

ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE

You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified. In an effort to make the withdrawal sheets easier to use, we have updated the withdrawal sheets, listing only the documents that are still closed. Use these updated withdrawal sheets to request Mandatory Declassification Review of closed security classified documents.

The original withdrawal sheets are in a mylar sleeve in the front of the folder. We have retained them in the file so that you can see the status of the documents when the folder was opened and the history of their declassification. Please replace the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them.

April 18, 2005

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
064	cable	Amman 3041 [Sanitized 6/24/03 NLJ 02-155] same sanitization 5/23/19 per NLJ 15-38	S	3	01/19/68	A
071	cable	Amman 2800 [Sanitized 6/24/03 NLJ 02-155] same sanitization 5/23/19 per NLJ 15-38	S	1	12/29/67	A
092	cable	Amman 2163 [Sanitized 10/25/02 NLJ 02-152] open 5/5/15 per NLJ 15-39	S	3	11/07/67	A
096	cable	Amman 1892 [Sanitized 6/24/03 NLJ 02-155] same sanitization 5/23/19 per NLJ 15-38	S	3	10/16/67	A
101	cable	Amman 1780 [Sanitized 6/29/03 NLJ 02-155] same sanitization 5/23/19 per NLJ 15-38	S	3	10/08/67	A
175	cable	Amman 2707 [Sanitized 8/2/02 NLJ 02-152] more info released 5/5/15 per NLJ/RAC 15-35	S	3	12/20/67	A
190	cable	Intelligence Information Cable [Exempt 9/14/05 NLJ 05-92] exempt 5/5/15 per NLJ/RAC 15-35	S	4	02/16/68	A
191	cable	Intelligence Information Cable [Exempt 9/14/05 NLJ 05-92] exempt 5/5/15 per NLJ/RAC 15-35	S	4	01/13/68	A
192	cable	Intelligence Information Cable [Exempt 9/14/05 NLJ 05-92] exempt 5/5/15 per NLJ/RAC 15-35	S	3	11/08/67	A

Collection Title National Security File, Country File

Folder Title "Jordan, Vol. 4"

Box Number 147

Restriction Codes

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 13292 governing access to national security information.
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9/14/2005

fur
Initials

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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193	cable	Intelligence Information Cable [Sanitized per RAC 9/00] Temporarily removed from file 7/03 <i>EXEMPT 6-2-05 NLJ 05-91</i> <i>3.3(B)(1) exempt 5/5/15 per NLJ/RAC 15-35</i>	S	6	10/23/67	A
194	cable	Intelligence Information Cable [Exempt 9/14/05 NLJ 05-92] <i>exempt 5/5/15 per NLJ/RAC 15-35</i>	S	15	10/23/67	A
195	cable	Intelligence Information Cable [exempt per RAC 9/00] <i>exempt 5/5/15 per NLJ/RAC 15-35</i>	S	9	09/13/67	A
207	memo	Rostow to LBJ [Sanitized 9/14/05 NLJ 05-93] <i>same sanitization 1/13/16 per NLJ 15-40</i> [dup. #98, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 58, bx 28; #21a, NSF, Files of Saunders, "Jordan Arms, 4/1/66 - 2/29/68," bx 22]	S	1	01/25/67	A
207a	memo	Helms to LBJ [Sanitized 9/14/05 NLJ 05-92] <i>same sanitization 1/13/16 per NLJ 15-40</i> [dup. #98a, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 58, bx 28; #21b, NSF, Files of Saunders, "Jordan Arms, 4/1/66 - 2/29/68," bx 22]	S	2	01/25/68	A
221a	note	INR Briefing Note [Sanitized 10/25/02 NLJ 02-152]- <i>open 5/5/15 per NLJ 15-39</i>	S	1	11/16/67	A
224a	memo	Intelligence Memo [Exempt 9/14/05 NLJ 05-92] <i>exempt 1/13/16 per NLJ 15-40</i>	S	6	10/27/67	A

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227	memo	Saunders to Rostow [Sanitized 12/5/03 NLJ 02-153] same sanitization 5/5/15 per NLJ/RAC 15-35 [dup. #12, NSF, Files of Saunders, "Jordan, 4/1/66 - 10/31/67," bx 22]	S	1	09/14/67	A
227a	cable	Intelligence Information Cable [Sanitized per RAC 9/00] [Temporarily removed from file 7/03] EXEMPT 3.3(B)(1) exempt 5/5/15 per NLJ/RAC 15-35 NLJ 05 91 6-2-05	S	9	09/13/67	A
229	memo	Rostow to LBJ [Sanitized 4/26/02 NLJ 00-189] same sanitization 1/13/10 per NLJ 15-40 [dup. #59, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 40, bx 22]	S	1	09/05/67	A
229a	memo	Helms to LBJ [Sanitized 4/26/02] same sanitization 1/13/10 per NLJ 15-40 [dup. #59a, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 40, bx 22]	S	1	09/05/67	A

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
012	cable	Amman 3570 <i>open 6-24-03 NW 02-155</i>	S	5	2/24/68	A
018	cable	Amman 3539 <i>open 3-2-04 NW 02-156</i>	S	2	2/21/68	A
024	cable	Amman 3516 <i>open 6-24-03 NW 02-155</i>	S	2	2/20/68	A
025	cable	Amman 3509 <i>open 6-24-03 NW 02-155</i>	S	5	2/20/68	A
026	cable	Amman 3508 <i>open 6-24-03 NW 02-155</i>	S	3	2/20/68	A
029	cable	Amman 3464 <i>open 5-13-03 NW/RAC 02-119</i>	S	3	2/16/68	A
032	cable	Amman 3440 (corrected copy) <i>open 6-24-03 NW 02-155</i>	S	3	2/15/68	A
032a	cable	Amman 3440 (near dup., #32) <i>open 6-24-03 NW 02-155</i>	S	3	2/15/68	A
033	cable	Amman 3431 <i>open 5-13-03 NW/RAC 02-119</i>	S	2	2/15/68	A
035	cable	Amman 3419 <i>open 6-24-03 NW 02-155</i>	S	6	2/14/68	A
039	cable	Amman 3385 <i>open 6-24-03 NW 02-155</i>	S	2	2/13/68	A
060	cable	Amman 3082 <i>open 6-24-03 NW 02-155</i>	S	2	1/23/68	A

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
061	cable	Amman 3081 <i>open 6.24.03 NLJ 02.155</i>	S	2	1/23/68	A
063	cable	Amman 3042 <i>open 6.24.03 NLJ 02.155</i>	S	2	1/19/68	A
064	cable	Amman 3041 <i>sanitized 6.24.03 NLJ 02.155</i>	S	3	1/19/68	A
067	cable	Amman 2973 <i>open 6.24.03 NLJ 02.155</i>	S	3	1/11/68	A
068	cable	Amman 2952 <i>open 6.24.03 NLJ 02.155</i>	S	3	1/10/68	A
070	cable	Amman 2834 <i>open 6.24.03 NLJ 02.155</i>	S	5	12/30/67	A
071	cable	Amman 2800 <i>sanitized 6.24.03 NLJ 02.155</i>	S	1	12/29/67	A
082	cable	Amman 2519 - Sanitized, NLJ 92-217 (near dup., #217a) <i>open 6/10/03 NLJ 02-155</i>	S	4	12/5/67	A
090	cable	Amman 2236 <i>open 5/30/03 NLJ/RAC 02-119</i>	S	2	11/15/67	A
092	cable	Amman 2163 <i>Sanitized 10/25/02 per NLJ 02-155</i>	S	3	11/7/67	A
095	cable	Amman 2026 <i>open 6.24.03 NLJ 02.155</i>	S	3	10/26/67	A
096	cable	Amman 1892 <i>sanitized 6.24.03 NLJ 02.155</i>	S	3	10/16/67	A

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099	cable	Amman 1797	S	3	10/9/67	A
<i>OPEN 6-29-03 NW 02-155</i>						
101	cable	Amman 1780	S	3	10/8/67	A
<i>submitted 6-29-03 NW 02-155</i>						
102	cable	Amman 1776	S	7	10/8/67	A
<i>OPEN 6-29-03 NW 02-155</i>						
103	cable	Amman 1757 (corrected copy)	S	2	10/7/67	A
<i>OPEN 6-29-03 NW 02-155</i>						
104	cable	Amman 1614	S	2	9/26/67	A
<i>OPEN 3-2-04 NW 02-156</i>						
116	cable	State 117988 to Amman	S	2	2/20/68	A
<i>OPEN 6-29-03 NW 02-155</i>						
118	cable	State 115565 to Amman	S	2	2/15/68	A
<i>OPEN 6-29-03 NW 02-155</i>						
119	cable	State 113634 to Amman (near dup., #233a, 233d)	S	5	2/11/68	A
<i>OPEN 4/22/03 NW/RAL 02-120</i>						
132	cable	State 102083 to Amman	S	4	1/20/68	A
<i>OPEN 5/30/03 NW 02-152</i>						
145	cable	State 65525 to Amman	S	2	11/7/67	A
<i>OPEN 6-29-03 NW 02-155</i>						
154	cable	Amman 3510	S	1	2/21/67	A
<i>OPEN 4/22/03 NW/RAL 02-121</i>						
159	cable	Amman 1405	S	2	2/14/68	A
<i>OPEN 6-29-03 NW 02-155</i>						

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
160	cable	Amman 3373 <i>open 6/24/03 NW 02-155</i>	S	1	2/12/68	A
161	cable	Amman 3261 <i>open 4/12/03 NW/RAC 02-121</i>	S	1	2/2/68	A
169	cable	Amman 2913 <i>open 6/24/03 NW 02-155</i>	S	3	1/9/68	A
175	cable	Amman 2707 <i>Sanitized 8/2/02 NW 02-152 (same as PAC)</i>	S	3	12/20/67	A
181	cable	State 119313 to Amman <i>open 4/22/03 NW/RAC 02-121</i>	S	1	2/22/68	A
190	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Exempt per RAC, 9/00 <i>EXEMPT 9.14.05 NW 05.92</i>	S	4	2/16/68	A
191	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Exempt per RAC, 9/00 <i>EXEMPT 9.14.05 NW 05.92</i>	S	4	1/13/68	A
192	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Exempt per RAC, 9/00 <i>EXEMPT 9.14.05 NW 05.92</i>	S	3	11/8/67	A
193	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Sanitized per RAC, 9/00 <i>temporarily removed from file 7/03</i>	S	6	10/23/67	A
194	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Exempt per RAC, 9/00 <i>EXEMPT 9.14.05 NW 05.92</i>	S	15	10/23/67	A
195	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Exempt per RAC, 9/00	S	9	9/13/67	A
197a	memo	Talking Points with King Husein <i>open 12/5/03 NW 02-154</i>	C	5	6/27/67	A

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199a	cable	Amman 3498 <i>open 6-24-03 NJ 02-155</i>	C	6	2/19/68	A
206	memo	Harold Saunders to Walt Rostow <i>Open 5/29/03 NJ/RAC 02-122</i>	S	1	1/25/67	A
207	memo	Walt Rostow to LBJ (dup., #98, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 58, Box 28) sanitized per MTP, 02/29/03 <i>same sanitization 9-14-05 NW 05-93</i>	S	1	1/25/67	A
207a	memo	Richard Helms to LBJ (dup., #98a, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 58, Box 28) - Exempt 9/00 sanitized MTP 02/29/03 <i>dup. #98a, NSF, MTP, vol. 58, box 28</i> <i>same sanitization 9-14-05 NW 05-92</i>	S	2	1/25/68	A
208a	memo	CM-2929-68, Earle Wheeler and General Khammash open 4/22/03 NJ/RAC 02-120	S	3	1/21/68	A
209	memo	Intelligence Memo RNA-2 <i>open 6-24-03 NJ 02-155</i>	C	8	1/12/68	A
214	cable	CAP 80198 <i>open 6-24-03 NJ 02-155</i>	S	1	1/8/68	A
217a	cable	text of Amman 2519 - Sanitized, NLJ 92-247; near dup., #82, dup of #22a, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 53, <i>open 6-24-03 NJ 02-155</i>	S	3	12/7/67	A
248	memo	Walt Rostow to LBJ (dup., #32, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 53, Box 26) <i>open 4/26/02</i>	S	1	12/6/67	A
219	note	Richard Helms to Walt Rostow <i>open 4/26/02</i>	S	1	12/5/67	A
219a	memo	Intelligence Memo - Sanitized per RAC, 9/00 <i>open 4/26/02</i>	S	6	12/5/67	A
220a	memo	from Lucius Battle for the Files re LBJ's meeting with King Hussein, 11/8/67 <i>open 6-24-03 NJ 02-155</i>	S	2	11/11/67	A

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221a	note	INR Briefing Note <i>Sanitized 10/25/02 per NSJ 02-152</i>	S	1	11/16/67	A	
222	memo	Hal Saunders to Walt Rostow re Hussein-Rusk-Talk	S	1	11/6/67	A	
<i>open 12-5-03 NW 02-154</i>	224	memo	Hal Saunders to Walt Rostow - Exempt per RAC, 9/00 <i>open 5/30/03 NSJ 02-151</i>	S	1	[10/67]	A
224a	memo	Intelligence Memo - Exempt per RAC, 9/00 <i>EXEMPT 9-14-05 NW 05-92</i>	S	6	10/27/67	A	
224b	cable	Cairo 834	C	2	10/25/67	A	
<i>open 6-24-03 NW 02-155</i>	224c	cable	London 3272	C	3	10/24/67	A
<i>open 6-24-03 NW 02-155</i>	227	memo	Hal Saunders to Walt Rostow	S	1	9/14/67	A
<i>Sanitized 12-5-03 NW 02-153</i>			<i>Edug.# 12, NSF, Files of Saunders, "Jordan, 4/1/66-10/31/67" Box 22</i>				
227a	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Sanitized per RAC, 9/00 <i>EXEMPT 3.3(B)(1) temporarily removed from file 7/03 NW 05-91 6-2-05</i>	S	9	9/13/67	A	
229	memo	Walt Rostow to LBJ - Sanitized, 1993; dup., #59, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 40, Box 22 <i>same san 10-12-01 NSJ/RAC 02-139</i>	S	1	9/5/67	A <i>same sanitization per EAL-02500-159 4/26/02</i>	
229a	memo	Richard Helms to LBJ - Sanitized per RAC, 9/00; dup., #59a, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 40, Box 22 <i>same sanitization 4/26/02</i>	S	1	9/5/67	A	
<i>open 6-24-03 NW 02-155</i>	232	memcon	Chassan Shaker, John McCrane, Lucius Battle, Rodger Davies, Robert Paganelli	S	3	2/23/68	A
233c	memo	Memo of Understanding (near dup., #119) <i>open 4/22/03 NSJ/RAC 02-120</i>	S	4	[2/68]	A	

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233d	memo	Applicable Conditions near dup., #119)	S	1	[2/68]	A
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open 4122103 NW/RAC 02-120

234	memcon	Amar Khammash, Abdul-Hamid - Sharaf, Harold Saundres	S	2	1/29/68	A
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open 12-503
NW02-154

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Department of State

1
TELEGRAM
25

SECRET 716
2

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03636 291634Z

44
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 000/030 W

P 291610Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4790

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3636

EXDIS

SUBJ: JORDAN ARMS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY BATTLE FROM SYMMES

REF: AMMAN 3570 AND 3614

1. I OF COURSE RECOGNIZE THE JORDANIAN REQUESTS FOR ADJUSTMENTS ON ARMS PACKAGE HAVE INEVITABLY RAISED FURTHER PROBLEMS IN WASHINGTON AND THAT YOU MAY NOT BE ABLE TO PREDICT WHEN DEFINITIVE REPLY AVAILABLE. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL, HOWEVER FOR ANY WORD YOU COULD GIVE ME ON POSSIBLE TIMING. WE ARE GETTING DAILY TELEPHONE

PAGE 2 RU0MKQ 3636A ~~SECRET~~
CALLS FROM KHAMMASH AND THE PALACE ASKING IF ANSWER HAS BEEN RECEIVED AND ARE TRYING TO KEEP OUR FRIENDS' BLOOD PRESSURE AS LOW AS POSSIBLE.

2. ALSO WOULD APPRECIATE ADVISE WHETHER WHEN DECISION ON EQUIPMENT ADD ONE IS TAKEN IN WASHINGTON, I WILL BE AUTHORIZED TO SIGN MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AS SOON AS I HAVE SECURED GOJ ACCEPTANCE OF TEXT FORWARDED STATE 113634 AND AMENDED STATE 117988. ASSUME SEPARATE ANNEX FOR ITEMS IN PARA 5 TO WHICH KING INITIALLY TOOK EXCEPTION WILL BE DRAFTED BY WASHINGTON. SYMMES
GP-3

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 92001
By ag/ee, NARA, Date 6/14/01



Department of State

2
TELEGRAM
26

SECRET 647

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03634 291530Z

40
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 W

0 291443Z FEB 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4788
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1325
USMISSION USUN NY 732

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3634

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO

REF: STATE 121582, USUN 3936

SUBJ: POSSIBLE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON JERUSALEM

1. PRIOR TO RECEIPT STATE 121582 I HAD ARRANGED FOR
EMBOFF TO SPEAK TO MINSTATE FOR FONAFF RIFAI EVENING
FEB 27 TO SEEK ASSURANCES THAT RIFAI WOULD NOT RPT NOT CALL

PAGE 2 RUOMKG 3634A ~~SECRET~~

FOR SC SESSION ON JERUSALEM UNTIL I HAD OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK
WITH HIM AGAIN. RIFAI GAVE THESE ASSURANCES. (RIFAI, AS
EVENTS HAVE DEVELOPED OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS IS NOW
EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLING TIMING AND CHARACTER OF GOJ'S
DEALINGS WITH JARRING AND HAS BECOME OUR PRINCIPAL
CONTACT ON JERUSALEM ISSUE.) TODAY I RECONFIRMED
PERSONALLY WITH RIFAI HE INTENDS HOLD BACK ANY SC
INITIATIVE AND ARRANGED APPOINTMENT TO SEE HIM SATURDAY
MORNING MARCH 2.

2. TO CONVINCING JORDANIANS IT IS AGAINST THEIR BEST
INTERESTS TO RAISE JERUSALEM IN THE COUNCIL AT THIS
STAGE, SEEMS TO ME WE HAVE THREE POTENTIALLY USEFUL
POINTS: (A) WE ARE PRESSING GOI TO STOP ITS ACTIVITIES

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001
By rg/lll, NARA, Date 8/14/01



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 AMMAN 03634 291530Z

IN JERUSALEM AND HAVE WARNED IT MAY NOT HAVE OUR SUPPORT IF JORDAN DOES GO TO THE COUNCIL. IN THIS CONNECTION, I WISH TO ASSOCIATE MYSELF FULLY WITH AMB GOLDBERG'S RECOMMENDED DEMARCHE TO GOI (PARA 2 USUN 3936) AND HOPE DEPARTMENT WILL ACCEPT AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG'S FORMULATION. (B) IN SAME CONNECTION WOULD

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3634A ~~SECRET~~

ALSO FIND USEFUL BEING AUTHORIZED TO RELATE TO RIFAI ANY GOI REACTION TO UK DEMARCHE REPORTED TEL AVIV 2668. (C) HOWAR CASE. HAVING REVIEWED AGAIN DEPTTEL 116833 OF FEB 17 ISSUE OF GOI EXPROPRIATION OF LAND IN JERUSALEM WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO PROPERTY OF US CITIZEN MRS. HOWAR, I WOULD LIKE AUTHORIZATION TO CONVEY TO RIFAI DETAILS OF OUR DEMARCHE AND GOI REACTION, IF POSITIVE.

3. I WOULD APPRECIATE A READING ON THESE POINTS AND AUTHORIZATION TO DISCUSS THEM WITH RIFAI BY OPENING OF BUSINESS HERE MARCH 2, I.E. 0600 ZULU.

4. WHAT GOJ REALLY NEEDS TO RELIEVE PRESSURE ON IT OVER JERUSALEM IS NOT SIMPLY SECRET ASSURANCES FROM US THAT WE ARE DOING OUR BEST TO BE HELPFUL BUT SOME PUBLICLY RECOGNIZABLE RESULTS TO WHICH GOJ CAN POINT IN JUSTIFYING ITS CONTINUED "INACTIVITY". IDEAL RESULT WOULD BE INDEFINITE POSTPONMENT OF CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULED TO BEING MARCH 3 AND MODIFICATION OF DEADLINE

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 3634A ~~SECRET~~

ON SUBMISSION OF CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION. SUSPENSION OF CONSTRUCTION WOULD HAVE VERY FAVORABLE AREA WIDE EFFECT AND WOULD, I BELIEVE, BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL TO EASING THE WAY FOR THE PARTIES TO MEET IN CYPRUS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

GP-2 SYMMES

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.

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42
ACTION SS 30
INFO /030 W

P R 281255Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4778
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0607

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3614

EXDIS
SUBJ: JORDAN ARMS

REF: AMMAN 3597, 3571, 3570

1. KHAMMASH RETURNED LATE FEB 26 FROM SAUDI ARABIA WHERE HE HAD TWO-HOUR SESSION WITH FAISAL ATTENDED IN PART BY RASHAD PHARSON. KHAMMASH THROUGH EMBOFF RELAYED FOLLOWING TO ME FEB 27. IN ESSENCE HE RECEIVED LITTLE ENCOURAGEMENT FROM FAISAL THAT ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE WOULD BE FURNISHED TO BE USED FOR ARMS EITHER NOW OR IN FORESEEABLE FUTURE. RE KHAMMASH'S INTEREST IN SAUDI FINANCING OF BRITISH CENTURION TANKS AND BRITISH OR FRENCH SUPERSONICS, FAISAL DID,

PAGE 2 ROOMNO 3614A ~~SECRET~~

HOWEVER, SUGGEST THAT KHAMMASH DEVELOP FURTHER INFORMATION ON PRICING AND AVAILABILITIES SO THAT FAISAL COULD STUDY IT IN GREATER DEPTH. FAISAL MADE FAMILIAR PRESENTATION TO KHAMMASH THAT SAG WAS HEAVILY COMMITTED TO ARMS AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES OF ITS OWN. IN SUM, KHAMMASH FOUND FAISAL CORDIAL, BUT CLEARLY RELUCTANT COMMIT HIMSELF TO ANY FUTURE INCREASES IN ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN.

2. KHAMMASH SAID HE INTENDS TO OBTAIN MORE DETAILS FROM THE BRITISH AND THE FRENCH ON TANKS AND AIRCRAFT AND PRESENT THEM FOR FAISAL'S STUDY IN THE NEAR FUTURE IN THE HOPES THAT FAISAL

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WOULD AGREE TO SOME ASSISTANCE ON THESE ITEMS. HE HAD TOLD FAISAL THAT THIS ASSISTANCE COULD BE EXTENDED IN ONE OF THREE POSSIBLE WAYS: SAUDI GIFT OF THE EQUIPMENT TO JORDAN; GIVE JORDAN FUNDS TO BY EQUIPMENT ON ITS OWN; OR SAUDI FINANCIAL GUARANTEE OF JORDANIAN PURCHASE.

3. KHAMMASH SAID HE HAD REVIEWED THE RESULTS OF HIS TRIP WITH HUSSEIN. WHILE THE KING EXPRESSED KEEN DISAPPOINTMENT IN THE SAUDI ATTITUDE HE MANIFESTED A STRONG DESIRE TO FINISH NEGOTIATIONS ON OUR PROPOSAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ACCORDING TO KHAMMASH, HUSSEIN HAS DECIDED TO SHELVE THE QUESTION OF SUPERSONICS FOR THE PRESENT. AS FAR AS THE GROUND EQUIPMENT PROPOSAL IS CONCERNED, KHAMMASH SAID HE HAD PERSUADED KING TO AUTHORIZE SIGNING GROUND PACKAGE WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY PROVIDED FOLLOWING ITEMS COULD BE ADDED TO OUR PRESENT PROPOSAL: (A) ADD ON OF AS MANY M-48A1 TANKS AS POSSIBLE; (B) FORTY ADDITIONAL TWIN 40 AAA WEAPONS BRINGING TOTAL TO FORTY-FOUR; (C) NINETY-ONE ADDITIONAL 50 CALIBRE QUAD MOUNTS FOR NEW TOTAL OF ONE HUNDRED. HE URGED OUR PROMPT AGREEMENT AND SAID THE KING IS VERY ANXIOUS TO SETTLE THIS MATTER IN NEXT FEW DAYS.

4. KHAMMASH MADE NO MENTION OF THE ADDITIONAL 2 1/2 TON TRUCKS REQUIRED FOR THE QUAD 50S AND THIS HAS NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY RAISED WITH HIM. HOWEVER, WE ASSUME THESE WOULD ALSO BE REQUIRED (PERHAPS AS SUBSTITUTION FOR SOME OF \$7 MILLION SPARE PARTS).

5. KHAMMASH SAID HE FULLY REALIZED THERE MIGHT BE AVAILABILITY PROBLEM ON SOME OF THE AI CY#AIRCRAFT. HE WOULD SIMPLY ASK US

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TO AGREE TO SUPPLY THE TOTAL WITH THE BEST DELIVERIES POSSIBLE.

HE REITERATED THE KING'S REQUEST THAT WE ARRANGE THE AIRLIFTING

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OF SOME EQUIPMENT OF IMMEDIATE IMPACT.

6. COMMENT: I STRONGLY RECOMMEND WE AGREE TO PROVIDE THESE ADDITIONAL ITEMS SO THAT HIS NEGOTIATION MAY BE BROUGHT TO A CONCLUSION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I RECOMMEND WE UP THE M-48A1 TANKS TO 100 AS PER STATE 119271. SYMMES
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AS RECEIVED. WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P 271130Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4768
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 606

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3597

EXDIS:

SUBJECT: JORDAN ARMS

REF AMMAN 3571

KHAMMASH HAS JUST RETURNED FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND HE
SUGGESTED EARLY MEETING DISCUSS RESULTS HIS VISIT
AND JORDANIAN REQUEST MADE TO US ON TWENTY-THIRD.

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P 261850Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4765
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 1304
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1317
USUN NEW YORK 728

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3588

EXDIS

PLEASE PASS CAIRO

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION

1. SUMMARY. MINSTATE FOR FONAFFS RIFAI CALLED ME OVER THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS JERUSALEM QUESTION AND ALSO JARRING'S LATEST VISIT TO AMMAN. RIFAI WAS VERY DEPRESSED ABOUT LACK OF PROGRESS IN JARRING MISSION. HE SAID MOST RECENT FORMULATION ON ISRAELI POSITION COMMUNICATED BY JARRING ON TWENTY-FIFTH DID NOT INCLUDE THE WORD "ACCEPT", AND IN DISCUSSION WITH GOJ OFFICIALS JARRING HAD ADMITTED THAT ISRAEL'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE RESOLUTION LACKS CLARITY EVEN TO HIM. JARRING HAD INDICATED TO JORDANIANS THAT IT WAS CLEAR TO HIM UAR HAS ACCEPTED THE RESOLUTION.

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2. MINSTATE FOR FONAFFS RIFAI HAD COME OVER TO DISCUSS JERUSALEM (AMMAN 3587) AND IN COURSE OF OUR DISCUSSIONS BRIEFED ME ON JARRING'S VISIT FEB 25. HE BEGAN BY REFERRING TO CIRCULATION OF MISINFORMATION ON ATTITUDE OF VARIOUS PARTIES WITH REGARD TO ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION. HE WAS CERTAIN THAT JARRING NEVER HAD HAD ANY QUESTION ABOUT JORDAN'S ATTITUDE EITHER TOWARDS ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION OR AS TO "NEXT STEP" THAT WOULD BE TAKEN. HE WAS ALSO CERTAIN THAT JARRING UNDERSTOOD UAR HAD ACCEPTED THE RESOLUTION. YESTERDAY JARRING

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HAD COMMUNICATED TO GOJ LATEST FORMULATION ISRAELIS HAD AUTHORIZED HIM TO MAKE TO UAR. ACCORDING TO JARRING, EBAN HAD NOT ASKED HIM TO PRESENT THIS FORMULATION TO JORDAN BUT, IN RESPONSE TO JARRING'S QUESTION WHETHER HE SHOULD TELL JORDAN, EBAN HAD INDICATED HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO JARRING'S LETTING JORDAN KNOW WHAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD TO SAY TO UAR.

3. I TOLD RIFAI THAT I ASSUMED JORDAN CONSIDERED THIS LATEST FORMULATION TO CONSTITUTE ISRAEL ACCEPTANCE OF THE

RESOLUTION. HE RESPONDED THAT, ON THE CONTRARY, JARRING HIMSELF HAD BEEN UNABLE TO CLARIFY WHAT ISRAEL MEANT. THE WORDING WAS DIFFERENT BUT THE WORD "ACCEPT" WAS NOT MENTIONED, AND IN DIS-

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CUSSION JARRING HAD ADMITTED THAT THE ISRAELI FORMULATION DID NOT STATE CLEARLY THAT ISRAEL "ACCEPTS THE RESOLUTION." JARRING STATED THE UAR SIMILARLY HAD FOUND THE NEW FORMULATION UNACCEPTABLE.

4. RIFAI THEN READ TO ME FROM THE JORDANIAN NEWSPAPER AD-DUSTOUR THE GOJ STATEMENT MADE YESTERDAY ON THE JARRING TALKS (AMMAN 3583). I COMMENTED THAT THIS STATEMENT SEEMED TO ME TO HAVE INTRODUCED NEW WORDS AND PHRASES. I MENTIONED THAT IN ALL PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH ME THE KING, PRIMIN AND RIFAI HAD ONLY SPOKEN ABOUT THE ARABIC EQUIVALENT OF "ACCEPTS THE RESOLUTION." THE PHRASE "AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION" HAD NEVER BEEN MENTIONED TO ME NOR HAD I SEEN IT IN PRINT WITH REGARD TO THE POSITION OF JORDAN. MOREOVER, THE ARABIC WORD "INSIYAA" (ACQUIESE IN OR OBEY) WAS ENTIRELY NEW. I SAID I COULD UNDERSTAND WHY ISRAEL MIGHT HAVE SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THE REPORTED UAR EMPHASIS ON "IMPLEMENTATION." NOW JORDAN APPEARED TO BE ADDING TO UNCERTAINTY.

5. RIFAI RESPONDED THAT HE WAS CERTAIN THE JORDANIAN AND UAR POSITION WERE "CRYSTAL CLEAR" TO JARRING. IT WAS TRUE THAT THE "IMPLEMENTATION" DIFFICULTY HAD BEEN RAISED BY THE UAR,

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BUT THIS HAD BEEN CAUSED BY ISRAEL'S LINKING ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION WITH NEGOTIATIONS (INITIALLY TO DIRECT NEGO-

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TIATIONS). RIFAI STRESSED THAT A FORM OF INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS ALREADY ARE TAKING PLACE THROUGH JARRING AND THERE COULD BE OTHER FORMS OF INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AS TIME WENT ON. RIFAI EMPHASIZED THAT HE WAS CERTAIN JARRING UNDERSTANDS THIS ASPECT OF THE UAR AND JORDANIAN POSITIONS. HE SAID ONCE ALL PARTIES HAVE ACCEPTED THE RESOLUTION AS UNDERSTOOD IN THE ARABIC PHRASE "QUBUUL AL-QARAAR" THE UAR WOULD BE OPEN TO THE "NEXT STEPS." IN CONNECTION WITH NEXT STEPS, JORDAN HAD TOLD JARRING YESTERDAY "ONCE YOU GET ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION FROM ISRAEL, WE WILL FACILITATE THE FUTURE STEPS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION." ACCORDING TO RIFAI THIS MEANS "IN THE SAME PLACE" EVEN IF NOT "IN THE SAME ROOM".

6. RIFAI SAID HE HAD READ THE MINUTES OF RIAD'S LAST MEETING WITH JARRING AND THAT HE SEES NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE UAR AND JORDANIAN UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE ISRAELI FORMULATION NOR BETWEEN THE UAR AND JORDANIAN RESPONSES TO IT. UNLESS ISRAEL CLEARLY ACCEPTS THE RESOLUTION HE SAID HE COULD FORESEE ONLY A BLACK FUTURE FOR JARRING'S MISSION.

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7. COMMENT: RIFAI HAD TAKEN UP THE JERUSALEM QUESTION WITH ME IN THIS SAME CONVERSATION. HE EXHIBITED EXTREME PESSIMISM AND FRUSTRATION WITH REGARD TO THE JERUSALEM QUESTION SPECIFICALLY AND THE LACK OF PROGRESS GENERALLY IN JARRING'S MISSION. HE INDICATED THAT HE AND OTHERS HAVE CONSIDERED RESIGNING FROM THE CABINET. LINKING THE LACK OF PROGRESS BY JARRING WITH THE JERUSALEM QUESTION, HE INDICATED THAT JORDAN WILL BE FORCED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS TO GO TO THE SC UNLESS THE GOVT CAN POINT TO SOME TANGIBLE PROGRESS IN SOME ASPECT OF THE SITUATION.
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NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OCT.

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P 261900Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4764
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1316
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1458
USUN NY 727

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3587

E X D I S

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PAGE 3 FIRST PARA)

SUBJ: JERUSALEM

1. SUMMARY: MINSTATE FOR FONAFFS RIFAI INFORMED ME THIS MORNING THAT HE HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO INSTRUCT JORDANIAN PERM DEL FARRA TO REQUEST AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE SC ON JERUSALEM. RIFAI SAID GOJ UNDER GROWING PRESSURE RE JERUSALEM, SINCE USG AND JARRING HAD BEEN UNABLE TO OBTAIN ANY CESSATION OF ISRAELI ACTIVITIES, JORDAN GOVT NOW HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO GO TO SC. AFTER DISCUSSION HE AGREED TO DELAY A FURTHER "VERY FEW DAYS" SUBMITTING A REQUEST FOR SC MEETING BUT STATED HE WOULD NOT FEEL OBLIGATED TO SPEAK TO ME AGAIN BEFORE REQUEST FOR SC MEETING MADE.

2. MINSTATE FOR FONAFFS RIFAI CALLED ME OVER THIS MORNING TO INFORM ME THAT HE HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED TO REQUEST AN

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3587A ~~SECRET~~
EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE SC TO TAKE UP CONTINUING ISRAELI ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM AND WOULD BE SENDING INSTRUCTIONS TO JORDANIAN PERMDEL FARRA. RIFAI SAID THE GOVT WAS UNDER STRONG PRESSURE TO TAKE THIS ACTION. THE PERMANENT COMMITTEE FORMED LAST WEEK (AMMAN 3548), FAR FROM HAVING SUPPLIED A

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SAFETY VALVE, HAD TURNED AGAINST THE GOVT BECAUSE OF ITS INACTIVITY AND INABILITY TO PRODUCE ANY RESULTS ON JERUSALEM. THE COMMITTEE IS FULL OF LEFTISTS AND MOSLEM BROTHERS. THE SITUATION HAS NOW REACHED A POINT WHERE THERE COULD BE A MAJOR CABINET CRISIS ON THIS ISSUE UNLESS THE GOVT, WITHIN A VERY FEW DAYS, EITHER TAKES SOME ACTION OR IS ABLE TO SHOW THAT ISRAEL HAS CEASED ITS ACTIVITIES IN JERUSALEM. RIFAI STATED PARENTHETICALLY THAT JORDAN IS UNDER PRESSURE FROM OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES TO PROCEED TO THE COUNCIL ON JERUSALEM.

3. RIFAI ALSO TOLD ME THAT JERUSALEM ARABS HAVE BEEN PUTTING CONTINUOUS PRESSURE ON COUNCIL OF MINISTERS TO TAKE A POSITION WITH REGARD TO THEIR LEGAL RIGHTS IN CONNECTION WITH GOI'S TWO MONTH DEADLINE TO APPLY FOR COMPENSATION FOR PROPERTIES EXPROPRIATED. ACCORDING TO RIFAI, ISRAELI AUTHORITIES ISSUED A DIRECTIVE LAST WEEK STATING IN EFFECT

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THAT THOSE WHO DID NOT APPLY FOR COMPENSATION WITHIN 60 DAYS WOULD FORFEIT ALL RIGHTS TO COMPENSATION FOR EXPROPRIATED PROPERTIES. THUS JORDAN GOVT IS CAUGHT BETWEEN TAKING ACTION IN SC TO OBTAIN DECLARATION THAT ISRAELI ACTIONS ARE ILLEGAL OR DOING NOTHING AND THEREBY PLACING IN JEOPARDY THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY OWNERS. PROPERTY OWNERS IN OTHER HAND MUST EITHER RECOGNIZE EXPROPRIATION BY APPLYING FOR COMPENSATION OR FAIL TO APPLY AND FORFEIT COMPENSATION. MEANWHILE, ACCORDING TO RIFAI ISRAEL HAS ANNOUNCED CONSTRUCTION OF NEW HOUSING OF EXPROPRIATED PROPERTIES WOULD BEGIN ON MARCH 3.

4. RIFAI SAID THAT HE HAD NOT DISCUSSED JERUSALEM WITH JARRING YESTERDAY. GOJ HAD, HOWEVER, IN PREVIOUS TWO MEETINGS INFORMED JARRING THAT UNLESS THERE WERE SOME CONCRETE RESULTS, THEY WOULD FEEL BOUND TO GO TO THE SC ON JERUSALEM. IN THE LAST PREVIOUS MEETING JARRING HAD INFORMED THEM THAT HE HAD GOTTEN NOWHERE WITH THE ISRAELIS WITH REGARD TO JERUSALEM AND THAT ISRAELIS WERE CALLING THEIR ACTIVITIES "MUNICIPAL REFORMS". IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES THE JORDAN GOVT CONSIDERED IT HAD FULLY ALERTED JARRING TO ITS INTENTIONS TO PROCEED TO THE COUNCIL

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FAILING CONCRETE ASSURANCES THAT ISRAELI ACTIONS WOULD CEASE. IN THE MEETINGS YESTERDAY JARRING HIMSELF HAD SAID NOTHING ABOUT JERUSALEM, EVEN THOUGH HE OWED JORDAN A REPLY. MORE- OVER, RIFAI SAID, SINCE THE FEB 25 MEETING WITH JARRING (REPORTED SEPARATELY) HAD SHOWN NO IMPROVEMENT IN ISRAELI POSITION WITH REGARD TO ACCEPTANCE OF THE UN RESOLUTION, THE JORDAN GOVT FEELS IT IS JEOPARDIZING NOTHING BY GOING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON JERUSALEM.

5. RIFAI REFERRED TO THE SEC GEN'S REQUEST THAT JORDAN AGREE TO STATIONING OF UN MILITARY OBSERVERS ALONG THE CEASEFIRE LINES. HE SAID GOJ RESPONSE LINKS THIS TO JERUSALEM QUESTION BY STATING GOJ WILL NOT AGREE TO STATIONING OF UN MOS ALONG CEASEFIRE LINES UNLESS ISRAEL CEASES ITS ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES IN JERUSALEM.

6. IN DISCUSSING THE FOREGOING WITH RIFAI, I AGAIN USED ARGUMENTS AGAINST GOING TO THE SC THAT I HAD EMPLOYED PREVIOUSLY. I WAS ABLE TO OBTAIN HIS AGREEMENT TO HOLDING OFF GOING TO THE SC FOR A FEW DAYS. HW SAID, IN EFFECT, THAT JORDAN WILL HAVE TO GO TO SC UNLESS USG EITHER GETS ISRAEL TO CEASE ITS PRESENT ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES IN JERUSALEM OR INDUCES ISRAEL TO ACCEPT THE UN RESOLUTION AND EARLY PROGRESS

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ON ITS IMPLEMENTATION. FACED WITH ALL OF THE PRESSURES HE HAD DESCRIBED, HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE GOVT COULD NOT STALL MORE THAN A "VERY FEW MORE DAYS" ON THIS MATTER. HE THEN SAID "I WILL ASK YOU NOW TO EXCUSE ME IF WE SUBMIT OUR REQUEST FOR AMMEETING WITHOUT INFORMING YOU." I TOLD HIM I HOPED HE WOULD NOT TAKE SUCH AN ACTION WITHOUT LETTING ME KNOW BEFORE- HAND SINCE IT WAS ALWAYS POSSIBLE THERE MIGHT BE SOME LATE DEVELOPMENT THAT COULD INFLUENCE SUCH A DECISION. HE WOULD NOT COMMIT HIMSELF TO DO SO.

7. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH I SUSPECT THAT GOJ ITSELF HAS GENERATED

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SOME OF THE PRESSURE IN JERUSALEM WHICH RIFAI CLAIMS IS FORCING GOVT'S HAND, THIS DOES NOT CHANGE THE FACT THAT THE PRESSURE IS REAL. WE DOUBT ANY CONCEIVABLE JORDANIAN CABINET WOULD TAKE A DIFFERENT LINE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

8. WE ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH AMBS GOLDBERG AND BARBOUR ABOUT THE SERIOUS DISADVANTAGES TO JARRING'S MISSION IF THIS QUESTION IS NOW RAISED AS A SEPARATE ISSUE IN NEW YORK. WE WOULD AGREE ALSO THAT JERUSALEM IS PROBABLY THE MOST INTRACTABLE ISSUE IN THE WHOLE ARAB-ISRAELI COMPLEX. NEVERTHELESS, ARGUMENT THAT CONFRONTING THE ISRAELIS WITH PROBLEM NOW MAY CAUSE ISRAELIS TO DIG IN THEIR HEELS WILL SOUND VERY HOLLOW TO

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ARABS, WHO ARE ALREADY POINTING OUT TO US THAT THERE WILL BE LITTLE TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT ONCE THE ISRAELIS HAVE CHANGED THE PHYSICAL SHAPE AND CONTENT OF LARGE AREAS OF THE CITY. I DOUBT THAT CONSTRUCTION AND OWNERSHIP ON EXPROPRIATED SITES ONCE ACCOMPLISHED WOULD BE REVERSIBLE IN SOME FINAL STAGE OF JARRING MISSION. I AM AFRAID THAT WHAT THE ISRAELIS ARE NOW DOING IN JERUSALEM IS A MAJOR ASPECT OF THE JERUSALEM ISSUE IN JORDANIAN EYES. TO USE THEM WITH ARABS SUGGESTED IN TEL AVIV 2649 RISKS: (1) COMMITTING US IN THEIR MINDS TO REVERSING TOWARDS END OF NEGOTIATING PROCESS SOME OF THINGS THAT ARE NOW TAKING PLACE, OR (2) MISLEADING THEM AS TO OUR INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES.

9. AS I SEE IT, WE ARE IMMEDIATELY FACED EITHER WITH GETTING ISRAELIS QUIETLY TO SUSPEND EXPROPRIATION AND CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES THAT THEY HAVE UNDERTAKEN OR PERSUADING THEM TO GIVE JARRING AN UNEQUIVOCAL ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD ENABLE JARRING TO MOVE IMMEDIATELY INTO A NEGOTIATING SITUATION. EVEN IN THE LATTER CASE, HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT THE JERUSALEM ISSUE WOULD ARRISE AGAIN TO PLAGUE US UNLESS WE CAN PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS TO PUT EXPROPRIATION AND CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES IN THE ICE BOX.

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P 261900Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4764
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1316
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1458
USUN NY 727

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3587

EXDIS

SUBJ: JERUSALEM

1. SUMMARY: MINSTATE FOR FONAFFS RIFAI INFORMED ME THIS MORNING THAT HE HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO INSTRUCT JORDANIAN PERM DEL FARRA TO REQUEST AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE SC ON JERUSALEM. RIFAI SAID GOJ UNDER GROWING PRESSURE RE JERUSALEM, SINCE USG AND JARRING HAD BEEN UNABLE TO OBTAIN ANY CESSATION OF ISRAELI ACTIVITIES, JORDAN GOVT NOW HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO GO TO SC. AFTER DISCUSSION HE AGREED TO DELAY A FURTHER "VERY FEW DAYS" SUBMITTING A REQUEST FOR SC MEETING BUT STATED HE WOULD NOT FEEL OBLIGED TO SPEAK TO ME AGAIN BEFORE REQUEST FOR SC MEETING MADE.

2. MINSTATE FOR FONAFFS RIFAI CALLED ME OVER THIS MORNING TO INFORM ME THAT HE HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED TO REQUEST AN

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3587A ~~SECRET~~
EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE SC TO TAKE UP CONTINUING ISRAELI ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM AND WOULD BE SENDING INSTRUCTIONS TO JORDANIAN PERMDEL FARRA. RIFAI SAID THE GOVT WAS UNDER STRONG PRESSURE TO TAKE THIS ACTION. THE PERMANENT COMMITTEE FORMED LAST WEEK (AMMAN 3548), FAR FROM HAVING SUPPLIED A SAFETY VALVE, HAD TURNED AGAINST THE GOVT BECAUSE OF ITS

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INACTIVITY AND INABILITY TO PRODUCE ANY RESULTS ON JERUSALEM. THE COMMITTEE IS FULL OF LEFTISTS AND MOSLEM BROTHERS. THE SITUATION HAS NOW REACHED A POINT WHERE THERE COULD BE A MAJOR CABINET CRISIS ON THIS ISSUE UNLESS THE GOVT, WITHIN A VERY FEW DAYS, EITHER TAKES SOME ACTION OR IS ABLE TO SHOW THAT ISRAEL HAS CEASED ITS ACTIVITIES IN JERUSALEM. RIFAI STATED PARETHETICALLY THAT JORDAN IS UNDER PRESSURE FROM OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES TO PROCEED TO THE COUNCIL ON JERUSALEM.

3. RIFAI ALSO

TOLD ME THAT JERUSALEM ARABS HAVE BEEN PUTTING CONTINUOUS PRESSURE ON COUNCIL OF MINISTERS TO TAKE A POSITION WITH REGARD TO THEIR LEGAL RIGHTS IN CONNECTION WITH GOI'S TWO MONTH DEADLINE TO APPLY FOR COMPENSATION FOR PROPERTIES EXPROPRIATED. ACCORDING TO RIFAI, ISRAELI AUTHORITIES ISSUED A DIRECTIVE LAST WEEK STATING IN EFFECT

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THAT THOSE WHO DID NOT APPLY FOR COMPENSATION FOR EXPROPRIATED PROPERTIES.) THUS, JORDAN GOVT IS CAUGHT BETWEEN TAKING ACTION IN SC TO OBTAIN DECLARATION THAT ISRAELI ACTIONS ARE ILLEGAL OR DOING NOTHING AND THEREBY PLACING IN JEOPARDY THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY OWNERS. PROPERTY OWNERS ON OTHER HAND MUST EITHER RECOGNIZE EXPROPRIATION BY APPLYING FOR COMPENSATION OR FAIL TO APPLY AND FOREIT COMPENSATION. MEANWHILE, ACCORDING TO RIFAI ISRAEL HAS ANNOUNCED CONSTRUCTION OF NEW HOUSING ON EXPROPRIATED PROPERTIES WOULD BEGIN ON MARCH 3.

4. RIFAI SAID THAT HE HAD NOT DISCUSSED JERUSALEM WITH JARRING YEATERDAY. GOJ HAD, HOWEVER, IN PREVIOUS TWO MEETINGS INFORMED JARRING THAT UNLESS THERE WERE SOME CONCRETE RESULTS, THEY WOULD FEEL BOUND TO GO TO THE SC ON JERUSALEM. IN THE LAST PREVIOUS MEETING JARRING HAD INFORMED THEM THAT HE HAD GOTTEN NOWHERE WITH THE ISRAELIS WITH REGARD TO JERUSALEM AND THAT ISRAELIS WERE CALLING THEIR ACTIVITIES "MUNCIPAL REFORMS". IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES THE JORDAN GOVT CONSIDERED IT HAD FULLY ALERTED JARRING TO ITS INTENTIONS TO PROCEED TO THE COUNCIL

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PAGE 4 RUQMG 3587A ~~SECRET~~

FADING CONCRETE ASSURANCES THAT ISRAELI ACTIONS WOULD CEASE. IN THE MEETINGS YESTERDAY JARRING HIMSELF HAD SAID NOTHING ABOUT JERUSALEM, EVEN THOUGH HE OWED JORDAN A REPLY. MORE OVER, RIFAI SAID, SINCE THE FEB 25 MEETING WITH JARRING (REPORTED SEPARATELY) HAD SHOWN NO IMPROVEMENT IN ISRAELI POSITION WITH REGARD TO ACCEPTANCE OF THE UN RESOLUTION, THE JORDAN GOVT FEELS IT IS JEOPARDIZING NOTHING BY GOING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON JERUSALEM.

5. RIFAI REFERRED TO THE SECGEN'S REQUEST THAT JORDAN AGREE TO STATIONING OF UN MILITARY OBSERVERS ALONG THE CEASEFIRE LINES. HE SAID GOJ RESPONSE LINKS THIS TO JERUSALEM QUESTION BY STATING GOJ WILL NOT AGREE TO STATIONING OF UNMOS ALONG CEASEFIRE LINES UNLESS ISRAEL CEASES ITS ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES IN JERUSALEM.

6. IN DISCUSSING THE FOREGOING WITH RIFAI, I AGAIN USED ARGUMENTS AGAINST GOING TO THE SC THAT I HAD EMPLOYED PREVIOUSLY. I WAS ABLE TO OBTAIN HIS AGREEMENT TO HOLDING OFF GOING TO THE SC FOR A FEW DAYS. HW SAID, IN EFFECT, THAT JORDAN WILL HAVE TO GO TO SC UNLESS USG EITHER GETS ISRAEL TO CEASE ITS PRESENT ILLEGAL ACITIVITIES IN JERUSALEM OR INDUCES ISRAEL TO ACCEPT THE UN RESOLUTION AND EARLY PROGRESS

PAGE 5 RUQMG 3587A ~~SECRET~~

ON ITS IMPLEMENTATION. FACED WITH ALL OF THE PRESSURES HE HAD DESCRIBED, HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE GOVT COULD NOT STALL MORE THAN A "VERY FEW MORE DAYS" ON THIS MATTER. HE THEN SAID "I WILL ASK YOU NOW TO EXCUSE ME IF WE SUBMIT OUR REQUEST FOR AMMEETING WITHOUT INFORMING YOU." I TOLD HIM I HOPED HE WOULD NOT TAKE SUCH AN ACTION WITHOUT LETTING ME KNOW BEFOREHAND SINCE IT WAS ALWAYS POSSIBLE THERE MIGHT BE SOME LATE DEVELOPMENT THAT COULD INFLUENCE SUCH A DECISION. HE WOULD NOT COMMIT HIMSELF TO DO SO.

7. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH I SUSPECT THAT GOJ ITSELF HAS GENERATED SOME OF THE PRESSURE IN JERUSALEM WHICH RIFAI CLAIMS IS FORCING

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PAGE 04 AMMAN 03587 262018Z

GOVT'S HAND, THIS DOES NOT CHANGE THE FACT THAT THE PRESSURE IS REAL. WE DOUBT ANY CONCEIVABLE JORDANIAN CABINET WOULD TAKE A DIFFERENT LINE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

8. WE ARE IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH AMBS GOLDBERG AND BARBOUR ABOUT THE SERIOUS DISADVANTAGES TO JARRING'S MISSION. IF THIS QUESTION IS NOW RAISED AS A SEPARATE ISSUE IN NEW YORK. WE WOULD AGREE ALSO THAT JERUSALEM IS PROBABLY THE MOST INTRACTABLE ISSUE IN THE WHOLE ARAB-ISRAELI COMPLEX. NEVERTHELESS, ARGUMENT THAT CONFRONTING THE ISRAELIS WITH PROBLEM NOW MAY CAUSE ISRAELIS TO DIG IN THEIR HEELS WILL SOUND VERY HOLLOW TO

PAGE 6 RUQMKG 3587A ~~SECRET~~

ARABS, WHO ARE ALREADY POINTING OUT TO US THAT THERE WILL BE LITTLE TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT ONCE THE ISRAELIS HAVE CHANGED THE PHYSICAL SHAPE AND CONTENT OF LARGE AREAS OF THE CITY. I DOUBT THAT CONSTRUCTION AND OWNERSHIP ON EXPROPRIATED SITES ONCE ACCOMPLISHED WOULD BE REVERSIBLE IN SOME FINAL STAGE OF JARRING MISSION. I AM AFRAID THAT WHAT THE ISRAELIS ARE NOW DOING IN JERUSALEM IS A MAJOR ASPECT OF THE JERUSALEM ISSUE IN JORDANIAN EYES. TO USE THEM WITH ARABS SUGGESTED IN TEL AVIV 2649 RISKS: (1) COMMITTING US IN THEIR MINDS TO REVERSING TOWARDS END OF NEGOTIATING PROCESS SOME OF THINGS THAT ARE NOW TAKING PLACE, OR (2) MISLEADING THEM AS TO OUR INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES.

9. AS I SEE IT, WE ARE IMMEDIATELY FACED EITHER WITH GETTING ISRAELIS QUIETLY TO SUSPEND EXPROPRIATION AND CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES THAT THEY HAVE UNDERTAKEN OR PERSUADING THEM TO GIVE JARRING AN UNEQUIVOCAL ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD ENABLE JARRING TO MOVE IMMEDIATELY INTO A NEGOTIATING SITUATION. EVEN IN THE LATTER CASE, HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT THE JERUSALEM ISSUE WOULD ARRISE AGAIN TO PLAGUE US UNLESS WE CAN PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS TO PUT EXPROPRIATION AND CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES IN THE ICE BOX.

SYMMES

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ORIGIN/ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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XR Pol Jordan - US
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RM/REP/AF

ARA/EUR/FE

NEA/CU/INR

E/P/IO

L/FBO/AID

AGR/COM/FRB

INT/LAB/TAR

TR/XMB/AIR

ARMY/CIA/NAVY

OSD/USIA/NSA

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NO.

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AIR POUCH
HANDLING INDICATOR

8

TO : Department of State

COPY NO. _____ SERIES B

W/encl

FEB 25 1 43 PM 1968

2

FROM : Anembassy AMMAN

DATE: February 20, 1968

SUBJECT : Letter to Secretary of State from Prime Minister Talhouni

REF : State 106935 *no copy*

There is forwarded in single copy the original of Prime Minister Talhouni's letter dated February 14, replying to the Secretary's letter to him of January 31.

In this letter Talhouni described the widespread belief in the country that U.S. support for Jordan had been lacking since the June war. He expressed his recognition of and appreciation for U.S. good intentions but observed that concrete results remain elusive. Specifically, he expressed hope that an appropriate arms agreement would be soon reached; that our decision to halt budget support would be reviewed; that assurances we had given on Jerusalem and the West Bank would be fruitful; and that we assist GOJ in achieving "some quick positive results on political level."

COMMENT: Despite Prime Minister's expressed reservations on U.S. policy we are convinced that the Secretary's letter had considerable favorable impact on him.

GP
SYMES

att
Enclosure:

Original of Prime Minister Talhouni's letter

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In Out

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by:

RM
POL: RWMurphy/clc

2/20/68

Contents and Classification Approved by:

DCM: ESDuncan

Clearances:

1968 FEB 25 PM 4 47

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJS 98001
By *ag/ll*, NARA, Date *8/14/01*



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24

SECRET 606

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03572 241542Z

45
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

O 241430Z FEB 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4756
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 603
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 58

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3572

EXDIS

SUBJ: JORDAN ARMS

JIDDA AND DHAHRAN FOR INFO AMBASSADOR EILTS

REF: AMMAN 3570

1. KHAMMASH INFORMED US THAT HE DEPARTING FOR JIDDA EVENING FEB 24 AND THAT HE EXPECTS MEET WITH FAISAL IN RIYADH FEB 25. HE HOPES RETURN WITHIN ONE OR TWO DAYS.

2. IN CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR ON FEB 23 KHAMMASH SAID HE HAD BEEN ASKED BY KING TO REQUEST U.S. TO INTERCEDE WITH FAISAL TO HELP JORDAN AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE IN MEETING

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3572A ~~SECRET~~
ITS ARMS NEEDS. IN NOTIFYING US TODAY OF HIS TRAVEL PLANS, KHAMMASH REITERATED THIS REQUEST AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT WE COULD GET SUCH WORD TO FAISAL BEFORE KHAMMASH'S MEETINGS WITH HIM.

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3. KHAMMASH INDICATED THAT JORDAN'S MAIN INTEREST WAS IN OBTAINING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM FAISAL FOR ARMS PURCHASES FROM OTHER WESTERN SOURCES TO MAKE UP FOR PRIORITY ITEMS THE U.S. COULD NOT SUPPLY.
GP-3

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EXDISE

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~~SECRET~~ 609

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03571 270708Z

2
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P 241450Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4755

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3571

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA 3(E))

SUBJ: JORDAN ARMS

REF: AMMAN 3570 AND AMMAN 3546

1. FROM REACTION KING AND DISCUSSION WITH KHAMMASH REPORTED 3546 AND 3570, WE CONCLUDE THAT WE HAVE MADE MUCH PROGRESS TOWARD ESTABLISHING CREDIBILITY OF OUR PROFESSION OF SUPPORT TO HUSSEIN AND JORDAN. WE BELIEVE DISPOSITION AND PREFERENCE IS NOW ESTABLISHED TO WORK THINGS OUT WITH US AND ESCHEW SOVIET ROUTE. RE LATTER POINT, WE SHOULD RECORD, HOWEVER, THAT KHAMMASH TELLS KING IS STILL VERY PREOCCUPIED AND CONCERNED WITH OUR REFUSAL INCREASE ANY ITEMS FROM ORIGINAL OFFER, ESPECIALLY TANKS AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT. THUS WHILE SOVIET CLOUD MAY HAVE SOMEWHAT RECEDED WE CANNOT PREDICT WITH FULL

PAGE 2 RUGMKG 3571A ~~SECRET~~
ASSURANCE THAT KING WILL ACCEPT OUR PROPOSAL AS IT NOW STANDS.

2. OUR BEST JUDGEMENT IS THAT SOME FURTHER ACCOMMODATION AT THIS STAGE WILL TIE UP MATTER. BY OUR COMPLETE REFUSAL OF HUSSEIN'S INITIAL MAJOR COUNTER PROPOSAL WE HAVE WITH PERHAPS SOME TRAUMA-MADE POINT WE WERE NOT GOING TO BE STAMPEDED OR PEN FLOODGATES. NOW, A REASONED ACCOMMODATION ON CERTAIN POINTS SHOULD HELP RELIEVE HUSSEIN'S COMMITMENT OF HIS PRESTIGE AND SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE THE IMPACT OF THE PACKAGE WITH THE

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By 16/12 NARA, Date 01/10/01



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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03571 270708Z

ARMY. A I-AIRCRAFT HAVE AN ESPECIALLY VALUABLE IMPACT ON THE PUBLIC AS WELL.

3. WE ACCORDINGLY RECOMMEND (A) THAT WE AGREE TO INCREASE NUMBER OF TANKS TO AT LEAST 100. WHILE WE CANNOT AT THIS STAGE SAY THIS IS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EVENTUALLY GOING TO SOVIETS OR NOT, WE BELIEVE THIS COULD BE VERY IMPORTANT IN RESOLVING THE ARMS PROBLEMS BEFORE SOMETHING HAPPENS WHICH MIGHT UPSET THE WHOLE SITUATION. IF NOT TOO DIFFICULT FOR US, AGREEMENT TO CONTRACT FOR KHAMMASH'S PROPOSAL OF 124 (PER AMMAN 3570) WOULD HAVE EXCELLENT EFFECT WHICH COULD HAVE USEFUL INFLUENCE ON OTHER

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3571A ~~SECRET~~

ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONS. WE WONDER IF THE DIFFERENCE IN NUMBER IS SUFFICIENT FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW EITHER TO RUN THE RISKS ATTENDANT ON HOLDING BACK OR TO FOREGO THE BENEFITS OF BEING LIBERAL.

(B) THAT WE MEET KHAMMASH'S REVISED REQUEST ON ANTI-AIRCRAFT. WITH REF STATE 120229, WE HAVE ALREADY INTERJECTED IDEA THAT NUMBER OF AA GUNS MIGHT BE SUFFICIENT IF DEPLOYED DIFFERENTLY. KHAMMASH HAS STRESSED IN REPLY THAT THEY MUST ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECIDING DISPOSITION. HE NOTES THEY HAVE MANY EXPOSED AREAS AND THEIR AIR DEFENSE PROBLEM IS PSYCHOLOGICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY. KHAMMASH HAS ALSO POINTED OUT THAT LIMITATIONS OF THEIR AIRFORCE COMPEL THEM TO RELY ALMOST 100 PERCENT ON AA FOR AIR DEFENSE. WE ARE INCLINED TO AGREE THAT THIS IS HIGHLY SENSITIVE QUESTION ON WHICH WE RISK MUCH, BOTH WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT AND THE PUBLIC, BY NOT BEING MORE FORTHCOMING.

(C) THAT WE INDICATE A WILLINGNESS IN PRINCIPLE TO OFFER F-5S LEAVING DETAILS FOR DISCUSSION AFTER HUSSEIN AND KHAMMASH

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 3571A ~~SECRET~~

HAVE STUDIED THE MATTER FURTHER AND PERHAPS REVIEWED PROSPECTS WITH FAISAL. (THIS CONNECTION, PLEASE SEE LAST PARA AMAN 3570) OUR CONTINUED READINESS TO SUPPLY IOR TO CONSIDER A SUPERSONIC ALTERNATIVE WILL MAINTAIN THE VALUABLE TACTICAL

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 03571 270708Z

ADVANTAGE OUR F-104 OFFER HAS GAINED FOR US.
KD) THAT WE AGREE TO WORK OUT SPARE PARTS SCHEDULE TO RELEASE
FUNDS FOR EARLIER DELIVERY ON OTHER ITEMS AS REQUESTED BY
KHAMMASH.

(E) THAT WE CONTINUE EFFORTS ARRANGE AIRLIFT AND ADVANCE
DELIVERY DATES AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. (STATE 120228 WILL BE
VERY HELPFUL IN OUR NEXT DISCUSSION WITH KHAMMASH.)

SYMMES

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~~SECRET~~ 634

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03571 241621Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00,1030 W

P 241450Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4755

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3571

EXDIS

SUBJ: JORDAN ARMS

REF: AMMAN 3570 AND AMMAN 3546

1. FROM REACTION KING AND DISCUSSION WITH KHAMMASH REPORTED 3546 AND 3570, WE CONCLUDE THAT WE HAVE MADE MUCH PROGRESS TOWARD ESTABLISHING CREDIBILITY OF OUR PROFESSION OF SUPPORT TO HUSSEIN AND JORDAN. WE BELIEVE DISPOSITION AND PREFERENCE IS NOW ESTABLISHED TO WORK THINGS OUT WITH US AND ESCHEW SOVIET ROUTE. RE LATTER POINT, WE SHOULD RECORD, HOWEVER, THAT KHAMMASH TELLS KING IS STILL VERY PREOCCUPIED AND CONCERNED WITH OUR REFUSAL INCREASE ANY ITEMS FROM ORIGINAL OFFER, ESPECIALLY TANKS AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT. THUS WHILE SOVIET CLOUD MAY HAVE SOMEWHAT RECEDED WE CANNOT PREDICT WITH FULL

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3571A ~~SECRET~~

ASSURANCE THAT KING WILL ACCEPT OUR PROPOSAL AS IT NOW STANDS.

2. OUR BEST JUDGEMENT IS THAT SOME FURTHER ACCOMMODATION AT THIS STAGE WILL TIE UP MATTER. BY OUR COMPLETE REFUSAL OF HUSSEIN'S INITIAL MAJOR COUNTER PROPOSAL WE HAVE WITH PERHAPS SOME TRAUMA-MADE POINT WE WERE NOT GOING TO BE STAMPEDED OR



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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03571 241621Z

OPEN FLOODGATES. NOW, A REASONED ACCOMMODATION ON CERTAIN POINTS SHOULD HELP RELIEVE HUSSEIN'S COMMITMENT OF HIS PRESTIGE AND SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE THE IMPACT OF THE PACKAGE WITH THE ARMY. ANTI-AIRCRAFT HAVE AN ESPECIALLY VALUABLE IMPACT ON THE PUBLIC AS WELL.

3. WE ACCORDINGLY RECOMMEND (A) THAT WE AGREE TO INCREASE NUMBER OF TANKS TO AT LEAST 100. WHILE WE CANNOT AT THIS STAGE SAY THIS IS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EVENTUALLY GOING TO SOVIETS OR NOT, WE BELIEVE THIS COULD BE VERY IMPORTANT TO RESOLVING THE ARMS PROBLEMS BEFORE SOMETHING HAPPENS WHICH MIGHT UPSET THE WHOLE SITUATION. IF NOT TOO DIFFICULT FOR US, AGREEMENT TO CONTRACT FOR KHAMMASH'S PROPOSAL OF 124 (PER AMMAN 3570) WOULD HAVE EXCELLENT EFFECT WHICH COULD HAVE USEFUL INFLUENCE ON OTHER

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3571A ~~SECRET~~

ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONS. WE WONDER IF THE DIFFERENCE IN NUMBER IS SUFFICIENT FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW EITHER TO RUN THE RISKS ATTENDANT ON HOLDING BACK OR TO FOREGO THE BENEFITS OF BEING LIBERAL.

(B) THAT WE MEET KHAMMASH'S REVISED REQUEST ON ANTI-AIRCRAFT. WITH REF STATE 120229, WE HAVE ALREADY INTERJECTED IDEA THAT NUMBER OF AA GUNS MIGHT BE SUFFICIENT IF DEPLOYED DIFFERENTLY. KHAMMASH HAS STRESSED IN REPLY THAT THEY MUST ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECIDING DISPOSITION. HE NOTES THEY HAVE MANY EXPOSED AREAS AND THEIR AIR DEFENSE PROBLEM IS PSYCHOLOGICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY. KHAMMASH HAS ALSO POINTED OUT THAT LIMITATIONS OF THEIR AIRFORCE COMPEL THEM TO RELY ALMOST 100 PERCENT ON AA FOR AIR DEFENSE. WE ARE INCLINED TO AGREE THAT THIS IS HIGHLY SENSITIVE QUESTION ON WHICH WE RISK MUCH, BOTH WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT AND THE PUBLIC, BY NOT BEING MORE FORTHCOMING.

(C) THAT WE INDICATE A WILLINGNESS IN PRINCIPLE TO OFFER F-5S LEAVING DETAILS FOR DISCUSSION AFTER HUSSEIN AND KHAMMASH

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 03571 241621Z

HAVE STUDIED THE MATTER FURTHER AND PERHPS REVIEWED PROSPECTS WITH FAISAL. (THIS CONNECTION, PLEASE SEE LAST PARA AMMAN 3570) OUR CONTINUED READINESS TO SUPPLY IOR TO CONSIDER A SUPERSONIC ALTERNATIVE WILL MAINTAIN THE VALUABLE TACTICAL ADVANTAGE OUR F-104 OFFER HAS GAINED FOR US.

(D) THAT WE AGREE TO WORK OUT SPARE PARTS SCHEDULE TO RELEASE FUNDS FOR EARLIER DELIVERY ON OTHER ITEMS AS REQUESTED BY KHAMMASH.

(E) THAT WE CONTINUE EFFORTS ARRANGE AIRLIFT AND ADVANCE DELIVERY DATES AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. (STATE 121328 WILL BE VERY HELPFUL IN OUR NEXT DISCUSSION WITH KHAMMASH.)

SYMMES

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~~SECRET~~ 624

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03570 241557Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

O 241410Z FEB 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4754
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 602
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 57

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3570

EXDIS

JIDDA AND DHAHRAN FOR INFO AMBASSADOR EILTS

SUBJ: JORDAN ARMS

REF : AMMAN 3546

1. GEN KHAMMAH REQUESTED A MEETING WITH ME AND EMBOFF FEB 23 AS AN INITIAL FOLLOW-UP TO MY PRESENTATION ON TWENTYSECOND. KHAMMASH MADE COUNTERPROPOSALS ON TANKS, ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND SPARE PARTS AND STRESSED KING'S DISAPPOINTMENT IN OUR RESPONSE TO HIS REQUEST FOR INCREASES. HE CONFIRMED PROBABLE UNACCEPTABILITY OF F-104S. INDICATIONS ARE THAT WE MAY BE OVER HUMP IF WE CAN SATISFY THEM IN LIMITED INCREASES IN TANKS AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY AND CAN ALSO FIND WAY TO HELP THEM GET ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM FAISAL FOR TANKS AND AIRCRAFT. IT WILL PROBABLY ALSO BE NECESSARY TO AIRSHIP AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE INITIALLY AND TO MAKE IMPROVEMENT ON SOME DELIVERY DATES.

2. IN MEETING ON TWENTYTHIRD WITH ME AND EMBOFF KHAMMASH SAID HE HAD SPENT SEVERAL HOURS WITH KING AFTER OUR MEETING ON TWENTY SECOND AND THAT HE HAD SPENT ENTIRE MORNING OF TWENTYTHIRD DISCUSSING

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03570 241557Z

AIRCRAFT PROBLEM WITH JORDAN AIR FORCE OFFICER. KHAMMASH DESCRIBED IN DETAIL KING'S DEEP DISAPPOINTMENT IN OUR FAILURE TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO ANY

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3570A ~~SECRET~~

OF HIS REQUESTS FOR INCREASED QUANTITIES OF EQUIPMENT. HE SAID KING WAS "HURT" PERSONALLY AND THAT OUR RESPONSE WAS PARTICULARLY EMBARRASSING TO KING BECAUSE HE HAD ENGAGED HIS OWN PRESTIGE IN ASKING FOR INCREASES. KING HAD LAST WEEK GIVEN HIS ARMY COMMANDERS A GENERAL RUNDOWN OF OUR ARMS OFFER AND HAD TOLD THEM HE WAS PERSONALLY NEGOTIATING AN INCREASE IN SOME OF THE ITEMS. OUR REFUSAL, SAID KHAMMASH, TO BUDGE AT ALL WAS GALLING PERSONALLY TO THE KING AND WILL MAR HIS AND US IMAGE WITH ARMY.

AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND KHAMMASH MADE FOLLOWING LIMITED COUNTERPROPOSALS:

A. TANKS: JORDAN LOST 124 M-48S IN JUNE WAR AND MUST AT LEAST MAKE UP THEIR LOSSES. 124 IS SUBSTANTIALLY LESS THAN THEIR NEEDS OF 200, LESS THAN THEIR TOTAL WAR LOSSES OF 152 TANKS US TANKS, AND EQUALS THEIR LOSS OF 124 M-48S. I SAID I COULD NOT ENCOURAGE HIM TO THINK WE WOULD BE WILLING TO PROVIDE EVEN TWO MORE TANKS BUT THAT I WOULD REPORT THIS REQUEST.

B. ANTI-AIRCRAFT: KHAMMASH MADE IMPASSIONED PLEA WE INCREASE THE NUMBER OF 40 MM BATTERIES FROM 4 TO 44 AND INCREASE THE NUMBER OF 50 CALIBRE QUAD MOUNTS TO 100. HE SAID THAT SINCE JUNE JORDAN HAD HAD A DEMONSTRABLY DEFICIENT AIR DEFENSE WITH NO AIR FORCE AND AN INSUFFICIENT NUMBER OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS TO DEFEND ALL ON THE TARGETS

IT MUST DEFEND. HE REMINDED ME OF THE HEAVY AIR ATTACKS IN THE VALLEY AND IN IRBID AREA. INSUFFICIENT WEAPONS TO DEFEND ALL OF THE TARGETS THAT MUST BE DEFENDED--PARTICULARLY IN THE ABSENCE OF AN AIR FORCE--HAD CREATED A MAJOR

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3570A ~~SECRET~~

MORALE PROBLEM AMONG TROOPS AND THIS WAS SPREADING TO THE POPULATION GENERALLY (WE HAVE BEEN HAVING PRACTISE AIR ALERTS DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS.) KHAMMASH REACTED SHARPLY TO REMARKS

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 03570 241557Z

I HAD MADE TO KING WITH REGARD TO JAA EMPLOYMENT OF ITS ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY. HE SAID PRESENT SITUATION GOES BEYOND "MILITARY DOCTRINE" AND WHAT AMERICANS MIGHT THINK ABOUT MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. KING HAS MAJOR POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURES ON HIM TO SHOW THAT HE IS DEFENDING A NUMBER OF TARGET AREAS. IT IS POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL USE OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT THAT IS INVOLVED, NOT JUST MILITARY DOCTRINE. KHAMMASH ARGUED THAT SMALL NUMBERS OF "DEFENSIVE" TYPE WEAPONS INVOLVED ARE WELL WITHIN U.S. ABILITY TO PROVIDE WHATEVER OUR PRIORITIES MIGHT BE. IF HE WERE FORCED TO GO BACK TO THE ARMY TO TELL THEM WE WERE UNWILLING TO SUPPLY THIS ANTI-AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT, ARMY WOULD BE CONVINCED THAT FOR POLITICAL REASONS USG DOES NOT WANT JORDAN TO HAVE A CAPABILITY TO DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST ISRAELI AIR ATTACKS, --- A RUMOR WHICH HE SAYS IS ALREADY GAINING SOME CREDENCY. NEITHER HE NOR KING WOULD BE ABLE TO UNDERSTAND OUR CONTINUED REFUSAL ON ANTI-AIRCRAFT.

C. SEVEN MILLION DOLLAR SPARE PARTS PACKAGE; KHAMMASH SAID HE MIGHT NOT NEED SO LARGE A QUANTITY OF SPARE PARTS IMMEDIATELY, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE SUPPLY NOW WOULD DIVERT FY 68 FUNDS FROM

PAGE 4 RUGMKG 3570A ~~SECRET~~
ITEMS OF MUCH HIGHER PRIORITY TO THE ARMY, INCLUDING TANKS AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT. HE SAID HE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN A SELECTIVE PACKAGE OF SPARE PARTS IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF ABOUT TWO MILLION IN FY 68 WITH THE BALANCE OF THE SEVEN MILLION ALLOCATED TO PRIORITY ITEMS SUCH AS ANTI-AIRCRAFT.

D. AIRCRAFT: KHAMMASH SAID AFTER CAREFUL STUDY F-104S ARE PROBABLY OUT OF THE QUESTION. ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT HAVE KING'S FINAL DECISION IN RESPONSE TO MY PRESENTATION ON TWENTYSECOND, HE WAS ALMOST CERTAIN KING WOULD SUPPORT RECONFIRMATION OF AIR FORCE ATTITUDE NOT TAKE F-104. KHAMMASH NOTED THAT AS SOON AS JORDAN HAD SUPERSONICS OPERATIONAL IN THE COUNTRY, IT WOULD BE EXPECTED TO PREVENT FURTHER ISRAELI INTRUSIONS AND AIR STRIKES. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER THIS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE. THE F-104 WAS NOT MANEUVERABLE ENOUGH AT LOW ALTITUDES. THEY WOULD HAVE NOT HAD FPKVICIENT

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PILOTS IN NEAR FUTURE TO MAKE ADEQUATE USE OF EARLY DELIVERIES OF F-104S NOR WOULD THEY HAVE ADEQUATE WARNING EQUIPMENT AND OTHER GROUND ENVIRONMENT. H-5 AIRFIELD IS STILL INCOMPLETE AND JORDAN COULD NOT AFFORD HAVE ISRAELIS BOMB F-104S OR ANY OTHER AIRCRAFT ON GROUND AT MAFRAK. KHAMMASH CONCLUDED THAT JORDAN'S OVERALL PSYCHOLOGICAL AS WELL AS EVENTUAL MILITARY NEEDS WOULD BE BEST SATISFIED BY MAKING FIRM ARRANGEMENTS FOR AN AIRCRAFT THE AIR FORCE COMMANDERS THOUGHT MET THEIR NEEDS. IN LIGHT OF ALL CONSIDERATIONS, THE FACT THAT DELIVERIES MIGHT BE EIGHTEEN OR MORE MONTHS AWAY POSED NO REAL PROBLEMS TO JORDAN. HE SUGGESTED THAT AN OFFER

PAGE 5 RUQMGK 3570A ~~SECRET~~
OF F-5S MIGHT DO THE JOB. ALTERNATIVELY HE INTENDED TO SEEK SAUDI HELP FOR MIRAGES (WHICH WERE PREFERABLE TO JORDAN) OR LIGHTNINGS. IN THIS PART OF DISCUSSION I MADE CLEAR TO KHAMMASH THAT MUCH OF HIS \$10 MILLION F-104 DOWNPAYMENT HAS BEEN SPENT AND THAT ECONOMICALLY SPEAKING WE THOUGHT F-104 STILL BEST BET. KHAMMASH MADE A SPECIAL PLEA FOR US TO BE AS LENIENT AS POSSIBLE ON THE \$10 MILLION.

E. APPROACH TO SAUDI ARABIA: KHAMMASH SAID HE PLANS MOMENTARILY TO GO TO SAUDI ARABIA TO ASK FOR HELP ON TANKS, ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND AIRCRAFT. ON TANKS HE WOULD SEEK SAUDI HELP TO MAKE UP JORDAN'S COMPLETE 200 TANK NEEDS (PRESUMABLY BY FILLING OUT WITH CENTURIONS). HE WAS NOT CLEAR AS TO HOW HE INTENDS TO APPROACH SAUDIS TACTICALLY: E.G., WHETHER HE WOULD PREFER FOR US TO GIVE EARLY INDICATION OF OUR FIRM POSITION TO AMBASSADOR EILTS TO MAKE KNOWN TO FAISAL (WHICH HE COULD THEN USE TO INFLUENCE FAISAL) OR WHETHER HE WANTED TO HAVE USE SEEK INCREASES REQUESTED ABOVE FROM WASHINGTON BEFORE HE GOES TO FAISAL. IT WAS ALSO NOT CLEAR TO US WHETHER KING HAS YET ENDORSED KHAMMASH'S NEW GROUND FORCE FIGURES AS BEING ENOUGH. (KING HAS BEEN MUCH MORE HARDNOSED ALL ALONG THAN HAS KHAMMASH).

F. NEXT STEPS: I PRESSED KHAMMASH TO GET KING'S AGREEMENT FOR HIM ACCEPT MEMO UNDERSTANDING IN PRINCIPLE AND THEN TO SIT DOWN WITH ME AND COL. THOMPSON TO DISCUSS ACTUAL DELIVERY AND POSSIBLE

~~SECRET~~



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PAGE 05 AMMAN 03570 241557Z

SPARE PARTS SUBSTITUTION DETAILS. HE DID NOT ABSOLUTELY REJECT THIS

PAGE 6 RUQMKG 3570A ~~SECRET~~
POSSIBILIITY. (I BELIEVE WE HAVE A CHANCE OF MOVING AHEAD
IN THIS WAY IF WE CAN MAKE SOME INCREASES WHICH I WILL RECOMMEND
IN SEPTEL). ON EDITORIAL CHANGES IN MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING
I THINK KHAMMASH IS CONVINCED THAT CHANGES KING WANTED MADE
IN PARA. 5 COULD BE PLACED IN A SEPARATE ANNEX.

3. KHAMMASH ADVISED US AFTER FOREGOING WAS WRITTEN THAT
HUSSEIN HAS CONCURRED IN HIS, KHAMMAH'S PROPOSALS AND ASKED
THAT THESE BE REPORTED TO WASHINGTON URGENTLY. WITH RESPECT
TO AIRCRAFT, HOWEVER, KHAMMASH SAID THEY WISHED TO STUDY THE
MATTER FURTHER BEFORE COMING TO ANY DECISION AND THEY WOULD
ADVISE US ON THIS LATER.

GP-3

SYMMES

~~SECRET~~



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7

SECRET 654

PAGE 1 AMMAN 03552 231150Z

3
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

2

R 231035Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0000
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1310
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0723

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3552

EXDIS

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

REF: CAIRO 1686

DEP PASS CAIRO

1. IN COURSE MY MEETING WITH KING FEB 22 ON OTHER SUBJECT I REFERRED TO ROCKEFELLER'S ACCOUNT HIS CONVERSATION WITH NASSER ON JARRING MISSION AND ZAYAT'S LATEST STATEMENT TO PRESS. I ALSO MENTIONED WE HAD REPORTS UAR SEEMED TO HAVE SOME SECOND THOUGHTS ON NEXT STEP. I SAID WE BELIEVED ISRAELIS HAD NOW GIVEN JARRING WHAT COULD BE CONSIDERED ACCEPTANCE OF SC RESOLUTION, HOWEVER MUCH THEIR FORMULATION MIGHT REFLECT THEIR FEAR OF BEING MOUSTRAPPED BY UAR.

2. HUSSEIN SAID JORDAN HAS HEARD NOTHING FROM UAR RE LATEST

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3552A ~~SECRET~~
JARRING VISIT. HE COMMENTED THAT EGYPTIANS MAY FEEL THEY MIGHT HAVE GONE TOO FAR WITH JARRING IN BEING FORTHCOMIN WITH

SECRET

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ISRAEL IS. HOWEVER, HE STATED ALSO SOUNDED AS IF EGYPTIANS WERE "PUTTING UP A PRETENSE" AND WE SHOULD NOT BE OVERLY CONCERNED AT WHAT MIGHT APPEAR TO BE OBSTRUCTIONISM.

3. HE ASKED ME IF HE SHOULD INQUIRE DIRECTLY OF UAR ABOUT POSITION IT HAD TAKEN RE "NEXT STAGE" IN RECENT DISCUSSIONS. I SAID I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL BUT RECOMMENDED THAT HE WAIT UNTIL GOJ HAD RECEIVED ITS OWN MINUTES OF THIS MEETING FROM CAIRO. KING ASSENTED. SYMMES
GP-3

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.

STICK

5 5 2 2 5 1 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 5

ADMISSION ROOM
10, 25, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100

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SECRET



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SECRET

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02

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03547 221700Z

41
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P 221630Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4735

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3547

EXDIS

SUBJ: BEIRUT NEWSPAPER STORY-PHANTOM JETS FOR
ISRAEL LINKED TO JORDAN ARMS

REF: BEIRUT 6853

1. WHEN I SAW KING AND GENERAL KHAMMASH THIS AFTERNOON, KHAMMASH SHOWED ME AL HAYAT ARTICLE (REFTEL) WHICH ATTRIBUTES TO "INFORMED SOURCES" UNDER NEW YORK DATELINE THAT US WILL ANNOUNCE PHANTOM AIRCRAFT SALES TO ISRAEL IN MARCH AND IS EXPECTED JUSTIFY THE SALE BY ITS DECISION RESUME ARMS SHIPMENTS TO JORDAN. ARTICLE ALSO SAYS ANNOUNCEMENT RE PHANTOMS EXPECTED DURING DAYAN'S UPCOMING VISIT. I TOLD KHAMMASH I HAD NO INFORMATION THAT WOULD CONFIRM THIS REPORT AND THAT I THOUGHT IT WAS MERELY A MISCHIEF MAKING ARTICLE.

PAGE 2 RUGMKG 3547A ~~SECRET~~

2. THIS KIND OF STORY OBVIOUSLY UNDERMINES VALUE FROM OUR ANNOUNCEMENT OF LIFTING ARMS BAN ON JORDAN AND I HOPE WE CAN MAKE SOME KIND OF A DENIAL STATEMENT BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY. I SHALL APPRECIATE

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GUIDANCE ON WHAT FURTHER I CAN SAY TO KING AND KHAMMASH
 RE THIS ARTICLE. I HOPE ALSO THAT WHATEVER INTENTIONS
 WE MAY HAVE OF ULTIMATELY SUPPLYING FURTHER AIRCRAFT
 TO ISRAEL THAT WE CAN HOLD OFF FINALIZING AN AGREEMENT
 IN THE COMING MONTHS. BECAUSE OF THE INEVITABLE
 FLARE UP OF ARAB PUBLIC OPINION, THE PROSPECTS
 FOR PROMOTING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION WOULD BE SEVERLY
 DAMAGED. THE ARGUMENTATION I USED THIS AFTERNOON ABOUT
 RESTRAINTS IN OUR SUPPLYING ARMS IN AREA (STATE 118025)
 WILL SOUND AWFULLY HOLLOW TO JORDAN IF WE NOW MOVE TO
 PHANTOMS FOR ISRAEL.
 GP=3

SYMMES

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~~SECRET~~



Department of State

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15

SECRET 129

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03546 221630Z

44
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, /030 W

P 221535Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4734

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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3546

EXDIS

SUBJ: ARMS FOR JORDAN

REF: STATE 119271 AND 118025

1. KING RECEIVED ME THIS AFTERNOON WITH KHAMMASH PRESENT. I MADE PITCH BASED ON REFTELS. THEY HEARD ME OUT AND MADE NO SIGNIFICANT SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS EXCEPT TO SAY THEY BADLY NEED ADDITIONAL ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY WE CANNOT MAKE IT AVAILABLE.

2. KING SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO THINK OVER HIS ANSWER AND THAT HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH ME.

GP=3

SYMMES

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SECRET 052

02

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03545 221325Z

41
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 W

O 221305Z FEB 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO AMCONSUL DHAHRAN IMMEDIATE 56
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 601
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4733

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3545

EXDIS

REF: DHAHRAN 613

SUBJ: JORDAN ARMS

JIDDA AND DHAHRAN FOR AMBASSADOR EILTS

1. WE AGREE IT IMPORTANT FAISAL APPRECIATE THAT WE ARE DOING OUR BEST TO MEET JORDAN'S QTE LEGITIMATE DEFENSE REQUIRMENTS END QTE. SUGGEST THEREFORE THAT AMBASSADOR

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3545A ~~SECRET~~

EILTS INFORM FAISAL AND/OR OTHER APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL SUCH AS PHARAON THAT SYMMES IS TODAY (FEB 22) SCHEDULED REVIEW ENTIRE PACKAGE WITH HUSSEIN. SUGGEST AMB EILTS ADD THAT OUR PROPOSAL TRANSMITTED TO GENERAL KHAMMAHS AFTER APPROVAL AT HIGHEST LEVELS USG REPRESENTED OUR READINESS SUPPLY ALL JORDAN'S JUNE LOSSES WITH CERTAIN LIMITED, PARTIAL EXCEPTIONS. WE ALSO AGREED SUPPLY F-104 SUPERSONICS UNDER ORIGINAL CONTRACT AND CERTAIN

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ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES UNDER BOTH GRANT AND SALES AGREEMENTS. IN CASE OF EXCEPTIONS IN JUNE LOSSES, WE HAVE EXPLORED AND VERIFIED THAT ALTERNATIVE EQUIPMENT CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FROM OTHER WESTERN SOURCES TO ROUND OUT OUR PROPOSALS. (THIS RELATES ESPECIALLY TO TANKS IF HUSSEIN FEELS HE MUST HAVE MORE THAN WE ARE NOW RPT NOW ABLE SUPPLY. JORDANIANS ARE ALSO DEBATING THE TYPE OF AIRCRAFT THEY FEEL THEY SHOULD HAVE. IN THIS CASE PARTICULARLY JORDAN WOULD HAVE TO LOOK TO PROBLEMS OF FINANCING. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND

PAGE 3 RUQMG 3545 ~~SECRET~~

WE BELIEVE AMB EILTS MIGHT SUGGEST DISCREETLY TO FAISAL THAT OUR PROPOSAL ALSO MAY POSE SOME PROBLEMS FOR JORDAN FINANCIALLY, ESPECIALLY SINCE OUR CAPABILITY PROVIDE CREDIT HAS BEEN SEVERELY CURTAILED BY LEGISLATION.

2. OUR CONCERN IN TACTICS HAS BEEN TO KEEP OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE JORDANIANS WILL BE ABLE TO APPROACH FAISAL FOR THE FUNDS IF THEY DECIDE THEY MUST GO THE ROUTE OF LIGHTNINGS OR MIRAGES OR THAT THEY MUST TRY TO BUY A LARGER NUMBER OF TANKS FROM THE BRITISH. ALSO WE HAVE WISHED TO PRESERVE THE JORDANIAN'S OPTION OF PURSUING WITH FAISAL THE QUESTION OF FUNDS FOR THE PROPOSAL GENERALLY.

GP-3

SYMMES

~~SECRET~~



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SECRET 986

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03544 221154Z

3

ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

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P R 221105Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4732
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1306
US MISSION UN NY 719

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3544

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EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 3518, 3533

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION-JERUSALEM

DEPT PASS CAIRO

1. I TOOK DAVID ROCKEFELLER TO CALL AFTERNOON FEB 21 ON HUSSEIN AND PRIMIN TALHOUNI. ROCKEFELLER MENTIONED TO BOTH THAT WHEN HE HAD EARLIER THAT DAY IN CAIRO ASKED NASSER ABOUT PROGRESS OF JARRING MISSION, NASSER HAD ANSWERED IN VERY PESSIMISTIC TERMS. NASSER COMMENTED THAT JUDGING FROM WHAT JARRING HAD TOLD RIAD FEB 20, ISRAELIS HAD BEEN TALKING SOMEWHAT DIFFERENTLY BUT UAR SAW NO REAL INDICATION OF PROGRESS. NASSER, ACCORDING

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3544A ~~SECRET~~
ROCKEFELLER, STRONGLY IMPLIED UAR CONSIDERING WHAT ELSE IT MAY HAVE TO DO OUTSIDE OF JARRING MISSION. NASSER SAID THAT AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED REFUGEE

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PROBLEM WAS MAJOR ISSUE BETWEEN ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL AND LINKED SOLUTION OF REFUGEE PROBLEM WITH OPENING OF SUEZ TO ISRAELI SHIPPING. IN THIS CONNECTION, HUSSEIN COMMENTED THAT WHEN NASSER SPOKE OF "SOLUTION" HE MIGHT IN FACT BE SATISFIED AND COULD OPEN CANAL IF THERE WERE ONLY AN "OUTLINE" OF A SOLUTION TO REFUGEE PROBLEM.

2. DURING MEETINGS WITH TALHOUNI AND KING AND SUBSEQUENTLY WITH ABDUL MUN'IM RIFAI, ISAIID THAT WHILE WE AS YET HAD HEARD NOTHING DIRECT FROM BERGUS CONCERNING THE MOST RECENT JARRING TALKS IN CAIRO (STATE 118615 REPEATING CAIRO 1686 NOT RECEIVED UNTIL THIS MORNING), OUR IMPRESSION WAS THAT RECENTLY THERE HAD BEEN DISTINCT IMPROVEMENT IN THE ISRAELI POSITION. ALL THREE RESPONDED THAT THEIR IMPRESSION WAS JUST TO THE CONTRAY, THEY SAID THAT WHILE JORDAN AS WELL HAS HAD NO DIRECT REPORT FROM

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3544A ~~SECRET~~
CAIRO ITS GENERAL IMPRESSION WAS ISRAELIS CONTINUING TO PLAY WITH WORDS.

3. WITH ONLY SLIGHT VARIANCE IN FORMULATION KING, TALHOUNI AND RIFAI COMMENTED TO ROCKEFELLER "MEANWHILE JORDAN IS STILL LOSING OUT ON JERUSALEM." THEY DESCRIBED JERUSALEM PROBLEM AS JORDAN'S MAJOR PRESENT DIFFICULTY AND TOLD ROCKEFELLER THEY WERE WAITING TO HEAR WHAT USG IS PREPARED TO DO ABOUT JERUSALEM AND ADDED THAT IF OUR INTENDED ACTIONS SEEM INSUFFICIENT, JORDAN WILL HAVE TO TAKE ITS CASE TO SC.

4. TALOUNI AND RIFAI POINTEDLY COMMENTED THEY WAITING FOR MY SPECIFIC ANSWER ON THIS QUESTION AND REAFFIRMED THAT GOJ WAS UNDER GREAT PRESSURE. (AMMAN 3498, PARA 8) THEY SAID THEY FULLY RECOGNIZED THE DANGER THAT THEIR GOING TO SC OVER JERUSALEM COULD DAMAGE JARRING MISSION BUT THEY MUST EITHER HAVE INDICATION THAT "ISRAELIS ARE GOING TO CEASE THEIR ACTIVITIES IN JERUSALEM" OR BE ABLE TO

~~SECRET~~



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POINT TO SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS UNDER JARRING MISSION.

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 3544A ~~SECRET~~

FAILING EITHER DEVELOPMENT JORDAN MUST SOON TAKE
CASE TO THE COUNCIL.

5. WE ARE REPORTING SEPARATELY DETAILS OF FEB 21
MEETING IN AMMAN OF "PREPARATORY COMMITTEE TO SAVE
JERUSALEM" WHICH WAS ATTENDED BY SEVERAL GOJ CABINET
MINISTALS AS WELL AS CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM
HIERARCHY.

GP-4

SYMMES

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.

~~SECRET~~



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02

~~SECRET~~ 378

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03539 211640Z

42
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

0 211519Z FEB 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4730

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3539

EXDIS

JOINT DATT/EMBASSY

PLEASE PASS DOD AND CINCSTRIKE

SUBJ: JORDAN ARMS - AIRLIFT CERTAIN ITEMS

1. AS INDICATED AMMAN 3527, OUR UNDERTAKING TO AIRLIFT SOME ITEMS OF THE JORDAN ARMS PACKAGE WOULD ADD NEEDED FLEXIBILITY IN THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE KING AND KHAMMASH. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPRESSION ON ARMY AND PEOPLE TO BE GAINED FROM SUCH SHIPMENT WOULD HELP GAIN KING'S APPROVAL WHOLE PACKAGE.

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3539A ~~SECRET~~

2. WE WOULD HOPE AS A MINIMUM THAT FOLLOWING CATEGORIES MIGHT BE AIR SHIPPED IN REMAINING MONTHS OF FY 68:

PLANE LOADS	QUANTITY	ITEMS
2	25 EACH	106MM RR W/TRUCK
4	4 EACH	40MM M42

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By ins, NARA, Date 1-12-04

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03539 211640Z

- 5 9 EACH QUAD 50 CAL MG
- 9 EACH TRUCK 2 1/2 TON
- 1 CAL .30 AND CAL .50 MG'S
- 2 AMMUNITION (ARTILLERY, TANK, 106MM, 40MM, SMALL ARMS)
- 1 TARGET DRONE SYSTEM
- 2 SPARE PARTS (TANKS, VEHICLE, WEAPONS AND COMM)

3. THE JORDANIANS HAVE EMPHASIZED AN IMMEDIATE NEED FOR BOLSTERING THEIR DEFENSES AGAINST AIR ATTACK WHICH DEFENSE, AS FEB 15 DEMONSTRATED, IS WOEFULLY WEAK. AIRLIFT OF THE TARGET DRONE SYSTEM, WHICH IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FROM A TRAINING STANDPOINT, WOULD TEND BE RESPONSIVE TO THIS NEED. THE JAA SUFFERS FROM INADEQUATE EMPLOYMENT OF AAA MOSTLY DUE TO LACK OF SUCH TRAINING DEVICE

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3539A ~~SECRET~~
WHICH WAS IN 1966 MAP PROGRAM. WOULD SUGGEST A MOBILE TRAINING TEAM BE SENT IN WITH THE DRONE EQUIPMENT TO INSURE AN EFFECTIVE TRAINING PROGRAM IS INITIATED SOONEST AND TO SATISFY DOD CONCERN FOR PROPER ASSIMILATION AND USE OF EQUIPMENT.

SYMMES

NOTE: NOT PASSED DOD AND CINCSTRIKE BY OCT.

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

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19 50

~~SECRET~~ 438

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 03533 211732Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 W

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O R 211425Z FEB 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4724
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1304
USMISSION UN 718

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3533

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 3498, STATE 118639

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION-JERUSALEM

DEPT PASS CAIRO

1. WHEN I SEE KING THIS AFTERNOON TO PRESENT DAVID ROCKEFELLER I WILL EMPHASIZE OUR BELIEF THAT SINCE REAL PROGRESS IS BEING MADE BY JARRING WE STRONGLY RECOMMENDING GOJ AVOID MOVING AT PRESENT TO SECURITY COUNCIL ON ANY ISSUE.

2. RE FORMULA CONVEYED BY EBAN TO JARRING (TEL AIV

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3533A ~~SECRET~~

2589) WHICH BY NOW WILL HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO UAR, IT WOULD BE MOST USEFUL IF I COULD COMMUNICATE ESSENCE OF THIS TO PRIMIN AND ABDUL MUN'IM RIFAI. I UNDERSTAND JARRING WILL NOT BE IN AMMAN ANYTIME SOON AND MY CONCERN IS THAT NO COMMUNICATIONS GAP BE ALLOWED TO DEVELOP

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By ryll, NARA, Date 01/14/01

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03533 211732Z

BETWEEN CAIRO, AMMAN AND GOJ. I WOULD OF COURSE FIRST PROBE WITH TALHOUNI AND RIFAI TO DETERMINE WHAT IF ANY DIRECT WORD THEY HAVE HAD FROM UAR ON LATEST JARRING-RIAD MEETINGS.

3. WOULD REMIND DEPT, HOWEVER, THAT STATE REFTEL DOES NOT ADDRESS GOJ'S CONCERNS ON JERUSALEM OUTLINED AMMAN 3498 (ESPECIALLY PARA 8). I DOUBT EITHER TALHOUNI OR RIFAI WILL OVERLOOK JERUSALEM WAS PRINCIPAL POINT OF THEIR DEMARCHE TO ME. I AM CONVINCED THEY RECOGNIZE THAT GOING TO COUNCIL AT THIS STAGE ON JERUSALEM RISKS POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO JARRING MISSION AND FOR THAT VERY REASON THEY HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT TO TAKE THIS STEP. THEIR PROBLEM IS TO FIND WAY TO TAKE PRESSURE OFF GOJ ON JERUSALEM ISSUE AND THEY ARE LOOKING TO US FOR HELP. IS THERE ANYTHING I MAY TELL THEM IN REGARD JERUSALEM?

GP-3

SYMMES

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.

~~SECRET~~



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29

~~SECRET~~ 182

02

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43

ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

0 211125Z FEB 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4720

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3527

EXDIS

SUBJ: ARMS FOR JORDAN

REF: STATE 117988, 118025

DELIVER OPENING OF BUSINESS FEB 21

1. STATE 118025 WAS RECEIVED IN AMMAN SEVERAL HOURS AFTER 117988 AND AFTER TRANSMISSION OUR 3522. I AM ASKING FOR MEETING WITH KING AND KHAMMASH FOR THURSDAY, FEB 22 FOR PRESENTATION OUR RESPONSE THEIR QUESTIONS AND REQUESTS AS CONTAINED AMMAN TEL 3417, 3418 AND 3419.

2. I APPRECIATE HAVING IN HAND ARGUMENTATION IN STATE 118025 FURNISHED FOR USE WITH KING AND WILL OF COURSE EXPLOIT IT FULLY. I AM WELL AWARE OF PROBLEMS PACKAGE AS IT STANDS HAS POSED AND WILL POSE FOR US, AND I AM MOST RELUCTANT RAISE FURTHER QUESTIONS. NEVERTHELESS, LOOKING AT MATTER FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE KING AND KAMASH, I AM AFRAID IT WILL APPEAR WE HAVE NO FLEXIBILITY IN OUR POSITION. I THINK FROM THE TACTICAL STANDPOINT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR ME TO BE ABLE TO HOLD OUT SOME HOPE OF AT LEAST MINOR SHIFTS IN OUR POSITION ON QUANTITIES OR DELIVERY TIME. OTHERWISE, I FEAR THE JORDANIANS WILL FEEL THEY ARE NOT NEGOTIATING

~~SECRET~~

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By ag/ell, NARA, Date 01/10/01



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BUT RATHER BEING FACED WITH TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT SITUATION.

3. I AM SURE DEPT HAS NOT OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THERE WERE NO NEGOTIATIONS AS SUCH WITH KHAMMASH IN WASHINGTON. KHAMMASH HAS TOLD ME THAT ON HIS LAST DAY THERE SATURDAY FEB 10 SECRETARY MCNAMARA PRESENTED HIM OUR PROPOSAL AT

PAGE 3 RUQMG 3527A ~~SECRET~~

1230 AND KHAMMASH FLEW OUT OF WASHINGTON AT 1700. KHAMMASH STATED THAT PRIOR TO THAT MEETING HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE SECRETARY'S LIST WOULD CONTAIN. HE EMPHASIZED THAT WHEN SECRETARY MCNAMARA HANDED HIM OUR PROPOSAL HE EXPLICITLY TOLD HIM NOT TO COMMENT BUT TO GO BACK AND DISCUSS OUR PROPOSAL WITH THE KING. SINCE THERE WAS APPARENTLY LITTLE GIVE AND TAKE IN WASHINGTON, FLEXIBILITY ON OUR PART HERE SEEMS PSYCHOLOGICALLY ESSENTIAL IF WE ARE NOT TO PREJUDICE THE NEGOTIATION. IN EFFECT, "NEGOTIATION" DID NOT BEGIN UNTIL KING CALLED ME UP ON THIRTEENTH.

4. SPECIFICALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW TODAY WHETHER WE CAN BE AT ALL ACCOMMODATING ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES IN REGARD TO TANKS AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT:

A. TANKS-- IS IT ABSOLUTELY IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY THAT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO SUPPLY A FEW ADDITIONAL TANKS? I WOULD RECOMMEND AGREEING TO OFFER TWELVE MORE. AN ADDITIONAL TWELVE M-48A1'S WILL BRING OUR PROPOSAL UP TO A ROUND FIGURE OF ONE HUNDRED TANKS WHICH IS 50 PER CENT OF THE QUANTITY REQUESTED BY THE JORDANIANS.

PAGE 4 RUQMG 3527A ~~SECRET~~

B. MAY I SAY THAT IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO GET SOME OF THESE TANKS TO JORDAN PRIOR TO JULY 1, 1968?

C. ANTI-AIRCRAFT-- COULD WE FACTOR IN SOME ADDITIONAL ANTI-AIRCRAFT OF THE 40MM AAA TYPE? IF NECESSARY, SUGGEST WE SUBSTITUTE

~~SECRET~~



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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 AMMAN 03527 211246Z

ADDITIONAL ANTI-AIRCRAFT FOR SOME OTHER EQUIPMENT IN PACKAGE.

5. WOULD NOTE THAT KHAMMASH WAS ALSO LEFT WITH IMPRESSION THAT THE SECRETARY AND OTHER DOD OFFICIALS DID NOT RULE OUT POSSIBILITY OF AIRLIFTING IN SOME OF THE PACKAGE. I CANNOT STRESS TOO MUCH IMPORTANCE OF THIS AS A WAY OF BRACING ARMY MORALE AT THIS JUNCTURE. MAY I INDICATE TO KING AND KHAMMASH TOMORROW THAT WE WILL TRY TO AIRLIFT TO JORDAN AT LEAST SOME OF THE SPARE PARTS, AMMUNITION AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT FROM THE UNDELIVERED MAP FY 1966-67?

6. IN ORDER TO REACH ME PRIOR TO MY MEETING WITH KING, ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS SHOULD BE SENT BY CLOSE OF BUSINESS WASHINGTON FEB 21.

GP-3. SYMMES

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 03522 201802Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

0 201740Z FEB 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4717

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3522

EXDIS

SUBJ: JORDAN ARMS

REF: STATE 117988

1. REFTEL REFERS ONLY TO AMMAN 3418 AND DOES NOT ADDRESS ITSELF TO OUR 3417 (AIRCRAFT) OR OUR 3419 (WHICH SUGGESTED TACTICS FOR HANDLING KING'S REQUEST FOR INCREASED QUANTITIES AND EARLIER DELIVERY DATES). I NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT PARA 2 OF REFTEL STATES WE ARE UNWILLING TO CHANGE THE QUANTITIES OF EQUIPMENT IN PARA IV-C.

2. I ASSUME DEPT INTENDS PROVIDE DETAILED GUIDANCE

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3522A ~~SECRET~~

BEFORE I GO BACK TO KING. SPECIFICALLY I WILL NEED SOMETHING ON AIRCRAFT AS WELL AS RATIONALE TO EXPLAIN OUR REFUSAL TO INCREASE QUANTITIES AND IMPROVE DELIVERY DATES. PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT WILL BE INDICATIONS AS TO WHETHER QUANTITIES COULD BE MOVED UP IF JORDANIANS WERE ABLE TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL FUNDS FROM SAUDI ARABIA. IN FACT, AS SITUATION NOW STANDS, WE HERE HAVE NO IDEA AS

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TO WHAT DELIVERY DATES ARE CONTEMPLATED.

3. FINALLY, I WOULD LIKE WORD ON WHETHER THERE IS ANY POSSIBILITY OF US CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS OR OF SOME KIND OF GUARANTEED FUNDING BY SAUDI ARABIA AND, IF SO, WHETHER THIS WOULD BE MEANS TRYING TO MEET SOME OF KING'S REQUESTS.

GP-3

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

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P R 201830Z FEB 68 ZFG
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4716
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 55
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA 599

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3521

EXDIS

SUBJ: JORDAN ARMS

REF: STATE 117890; AMMAN 3504

DHAHRAN FOR AMBASSADOR EILTS

1. SINCE AGREEMENT HAS NOT BEEN REACHED WITH KING ON ARMS PACKAGE, WE BELIEVE AT THIS STAGE IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE NOT TO INFORM FAISAL OF DETAILS OUR PROPOSAL. IF AND WHEN WE MIGHT AGREE ON PACKAGE, KING PLANS TO DESPATCH KHANNASH TO REVIEW WHOLE PROBLEM INCLUDING FINANCING WITH SAUDIS AND SEEK THEIR ASSISTANCE. WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT KHANNASH SHOULD BE ALLOWED STAGE

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3521A ~~SECRET~~
HIS PRESENTATION WITHOUT SAUDIS HAVING DETAILED ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE OF PACKAGE.

2. SINCE SAQQAF ASKED SPECIFICALLY ABOUT F-104 OFFER, WE SEE NO PROBLEM INFORMING KING THAT WE ARE PREPARED OFFER

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NUMBER OF F-104 AIRCRAFT.

3. OUR CONCERN IS THAT IF FAISAL AT THIS POINT RECEIVES COMPLETE RUNDOWN PROVIDED STATE REFTEL IT WILL BE RELATIVELY EASY FOR HIM TO ASSUME THAT USG HAS SOLVED OR WILL SOMEHOW TAKE CARE OF FINANCING PROBLEMS AND THAT HE CAN RELAX. IN THE INTERESTS OF SUSTAINING FAISAL'S INTEREST IN BEING HELPFUL TO JORDAN, RECOMMEND WE NOW PROVIDE ONLY GENERAL ASSURANCES THAT WE DOING OUR BEST TO MEET JORDAN'S REQUEST, SPECIFICALLY STATE THAT F-104S HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN PACKAGE, BUT ADVISE THAT DETAILS OF PACKAGE STILL BEING NEGOTIATED.

4. IF HUSSEIN APPEARS ON VERGE OF REJECTING OUR OFFER, WE MAY NEED TO SEEK ENLIST FAISAL'S ASSISTANCE AND AT THAT TIME IT WOULD OF COURSE BE NECESSARY REVIEW DETAILS WITH HIM.
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~~SECRET~~ 955

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P 201750Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4715

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3520

EXDIS

SUBJ: JORDAN ARMS

1. BRITISH AMB SAW KING AND KHAMMASH SEPARATELY ON FEB 17 TO PROVIDE DETAILS OF POSSIBLE AIRCRAFT SUPPLY. HE SAID BOTH WERE RELAXED AND KING EXPECTED NEGOTIATE IN GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF OUR PACKAGE.

2. ADAMS GAVE KING AND KHAMMASH ADVANCE WORD OF LETTER FROM STONEHOUSE (MINTECHNOLOGY) TO KING ADVISING THAT FOUR ADDITIONAL HAWKER-HUNTERS HAVE BECOME AVAILABLE FROM BRITISH SOURCES AND TWO ADDITIONAL MAY BE AVAILABLE FROM HUNTERS THAT HAD BEEN EARMARKED FOR IRAQ. THIS WOULD BRING TOTAL HUNTERS

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3520A ~~SECRET~~
IN JORDAN TO SEVENTEEN. STONEHOUSE ALSO ADVISED THAT BRITISH WERE PREPARED TO RECONDITION JORDAN'S TWO-SEATER HUNTER AND TO FURNISH AN ADDITIONAL TWO-SEATER (MAKING TOTAL ON OF NINETEEN HUNTERS OF ALL TYPES). FINALLY, LETTER WOULD SAY THAT BRITISH WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS SALES OF EIGHTEEN LIGHTNINGS TO JORDAN.

3. ON TANKS, ADAMS INFORMED KING AND KHAMMASH THAT BRITISH

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COULD MAKE AVAILABLE ONE HUNDRED CENTURIONS THAT COULD BE UPGUNNED WITH 105MMS.

4. BRITISH AMB SAID HE HAD FOUND THE KING "NOT SERIOUSLY DISSATISFIED" WITH US PACKAGE. KING HAD IMPLIED THAT HE PLANS TO NEGOTIATE WITH US IN GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF PACKAGE AND ADAMS SAID HE HAD NOT FOUND THE DISPOSITION ON THE KING'S PART TO GO TO THE SOVIETS WHICH HAD SO MUCH IMPURCAO HIM ON HIS RETURN FROM LEAVE ABOUT TWO WEEKS AGO. KHAMMASH, ACCORDING TO ADAMS, ALSO SEEMED "RELAXED" AND INDICATED THAT THE US PACKAGE SEEMED IN GENERAL SATISFACTORY.

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3520A ~~SECRET~~

5. IN DISCUSSION US PACKAGE, KING EMPHASIZED TANKS WERE HIS BIGGEST PROBLEM. HE NEEDS TWO HUNDRED TO MAKE UP LOSSES IN THE JUNE WAR PLUS REPLACING CURRENTLY OBSOLETE TANKS. (ADAMS TOLD ME HE THOUGHT IT WOULD NOT BE IMPOSSIBLE TO PERSUADE THE INRCAA SETTLE ON A MIX OF M48A1S AND CENTURIONS, PROVIDED HE GOT A TOTAL OF TWO HUNDRED. ON ASSUMPTION KING, TO BE POLITE TO ADAMS, HAD NOT EXPRESSED HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD CENTURIONS, I THOUGHT IT BEST NOT TO MENTION WHAT KING AND KHAMMASH HAD TOLD ME (PARA 11, AMN/ 3417). THE KING ALSO SAID THAT HE WORRIED ABOUT DELIVERY DATES WHICH WERE NOT AT ALL CLEAR IN THE INFORMATION HE HAD OBTAINED FROM US ;

6. ON AIRCRAFT, THE KING TOLD ADAMS HE DOES NOT WANT THE F-104, LARGELY BECAUSE HIS AIR FORCE HAS BECOME IRREVOCABLY OPPOSED TO IT. HE WANTS SKY HAWKS INSTEAD. IN A BRIEF DISCUSSION ABOUT SKY HAWKS, KING HAD INDICATED TO ADAMS HE SAW THE PROBLEM AS A CHOICE OF A CHEVY INSTEAD OF A FORD AND DID NOT ANTICIPATE THERE WOULD BE ANY PROBLEM GETTING SKY HAWKS FROM THE USG. ON THE QUESTION OF SUPERSONICS AND SPECIFICALLY THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTING LIGHTNINGS, THE KING

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PAGE 4 RUQMKG 3520A ~~SECRET~~

SAID HE IS KEEPING AN OPEN MIND. SUPERSONICS ARE VERY EXPENSIVE AND JORDAN WOULD NEED TO HAVE HELP (HE SAID POSSIBLY SAUDI ARABIA) IF IT WERE TO GO FOR SUPERSONICS. WHEN THAT TIME CAME, HE TOLD ADAMS, HE WOULD CONSIDER LIGHTNINGS BUT HE WOULD FIRST HAVE TO SORT OUT THE PROBLEM OF OBTAINING US SUBSONICS. WHEN HE HAD FOUND OUT HOW TO FINACE ALL OF HIS NEEJPKN H WOULD DICUS LIGHTNINGS AGAIN WITH THE BRITISH.

7. ACCORDING TO ADAMS, THE KING'S ATTITUDE TOWARD LIGHTNINGS STEMS FROM DISAPPROVAL OF THEM ONCE EXPRESSED BY AN OLD RAF FRIEND OF THE KING.

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INFO /030 W

R 201430Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4711
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1298
USUN 714

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NLJ 02-155
By , NARA, Date 6-9-03

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3516

EXDIS

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

REF: USUN 3812, STATE 117356, AMMAN 3441

1. RE COMMENT PARA ONE USUN 3812 (STATE 117356) THAT AL-FARRA SEEMED UNAWARE GOJ HAD GONE AS FAR TOWARDS RHODES FORMULA AS REPORTED AMMAN 3441. WE BELIEVE THIS NOT SURPRISING. TALHOUNI AND RIFA'I HAVE PLAYED THEIR CARDS ON JARRING MISSION EXTREMELY CLOSE TO THEIR CHESTS AND AL-FARRA WILL NOT ALWAYS BE FULLY READ IN.

PAGE 2 RUGMKG 3516A ~~SECRET~~

2. TALHOUNI COMMENTED DURING MEETING WITH ME LAST WEEK THAT HE WAS RIGOROUSLY EXCLUDING OTHER CABINETMINISTERS FROM ANY MEETINGS WITH JARRING, MENTIONING SPECIFICALLY THAT HE HAD REJECTED JAZEM NUSEIBEH'S REQUEST TO DICUSS JERUSALEM WITH JARRING. IT OF POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANCE THAT MUSEIBEH AND AL-FARRA ARE BOTH PALESTINIAN AND THAT PRIMIN IS ESPECIALLY CAUTIOUS IN REVEALING HIS THINKING ON FUTURE STEPS UNDER

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JARRING MISSION TO THEM. IN ANY CASE BELIEVE OUR TEL SHOWS THAT I HAD TO PROBE DEEPLY WITH BOTH TALHOUNI AND RIFA'I DURING OUR FEB 15 MEETINGS TO BRING THEM TO ARTICULATE THOUGHTS ABOUT FUTURE.

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By js NARA, Date 6-9-03

P 201200Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4706

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 3509

EXDIS

SUBJ: ADVERSE EFFECTS OF FEB 15 CEASEFIRE VIOLATION
RZSM ISRAELI AND INTERNATIONAL PRESS COVERAGE OF LATEST
STATEMENTS BY KING AND MIN INTERIOR OF OPPOSITION TO
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IMPLY A VIEW THAT A LESSON WAS AUGHT
AND LEARNED BY THE FEB 15 BOMBARDMENT OF JORDAN CIVILIAN
CENTERS IN THE JORDAN BALLEY. APPRAISAL OF JORDANIAN
SITUATION IN WAKE OF FEB 15 ATTACK SUGGESTS THAT IF
ISRAELI ATTACK WAS INTENDED TO DISCREDIT AND THEREBY
REDUCE GUERRILLA ACTIVITY INDICATIONS ARE IT HAS HAD
REVERSE EFFECT AND HAS GREATLY COMPLICATED GOJ'S ABILITY
TO COPE WITH GUERRILLAS. KING'S OWN ANTI-TERRORIST
PLIY REMAINS CONSTANT BUT CABINET IS BALKING AT
ENDORING THIS PUBLICLY IN FACE OF INCREASED PUBLIC
BITTERNESS AND HOSTILITY TOWARD ISRAEL AND INCREASED

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3509/1A ~~SECRET~~
SYMPATHY FOR QUERRILLAS AS RESULT OF RECENT ISRAELI
ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN CENTERS.

2. OVER FORTY CIVILIANS HAVE NOW REPORTEDLY DIED AS
RESULT OF FEB 15 ISRAELI BOMBING AND SHELLING. FATALITIES
WERE RESIDENTS EAST BANK VILLAGES, NOT REFUGEE CAMPS,

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CONSISTED MAINLY OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN AND INVOLVED NO QUERRILLAS OR PALESTINIANS. CHIEF PUBLIC SECURITY ABU NUWAR AND GID CHIEF KILANI HAVE SPOKEN TO US ABOUT MARKED USWING IN POPULAR RESENTMENT OF ISRAEL AND CONCOMMITANT SUMPATHY FOR GERRIALLAS AS RESULT OF FEB 15 ATTACK. ABU NUWAR STATED 60,000 HAD ATTENDED MILITARY FUNERAL FEB 16 IN AMMAN AND MOOD WAS UGLY. ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENTS, SUCH AS THAT THESE MEN WERE KILLED BY AMERICAN ARMS AND WHAT DOES PRESIDENT JOHNSON WANT FROM US, WERE HEARD. APPREHENSIVE THAT DEMONSTRATION WAS IN OFFING, ABU NUWAR HAD BUSES WAITING AT CEMETARY FOR MARCHERS WHO WERE TRANSPORTED IN LARGE NUMBERS BACK TO CITY BUT DEPOSITED IN VARIOUS QUARTERS TO BREAK UP CONCENTRATIONS OF POTENTIAL

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3509/1A ~~SECRET~~

DEMONSTRATORS. ABU NUWAR AND KILANI FRUSTRATED AT MAGNITUDE OF NEW PROBLEMS CONFRONTING GOVERNMENT AS REFUGEES AND OTHER VALLEY RESIDENTS CONTINUE STREAM INTO AMMAN, ZERKA, AND IRBID (UNRWA ESTIMATED FEB 19 THAT 70,000 HAD MOVED UP FROM VALLEY.)

3. POPULAR SYMPATHY FOR GUERRILLAS HAS NOT DIMINSISHED AND MAY HAVE GROWN. EMBOFF ACCOMPANYING UNRWA COMGENI MICHAELMORE ON TOUR OF VALLEY CAMPS FEB 18 NOTED SEVEN MEN WEARING IDENTICAL OLIVE DRAB JACKETS IN KARAMEH CAMP AREA. THREE OF GROUP CARRIED WEAPONS AND ALL WERE IDENTIFIED TO EMBOFF BY JORDANIAN UNRWA CAMP OFFICIAL AS QUERRILLAS. MICHELMORE WAS DISTURBED AND SAID HE WOULD REPORT HIS OBSERVATIONS OF GUERRILLAS TO U THANT.

4. ABU NUWAR RECOUNTED TO EMBOFF STORY OF HOW HIS POLICEMEN HAD BEEN SENT TO KARAMEH CAMP IN EARLY FEB AT PRIMIN'S ORDERS TO CLEAR CAMP OF FEDAYYIN. HIS POLICE WERE PROCEEDING WITH SEARCH WHEN GERRIALLAS CARRYING AUTOMATIC WEAPONS SURROUNDED THEM. (" ALL WERE

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BETTER ARMED THAN POLICE," ABU NUWAR COMMENTED WITH CHAGRIN.) AS RESULT POLICE WITHDREW AND ABU NUWAR WAS CRITICIZED BY PRIMIN AND CABINET FOR HAVING BROUGHT EMBARRASSMENT TO GOVT. ABU NUWAR WAS ABLE TO SET RECORD STRAIGHT WITH KING BUT COMMENTED ON DEMORALIZING EFFECT THIS HAD ON HIS FORCES AND NOTED THAT INCIDENT DEMONSTRATED HOW POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR SECURITY FORCES TRYING TO DO THEIR DUTY IS APT TO BE SWITCHED OFF FOR REASONS POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY.

5. JUST PRIOR TO ATTACK PRIMIN TALHOUNI HAD TOLD US OF DELEGATION FROM AMMAN MERCHANTS WHO CAME TO HIM MORNING FEB 15 TO PROTEST REPEATED ENTRIES OF GUERRILLAS TO THEIR STORES DEMANDING CONTRIBUTIONS. IN ON CASE THEY DEMANDED LOCAL PRINTER PRINT PANPHLETS SUPPORTING CAUSE. PRIMIN EMPHASIZED POLITICAL TIGHT-ROPE HE WALKING IN ATTEMPT CONTROL AND ARREST GUERRILLAS.

6. SINCE FEB 15 SOME DIVISIONS BETWEEN KING AND HIS OWNGOVT ON THIS ISSUE ARE NOW MORE EVIDENT. WILL BE RECALLED ISRAELI RADION FEB 17 INTERPRETED KING'S

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 3509/1A ~~SECRET~~

STATEMENT OF PREVIOUS DAY AS EXPLICIT CONDEMNATION OF TERRORISTS (AMMAN 3478) AND SUBSEQUENTLY PLAYED GOV. MIN INTERIOR STATEMENT ON ARMS CACHE SEIZURE ALONG SAME LINE. PRIMIN TALHOUNI HAS MADE EVIDENT HIS DISPLEASURE WITH MIN INTERIOR'S STATEMENT. THIS DEVELOPMENT COUPLED WITH COMMENT TO MICHELMORE BY MIN RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT NUSEIBEH THAT KING'S STATEMENT DID NOT HAVE SUPPORT OF ALL PEOPLE AND THAT STATEMENT BY MIN INTERIOR NOT AUTHORIZED BY PRIMIN SUGGESTS KING IS NOW OUT FRONT OF HIS GOVT AND PUBLIC OPINION GENERALLY IN MAKING PUBLIC CRITICISM OF GUERRILLAS.

7. COMMENT: IN PRESENT ATMOSPHERE TALHOUNI AND

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CABINET COLLEAGUES, IN REFUSING ENDORSE FORTHRIGHT DENUNCIATION OF GUERRILLAS, COULD BE BEST DESCRIBED AS POLITICAL REALISTS. UNPLEASANT RESULT IS THAT KING HAS STUCK HIS NECK OUT IN TAKING THIS POSITION AND IT UNLIKELY WIN ANY FRIENDS THEREBY EITHER HERE OR IN ISRAEL. ABU NUWAR-KILANI APPRAISAL THAT THEY WILL

PAGE 6 RUQMKG 3509/1A ~~SECRET~~

NOT FULLY SUPPORTED BY GOVT IN VIGOROUS EFFORTS SEARCH OUT AND ARREST GUERRILLAS MAY ALSO BE CORRECT. THE FEB 15 ATTACK WE CONSIDER HAS UNDERMINED GOV ABILITY TO INTERDICT GUERRILLAS AND TO THE EXTENT IT HAS PERCEPTIBLY INFLUENCED BOTH OFFICIAL AND POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARDS POSITION THAT THERE MAY BE NO ALTERNATIVE TO GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES, WE RATE THE ATTACK A FAILURE RATHER THAN A VINDICATION OF RETALIATORY POLICY. WE VIEW FEB 15 AS BUT ANOTHER ISRAELI ATTEMPT, LONG PROVEN INEFFECTIVE TO STOP GUERRILLAS ATTACKS BY RETALIATION WITH REGULAR MILITARY FORCES. FINALLY, IT IS IRONIC AND PUZZLING THAT THIS GOVT WHICH HAS CONSISTENTLY BEEN THE TARGET WHILE BAGHDAD AND DAMASCUS ESCAPE. (IN THIS CONNECTION WE NOTE FEB 19 ANNOUNCEMENT BY AL-ASIFA, MILITARY ARM OF DAMASCUS ORIENTED FATAH GROUP, CLAIMING CREDIT FOR FEB 14-15 NIGHT ATTACKS ON ISRAELI SETTLEMENT OF KFAR RUPIN AND MAOZ HAIM. THESE ATTACKS WERE PROBABLY IMMEDIATE STIMULANT FOR FEROCITY OF ISRAELI REPRISALS FOLLOWING DAY.)

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~~SECRET~~ 517

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ACTION SS 30
INFO /030 W

P 201235Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4707

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SECTIONS AMMAN 3509

EXDIS

8. WE ESTIMATE THAT KING'S STAND AGAINST GUERRILLAS APT TO PREVAIL WITH HIS COUNTRYMEN ONLY WHEN THERE IS SOME EARLY DEMONSTRABLE SUCCESS TOWARDS PEACE UNDER JARRING MISSION. ONLY WHEN KING CAN POINT TO SUCCESS OF PEACE POLICY, WILL HE BE ABLE TO MOBILIZE MORE FULLY ENERGIES OF HIS GOVT AND PEOPLE AGAINST THE SELF-DESTRUCTIVE POLICY OF GUERRILLA WARFARE. MEANWHILE, THE GUERRILLAS ARE BECOMING BOLDER IN SHOWING THEMSELVES AND WE HAVE NO REASON TO SUPPOSE THAT FURTHER TERROIST INCIDENTS WILL NOT TAKE PLACE SHORTLY. GUERRILLA BANDS ARE, AFTER ALL, ALREADY ON WEST BANK. UNLESS ISRAELI POICY IS REEXAMINED, FURTHER ISRAELI REPRISALS SEEM INEVITABLE AND THIS IN TURN WILL ONLY HASTEN THE DETERIORATION OF LOCAL SITUATION, PERHAPS BEYOND RECALL. THIS IS CLEARLY NOT IN OUR INTEREST OR THE INTEREST OF A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

9. FOREGOING IS PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE, AND WE LEAVE ANY FURTHER DISTRIBUTION TO DEPT.
GP-3

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~~SECRET~~ 545

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 201115Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4705

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3508

EXDIS

SUBJ: GOJ ATTITUDE TOWARDS TERRORISTS

1. SUMMARY: PRIMIN TALHOUNI COMPLAINED FEB 19 ABOUT USG INACTION ON STOPPING ISRAELI RETALIATION. IN RESPONSE OUR POSITION THAT TERRORISM IS PRINCIPAL CAUSE OF RETALIATION, HE ARGUES IT WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC FOR GOJ AT THIS TIME TO MOVE MORE STRONGLY AGAINST TERRORISM. HE IMPLIES KING IS OUT OF STEP WITH POPULAR FELLING OF SUPPORT FOR TERRORISTS. TALHOUNI BELIEVES ONLY WAY JORDAN CAN BETTER CONTROL GUERRILLAS IS IF IT CAN POINT TO SOME PROGRESS IMPLEMENTING SC RESOLUTION THROUGH JARRING. I DOUBT PRIMIN WILL TAKE STRONGER ANTI-TERRORIST LINE BUT ALSO RECOGNIZE FEB 15 ISRAELI ATTACK ON CIVILIANS HAS REDUCED

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3508A ~~SECRET~~
HIS ABILITY DO SO.

2. WHEN PRIMIN TALHOUNI AND MINISTER OF STATE FOR FONAFFS RIFA'I SPOKE TO ME ABOUT JERUSALEM FEB 19, THEY ALSO TOOK UP THE ADVERS EFFECTS OF THE CEASEFIRE VIOLATION OF FEB 15 AND WHAT THEY CALLED CONTINUED ISRAELI ARROGANCE AND ATTEMPTS TO HUMILIATE JORDAN. PRIMIN WAS AS USUAL ARGUING THAT ONLY USG CAN STOP ISRAELI RETALIATION AND THAT WE HAVE

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FAILED TO DO SO. I RESPONDED THAT SINCE THEY HAD PLACED ISSUE IN LARGER CONTEXT, I FELT I HAD TO SAY I CONSIDERED TERRORISM TO BE THE PRIMARY CAUSATIVE FACTOR IN THE CEASEFIRE VIOLATION OF FEB 15 AND PREVIOUS SUCH ISRAELI RETALIATIONS. AFTER DE-PLORING ISRAEL'S POLICY OF RETALIATION. I SAID UNFORTUNATELY I HAD MOST RELIABLE INFORMATION INDICATING TERRORISTS HAVE BEEN OPERATING IN AND FROM REFUGEE CAMPS AND VALLEY VILLAGES-- HIDING BEHIND WOMEN AND CHILDREN. AS OF YESTERDAY TERRORISTS WERE STILL OPENLY CARRYING WEAPONS IN KARAMEH. THE PRIMIN HAD SPOKEN OF "LASTING PEACE" AS BEING HIS PRIMARY AIM, AN AIM WHICH WE SHARE WITH HIM, BUT TERRORISM IS COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT WITH THIS PRINCIPLE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

PAGE 3 RUQMGK 3508A ~~SECRET~~

IT IS NOT ENOUGH FOR THE ARABS TO GIVE UP RELIANCE ON MILITARY MEASURES TO SOLVE THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM. TERRORISM IS AN EQUALLY STERILE APPROACH TO ITS SOLUTION. I CONCLUDED THAT IF I COULD SPEAK WITH SUCH CONFIDENT KNOWLEDGE OF CONTINUED TERRORIST PRESENCE IN THE VALLEY, THEN I THOUGHT THE ISRAELIS PROBABLY HAD EVEN BETTER INFORMATION.

3. IT BECAME OBVIOUS I HAD TOUCHED A TENDER SPOT WITH THE PRIMIN. HE SAID THE HE HAD FELT ALREADY A SEVERE REACTION TO RECENT STATEMENTS THAT HAD BEEN MADE ABOUT THE TERRORISTS (IT WAS CLEAR HE WAS REFERRING TO STATEMENTS OF THE KING AND THE MININTERIOR). HE DESCRIBED AGAIN THE INCIDENT AT KARAMEH CAMP WHEN SECURITY FORCES HAD SURROUNDED THE TERRORISTS IN THE CAMP AND IN TURN HAD THEMSELVES BEEN SURROUND BY A LARGER, BETTER EQUIPPED FORCE OF TERRORISTS. HE STATED THAT QUITE FRANKLY HE BELIEVED THERE WOULD BE A "CASTASTROPHE" IF JORDANIAN SECURITY FORCES NOW TRIED TO MOVE STRONGLY AGAINST THE TERRORISTS. HE REFERRED TO ARTICLES CRITICAL OF JORDAN POSITION IN THE ARAB PRESS IN OTHER COUNTRIES AND SPECIFICALLY CALLED MY ATTENTION TO A CURRENT ARTICLE IN

PAGE 4 RUQMGK 3508A ~~SECRET~~

AL-NAHAR STATING THE KING IS OUT OF STEP WITH POPULAR FEELING.

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THE PRIMIN SAID IF HE TOOK ANY STRONGER MEASURES THAN HE IS NOW TAKING, HALF OF HIS CABINET WOULD RESIGN. HE BELIEVES THE ONLY WAY JORDAN CAN DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM IS TO BE ABLE TO POINT TO SOME PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE UK RESOLUTION AND THE JARRING MISSION. HE ASKED WHAT ONE COULD EXPECT THE PEOPLE TO THINK WHEN WOMEN AND CHILDREN ARE BEING KILLED IN THE VALLEY BY ISRAELI ARTILLERY AND NO PROGRESS IS BEING MADE TOWARDS IMPLEMENTING THE SC RESOLUTION. I OBSERVED THAT INNOCENT ISRAELI CIVILIANS WERE ALSO BEING KILLED BY ACTIONS OF THE TERRORISTS. WE DEPLORE THE DEATHS ON BOTH SIDES. I FELT THAT UNLESS THE JORDAN GOVT COULD INSURE THAT ARMED TERRORISTS WERE NOT USING THE VALLEY CAMPS AND VILLAGES IN THEIR ACTIVITIES, THEY MUST SHARE SOME RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHAT HAPPEND AS A RESULT.

4. COMMENT: I CAMEAWAY WITH THE FELLING THAT HOWEVER MUCH MY STATEMENTS MIGHT HAVE TOUCHED TENDER SPOTS, PRIMIN TALHOUNI DOES NOT HAVE THE FIBER TO TAKE STRONGER MEASURES AGAINST THE TERRORISTS. AT SAME TIME WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT HE IS

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 3508A ~~SECRET~~
RATHER GOOD JUDGE OF WHAT THE TRAFFIC WILL BEAR, AND THIS HAS OBVIOUSLY BEEN REDUCED BY THE FEB 15 ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS.

5. IN VIEW OF EXTREME SENSITIVITY OF FOREGOING, I LEAVE TO DEPT WHETHER IT SHOULD BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED. SYMMES
GP-1

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~~SECRET~~ 269

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ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

O 200914Z FEB 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0598

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3504

EXDIS

SUBJ: JORDAN ARMS

REF: STATE 117890

DELIVER STATE DEPT ACTION OFFICER OPENING OF BUSINESS FEB 20
REQUEST WITHHOLD ACTION TO INFORM FAISAL PER STATE 117890
PENDING RECEIPT SUGGESTIONS WHICH WE SHALL SUBMIT AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE RE TACTICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED. SYMMES

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001
By ag/ll NARA, Date 8/14/01



Department of State

TELEGRAM

28

~~SECRET~~ 234

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03503 200904Z

4

ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

O 200850Z FEB 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4660

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3503

EXDIS

SUBJ: JORDAN ARMS

REF: AMMAN 3417, 3418, 3419

DELIVER TO ACTION OFFICER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS FEB 20

I AM ACCOMPANYING DAVID ROCKEFELLER TOMORROW AFTERNOON IN CALL ON KING HUSSEIN. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL THEREFORE IF DEPT COULD PROVIDE ME URGENTLY WITH SOME INDICATION OF WHAT WE MAY BE PLANNING TO DO WITH REGARD TO KING'S REACTION TO OUR PACKAGE. SPECIFICALLY, ARE WE GOING TO TRY TO DO MORE? HOW LONG BEFORE

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3503A ~~SECRET~~
WE EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND?

SYMMES

~~SECRET~~

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By rg/lll NARA, Date 8/14/01



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TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~ 721

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03464 162009Z

42
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P 161500Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4674

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3464

EXDIS

REF STATE 115565

SUBJECT: ISRAEL-JORDAN

DEPT PASS TEL AVIV

1. WE ARE AT LOSS TO UNDERSTAND WHY ISRAELI REP
PROCEEDED TO BRIDGE FEB 12 IN EXPECTATION MEETING DAUD.
THERE IS OF COURSE POSSIBILITY THAT HE WHO RELAYED
AMMAN'S MESSAGE TO ISRAELIS MAY HAVE GARBLED TEXT. AS
KING TOLD US FEB 13, IN CONNECTION DISCUSSION OF MESSAGE

PAGE TWO RUOMKG 3464A ~~SECRET~~
FROM ISRAELIS, HE HAD CABLED DAUD WHO HAD BEEN ILL IN
NEW YORK TO RETURN IMMEDIATELY AND EXPECTED HIM IN A FEW
DAYS. (WE UNDERSTAND DAUD SUFFERED RUPTURED EAR DRUM IN
JUNE WAR AND HAS UNDERGONE DELICATE SURGERY IN NEW YORK.)
IN ANY EVENT, DAUD HAS BEEN ABSENT FROM JORDAN FOR OVER
THREE MONTHS AND JAA DIRECTOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLONEL
ARABIYAT WAS NOMINATED IN JANUARY TO SUBSTITUTE FOR DAUD
UNTIL HIS RETURN (AMMAN 3108).

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-119
By ms, NARA, Date 5-16-03

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03464 162009Z

2. ARABIYAT TOOK THE POSITION WITH DATT FEB 12 THAT REASONS HE HAD NOT YET GONE TO BRIDGE IN CONNECTION WITH CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS WAS BECAUSE GOJ HAD NOT RECEIVED ANY REPLY TO ITS POSITION THAT SUCH TALKS COULD BE HELD ONLY IF UN OR RED CROSS REPRESENTATIVES WERE PRESENT. THIS WAS REASON MAJ TWAL WENT TO BRIDGE FEB 12 IN COMPANY WITH RED CROSS REP (USDAO AMMAN 0049, FEB 68).

3. RE GOI INDICATION ITS DISAPPOINTMENT OVER DAUD NOMINATION (STATE 115565), WE RECALL LONGSTANDING ISRAELI ANTI-PATHY TOWARDS DAUD. JORDANIANS HAVE

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3464 ~~SECRET~~

INTERPRETED THIS ANTI-PATHY AS OWING IN LARGE MEASURE TO DAUD'S LONG EXPERIENCE IN MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION AFFAIRS WHICH ENABLED HIM AT LEAST EFFECTIVELY STAND UP TO HIS ISRAELI COUNTERPARTS.

3. ISRAELIS IN IJMAC DAYS#ALSO COMPLAINED OF DAUD'S LACK OF ACCESS TO GOJ LEADERSHIP. THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION OF HIGH POSITION OF TRUST WHICH DAUD ENJOYS WITH KING. IN CONVERSATION WITH AMB FEB 13 HUSSEIN DESCRIBED DAUD AS OUTSTANDING OFFICER AND SAID HE WAS WAITING IMPATIENTLY FOR HIS RETURN. HE EXPRESSED PARTICULAR REGARD FOR DAUD'S DISCRETION AND ASTUTENESS.

4. WE DO NOT CONSIDER GOJ HAS SLAMMING DOOR ON ISRAELI INITIATIVE. WE RECOMMEND USG URGE ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO GOJ PROPOSAL THAT TALKS AT BRIDGE BE HELD IN PRESENCE OF UN OR RED CROSS REP. WE SEE LITTLE OR NO PROSPECT THAT JORDANIANS CAN BE FORCED AT THIS STAGE OF EVENTS TO ACCEPT MEETINGS AT ANY LEVEL WITHOUT SUCH PRESENCE. PENDING RETURN DAUD IT SEEMS TO US ISRAELIS ARE NEGLECTING

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 3464 ~~SECRET~~

EXPLOITING AN OPPORTUNITY IN GOJ'S INDICATED WILLINGNESS

~~SECRET~~



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PAGE 03 AMMAN 03464 162009Z

TO DETAIL ITS DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TO GO TO BRIDGE FOR MEETINGS. PRESENCE OF RED CROSS REP. IN PARTICULAR, WOULD SEEM NO THREAT TO ISRAELI POSITION. REJECTION OF JORDANIAN FORMULA, HOWEVER, DOES ELIMINATE ONE PROSPECT FOR MEANINGFUL JORDANIAN-ISRAELI DISCUSSIONS AND THEREBY WORKS COUNTER TO OUR EFFORTS AIMED AT HELPING EVOLVE A NEW, MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES. SYMMES

AS RECEIVED. WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

30
TELEGRAM
5

~~SECRET~~ 971

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03456 161025Z

4
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 161005Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4669

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3456

EXDIS

SUBJ: KING'S CONVERSATION ON ARMS WITH AYUB KHAN AND SHAH

1. KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY RIFA'I INFORMED US FEB 15 THAT NEITHER AYUB KHAN NOR SHAH HAD BEEN MARKEDLY HELPFUL IN COUNSEL THEY GAVE KING DURING HIS LATE JANUARY VISITS TO THEIR COUNTRIES WHEN HUSSEIN SOUGHT THEIR OPINION ON WHAT HE SHOULD DO ABOUT HIS ARMS SUPPLY.

2. AYUB, ACCORDING RIFA'I, WAS PARTICULARLY UNHELPFUL. AFTER KING HAD DESCRIBED HIS ARMS DILEMMA, AYUB

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3456A ~~SECRET~~
REPORTEDLY SAID THAT WHILE HUSSEIN SHOULD CONTINUE TO TRY TO GET SUPPLIES FROM US, IF HE DID NOT SUCCEED AND GET WHAT HE WANTED, HE SHOULD WITHOUT DELAY OR FURTHER ARGUMENT MAKE CLEAN BREAK WITH US AND GO TO SOVIETS.

3. SHAH REPORTEDLY SAID THAT HE COULD NOT IMAGINE US WOULD NOT MEET HIS ARMS REQUIREMENTS. HOWEVER, IF IT DID NOT, SHAH COMMENTED HUSSEIN HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO GO TO SOVIETS.

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4. ACCORDING RIFA'I, COMMENTS BY THESE TWO LEADERS, WHO KING CONSIDERS GOOD FRIENDS AND ANTI-SOVIET, UNDOUBTEDLY CONTRIBUTED TO HIS IMPATIENCE IN HIS DISCUSSIONS ABOUT ARMS WITH USG.

5. DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT RAWALPINDI, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV.

GP-3 SYMMES

EXDTS

TO SECRETARY OF STATE
FROM AMMAN 03456 161025Z

INFO

ACTION 23

UNCLAS 01 UNCLAS 03456 161025Z

SECRET



SECRET



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50

~~SECRET~~ 67

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03441 152356Z

32
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P R 151650Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4657
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1271
USMISSION USUN NY 692
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1276

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3441

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION

1. IN COURSE OF SEPARATE DISCUSSION WITH PRIMIN TALHOUNT AND
MINSTATE FOR FONAFF ABDUL MUN'IM RIFA'I FEB 15 I SOUGHT INFORMATION
ON JARRING'S FEB 14 VISIT.

2. BOTH SAID THAT ISRAELI POSITION WHICH JARRING HAD BROUGHT
WITH HIM REPRESENTED SOMETHING NEW, OR AS THEY PUT IT REPRESENTED
"SOME MOVEMENT" (RIFA'I) AND "SOME PROGRESS" (TALHOUNT). THEY
FELT HOWEVER THAT SHIFT IN ISRAELI POSITION APPEARED NOT TO
MEAN MUCH IN PRACTICE. THEY EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR WHATEVER
INFLUENCE WE MAY HAVE HAD ON ISRAELIS. HOWEVER, RIFA'I STATED

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3441A ~~SECRET~~

WHAT JARRING CONVEYED IS STILL NOT WHAT JORDAN AND OTHER ARABS
HAD TO HEAR IF THEY ARE TO PROCEED TO NEXT STAGE. IN HIS VIEW,
ISRAEL HAS CONTINUED TO PLAY WITH WORDS WHICH FALL SHORT OF A

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03441 152356Z

CLEAR STATEMENT OF ACCEPTANCE AND THIS ONLY SERVED FURTHER TO STIMULATE ARAB SUSPICIONS. FOR THAT REASON HE, RIFA'I, USED THE WORD "MOVEMENT" INSTEAD OF THE WORD "IMPROVEMENT" TO DESCRIBE JARRING'S LATEST WORD OF ISRAEL'S POSITION. UNTIL ISRAEL SIMPLY ACCEPTED RESOLUTION HE THOUGHT JARRING'S MISSION WOULD GET NOWHERE.

3. I INQUIRED OF EACH WHAT THEY THOUGHT UAR PRESENT POSITION WAS TOWARDS RESOLUTION. TALHOUNI ANSWERED HE FELT UAR HAD NOT BEEN AS FORTHCOMING WITH JARRING AS HAD JORDAN. IF ISRAEL WOULD ACCEPT THE RESOLUTION, HOWEVER, AS CATEGORICALLY AS HAD JORDAN, TALHOUNI WAS CONVINCED UAR WOULD DO THE SAME. "IF ISRAEL, HOWEVER INSERTS ONE QUALIFYING WORD IN ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION, CAIRO WILL INSERT TWO." RIFA'I AT FIRST AFFIRMED THAT UAR HAD INDEED CLEARLY ACCEPTED RESOLUTION AND SAID HE HAD JUST REREAD MINUTES OF LATEST RIAD-JARRING MEETINGS WHICH CONFIRM HIS VIEW. WHEN I PROBED HOWEVER FOR EXACT WORDING OF UAR ACCEPTANCE, RIFA'I RETREATED TO STATEMENT HE WAS CERTAIN

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3441A ~~SECRET~~

THAT UAR WOULD DECLARE ITS ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION IN SAME WORDS USED BY ISRAEL IF ISRAEL WOULD ONLY STATE ITS ACCEPTANCE.

4. WHEN I ASKED WHAT JORDAN ENVISAGED AS NEXT STEP, ASSUMING ALL PARTIES DECLARED THEIR ACCEPTANCE, PRIMIN SPOKE OF THE NEED OF A BRIEF INTERIM STAGE FOR ARAB LEADERS TO EDUCATE THEIR PUBLIC. DIRECT TALKS WOULD COME IN THE FUTURE, TALHOUNI STATED, BUT THE GROUND MUST BE PREPARED. ONLY HUSSEIN, TALHOUNI SAID, HAD BEEN WILLING TO BE FRANK AND FORTHCOMING ABOUT THE SC RESOLUTION, AND, PRIMIN COMPLAINED, RECENT ESHKOL-DAYAN SPEECHES HAD ONLY COMPLI-

CATED HUSSEIN'S PROBLEMS. ISRAEL MUST REALIZE ITS RELIANCE ON FORCE WILL NOT SOLVE PROBLEMS. RIFA'I CHARACTERIZED THE NEXT STAGE AS "IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION". WHEN I PROBED HE FINALLY SAID RATHER CAREFULLY IT WOULD MEAN "GETTING TOGETHER IN THE SAME PLACE WITH JARRING SO THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE DONE FROM AN AIRPLANE." TO MY QUERY WHETHER THIS MEANT HE WAS THINKING OF SOMETHING LIKE THE RHODES FOR MULA, HE REPLIED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE LIKE THAT AT FIRST BUT IT WOULD

~~SECRET~~



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PAGE 03 AMMAN 03441 152356Z

PROBABLY COME TO THAT.

5. I ASKED RIFA'I IF HE BELIEVED UAR SAW THE NEXT STEP IN THE SAME WAY JORDAN DID. ALTHOUGH HE HEDGED HIMSELF A BIT, HE AFFIRMED

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 3441A ~~SECRET~~

THAT HE BELIEVED UAR WOULD GO ALONG WITH TYPE OF "NEXT STEP" HE HAD DESCRIBED.

6. I DISCUSSED BRIEFLY WITH RIFA'I HIS COMMENT THAT THE DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE RESOLUTION HOLD DIFFERING ATTRACTIONS FOR THE VARIOUS ARAB PARTIES. RIFA'I MENTIONED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT OBVIOUSLY JORDAN HAD A DIFFERENT INTEREST IN FREE NAVIGATION OF THE SUEZ CANAL THAN HAS THE UAR. I TOOK OCCASION TO SUGGEST THAT PERHAPS JORDAN ALSO A STRONGER INTEREST IN JERUSALEM THAN HAS THE UAR. HE AGREED AND ADDED "WE ARE VERY MINDFUL OF THIS." I THEN SAID THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THE ARABS HAD A GREATER INTEREST IN A MEETING UNDER THE SAME ROOF WITH JARRING THAN HAD ISRAEL IN THAT THE ARABS DID NOT ALWAYS SEEM TO BE SPEAKING WITH ONE VOICE TO JARRING OR TO ISRAEL. RIFA'I ASSENTED EMPHATICALLY TO THIS COMMENT.

7. AS I LEFT, RIFA'I SAID HE HOPES JARRING WILL HAVE BETTER NEWS WHEN HE RETURNS NEXT TIME SO THAT HE CAN REPORT TO THE SYG THAT ALL PARTIES ACCEPT THE RESOLUTION. THEN HE COULD SUGGEST GETTING THE PARTIES IN THE SAME PLACE FOR THE NEXT STEP. HE SAID HE HOPED WE COULD USE OUR INFLUENCE TO GAIN ISRAEL'S ACCEPTANCE AND THAT MEANWHILE IT WAS ESSENTIAL WE DO SOMETHING TO PREVENT FURTHER ISRAELI FAIT ACCOMPLIS IN JERUSALEM.

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 3441A ~~SECRET~~

GP-3 SYMMES

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OCT.

~~SECRET~~



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TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~ 619

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03440 151843Z

42
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

0 151635Z FEB 68 ZFF=4 ZEL
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4656

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3440
CORRECTED COPY (PARA #4. LINE 6)
EXDIS

SUBJECT: ARMS FOR JORDAN
AREF: AMMAN 3417

1. EMBOFF HAS LEARNED FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL DETAILS FROM KHAMMASH AND KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY RIFA'I ABOUT FEB 12-13 DISCUSSIONS INVOLVING KING CONCERNING OUR ARMS PACKAGE. KING SUMMONED KHAMMASH IMMEDIATELY ON HIS ARRIVAL IN AMMAN EVENING FEB 12 TO KING'S HOME FOR FOUR-HOUR PRIVATE TALK. ACCORDING TO KHAMMASH, CONFIRMED SEPARATELY BY RIFA'I, HUSSEIN WAS EXTREMELY PLEASED WITH PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND WITH KHAMMASH'S ACCOUNT OF ACROSS BOARD MANIFESTATIONS OF USG SUPPORT FOR JORDAN, EVIDENCED BY ALL TOP OFFICIALS HE MET IN WASHINGTON. BUT KING WAS SINCERELY DISAPPOINTED AT PACKAGE WITH WHICH KHAMMASH RETURNED, SINCE IT WAS CONSIDERABLY LESS IN KEY AREAS THAN KING HAD REQUESTED. HIS DIS-

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3440A ~~SECRET~~
APPOINTMENT WAS CLEARLY COMPOUNDED BY FACT IT TOOK KHAMMASH ONE MONTH TO GET THE PACKAGE. KHAMMASH TOOK IMMEDIATE BRUNT OF KING'S DISAPPOINTMENT ARGUING IN HIS OWN DEFENSE THAT HE WAS GIVEN LITTLE CHANCE TO DEBATE USG OFFER AND THAT HE CONSIDERED IN ANY EVENT USG POLITICAL SUPPORT WAS IMPORTANT

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~~SECRET~~



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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03440 151843Z

SUPPLEMENT TO BE CONSIDERED IN OVERALL APPRAISAL OF HIS MISSION'S RESULTS. KING COUNTERED BY ARGUING THAT DECLARATION OF USG POLITICAL SUPPORT MADE ITS LIMITATIONS ON ARMS LISTEVEN MORE INCOMPREHENSIBLE. KHAMMASH THEN ASSURED KING HE WAS CERTAIN, IN VIEW OF ATTITUDES EXPRESSED, THAT USG WOULD ENTERTAIN ADDITIONAL ARMS REQUESTS IN FUTURE. KING RESPONDED THAT PRESENT WAS CRUCIAL FOR HIM AND JORDAN AND THAT UNLESS HE WAS ASSURED NOW OF SUPPORT FROM AND THEREBY CONTROL OF ARMY HE AND KHAMMASH WOULD NOT BE AROUND TO PRESENT ANY FUTURE REQUESTS TO USG. IN SUM, KING VIEWED USG RESPONSE AND KHAMMASH PERFORMANCE IN WASHINGTON WITH MIXED EMOTIONS; ON BALANCE HIS REACTION WAS ON NEGATIVE SIDE PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF HIS APPREHENSIONS ABOUT HIS CRITICAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH ARMY.

2. ON FEB 13 AT PALACE, KING WAS OBVIOUSLY FRUSTRATED AND

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3440A ~~SECRET~~

UNHAPPY OVER PACKAGE WITH WHICH HE "ASHAMED FACE ARMY." PRIMIN TALHOUNI, KHAMMASH, AND RIFA'I IN JOINT AND PRIVATE SESSIONS WITH KING EMPHASIZED POSITIVE ASPECTS OF USG POSITION, IN FEAR HE MIGHT TAKE SOME PRECIPITOUS ACTION ALL WOULD REGRET. THESE SESSIONS SERVED TO LOWER KING'S TEMPERATURE BEFORE HIS MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR BUT RESULT WAS HIS MORE REASONED INSISTENCE ON IMPROVEMENT OF USG LIST IN ORDER SECURE ARMY ACCEPTANCE.

3. BOTH KHAMMASH AND RIFA'I EXPRESSED HOPE USG COULD DEVISE FORMULA BOTH ACCEPTABLE TO IT AND ENOUGH FOR KING TO FACE ARMY. BOTH ESPOUSED OBVIOUS ARGUMENTS THAT OFFER, NOT DELIVERY, OF EQUIPMENT WAS NOW WHAT KING DESPERATELY NEEDED AND WARNED THAT OUR UNWILLINGNESS TO FIND A WAY TO PROMISE MORE EQUIPMENT, WHETHER IT IS EVER DELIVERED, COULD DEFEAT SUCCESS OF PRESENT EXERCISE. KHAMMASH WAS THE MORE EXPLICIT OF THE TWO. HE URGED THAT WE APPROVE A PACKAGE LARGER THAN THE ONE HE BROUGHT BACK WHICH KING COULD TALK ABOUT WITH CONFIDENCE TO ARMY BUT ONE WHICH WOULD CONTAIN ENOUGH CONTROLS IN TERMS OF AVAILABILITY, DELIVERY DATE, AND PAY.

~~SECRET~~



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MENT REQUIREMENTS, TO PROTECT
USG INTERESTS. AFTER ALL.

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 3440A-~~SECRET~~
KHAMMASH SAID, QTE WE ARE AT YOUR MERCY. IF AT DELIVERY
TIME YOU DECIDE THAT THE AREA SITUATION DICTATES OTHERWISE,
YOU CAN FIND AMPLE REASONS FOR DELAYING OR CURTAILING
DELIVERY. BUT AT LEAST YOU WILL HAVE GIVEN THE KING A
YEAR'S LEASE WHICH IS WHAT YOU AND WE NEED. UNQTE

4. KHAMMASH, WHO SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO RESIGN IF JORDAN-US
RELATIONS WERE NOT PRESERVED, CONCLUDED BY OBSERVING THAT
THE PERSPECTIVES ON THE CASE WERE BECOMING DISTORTED. HE
SAID, IF SAUDI ARABIA WAS WILLING TO PAY TO KEEP THE
SOVIETS OUT OF JORDAN AND THE US IN, WE PROBABLY OUGHT TO
LET THEM DO IT. AS RIFA'I PUT IT, IF \$10,000,000 OF FAISAL'S
MONEY IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A SOVIET AND AN AMERICAN
JORDAN, THE CHOICE SHOULD BE EASY.

5. COMMENT: BOTH KHAMMASH AND RIFA'I OBVIOUSLY HAVE A VESTED
INTEREST IN OUR DECISION SINCE BOTH REALIZE THAT NEITHER THEY
NOR LIKE-MINDED COLLEAGUES WOULD LONG SURVIVE A SHIFT TO
MOSCOW. HOWEVER, RECOGNIZING THEIR BIAS, I DO NOT FIND IT
DESTROYS THE VALIDITY OF WHAT THEY WERE TRYING TO CONVEY.

GP-3. SYMN S

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TELEGRAM

32a

~~SECRET~~ 514

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ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

0 151628Z FEB 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3440

EXDIS

SUBJECT: ARMS FOR JORDAN

REF: AMMAN 3417

1. EMBOFF HAS LEARNED FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL DETAILS FROM KHAMMASH AND KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY RIFA'I ABOUT FEB 12-13 DISCUSSIONS INVOLVING KING CONCERNING OUR ARMS PACKAGE. KING SUMMONED KHAMMASH IMMEDIATELY ON HIS ARRIVAL IN AMMAN EVENING FEB 12 TO KING'S HOME FOR FOUR-HOUR PRIVATE TALK. ACCORDING TO KHAMMASH, CONFIRMED SEPARATELY BY RIFA'I, HUSSEIN WAS EXTREMELY PLEADED WITH PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND WITH KHAMMASH'S ACCOUNT OF ACROSS BOARD MANIFESTATIONS OF USG SUPPORT FOR JORDAN, EVIDENCED BY ALL TOP OFFICIALS HE MET IN WASHINGTON. BUT KING WAS SINCERELY DISAPPOINTED AT PACKAGE WITH WHICH KHAMMASH RETURNED, SINCE IT WAS CONSIDERABLY LESS IN KEY AREAS THAN KING HAD REQUESTED. HIS DIS-

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3440A ~~SECRET~~

APPOINTMENT WAS CLEARLY COMPOUNDED BY FACT IT TOOK KHAMMASH ONE MONTH TO GET THE PACKAGE. KHAMMASH TOOK IMMEDIATE BRUNT OF KING'S DISAPPOINTMENT ARGUING IN HIS OWN DEFENSE THAT HE WAS GIVEN LITTLE CHANCE TO DEBATE USG OFFER AND THAT HE

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03440 151733Z

CONSIDERED IN ANY EVENT USG POLITICAL USPPORT WAS IMPORTANT SUPPLEMENT TO BE CONSIDERED IN OVERALL APPRAISAL OF HIS MISSION'S RESULTS. KING COUNTERED BY ARGUING THAT DECLARATION OF USG POLITICAL SUPPORT MADE ITS LIMITATIONS ON ARMS LISTEVEN MORE INCOMPREHENSIBLE. KHAMMASH THEN ASSURED KING HE WAS CERTAIN, IN VIEW OF ATTITUDES EXPRESSED, THAT USG WOULD ENTERTAIN ADDITIONAL ARMS REQUESTS IN FUTURE. KING RESPONDED THAT PRESENT WAS CRUCIAL FOR HIM AND JORDAN AND THAT UNLESS HE WAS ASSURED NOW OF SUPPORT FROM AND THEREBY CONTROL OF ARMY HE AND KHAMMASH WOULD NOT BE AROUND TO PRESENT ANY FUTURE REQUESTS TO USG. IN SUM, KING VIEWED USG RESPONSE AND KHAMMASH PERFORMANCE IN WASHINGTON WITH MIXED EMOTIONS; ON BALANCE HIS REACTION WAS ON NEGATIVE SIDE PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF HIS APPREHENSIONS ABOUT HIS CRITICAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH ARMY.

2. ON FEB 13 AT PALACE, KING WAS OBVIOUSLY FRUSTRATED AND

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3440A ~~SECRET~~

UNHAPPY OVER PACKAGE WITH WHICH HE "ASHAMED FACE ARMY." PRIMIN TALHOUNI, KHAMMASH, AND RIFA'I IN JOINT AND PRIVATE SESSIONS WITH KING EMPHASIZED POSITIVE ASPECTS OF USG POSITION, IN FEAR HE MIGHT TAKE SOME PRECIPITOUS ACTION ALL WOULD REGRET. THESE SESSIONS SERVED TO LOWER KING'S TEMPERATURE BEFORE HIS MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR BUT RESULT WAS HIS MORE REASONED INSISTENCE ON IMPROVEMENT OF USG LIST IN ORDER SECURE ARMY ACCEPTANCE.

3. BOTH KHAMMASH AND RIFA'I EXPRESSED HOPE USG COULD DEVISE FORMULA BOTH ACCEPTABLE TO IT AND ENOUGH FOR KING TO FACE ARMY. BOTH ESPOUSED OBVIOUS ARGUMENTS THAT OFFER, NOT DELIVERY, OF EQUIPMENT WAS NOW WHAT KIN DESPERATELY NEEDED AND WARNED THAT OUR UNWILLINGNESS TO FIND A WAY TO PROMISE MORE EQUIPMENT, WHETHER IT IS EVER DELIVERED, COULD DEFEAT SUCCESS OF PRESENT EXERCISE. KHAMMASH WAS THE MORE EXPLICIT

OF THE TWO. HE URGED THAT WE APPROVE A PACKAGE LARGER THAN THE ONE HE BROUGHT BACK WHICH KING COULD TALK ABOUT WITH CONFIDENCE TO ARMY BUT ONE WHICH WOULD CONTAIN ENOUGH

~~SECRET~~



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PAGE 03 AMMAN 03440 151733Z

CONTROLS IN TERMS OF AVAILABILITY, DELIVERY DATE AND PAYMENT REQUIREMENTS, TO PROTECT USG INTERESTS. AFTER ALL,

PAGE 4 RUOMKG 3440A ~~SECRET~~

KHAMMASH SAID, QTE WE ARE AT YOUR MERCY; IF AT DELIVERY TIME YOU DECIDE THAT THE AREA SITUATION DICTATES OTHERWISE, YOU CAN FIND AMPLE REASONS FOR DELAYING OR CURTAILING DELIVERY. BUT AT LEAST YOU WILL HAVE GIVEN THE KING A YEAR'S LEASE WHICH IS WHAT YOU AND WE NEED. UNQTE

4. KHAMMASH, WHO SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO RESIGN IF JORDAN-US RELATIONS WERE NOT PRESERVED, CONCLUDED BY OBSERVING THAT THE PERSPECTIVES OF THE CASE WERE BECOMING DISTORTED. HE SAID, IF SAUDI ARABIA WAS WILLING TO PAY TO KEEP THE SOVIETS OUT OF JORDAN AND THE US IN, WE PROBABLY OUGHT TO LET THEM DO IT. AS RIFA'I PUT IT, IF \$10000,000 OF FAISAL'S MONEY IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A SOVIET AND AN AMERICAN JORDAN, THE CHOICE SHOULD BE EASY.

5. COMMENT: BOTH KHAMMASH AND RIFA'I OBVIOUSLY HAVE A VESTED INTEREST IN OUR DECISION SINCE BOTH REALIZE THAT NEITHER THEY NOR LIKE-MINDED COLLEAGUES WOULD LONG SURVIVE A SHIFT TO MOSCOW. HOWEVER, RECOGNIZING THEIR BIAS, I DO NOT FIND IT DESTROYS THE VALIDITY OF WHAT THEY WERE TRYING TO CONVEY.

GP-3. SYMMES

#NOTE: AS RECEIVED.

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TELEGRAM
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~~SECRET~~ 124

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03431 151241Z

42
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 151155Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4652

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3431

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 3421

SUBJ: ISRAEL-JORDAN

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY BATTLE

1. WE ARE STRUCK BY COINCIDENCE THAT ESHKOL AND DAYAN SPEECHES THREATENING JORDAN WITH RETALIATION (REFTEL) BECAUSE OF ITS ALLEGED TOLERATION OF TERRORISM WERE MADE SOON AFTER ISRAELIS HAD BEEN INFORMED OF OUR INTENT TO RESUME ARMS SHIPMENTS TO JORDAN. ESKHOL'S SPEECH WITH ITS COMMENTS CRITICAL OF THOSE COUNTRIES THAT WOULD SUPPLY ARMS TO THE ARABS IS PARTICULARLY PERTINENT. WE FIND THESE PUBLIC STATEMENTS CURIOUSLY AT VARIANCE!

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3431A ~~SECRET~~
WITH REASONABLE TONE AND CONTENT OF GEN YARIV COMMENT WHICH SEEMED DESIGNED ACTUALLY REDUCE TENSION (TEL AVIV USDAO 0319).

2. WE RECOGNIZE THERE HAVE BEEN REPEATED INCIDENTS. IT SEEMS TO US, HOWEVER, THAT BAD AS IT IS THE PATTERN

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HAS NOT BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY WORSE THAN FOR QUITE SOMETIME IN THE PAST AS EMBASSY DATT TEL AVIV POINTED OUT, THE MAIN RECENT CHANGE WAS THE DEATH OF CIVILIANS IN THE FEB 8 INCIDENT. ISRAELI POLICY OF STRIKING BACK HARD AT TARGETS OF ITS OWN CHOOSING IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES IS WELL ESTABLISHED AND THE SHELLING OF REFUGEE CAMPS SEEMS EXPLAINABLE ONLY IN THIS LIGHT. THE DIFFICULTY OF FIXING RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHO INITIATES AND WHO ESCALATES IN EACH CASE OF CROSS-BORDER FIRINGS IS OBVIOUS (AND, FRANKLY, STATEMENTS BY EITHER SIDE ARE OF LITTLE OR NO MEANING IN THIS CONNECTION). IT IS HARD FOR US TO UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, HOW JORDAN, GIVEN ITS VULNERABILITY, WOULD DELIBERATELY INITIATE AND ESCALATE MAJOR EXCHANGES. MOREOVER, WE

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ARE ALL AWARE THAT LIMITED EXCHANGES MEANS REDUCING INCIDENTS HAVE BEEN TAKING PLACE BETWEEN GOI AND GOJ.

3. RECOGNIZING THAT ISRAELIS HAD BEEN PREPARED FOR OUR DECISION ON ARMS AND PROBABLY GOTTEN POINT THAT WE WOULD NOT APPRECIATE DIRECT PUBLIC REACTION TO OUR MOVE, WE WONDER IF THESE SPEECHES AND THE STEPPED UP EFFORT TO DEPICT JORDAN GOVT AS VILLIAN IN PIECE MAY REPRESENT AN ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF PRESSURE. SUGGEST IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO CONVEY TO GOI LEADERSHIP OUR LACK OF APPRECIATION OF THIS TYPE PRESSURE AS WELL.
GP-3 SYMMES

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4646

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3420

EXDIS

REF AMMAN 3417

SUBJECT JORDAN ARMS -- AIRCRAFT

1. AS REPORTED FEETEL FIRST REACTION OF KING AND KHAMMASH TO F-104 OFFER IN OUR PACKAGE WAS THAT THEY WERE INTERESTED INSTEAD IN SUBSTITUTING A-4 SKYHAWKS. THIS WAS BASED ON SERIES OF LENGTHY DISCUSSIONS WITH JORDAN AIR FORCE OFFICERS WHO WE UNDERSTAND CONTINUE TO FEEL THAT F-104 IS NOT SUITABLE FOR THEIR REQUIREMENTS. ADDITIONALLY, THERE IS A PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORSTEMMING FROM THEIR EXPERIENCE

PAGE TWO RUQMKG 3420A ~~SECRET~~
WITH F-104S IN OPERATION COLLEGE RUN WHEN TWO AIRCRAFT WERE LOST. SINCE MY CONVERSATION WITH KING YESTERDAY WE HAVE LEARNED INDIRECTLY THAT HE HAS REAFFIRMED HIS INTEREST IN SECURING SKYHAWKS IN LIEU OF F-104S.

2. IN VIEW OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO SEPARATE THE GROUND AND AIR ELEMENTS INOUR ARMS PACKAGE. WHILE WE ENDEAVOR TO FIND OUT HOWSERIOUS THE KING REALLY IS IN OBTAINING ANY US

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AIRCRAFT AT THIS TIME AND HOW KEENLY HE FEELS THE PRESSURE FOR EARLY DELIVERY. THEREFORE REQUEST WE BE INFORMED WHETHER SKYHAWKS WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR JORDAN AND WHAT COST AND DELIVERY DATES MIGHT BE. IN ADDITION WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR PERTINENT INFORMATION ON COST AND DELIVERY DATES FOR F-5 AIRCRAFT ALSO. ALTHOUGH JORDANIANS HAVE A DECIDED PREFERENCE FOR SKYHAWKS AND HAVE CONSISTENTLY INDICATED THEY WOULD NOT FAVOR INTRODUCING F-5S. I THINK WE SHOULD BE IN A POSITION IF SKYHAWKS ARE NOT AVAILABLE OR SHOULD PROVE TOO COSTLY TO PROVIDE THEM WITH AN ALTERNATIVE.

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3. JORDANIAN INTEREST IN THE SKYHAWK APPEARS TO BE BASED AS NEARLY AS WE CAN JUDGE ON (A) ATTRACTIVENESS OF OBTAINING SAME AIRCRAFT SUPPLIED TO ISRAELIS (B) THEIR BELIEF THAT SKYHAWK IS RELATIVELY CHEAP AIRCRAFT (C) ATTRACTIVENESS OF SKYHAWK IN THEIR EYES AS A MULTI-PURPOSE AIRCRAFT.

4. I HAVE ALREADY MENTIONED TO KING THAT I HAVE NO IDEA AS TO WHEN SKYHAWKS MIGHT BE AVAILABLE BUT I WOULD SURMISE IT MIGHT BE EIGHTEEN MONTHS TO THREE YEARS. AS I SEE IT, WE HAVE ROOM FOR MANEUVER IN WAY WE RESPOND TO HIS INTEREST IN SKYHAWKS BY (1) DEMONSTRATING OUT WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER MAKING THEM AVAILABLE WHILE (2) SHOWING THAT THEIR COST AND DELIVERY DATES MAY MAKE THEM LESS FAVORABLE THAN F-104S AS FAR AS JORDAN IS CONCERNED. AT SAME TIME, WE MIGHT SLIP IN THE F-5S AS A COMPROMISE THAT HE MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT WISH TO ELECT BUT WHICH WOULD INDICATE OUR CONTINUED WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT JORDAN.

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5. WE BELIEVE THAT OUR WILLINGNESS TO SUPPLY F-104S

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HAS HAD DECIDEDLY GOOD EFFECT AS AN EARNEST OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT JORDAN AND IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE THAT AFTER FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF PRICES AND AVAILABILITIES THE KING WILL REVERT TO F-104S.

6. ASSUMING THAT NO AMERICAN AIRCRAFT OPTIONS SUIT HIM AND ASSUMING ALSO THAT WE ARE ABLE SUBSTANTIALLY TO MEET HIS GROUND FORCE REQUIREMENTS, WE WOULD EXPECT THAT HE MIGHT THEN DECIDE TO LOOK FOR OTHER WESTERN AIRCRAFT PERHAPS MIRAGES OR LIGHTNINGS AND THAT IN DOING SO HE WOULD GO TO KING FAISAL FOR HELP IN FINANCING.

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O 141730Z FEB 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4644

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTION AMMAN 3419

EXDIS

SUBJECT: SUGGESTED TACTICS FOR REVISING AND NEGOTIATING
JORDAN ARMS PACKAGE

REF: AMMAN 3417 AND AMMAN 3418

1. REFTELS REPORT KING'S REACTION TO ARMS PACKAGE AND HIS PROPOSED CHANGES. PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO SUGGEST TACTICS FOR HANDLING KING'S REQUEST FOR INCREASED QUANTITIES AND EARLIER DELIVERY DATES. AS WE SEE IT, WHAT KING NEEDS AND WANTS IS A PACKAGE THAT WOULD AT LEAST APPEAR TO HIS TROOPS AND TO LOCAL AND OTHER ARAB OPINION TO PROVIDE

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 341/1A ~~SECRET~~

A LARGER AMOUNT OF KEY EQUIPMENT SOONER THAN DOES OUR PRESENT PACKAGE. THUS, PROBLEM IS TO FIND A WAY TO GIVE HIM A BIGGER AND BETTER PACKAGE HE COULD TALK ABOUT WHICH, AT THE SAME TIME, WOULD BE CONDITIONED ON THE ACTUAL AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS AND EQUIPMENT. WAY OUT, AS WE SEE IT, IS TO GIVE HIM A NEW PACKAGE THAT WOULD INCLUDE OPTIONS CONDITIONED ON HIS FINDING CASH OR DREDIT (PERHAPS IN FORM LOAN GUARANTEES), PRESUMABLY FROM SAUDI ARABIA.

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2. TANKS DEFINITELY SEEM TO BE MOST IMPORTANT ITEM IN MIND OF BOTH KING AND KHAMMASH, AND WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND AGREEING TO SUPPLY 152 M48A1S. THEY LOST 152 AMERICAN TANKS OF WHICH 124 WERE M48S. WE WOULD BE MAKING UP THEIR ACTUAL US TANK LOSSES (WHICH IS FORMULA IN WHICH THEY AND OTHER ARABS SET GREAT STORE), AND WE WOULD BE ACCEPTING THEIR ARGUMENTS FOR TANK STANDARDIZATION. FINALLY, THIS MIGHT HELP TO STAVE OFF THEIR COMING IN LATER FOR MORE TANKS-- PERHAPS OF THE M48A3 VARIETY WHICH HAPPILY THEY HAVE NOT MENTIONED. OUR APPROXIMATE COSTING OUT OF THIS ITEM INDICATES THAT ROUGHTLY \$3 MILLION ADDITIONAL MIGHT BE INVOLVED. IN TERMS OF BEING ABLE

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3419/1A ~~SECRET~~

TO PROVIDE JORDAN WITH AN OPTION (TO BE FUNDED BY ADDITIONAL SAUDI FUNDS OR CREDIT) WE WOULD PROPOSE OUR AGREEING TO A TOTAL OF 152 M48A1S WITH 100 TO BE SHIPPED AS PART OF THE "CERTAIN" PACKAGE AND A FURTHER 52 TO BE SHIPPED IN FY 1970 IF FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE.

3. ASIDE FROM TANKS MOST OF THE REMAINING INCREASES REQUESTED REFLECT THE JORDANIAN OBSESSION WITH THE NEEDS FOR A BETTER ANTI-AIRCRAFT CAPABILITY. THEY SAY ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFICIENCIES IN JUNE AND SINCE (WHEN ISRAELIS HAVE FLOWN OVER ENTIRE COUNTRY WHENEVER THEY HAVE WISHED) HAVE HAD A SEVERE EFFECT ON JAA MORALE. DEPT WILL RECALL KHAMMASH FELT FORCED TO MOVE AN IRAQI AAA UNIT INTO JORDAN VALLEY AFTER KARAMEL INCIDENT LAST NOVEMBER (USDAO AMMAN 0625 NOV 67). KING AND KHAMMASH RECOGNIZE THEY LACK "MAKING UP LOSSES" ARGUMENT IN CASE OF 40MMS AND 50 CAL QUADS, AND THEY HAVE INSTEAD ARGUED THAT IT IS (1) THE JAA MORALE FACTOR AND (2) THE OBJECTIVE DETERRENT TO ISRAELI OVERFLIGHTS THAT JUSTIFIES THEIR NEED FOR THESE ITEMS. KHAMMASH ALSO POINTED OUT TO ME THAT WHEN SECRETARY MCNAMARA HANDED HIM THE MEMO OF UNDER-

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STANDING HE, KHAMMASH, HAD MISTAKENLY READ "40" INSTEAD OF "4" AS THE QUANTITY OF 40MMS BEING OFFERED. OTHERWISE,

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HE WOULD HAVE ON THAT OCCASION FELT COMPELLED TO JUSTIFY JORDAN'S NEED FOR ADDITIONAL 40MMS. REAL NEEDS AS THEY SEE THEM ARE FOR 50 40MMS. KING AND KHAMMASH INDICATED THAT THEY WANT 40MMS NOW, AND I BELIEVE THEY WOULD NOT ENTERTAIN THEIR BEING PROVIDED AS A DELAYED OPTION, BUT WE MIGHT CONSIDER AN OPTION PROVIDING FOR THEIR AVAILABILITY NOW IF FUNDS (FROM FAISAL?) ARE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE. SO FAR AS THE 50 CAL QUADS ARE CONCERNED WE WOULD SUGGEST A FORMULA OF 100 NOW AND 50 IN FY 1970.

4. ON ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS, KING AND KHAMMASH ACKNOWLEDGE THEY LOST ONLY 43, WHICH IS NUMBER IN OUR PACKAGE, IN JUSTIFICATION OF THEIR REQUEST FOR 100, THEY ARGUE THAT THEY HAVE ALWAYS TAKEN LINE WITH US THAT THEIR APC STRENGTH WAS INADEQUATE. THEY PARTICULARLY NEED ADDITIONAL APCS TO STRENGTHEN THEIR BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS UNITS. AS WE SEE IT, THIS REQUEST COULD BE COMPROMISED AS 50 NOW (SEVEN MORE THAN OUR PACKAGE) WITH AN OPTION OF 50 MORE IN FY 1970 PROVIDED

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 3419/1A ~~SECRET~~
FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE.

5. PRESUMABLY DOD IS ALREADY LOOKING INTO AVAILABILITY OF 155MM GUNS. KING AND KHAMMASH REFERRED TO SECRETARY MCNAMARA'S AGREEMENT "TO TRY TO FIND" THESE AND ARE ASKING FOR 10. THE FIGURE OF 20 155MM HOWITZERS REPRESENTS A BATTALION WITH TWO SPARES. KING AND KHAMMASH JUSTIFY THIS REQUEST ON GROUNDS THAT THEY NOW HAVE ONE BATTALION ASSOCIATED WITH ONE OF THEIR DIVISIONS AND NEED THIS ADDITIONAL 20 TO SUPPORT THE SECOND DIVISION. WE THINK WAY TO HANDLE THIS REQUEST WOULD BE TO AGREE TO AN OPTION TO SUPPLY IN FY 1970 PROVIDED FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE.

6. INCREASED FIGURE FOR 2-1/2 TON TRUCKS (WHICH WOULD MOUNT 50 CAL QUADS) APPEARS TO DERIVE FROM FOLLOWING: 40 2-1/2 TON TRUCKS WERE OFFERED IN PACKAGE; 40 ADDITIONAL 2-1/2 TON TRUCKS ARE NEEDED FOR MOUNTING 40 UNMOUNTED 50 CAL MACHINE GUNS NOW ON HAND; ADDITIONAL 150 WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR MOUNTING 150 ADDITIONAL 50 CAL QUADS THEY HAVE REQUESTED.

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THIS MAKES A TOTAL OF 230 2-1/2 TON TRUCKS REQUESTED AGAINST

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A TOTAL LOSS OF 1240 TRUCKS LOST IN JUNE (INCLUDING 820 THREE-TON TRUCKS). WE BELIEVE WAY TO HANDLE THIS WOULD BE TO TIE IT TO OPTIONAL PACKAGE PROPOSED FOR 150 50 CAL QUADS.

7 EXTENT OF EQUIPMENT DESIRED FOR THE LOCATOR BATTALION IS NOT KNOWN. SOME TARGET ACQUISITION EQUIPMENT WAS INCLUDED IN PROJECT MOB COMMITMENTS AFTER SAMU. THIS HAS NEVER BEEN SUPPLIED. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THREE COUNTER BATTERY RADAR PLATOONS ARE NOW DESIRED IN ADDITION TO WHAT WAS REQUESTED UNDER PROJECT MOB.

8. WE KNOW THAT APART FROM NEED TO SHOW US RESTRAINT IN SUPPLY ARMS MONEY IS ONE OF PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS IN FORMULATING JORDAN PACKAGE. WE RECOGNIZE OUR INABILITY FROM THIS END TO PROPOSE A MIX THAT COULD TAKE FULLY INTO ACCOUNT EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITIES AND REALITIES OF JORDAN FUNDS AVAILABILITIES. OUR PRELIMINARY COSTING OF ALL FOREGOING ADDITIONAL ITEMS REQUESTED BY KING INDICATES IT WOULD REPRESENT APPROXIMATELY DOLS 11.5 MILLION ADDITIONAL TO THE

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EXDIS

PRESENTLY APPROVED DOLS 80-85 MILLION PACKAGE. ABOUT 50 PER CENT OF THE INCREASE WOULD BE FOR ANTI-AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT. KING WANTS TO KNOW IN DETAIL AND AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE WHAT HE IS GOING TO HAVE TO TRY TO GET FROM FAISAL.

9. I HOPE SOME KING OF CREDIT ARRANGEMENT IS NOT COMPLETELY

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3419/2A ~~SECRET~~
OUT OF THE QUESTION AND THAT WHATEVER MAY BE REALISTICALLY AVAILABLE CAN NOW BE FACTORED INTO A REVISED PACKAGE THAT WILL DO THE FOLLOWING:

A. GIVE THE KING SOMETHING CLOSE TO THE TOTAL FIGURES HE WANTS (BUT CONDITIONED OF COURSE ON AVAILABLE FUNDS).

B. SET FORTH CLEARLY THE ADDITIONAL FUNDS AND/OR CREDIT HE IS GOING TO REQUIRE (SO THAT NUMCAN SEE WHAT FAISAL IS PREPARED TO DO.)

10. I KNOW THIS IS A DIFFICULT PROPOSITION, BUT I HOPE I CAN BE GIVEN AN INDICATION BY FEB 17 AT LATEST THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH ABOVE SUGGESTIONS IN PRINCIPLE

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SO THAT I CAN GO BACK TO KING TO RELIEVE HIS MIND WHILE
DETAILED PROPOSALS ARE BEING WORKED OUT. I NEED NOT
EMPHASIZE THAT HE WANTS TO GO TO FAISAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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TO SECSTATE WAUHDC IMMEDIATE 4643

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3418

EXDIS

SUBJECT: JORDAN ARMS-DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

REF STATE 113634, AMMAN 3417

1. CHANGES PROPOSED BY KING HUSSEIN IN OUR DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING HAD BEEN WRITTEN IN BY HIM ON DRAFT MEMO HANDED TO KHAMMASH BY SECRETARY MCNAMARA (WHICH DOES NOT AGREE ENTIRELY WITH OUR TELEGRAPHIC TEXT). I BELIEVE HIS EDITORIAL CHANGES LARGELY REFLECT HIS OFF-THE-CUFF REACTION AND HIS USUAL UNWILLINGNESS ACCENTUATED BY HIS PRESENT EMOTIONAL MOOD TO APPROVE LANGUAGE THAT

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APPEARS TO "TIE HIS HANDS." I BELIEVE THAT CALM DISCUSSION COULD WIN HIS ACCEPTANCE OF MOST OF OUR LANGUAGE AFTER MINOR REVISIONS IF WE ARE ABLE TO SATISFY HIM TO SOME EXTENT ON INCREASED QUANTITIES AND DELIVERY DATES. I DELIBERATELY AVOIDED DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE SUGGESTED CHANGES IN MOST CASES IN THE BELIEF THAT HIS REAL PROBLEM WAS QUANTITIES AND DELIVERY DATES. IT IS IMPORTANT ALSO TO NOTE THAT KING SAID HE FEARED THAT AGREEMENT MIGHT BECOME PUBLIC OR MIGHT HAVE TO BE SHOWN TO OTHER ARABS

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WHO ARE PAYING FOR EQUIPMENT. I SUGGESTED IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE (I COULD MAKE NO COMMITMENT) TO PUT SOME OF THE LANGUAGE TO WHICH HE OBJECTED IN A SEPARATE ANNEX IF THAT WOULD HELP. IN ANY CASE I REPORT HIS CHANGES FOR THE RECORD AND WITH THE CAUTION THAT I HAVE NOT YET SOUNDED OUT HIS REAL FEELINGS ABOUT THEM.

2. FOLLOWING CHANGES PROPOSED BY KING ARE KEYED TO NUMBERED PARAS OF DRAFT MEMO IN REFTEL:

3. PARA I. THE KING WANTED THE WORD "MILITARY" INSERTED

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BETWEEN "LEGITIMATE" AND "DEFENSIVE" AT END OF SENTENCE. I DID NOT EXPLORE HIS REASONS FOR THIS CHANGE.

4. PARA III. ADD AT END OF FIRST SENTENCE "SO LONG AS ALL SUCH REQUIREMENTS CONTINUE TO BE MADE AVAILABLE TO IT." THE KING'S IDEA WAS THAT IT HAD TO BE UNDERSTOOD THAT HIS PROCUREMENT POLICY DEPENDED ON OUR WILLINGNESS TO MAKE EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE.

5. PARA IV-CM VERSION OF MEMO HANDED TO KHAMMASH READ: "REPLACE 'WITH SOME EXCEPTIONS' GROUND FORCE EQUIPMENT LOST IN JUNE." OUR VERSION IN STATE 113634 READS: "REPLACE 'BULK OF' GROUND FORCE EQUIPMENT." (THIS HAS BEEN CLEARED UP BY STATE 114802.) KING WISHED TO DELETE "WITH SOME EXCEPTIONS" BUT APPEARED TO FIND "BULK OF" ACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE. KING'S PROPOSED LIST OF EQUIPMENT IN IV-C WOULD READ AS FOLLOWS:
(ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO) M48 A-1 TANKS
(TWENTY-FIVE) 105 MM HOWITZERS
(ONE HUNDRED) ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS

PAGE FOUR RUQMKG 3418A ~~SECRET~~
(TWENTY) 155 MM HOWITZERS. (THIS IS A NEW ITEM REPRESENTING ONE BATTALION WITH TWO SPARE HOWITZERS.)

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(TEN) 155 MM GUNS. (KHAMMAS STATES SEC MCNAMARA AGREED TO TRY TO FIND THESE FOR JORDAN.)
(ONE) LOCATOR BATTALION
(FIFTY) 40 MM SP AAA GUNS
(ONE HUNDRED FIFTY) 106 MM JEEP-MOUNTED RECOILLESS RIFLES.
(TWO HUNDRED THIRTY) M35A2 TWO-AND-A-HALF TON TRUCKS.
(ONE HUNDRED FIFTY) 50 CALIBER BROWNING QUAD MACHINE GUNS.
AFTER DISCUSSION OF DELIVERY DATES THE KING ASKED I DELETE "AND 1970" FROM US FISCAL YEARS IN THIS PARAGRAPH. HE NOTED HIS AGREEMENT TO "1969" WOULD DEPEND ON DETAILS OF HOW AND WHAT WE PROPOSED TO DELIVER.

6. PARA IV-F. TO BE CHANGED TO READ "AGREE TO AN OPTION" INSTEAD OF "AGREE TO CONSIDER AT SOME POINT IN THE FUTURE."

7. PARA V-A(1). DELETE "RESULTING FROM PROGRESS TOWARDS

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AN ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT."

8. PARA V-A(2). DELETE "AND THE EXTENT OF ITS FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES."

9. PARA V-A(3). DELETE "PROGRESS TOWARDS ARMS LIMITATION IN THE AREA."

10. PARA V-B. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING IN STATE 113634 DOES NOT INCLUDE AT THE END OF FIRST SENTENCE "AND ITS MILITARY MANPOWER LEVEL AT NOT MORE THAN 53,000" WHICH IS INCLUDED IN VERSION HANDED KHAMMASH. IN ANY CASE, KING HUSSEIN WANTS THAT PHRASE DELETED, AS WELL AS THE FOLLOWING CLAUSE: "THIS MILITARY BUDGET, AS WELL AS JORDAN'S MILITARY MANPOWER LEVEL WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF ANNUAL REVIEW BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS." IN LATTER PART OF SECOND SENTENCE, KING WISHES "AGREED" CHANGED TO "DISCUSSED." KING PROPOSES TO ADD TO LAST SENTENCE OF THIS PARA "WHENEVER JORDAN FEELS ABLE TO DO SO DUE TO IMPROVEMENTS IN AREA CONDITIONS."

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11. PARA V-D. KING PROPOSED DELETION OF THIS PARA. I EXPLAINED THAT I WAS CERTAIN THIS IS STANDARD LANGUAGE AND THAT I THOUGHT IT MUST HAVE BEEN IN OTHER AGREEMENTS SIGNED BY JORDAN. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT ITS PRIMARY PURPOSE AMONG OTHERS IS TO INSURE THAT A RECIPIENT COUNTRY DOES NOT UNDLY DIVERT ITS RESOURCES TO MILITARY PURCHASES, WHATEVER THE SOURCE OF SUPPLY. CONGRESS FEELS MORE AND MORE DEEPLY THE IMPORTANCE OF SUCH ASSURANCES. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION THE KING AGREED TO DEFER POSSIBLE REVISION OF THE PARA UNTIL AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE MODIFICATIONS IN THE PACKAGE AS A WHOLE.

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4641

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTIONS AMMAN 3417

EXDIS

SUBJECT: HUSSEIN'S REACTION TO JORDAN ARMS PACKAGE

1. SUMMARY: KING HUSSEIN'S REACTION TO OUR ARMS PACKAGE IS THAT AS IT STANDS IT IS INSUFFICIENT IN TERMS OF QUANTITIES (PARTICULARLY TANKS), DELIVERY DATES, AND FINANCIAL TERMS. HE REQUESTED WE GIVE URGENT CONSIDERATION TO CORRESPONDING CHANGES HE WISHES INCORPORATED INTO OUR DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING TO TAKE CARE OF THESE DEFICIENCIES. KING ALSO INDICATED HE WILL RELUCTANTLY HAVE TO CONSIDER OTHER SOURCES IF WE CANNOT GO FURTHER TO MEET HIS POLITICO-MILITARY NEEDS.

2. KING HUSSEIN ASKED I CALL LATE ON THE THIRTEENTH. AS I EXPECTED, HE WANTED TO DISCUSS THE ARMS PACKAGE WHICH HE HAD SPENT MOST OF DAY DISCUSSING WITH GENERAL KHAMMASH AND VARIOUS OTHER GOJ OFFICIALS. CROWN PRINCE HASSAN AND

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3417/1A ~~SECRET~~
GENERAL KHAMMASH WERE PRESENT THROUGHOUT OUR CONVERSATION.

3. KING BEGAN BY EXPRESSING WARM THANKS FOR PRESIDENT'S

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LETTER (STATE 1136345) AND SAID HE WOULD BE RESPONDING IN SIMILAR SPIRIT. HE ALSO EXPRESSED THANKS FOR TIME AND ATTENTION GIVEN TO GENERAL KHAMMASH DURING HIS TALKS IN WASHINGTON AND FOR OPPORTUNITIES FOR KHAMMASH TO DISCUSS JORDAN'S PROBLEMS WITH KEY US OFFICIALS. HE THEN SAID HE WAS QUITE DISAPPOINTED THAT LENGTH OF TIME AND NATURE OF DISCUSSIONS HAD NOT PRODUCED A MORE ACCEPTABLE PACKAGE IN TERMS OF HIS POLITICAL AND MILITARY NEEDS. IF PACKAGE BROUGHT BY GENERAL KHAMMASH REPRESENTED BEST WE COULD DO, HE WAS STILL FACED WITH QUESTION WHETHER IT WAS NOT IN JORDAN'S BEST INTEREST TO SEEK ARMS FROM ANOTHER SOURCE. HE HOPED THAT HE WOULD NOT HAVE TO GO TO THAT OTHER SOURCE BECAUSE HE STILL DID NOT CONSIDER IT TO BE IN JORDAN'S LONG-TERM INTEREST, NOR FOR THAT MATTER IN THE INTEREST OF THE US. NEVERTHELESS, FACT REMAINED THAT ARMS PACKAGE THAT HAD BEEN BROUGHT BACK BY KHAMMASH DID NOT SATISFACTORILY MEET JORDAN'S POLITICAL AND MILITARY REQUIREMENTS.

4. THE KING THEN SPECIFIED DEFICIENCIES IN TERMS OF QUAN-

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3417/1A ~~SECRET~~
TITIES AND DELIVERY DATES. HE FIRST LAID GREAT STRESS ON INSUFFICIENT NUMBER OF TANKS INCLUDED IN PACKAGE. HE REFERRED TO FACT WE HAD SAID WE WERE IN GENERAL REPLACING LOSSES SUFFERED BY JAA IN JUNE HOSTILITIES. JORDAN HAS LOST 152 AMERICAN TANKS OF WHICH 124 WERE M48S AND THE REMAINDER M47S. YET WE WERE OFFERING JORDAN ONLY 88US TANKS TO MAKE UP THIS LOSS. THESE 152 TANKS WERE APART FROM THE CENTURION TANKS THAT HAD BEEN LOST. THE KING NOTED BITTERLY THAT 142 OF THE AMERICAN TANKS LOST BY JORDAN ARE NOW IN SERVICE IN ISRAELI ARMY. HE THEN POINTED OUT VARIOUS OTHER INCREASED QUANTITIES OF GROUND EQUIPMENT NEEDED BY JORDAN. HE EMPHASIZED NEED FOR MORE ANTI-AIRCRAFT CAPABILITY IN TERMS OF MORALE FACTORS AND DETERRENT EFFECTS, BUT IT WAS CLEAR TANKS WERE HIS CHIEF CONCERN.

5. HUSSEIN SAID THAT APART FROM FAILURE OF PACKAGE TO MEET JORDAN'S "LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS" IN TERMS OF QUANTITIES, PROPOSED DELIVERY DATES ALSO GREATLY DISTURBED HIM BECAUSE

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THEY FAILED TO MEET JORDAN'S POLITICAL AND MILITARY NEEDS. HE NOTED THAT OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES HAVE ALREADY MADE UP THEIR LOSSES, WHEREAS OUR PROPOSED DELIVERY DATES, OFFERED

PAGE 4 RUGMKG 3417/1A ~~SECRET~~

EIGHT MONTHS AFTER THE JUNE WAR, EXTEND INTO US FISCAL YEAR 1970. HE SAID MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING PROVIDED NO ASSURANCE THAT SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF GROUND EQUIPMENT WOULD ARRIVE IN JORDAN IN 1968. HE HAD NO IDEA OF WHEN TANKS, WHICH WERE SO IMPORTANT FOR MORALE, WOULD BEGIN TO ARRIVE.

6. MOVING TO AIRCRAFT, THE KING AT FIRST SAID THAT HE DID NOT WANT F104S UNDER ANY CONDITIONS, AND HE ASKED TO HAVE 18 AA SKY HAWKS SUBSTITUTED FOR 18 F104S. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT HE WANTED TO RECONSIDER THAT PART OF THE PACKAGE FOR AT LEAST A FURTHER 24 HOURS TO MAKE UP HIS MIND AS TO WHAT HE SHOULD DO ABOUT AIRCRAFT. HIS MAIN COMPLAINT ABOUT THE F104S WAS THAT THEY ARE NO LONGER SUITABLE FOR JORDAN'S NEEDS. I POINTED OUT THE LOCAL AND AREA POLITICAL IMPACT AS WELL AS THE MORALE SIGNIFICANCE THAT DELIVERIES OF SOME F104S BY JUNE 1968 MIGHT HAVE AND THE FACT THAT HIS PILOTS ARE ALREADY WELL DOWN THE ROAD IN THEIR TRAINING. I SUGGESTED THAT INTRODUCTION OF ANY OTHER TYPE OF AIRCRAFT AT THIS STAGE, WHETHER US OR NON-US, WOULD POSE UNKNOWN DELIVERY AND TRAINING DELAYS. IT WAS AFTER HE HAD REFLECTED ON THIS THAT HE SAID HE WANTED TO RESERVE HIS POSITION WITH REGARD TO AIRCRAFT FOR ANOTHER 24 HOURS.

PAGE 5 PUQMKG 3417/1A ~~SECRET~~

7. FINALLY, THE KING HAD A NUMBER OF EDITORIAL REVISIONS THAT HE WISHED MADE IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING. MOST OF THESE, HE EMPHASIZED, RELATED TO HIS CONCERN IN

EVENT OF PUBLICITY, TO APPEARING TO HAVE TIED HIS HANDS. HE SAID HE PARTICULARLY WANTED TO AVOID BEING PUT IN A

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POSITION OF POTENTIAL EMBARRASSMENT VIS-A-VIS OTHER ARAB STATES AND WITH HIS OWN PEOPLE IF THE MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING SHOULD EVER BECOME PUBLIC. IN ANY CASE, HE SAID, HE PROBABLY WOULD BE FORCED TO SHOW THE MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING TO SOME OF THE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES PROVIDING FUNDS TO JORDAN.

8. WITH OBVIOUS RESULTS. HE THEN HANDED ME HIS COPY OF THE MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING AND REQUESTED I TRANSFER HIS INTERLINEATIONS TO MY TELEGRAPHIC COPY (AMENDED MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING WILL BE TRANSMITTED BY SEPTEL).

8. BEARING IN MIND POINTS IN STATE 1136"58998 RESPONDED TO HUSSEIN THAT WHILE I COULD SEE PACKAGE DID NOT CONTAIN EVERYTHING HE WANTED, I THOUGHT HE MIGHT HAVE OVERLOOKED HOW MUCH IT DID CONTAIN. IT SEEMED TO ME THAT IT REPRESENTED A VERY SUBSTANTIAL MEETING OF HIS STATED MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. MOST IMPORTANT, IT REPRESENTED TANGIBLE AND

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SIGNIFICANT PROOF OF US INTENTION TO SUPPORT JORDAN AND TO PROMOTE CLOSE AND CORDIAL RELATIONS WE HAVE HAD. I SAID WE HAD HOPED HE WOULD PROCEED IMMEDIATELY TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT AND THAT I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO MOVE AHEAD NOW ON THE ARMS PACKAGE IN ORDER TO OBTAIN THE POLITICAL BENEFITS I SAW COMING FROM HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE PACKAGE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE MORALE OF HIS ARMY COULD BE IMPROVED IMMEDIATELY. MOVING AHEAD QUICKLY WITH THE PACKAGE WOULD ENABLE HIM TO ASK NOW FOR THE EVACUATION OF SAUDI AND IRAQI TROOPS AND THEREBY TO EXERT GREATER CONTROL OVER THE TERRORISTS WHO HAVE BEEN THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF THE RECENT INCIDENTS IN THE VALLEY. IT WOULD ALSO IMPROVE THE GENERAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ATMOSPHERE NECESSARY FOR HIM TO PROCEED TOWARDS A MIDDLE EASTERN SETTLEMENT.

9.

GSSEIN INTERRUPTED TO SAY THAT UNFORTUNATELY THE QUANTITIES AND THE DELIVERY DATES IN THE PACKAGE WOULD NOT BE

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SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE HIM TO HOLD UP HIS HEAD WITH THE OFFICERS OF HIS OWN ARMY. HE THEREFORE NEEDED TO KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHETHER WE WOULD MEET HIS REQUIREMENTS AS HE HAD OUTLINED THEM. WHEN HE HAD OUR FINAL ANSWER, HE

SYMMES

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~~SECRET~~ 736

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45
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

0 141650Z FEB 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4642

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SECTIONS AMMAN 3417

EXDIS

INTENDED TO SEND GENERAL KHAMMASH TO KING FAISAL TO SEE WHAT, IF ANYTHING, FAISAL IS PREPARED TO DO IN TERMS OF FURTHER FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE BEFORE HE CONSIDERS OTHER SOURCES.

10. I TOLD THE KING I BELIEVED THAT IN CONSTITUTING OUR PACKAGE WE HAD TRIED TO GO AS FAR AS POSSIBLE TO MEET ALL OF HIS REQUIREMENTS. I WAS NOT YET INFORMED, OF COURSE, ON DETAILS OF WASHINGTON'S VIEWS ON VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE PACKAGE, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO DETAILED PROVISIONS OF THE MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING. I SAID I WOULD SURMISE THAT QUANTITIES THEREIN REPRESENTED THE BEST MIX POSSIBLE, GIVEN PRESUMED AVAILABILITY OF THE ITEMS INVOLVED AND THE FUNDS THAT JORDAN HAD AVAILABLE. I STRESSED THAT OUR CAPABILITY TO EXTEND CREDIT HAD BEEN DRASTICALLY MODIFIED BY CONGRESS. I NOTED ALSO THAT WE HAVE ALWAYS TRIED TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT WITH REGARD TO ARMS DELIVERIES TO ALL

PAGE 2 RUQMG 3417/2A ~~SECRET~~

STATES IN THE AREA AND THAT NO STATES HAD OBTAINED EVERYTHING THEY WANTED WHEN THEY HAD COME TO US FOR ARMS. KHAMMASH HAD SAID SECRETARY MCNAMARA TOLD HIM HE WOULD TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT HELPING JORDAN TO FIND SOME 155MM GUNS. WITH REGARD TO DELIVERY DATES, I POINTED OUT THAT THE

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MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING IN PARA IV-C REFERRED TO US FISCAL YEARS AND NOT CALENDAR YEARS, WHICH WOULD TAKE SIX MONTHS OFF THE 1970 DATE. ON THE OTHER HAND, I THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT EVERYTHING TO BE DELIVERED IN CALENDAR YEAR 1968 IN VIEW OF FUNDS AVAILABLE TO JORDAN, OUR OWN CREDIT LIMITATIONS, AS WELL AS PERHAPS THE LIMITED AVAILABILITY OF SOME OF THE EQUIPMENT. I REFERRED TO SECRETARY MCNAMARA'S MENTIONING TO KHAMMASH THAT HE WOULD LOOK AGAIN AT THE POSSIBILITY OF SHIPPING SOME ITEMS OUT BY AIR. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS THAT JORDAN HAD A QUITE SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY PACKAGE. I WOULD HAVE HOPED THIS IN ITSELF WOULD BE ENOUGH TO TAKE CARE OF MORALE IN HIS ARMY AND PUBLIC OPINION IN JORDAN AND ELSEWHERE, PARTICULARLY ONCE IT BECAME KNOWN PUBLICLY THAT ITEMS WERE COMING IN AND THAT JORDAN'S "LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS" WERE BEING MET BY

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3417/2A ~~SECRET~~
THE U.S.

11. SPECIFICALLY ON TANKS, I MENTIONED OUR UNDERSTANDING BRITISH MIGHT HAVE UP TO 200 CENTURIONS AVAILABLE WHICH COULD EASILY BE UPGUNNED IN JORDAN WITH SPARES AVAILABLE WELL INTO 1970. BOTH KING AND KHAMMASH SAID MOST EMPHATICALLY THEY DO NOT WANT ANY MORE CENTURIONS. KHAMMASH ADDED THAT IF HE COULD GET ADDITIONAL M48S THEY NEED TO MAKE UP THEIR US TANK LOSSES HE WOULD HAPPILY DUMP EXISTING CENTURIONS IN GULF OF AQABA--IF THAT WERE A US CONDITION. PRINCIPAL ARGUMENT AGAINST CENTURIONS, HE SAID, IS JORDAN'S NEED TO STANDARDIZE. NOW IT HAD VERY COMPLICATED SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE AS WELL A TRAINING PROBLEMS. GIVEN OBSOLESCENCE OF CENTURIONS AND BRITAIN'S POSITION TODAY, HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE FOLLY TO STANDARDIZE ON BRITISH TANKS AND MIXING SIMPLY IS NOT FEASIBLE.

12. AS I RESPONDED THE KING DEPT RETURNING TO HIS ORIGINAL STATEMENTS WITH REGARD TO THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE QUANTITIES AND DELIVERY DATES OF THE PACKAGE AND HIS NEED TO KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHAT WE ARE PREPARED TO DO TO MAKE UP FOR

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THE DEFICIENCIES THAT HE SEES IN IT. HE WANTS TO SEND KHAMMASH TO SEE FAISAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 3417/2A ~~SECRET~~

13. WITH REGARD TO CREDIT AND FUNDS, I ASKED THE KING IF HE THOUGHT KING FAISAL WOULD BE WILLING TO ADVANCE JORDAN ADDITIONAL FUNDS IF NECESSARY TO SPEED UP DELIVERIES OR, ASSUMING THE ADDITIONAL ITEMS MIGHT BE AVAILABLE, TO OBTAIN OUR AGREEMENT TO INCREASE SOME QUANTITIES IN THE PACKAGE. THE KING TURNED TO KHAMMASH, WHO SAID FAISAL HAD TOLD THEM TO COME BACK BEFORE THEY WENT TO ANY OTHER SOURCE AND THEY HAD NO CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT HE WAS PREPARED TO DO FOR THEM. KHAMMASH SAID HE WOULD HOPE THAT AT THE VERY LEAST, HOWEVER, THERE MIGHT BE SOME WAY TO ARRANGE FOR SAUDI ARABIA TO PUT UP AN ACCEPTABLE LOAN TO JORDAN OR LOAN GUARANTEE TO US THAT WOULD THEN ENABLE THE USG TO PROVIDE FINANCING OR CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS THAT WOULD TAKE CARE OF THE DELIVERY AND QUANTITY PROBLEMS THEY HAD JUST DISCUSSED WITH ME

14. COMMENT: HUSSEIN WAS MORE RELAXED AND FRIENDLY TODAY THAN HE HAS EVER BEEN WITH ME. IT WAS CLEAR HE HAD BEEN CHEERED UP BY OUR WILLINGNESS TO GO AS FAR AS WE HAD. HE SAW THIS AS A REAL POLITICAL PLUS, BUT THERE WAS NO LACK OF DETERMINATION IN HIS STATEMENTS WITH REGARD TO THE PRESENT DEFICIENCIES HE SEES IN OUR PACKAGE AND HIS INTENTION TO

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3417/2A ~~SECRET~~

GO ELSEWHERE IF NECESSARY. AT THIS STAGE I FEEL UNABLE TO SAY WHETHER HE WILL BE WILLING TO COMPROMISE ON LESS THAN HIS TOTAL ASKING PRICE. MY PRESENT ESTIMATE IS THAT THERE MUST BE SOME SWEETENING OF THE PACKAGE TO GAIN HIS ACCEPTANCE. I BELIEVE THAT THE CRITICAL SWEETENER WOULD BE SOME MORE TANKS. ANTI-AIRCRAFT IS ALSO A MAJOR CONCERN. BEYOND THAT I THINK WE NEED TO DEVELOP A SET OF OPTIONS ON THE OTHER ITEMS THAT HE CAN PRESENT TO HIS ARMY AS A GLOBAL INDICATION OF WHAT WE ARE PREPARED TO DO. SUBJECT

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ACTUALLY, OF COURSE, TO HIS FINDING ADDITIONAL FUNDS OR CREDIT EITHER FROM US OR FROM THE SAUDIS. WE WILL PRESENT OUR DETAILED IDEAS IN A FOLLOWING MESSAGE.

15. SUGGEST DEPT REPEAT TO JIDDA FYI ONLY.

GP-1. SYMMES

WITH REGARD TO CREDIT AND FUNDS, THE KING, IF HE THOUGHT THE KING RAISAL WOULD BE WILLING TO ADVANCE JORDAN ADDITIONAL FUNDS OR NECESSARY TO SPEED UP DELIVERIES OR ASSUMING THE ADDITIONAL ITEMS MIGHT BE AVAILABLE TO OBTAIN OUR AGREEMENT TO INCREASE SOME QUANTITIES IN THE PACKAGE. THE KING TURNED TO KHAMMASH WHO SAID RAISAL HAD TOLD THEM TO COME BACK BEFORE THEY WENT TO ANY OTHER SOURCE AND THEY HAD NO CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT HE WAS PREPARED TO DO FOR THEM. KHAMMASH SAID HE WOULD HOPE THAT AT THE VERY LEAST, HOWEVER, THERE MIGHT BE SOME WAY TO ARRANGE FOR BAWLA PARAA TO PUT UP AN ACCEPTABLE LOAN TO JORDAN OR JORDAN GUARANTEE TO US THAT WOULD THEN ENABLE THE USG TO PROVIDE FINANCING OR CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS THAT WOULD TAKE CARE OF THE DELIVERY AND QUANTITY PROBLEMS THEY HAD JUST DISCUSSED WITH BECKYCE. SHOWING THE KING MIGHT BE WILLING TO GO WITH THE COMMENT I HESSEY WAS MORE RELAXED AND FRIENDLY TODAY THAN HE HAS EVER BEEN WITH ME. IT WAS CLEAR HE HAD BEEN CHEERED UP BY OUR WILLINGNESS TO GO AS FAR AS HE HAD. HE SAW THIS AS A REAL POLITICAL PLUS, BUT THERE WAS NO LACK OF DETERMINATION IN HIS STATEMENTS WITH REGARD TO THE PRESENT DEFICIENCIES HE SEES IN OUR PACKAGE AND HIS INTENTION TO

PAGE 02 RUQMKG 13417/2A SHE CLEAR BUT ILL HE WOULD SEND GO ELSEWHERE IF NECESSARY. AT THIS STAGE I FEEL UNABLE TO SAY WHETHER HE WILL BE WILLING TO COMPROMISE ON LESS THAN HIS TOTAL ASKING PRICE. MY PRESENT ESTIMATE IS THAT THERE MUST BE SOME SWEETENING OF THE PACKAGE TO GAIN HIS ACCEPTANCE. I BELIEVE THAT THE CRITICAL SWEETENER WOULD BE SOME MORE TANKS. ANTI-AIRCRAFT IS ALSO A MAJOR CONCERN. BEYOND THAT I THINK WE NEED TO DEVELOP A SET OF OPTIONS ON THE OTHER ITEMS THAT HE CAN PRESENT TO HIS ARMY AS A GLOBAL INDICATION OF WHAT WE ARE PREPARED TO DO--SUBJECT

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SECRET 111

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 140740Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4636
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1269
USUN 690

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3406

EXDIS

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

WHEN I SAW KING HUSSEIN FEB 13, I ONCE AGAIN WENT OVER WITH HIM OUR EXPECTATION THAT JARRING, WHO ARRIVING TODAY, WOULD BE BRINGING A MESSAGE FROM ISRAEL WHICH WE THOUGHT WOULD REPRESENT SOME FORWARD MOVEMENT IN ISRAELI ATTITUDES. I ADDUCED THIS AS EVIDENCE THAT WE HAVE BEEN WORKING TO PUT MUSCLE IN OUR SUPPORT OF THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION AND JARRING MISSION. I SAID I HOPED WHEN AND IF JARRING DID COMMUNICATE

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3406A ~~SECRET~~
SUCH A MESSAGE JORDAN WOULD MAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE. THE KING SAID THAT JORDAN WAS EAGER TO SEE FORWARD MOTION AND HAD ALREADY INDICATED IT DESIRED TO MOVE FORWARD WITH JARRING AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.
GP-3

SYMMES

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001
By AG/11, NARA, Date 8/14/01



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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 130650Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4625
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 171
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1266
USUN 689

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3385

EXDIS

SUBJ: SOVIET INTEREST IN JORDAN

1. ZAID RIFA'A, KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY, EVENING FEB 10 SHOWED US TEXT OF TELEGRAM FROM JORDANIAN AMB MOSCOW TO GOJ FOM MIN CONSISTING OF FOLLOWING BRIEF PARAGRAPHS:
(A) SOVIET MILITARY DELEGATION WAS READY TO DEPART MOSCOW FOR AMMAN AT ANY TIME AND WAS AWAITING ONLY SIGNAL FROM KING. DELEGATION WOULD ARRIVE IN SPECIAL AIRCRAFT.
(B) JORDANIAN EMBASSY NEEDED FULL DETAILS CONCERNING ECONOMIC DISCUSSIONS RECENTLY CONCLUDED BETWEEN GOJ AND

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3385A ~~SECRET~~
SOVIET ECONOMIC DELEGATION IN AMMAN TO ENABLE IT TO CARRY OUT ANY FURTHER DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW.

2. RIFA'I SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN GIVEN THIS TELEGRAM BY MINSTATE FOR FONAFF ABDUL MUNIM RIFA'I TO SHOW KING. HE HAD NOT DONE SO BUT HAD POCKETED TELEGRAM. HE COMMENTED HE FELT IT HIS JOB TO KEEP THIS SORT OF MESSAGE FROM

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THE KING AT PRESENT TIME BUT SAID IT WAS ESSENTIAL EARLY FAVORABLE ANSWER BE FORTHCOMING ON RESULTS KHAMMASH ARMS MISSION IN WASHINGTON.

3. COMMENT: FOREGOING CONVERSATION TOOK PLACE ONLY FEW HOURS PRIOR TO RECEIPT OF SERIES OF DEPARTMENTAL MESSAGES CONCERNING RESULTS OF KHAMMASH TALKS AND IS REPORTED FOR RECORD.

GP-3

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~~SECRET~~ 019

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P R 121545Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4621
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1264
USMISSION USUN NY 0688

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3381

EXDIS

SUBJ: JERUSALEM QUESTION AND JARRING MISSION

1. SUMMARY: MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS RIFA'I TODAY MADE FURTHER DETAILED DEMARCHE TO ME ON JERUSALEM AND JARRING MISSION. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE GOJ IS BEING PRESSED FROM ALL SIDES (INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY) TO TAKE JERUSALEM ISSUE TO SC. HE SAID THAT UNLESS JORDAN SOON RECEIVES SOME TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF PROGRESS BY JARRING AND CESSATION OF ISRAELI ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM. GOJ MAY BE FORCED TO RAISE JERUSALEM ISSUE IN SECURITY COUNCIL. ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING SCHEDULED FOR MARCH 2 WOULD REPRESENT DEADLINE FOR

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3381A ~~SECRET~~
POITIVE ACTION.

2. RIFA'I SAID THAT ON FEB 10 WHEN JERUSALEM WAS AGAIN DISCUSSED IN THE JORDAN CABINET, HE HAD ONCE MORE SUCCESSFULLY ARGUED FOR DELAY IN GOING TO THE SC. HE HAD USED THE FOLLOWING ARGUMENTS IN OBTAINING CABINET APPROVAL FOR FURTHER DELAY:

A. JORDAN HAS BROUGHT THE QUESTION TO THE ATTENTION OF THE

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U.S. AMBASSADOR IN JORDAN WHO HAD IN TURN INFORMED WASHINGTON OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE MATTER. JORDAN IS WAITING TO SEE RESULTS OF U.S. ACTIONS. B. THE MATTER WAS CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF JARRING ON FEB 4, AND JARRING PROMISED TO HOLD SERIOUS TALKS WITH ISRAEL. SO FAR JARRING HAS NOT RESPONDED TO JORDAN. C. THE JORDAN AMB IN NEW DELHI HAD REPORTED THAT U THANT, WHEN HE SAW HIM THERE, HAD URGED THAT JORDAN SHOULD GIVE JARRING A BIT MORE TIME TO MAKE PROGRESS BEFORE A SC MEETING IS CALLED. RIFA'I SAID THE CABINET THEREUPON AGREED TO FURTHER DELAY BEFORE GOING TO THE SC BUT ON CONDITION THAT THE JERUSALEM MATTER WOULD AGAIN BE RAISED URGENTLY WITH THE U.S. AMBASSADOR (WHICH WAS WHY HE HAD CALLED ME IN).

3. RIFA'I SHOWED ME MEMORANDA PROVIDING DETAILS OF EXPRO-

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3381A ~~SECRET~~

PRIATION OPERATIONS BEING CARRIED OUT BY ISRAELIS IN JERUSALEM AND HANDED ME MAP (TO BE POUCHED) SHOWING EXPROPRIATED AREAS TO THE NORTH AND EAST OF THE OLD CITY. HE SAID PORTIONS OF THIS AREA ARE ALREADY BEING BULLDOZED AND THAT THE EFFECT OF THE EXPROPRIATIONS IS TO SURROUND THE OLD CITY WITH JEWISH SETTLEMENTS. COMMUNICATIONS WITH RAMALLAH BY THE OLD ROAD HAVE ALREADY BEEN CUT AND THE NORTHERN SECTION OF JERUSALEM HAS EFFECTIVELY BEEN SEVERED FROM THE SOUTHERN SECTION. HE CITED DETAILS OF BUILDING CONSTRUCTION AND FINANCING POLICY FOR 500 RESIDENTIAL UNITS IN THE AREA. HE SAID 50 MILLION ISRAELI POUNDS HAD BEEN ALLOCATED FOR COMPENSATION OF THOSE WHOSE PROPERTY HAS BEEN EXPROPRIATED. ISRAELI PAPERS ARE FULL OF DETAILS ON LOANS TO BE PROVIDED TO ISRAELIS WHO WILL SETTLE IN NEW HOUSING UNITS. IF THE RESIDENT STAYS IN THE UNIT FOR NO LESS THAN SEVEN YEARS, HIS LOAN WILL BE CHANGED TO A GRANT. ACCORDING TO RIFA'I FOREIGN CONSULS RESIDENT IN JERUSALEM HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY ARAB NOTABLES OF THEIR REACTION TO THESE VARIOUS ISRAELI ACTIVITIES. LETTERS, PETITIONS AND OTHER TYPES OF APPEALS ARE FLOODING THE JORDAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND HAVE BEEN RECEIVED FROM LOCAL ARABS AS WELL AS FROM NON-ARABS IN EUROPE. MANY OF THESE DOCUMENTS BLAME JORDAN FOR NOT HAVING ALREADY TAKEN THE MATTER TO THE UN.

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4. IN DISCUSSION I REFERRED TO MY FEB 7 CONVERSATION WITH RIFA'I (AMMAN 3304) AND ASKED IF HE HAD ANY WORD AS TO WHEN JARRING MIGHT BE COMING TO JORDAN AGAIN. I ALSO TOLD HIM THAT WE ARE CONTINUING TO PRESS OUR VIEWS WITH ISRAEL WITH REGARD TO ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION GENERALLY, AS WELL AS WITH REGARD TO JERUSALEM SPECIFICALLY. RIFA'I RESPONDED THAT JORDAN COUNTS HEAVILY ON U.S. PRESSURE ON ISRAEL AND THAT HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR WHAT I HAD SAID. NEVERTHELESS, OUR PRESSURE DID NOT APPEAR TO BE CHANGING THE SITUATION. YESTERDAY HE HAD RECEIVED THE MINUTES OF JARRING'S LATEST DISCUSSIONS IN CAIRO AND HE HAD FOUND NOTHING NEW IN THEM. THEY APPEARED TO REVOLVE AROUND THE SAME ORIGINAL POINT OF WHETHER JARRING HAD RECEIVED A REPLY FROM ISRAEL AS TO ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION. ACCORDING TO THE MINUTES, JARRING SAID HE HAD HAD NO CLEAR ANSWER FROM ISRAEL, AND THERE WAS NO MENTION IN THE MINUTES OF ANY NEW PROPOSALS FROM ISRAEL. IN SUMMARY, SAID RIFA'I THE MINUTES REVEALED THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE STILL BEING EVASIVE AND UNCLEAR.

• RIFA'I ADDED HE HAD YESTERDAY MET WITH THE AMB OF CEYLON IN CAIRO WHO IS VISITING AMMAN. THE CEYLONESE AMB HAD JUST

PAGE 5 RUQMG 3381A ~~SECRET~~

SEEN UAR FOREIGN MINISTRY UNDER SECRETARY GOHAR WHO HAD BEEN ATTENDING THE JARRING TALKS. WHEN RIFA'I HAD COMMENTED TO THE CEYLONESE AMB THAT JORDAN IS NOT ENCOURAGING JARRING TO SUBMIT A REPORT TO THE SC AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE CEYLONESE AMB SAID THE SAME COMMENT HAD BEEN MADE TO HIM BY GOHAR, WHO HAD MADE CLEAR THAT IF JARRING SUBMITTED A REPORT AT THIS TIME IT COULD ONLY SHOW HIS MISSION HAD BEEN A FAILURE.

6. RIFA'I SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD ON THE ISRAELI RADIO THIS MORNING THAT JARRING HAD MET WITH THE ISRAELIS YESTERDAY AND THAT IT WAS NOT YET KNOWN WHETHER HE WOULD GO TO NICOSIA OR WHETHER HE WOULD VISIT AN ARAB CAPITAL. RIFA'I'S IMPRESSION

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7. WAS THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET IN ITS MEETING YESTERDAY HAD DISCUSSED BORDER INCIDENTS RATHER THAN THE JARRING MISSION.

7. RIFA'I CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE HAD SEEN AND HEARD NOTHING THAT WOULD ENCOURAGE HIM TO BELIEVE THAT THERE HAS BEEN ANY POSITIVE PROGRESS IN TERMS OF FORWARD MOVEMENT ON THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION. BEYOND THAT--THE JERUSALEM SITUATION, THE CONTINUING SERIOUS INCIDENTS ON THE CEASEFIRE LINES, THE ISRAELI SHELLING OF REFUGEE CAMPS, REACTION TO THE UNRWA ATTEMPTS TO RECTIFY THE ROLLS IN THE

PAGE 6 RUQMKG 3381A ~~SECRET~~

VALLEY CAMPS--ALL OF THESE HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO BUILDING UP A BIG HEAD OF PRESSURE FOR JORDAN TO GO TO THE SC. RIFA'I SAID THAT AN ARAB LEAGUE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IS TO BE HELD IN CAIRO ON MARCH 2 TO DISCUSS THE GENERAL SITUATION. HE HOPES TO HOLD THE SITUATION UNTIL THEN, BUT UNLESS THERE HAS BEEN SOME POSITIVE ACTION WITH REGARD TO THE JERUSALEM QUESTION AND WITH REGARD TO ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION, HE WOULD ANTICIPATE THE FOREIGN MINISTERS WILL FORCE A DECISION TO GO TO THE SC.

8. COMMENT: RIFA'I'S ACCOUNT OF RECENT UAR-JARRING TALKS ABOUT ACCEPTANCE ISSUE IS AT VARIANCE WITH PRELIMINARY REPORT JUST RECEIVED FROM EMBASSY TEL AVIV (TEL AVIV 2488). WOULD APPEAR THAT FURTHER ROUNDS OF TALKS TO CLARIFY ISRAELI POSITION WILL BE REQUIRED. WE SUSPECT JORDANIANS WILL PROVE EVEN BALKIER THAN EGYPTIANS IN THEIR INSISTANCE ON A MORE CLEAR CUT STATEMENT OF ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE.

GP-3 SYMMES

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TELEGRAM
28

SECRET 820

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03358 111721Z

47
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

0 111630Z FEB 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4613

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3358

EXDIS

REF: STATE 113629

1. CONCUR PROPOSED PRESS GUIDANCE.

2. WE CONTINUE BELIEVE ADVANTAGES TO EARLY RELEASE OUTWEIGH
DISADVANTAGES ESPECIALLY IN THAT ANNOUNCEMENT PRIOR KING'S
FINAL DECISION WOULD INHIBIT THE KING' OPTION TO REFUSE
PACKAGE AND MOVE PRECIPITOUSLY TO SOVIET SOURCE.

GP-3
SYMMES

SECRET

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001
By rytel, NARA, Date 8/14/01



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TELEGRAM

42

28

~~SECRET~~ 110

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03353 101028Z

6
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P R 100830Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4610
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1258
USMISSION USUN NY 683

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3353

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

REF: USUN 3698

1. WE SHARE AMB GOLDBERG'S CONCERN THAT THE GOI'S ORAL MESSAGE
TO JARRING (TEL AVIV 2389, PARA 4) MAY BE VIEWED AS INSUFFICIENT
BY THE ARABS AND NOT SERVE TO ALLAY THEIR APPREHENSIONS ABOUT

PAGE 2 RUQMG 3353A ~~SECRET~~

THE ISRAELI POSITION ON THE SC RESOLUTION. OF COURSE IF THE
UAR LEADERSHIP IN ITS MOST RECENT CONTACTS WITH JARRING HAS
ACCEPTED THE ISRAELI FORMULATION, WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE ALL PARTIES
TO MOVE AHEAD AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. IF THEY HAVE NOT FOUND
THE ISRAELI FORMULATION SATISFACTORY, HOWEVER, WE SHOULD PRESS
TO GET A CLEAR ISRAELI STATEMENT OF ACCEPTANCE FOR JARRING TO
PASS TO THE PARTIES BEFORE THEY FEEL IMPELLED TO GO OFF AT A
TANGENT.

~~SECRET~~

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03353 101028Z

2. THE GOJ'S MOOD OF DISCOURAGEMENT ABOUT JARRING MISSION PROSPECTS HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY PRONOUNCED AND APPARENT. ISRAELI RELUCTANCE TO MAKE A SIMPLE STATEMENT "ACCEPTING" THE RESOLUTION HAS SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTED TO THIS MOOD. GOJ AMB AL-FARRA'S RECOMMENDATION DURING HIS RECENT CONSULTATIONS IN AMMAN THAT THE GOJ TAKE THE JERUSALEM ISSUE TO THE SC IS A MEASURE OF THE PREVAILING SENSE OF FRUSTRATION. RECOGNIZING THE PROBABLE DISADVANTAGES OF ANY SUCH ACTION TO THE OVERALL COURSE OF JARRING'S MISSION AND PROSPECTS FOR SETTLEMENT, WE SHOULD DO WHAT IS POSSIBLE TO RELIEVE THIS SENSE OF FRUSTRATION.

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3353A ~~SECRET~~

3. THE ISRAELI ORAL MESSAGE CONTAINS TWO POINTS WHICH ARE PARTICULARLY LIKELY TO PROVE STUMBLING BLOCKS FOR THE JORDANIANS. THE PREDICTABLY WILL SUSPECT THE SUBTLE FORMULATION "WE ARE READY TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE IN A NEGOTIATION EMBRACING ALL MATTERS INCLUDED IN THE SC RESOLUTION 22 NOV 67 WHICH EITHER SIDE MAY WISH TO RAISE" AS BEING NO ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION AT ALL. SIMILARLY, THE USE OF THE WORD "CONVENE" AS A DESCRIPTION OF JARRING'S ROLE AS APT TO CONJURE UP THE IMAGE IN JORDANIANS' MINDS THAT THE ISRAELIS INTEND TO HAVE JARRING MERELY STAND AT THE CONFERENCE ROOM DOOR - SO TO SPEAK - ON THE FIRST DAY OF NEGOTIATIONS AND THEN DISAPPEAR ONCE HE HAS CONDUCTED THE PARTIES TO THEIR SEATS. WE CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL THE ISRAELIS BE PREPARED TO INDICATE THAT THEY WILL ACCEPT JARRING'S EXTENDED AND CONTINUOUS AUSPICES OVER, AND EVEN ACTIVE ROLE IN, WHATEVER TALKS MAY BE ARRANGED.

4. AMB GOLDBERG HAS RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHAT THE JORDANIANS WILL BE PREPARED TO DO ONCE THEY HAVE ISRAELI "ACCEPTANCE" OF THE RESOLUTION (PARA 3, USUN 3698.) FOR THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS WE

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 3353A ~~SECRET~~

HAVE REPORTED SEVERAL INDICATIONS BY KEY JORDANIANS OF THEIR READINESS TO MOVE TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS. ILLUSTRATIVE ARE THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE KING

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 AMMAN 03353 101028Z

TO SENATOR RIBICOFF AND THE AMBASSADOR IN EARLY DECEMBER WHEN THE SENATOR QUESTIONED HUSSEIN ABOUT HOW HE SAW THE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. AT THAT TIME IT WILL BE RECALLED THE KING SAID HE WAS NOT AGAINST DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS IN PRINCIPLE BUT THAT STAGE COULD ONLY BE REACHED THROUGH THE JARRING MISSION AND "WITH THE HELP OF FRIENDS." (AMMAN 2519, PARA 2.)

5. IN CONNECTION WITH THE WHOLE ISSUE OF NEGOTIATIONS, WE CONSIDER THAT THE RELITIES OF ARAB POLITICS ARE SUCH THAT JORDAN WOULD QUICKLY FOLLOW A LEAD BY CAIRO, BUT WOULD NOT PRECEDE CAIRO IN ANY STEP SUCH AS SENDING REPRESENTATIVES TO CYPRUS FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS (CAIRO 1407). ANY SUCH INITIATIVE BY CAIRO WOULD PROVIDE HUSSEIN ALL THE PROTECTION HE FEELS HE NEEDS TO MOVE AHEAD. HE SOUGHT IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH SENATOR RIBICOK AND ON SEVERAL OTHER OCCASIONS TO EXPLAIN THE PRESENT RESTRICTIONS ON HIS OWN ABILITY TO MOVE TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS. THESE RESTRICTIONS WOULD

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 3353A ~~SECRET~~
LARGELY DISAPPEAR SHOULD CAIRO TAKE THE INITIATIVE.

GP-1 SYMMES

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY DC/T.

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

NJC

43 48

~~SECRET~~ 235

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03321 082256Z

82
ACTION SS 30

INFO MM 012/031 W

R 081314Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4590
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1249
USUN NEW YORK 0678

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3321

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y --ADDED EXDIS CAPTION ONLY

SUBJ: EUGENE BLACK'S CALL ON PRIMIN TALHOUNI

1. IN CALL ON PRIMIN TALHOUNI ON SEVENTH, BLACK DESCRIBED NATURE OF HIS VISIT IN TERMS HE HAD USED WITH KING (AMMAN 3316), EMPHASIZING HIS CONNECTION WITH NEED AND HIS GREAT PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

2. HE THEN INVITED TALHOUNI'S FRANK COMMENTS ON CURRENT SITUATION AND US-JORDANIAN RELATIONS. IN HOUR-AND-A HALF MONOLOGUE TALHOUNI MADE FOLLOWING POINTS OF SIGNIFICANCE.

PAGE 2 RUQMKG3321 ~~SECRET~~

3. JORDAN HAD TOLD JARRING ON HIS SECOND VISIT TO AMMAN THAT GOJ UNCONDITIONALLY ACCEPTS THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION AND HAD ASKED JARRING TO SO INFORM ISRAEL. JARRING HAD ALSO BEEN ASKED TO URGE THE ISRAELI LEADERSHIP NOT TO BE INTIMIDATED BY EXTREMISTS (THAT IS, THOSE ISRAELIS OPPOSED

~~SECRET~~

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By 26/ll NARA, Date 8/14/01



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03321 082256Z

TO MODERATION IN DEALING WITH ARABS). JORDAN ALSO HAS ITS EXTREMISTS, BUT BOTH SIDES HAVE AN INTEREST IN MOVING CONSTRUCTIVELY AND POSITIVELY TOWARDS PEACE.

4. DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS ARE OUT OF THE QUESTION AT THIS TIME. ISSUES AND NOT FORM MUST BE EMPHASIZED. IN THIS REGARD, ISRAEL, AFTER EIGHT MONTHS OF "DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS" WITH THE WEST BANK ARABS, MUST HAVE SEEN FOR ITSELF THAT JORDAN HAS A VALID POINT. JORDAN DID NOT DRAFT THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION. IT HAS ACCEPTED THAT RESOLUTION UNCONDITIONALLY BUT NOWHERE IN IT ARE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS MENTIONED. IF NASSER ACCEPTED DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS, HE WOULD BE PUT ASIDE AS QUICKLY AS WOULD HUSSEIN. IN HUSSEIN'S CASE, IF HE GOES, THERE WILL BE NO

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3321 ~~SECRET~~

MODERATE LEFT WITH WHOM THE ISRAELIS COULD DEAL. IN JORDAN THINGS ARE DISCUSSED IN A DEMOCRATIC FASHION, AND THE SENATE AND CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES ARE BY NO MEANS IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH THE MODERATE POLICY OF THE KING AND THE PRIN. THESE WHO SUPPORT THE KING ALWAYS HAVE IN MIND THE FATE OF HIS GRANDFATHER, WHICH RESULTED FROM HIS ACCEPTANCE OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS.

5. MEANWHILE, ISRAEL CONTINUES TO INTERPOSE ALL KINDS OF OBSTACLES TO MOVING TOWARDS A RELAXATION OF TENSIONS. THE JORDAN GOVT HAD TRIED TO ACCOMMODATE ISRAEL WITH REGARD TO SUCH MATTERS AS THE REOPENING OF THE WEST BANK BRANCHES OF JORDAN BANKS; THE REOPENING OF WEST BANK SCHOOLS; AND THE PASSAGE OF PEOPLE AND GOODS FROM ONE BANK TO THE OTHER. IT HAD HAD NO RESPONSE FROM ISRAEL AS TO WHETHER OR NOT IT ACCEPTS THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION. INSTEAD IT HAD RECEIVED CONTINUED ISRAELI INSISTENCE ON DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WHILE MORE ARABS WERE BEING PUSHED OUT DAILY FROM GAZA AND THE WEST BANK.

PAGE 4 RUQMK3321 ~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 03321 082256Z

6. MEANWHILE, THE SITUATION IN JORDAN AND THE REST OF THE ARAB WORLD IS WORSENING. BLACK HAD PROBABLY HEARD FROM KING FAISAL THAT SYRIA IS SENDING PILOTS TO YEMEN WHILE THE SOVIETS EXTENDING THEIR PRESENCE SOUTHWARD INTO THE NEW REPUBLIC OF SOUTH YEMEN, NEARER TO HOME, THE SYRIAN CHIEF OF STATE ATASSI HAD SAID ON TELEVISION THAT THE PATH TO TEL AVIV GOES THROUGH AMMAN. JORDAN HAS VERY RELIABLE REPORTS THAT 12,000 TERRORISTS ARE BEING TRAINED IN IRAQ. THIS FIGURE IS IN ADDITION TO THE TERRORISTS BEING TRAINED IN SYRIA AND PERHAPS OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES. FULLY RECOGNIZING THAT JORDAN IS A JUMPING OFF PLACE FOR THE TERRORISTS, THE GOJ IS DOING EVERYTHING IT CAN TO ARREST THEM IN JORDAN AND TO PREVENT THEIR ENTRY FROM OUTSIDE JORDAN.

7. PRIMIN CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT WHAT ISRAEL AND WESTERN FRIENDS OF JORDAN SHOULD UNDERSTAND IS THAT THE ARAB MODERATES DEALING WITH JARRING REPRESENT A

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 3321 ~~SECRET~~

LAST CHANCE FOR PEACE. IF PRESENT MODERATE LEADERS FAIL, THERE ARE NO OTHERS. JORDAN, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD PROBABLY END UP AS VIRTUAL A COMMUNIST STATE WITH A MAN SUCH AS IBRAHIM BAKR AS PRIMIN. TALHOUNI THEN EMPHASIZED THAT HE HOPED BLACK, WHEN HE SAW RESPONSIBLE ISRAELIS, WOULD TELL THEM THAT HE HAD HEARD FROM TALHOUNI AND OTHERS THAT JORDAN WANTS PEACE AND THAT JORDAN ACCEPTS THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION UNCONDITIONALLY.

8. BLACK THANKED TALHOUNI FOR HIS PRESENTATION WHICH HE SAID HE FOUND MOST INTERESTING AND THAT HE INTENDED TO REPORT HIS IMPRESSIONS TO THE PRESIDENT WHEN HE RETURNS TO WASHINGTON. WHAT TALHOUNI HAD SAID HAD BEEN HELPFUL TO HIM IN UNDERSTANDING THE SITUATION. HE AGREED WITH TALHOUNI THAT TIME IS VITAL AND SAID HE ALSO IS FEARFUL OF WHAT MAY HAPPEN IN THE AREA UNLESS JARRING IS ABLE TO ACHIEVE SOME PROGRESS. WHAT TALHOUNI HAD SAID TO HIM CONFIRMED IMPRESSIONS HE HAD

~~SECRET~~



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TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 04 AMMAN 03321 082256Z

OBTAINED IN OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES HE HAD VISITED. SYMMES GP-1

THE NOA IS... (mirrored text)

THE VHYR... (mirrored text)

OUTSIDE... (mirrored text)

BYDE... (mirrored text)

SECRET



Department of State

44
TELEGRAM

21

~~SECRET~~ 817

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03321 081442Z

51 42
ACTION SS 30

INFO MM 01/031 W

R 081314Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4590
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1249
USUN NEW YORK 0678

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3321

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PAGE 2 RUQMKG3321 ~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03321 081442Z

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PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3321 ~~SECRET~~

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5. MEANWHILE, ISRAEL CONTINUES TO INTERPOSE ALL KINDS OF OBSTACLES TO MOVING TOWARDS A RELAXATION OF TENSIONS. THE JORDAN GOVT HAD TRIED TO ACCOMMODATE ISRAEL WITH REGARD TO SUCH MATTERS AS THE REOPENING OF THE WEST BANK BRANCHES OF JORDAN BANKS; THE REOPENING OF WEST BANK SCHOOLS; AND THE PASSAGE OF PEOPLE AND GOODS FROM ONE BANK TO THE OTHER. IT HAD HAD NO RESPONSE FROM ISRAEL AS TO WHETHER OR NOT IT ACCEPTS THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION; INSTEAD IT HAD RECEIVED CONTINUED ISRAELI INSISTENCE ON DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WHILE MORE ARABS WERE BEING PUSHED OUT DAILY FROM GAZA AND THE WEST BANK.

PAGE 4 RUQMK3321 ~~SECRET~~

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SECRET



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TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 AMMAN 03321 081442Z

FROM KING FAISAL THAT SYRIA IS SENDING PILOTS TO YEMEN WHILE THE SOVIETS EXTENDING THEIR PRESENCE SOUTHWARD INTO THE NEW REPUBLIC OF SOUTH YEMEN, NEARER TO HOME, THE SYRIAN CHIEF OF STATE ATASSI HAD SAID ON TELEVISION THAT THE PATH TO TEL AVIV GOES THROUGH AMMAN. JORDAN HAS VERY RELIABLE REPORTS THAT 12,000 TERRORISTS ARE BEING TRAINED IN IRAQ. THIS FIGURE IS IN ADDITION TO THE TERRORISTS BEING TRAINED IN SYRIA AND PERHAPS OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES. FULLY RECOGNIZING THAT JORDAN IS A JUMPING OFF PLACE FOR THE TERRORISTS, THE GOJ IS DOING EVERYTHING IT CAN TO ARREST THEM IN JORDAN AND TO PREVENT THEIR ENTRY FROM OUTSIDE JORDAN.

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PAGE 5 RUGMKG 3321 ~~SECRET~~

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8. BLACK THANKED TALHOUNI FOR HIS PRESENTATION WHICH HE SAID HE FOUND MOST INTERESTING AND THAT HE INTENDED TO REPORT HIS IMPRESSIONS TO THE PRESIDENT WHEN HE RETURNS TO WASHINGTON. WHAT TALHOUNI HAD SAID HAD BEEN HELPFUL TO HIM IN UNDERSTANDING THE SITUATION. HE AGREED WITH TALHOUNI THAT TIME IS VITAL AND SAID HE ALSO IS FEARFUL OF WHAT MAY HAPPEN IN THE AREA UNLESS JARRING IS ABLE TO ACHIEVE SOME PROGRESS. WHAT TALHOUNI HAD SAID TO HIM CONFIRMED IMPRESSIONS HE HAD OBTAINED IN OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES HE HAD VISITED. SYMMES GP-1

NOTE: HANDLED EXDIS PER S/S-O.

~~SECRET~~



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TELEGRAM

26

~~SECRET~~ 907

45

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03316 071659Z

41
ACTION SS 30

INFO MM 01, /031 W

R R 071600Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4587
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1246
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1253
USMISSION USUN NY 677

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3316

EXDIS

SUBJ: EUGENE BLACK'S CALLSON KING HUSSEIN

1. I ACCOMPANIED EUGENE BLACK AND HIS ASSISTANT JOSEPH REED
IN CALL ON KING HUSSEIN ON SIXTH.

2. BLACK EXPLAINED THAT IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY AS SPECIAL
ADVISER TO PRESIDENT ON EAST ASIAN ECON DEVELOPMENT HE HAD
NO OFFICIAL MISSION IN JORDAN BUT NEVERTHELESS HAD GREAT

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3316A ~~SECRET~~

INTEREST IN MIDDLE EAST AS PRIVATE AMERICAN. PRESIDENT
JOHNSON HAD ASKED THAT HE REPORT HIS REACTIONS AND OBSER-
VATIONS WHEN HE RETURNS TO WASHINGTON. BLACK SAID DURING
HIS TALKS IN KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA AND UAR HE HAD BEEN IM-
PRESSED BY EXTENT TO WHICH VARIOUS ARAB LEADERS SEEM BELIEVE
(1) ISRAEL DOES NOT REALLY WANT PEACE AND IS BECOMING
INCREASINGLY INFLEXIBLE AND EXPANSIONIST; (2) US HAS BECOME
IDENTIFIED WITH ISRAELI POLICY AND IS NOT RESPONSIVE ARAB
VIEWS; (3) US SO OCCUPIED IN FAR EAST IT DISINTERESTED IN

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03316 071659Z

MIDDLE EAST AND LESS AND LESS INFLUENTIAL IN MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS. IN CAIRO HE HAD FOUND CONSIDERABLE PESSIMISM REGARDING JARRING MISSION. EVERYWHERE HE HAD FOUND GLOOMINESS CONCERNING RECENT SOVIET SUCCESSES IN THE AREA. IN COURSE HIS REMARKS BLACK ALSO REFERRED TO KING FAISAL'S APPROACH TO HIM ON JORDAN ARMS AND SAID HE HAD NOW BEEN INFORMED FROM WASHINGTON THAT JORDAN'S ARMS NEEDS ARE RECEIVING ACTIVE AND SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION. BLACK CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE WOULD LIKE KING'S FRANK COMMENTS ON FOREGOING SUMMARY.

3. KING HUSSEIN WENT THROUGH PRESENTATION HE HAS MADE TO

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3316A ~~SECRET~~

RECENT US VISITORS EMPHASIZING HIS BELIEF THAT AFTERMATH OF JUNE HOSTILITIES HAD CREATED A REAL CHANCE FOR AREA PEACE. HE RECITED HIS EFFORTS AT KHARTOUM AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO BRING ABOUT A CONSENSUS LEADING TO THE UK RESOLUTION OF NOV 22, 1967. HE SAID JORDAN IMMEDIATELY INFORMED JARRING OF ITS UNCONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION. OTHDR ARABS IMMEDIATELY INVOLVED HAD ALSO TRIED TO COOPERATE WITH JARRING. BUT AFTER SEVERAL VISITS JARRING STILL HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO INDICATE WHETHER ISRAEL ACCEPTS THE RESOLUTION. MEANSHILE ISRAEL HAS FOLLOWED A RUTHLESS AND ARROGANT POLICY OF EXPROPRIATION, DEPORTATION, DEPRIVAL OF PERSONAL RIGHTS, AND OTHER ACTIONS THAT CONSIDERED ALL TOGETHER INDICATED THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT WANT TO LIVE AT PEACE WITH ITS NEIGHBORS.

4. ACKNOWLEDGING BLACK'S REMARK THAT THE USG HAS ONLY LIMITED INFLUENCE WITH ISRAEL OR ANY OTHER INDEPENDENT GOVT, KING HUSSEIN QUESTIONED NEVERTHELESS WHETHER US HAS EXCERCISED THE CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE IT DOES HAVE WITH ISRAEL. HE THEN SAID THAT SINCE THE SAMUA RAID HE HAS COME INCREASINGLY TO QUESTION WHETHER USG REALLY UNDERSTANDS NATURE OF ITS

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 3316A ~~SECRET~~

INTERESTS IN MIDDLE EAST AND, IF IT DOES, WHETHER IT WILLING OR ABLE TO TRY TO MAINTAIN AND PROMOTE THEM. HE BRIEFLY

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 03316 071659Z

cITED SUSPENSION US ARMS SUPPLY AS ONE OF SEVERAL SERIOUS DISAPPOINTMENTS TO JORDAN. BUT, HE EMPHASIZED, IMPORTANT AS ARMS SUPPLY IS TO JORDAN (AND AGAIN HE INDICATED HE WOULD GO TO SOVIETS IF NECESSARY), THE JARRING MISSION AND THE UK RESOLUTION ARE EVEN MORE IMPORTANT. THEY REPRESENT A "LAST CHANCE FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST." KING REFERRED TO ASSURANCES US WOULD PUT "MUSCLE" INTO ITS SUPPORT OF UK RESOLUTION. USG NOW HAS CHANCE TO ACT. QUESTION IS WILL USG ACT AND, IF SO, WHEN. TIME WAS RUNNING OUT. IF THE MATTER WENT BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE CHANCE FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WOULD BE LOST. THE RUSSIANS WOULD INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE AT US EXPENSE, AND THE ULTIMATE RESULT WOULD BE CHAOS WHICH WAS IN NO ONE'S INTEREST, INCLUDING ISRAEL'S. KING CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE ALSO SHARED BELIEF OF THOSE ARAB LEADERS WHOSE VIEWS HAD BEEN SUMMARIZED BY BLACK. HE HOPED THEREFORE BLACK WOULD PASS HIS VIEWS TO PRESIDENT AND OTHER US OFFICIALS.

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 3316A ~~SECRET~~

5. AFTER KING HAD CONCLUDED HIS REMARKS, I TOOK OCCASION TO PASS ON TO HIM SUBSTANCE OF STATE 110500. HE EXPRESSED THANKS BUT INDICATED IN PLEASANT WAY THAT WHAT HE NEEDS AND WANTS ARE CONCRETE RESULTS RATHER THAN ASSURANCES WE ARE PRESSING ISRAELIS AND HOPE THEY WILL PRODUCE.

6. BLACK IS TO MAKE FAREWELL COURTESY CALL ON KING ON EIGHTH.

GP-1 SYMMES

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TELEGRAM

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46

~~SECRET~~ 471

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03303 071148Z

2
ACTION SS 30

INFO MM 01, /031 W

P R 071120Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4579
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1241
USMISSION USUN NY 674

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3303

EXDIS

REF: STATE 111229, 110500

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION

1. I HAVE NOW SEPARATELY INFORMED KING HUSSEIN, PRIMIN TALHOUNI AND MINISTER OF STATE FOR FONAFFS RIFA'I OF THE SUBSTANCE OF PARA FIVE OF STATE 110500. EACH OF THEM WELCOMED INFORMATION AND THE PRIMIN TOLD ME THAT JORDAN DOES NOT INTEND TO RAISE THE JERUSALEM QUESTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING.

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3303A ~~SECRET~~

2. WHEN I SAW RIFA'I LATER THIS MORNING HE COMMENTED THAT IMPORTANT THING WOULD BE TO INSURE THAT JARRING DOES FOLLOW THROUGH TO COMMUNICATE DETAILS OF PRESENT ISRAELI POSITION TO JORDAN. HE SAID AFTER JARRING'S LAST VISIT TO AMMAN IT HAD BEEN LEFT THAT GOJ WOULD LET HIM KNOW IF THEY WISHED HIM TO COME BACK. AS OF NOON LOCAL TIME TODAY, JORDAN HAS HEARD NOTHING FROM JARRING ABOUT PLANS TO VISIT AMMAN.

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TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 AMMAN 03303 071148Z

3° GIVEN JARRING'S MODE OF OPERATION AND DESIRABILITY OF OUR CAPITALIZING ON THIS EVIDENCE OF ISRAELI RESPONSIVENESS TO OUR RECENT APPROACHES, I HOPE DEPT CAN FIND SOME WAY TO INSURE THAT ISRAELIS NOW MAKE IT CLEAR TO JARRING THAT THEY WANT THEIR POSITION (TEL AVIV 2396, PARA 4) CONVEYED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO JORDANIANS.

4° DEPT MAY WISH PASS CAIRO.

GP-1. SYMMES

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

27

SECRET 058

47

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03304 071908Z

42
ACTION SS 30

INFO MM 01, /031 W

P R 071125Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4580
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1242
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 170
USMISSION USUN NY 675

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3304

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 3303 (NOTAL)

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

I. WHEN I SAW RIFA'I TODAY (AMMAN 3303) HE SAID HE HAD JUST HAD A TELEGRAM FROM JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW STATING SOVIET OFFICIALS EXPRESSING PESSIMISM CONCERNING JARRING'S EFFORTS. I GATHERED FROM WHAT RIFA'I SAID THAT JORDANIAN

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3304A ~~SECRET~~

AMB HAD ALSO REPORTED SOVIETS MAY HAVE DISCUSSED WITH HIM POSSIBILITY OF SEEKING NEW RESOLUTION FROM SECURITY COUNCIL EMPHASIZING PRIMACY OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. BY COINCIDENCE I HAD EARLIER IN MORNING RECEIVED COURTESY CALL FROM SOVIET AMB. SLIOUSSARENKO. HE ALSO HAD TAKEN LINE WITH ME THAT JARRING MISSION APPRENTLY HAD FAILED AND THAT SOME NEW EFFORT MIGHT HAVE TO BE LAUNCHED IN UN. HE ALSO MADE MUCH OF FACT THAT

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03304 071908Z

RESOLUTION OF NOV 22 HAD PROVIDED FOR PRIMACY OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. I, OF COURSE, CONTERED WITH APPROPRIATE ARGUMENT TO DEMONSTRATE RESOLUTION IS PACKAGE.

2. IT WOULD SEEM FROM FOREGOING ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT FOR US TO INSURE JARRING COMMUNICATES LATEST ISRAELI POSITION (TEL AVIV 2396, PARA 4) TO JORDAN GOVERNMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

GP-1 SYMMES

EXDIB

C O N N E C T I O N

S E C R E T

PERMISSION GRANT FOR...
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BY... 03304 071908Z

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~~SECRET~~ 598

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 03304 071346Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO MM 012/031 W

02
(Handwritten signature)

P R 071125Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4580
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1242
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 170
USMISSION USUN NY 675

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3304

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 3303 (NOTAL)

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

I. WHEN I SAW RIFA'I TODAY (AMMAN 3303) HE SAID HE HAD JUST HAD A TELEGRAM FROM JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW STATING SOVIET OFFICIALS EXPRESSING HMYJKMISM#CONCERNING JARRING'S EFFORTS. I GATHERED FROM WHAT RIFA'I SAID THAT JORDANIAN

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3304A ~~SECRET~~

AMB HAD ALSO REPORTED SOVIETS MAY HAVE DISCUSSED WITH HIM POSSIBILITY OF SEEKING NEW RESOLUTION FROM SECURITY COUNCIL EMPHASIZING PRIMACY OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. BY COINCIDENCE I HAD EARLIER IN MORNING RECEIVED COURTESY CALL FROM SOVIET AMB. SLIOUSSARENKO. HE ALSO HAD TAKEN LINE WITH ME THAT JARRING MISSION APPRENTLY HAD FAILED AND THAT SOME NEW EFFORT MIGHT HAVE TO BE LAUNCHED IN UN. HE ALSO MADE MUCH OF FACT THAT RESOLUTION OF NOV 22 HAD PROVIDED FOR PRIMACY OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. I, OF COURSE, CENTERED WITH APPROPRIATE ARGU-

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 AMMAN 03304 071346Z

MENT TO DEMONSTRATE RESOLUTION IS PACKAGE.

2. IT WOULD SEEM FROM FOREGOING ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT FOR US TO INSURE JARRING COMMUNICATES LATEST ISRAELI POSITION (TEL AVIV 2396, PARA 4) TO JORDAN GOVERNMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

GP-1 SYMMES

AS RECEIVED.

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SECRET 610

49

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03289 060908Z

3
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, MM 01, /031 W

.....
O R 060855Z FEB 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4566
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1237
USMISSION USUN NY 671

2

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3289

EXDIS

REF: STATE 1105001 AMMAN 3280

DELIVER ACTION OFFICER OPENING OF BUSINESS FEB 6

PLEASE ADVISE IF STATE 110500 REPRESENTS FULL ANSWER TO PROPOSALS FOR ACTION BY THIS EMBASSY CONTAINED PARAS THREE AND FOUR AMMAN 3280. WILL WITHHOLD REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT WITH PRIMIN PENDING REPLY.

GP-3. SYMMES

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TELEGRAM

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SECRET 521

50

2

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03280 051701Z

*1
ACTION SS 30

INFO MM 010/031 W

O P 051525Z FEB 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4563
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 751
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 671
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1235

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3280

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO

REF TEL AVIV 2396; STATE 109809

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION

I. I AM PUZZLED BY IMPLICATION IN EBAN/RAPHAEL STATEMENTS THAT JARRING EITHER "DID NOT CONTEMPLATE STEPS AT THIS

PAGE TWO RUQMKG 3280 A ~~SECRET~~
STAGE TO BRING JORDAN INTO PICTURE" OR "DID NOT KNOW WHETHER JORDAN WOULD BE BROUGHT IN AT THIS TIME." (PARA 11 TEL AVIV 2396) GIVEN JARRING'S MODE OF OPERATIONS, INITIATIVE ON BRINGING IN OR EXCLUDING JORDAN FROM PICTURE SEEMS TO US TO LIE SOLE IN GOI'S HANDS. AS THIS AND OTHER POSTS HAVE REPORTED, JARRING HAS NOT BEEN TAKING INITIATIVES ON QUESTIONS OF LESSER IMPORT THAN THIS AND IT SEEMS MOST UNLIKELY HE WOULD BE DOING SO ON AN ISSUE SO BASIC TO MOVEMENT TOWARDS A

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03280 051701Z

SETTLEMENT.

2. WE ARE NOT ARGUING ISRAELIS SHOULD GIVE JORDAN MORE IMPORTANCE THAN CAIRO AND WE AGREE WITH THRUST OF EBAN'S REMARKS TO AMB BARBOUR THAT JORDAN HAS LIMITED CAPABILITY FOR ACTING ALONE. AT SAME TIME, IT SEEMS TO US THAT RIAD AND UAR GENERALLY HAVE NO INTENTION GETTING TOO FAR OUT FRONT OF JORDAN AND OTHER ARAB STATES. ALMOST ONLY RESULTS OF JARRING'S EFFORTS SO FAR HAVE BEEN TO SHOW THAT UAR WANTS JORDAN AND LEBANON WITH IT AT ALL TIMES. IT SEEMS TO US THAT EITHER ISRAELIS OR JARRING OR BOTH HAVE FAILED TO GRASP IMPORTANCE OF

PAGE THREE RUQMKG 3280A ~~SECRET~~

COMMUNICATING SAME ISRAELI POSITION TO ALL THREE ARAB PARTIES, SO THAT LATTER WILL BE IN POSITION REASSURE EACH OTHER BEFORE TAKING NEXT STEP.

3. WE THEREFORE STRONGLY RECOMMEND URGIN ISRAELIS EMPOWER JARRING TO TRANSMIT ESSENTIALLY SAME MESSAGE TO AMMAN AS THEY HAVE NOW DONE IN REGARD TO CAIRO. WE ARE UNABLE TO PREDICT RECEPTION JORDANIAN LEADERSHIP WOULD GIVE TO MESSAGE SIMILAR TO THAT CONTAINED IN PARA FOUR TEL AVIV 2396. JORDANIANS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY PREFER SIMPLER FORM OF ASSERTION TO EFFECT THAT QUOTE ISRAEL ACCEPTS UN SC RESOLUTION AND AGREES IN COMPANY WITH OTHER PARTIES TO JUNE WAR TO IMPLEMENT ITS INTERRELATED PROVISIONS UNQUOTE. NONETHELESS WE AGREE WITH AMB BARBOUR THAT FORMULATION SEEMS TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE AND TO REPRESENT GOI CONCESSION. INCIDENTLY, WE DO CONSIDER GOJ AND PROBABLY OTHER ARABS AS WELL WILL WANT PUBLIC ISRAELI ANNOUNCEMENT OF ITS ACCEPTANCE. PART OF THIS EXERCISE IS AFTER ALL TO INFLUENCE ARAB PUBLIC OPINION IN FAVOR OF NEGOTIATIONS.

PAGE FOUR RUQMKG 3280A ~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 AMMAN 03280 051701Z

4. I ALSO RECOMMEND I BE AUTHORIZED INDICATE TO GOJ SUCH ISRAELI PROPOSAL IS ON ITS WAY. WE MAY HAVE BOUGHT SOME TIME ON QUESTION OF JERUSALEM DEBATE IN SECURITY COUNCIL (STATE 109809) BUT I KNOW THAT GOJ FEELS ITSELF UNDER PRESSURE TO MOVE ON JERUSALEM ISSUE AND BARRING FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS ON THE JARRING MISSION THE TIME NOW IN HAND MAY AMOUNT TO ONLY A FEW DAYS. I PASSED DEPT'S TALKING POINTS ON JERUSALEM DEBATE TO KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY FEB 4 WITH REQUEST HE INFORM KING AND PRIMIN TALHOUNI. GIVEN PRESENT ATTITUDES HERE, HOWEVER, I HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE JORDANIANS WILL FIND THESE STATEMENTS CONVINCING. WE STILL NEED SOME TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF MOVEMENT ON OVERALL QUESTION OF JARRING MISSION AND SPECIFIC SIGNS OF ISRAELI FORBEARANCE IN JERSUALEM.

5. MY SECOND PURPOSE IN RECOMMENDING THAT I BE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM JORDANIANS OF THIS MOVE IS BECAUSE OF ITS OBVIOUS PRESENT UTILITY AS A DEMONSTRATION OF OUR ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO INFLUENCE THE GOI. PERIODICALLY DURING

PAGE FIVE RUQMKG 3280A ~~SECRET~~

THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS ON THE ISSUES OF REFUGEES, JERUSALEM, UNSC ACTION AND NOW JARRING, WE HAVE TOLD THE JORDANIANS OF THE PRESSURE WE HAVE BEEN EXERTING ON ISRAEL. THIS TIME I WOULD PARTICULARLY LIKE US TO GET THE CREDIT FOR DOING SO.

GP-3

SYMMES

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.

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SECRET 694

51

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03274 051941Z

47

ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, MM 01, /031 W

O R 051000Z FEB 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4558
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1242
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1233
USUN NEW YORK 669

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3274A

EXDIS

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

DEPT PASS CAIRO

DELIVER ACTION OFFICE OPENING OF BUSINESS FEB 5

1. JARRING PAID ONE DAY VISIT TO AMMAN FEB 4 AND MET WITH PRIMIN TALHOUNI AND MINSTATE FOR FONAFF RIFA'I.

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3274A ~~SECRET~~

2. KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY ZAID RIFA'I TOLD US EVENING FEB 4 THAT JARRING HAD STILL BEEN UNABLE ELICIT FROM ISRAELIS EXPLICIT STATEMENT ACCEPTING OR REJECTING NOV 22 SC RESOLUTION. JARRING HAD SPECUALTED TO JORDANIANS THAT ISRAELI LEADERSHIP COMPLETLEY DIVIDED ON THIS QUESTION, THAT LEADERS WERE ACCORDINGLY HAVING DIFFICULTY WORDING THEIR POSITION AND WERE EYEING ONE ANOTHER CAREFULLY READY TO PUNCE ON THE FIRST AMONG THEM WHO EXPLICITLY ENDORSED "THE MODERATE COURSE" OF SUBSCRIBING TO

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03274 051941Z

THE SC RESOLUTION.

3. RIFA'I SAID JARRING NOW GOES TO CAIRO, THEN JERUSALEM AND AMMAN. THE JORDANIANS HAVE TOLD JARRING THAT, UNLESS HE BRINGS NEWS OF ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION, THEY SEE NO POINT IN CONTINUING HIS MISSION BEYOND THIS NEXT VISIT TO AMMAN AND THEY WILL EXPECT HIM TO RETURN TO NEW YORK TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

GP-3

SYMMES

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SECRET 244

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03210 311833Z

02

43
ACTION SS 30

INFO MM 01, /031 W

R 311500Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4517

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3210

EXDIS

REF STATE 106935

SUBJECT LETTER FROM SECRETARY TO PRIME MINISTER

1. EMBASSY WAS GRATEFUL FOR SECRETARY'S LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER TALHOUNI AND BELIEVES IT WILL BE HELPFUL IN IMPROVING CURRENT PSYCHOLOGICAL ATMOSPHERE.

2. DURING OUR BRIEF TETE-A-TETE, PRIMIN (WHOSE ENGLISH IS POOR) DID NOT READ LETTER, BUT HE VOICED BOTH PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL GRATITUDE FOR BRIEF SUMMARY THAT I MADE ORALLY. I

PAGE TWO RUGMKG 3210A ~~SECRET~~
OF COURSE CAUTIONED HIM ON CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF LETTER AND TOLD HIM I WOULD LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING CONTENTS WITH HIM WHEN HE HAD HAD CHANCE TO GO OVER IT.

GP-3.
SYMMES

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SECRET 249

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 03207 311837Z

43
ACTION SS 30

INFO MM 01/031 W

R 311500Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4515
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1233
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1225
USUN 663

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3207

EXDIS

REF: STATE 105874 AND AMMAN 3153

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

DEPT PASS CAIRO

WHEN I SAW PRIMIN ON ANOTHER MATTER TODAY HE RAISED SUBJECT OF JARRING MISSION, STRESSING THAT JARRING HAS BEEN TOLD

PAGE 2 RUGMKG 3207A ~~SECRET~~
UNEQUIVOCALLY JORDAN ACCEPTS NOV 23 RESOLUTION WITHOUT QUALIFICATION AND THAT IS ESSENTIAL THAT ISRAEL PUBLICLY MAKE CLEAR ITS ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION WITHOUT CONDITIONS. WHEN I POINTED OUT THAT CAIRO AND BEIRUT DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE PROCLAIMED THEIR UNCONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE, PRIMIN COUNTERED WITH STATEMENT THAT IF ISRAEL ACCEPTS TODAY, HE CAN PROMISE THAT CAIRO AND BEIRUT WILL ACCEPT UNCONDITIONALLY TOMORROW.
GP-3 SYMMES

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~~SECRET~~ 777

54

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03174 291706Z

44
ACTION SS 30

INFO MM 01/031 W

02

R 291635Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4492
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1220
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1228
USUN NEW YORK 0658

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3174

EXDIS

DEP PASS CAIRO

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

PRIMIN TALHOUNI IN DISCUSSING RECENT VISIT UAR FONMIN
RIAD TO AMMAN TOLD AMBASSADOR JAN 27 THAT HE FELD RIAD HAD
LEFT AMMAN CONVINCED UAR SHOULD SIGNIFY ITS ACCEPTANCE
OF NOV 22 RESOLUTION TO JARRING DURING HIS NEXT VISIT TO
CAIRO. LEBANON, TALHOUNI ADDED, WOULD FALL IN LINE
WITH JORDAN AND UAR ON THIS ISSUE DESPITE NEGATIVE

PAGE 2 RUQMG 3174A ~~SECRET~~
ATTITUDE SHOWN BY PRIMIN KARAME DURING LAST WEEK'S VISIT
BY PRESIDENT HELOU. KARAME, ACCORDING TO TALHOUNI, IS
BEATING THE WAR DRUMS TO ENHANCE HIS CHANCES OF RETURNING
AS PRIMIN AFTER THE LEBANESE ELECTIONS. SYMMES
GP-3

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~~SECRET~~ 1867

55
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PAGE 01 AMMAN 03153 272024Z

45
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, MM 01, 2031 W

0 P 271900Z JAN 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4481
INFO AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI PRIORITY 033

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3153

EXDIS

REF: STATE 105874

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

PRIMIN TALHOUNI STATED TO ME THIS MORNING THAT JORDAN
ACCEPTS UK RESOLUTION IN FOTO. DEPUTY PRIMIN, WHO HAS

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3153A ~~SECRET~~

ATTENDED MOST SESSIONS WITH JARRING, REAFFIRMED TO DCM
THIS AFTERNOON THAT THIS JORDANIAN POSITION HAS BEEN
MADE CLEAR IN DISCUSSIONS WITH JARRING. AS EXPLAINED IN
AMMAN 3128, JORDANIANS SAY THE INTRODUCED ELEMENT OF PRIOR
WITHDRAWAL ONLY IN RESPONSE ISRAELI PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT ENGO-
TIATIONS, BUT THEY ALSO EMPHASIZE THEY RECOGNIZE RESOLUTION
IS PACKAGE AND THAT DETAILED IMPLEMENTATION SHOULD FOLLOW
ACCEPTANCE RESOLUTION BY ALL PARTIES. TOUQAN COMMENTED TO
DCM THAT THIS POSTURE ON WITHDRAWAL SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
OUT OF CONTEXT AND WAS NOT A QUOTE PRECONDITION UNQUOTE.

2. FROM TEL AVIV 2257 AND INDICATIONS STATE 105874, IT SEEMS
TO US THERE MAY HAVE BEEN CONSIDERABLE

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03153 272024Z

SLIPPAGE IN COMMUNICATION IN VARIOUS PLACES. ANOTHER CONSIDERATION IS THAT JARRING MAY CONSIDER HIMSELF CAREFULLY LIMITED IN WHAT HE CAN CONVEY, OR IS AUTHORIZED TO CONVEY, TO ONE PART FROM DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER PARTY, HOWEVER MUCH HE MAY HAVE BEEN PRIVY TO INNERMOST THOUGHTS OF THAT PARTY.

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3153A ~~SECRET~~

3. WITH BOTH KING AND MIN STATE FOR AFFAIRS RIFA AWAY AND GIVEN SLIPPAGE IN COMMUNICATION UNDER BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES, WE BELIEVE IT IMPRACTICABLE TO TRY TO STIMULATE A FURTHER FORMULATION TO JARRING BY THE JORDANIANS UNTIL THESE TWO KEY FIGURES RETURN TO AMMAN. THIS WILL NOT BE BEFORE THURSDAY FEB 1.

4. MEANWHILE, WE BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL FOR USG TO CONTINUE TO PRESS ISRAELIS FOR CLEAR CUT ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION AS BASIS FOR SETTLEMENT. USG POLICY HAS ALWAYS ENVIAGED THIS AS ESSENTIAL STARTING POINT. TIMING OF WITHDRAWAL, FORMS AND SUBSTANCE OF ENDING BELLIGERENCY, AGREEMENT ON SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES, ETC., ARE ALL ELEMENTS OF PACKAGE. THE JORDANIANS' PLOY ON WITHDRAWAL (AMMAN 3128) BELONGS IN THIS STAGE, IT SEEMS TO US. WE AND ALL PARTIES KNOW THERE WILL BE DIFFICULT UNDERSTANDING TO REACH AFTER THIS BRIDGE IS CROSSED. TRUE, ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION DOES IMPLY ULTIMATE OBLIGATIONS, BUT WITHOUT THIS, THE EXERCISE IS GOING NOWHERE.

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 3153 A ~~SECRET~~

5. I DO NOT CONSIDER IT ADVISEABLE APPROACH KING IN PAKISTAN ON THIS MATTER. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS (MOST RECENTLY ON TWENTY-FIFTH) HUSSEIN HAS UNQUIVOCALLY STATED TO ME THAT HE ACCEPTS UK RESOLUTION AS PACKAGE AND WANTS PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. I AM NOT CERTAIN THAT ALL ELEMENTS OF GOJ ARE IN COMMUNICATION WITH ONE ANOTHER, BUT I AM CERTAIN IT WILL TAKE KING TO DECIDE TO RISE ABOVE ANY LEGALISMS IF IN FACT THERE ARE ACTUALLY ANY INCONSISTENCIES IN JORDANIAN POSITION. KING IS

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 AMMAN 03153 272024Z

UNDER GREAT TENSION BECAUSE OF ARMS QUESTION AND OTHER MATTERS AND IS INVOLVED IN STATE VISIT. TO APPROACH MGM IN RAWALPINDI OR ELSEWHERE AT THIS TIME RISKS, IN MY JUDGEMENT, INTRODUCING AN ELEMENT OF SUSPICION AS TO US MOTIVES THAT TRAFFIC SIMPLY WILL NOT BEAR.

6. I THEREFORE STRONGLY RECOMMEND WE (1) NOT TAKE THIS MATTER UP FURTHER WITH JORDANIANS AT THIS TIME AND (2) PROCEED TO ELICIT ISRAELI STATEMENT OF ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION. AFTER ALL WE ARE ON RECORD AS HAVING STATED WE EXPECT ALL PARTIES TO ACCEPT RESOLUTION AS PACKAGE. IF JORDANIANS SAY THEY ACCEPT, THERE IS NO REASON WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT ISRAELIS DO SAME.

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 3153A ~~SECRET~~

7. DEP T MAY WISH REPEAT THIS AND REFTEL TO TEL AVIV AND USUN.
GP-3 SYMMES

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~~SECRET~~ 827

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 03143 261704Z

41
ACTION SS 30

INFO MM 01, /031 W

P 261625Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4475

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3143

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 3126

SUBJ: JORDAN ARMS PROBLEM IN CONNECTION HUSSEIN VISIT TO SHAH

1. AS REPORTED REFTTEL, KING INTENDS PAY BRIEF VISIT TO SHAH FOLLOWING CURRENT VISIT TO PAKISTAN. IT OCCURS TO US THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY USEFUL IN OUR PRESENT DEALINGS WITH GOJ IF SHAH COULD CAUTION HUSSEIN AGAINST ENTERING INTO ARMS SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH

PAGE 2 RUGMKG 3143A ~~SECRET~~
SOVIETS. IN THIS REGARD, WOULD NOTE THAT SOME OF KING'S ADVISORS HAVE POINTED TO SUCCESS OF BOTH IRAN AND MOROCCO IN ACCEPTING SOVIET ARMS WITHOUT DAMAGING THEIR RELATIONS WITH US.

2. WE ARE NOT FULLY CURRENT ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAIAN-SOVIET ARMS RELATIONSHIP AND CHARACTER OF USG -IRANIAN DIALOGUE ON THIS ISSUE. HOWEVER, CONDITION OF IRANIAN ECONOMY AND POLITICAL SITUATION ARE SO DISPARATE FROM THOSE OF JORDAN THAT PERHAPS SHAH MIGHT BE WILLING TO COUNSEL HUSSEIN AGAINST

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03143 261704Z

STARTING SOMETHING WHICH COULD END IN A RELATIONSHIP OF DANGEROUS DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIETS AND BE DIRUPTIVE OF PRESENT DELICATE PEACE EFFORTS.
GP-3 SYMMES

EXD-1

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SECRET 627

57
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PAGE 01 AMMAN 00313 261356Z

44

ACTION SS 30

INFO MM 01, /031 W

R 261340Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4469

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3137

EXDIS

REF: STATE 104256, AMMAN 3039

1. THERE HAS BEEN NO PUBLICITY LOCALLY CONCERNING KHAMMASH'S VISIT. RE OUR DECISION ON ARMS, ONE LOCAL PAPER JAN 21 QUOTED RECENT NY HERALD TRIBUNE ARTICLE TO EFFECT US HAD TOLD JORDAN IT WILLING TO RESUME ARMS SUPPLY AND ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WAS NOT PICKED UP BY OTHER PAPER AND THERE HAS BEEN NO EDITORIAL COMMENT. AREA PRESS, AS FAR AS WE CAN

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3137A ~~SECRET~~
DETERMINE, HAS BEEN SILENT ON BOTH KHAMMASH VISIT AND OUR DECISION TO RESUME ARMS SUPPLY.

2. WE ARE INFORMING DEPUTY PRIMIN TOUQAN OF DEPT'S VIEWS ON QUESTION OF PUBLICITY SINCE WE INITIALLY DISCUSSED MATTER WITH HIM.

3. DEPT SHOULD BE AWARE THAT FACT KHAMMASH IS IN STATES IN ARAMS MISSION IS KNOWN TO GOJ CABINET AND WE HAVE HAD INDICATIONS IT IS OPEN SECRET AMONG SOMEWHAT WIDER SEGMENT JORDANIAN OFFICIALDOM AND PRIVATE SECTOR.

SYMMES

GP-3

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58
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PAGE 01 AMMAN 03128 251844Z

41
ACTION SS 25

INFO MM 012/026 W

R 251800Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4462
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1213
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1222
USUN NEW YORK 0652

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3128

EXDIS

REF: TEL AVIV 2257

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

1. TEL AVIV REFTEL PARA 1 REPORTING JAN 17 JARRING-EBAN MEETING REFERS TO GOJ WANTING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL PRIOR

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3128A ~~SECRET~~

TO TALKS ABOUT OTHER SUBJECTS INVOLVED IN PEACE SETTLEMENT. WE ASKED KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY RIFA'I PRECISELY HOW THE GOJ HAD PHRASED ITS WITHDRAWAL POSITION IN THE JAN 7-10 DISCUSSIONS WITH JARRING. HE CONFIRMED IT HAD BEEN ALONG LINES REPORTED REFTEL. HOWEVER, RIFA'I POINTED OUT, GOJ POSITION AS EXPRESSED DURING THAT VISIT OF JARRING WAS LONG-STANDING FORMAL ARAB ONE DEVELOPED TO BE USED AS COUNTER TO FORMAL ISRAELI REQUIREMENT OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. HE REAFFIRMED HIS EARLIER STATEMENT THAT JORDANIANS MADE IT CLEAR TO JARRING THEY DO NOT REGARD PRIOR

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03128 251844Z

ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AS ESSENTIAL AND FULLY RECOGNIZE
INTERDEPENDENCE ALL ASEPECTS OF THE NOV 22 UN
RESOLUTION (AMMAN 3083). SYMMES
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PAGE 01 AMMAN 03083 230936Z

ACTION SS 25

INFO MM 01/026 W

P 230805Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4436
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1206
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1217
USMISSION USUN NY 648

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3083

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO

SUBL JARRING MISSION

REF: STATE 102085, 102239

1. DRAWING ON STATE'S 102085, I DISCUSSED WITH KING JAN 21
DEPT'S REACTION TO HUSSEIN'S IDEA OF PROPOSING TO JARRING

PAGE 2 RUGMKG 3083A ~~SECRET~~
THAT IF ISRAELI FORCES WOULD WITHDRAW GOJ WOULD NOT SEND
MILITARY FORCES TO THE WEST BANK. KING THANKED ME FOR
PRESENTATION BUT MADE NO COMMENT ON DEPT'S VIEWS.

2. WE LEARNED JAN 22 FROM KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY
ZAID RIFA'I THAT, AFTER MY OWN MEETING WITH KING, HUSSEIN
HAD DISCUSSED IDEA WITH JARRING AND HAD AUTHORIZED

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03083 230936Z

JARRING TO REVIEW IDEA WITH ISRAELIS PROVIDED JARRING FIRST SECURED ISRAELI CONFIRMATION THAT GOI WAS READY TO STATE IT ACCEPTED THE NOV 22 UN RESOLUTION.

3. ACCORDING TO RIFA'I, JARRING OPENED MEETING ASKING WHETHER JORDANIANS FELT TIME HAD ARRIVED FOR HIM TO PUT FORWARD SUGGESTIONS OF HIS OWN AIMED AT DEALING WITH THE INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS OF THE UN RESOLUTION. JORDANIANS REPLIED THAT THEY COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO ANSWER THIS UNTIL THEY KNEW WHETHER GOI WOULD ACCEPT THE RESOLUTION ITSELF.

4. RIFA'I COMMENTED TO US THAT IN ABSENCE OF ISRAELI

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3083A ~~SECRET~~

ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION, MATTER WOULD RELATIVELY SOON HAVE TO BE RETURNED TO SECURITY COUNCIL IN WHICH EVENT HE FORESAW LIKELIHOOD THAT SOVIETS WOULD SEIZE OPPORTUNITY TO TABLE MOTION OF CENSURE OF ISRAEL AND CALL FOR SANCTIONS. RIFA'I SAID GOJ SINCERELY HOPED EVENTS WOULD NOT SO DEVELOP, SINCE IT FELT THIS WOULD GRAVELY THREATEN JARRING MISSION PROSPECTS.

5. ASKED HOW GOJ WOULD EXPECT ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION TO BE NOTIFIED, RIFA'I STATED THAT ISRAELIS COULD INFORM JARRING OF ITS ACCEPTANCE AND JARRING COULD ARRANGE A SIMULTANEOUS ISRAELI-JORDANIAN-UAR ANNOUNCEMENT OF ACCEPTANCE.

6. MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ABDUL MUN'IM RIFA'I TOLD US JAN 21 THAT IN HIS OPINION UNLESS USG IS PREPARED TO BRING GOI TO STATE IT ACCEPTED UN RESOLUTION THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF ANY FORWARD MOVEMENT UNDER JARRING MISSION.

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7. COMMENT: OBVIOUSLY, SECURING A GOI STATEMENT THAT IT ACCEPTS UN RESOLUTION HAS COME TO MEAN A GREAT DEAL PSYCHOLOGICALLY AND PRACTICALLY TO THE JORDANIANS AND THEY FEEL UNABLE TO MOVE FURTHER TOWARD A SETTLEMENT WITHOUT IT. EVEN MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE RESOLUTION PRINCIPLES ARE THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A SOLUTION, SINCE THEY ARE INTERDEPENDENT, WE DO NOT SEE THAT THE GOI NEED HESITATE IN FORMALLY SUBSCRIBING TO THEM. THE RESOLUTION'S SEVERAL ELEMENTS ARE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD BY THE JORDANIANS TO FORM A PACKAGE, WITH PROGRESS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF ONE CONDITIONAL UPON PROGRESS ON ALL. THE JORDANIANS, FOR EXAMPLE, TELL US THEY HAVE MADE IT PERFECTLY CLEAR TO JARRING, AS THEY HAVE TO US, THAT THEY DO NOT ENVISAGE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL PRIOR TO PROGRESS TOWARDS IMPLEMENTATION ON ALL OTHER ASPECTS OF THE UN RESOLUTION. WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND GOI BE APPROACHED ON THIS MATTER, AND THAT WE URGE ISRAELIS TO AFFIRM THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE UN RESOLUTION IN SOME WAY WHICH JORDANIANS CAN CITE IN JUSTIFYING PUBLICLY

PAGE 5 RUOMKG 3083A ~~SECRET~~

THEIR OWN FUTURE ACTIONS TO MOVE TOWARDS PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

4P-3 SYMMES

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TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~ 906

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 03082 230818Z

7

ACTION SS 25

INFO MM 01, /026 W

R 230703Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4435
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1216
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1205
USMISSION USUN NY 647

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3082

EXDIS

SUBJECT: HELOU VISIT - HUSSEIN INITIATIVE RE JARRING MISSION

1. LEBANESE PRES CHARLES HELOU PAID STATE VISIT TO JORDAN JAN 19-20 RETURNING HUSSEIN VISIT TO LEBANON OF LAST SUMMER.

2. LOCAL PRESS GAVE HEAVY PLAY TO IMPORTANCE OF VISIT AS DEMONSTRATION ARAB UNITY AND WAS HIGHLY COMPLEMENTARY TO HELOU PERSONALLY.

PAGE 2 RUOMKG 3082A ~~SECRET~~

DURING VISIT HE HAD FORMAL TALKS WITH KING AND PRIMIN TALHOUNI AND INSPECTED EMERGENCY REFUGEE CAMPS IN JORDAN VALLEY.

3. KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY RIFA'I WHO ATTENDED ALL MEETINGS ADVISES US THAT ONLY ITEM ON WHICH DISCUSSION WENT BEYOND GENERALITIES WAS KING'S PROPOSAL THAT IF ISRAELIS WOULD WITHDRAW FROM WEST BANK JORDAN WOULD NOT MOVE IN ITS MILITARY FORCES. RIFA'I STATED THAT WHEN IDEA WAS BROACHED IN FORMAL CONVERSATIONS,

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03082 230818Z

HELOU ENTHUSIASTICALLY ENDORSED IT. AT STATE DINNER THAT EVENING, HOWEVER, HELOU REVERSED HIMSELF AND SAID PROPOSAL WAS OF SUCH SERIOUSNESS THAT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE REFERRED TO ARAB SUMMIT FOR APPROVAL.

4. RIFA'I SAID THAT GOJ SUSPECTED HELOU HAD BEEN SUBJECT TO PRESSURE ON THIS QUESTION FROM LEBANESE PRIMIN KARAME WHOM JORDANIANS CONSIDER PARTICULARLY UNHELPEFUL IN ANY MATTER AFFECTING MOVEMENT TOWARD ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE SETTLEMENT. COMMENTING THAT KARAME'S

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3082A ~~SECRET~~
STAND ON THIS QUESTION WAS "PARTICULARLY STUPID", RIFA'I NOTED THAT NASSER HIMSELF HAD TOLD HUSSEIN HE WOULD BACK HIM FULLY SHOULD HE TAKE INITIATIVE OF VOLUNTEERING TO DEMILITARIZE WEST BANK AREAS VACATED BY ISRAELIS. THIS, RIFA'I ADDED, WAS AFTER ALL NASSER'S OWN THINKING ABOUT THE SHAPE OF A SETTLEMENT ON SINAI.

5. IN EFFORT GET KING'S PROPOSAL BACK ON TRACKS, JORDANIANS ON SECOND DAY OF VISIT APPROACHED HELOU PRIVATELY THROUGH GOJ AMR TO BEIRUT AL-MADANI. AL-MADANI TOLD HELOU HOW MUCH KING HAD APPRECIATED HIS SYMPATHETIC RESPONSE TO KING'S IDEA AND, UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM KING, ADDED THAT GOJ FULLY AWARE THAT ANY SUCH IDEA HAD SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS AND HELOU'S VIEWS ON ARAB SUMMIT WOULD BE TAKEN INTO FULL ACCOUNT. ACCORDING RIFA'I, HELOU THEN TOLD AL-MADANI "YOU UNDERSTAND MY POSITION PERFECTLY" AND INCIATED THAT HE HAD BEEN INFLUENCED BY HIS PRIMIN INTO MAKING PUBLIC REVISION OF HIS ORIGINAL STAND.

GP-3. SYMMES

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ACTION SS 25

INFO MM 01/026 W

S

F 230658Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4434

2

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3081

EXDIS

SUBJECT: TERRORISM: EILAT INCIDENT

1. KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY ZAID RIFA'I INFORMED US JAN 22 THAT GOJ NOW BELIEVES THERE WAS SOME TYPE OF UAR INVOLVEMENT IN EILAT INCIDENT.

2. RIFA'I STATED THAT UAR AMB AMMAN HAD APPROACHED PRIMIN TALHOUNI JAN 21, HANDED OVER LIST OF NAMES OF TWELVE "COMMANDOS" UNDER ARREST IN JORDAN AND, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM CAIRO, APPEARED FOR THEIR RELEASE. GOJ IN CHECKING NAMES DISCOVERED THAT EIGHT ON THE UAR AMB'S LIST CORRESPONDED TO THE EIGHT TERRORISTS ARRESTED JAN 13-14 IN EILAT. GOJ IS NOT ABLE TO IDENTIFY THE FOUR REMAINING NAMES ON THE LIST BUT POLICE HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED

TO SEARCH FOR THESE FOUR AND ARREST THEM.

3. RIFA'I STATED THAT GOJ HAS TENTATIVELY CONCLUDED

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3081A ~~SECRET~~
CAIRO MAY HAVE SANCTIONED EILAT RAID IF IT DID NOT PLAN AND

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03081 230847Z

DIRECT IT. WE ASKED RIFA'I WHETHER GOJ STILL CONSIDERED THOSE INVOLVED HAD BEEN AL-FATAH AGENTS AND HE AFFIRMED THEY WERE. WE THEN ASKED HOW GOJ RECONCILED UAR INVOLVEMENT WITH INTELLIGENCE REPORTS INDICATING THAT AL-FATAH IS BEING ORGANIZED AND DIRECTED OUT OF DAMASCUS. RIFA'I REPLIED THAT WHILE PRINCIPAL AL-FATAH HEADQUARTERS IS IN SYRIA, THIS HEADQUARTERS EXERTS ONLY GENERAL POLICY DIRECTION AND AL-FATAH COMMANDS IN OTHER COUNTRIES, FOR SECURITY REASONS, OPERATE WITH LARGE DEGREE OF AUTONOMY. HE ADDED THAT EVEN WITHIN JORDAN, AS FAR AS GOJ INTELLIGENCE COULD DETERMINE, AL-FATAH UNITS WERE HIGHLY COMPARTMENTALIZED. THUS THERE WAS OPENING FOR OTHER THAN SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT IN AL-FATAH OPERATIONS.

4. ASKED HOW TALHOUMI HAD REACTED TO UAR AMB'S APPROACH, RIFA'I SAID THAT PRIMIN HAD REFUSED TO SANCTION RELEASE OF THESE TERRORISTS AND HAD REMINDED UAR AMB IN STRONG TERMS THAT THERE WAS UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN HUSSEIN AND NASSER AGAINST TERRORISM. TALHOUMI PLANS DISCUSS THIS QUESTION WITH UAR FONNIN MAHMOUD RIAD WHO ARRIVES AMMAN JAN 23.

PAGE 3 RUGMKG 3081A ~~SECRET~~

5. DEPT PASS TEL AVIV, USUN.

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ACTION SS 25

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INFO MM 01/026 W

R 221645Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4433

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AMMAN 3080

EXDIS

Rptow

CORRECTED COPY FOR MRN ONLY

SUBJ: SKYHAWKS FOR ISRAEL

REF: STATE 101371

1. IN CONNECTION WITH DISCUSSIONS WITH GEN. KHAMMASH AND POSSIBLE CONTACTS WITH JORDANINA AMB SHARAF, DEPT SHOULD KNOW THAT I HAVE DECIDED FOR PRESENT IT INADVISABLE TO INITIATE DISCUSSIONS WITH GOJ OFFICIALS HERE RE OUR DECISION SUPPLY ADDITIONAL SKYHAWKS TO ISRAEL. I WILL OF COURSE DRAW ON REFTEL IF SUBJECT RAISED WITH ME BY GOJ OFFICIALS.

2. PLEASE ADVISE IF SUBJECT DISCUSSED WITH KHAMMAH OR SHARAF.

3. DEPT PLEASE REPEAT OTHER ADDRESSEES REFTEL.
GP-3

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~~SECRET~~ 660

63

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4
ACTION SS 25

INFO MM 01,1026 W

R 190555Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4411

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3042

EXDIS

SUBJ: JORDANIAN POSITION ON DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL

1. IN MEETING WITH KING REPORTED IN AMMAN 3041, SUBJECT OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL CAME UP IN OUR DISCUSSION OF WAYS TO ARRANGE FOR COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN ISRAELI AND JORDANIAN MILITARY IN CONNECTION WITH SHOOTING INCIDENTS. I HAD COMMENTED TO KING HUSSEIN ON MY DISAPPOINTMENT OVER CONTINUED REFUSAL OF BOTH ISRAEL AND JORDAN TO AGREE TO SOME FORM OF UN PRESENCE IN THE CEASEFIRE AREA. I HAD ALSO QUERIED HIM AS TO WHETHER COL. DAUD MIGHT NOT BE DETAILED TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THE ISRAELIS WHEN SHOOTING INCIDENTS TAKE PLACE. IN MAKING THESE COMMENTS I HAD VOLUNTEERED TO THE KING THAT ALTHOUGH I AM AWARE OF THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS HIS GOVERNMENT SEES FLOWING FROM CONTACTS

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3042A ~~SECRET~~
ALONG CEASEFIRE LINE, I BELIEVE IT MOST IMPORTANT TO FIND SOME WAY FOR EFFECTIVE CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO MILITARY FORCES.

2. KING HUSSEIN REPLIED THAT HE HAS ALREADY TAKEN STEPS

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TO GET COL. DAUD BACK ON THE SCENE AND THAT HE INTENDED THERE BE SOME KING OF CONTACT THROUGH DAUD WITH THE ISRAELIS. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS THAT THE ISRAELI SHOULD NOT ABUSE THIS CONTACT BY PUBLICIZING IT OR EXAGGERATING ITS SIGNIFICANCE. HE COMMENTED ON HOW OFTEN ISRAELIS HAVE SURFACED SUCH CONTACTS AND THEREBY MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR ARABS TO DEAL WITH THEM EFFECTIVELY. HE WAS GOING TO ALLOW CONTACTS ONCE AGAIN IN THE HOPE IT WOULD HELP TO MOVE TOWARD EFFECTIVE PEACEFUL CONDITIONS BUT THE ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE TO PLAY BALL.

3. KING HUSSEIN THEN SAID THAT HE WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR TO ME THA HE AND HIS ADVISERS (AND AT THIS POINT HE SAID " AND OTHER ARABS") KNOW THAT IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO HAVE SOME KING OF DIRECT CONTACT WITH ISRAELI AT LATER STAGES. IT IS A QUESTION OF WHETHER THE FORM OR THE SUBSTANCE IS IMPORTANT AT PRESENT. SOME MATTERS, LIKE THE REFUGEE PROBLEM,

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3042A ~~SECRET~~

WOULD TAKE A LONG TIME TO SETTLE AND FOR THEM DIRECT TALKS WOULD BE ESSENTIAL, BUT THIS STAGE HAS NOT YET BEEN REACHED. HE CONTINUED THAT IF WE COULD GET GOING ON SOLUTION OF SOME OF THE SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS, IT WOULD NOT BE HARD TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE FORM OF DIRECT CONTACTS AT A LATER DATE. HE ADDED THAT HE IS NOT WILLING, HOWEVER, TO BEGIN DIRECT CONTACT WITH ISRAEL " UNTIL WE HAVE SEEN WHERE WE CAN GO".

4. DEP MAY WISH REPEAT TO TEL AVIV AND USUN. SYMMES
GP-1

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8
ACTION SS 25

INFO MM 01/026 W

S

R 190525Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4410

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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3041

EXDIS

D

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION: PROPOSED INITIATIVE BY HUSSEIN

1. IN MEETING CALLED AT HIS REQUEST TODAY, KING HUSSEIN DESCRIBED TO ME HIS "PERSONAL IDEAS" ON HOW TO BREAK OUT OF STALEMATE THAT APPEARS TO HAVE DEVELOPED RE JARRING MISSION. HE SAID THAT DURING HIS LAST VISIT TO AMMAN JARRING HAD COMMENTED HE DID NOT KNOW HOW TO GET OUT OF CIRCUMSCRIBED SITUATION CREATED BY FACT THAT ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL WERE HOLDING FIRMLY TO THEIR INDIVIDUAL POSITIONS. AT THAT TIME, KING SAID, HE HAD THROWN OUT TO JARRING PERSONAL IDEA THAT MAYBE TIME HAD COME TO DO SOMETHING THAT WOULD (1) DEMONSTRATE THAT SOME SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS BEING MADE UNDER UK RESOLUTION AND (2) AT SAME TIME PROVIDE ARABS WITH INDUCEMENT TO PROCEED FURTHER IN COMING TO AGREEMENTS WITH JARRING. KING THEN OUTLINED IN

W

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3041A ~~SECRET~~
GENERAL WAY PROPOSITION REPORTED IN [] RE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM WEST BANK. HE SAID JARRING HAD INDICATED HIS PERSONAL RECEPTIVITY TO THIS IDEA AS THE KING HAD OUTLINED IT AND HAD SUGGESTED THE KING CONSIDER PUTTING IT FORWARD MORE OFFICIALLY.

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2. SUBSEQUENTLY, KING SAID, HE HAD DISCUSSED IN A GENERAL WAY WITH VARIOUS PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL ADVISERS HIS IDEA THAT IF ISRAEL WOULD ANNOUNCE WITHDRAWAL FROM WEST BANK, JORDAN WOULD ANNOUNCE IT RESUMING CIVIL ADMINISTRATION BUT WOULD NOT MOVE ANY MILITARY FORCES ONTO WEST BANK PENDING SETTLEMENT OF OTHER OUTSTANDING ISSUES, INCLUDING BOUNDARIES AND REFUGEES. HE HAD MADE SOUNDINGS BOTH WITH LEADING WEST BANK PERSONALITIES AND WITH VARIOUS EAST BANKERS, INCLUDING JORDANINANS OF PALESTINIAN ORIGIN ON EAST BANK. THE CONSENSUS WAS THAT THIS IDEA WAS WORTH TRYING. KING SAID HE HAD ALSO EXPLORED IT IN JIDDA AND IN CAIRO, AND HE NOW INTENDS TO RAISE IT OFFICIALLY WITH JARRING WHEN LATTER RETURNS TO JORDAN IN NEXT FEW DAYS.

3. KING HUSSEIN SAID HE WAS INFORMING ME OF THIS MATTER IN THE HOPE THAT AFTER CONSIDERING IT, USG MIGHT BE INCLINED

PAGE 3 RUQMG 3041A ~~SECRET~~

TO SUPPORT IT IN APPROPRIATE WAYS WITH ISRAEL. FOR MOMENT HE IS KEEPING KNOWLEDGE OF MATTER CONFINED TO HIMSELF AND TALHOUNI. HE STRESSED THAT UNLESS SOMETHING LIKE THIS INITIATIVE CAN BE DEVELOPED, HE FEARS THAT THE SITUATION WILL CONTINUE TO BE BOGGED DOWN, THAT TERRORISM WILL INCREASE, THAT THREATS TO HIS OWN REGIME WILL GROW, AND THAT PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN AREA WILL FURTHER DIMINISH. HE STRESSED THAT HE WISHED MAKE CLEAR JORDAN ACCEPTS UN RESOLUTION AS PACKAGE BUT HE BELIEVES SOME WASY MUST BE FOUND TO GET OUT OF PRESENT BOX, BY SHOWING SOME PROGRESS WHICH MAY HAVE TO BE PIECEMEAL.

4. I TOLD KING HUSSEIN, AS I HAD TOLD PRIMIN TALHOUNI (TALHOUNI HAD ALREADY EXPLORED THIS GENERAL IDEA WITH ME EARLIER IN DAY AND TOLD ME HE HAD SUGGESTED TO KING THAT HE DISCUSS IT WITH ME), THAT I WOULD REPORT WHAT HE HAD TOLD ME TO WASHINGTON WHERE I KNEW IT WOULD BE GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. I ASSURED HIS THAT WE, OF COURSE, WANT TO DO ANYTHING WE CAN TO HELP IN MOVING FORWARD CONSTRUCTIVELY ON THIS MATTER. I COMMENTED, HOWEVER, THAT MY

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PERSONAL PRELIMINARY REACTION WAS A COMPLETE ISRAELI

PAGE 4 RUMKG 3041A ~~SECRET~~

WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WEST BANK, BECAUSE OF ITS OBVIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC ISRAELI POSITION ON JERUSALEM AND PERMANENT BOUNDARIES OF THE WEST BANK, MIGHT BE AN INSUPERABLE OBSTACLE TO GETTING A FAVORABLE RESPONSE FROM THE ISRAELIS. I THEREFORE HOPED I COULD ASSUME DETAILS OF THE PROPOSITION COULD BE DISCUSSED AND PERHAPS MODIFIED. IN RESPONSE TO MY COMMENTS, THE KING INDICATED THAT AT THE MOMENT HE IS ONLY EXPLORING WHAT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO MOVE OFF DEAD CENTER AND DID NOT INTEND TO PUT FORWARD AN ALL-OR-NOTHING TYPE PROPOSITION.

5. EMBASSY INTENDS SUBMIT COMMENTS ON THIS PROPOSITION. MEANWHILE, I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR DEP'S GUIDANCE AS TO HOW EMBASSY SHOULD PROCEED IN FURTHER DISCUSSING THIS MATTER WITH KING OR GOJ OFFICIALS.

6. DEPT MAY WISH REPEAT ALL OR PART OF THIS TELEGRAM TO USUN AND TEL AVIV. SYMMES
GP-1

WE

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By 16/ll NARA Date 8/14/01

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 003039 182151Z

82
ACTION SS 25

INFO MM 01, /026 W

P 181710Z JAN 68 ZEL
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4408

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3039

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

SUBJ: ARMS FOR JORDAN

1. WHEN I SAW KING HUSSEIN TODAY, HE COMMENTED ON FACT GENERAL KHAMMASH WOULD HAVE ARRIVED TODAY IN WASHINGTON AND THAT HE HOPED THINGS WOULD GO WELL. REFFERRING TO OUR CONVERSATION OF JAN 8, HE THEN SAID HE HOPED WE WOULD NEVER AGAIN HAVE SUCH A CRITICAL MEETING.
2. IN RESPONSE TO HIS QUERY, I TOLD HIM THAT I HAD HAD NO FURTHER WORD FROM WASHINGTON WITH RESPECT TO WHAT PUBLICITY MIGHT NOW BE INTENDED AND THAT I COULD ONLY ASSUME THAT THE URGENCY REPRESENTED IN LAST SATURDAY'S MESSAGE (AMMAN 2998, STATE 9&452) HAD FOR SOME REASON

PAGE TWO RUQMKG 4408A ~~SECRET~~
 DIMINISHED. I SAID I ASSUMED IN ANY CASE THAT KHAMMASH WOULD BE DISCUSSING QUESTION OF PUBLICITY WITH APPROPRIATE USG OFFICIALS WHEN HE BEGINS HIS TALKS TOMORROW.
 3. COMMENT; I HOPE DEPT WILL BEAR IN MIND KING'S PSYCHOLOGICAL NEEDS WITH REGARD TO PUBLICITY. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE WISE FOR US TO TAKE INITIATIVE TO LET KHAMMASH KNOW HOW WE INTEND HANDLE PUBLICITY.

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TELEGRAM

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001

By 06/11, NARA, Date 8/14/01

SECRET 009

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02976 120615Z

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ACTION SS 25

INFO MM 010/026 W

R 111659Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4367
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1195
USMISSION USSF 635
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1181

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2976

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS CAIRO

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION

REF: AMMAN 2973

1. MY CONVERSATION WITH RIFAÏ REGARDING JARRING MISSION (REFTEL) WAS LIMITED BECAUSE OF HIS OTHER APPOINTMENTS. I NOTED THIS FACT IN CALL ON ACTING PRIME MINISTER AHMED TOUGAN JAN 17 AND ASKED FOR ANY DETAILS HE MIGHT PROVIDE.

2. TOUGAN DESCRIBED IN SOME DETAIL THE ISRAELI LETTER TO JARRING (TEL AVIV 2102 WHICH DUE TO DELAY FOR SERVICING I HAD NOT YET SEEN AT THE TIME OF MEETING WITH TOUGAN). HE SAID JARRING HAD CONVEYED CONTENTS AND OTHER POINTS AS AUTHORIZED BY

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ISRAEL, BUT THE JORDANIANS DID NOT ACCEPT A COPY OF THE LETTER.

3. ACCORDING TO TOUQAN'S DESCRIPTION THE ISRAELIS PROPOSED DIRECT TALKS EITHER WITH OR WITHOUT PRESENCE OF JARRING AND IN AS SECRET

A WAY AS MIGHT BE DESIRED. HE ALSO MENTIONED THE BROAD HEADINGS OF THEIR SUGGESTED AGENDA AS POLITICAL, SECURITY, HUMANITARIAN, ECONOMIC, AND HISTORICAL AND RELIGIOUS SITES. TOUQAN SAID JORDANIANS TOLD JARRING THAT THIS WAS DEPARTURE FROM THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UN RESOLUTION WHICH HAD UNANIMOUS SUPPORT OF SECURITY COUNCIL. THE JORDANIANS FURTHER SAID JORDAN HAD BEEN SEVERELY CRITICIZED BY SOME OF THE ARABS FOR DECLARING FULL SUPPORT OF THE RESOLUTION, AND THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO BE DRAWN INTO AN EFFORT HG DEAL WITH THE MATTER IN A DIFFERENT CONTEXT. IN ANY EVENT, THIS WAS NOT NECESSARY. THEY CONSIDERED THE JARRING MISSION PROVIDED PROPER AND ADEQUATE BASIS TO MOVE AHEAD. JORDAN THEREFORE, PROPOSED TO JARRING THAT ISRAEL DECLARE ILB UNEQUIVOCAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL JUST AS JORDAN DECLARES ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE ENDING OF BELLIGERANCE AND ITS INTENTIONS TO LIVE IN PEACE AND OTHERWISE MEET THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE RESOLUTION.

4. TOUQAN SAID THAT JORDANIANS HAD LONG TALKS WITH JARRING ON

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VARIETY OF OTHER ASPECTS. JARRING HAD POINTED TO SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT IN THE ATMOSPHERE SUCH AS THE RELEASE OF POW'S, MANS TO RELEASE SHIPS FROM CANAL, AND ISRAEL'S RELAXATION OF TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS. (THE LAST MENTIONED POINT, SAID TOUQAN, SIMPLY CREATED NEW PROBLEMS FOR JORDAN. RELATIVELY LARGE NUMBERS OF VISITORS HAD BEGUN TO ARRIVE FROM THE WEST TO THE EAST BANK WITHOUT ADEQUATE SECURITY CONTROLS, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME RELATIVELY FEW FROM THE EAST BANK WERE BEING ALLOWED TO VIETT THE WEST BANK.) JARRING ALSO INDICATED HE HAD URGED ISRAELIS TO AVOID WHAT TOUQAN CALLED "WILD D KLARATIONS" E.G. ON FUTURE OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. IN RESPONSE TO JORDANIAN COMPLAINT REGARDING ISRAELI INACTION UNDER UN RESOLUTION ON DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEES, JARRING COMMENTED HE HAD OBSERVED THE EMPTY CAMPS IN THE JERICHO AREA. THE JORDANIANS NOTED THAT THEY HAD

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NOT SOUGHT TO ARRANGE HIS VISIT TO THE CAMPS ON THE EAST BANK TO AVOID THE POSSIBILITY OF EMBARRASSING HIM WITH PUBLICITY OR OTHERWISE EXPOSING HIM TO PRYING.

DUNCAN

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.

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