

Nashville, Tennessee

III. Basic Data

A. Arrests & Dispositions

94 arrests , 30 convictions as of Nov., 1967

B. Deaths & Injuries

No deaths.

12 law officers injured, 35 civilians

C. Property Loss and Damage


Number of arson caused fires 19; economic loss under \$100,000.

THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS

1016 16TH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

The attached is a controlled confidential preliminary report submitted by the Nashville Center for Community Studies.

Please return any comments to me in time for their final report which is due January 1, 1968. Thank you.


Dr. Robert Shellow

Summary Analysis of Three Civil Disturbances

Involving Negro College Students:

The Cases of

Nashville, Tennessee;

Jackson, Mississippi; and

Houston, Texas.

Spring, 1967

Neither submitted to, nor approved by,
The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders

A Study Conducted and Report Prepared by

Center for Community Studies

A University Center Affiliate of

The John F. Kennedy Center for Research

on Education and Human Development

George Peabody College for Teachers

Nashville, Tennessee 37203

November, 1967

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Center for Community Studies

The Center for Community Studies was formed in September, 1966, as a result of interest in several academic departments in Meharry Medical College, Vanderbilt University, and Peabody College, and at the Nashville Mental Health Center, in having an inter-institutional center for the coordination of research directed toward the Nashville Community. The departments included psychiatry, psychology, and sociology with their several approaches and interests in human behavior in its natural location, the community. The Center has as its primary purpose the provision for interdisciplinary discussion and inquiry about human social problems. It is planned that the Center should become the operating base for both substantive and descriptive studies of the community processes and structures for handling problems of individual adjustment and behavior. It aspires to provide a skilled supporting staff, collections of background data, and contacts from which data might be efficiently obtained.

During the fall, 1966, the Center for Community Studies became affiliated with the John F. Kennedy Center for Research on Education and Human Development. In the spring of 1967 the Executive Board was expanded to include social scientists from Fisk University, Tennessee A & I State University, University of Tennessee School of Social Work and the Council of Community Services. The Center for Community Studies is continuing its development as an Inter-University organization in the service of interdisciplinary work on individual and community problems in their broadest meaning.

The Center is governed by an executive board which makes policy decisions on all activities of the Center. They are:

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The organizational affiliation of the Executive Board shows the interdisciplinary and inter-institutional nature of the group but does not denote official sponsorship by the department of institution.

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Introduction

This project was directed towards information gathering and analysis of three civil disorders occurring in the spring of 1967 which have two similarities: 1) they seemed primarily to involve Negro college students, and 2) they occurred in late spring in the South. The questions of their similarity to each other, and of the differences from the typical campus disorders occurring in the spring (e.g., panty raids) were of primary interest in this inquiry, along with the description of the anatomy of each disorder.

Method and procedure

The study was based on information collected in two different ways: (1) interviews with a variety of persons within a community and (2) documentary information about the disorder and about the community. The information was collected and processed by a team of social scientists working with a coordinator who bore the responsibility for writing the report on the disorder based on his team's efforts and the documentary information.

Each team of social scientists which did interviewing was from outside each city and came in as strangers to talk with interviewees. The stranger role used here has been shown to facilitate candid and content oriented discussion; the interviewee did not have to be concerned about the interviewer as a member of the local community to whom he must speak in particular ways. In planning for the interviewing, there had to be selection of persons to interview and scheduling of them to be interviewed. As a beginning the administrative staff (Project Coordinator and City Coordinators) drew up a grid which represented important social groups and institutions of the community and levels of

responsibility within them. This is shown in Table 1. Once the grid was made, each city coordinator worked with one or more contact persons in each city to select the persons to represent the cells in the grid. The local contact person also helped in making contacts and appointments. Each team of interviewers was constituted of 6-8 persons who traveled as a group to each city and spent 3-4 days going to talk with interviewees. Typically each team would meet each day to review their experience and to work out assignments for the next day. Interview assignments were made on the basis of the appropriateness of the interviewer; usually two or three interviewers would meet with public officials. Each team was mixed as regards age, race and professional status which allowed for matching of interviewer and interviewee where indicated.

An interview format was devised drawing both from a format provided by the National Advisory Commission of Civil Disorders and on areas deemed appropriate to these particular disorders. A facsimile of the format is in Appendix 1. The interviewer drew areas to discuss from the format as appropriate to each interviewee's position. Interviews ranged in length from 45 minutes to 3 hours. Respondents were guaranteed anonymity; it was ensured by coding of the notes and summaries according to the grid position. It is of interest to note that the respondents in all three cities were very cooperative, even though they had experienced several inquiries on this same disorder.

Representativeness of viewpoint and perspective was the goal of the interviewing. The grid was a systematic way of ensuring the range and appropriateness of coverage. The approach was to regard the information from the respondents as representative of their position in the community--

Table 1

Grid Showing the Elements of the Community and
Levels of Responsibility within Them for Selecting Interviewees

Community Elements	Levels of Responsibility		
	1	2	3
A. University Admin.	president	deans campus police	teachers
B. University Students	leaders	members of orgs.	non-members
C. Police	chief	officers	patrolmen
D. City Government	mayor	dept. heads	councilmen
E. Govt. commissions local/state/fed.			local comm. reps.
F. Negro Community (non-organized)	professional	business	citizen
G. Negro Organization	political	civic-fraternal	
H. Negro Religious	minister bishop	lay leader	
I. Negro Likely Riot participants	high		
J. White Likely Riot participants	high		
K. White Community	professional	business Chamber of Commerce	citizen
L. White Organization	political	civic	civil rights
M. White Church	minister bishop	lay leader	
N. Press	editors owners	bureau chiefs	reporters
O. Litigation	justice dept.	lawyers	litigants
Total			
		Grand Total	

a position which was often unique to that person. Executives and community leaders are small in number and often speak for a body of opinion. It was this body of opinion and viewpoint that was sampled here, and not that based on a statistically drawn random sample of the population. There has been a particular concern in preparing this report that the story highlights the perspective of those not in official and administrative position who have not had the channels of communication to get it told clearly in other ways.

Background considerations

Before considering the disorders in detail, it seems useful and important to review several areas to set the perspective for them. There are (1) the Negro college, (2) the student activist movement and (3) a view of collective disturbances.

The Negro college. There are 123 Negro colleges located almost entirely in the South (except for 2 in Ohio, 2 in Pennsylvania and 1 in Missouri). They enroll about 3% of all college students, but over half of all Negro college students.¹ Jencks and Reisman describe them as ranging from poor to quite good compared to each other, but are academically inferior to most white colleges. They are often captive of the administration (if private) or of the state and local government (if public). The atmosphere is usually authoritarian and repressive with an emphasis on student and faculty conformity and passivity. The administration often feels very insecure and caught between the campus

¹Earl J. McGrath. The predominantly Negro colleges and universities in transition. New York: Columbia University Press, 1965.

pressures for change and freedom on the one hand and the community pressures for order on the other.²

This study is concerned with five of the Negro colleges: two in Nashville and Jackson, one in Houston. They are all regarded as being at the top of the Negro colleges in quality. Where there were two, one was public, the other private--with the private schools having the aura of more campus freedom and higher quality of education than the public institution. There seems to be some inter-campus rivalry between the public and private schools in each locality.

The student activist movement. The student activist movement began in 1960 with the sit-ins to desegregate lunch counters. It was organized through two groups, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and later by the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and involved, in the main, Negro students. From this beginning came Freedom Rides in 1961, and community organization in Mississippi around voter registration and local leadership development between 1961 and 1964. This was a movement of students from the campus to the community where they felt their actions could help to make a difference. By 1965 there was a growing disillusionment with the effectiveness and meaningfulness of civil rights goals, and their concern was focussed on the campus with questions about the adequacy of education at Negro colleges, the meaning of education for future opportunities and the meaning to be attached to a growing black consciousness and race pride.

Collective disturbances. Civil disorder as studied in this report can be viewed at two levels: the individual and the organizational.

²Christopher Jencks & David Reisman. The American Negro college. Harvard Educational Review, 1967, 37, 3-60.

It is useful to keep both of these in mind. At the individual level, one is concerned about the role of particular persons, why some participated and others did not, and what particular interests are being served or damaged by this event, which serves as a final common path, a means for expression. At the organizational level, one can think in terms of the community, its structure and function. Viewed at this level, disorder can be seen as a signal that something is wrong with the organization; channels may be closed, structures may not be working so that concerns of persons or groups can be dealt with in an orderly manner. The interpretation of the disorder event will be developed in this report to incorporate both perspectives.

City Reports

Each of the disorders will be summarized and accompanied by an analysis of the event. They are presented in chronological order of the occurrence of the event:

Nashville, Tennessee, April 8-10, 1967

Jackson, Mississippi, May 10-11, 1967

Houston, Texas, May 16-17, 1967

Following the individual report will be a discussion of the salient similarities and differences of the three disorders.

Nashville, Tennessee

Richard A. Peterson, Ph.D.¹
Nashville City Co-coordinator

Chronology of Events

Events leading to the disturbance

In the latter part of 1966 the local police report learning that the local Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee group began to organize youth gangs, began teaching Karate, judo and the use of firearms, began locating white-owned stores in the Negro area for future arson, and began teaching the manufacture of Molotov cocktails. The team inquiry has found no evidence of any of these formal training activities having taken place, and the sequence of events during the time of the disturbance does not show the mark of a singular plan. At that same time SNCC members and adults close to the students report that they began to notice police in marked and unmarked cars following their activities. They also report that for the first time they found concrete evidence of the telephone at the center of local SNCC activities being tapped.

During the fall and winter several student protests were mounted at Fisk and Tennessee State University. The protests focused on questions of poor food and inadequate dormitory facilities. While the specific issues were not unlike those perennially raised on all American college campuses, the belief came to be felt by a broad range of students that these conditions were caused by white dominated administrations. In the fall Stokely Carmichael was first allowed permission

¹This chapter was read and improved by the comments of David G. Berger, Stephen Cobb and Sherman Webster.

to speak on campus and then the permission was withdrawn. Students were quite upset that they could not find who had ordered the invitation withdrawn or the reasons. But it fit the pattern of an administration being pulled by outside strings.

In February, 1967, officials at Fisk and Tennessee State report being "advised by the FBI and the local police" that SNCC was planning to foment a riot to induce the police into acts which could be labeled "police brutality."

During the week of March 17-23, 1967, a National SNCC conference was held at St. Anselm's Episcopal Chapel, adjacent to the Fisk campus. Stokeley Carmichael and other SNCC officials gave impromptu speeches on the Negro campuses during this period. Their activities received full local press coverage with the accent on any inflammatory remarks. On March 25 the editor and publisher of the evening Banner predicted in a front-page editorial that Stokeley Carmichael's presence at a forthcoming Vanderbilt University symposium might touch-off violence and laid the blame for this potential riot on the shoulders of the University's Chancellor. This front page editorial was headed, "Hate-Spielung Carmichael Unwelcome in City." The American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars and the Tennessee State Senate joined in condemning the Carmichael speaking plan during the following week. These actions were featured prominently by the mass media. This set the mood of the white community.

Shortly after the SNCC conference Mayor Briley called a meeting at his offices attended by Reverend James Woodruff, his Bishop, Captain John Sorace and several other persons. The Mayor reportedly asked the

Bishop to get Woodruff to stop allowing church facilities to be used by militant groups or to remove Woodruff from his position. No mutually satisfactory agreement was reached. On April 6, 1967, according to their later testimony, the local police had several riot-equipped police squads stationed at the police station nearest the Negro campuses. The police had riot helmets borrowed from a Michigan State Highway Patrol, shotguns, and teargas available. In addition, an unstated number of policemen were "staked-out around the Negro neighborhood."

On April 6-8 Stokeley Carmichael and George Ware, a National SNCC official, gave speeches at Fisk and Tennessee State. While these were closed to reporters the newspaper headlines were "U. S. Barbaric, Stokeley Claims," "Take Control: Carmichael," "'Might take some dynamite' Ware Told Students at Fisk." The local T.V. reporting equally highlighted the sensational elements. Students present report that the talks focused on chiding students for their absorption in the frivolities of campus social life and their ineffectiveness in standing up to their "white-dominated school administrations in making any effective demands for better education."

Saturday -- the first day

On Saturday, April 8, 1967, at 3:00 P.M. Stokeley Carmichael spoke at the Vanderbilt University "Impact" symposium together with Senator Strom Thurmond, Martin Luther King, columnist Rowland Evans, and poet, Allen Ginsberg. Police surveillance during this period was extensive; there were some 30 uniformed officers and 55 police in civilian clothes present. No riot-equipped squads were in evidence. In his speech Carmichael put forward the Black Power position in strong but low key

terms. The speech was drawn from a SNCC position paper published some months earlier. There were no demonstrations before or after the talk. Two Vanderbilt students lowered a large Confederate flag from the balcony just for a lark. Carmichael responded with a joke and the banner was taken down without incident after a few minutes. After the speech Stokeley Carmichael went to a party in honor of the Impact speakers and then to a party in his honor at the home of a Nashville attorney.

At about 7:00 P.M. that evening the Negro operator of the University Dinner Club, located at 1728 Jefferson Street, across from Fisk University, summoned police because of the presence of a drunk and/or disorderly Negro soldier; by some reports he was simply asleep. In response to the call, two white officers were directed to the restaurant in a patrol car. At about 7:50 P.M. (50 minutes after the original call) the operator of the University Dinner Club called in again requesting that police be sent. When the police arrived in response to the first call, they found that the Negro soldier had gone. The operator of the establishment, however, wished to eject another Negro patron with whom he had quarreled a year earlier. This was done without force, but by at least one account the Negro soldier, who was still in the vicinity, made a number of comments about the state of affairs when Negroes received this sort of treatment by white policemen while his people were fighting in Vietnam. Two different policemen--also white--arrived in answer to the second call and removed the Negro soldier, who by that time, had re-entered the University Dinner Club.

Within 5-8 minutes after the arrival of the second group of officers, and while they were still present, a number of young Negroes (most of

whom were students) appeared and began picketing the University Dinner Club. The signs protested the arbitrary actions of the University Dinner Club operator and the presence of white police. The police indicate that the quick setting up of a picket line complete with placards suggests that this incident was staged by SNCC. The students claim that the signs were made on the spot with materials bought at a dime store on the block. Newspaper reporters and others on the scene affirm that the signs were of a quality that could have been fabricated in minutes. In addition the residence which is used as a local SNCC headquarters is only a few houses from the University Dinner Club. Local SNCC members were present in the group which began the picket but none of the national SNCC personnel were there at this time. The police who had been called to the University Dinner Club left the scene.

The picket might well have dwindled at this point but the police were now responding to the riot-situation for which they had been prepared. A squad of riot helmeted police arrived in the area; they quickly became the focus of increasing attention. The pickets began yelling "Come on; are you going to be a Nigger all your life?" at other students and on-lookers to join their picketing, and the small incident gradually became a pleasantly warm weekend campus "happening." Several of the adult Negroes present sympathetic to SNCC, most notably Reverend James Woodruff, counselled the students to break up the picket line.

Dr. Edwin Mitchell, a Negro community leader and director of the Nashville-Davidson County Human Relations Commission, attempting to bring order to the situation, suggested that the helmeted police be

removed. Within a few minutes this request was complied with. By this time, however, the crowd was growing rapidly. The nearby movie theater changed shows and an increasing number of students bringing their dates to and from the campus swelled the crowd of curious onlookers. Their attention was galvanized by the false rumor that a Negro youth had been beaten by the police and taken from the scene.

The operator of the University Dinner Club met with the leaders of the protesting students. They agreed to recess the meeting to go outside in an attempt to disperse the pickets and growing crowd. This attempt was not fruitful and the milling crowd by this time covered the distance along Jefferson Street to the major intersection with 18th Avenue, North. The only police in the area at this time were several officers attempting to free up traffic caught in the swirl of people. At this point outspoken non-student Negro adults became the center of people's attention.

Apparently police blockades had been set up some distance from the crowd so that vehicular traffic could not enter the area. However, about 9:30 P.M. a city bus was allowed into the intersection where the crowd was gathered. Several informants suggest that the bus was allowed into the area by the police as a point of provocation. A number of people began banging on its side and a young man broke out the window in front of the driver. A number of the students believe that this person was a paid agent-provocateur whose activities are supported by a prominent figure who would politically profit from disorder in the cities. When the window was broken, a Negro police lieutenant fired a warning shot into the air with his revolver. This dispersed the crowd momentarily and the bus proceeded out of the congested area.

Several squads of riot-helmeted police reappeared in the area immediately following this. The helmeted police formed a line across the street between the crowd and the downtown section of Nashville. The crowd began actively taunting the police saving their most nasty comments for the Negro police in the ranks of the helmeted riot squad. A static stand off continued for a few minutes and then about 10:00 P.M. a number of rocks and bottles and other missiles began to be thrown from the back of the crowd at the police. Soon there were 400 police on the scene according to the police.

The number of Negroes apparently varied from 200 to something like 700 and the people making up the Negro crowd was continually changing as students returned to their dormitories and were replaced in the crowd by other students bringing their Saturday night dates home to the campus. Groups of students and relatively young Negroes ranged over an area centered still around Fisk University. The main zone of activity extended along Jefferson Street from 16th Avenue to 23rd Avenue, North, between Scovel Street and Herman Street. The Negroes sporadically threw rocks and the police returned with shotgun fire over their heads. From time to time the police charged into the crowd but since its lines were thin and dormitories were near at hand, no wall of unmoving demonstrators confronted the police. Thus the situation which most easily produces the massive use of police nightsticks did not occur.

There were several reports that a white taxi cab driver drove onto the Fisk University campus and shot several rounds from a revolver into a girl's dormitory. The only indication in the official records that at all corroborates this incident is that a cab driver was admitted to

Madison hospital a few hours later suffering from what are termed "hallucinations" about the rioting. The police established road blocks to keep whites outside of the affected area. Several carloads of white toughs were apprehended by the police and six were arrested and booked. There are also reports that some Negroes set up road blocks turning whites back from the neighborhood, but this is not clear. The police continued their efforts to break up and disperse the milling crowds. By all reports they used much profanity and abusive language in the course of clearing the streets. As indicated by the number of persons seeking medical attention from the hospitals, the extent of police using nightsticks was relatively limited.

About midnight Dr. Edwin Mitchell called a meeting of Negro leaders at his house. Inman Otey was there along with a number of the Negro business, religious, and political leaders as well as SNCC leaders Stokeley Carmichael, George Ware and Fred Brooks. Also present was Reverend James Woodruff, the Episcopal minister and informal advisor to the Negro militant students. Both the middle class civil rights leaders and the Black Power group lectured each other at length and nothing constructive came from this prolonged meeting which lasted almost until daybreak. Many of the older group left during the course of the discussion. On his way home from the meeting, Mr. Inman Otey was stopped by the police for having one taillight out. Asked to step from the car, he was rather seriously roughed up and beaten by the police. He was arrested and booked for resisting arrest.

In the disturbance area at about 12:30 the police fired several rounds of tear gas at students and on several occasions, according to Fisk University officials and students, chased demonstrators into

girl's dormitories and on one occasion broke down a glass door. The police deny entering dormitories. According to one published account of this same incident, students in a Fisk dormitory panicked when police began to fire into the dorm at a group of those not involved in the disturbance, threw a fellow militant student out of the dorm through a pane of plate glass.

At about 1:30 A.M. one police officer fired a shotgun in the direction of a group of students who had been pelting police with bricks and rocks. He was immediately stopped by other officers and this seems to have been the only instance of police shooting directly at the Negroes facing them. At 2:30 A.M. the crowd had completely dwindled away and many police detachments were withdrawn. In all, only a dozen Negroes involved in the disturbance were arrested. Four were university students and one was a former student. None of these were active in SNCC. It was widely believed in the Negro community that there had been "mass arrests."

By 1:30 A.M. the police forces in the affected area were reduced to approximately 100 men. By 11:00 A.M. Sunday morning the police in the area had been reduced to the usual number of two police cars.

The final incident in the first night of rioting occurred approximately at 4:30 A.M. Sunday morning. William Reagan, a 21-year-old Negro was shot in the neck as he crossed the intersection at Charlotte Avenue and 42nd Avenue. The driver of the car in which Reagan was riding saw three or four white youths speed away from the intersection immediately after the shot was fired. Reagan was taken into a hospital and was listed in fair condition after minor surgery. The youths were not apprehended.

Sunday -- the second day

The weather continued balmy and there were light showers early in the day. The area remained quiet throughout the morning. Eleven hundred fifteen Tennessee National Guardsmen were alerted, but they were not assembled or moved.

About noon the meeting of Negro militants and middle class leaders re-convened at St. Anselm's Episcopal Chapel. Absent were Carmichael and Ware; they had left town after the break-up of the meeting the evening before. Also absent were several of the middle class leaders who had been at the earlier meeting. Notable by his absence was Avon Williams, attorney for the local chapter of the NAACP. An article in the Sunday morning Tennessean newspaper featured Williams' comments about the starting of the riot. Williams was quoted in the newspaper as saying in part, "Stokeley Carmichael didn't have to be present in town when this started. His bully boys are here and they knew what he wanted." The students felt hurt by this attack. At the meeting they discussed a number of demands they wanted to make to the city authorities. These were quite short-ranged in nature and focussed on getting the students still in jail released and getting the police, particularly white police, out of the campus area. Dr. Edwin Mitchell, who was present at the meeting, and who was director of the Metro Human Relations Commission, said he would contact "the authorities" about these demands. The students wanted to accompany him, but he refused to take them along saying it was entirely too delicate and also that he did not want to make clear who it was he would contact. Mitchell was in contact with city officials during the day but no public statement came from these meetings.

Students left the meeting feeling quite frustrated. They put out several hand bills during the day. One of these attacked the complacency of the Negro middle class and particularly focussed their attention on Inman Otey, Edwin Mitchell and Mansfield Douglas for having sold out their Negro brethren. The second handbill noted a rally to be held at 6:00 P.M. at the Fisk football stadium to rally support for the students' interests. At about the same time Inman Otey was showing off the bruises he had received at the hands of the police before a large Negro church congregation.

About 3:00 P.M. the student committee went to the police department to present their demands. They met with Assistant Police Chief, Donald Barton, who had been in charge of the police in the area of the rioting the night before. The students requested the release from jail of those still held and also requested that all white riot police stay out of the campus area. Chief Barton explained that those in jail were not in his hands but in the custody now of the sheriff so he was unable to help the students. According to the students they set a deadline of 6:00 P.M. for some reply on their demands. According to the police, no deadline time was set. The students informed one of the reporters for the Tennessean newspaper and also the highest Negro official in the police department, Lieutenant Bobby Hill, about their plans to meet at the Fisk football stadium.

During the day Acting-President of Fisk University, Lawson, met with student groups including the leaders of the student council and the football team to enlist their aid in keeping militants off the campus.

Shortly after 6:00 P.M. several hundred Negro students gathered in front of the gates to the Fisk stadium. They found the gates to it locked and the area being patrolled by football team members wearing their jerseys. According to informants on the scene some of the students were armed and Molotov cocktails of a primitive sort were in evidence. The two groups of students who confronted each other engaged in a considerable amount of name calling, but no fights broke out between the two groups. There were no university officials present and there was no concentration of police in the area. The crowd gradually broke up and filtered off in numerous directions.

The Fisk campus area was patrolled by what the administration called "trusted students" and apparently almost all of the Fisk student body stayed in their dormitories.

About 8:00 P.M. several shop windows were broken, some Molotov cocktails were thrown and there were several instances of minor looting of stores. Most of these were Negro-owned establishments. Post-riot estimates place the total loss due to looting at \$300. Numerous carloads of Negro and white sightseers were in the area on a number of occasions--cars were stopped in the slow moving traffic and rocked by Negro youths. Police patrols in automobiles with riot-helmeted police, six to a car, with sawed-off shotguns, were very much in evidence throughout a wide area after 6:00 P.M. Police blocked off the stretch of Jefferson Street--routing traffic through the run-down residential areas in the neighborhood. The local residents sat on their front porches watching the swirl of events about them without ever taking any part. Police got out of their cars and broke up any groupings of larger than five or six by threatening them with their nightsticks.

A fire at 22nd Avenue and Underwood Street in a deserted residential shack attracted a crowd of about a hundred neighborhood residents, who circled the fire engine and watched quietly while firemen poured water on the structure. Most of the crowd were children and older people.

The entire Fisk University campus area remained quiet through the evening. By 8:00 P.M. a line of students had formed on either side of Centennial Avenue, a main thoroughfare which runs directly through Tennessee A & I State University. (This street is a continuation of Jefferson Street which runs past Fisk.) The A & I students exchanged taunts with sightseers in cars, threw rocks at some and rocked others. About 9:15 P.M. city police moved to break up one of these car-rocking episodes and began firing over the heads of students in an attempt to disperse them. For the first time during the disturbance shots were returned from the crowd. The police sought protection behind a low wall and continued to exchange fire with students for about twenty minutes. At this point the police withdrew from the campus and the firing ceased. Six white youths were arrested at this juncture at the edge of Tennessee State University. One of them had in his possession a pistol. A police officer has told us that these whites shot several rounds at a police paddy wagon on the edge of the school campus. Several small fires were started on the area adjacent to the university, but police and firemen quickly brought them under control. Police made numerous arrests of persons for loitering and vagrancy. The police estimate that 150 rounds in all were fired in this incident.

About 11:00 P.M. several shots reportedly came from a Fisk University dormitory in the direction of the police. Police received permission from the university administration officials to search the dormitory. No arms were found.

Scattered incidents of rock throwing, fires, and exchanged insults continued for the next several hours. The notable incident was another exchange of fire on the A & I campus about midnight. Again, no one on either side was hurt in this exchange of fire.

About 12:30 A.M. Stokeley Carmichael returned to Nashville from a speaking engagement in Knoxville in a rented station wagon with George Ware and Ernest Stevens, both National SNCC workers. Carmichael was dropped off outside the area of the disturbance and the other two, in the company with a local member of SNCC, Eugene Andrews, proceeded toward the area of the disturbance. They were stopped at a police roadblock and ordered out of the car. Police thoroughly searched the car. They distributed some of the seized SNCC leaflets to newspapermen and other onlookers. They also confiscated a briefcase containing numerous checks payable to Carmichael and to SNCC. The police also pulled a revolver from the briefcase. The search was conducted in such a way that the reporters and other onlookers on the scene could not see whether the revolver actually came from the briefcase or had been placed there by an investigating police officer, as was alleged at the time. Ware and Stevens were booked on "inciting to riot" for their presumed activities on Saturday night. The local SNCC worker was booked on a charge of loitering and vagrancy.

The final event on Sunday night was a raid on several homes, conducted at 3:30 A.M. by detectives with narcotics search warrants. Arrests were made only at 1720 Jefferson Street. This house is the residence of several SNCC actives. The several occupants of the house were apparently asleep when police arrived. Several apartments in the

house were thoroughly searched and a six-pack carton of 10-ounce bottles filled with gasoline and stuffed with rags were found behind the house. The police say it was dropped from a second story window when the raid began. A police officer took the bottles into the house to pose for photographs with the bottles in front of a "Black Power" poster. The residents of the house alleged the Molotov cocktails were planted by the police. No narcotics were found by the police. SNCC members believe the police were looking for Carmichael, expecting him to run into the street where he could be shot down.

In all, about 60 arrests were made in the second night of violence. Of this number, at least 8 were white youths (arrests records do not uniformly show race). The rest were either Tennessee State students or Negroes in their 20's, many of whom had been students at Tennessee State and are now employed as laborers and unskilled service workers. The only Fisk students arrested on the second night of the disturbance were those picked up in the early morning police raid on the residence at 1720 Jefferson. Eight persons were treated at local hospitals for injuries received on the second night of violence.

Monday -- the third day

At 7:30 A.M. Stokeley Carmichael left Nashville by plane down to New Orleans to fulfill a speaking engagement. At 10:30 A.M. Dr. W. S. Davis, President of Tennessee A & I State University, met with faculty and representatives of all student organizations to present stern warnings against the participation of students in riots and to organize students to keep non-students off of the campus.

The day began warm and sultry for the spring as the first two days of the riot had been; however, a cold front moved through Central Tennessee bringing rain and steadily dropping temperatures. By evening a steady chill rain was falling.

A crowd, apparently composed of students, began gathering on the Tennessee State University campus about 5:00 P.M. and within an hour the situation had become as tense as that of the night before. Crowds also gathered on the main thoroughfare between Tennessee State and Fisk University. At about 6:30 P.M. school officials asked the police to help them move the two groups of students together to form one large and more easily controlled group. This the police did and then most police units pulled back out of the student campus area. Sporadic shots were fired and at about 7:00 P.M. roadblocks were set up around the campus by the police attempting to stop traffic into and out of the area.

At 7:30 P.M. police were dispatched to the Humble Oil Refining Company depot upon hearing rumors that an explosion was set to go off there. The first arrests of the evening came when three white youths from Sparta, Tennessee were taken into custody. Over the next several hours several groups of persons were arrested for loitering or possession of arms. All of the activities seemed to be concentrated in the area of Tennessee State University.

A stack of new lumber being used to build an annex to the Tennessee State Student Union building began burning about 10:00 P.M. Since the blaze did not threaten to spread to other buildings the fire department did not attempt to enter the area to put it out. They reasoned that their presence might only spark further disorders. Soon a group of students formed to pour water on the blaze with water hoses, as campus

security police stood by. Youths trying to set fire to a Nashville Electric Service pole in the rain were jeered by a group of students for their stupidity. While there were several reports of shots being fired throughout the evening the total number of persons involved was not ever very large and the disturbance of the evening petered out soon after 10:00 P.M.

During the evening the Tennessee House of Representatives was in session. A resolution was brought to the floor to demand that Stokeley Carmichael be deported from the United States to the land of his birth, Trinidad. Ignoring the pleas of some that such an action would only serve to make Carmichael more of a hero and martyr and ignoring those who pointed out that such a deportation would be impossible, as Carmichael is a citizen, the vote to seek deportation was passed by a wide margin on a voice vote.

During the day several individuals and groups made pleas to end the violence together with commentaries on causes of the riots. Mayor Beverly Briley stated in a prepared statement to the press that "this was not a rebellion of the ghetto, in fact they are the victims of this insurrection." He added that Stokeley Carmichael and his aids were responsible for the riot. When asked by a reporter whether slum conditions might also be a contributing factor to the riot, the mayor said, "No, as the rioting had not been slum area residents, but students--those who Carmichael was able to agitate." Most of the other statements, while deploring the riot in some way, linked them to deplorable conditions of the ghetto life.

Tuesday -- the fourth day

During the day Tuesday the riot-affected area was quiet. At 1:00 P.M.

the Negro Interdenominational Alliance held an open meeting at St. John's A.M.E. Church. A number of students, as well as faculty members, spoke and several middle class Negroes made comments as well. Their comments focussed on personal experiences of police abuse and generalized statements of indignation at the treatment of blacks in Nashville. The prime focus of attention of the meeting was on getting the jailed students released. By that evening all students had been released from jail.

Tuesday evening police continued to maintain roadblocks at two intersections near the campus of Tennessee State University allowing only residents to enter the area. Those entering the campus were asked by city police to show their Tennessee State Identification Cards. Outgoing traffic was not halted. No arrests were made during the day or evening and police roadblocks were not continued on the next day--Wednesday. On Wednesday the first set of trials of those arrested in the disturbance began.

The statistics for the entire riot period are as follows. According to a police report 94 arrests were made. To date (November 10, 1967) there have been 30 convictions. The number of arson caused fires was 19; the number of law officers injured was 12, and 35 civilians were treated in hospitals. Three of these civilians were hit by bullets but none of the injuries was serious. The most generous and all-inclusive estimate of economic loss placed the total figure under \$100,000.

A Profile of Nashville

Nashville is the State Capital and principal city of central Tennessee. Its ecology, climate, political and social atmosphere are different from Mississippi Delta-oriented, Southern Democrat Memphis and Appalachia-oriented, Republican Knoxville. The disturbances which occurred in the environs

of the two Nashville Negro universities on the week-end of April 8 -10, 1967, resulted in no deaths (as compared with an average of five traffic fatalities in Metropolitan Nashville for a comparable period) and only minor property damage, but caught the national press attention as the first event of a "long hot summer." It deserves the Commission's attention in examining the causes of the disturbance, its limited extent, and the diverse outcomes of the experience.

Dimensions of the city

In 1960 Metropolitan Nashville had a population of just under 400,000. The SMSA has grown rapidly since so that the population in 1967 by all estimates approaches 500,000. The in-migrants have been predominantly poor whites and poor Negroes from the South, and professionals from the North and East.

Nashville has a widely diversified economy; besides the State and Federal Government business it is a regional center for finance, commercial banking, insurance, and warehousing. No single industry dominates the city; there are over 500 manufacturing establishments in such diverse industries as Avco, Dupont, Ford, Genesco, Gates, RCA Victor, and Western Electric. A number of religious organizations and religious publishing firms are headquartered in Nashville. In addition it is the center of the country and western music recording industry derived from the Grand Ole Opry. Finally, the city has 12 centers of higher education; the three predominantly Negro institutions are Meharry Medical College which has trained a high proportion of all Negro doctors, Fisk University, one of the "Negro Ivy League," and Tennessee (Agricultural and Industrial) State University, one of the "Negro Big Ten" public schools. Together these three institutions

have over 6500 students.

In 1962 the Nashville City and Davidson County governments were merged to form a single "Metropolitan" form of government which is locally called "Metro." Among the many issues involved in this merger was concern on the part of some about the growing political power of Negroes in the central city. In 1960 Negroes constituted 35% of the city population but only 19% of the total metropolitan population. The several Negro political leaders were induced to work for the enactment of Metro in exchange for the cutting of councilmanic districts in such a way that each leader had a safe constituency. The new Metro system has made possible the coordinated urban development of the city. School improvements, slum clearance, urban renewal, and an active program of public housing have gone forward but they have been hampered both by a lack of tax funds and the familiar strategy of using these programs to build buffers between white and Negro residential areas.

According to FBI crime statistics, crime rates in Nashville are high. Just 3% of all American cities of 100,000 population or more had a higher crime rate than Nashville in 1966. For the first half of 1967 Nashville crime rates were up 17%, an increase identical with the national average. Nashville was the only one of the four major Tennessee cities to show increases in all seven of the crime categories covered by the FBI Uniform Crime Reports. At the same time, Nashville has a relatively large police force as measured by the number of law enforcement personnel per 1,000 population. Only 14% of large cities have police forces which are larger on a per capita basis.

While the Metropolitan Government articulates the city with its suburbs, it cannot obliterate the wide gaps between the large number in

real poverty, the middle classes, and the relatively large number of millionaires who reside in Nashville. Although race and economic position do not coincide, the following figures taken from the 1960 U. S. census show the extent to which Nashville Negroes are disadvantaged relative both to white Nashvillians and the U. S. population as a whole.

Nashville whites have a median family income of \$5,800, while Negroes have less than half this income, \$2,700. Seventeen percent of white families have less than \$3,000 in income per year while fully 55% of Negro families have incomes below this poverty line.

Over the past few years the Nashville unemployment figures have consistently been below the nation as a whole. As a result of this full employment situation, Negro unemployment rates have not been markedly higher than those of whites. Thus there is not the large pool of chronically unemployed Negro youths as there is in some other cities. At the same time the quality of employment is markedly different for these two groups. While 10% of the white employed male labor force is engaged as laborers, service and private household workers, fully 51% of Negro males are employed in such low status occupations. Moreover, nearly three-quarters of all employed Negro women are employed at this level.

Linked to occupational differences are differences in education. While the median number of years of schooling achieved by adult whites is almost eleven years, it is only just over eight years for Negroes. Although Nashville schools have been desegregated, most students still go to schools which have pupils of only one race because of the pattern of residential segregation in the city and the drawing of school districts to maintain segregation. The quality of education is markedly different. Standard achievement tests administered by the school system show that

by the age of eleven years, Negro students are achieving one full year below their white age-mates.

Differences in housing are also striking. Two-thirds of white families own and live in their own homes. These have a median value of \$11,500. One-third of Negro families own and live in their own homes and these have a median value of \$6,800. Fully one-quarter of all Negroes live in grossly over-crowded units with more than one person per room. Forty-three percent of whites live in units built before 1939, and 18% of whites do not have full plumbing facilities while over two-thirds of all Negroes live in units built before 1939 and only 57% have complete plumbing facilities. While there are several extensive public housing developments, Nashville has shanty slums that rival those of any American city.

There are numerous Negro neighborhoods scattered over the Metropolitan area; in most cases the boundaries of these are not clearly demarcated so that there is a high degree of integration of poor whites and Negroes for an American city, according to a recent report. The riot-disturbance of April, 1967, occurred along the principal street of the largest Negro neighborhood. This connects Fisk and Tennessee A & I. At the Fisk end it is called Jefferson Street; at the A & I end of this mile long street it is called Centennial Avenue.

Community power sketch

The locally prominent men tend to be in finance, insurance and commerce, rather than in manufacturing. There is a lively participation of this group in some levels of civic affairs. Their influence is felt through an overlapping network of civic, philanthropic, religious, and social clubs, rather than through public or political party organizations.

Many influentials are graduates of Vanderbilt University located in Nashville. This institution serves both as a common fraternal base for the influentials and a reservoir of expertise which can be periodically drawn upon.

The overall impression is of a city managed by a wide net of men linked by multiple ties of long-term friendship and association, rather than a town run by a political party machine, or one run by professionals who are comparative strangers, or one run by a combination of conflicting power blocks.

The Nashville net of influentials does not form a monolithic power structure. There are clear differences of opinion and interest. There is a clear cleavage between the locally oriented political-contracting group who run Metro affairs on a day-to-day basis and the cosmopolitan banking-commercial "influentials" who less often become involved around local social issues. For the most part contacts with, and policy concerning, the Negro community are in the hands of the local politicians; not the cosmopolitan influentials. As one of the latter said in refusing our request for an interview, "All I know is what I read in the newspapers."

On the few occasions when the influentials are united behind an issue they are all-powerful. The most impressive display of this power was the creation of the Metropolitan form of government. The most recent example of its power is passage, by a wide margin earlier this year, of a "liquor by the ounce" referendum; it passed over the strong objections of the fundamentalist religious groups of the community. Nashville influentials have consistently taken a "slow-but-progressive" view on Negro civil rights as will be outlined below.

Recent Negro civil rights history

Before 1960 when Nashville became a major center of the sit-in

movement, public parks and buses had been desegregated and a school desegregation plan was well underway. All of this had not gone forward smoothly; when the parks were integrated all city swimming pools were permanently closed after several incidents of violence. In 1957, one year after federal troops were called into Little Rock, Arkansas, Nashville was a center of national attention when whites led by John Kaspar, a northern segregationist, tried forcibly to block school integration. Rioting and violence followed; Kaspar was jailed and eventually convicted by sedition. After Kaspar and other "outside" Klan agitators were removed from the city, school integration went forward without incident. City officials tend to draw a parallel in their actions ten years later. As a top city official commented, "If we can clean out the outside agitators--white and Negro--we can get on quite well." One of the by-products of school "integration" has been acceleration of the movement of whites from the central city, thus increasing the degree of residential segregation in Nashville.

In February, 1960, when the first sit-ins occurred in Greensboro, North Carolina, the local unit of Martin Luther King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference had been learning the techniques of non-violence. Well-planned and disciplined sit-ins started here within two weeks. Over the next three years lunch-counters, rest-rooms, theaters, and restaurants were the objects of massive sit-ins, boycotts and demonstrations. Through this period Negro students, local ministers, and academics worked closely together in the organizational context of the local SCLC branch, the nascent SNCC under local Fisk student, John Lewis, and the local NAACP chapter. Based at Fisk and several of the Negro churches, the movement of the early sixties was locally directed and run. Significantly, almost

all of these leaders had moved to jobs outside of Nashville by 1967. The Negro "leaders" who remained are mostly those involved in local politics and business.

The reactions of the white community to the various sit-in and demonstration activities tended to follow a pattern. The first incident would be met with violence set off by white toughs and there would be large numbers of Negroes arrested. After the initial incident in any series, the police were able to keep the white toughs completely in check. The sympathy of whites with the demonstration was voiced through the Nashville Tennessean. The reaction of the white power structure to each new wave of protest was first to try to out-last the picket or boycott. If it became obvious that the student demonstrators were backed by the adult Negro community and elements of the white middle class and the press, negotiations would begin and the desired change would rather quickly be effected.

A residue of this period is a general feeling on the part of white influentials and middle class citizens alike that Nashville has been more than fair in solving problems of segregation and there is very little more that Negroes can rightfully demand. Going along with this has been a very much decreased concern with the whole area of civil rights and the plight of the Negro. From this perspective Nashville has no race problem; the problems many Negroes face are those which all poor people face irrespective of color. From this perspective, individual hard work is the only way for a family to escape poverty. Thus, any criticism of the condition of Negroes in a city is seen as outside attempts to stir up trouble. This is the frame of reference which most whites, and many middle class Negroes as well, brought to the impending visit of

Stokeley Carmichael in April, 1967.

Aftermath

Limits of the disorder

The mayor would seem to be right in his comment that this was not a ghetto riot. At no time did adults or any significant number of high school students in the black neighborhood surrounding the two university campuses or the more impoverished residents in the Edgehill area contribute to the disorder. It is not hard to imagine that if the disturbance had begun in the Edgehill area at this time the police forces would have been so divided that the mayor would have requested elements of the Tennessee National Guard and the conflict might have easily escalated further as rural and small town white guardsmen without riot training entered the situation.

At the same time no great number of whites entered the area to convert the disturbance into a genuine race riot.

Those involved in the disturbance were almost exclusively university students, university drop-outs or graduates employed in low paid jobs who hang-out in the university area. This latter group will be called by the locally applied term--"street Negroes." Thus, any search for "causes" must focus on the experiences, grievances, orientations which would bring these and only these groups to riotous action. It is equally important to note the object or focus of this behavior--the police, whites driving through the campuses, and to a limited extent the destruction of private property. The two final important ingredients in the situation are more situational in nature. The first is the presence of Stokeley Carmichael. Clearly his presence affected police behavior and most probably that of the students as well. The second ingredient

is the weather.

What follows is our personal explanation of the disturbance of April 8-10 stated in the briefest possible terms. More detail will be presented in sections which follow and in the final Field Research Report.

The local police had for months been preparing for a SNCC triggered incident. Their intelligence informants had interpreted youthful bravado about "tearing this town apart" as a developing plan for insurrection. Police concern centered on the visit of Stokeley Carmichael and this was seconded by the Nashville Banner which predicted an outbreak concurrent with Carmichael's visit.

The triggering event was the incident at the University Dinner Club which is adjacent to the Fisk campus. The picket line which was set up outside the Dinner Club included some of the most volatile of the local SNCC members, but none of its leaders. The issues involved surrounded the unfair treatment of a Negro bar operator and the presence of white arresting officers. While Negro or mixed patrols usually work in this area it is not surprising that two whites were sent as they were there originally to arrest a military man.

The night was unusually warm for April--what one observer called, "pure panty-raid weather." The picket drew some attention from those in the area, but attention was galvanized by entry of the first riot squad who was sent on the belief that the planned insurrection had begun. More students returning to campus swelled the crowd of curious. Although the SNCC members had stopped the picket after negotiations, faculty members respected by the students had tried to disperse the crowd, and the riot squad had left the area momentarily, the mass of students had already spilled over into the street so that interference

with traffic became inevitable.

If the police had routed traffic around the crowd it would have in all likelihood dispersed. The entry of scores of riot police coming in answer to the general "riot mobilization" plan triggered the general violence which followed. In this situation of milling throngs of students and police, the Fisk students were able to act like men facing "whitey" just like Carmichael had been telling them to do. Many of the Fisk students found the experience exhilarating and great fun. Their only concern, beyond being hit or shot which didn't seem to be a very likely possibility, was that street-Negroes would use this occasion to enter dormitories.

Before the second night the mood of Fisk students had changed. They no longer saw themselves as shock troupes of "Black Power" ready to stand up to "honkie cops" and to defy their "white-dominated university administration" in an atmosphere of "blowing off steam" not unlike any American university on a warm spring night. They became the defenders of the university and their women against all outsiders, working with school authorities to keep out SNCC radicals, white toughs and street-Negroes. In this way they would keep the police off their territory as well.

Many Tennessee State students had been involved in the first night's activities as they brought dates back to the Fisk campus. Now the feeling was that A & I students should get something going on their own--in their own area to show they were as good as Fisk students. Many more street-Negroes were involved on the second night. They harrassed the police from the midst of student groups and set out to settle personal scores with store owners by attacking their establishments.

The third night it rained and the holiday was over for the students. Without this supporting cover of students the street-Negroes could not operate. There were no militant organizations such as Deacons or RAM or Muslim group in town and street-Negroes have no organization asking their support or channeling their energy. Because of the relatively high level of Negro employment in Nashville this group is relatively small. Thus, it could not constitute a large crowd in and of itself. With the rain and disappearance of students, the disturbance was at an end.

Why was this termed a riot?

A Negro child or community adult might have been killed in the nights of shooting. Then a riot might have been touched off, but the several nights of violence in Nashville hardly merit the use of this term. Why then have numerous people from the Mayor on down used the word or played-up the seriousness of the event? The answer seems to be that numerous groups could use it to foster their own special interests. Without taking the space for full details let us mention a few of these.

1. The editor and owner of the Nashville Banner, a member of the Executive Committee of the Vanderbilt University Board of Trust, had long been concerned with the liberal attitudes of Vanderbilt Chancellor Alexander Heard. By linking the riot to Carmichael's speech at Vanderbilt he saw an opportunity to pressure the Chancellor's resignation. In a first page editorial, "What Price Folly," published on the third day of the disturbance, James Stahlman stated in part, "Nothing that could be said by way of public apology--nor any innings of after-the-

fact remorse, felt or spoken, on the part of his sponsors there--can remove the stench of the Stokeley Carmichael visit to Vanderbilt University; and the tragic infliction (sic) of civil disturbance that broke out a little later a few blocks distant, and has raged through two nights. This violence occurred precisely as planned, and concerning it the public had been amply warned...That Pandora's Box of violent contents was opened by academic hands and with high official consent is a fact so self-evident as to brand as totally inane expressions of wonderment after-the-fact concerning what happened, how and why. The contributory circumstances speak for themselves. In the final analysis, the ultimate responsibility for what occurred lies at the door of the Chancellor and fellow-administrative authorities at Vanderbilt University."

2. There was very little national news at the time the riots occurred and so it got wide front-page coverage as the first warmth of a "long hot summer."

3. The local police had had nothing but a bad press in the recent past. Several officers had been dismissed for their involvement in a theft ring. The police had received much attention from the beating of an African student, and in January one of three officers arresting a mentally unbalanced Vanderbilt graduate student, Ramsey Hall, had unloaded his police revolver into the student at close range. The riot provided an excellent way to show the police as competent defenders of the community. Thus, the riot fit into a local program whose slogan was, "Support Your Local Police."

4. There was mounting concern within city circles concerning the use of illegal information gathering devices by the intelligence division of the police department. However, in the eyes of some officials the

riot vindicated the use of such devices because of the "demonstrated danger" of SNCC radicals in the community. The riot situation convinced the mayor that there were communists at work here.

5. The situation allowed moderate Negro leaders both to denounce the methods of Carmichael and at the same time to point-up to the white community the levels of misery which exist and breed support for Carmichael and Black Power. Their formula may be reduced to the following--if you don't work now through the organizations we represent, you will soon have to face a strident and powerful Black Nationalism. White ministers and social agency personnel often have taken this same moral from the affair.

6. Negro business and real estate interests have pointed to this show of ghetto unrest to pressure their own interests in the name of creating ghetto harmony. The most obvious example of this is the current controversy over the location of a section of Interstate Highway 40 through the North Nashville Negro ghetto.

7. One police captain who was present during the disturbance has been able to further his own career through nationally televised exposes of the SNCC conspiracy, highlighting its link to the locally sponsored OEO projects. On the local level he has recounted the ever present danger of subversives before Nashville civic groups. The relation between the disturbance and international conspiracy is presented roughly as follows. SNCC is identified as the prime cause of the riot in Nashville. SNCC is then linked to the Southern Student Organizing Committee which has a small but active chapter in Nashville. SSOC, a white run student group, has been active in civil rights and more recently in anti-war protests. SSOC is in turn linked to SCEF which is active in aiding various civil rights and militant poverty efforts. Its

Executive Director in Carl Braden who is cited for numerous Communist Party connections. Thus, the links between the riot and communism are drawn.

The evidence of our informants show these links to be real but to form no coherent plot. The SCEF board of directors was meeting in Nashville just prior to the riot and Carmichael spoke to them. We are told that he requested money for SNCC whose treasury was empty. SSOC members were preoccupied at this time with the disturbance several of their members had created during the visit of President Johnson to Nashville. SNCC actives do know those in SOCC; the ranks of militant bohemians are quite thin in Nashville and thus this is no surprise. They gravitate together in a shared atmosphere of "persecution by the white power structure." Thus, the clear fact that Carl Braden was in town the day before the disturbance probably has no more relevance than the equally true facts that a central figure in an early civil rights riot, or the man who first identified the killers of the three civil rights workers in Mississippi or Allen Ginsberg, were also in town the day before the disturbance.

8. National SNCC has tried to get the attention of the nation in its suit against the Metropolitan government charging that the city conspired to start the riot and deprive them of their civil rights.

9. The conservative Negro faculty at Fisk and Tennessee State Universities have seen the riots as an excellent opportunity to pressure for weeding out competent, militant white faculty members who in recent years have spoken out against authoritarian administration and incompetent faculty.

10. Rank and file students of the two schools see the riot as a

time when they showed the "white power structure" that they were a force to be reckoned with. They generally feel that some good came from the experience and point to the installation of several traffic lights and sidewalks in front of the Tennessee State campus.

11. The mayor has used the disturbance and its aftermath in his alternating efforts to dominate or disrupt the local arm of the OEO, the Metropolitan Action Commission. This affair has developed over three years at the local level and has received national attention before congressional committees on two occasions since the riot. It is too complex to be detailed here.

12. Some local program administrators and government officials see Carmichael's visit as causing a great change in the attitudes of Negro youth. As one official complained to our interviewer, "Since Carmichael came to town you can't hardly get Fisk students to take jobs cutting grass."

13. The people who have been able to gain the least from the events of last April are those involved in local SNCC affairs. Not only did the events show their weakness on campus but many have had their lives changed in ways to be outlined below.

Police-community relations

As noted above the police were under attack at the time of the disturbance. There were numerous civic and business leaders calling for reform. These came to a head over the shooting of Ramsey Hall, the Vanderbilt graduate student. The disturbance changed all this as far as the white community was involved. Numerous groups joined in unqualified praise of the police. The response of Mayor Briley to documented cases of "police brutality" brought to him by a group of the most

respected middle class black leaders is typical. According to reports the mayor lectured the group saying that such allegations served only to hurt the "image" of the police and hinder recruiting efforts. The implication that men would not join the force if they could not have a free hand in dealing with Negroes was not lost on the educated Negro group. (For a more detailed discussion of the attitudes towards the police see the third page of the newspaper article in Appendix 3.)

Almost all observers agree that the rank-and-file police obeyed their commanders and did not display the apparent zest for violence often shown by their counterparts in other cities. A quiet investigation of all charges of brutality, several of which seem to have been well founded, made jointly by the Negro group and the mayor would have done much to point up the disciplined performance of the Nashville police as a whole.

The changes in the attitude of the Negro community at large toward the police is more difficult to gauge. One element of their reaction is support of the police in their efforts which kept young street-Negroes from generating something like a Watts situation. One comment that goes through most of the interviews is a shock at the verbal abusiveness of the police. Perhaps one can draw hope from the fact that in this situation the abuse was mostly verbal.

One prominent white police official is seen by the militant students to be engaged in a personal vendetta against them. They associate all cases of surveillance, wire-tapping, and police informers with this individual. They explain his motivations in a rather unusual way. It is a widely circulated belief that when this captain was a student at a

local college, a decade ago, he often wore a pistol in a shoulder holster to class and was otherwise "gun crazy." They also believe that he later set up a coffee house catering to mixed couples and thus they see him as the personification of a hypocritical "honkie cop."

One final aspect of the police-community relation deserves attention. Numerous persons including a news media executive and a leading attorney not involved in either side of the legal action stemming from the disturbance told our interviewers with alarm about the wide-spread use of illegal surveillance devices used in monitoring the conversations of many of those involved in the disturbance. The lawyer told our interviewer that Ware and Stephens could not be brought to trial for inciting to riot because the bulk of the evidence against them was obtained illegally. In fact the files on the cases are kept in the personal possession of the Head of the Intelligence Division and have not been made available to the District Attorney. Wire-tapping has not yet become a public issue in Nashville but our judgement of the current climate of opinion is that the police would be supported by most whites, and Negroes as well, on the grounds that any means are legitimate if it aids in running the rascals out of town.

Effects on individuals

The disturbance has changed the lives of some who did not participate, as well as a number who did. Reverend James Woodruff, Negro Episcopal Chaplain at Fisk, was one of the only adults that the students thoroughly trusted. Thus, he was one of the possible links between generations in the Negro community. Woodruff's Bishop was under direct fire from Mayor Briley to quiet or remove Woodruff even before the April disturbances. After another round of adverse publicity surrounding

the SNCC directed Liberation School this past summer, Reverend Woodruff was transferred to a parish out of the South. Before he left his automobile insurance had been doubled and the insurance on his church-owned residence had been cancelled. Thus the community has lost one of its only links to the militant youth.

At least eight white faculty members of Tennessee State and Fisk who spoke out in sympathy with Black Power or were openly critical of the campus administration's policy did not get their contract renewed this year, and no new crop of northern "missionaries which the conditions at the Negro colleges convert into militants" (as one of our informants put it) were hired this year. Applicants for faculty positions at Tennessee State this year have been quizzed on their opinions concerning Black Power.

Paul G. King, Business Manager of Tennessee State University resigned on May 26 after "irregularities" were found in the financial records of the university. The charge was a failure to collect from students about \$100,000 in fees. Almost half of this amount involved uncollected out-of-state tuition. According to varying official figures, either 36% or 41% of all A & I students are from outside the state. Negro teachers see King as a scape-goat created by the state government for the disorder. They see the situation as follows: participants were in most cases students from outside of Tennessee. King encouraged the presence of these students through not charging out-of-state fees. Thus, King in part is responsible for the disorder. Certainly the state administration has acted on the presumption that out-of-state students are militants. The freshman class of 1966 had approximately 1,700 members. This year's freshman class numbers about 1,000, and there

are almost no non-Tennessee residents in its ranks.

Seventy of last year's students at Tennessee State were expelled from the institution for their activities in the disturbance. Apparently no students were dismissed from Fisk, however, students report being threatened with having their scholarships withdrawn if they did not refrain from involvement in militant activities. Fred Brooks, local SNCC leader, was expelled from Tennessee State on the charge of "gross disrespect to university authorities." His demand to be reinstated as a student was not granted by a Federal Court sitting in Nashville. In rejecting the motion for a temporary injunction the judge said, "I don't think it would be proper for me to change the status at the university at this time."

Employed persons whose address were listed in the newspapers report being fired from their jobs, their neighbors or associates warned not to be seen with them, report being followed by police cars and report having their auto insurance cancelled.

A number of Negroes, including professors at Tennessee State University have had their auto insurance cancelled. Fire and theft insurance was cancelled on a number of Negro businesses. Those affected, many of whom were in no way involved in the disturbance, felt this to be an unwarranted reprisal.

The picture which emerges from all of the above is that persons, variously situated in positions of authority, have acted to bring pressure on those seen as involved in, or in some way responsible for, the disturbance so that they will leave town. This policy fits with the widely accepted belief in the white community that the disturbance was caused by outside agitators.

Current community atmosphere

Those who blame the disturbance on militant Black Power advocates can take solace from the fact that these individuals and groups have either left town or now have most of their energies absorbed in litigation.

Those who see the causes of the riot in the plight of the Negro college student can look for a further disturbance. The authoritarian and paternalistic administration out of touch with its students and the second rate instruction remain in the schools as do the poor job opportunities for all but the best Negro graduates.

Those who see the basic cause of the disturbance in slum conditions tend to see a genuine riot on its way. Little has been done to change the basic ghetto problems over the past year. The local unit of the OEO, the Metropolitan Action Commission, has been in a constant state of turmoil in squabbles within itself and between the mayor and the Atlanta based Regional Office of the OEO. With MAC and the mayor feuding there has been little guidance and coordination given to the numerous different, but small projects, trying to bring changes to the ghetto.

One theory that is often expressed locally is that riots occur when "communication breaks down." In Nashville today several different groups talk in different languages and see the same events from entirely different perspectives so that genuine communication seems to be out of the question. These differences in perspective derive from differences of race, generation, and social class in Nashville in much the same way as in other American cities. Rather than detail these differences here the reader is referred to the appendix of this chapter. It is an excellent article written by Rob Elder, feature writer for the Nashville Tennessean. It shows the hiatus in understanding between the mayor and

middle class Negroes. One might only add that the numerous efforts at bridging the gaps between race, generation, and social class which were instituted immediately after the riot have pretty much come to an end.

As striking as the lack of communication between groups is the belief on the part of white influentials that they understand and are in touch with all elements of the community. The mayor summed up this perspective in his final comment to our interviewers, "They say I don't know them, but I do know our niggers." From such a view, rooted in the past, it is not surprising that all clamor for change is defined as due to the efforts of outside agitators.

Jackson, Mississippi

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This study of the disorder that occurred on the Jackson State College campus on May 10-12, 1967, was conducted, as were all three city studies, as a social research project. This led us to emphasize that the raw data collected must be considered in the context of the report which organizes and interprets it, and to adhere to the principle that information obtained from individuals who are interviewed be treated as a professional confidence and that the interviewee's identity be carefully protected. These two conditions were an important part of the working rationale of the team for this study in the Jackson community, and it is felt that any ultimate constructive effect of this report in the Jackson community is dependent upon allegiance to these principles.

Another general principle upon which the interviewers operated was one of approach and purpose. We decided that our best contribution to the problem of understanding and preventing future disorders and violence would be to seek an understanding of the interviewee's basic attitudes and feelings relevant to the continuing problems and issues which give

¹Contract limitations on time made it impossible to make this a tightly integrated report. This fault may in one way be a strength. Though it contains different writing styles and some disjointedness, the report as it stands presents verbatim observations of every member of the team. The Field Research Report will contain some objective quantification of supporting information, attitudes, and feelings. The observation and conclusions given in the present report are based on the data obtained in the interviews with Negroes and whites in Jackson.

rise to riots. It was recognized that we would first have to sample the individual's knowledge or awareness of these problems and issues in order to assess his attitudes and feelings. The format for information collection is to be found in Appendix 1; a format which all three teams used.

Prior to the field trip to Jackson a careful effort was made to determine the types of groups and individuals in the community that should be included in the sample using the grid described earlier. Table 2 gives a description of the persons interviewed showing the kinds of groups or elements within the community that were sampled, the levels at which these people operate, and the number interviewed within each subgroup.²

Some Early Observations

Frequent comments on the part of local coordinators in summing up their attempts to arrange interviews were statements such as: "people seem not to want to be involved." A gun store proprietor very quickly told the local coordinator: "I'm neutral, I'm neutral, I have nothing to say," and the proprietor added: "Whatever I say would be twisted." This latter opinion seems to be quite commonly held by many of the conservative and occasionally by those with a rather liberal opinion.

One, fairly prominent upper middle class white person could not remember any particular disturbance in Jackson although he did seem to have a vague recollection of something a couple of years back. When reminded of the incident on the Jackson State campus in the spring he was

²The reader is reminded that the sampling was designed to be representative of points of view within the community but not representative of a population of groups in a statistical sense.

Table 2
Jackson
Grid Showing the Elements of the Community and
Levels of Responsibility within Them for Selecting Interviewees

Community Elements	Levels of Responsibility		
	1	2	3
A. University Admin.	president 4	deans campus police 1	teachers 4
B. University Students	leaders 5	members of orgs. 28 (includes 6 white students)	non-members 7
C. Police	chief 1	officers 2	patrolmen 1
D. City Government	mayor 1	dept. heads	councilmen
E. Govt. commissions local/state/fed.	6	4	local comm. reps. 2
F. Negro Community (non-organized)	professional 2	business 7	citizen 10
G. Negro Organization	political 6	civic-fraternal	2
H. Negro Religious	minister 1 bishop	lay leader	
I. Negro Likely Riot participants	high		
J. White Likely Riot participants	high		
K. White Community	professional 8	business Chamber of Commerce 8	citizen 6
L. White Organization	political 1	civic 1	civil rights 8
M. White Church	minister 3 bishop	lay leader 3	
N. Press	editors 2 owners	bureau chiefs	reporters 1
O. Litigation	justice dept. 2	lawyers 2	litigants
Total	42	56	41

able to remember it but still could hardly believe that it was so recent. He refused to be an interviewee for the study. Another call to a prominent surgeon's wife, a native of another southern state and a member of the Jackson community for several years, responded immediately and without any introduction to me: "I am delighted you are here. I am glad somebody is taking a look at this thing instead of trying to forget that it happened."

Not all of the resistance and concern over participation came from members of the white race. One interviewer, after having interviewed a middle class Negro woman--a school teacher--attempted to obtain other names of people in her community who might participate in the study and she refused to give any names of any other persons that she knew.

Chronology of Events

There is apparently no completely documented and accurate report of the chronology of events during the May 10-12 disturbance on and in the vicinity of the Jackson State College campus. A very brief factual account of principal events will be presented as a summary, followed by a more lengthy description of the affair as obtained from our interviewees. This account will be interspersed with the opinions, attitudes, and feelings of the informants.

Summary of Principal Events

On May 10, 1967, student elections were being held on the Jackson State College campus. It was to be a close election and excitement was running high. Students were milling around after a student political rally when Negro policemen chased a speeding student motorist onto the campus. The police apparently only asked the driver for his identifica-

tion and driver's license, but the students surrounded the police and told them they could not take the man. The police withdrew but called for reinforcements. The reinforcements were apparently white police, some of them armed. They parked on Lynch Street in full view of the students. This apparently aroused and upset the students. At the same time "the corner gang" made up mainly of unemployed Negro youths started trying to organize the students and other members of the community into action. They were not very successful although there were several large groups of about 200 students and members of the community milling around at various points on the campus. This caused the police to barricade the streets leading into the campus, apparently to prevent motorists from driving through the campus and becoming victims of incidents. It may have been to some extent to control the crowds within the barricades to keep them from moving into the city and causing destruction. On occasions the students moved toward the police who would retreat away from the campus leaving the barricades which the students piled in the streets and burned. There was some relatively minor damage to property such as destruction of telephone booths and the windows in a couple of stores. At about 2:00 A.M. (Thursday morning) with large groups of students and members of the community still visible within the barricades, the National Guard was put on stand-by. Some highway patrolmen were also called into the situation.

Not too much happened during the daylight hours on Thursday. Toward dusk Thursday some of the people inside the barricades, seemingly more outsiders than students, began moving toward the barricades. They had several experiences where large groups moved toward the barricades and

the police moved back. On one occasion a large group moved toward a police barricade, and as they moved in someone from within the group threw a bottle which broke near the police. The noise seemed to cause the students to become frightened and they, apparently thinking that a shot had been fired or someone had been hit, turned and ran away from the police. At this point the police began firing. Reportedly, they were firing over the heads of the students for the most part. At least five students were hit; one named Benjamin Brown was fatally wounded. He died a little later in a hospital.

Just before Brown was fatally wounded the National Guard was moving up the end of Lynch Street opposite the barricades and thus headed down the portion of the street which passed through the campus. Apparently with the cooperation of some of the student leaders the National Guard passed through the campus without incident.

After Brown was wounded and the other students had been injured, the crowd dispersed. The students apparently returned to their dorms or other places within the campus. Some, reportedly, spent the night in front of the administration building.

Detailed Eye Witnesses Accounts of the Events of the Disturbance

Students on the Jackson State Campus thought that academically the school was not doing what it was supposed to do. They felt unduly restricted in their social life. Chapel attendance was mandatory. These things seem to have bothered the students a great deal. The evening of the disturbance some of the students had been having political rallies. These were primarily juniors, sophmores and freshmen; the seniors were downtown at the Jackson Hotel attending a senior ball.

Wednesday evening, May 10, 1967 the students had just left the rally when the police chased a speeding student motorist on to the campus and into a parking lot back of the dormitory. Some of the interviewees thought one of the reasons he had been chased was that he had Illinois license plates on his car and that in addition to his speeding the out-of-state plates had drawn the attention of the police. By the time the police entered the campus the students then began to congregate and to say things.

From the interviewees reports, it seemed fairly clear that the student had not been abused in any way. He had been asked just to identify himself and to show his drivers license. The fact that the police had set foot on the campus was what really upset the students; they congregated very quickly around the police. At this point the police called for some reinforcements. The reinforcements turned out to be armed white police and this caused a great deal of concern. Instead of falling back from the armed police the students began saying various things to the police. Finally one of the student leaders gave the police kind of an ultimatum telling them that they had approximately five minutes and that he could not guarantee their safety on the campus after that period.

At this point the police withdrew from the campus, but parked on Lynch Street which runs through the Jackson State Campus and thus remained in plain view of the students. The students felt this is what caused the disorder to increase.

The Lynch Street traffic was a long standing grievance. The street is a busy thoroughfare that divides the campus. One student had been hurt a couple of months prior to the disturbance. White teen-agers sometime speed through or gun their motors and harass the students, particu-

larly the co-eds. A couple of co-eds mentioned that walking alone one could be brutally abused or propositioned.

The students really believe that the police over-stepped their bounds by coming on the campus. An interviewee from the Negro community said that the Negro community felt that the ten policemen on the Jackson force were just tokens, sort of a peace offering, and not real police since they can not arrest whites. In addition there was resentment over claims of police brutality.

Another precipitating event seemed to have occurred almost two weeks prior to the disturbance. Some local white toughs had been harassing any Negro they found in the street but especially three children who lived near the Jackson State College area within two blocks of the campus. One of them threw acid on a nine year old girl. Another time these hoodlums threw a fire bomb which hit a boy. The boy threw a Coke bottle and broke out the window of the car making it identifiable and also wrote down the license number of the car from which the bomb was thrown. This information was given to the police and they reportedly lost it and never pursued the matter. Some people in the college neighborhood said that you could call the police to report a beating going on right outside your door and there would be no action taken. Immediately prior to the actual disturbance there were a couple of incidents involving bricks thrown at children.

The students were frustrated in their inability to act effectively in relationships with the administration or with the city government. There also were restrictions on political organizations and activities. A national figure in a Negro political movement came to Jackson State the month before the disturbance and was denied the right to speak on

campus. Some of the students resented this very much.

After the police backed off to Lynch Street and set up barricades to prevent motorists from driving through the campus, some of the Jackson State students evidently stayed out all night and they were joined by a number of students from Tougaloo College. Evidently not much damage was done that night, a couple of telephone booths were smashed, the police barricades were burned in the streets, a signal light was knocked out and the drug store across from the campus had been damaged because the Negro lady owner was thought to be trying to cheat students.

When the police moved out to Lynch Street the students felt they had accomplished something; the boys as a group wandered over to the girls dormitory and began yelling into it. From the dorm apparently the news traveled out to Tougaloo College. Soon several bus loads of the students arrived to join in the affair. The news also traveled down the street to the corner gang who began to congregate about a block from Jackson State College. The corner gang moved closer and tried to get the girls to come out of the dorms and join the fracas. The Jackson State students responded by trying to keep the girls inside the dormitory and to keep the corner gang from getting close enough to entice the girls onto the grounds.

It seems that most of the Jackson State students stayed out all night Wednesday night and that the corner boys were the ones primarily responsible for the destruction. The Tougaloo students went back to their own campus.

The next day, Thursday, May 11, 1967, there were student government elections going on and the students were milling around. The mayor came out to the campus, coming through the barricades accompanied by many

police. The students did not want him to come on campus so they went out to meet him. The mayor asked the students to return to normal. He promised them an over-walk for Lynch Street. It is interesting to note the differences in perception by the white and black community of the mayor's role. One white respondent thought it was the mayor's great personality and personal appeal that stopped the whole thing. A Negro student believed that the mayor came out and put pressure on the administration and caused the administration to apply pressure to the students. The Jackson State students expressed some hostility towards students from Tougaloo and the corner gang, who seemingly were the ones directly involved in the disorder while Jackson State was getting blamed for it.

During the day Thursday the Tougaloo students, the corner gang, and the Jackson State students seemed to drift apart a little more. The militant leader on Jackson State Campus (who supposedly representing the students at this time and subsequently elected student body president) was attempting to control the participation of Jackson State students in the disturbance and to prevent Jackson State students from involvement with the police. He had been evidently called by a Tougaloo student leader asking if Tougaloo students could come over to help out. He refused the offer and tried to during Thursday to keep Jackson State students on the campus and away from the march that proceeded down Lynch Street to the barricade where eventually Brown was shot.

During Thursday morning some Millsaps students came over and had a peaceful demonstration on Lynch Street in support of the Jackson State students. They left without any incidents.

An official at Jackson State reported that the students became very much concerned that there were a lot of "strangers" on campus moving back and forth, the students asked permission to wear identifying arm bands so that they could form a protective ring around the campus to keep off trouble makers. They saw this as a defensive role, starting sometimes Wednesday night and continuing on Thursday. In particular they wanted to keep anybody from getting at the girls and also to keep other people from destroying or damaging property.

To some extent Jackson State students, usually seen as passive, resented the "help" of others. They wanted to handle the disturbance on their own, take a stand on their own, and were seeing this as a kind of a maturation or self-growth experience.

On this Thursday, in addition to the elections and the events of the disturbance, the students presented a list of grievances to the college administration. These reportedly centered around social matters and a specific complaint that the dining hall was in bad condition.

After the students formed the defensive ring around campus, some individuals came and tried to get the Jackson State students to march down Lynch Street to the police barricades. The Jackson State students said that their concerns were confined to the Campus and that they would not as a body participate in this march.

The barricade was not completely effective. Apparently people could get through, with the police warning them to travel at their own risk. As dusk fell, the corner gang inside the barricades started throwing rocks and yelling at passing motorists. They would try to overturn a car if it slowed down. An administrative official at the college said that the corner gang tried to organize the demonstration

and failed. Then they went into the community rounding the available young people and brought them back to the first stop light at the edge of Jackson State Campus. Later they turned around and started down Lynch Street in the direction of downtown Jackson and toward the barricades. The official did not think there were many Jackson State students involved. The majority of Jackson State students and the student leaders were primarily trying to keep the trouble makers off the campus. There were also a number of high school students from other parts of the city who became involved.

Some of the students described the nature of the disorder as changed in its second night. The high school students and corner gang would advance on the police shouting: "Hell No We Won't Go." The police had withdrawn to move their barriers farther back upon earlier advances of the group. They stood their ground however and had a confrontation in the setting where Benjamin Brown was shot. One student, reportedly three feet from Brown when he was hit, related the incident in the following way. A group of predominantly high school students were moving towards the police expecting the police to withdraw again. This was in the midst of some bottle throwing but not from that particular group. When the group had come relatively close to the police, someone from the back of the group threw a bottle at the police and when the bottle broke the group became frightened and turned around and ran - literally ran in all directions away from the police. At this point, the police began to fire. Most of the students believe that most of the police were shooting over the heads of the students. There is some disagreement as to how many police were shooting at the students. Some thought it was one particular policeman; others reasoned there must have been two, consider-

ing the location of some of the people at the time they were hit. There was considerable chronic hostility toward one of the white policemen whom students thought was firing at them.

The report was that the police did not open fire until the students began to run away. When Brown was shot he did not stop running immediately. He ran for a little while before he fell and yelled that he couldn't make it any farther. He died a little later in the hospital. At least four other students received gun shot wounds.

According to another informant one highway patrolman and two Jackson city police deliberately disobeyed orders by firing into the crowd. Some persons thought that there was a disobedience of orders on the part of the police because there was no order to fire. Apparently some of the police panicked in the face of the advancing group and started firing. Brown evidently was not part of this group who advanced on the police. One informant said he told the policeman in charge: "You hit a guy - there's a fellow down over there." The policeman in charge refused to acknowledge this and asserted that it was a garbage can. Some thought that dusk had fallen to the point that one could not clearly distinguish people and objects.

One Negro interviewee said Brown had been a real source of controversy, had real problems with some of the Negroes in the community, and that some Negroes hated him. Another informant thought the fact that the very militant Negro leaders hadn't picked up the killing as a continuing rallying point was that they were aware that it wasn't a policeman who fired the shot. This was from one person and based only on rumor or hearsay.

The police department officials also stated that they were not the first to fire. They indicated that there was firing from somewhere outside of their ranks before they fired any shots.

One Negro, active in a militant group and apparently on the scene at the time of the killing, said Brown had been in a cafe and had just come out. When he came out he walked either toward the mob or some other way when a policeman recognized him and called him. At the same time that the policeman called him, Brown turned toward the policeman who yelled "Halt!" Brown turned and started running apparently from the police and at this point was shot.

Immediately after the shooting, things got quiet. The killing apparently had a sobering and suppressive effect on the group for things remained quiet for the rest of that evening.

The National Guard was alerted by the governor at 2:00 A.M. Thursday. They started assembling and getting people in from around the area. Around 4:00 A.M. they started for the Campus. The governor had issued an executive order releasing the National Guard to do what was necessary. They were under orders not to shoot unless an officer told them to.

Just before the shooting of Brown, the National Guard was pulling up behind the crowd on Lynch Street opposite to the police barricades. Apparently campus police had walkie-talkie communication with the National Guard. Campus police said they had the Jackson State Campus under control and they did not need National Guards to come onto the Campus. The officer in charge of the National Guards reported that he had been ordered by the governor to go down Lynch Street and not to stop at the Jackson State Campus. This college official was afraid that if the National Guard did come through the Campus with its show of military

might that this would frighten the students and perhaps antagonize them into further disorder. This didn't happen for they passed through without incident.

It is reported that the student leader who emerged earlier asked the National Guard for a microphone so that he could ask the students to get out of the way and let them pass through peacefully. This was accomplished with some cooperation between the students and the National Guard. After this the crowd dispersed.

Interpretation of Events

The Nature Of The City³

Demography. Jackson, the capital of Mississippi, was slow to recover from the Civil War destruction. The recovery from the depression of the thirties was rapid due to a railroad junction and the discovery of natural gas in the late twenties. Thereafter, its growth has been phenomenal. Formerly a white-collar city, it began to attract industry and at the same time made a conscientious effort to avoid industrial slums. Wide streets and modern smoke-free skyscrapers give it the clean, spacious appearance of a western city. The population increase was the result of the influx of people from surrounding countryside. There is diversified manufacturing, including glass, textiles, electronic equipment and meat and dairy products.

Population. Jackson had a population of approximately 144,000 in 1960. Negroes made up about 36% of the population. OEO estimates of

³These data were taken from a memorandum prepared by the Research Division of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders dated October 13, 1967.

unknown validity place the total population at 167,000 for 1966, with a non-white population of 57,807. These estimates suggest:

-- an increase in population since 1960.

-- a greater increase of white population than of Negro since 1960.

Over one-half of Jackson's Negro population in 1960 were children and young people. About 43% of Jackson's white inhabitants were children and young people. About 51% of Negro children under 18 lived with both parents. Seventy-nine percent of Jackson's white children under 18 lived with both parents.

Education. There was a very significant difference between the levels of achievement of the white and Negro portions of Jackson's adult population. The median school years completed by the white population was twelve, over four grades higher than the median level of education of the adult Negro population. Twelve percent of adult whites (over 25) and 64% of adult Negroes had eight years of schooling or less.

Income. Median income of white families was 38% higher than that of non-white families. Sixty percent of non-white families received less than \$3,000 per year income; 11% of white families were in this category.

Employment. Negroes were participated in the labor force to a lesser degree than whites in 1960. Negro women were participating in the labor force to a greater degree than white women. In each case they were having greater difficulty finding jobs. The unemployment rate for Negro men was $3\frac{1}{2}$ times that of white men while Negro women had an unemployment rate 50% greater than that for white women.

Housing. Negroes had less of a stake in the community deriving from home ownership. Of the housing units occupied by Negroes, 38%

were owner-occupied; some 70% of white-occupied housing was owner-occupied. One-third of Negro-occupied housing was overcrowded; less than 7% of white housing was overcrowded. Only 52% of Negro-occupied housing was sound and had all plumbing facilities; 90% of white-occupied housing met these criteria for adequate housing.

Median rent paid as a proportion of median income indicates that Negroes had to pay about 45% more of their income for housing than did their white fellow citizens.

Crime. Crime in Jackson is quite low. Ninety-five percent of all American cities of 100,000 population or more had a higher crime rate than Jackson in 1966. Crime has increased less rapidly in Jackson since 1961 than in most large cities. Jackson has a relatively large police force as measured by the number of law enforcement personnel per 1,000 population. By this measure, only 33% of America's big cities have larger police forces.

From the above it would appear that Negroes are substantially more disadvantaged than whites in education, income, employment, and housing in Jackson, Mississippi.

Chronic Underlying Issues In The City

- (1) A city official traced the riot back to CORE and the original freedom riders who came into Mississippi soon after the first major civil rights legislation in the mid 50's. This same interviewee held the opinion that Negroes, themselves, had started segregation by insisting on a separate place to worship where they could preach and sing and carry-on in their own particular way. In seeming agreement, a middle class Negro interviewee who exercises considerable influence over a segment of the Negro com-

munity volunteered a similar point when he indicated that Negroes didn't like to worship in the same way that white people worshiped, giving reasons that sounded very like those given the the city official.

- (2) There is virtually no meaningful communication between the Negro and white communities. They remain for the most part separate and distinct communities with a kind of physical proximity and overlap but with formidable barriers that prevent personal, social, and cultural interaction between the races.

These barriers are a factor in the educational and economic systems of the state. The existence of virtually all-Negro and virtually all-white businesses and the existence of virtually all-white state colleges and universities on the one hand and of all-Negro colleges on the other are long standing and continued evidence of this fact.

- (3) The harassment of Negro co-eds by white, male motorists while always a potential precipitating factor in disorder probably points also to a negative and demeaning attitude on the part of a certain segment of the white, male community toward Negro females. This long-standing attitude, now most prevalent in the group that southerners call "riff-raff," is that Negro females can be used for white man's sexual pleasure with impunity. Most interviewees believe that white riff-raff get by with things that Negroes would be arrested for.
- (4) There were a number of promises made by the city government which were not kept. One of these related to the control of the traffic on the public street that runs through the Jackson State Campus.

Another was the fact that the ten Negro policemen on the city force were picked without consulting Negro leaders. As it turned out, one of the policemen had a rather aggressive and tough attitude toward members of his own race and he happened to be assigned to the area around Jackson State College.

In another instance the city government promised a Negro minister they would try to create two to three hundred summer jobs for needy youth. There was no real follow-through on this. The only exception being a token \$3500 project utilizing a few youth in making a religious survey.

- (5) The educational system militates against the Negro. Negroes often cannot qualify for the better positions in business and industry, particularly those requiring technical skills. The interviewee who made this point indicated that he understood that Negroes did not even try for secretarial training because they knew they could not make the grade. Negroes are aware of lack of preparation, but also feel more discrimination on clerical jobs (than on industrial and labor jobs) even when they are qualified. White employers confirmed this. Negroes also are not put in sales positions, allegedly because Negroes do not trust Negro salesmen and whites will not accept them.

Jackson State College students, perhaps typical of most Mississippi Negro college students, are generally regarded as passive and submissive. Conditions in the educational system of the college are a source of general grievance for students and many persons in the Negro community. Negro students at Jackson State feel inferior to students in white schools in terms of their level of preparation

and their intellectual competence. Such attitudes are quite common among Negro students in the high schools and elementary schools of the city.

Knowledgeable persons generally agreed that Jackson State is an inferior institution, preparing students to achieve at not much higher than the high-school level by the time they graduate. It is also generally agreed that when students enter Jackson State College they are very poorly prepared, the public schools of the city and of the state being quite inferior in their preparation of Negro students. While some of the more conservative whites insist that Jackson State is a fine institution, and that it is regarded by the Negro community with considerable pride, educators offer a contrary opinion. It is agreed that there are some excellent teachers on the faculty at Jackson State but that, in general, the faculty is less competent than that of comparable white institutions and that the students at Jackson State have an average ACT (scholastic ability) score in the lower ten percent of national norms. The students in general have very poor language skills when they graduate - many reportedly cannot write and spell and compose intelligible sentences. Since it is these students who are typically used to staff the classrooms of the city's negro public schools, the inferior preparation of Negro students at the college is quite understandable. In general, physical facilities at Jackson State are fair, but library and laboratory facilities are quite poor.

Jackson State students are seen as having a very low social commitment and, in general, do not participate in civil rights

activities. The newspapers and news media give very little attention to Jackson State. It appears in the papers or on television and radio only in the event of some negative incident. Most of the whites in the community are hardly aware that Jackson State exists, and many are puzzled when asked where the college is located. No activities or events bring elements of the white community and the Negro colleges together, and communication between the Negro colleges in the community and the white college, is very poor.

The public school situation of the Negroes in Jackson was extremely poor up until 1952, when the State began to make rapid changes in the education of Negroes, principally building new physical plants. They were, however, poorly equipped and the faculties remained decidedly inferior as they had been in the past.

Desegregation of schools has taken place slowly in Jackson, but segregation of Negro and white students within the "legally integrated" schools is apparently customary. The races are segregated in lines, and often in classrooms. They are segregated in the cafeteria, at chapel, etc. Observers report that Negroes in desegregated classrooms in the city schools are usually ignored by white teachers, nor called upon, or asked to perform special work.

Some interviewees felt that the only long-range solution to the many circular problems in the educational system available to the Negro was to merge all the schools including the Negro colleges and the universities with white schools.

Most of the interviewees felt that the Negro college needed a great deal of upgrading on almost all counts. Some felt this was a massive problem - so great that one interviewee had information to the effect that one very large private foundation had given up on all but a few Negro colleges. A few informed interviewees viewed even the white state universities in Mississippi as third and fourth rate with the Negro universities falling far short of them. Some interviewees were of the opinion that Negroes and whites still want their own universities and want to maintain them as separate institutions. Others felt that the existence of separate Negro institutions was at best a stop-gap operation during the in-between era.

- (6) In Negro colleges the students reject the authoritarian structure and authoritarian patterns which the administration has taken over from the white community and imposed upon the students. This creates a kind of chronic set of "inside" tensions. At times these "inside" tensions can be exacerbated to the point of explosion by "outside" tensions such as those created by black power leaders and other militants and agitators. These groups are splitting young Negroes from responsible Negro leadership, and due to their unpopular stance on the Viet Nam War are causing even moderate whites to react with negative emotion rather than reason to the Negro cause.
- (7) There are chronic tensions between the city police and the students. The students interpret this as a continuing challenge to their integrity and freedom. Incidents between students and police occur with what is justified or unjustified in the interaction often be-

coming blurred because of the underlying tensions that are always present. The police have had unlimited rights which have traditionally gone unchallenged. Yet the police fear vengeance and their authoritarian posture and brutality is a preventive measure against it. Police roughness and show of strength is a cover for insecurity created by the threat of loss of control. This insecurity is on the increase and so brutality may increase. Some Negroes and whites, however, reported a decrease in police brutality. Generally, though, the white community supports the attitude and posture of the police and this tends to create a vicious circle.

- (8) We are living in an in-between era where old patterns of social interaction are not sufficient and where new patterns are not well established or accepted. The old patterns of social interaction are being challenged to the point where even the rhetoric of these interactions is challenged: What is white and what is black? The Negro students' struggle for self identity and integrity in a community like Jackson inevitably leads to a challenge of old social interaction patterns and sometimes to disorder and violence.
- (9) While some substandard housing does exist in both white and Negro communities of Jackson, this was not considered a hot issue at the moment. Some interviewees did indicate a need for public housing projects for the "underclass."
- (10) One of the two large newspapers in the state is clearly and rabidly segregationist. The other has been identified as segregationist in the past but at the present has adopted some policies which makes

for change toward a more moderate position. Still, the dominant attitudes propagated by the mass communication media of Jackson are segregationist in nature.

- (11) Negroes are unprepared by way of family background, education, or special training for living or competing in a modern technological society. This is true of many whites, too, but their reaction to the Negro's skin color tends to make his plight worse. Reportedly the state's attempt to attract industry by promising cheap, docile labor and its fight against unionization is preventing upgrading of all poor.
- (12) Sometimes a lack of initiative on the part of Negro college administration, due perhaps to lack of competent manpower within the university, allows opportunities for development and upgrading of the university and opportunities for the university to do "social action" research to go begging.
- (13) Employment opportunities for Negroes leave much to be desired. Sometimes even those well qualified find it difficult to compete for the better jobs and move on to other communities in other states seeking better opportunities. One Negro said: "We'll be 'helpers' til the day we die."
- (14) The black power movement was seen by one interviewee as having as many potentially constructive elements as destructive ones. By contrast, another interviewee highly intelligent, highly influential, and liberal in outlook indicated that some elements of the black power movement, such as RAM, "scares hell out of me." The latter interviewee indicated that he had talked with people who had attended their meetings here in Jackson and that his in-

formants had indicated that they had seen the RAM members making bombs.

Some interviewees did not seem to think that there was very much organization of any kind within the Negro community. Consequently, even in political campaigns where they might have an opportunity to affect the outcome there has been considerable division. Most interviewees saw the NAACP as a rather conservative organization working within the law and proving to be a reliable source of help in times of crisis.

Other interviewees thought the black power movement was growing in strength by recruitment of outsiders as well as insiders. One very active liberal Negro businessman, a Negro minister, and a Negro community organizer felt that the fragmentation of Negro leadership in Jackson had allowed and would probably continue to promote the Committee for Black Youth, an extremely militant black power group. One interviewee saw them deeply affecting the awareness of the black community and would do so to a greater extent once their own leadership problems were solved.

All these interviewees thought that the Committee or similar organizations would have increasingly influential and active involvement in determining community attitudes.

The Urban League has been active in Jackson only about a year. It has established contacts with white businessmen and claims to have secured some jobs for Negroes.

- (15) The Ku Klux Klan or at least its ghost still exists in Jackson. Some feel its presence more than others, viewing a large part of the police as K K K. Most interviewees, however, did not feel it

was a very potent or active force in the community. Most also agreed that its members were likely to be riff-raff.

- (16) The White Citizens Council still maintains its national headquarters in Jackson, Mississippi, and they are presently planning to construct a new building which will house their national publication. Most of the interviewees did not see it as a very strong force in the community. However, it remains as a chronic reminder of the white community's segregationist stand. The White Citizen's Council was reported by one of the interviewees as having two basic purposes: to keep integration to a minimum and to reduce federal encroachment in local and state affairs. Most individuals interviewed made sharp distinction between the Ku Klux Klan and the White Citizen's Council (WCC), the latter being termed by one as "pure as the Baptist Church" and another indicating that some of the most respectable citizens of Jackson belong to it. However, some thought the WCC used economic threats extensively to keep business people in line.
- (17) A few other small and relatively influential organizations exist which may contribute in a small way to underlying tensions. One of these is the Americans for the Preservation of the White Race which some consider is only a little better than the Ku Klux Klan. Another is the American Victory Committee which seems to be more concerned with the Viet Nam war than with racial affairs.
- (18) There are no official bi-racial commissions at either the city or state levels. When asked about the possibility of such a commission the assistant to the mayor indicated that there would be no point in such a commission; if one were formed it could be of no

constructive use since only a bunch of radicals would agree to sit down and work together in a racially mixed committee. The assistant to the governor in response to the same question indicated that there was no need for a bi-racial committee. Since the law was very simple and straightforward, it did not need a bi-racial committee to read it or interpret it. Anyone could understand and implement the law. In addition he expressed extreme skepticism of the usefulness of such a committee and thought that no such commission anywhere in the country had proved to be effective.

- (19) There was no evidence that any governmental or civic organization that was really making much headway in the improvement of Negro-white relations or of social and economic conditions or of educational and vocational opportunities for Negroes. Yet some progress is evident. STAR was considered by some to be effective in retraining and in referring Negroes and poor whites to auxillary services, and in publicizing Negro needs to whites and in helping provide opportunity for advancement to Negroes. One interviewee, a prominent member of the news media world, indicated that he thought the Chamber of Commerce will appoint a bi-racial commission and that will move things forward. He thinks that this move will help put pressure on the government to appoint an official commission.

A Negro minister (civic leader, businessman, and a director of a community development organization) felt that there should be more stringent enforcement of federal non-discriminatory policies in federally supported local service agencies, like welfare, well-baby clinics, Neighborhood Youth Corps, adult education etc.

Even the programs which are set up to attack the problems of the poor are often administered so as to perpetuate the status quo. There are no effective ways of hearing and responding to complainys.

- (20) Students believe that the Negro colleges have no impact upon the operations of the city. Educators cannot effect change.

This was substantiated by an interviewee who is a prominent business executive and one who probably has some opportunity to influence mass communication media in the city and one who is also a member of the State Board of Education. He indicated that he was in rather continual contact with the president of Jackson State during the period of the riot. He put considerable pressure on the president of Jackson State to turn over to the police the student who violated the traffic law and caused the incident that sparked the disturbance. He also put pressure on the president to discipline all the students who participated in the disturbance and he indicated that some 30 students were suspended and that two or three seniors were not allowed to graduate.

The Situational Context: Immediate Causes Of The Disorder

- (1) Campus elections had created a fairly high degree of interest and excitement. Campaign speeches and rallies were attended by large numbers of students and sometimes continued late into the night. The heat of the election campaign was evidenced in the two vote difference between the two candidates for student body president. Because of inadequate recreational facilities students often just mill around aimlessly, especially after gatherings such as a political rally.
- (2) One of the students took the traffic violation incident as an

opportunity to attract some attention to himself, according to a college official. This same interviewee considered the pursuit by two Negro patrolmen of a student taxi driver onto the campus and their attempt to arrest him as merely the spark that set off the riot. He felt that the likelihood of a disorder was great at the time and if this had not started it, something else would have.

- (3) General increase in sympathy with the black power movement all over the country.
- (4) A number of student gripes, some chronic and some more immediate. Students were comparing themselves and their facilities with students and facilities at the white state universities in Mississippi.
- (5) The expansion of Jackson State College across Lynch Street worsened some already bad traffic conditions on the campus. A busy thoroughfare separates some parts of the university.
- (6) Carmichael's visit to the campus a month prior to the riot.
- (7) Young, white hoodlums who drive down the street dividing the campus and harass Negro students. The interviewee who mentioned this was an extremely influential executive in the news media; he noted that some of his reporters had indicated that white motorists had actually tried to run down co-eds. This has caused male students to adopt a rather aggressive and sometimes provocative attitude toward white motorists passing through the area. The Negro male students sometimes step out into the street as though they are daring you to hit them, according to this same interviewee.
- (8) The students on the Negro college campus feel isolated and this isolation sometimes leads to despair or to criticism of the outside community.

The Character Of The Disorder

The character of this disorder is the character of Jackson, of Mississippi, of the South and of America. A people long oppressed are gradually gaining some awareness of their oppression, its weight and its resistance to change. Young Negroes see the oppression by the whites as generalizing to Negroes in authority, such as college administration, and as affecting the whole social order, including their education, their economic opportunities, and their acceptance as people who are fully human. Given this ubiquitous and chronic tension, at any given time most any incident that re-enacts or symbolizes the oppression and its inhumanity can precipitate disorder, riot, and destruction.

A variety of responses were obtained when the interviewer asked the question "What did the disorder accomplish?" The city and state officials thought that it accomplished nothing. An administrator at Jackson State College was skeptical. He said: "I wonder. I can't honestly say that anything was really accomplished." One highly influential interviewee thought that at least one thing was accomplished, that the disturbance made people realize that "it can happen here." Another interviewee on one of the college campuses indicated that it might have increased awareness on the part of the faculty and administration that students desire and need to play an active role in all college affairs. A news media executive ventured the opinion that the disturbance made for a better understanding on the part of the community of the problems at Jackson State College and perhaps increased the community's willingness to help resolve these problems. A leader of the Committee for Black Youth and a Negro

businessman felt that the riots resulted in somewhat increased solidarity in the black community. There is a greater self-awareness in the community and a growing recognition of its identity as a black community.

In answer to the question as to what was learned from the disturbance most interviewees thought that nothing or very little was learned. The police felt that they had learned at least one thing: that they will have to react more firmly and more quickly the next time there is indication of disorder.

"Will other disorders occur?" Many interviewees replied in the affirmative.

Many interviewees replied in the affirmative to the question "Are disorders, riots, and violence an inevitable part of social change?" An administrator at Jackson State College pointed to history to support his affirmative answer. A professor at Tougaloo College supported his affirmative answer with the observation that civil disobedience was in effect built into our system or at least allowed for by the 1st amendment to the constitution. He indicated that problems arose because disobedience and violence were hard to distinguish being on the same continuum. The news media executive answered: "Yes, I would think so, but this doesn't excuse any citizen from working to prevent a disorder and violence."

One Negro expressed his belief that further riots would occur if the "whites don't get off our back." He expressed the Negroes fear of whites when acting individually and the relative safety when there is collective action - "and massive acts are violent acts." "I don't like violence, but I don't like its cause either. No thinking Negro can say the militant leaders are too wrong."

In response to the question "Are you generally optimistic or pessimistic about the future?", some of the interviewees felt optimistic but in different degrees. The director of the Research and Development Center, indicated that he thought it was possible to improve Negro-white relations. He has, in fact, appointed one bi-racial committee for the Delta Project which is now getting under way. He indicates that the Committee members have agreed to meet though they have not sat down together yet. He believes that they will. This bi-racial committee will act as an advisory body for the project and will help get the job done. It is a vast project with a budget of approximately \$13,000,000 aiming at the relocation and the training of entire families for living in modern society.

The news media executive qualified his optimism by saying that it was unfortunate that technological change had given us so many indigent Negroes at the same time that social and racial upheaval had reached such a height. He felt that unemployment among the uneducated Negro and white communities and the poverty that existed among these groups had contributed significantly to the problems now to be faced. This individual felt that economics was a much bigger factor in the whole problem than most people thought, and thought that economics would be at the root of the friction that would inevitably occur between middle class Negroes and the lower class, uneducated, indigent Negroes. He indicated that part of his optimism was based on the fact that Jackson has so many middle class Negroes and by comparison with other trouble spots around the country had relatively few of the lower-lower class, typically uneducated, unemployed, and indigent.

Aftermath and Consequences: Continuing Issues and The Future

It is difficult in a short period of time to summarize an effort to assess a community's awareness, attitudes, and feelings toward issues so fundamental to its existence and progress. We shall attempt to present what appears to emerge from the interview data as the principle findings of this study. These findings represent our estimate of the continuing issues and their relationship to possible future disorders and to constructive change. This section is in two parts: Signs of Trouble, Signs of Hope.

Signs of Trouble

There were many indications coming from interviewees with widely differing stands on questions such as integration and equal opportunities that there are deep and strongly rooted issues that show no sign of immediate and rapid change. Some of these issues touch the lives of large portions of the population of the community.

- (1) Jackson consists of two communities, not one. There is a white community and a Negro community with no real interaction between these communities or the members of these communities. The few exceptions are tiny waves on a large, large ocean. Certainly the psychological and sociological interaction between Negroes and whites is not very far removed from the rigid caste system which has characterized the south for hundreds of years. This caste system and the psychological and social barriers that keep the members of the two races apart was described by John Dollard in Caste and Class in a Southern Town about 30 years ago. There is still a large proportion of the white population of Jackson who

cannot bring themselves to shake hands with a Negro, to address him as Mister, to sit down with him for any purpose whether to eat or to reason. Pertinent to this point is the statement from the mayor's office in reply to the question, "Do you foresee the appointment of an official bi-racial commission in this city?" His answer was, in effect, "certainly not, there is no need for one, what good would it do. Any group of Negroes and whites who would sit down together are radicals, anyway." The interviewee in the governor's office added to this line of reasoning the thought that it does not take a bi-racial commission to read, interpret, and carry out the law and that's all that's really needed.

One aspect of the communication barrier appears to be the insistence of the whites on deciding with whom they will communicate. This, in effect, gives them the privilege of choosing the leadership of the Negro community. Obviously, this will not be tolerated by the Negro community and is a potential source of considerable trouble.

- (2) There is wide spread belief that Negroes and whites have fundamental differences that do and should keep them apart. The mayor's office indicated that the Negroes themselves began segregation in the early days after the Civil War when they found that they could not worship and sing and carry-on the way they wanted to in white man's churches. He was firm about this belief. The very same sentiment was expressed by a middle class Negro who is an executive in the Negro news media business and is in an influential position among members of his race.
- (3) The white man's attitude toward the Negro contains elements of

paternalism and authoritarianism. There is evidence of the authoritarian attitude in the white man's allegiance to and dependence upon the law and on force to regulate and control people and to resolve problems. The paternalistic attitude is clearly evidenced by the following statements which came from the mayor's office. "If my Negro maid works late, I pay her overtime, put her in my car and take her home; if she gets sick, we take care of her. If my Negro year boy gets in trouble, gets himself in jail, I get him out. If he gets in debt and his wages get garnisheed, I lend him money and find some way to help him out." Similar attitudes were expressed by the Negro news media executive, referred to above. He gave numerous instances of how white people had helped him out of trouble. In particular, one who had loaned him \$500 to bail his son out of jail. He also indicated that his own business was dependent upon white people. He said the Negro businesses who are his clients are too small to really make a dent in his operating expenses. This combination of paternalistic and authoritarian attitudes helps sustain the dilemma of one city existing as two communities symbiotically related.

- (4) Both the white and the Negro community are reportedly very heavily armed, and the Negro community especially is highly sensitive to the possibility of riots. Most members of the Negro community are said to have made specific plans for their own action in the event of such rioting. During the past summer, when riots were taking place in other cities in the country, there was continual discussion of the possibility of riots among Negroes in the Jackson community and the people in general expected that riots would break out at any

time. This led to a considerable increase in the purchase of guns and ammunition. This rather excited and interested acceptance of the possibility of riots may be a very negative factor with which the future will have to deal.

- (5) A potentially dangerous development is the split within the Negro community. This is produced by radical militants who are becoming more emotional and irrational than were white racists (now on the downswing). The division is produced also by Negro business leaders defecting and aligning themselves with white business interests for personal gain. The split in the Negro community has multiple potentials for long term harm. First, it divides Negroes economically and politically and thus takes from them their most potent weapons. Secondly, black militants are producing a negative emotional reaction on the part of the whites because of their racial stance and also because they have aligned themselves with unpopular international policy. Third, there is a real danger that whites who have become more reasonable, perhaps by the inevitability of change, will regress in their attitudes due to their emotional reactions to militant, violent Negroes. Fourth, the wedge driven by the militants and the defection of the Negro business leaders also seems to be making the leadership of responsible Negro ministers and teachers less effective.
- (6) A major shortcoming of the local civil rights movement is the lack of publicity given to the gains made by Negroes. This leaves Negroes in ignorance of the progress that has been made and makes them much more susceptible to extremist propaganda. There is also a lack of publicity directed at moderate and reasonable white citizens. Many

of them who have no animosity toward the individual Negro are left in ignorance of the Negro's plight.

- (7) There has been a lack of effective follow-up of voter registration campaigns. Negroes and whites are disappointed at the absence of an effective use of the ballot box during recent elections. Most agreed that Negroes had a real opportunity to elect responsible officials but that this opportunity was not taken because Negroes were ignorant of the voting procedure and because black militants would campaign against a Negro candidate whom they felt to be an "Uncle Tom."
- (8) Another problem, which is felt keenly by Negroes and by whites, is the inferiority of the Negro education. The less informed think that the Negro educational institutions are "just fine." The more informed know that they are far from being just fine, but they believe also that Negroes are not taking advantage in all cases of the educational opportunities which are available to them.
- (9) There is a relatively large Negro middle-class in Jackson. It has adopted white middle-class values which includes some attitudes of indifference and contempt and sometimes even aggressive and hostile attitudes toward any trouble making potentially disruptive group whether it be the uneducated, unemployed, indigent Negro, the restless, demanding student, or the Black Power extremist.
- (10) The problem of up-grading the educational system of Jackson and the State of Mississippi to a level within range of national standards is a massive problem. This problem is not peculiar to

the Negro though it is more serious for him. The director of the Mississippi Research and Development Center indicated that he understood that the Ford Foundation had given up on all but a few Negro colleges apparently because it saw the task of upgrading them to be a hopeless one. He pointed out that he had offered to finance a study of vocational and technical training needs among Negroes relative to the Jackson labor market and got no response from the college administration. He renewed his offer even to the point of bringing in and paying new people on the faculty to head up the study and still did not get an affirmative response. Attraction of well educated and talented faculty to an academically low rated, Negro college in the deep South seems impossible. The R & D director and the news media executive seemed to have the most sensible appraisal of the situation when they indicated that the only meaningful long range future for Jackson State College was for it to become a fully integrated university obtaining support on a par with that of the other state colleges and universities.

- (11) Among the highly influential business executives of the city are many people who describe themselves as arch conservatives. One such interviewee described the recent incident in which he was "forced" to associate with a Negro woman for a perfectly good (socially approved) reason. Despite the reason he could not help but react with very strong negative emotions. These appeared to be a mixture of contempt for the Negro with whom he was associated and of fear that he would be censured by his own group and lose status.

- (12) Both the middle class whites and the middle class Negroes who constitute a large proportion of the population seem to want above all to suppress the issues of integration and equal opportunity and not to get involved. This middle class suppression of issues is congruent with and reinforcing for the city government and police attitude of solving all problems by rigorous application of the law and order approach which is essentially control by force and subordination. This middle class suppression of issues and the governmental-police management of all race related issues through legalistic subordination work together to create a social and political inertia, the force of which is difficult to over-estimate. This combination of forces represents tremendously strong support for status quo and against the search for new patterns of social interaction.
- (13) Suppression of issues by middle class Negroes and whites and the legalistic control of problems by forced subordination precludes any genuine interaction between members of the white and Negro race and pre-empt any possibility of inter-racial negotiation regarding the many and rigid barriers that separate the two groups.

Signs of Hope

There seems to be little doubt that there exist in Jackson and in the State of Mississippi a number of significant forces for constructive change, for social, political and economic progress. It appears that these agents of constructive change are making some headway. As already indicated, the problems with which they grapple are massive and their entrenchment is long standing, deep rooted, and strong, yet the hope for change is real. The crucial question is this: Can the forces for con-

structive change act quickly enough to mitigate the underlying tensions between the races, between old and new patterns of social interaction to a point where minor incidents cannot exacerbate the tensions to a point where they explode in rebellion, riot, and destruction.

- (1) Perhaps the strongest and most pervasive influence for constructive change in Jackson and the State of Mississippi, is the recently established Research and Development Center. The State Chamber of Commerce worked effectively in order to begin this organization. It has been chartered by the State Legislature and given the status of a "separate university" with the director reporting, as does a college president, directly to the State Board of Education. The primary mission of the organization is economic development, increasing the per capita income of the citizens of the state and thereby raising the standard of living. The policies of this organization are seemingly non-racial. All projects and operations of the center are framed in terms of economic development. This has made it possible to sell programs even to arch conservatives or arch segregationists, programs which ultimately will make vast changes in the economic social and political life of the Negro in Mississippi. This orientation toward economic problems accounts for the fact that it has as one of its staunchest supporters, perhaps one of the two most influential and powerful men in the state, a person who is traditionally identified as an arch segregationists. For example this highly influential person is presently lending very strong support to the Center's 13 million dollar "Delta Project" which is giving extensive training to entire Negro families aimed

at equipping them to live and compete successfully in a modern society. The Center has another project which consists of a net-work of analysts which attempts to locate the racial hot-spots around the State. A continual check on the pulse of these hot-spots enables the Center to move in and do something to avoid head-on collisions and eruptions of violence. The Center has plans to launch a five-year study of change. In addition to a staff of expert economic analysts, the project will also have a team of social scientist^s consisting of a psychologist, a social anthropologist, a sociologist, and a political scientist who will look for the psycho-social and political factors involved in economic and social change.

I was extremely impressed with the director of this organization. He exhibited quiet, intelligent optimism, and a confident determination in the Center's ability to effect sweeping changes in Mississippi. I was surprised after leaving the two hour interview to learn that the man was not an economist but a sociologist. Learning his professional background gave additional meaning to a few words he dropped quietly about two-thirds of the way through the interview: "my first interest is in the development of human resources."

Our judgement as to the potential impact of the various programs of the Research and Development Center on improvement of the Negroes lot and of Negro-white relations seems to be supported by the fact that this center has strong financial support from the Ford Foundation. Despite the hope generated by R & D Center,

some people doubt that its projects can give equal and fair treatment to Negroes.

- (2) Tougaloo College, though considered by most middle class whites and Negroes as a hot-bed of trouble-makers formerly referred to as integrationists and communists but now more likely referred to as militants and communists, is probably a force for constructive change. The college is integrated at both faculty and student levels and it has served as a fertile training ground for the learning of new patterns of social interaction for many Negroes - some of them from Mississippi. The administration and faculty are aware of the presence of black power advocates on the campus and some of them take the view that if the black power advocates are recognized openly and dealt with fairly and taught to operate within acceptable limits that they may be as much a constructive as a destructive force.
- (3) One influential Jackson-based Mississippi newspaper shows some signs of gradually becoming a more moderate news media. The editor indicated that he had already turned two columnists loose to write on the issues as they saw fit, indicating that these people had integrationists leanings and were free to move away from the strong segregationist policy that long characterized the paper. The editor indicated that he had made a change some time ago in referring to Negroes as Mr. and Mrs. or by other proper title and this was no longer a source of complaint from the segregationists. The editor, however, is a realist and he knows (or he thinks he knows,) that if he swings too far and too fast from

the old stand they may lose in circulation and in influence.

- (4) Respect for the law and insistence on its enforcement can potentially be an influence for constructive change in Jackson and in Mississippi. It is true that Jacksonians and in particular the city government uses city and local ordinance and law to maintain the status quo through force and subordination, but it is also true that Jacksonians seem to have passed through the stage of open defiance of Federal Law. Though there is considerable resistance and propaganda against civil rights legislation and against local laws that stand to crack the dike of segregation, and though there may be studied efforts to reduce or weaken the law by finding schemes of compliance which affect minimum change in present structure, once there is a law, it is law and it is respected as law. Thus Federal civil rights legislation with careful and sensible monitoring of challenges to this law through the Federal Courts provide a substantial force for constructive change.
- (5) In general, judges in the Mississippi courts are adequate scholars of the law, although their opinions tend to be rather conservative. They have respect for the opinions of higher courts and they do not like to have their own judgments overruled or reversed. For this reason, they spend considerable time and effort in attempting to relate their court actions involving Negroes to current practices nationally and spend considerable time instructing rank and file police in the rights of defendants in the courts.
- (6) The Urban League is launching a program with white businessmen to secure better jobs for Negroes. It is seen as setting up working

relations between responsible elements in both communities. The program is to include seminars for high school vocational counselors, conferences for Negro students, and job placement services. Much of their efforts are centered around placement of talented Negroes in positions in factories, clothing stores, banks, etc. which are other than service or janitorial.

- (7) The Community Development Agency has attempted to organize mothers on ADC and other welfare recipients in Hinds County so that they can effectively express their complaints and be heard. Presently they have launched a drive to obtain service at the Mother and Infant Care Center at the University Hospital which they claim has had discriminatory policies. This group constitutes a relatively cohesive unit in the county and has several sub-groups throughout. The potential for this kind of organization in encouraging and training people to act in their own behalf in a purposeful way has implications for the manner in which Mississippi changes.
- (8) A few Jackson Negroes have acquired or have made substantial progress in acquiring a new self image or self concept. These are Negroes who can talk with white people on a man-to-man basis without showing either hostility or fear. Jackson Negroes who achieve this invaluable experience of personal integrity and stay around to encourage and nurture the development of this experience in their family and friends, constitute a potential significant force for effective and constructive change. It should be noted that the Negro with this new self-concept is vastly different from the

average middle class Negro who has adopted virtually all white middle class values, values which counteract the development of the new self image or self concept and the achievement of full personal integrity.

- (9) Native Mississippians are in process of learning new patterns of social interaction, based on a regard for Negroes as full fledged human beings. The number of these who have already established these new patterns are extremely few. The number who are capable of learning them, however, is increasing. The team had the pleasure of working with some members of this group during the course of this study in Jackson. However the size of the active liberal white group should not be overestimated. One observer commented that the white liberals tend to associate with each other --that you could put all of them in a small room and that they would all know each other by their first names.
- (10) Liberals from the "outside" while probably much more numerous than native born liberals may not be as effective as the many privately financed organizations and programs would lead one to believe. Their presence is probably a constructive force if for no other reason than they help to teach new patterns of interaction to the few who interact with them.
- (11) The church and religion is potentially a potent force in improving Negro-white relations. At present it is a very weak force. There is an inter-racial ministers alliance and there seems to be some possibility that its membership will grow. A recent ray of hope appeared when the Executive Secretary of the Southern Baptist Sunday School Board (based in Nashville) indicated that the Board

itself was going to be integrated. While every Baptist Church has autonomy to run its own affairs, there is a certain amount of respect for and allegiance to the denomination's Executive Board. Probably a larger proportion of Jacksonians owe some allegiance to organized religion than most other American cities. The largest single denomination in Mississippi is the Southern Baptist and if the move of the Southern Baptist Convention Board is followed by the Mississippi Baptist Convention, and it gets adopted by some of the highly influential churches in Jackson this could be an extremely important development. However, the likelihood of this happening in the near future is rather remote. The minister of one of the largest and most influential churches in Jackson refused to participate in the study as an interviewee. It is understood that he still has ushers at the door to turn away Negroes who come to his church to worship.

- (12) Some of the old caste barriers that set up rigid boundaries and definitions for allowable kinds of interaction between the races have broken down. Racially mixed groups move in and out of the hotels, motels and restaurants in Jackson without any reasonable cause for discomfort. It is possible for members of the two races to live together and to work together without fear of retribution. At least this is true for people whose personal integrity, security and confidence is adequate to deal with the informal social disapproval they may encounter. Many young whites of the educated middle and upper classes acknowledge that equality on all dimensions including the social is inevitably coming and

want to get it over with as quickly and painlessly as possible.

None of this may be true of rural Mississippi.

Summary

This study was originally intended as an analysis of a civil disturbance on a college campus. Even before the team of interviewers got into the field, our preparations and deliberations had made us realize that the disorder that began on the Jackson State Campus on May 10, 1967 had in a very real sense begun centuries earlier with the institution of slavery, or more broadly still with the oppression and subordination of one people by another. This great social evil and injustice, man's inhumanity to man, is by virtue of both its age and nature, a terribly complex and massive problem. In trying to examine the relatively minor disorder of last spring, we could not help seeing the long standing and continuing issues that keep Jackson from being one city with equal opportunities for all. Our report has detailed the chronology of events of the spring disorder, the precipitating factors and the longstanding underlying issues. It has specified the manifest sources of acute and chronic tensions and indicated some of the ways in which these tensions can be exacerbated to the point of explosion--disorder, riot, destruction, bloodshed. And it has concerned itself with the aftermath and effects of the particular disorder.

It all began centuries ago with man's inhumanity to man--subordination, slavery, oppression. It will not end until whites accept Negroes as fully human and Negroes are freed and enabled to actualize their highest human potentialities as these exist for each individual and for the people. Progress toward this end is slow and unsteady. It would have surer footing and a better pace if more Jacksonians and Mississippians would accept now their rightful responsibility for directing and managing the inevitable course

of events that is leading toward equal opportunity and one justice for all. This responsibility must ultimately rest with them.

Houston, Texas
Ralph H. Hines, Ph.D.
Houston City Coordinator

This section of the report is an attempt to summarize the character of events and situations leading up to major confrontation of students and law enforcements agencies in the city of Houston, Texas, May 16-17, 1967. A chronology of events leading up to the major outbreak of disturbances is presented. The disturbances themselves, their character, order, and magnitude are discussed in the context of a university-community complex in which forces of interaction and reaction were inextricably wed. Information included in this report has been collected from a variety of sources (both interviews and documentary materials) and in many respects represent the consensus of opinion regarding specifics where possible and generalized factual data. The grid in Table 3 summarized the number, types and positions of the interviews which were conducted.

Opinions tended to be strong among the informants in Houston who taking diametrically opposed positions left little room for middle ground. The clash of interests in Texas Southern University (T.S.U.) were seemingly an inevitable confrontation, predicted and expected because town and gown took on a third dimension, race. The gap between whites and blacks have widened and strong feelings of self righteousness on both sides are to be found.

Chronology of Events: Background

The seed of disturbances of May 16-17, 1967 on the campus of Texas Southern University were probably sown many years ago. They first

Table 3
Houston
Grid Showing the Elements of the Community and
Levels of Responsibility within Them for Selecting Interviewers

Community Elements	Levels of Responsibility					
	1		2		3	
A. University Admin.	president	1	deans	3	teachers	4
			campus police	2		
B. University Students	leaders	8	members of orgs.	3	non-members	18
C. Police	chief	1	officers	3	patrolmen	2
D. City Government	mayor	1	dept. heads	3	councilmen	1
E. Govt. commissions local/state/fed.		4			local comm. reps.	1
F. Negro Community (non-organized)	professional	3	business	2	citizen	1
G. Negro Organization	political	5	civic-fraternal	2		2
H. Negro Religious	minister	3	lay leader			
	bishop					
I. Negro Likely Riot participants	high					
J. White Likely Riot participants	high	1				1
K. White Community	professional		business		citizen	
		2	Chamber of Commerce	3		
L. White Organization	political	3	civic	1	civil rights	1
M. White Church	minister	1	lay leader			
	bishop	1				
N. Press	editors	1	bureau chiefs	3	reporters	7
	owners					
O. Litigation	justice dept.	1	lawyers	3	litigants	3
Total		36		28		41

began to sprout, however, in the Fall of 1966. In October, 1966 James Foreman, National Coordinator of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), spoke on the TSU campus on the subject "Black Power: A New Religion." Shortly thereafter, a Friends of SNCC Chapter was formed.

In February, 1967, with the legislature still in session in Austin, the Friends of SNCC organized and conducted a march of about 100 persons on downtown Houston in protest of alleged police brutality against Negroes in east Texas. The protest march was organized because five Negro gospel singers from Houston had been beaten in Livingstone, Texas, about 65 miles northeast of Houston. The Friends of SNCC organization, which had been meeting on the campus of TSU with the tacit permission of the administration were told that they would no longer be permitted to hold meetings there in the future. The group's faculty sponsor, Mr. Mack Jones, was advised about this time that his teaching contract would not be renewed.

Another protest was quickly organized around March 19, 1967 by Rev. S. D. Kirtpatrick, a graduate student and one of the founders of the Deacons for Justice and Defense, a Negro self defense organization; Willard Lowe, another student and with Kirtpatrick, the co-chairman of the Friends of SNCC; Lee Otis Johnson, a former TSU student and Franklin Alexander of Chicago, the National chairman of the W. E. Dubois Club.

A boycott of classes was called and meetings were held. There was another march downtown. Wheeler Street, a thoroughfare which traverses the campus of Texas Southern University, was blocked by

students who had long resented the presence of a major street in the middle of their campus. The protest widened to include such student life matters as the quality of food served at TSU cafeterias and hours for girls. Kirtpatrick, Alexander and Johnson were arrested as leaders of the protest and were jailed on \$25,000 bond each. Later the bond was reduced to \$1,000. University officials at Texas Southern University, after conferring with the mayor's office and in particular with Dr. Blair Justice, the mayor's advisor on intergroup relations, agreed to recognize the Friends of SNCC as a bonafide campus organization and to work to correct grievances raised.

On April 3, 1967 students demonstrated in the cafeteria against the poor quality of food served. Chairs and tables were upset and food scattered across the room.

Two weeks later, April 13, 1967 Stokeley Carmichael arrived in Houston at the invitation of the University of Houston for a series of speeches. The police department had meanwhile assigned two Negro policemen to permanent duty at TSU to keep an eye on things. During the same period numerous instances of students throwing rocks at cars driving along Wheeler Street were reported to the police. Two specific dates are mentioned in connection with rock throwing incidents along Wheeler Street, April 22 and 23, 1967. Attention and hostility were focused on white motorists who drove through the thoroughfare of the University.

The Immediate Events

The days, weeks and months preceding May 16 and 17 set the prelude

for and nurtured tensions in the third ward of Houston, Texas. On May 16 and 17 tensions reached their apogee when about 400 city police entered the campus of Texas Southern University and reportedly fired as many as three thousand rounds of ammunition into the male student dormitories of TSU. More than 480 students were arrested. Five students were later brought before a grand jury and indicted for murder.¹

During the day of May 16, 1967 the police had arrested 36 Negroes who were picketing in support of closing a garbage dump in a Negro residential area called Sunny Side in South Houston. The same morning on the other side of town, the Sheriff's Department had arrested 28 Negro demonstrators at the Northwood Junior High School, the scene of a dispute over the fairness of discipline policies as applied to white and Negro students.

By early evening, members of both groups of protestors had gravitated to the campus of TSU bearing stories of brutality, profanity and racism by the police. At about the same time a false report was circulated that a white boy had shot a Negro youth elsewhere in town. Actually, the Houston Chronicle carried a late bulletin that a white boy had been accidentally shot by another white boy (age 11). Rumors persisted and circulated. From most reports, students at TSU were preparing themselves for final examination and showed little interest in manning a picket line or in demonstrating.

In front of the Student Union Building, Douglas Wayne Waller, a

¹Under Texas law anyone who starts a riot can be held responsible for any murders arising out of it whether or not he had a hand in the actual killing.

21 year old student and Viet Nam veteran, tried to recruit students to go with him to the dump. Interest was slow. Waller reportedly to gain attention, slapped one of the students. The student left remarking that he would be back shortly to take care of Waller and presumably anyone else. Waller, it is said, left and returned with a pistol. He was haranguing a small crowd outside the Student Union Building when two unmarked police cars carrying four officers pulled up to investigate a report that trouble was brewing on the campus. A watermelon rind was thrown at the police cars. An officer arrested Waller as the most conspicuous member of a then fast disappearing crowd.²

In custody of the police a pistol was taken from Waller who was taken to police headquarters. A few minutes later, the same unmarked police car returned to the campus to be met by a hail of rocks and bottles. A call for assistance was put out and three more police cars arrived at about 10:30 P.M. At this point there were about nine officers present on the campus although contradictory reports indicate that a substantial force of police were in fact bivouaced at nearby Jeppersen Stadium in anticipation of difficulty this particular evening. That police officers were at Jeppersen Stadium standing by is uncontroversial. The exact number, however, remains open to question.

From reports of persons who arrived early in the evening, Wheeler Street, the thoroughfare which bisects the campus and parallels Lanier Hall dormitory and the Student Union, was littered with debris. Students were running around the dormitories throwing things and generally raising

²This information has been substantiated both from police and student observers at the scene as well as reported officially by the SNCC organization in their fact sheet on events of the day of May 16-17, 1967.

a ruckus. An occasional fire cracker went off and later a bullet was heard to cut through the tree branches. At about 10:40 P. M. five police cars were on Wheeler Street with nine police officers crouched behind them. A muzzle flash was seen. More policemen arrived. One officer, Robert Blaylock, who had arrested Douglas Wayne Waller earlier, was hit in the upper leg by a small caliber bullet (apparently a .22). Sporadic firing seemed to be coming from the Junior-Senior dormitory behind Lanier Hall. Various witnesses on the scene indicated that the police readily returned the fire.

About 11:00 P.M. police inspector Weldon Waycott, arrived. He ordered his men to pull back from the dormitory area to allow several Negro leaders to talk with the students without the presence of the police. This effort failed. The Reverend Bill Lawson (arrested at the dump demonstration earlier the same day) had been released from jail and driven to the campus by police for the specific purpose of trying to reason with the students. He found no leaders or spokesmen with whom he could negotiate a truce. Newsmen on the scene and Rev. Lawson both agreed that at this point, the disorder at TSU was more collegiate rowdyism at final examination time than a riot.

Fifteen minutes later with the talks concluded the police moved back into firing position wherever they saw a muzzle flash. Around midnight, Chief of Police H. B. Short arrived.

May 17, 1967. At about 1:00 A.M. Chief Short ordered his cars and men back to the eastern boundary of the Tierwester Street, in order to give Negro leaders another chance to calm the students. Rev. Kirtpatrick and others went in at this time to talk with student. Upon their return, they reported to Chief Short that the students were demanding a permanent

closing of Wheeler Street. This was the only significant campus grievance the students forwarded at this point. The police chief refused to negotiate on a specific conflict element which he believed to be outside his jurisdiction and control.

While the police were withdrawn several hundred feet from the men's dormitories, several students began dragging construction materials into the street to block it. A tar barrel was set afire. Police Chief Short thereafter sent his men in to "clean up the mess."

The final advance on the demonstrators by the police was made at about 2:00 A.M. F. D. Kirtpatrick (SNCC Leader) accompanied the officers in to make a last ditch effort to talk to the students. He retreated when shots came from the junior-senior dorm. The police opened a barrage of gunfire. At about this time patrolman Louis Kuba, standing near the corner of the Student Union Building, fell mortally wounded when a ricocheting bullet hit him in the forehead. A few minutes later, patrolman Allen Dale Dugger, approaching the junior-senior dorm, had his face grazed by another bullet. The police poured into the dormitory at about 3:00 A.M. With 480 students, many in shorts and pajamas, lying face down on the ground awaiting the arrival of patrol cars to take them to the county and city jails, the police had the situation under control by 4:00 A.M.

Socio-Economic Profile of Houston-Harris County, Texas

Houston, Texas is one of America's very few regional metropolises. It is the largest urban center in the Southern Region as defined by the United States Bureau of the Census, and it was the seventh largest city

in the nation in 1960. The 1960 Census of Population reports a population of 1,243,158 for Harris County in which Houston is located.³ Of this county total, about 76 percent or approximately 938,200 lived in the City of Houston proper.⁴

OEO Information Center estimates place the 1966 city population at 1,135,000 and the Harris County population (1966) at 1,513,000. By any standard, the Houston-Harris County area is a rapidly growing one. If the above estimates for 1966 are accurate, then the Harris county population has practically doubled since 1950 (a population then of 806,000.) If the factors operating during the 1950 to 1960 period have operated to the present time, about half of this growth may be attributed to "natural increase" (births minus deaths) and half to migration. The OEO data show, further, that Harris County's population has become noticeably younger during the recent past: The typical (median) age 1950 was 29.0 years. Estimates for 1966 place the typical age at 25.8 years. Non-whites as a proportion of county population has remained fairly stable over the past sixteen years. In 1950 non-whites constituted about 18.7 percent of the county population. According to 1966 estimates the proportion rose very slightly to 20.2 percent over the sixteen year period.

In 1964, the three industries with the highest proportions of the Harris County labor force were: special trade contracting construction, medical and other health services and non-electrical machinery

³U.S. Bureau of the Census. County and City Data Book, Washington, D.C.: U.S.G.P.O. 1962.

⁴A compendium of data selected from the 1960 Census of population, Volume II. Characteristics of the Population and summarized in a memorandum from the Research Division of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (October 9, 1967) supplied the information for the remainder of the socio-economic section.

production industries. These three industries, out of a ninety-seven category industrial classification, employed only about 12 percent of the county's total of employed persons, suggesting that Harris County has a rather diversified economy.

U.S. Census data indicate that the median family income in the City of Houston in 1960 was \$5,902. In comparison to the other nineteen of the twenty largest cities in the United States in 1960, Houston's typical family income was greater than that of nine of the cities and smaller than that of eleven.

When one compares the typical (median) family of white and non-white families in 1960, it is found that (in both the city and county) white family income was more than 90 percent higher than non-white family income. The median family income for whites in 1960 was \$6,659, for non-white families \$3,426 (City of Houston).

As an index of poverty, the proportion of all families with an income under \$3,000 may be considered. In 1960 about 19 percent of all Houston families had such incomes. Compared to the remaining nineteen of the twenty largest U.S. cities in 1960, Houston had a higher percentage of families with incomes under \$3,000 than fifteen of the nineteen cities. Thus Houston had proportionately more poor families than over three quarters of these cities. In comparing racial populations in Houston only about 13 percent of all white families, as opposed to nearly 42 percent of all non-white families, were, by the above definition, poor in 1960.

Other socio-economic indicators show similar differences between racial groupings; about 84 percent of all white males over age 14 were in the civilian labor force in 1960, as opposed to 79 percent

of all non-white males over age 14.

Nearly half, or 49 percent of all employed non-white males were unskilled. About one in three white employed males in 1960 was classified as "white collar," while only about six non-white males in every hundred were in this category. (3) The typical (median) white Houstonian had completed twelve years of school, while the typical non-white Houstonian had completed about nine years.

Housing differences in Houston in 1960 also reflected significant racial disproportions: (1) Nearly two-thirds (65.3%) of all non-white units were owner-occupied, while less than half (42.3%) of all non-white units were owner-occupied. (2) Using the U.S. Census definition of "overcrowding" in housing, in 1960 one-in-ten of the white units were overcrowded, while about one-in-four non-white units (24.1%) were so classified. (3) In 1960, 89.2% of all white units were classified as "sound with all plumbing facilities," while only 64.2% of all non-white units met these criteria. (4) Median rent for whites in 1960 was approximately \$73.00 and for non-whites approximately \$60.00. These typical (median) rents should be compared against the backdrop of the typical (median) incomes of the two racial groupings. From this standpoint, the typical rent for whites was about 13% of the typical monthly income of white families. For non-white families the median rent of \$60.00 represented about 21% of the typical monthly income. In other words, rent represented a higher proportion of income for non-whites; non-whites paid about 62% more of their income for rent than did white Houstonians in 1960.

Interpretation Of Events

Houston, Texas has been variously described as a deep south southern

city, and as the most liberal and progressive town in the southwest. Regardless of the source of information most people agree that Houston is the kind of town that is slow to move in new directions. It has been characterized by white and black informants as being a community that will do only those things necessary to prevent disruptive patterns to its way of life. Persons concerned with race relations of the community were almost unanimous in their view that city, government, and civic leaders have been unresponsive to the intensifying problems of the rapidly growing number of Negroes who live here. Houston's Negro population numbers about 300,000 or one fourth of the city. Houstonians pride themselves on being a money city. It is a city well represented by major oil interests and a city in which political control is admittedly in the hands of a few. A nine man council organization is elected on a county wide basis; this makes political potency of minority groups virtually impossible in the fact of the tremendous odds of electing minority group representatives to city wide positions.

The third, fourth, and fifth wards are heavily populated by Negroes. One of the major problems for Negroes in Houston is housing. The mayor has appointed a committee to plan and develop new housing sources for low income groups. The Bottoms Project is a major program designed to improve parts of the fifth ward, the worse slums in Houston, located just across Buffalo Bay from downtown.

Houston was among the last major U.S. cities to enter the war on poverty. The effectiveness of the Office of Economic Opportunity programs has been an object of considerable controversy. Persons working with the poor report that the poorest parts of town feel the least impact from OEO efforts. Several surveys have shown that many poor

people have never heard of the poverty war. Antagonistic feelings have been heightened among poverty workers and city officials with recriminations and allegations made from various factions.

White civic and government leaders believe that the war on poverty is responsible, at least in part, for present unrest among Houston's Negroes. Among many Negro leaders, community action has come to mean action against City Hall.

The low status of Negroes is usually coupled with the pervasive lack of personal dignity and self esteem and are regarded as points of contention among Negroes regardless of their position in the community. Negroes are convinced that the city and school administrators are indifferent to their problems and have neither the interest nor the willingness to develop a real understanding of them. It is believed for example, that the police department is totally dominated by the Ku Klux Klan. The police chief is described in less than complimentary terms. The fact that there are only 60 Negro policemen on a force of 1,200, none holding a rank above patrol officer is pointed to as evidence of bad faith.

The need and desire for racial understanding in Houston has been stressed by white and Negro leaders. There were some real opportunities for reconciliation and compromise (e.g. The mayor's conference about the dump on May 9, 1967): This was one point when there was a genuine desire among Negro leaders to be shown a sign of goodwill and understanding from the city's white community. The grievances raised by the Negro community that Sunny Side dump be closed, that Wheeler Street be rerouted around Texas Southern University, that Negroes be treated the same as whites in discipline cases at the schools, that the

war on poverty be given a chance and finally, that the police treat Negroes the same as whites, are pointed to as issues for discussion and compromise. Differential treatment because of race has long been a source of irritation and distrust in the Negro community. Negroes offer as evidence the fact that the Beechnut Street Compost Plant was closed when residents of a prosperous white neighborhood protested about the odor. When the same complaint was registered by Negroes in the Sunny Side area, City Hall was unmoved. In the same connection Negroes often remark that the events on the campus of TSU would not have happened at Rice University of Texas or at the University of Houston. Students wondered why Wheeler Street is to be rerouted at the University of Houston, a few blocks away, but not at Texas Southern University whose campus it bisects and disrupts. Several white leaders affirmed to the interviewers that Houston refuses to face its race relations problems squarely. There is wide spread criticism of the legal fees that have been spent by Houston schools to delay desegregation. Bond issues often involve questions of whether the improvements called for will have the effect of maintaining racially separate schools by enlarging or building schools deep in the Negro neighborhoods and neglecting those in areas where white and Negro families live nearest each other. Only 60 of Houston's 9,000 teachers are in integrated settings.

Although more than 75 percent of the Negroes in Houston were born in Texas, few of these families have roots in the city. The Negro population has risen from 86,000 in Houston in 1940 to nearly 300,000 today. Half have come since the Second World War from rural areas of the state, especially East Texas. Many are unable to read or write. The process of transculturation and resocialization required to live in an urban environment with its many complexities and rapid changes cannot be disregarded as an influencing, but unmeasurable factor of Negro unrest in Houston.

Houston's Negro population has been growing more rapidly than the

white. Negroes who have moved in since 1950 have come largely from East Texas and other states of the deep South and have settled in the third ward which surrounds Texas Southern University. The net effect of immigration has been to force an extension of the boundaries of the black community south and west into formerly white sections of town. Race relations, however, have been generally good. This has been due historically in part to the contented life that the Negroes have found in Houston and to a feeling of security which Houston's wealth provides for most people. The kinds of jobs available and under-employment rather than unemployment seem to be the employment problems of Negroes. Access to better work opportunities rather than to work itself, is the complaint most often voiced.

One major breakdown in race relations did occur in 1917 when a riot developed in which 16 persons were killed (including seven white policemen) and nineteen others were wounded. This riot was triggered by the attempted interference by a Negro soldier with the arrest of a Negro woman by a policeman. With the exception of this incident fifty years ago, Houston has not had any widespread racially motivated violence until 1966.

The most influential area in Houston for the Negro is the Third Ward. It is the site of Texas Southern University, the two Negro newspapers, the Forward Times and the Houston Informer, the Houston Citizens Chamber of Commerce (Negro), (reportedly subsidized periodically by the downtown chamber), the Negro owned Riverside National Bank and the Standard Savings and Loan Associations. The Negro oriented radio stations and the officers of most of the professional Negroes in the city are within the Third ward. Most of the city's Negro businessmen, political and civic

leaders make their homes in the Third Ward. The Southcentral YMCA and headquarters of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People are likewise found in the Third Ward.

The Third Ward, while not the most slum, is the most crowded of the Negro ghettos. Dowling Street is lined with wooden buildings and numerous beer joints. Roads are often unpaved and according to public work's statistics, most of the 400 miles of unpaved roads in Houston are found in the Negro area.

Negro leadership in the Third Ward seems to be split, divided and separated. No organizational lines cut across the entire Negro community to weld Negroes together into one strong organizational structure.

The Fourth Ward, west of downtown Houston, seems to be cut off and isolated. Most people regard the Fourth Ward as dying. Much of it has been razed for the Cullen Shopping Center. Area residents expect other new developments to dispossess them.

The Fifth Ward represents the worst of slums and ghetto life. It is filled with freight trains, with unpaved streets and dusty roads, with decrepit and dilapidated housing, with unemployed or underemployed persons.

The more militant and poverty class oriented organizations, such as the Crescent Foundation, HOPE, SNCC, Muslims and the Deacons for Defense make their homes in the Fifth Ward.

From the perspective of the Houston Negro population, the city has afforded them few realistic opportunities of economic development and no access to political power. Major social institutions in this city have tended to provide for a few prosperity and affluence. The

vast majority, however, have to contend with a level of living that can only satisfy basic needs.

As in many metropolitan areas of the country, the relationship between the Negro and the police has been strained. It is not infrequent that a Negro is shot or seriously injured and abused by local police officers. Negroes are more often threatened by verbal invectives and subjected to unusual pressure than whites. The underutilization of Negroes in the Houston police force has been a focal point for complaints especially with regard to assignments and promotions. To the Negro community, the Chief of Police personifies racism, arrogance and conservatism.

Police discourtesy, the absence of any satisfactory process for registering complaints and failure to incorporate (until recently) a mechanism for being heard through the mayor's office, have been areas of which minority groups in Houston have felt uneasiness toward the city administration.

Within the past six months, the police department instituted a Human Relations Program in its police academy training. The mayor in recent months hired several administrative aides to act as liaison between the Negro community and City Hall. Chief among these advisors is Dr. Blair Justice whose doctoral dissertation at Rice University discusses methods for determining in advance civil disorders and the extent of racial tensions within a given community. Working with Dr. Justice are two Negroes who are viewed as puppets and often avoided in the Negro community.

The Situational Context

The events surrounding the police-student confrontation on the

campus of Texas Southern University May 16, 17, 1967, grew out of specific grievances that had been formulated by both the student body at Texas Southern University and the Negro community. For purposes of clarity, these grievances are described in detail.

On the campus of Texas Southern University students were demanding the closing of Wheeler Street since it was believed to be an obstruction to normal campus life. Wheeler Street became an issue and a symbol. It was viewed as a hazard to student welfare and as a symbol of the administration's unwillingness to preserve the integrity of a Negro institution. Included in the same list of student grievances were demands for improved food conditions, later hours for girls, and generally a greater participation of students in the administration of campus life. The Friends of SNCC group was the most verbal and articulate of campus groups. In gaining control of the student body they provided the leadership in formulating student grievances. Two reasons are advanced to account for SNCC's prominence: (1) There were no other functional organizations, including the Student Council, vying for student support on the campus; (2) The Friends of SNCC were the only student group bold enough to oppose a reportedly strong administration. Administrative leaders at Texas Southern University were therefore faced with the dilemma of dealing directly with students interested and concerned with improving the affairs of the university, while at the same time maintaining good relations with civic and political leaders in the wider community who were concerned with the preservation of status quo relationships.

In the community two specific grievances were actively present which gave rise to social disruption at several points in the city.

The garbage dump in the Negro residential area of Sunny Side in south Houston had been a bone of contention for several weeks. Negroes had met with the mayor and other city officials to discuss the closing of the dump and had not been satisfied with the responsiveness to their concern. Thirty-six Negroes had been arrested on the day of the major confrontation at Texas Southern University following their participation in a meeting with the mayor and city officials. Negro leaders from the area had demanded that the dump be closed immediately. The mayor had refused to take this definitive step and grievances were left unresolved.

On the other side of town, the Sheriff's department had arrested 28 demonstrators at the Northwood Junior School growing out of a dispute over the fairness of disciplinary action accorded Negro and white students. Negro parents had withdrawn their children from the school and had picketed it in an effort to force the superintendent to reconsider punishment that had been meted out to Negro and white pupils.

While the mayor's office had worked as a mediating agent in both the garbage dump and the Northwood Junior High School dispute, Negro citizens were none the less convinced that they would not receive equal justice. They believed that more drastic means were necessary to ensure their own welfare.

Grievances in the Negro community seemed to have been pitched at two levels. The first level may be characterized as deep seated and rooted in the problems of a community in the process of "integrating." Integration for Houston appeared to the Negro community to be moving

slowly. Although such establishments as restaurants, hotels, motels, and movies were integrated, the Negro community did not perceive the advantages of these opportunities for them. Persons who appeared to benefit most from the advantages of integration were those already in the middle class. The poor, the underprivileged, the underclass saw themselves as benefiting least from recent civil rights laws and poverty program developments. Thus, the targets and the choice of grievances were linked in a manner which showed deep-seated rather than specific dissatisfaction with the lot of the Negro in Houston. Choices were made to attack problems that were central to the issues of status, e.g., the dumps and the school.

The second level of grievance may be considered as a natural derivative from the first. It was an attack upon the improved social status of a few Negro leaders who were using their power and position to "hold back" the many. The school administration became therefore an object of criticism. The student population tended to identify with the poor in the community. Students represented a source of leadership and a pool of innovators for change, and many were eager to fill a new social role. The new student leaders were ready to seize upon any opportunity to attack what they saw as problems of group elevation, self esteem and dignity. They were determined to right what they considered the wrongs forced on lower class Negroes. In essence, the situational context of conflict in Houston was largely ideological. The concrete manifestations of idealism often confuse rather than clarify the significant problems of student involved disturbances. Yet any meaningful interpretation of the motives and attitudes of people involved Houston's civil disturbances must take into account this important but not immediately apparent factor of idealism.

The present political and social organization of Houston provides no adequate means of communication wherein new voices can be heard by both the official and unofficial community.

In the vocabulary of the Negro community, city officials and the white "power structure" have generally not responded to their needs because they do not understand their language. A significant barrier to communications seems to be a traditional and conservative approach that has been taken by the city fathers to retain control of the political and economic forces of the community. A few powerful people seem to be in control of the total community. It is this political and social organization which deters rather than fosters communication between various social and economic class groups. Present channels for communicating grievances are highly ineffective. The City government has taken the position that community committees and councils are not the way to keep in touch with people.

The Character of the Disorders

It is difficult to draw neatly defined lines which characterize the dimension of the disorders in Houston, Texas. There were many actors and participants involved in a period of struggles which existed over many months. The emergence of a specific participant tended to focus interest on him for a given set of events. A new situation saw the emergence of a new leading actor. The problems and conflicts of Houston seem to elude classical description of social processes. Each specific incident was handled in a specific way by different actors. Evidence could not be found which pointed up serious attempts at compromise or bargaining by the confronting parties. Usually diametrically opposed positions were taken which tended to leave few

alternatives open. In the main, Houston experienced a set of events involving strong actors confronting each other with few alternatives and little room for maneuvering.

One thing seems clear. Out of the many months of seething emotional tension which culminated in the direct intervention of tactical police action, a student leadership core emerged as a significant force in Houston's life. Perhaps this represents the real basis for understanding the motivating factor underlying much of the disturbances in Houston. The student body at Texas Southern University became, in fact, the center of activism among Houston's Negroes. Student pressures to improve the quality of education at Texas Southern University and the pervasive notion that human dignity and self esteem are values worth fighting for may have roots in the peculiar relationship that Texas Southern University has in educational circles in Houston. It may indeed be traceable to the beginning of the school itself which was founded by a legislature intent upon stalling integration in the University of Texas.

There can be no doubt that race consciousness, pride, a search for meaningfulness played a role in student behavior at Texas Southern. Students who attend Texas Southern came from a variety of academic and personal backgrounds. Often they are not well educated before they go to the university due to poor education offered in segregated Negro public schools. Many courses are remedial; financing of Texas Southern University operations by the state is tight-fisted. Control is largely outside of the university center. These and other conditions, apparent and significant to a concerned student group, provided a justification for the efforts of an articulate and politically

conscious student group to change what the wrongs of the institutional framework at T.S.U. Specific students therefore constituted themselves as a core of leadership of the Negro community whether or not it was prepared to accept such leadership.

Houston's race relations must be viewed in the context of the educational and student life problems of T.S.U. The problems surrounding Texas Southern University were indeed tied to the students' assumed new role in the community. This theme was repeated by many diverse groups in the community.

The opposing sides in all the disputes tended to take very strong positions and tended to act out the roles expected from those positions. They each became, in fact, the personification of a point of view. On the one hand, Mayor Louis Welch and Police Chief H. D. Short epitomized the forces of conservatism apparently intent upon restraining the Negro. On the other hand the Kirtpatricks, Lawsons, Wallers and other militant persons represented new influences bringing into the community new ideas and ideals.

Mayor Louis Welch was the uneasy center of much of Houston's troubles. The mayor is viewed by the Negro community as extremely sensitive to any criticisms of the city. This stand made it difficult for him to react with much directness and objectivity to the suggestion that Houston had, for example, a race problem. It was difficult for the mayor to admit or to consider the possibility that the police may have handled the situation badly or may have contributed significantly to Houston's crisis. The mayor has attempted to sustain a public image of firmness with regard to Houston's increasing and apparent racial problems. His attitude seems to be

explained by two factors: (1) the white voters of Houston who vastly outnumber the Negroes would consider a softer stand to be weakness; and (2) firmness he believes will tend to discourage further law-breaking.

The important unanswered question at this time concerns the five Negro students who have been indicted for murder under a Texas law. This law makes participation or inciting a riot where a murder has been committed just cause for trial of individuals for murder. These students (Traswell Johnson, Floyd Nichols, Douglas Waller, Howard Franklin and Willie Freeman) have now emerged in the Negro community as both martyrs and a cause. The defendants are of the firm belief that they can receive no justice in Houston. In their opinion they have already been tried and judged by the newspapers of the city. The Negro community, on the other hand, may find in them a new basis for coalescence out of which a more potent form of unrest could develop. In either case, these and other student leaders will probably emerge as the moving and viable force of racial unrest in Houston.

Official responses by city authorities reflect a generally traditional approach to Negro-white relations. Grievances were given less than thorough consideration. There is an open tendency of city officials to oversimplify and thereby overact to points of stress. City officials were candid and willing to admit that they felt it necessary to approach Negroes with firmness and to deal with them in stark terms in order to guarantee peace and tranquility. They were also free to admit that this approach was important for the Negro Community to recognize since everyone would thereby understand that future demonstrations and hostile acts will be met with swiftness

and force. The eviction of students from the university was, therefore, a point insisted upon by both state and local officials as a means of dealing with some of the problems at T.S.U. In several specific ways the white community saw problems resolved once the "troublemakers" were out. This method of dealing with problems, of course, indicates the simplified level of interpretation of problems. It is at this junction that the Negro and white community seem to have moved from a gap to a gorge.

Aftermath

An evaluation of the current situation in Houston, Texas is complicated by the perspective which one brings to the situation. When viewed from the various elements of the community one would normally expect to gain different summaries of the current situation. University officials, for example, feel quite confident that they have met all of the needs of students and that all necessary steps had been taken to forestall any possibly future unrest. Students on the other hand feel that their problems have been superficially satisfied and the grievances have been unanswered. The mayor, the city council and city officials feel that communications channels are open and other kinds of programs are adequate to deal with basic problems confronting the city. It is their belief that the firm stand taken has demonstrated Houston's willingness to face up to its problems squarely and unequivocally. Negro community leaders express concern about the undercurrent of tensions and the possibility of Houston again becoming explosive. Those most actively involved in the civil rights protest and in spearheading social change evaluate Houston as a battleground with an uneasy truce awaiting another incident or skirmish.

These perspectives indicate that the community has not come to grips with the basic issues of communication and grievance settlement. It also indicates that people are not in fact talking with each other in terms that can lead to meaningful alternatives to violence. The Negro community is quick to point out that the city administration overreacted to the threat of violence and that in overreacting, mishandled and abused the Negro community. Others assert that overreaction is typical of those communities where traditional racism is the accepted point of view regarding multigroup coexistence. Fear, mistrust and suspicion are apparent on both sides. Pressures continue to be extremely high to maintain law and order without full recognition of some of the reasons which precipitated a breakdown of law and order. Since the official community has articulated and publicized its approach to race relations in traditional terms and has accepted the proposition that firmness, speed, and quick decisions are necessary steps to stemming racial conflicts, the likelihood of a future violence seems far more potent.

What happens to the five students indicted and now to be tried on November 17, 1967 can make a significant difference in the direction and flow of future unrest in Houston. The manner in which the court handles the case, the degree to which the Negro community feels that justice has been dispensed (which literally means exoneration of the five youths) and the development of new channels for youth in the area to be heard, are the weighty elements that can push the pendulum in one direction or another.

The action and reaction of the police remains a crucial factor in the present situation in Houston. Present attitudes regarding min-

ority groups among the police department has been characterized from numerous sources, including police officers, as being extremely poor. This creates the possibility of an individual policeman acting in such a way as to set off a chain of unfortunate events. The attitude of the police department, heard most often by the Negro community, is that the Negro is basically as an irresponsible person who only understands force.

Alternatives to present group relations in Houston seem to be few and beyond reach. Since the Houston Negro community is seeking basic and fundamental changes in the organizational, political, and social structure of the city, grievances and conflict are latently present. Real gains to full participation in the political life of the city do not seem possible in the near future since the present form of government virtually ensures control by whites. Few political alternatives appear to be open to the Negro except in coalition with other groups or by a change in the charter of the city.

City officials on the other hand are optimistic about the future. They believe that things will work out and that the police now have things under control. On the other side there is exactly the opposite viewpoint and it is this perspective which represents the major problem of racial unrest in Houston today. School segregation is still a continuing problem, equality of treatment before the law, particularly in day-to-day contacts with law enforcement officer, will remain a source of discontent and unrest for some time. Poor housing and differential treatment with respect to housing will be a major issue particularly as it effects the placement of a city's facilities such as dumps, incinerators, and other undersirable features

of urban life within the Negro community. Students at Texas Southern University will continue to play a role in the change process both as innovators and as leaders. It is likely that students will increase rather than decrease their activities of agitation for social change since the direct frontal "attack" by the police department on their campus brought uncommitted and neutral students into contact with the police on the worst of terms. These students now have a concrete object of hate. A broader coalition is likely to be formed between the student and other outspoken groups and the poor of the city. In this regard the poor are now organizing in a manner which will provide it with new opportunities to make demands for changes that have gone unnoticed up to this point. The fact that the Negro and white communities are not talking from the same set of assumptions or communicating with each other in any significant sense, constitutes a major source of continuing unrest. Because of racial differences in perspective and understanding and an overeagerness to accept the proposition "all is well again," the clash of community interests will likely mount again in Houston in a continuing test of strength and intent.

Discussion

Each of the three disorders had a unique character as a result of the particular situations in each city. The nature of the event, the precipitating incident, the background problems and tensions of the community gave it a personality of its own. Beyond this, however, were a considerable number of similarities ranging from each beginning on or adjacent to a Negro college campus and involving students to the fact that a busy street runs through the middle of the campus.

The similarities can be summarized into the following points:

- 1) The disorder occurred within the context of student-administration struggles about campus life.
- 2) The disorder seems to be the expression of intergroup tensions which circumstances caused to collide: thus the events might be seen as accidents of circumstance.
- 3) The police presence and response seemed to have a specific excitatory effect in the escalation of the disorder.
- 4) Control forces internal to the college campus were not readily at hand. They were mobilized and became important (in two instances) after the first eruption had died down.
- 5) All major participants were regarded by the city officials as criminals to be prosecuted and punished.
- 6) There has been little change in the white community as a result of the disorder. Most of the action has retributive in the form of law suits, dismissal of students from schools, non-renewal of some faculty contracts and difficulties with insurance.

Campus life. As noted in the introduction and described in the city

reports, each school was experiencing active student interest in administrative affairs and campus life. The students were expressing grievances which were not satisfactorily settled, and were comparing their situation to white campuses. The frustration yielded a considerable amount of tension. The tension was also heightened by the phase of the school year. Spring brings with it increased tension derived from winter confinement, testing over course work and the prospect of the end of the year. This often erupts into such disorders as panty raids, water fights, demonstrations, Easter Vacation resort riots, etc. Both types of background tension was present on the campuses in question and contributed to a predisposition for action. The particular disorder was a more exaggerated form of what had been in process on the campuses with student-administration conflicts and expressions of discontent. This is best seen in the series of minor disorders at TSU before the one on May 16-17.

The disorder. Each disorder can be seen as one specific instance of continuing town-gown relationships. In each situation there is a history of college-community contacts and experiences which predispose the groups in contact to have conflict. The groups in contact are the students and the police, each of which has a negative image of the other. In Nashville, the background situation was further heightened by the presence of a Black Power advocate and the community response to him. In Jackson, there was no major community build up; it was more situational. In Houston, there was active tension and conflict about the dump and the school policies which predisposed the community to react.

Each incident then began with a contact between students and police

which mobilized feelings towards each other, and then escalated into active conflict. Once the incident began, it was joined by street persons who were ready. Non-campus participants were a very important part of the Jackson disorder, were also important in Houston, and did not represent a major ingredient of the Nashville disorder.

Police presence and response. Police serve as social control agents for the general community and as such have the direct contact with persons who are regarded as threats to the social order. There is an image problem with both police and students which contributed to these disorders. Generally speaking, police are regarded by Negroes as persons who are alert to their behavior and stand ready to suspect them of wrong doing and lack of responsibility. In Nashville in the recent past, police have beaten an African student and shot a white college student. There was, however, no general antipathy to Negro police. In Jackson, the students had experienced surveillance and aggressive encounters with the police and were afraid to leave the campus, particularly alone. Negro policemen here were regarded as super-white. In Houston, the situation is similar to Jackson with police seen as meaning the Ku Klux Klan. Thus the image for the Negro student is one which expects unfair, harsh and demeaning treatment from the police.

The image of the Negro student for the police is one of contradictions. Negroes are expected to be irresponsible, trouble-makers and servile in demeanor. Education often leads Negroes to be assertive and thus appear to be "uppity." Perceived negatively, the Negro student is approached and treated as such. Contact between persons with

these images and negative expectations can be expected to lead to trouble unless there is extraordinary restraint on one or both sides.

Shooting became an important part of all three disorders. In Nashville and Jackson, it was a tactic to disperse the crowd. In both cases it seemed more excitatory and did not serve to disperse people. Dispersal came in Nashville more as a dual function of participants getting worn out and the police withdrawing. In Jackson, the shooting of Benjamin Brown dispersed the crowd. In Houston the situation was more like a siege. Shooting began with all students in a dormitory. The situation ended with the police storming the dormitory, overwhelming it with sheer force and routing everyone out and into subdued positions. With the amount of gunfire at all three disorders, it is remarkable that more wounding and death did not occur. It is to be speculated what the control would have been like if there had been no gunfire, or, for that matter, guns.

These three disorders escalated because of the major contact between the two groups and the consequent opportunity for each to be a target for the other. This was coupled in Nashville and Jackson with a combination of withdrawal at one point and moving forward at another. Both responses were perceived as the signal for aggressive responses from the participants. One wonders about the utility of a more distant containment approach without so much direct contact.

Control forces. Each of these events began on or near a campus and involved students engaged in disorderly behavior. None of the colleges had a campus police or security force which could have taken an "inside" stand to control the disorder. Thus, when things got out

of control, the outside control force (the hated local police), came right in. This may have had the effect of escalating the situation prematurely. One wonders what the effect would have been of a local control force more acceptable to the students. It is interesting to note that Tennessee State has instituted an extensive campus police system following the Nashville disorder.

Internal control forces were primarily the actions of students themselves. This took time to mobilize. It developed most quickly in Jackson where a student stepped into leadership and mobilized some organization to protect the campus and to keep off outsiders. The presence and threat of the "corner gang" seemed to be important in stimulating the internal control. In Nashville a similar organization of students for protection developed on the Fisk campus, but less strongly at Tennessee State. In both cases the disorders ran beyond one day: on the second day it was a new disorder with new participants and another site both in Jackson and in Nashville. The control organization was also developed by the second day. Internal control forces did not have the opportunity to develop in Houston, where the police overwhelmed the situation with force. Since it seems that the disorder did not involve the same people at the same site for very long, the use of containment for control might have been appropriate. This would be particularly the case where there is no concerted internal force for agitation and direction of the disorder.

Internal control, while natural and important to use, would seem to present real problems of recognition on the spot. To illustrate, on the second night of the Nashville disturbance, Tennessee State students had themselves begun to direct traffic on a corner near the campus to

keep outsiders, particularly whites, away from the area. The police saw this as grossly inappropriate and forceably ran the students away from the area. The response of the students was to join the participants of the disorder. This illustrates an area of potential help for the police. Residents and local people could serve as helpers in the control effort; many have demonstrated willingness in several different disorders.

Participants as criminals. In the course and aftermath of two of the disorders, there were arrests and subsequent court suits directed towards the participants. Community leaders tended to perceive the disturbances as attacks on the social order, and therefore, as a threat to the government. Participants were defined and treated as criminals. Jackson represents an exception to this for there has been no litigation from the city against the participants. In Nashville, suits were brought by the city and countersuits were lodged against the city by those initially charged. In Houston five students were charged with the responsibility for the property damage and death caused by a riot. Each disorder was considered to be serious and dangerous, and was handled accordingly.

It is interesting to observe that disorders of this and greater magnitude frequently occur with different outcomes. At about the same time as the Jackson State disorder, one occurred at the Mississippi State campus in Hattiesburg which did not become a riot. In October, a disorder occurred in Dallas associated with the SMU football game which is traditional and of considerably larger proportion. The newspapers reported this as a "melee." This would suggest that there is a sensitivity to situations involving Negroes which leads to an overestimation of their importance, and an over-response from the local authorities. One can

only speculate about the course of events had the disorders been defined as pranks.

Impact on the general community. The general response of interviewees to inquiry about change due to the disorder was that there had been none in the white community. While this seems generally true, it is something of an overstatement. The following list summarized some of the changes noted:

- 1) The police (Nashville and Jackson) would tend to use a different approach: swifter and greater force.
- 2) The mayors see little need for change since the whole thing was a misunderstanding--based on the lack of faith in the mayors understanding of Negroes.
- 2) The use of a duly constituted grievance channel has occurred only in Nashville where there is a Metropolitan Human Relations Commission with a Negro as director. It was important in the immediate aftermath of the disorder particularly in bringing pressure from community influentials on the mayor to be reasonable, and in relating to the police on the matter of brutality. It is weak but functioning. No such structure exists or is planned for Jackson or Houston.
- 4) Police training has been instituted on a large scale in Houston with major involvement of social scientists. It has been discussed in Nashville but has not been implemented. Training for the police was not picked up as a theme in Jackson.
- 5) Job opportunities for Negro college graduates has become of concern in Nashville with a group of local influentials and

businessmen forming a committee to work on the matter. Nothing comparable has occurred in the other cities, although the Mississippi R. & D. Center programs relate to the same problems.

- 6) The Negro community organizations and leadership have become more visible and in more contact with the whites. Dr. Edwin Mitchell was invited to address the Chamber of Commerce in the early fall. He spoke to a packed house and gave a strong statement about the plight of the Negro in Nashville. This has been hailed as an important event signalling the willingness of the white leaders to listen to the Negroes. Nashville has a more organized Negro community with many more leaders and a communication network than either Jackson or Houston. The mayor was in touch with at least two Negro leaders as soon as the disorder started. They worked to pull the leadership of the entire Negro community together, including the militants, to try to control it. This did not happen in Jackson or Houston where the Negro community is neither so well organized nor regarded as important by the local officials.

This suggests that there has been more change in Nashville than in Jackson and Houston. The organization of the Negro community and the ability of the local government and influentials to show some accommodation are important ingredients. It may therefore be no accident that the disorder in Nashville was of minor proportions.

The Negro College and Negro Student: Current Considerations

The discussion of the Negro colleges in the introduction was to describe them as an institution of considerable importance, particularly

in the education of Negroes, but to note that they have very serious problems and difficulties. These campuses have been important over the past seven years in the social change associated with civil rights since they have served both as staging areas and manpower resources. There seems to be a considerable difference between the public colleges (Tennessee State, Jackson State and Texas Southern) and the private college (Fisk) in their reaction to the disorder. While in all cases, there was some disciplinary action taken or threatened, it was much stronger in the public institutions. Students were expelled in large numbers, faculty were not continued or pressured to conform and the number of out-of-state students restricted (particularly at Tennessee State). Thus, there have been attempts by the college administrators to prevent further trouble by cleaning out potential trouble makers.

The students on these campuses are the important group to be considered as the source for continued action. As noted in the introduction, Negro college students began civil rights action in 1960 and have been the primary group which has continued this work in the South. The community-oriented experience of sit-ins, freedom rides and voter registration provided the students with a sense of accomplishment and of black consciousness. The activities of CORE and SNCC might, in their community action programs, be likened to a black Peace Corps appealing to idealistic young people. Experience in the field has given them confidence to try for action in other spheres.

The outlook which now predominates on the campuses studied here can be seen as a development from civil rights to freedom as the important theme. The civil rights action has yielded desegregation but no

apparent change in the jobs, income or living conditions of most Negroes. Daily life continues to feel the same to them--inferior. Education has been a traditional stepping stone to change in American Society. The students do not find this for the Negro, at least from the Negro college. Education through the college level does not insure success as it seems to for whites, yet it is better for those who graduate than those who do not.¹ The students have begun to suspect that the reason for the lower value of their education is that it is poorer. Their comparisons with white schools seems to confirm this.² They are now focussing their attention and concern on the ways in which the colleges can be changed to provide a better education, to better serve them as consumers and to allow them a voice in deciding what that education ought to be.

The next era of activist efforts can then be expected to move to the Negro college campus, and to be directed towards the administration in an attempt to get them to stand up to the white influentials who affect policy. The disorders covered in this study may then be the beginning signs of a new Negro student movement.

While the black educational establishment is the prime focus of concern by the students, their activism can be predicted to spill over into the general community. This will be due in part to the lack of campus controls to disorder, the fear and over-reaction of the adminis-

¹This is documented by Melvin Borland and Donald E. Yett. The cash value of college-- for Negroes and for whites. Trans-action, 1967, 5, (November), 44-49.

²So do the comparisons by professionals such as Earl J. Mcgrath. The predominantly Negro colleges and universities in transition. New York: Columbia University Press, 1965 and Christopher Jencks & David Reisman. The American Negro college. Harvard Educational Review, 1967, 37, 3-60.

tration officials and the readiness of street Negroes to join into any disorder. Tennessee State would seem to be anticipating this already with the expansion of the campus police force.

The other aspect of community involvement is conscious participation of students in community affairs. This is best seen in Houston where the students were actively involved with both the dump and the junior high school issues. There they have asserted leadership in the community and have become a rallying force around the matter of the five students charged with riot. In Houston where organization and leadership are in short supply, the students are playing a particularly important part in the Negro community.

The role of the faculty in these disorders is impressive in its lack of participation. Individual faculty members, often white, provided support to the students, but as a group they did not figure prominently. Apparently the faculty has been selected over the years on the basis of their lack of assertiveness. Although often in sympathy with the students, the administration has them in a particularly dependent situation. So while this group has higher education than most of the Negro community they have not been a resource for uplift. Their approach has been one of separatism using those more disadvantaged as a negative standard from which to judge their success. This then underlies the inability of most educated and middle class Negroes to gain important leadership positions with support from the general Negro community. The new Negro student, however, has put his education to the service of the poor and has already built the beginnings of support for leadership from this group.

A new style of leadership has been used by SNCC and other student

groups which may have profound implications. It is leadership by being a non-leader, by being a coordinator, an active helper. The style in SNCC, for example, is not to continue in any single position more than one or two years. Stokeley Carmichael's resignation and Rap Brown's assumption of SNCC leadership is the most apparent example of this. The organizational structure of SNCC is exceedingly informal and seems to change with each leader and with current circumstances. This style provides continuing opportunity for young Negroes to get experience with leadership. It also has a selflessness to it which works against the development of demagogues and ambitious people who would use their position for personal advancement. This may make the movement much more difficult to be opposed because there are no critical leadership points where it can be attacked. It will tend also to keep the local activity much more focussed on local affairs and not pulled away to national organizational projects and issues. It also suggests that the movement will gather momentum slowly while many persons rotate through the leadership and voluntary activist experience, and then speed up as more and more persons become disposed toward militant black consciousness. An example of this is already being seen on the Tennessee State campus where each new group of students seems much more militant and disposed to action than the last.

The students are demanding more student run organizations on campus and participation in college affairs. While this will be particularly frightening to the administration officials since it will inevitably increase the pressure on them from outside, it would seem to be a constructive move to bring the activism onto the campus and into organizations.

This would help to contain it and yet to give the students direct, first hand experience with improving their own education. In order to accomplish this, however, some way will have to be devised to aid and support administrations to pursue this goal.

In summary. The three disorders all appear to have been instances of expressive violence which began as campus events and were escalated into community disorders by the intervention of the police. They are related to the presence and relative status of Negro colleges in the South. The campus may function in the Southern community as the ghetto does in the North - a place where the residents are not tied in closely to a white system which would keep everyone in his place. Unemployment is relatively low and organization is non-existent for the street Negro. Thus the only major manpower for participation is students. Since they are also educated and intellectually stimulated, it may be that subsequent disorders will evolve from expressive events to specific instruments for change. It is speculated that future civil disorder in the South will be primarily associated with Negro college campuses and will be part of a new Negro student movement - a movement to improve education for the attainment of freedom and equality.

APPENDIXES

Appendix 1
DISORDER RESEARCH INTERVIEW FORMAT

The purpose of the interview is to appraise the interviewee's KNOWLEDGE, AWARENESS, ATTITUDES AND FEELINGS with respect to EACH TOPIC and ITEM on the Interview Form.

I. CAUSES OF THE DISORDER.

A. Immediate Causes

1. Conditions, attitudes, and feelings that might have contributed to the onset of the disorder.

2. Precipitating events- the specific incident and other related incidents prior to the disorder.

B. Underlying or historical causes

1. Who or what was the target of the violence?
 - a. The direct or immediate target(s)
 - b. The indirect or long range target(s)

2. What was the purpose of the disorder? What was it really all about? (Does the interviewee see the disorder as in any way a meaningful, purposeful act?)

3. Did the events, actions, or attitudes in the situation immediately prior to the disruption justify the initial disorder?


4. What conditions in the educational system of the community, including the colleges, might be a source of grievances (for Negroes)?
5. What do you think of _____ as a college? (check on each college involved for each item).
- a. Why do such colleges exist here?
1. Their purpose?
 2. Their role in the community?
 3. How well do they fulfill their purposes?
 4. What is the long-range future of this (these) college(s)?
- b. How does T college compare with your other state universities and colleges in:
1. competence of administration and faculty?

Extremely	Considerably	Somewhat	Slightly	About equal	Higher
less	less	less	less		


(If different, how come?)

3

2. Caliber of students?



(If different, how come?)

3. Physical facilities
(dorms, classrooms,
labs, recreation,
sports, etc.)?

(If different, how come?)

- c. How are faculty accepted
by Negroes in the city?
By whites?
- d. How are students accepted
by Negroes in the city?
By whites?
- e. What kind of coverage
do the newspapers and
news media give to events
of _____ college?
- f. To what extent are
graduates from _____
being hired here for
jobs requiring college
educated men and women?
- g. What do you think of
white faculty at Negro
colleges?
- h. How many graduates of _____
remain in the city? What
proportion go elsewhere
for jobs?

- i. What events or activities bring the Negro colleges and elements of the white community together?
 - j. What are the lines of communication or interchange between the college(s) and the other (white) colleges and white people of the city?
6. How would you describe the public school situation of Negroes in the city?
 7. Do any Negroes in the city have very poor housing conditions?

Streets?

Sewage?

Garbage collection?
 8. To what extent are businesses and industries using the Negro labor force at the levels appropriate to their training and experience?
 9. Are there any hotels, motels, restaurants, movies, etc., where segregation still exists?

Where segregation is technically or legally dead but still practiced, at least to the extent that Negroes are not welcomed?

10. What do you know about:
- a. R.A.M.? Its purposes, methods, activities?
 - b. NAACP? Its purposes, methods, activities?
 - c. SNCC? Its purposes, methods, activities?
 - d. Deacons for Defense? Its purposes, methods, activities?
 - e. Black Nationalists? Its purposes, methods, and activities?
 - f. Black Muslims? Its purposes, methods, activities?
 - g. White Citizens Council? Its purposes, methods, activities?
 - h. Ku Klux Klan? Its purposes, methods, activities?
 - i. Others?
11. To what extent can Negroes influence the outcome of political campaigns and elections?
12. To what extent can Negroes constitute a pressure group to influence civic, business, and governmental affairs?

13. What governmental organizations do you know of that are working to improve Negro-white relations, social and economic conditions, educational and vocational opportunities of Negroes? What are they?

Purposes, methods, activities?

Effectiveness?

14. What civic organizations do you know of that are working to improve Negro-white relations, social and economic conditions, educational and vocational opportunities of Negroes? What are they?

Purposes, methods, activities?

Effectiveness?

15. What student or other organizations do you know of that are working to improve Negro-white relations, social and economic conditions, educational and vocational opportunities of Negroes? What are they?

Purposes, methods, activities?

Effectiveness?

II. THE EVENTS BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER THE DISORDER

A. Pre-Riot

1. Did you participate in any events prior to the disorder which were in any way related to the disorder? What did you do?

2. What were your feelings at this time?

What did you want to do?
to happen?

3. Was the disorder planned?

By whom?

B. The Disorder, Disturbance, or Riot

1. Did you participate in any way in the disorder or in any activities relating to the actual disorder?

2. What did you do?

3. What were your feelings during this time?

What did you want to do?
to happen?

4. What was your relationships to others before, during, and in the aftermath of the disorder?

- a. Did you seek help from anyone?

- b. If so, describe.

- c. Did anyone seek your help?

- d. What, if anything, did you communicate to others relative to the disorder before, during, and immediately after its occurrence?

During?

After?

- e. What were the effects of these communications?

- 5. What different versions did you hear as to what was happening or going to happen?

- 6. What part did the police and law enforcement agencies play?
Were there other groups than the local police?

III. AFTERMATH OF THE DISORDER AND THE FUTURE

- A. What did the disorder accomplish?

- B. What was learned:
 - 1. by city officials?

 - 2. by the white community?

 - 3. by the Negro community?

 - 4. by the students?

 - 5. by the college administration and faculty?

- C. What damage did it do?
 - 1. How did it affect Negro-white relations?

 - 2. Did it help or hurt the Negro's situation here?

D. Will other disorders occur?

1. If no, why not?
2. If yes, why? How come?

E. What might be done to prevent the occurrence of disorders in the future?

1. What do the Negroes need to know or understand?
2. What do they need to do?
3. What do the white people need to know or understand?
4. What do they need to do?
5. What needs to be done by Negroes and whites working together?
6. What does the city (or state, or federal) government need to know or understand?
What should they do?
7. How soon do changes need to be made?
8. What kinds of possible solutions or changes will the white community reject, will not accept?
9. What kinds of possible solutions or changes will the Negroes reject or find unacceptable?

F. Are disorder, riots, and violence an inevitable part of social change?

G. If so, will the change be for the better or for the worse?

H. Are you generally optimistic or pessimistic about the future?

Are there ways in which the disorder has affected you, your family, your career?

Has it affected your children's educational and vocational future?

What is the future outlook for the city?

Thank you for your time and your cooperation.

Appendix 2
Nashville

Grid Showing the Elements of the Community and
Levels of Responsibility within Them for Selecting Interviewees

Community Elements	Levels of Responsibility		
	1	2	3
A. University Admin.	president 3	deans 4 campus police 2	teachers 8
B. University Students	leaders 4	members of orgs. 5	non-members 6
C. Police	chief 1	officers 2	patrolmen 1
D. City Government	mayor 1	dept. heads 3	councilmen 1
E. Govt. commissions local/state/fed.	2	3	local comm. reps.
F. Negro Community (non-organized)	professional 1	business 2	citizen 1
G. Negro Organization	political 8	civic-fraternal	
H. Negro Religious	minister 2 bishop	lay leader	
I. Negro Likely Riot participants	high 4		
J. White Likely Riot participants	high		
K. White Community	professional 2	business Chamber of Commerce 1	citizen
L. White Organization	political	civic 1	civil rights 5
M. White Church	minister 3 bishop	lay leader 2	
N. Press	editors 1 owners	bureau chiefs 1	reporters 3
O. Litigation	justice dept. 1	lawyers 4	litigants 2
Total	33	30	27

Appendix 3
 Feature article taken from the Nashville Tennessean of
 May 7, 1967

Community Problem

Since the Riot: A Search

By ROB ELDER

TENNESSEAN Staff Writer

MEMO TO: White people who don't want more riots.
 FROM: Negro people who don't want more riots.
 SUBJECT: Black power.

- o Stokely Carmichael was only part of the problem.
- o Nashville is full of fuel for a fire which could be set any time, on purpose or by accident.
- o Black power may not sound nice to you. It doesn't sound so nice to some of us. But the question right now is not whether there is going to be black power, but whether that power is expressed in peaceful politics or violent hellraising.
- o We're working to answer that question. We need your help.

* * *

No one of them wrote it, but that's the message they're trying to send.

Who Are They?

They aren't bearded students, or out-of-town agitators.

They are doctors, lawyers, businessmen, public officials and preachers. They are the political and civil rights leaders of Nashville's 83,000 Negro residents.

In the month since riots ripped open North Nashville, they've been trying to get the message to the 441,000 white people with whom they share this city.

They have been saying it for a long time. As soon as the riots began it seemed the white community might listen. But now . . .

Avon Williams, an attorney who has carried the civil rights fight through the courts for a decade, refused to ac-

cept the argument that Carmichael could not be blamed for violence because he had left town.


'Bully Boys' Here

"Stokely Carmichael didn't have to be present in town when this started," said Williams the night it started. "His bully boys were here and they knew what he wanted."

But Williams also refused to make Carmichael a scapegoat.

Nashville would continue to face the threat of riots, he said, "until the white people of this community open their eyes and begin to recognize what justice really means."

"As long as they keep their eyes shut they are going to make it possible for people like Carmichael to create disturbances among decent young boys and girls.



Nashville riot: blazing stacks of 1

"The white power structure, when it tries to create Negro puppets, plays into the hands of black power. And until Negro leadership is accepted on an equal basis, you are going to encourage difficulties of the type that occurred tonight."

The riots continued a second night, and Dr. Edwin Mitchell, chairman of the Metro Human Relations Commission, issued a statement which said:

"If the community attempts to seek the solution to the events of the past two nights

in terms of containment rather than in terms of a meaningful and immediate approach to the needs of the people of the ghetto, I would caution that incidents such as these are likely to persist or recur."

The Rev. Andrew White, national secretary of the A.M.E. Church and president of the Nashville Christian Leadership Council, released a statement from the Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance, an organization of Negro clergymen.

"We refute the statement of Mayor Beverly Briley who

pointed out Stokely Carmichael as the sole cause of this unrest, for the real causes of the recent turmoil were in existence long before Carmichael was born," it said.

The Nashville branch of the NAACP issued a statement through its president, Metro Councilman Mansfield Douglas. "The tension, despair and resentment which has been accumulating for quite a period of time in the Negro community was bound to cause some form of civil disorder," it said.

When the rioting stopped and the white community breathed a sigh of relief, the Negro leaders warned that the real problems had not been solved.

"Nothing has changed to make this violence not occur, and it would be foolish for the white community to live with the assumption that it isn't going to spill over into their neighborhoods," said Mitchell.

"We're sitting on a powder-keg," said White. "The explosive is there."

Kept Working

In the face of what they regarded as a continuing crisis, the Negro leaders kept working. They did three things.

First, they closed ranks. The Political Council — DCIPC — the NCLC and the NAACP formed a joint committee, headed by Williams. When Metro Councilman Robert Lillard brought his Davidson County Democratic League into the coalition, it

spanned the Negro political spectrum from one end to the other.

Second, they took the initiative.

"Police brutality" had emerged as the rawest issue among the rioting students.

But no one could deal with it so long as it was worded in the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) charge — in the image of Stokely Carmichael — that all the police were "mad men in uniform who think their badges are a license to beat and kill."

The joint committee of adult Negro leaders tried to turn this into a sensible statement.

"The Metropolitan police has been praised for its conduct in connection with the recent disturbances in North Nashville," the committee said in a statement to Mayor Briley. "No doubt some members of the police force deserve such praise. Many persons directly involved testify, however, that others deserve no such praise at all . . .

'Grave, Desperate'

"The unhappy fact is that despite all improvements in recruitment, training and leadership, the situation remains grave and indeed desperate. The duty of the police to protect should not be used as a cloak for raw brutality."

Recognizing that nothing could be done with the students' exaggerated, unsubstantiated charges against the police, the adult leaders got specific. There had been, they insisted, some cases of genuine brutality and several involving lesser degrees of abuse.

The NAACP invited anyone with a genuine grievance to come in and document it, and Williams offered the facilities of his law office. So did Lillard.

The third thing the Negro leaders did was perhaps the most important of all. They came to terms with the explosive slogan, "black power."

Black Power?

They did not always agree among themselves about what it meant.

If it meant wanton violence, they knew they wanted no part of it. The vast majority of Nashville's Negroes reject violence, White said, because it is "immoral" and because it was "impractical."

"We have no arsenals," he said.

If black power did not mean violence, what did it mean?

For some it meant a further development of a strong political base. The idea—minus the term black power — certainly was not new.

Some saw the need for

Negroes live — programs in which the residents have had no say.

"We need our own experts to go down and match our plans with the city's," said Mitchell, who as DCIPC president presided with White and Douglas at the first of the joint meetings.

Agreed Inman Otey, whose own charge of police brutality is under federal investigation: "We need to start looking at all this stuff that is being planned for us."

This, said some, would be a form of black power. After a long discussion at the first joint meeting of the civil rights and political groups, Dr. G. L. Tarlton, NAACP treasurer, stood up and said:

"Everything we have been discussing is what I interpret black power to mean. When we say we cannot depend on the administration, when we say we've got to chart our own course—then we're saying we need black power."

It became clear that the phrase could mean different things—even things that contradicted each other. "Stokely Carmichael and his black power slogans," declared Avon Williams, "stirred up a furor which helped curtail if not destroy the thrust of a whole lot of black power we had been developing."

Seek a Definition

If they were going to talk about black power, the adult Negro leaders decided, they would have to define it first.


As Dr. Mitchell put it: "It's not clear to me that the definition of 'black' and the definition of 'power' equal the definition of 'black power.'"

Some adults who had worked closely with the students said even Carmichael did not want violence. The riots, said The Rev. James Woodruff, Episcopal Chaplain at Fisk and Tennessee State universities, "were an example of black power of the worst kind."

Woodruff admitted that the best kind was yet to be demonstrated in a positive, specific program. He insisted it could be.

"The goals are the same," he said. "The goals are effectiveness."

Others admitted that black power might mean trouble. One said trouble might be necessary. "It just may be," said a young Negro lawyer, "that, it's Stokely Carmi-



Stokely Carmichael
A shouted challenge . . .

chael's calling to become a martyr—and to make me one, too."

Aware of the ambiguity on the subject of "black power" and again taking the initiative, the political and civil rights organizations moved to clear the air.

A committee including Williams, Flem B. Otey, N. W. Day and Mrs. Alice Walker scheduled a public panel discussion on "the concept of black power and its relationship to community needs."

A panelist would be invited from SNCC, they decided, and representatives from the other major Negro organizations would be there to state their stands on the subject.

The meeting was scheduled for 8 p.m. today at St. John's A.M.E. Church.

A Big Gamble

And so the leaders of the Nashville Negro community have worked to replace riots with reason. It is a gamble. For in condemning violence,

and by insisting that the problems can be settled peacefully the Negro leaders put not only their own prestige, but also the whole political process on the line.

Slap in the Face

As the Negro leaders were working to take the initiative, they said they saw no indication that leaders in the white community were working the other side of the city.

In fact, some Negro leaders felt when they raised the few cases of police brutality where there was some evidence, that they received what amounted to a slap in the face from the city administration.

The Metro Human Relations Commission—a body created by ordinance—met under the chairmanship of Dr. Mitchell. Mayor Briley was invited to come to the meeting. The complaints of these several cases of alleged police abuse were discussed with the mayor. When the mayor was asked what could be done about having these cases investigated, the mayor responded in what

many members of the commission thought was a lecture. Charges of police brutality, the mayor said, were hurting recruiting.

'Complete Lapse'

Only two months earlier the total community had been concerned about problems regarding the police. Greenfield Pitts vice president of Harveys and a member of the Metro Human Relations Commission, had stated at a commission meeting on Feb. 14:

"There has been a complete lapse of communication between the community and the police department."

After the riots the chance of improving the training program and improving the communication into the police department by recognizing the department's training weakness, seemed washed away on a wave of a white backlash. Various civic groups—including the Chamber of Commerce joined the mayor in publicly praising the police. The emphasis on police training—which the entire city had been worried about a few weeks before—had disappeared.

Still another impasse threatened when the Metro Council approved Briley's request for federal funds to plan a demonstration cities program for North Nashville. Negro residents of the area protested that they had been by-passed.

"We need to be in on the planning," declared Inman Otey.

Hurt the Worst

What hurt worst, the Negro leaders agreed, was the white community's attitude, as expressed by Briley, that the trouble resulting in the riots was "not a civil rights problem."

Whatever the immediate causes of the riot, they said, the root causes remained.

"Unemployment, underemployment, highway displacement and the overall disease of poverty—these are the types of deep seated frustrations that can be triggered by anyone," said Nat Williams, deputy director of the Metro Action Commission.

The riots, said Lillard, merely "pulled the scab off a wound" which had long existed because of the "day to day abuse" suffered by Negroes in Nashville.

The Negro leaders sense that the students who engaged in the rioting feel completely frustrated in every phase of life.

This includes such local is-



Dr. Edwin H. Mitchell
... A calm reply

issues as the handling of the war on poverty—which touches the Negro community more than any other segment of society, to the handling of the war in Vietnam—which many Negro students don't feel is "their war."

"A friend of mine is over there getting shot at," said one young Negro businessman, "but when he gets back he won't be able to buy a house where he wants to live, or get a decent job."

A Negro research scientist tied the Nashville problem to Vietnam in another way. Of course the students see a paradox, he said, "when the nation spends \$20 billion to fight communism in Vietnam and only peanuts to fight poverty in the place we live in."

When the Negro leaders used words like "ghetto," it sounded strange to many white people who have never connected that term with their own city. But the Tennessee State Advisory Com-

mittee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights reported recently that:

"... most of the Negro families in Nashville live in a ghetto front which they see little chance of escaping. Negroes who leave the Nashville ghetto leave Nashville."

And those trapped in the ghetto, the report stated, comprise "one-fifth of Nashville's population."

"In 1960," he said, "I got my head busted in front of First Baptist Church. I was completely nonviolent then."

"The power structure promised to open up jobs, but they didn't do anything until after the boycott."

"In 1961, things got a little more militant. Stokely Carmichael was in Nashville jails, then, but nobody noticed. The white power structure made more promises and we got bare tokenism."

"I've kept the faith," he went on. "But the power structure hasn't."

Now, he said, he sees Stoke-

ly Carmichael as a "threat" and an "enemy." But, he emphasized:

"I'm not going to give the white power structure — an equal enemy — the ammunition to kill him. I'm going to fight in the middle and fill the void."

Dr. Charles W. Johnson, head of the microbiology department at Meharry Medical College, diagnosed the city's problem as "a crisis of confidence."

The Negro community's confidence in Briley and the administration, he said, has been "slowly eroded" by "lack of faith in a long list of broken promises."

The responsible Negro leadership, Johnson said, "has to have somewhere to go." If they cannot deal through political channels, he said, then "for their own survival" they will have to start leading the militant students.

"And then you've got a real virulent situation," he added.

Another Negro leader expressed an identical analysis of the problem, adding:

'Real Question'

"The real question is whether you can deal with the white man."

This week they found a few encouraging indications.

Two days ago, Briley met with the committee representing the Negro political and civil rights organizations.

Avon Williams, Metro Councilman Z. Alexander Looby, Mrs. Mathew Walker and Flem B. Otey presented him with affidavits alleging police brutality against a Fisk professor and a student from Tennessee State.

"I'm directing my personal staff to go into this matter and to involve the Metro Human Relations Commission and the police staff, and to make a complete investigation," the mayor said after the meeting.

The mayor indicated he himself would take personal charge of these investigations and follow through, and that we'd hear from him in a very short length of time," said Williams.

In another meeting last week, William Reinhart, Metro urban development coordinator, assured a group of Negro business leaders that if Nashville gets funds for a model cities program, residents of the affected area will have a real share in planning it.

Reinhart quoted Briley as saying, in the cover letter requesting federal funds, that

private citizens would participate in the program "in a more significant degree than has been true for many governmental programs in the past."

"I believe that for this program to be successful will require substantial citizen involvement and participation from the beginning of the program, through the planning stage (and) carrying through to the execution of the program components," the mayor's letter said.

A third possibility for hope was the Metro Human Relations Commission, which already was working with the model cities program and attempting to assist the police department in improving recruiting and human relations training.

Grim Picture

The general picture, however, remains grim.

The students are still angry. When the Fisk board of trustees met, students surrounded the meeting room and locked them in until the trustees agreed to meet with them and hear grievances.

At Tennessee State, said Dr. W. S. Davis, president of the university, black power advocates are using "tremendous effort, every day and every night, to have this dangerous disease permeate every phase of our university life."

Almost to a man Negro leaders say that only the white community can answer the question, of whether Black Power will be a "dangerous disease" or political progress, in the long run.

Fork and Spoon

A Negro city official sat in a downtown restaurant and used the table silver to illustrate the point.

On one side, he said, was the fork, representing the militant movement characterized by Carmichael, SNCC, and some of the students. On the other side was the spoon, representing the white power structure.

In the middle was the knife. "This," he explained, pointing to the knife, "is the Negro leadership."

He pushed the knife toward the spoon. "The riots," he said, "pushed the Negro adult leaders over here towards the white leaders, because they both wanted to avoid violence."

"But now," he said, "the white power structure is pushing the Negro leaders the other way."

Appendix 4
Recommendations from the Jackson Team

From the experience of interviewing and preparing their city report, the Jackson team offers the following recommendations which might be helpful in that situation. It is to be hoped that they might have some generalizeability to other situations as well.

- (1) Each of the organizations and individuals who have been recognized as offering a sign of hope ought to be given every possible encouragement and support for continuing their work for constructive change.
- (2) Every possible support should be given to the Mississippi Research and Development Center but without labeling the organization as the savior of the Negro. The work of this organization would be slowed down if it were received by influential conservative supporters as openly or secretly working for the improvement of Negro-white relations, or as even dealing with racial-social problems.
- (3) Both Tougaloo College and Milsaps College deserve encouragement and support for their long standing efforts toward improvement of Negro-white relations and the betterment of the Negro's lot in Mississippi.
- (4) If it is possible to develop a sound Federal legislation which would at least control racism in the mass communication media such as newspapers, television and radio, this could be a potentially highly vital force in constructive change. Such control would not only eliminate the maintenance and propagation of negative

attitudes and feelings toward the Negro, it would probably increase the latitude of such newspapers as the one referred to earlier.

- (5) Federal money is needed to effect change. Guidelines for integrated facilities for federally supported projects should be enforced.
- (6) Federal help is needed to establish Negro medical personnel in Jackson and to encourage more Negro medical men to practice in the state.
- (7) Jackson police need more human relations training and better understanding and appreciation of civil rights and of the fact that these are unalienable rights for all citizens.
- (8) Discrimination in employment practices must be established, but this cannot be done until more Negroes are educated and trained to a level where they can compete effectively.