and cloaking law enforcement agencies with ample power to deal with lawless acts and violations of emergency regulations is an effective weapon in controlling and terminating widespread acts of violence and disorder.

e. The use of guerrilla sniper tactics in widespread civil disturbances requires the development of new techniques for employment against these agents in our cities. The sniper tactic employs an insignificant number of persons to harrass and jeopardize the welfare and physical and personal security of a preponderance of the local law abiding citizenry. The operation reported herein differed from any covered by existing military publications in that there were no large crowds to be dealt with, there was no discernable leadership to be apprehended and denied a mob. Acts of lawlessness and disorder were committed over wide areas by relatively small groups. The lawless pick their time and place, and the sniper does his damage. He then slips away in the dark or loses himself amidst the populace to employ his tactic at another opportuna time and place. This requires coverage of large general areas and extra security for known selected targets. It also results in an apparent overcommitting of forces in combating him or denying to him his objective of disrupting public safety and public service agencies. The presence of mass military and police power apparently deterred resumption of mass crowd actions.

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f. Dispersal of forces over wide areas in small increments (squads, fire teams, fire apparatus security details) emphasizes the need for additional training of small unit leaders.

g. Saturation of the whole of the trouble area with a strong force of State Police and military units was effective in ending looting, burning and disorders other than sniper fire after dark. This was true to the extent that the support forces possibly could have been withdrawn from Newark at least one day earlier than they were.

h. Foot patrols in extended, heavily populated areas must be closely supported by strong, highly mobile, rapidly responsive reserve forces to preclude the foot patrol from becoming engulfed and lost in any sudden localized mob action. The mobile reserve force must move throughout the area constantly. Its very presence is a deterrent to reviving mob activity.

i. The presence of and/or the introduction of the armored personnel carrier (weapons unloaded) in mobile reserve forces and in localized minor disturbances proved to be a strong deterrent to disorder. The vehicle was also found useful against snipers. Upon its arrival, snipers fled. It was used effectively in delivering relief forces to beleaguered fire houses and searchers to buildings believed to house snipers.

SECTION 2 - Commanders Observations.

20. Training and Organizations. The type civil disturbance experience reported on here indicates training deficiency only in anti-sniper activity in multiple areas of friendly cities and smallest unit command, and control in independent actions in large domestic population centers.

21. A solution to the multi-sniper fire problem may be to employ only trained anti-sniper forces to act against them whenever possible. These teams should be divided into two employment categories: mobile teams operating in SP mobile carriers with highly responsive communications equipment, and stationary teams operating from command positions on rooftops or other vantage points in known or likely sniper activity areas. Anti-sniper teams should be equipped with fire observation optical equipment, and be trained in target detection identification and destruction. Equipment should provide day and night capability. None of the foregoing should preclude the average soldier from defending himself against sniper attack if he returns the fire on identified hostile targets. Finding a sniper hidden among friends in a multi block size fifteen story apartment house containing hundreds of separate apartments is a monumental task at best.


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22. Development of small unit leadership requires opportunity to exercise doctrine and principles. The small unit leadership in this operation improved with time.

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:



SAMUEL F. BRINK
Colonel, NJANG
Adjutant General

2. Incl

1. Map
2. Personnel, Unit
Strength Summary

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UNIT-PERSONNEL SUMMARY
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UNIT*	HOME STATION	ASGD (-REP)	STRENGTHS			
			14	15	16	17
MEIC 1st Bde (Part)	Cherry Hill	102	43	43	47	61
MEIC 2nd Bde	Orange	102	96	96	96	97
MEIC 3d Bde	Paterson	112	99	102	103	104
50 MP Co	Passaic	157	142	146	146	147
2/112 Arty	E. Orange	325	276	282	292	300
1/113 Inf	Jersey City	591	510	555	558	590
2/113 Inf	(Passaic)	610	592	593	602	614
	(Paterson)					
	(Teaneck)					
	(Dumont)					
1/114 Inf	(Woodbury)	642	570	587	590	590
	(Salem)					
	(Pitman)					
	(Mount Holly)					
2/114 Inf	(Cherry Hill)	626	588	630	632	633
	(Burlington)					
	(Bordentown)					
5/117 Cav	(Westfield)	582	548	556	574	575
	(Elizabeth)					
2/50 Armor	(Red Bank)	357	-	286	315	350
	(Toms River)					
104 Engr Bn	Teaneck	729	-	522	608	656
3/112 Arty	(Morristown)	319	-	338	341	343
	(Somerville)					
HHT 102 Cav (Part)	West Orange	52	-	-	-	13
1/102 Cav	Newark	372	-	-	-	285
TOTALS						
	14 July	3849	3464			
	15 July	5254	-	4736		
	16 July	5254	-	-	4934	
	17 July	5678	-	-	-	5367
			90%	90%	93%	94%

*All units except those of 102 Armd Cav Regt are components of 50th Armd Div.

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dtd 22 August 1967