



Department of State

TELEGRAM

50

~~SECRET~~ 155

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02973 111759Z

43

ACTION SS 25

INFO MM 010/026 W

R 111636Z JAN 6 1  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4364  
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1194  
USMISSION USUN 634  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1184

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2973

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS CAIRO

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION

1. RECALLING HIS TALK WITH AMBASSADOR AFTER FIRST JARRING VISIT,  
I QUERIED MINSTATE FOR FONAFF ABDUL MUNIM RIFAI RE SECOND ROUND  
OF TALKS WITH JARRING DURING VISIT AMMAN JANUARY 7-10.

2. RIFAI SAID JARRING MISSION WAS GOING VERY SLOWLY. THIS TO  
SOME EXTENT DERIVED FROM NATURE OF MISSION. MAJOR CONCERN,  
HOWEVER, WAS THAT THE PARTIES HAD NOT YET COME TO GRIPS  
AT ALL WITH HOW TO CARRY OUT THE ELEMENTS OF THE UN RESOLUTION.  
ISRAELIS, RIFAI SAID, INSIST ON DIRECT TALKS. THEY HAD ADDRESSED  
MEMO TO JARRING SETTING FORTH THIS POSITION. THE JORDANIANS HAD

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 2973A ~~SECRET~~

TOLD JARRING THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE, AND THAT WHAT WAS REQUIRED  
WAS AGREEMENT OF THE ISRAELIS TO WORK WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE  
UNRESOLUTION. RIFAI SAID THE ISRAELIS HAD EVADED THE QUESTION

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-155  
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TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 AMMAN 02973 111759Z

OF WITHDRAWAL EVEN AS A PRINCIPLE. THE ISRAELIS HAD GIVEN NO SIGN OF THEIR INTENTIONS ON THIS CRITICAL POINT.

3. RIFAI SAID THE JORDANIANS HAD INFORMED JARRING THAT THEY ACCEPT THE RESOLUTION IN toto. THEY ARE READY TO APPROACH DISCUSSION AND IMPLEMENTATION IN WHOLE OR BY PARTS. RIFAI ADDED THAT THE JORDANIANS HAD GIVEN THEIR POSITION TO JARRING ON EACH POINT OF THE RESOLUTION IN DETAIL.

4. RIFAI SAID THEY HAD HAD LONG INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH JARRING ON BOTH DAYS OF HIS VISIT. WHILE THESE DISCUSSIONS WERE HELPFUL, TO OPEN THE WAY TO PROGRESS IT WAS NECESSARY, FOR THE ISRAELIS (A) TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF WORKING OUT SUBSTANTIVE ARRANGEMENTS THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF JARRING AND (B) TO MAKE SOME KIND OF CLEAR COMMITMENT AS TO THEIR INTENTIONS RE WITHDRAWAL.

5. RIFAI SAID EVERYTHING POINTED TO ISRAEL CONTINUING TO TAKE A HARDLINE. FOR EXAMPLE HE SAID THEY UNDERSTOOD FROM JARRING THAT THE ISRAELIS WANTED TO DEAL WITH JERUSALEM AS ENTIRELY

PAGE 3 RUQMGK 2973A ~~SECRET~~

SEPARATE MATTER, THUS EXCLUDING IT FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUERY, HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS MIGHT PERHAPS BE A STEP DOWN FROM PREVIOUSLY REITERATED ISRAELI POSITION THAT JERUSALEM WAS NOT NEGOTIABLE. RIFAI CONTINUED THAT ON JERUSALEM, JORDAN CONSIDERED IT ESSENTIAL THE CONCEPT OF WITHDRAWAL BE APPLIED AS CALLED FOR IN THE RESOLUTION UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF INADMISSIBILITY OF ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY CONQUEST. HE ADDED THAT OTHER QUESTIONS COULD OF COURSE BE RAISED SUCH AS INTERNATIONALIZATION AND THE OTHER UN RESOLUTIONS BEARING ON JERUSALEM. THESE QUESTIONS SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE EXAMINED HE SAID, APART FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM TERRITORY WHICH IT HAD OCCUPIED INCLUDING ARAB JERUSALEM.

6. AS TO NEXT STEPS, RIFAI SAID HE UNDERSTOOD JARRING WOULD RETURN TO ISRAEL IN ABOUT TWO OR THREE DAYS, AFTER HE HAD BEEN TO LEBANON. JARRING WOULD THEN WITHDRAW TO ASSIMILATE THE VIEWS THAT HE HAD OBTAINED FROM ALL THE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE. SOME COMMON

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 02973 111759Z

GROUND AS A BASIS FOR THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS. IF THIS PROCEDURE DID NOT SEEM TO BE PRODUCING RESULTS, RIFAI SAID HE SUPPOSED JARRING WOULD CONSIDER OFFERING SUGGESTIONS OF HIS OWN, THIS COURSE OF ACTION REQUIRING THE CONSENT OF THE PARTIES.

DUNCAN

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OCT.

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TELEGRAM

29

68

~~SECRET~~ 387 12

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02952 101834Z

43  
ACTION SS 25

INFO MM 01, /026 W

P 101708Z JAN 68  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4356  
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 573

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2952

EXDIS

REF: STATE 96062

SUBJ: HUSSEIN VISIT TO RIYADH

1. IN MEETING WITH EMBOFF JAN 9 SAG AMB KUHEIMI READ OUT EXCERPTS FROM HIS BRIEFING PAPER RE HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO RIYADH WHICH KUHEIMI WAS SCHEDULED TO PRESENT TO FAISAL JAN 10 PRIOR TO THE PRIVATE FAISAL-HUSSEIN CONVERSATIONS. BURDEN OF HIS PAPER KUHEIMI SAID, WAS THAT HUSSEIN FELT HE HAD BEEN CUT ADRIPT BY THE USG AND WAS CURRENTLY UDER SOME PRESSURE FROM DOMESTIC LEFTIST AND COMMUNIST ELEMENTS TO "GET INVOLVED WITH" THE SOVIETS. NEITHER KING NOR HIS ADVISORS INTENDED REDIRECT JORDANIAN POLICY TOWARDS SOVIETS. HOWEVER, THERE WAS SOME RISK THAT KING MIGHT BE TEMPTED DO "SOMETHING FOOLISH" AND MAKE A

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 2952A ~~SECRET~~  
GESTURE TOWARDS SOVIETS TO PLACATE PUBLIC OPINION.  
MEMBERS OF KING'S ENTOURAGE WERE COUNTING ON FAISAL TO ADVISE HUSSEIN TO STAY CLEAR OF SOVIETS.

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 02952 101834Z

2. HUSSEIN, KUHEIMI HAD WRITTEN, HAD BEEN DEEPLY DISTRESSED BY WASHINGTON'S SUSPENSION OF ARMS SUPPLY AND ITS CUTTING OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. KUHEIMI THEN INTERRUPTED HIS READING OF THE BRIEFING PAPER TO COMMENT THAT HE HAD BEEN VERY PLEASED TO HEAR OF USG DECISION RESUME ARMS SHIPMENTS TO JORDAN. QUERIED AS TO SOURCE HIS INFORMATION, KUHEIMI REPLIED THAT HE HAD HEARD IT FROM "TWO SEPARATE NON-CABINET SOURCES." EMBOFF THEN EMPHASIZED THAT AS FAR AS ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WAS CONCERNED, ONLY BUDGETARY SUPPORT HAD BEEN SUSPENDED AND THAT TYPE OF SUPPORT COULD BE REVIEWED IF CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRED. MEANWHILE OUR OTHER FORMS ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WERE CONTINUING. KUHEIMI EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE SATISFACTION AT THIS INFORMATION AND AMENDED HIS BRIEFING PAPER ACCORDINGLY.

3. KUHEIMI THEN SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED BY WISE COUNSEL PRIMIN TALHOUNI HAD GIVEN

PAGE 3 RUOMKG 2952A ~~SECRET~~  
KING IN RECENT WEEKS AGAINST GETTING ENTANGLED WITH SOVIET UNION. KUHEIMI ACKNOWLEDGED HE WAS NOT AN ADMIRER OF TALHOUNI BUT SAID HE FELT TALHOUNI HAD PLAYED SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN ADVISING KING AGAINST TAKING ANY HASTY STEPS TOWARDS MOSCOW.

4. ASKED ABOUT FAISAL'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS JARRING MISSION, KUHEIMI REPLIED ALONG FAMILIAR LINES THAT FAISAL WISHED JARRING EVERY SUCCESS. FAISAL, HE SAID, OPPOSED CONVENING OF SUMMIT AT PRESENT TIME PRECISELY BECAUSE HE FELT ARAB STATES, OTHER THAN THOSE DIRECTLY INVOLVED, HAD NO RIGHT TO EXPRESS OPINIONS ON STEPS JORDAN AND UAR MIGHT DECIDE TO TAKE FOR THE SAKE OF A SETTLEMENT. KUHEIMI SAID HE WAS CERTAIN FAISAL WOULD URGE HUSSEIN TO CONTINUE TO SEEK A JUST SETTLEMENT WITH JARRING'S ASSISTANCE, BUT HE WOULD IN ANY EVENT RECOMMEND THIS TO FAISAL.

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 02952 101834Z

5. KUHEIMI INTENDS REMAIN IN SAUDI ARABIA FOR SEVERAL  
DAYS LEAVE AFTER CONCLUSION HUSSEIN VISIT. PLANS VISIT  
JIDDA DURING THAT TIME AND HOPES MEET WITH AMB EILTS.

GP-3. DUNCAN

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20

SECRET 208

69

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02884 051306Z

44  
ACTION SS 25

INFO SSO 00, NSC 10, MM 01, 1036 W

02

P 051230Z JAN 68  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4322

S

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2884

EXDIS

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

1. DEPUTY  
PRIMIN ALMAD TOUGAN TOLD EMBOFF JAN 4 THAT  
INFORMAL REPORTS HE HAD OF LATEST JARRING CONVERSATIONS IN  
CAIRO INDICATED ISRAEL CONTINUES ISSIST DIRECT TALKS ARE  
NECESSARY FOR ANY PROGRESS ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. TOUGAN  
ASSERTED DIRECT TALKS NOT REQUIRED BY UN RESOLUTION AND IT  
WAS, AFTER ALL, PURPOSE AND ROLE OF UN REPRESENTATIVE TO ACT  
AS INTERMEDIARY. HE CONFIRMED JARRING WAS EXPECTED IN  
AMMAN JAN 8. SYMMES.

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By 16/112, NARA, Date 8/14/01

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TELEGRAM

70

47

~~SECRET~~ 047

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 02834 302207Z

83  
ACTION SS 25

INFO MM 01,1026 W

P 301830Z DEC 67  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4298  
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1161  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1331

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2834

EXDIS

SUBJECT: ESHKOL VISIT

1. WE HAVE NOTED ISRAELI PRESS COMMENTARY OF THE PAST FEW DAYS REPORTING SERIOUS DIVISIONS IN THE ISRAELI CABINET ON GOI POLICY AS TO THE OCCUPIED ARAB AREAS AND COMMENTING THAT THE CABINET MAY BE AWAITING THE RESULT OF CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PRIMIN ESHKOL DURING THEIR JANUARY MEETING. FROM THE VANTAGE POINT OF JORDAN WE WISH TO RECORD OUR PRINCIPAL CONCERNS ABOUT THIS VISIT

PAGE TWO RUQMKG 2834A ~~SECRET~~  
AS IT MAY PROVE CRITICAL IN THE PROSPECTS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

2. PUBLICITY. JORDANIANS ARE INTRIGUED BY THE ONE MONTH ADVANCE RESCHEDULING OF ESHKOL'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT THEY ARE, AS COULD BE EXPECTED, HOPEFUL THAT THIS CHANGE IN THE SCHEDULE MAY PRESAGE A USG DECISION TO BECOME MORE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS THAN THEY

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TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 AMMAN 02834 302207Z

BELIEVE HAS BEEN THE CASE TO DATE. COUNTERBALANCING THIS  
LGMZE IS THEIR SPECULATION THAT ESHKOL WILL PRESS HARD FOR  
USG SUPPLY OF FURTHER ARMS, PARTICULARLY PHANTOM AIRCRAFT,  
FOR ISRAEL. THE GENERAL PUBLICITY SURROUNDING THE PRIMIN'S  
VISIT COULD SERIOUSLY DAMAGE US-ARAB RELATIONS IF WE CONFIRM  
OUR INTENT TO PROVIDE FURTHER ARMS TO ISRAEL AND DO NOT AT  
THE SAME TIME MAKE SOME SIGNIFICANT SIGN OF SUPPORT FOR  
THE ARAB SIDE. WE WOULD HOPE IN FACT THAT EVEN IF WE  
AGREE TO SUPPLY FURTHER ARMS IT CAN BE KEPT SECRET FOR SEVERAL  
MONTHS.

3. OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE GOI INTENTIONS TOWARDS THE

PAGE THREE RUQMKG 2834A ~~SECRET~~

OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, PARTICULARLY THE WEST BANK, ARE

UNCLEAR TO US. WE WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT RETURN OF THE  
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES REMAINS ESSENTIAL TO JORDANIAN WILL-  
INGNESS TO WORK TOWARDS A POLITICAL SOLUTION. WE ARE CON-  
VINCED THAT IF ANY NEW TERRITORIES, INCLUDING THE ARAB  
SECTOR OF JERUSALEM, ARE RETAINED BY ISRAEL WE MUST ALL  
COUNT ON THERE BEING ANOTHER ROUND. A CENTRAL CONSIDERA-  
TION IS THAT THE ARABS HAVE A STRONG CASE FOR RETURN OF THE  
LANDS NOW UNDER ISRAELI OCCUPATION. (AT THE SAME TIME, OF  
COURSE, ADEQUATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS NEED TO BE WORKED OUT  
FOR ISRAEL.) THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF  
ISRAEL'S RETAINING THESE TERRITORIES ARE SO GRAVE THAT US  
FAILURE TO SUPPORT IN UNEQUIVOCAL FASHION THEIR RETURN TO  
ARAB CONTROL COULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE OUR POSTURE ON THE  
WORLD ORDER WHICH IS SO IMPORTANT TO OUR INTERESTS BOTH  
HERE AND BEYOND THE MIDDLE EAST. IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT THAT  
TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS THAT ISRAEL MAY ARGUE FOR ON  
SECURITY GROUNDS NOT BE SO EXTENSIVE AS TO JEOPARDIZE A  
SETTLEMENT. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT CERTAIN TERRITORIAL  
ADJUSTMENTS CAN BE MADE, PROVIDED THEY ARE CLEARLY JUSTIFIED

PAGE FOUR RUQMKG 2834A ~~SECRET~~

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TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 AMMAN 02834 302207Z

ON SECURITY GROUNDS AND PROVIDED SOME FACE-SAVING AND  
EQUITABLE EXCHANGE OF TERRITORY, OR OF TERRITORY FOR RIGHTS  
OF ACCESS, E.G. JORDANIAN USE OF A MEDITERRANEAN PORT, ARE  
ARRANGED.

4. JERUSALEM. OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS THERE HAVE BEEN  
OCCASIONAL GUARDED HINTS BY MIDDLE LEVEL ISRAELI OFFICIALS  
THAT THE GOI POSITION ON JERUSALEM MAY NOT BE AS UNCOMPROM-  
ISING AS ITS OFFICIAL POLICY WOULD LEAD ONE TO BELIEVE. WE  
ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED, HOWEVER, THAT IF THE HARD OFFICIAL  
POLICY LINE IS MAINTAINED FOR MUCH LONGER IT WILL SABOTAGE  
SETTLEMENT PROSPECTS. JERUSALEM IS A SIGNIFICANT BARGAINING  
LEVER FOR  
THE ISRAELIS ONLY IF THEY ARE PREPARED TO INDICATE  
TO THE ARABS THAT THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME GIVE IN  
THE ISRAELI POSITION. HOWEVER, IF THEY CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN  
THAT JERUSALEM IS NON-NEGOTIABLE, IT CAN PLAY NO ROLE IN  
MAKING THE ARABS AMENABLE TO MAKING ACCOMMODATIONS ON THEIR  
ISSUES ESSENTIAL TO A SETTLEMENT. WE WOULD NOTE THAT  
BOTH ARABS AND ISRAELIS ADDUCE GREAT EMOTIONAL CONCERN OVER  
JERUSALEM BUT IN NEITHER CASE DO THESE EMOTIONS ALONE

PAGE FIVE RUMK 2834A ~~SECRET~~

CONSTITUTE A CLAIM JUSTIFIABLE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW TO  
SOVEREIGNTY OVER ALL JERUSALEM. (A MAJOR CONSIDERATION  
WHICH SEEMS SOMETIMES IGNORED--BUT HAS OBVIOUS IMPLICATIONS  
FOR "SELF-DETERMINATION"--IS THE FACT THAT, FOR AS MANY  
GENERATIONS AS HAVE ANY LEGAL IMPLICATIONS, THE LAND  
AND BUILDINGS IN THE WALLED OLD CITY AND IN FACT ALL THE  
AREA INCLUDED BY THE GOI IN THE GREATER "EAST JERUSALEM"  
HAVE BEEN OWNED BY PERSONS WHO CONSIDER THEMSELVES ARABS,  
BOTH MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS. THE SINGLE EXCEPTION IS PROPERTY  
OCCUPIED BY FORMER RESIDENTS OF THE JEWISH QUARTER IN THE  
OLD CITY; EXPULSION OF THESE PEOPLE IN 1948 OBVIOUSLY ALSO  
HAS LEFT RIGHTS WHICH NEED TO BE REDRESSED.) GIVEN THE  
ABSOLUTELY BASIC NEED FOR THE GOI TO BE ACCOMMODATING ON

JERUSALEM, WE SUGGEST CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO OUR CON-  
DITIONING FURTHER US ARMS SUPPLY TO ISRAEL ON ISRAELI

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 AMMAN 02834 302207Z

AGREEMENT TO GIVE UP ANY CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OR ULTIMATE JURISDICTION OVER ARAB JERUSALEM.

6. US AID AND ARMS FOR JORDAN. OUR RELATIONS WITH JORDAN CURRENTLY HAVE LESS SUBSTANCE TO THEM THAN AT ANY

PAGE SIX RUQMKG 2834A ~~SECRET~~

TIME SINCE WE FIRST ASSUMED MAJOR FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR JORDAN OVER TEN YEARS AGO. THE KING AND SEVERAL GOVERNMENT LEADERS HAVE DISCUSSED WITH US THE DIFFICULTIES THEY ARE HAVING IN JUSTIFYING CONTINUED CLOSE TIES WITH THE USG. THERE HAS BEEN A SERIOUS POSSIBILITY THAT THE KING WOULD FEEL HIMSELF OBLIGED TO TURN TO THE SOVIETS FOR ARMS IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE. WE ARE CONCERNED, AND SUGGEST THAT THE GOI SHOULD BE EQUALLY CONCERNED, ABOUT THE EFFECT SUCH A POLICY DECISION COULD HAVE ON SETTLEMENT PROSPECTS. WE SUBMIT THAT BOTH US AND ISRAELI NATIONAL INTERESTS REQUIRE THAT JORDAN CONTINUE TO RELY ON US FOR ITS ARMS SUPPLIES. WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT ONE TOPIC TO BE DISCUSSED WITH THE PRIMIN SHOULD BE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE US CONTINUING TO SUPPLY JORDAN'S MILITARY NEEDS IN ORDER TO KEEP THE SOVIETS FROM PRE-EMPTING THIS FIELD

7. A JORDAN-ISRAELI PEACE. WE KNOW THAT JORDAN'S POSTURE TOWARDS A SEPARATE PEACE WITH ISRAEL COULD HAVE A MAJOR INFLUENCE ON HOW ACCOMMODATING THE GOI WOULD BE PREPARED TO BE ON THE ISSUES OF WITHDRAWAL AND JERUSALEM AND TO ITS

PAGE SEVEN RUQMKG 2834A ~~SECRET~~

INTERPOSING NO OBJECTION TO US ARMS FOR JORDAN. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE KING IS NOW PREPARED FOR A SEPARATE SETTLEMENT, BASICALLY BECAUSE HE IS CONCERNED THAT NEITHER HE NOR SUCH A SETTLEMENT COULD ENDURE THE PREDICTABLY ADVERSE FOREIGN ARAB AND DOMESTIC OPINION. AT PRESENT, THERE ARE SIMPLY TOO MANY VARIABLES TO PREDICT WITH ANY CONFIDENCE WHENEITHER A SEPARATE JORDANIAN-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT OR A GENERAL ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT MIGHT FORMALLY RPT FORMALLY

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PAGE 05 AMMAN 02834 302207Z

BE ARRANGED. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, WE SUGGEST THE ISRAELIS  
HAVE IT WITHIN THEIR POWER SO TO MANAGE CIRCUMSTANCES  
THAT A SEPARATE SETTLEMENT IN ALL BUT NAME COULD BE ARRANGED  
WITH JORDAN AND THE KING BE SUPPORTED IN IT BY JORDANIAN OPINION.  
GP-3. SYMMES

EXDISE

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TELEGRAM

71

25

~~SECRET~~ 416

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02800 291621Z

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44  
ACTION SS 25

INFO MM 01, 1026 W

P 291545Z DEC 67  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4282

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2800

EXDIS

FOR NEA/IAI AND NEA/ARN

REF: AMMAN 2636, 2770

SUBJ: IMPLICATIONS OF POSSIBLE SOVIET PRESENCE IN JORDAN

WE HOPE CONSIDERATIONS MENTIONED IN AMMAN 2636 AND MORE RECENT  
RELATED MESSAGES CAN BE INCLUDED IN PERTINENT BRIEFING MATERIALS  
FOR ESHKOL VISIT. WE SCULD ALSO LIKE TO CALL TO YOUR ATTENTION  
[REDACTED] WHICH POINT UP FRUSTRATIONS AND DISCOURAGE-  
MENT AS SUMMARIZED BY THE KING AND MANIFESTED RECENTLY BY EMBASSY  
CONTACTS ACROSS THE BOARD.

SUMMES

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Kathleen Allegrone, Senior Reviewer

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S 98001

By rg/ell, NARA, Date 8/14/01

72 2

~~SECRET~~ 009

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02779 270632Z

ACTION SS 25

INFO MM 01/026 W

R 261620Z DEC 67  
 FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4262  
 INFO AMEMBASSY RABAT 150  
 AMEMBASSY TUNIS 108  
 AMEMBASSY LONDON 731  
 USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 627  
 AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1174  
 AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1322  
 AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 165  
 AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1154  
 AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 489  
 AMEMBASSY JIDDA 568

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2779

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION

PAGE TWO RUQMKG 2779A ~~SECRET~~

1. WE IN AMMAN HAVE OBSERVED WITH INTEREST THAT, PERHAPS  
 BECAUSE NOTHING TANGIBLE RESULTED JARRING'S FIRST ROUND  
 OF TALKS APPEARS TO HAVE DISENCHANTED MANY IN THE AREA.  
 ACCORDING TO SOME REPORTS DISILLUSIONMENT WAS PRONOUNCED  
 IN BOTH CAIRO AND BEIRUT (LONDON 4998; BEIRUT 5129). WE  
 ALSO NOTE THE ISRAELIS HAVE VOICED CONCERN ABOUT A DETER-

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 02779 270632Z

ORATION IN THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE WITHIN WHICH JARRING MUST ACT (STATE 88487 NOTAL).

2. IN CONTRAST WITH THE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED, THE GOJ LEADERSHIP, ALTHOUGH CONCERNED THAT NEGOTIATIONS NOW NEED TO BE SPEEDED UP, IS RELATIVELY RELAXED ABOUT THE RESULTS OF THE INITIAL ROUND DURING WHICH, AS REPORTED SEPARATELY, IT SUCCEEDED IN MAINTAINING A FLEXIBLE NEGOTIATING POSTURE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE RESPONSIBLE JORDANIAN OFFICIALS ARE A BIT PUT OUT THAT THEIR LEBANESE AND UAR COLLEAGUES HAVE GOTTEN OUT FRONT IN MATTERS OF

PAGE THREE RUGMKG 2779A ~~SECRET~~  
SUBSTANCE (JERUSALEM, FOR EXAMPLE) THAT THEY THINK PRIMARILY, AND PERHAPS SOLELY, CONCERN JORDAN. THEY HAVE COMMENTED PARTICULARLY ON THE PROPENSITY TO RUSH TOO QUICKLY AND TOO PUBLICLY INTO WHAT APPEARS TO BE AN INFLEXIBLE NEGOTIATING POSTURE ON SOME OF THE SPECIFICS.

3. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE ATMOSPHERE OF GLOOM THAT IS ACCUMULATING AROUND JARRING'S MISSION MAY ONLY SERVE FURTHER TO COMPLICATE HIS TASK AS HE NOW GETS DOWN TO DEFINING SPECIFIC AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT AND TO PREPARING PROPOSALS FOR POSSIBLE ACCOMODATIONS. WE HAVE WONDERED WHAT MIGHT BE DONE TO IMPROVE THE ENVIRONMENT. MAKING DUE ALLOWANCE FOR THE INCAPACITY OF MANY ARABS TO KEEP IT SECRET, ONE THING THAT OCCURS TO US IS THAT THE ARAB PARTICIPANTS MIGHT BE ENCOURAGED TO CUT BACK ON PUBLIC COMMENTARY. WE KNOW THAT THE JORDANIANS THINK IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS WERE ARAB LEADERS TO REGRAIN EVEN FROM PRIVATE COMMENTS ON SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF PRIMARY INTEREST TO JORDAN. THIS WAS A BASIC PURPOSE IN THE JORDANIAN INTEREST IN A FIFTH SUMMIT; TO

PAGE FOUR RUGMKG 2779A ~~SECRET~~  
GET APPROVAL AND FLEXIBILITY FOR THE PRINCIPALS TO TACKLE THEIR INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS WITHOUT CARPING FROM THOSE WITH

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 02779 270632Z

ONLY MARGINAL INTERESTS. WE SUSPECT THAT THE LEBANESE AND EGYPTIANS FEEL JUST AS SENSITIVE AS THE JORDANIANS ABOUT THE ADVICE THAT HAS BEEN PROFERRED SO FREELY AMONG OTHERS BY TUNIS, KUWAIT AND RIYADH WHETHER THROUGH PRIVATE COMMENTARIES OR PRESS CRITIQUES.

4. WE CONSIDER THAT WHATEVER CAN BE DONE TO DISCOURAGE EITHER NEGATIVE OR TANGENTIAL PUBLIC COMMENT BY ARAB LEADERS ABOUT JARRING'SNYMISSIONWOULD BE BENEFICIAL. WOULD THERE BE ANY MERIT IN ENCOURAGING SYG U THANKT TO ISSUE A PUBLIC STATEMENT, OR A PRIVATE MESSAGE TO THE PRINCIPALS, EXPRESSING HIS CONFIDENCE IN THE MISSION'S PROSPECTS, RECOMMENDING PATIENCE TO THE PARTICIPANTS, AND SUGGESTING THE UNDESIRABILITY OF PUBLIC SPECULATION WHILE THE MISSION IS IN PROGRESS. GP-3. SYMMES

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T

EX-125

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NLJ-S 98001

By 16/10, NARA, Date 8/14/01

22

~~SECRET~~ 847

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 00002 241328Z

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ACTION SS 25

INFO MM 01/001 W

P 241224Z DEC 67  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4258

*Ristor*

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2770

EXDIS

1. MIN OF STATE FOR FOR AFF RIFA'I ASKED I CALL THIS MORNING TO RECEIVE FOLLOWING DEMARCHE WHICH HE MAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS OF PRIME MINISTER TALHOUNI.

2. JORDAN HAD LEARNED WITH GREAT CONCERN OF NEW ARMS REQUEST OF ISRAEL: I.E: REQUEST TO PURCHASE F-4 PHANTOMS. RESUMPTION OF A-4 SKYHAWK DEAL HAD BEEN HARD ENOUGH TO TAKE, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE ISRAEL IS STILL IN OCCUPATION JORDAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORY.

3. HAVING HEARD REPORTS OF THE NEW ISRAELI CAMPAIGN FOR F-4S, AMBASSADOR SHARAF HAD BEEN IN TO SEE UNDER SECRETARY AND HAD DISCUSSED THE ISRAELI REQUEST WITH HIM. SHARAF HAD REPORTED IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THERE MIGHT BE SOME DELAY IN CONSIDERATION OF THE ISRAELI REQUEST. SHARAF HAD ALSO REPORTED HE UNDER-

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 2770A ~~SECRET~~

STANDING THAT DECISION IN RESUMING US ARMS SHIPMENT TO JORDAN MIGHT COME SOONER. SHARAF HAD CONCLUDED THERE MIGHT BE SOME CHANCE THAT RESUMPTION OF SHIPMENTS TO JORDAN WOULD BE FOLLOWED SOON AFTERWARD BY ANNOUNCEMENT OF A NEW SALES AGREEMENT FOR ISRAEL.

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 00002 241328Z

4. IF FOREGOING CONCLUSION HAD ANY BASIS IN FACT, GOJ WOULD FIND IT MOST EMBARRASSING. A NEW SALES AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD GREAT ANXIETY IN JORDAN. BUT, MORE IMPORTANT, IT WOULD BOLSTER THOSE ARABS WHO DO NOT FAVOR FOLLOWING "THE POLITICAL PATH TOWARD AN ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT." THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN ADVOCATING MODERATION AND PEACEFUL APPROACHES WOULD BE SERIOUSLY UNDERCUT. ALREADY, RIFA'I SAID, THERE WERE DISTURBING SIGNS THAT TONE OF NEXT SUMMIT WOULD BE MORE IMMEDIATE. MERE FACT THAT ISRAEL WAS MOUNTING A CAMPAIGN FOR MORE US ARMS WOULD STIMULATE IMMEDIATE ARABS.

5. IN VIEW OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT PROVIDED BY JARRING MISSION, GOJ URGED THAT USG TAKE ITS VIEWS INTO ACCOUNT AND NOT MOVE FAVORABLY ON ISRAELI REQUEST FOR PHANTOMS. GOJ PARTICULARLY HOPED, HOWEVER, THAT FAVORABLE DECISION ON RESUMPTION US ARMS SHIPMENT TO JORDAN COULD BE MADE WITHOUT ANY

PAGE 3 RUGMKG 2770A ~~SECRET~~

REFERENCE TO CURRENT SKYHAWK (A-4) SHIPMENTS TO TO ISRAEL OR ANY OTHER ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL.

6. I ASSURED RIFA'I I WOULD REPORT FOREGOING APPROACH. I SAID ON PERSONAL BASIS I COULD NOT FAIL TO OBSERVE, HOWEVER, THAT TRUMPETINGS FROM CAIRO, BAGHDAD, AND DAMASCUS ABOUT THEIR OWN REARMMENTS, SERIES OF SOVIET NAVAL AND MILITARY VISITS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES IN UAR AND YEMEN, AND RECENT REPORTS OF POSSIBLE FRENCH AIRCRAFT SALES TO IRAQ AND SYRIA HAD PROVIDED MORE THAN ENOUGH PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION FOR ISRAEL TO SEEK ADDITIONAL ARMS.

7. RIFA'I RUEFULLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ARAB STATEMENTS HAD CONTRIBUTED TO PROLONGING THE "VICIOUS CIRCLE." HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD URGE, HOWEVER, THAT THE CIRCLE BE STOPPED SO THAT THE SITUATION COULD BE DEALT WITH POLITICALLY BY JARRING AND THE ARAB MODERATES WHILE THERE IS STILL A CHANCE.

8. COMMENT: WE ARE AWARE OF COURSE OF ISRAELI INTEREST IN F-4. WE WOULD EARNESTLY HOPE THAT USG WOULD FORBEAR FROM GIVING ANY

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 00002 241328Z

ENCOURAGEMENT TO THIS NEW ISRAELI INTEREST SO LONG AS JARRING IS WORKING TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. WE WOULD RECOMMEND USG CONSIDER ISSUING A PUBLIC STATEMENT TO EFFECT (1) NO NEW US

PAGE 4 RUGMKG 2770A ~~SECRET~~  
US SALES AGREEMENT WILL BE MADE WITH ANY STATE IN AREA WHILE JARRING MISSION WORKING AND (2) CALLING UPON FRENCH AND SOVIETS TO MAKE SIMILAR SELF-DENYING ANNOUNCEMENT.

9. DEPT PLEASE REPEAT AS DESIRED.

SYMMES

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26

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 02766 231640Z

41  
ACTION SS 25

INFO MM 01, /026 W

*R. Stewart*

R 231604Z DEC 67  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4259  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 730  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1152

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2766

EXDIS

SUBJECT: ARMS FOR JORDAN

1. IN COURSE OF DINNER CONVERSATIONS KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY ZAID RIFA'I EXPRESSED TO EMBOFF DEC 22 HIS DEEPLY CONCERN ABOUT LIKELIHOOD KING MAY FEEL OBLIGED TO OPT FOR ARMS FROM SOVIETS IF HE HAS NOT RECEIVED FAVORABLE RESPONSE FROM USG BY JANUARY 1.

2. RIFA'I STATED KING SENSES HIMSELF UNDER GREAT PRESSURE ON THIS ISSUE. ASKED WHO IF ANYONE WAS PUSHING HUSSEIN AT THIS POINT RIFA'I FIRST STATED PRESSURES WERE COMING FROM JUNIOR ARMY OFFICERS. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION, HOWEVER, RIFA'I INDICATED SITUATION WOULD BETTER BE DESCRIBED AS FACT THAT KING IS VERY SENSITIVE TO PRESSURES FROM HIS

PAGE 2 RUGMKG 2766A ~~SECRET~~  
MILITARY AND THAT REMARKABLE "SURVIVAL INSTINCT" IS AT WORK. RIFA'I OBSERVED THAT IN FEELING AN EARLY DECISION MUST BE MADE TO CONCILIATE HIS OFFICERS, HUSSEIN MIGHT BE "A LITTLE BIT OUT AHEAD OF THE OFFICERS BUT ONLY A VERY

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 02766 231640Z

LITTLE".

3. ASKED SPECIFICALLY WHETHER THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN PRESSURING THE KING FOR SUCH A DECISION RIFA'I SAID THEY HAD NOT.

4. RIFA'I REPEATEDLY REFERRED TO HUSSEIN'S PROBLEM IN ATTEMPTING TO EXPLAIN TO HIS OFFICERS WHAT POINT THERE WAS IN PRESERVING US-JORDANIAN FRIENDSHIP. HE SAID THE OFFICERS CANNOT UNDERSTAND, FOR EXAMPLE, THE POSSIBLE SIDE EFFECTS WHICH A SOVIET ARMS DEAL COULD HAVE ON US WILLINGNESS TO USE ITS INFLUENCE OVER ISRAELI DURING THE LENGTHY DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERS AHEAD AIMED AT AN ARAB-ISRAELI POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

5. RIFA'I VOLUNTEERED HE WAS DOING HIS BEST TO CAUTION THE KING ABOUT THE NEED TO BALANCE ALL ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES INHERENT IN GOING TO THE SOVIETS FOR ARMS. RIFA'I SAID HE HAD, IN ORDER TO BUY TIME, GONE SO FAR AS TO URGE THE KING THAT EVEN IF HE SHOULD DECIDE TO GO TO

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 2766A ~~SECRET~~

THE SOVIETS, HE SHOULD DELAY REVEALING THIS INTENT UNTIL THE SUMMIT MEETING IN MID-JANUARY. THE SUMMIT WOULD PROVIDE A SETTING WHICH WOULD GUARANTEE ANY SUCH ANNOUNCEMENT MAXIMUM PUBLICITY AND BENEFIT IN TERMS BOTH OF DOMESTIC AND INTER-ARAB POLITICS. RIFA'I STRESSED IN CONCLUSIONS, HOWEVER, HE DID NOT FEEL THAT KING'S DECISION WOULD BE DELAYED AS LONG AS MID-JANUARY AND REPEATED HE FELT STRONGLY THAT IF THE US DOES INTEND TO RESUME SUPPLY OF ARMS TO JORDAN, IT SHOULD LET THE KING KNOW PRIOR TO JANUARY 1.

GP-3. SYMMES

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NLJ-S 98001  
By ag/ll, NARA, Date 8/14/01

75 26

~~SECRET~~ 57

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02765 231558Z

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ACTION SS 25

INFO MM 01, /026 W

R 231514Z DEC 67  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4253

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2765

EXDIS

SUBJECT: GOVERNOR ROMNEY'S CALL ON KING HUSSEIN

1. KING HUSSEIN WELCOMED GOVERNOR ROMNEY THIS MORNING AS GUEST OF JORDAN GOVT. GOV ROMNEY EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD COME TO LOOK, LISTEN AND LEARN AND THAT PRIMIN HAD ALREADY GIVEN HIM EXTENSIVE BACKGROUND BRIEFING. GOV ALSO TOLD HIS MAJESTY HE HAD BEEN DEEPLY IMPRESSED BY SAD CONDITION OF REFUGEES AND THAT HE PLANNED TO ACCOMPNAV PRIMIN TALHOUNI TO ZIZIYA CAMP IN AFTERNOON. (MOST OF ZIZIYA CAMP TENTS HAD BEEN BLOWN AWAY IN LAST NIGHT'S STORM AND REFUGEES ARE NOW IN PROCESS OF BEING MOVED TO BALLEY CAMPS.) AFTER THANKING GOV FOR HIS EXPRESSIONS OF FRIENDSHIP FOR JORDAN AND CONCERN FOR REFUGEES, KING MADE GENERAL RESTATEMENT OF JORDANIAN POLICY ALONG RECENT LINES HE HAS TAKEN, EM-PHASIZING TO GOV "YOU CAN SEE FOR YOURSELF HOW SITUATION

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 2765A ~~SECRET~~  
IS."

2. FOLLOWING OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE EMERGED DURING CONVERSATION:

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Department of State

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 02765 231558Z

A. SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL. KING HUSSEIN SAID IN RESPONSE TO GOV'S QUERY THAT HE SAW NO BENEFIT IN SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS AT THIS TIME. CHIEF DISADVANTAGE LAY IN PROBABILITY OTHER ARABS WOULD REPUDIATE ANY AGREEMENTS REACHED IN SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS. THUS, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, HE WISHED TO PROCEED ALONG LINES ACCEPTABLE TO PRINCIPAL ARAB PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE. IF THIS PRODUCED NO RESULTS, HOWEVER, HE HAD NOT COMPLETELY CLOSED OUT POSSIBILITY OF SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS. FACT REMAINED THAT AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT THAT INCLUDED PRINCIPAL ARAB PARTIES WOULD BE MUCH MORE PERMANENT AND THEREFORE MORE DESIRABLE.

B. ARMS FOR JORDAN. IN RESPONSE TO GOV'S QUERY AS TO HOW USG COULD HELP JORDAN IN PRESENT SITUATION, KING HUSSEIN REPLIED THAT, "AS AMBASSADOR KNOWS VERY WELL," JORDAN'S CHIEF REQUIREMENT AT THE MOMENT IS RESUMPTION OF U.S. ARMS SHIPMENTS. HE THEN DESCRIBED SITUATION ALONG FAMILIAR LINES AND SAID THAT HE COULD HOLD OFF ONLY A FEW

PAGE 3 RUGMKG 2765A ~~SECRET~~

MORE DAYS BEFORE MAKING A DECISION TO SEEK ARMS ELSEWHERE. AT THIS POINT I REVIEWED WHAT I HAD TOLD DKHAMDASH ON DEC 21 AND STATED I PERSONALLY WAS OPTIMISTIC A FAVORABLE DECISION WOULD SOON BE FORTHCOMING. I ALSO SUMMARIZED FOR HIS MAJESTY AN ANALYSIS OF SOVIET AIMS AND ACTIVITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST DISCUSSED EARLIER IN EMBASSY BRIEFING FOR GOV ROMNEY. I EMPHASIZED I BELIEVED AN ARMS AGREEMENT WITH SOVIETS WOULD BE VERY MUCH IN DISINTEREST OF BOTH JORDAN AND U.S. HIS MAJESTY SAID HE AGREED WITH THE ANALYSIS AND THAT HE WAS AWARE OF THE GRAVE DANGERS IN MAKING AN AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS. UNLESS THE USG ACTED VERY SOON, HOWEVER, HE WOULD HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S 96001

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76 28

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 02741 211747Z

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ACTION SS 25

INFO MM 01, /026 W

P 211559Z DEC 67  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4240  
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1147  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 728  
CINCSTRIKE

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2741

EXDIS

SUBJECT: ARMS FOR JORDAN

1. SINCE I KNOW DEPT AND ADDRESSEES ARE WELL AWARE DEGREE OF URGENCY ATTACHING TO JORDAN ARMS SITUATION, I REGRET HAVING TO REPORT FURTHER CONCERNING CRITICAL STAGE WE ARE APPROACHING IN THIS MATTER.

2. THIS MORNING GENERAL KHAMMASH TRACKED ME DOWN TO MINSTATE FOR FONAFFAIRS RIFAI'S OFFICE TO SAY HE HAD TO SEE ME ON URLPNT INSTRUCTIONS FROM KING HUSSEIN. WHEN I SAW KHAMMASH, HE TOLD ME KING HAD TOLD HIM YESTERDAY TO ASK IF WE HAD YET RECEIVED DECISION. ABOUT 7:30 THIS MORNING (AN EARLY HOUR ILLUSTRATING KING'S RESTIVENESS ABOUT THIS MATTER, ACCORDING TO KHAMMASH) KING HAD TELEPHONED HIM TO ASK WHAT HE

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 2741A ~~SECRET~~

HAD LEARNED. KHAMMASH SAID KING WAS "ON HIS HEAD" WHEN HE FOUND KHAMMASH HAD NOTHING TO REPORT AND TOLD HIM TO SEE ME IMMEDIATELY.

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 02741 211747Z

3. WITH STATE 87083 A D 87402 (FOR WHICH WE WERE MOST GRATEFUL) IN MIND, I TOLD KHAMMASH WASHINGTON WAS STILL WORKING ACTIVELY ON PROBLEM AND THAT I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE AT MOST MATTER OF ONLY FEW MORE DAYS BEFORE WE HAD DECISION. I POINTED OUT THAT PRESIDENT IS OUT OF COUNTRY AND THAT I DOUBTED DECISION OF THIS KIND COULD BE MADE IN HIS ABSENCE. THUS, I COULD ONLY URGE IN BOTH OUR INTERESTS THAT JORDAN BE PATIENT A WHILE LONGER.

4. I THEN SAID I HAD JUST LEARNED FROM RIFAI THAT SOVIET SURVEY MISSION IS NOW DUE TO ARRIVE ON JAN FIFTH AND THAT I ASSUMED THIS ACCOUNTED FOR RENEWED SENSE OF URGENCY.

5. KHAMMASH REPLIED THAT KING HAS BEEN WORRYING CONTINUOUSLY ABOUT ARMS MATTER EVER SINCE HIS RETURN. PUBLICITY ABOUT REPORTED ISRAELUGF-4 PHANTOMS REQUEST AND CONGRESSIONAL AND OTHER PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF ARMS FOR ISRAEL HAVE FURTHER EXACERBATED KING'S SENSE FRUSTRATION

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 2741A ~~SECRET~~  
AND CONCERN. KHAMMASH STRESSED HE IS AFRAID KING EITHER MAY MAKE SUDDEN DECISION BO BUY SOVIET ARMS OR PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HE INTENDS TO EXPLORE MATTER WITH SOVIETS.

6. I TOLD HIM THAT EVEN IF OUR DECISION WERE UNFAVORABLE (AND I PERSONALLY WAS STILL OPTIMISTIC), I THOUGHT JORDAN WOULD MAKE GREAT MISTAKE EVER TO BUY ARMS FROM SOVIETS. I EMPHASIZED I THOUGHT SUCH A MOVE WOULD PUT OFF PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN AREA INDEFINITELY. KHAMMASH AGREED BUT SAID JORDANIAN LACK OF CASH MADE IT EITHER U.S. OR SOVIET SINCE OTHER SUPPLIERS SIMPLY COULD NOT OR WOULD NOT SELL AT DISCOUNT. MOVEOVER, KHAMMASH SAIK N JORDANIAN PUBLIC OPINION HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY "ITCHY" ON THIS MATTER. HE THEN ADDED THAT HE DOES NOT HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF ECHRYONE THE KING SEES, BUT HE IS AFRAID SOME PERSON OR PERSONS MAY BE PUSHING HUSSEIN TO TAKE SOVIET ARMS.

7. KHAMMASH SUGGESTED THAT IF DECISION IS MADE TO RESUME U.S. SUPPLY, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO FLY INNCOME OF FIRST

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 02741 211747Z

ITEMS. HE LAID CONSIDERABLE STRESS ON IMPORTANCE OF DOING SOMETHING DRAMATIC SO FAR AS LOCAL SITUATION IS CONCERNED. KHAMMASH ALSO BELIEVES IN DUE COURSE IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 2741A ~~SECRET~~  
HIM TO VISIT U.S. TO FOLLOW UP ON JORDANIAN NEEDS.

8. I CONCLUDED OUR CONVERSATION BY ASSURING KHAMMASH I WOULD IMMEDIATELY REPORT HIS MAJESTY'S CONCERN TO WASHINGTON. I ASKED HIM TO LET THE KING KNOW HOW I HAD RESPONDED TO HIM (SPECIFICALLY WHY THERE MIGHT BE SLIGHT FURTHER DELAY) AND URGED THAT WE BE GIVEN A WHILE LONGER TO GET WHAT I STILL BELIEVED WOULD BE A FAVORABLE DECISION.

GP-3. SYMMES

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TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~ 113

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02636 151125Z

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ACTION SS 25

INFO MM 01, /026 W

R 151020Z DEC 67  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4188  
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1129  
USMISSION USUN NY 619

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2636

EXDIS

SUBJ: ISRAELI ATTITUDE TOWARD SOVIET NE PRESENCE

REF: STATE 84998 AND 84999; AMMAN 2635 (NOTAL)

1. WE WERE ENCOURAGED BY ACTING SECRETARY'S EXCHANGE WITH AMB HARMAN ABOUT SOVIETS SUPPLYING ARMS TO JORDAN (PARA 6 STATE 84998), AND WE HOPE IT WILL HAVE SOME TANGIBLE EFFECTS ON ISRAELI ATTITUDES.

2. WE REMAIN PUZZLED AS TO WHY HARMAN AND GOI LEADERS THINK USG SHOULD DIFFERENTIATE ITS CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET EXPANDING INFLUENCE IN UAR AND YEMEN (STATE 84999) AND ITS CONCERN ABOUT

PAGE 2 RUGMKG 2636A ~~SECRET~~  
POSSIBILITY SOVIETS MAY BE ON VERGE OF ESTABLISHING THEMSELVES IN JORDAN. WE HERE DO NOT THINK HUSSEIN WOULD NECESSARILY BE FINISHED INTERNALLY IF HE TAKES SOVIET ARMS (SHAH AND KINGS OF MOROCCO AND AFGHANISTAN HAVE SURVIVED)--HE MIGHT EVEN BE STRENGTHENED. MOREOVER, I HOPE ISRAELIS WILL NOT MISREAD THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS WEEK'S JORDANIAN EXCHANGES WITH DAYAN (SEE NJA-6799 ~~SECRET~~ NOFORN NOTAL). IF THEY INTERPRET THESE AS INDICATING THAT NEED

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 02636 151125Z

FOR AN "UNDERSTANDING" IS SO STRONGLY FELT BY JORDAN LEADERS THAT THEY WILL DO ANYTHING TO GET IT, THEY ARE BADLY MISREADING THE SITUATION.

3. I AM CONVINCED THAT EXISTING MODERATE VIEWS TOWARD EFFECTING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL WILL GRY UP IF JORDAN DECIDES ON SOVIET ARMS, AND I HOPE THE ISRAELIS CAN BE PERSUADED NOT TO ACT

SO AS TO PUSH THE KING ANY FURTHER TOWARD THIS OPTION. MORE POSITIVELY, I WOULD HOPE THEY COULD BE PERSUADED ACQUIESCE IN EARLY RESUMPTION US ARMS SUPPLY TO JORDAN.

GP-3 SYMMES

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NLJ-S 98001  
By as/ml, NARA, Date 8/14/01

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 02635 150932Z

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ACTION SS 25

INFO MM 01, /026 W

P R 150845Z DEC 67  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4187  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 721  
CINCSTRIKE  
DOD  
DIA

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2635A

EXDIS

SUBJ: ARMS FOR JORDAN

1. GEN KHAMMASH INFORMED US LATE AFTERNOON DECEMBER 14 KING ASKED HIM INQUIRE WHETHER ANY WORD YET RECEIVED FROM WASHINGTON ON ARMS REQUEST. KHAMMASH EXPLAINED THAT HE AND KING HAD SPENT LAST TWO DAYS VISITING JORDAN ARMY FIELD UNITS. ALL UNITS COMPLAINED OF SHORTAGES IN ESSENTIALS AND NUMBER ONE QUESTION WAS WHEN WOULD

PAGE 2 RUGMKG 2635A ~~SECRET~~  
THEY BE RESUPPLIED. KHAMMASH SAID HE AND KING STALLED AS BEST THEY COULD BUT SITUATION WAS EXTREMELY AWKWARD FOR THE KING.

2. KHAMMASH SAID THAT IN INSTRUCTING HIM TO GET IN TOUCH WITH US, KING EMPHASIZED HIS EXPECTATION THAT HE WOULD RECEIVE FAVORABLE REPLY AS SOON AS FOREIGN AID BILL PASSED WHICH HAD BEEN EXPECTED AROUND MID-DECEMBER. KHAMMASH SAID PURPOSE OF CALL WAS TO INQUIRE ON BEHALF OF KING STATUS OF AID BILL AND TO URGE FAVORABLE REPLY ON ARMS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 02635 150932Z

3. I AM AVING RESPONSE PASSED TO HIS MAJESTY TO EFFECT FOREIGN AID BILL HAS NOT YET BEEN PASSED BUT IN FACT HAS BEEN RECOMMITTED BY HOUSE. NEVERTHELESS, EMBASSY REMAINS OPTIMISTIC THAT BILL WILL BE PASSED THIS MONTH. MEANWHILE, WE HAVE REMAINED IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH WASHINGTON, AND WE BELIEVE THERE IS DISPOSITION TO ACT SOON AFTER PASSAGE OF BILL TO RESUME SOME ARMS SHIPMENTS TO JORDAN. WE THEREFORE HOPE HIS MAJESTY WILL BEAR WITH US A WHILE LONGER.

4. NEED FOR EARLIEST POSSIBLE FAVORABLE RESPONSE HAS BEEN SET

PAGE 3 RUGMKG 2635A ~~SECRET~~

FORTH IN PREVIOUS MESSAGES (AMMAN 2395 AND RELATED MESSAGES) AND I AM CERTAIN I NEED NOT EXPRESS AGAIN URGENCY WE ATTACH TO BEING ABLE TO TELL KING SOMETHING POSITIVE IN NEAR FUTURE.

SYMMES

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S 98001

By lll, NARA, Date 8/14/01

79

~~SECRET~~ 956

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02633 141850Z

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ACTION SS 25

INFO MM 01, /026 W

R 141700Z DEC 67  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4184  
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA 562  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 719  
USMISSION USUN NY 617

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2633

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO

SUBJ: YEMEN SITUATION

1. WHEN I SAW RIFAI TODAY (AMMAN 2632) I DISCUSSED YEMEN SITUATION AS REQUESTED IN LAST PARA STATE 83752. I BELIEVE THIS APPROACH TO RIFA'I SERVED ADDITIONAL USEFUL PURPOSE OF REMINDING GOJ OF SOME OF DANGERS THAT MAY LIE IN ESTABLISHING ECONOMIC OR MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 2633A ~~SECRET~~  
THE SOVIET UNION.

2. IN RESPONSE TO MY APPROACH RIFA'I SAID YEMEN HAD, OF COURSE, COME UP IN PERIPHERAL WAY DURING FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETINGS IN CAIRO. IN FACT, HASSAN SABRI AL-KHOULI HAD CALLED TO HIM PRIVATELY IN ORDER TO OUTLINE UAR POINT OF VIEW TOWARD CURRENT SITUATION. AMONG OTHER THINGS, AL-KHOULI HAD ASSERTED THAT THE YEMENI REPUBLICANS HAD INSUFFICIENT TRAINED

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 02633 141850Z

YEMENI PILOTS FOR THEIR AIRCRAFT AND SOME UAR MERCENARIES HAD BEEN RECRUITED TO FLY THESE YEMENI AIRCRAFT. RIFA'I SAID HE HAD NOT PROBED FOR DETAILS BUT HAD MERELY LISTENED TO AL-KHOULI'S EXPOSITION.

3. AS RIFA'I WAS LEAVING CAIRO, YEMENI PRIMIN MUHSIN AL-AINI HAD SOUGHT A MEETING WITH HIM. AL-AINI HAD EXPLAINED THAT NOW THAT YEMEN HAD RID ITSELF OF THE UAR OCCUPYING FORCES IT WANTED ONLY TO SEEK PEACE AND RECONCILIATION WITH OTHER PARTIES TO THE YEMEN DISPUTE. AL-AINI HAD REQUESTED JORDAN HELP PROMOTE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN YEMEN BY PERSUADING OTHER FOREIGN STATES TO DISCONTINUE INTERFERENCE.

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 2633A ~~SECRET~~

4. RIFA'I SAID HE HAD BRIEFED THE KING ABOUT THESE CONVERSATIONS IMMEDIATELY UPON HIS RETURN TO AMMAN ON DEC L2 AND THAT HE BELIEVED JORDAN MIGHT HAVE SOME CAPABILITY FOR HELPING IN THIS SITUATION EVEN THOUGH IT HAD NO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH YEMEN. HE IMPLIED THAT HE WOULD RECOMMEND TRYING TO HELP OUT AS REQUESTED BY AL-AINI.

5. RIFA'I ASSURED ME THAT HE WOULD BRING USG CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET ACTIONS IN YEMEN TO THE ATTENTION OF THE KING AND THE PRIMIN. HE SAID HE WAS CERTAIN THE GOVT OF JORDAN WOULD WISH TO MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE USG ABOUT YEMEN. I TOLD RIFA'I THAT THE EMBASSY WOULD PROVIDE ANY NEW INFORMATION TO THE GOJ THROUGH REGULAR OPERATIONAL CONTACTS.

GP-3 SYMMES

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.

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TELEGRAM

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80 25

~~SECRET~~ 370

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02530 061824Z

42  
ACTION SS 25

INFO MM 01/026 W

R 061350Z DEC 67  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4141  
INFO CINCSTRIKE  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 157  
AMEMBASSY LOPGON 709  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 111

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2530/7

EXDIS

SUBJECT: ARMS FOR JORDA

REF: STATE 79171, AMMAN 2519 AND 2528

1° BY PRIOR ARRANGEMENT I STAYED ON WITH KING HUSSEIN FOLLOWING SENATOR RIBICOFF'S AUDIENCE FOR A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF ARMS SITUATION. ARMS QUESTION HAD ALREADY COME UP IN GENERAL WAY DURING MEETING WITH SENATOR.

2° I SAID I WAS PLEASED HIS MAJESTY HAD HAD OPPORTUNITY MENTION JORDAN ARMS REQUIREMENTS TO THE SENATOR, WHO HAD SEEMED QUITE SYMPATHETIC TO JORDAN'S NEEDS AS DESCRIBED BY THE KING. I HAD BEEN CONCERNED, HOWEVER, TO LEARN THROUGH

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 2530A ~~SECRET~~  
EMBOFF ON FOURTH (AMMAN 2528) THAT SOVIET ECONOMIC SURVEY MISSION SCHEDULED TO COME TO JORDAN LATER THIS MONTH WOULD, AT SOVIET REQUEST, INCLUDE THREE SOVIET MILITARY OFFICIALS.

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Authority ERUS, Vol XX, # 10  
By S NARA, Date 7-17-01

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TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 AMMAN 02530 061824Z

I COULD APPRECIATE SENSE OF FRUSTRATION FELT BY HIS MAJESTY. I FELT OBLIGED NEVERTHELESS TO SAY I PERSONALLY BELIEVED PRESENCE IN JORDAN OF SOVIET MILITARY, IF IT BECAME KNOWN, WOULD TEND PREJUDICE OUR EFFORTS GAIN APPROVAL FOR RESUMPT

ION OF U.S. ARMS SHIPMENTS TO JORDAN AS WELL AS FOR OUR GENERAL EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF JORDAN. I HAD NOTED JORDAN PRESS ARTICLE THAT MORNING STATING THAT SOVIET SURVEY MISSION WOULD NOT ARRIVE UNTIL AFTER FIRST OF YEAR. I HOPED THIS WAS TRUE BECAUSE IT WOULD ALLOW TIME FOR USG TO ARRIVE AT WHAT I BELIEVED WOULD ULTIMATELY BE FAVORABLE DECISION ON RESUMING SOME ARMS SHIPMENTS TO JORDAN.

3. HIS MAJESTY RESPONDED THAT HE WAS NOT SURE WHEN SOVIET MISSION WOULD ARRIVE. IT MIGHT BE BEFORE END OF YEAR. SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN INFORMING HIM ONLY A FEW DAYS AGO OF MISSION'S COMING HAD STATED MISSION WOULD INCLUDE THREE SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIALS BUT THAT LATTER WOULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED AS SUCH IN ORDER TO AVOID EMBARRASSING JORDANIAN

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 2530A ~~SECRET~~  
GOVT. KING SAID

HE HAD BEEN TAKING LINE WITH SOVIETS THAT HE STILL INTENDED OBTAIN HIS ARMS FROM USUAL SOURCES. NEVERTHELESS, HE HAD NOT FELT HE COULD TELL SOVIET AMB TO DELETE THREE MILITARY FROM SURVEY MISSION. FOR ONE THING, SOVIETS HAD BEEN TAKING VERY MODERATE LINE RECENTLY. THEY WERE SUPPORTING U.K. RESOLUTION IN TALKS WITH JORDAN AND HAD STRESSED ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXISTENCE. SOVIET AMB HAD ALSO SPOKEN OF SOVIET EFFORTS TO DAMPEN SYRIAN EXTREMISM. HE CONSIDERED SOVIETS, DESPITE SOME OUTWARD APPEARANCES, HAD BEEN PLAYING A GENERALLY CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE WITH REGARD TO ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM. THIS FACTOR ALSO LED HIM TO FEEL HE COULD NOT TELL SOVIETS NOT TO SEND MISSION AT THIS TIME OR NOT TO BRING MILITARY PERSONNEL IF THEY DID. ON OTHER HAND, IT WAS HIS INTENTION TO SEE THAT SOVIET MILITARY ONLY LOOKED AROUND IN GENERAL WAY AND THAT THEY DID NOT GET INTO ANY SPECIFIC DISCUSSION OF JORDAN'S REQUIREMENTS. THIS WAS UNDERSTOOD, HE EMPHASIZED.

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 02530 061824Z

4. I COMMENTED THAT HIS MAJESTY WAS, OF COURSE, BEST JUDGE OF GOJ INTERESTS IN THIS RESPECT. SOME OF US, HOWEVER, STILL HAVE SUSPICIONS ABOUT SOVIET MOTIVES IN THE NEAR

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 2530A ~~SECRET~~

EAST. ONLY IN LAST FEW DAYS SOVIETS HAD BEEN MAKING NOISES OF WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS SOME FORM OF ARMS LIMITATION IN AREA; YET WITH JORDAN THEY WERE PURSUING WHAT COULD ONLY BE CONSIDERED A SIGNIFICANTLY NEW ARMS SUPPLY ROLE IN NEAR EAST. ALTHOUGH SOVIETS MORE CAUTIOUS AND SEEM

TO RECOGNIZE DANGER OF ESCALATION OF ARAB-ISRAELI INCIDENTS, SOME OF US STILL BELIEVE THEY WILL PURSUE THEIR SPOILING OPERATIONS IN NEAR EAST WHEREVER POSSIBLE. I PERSONALLY WAS SUSPICIOUS ENOUGH OF THEIR MOTIVES TO WONDER IF THEY COULD BE COUNTED ON TO KEEP PRESENCE IN JORDAN OF THREE MILITARY PERSONNEL QUIET.

5. CONVERSATION CONCLUDED WITH MY TELLING HIS MAJESTY I HAD NEW WORD FROM WASHINGTON INDICATING HIGH LEVEL USG OFFICIALS FULLY APPRECIATE URGENCY GOJ REQUIREMENTS AND ACTIVELY REVIEWING MATTER. I WAS THEREFORE HOPEFUL OF A FAVORABLE DECISION ON JORDAN ARMS SHORTLY AFTER CONGRESSIONAL ACTION IS COMPLETED ON FOREIGN AID APPROPRIATION BILL. I THOUGHT THIS COULD BE BEFORE CHRISTMAS. KING SEEMED TO APPRECIATE THESE ASSURANCES. HE SAID EARLIER IN MORNING HE HAD SPOKEN TO ASSEMBLED SENIOR JAA OFFICERS TO TELL

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 2530A ~~SECRET~~

THEM HE EXPECTS SOON TO BE ABLE TO PROVIDE THEM WITH SPECIFICS REGARDING MILITARY EQUIPMENT SUPPLIES.

GP-3. SYMMES

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NLJ-S 88001

By gll NARA, Date 8/14/01

81

~~SECRET~~ 285

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02528 071809Z

42  
ACTION SS 25

INFO MM 01,1026 W

R 061230Z DEC 67  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4139  
INFO CINCSTRIKE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 708  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 156  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1110

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2528

EXDIS

CORRECTED - COPY

SUBJECT: ARMS FOR JORDAN

1. KING HUSSEIN ADVISED EMBOFF ON 4 DECMEBER THAT SOVIETS WERE PRESSING TO CONTINUE THE MILITARY DIALOGUE INITIAED BY THE SOVIETS DURING THE KING'S MOSCOW TRIP. HUSSEIN SAID THE GOJ HAD RECEIVED A LETTER FROM SOVIET FOREIGN OFFICE STATING THAT THE SOVIETS PLANNED TO SEND A THREE-MAN MILITARY

PAGE TWO RUQMG 2528A ~~SECRET~~  
DELEGATION TO JORDAN TO RETURN THE VISIT OF THE JORDANIAN MILITARY OFFICERS TO MOSCOW. HOWEVER, THE LETTER STATED THAT IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY POSSIBLE EMBARRASSMENT TO JORDAN, THE THREE MILITARY OFFICERS WOULD BE INCLUDED AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET ECONOMIC DELEGATION SCHEDULED HERE SHORTLY. THE KING SAID HE WAS MOST ANXIOUS TO RECEIVE A POSITIVE REPLY ON US ARMS POLICY FOR JORDAN SO HE COULD HEAD OFF ANY

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 02528 071809Z

FURTHER SOVIET OVERTURES OF THIS SORT.

2. IN A LATER CONVERSATION, CHIEF OF STAFF KHAMMASH TOLD EMBOFF THAT THE LETTER IN QUESTION HAD BEEN SENT TO THE GOJ OVER DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SEMINOV'S SIGNATURE. KHAMMASH SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS WERE PRESSING HARD, IN A VERY CORRECT BUT VERY CLEVER WAY, TO PUT MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON JORDAN TO ACCEPT SOME LOC ARMS. HE NOTED THAT SEMINOV'S LETTER WAS THE THIRD SOVIET MOVE IN THIS REGARD WITHIN THE PAST TEN DAYS. THE FIRST WAS A VISIT BY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO THE KING, DURING WHICH THE AMBASSADOR REITERATED THE SOVIETS' COMPLETE WILLINGNESS TO SUPPLY JORDAN WITH ALL ITS ARMS NEEDS

PAGE THREE RUQMKG 2528A ~~SECRET~~

AT BARGAIN PRICES UNDER THE MOST FAVORABLE TERMS. THIS WAS FOLLOWED THE SAME DAY BY A CALL FROM THE CZECH AMBASSADOR ON THE KING, IN WHICH THE AMBASSADOR VOLUNTEERED THE SAME OFFER TO THE KING ON BEHALF OF THE CZECH GOVERNMENT. THE CZECH LEFT A VERY IMPRESSIVE BROCHURE OF CZECH ARMAMENT CONSISTING OF SOPHISTICATED AIRCRAFT, ARMOR, ARTILLERY AND OTHER MAJOR ITEMS, WHICH COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE JORDANIANS. KHAMMASH ASSUMED THAT THE CZECH OFFER WAS TAKEN AT SOVIET INITIATIVE TO GIVE JORDAN A MORE PALATABLE ALTERNATIVE IN THE EVENT DIRECT DEALINGS WITH THE SOVIETS PROVED POLITICALLY UNDESIRABLE. KHAMMASH STATED THAT, WHILE BOTH HE AND THE KING WERE PREPARED TO STALL, THE SOVIETS WERE HANDLING THE MATTER IN AN EXTREMELY SUBTLE FASHION AND HE HOPED THAT THE AMERICAN ANSWER WOULD FORTHCOMING SOONEST SO THAT THE PRESENT UNCERTAINTY AND FURTHER SOVIET MANEUVERINGS COULD BE BROUGHT TO AN END. KHAMMASH PROMISED TO DO WHAT HE COULD TO DELAY THE SOVIET DELEGATION'S ARRIVAL AND TO INSURE, WHEN IT DID ARRIVE, THAT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE MILITARY MEMBERS WERE KEPT INNOCUOUS AND THEIR ACTIVITIES

PAGE FOUR RUQMKG 2528A ~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 02528 071809Z

CAREFULLY CIRCUMSCRIBED.

GP-3.

SYMMES

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TELEGRAM

82 26

*Tyler for the President*

~~SECRET~~ 955

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02519 061444Z

42  
ACTION SS 25

INFO MM 01,7026 W

S

02

R 051730Z DEC 67  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4135  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 707  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1132  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1282  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1109

*Dec 5*

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2519

EXDIS

*Text of cable from Chile Symmes (Amman 2519)*

SUBJECT: TOUR D'HORIZON OF SENATOR RIBICOFF WITH KING HUSSEIN

1. KING HUSSEIN RECEIVED SENATOR RIBICOFF AND MR. GRANQUIST WITH ME THIS MORNING. SENATOR RIBICOFF HAD BEEN RECEIVED EARLIER BY PRIMIN TALHOUNI AND DEPRIMIN TOUQAN AND HAD HAD EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM IN WHICH HE DELVED INTO SPECIFICS OF POSSIBLE SETTLEMENT. *IN THE MEETING WITH the*

PAGE TWO RUQMKG 2519A ~~SECRET~~

KING, *the* SENATOR REFERRED TO THOSE EARLIER DISCUSSIONS. HE SAID HE HAD JUST COME FROM ISRAEL WHERE HE HAD HAD TALKS WITH PRIMIN ESHKOL AND FONMIN EBAN. HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH PRIMIN TALHOUNI HIS OWN PERSONAL VIEWS RE POSSIBLE STEPS TOWARDS PEACE IN THE AREA. SENATOR THREWOUT SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF MUTUALITY OF ISRAELI-JORDANIAN INTEREST IN SUCH AREAS AS EILAT/AGABA PORT DEVELOPMENT, JOINT POTASH DEVELOPMENT IN *the* DEAD SEA, JORDAN USE OF ASHDOD OR HAIFA, JOINT TOURIST DEVELOPMENT IN JERUSALEM, JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF WATER AND AGRICULTURAL

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-155  
By *10* NARA, Date 6-10-03

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 02519 061444Z

RESOURCES AND SETTLEMENT <sup>of the</sup> REFUGEE PROBLEM. SENATOR ALSO OUTLINED POSSIBILITY JORDAN SUPERVISION MUSLIM SHRINES IN JERUSALEM. SENATOR THEN LED INTO <sup>the</sup> ISRAELI VIEW THAT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS ARE NECESSARY TO MOVE TOWARD <sup>an</sup> ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT OF <sup>a</sup> LASTING NATURE. HE SAID HE RECOGNIZED THAT <sup>the</sup> KING COULD NOT MOVE ALONE AND THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR HIM TO CONSULT HIS ARAB ALLIES BUT HE WONDERED HOW <sup>the</sup> KING SAW <sup>the</sup> POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS.

2. <sup>The</sup> KING RESPONDED BY PROVIDING <sup>a</sup> GENERAL OUTLINE OF RECENT JORDANIAN POLICY. HE STRESSED THAT HE SAW <sup>the</sup> FORTHCOMING SUMMIT MEETING (FOR WHICH <sup>a</sup> DEFINITE DATE HAD NOT BEEN SET)

PAGE THREE RUGMKG 2519A ~~SECRET~~

AS CHIEFLY A MEANS BY WHICH HE WOULD OBTAIN FLEXIBILITY TO PURSUE POLICIES IN JORDAN'S INTEREST. JORDAN WOULD PRESS FOR <sup>an</sup> EARLY SUMMIT MEETING IN RABAT, PERHAPS BY <sup>the</sup> TWELFTH. HE ELABORATED ON HUMAN, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS POSED FOR JORDAN BY <sup>the</sup> LATEST CROP OF REFUGEES, BY PERENNIAL DIFFICULTIES ARISING FROM <sup>the</sup> 1948 WAR, AND FROM CONTINUED, STRIDENT ATTACKS ON JORDAN'S POLICIES OF MODERATION BY VARIOUS ARAB EXTREMISTS. HE SAID HE COULD NOT, IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, MOVE TO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS, BUT IN RESPONSE TO APPOINTED QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR RIBICOFF HE SAID HE WAS NOT AGAINST DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS IN PRINCIPLE. THAT STAGE COULD ONLY BE REACHED THROUGH THE JARRING MISSION AND "WITH THE HELP OF FRIENDS." <sup>The</sup> KING ALSO TOLD THE SENATOR THAT HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO AND, IN FACT, WOULD FAVOR <sup>Israeli</sup> THE SENATOR'S PASSING ON HIS VIEWS TO GOP LEADERS ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS. BECAUSE OF ENEMIES OF MODERATION IN THE ARAB WORLD, HOWEVER, HE DID NOT WISH THESE VIEWS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS TO BE PUBLICLY ATTRIBUTED TO HIM.

3. THE KING STRONGLY REITERATED HIS OPPOSITION TO TERRORIST ACTIVITY. HE STRESSED THAT EVEN THE ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE

PAGE FOUR RUGMKG 2519A ~~SECRET~~

TO ADMIT THAT THOSE THEY HAD ARRESTED WERE NOT JORDANIAN AND

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 02519 061444Z

THAT THEIR ARMS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT, AS WELL AS THEIR TRAINING AND BRIEFING, HAD BEEN SUPPLIED BY SYRIA. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SYRIANS ARE FALSELY BRIEFING AND MISLEADING INFILTRATORS IN ORDER DELIBERATELY TO COMPROMISE JORDANIAN EFFORTS AGAINST TERRORISM IN THE EYES OF THE ISRAELIS.

4. THE KING OUTLINED IN WELL KNOWN TERMS JORDAN'S SITUATION WITH REGARD TO ARMS REQUIREMENTS. HE STRESSED THAT HE HAD ALMOST REACHED LIMITS OF HIS ABILITY TO DEAL WITH THIS SITUATION. HE IS BEGINNING TO SEE DANGER POINTS IN HIS OWN ARMY WHICH, HE SAID FRANKLY, IS HIS ONLY GUARANTEE OF CONTINUED STABILITY AND MODERATION.

THE ARMY'S MORALE CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE AS THEY SEE OTHER ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL SUPPLIED WITH NEW EQUIPMENT WHILE THEY GET NOTHING. KING STRESSED THAT HE HAS BEEN FORCED TO ACCEPT THE PRESENCE OF OTHER ARAB TROOPS IN HIS TERRITORY, AND THIS IS AN ADDED DANGER. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE CANNOT ASK FOR THE REMOVAL OF THESE TROOPS SO LONG AS HE OBTAINS NO MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THE SOVIETS HAVE OFFERED TO SUPPLY HIM WITH ARMS, AND HE WILL SOON BE FACED WITH HAVING TO TURN TO THAT SOURCE IF THERE IS NO OTHER

PAGE FIVE RUGMKG 2519A ~~SECRET~~

ALTERNATIVE. THE KING SAID THIS WAS A MOST UNPLEASANT ALTERNATIVE FOR HIM AND THAT HE DID NOT CONSIDER IT IN THE INTEREST OF THE US OR OTHER STATES IN THE AREA FOR HIM TO BE FORCED TO MAKE THIS CHOICE.

THE SENATOR AGREED WITH THE KING AND ASKED ME TO BRIEF HIM AND THE KING ON THE PRESENT STATUS OF US ARMS SUPPLY TO JORDAN, WHICH I THEN DID. THE SENATOR ALSO SAID HE INTENDED TO DISCUSS THIS SITUATION WITH AMB BARBOUR ON HIS RETURN TO ISRAEL WITH A

VIEW TO

GIVING HIS PERSONAL ENDORSEMENT OF A RESUMPTION OF US MILITARY SHIPMENTS TO JORDAN.

5. <sup>The</sup> CONVERSATION THROUGHOUT WAS FRANK AND CORDIAL. SENATOR WIBICOFF'S SINCERITY AND OBJECTIVITY SEEMED ~~TO ME TO BE~~ **NOT TO BE**

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PAGE 04 AMMAN 02519 061444Z

DISTINCTLY FAVORABLE IMPRESSION ON THE KING.

GP-3

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NLI-S 98001  
By ag/ll, NARA, Date 8/14/01

83

~~SECRET~~ 584

02

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02465 011225Z

43  
ACTION SS 35

INFO MM 014/036 W

R 011131Z DEC 67  
FM AMEMBASS AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4108  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 703  
USMISSION USUN NY 601  
CINCSRIKE  
DSC/ISA

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2465EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 2426

CHIEF OF STAFF AMER KHAMMASH PASSED MESSAGE TO EMBASSY  
EVENING 30 NOVEMBER FROM KING HUSSEIN STATING HE COULD  
NOT DELAY LONGER HIS MEETING WITH TOP ARMY COMMANDERS  
WITHOUT CREATING ADVERSE SUSPICIONS AND RUMORS.  
HE HAS THEREFORE SCHEDULED MEETING FOR 5 DECEMBER.

GP-3. SYMMES

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8  
NLJ-S 98001  
By as/ll NARA, Date 8/14/01

84 23

~~SECRET~~ 290

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02465 011225Z

43  
ACTION SS 35

INFO MM 010/036 W

R 011131Z DEC 67  
FM AMEMBASS AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4108  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 703  
USMISSION USUN NY 601  
CINCSTRIKE  
OSD/ISA

02

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2465EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 2426

CHIEF OF STAFF AMER KHAMMASH PASSED MESSAGE TO EMBASSY EVENING 30 NOVEMBER FROM KING HUSSEIN STATING HE COULD NOT DELAY LONGER HIS MEETING WITH TOP ARMY COMMANDERS WITHOUT CREATING ADVERSE SUSPICIONS AND RUMORS. HE HAS THEREFORE SCHEDULED MEETING FOR 5 DECEMBER.

GP-3 SYMMES

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S 09001  
By 26/11 NARA, Date 8/14/01

85

~~SECRET~~ 488

2

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02426 282105Z

82  
ACTION SS 35

INFO /035 W

R 281556Z NOV 67  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4087  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 701  
USMISSION USUN NY 593  
CINCSTRKE  
OSD/ISA

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2426

EXDIS

DURING MY BRIEF COURTESY CALL ON KING HUSSEIN TODAY, HE EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT HE HAD NOT HAD A FAVORABLE REPLY TO HIS ARMS REQUEST ON HIS RETURN, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE UK RESOLUTION HAD MEANWHILE BEEN ADOPTED. HE SAID THE JORDAN ARMY LEADERSHIP IS PRESSING HIM VERY HARD AND STRESSED THAT THE NEED FOR HIM TO TAKE SOME ACTION QTE IS BECOMING A MATTER OF DAYS UNQTE. I RESPONDED THAT THE KING KNEW FROM HIS HIGH LEVEL CONVERSATIONS IN WASHINGTON THAT THE USG IS SYMPATHEITC TO JORDAN'S NEEDS BUT THAT WE HAVE PROBLEMS THAT HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED TO HIM. FOLLOWING ADOPTION OF UK RESOLUTION I

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 2426A ~~SECRET~~  
HAD REQUESTED EARLY DECISION AND HAD BEEN ASSURED MATTER UNDER ACTIVE STUDY AT HIGH LEVEL.

GP-3. SYMMES

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By 16/22, NARA, Date 8/14/01

86  
28

~~SECRET~~ 311

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 02396 271136Z

4  
ACTION SS 35

INFO /035 W

P R 271010Z NOV 67  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4073  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 698  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1082  
USMISSION USUN NY 588  
CINCSTRIKE  
OSD/ISA

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2396

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 2395

SUBJ: ARMS FOR JORDAN

1. FOLLOWING EIGHT CATEGORIES OF PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS FOR JAA EQUIPMENT ARE DRAWN FROM KHAMMASH LIST PRESENTED

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 2396A ~~SECRET~~

COL JORDAN AUGUST 1967:

A. WEAPONS: 106MM RECOILESS RIFLES WITH TRUCK

M151A1C 100 EACH

B. AMMUNITION:

CARTRIDGE CAL 30 API, 8 RD CLIP 4,000,000RDS

CARTRIDGE CAL 30 CARBINE 2,000,000RDS

CARTRIDGE CAL 50 MIXED LINK 3,000,000RDS

CARTRIDGE 40 MM M3 HET 65,000EACH

CARTRIDGE 40 MM M 81 APT 3,000EACH

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 02396 271136Z

CARTRIDGE 105 MM HE	10,580 EACH
CARTRIDGE 106 MM HEAT W/FUSE	10,000 EACH
FUSE M557A1	7,351 EACH
C. COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT:	
RADIO AN/PRC 10A	250 EACH
RADIO AN/VRC 34	70 EACH
RADIO AN/VRQ 3	20 EACH
TELEPHONE TA 312/PT	1,000 EACH
WIRE WDI/TT	2,500 MILES
SWITCHBOARDS 30 LINES	20 EACH
SWITCHBOARDS 12 LINES	50 EACH

PAGE 3 RUGMKG 2395A ~~SECRET~~

D. VEHICLES:	
TRUCK 2 1/2 TON M35A2	40 EACH
E. AERIAL TARGET DRONE SYSTEM	
AERIAL TARGETS Q19B	20 EACH
LAUNCHER ZL4	1 EACH
F. AIMING CIRCLES	38 EACH
G. SIGHT UNITS M53	250 EACH
H. REQUISITIONS PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED FOR ITMES IN FOLLOWING CATEGORIES UNDER FY 66 AND 67 MAP GRANT AID:	
AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLIES	
WEAPON SPARE PARTS	
COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT SPARE PARTS	
MEDICAL SUPPLIES	

GP-3 SYMMES

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NLJ-S 88001

By 12/02 NARA, Date 8/14/01

87

SECRET 310

2

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02395 01 OF 02 271131Z

ACTION SS 35

INFO /035 W

P R 271005Z NOV 67  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4072  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 697  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1081  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 587  
CINCSTRIKE  
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 2395

EXDIS  
SUBJECT ARMS FOR JORDAN

COUNTRY TEAM MESSAGE

1. AS ADDRESSEES ARE AWARE, WHEN KING WAS IN UNITED STATES HE SOUGHT ANSWER ON WHETHER WE WOULD BE PREPARED RESUME OUR

PAGE TWO RUQMKG 2395/1A ~~SECRET~~  
ARMS SUPPLY TO JORDAN AND ASKED THAT DEFINITE ANSWER BE PROVIDED HIM ON HIS RETURN TO THE KINGDOM. WE HAVE WORD THAT HUSSEIN, WHO RETURNED FROM HIS MONTH LONG TRIP NOV 26, EXPECTS A POSITIVE RESPONSE NOW THAT THE UK RESOLUTION HAS BEEN PASSED BY THE SC.

2. THE KING IS KEENLY AWARE OF HIS ARMY'S DESIRE FOR RECOMMENCEMENT OF ARMS SUPPLY TO JORDAN FROM ONE SOURCE OR ANOTHER. THE JAA POINTS OUT THAT JORDAN IS THE ONLY COUNTRY INVOLVED IN THE JUNE WAR WHICH HAS NOT

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TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 AMMAN 02395 01 OF 02 271131Z

YET REPLACED LOST EQUIPMENT. LAST WEEK'S EVENTS, WHEN A JORDANIAN REFUGEE CAMP WAS BOMBARDED AND THERE WAS AN ISRAELI AERIAL ATTACK ON EMPLACEMENTS IN THE JORDAN VALLEY, ARE FRESH IN MEMORY.

3. THE ARMY LEADERSHIP REPORTEDLY IS NOT PRESSING FOR FULL REPLACEMENT OF EQUIPMENT LOST LAST JUNE BUT IS SEEKING REASSURANCE THAT THE KING HAS A PLAN TO OBTAIN CERTAIN PRIORITY ITEMS. THE SPARE PARTS SITUATION IS PARTICULARLY CRITICAL IN THAT THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT SHORTAGES OF PARTS

PAGE THREE RUQMKG 2395/1A ~~SECRET~~

WHOSE REPLACEMENT IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT RENDERING US SUPPLIED WEAPONS AND VEHICLES UNSERVICEABLE. SOME AUTOMOTIVE EQUIPMENT IS BEING OPERATED UNDER UNSAFE CONDITIONS. THE EQUIPMENT SITUATION IS SO TIGHT THAT OUTLYING UNITS LACK COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. IN SEVERAL RESPECTS, THEREFORE, THE JAA SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE SITUATION IS SUCH THAT IT CANNOT FULFILL ITS MINIMUM ROLYEIN DEFENSE AND PUBLIC SECURITY.

4. WE WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE KING AND HIS ADVISORS HAVE TAKEN PAINS TO AVOID THE APPEARANCE OF TRYING TO BLACKMAIL US INTO RESUMING ARMS SHIPMENTS BY THREATENING TO GO TO THE SOVIETS FOR THEIR EQUIPMENT. ON THE CONTRARY THEY HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THEY WOULD MUCH PREFER TO AVOID GETTING ENTANGLED WITH THE USSR ON ARMS SUPPLY. WE JUDGE THIS IS IN PART BECAUSE THE JORDANIANS SUSPECT THAT TO SEEK SOVIET ARMS MIGHT WELL COST THEM CONSIDERABLY IN TERMS OF CONTINUED USG SUPPORT IN REGAINING THE WEST BANK AND IN ACHIEVING AN OVERALL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL. HOWEVER, THEY POINT OUT THE DILEMMA THEY FACE IN HAVING TO ANSWER QUESTIONS

PAGE FOUR -UQMKG 2395/1A ~~SECRET~~

ABOUT MILITARY REEQUIPMENT, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE USG'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT WE WERE RESUMING SELECTIVE ARMS SHIPMENTS TO ISRAEL AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES.

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 AMMAN 02395 01 OF 02 271131Z

5. THE GOJ LEADERSHIP WANTS OUR ASSISTANCE IN HELPING MEET THEIR IMMEDIATE NEEDS EITHER DIRECTLY OR FROM OTHER THAN US SOURCES. IT WOULD BE HAPPY TO GET THESE SUPPLIES AS A GIFT, A SALE OR, IN THE CASE OF THIRD COUNTRY SOURCES, EVEN AS A SEVERAL MONTHS' LOAN OR LEASE. THE GOJ RECOGNIZES IT CAN NOT ESTABLISH NEW FORCE GOALS THILE THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF THE AREA REMAINS UNCLEAR. FURTHERMORE, THE GOJ KNOWS IT BASICALLY MUST PLAY FOR TIME IN THE HOPE MODERATION WILL PREVAIL.

6. A DECISION IN AMMAN TO SEEK SOVIET ARMS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY MEET WITH A QUICK RESPONSE FROM MOSCOW. SOVIET PRICES WOULD BE DRASTICALLY LOWER THAN THOSE FOR COMPARABLE WESTERN ITEMUQ AND SOVIET FINANCING WOULD PROBABLY ALSO BE ON EASIER TERMS. AS THE USSR LEADERSHIP PHRASED IT TO THE KING AND HIS PARTY LAST OCTOBER, THEY HAVE NO SET PRICES AND ARE NOT IN THE

PAGE FIVE RUQMKG 2395/1A ~~SECRET~~  
ARMS BUSINESS FOR PROFIT. DIFFERENT BUYERS GET DIFFERENT PRICES, THE JORDANIANS WERE TOLD, BUT JORDAN COULD ASSUME THE PRICES SET WOULD BE ONES THE KINGDOM COULD AFFORD. THIS SOFT SALES PITCH IMPRESSED THE JORDANIANS THEN. THE PROSPECT OF ARMS AT BARGEN BASEMENT PRICES WILL BE NO LESS ATTRACTIVE NOW THAT JORDAN HAS (A) LOST SOURCES OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE PROVIDED IN THE PAST BY US AND UK BUDGET SUPPORT (B) SUFFERED A LOSS OF FLEXIBILITY IN ITS FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES TO THE EXTENT OF SOME SEVEN MILLION DINARS IN ITS CURRENT STERLING RESERVES AS A RESULT OF THE UK DEVALUATION AND (C) A LOSS, IF SPENT OUTSIDE THE STERLING AREA, OF SIX MILLION DINARS IN THE PROJECTED ARAB DONATIONS FROM KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA AND LIBYA.

7. WHILE IN US KING WAS TOLD IN RESPECT TO OUR CONGRESSIONAL PROBLEM ON RESUMING ARMS SHIPMENTS THAT PASSAGE OF AN ACCEPTABLE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WOULD HELP EASE OUR PROBLEM. HE WAS ALSO TOLD THAT SUCH RESOLUTION WOULD SONSTITUTE ONE OF THE FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS

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TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 04 AMMAN 02395 01 OF 02 271131Z

PAGE SIX RUQMKG 2395/JA ~~SECRET~~

LOOKING TOWARDS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH WE WOULD HOPE WOULD PERMIT US TO RESUME SOME SHIPMENTS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN THE FAIRLY NEAR FUTURE. RIGHT NOW OUR PROBLEM IS HOW TO HELP THE KING BUY TIME AND AVOID A DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH HIS ARMY ON WHETHER OR NOT TO OPT FOR SOVIET WEAPONS.

8. WE ARE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED THAT IF JORDAN DOES GO TO MOSCOW FOR ARMS, THIS WILL ONLY SERVE FURTHER TO STRENGTHEN THOSE ELEMENTS IN THE AREA WHO ARE OPPOSED TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE CRISIS. IT WOULD CREATE THE IMPRESSION, HOWEVER UNJUSTIFIED IT MIGHT BE, THAT JORDAN HAD ADOPTED AN EXTREMIST AND MILITANT LINE. IT WOULD ALSO WE BELIEVE GIVE THE SOVIETS FURTHER SCOPE TO PLAY A MISCHIEVOUS ROLE IN THE AREA SUCH AS BY ENCOURAGING IT TO PRESS ITS DEMAND THAT ISRAEL WITHDRAW FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES BEFORE ANY OTHER STEPS ARE TAKEN. WE WOULD SEE SUCH A COURSE OF EVENTS AS GREATLY COMPLICATING THE PROSPECTS OF ACHIEVING THE PEACEFUL ACCOMMODATION IN THE AREA THAT THE NEW RESOLUTION HAS AT LEAST MADE POSSIBLE.

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TELEGRAM

28

~~SECRET~~ 316

2

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02395 02 OF 02 271145Z

4  
ACTION SS 35

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P R 271030Z NOV 67  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4074  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 699  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1083  
USMISSION USUN NY 589  
CINCSTRIKE  
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 AMMAN 2395

EXDIS

9. BY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING MESSAGE WE SUBMIT A LIST OF ITEMS WE HAVE SELECTED FROM THE JAA'S PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT, WHICH WAS FURNISHED TO COL JORDAN BY CHIEF OF STAFF KHAMMASH LAST AUGUST AND WHICH KHAMMASH WAS THEN GIVEN HOPE TO THINK COULD BE AT LEAST PARTIALLY

PAGE 2 RUQMKN02395/2A ~~SECRET~~  
FURNISHED BY EARLY OCTOBER. KHAMMASH HAS RECENTLY CONFIRMED TO US THAT HIS AUGUST LIST IS STILL CONSIDERED TO REPRESENT THE JAA'S MINIMUM EMERGENCY REQUIREMENTS. THE JORDANIANS' EXPECTATIONS ARE THAT THEIR WHOLE LIST WOULD NOW BE FURNISHED EITHER FROM US STOCKS OR WITH USG ASSISTANCE FROM THIRD COUNTRY SOURCES. THE SHORT LIST WE HAVE SUBMITTED REPRESENTS WHAT WE CONSIDER THE KING AND GOJ COULD GET AWAY WITH AND SATISFY THE JAA'S

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 02395 02 OF 02 271145Z

SENSE OF URGENCY ON REEQUIPMENT.

10. OUR AIM HAS BEEN TO SELECT A CREDIBLE MIX OF ITEMS THAT WILL BUY TIME BY IMPROVING MORALE OF THE JAA. WE

WOULD STRESS THAT THESE ITEMS DO NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGE JORDAN'S MILITARY CAPABILITY VIS-A-VIS ITS NEIGHBORS.

11. WE RECOGNIZE PROBLEM POSED BY FACT THAT ACTION HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETED ON THE FOREIGN AID APPROPRIATIONS BILL.

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 2395/2A ~~SECRET~~

WE ARE NOT NOW RECOMMENDING WHAT OUR FUTURE MAP RELATIONSHIP WITH JORDAN MIGHT BE, MUCH LESS WHAT KIND OF MILITARY FORCE JORDAN SHOULD ULTIMATELY HAVE. BEGIN UNDERLINE OUR CURRENT RECOMMENDATION IS SIMPLY THAT WE FIND A WAY TO MAKE A SELECTIVE RELEASE NOW OF THE LISTED MATERIAL FROM OUR INVENTORIES OR ASSURE DELIVERY FROM STOCKS OTHER THAN SOVIET. END UNDERLINE I BELIEVE THIS IS MINIMUM KING NEEDS TO HOLD LOYALTY JORDAN ARMY AND AT SAME TIME AVOID SERIOUS EMBARRASSMENT AT FORTHCOMING ARAB SUMMIT.

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NLJ-S 98001

By 6/11/01 NARA, Date 8/14/01

88  
**TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ 263

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02291 190941Z

9  
ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

R 181840Z NOV 67  
FM AMEMXASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4011  
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1056  
AMEMBASSY LONDON678  
USMISSION USUN NEWYORK 570

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2291

EXDIS

SUBJECT: ISRAEL-JORDAN

REF STATE 69864

1. FROM VOLUMINOUS COVERAGE AVAILABLE TO US ON KHARTOUM CONFERENCE WE FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF ANY SEPARATE SECRET AGREEMENT OR OF A TWO-STAGE PROGRAM. DISCUSSIONS DID DISTINGUISH AT TIMES BETWEEN (A) PROBLEM OF RECOVERY OF TERRITORY AND

PAGE TWO RUQMG 2291A ~~SECRET~~

(B) SOLUTION OF PALESTINE PROBLEM BUT IEAD THAT "SOLUTION OF PALESTINE PROBLEM" WOULD BE MILITARY WAS NEITHER IMPLICIT NOR EXPLICIT. RATHER, ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION IS THAT CONFEREES, SOME FREELY AND SOME GRUDGINGLY, ACKNOWLEDGED FAILURE OF ARAB MILITANT POLICIES AND AGREED THAT POLITICAL ACTION WAS THE ONLY FEASIBLE WAY TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION. WE REGARD IT AS SIGNIFICANT IN EVALUATING KHARTOUM CONFERENCE THAT UNRECONSTRUCTED MILITANTS SUCH AS SHUQAIRY AND SYRIANS REFUSED PARTICIPATE IN DECISIONS. IT SEEMS TO US THEY WOULD HAVE REGARDED A

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 02291 190941Z

DELIBERATE TWO-STAGE PLAN AS CLEVER AND IN KEEPING WITH THEIR EMOTIONAL COMMITMENT EVENTUALLY TO DEAL WITH ISRAEL MILITARILY.

2. ADDITIONNALLY, ANY IDEAS OF A MILITARY SECOND STAGE APPROACH, HAD THEY BEEN FORMULATED, HAVE BEEN OBVIOUSLY WEAKENED BY THE NATURE OF THE SPECIFIC CONCESSIONS AND COMMITMENTS THE ARABS HAVE INDICATED THEY ARE WILLING TO UNDERTAKE IN THE POST KHARTOUM PERIOD. IN FACT THE DRAFT RESOLUTIONS WHICH THEY HAVE ENDORSED DEAL WITH THE "PALESTINE PROBLEM," THE HEAT OF WHICH IS

PAGE THREE RUQMKG 2291A ~~SECRET~~

THE REFUGEES. EVEN MORE IMPORTANT FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW IS THE FACT THAT WHETHER OR NOT ARABS HAVE MENTAL RESERVATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH A SETTLEMENT, IT IS IMPORTANT TO CAPTIALIZE ON THE EXISTING SITUATION TO ESTABLISH CONDITIONS OF PEACE ON WHICH WE CAN HOPE TO IMPROVE AS TIME GOES ON (STATE 65127).

3. AS TO WHY ISRAELIS ARE PERSISTING IN THEIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST HUSSEIN, WE FIND, AS BEST WE CAN SEE IT FROM HERE, DEPARTMENTS SUGGESTIONS OF MOTIVATIONS (A), (B) AND (D) OF PARA 6 REFTEL EQUALLY COMPELLING. RE (B) WE ARE NOT IN A VERY GOOD POSITION TO TRY TO JUDGE WHETHER ISRAELIS ARE CONSCIOUSLY SEEKING TO INCREASE US-USSR POLARIZATION IN AREA BUT THIS TREND TO FURTHER POLARIZATION IS A NATURAL CONSEQUENCE IF THE PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE EXTENT HUSSEIN EMBODIES THEM ARE TO BE DISCARDED.

4. WE ARE INCLINED TO ADDAS ONE FURTHER POSSIBLE EXPLANATION TO THOSE LISTED REFTEL THE INADEQUACY OF ISRAELI POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE AND ASSESSMENTS ON JORDAN, IN CONTRAST PERHAPS

PAGE FOUR RUQMKG 2291A ~~SECRET~~

WITH ITS MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. IN PART, HOWEVER, THEIR INTERPRETATIONS MAY BE TACTICAL. THE ISRAELI VERSION OF THE KHARTOUM CONFERENCE IS A CASE IN POINT, ESPECIALLY IN THAT IT SEEMS TO IGNORE MUCH OF POSITIVE CONTENT WHICH WE

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 02291 190941Z

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NLJ-S 98001

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89  
**TELEGRAM**

43

SECRET 109

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02281 182325Z

87  
ACTION SS 25

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P 181600Z NOV 67  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4007  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 676  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1053  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 568

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2281

EXDIS

CORRECTED COPY

SUBJECT: JORDAN SUPPORT OF UK SC RESOLUTION

1. REGNET CROWN PRINCE HASSAN SUMMONED CHARGE AFTERNOON NOV 18. CROWN PRINCE STATED KING IN TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH HIM IN MORNING FROM PARIS HAD DIRECTED HIM INFORM CHARGE THAT KING SUPPORTS UK DRAFT SC RESOLUTION. OTHER ARABS WILL ALSO SUPPORT THIS DRAFT. HE HAD DOUBTS ONLY ABOUT SYRIA'S POSITION. HOWEVER, HE FELT SYRIA'S POSSIBLE OPPOSITION WAS NOT A MATTER

PAGE TWO RUGMKG 2281A ~~SECRET~~  
OF CONCERN.

2. ASKED SPECIFICALLY RE UAR POSITION, HASSAN SAID HE WAS CONFIDENT UAR WOULD SUPPORT UK DRAFT. HE NOTED THAT PRIMIN TALHOUNI HAD TAKEN SUBJECT UP IN CAIRO AND ADDED THAT JORDAN IS STILL FOLLOWING UP ON THIS WITH UAR. AS TO PRESS REPORTS THAT KING MIGHT VISIT CAIRO BEFORE RETURNING TO AMMAN, HASSAN

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 02281 182325Z

SAID THIS WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY IF RESOLUTION IS APPROVED BY SC.

3. ASKED ABOUT SOVIET POSITION, HASSAN SAID HE UNDERSTOOD SOVIETS WOULD SUPPORT ANY RESOLUTION AGREEABLE TO ARAB BLOC. CHARGE NOTED SOVIET ROLE IN NOV 17 POSTPONEMENT OF SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION.

4. HASSAN ALSO OBSERVED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD ISRAELI NEWSPAPERS WERE COMMENTING RELATIVELY FAVORABLY ON THE UK DRAFT.

5. CHARGE ASSURED CROWN PRINCE THAT USG IS DEEPLY INTERESTED IN EARLY SC ACTION AND NOTED WE HAVE CONFIRMED THIS TO RIFAI IN

PAGE THREE RUQMKG 2281A ~~SECRET~~

NEW YORK. CHARGE ADDED THAT WHILE WE PREFER WORDING OF OUR DRAFT RESOLUTION, THE UK TEXT SEEMS TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR GETTING ON WITH THE MAIN JOB OF SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS. REFERRING BRIEFLY TO THE US DRAFT, HASSAN SAID HE WAS AWARE UAR CONSIDERED THIS TEXT REQUIRED MODIFICATION ON PHRASING OF SECTIONS ON WITHDRAWAL AND "RECOGNIZED" BOUNDARIES. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE REFERRED IN PASSING TO UAR LETTER DELIVERED TO SECRETARY ANDERSON IN BAGHDAD. UK TEXT, HASSAN SAID, APPARENTLY WORDED BOTH ISSUES IN FORM WHICH UAR COULD ACCEPT.

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 02236 151252Z

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3982  
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1047  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1222  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 670  
USMISSION USUN NY 563

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2236

EXDIS

SUBJ: ISRAEL-JORDAN TENSION

1. DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TOUQAN CALLED CHARGE SHORTLY AFTER NOON NOV 15 TO STATE JORDAN GOVERNMENT HAD REPORTS FROM VARIETY SOURCES THAT ISRAELIS HAVE MASSED SIZEABLE ADDITIONAL FORCES INCLUDING 200 RPT 200 TANKS ALONG NORTHERN JORDAN RIVER LINE. BUILD-UP OBSERVED LAST TWO DAYS. REPORTS ATTRIBUTED TO EYEWITNESSES AND TO SEVERAL QUOTE HIGHLY PLACED DIPLOMATS END QUOTE. PRIMIN TAHOUNI HAD ASKED TOUQAN INFORM AMERICANS, BRITISH, AND FRENCH. TALHOUNI PLANS MEET WITH ARAB AMBASSADORS THIS AFTERNOON TO REVIEW

PAGE 2 RUQMG 2236A ~~SECRET~~  
SITUATION. TOUQAN SAID GOJ GRAVELY CONCERNED ISRAELIS PLANNING MAJOR BLOW AGAINST JORDAN AND HOPED US COULD DISSUADE THEM.

2. WHILE RECALLING OUR PREVIOUS ACTIONS COUNSELING

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 02-119  
By ms, NARA, Date 5-16-03 ~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 02236 151252Z

RESTRAINT, CHARGE PROMISED REPORT. CHARGE ADDED THAT WE HAD BEEN TOLD ABOUT THREE OR FOUR DAYS AGO THAT ISRAELIS INTENDED A ROTATION OF UNITS ALONG FRONTIER (TEL AVIV USDAO 15811 NOV 67) AND ASKED IF THIS MIGHT NOT BE WHAT WAS INVOLVED IN OBSERVATIONS REPORTED TO JORDANIANS. TOUQAN EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THIS POSSIBLE EXPLANATION BUT SAID THAT FROM REPORTED INCREASE IN ISRAELI FORCES IN REA INCLUDING TANK NUMBERS, HE FELT SURE MORE THAN ROTATION OF FORCES WAS INVOLVED.

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Department of State

91  
**TELEGRAM**

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S 98001

By ag/ll, NARA, Date 8/14/01

22

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 02179 081452Z

41  
ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

R 081155Z NOV 67  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3953  
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1037  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 557  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1213

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2179

EXDIS

SUBJECT: ISRAEL-JORDAN TENSION

REF: AMMAN 2155

1. SAUDI AMBASSADOR KUHEIMI TOLD US LAST EVENING OF HIS DEEP CONCERN THAT ISRAEL MIGHT BE ABOUT TO LAUNCH RETALIATORY ATTACK ON JORDAN OWING TO RECENT RASH OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS.

PAGE 2 RUGMKG 2179A ~~SECRET~~

2. KUHEIMI STATED THAT ON AFTERNOON NOV 6 UAR AMBASSADOR HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTACT PRIMIN TALHOUNI URGENTLY AND WARN HIM THAT AN ISRAELI ATTACK WAS IMMINENT ON AQABA (SIC) AND UNSPECIFIED SYRIAN TARGETS. KUHEIMI SAID HE WAS IN MEETING WITH GOJ MINISTER OF INTERIOR AL-KAYYID WHEN AL-KAYYID WAS CONTACTED BY UAR AMBASSADOR AND ASKED WHEREABOUTS OF TALHOUNI TO RELAY THIS WARNING.

3. COMMENT: THIS TENDS ESTABLISH THAT IMMEDIATE SOURCE SPECIFIC WARNING MENTIONED TO CHARGE BY TALHOUNI (PARA 1

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 02179 081452Z

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SECRET 178



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Department of State

TELEGRAM

92

23

~~SECRET~~ 404

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02163 071621Z

ACTION SS 25

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INFO /025 W

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3943  
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INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1030  
USMISSION USUN NY 554  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 664  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1206  
CINCSTRIKE

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EXDIS

SUBJECT: ISRAEL-JORDAN TENSION

REF: STATE 65325

JOINT EMBASSY/DATT MESSAGE

1. CHARGE CONVEYED INFORMATION PARA 1 RETEL TO DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TOUGAN FOR TALHOUNI MORNING NOV. 7. TOUGAN GAVE ASSURANCE CONTINUED BEST EFFORTS BY GOJ TO CONTROL INFILTRATION. AT SAME TIME, ACTING DATT REVIEWED CURRENT SITUATION TERRORISM AND JORDAN RIVER CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 2163A ~~SECRET~~  
WITH JAA DIRECTOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, COL. GHAZI ARABIYAT, TO REITERATE NECESSITY MAXIMUM EFFORT TO PREVENT TERRORISM AND TO SEEK CLARIFICATION CERTAIN INCONSISTENCIES IN REPORTS OF

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NLJ 15-39

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 02163 071621Z

NOV 5 FIRING INCIDENT.

2. ADATT REVIEWED WITH DMI SOME OF THE CHARGES INCLUDED IN RECENT ISRAELI NEWS MEDIA AND IN YESTERDAY'S ISRAELI COMPLAINT TO THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE EFFECT THAT (A) THE JAA HAD BUILT UP ITS FORCES IN THE JORDAN VALLEY EAST OF BEISAN (B) THAT THE JAA WAS ACTIVELY SUPPORTING TERRORISTS, INCLUDING PROVIDING COVERING FIRE FOR THEIR RETREAT EASTWARD ACROSS THE JORDAN RIVER AND (C) THAT AS OF THE NOV 5 INCIDENT IT NOW APPEARED JORDAN WAS FOLLOWING THE PREVIOUS SYRIAN PRACTICE OF INDISCRIMINATE ARTILLERY SHELLING OF ISRAELI CIVILIAN TARGETS.

3. ON THESE POINTS, COL. ARABIYAT REPLIED (A) ESCALATION TO TANK AND ARTILLERY FIRE IN CROSS RIVER SHOOTING WAS INTRODUCED BY THE IDF ON OCT 14. PRIOR TO THAT TIME JAA HAD NO TANKS ACROSS FROM BEISAN. EVEN THOUGH SEEMINGLY FUTILE, HE SAID, JAA IS OBLIGED MAKE THE EFFORT TO DEFEND JORDAN, THUS WAS OBLIGED TO REINFORCE ITS FORCES OPPOSITE BEISAN WITH HARDWARE

PAGE 3 RUQMG 2163A ~~SECRET~~  
EQUIVALENT THAT INTRODUCED BY IDF. (B) HE ASSERTED GOI WELL AWARE OF REAL AND SIGNIFICANT JORDANIAN EFFORTS TO CONTROL TERRORISM. HE STATED IT IS NOT JAA POLICY EITHER TO CONDONE TERRORISM OR TO PROVIDE COVERING FIRE TO RETREATING TERRORISTS AS CLAIMED BY ISRAELIS. HOWEVER, HE SAID, WHEN

BULLETS AND SHELLS ARE DIRECTED ACROSS THE RIVER AT JAA FORCES FROM THE IDF, THEY ARE OBLIGED IN SELF DEFENSE TO RETURN THIS FIRE EVEN IF LATER IT MAY TURN OUT THAT THE IDF STARTED THE FIRING AGAINST FLEEING TERRORISTS. (C) IN PARTICULAR CASE OF NOV 5 INCIDENT HE SAID JAA WISHES TO STRESS THAT NO SMALL ARMS FIRE WARD HEARD ACROSS THE RIVER; NO TERRORISTS WERE OBSERVED ATTEMPTING CROSS RIVER; THE FIRST SHOTS FIRED WERE SIMULTANEOUS BARRAGE DIRECTED AGAINST JAA FORCES AND CIVILIAN SETTLEMENTS IN THE AREA FROM ISRAELI TANKS, FIELD ARTILLERY AND 106MM RECOILESS RIFLES AT 0530 HOURS LOCAL TIME NOV 5. (D) REGARDING CHARGE THAT JAA INDISCRIMINATELY SHELLED CIVILIAN CENTER, HE SAID MAOZ HAIM, WHICH IS CENTER REPORTEDLY HIT ON

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 02163 071621Z

NOV 5, IS AN ISRAELI NAHAL PARAMILITARY SETTLEMENT LOCATED TWO KILOMETERS WEST OF THE RIVER. HE STATED THAT THE IDF FIELD ARTILLERY BATTERY WHICH WAS FIRING AT JORDANIAN FORCES

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 2163B ~~SECRET~~

WAS LOCATED ADJOINING AND JUST WEST OF THE MAOZ HAIM SETTLEMENT, WHICH THUS WAS IN LINE AND EXPOSED TO COUNTER BATTERY FIRE. HE ADDED THAT NOT ONLY IS THIS SETTLEMENT PARAMILITARY IN NATURE BUT LIKE ALL OTHER SETTLEMENTS IN BEISAN VALLEY AREA HAS RECENTLY BEEN REINFORCED WITH REGULAR ARMY IDF UNITS. (IN THIS CONNECTION SEE USDAO TEL AVIV 1552 REPORTING CONFIRMATION BY RECON OCT 31 THAT KUBBUTZIM IN BEISAN VALLEY HAD BEEN REINFORCED BY REGULAR ARMY TROOPS.)

4. IN CONCLUDING, COL. ARABIYAT SAID JAA IS WELL AWARE OF THREATENED REPRISALS IN ISRAELI NEW MEDIA. HE SAID HE RELIEVED GOI KNOWS JAA IS DOING ITS BEST AND HE WONDERED WHAT ISRAEL HOPED TO ACCOMPLISH BY PURSUING PRESENT HARD LINE.

GP-3. DUNCAN

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By ag/ll, NARA, Date 6/14/01

93  
**TELEGRAM**  
3

SECRET 795

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02144 061121Z

3  
ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

R 061050Z NOV 67  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3933

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2144

EXDIS

SUBJ: JORDAN ARMS EMBARGO

1. CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GENERAL KHAMMASH TOLD EMBOFF NOV 4 THAT HIS PRINCIPAL HEADACHE IN HIS NEW JOB WAS TO FEND OFF QUERIES FROM JORDANIAN MILITARY AS TO WHY THE US HAS KEPT AN EMBARGO ON ARMS SUPPLY TO JORDAN.
2. KHAMMASH CONFIDED THAT LAST SEPT IN ORDER TO BUY TIME AND IMPROVE JAA MORALE, WHICH THEN AT ROCK BOTTOM, HE HAD SPOKEN PERHAPS TOO OPTIMISTICALLY TO KEY JAA PERSONNEL ABOUT THE RESULTS OF HIS LONDON CONVERSATIONS WITH COL. JORDAN. HE HAD

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 2144A ~~SECRET~~

NOT EXAGGERATED, HOWEVER, IN TELLING THESE PERSONNEL THAT HE HAD BEEN ASSURED CERTAIN URGENTLY REQUIRED ITEMS FOR THE JAA WOULD BE RECEIVED IN THE KINGDOM DURING OCTOBER. AS RESULT OF THE CONTINUED US EMBARGO, HE SAID, HE HAS BEEN PLACED IN A HIGHLY EMBARRASSING POSITION PERSONALLY, AND PRESSURE FOR ARMS PROCUREMENT IS MOUNTING.

GP-3 DUNCAN

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94  
**TELEGRAM**

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~~SECRET~~ 823

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02142 061156Z

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ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

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P 060950Z NOV 67  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3931

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2142

EXDIS

FOR JOHN WALSH S/S FROM DUNCAN

REQUEST OU REPEAT USUN 1993 AND STATE 65127/(TO BEIRUT FOR  
AMBASSADOR BURNS. HE WILL CHECK AT EMBASSY BEIRUT THROUGH  
NOV 8 AND SUBSEQUENTLY AT EMBASSY LONDON AND DESIRES REPEAT  
KEY MESSAGES THESE SUBJECTS FOR INFORMATION PRIOR HIS  
CONSULTATION. ALTERNATIVEY WILL S/S AUTHORIZE AMMAN REPEAT  
SELECTED EXDIS LATERALLY FOR THIS PURPOSE?

GP-3. DUNCAN

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95  
**TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ 621

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02026 262149Z

2

85

ACTION SS 25

INFO SSD 00, /025 W

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P 261610Z OCT 67  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3872

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2026

EXDIS

REF: STATE 58791

1. AMBASSADOR MET WITH REGENT, CROWN PINCE HASSAN, LATE AFTERNOON OCTOBER 25 TO DISCUSS ANNOUNCEMENT THAT USG HAD DECIDED ON SELECTIVE RELEASE OF ARMS TO ISRAEL AND FIVE ARAB STATES AND THAT DECISION ON ARMS SUPPLIES TO JORDAN STILL UNDER STUDY. IN REQUESTING THE MEETING, AMBASSADOR INDICATED THE SUBJECT AND SUGGESTED THAT HASSAN MIGHT WISH TO HAVE GENERAL KHAMMASH ATTEND. REGENT EXPLAINED THAT OTHER BUSINESS KEPT KHAMMASH AWAY.

PAGE 2 RUQMGK 2026A ~~SECRET~~

2. AMBASSADOR EXPLAINED THAT RELEASE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING THAT WHICH KHAMMASH AND COL. JORDAN HAD DISCUSSED IN THEIR LONDON MEETINGS LAST AUGUST, COULD NOT BE AUTHORIZED AT THIS TIME BECAUSE OF CONGRESSIONAL PROBLEM WHICH AT PRESENT AFFECTS PARTICULARLY JORDAN. AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED THAT QUESTION OF RESUMPTION OF MILITARY SHIPMENTS TO JORDAN REMAINS OPEN, THAT WE ARE KEEPING MATTER UNDER CLOSE REVIEW AND THAT WE EXPECT QUESTION TO BE DISCUSSED FULLY WITH KING DURING LATTER'S VISIT TO U.S.A. IN NOVEMBER. AMBASSADOR ALSO TOLD HASSAN THAT ARRANGEMENT HAD BEEN MADE

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 02026 262149Z

TO INFORM THE KING IN PARIS OF THE BACKGROUND FOR THE ARMS DECISION ALONG SAME LINES AS DISCUSSED WITH HASSAN.

3. REGENT PREFACED HIS COMMENTS WITH OBSERVATION, "IT SEEMS THESE DAYS THERE IS NO GOOD NEWS FOR JORDAN." HE THEN SAID THAT THE TIMING OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS TACTLESS AND HAD PUT JORDAN IN A PARTICULARLY HUMILIATING SITUATION. HE KNEW THAT THE KING INTENDED TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE IN WASHINGTON AND WAS CARRYING WITH HIM A COPY OF THE LIST OF EQUIPMENT WHICH KHAMMASH HAD DISCUSSED LAST SUMMER WITH

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 2026A ~~SECRET~~  
COL. JORDAN.

4. HASSAN THEN EXPANDED FOR TWENTY MINUTES ON HIS DISMAY AND PUZZLEMENT AT THE APPARENTLY NEGATIVE FEELINGS TOWARDS JORDAN IN THE US CONGRESS. INTER ALIA, HE RECALLED THAT "FOR YEARS OUR ENEMIES IN THE ARAB WORLD HAVE TRIED TO BLACKEN US WITH THE ACCUSATION THAT WE ARE IMPERIALIST LACKEYS. COULD ANY US CONGRESSMAN HONESTLY DOUBT THE KING'S LONG-STANDING FRIENDSHIP FOR THE WEST AND HIS FIRM SUPPORT FOR FREE-WORLD PRINCIPLES?" HASSAN ASSERTED HE WAS SURE THE USG KNEW THAT LAST MAY THE KING HAD DELAYED UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT GOING TO CAIRO AND SIGNING A MUTUAL DEFENSE PACT WITH NASSER. HUSSEIN HAD NOT WANTED TO DO THIS BUT HIS OPTIONS HAD BECOME SEVERELY LIMITED. FURTHERMORE, THE JUNE WAR ITSELF COULD HAVE BEEN AVERTED HAD THE UK AND US ONLY ACTED TO FORCE OPEN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN.

5. TODAY, HASSAN CONTINUED, JORDAN IS WEAK AND SURROUNDED BY ENEMIES. HASSAN REFERRED TO ISRAELI AGGRESSIVENESS, ASSERTING INVERE HAS BEEN A RECENT STRENGTHENING OF ISRAELI MILITARY UNITS

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 2026A ~~SECRET~~

IN THE BEISAN VALLEY AND JERICHO AREAS. THE ISRAELI CABINET, HE FELT, WAS INTENT ON RETALIATING AGAINST JORDAN FOR THE ACTS OF TERRORIST INFILTRATORS. AT THE SAME TIME, IN SYRIA

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 02026 262149Z

THERE ARE ONLY MANIACS," EACH LEADER HAD A PRIVATE ARMY AND WUU JOUSTING FOR SUPREMACY. DAMASCUS HAS BEEN TOTALLY UNRESPONSIVE TO JORDAN'S PLEAS THAT IT BRING TERRORISTS UNDER CONTROL. JORDAN WOULD CONTINUE TO DO ITS UTMOST TO INTERDICT TERRORIST MOVEMENTS ACROSS ITS TERRITORY BUT THIS PROBLEM WAS NOT ONE WHICH IT COULD FULLY CONTROL.

6. AS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF ITS NEIGHBORS' BASIC HOSTILITY TOWARDS JORDAN, HASSAN SAID THE KING HAD RECEIVED "DEEPLY DISTURBING" NEWS FROM BOUMEDIENNE DURING HUSSEI'S RECENT VISIT TO ALGIERS. BOUMEDIENNE REVEALED THAT NASSER HAD TOLD BOTH THE ALGERIANS AND THE SYRIANS THAT THE UAR AIR FORCE HAD BEEN DESTROYED BY THE ISRAELIS LONG BEFORE TELLING HUSSEIN. (COMMENT: HASSAN DID NOT FURTHER ELABORATE BUT HIS SUSPICION WAS CLEAR THAT THE UAR HAD BEEN CONSCIOUSLY AIMING AT JORDAN'S DESTRUCTION.)

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 2026A ~~SECRET~~

7. CONCLUDING, HASSAN SAID THAT THE KING WAS PLACING GREAT STOCK IN HIS MEETING WITH THE PRSIDENT AND HOPED THAT JORDAN'S FRIENDSHIP FOR AND LOYALTY TO THE WEST WOULD NOT BE DISREGARDED IN JORDAN'S PRESENT PREDICMENT.

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96  
**TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ 128

PAGE 01 AMMAN 1892 170801Z

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ACTION 55 25

INFO 1625 W

P 161655Z OCT 67  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3802  
INFO USMISSION USUN NY PRIORITY 512  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 973

D

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1892

EXDIS

CORRECTED COPY

REF: STATE 52869, 54416, AMMAN 1876

1. IN MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN OCT 15 AMBASSADOR CONVEYED SUBSTANCE DEPTTEL 52869 AND APPROPRIATE PORTIONS DEPTTEL 54416. IN SEPARATE MEETINGS OCT 14 WITH DEPUTY FORMIN RIFA'I, AND ON OCT 16 WITH PRIMIN TALHOUNI, AMBASSADOR COVERED SUBSTANTIALLY SAME GROUND.
2. RIFA'I DEPARTED AMMAN OCT 15 FOR NEW YORK. HE INTENDS SEEK EARLY MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG.
3. IN VIEW FYI COMMENT, PARA 4, STATE 54416, WE THOUGHT IT BEST TO AVOID GETTING INTO DETAILS CONCERNING WORDING OF JORDANIAN DRAFT SC RESOLUTION WITH KING, TALHOUNI OR RIFA'JI, EXCEPT TO NOTE GENERALLY WE FOUND CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES

PAGE 2 RVQMKG 1892A ~~SECRET~~  
WITH JORDANIAN DRAFT WHERE IT DEPARTED FROM WHAT WE HAD DISCUSSED

WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION  
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~

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Authority NLI 15-38  
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REVIEW AUTHORITY: Kathleen Allegrone, Senior



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PAGE 02 AMMAN 01892 170801Z

WITH SOVIETS AT END OF THE ESSQA. (RE DEPT'S INTEREST WHY CERTAIN CHANGES WERE MADE BY KING. WE REFERE ADDRESSEES' ATTENTION TO [REDACTED] THE INCLUSION OF THE JUNE 4 DATE WE UNDERSTAND WAS TO REDUCE WHAT JORDANIANS CONSIDER TO BE AMBIGUITY REGARDING THE MENING OF WITHORAWAL, AN AMBIGUITY WHICH THE KING FEARED COULD TOTALLY EFFECT THE NEGOTIATIONS. (THE AILION OF WORD "REDRESSING," KING INTENDED THIS AS SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO REFUGEE ROBLEM.)

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4. KING, FONMIN AND RIFA'I TOOK INITIATIVE TO REITERATE THAT JORDAN WAS NOT WEDDED TO WORDING OF GO'S PROPOSED DRAFT (AMMAN 1776.) THEY STRESSED JORDAN'S SOLE INTEREST AT PRESENT STAGE IS TO SECURE EARLY URC RESOLUTION AS COVER AFDER WHICH JORDANIANS COULD WORK OUT DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS FOR OVER-ALL SETTLEMENT. THEY SAID THEY ARE DEEPLY APPREHENSIVE THAT IF USG INSISTS THE DETAILS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF AN OVERALL SOLUTION BE WORKED OUT IN ADVANCE, THERE WILL BE NO RESOLUTION. AMBASSADOR STRESSED WE WEPE NOT INSISTING ON THE SPELLING OUT IN ADVANCE OF ALL DETAILS BUT HAVE FELT THAT ON CERTAIN BASICS THERE MUST BE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT AS TO MEANING OF A SC RESOLUTION.

PAGE 3 RUOMKG 1892A ~~SECRET~~  
AND ON INITIAL STEPS TO BE TAKEN THEREUNDER.

5. HUSSEIN MADE CLEAR HE RECOGNIZES THAT, FOLLOWING ADOPTION OF A GENERAL SCRESOLUTION, IN ALL PROBABILITY THERE WILL BE NO ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL UNTIL AGREEMENT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF WHOLE PACKAGE IS WORKED OUT. RIFA'I STATED HE COULD ENVISAGE ISRAALI WITHDRAWAL IN STAGES AS VARIOUS ISSUES INVOLVED IN SETTLEMENT OF PALESTINE PROBLZNARE SECESSFULLY NEGOTIATED. KING AND PRIMIN REITERATED THAT IF A SC RESOLUTION COULD BE PASSED WHICH WOULD PROVIDE THE REQUISITE UMBRELLA FOR WORKING OUT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, JORDAN WOULD SIGNIFY ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION AND GO TO WORK TO TRY TO REACH A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL UNDER UN AUSPICES, EVEN IF NO OTHER ARAB STATE WERE WILLING AT THAT MOMENT TO FOLLOW SUIT.

6. RIFA'I STATED THAT IF NO RESOLUTION APPEARS TO BE REPRODUCED PASS IN SC, HE BELIEVED IT POSSIBLE TO EFFECT NECESSARY STEPS WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 01892 17080:Z

IN GA FOR RESOLUTION ESSENTIALLY SIMILAR TO THAT AIV KERDAM HAS SUGGESTED FORSC.

7. COMMENT: AS FAR AS JORDAN IS CONCERNED, THE KING REMAINS THE FINAL ARBITER ON POTENTIAL DISPUTES OVER THE LANGUAGE OF A RESOLUTION AND ANY COMMITMENTS FOR GOJ ACTION TO IMPLEMENT ONE. SHOULD DEADLOCK DEVELOP INVOLVING JORDANIANS IN NEXT

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 1892A ~~SECRET~~  
TWO WEEKS AT UN, WE SUGGEST THIS EMBASSY BE ADVISED. WE HAE ARRANGED WITH THE PALACE TO BE IN CONTACT WITH THE KING AT ANY POINT DURING HIS FORTHCOMING TRAVELS SHOULD HIS INTERVENTION BE NEEDED TO RESOLVE ANIMASSE INVOLVING HIS OWK DELEGATION IN NEW YORK.

GP-3: BURNS

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NLJ-S 88001

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97

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 01876 141759Z

43  
ACTION SS 25

INFO SSD 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /025 W

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O 141749Z OCT 67 ZFF-6  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3793  
INJXHKUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NY IMMEDIATE 508

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1876

EXDIS

REF: DEPTTEL 52869

1. THE KING HAS BEEN ABSENT FROM AMMAN SINCE RECEIPT OF REFTTEL AND WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE UNTIL MONDAY, OCT 16.
2. THE KING HAS, HOWEVER, JUST SENT ME A MESSAGE VIA HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY ZAID RIFA'I STATING:
  - A. THE KING HAS LEARNED FROM JORDANIAN DELEGATION AT UN THAT HIS DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION IS NOT RPT NOT ACCEPTABLE TO U.S. KING UNDERSTANDS THAT ONE OBJECTION IS THE MENTION OF JUNE 4 DATE.
  - B. THE KING REITERATES THAT HE IS NOT RPT NOT WEDDED TO THE WORDING OF HIS PROPOSED RESOLUTION. HIS OBJECT HAS BEEN TO ACHIEVE A RESOLUTION WHICH COULD BE PASSED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO GIVE HIM AND OTHER ARABS AN UMBRELLA

PAGE 2 RUGMKG 1876A ~~SECRET~~  
UNDER WHICH TO ARRIVE AT A POLITICAL SOLUTION WITH ISRAEL.

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 01876 141759Z

C. HUSSEIN ASKS THAT I TELL HIM ON OCT 16 THE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE IN HIS DRAFT TO WHICH U.S. OBJECTS, AND PREFERRED U.S. WORDING. HUSSEIN WOULD DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH NASSER IN CAIRO ON THE MORNING OF OCT 17 TO COORDINATE WITH HIM. THE KING STATES THIS WILL BE THE LAST CHANCE HE WILL HAVE FOR A FACE-TO-FACE MEETING WITH NASSER BEFORE HE (HUSSEIN) GOES TO NEW YORK.

3. COMMENT: WE MAY HAVE HERE AN OPPORTUNITY TO GET OVER AT LEAST THE HUMP OF LANGUAGE.

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TELEGRAM

98

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 AMMAN 01849 121716Z

40  
ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

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P 121615Z OCT 67  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3777

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1849

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 1797, 1834

1. HUSSEIN NOW PLANS TO LEAVE AMMAN NEXT TUESDAY (OCT 17) FOR HIS TRIP TO ALGERIA, EUROPE AND NEW YORK. HE IS THINKING OF STOPPING OFF IN CAIRO ON TUESDAY FOR A TALK WITH NASSER.

2. I WOULD HOPE ON MONDAY TO BE ABLE TO GIVE HUSSEIN AT LEAST AN INTERIM REPLY TO THE QUESTIONS HE HAS POSED (AMMAN 1797). THE MOST DESIRABLE FORM OF REPLY, IF FEASIBLE, WOULD BE A PRESIDENTIAL LETTER IN ANSWER TO HUSSEIN'S OWN LETTER (AMMAN 1777).

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PAGE 01 AMMAN01797 091741Z

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ACTION SS 25

INFO SSG 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /025 W

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0 091700Z OCT 67 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3754  
INFO USMISSION USUN NY IMMEDIATE 503

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NLJ 02-155  
By usa NARA, Date 6-9-03

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1797

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 1776

1. I MET WITH KING AFTERNOON OCT 9 AT HIS REQUEST. HUSSEIN SAID HE HOPED I COULD GET HIM AN URGENT REPLY FROM WASHINGTON AS TO WHETHER USG WOULD (A) SUPPORT A RESOLUTION MOVING DISCUSSION OF MIDDLE EAST CRISIS FROM GA TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL PRIOR TO THE GA PLENARY DEBATE SCHEDULED TO BEGIN OCT 16 AND (B) WHETHER WE WOULD SUPPORT A RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ALONG THE LINES OF THE DRAFT GIVEN ME OCT 7 (REFTEL PARA 5). HUSSEIN MAY

PAGE 2 RUCXMO  
~~1797 SECRET~~

LEAVE FOR ALGIERS AS EARLY AS THE MORNING OF OCT 12, AND HOPED I COULD GIVE HIM AN ANSWER BEFORE THEN.

2. HUSSEIN EXPLAINED HE HAD WRITTEN HIS LETTER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON (AMMAN 1777) BECAUSE HE FELT SO PERSONALLY "LET DOWN" BY THE USG IN RECENT WEEKS. HE ASSERTED THERE WAS A FEELING THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST THAT OUR EVERY ACTION WAS DESIGNED SOLELY TO ASSIST THE ISRAELIS. FURTHERMORE,

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 01797 091741Z

WHEN IN MOSCOW THE SOVIETS HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE USG POSITION HAD HARDENED TO THE POINT OF INSISTING THAT ALL MODALITIES OF IMPLIMENTATION BE WORKED OUT PRIOR TO THE US AGREEING TO SUPPORT ANY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, EVEN ONE SIMILAR TO THE US-USSR DRAFT OF LAST SUMMER.

3. THE BASIC REASON, HUSSEIN SAID, THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM MUST BE REMOVED FROM THE GA IS THAT IT IS TOO LIKELY THE PRESENT DEGREE OF ARAB UNITY FAVORING A POLITICAL SOLUTION WOULD SPLI  
PER UNDER EXPOSURE TO THE PRESSURES OF GA DEBATE.  
IF THE MATTER COMES TO THE SC ONLY AFTER EXTENDED GA DEBATE,

~~PAGE 3 RUQMKG 1797A S E C R E T~~

VARIOUS ARAB STATES MIGHT HAVE TAKEN POSITIONS IN THE GA WHICH WOULD MAKE THEIR SUBSEQUENT ADHERENCE TO A SC RESOLUTION MORE DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE. THE JORDANIAN UN DELEGATION HAD JUST REPORTED THEY HAD SECURED THE AGREEMENT OF THE SYRIAN AND ALGERIAN DELEGATIONS NOT TO OFFER ANY OPPOSITION AT THE UN TO A POSSIBLE SC RESOLUTION. FOR THESE REASONS EARLY TRANSFER TO THE SC WAS ESSENTIAL.

4. REGARDING A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, HUSSEIN SAID HE SIMPLY HAD TO HAVE THE UNBRELLA OF A SC RESOLUTION IN ORDER TO WORK OUT THE MODALITIES OF IMPLEMENTATION. IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO MOVE WITHOUT THIS COVER.

5. WHEN I INQUIRED ABOUT HOW HE ENVISAGED THE TIMING OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL ONCE A RESOLUTION WERE PASSED, HUSSEIN SAID HE RECOGNIZED THAT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WOULD TAKE SOME TIME. DURING THIS PERIOD HE RECOGNIZED HE WOULD HAVE TO WORK OUT A SOLUTION TO JORDANIAN-ISRAELI PROBLEMS. HE WOULD IF IT SEEMED ADVANTAGEOUS COME TO NEW YORK AND

~~PAGE 4 RUQMKG 1797A S E C R E T~~

DO SO HIMSELF. ASKED IF HE WOULD CONSIDER DIRECT NEGO-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 AMMAN 01797 091741Z

TIATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS AT SOME POINT UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF A SC RESOLUTION, HUSSEIN SAID IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO ANSWER IN ADVANCE; IT WOULD DEPEND ON CIRCUMSTANCES THEN EXISTING BUT HE EXCLUDED NO POSSIBILITIES.

6. ASKED WHAT THE UAR POSITION IS, THE KING SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE UAR TODAY IS AS READY AS JORDAN, ONCE A SC RESOLUTION IS PASSED ON IMMEDIATELY TO TRY TO WORK OUT A SOLUTION WITH ISRAEL. HOWEVER, SAID HUSSEIN, EVEN SHOULD CAIRO CHANGE ITS POSITION, AMMAN IS PREPARED, ONCE A RESOLUTION IS SECURED, TO TRY TO REACH A SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL EVEN IF JORDAN IS THE ONLY ARAB STATE TO DO SO.

7. FAILING EARLY PASSAGE OF A SC RESOLUTION, SAID HUSSEIN, THE POSSIBILITY OF A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE ME CRISIS, AND HE HIMSELF AS PRINCIPAL PROPONENT OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION, WOULD BE DISCREDITED. IN SUCH EVENT HE SEES ONLY A BLEAK FUTURE AHEAD IN THE AREA FOR THE

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

~~PAGE 5 RUQMKG 1797A SECRET~~  
ARABS, THE ISRAELIS, AND THE AMERICANS. ONLY THE SOVIETS WOULD STAND TO GAIN.

GP-3 BURNS



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100  
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PAGE 01 AMMAN 01791 091829Z

43  
ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

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R 091615Z OCT 67  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3748  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 152  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 958  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 634  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1037  
AMEMBASSY PARIS 204  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 534  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1128  
USMISSION USUN NY 499

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1791

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 1780

1. WHEN I SAW THE KING TODAY HE DISCUSSED BRIEFLY HIS TRIP TO

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 1791A ~~SECRET~~  
MOSCOW.

2. HUSSEIN SAID THAT THE SOVIETS APPEARED TO BE MORE INTERESTED IN FURNISHING MILITARY EQUIPMENT THAN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. IN ADDITION TO AN ECONOMIC SURVEY TEAM, THE SOVIETS PROPOSED TO SEND TO JORDAN A MILITARY SURVEY TEAM AS WELL. HUSSEIN SAID HE TOLD THE RUSSIANS THAT THE JORDANIANS HAD MADE NO DECISION ABOUT MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND WERE STILL IN THE PROCESS OF SURVEYING AND ASSESSING JAA NEEDS. (I GATHER, HOWEVER,

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 01791 091829Z

HUSSEIN DID NOT DECLINE THE OFFER OF A SOVIET MILITARY SURVEY TEAM.)

GP-3 BURNS

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<sup>101</sup>  
**TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 01780 090738Z

9  
ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

R 081545Z OCT 67  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3745  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 632  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 151  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 498  
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 203  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1035  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1125  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 955  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 532

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1780

EXDIS.

REF:

SUBJ: SOVIET ECONOMIC AND ARMS OFFERS TO JORDAN.

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 1780A. ~~SECRET~~

1. DURING THE KING'S RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW, HUSSEIN AND HIS ENTOURAGE WERE FAVORABLY SURPRISED BY THEIR RUSSIAN HOSTS. EVEN THE MORE CYNICAL MEMBERS OF THE JORDANIAN DELEGATION WERE QUITE BEGUILLED BY THE FLATTERING ATTENTIONS PAID THEM BY THE TOP SOVIET LEADERSHIP. SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE JORDANIAN DELEGATION HAVE SPOKEN TO US OF THE UNEXPECTED REASONABLENESS AND MODERATION WITH WHICH THE SOVIETS DISCUSSED VARIOUS TOPICS. FURTHERMORE, THE RUSSIANS IDENTIFIED WITH THE JORDANIANS BY TELLING THEM RUSSIANS WERE JUST LIKE JORDANIANS. AN ORIENTAL PEOPLE STILL IN

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**SANITIZED**  
Authenticity NL/15-38  
By CTS; NARA, Date 10/25/18

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Kathleen Allegrone, Senior



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PAGE 02 AMMAN 01780 090738Z

THE DEVELOPMENT STAGE, WHO HAD MANY EXPERIENCES IN SOLVING THE SORT OF PROBLEMS CONFRONTING JORDAN, EXPERIENCES WHICH THEY WOULD BE HAPPY TO SHARE.

2. ALTHOUGH EVIDENTLY NOTHING WAS CONCLUDED IN MOSCOW EXCEPT FOR A CULTURAL TREATY, THE JORDANIANS REPORTEDLY ACCEPTED A RUSSIAN OFFER TO SEND AN ECONOMIC TEAM TO JORDAN TO STUDY POSSIBLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS. (IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE HAS BEEN MENTIONED TO US AS ONE SUCH POSSIBILITY.)

3. THE JORDANIANS WERE SHOWN MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THE SOVIETS

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 1780A ~~SECRET~~  
SAID THEY WOULD BE GLAD TO FURNISH JORDAN WITH WHATEVER SHE NEEDED AT PRICES WHICH WOULD BE SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATION BUT DEFINITELY WITHIN JORDAN'S MEANS. FURTHERMORE, SOME MIG 21S, IT WAS STATED, MIGHT EVEN BE FURNISHED FREE OF CHARGE.

4. IN HIS OCT 7 PUBLIC LETTER TO NEWLY APPOINTED PRIMIN TALHOUNI HUSSEIN INSTRUCTED HIM TO EQUIP THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES WITH THE LATEST ARMS "FROM ANY SOURCE." WE DOUBT THAT THE JORDANIANS WILL IN FACT TRY TO REACH ANY FINAL DECISIONS ON THEIR MILITARY SUPPLY PROBLEMS UNTIL IT BECOMES CLEAR DURING THE WEEKS AHEAD WHETHER A POLITICAL SOLUTION CAN BE ACHIEVED OR NOT. IN THE EVENT NO POLITICAL SOLUTION IS REACHED, WE MUST ASSUME THAT THE MEMORY OF THE SOVIET "OFFERS" OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT WILL EXERT A POWERFUL PULL ON THE GOJ LEADERSHIP. HOWEVER, WE SUSPECT THAT THE JORDANIANS WILL MAKE ONE FINAL EFFORT TO GET MILITARY SUPPLIES FROM THE WEST BEFORE THEY TURN TO THE EAST. (THE JORDANIANS HAVE EVIDENTLY ALREADY DECIDED THAT INSOFAR AS SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT IS CONCERNED, THE IDEAL PLANE FOR THEM WOULD BE THE MIRAGE. THE KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY TOLD THE AMBASSADOR OCT 7 THAT THE GOJ HAS ALREADY HAD QUIET CONTACT WITH THE FRENCH IN THIS REGARD. AND

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 1780A ~~SECRET~~

HAS BEEN TOLD THAT IF THE GOJ WERE WILLING TO PAY CASH FOR

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 01780 090738Z

THE MIRAGE, THE FRENCH WOULD FIND SOME WAY FOR THE JORDANIANS TO ACQUIRE THE PLANE DESPITE THE CURRENT FRENCH EMBARGO.)

GP-3. BURNS.

EX-D-1

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W4  
**TELEGRAM**

102

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 01776 191552Z

12  
ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

*Rostow*

P R 081525Z OCT 67  
 FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3739  
 INFO AMEMBASSY RABAT 119  
 AMEMBASSY TUNIS 124  
 AMEMBASSY LODON 629  
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 149  
 USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 495  
 AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 106  
 AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1032  
 AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1123  
 AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 150  
 AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 952  
 AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 92  
 AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 558  
 AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI 23  
 AMEMBASSY JIDDA 529  
 STATE GRNC

~~SECRET~~ SECTION ONE OF TWO AMMAN 1776

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 1776/1A ~~SECRET~~  
EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO

1. ON HUSSEIN'S INSTRUCTION, KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY ZAID RIFA'I CALLED ON AMBASSADOR EVENING OCT 7 TO BRING JUST COMPLETED GLENGTHY LETTER FROM KING TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON TOGETHER WITH A SUGGESTED SC RESOLUTION ON ME CRISIS. (TEXT OF LETTER

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-155  
By *us*, NARA, Date 6-9-03

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 01776 094152Z

TO DEPT ONLY IN IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING MESSAGE.)

2. RIFA'I ASKED AMBASSADOR TO READ LETTER AND THEN SOUGH HIS COMMENTS. AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THE LETTER HAD AN INOPPORTUNE TONE AND NOTED IN PARTICULAR THAT IT CONTAINED ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT US POLICY TOWARDS THE ME CRISIS WHICH APPEARED TO BE LARGELY BASED ON WHAT THE SOVIETS AND THE EGYPTIANS HAD LED HUSSEIN TO BELIEVE TO BE OUR POLICY. RIFA'I REPLIED THAT HE HOPED THE LETTER WOULD NOT BE MISINTERPRETED IN WASHINGTON BUT READ RATHER AS STATING HOW REMOTE THE KING FELT WERE THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE UNLESS THE USG WERE PREPARED TO USE ITS INFLUENCE OVER THE ISRAELIS AND, FURTHERMORE, TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT A

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 1776/1A ~~SECRET~~

RESOLUTION SUCH AS THE US AND USSR HAD FORMULATED AT THE ESSGA. THE ALTERNATIVE TO ACTION ON THE PART OF THE USG WOULD BE ARAB PREPARATION FOR ANOTHER ROUND AND JORDAN, AS THE KING'S LETTER STATED, WOULD BE FORCED TO SECURE ARMS FROM ANY AVAILABLE SOURCE. RIFA'I ALSO SAID THAT THE KING'S UNDERSTNDING OF THE RECENT TREND IN THE USG POLICY WAS BASED ON REPORTS TO HIM FROM SEVERAL SOURCES INCLUDING CONTACTS BETWEEN THE JORDANIAN DELEGATION AND USUN. HE ADDED THAT DURING THE AFTERNOON THE KING HAD SHOWN HIM AN EARLIER DRAFT OF THE LETTER WHICH HAD BEEN "TEN TIMES MORE BITTER" IN EXPRESSING HUSSEIN'S CONVICTION THAT THE USG WAS ABANDONING JORDAN BY UNWILLINGNESS TO PLAY A ROLE IN BRINGING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT. RIFA'ID SAID THAT HE HAD CONVINCED THE KING TO TONE DOWN THE EARLIER DRAFT AND FELT THAT THE FINAL VERSION WAS AN ACCURATE AND FRANK EXPOSITION BY A FRIEND OF THE UNITED STATES OF THE KING'S AND THE JORDANIAN PEOPLE'S SENSE OF FRUSTRATION OVER US "INACTION". AMBASSADOR CHALLENGED RIFA'I ON THIS AND REMINDED HIM OF OUR EFFORTS THROUGHOUT THE ESSGA, WHICH THE ARABS HAD REBUFFED, TO ASSIST IN PASSING A RESOLUTION FAIR TO ALL PARTIES.

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 1776/1A ~~SECRET~~

3. ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HUSSEIN, RIFA'I THEN SUBMITTED THE DRAFT SC RESOLUTION WHICH THE KING HAD SHOWN TO THE SOVIETS

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 01776 09152Z

IN MOSCOW. THE SOVIETS HAD TOLD HUSSEIN THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO SUPPORT THIS RESOLUTION BUT DOUBTED THAT THE USG WOULD DO SO. RIFA'I EMPHASIZED THAT NEITHER THE GOJ NOR THE UAR WAS WEDDED TO THE EXACT WORDING OF THIS DRAFT. HE ASSERTED THAT THE SUGGESTED DRAFT WAS BASED ON THE TEXT OF THE JOINT US-USSR DRAFT WHICH THE SOVIETS HAD REVIEWED WITH THE UAR LAST JULY WITH A FEW REWORDINGS INTENDED PRIMARILY TO DRESS UP LAST SUMMER'S DRAFT AS A NEW RESOLUTION SO THAT CERTAIN OTHER ARAB STATES COULD MORE EASILY ADHERE. RIFA'I STRESSED THAT BOTH PRESIDENT NASSER AND THE KING INTENDED THIS SUGGESTED DRAFT TO SERVE AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON AND THAT THEY WOULD ACCEPT ANY CHANGES AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND OURSELVES WHICH DID NOT SIGNIFICANTLY DEVIATE FROM THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRESENT DRAFT. THE SOVIET POSITION BASICALLY WAS THAT IT WOULD SUPPORT ANY RESOLUTION AGREEABLE TO THE ARABS.

4. IN THIS REGARD THE SOVIETS HAD TOLD THE KING HOW UNHELPFUL

Q

PAGE 5 RUGMKG 1776/1A-S ~~SECRET~~

THEY CONSIDERED THE SARB'S ATTITUDE HAD BEEN AT THE ESSGA AND SUBSEQUENTLY. THE SOVIETS ASSURED HUSSEIN THAT MOSCOW WOULD NOT BE DETERRED BY POSSIBLE SYRIAN OPPOSITION IN THE FUTURE FROM SUPPORTING A SC RESOLUTION WHICH WAS AGREEABLE TO CAIRO AND AMMAN.

THE SOVIETS HAD PROMISED TO COUNSEL DAMASCUS TO PRACTICE RESTRAINT AND PERMIT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO BE WORKED OUT BUT SAID THAT THEIR EFFORTS AT PERSUASION HAD TO BE SUPPLEMENTED BY THOSE OF OTHER ARAB STATES AND URGED THE KING TO USE HIS INFLUENCE ON DAMASCUS. ACCORDING TO RIFA'I, HUSSEIN HAS JUST PASSED WORD THROUGH THE SYRIAN AMBASSADOR HERE REQUESTING THAT WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS EITHER PRES. ATASSI OR FONMIN MAKHUS COME TO AMMAN TO DISCUSS HUSSEIN'S SOVIET TRIP. WITH THAT TOPIC AS BAITN THE KING IS OPTIMISTIC HE CAN ATTRACT ONE OR THE OTHER OF THE SARB LEADERSHIP TO AMMAN WHERE HE WILL URGE THAT DAMASCUS SUPPORT A POLITICAL SOLUTION OF THE PRESENT IMPASSE OR AT LEAST NOT OPPOSE SUCH A SOLUTION.

GP-3. BURNS

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PAGE 04 AMMAN 01776 031552Z

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**TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 01776 090558Z

6  
ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

P R 081525Z OCT 67  
 FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3740  
 INFO AMEMBASSY RABAT 140  
 AMEMBASSY TUNIS 125  
 AMEMBASSY LONDON 630  
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 150  
 USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 456  
 AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 107  
 AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1033  
 AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1123  
 AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 151  
 AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 953  
 AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 93  
 AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 559  
 AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI 29  
 AMEMBASSY JIDDA 530  
 STATE GRNC

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1776 SECTION 2 OF 2

PAGE 2 RUGMKG 1776/2A ~~SECRET~~  
EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO

5. THE TEXT OF THE SUGGESTED DRAFT STATES: QUOTE THE SECURITY COUNCIL: 1. DECLARES THAT PEACE AND FINAL SOLUTION TO THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM SHOULD BE ACHIEVED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. 2. CALLS FOR: A. THE

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 01776 090158Z

IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAELI FORCES FROM ALL TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY THEM AFTER THE 4TH OF JUNE, IN KEEPING WITH THE INADMISSABILITY OF THE CONQUEST OF TERRITORY BY WAR. B. THE IMMEDIATE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY EACH MEMBER STATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE AREA THAT ALL ENJOY THE RIGHT TO MAINTAIN AN INDEPENDENT NATIONAL STATE AND TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY, AND THE REDRESSING AND REPUDIATION OF ALL CLAIMS AND ACTS INCONSISTENT THEREWITH. 3. DETERMINES THAT IT WILL ACT DIRECTLY WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED AND UTILIZE A UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT A JUST SOLUTION OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM, IN PARTICULAR THE PROBLEM OF THE REFUGEES AND THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS DENIED THEM FOR SO LONG AND OF ASSURING FREEDOM

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 1776/2A ~~SECRET~~  
OF PASSAGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS. END QUOTE

6. THE KING, RIFA'I STATED, IS MOST ANXIOUS TO FORESTALL THE SCHEDULED GA DEBATE ON THE NEAR EAST WHICH, THE JORDANIANS UNDERSTAND, MAY BEGIN OCT 16. THE GOJ'S IDEA IS TO CUT OFF GA DEBATE BY HAVING A GA RESOLUTION PASSED ON OR BEFORE OCT 16 SIMPLY REFERRING THE ME PROBLEM TO THE SC FOR ACTION. (RIFA'I DID NOT INDICATE WHICH COUNTRIES THE GOJ THOUGHT MIGHT INTRODUCE SUCH A RESOLUTION AT THE (A.) ONCE THE PROBLEM IS IN THE HANDS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE KING HOPES THAT A RESOLUTION ALONG THE LINES OF THE DRAFT IN PARA 5 COULD BE SPEEDILY PASSED. THE MODALITIES OF WITHDRAWAL AND IMPLEMENTATION OF DROPPING THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY COULD THEN BE WORKED OUT WITH THE AID OF A UN APPOINTED MEDIATOR. THE JORDANIAN DELEGATION, RIFA'I ADDED, HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO TAKE NO INITIATIVE AT THE UN WHICH IS NOT FULLY COORDINATED WITH BOTH THE US AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS.

7. HUSSEIN ALSO INSTRUCTED RIFA'I TO INFORM AMBASSADOR THAT, DEPENDING UPON THE COURSE OF THE SC CONSIDERATION OF THE ME PROBLEM, HE MIGHT TRAVEL TO NEW YORK IN EARLY NOVEMBER.

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 1776/2A ~~SECRET~~  
THE REAL PURPOSE OF THE TRIP WOULD BE TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 01776 090158Z

JOHNSON IN WASHINGTON.

GP-3. BURNS

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103  
TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 01757 071128Z

45

ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

P 070855Z OCT 67 ZEL  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3726  
USMISSION USUN NY 492

~~S E C R E T~~ AMMAN 1757

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y FOR ADDRESSEE ONLY

REF: NJA 6772, 6773

1. KING IS RESTING UP AFTER HIS RETURN FROM MOSCOW AND HAS SENT MESSAGE HE WILL GET IN TOUCH WITH ME DURING NEXT FEW DAYS FOR REVIEW OF HIS TALKS WITH SOVIETS. HE INDICATED HE ALSO PLANS TO TALK OVER THE TEXT OF THE SUGGESTED DRAFT UN RESOLUTION WHICH HE DISCUSSED WITH THE SOVIETS (NJA 6772). HE MIGHT ALSO HAVE A LETTER TO TRANSMIT TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON.

2. HUSSEIN IS CONSIDERING ASKING SYRIAN PRES ATASSI TO COME TO AMMAN THIS WEEKEND, OR TO SEND FONMIN MAKHOUS TO AMMAN, FOR

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 1757A ~~S E C R E T~~  
REVIEW OF MOSCOW VISIT. KING HOPES TO SECURE SARG COOPERATION, OR AT LEAST ITS SILENCE, AS FURTHER STEPS ARE TAKEN TOWARDS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT DURING THE COMING WEEKS IN NEW YORK. HUSSEIN WILL ALSO RENEW HIS REQUEST TO SARG TO TAKE ALL STEPS WITHIN SARG POWER TO STOP TERRORISM ON WEST BANK AND IN ISRAEL.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NJL 02-155  
By NARA, Date 6-9-03

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 01757 071128Z

3. AMONG OTHER IMMEDIATE BUSINESS HUSSEIN FACES IS POSSIBLE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT REPLACING THAT OF SA'D JUMA. AS OF LATE OCT 6 KING HAS APPARENTLY NOT DECIDED ON THE NEW PRIMIN OR CABINET.

GP-3 BURNS

EXD-16

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TELEGRAM

104

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 AMMAN 01614 261820Z

40  
ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

2

R 261545Z SEP 67  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SDLSTATE WASHDC 3651  
ISA  
INFO CINCSIBFKE  
CINCUSAFE  
KSAF  
DIA  
STATE GRNC

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1614

EXDIS

JOINT EMBASSY/DATT MESSAGE  
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE COMBINATION AIRLIFT FOR MAP SHIPMENT  
AND COLLEGE RUN RECOVERY

REF: CINCUSAFEMSG MLPA 06843 DTG 221530Z SEPT 67 (NOTAL),  
LONDON 1017 (NOTAL), STATE 34026, (NOTAL) AMMAN 1278 (NOTAL).

1. USAF SURVEY TEAM HAS RECOMMENDED AIRLIFT OF APPROXIMATELY  
15 AIRCRAFT LOADS OF USABLE COLLEGE RUN EQUIPMENT LEFT  
BEHIND WHEN TRAINING MISSION DEPARTED JUNE 5, 1967. WOULD  
UTILIZE MAINLY C-130'S BUT AT LEAST THREE C-124 SORTIES. TEAM

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 1614A ~~SECRET~~ EXDIS  
RECOMMENDED AIRLIFT AS SOON AS FEASIBLE ALLOWING FOR PROBLEMS  
OF DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 02-156  
By ms, NARA, Date 1-12-04

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 01614 261820Z

2. IN VIEW OF JORDANIAN SENSITIVITY TO THE HIATUS IN GRANT MAP SHIPMENTS, THERE COULD BE UNFORTUNATE EFFECT IF THE PROPOSED AIRLIFT SHOULD BE SCHEDULED IN EMPTY TO CARRY OUT THE COLLEGE RUN MATERIEL. AS STATE AND DOD WILL RECALL, GENERAL KHAMMASH IN JULY REQUESTED AIRLIFT OF JEEP MOUNTED 106MM RECOILLESS RIFLES, 3.5 ROCKET LAUNCHERS, RADIOS, AND SIGHT UNITS FOR 81MM MORTARS. (SEE MEMCON COL. JORDAN - GENERAL KHAMMASH DISCUSSION, LONDON JULY 25, 1967).

3. WE ARE ALSO EVIDENTLY UNABLE TO MEET THE TIMETABLE OF A SEPTEMBER SEA SHIPMENT ARRIVING IN AQABA IN EARLY OCTOBER, AS WAS INDICATED TO GEN. KHAMMASH IN LONDON ON AUGUST 13 (LONDON 1017). WHILE GEN. KHAMMASH MAY SUSPECT THAT IN FACT THERE HAS BEEN NO SHIPMENT, BOTH SIDES HAVE CAREFULLY AVOIDED CONFRONTING THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE SINCE EARLY SEPTEMBER. HOWEVER, OUR CONTINUING DELAY IN CARRYING THROUGH OF THE GRANT MAP AND THE BALANCE OF THE GROUND FORCES SALES PACKAGE MAKES FOR OBVIOUS PROBLEMS.

4. WE CONSIDER IT HIGHLY DESIRABLE TO MOVE AHEAD WITH SOME

PAGE 3 RUQMG 1614A ~~SECRET~~ XDIS  
INDICATION OF OUR GOOD INTENTION ON BKR MAP AND SALES COMMITMENTS AND RECOMMEND THAT THE PROPOSED AIRLIFT OF THE COLLEGE RUN EQUIPMENT BE UTILIZED ON THE FLIGHT IN FOR AIRLIFT OF HIGH PRIORITY ITEMS ON THE JORDANIAN MAP LIST. TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO INCLUDE USEABLE ITEMS SUCH AS THE JEEP MOUNTED RECOILLESS RIFLES (THESE ARE DEMONSTRABLY DEFENSIVE IN NATURE) AS OPPOSED TO CRATES OF SPARE PARTS, ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE LATTER SHOULD BE INCLUDED, TOO.

5. SHOULD IT NOT BE FEASIBLE TO SCHEDULE MAP SUPPLY LOADS ON THE INCOMING FLIGHTS OF THE PROPOSED AIRLIFT, WE RECOMMEND THAT THE COLLEGE RUN EQUIPMENT BE MOVED OUT BY SURFACE SHIPMENT FROM AQABA.

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105  
TELEGRAM

SECRET

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 01278 051747Z

87  
ACTION Ss 25

INFO /025 W

R 051722Z SEPT 67  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3456  
INFO DOD/ISA

~~SECRET~~ 1278

EXDIS:

REF: LONDON 1017, STATE 20137

SUBJ: RESUMPTION JORDAN GRANT MAP SHIPMENTS

WILL APPRECIATE REPORT STATUS PROPOSED RESUMPTION SHIPMENTS OF SUSPENDED GRANT MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN. ON BASIS INSTRUCTIONS AND CONVERSATIONS AUG 13 BETWEEN GENERAL KHAMMASH AND COLONEL JORDAN IN LONDON PER REFTELS, JORDANIANS HAVE BEEN ASSUMING ACTION WOULD TAKE PLACE ABOUT SEPT 1 WITH EXPECTED ARRIVAL INITIAL SHIPMENTS IN AQABA SOMETIME IN OCTOBER. ON THIS BASIS, WE HAVE MANAGED UNTIL NOW TO AVOID DISCUSSING PROBLEM. EVENING SEPT 4, HOWEVER, GENERAL KHAMMASH ASKED EMBOFF IF GRANT MAP SHIRMENTS HAD IN FACT NOW BEEN MADE. EMBOFF REPLIED HE DID NOT KNOW STATUS. GP-1. BURNS

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By ng/ll, NARA, Date 8/14/01

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NLJ-S 98001  
By ag/ll, NARA, Date 8/14/01

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SECRET 141

PAGE 01 STATE 121582

81  
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO 1030 R

DRAFTED BY: IO: SISCO  
IO:UNP: DAY  
APPROVED BY: IO: SISCO  
NEA: DAVIES  
S/S: KELLY

P R 280138Z FEB 68  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0926  
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2683  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0986  
CAIRO 1469

~~SECRET~~ STATE 121582

EXDIS

SUBJ: POSSIBLE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON JERUSALEM

REF: AMMAN 3587; USUN 3919

1. JARRING'S RETURN TO NEW YORK FEB 28 MAKES THIS PARTICULARLY INAPPROPRIATE TIME FOR JORDANIANS TO SEEK SC MEETING. JARRING PRESUMABLY WILL BE WORKING OUT WITH SYG NEXT PHASE OF HIS MISSION. ON ONE HAND THERE THUS APPEARS TO BE PROSPECT FOR MOVEMENT INTO

PAGE 2 RUEHC 121582 ~~SECRET~~

MORE ACTIVE STAGE, WHILE ON OTHER HAND CONVENING OF SC COULD HAVE ESPECIALLY DISRUPTIVE EFFECT WHILE MISSION IS IN THIS CRITICAL PERIOD. DESPITE PESSIMISTIC IMPRESSION JORDANIANS SEEM TO HAVE OBTAINED FROM JARRING (AMMAN REFTEL), WE ARE HOPEFUL IT MAY PROVE POSSIBLE TO MOVE TALKS TO CYPRUS IN NEAR FUTURE (USUN 3891).

2. YOU SHOULD APPROACH JORDANIAN GOVT URGENTLY, CALLING TO

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PAGE 02 STATE 121582

THEIR ATTENTION SYG'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF JARRING'S RETURN AND USING ARGUMENTS IN PARA 1 TO PERSUADE THEM TO HOLD OFF SEEKING A COUNCIL MEETING FOR TIME BEING. YOU SHOULD IN MANNER YOU DEEM APPROPRIATE MAKE CLEAR THAT, WHILE WE APPRECIATE FULLY PRESSURES ON JORDANIAN GOVT IN FACE OF ISRAELI ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM, JORDAN WOULD BE TAKING ON SERIOUS RESPONSIBILITY, IN OUR JUDGMENT CONTRARY TO ITS OWN INTERESTS, BY MOVING PREMATURELY IN SC AND RISKING DEMISE OF UN MISSION. SINCE OUR ACTIVE EFFORTS, PAST AND CURRENT, CONTINUE TO BE DIRECTED TOWARDS GETTING TALKS STARTED UNDER JARRING'S AEGIS, WE COULD NOT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES SUPPORT A MOVE TO TAKE JERUSALEM ISSUE TO SECURITY COUNCIL. FOR SAME REASON, GOJ CANNOT ASSUME

PAGE 3 RUEHC 121582 ~~SECRET~~

THAT, BECAUSE OF OUR WELL-KNOWN POSITION OF OPPOSITION TO ISRAELI UNILATERAL ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM, WE WOULD BE ABLE SUPPORT ACTION IN SC ON THIS ISSUE AT THIS TIME. OUR OVERRIDING CONCERN IS FOR SUCCESS OF JARRING MISSION, AND WE WOULD NOT WANT TO MISLEAD GOJ BY FAILING MAKE CLEAR THAT THIS WILL BE GUIDING PRINCIPLE OF OUR POSITION WITH RESPECT TO SC ACTIONS WHICH IN OUR VIEW DETRACT FROM THAT GOAL. IN OUR JUDGMENT, BEST HOPE FOR JORDAN TO GET AT JERUSALEM ISSUE IS BY MEANS OF SOME FORM OF SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL. WE ASSUME THAT POSSIBILITY OF JORDAN-ISRAELI DIALOGUE UNDER UN UMBRELLA, BECAUSE OF REALITY OF SITUATION IN AREA AND REALISTIC VIEW OF KING THAT HE CANNOT GET OUT IN FRONT, MUST AWAIT BEGINNING OF TALKS BETWEEN UAR AND ISRAEL.

A MOVE TO SC BY JORDAN AT THIS CRITICAL STAGE, WHICH IS LIKELY TO HAVE EFFECT OF DELAYING INDEFINITELY POSSIBLE DIALOGUE BETWEEN UAR AND ISRAEL UNDER JARRING'S AEGIS, CAN ONLY WORK ADVERSELY TO JORDAN'S SHORT-RANGE AND LONG-RANGE INTERESTS BOTH AS REGARDS ACHIEVING REASONABLE SETTLEMENT AND GETTING SOME SATISFACTION ON JERUSALEM ISSUE. SURELY JORDANIANS REALIZE, AS WE DO,

PAGE 4 RUEHC 121582 ~~SECRET~~

THAT JERUSALEM ISSUE IS HARDEST NUT TO CRACK AND CANNOT BE DEALT WITH SEPARATELY IN OR OUT OF SC IN WAY SATISFACTORY

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 STATE 121582

TO JORDANIANS.

3. FOR USUN: WE ASSUME AMB GOLDBERG WILL BE SEEING SYG, JARRING, AND JORDANIAN REP. BELIEVE EVERY FEASIBLE STEP SHOULD BE TAKEN WITH ABOVE THREE TO CONVINCe JORDANIANS RE UNTIMELINESS OF SUCH MOVE. WE ASSUME ALSO YOU WILL WANT TO GET OTHER FRIENDLY SC MEMBERS TO TAKE SAME LINE. OUR HOPE IS OF COURSE THAT AS RESULT OF SYG-JARRING DISCUSSIONS, JARRING, WITH HELP OF SYG, CAN PROPOSE THAT IN LIGHT OF FACT THERE IS SUFFICIENT AREA OF AGREEMENT ON AND ACCEPTANCE OF SC RESOLUTION, UAR AND ISRAEL WILL AGREE TO MEET WITH HIM IN NICOSIA TO BEGIN NEXT PHASE OF DISCUSSIONS. SYG'S DIRECT INTERVENTION, BULWARKING JARRING'S EFFORTS, WOULD PROBABLY ALSO BE USEFUL. IF THIS SHOULD BE OUTCOME OF TALKS IN NEW YORK, THIS WOULD PROVIDE JORDANI WITH A HANDLE TO BACK OFF FROM ITS PRESENT STRONG DISPOSITION TO MOVE IN SC WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS. GP-3 RUSK

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NLJ-S 08001

By *ag/ee*, NARA, Date *3/14/01*

107  
**TELEGRAM**

SECRET 750

PAGE 01 STATE 120284

45  
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/DLGAMON; DOD/ISA-MR. QUINN  
APPROVED BY: NEA-RODGER P. DAVIES  
NEA/ARN-MR. WILEY  
S/S; MRS. DAVIS

R 241838Z FEB 68  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0914

~~SECRET~~ STATE 120284

EXDIS

REF: STATE 120229

SUBJECT: ARMS NEGOTIATIONS -- ANTI-AIRCRAFT

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

FOLLOWING IS CORRECTION FOURTH SENTENCE REFTEL QUOTE ACCORDING  
TO OUR INFORMATION JAA HAS 191 QUAD .50 AA GUNS, 100 TWIN  
MOUNT .50 CAL. SS'S, 100 SINGLE MOUNT .50 CAL. AA'S AND  
72 .40 MM SELF-PROPELLED AA'S FOR A TOTAL OF 463 AA WEAPONS  
NOT COUNTING THE .40 MM AA TOWED WEAPONS WHICH MAY STILL

PAGE 2 RUEHC 120284 ~~SECRET~~  
BE IN THE JAA INVENTORY. END QUOTE. GP-1. RUSK

SECRET

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108  
**TELEGRAM**  
43

~~SECRET~~ 795

PAGE 01 STATE 120230

83  
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: ALATHERTON, JR. NEA:IAI:JHBAHTI  
APPROVED BY: NEA - RODGER P. DAVIES  
NEA/ARN = MR. WILEY  
NEA/UAR = MR. BOVIS  
NEA/ARP = MR. BREWER  
DOD/ISA = CMDR. CONE, MR. QUINN,  
MR. MURRAY (SUBS)  
IO/UNP = MR. DAY (INFO)  
S/S = JDAVIS  
USIA/IAN = MR. KENNEDY (SUBS)  
NEA/P = MR. BROWN  
P/ON = MR. C BARTCH

-----  
P R 240203Z FEB 68  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0906  
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1015  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0963  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2616  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 3659  
CAIRO 1445  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0667  
AMEMBASSY ADEN 0329  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0325  
AMEMBASSY PARIS 3306

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TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 120230

REF: AMMAN 3547 (NOTAL - BEING REPEATED INFO ADDRESSEES)

PAGE 2 RUEHC 120230 ~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: BEIRUT NEWSPAPER STORY - PHANTOMS FOR ISRAEL

1. SITUATION RE AIRCRAFT FOR ISRAEL REMAINS AS OUTLINED STATE 101371 JAN 19 AND YOU MAY PRIVATELY ASSURE GOJ ACCORDINGLY.
2. IF QUERIED RE BEIRUT PRESS STORY, DEPT WILL REPLY AS FOLLOWS AND POSTS MAY DO THE SAME: QTE USG POSITION ON ARMS TO ISRAEL REMAINS AS STATED IN JANUARY 8 JOINT STATEMENT. BEIRUT PRESS STORY ENTIRELY SPECULATIVE UNQTE. IF QUERIED RE ALLEGATIONS ABOUT DAYAN VISIT, WE WILL REPLY QTE WE UNDERSTAND THAT DEFMIN DAYAN HAD PLANNED A PRIVATE VISIT TO THE US BUT THAT HE HAS NOW DECIDED NOT TO COME AT THIS TIME UNQTE.
3. DEPT FEELS ISSUANCE PUBLIC DENIAL AT THIS TIME WILL BE IN NEITHER USG NOR GOJ INTERESTS, AS FLURRY CAUSED BY ANNOUNCEMENT RESUMPTION ARMS SALES TO JORDAN HAS DIMINISHED AND THIS COULD AGAIN AGITATE ENTIRE ISSUE. FURTHER, BEIRUT STORY HAS NOT YET SURFACED HERE. GP-3. RUSK

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Department of State

109  
**TELEGRAM**  
43

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~~SECRET~~ 799

PAGE 01 STATE 120229

83  
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN; MWWILEY; DOD/ISA; QUINN  
APPROVED BY: NEA - RODGER P. DAVIES  
NEA/ARN - MR. GAMON  
DOD/ISA - MR. QUINN  
S/S - JDAVIS

R 240202Z FEB 68  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0908

~~SECRET~~ STATE 120229

EXDIS

SUBJECT: ARMS NEGOTIATIONS -- ANTI-AIRCRAFT

REF: AMMAN 3546

JOINT STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE

1. WE UNDERSTAND REASONS WHY KING NOW DESIRES IMPRESS HIS OFFICERS BY OBTAINING QUICK DELIVERIES OF ADDITIONAL US ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS. RECENT USE OF AIRCRAFT BY ISRAELIS IN JORDAN VALLEY HAS NO DOUBT CREATED PSYCHOLOGICAL ATMOSPHERE WHERE SUCH GESTURE WOULD HAVE CONSIDERABLE IMPACT. UNFORTUNATELY IT IS DIFFICULT

PAGE 2 RUEHC 120229 ~~SECRET~~  
DEMONSTRATE JORDANIAN NEED FOR SUCH WEAPONS. ACCORDING TO

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 120229

OUR INFORMATION JAA HAS 194 QUAD .50 CAL. AA GUNS, 150 TWIN MOUNT .50 CAL. AA'S, AND 72 .40 MM SELF-PROPELLED AA'S FOR A TOTAL OF 516 AA WEAPONS NOT COUNTING THE .40 MM AA TOWED WEAPONS WHICH MAY STILL BE IN THE JAA INVENTORY.

2. WE SUGGEST YOU OR USDAO DISCUSS AA REQUIREMENTS FURTHER WITH JAA AND OFFER TO INCLUDE THIS SUBJECT ON AGENDA FOR FIRST ANNUAL REVIEW IF IN FACT REASONABLE MILITARY REQUIREMENT CAN BE ESTABLISHED. RUSK

*[Faint, mostly illegible text and markings, including large stylized letters 'D', 'X', 'E', and '2' overlaid on the page.]*

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S 98001

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110  
TELEGRAM

73

SECRET 797

PAGE 01 STATE 120228

83  
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN;MWWILEY  
APPROVED BY: NEA-RODGER P. DAVIES  
DOD/ISA - MR. QUINN  
S/S-JDAVIS

R 240202Z FEB 68  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0907

~~SECRET~~ STATE 120228

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 3417

1. YOU MAY INFORM JORDANIANS THAT MAC WEEKLY FLIGHT TO AMMAN CAN CARRY SOME OF EQUIPMENT REMAINING TO BE DELIVERED UNDER GRANT MAP FY 67 AND PRIOR YEAR PROGRAMS.

2. TARGET DRONE SYSTEMS CAN BE SO DELIVERED. THIS WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE MOBILE TRAINING TEAM (MTT) TO COMPLETE ITS TOUR IN JORDAN DURING THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR.

3. IN ADDITION TO THE DRONE SYSTEMS, WE HAVE IN MIND SPARE

PAGE 2 RUEHC 120228 ~~SECRET~~  
PARTS (INCLUDING SOME LOCATED IN SPAIN), AIMING CIRCLES, MORTAR SIGHTS, RADIOS, AND OTHER MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT WHICH MEETS MAC CUBE AND WEIGHT REQUIREMENT. RUSK

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21

~~SECRET~~ 675

PAGE 01 STATE 119574

2  
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: IO:UNP:ARDA  
APPROVED BY: NEA - MR BATTLE  
IO: MR SISCO (DRAFT)  
S/S-O: MR WISE

P R 231158Z FEB 68  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0904  
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0956  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2597  
CAIRO 1431

~~SECRET~~ STATE 119574

EXDIS

SBJ: JARRING MISSION

REF: AMMAN'S 3533

1. WE HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT TO GET INTO BUSINESS OF CONVEYING POSITIONS FROM ONE SIDE TO ANOTHER. FURTHERMORE, MUCH DEPENDS UPON EXACT FORMULATION OF POSITION IN THIS CASE, AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION MIGHT ONLY INCREASE SUSPICIONS OF JORDANIANS.

PAGE 2 RUEHC 119574 ~~SECRET~~

THEREFORE WE WOULD PREFER NOT TO GO BEYOND STATEMENT THAT IN OUR VIEW NEW FORMULATION SHOULD RELIEVE ARAB CONCERNS ABOUT

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 119574

ISRAELI ATTITUDE TOWARD RESOLUTION. IF YOU CONSIDER, HOWEVER, THAT JORDANIAN STATE OF MIND SUCH THAT IT NECESSARY TO DO SO, YOU MAY CONVEY ESSENCE BUT NOT RPT NOT PRECISE TEXT OF PARAS 1 AND 5 OF ISRAELI FORMULA, POINTING OUT ELEMENTS DESIGNED MEET ARAB NEEDS. YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE INFORMAL CHARACTER SUCH INFORMATION WHEN IT COMES FROM US RATHER THAN FROM JARRING.

2. RE JERUSALEM, FACT IS THERE IS LITTLE WE CAN TELL JORDANIANS THAT YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY INCLUDED IN YOUR PERSUASIVE PRESENTATIONS. FOR THE MOMENT AT LEAST IT SEEMS TO US JORDANIANS' BEST HOPE FOR FORESTALLING ISRAELI ACTIVITY IN JERUSALEM, AS WELL AS FOR RESOLUTION OF PROBLEM SATISFACTORY TO ARABS, LIES IN INCREASING MOMENTUM OF TALKS UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES. UNTIL NOW ISRAEL HAS NOT RPT NOT HAD TO WEIGH DECISIONS ON JERUSALEM IN TERMS WHETHER THEY LIKELY JEOPARDIZE CHANCE FOR OVERALL PEACE SETTLEMENT. THEREFORE, IN RESPECT TO JERUSALEM AS TO OTHER ISSUES INVOLVED, WE COME BACK TO NEED FOR PARTIES TO PRESS AHEAD TO SUBSTANTIVE TALKS. AS YOU WILL SEE FROM

PAGE 3 RUEHC 119574 ~~SECRET~~

SEPTEL WE SUGGESTING USUN SEEK THROUGH BUNCHE TO HAVE JARRING WEIGH IN WITH JORDANIANS RE RECOURSE TO SC.

3. FYI - WE DO NOT WISH TO APPROACH ISRAELIS FURTHER AT THIS MOMENT RE JERUSALEM ISSUE. THEY CAN BE IN NO DOUBT OF OUR VIEWS ON THIS, AND WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE OUR CURRENT EFFORTS WITH THEM, AS NECESSARY, ON GETTING PROGRESS IN JARRING TALKS. WE BELIEVE IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT WE CAN BE MOST EFFECTIVE ON JERUSALEM ISSUE, WHOSE IMPORTANCE WE FULLY APPRECIATE.

END FYI.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S 98001  
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112 50

~~SECRET~~ 979

PAGE 01 STATE 119271

85

ORIGIN SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:RBHOUGHTON  
APPROVED BY: U - NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH  
NEA - MR. DAVIES  
NEA - MR. BATTLE  
S/S - MR. SHEPARD  
DOD/ISA - MR. MURRAY

O 220032Z FEB 68 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0884

~~SECRET~~ STATE 119271

EXDIS

PLEASE DELIVER TO ACTION OFFICER AT BEGINNING OF BUSINESS FEBRUARY 22

SUBJECT: ARMS FOR JORDAN

REF: AMMAN 3527

1. WE HAVE CAREFULLY WEIGHED CONSIDERATIONS RAISED IN REFTEL. FROM A TACTICAL POINT OF VIEW WE STILL BELIEVE RATIONALE GIVEN STATE'S 118025 SHOULD BE BASIS OF PRESENTATION NEXT ROUND. TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD WHET GOJ APPETITE FOR LARGER PACKAGE

PAGE 2 RUEHC 119271 ~~SECRET~~

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 119271

THAN WE ARE PREPARED TO PROVIDE. IF, AFTER YOU HAVE MADE YOUR PRESENTATION, YOU ARE CONVINCED THAT KING WILL NOT ACCEPT PACKAGE IN ITS PRESENT FORM, YOU SHOULD INFORM HIM THAT YOU WILL GO BACK TO WASHINGTON IN AN ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN SOME FLEXIBILITY AS TO SIZE OF PACKAGE.

2. ON TANKS, DEFENSE ESTIMATES THAT IT WILL TAKE APPROXIMATELY SIX MONTHS TO BEGIN SHIPMENT. WE WILL, HOWEVER, ATTEMPT TO SHIP SOME TANKS PRIOR TO 1 JULY. THIS DATE WOULD BE SUBJECT TO AVAILABILITY OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT OF TYPE WHICH JORDANIANS WISH INSTALLED. THESE TANKS WOULD BE OVERHAULED UNDER STANDARDS FOR ISSUE TO US ARMY TROOPS. SOME OF THE NON-ESSENTIAL BASIC ISSUE LIST ITEMS AND ALL OF THE ONE-YEAR'S SPARLS MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR CONCURRENT SHIPMENT.

3. FYI IN CIRCUMSTANCES DESCRIBED PARAGRAPH ONE ABOVE, WE WOULD BE PREPARED OFFER ADDITIONAL 12 M48A1'S. UNLESS WE CAN OBTAIN HIGHER PRIORITY ON DELIVERY DATES, IT WOULD NOT APPEAR TO BE USEFUL TO SUBSTITUTE ADDITIONAL 40 MM ANTI-AIRCRAFT FOR SOME OTHER EQUIPMENT IN THE PACKAGE. WE ARE INVESTIGATING

PAGE 3 RUEHC 119271 ~~SECRET~~  
POSSIBILITY OF AIRLIFTING VIA MAC SOME OF THE EQUIPMENT TO JORDAN. END FYI.

4. IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT HEAVY DEMANDS ON EQUIPMENT FOR VIETNAM ARE A MAJOR FACTOR IN DETERMINING DELIVERY DATES FOR ITEMS IN OUR ARMS PACKAGE. GP-3. RUSK

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113  
**TELEGRAM**

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
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By ag/2, NARA, Date 8/14/01

2

~~SECRET~~ 502

2

PAGE 01 STATE 118639

82  
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: IO:JJSISCO  
APPROVED BY: NEA - MR. BATTLE  
S/S - MR. SHEPARD

R 210152Z FEB 68  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0872  
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0939  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2551  
CAIRO 1419

~~SECRET~~ STATE 118639

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN'S 3458

1) DEPT BELIEVES FORMULA CONVEYED BY EBAN TO JARRING AS REPORTED IN TEL AVIV'S 2589 REPRESENTS SUBSTANTIAL MOVE FORWARD AND SHOULD MEET ANY LEGITIMATE CONCERNS UAR MAY HAVE. REQUEST AMBASSADOR SEE JORDANIANS IMMEDIATELY, UNDERSCORING OUR JUDGMENT THAT REAL PROGRESS BEING MADE BY JARRING AS PRINCIPAL REASON TO HOLD OFF ON ANY MOVE TO SC. DEPT CANNOT IMPROVE ON IMPRESSIVE

PAGE 2 RUEHC 118639 ~~SECRET~~  
ARGUMENTS MADE BY AMBASSADOR IN PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WHICH SHOULD BE REPEATED AS HE DEEMS APPROPRIATE.

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TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE I18639

2) AS WILL BE NOTED FROM SEPTTEL WE WEIGHTING IN WITH UAR TO URGE PROMPT ACCEPTANCE OF LATEST ISRAELI FORMULA.

GP-3. RUSK

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TELEGRAM

23

114

~~SECRET~~ 268

2

PAGE 01 STATE 118025

3  
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: MWWILEY: RBHOUGHTON  
APPROVED BY: U: NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH  
DOD/ISA/-MR. MURRAY S/S: MR. WENZEL  
NEA: MR. BATTLE NEA: MR. DAVIES

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O 201639Z FEB 68 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0000

~~SECRET~~ STATE 118025

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA 7. LINE SIX, LAST SENTENCE  
SHOULD READ: WE ARE NOW REPEAT NOW ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN HIGHER..)

REF: AMMAN 3417, 3418, 3419 AND 3420.

1. WE ARE DISAPPOINTED IN HUSSEIN'S ASSESSMENT OF OUR ARMS  
PACKAGE AS BEING INSUFFICIENT TO MEET HIS POLITICAL AND MILITARY  
REQUIREMENTS. WE BELIEVE THAT FURTHER STUDY ON HIS PART WILL  
REVEAL IT AS A SUBSTANTIAL RESPONSE TO HIS REQUEST. WITH THE  
EXCEPTION OF SOME OF THE TANKS (AND 155 MM GUNS WHICH MAY  
NOT BE AVAILABLE) WE ARE OFFERING TO MAKE UP HIS JUNE LOSSES.  
THE RUSSIANS HAVE DONE NO MORE FOR SYRIA AND THE UAR ALTHOUGH  
ADMITTEDLY THEY ARE DOING IT MORE QUICKLY. WE FULLY APPRECIATE  
THAT THE KING HAS PROBLEMS BUT HE MUST REMEMBER THAT WE ALSO  
HAVE PROBLEMS ABOUT WHICH HE AND KHAMMASH SHOULD BE FULLY  
CONVERSANT. OUR OFFER SHOULD BE VIEWED IN THIS CONTEXT.

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By *ng* NARA, Date 7-17-01

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 118025

2. AS KHAMMASH LEFT WASHINGTON BEFORE WE HAD A CHANCE TO EXPLAIN OUR PACKAGE, WE BELIEVE THE JORDANIANS PERHAPS DO NOT FULLY APPRECIATE ALL OF THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH WENT INTO THE DETERMINATION OF THE SIZE OF THE PACKAGE. THE ARMS OFFERED TO JORDAN INCLUDE ALMOST EVERY ITEM IN THE SPECTRUM OF MILITARY HARDWARE USED BY THE JORDAN ARAB ARMY. SUCH A SWEEPING OFFER SHOULD BE VERY USEFUL TO THE KING IN EXPLAINING HIS POLICY TO THE ARMY OFFICERS. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT THE ILLUSTRATIVE ITEMS FOLLOWING THOSE SPECIFICALLY LISTED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING PROVIDE FOR \$2 MILLION IN SMALL ARMS, \$12.8 MILLION IN AMMUNITION, \$4 MILLION WORTH OF VEHICLES (1200), AND MISCELLANEOUS COMMUNICATIONS AND ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT.

3. FOR REASONS WITH WHICH THE KING AND KHAMMASH SHOULD BE FAMILIAR, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR US TO ENLARGE OUR ARMS PACKAGE AT THIS TIME. THERE ARE VERY REAL RESTRAINTS IN TERMS OF QUANTITIES ON WHAT WE CAN OFFER AT ANY ONE TIME. WE CANNOT IGNORE STRONG CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC FEELING AGAINST (A) THE SUPPLY OF ARMS TO COUNTRIES WHERE ECONOMIC RESOURCES ARE SO LIMITED AND (B) WHERE WE APPEAR TO BE ARMING BOTH SIDES OF A CONFLICT. THESE SAME RESTRAINTS HAVE INFLUENCED OUR RESPONSE TO ISRAELI REQUESTS AS WELL. THERE IS ALSO GENUINE CONCERN WITHIN THE USG THAT JORDAN'S MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT NOT BE DRASTICALLY DISPROPORTIONATE TO ITS ECONOMIC CAPACITY TO FINANCE SUCH AN ESTABLISHMENT. HOWEVER IRRELEVANT SUCH CONSIDERATIONS MAY SEEM TO BE TO THE KING'S IMMEDIATE PROBLEM, THESE ARE FACTS OF LIFE WITH WHICH WE HAVE TO DEAL. NOTWITHSTANDING, WE HAVE OFFERED HIM AS AN EARNEST OF OUR SUPPORT SUCH POLITICALLY SENSITIVE ITEMS AS TANKS, PLANES, ARTILLERY AND AMMUNITION.

4. WE SHOULD ALSO BEAR IN MIND THAT OUR OFFER IS THE BEGINNING OF A RENEWED MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP. IT SEEKS TO MEET JORDAN'S LEGITIMATE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AS WE SEE THEM AT THIS JUXTURE AND AS WE ARE ABLE TO PROVIDE. WE WILL BE PREPARED TO REVIEW JORDAN'S EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS DURING THE FIRST ANNUAL REVIEW TO BE HELD WITHIN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. IN ADDITION, HE HAS BEEN GIVEN STRONG ASSURANCES OF SUPPORT FROM THE UNITED STATES (STATE'S 113645). SUCH ASSURANCES SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN LIGHTLY.

5. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE BELIEVE THAT THE KING SHOULD ACCEPT

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 STATE 118025

OUR OFFER IN THE CONTEXT AND SPIRIT IN WHICH IT WAS MADE. TO SOLVE HIS IMMEDIATE PROBLEM WITH HIS ARMY, THE IMPORTANT THING IS FOR HIM TO GET ON WITH THE RE-EQUIPPING OF THAT ARMY. YOU SHOULD MAKE THIS CLEAR IN YOUR TALKS WITH HIM. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, YOU MAY WISH TO USE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN YOUR TALKS.

6. WE UNDERSTAND WHY KING IS IMPATIENT AND ARE AWARE OF THE URGENCY OF HIS PROBLEMS. HE SHOULD REALIZE, HOWEVER, THAT SENIOR LEVELS OF USG WERE FACED WITH OTHER SERIOUS PROBLEMS CONCERNING VIETNAM AND KOREA DURING THE PERIOD THAT GENERAL KHAMMASH WAS IN WASHINGTON, OUR DECISIONS IN RESPECT TO FAR EAST ARE SERIOUS MATTER NOT ONLY FOR US BUT FOR ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. SINCE WE ARE NOT A TOTALITARIAN GOVERNMENT DECISIONS ON MATTERS OF WIDE POLITICAL INTEREST (SUCH AS SUPPLYING MAJOR COMBAT ITEMS TO JORDAN) CANNOT BE MADE OVERNIGHT. IN FACT, IN LIGHT OF THE OTHER PROBLEMS WE WERE FACING AT THE TIME, OUR DECISION TO RESUME SUBSTANTIAL ARMS SHIPMENTS TO JORDAN, GIVEN THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS CREATED FOR US BY JORDAN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE JUNE HOSTILITIES, WAS REACHED RELATIVELY QUICKLY.

7. IN MEETING OUR POLITICAL PROBLEMS, IT IS IMPORTANT TO US THAT THE TOTAL PACKAGE BE PHASED OVER 2 1/2 YEARS AND IN ESTABLISHING A DELIVERY SCHEDULE WE MUST TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION RELATIVE PRIORITIES FOR VIETNAM WHERE OUR TROOPS ARE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN COMBAT OPERATIONS. THE FOLLOWING IS OUR INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF DELIVERY DATES. WE ARE NOW REPEAT NOW ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN HIGHER PRIORITIES FOR SOME OF THESE ITEMS.

F-104 AIRCRAFT	FY 1968
M48A1 TANKS	1ST AND 2ND HALF FY 1969
105 MM HOWITZERS	2ND HALF FY 1969
M113 APC'S	2ND HALF FY 1970
106 MM RECOILLESS RIFLES	25 UNITS FY 1968, 113 UNITS 2ND HALF FY 1969
40 MM AA SP	2ND HALF FY 1969

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 04 STATE 118025

50 CAL. QUAD AA

1ST HALF FY 1969

2 1/2 TON TRUCKS

25 UNITS FY 1968, 15 UNITS 1ST  
HALF FY 1970

MISCELLANEOUS VEHICLES

2ND HALF FY 1969

AMMUNITION

\$8 MILLION FY 1968, \$4.8MILLION  
1ST HALF FY 1970

MISCELLANEOUS SMALL ARMS

\$0.8 MILLION IN FY 1968, \$0.8  
MILLION 1ST HALF FY 1969, \$0.4  
2ND HALF FY 1969

8. IN DISCUSSING THESE DELIVERY SCHEDULES YOU MAY WISH TO POINT OUT THAT THE KING, BY ACCEPTING OR OFFER, CAN INITIATE A STEADY FLOW IN THE MONTHS AHEAD OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR JODAN, AS A FIRST STEP THE UNDELIVERED MAP FY 1966-67 AND THE BALANCE OF GROUND FORCE EQUIPMENT SOLD TO JORDAN IN 1965 CAN BE READY FOR SHIPMENT IN THE NEXT 60-90 DAYS. ALTHOUGH THESE CATEGORIES DO NOT CONTAIN SUCH GLAMOUR ITEMS AS TANKS OR ARTILLERY THEY DO CONTAIN IMPORTANT COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, SOME VEHICLES, AMMUNITION AND VITALLY NEEDED SPARES FOR TANKS, VEHICLES AND WEAPONS. THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING LISTED ONLY GENERAL CATEGORIES FOR VEHICLES, SMALL ARMS, AMMUNITION, SPARE PARTS, COMMUNICATIONS AND ENGINEER EQUIPMENT. YOU MAY WISH TO BE MORE SPECIFIC. FOR EXAMPLE, THE PACKAGE INCLUDES 7,105 CALIBRE 30 RIFLES; 1802 CARBINES; 732 CALIBRE 30 MACHINE GUNS; 398 CALIBRE 50 MACHINE GUNS; 1240 VEHICLES OF 1 TO 3 TONS, APPROXIMATELY \$8 MILLION FOR ENGINEER EQUIPMENT AND VARIOUS RADIOS, TELEPHONES, SWITCHBOARDS, FIELD WIRE, TEST SETS, AND \$12 MILLION WORTH OF AMMUNITION.

9. YOU MAY ALSO WISH TO POINT OUT THAT THE JORDANIANS HAVE APPARENTLY GIVEN NO CONSIDERATION TO THE RATE AT WHICH THE EQUIPMENT REQUESTED BY KHAMMASH CAN BE EFFECTIVELY ABSORBED INTO THEIR MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.

10. ON THE SUBJECT OF AIRCRAFT, WE FIND THE JORDANIAN REACTION DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND. GENERAL KHAMMASH TOLD THE NEGOTIATING TEAM THAT HE WANTED A SUPERSONIC MULTI-PURPOSE PLANE BUT ALSO

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 05 STATE 118025

MADE CLEAR THAT HE WANTED A TYPE WHICH COULD INTERCEPT HIGH LEVEL MACH 2 INTRUDERS. FYI HE TOLD GENERAL WHEELER HE WANTED F-104'S. END FYI. WITH THE NEGOTIATING TEAMS HE REFUSED TO SPECIFY THE AMERICAN AIRCRAFT HE HAD IN MIND. WHEN PRESSED HE REPLIED, "IT IS FOR YOU TO CHOOSE WHICH OF YOUR AIRCRAFT IS MOST SUITABLE FOR OUR NEEDS." THE F-104, IN ADDITION TO BEING AN EXCELLENT HIGH LEVEL INTERCEPTOR, CAN BE CONVERTED TO CARRY OUT A TACTICAL GROUND SUPPORT MISSION. CONVERSION KITS TO ADD A BOMB CARRYING CAPABILITY WERE INCLUDED IN THE ORIGINAL SALES CONTRACT. THE A-4 ON THE OTHER HAND HAS PRACTICALLY NO AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY. IT IS A SUBSONIC ATTACK BOMBER. THE F-5 IS A POSSIBLE SUBSTITUTE BUT JORDAN WOULD THEN LOSE A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE \$10 MILLION THEY HAVE ALREADY PAID ON THE F-104'S. IN ADDITION, THE DELIVERY TIME WOULD BE MUCH LONGER, PERHAPS 18 TO 24 MONTHS. WE WERE GIVEN CLEARLY TO UNDERSTAND BY GENERAL KHAMMASH THAT DELIVERY TIME ON AIRCRAFT WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO HIM. WE THEREFORE DESIGNED A PACKAGE THAT TOGETHER WITH THE 18 HARKER HUNTERS HE ANTICIPATES RECEIVING FROM THE UK, WOULD GIVE HIM 36 GOOD PLANES TO FLY, OFF JORDAN'S OWN AIRFIELDS, BEFORE THE END OF THIS CALENDAR YEAR. IF SOME OTHER ARAB STATES, SUCH AS SAUDI ARABIA, WERE WILLING TO FOOT THE BILL, WE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO JORDAN PURCHASING LIGHTNINGS OR MIRAGES, BUT THEY WOULD COST TWO OR THREE TIMES AS MUCH AS THE F-104'S WITH UNCERTAIN DELIVERY TIMES.

11. GIVEN JORDAN'S PRESENT COMFORTABLE RESERVE POSITION AND RELATIVELY LARGE BALANCES OF UNUSED DONATIONS WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY CREDIT SHOULD NOW BE OFFERED FOR ARMS PURCHASES. WE UNDERSTAND THAT JORDAN'S LONGER RANGE ECONOMIC FUTURE IS A MATTER OF CONCERN TO THE GOJ AND WE ARE WILLING TO DISCUSS FINANCING OF THE LATTER PART OF OUR PACKAGE DURING THE ANNUAL REVIEWS. FYI WE ALSO FEEL THAT INSISTENCE ON CASH INJECTS A HEALTHY NOTE OF SELF DISCIPLINE INTO THE JORDANIAN APPETITE FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT. END FYI.

12. OUR COMMENTS ON THE KING'S SUGGESTED REVISIONS FOR THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING FOLLOW IN SEPTTEL. RUSK

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Department of State

115  
TELEGRAM  
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112

PAGE 01 STATE 118025

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ORIGIN SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN; MWWILEY; RBHOUGHTON  
APPROVED BY: U; NICHOLAS DEB; KATZENBACH  
DOD/ISA/ -MR. MURRAY S/S; MR. WENZEL  
NEA; MR. BATTLE NEA; MR. DAVIES

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O 201639Z FEB 68 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0000

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EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 3417, 3418, 3419 AND 3420.

1. WE ARE DISAPPOINTED IN HUSSEIN'S ASSESSMENT OF OUR ARMS PACKAGE AS BEING INSUFFICIENT TO MEET HIS POLITICAL AND MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. WE BELIEVE THAT FURTHER STUDY ON HIS PART WILL REVEAL IT AS A SUBSTANTIAL RESPONSE TO HIS REQUEST. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SOME OF THE TANKS (AND 155 MM GUNS WHICH MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE) WE ARE OFFERING TO MAKE UP HIS JUNE LOSSES. THE RUSSIANS HAVE DONE NO MORE FOR SYRIA AND THE UAR ALTHOUGH ADMITTEDLY THEY ARE DOING IT MORE QUICKLY. WE FULLY APPRECIATE THAT THE KING HAS PROBLEMS BUT HE MUST REMEMBER THAT WE ALSO HAVE PROBLEMS ABOUT WHICH HE AND KHAMMASH SHOULD BE FULLY CONVERSANT. OUR OFFER SHOULD BE VIEWED IN THIS CONTEXT.

2. AS KHAMMASH LEFT WASHINGTON BEFORE WE HAD A CHANCE TO EXPLAIN OUR PACKAGE, WE BELIEVE THE JORDANIANS PERHAPS DO NOT FULLY APPRECIATE ALL OF THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH WENT INTO THE

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By ly NARA, Date 7-17-01

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 118025

DETERMINATION OF THE SIZE OF THE PACKAGE. THE ARMS OFFERED TO JORDAN INCLUDE ALMOST EVERY ITEM IN THE SPECTRUM OF MILITARY HARDWARE USED BY THE JORDAN ARAB ARMY. SUCH A SWEEPING OFFER SHOULD BE VERY USEFUL TO THE KING IN EXPLAINING HIS POLICY TO THE ARMY OFFICERS. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT THE ILLUSTRATIVE ITEMS FOLLOWING THOSE SPECIFICALLY LISTED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING PROVIDE FOR \$2 MILLION IN SMALL ARMS, \$12.8 MILLION IN AMMUNITION, \$4 MILLION WORTH OF VEHICLES (1200), AND MISCELLANEOUS COMMUNICATIONS AND ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT.

3. FOR REASONS WITH WHICH THE KING AND KHAMMASH SHOULD BE FAMILIAR, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR US TO ENLARGE OUR ARMS PACKAGE AT THIS TIME. THERE ARE VERY REAL RESTRAINTS IN TERMS OF QUANTITIES ON WHAT WE CAN OFFER AT ANY ONE TIME. WE CANNOT IGNORE STRONG CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC FEELING AGAINST (A) THE SUPPLY OF ARMS TO COUNTRIES WHERE ECONOMIC RESOURCES ARE SO LIMITED AND (B) WHERE WE APPEAR TO BE ARMING BOTH SIDES OF A CONFLICT. THESE SAME RESTRAINTS HAVE INFLUENCED OUR RESPONSE TO ISRAELI REQUESTS AS WELL. THERE IS ALSO GENUINE CONCERN WITHIN THE USG THAT JORDAN'S MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT NOT BE DRASTICALLY DISPROPORTIONATE TO ITS ECONOMIC CAPACITY TO FINANCE SUCH AN ESTABLISHMENT. HOWEVER IRRELEVANT SUCH CONSIDERATIONS MAY SEEM TO BE TO THE KING'S IMMEDIATE PROBLEM, THESE ARE FACTS OF LIFE WITH WHICH WE HAVE TO DEAL. NOTWITHSTANDING, WE HAVE OFFERED HIM AS AN EARNEST OF OUR SUPPORT SUCH POLITICALLY SENSITIVE ITEMS AS TANKS, PLANES, ARTILLERY AND AMMUNITION.

4. WE SHOULD ALSO BEAR IN MIND THAT OUR OFFER IS THE BEGINNING OF A RENEWED MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP. IT SEEKS TO MEET JORDAN'S LEGITIMATE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AS WE SEE THEM AT THIS JUNCTURE AND AS WE ARE ABLE TO PROVIDE. WE WILL BE PREPARED TO REVIEW JORDAN'S EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS DURING THE FIRST ANNUAL REVIEW TO BE HELD WITHIN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. IN ADDITION, HE HAS BEEN GIVEN STRONG ASSURANCES OF SUPPORT FROM THE UNITED STATES (STATE'S 113645). SUCH ASSURANCES SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN LIGHTLY.

5. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE BELIEVE THAT THE KING SHOULD ACCEPT OUR OFFER IN THE CONTEXT AND SPIRIT IN WHICH IT WAS MADE. TO SOLVE HIS IMMEDIATE PROBLEM WITH HIS ARMY, THE BEST THING IS FOR HIM TO GET ON WITH THE RE-EQUIPPING OF THAT ARMY.

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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 STATE 118025

YOU SHOULD MAKE THIS CLEAR IN YOUR TALKS WITH HIM. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, YOU MAY WISH TO USE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN YOUR TALKS.

6. WE UNDERSTAND WHY KING IS IMPATIENT AND ARE AWARE OF THE URGENCY OF HIS PROBLEMS. HE SHOULD REALIZE, HOWEVER, THAT SENIOR LEVELS OF USG WERE FACED WITH OTHER SERIOUS PROBLEMS CONCERNING VIETNAM AND KOREA DURING THE PERIOD THAT GENERAL KHAMMASH WAS IN WASHINGTON, OUR DECISIONS IN RESPECT TO FAR EAST ARE SERIOUS MATTER NOT ONLY FOR US BUT FOR ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. SINCE WE ARE NOT A TOTALITARIAN GOVERNMENT DECISIONS ON MATTERS OF WIDE POLITICAL INTEREST (SUCH AS SUPPLYING MAJOR COMBAT ITEMS TO JORDAN) CANNOT BE MADE OVERNIGHT. IN FACT, IN LIGHT OF THE OTHER PROBLEMS WE WERE FACING AT THE TIME, OUR DECISION TO RESUME SUBSTANTIAL ARMS SHIPMENTS TO JORDAN, GIVEN THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS CREATED FOR US BY JORDAN'S PARTICIPATION IN THE JUNE HOSTILITIES, WAS REACHED RELATIVELY QUICKLY.

7. IN MEETING OUR POLITICAL PROBLEMS, IT IS IMPORTANT TO US THAT THE TOTAL PACKAGE BE PHASED OVER 2 1/2 YEARS AND IN ESTABLISHING A DELIVERY SCHEDULE WE MUST TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION RELATIVE PRIORITIES FOR VIETNAM WHERE OUR TROOPS ARE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN COMBAT OPERATIONS. THE FOLLOWING IS OUR INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF DELIVERY DATES. WE ARE NOT ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN HIGHER PRIORITIES FOR SOME OF THESE ITEMS.

F-104 AIRCRAFT	FY 1968
M48A1 TANKS	1ST AND 2ND HALF FY 1969
105 MM HOWITZERS	2ND HALF FY 1969
M113 APC'S	2ND HALF FY 1970
106 MM RECOILLESS RIFLES	25 UNITS FY 1968, 113 UNITS 2ND HALF FY 1969
40 MM AA SP	2ND HALF FY 1969
50 CAL. QUAD AA	1ST HALF FY 1969
2 1/2 TON TRUCKS	25 UNITS FY 1968, 15 UNITS 1ST 2ND HALF FY 1969

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 04 STATE 118025

HALF FY 1970

MISCELLANEOUS VEHICLES

2ND HALF FY 1969

AMMUNITION

\$8 MILLION FY 1968, \$4.8 MILLION  
1ST HALF FY 1970

MISCELLANEOUS SMALL ARMS

\$0.8 MILLION IN FY 1968, \$0.8  
MILLION 1ST HALF FY 1969, \$0.4  
2ND HALF FY 1969

8. IN DISCUSSING THESE DELIVERY SCHEDULES YOU MAY WISH TO POINT OUT THAT THE KING, BY ACCEPTING OUR OFFER, CAN INITIATE A STEADY FLOW IN THE MONTHS AHEAD OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR JORDAN, AS A FIRST STEP THE UNDELIVERED MAP FY 1966-67 AND THE BALANCE OF GROUND FORCE EQUIPMENT SOLD TO JORDAN IN 1965 CAN BE READY FOR SHIPMENT IN THE NEXT 60-90 DAYS. ALTHOUGH THESE CATEGORIES DO NOT CONTAIN SUCH GLAMOUR ITEMS AS TANKS OR ARTILLERY THEY DO CONTAIN IMPORTANT COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, SOME VEHICLES, AMMUNITION AND VITALLY NEEDED SPARES FOR TANKS, VEHICLES AND WEAPONS. THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING LISTED ONLY GENERAL CATEGORIES FOR VEHICLES, SMALL ARMS, AMMUNITION, SPARE PARTS, COMMUNICATIONS AND ENGINEER EQUIPMENT. YOU MAY WISH TO BE MORE SPECIFIC. FOR EXAMPLE, THE PACKAGE INCLUDES 7,105 CALIBRE 30 RIFLES; 1802 CARBINES; 732 CALIBRE 30 MACHINE GUNS; 398 CALIBRE 50 MACHINE GUNS; 1240 VEHICLES OF 1 TO 3 TONS, APPROXIMATELY \$8 MILLION FOR ENGINEER EQUIPMENT AND VARIOUS RADIOS, TELEPHONES, SWITCHBOARDS, FIELD WIRE, TEST SETS, AND \$12 MILLION WORTH OF AMMUNITION.

9. YOU MAY ALSO WISH TO POINT OUT THAT THE JORDANIANS HAVE APPARENTLY GIVEN NO CONSIDERATION TO THE RATE AT WHICH THE EQUIPMENT REQUESTED BY KHAMMASH CAN BE EFFECTIVELY ABSORBED INTO THEIR MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.

10. ON THE SUBJECT OF AIRCRAFT, WE FIND THE JORDANIAN REACTION DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND. GENERAL KHAMMASH TOLD THE NEGOTIATING TEAM THAT HE WANTED A SUPERSONIC MULTI-PURPOSE PLANE BUT ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT HE WANTED A TYPE WHICH COULD INTERCEPT HIGH LEVEL MACH 2 INTRUDERS. FYI HE TOLD GENERAL KHAMMASH HE WANTED F-104'S. END FYI. WITH THE NEGOTIATING TEAMS HE REFUSED TO

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 05 STATE 118025

SPECIFY THE AMERICAN AIRCRAFT HE HAD IN MIND. WHEN PRESSED HE REPLIED, "IT IS FOR YOU TO CHOOSE WHICH OF YOUR AIRCRAFT IS MOST SUITABLE FOR OUR NEEDS." THE F-104, IN ADDITION TO BEING AN EXCELLENT HIGH LEVEL INTERCEPTOR, CAN BE CONVERTED TO CARRY OUT A TACTICAL GROUND SUPPORT MISSION. CONVERSION KITS TO ADD A BOMB CARRYING CAPABILITY WERE INCLUDED IN THE ORIGINAL SALES CONTRACT. THE A-4 ON THE OTHER HAND HAS PRACTICALLY NO AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY. IT IS A SUBSONIC ATTACK BOMBER. THE F-5 IS A POSSIBLE SUBSTITUTE BUT JORDAN WOULD THEN LOSE A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE \$10 MILLION THEY HAVE ALREADY PAID ON THE F-104'S. IN ADDITION, THE DELIVERY TIME WOULD BE MUCH LONGER, PERHAPS 18 TO 24 MONTHS. WE WERE GIVEN CLEARLY TO UNDERSTAND BY GENERAL KHAMMASH THAT DELIVERY TIME ON AIRCRAFT WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO HIM. WE THEREFORE DESIGNED A PACKAGE THAT TOGETHER WITH THE 18 HARKER HUNTERS HE ANTICIPATES RECEIVING FROM THE UK, WOULD GIVE HIM 36 GOOD PLANES TO FLY, OFF JORDAN'S OWN AIRFIELDS, BEFORE THE END OF THIS CALENDAR YEAR. IF SOME OTHER ARAB STATES, SUCH AS SAUDI ARABIA, WERE WILLING TO FOOT THE BILL, WE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO JORDAN PURCHASING LIGHTNINGS OR MIRAGES, BUT THEY WOULD COST TWO OR THREE TIMES AS MUCH AS THE F-104'S WITH UNCERTAIN DELIVERY TIMES.

11. GIVEN JORDAN'S PRESENT COMFORTABLE RESERVE POSITION AND RELATIVELY LARGE BALANCES OF UNUSED DONATIONS WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY CREDIT SHOULD NOW BE OFFERED FOR ARMS PURCHASES. WE UNDERSTAND THAT JORDAN'S LONGER RANGE ECONOMIC FUTURE IS A MATTER OF CONCERN TO THE GOJ AND WE ARE WILLING TO DISCUSS FINANCING OF THE LATTER PART OF OUR PACKAGE DURING THE ANNUAL REVIEWS. FYI WE ALSO FEEL THAT INSISTENCE ON CASH INJECTS A HEALTHY NOTE OF SELF DISCIPLINE INTO THE JORDANIAN APPETITE FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT. END FYI.

12. OUR COMMENTS ON THE KING'S SUGGESTED REVISIONS FOR THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING FOLLOW IN SEPTEL. RUSK

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Department of State

116  
**TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ 595

PAGE 01 STATE 117988

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45  
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: MWWILEY  
APPROVED BY: NEA: RODGER P. DAVIES  
NEA/ARN: MR. HOUGHTON S/S; MR. MEEHAN DOD: MR. SCHWARTZ

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O 201406Z FEB 68 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0863

~~SECRET~~ STATE 117988

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 3418

1. WE WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE WORDING OF MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BUT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE RETAIN SUBSTANCE OF POINTS CONTAINED IN DRAFT MEORANDUM. SOME OF THESE PROVISIONS, E.G., REQUIREMENT FOR PRIOR APPROVAL BY USG BEFORE JORDAN PURCHASES MAJOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT ITEMS FROM OTHER SOURCES AND PROVISION FOR USG APPROVAL OF GOJ MILITARY BUDGET WERE INSERTED TO MEET REQUIREMENTS OF CONTE AND SYMINGTON AMENDMENTS SO THAT WE COULD CONTINUE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS TO JORDAN. IF JORDANIANS PREFER,

PAGE 2 RUEHC 117988 ~~SECRET~~  
WE WOULD BE WILLING TO ENTER INTO SEPARATE CLASSIFIED AGREEMENT ON MATTERS WHICH KING BELIEVES WOULD BE EMBARRASSING FOR HIM IF BASIC AGREEMENT IS SHOWN TO OTHER ARABS OR TO HIS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-155  
By *ns*, NARA, Date 6-9-03

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 117988

ARMY OFFICERS.

2. AS TO SPECIFIC CHANGES REQUESTED BY KING, WE WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT INSERTION OF WORD "MILITARY" BETWEEN LEGITIMATE AND DEFENSIVE (PARAGRAPH 3 AMMAN 3418). WE WOULD ALSO BE WILLING TO ADD "SO LONG AS ALL SUCH REQUIREMENTS CONTINUE TO BE MADE AVAILABLE TO IT" AT END OF FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 3 (PARAGRAPH 4 AMMAN 3417). WE WOULD ACCEPT WORDS "BULK OF" IN PLACE OF "WITH SOME EXCEPTIONS" IN PARAGRAPH 4C (PARAGRAPH 5 AMMAN 3417). WE ARE NOT WILLING TO CHANGE THE QUANTITIES OF EQUIPMENT NOR TO DELETE THE "AND 1970" FROM THE END OF THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH C. WE WOULD BE WILLING TO CHANGE PARA 5A(1) TO READ "JORDAN'S MILITARY REQUIREMENTS IN THE LIGHT OF THE AREA SITUATION AT THE TIME." WE ARE NOT WILLING TO CHANGE PARAGRAPH 4F OR 5A (WITH EXCEPTION OF PARA 5A(1) ) B, C, OR D, ALTHOUGH THE KING MAY WISH TO INCLUDE THESE PROVISION IN A SEPARATE CLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM. WE ARE

PAGE 3 RUEHC 117988 ~~SECRET~~  
WILLING TO DROP "AND ITS MILITARY MANPOWER LEVEL OF NOT MORE THAN 53,000" WHICH WAS NOT INCLUDED IN OUR DRAFT MEMORANDUM TRANSMITTED STATE 113634.

GP-3 RUSK

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

48/117

~~SECRET~~ 183

PAGE 01 STATE 115647

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82  
ORIGIN SS 30  
INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: RBHOUGHTON  
APPROVED BY: NEA: RODGER P. DAVIES  
NEA/IAI: MR. ATHERTON  
S/S: APARKER

R 150132Z FEB 68  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0820  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0879

~~SECRET~~ STATE 115647

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 3399 AND TEL AVIV 2528

YOU MAY PASS ON TO KING, KHAMMASH AND KILANI THOSE PORTIONS OF PARAGRAPH 1 WHICH YOU CONSIDER USEFUL. IN INFORMING THEM OF SECTION F OF PARA 1 (TEL AVIV USDAO'S 0319) YOU SHOULD NOT CONVEY IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE URGING HIM TO ACCEPT YARIV'S PROPOSAL. THE DECISION MUST BE THE KING'S AND WE DO NOT WISH TO EXERT PRESSURE ON HIM IN THIS REGARD BECAUSE OF THE EXTREMELY DELICATE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS INVOLVED. WE ARE PASSING THE INFORMATION ON BECAUSE OF OUR DEEP INTEREST IN

PAGE 2 RUEHC 115647 ~~SECRET~~  
DEFUSING THE PRESENT DANGEROUS SITUATION WHICH PREVAILS IN THE JORDAN VALLEY. GP-3. RUSK

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NLJ-S 96001  
By ag/ll NARA, Date 6/14/01



Department of State

TELEGRAM

48  
118

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PAGE 01 STATE 115565

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82  
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA:IAI:ALATHERTON, JR  
APPROVED BY: NEA:RPDAVIES  
NEA/ARN:MR. HOUGHTON/DRAFT  
S/S:APARKER

R 150102Z FEB 68  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0819  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0878

~~SECRET~~ STATE 115565

EXDIS

ISRAELI MINISTER EVRON CALLED DEPT OFFICER ON INSTRUCTIONS FEB 14 TO REPORT FOLLOWING:

IN RESPONSE ISRAELI PROPOSAL FOR MEETING OF IDF AND JAA CHIEFS OF STAFF TO DISCUSS WAYS OF DEFUSING SITUATION ON ISRAEL-JORDAN CEASE-FIRE LINE, JORDAN COUNTERED WITH OFFER SEND COL. DAUD FOR MEETING AT ALLENBY BRIDGE. ALTHOUGH DISAPPOINTED WITH THIS RESPONSE, ISRAELIS SENT OFFICER TO BRIDGE TO MEET DAUD. LATTER WAS NOT THERE, BUT AFTER DELAY OF SEVERAL HOURS DAUD'S DEPUTY APPEARED ACCOMPANIED BY RED CROSS REPRESENTATIVE.

PAGE 2 RUEHC 115565 ~~SECRET~~  
TATIVES, EXPLAINING THAT DAUD ILL AND NOT ABLE ATTEND. ISRAELIS CONSIDERED MEETING WITH DEPUTY USELESS AND WISHED CALL USG

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-155  
By *ms*, NARA, Date 6-9-03

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PAGE 02 STATE 115565

ATTENTION TO THIS NEGATIVE JORDANIAN RESPONSE TO SERIOUS AND GENUINE ISRAELI INITIATIVE. GP-3. RUSK

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PAGE 01 STATE 113634

83  
ORIGIN SS 30

1968 FEB 11 03 20

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN MWILEY  
APPROVED BY NEA RPD AVIES  
S/S-O R FINCH  
DOD/ISA HSCHWARTZ (IN SUBSTANCE)  
NEA/ARN RBHOUGHTON

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O 110218Z FEB 68 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0000

~~SECRET~~ STATE 113634

EXDIS

DELIVER TO ACTION OFFICER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS FEB 11.

1. FOLLOWING DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING HANDED TO  
GEN. KHAMMASH BY SECRETARY MCNAMARA FEB 10.

"MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

"I. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE  
GOVERNMENT OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN, THROUGH THEIR  
REPRESENTATIVES, HAVE RECENTLY CONFERRED CONCERNING JORDAN'S  
NEED TO MEET IN A REASONABLE MANNER ITS LEGITIMATE DEFENSIVE  
REQUIREMENTS.

"II. IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD THAT ANY ASSISTANCE IN THE  
FORM OF DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES RENDERED BY THE UNITED  
STATES, EXCEPT FOR U.S. GRANT AID, WILL BE ON A REIMBURSABLE

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PAGE 02 STATE 113634

BASIS.

"III. THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN REAFFIRMS ITS POLICY OF PROCURING FROM THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER FREE WORLD SOURCES ALL OF ITS REQUIREMENTS FOR DEFENSE ARTICLES AND DEFENSE SERVICES FOR ITS ARMED FORCES. SHOULD JORDAN FIND ITSELF UNABLE TO MAINTAIN THIS POLICY, THE COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN BY THE U.S. IN THIS MEMORANDUM AND THE MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING OF 18 MARCH 1965 AND 29 MARCH 1966 WILL CEASE TO BE VALID.

"IV. ACCORDINGLY, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, SUBJECT TO CONTINUING LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS, AND PURSUANT TO OTHER STIPULATIONS SET FORTH BELOW, THE UNITED STATES AGREES TO:

"A. RESUME SHIPMENT OF THE UNDELIVERED FY 66-67 MAP GRANT AID.

"B. RESUME SHIPMENT OF THE PREVIOUSLY SUSPENDED GROUND FORCE EQUIPMENT SOLD TO JORDAN UNDER THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING OF 18 MARCH 1965 AND COVERED BY SALES CASES (DD FORM 1513-OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE) UBM, UBW, UDB, UBQ, UBR, UBS, UBT, UBU, AND UBW.

"C. REPLACE BULK OF GROUND FORCE EQUIPMENT LOST IN JUNE BY SELLING ON A REIMBURSABLE BASIS THE FOLLOWING GROUND FORCE EQUIPMENT:

"(88) M48A1 TANKS, (23) 105 MM HOWITZERS, (43) ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS, (4) 40 MM SP AAA GUNS, (138) 106 MM JEEP MOUNTED RECOILLESS RIFLES, (40) H35A2 2-1/2 TON TRUCKS, AND, AS MAY BE MUTUALLY AGREED, SMALL ARMS, AMMUNITION, SPARE PARTS, COMMUNICATIONS AND ENGINEER EQUIPMENT. SUBJECT TO THE CONDITION SET FORTH BELOW THESE ARTICLES AND SERVICES ARE PROPOSED FOR DELIVERY DURING U.S. FISCAL YEARS 1968, 1969, AND 1970. ITEMS OFFERED FOR SALE TO JORDAN SHALL BE SUBJECT TO U.S. STANDARD SUPPLY PROCEDURES INVOLVING QUANTITIES, AVAILABILITY, DELIVERY SCHEDULE, PRICE AND OTHER DETAILS AND SHALL BE THE BASIS OF FURTHER DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND WILL BE SET FORTH IN THE NECESSARY SALES AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THESE TWO GOVERNMENTS.

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PAGE 03 STATE 113634

"D. DELIVER 18 F104 AIRCRAFT AND RELATED EQUIPMENT TO JORDAN AT A COST OF APPROXIMATELY DOLS 30.5 MILLION. SUBJECT TO JORDAN'S ABILITY TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN THESE AIRCRAFT, DELIVERIES COULD BEGIN BY JUNE 1968.

"E. SELL EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR A GROUND CONTROL RADAR SYSTEM FOR THE F104 AND HAWKER HUNTER AIRCRAFT AT A COST OF APPROXIMATELY DOLS 2.8 MILLION.

"(AS IN THE CASE OF THE GROUND FORCE EQUIPMENT, THE QUANTITIES, AVAILABILITY, DELIVERY SCHEDULE, PRICES, ETC., WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF FURTHER DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.)

"F. AGREE TO CONSIDER AT SOME POINT IN THE FUTURE, IN LIGHT OF CIRCUMSTANCES THEN PERTAINING, UP TO 18 ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT OF A TYPE TO BE MUTUALLY AGREED UPON.

"V. IN ADDITION, AS A CONTINUING MATTER, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS UNDERSTANDING IS CONDITIONED UPON:

"A. JORDAN'S AGREEMENT TO UNDERTAKE ANNUAL REVIEWS WITH THE UNITED STATES. THESE ANNUAL REVIEWS, AMONG OTHER MATTERS, WILL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT (1) JORDAN'S MILITARY REQUIREMENTS RESULTING FROM PROGRESS TOWARDS AN ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT; (2) JORDAN'S ECONOMIC SITUATION AND THE EXTENT OF ITS FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES; (3) PROGRESS TOWARDS ARMS LIMITATIONS IN THE AREA, AND (4) THE CONTINUED ABILITY OF JORDAN'S ARMED FORCES TO ABSORB AND MAINTAIN MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

"B. JORDAN'S ASSURANCE OF ITS INTENT TO MAINTAIN ITS INDIGENOUSLY FINANCED MILITARY BUDGET DURING CY 1968 AT NO MORE THAN DOLS 56.5 MILLION. THIS MILITARY BUDGET AS WELL AS JORDAN'S MILITARY MANPOWER LEVEL WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF AN ANNUAL REVIEW BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, AND JORDAN AGREES THAT THE LEVEL OF ITS MILITARY EXPENDITURE DURING THE TERM OF THIS UNDERSTANDING WILL BE MUTUALLY AGREED BY THE USG AND THE GOJ. DURING THE ANNUAL REVIEWS CONSIDERATION WILL BE GIVEN TO REDUCING THE MANPOWER LEVELS OF THE GOJ.

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PAGE 04 STATE 113634

"C. THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN AGREES TO FULL SECRECY ON ALL MATTERS CONCERNING THIS OFFER BY THE UNITED STATES. IN THE EVENT THE UNITED STATES DECIDES TO MAKE THE MATTER PUBLIC, JORDAN AGREES TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO THE TIMING, METHOD AND EXTENT OF THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE.

"D. JORDAN'S ASSURANCE THAT IT WILL NOT PURCHASE MAJOR ITEMS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT, EITHER GROUND OR AIR, FROM OTHER THAN U.S. SOURCES WITHOUT U.S. APPROVAL.

"VI. SINCE THE DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES OFFERED UNDER THIS MEMORANDUM, EXCEPT THOSE SET FORTH IN IV A. ABOVE, ARE TO BE FURNISHED ON A REIMBURSABLE BASIS, ONLY PARAGRAPHS 2 THROUGH 5 OF THE CLASSIFIED AGREEMENT EFFECTED BY AND EXCHANGE OF NOTES SIGNED ON 27 JUNE AND 29 JUNE, 1957, AS AMENDED, SHALL BE APPLICABLE TO THEM. THESE PARAGRAPHS ARE SET FORTH AS ANNEX A HEREOF. IN THIS CONNECTION, JORDAN CONFIRMS THAT THERE IS NO INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN ITS COMMITMENTS UNDER PARAGRAPHS 2 THROUGH 5 OF THE CLASSIFIED AGREEMENT AND ITS COMMITMENTS UNDER OTHER AGREEMENTS TO WHICH JORDAN MAY BE A PARTY."

ANNEX A

#### APPLICABLE CONDITIONS

(TAKEN FROM CLASSIFIED US-JORDAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT WHICH ENTERED INTO FORCE ON JUNE 29, 1957)

2. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN REQUIRES AND SHALL USE THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS AND SERVICES FURNISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES SOLELY TO MAINTAIN ITS INTERNAL SECURITY AND LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENSE. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN SHALL NOT UNDERTAKE ANY ACT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST ANY OTHER STATE.

3. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN SHALL

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PAGE 05 STATE 113634

NOT RELINQUISH OR TRANSFER TITLE TO, OR POSSESSION OF, THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS AND SERVICES FURNISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT THE PRIOR CONSENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

4. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN SHALL MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS AND SERVICES FURNISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

5. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN SHALL PROVIDE INFORMATION CONCERNING THE UTILIZATION OF THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS AND SERVICES FURNISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES. GP-1. RUSK

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TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0789

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DELIVER TO ACTION OFFICER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS FEB 11.

1. GEN KHAMMASH MET WITH SECDEF MCNAMARA ON FEB 10. FOL IS SUMMARY OF CONVERSATION BASED ON UNCLEARED MEMCON.

2. MR MCNAMARA APOLOGIZED FOR LENGTH OF TIME GEN HAD BEEN KEPT WAITING IN THE UNITED STATES. GEN INDICATED HE UNDERSTOOD WHY. GEN DESCRIBED SITUATION IN JORDAN AND POINTED OUT THAT MAXIMUM GOOD POLITICAL EFFECT WOULD FLOW FROM RAPID ARRIVAL IN HIS COUNTRY OF ARMS FROM U.S. HE ASKED FOR AIR SHIPMENT OF SOME ITEMS.

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PAGE 02 STATE 113633

3. SEC OF DEF MADE CLEAR THAT GENERAL'S ORIGINAL LIST WAS FOR US A VERY TOUGH ONE AND WOULD CAUSE US MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH CONGRESS. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT JORDAN AND U.S. HAVE SAME BASIC OBJECTIVE OF STABLE RELATIONS BETWEEN COUNTRIES OF AREA AND THIS WAS OBJECTIVE WHICH WOULD NOT PRIMARILY BE MET BY ARMS. WE WERE LIMITED BY NEED TO JUSTIFY SUPPLYING ARMS TO BOTH JORDAN AND ISRAEL JUST AFTER THEY HAVE HAD A WAR. ALSO THERE WERE PROBLEMS OF DIVERTING RESOURCES FROM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

4. MCNAMARA THEN BRIEFLY OUTLINED WHAT WE COULD DO:

A. 12 F-104S BY JUNE (POSSIBLY AIR SHIPPED IF THIS SEEMS NECESSARY) AND 6 MORE BY DEC.

B. WE PROPOSE AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF THE PROBLEM. DURING SUCH REVIEWS WE COULD CONSIDER POSSIBILITY SOME TIME IN FUTURE OF 18 MORE SUCH AIRCRAFT.

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C. WE WOULD SHIP SUSPENDED MAP ITEMS AT EARLY DATE BY SEA.

D. WE WOULD SHIP REMAINING GROUND EQUIPMENT FROM PAST SALES AT EARLY DATE BY SEA.

E. WE WOULD REPLACE JORDAN'S JUNE LOSSES OF GROUND EQUIPMENT EXCEPT FOR TANKS AND HEAVY ARTILLERY.

5. MR MCNAMARA POINTED OUT WE HAD RECD RECENT INFO FROM BRITISH ON AVAILABILITY OF CENTURIONS, SPECIFICALLY THAT IF 200 WERE REALLY WHAT JORDAN NEEDED THEY COULD BE BOUGHT IN BRITAIN AND SPARES AND AMMO WERE AVAILABLE AND WOULD BE AVAILABLE WELL INTO 1970S. THEY COULD ALSO BE CONVERTED TO 105 MM GUNS IN JORDAN. GEN KHAMMASH'S LACK OF INTEREST IN TANKS FROM BRITISH, HOWEVER DESCRIBED, WAS CLEAR. MR MCNAMARA THEN RESPONDED THAT WE COULD ONLY MAKE AVAILABLE 88 M48A1S (AND THIS NUMBER WAS INSERTED IN THE DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WHICH GEN KHAMMASH TOOK WITH HIM).

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PAGE 03 STATE 113633

6. GEN KHAMMASH EXPRESSED A STRONG NEED FOR 7 TO 10 155 MM

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GUNS WHICH HE HAD LOST DURING THE WAR AND MR MCNAMARA PROMISED TO SEE WHAT WE COULD DO FOR HIM IN THIS RESPECT.

7. GEN KHAMMASH WENT ON TO POINT OUT THAT PAYMENTS COULD BE SPREAD OVER A PERIOD OF 2-1/2 YEARS AND TOTAL COST OF PACKAGE BETWEEN \$80 AND \$85 MILLION, INCLUDING THE \$10 MILLION JORDAN HAS ON DEPOSIT HERE. HE SAID WE WOULD NEED \$22 MILLION IN ADDITION TO THE \$10 MILLION ON DEPOSIT BEFORE JULY 1, 1968.

8. GEN KHAMMASH ASKED WHAT NEGOTIATING LATITUDE THERE WAS ON THE PLANES AND MR MCNAMARA REPLIED THAT IN OUR OPINION THE F-104 IS A GOOD PLANE FOR JORDAN AND THAT OTHERS ARE EITHER NOT AVAILABLE OR NOT AS APPLICABLE TO JORDAN'S REQUIREMENTS AS THE F-104.

9. MR MCNAMARA SAID, IN RESPONSE TO THE GENERAL'S QUESTION, THAT A PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION UNDER THE CONTE-LONG AMENDMENT WOULD NOT CHANGE THE TYPE OF PLANE WHICH WE ARE CONSIDERING. MR MCNAMARA DID SAY, HOWEVER, THAT ONCE THE 18 F-104S ARE DELIVERED, WE COULD CONSIDER SOME TIME IN THE

PAGE 5 RUEHC 113633 ~~SECRET~~

FUTURE ANOTHER 18. AS TO THE NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY OF OTHER ITEMS MR MCNAMARA SAID THAT AS TO TANKS, THIS DEPENDED ON THE ACCEPTABILITY OF BRITISH TANKS. ON OTHER ITEMS THERE WAS SOME BUT NOT MUCH NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY BECAUSE OF FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS.

10. FINALLY, THE SEC OF DEF SUGGESTED THAT GEN KHAMMASH TAKE THE DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WITH HIM, ASK US ANY QUESTIONS HE HAD, AND THEN PRESENT IT TO THE KING. HE POINTED OUT THAT IT COULD BE SIGNED IN JORDAN BY OUR AMB IF GEN KHAMMASH WISHED TO AVOID MAKING ANOTHER TRIP TO THE US.

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PAGE 04 STATE 113633

11. GEN KHAMMASH THANKED THE SEC FOR ALL THE WORK THAT HAD BEEN DONE IN HIS BEHALF AND SAID HE WOULD NOW SEE WHAT HE COULD DO WITH THE KING. GP-1 RUSK

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EXDIS

DELIVER TO ACTION OFFICER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS FEB 11.

1. KHAMMASH LEAVING FEB 10 FOR AMMAN VIA LONDON AND EXPECTS ARRIVE AMMAN FEB 12. HE SAW SECDEF TODAY AND SUMMARY MEMCON BEING SENT SEPTEL. DRAFT MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING HANDED TO KHAMMASH ALSO BEING SENT SEPTEL.

2. WE BELIEVE YOU SHOULD NOT DISCUSS PACKAGE WITH KING UNTIL KHAMMASH HAS HAD OPPORTUNITY TO REPORT ON HIS WASHINGTON TALKS. IT MIGHT BE EMBARRASSING TO HIM IF WE TOOK THE INITIATIVE. WE BELIEVE TACTICALLY IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE

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FOR HIM TO CARRY THE BALL, AT LEAST IN THE FIRST INSTANCE.

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PAGE 02 STATE 113632

3. THE FOLLOWING POINTS MAY BE HELPFUL TO YOU IN DISCUSSING PACKAGE AT APPROPRIATE TIME WITH GOJ.

(A) IN GENERAL, WE ARE REPLACING LOSSES SUFFERED BY JAA IN JUNE HOSTILITIES.

(B) AS FOR TANKS, WE ARE OFFERING 88 M48A1S WHICH WOULD BRING JAA'S TOTAL OF AMERICAN TANKS TO 181, ENOUGH TO EQUIP BOTH OF THEIR ARMORED BRIGADES.

(C) WE HAVE NOT AGREED TO DELIVER M48A4 TANKS WITH DIESEL ENGINE AND 105 MM GUNS BECAUSE WE HAVE NO TANKS OF THIS TYPE AND IT WOULD TAKE APPROXIMATELY TWO YEARS TO CONVERT TANKS WE DO HAVE. JORDAN'S NEEDS ARE MUCH MORE IMMEDIATE. IN ADDITION, THESE CONVERSIONS WOULD TRIPLE THE COST OF THE TANKS. FYI. IN FACT, RANGE OF 90 MM GUNS ALMOST IDENTICAL TO THAT OF 105 MM GUN ALTHOUGH LATTER WOULD DELIVER SOMEWHAT LARGER PROJECTILE. END FYI.

PAGE 3 RUEHC 113632 ~~SECRET~~

(D) OUR CAPABILITY TO EXTEND CREDIT FOR MILITARY SALES HAS BEEN DRASTICALLY IMPAIRED BY CONGRESS. WE WERE TOLD BY GEN. KHAMMASH THAT JAA HAS JD 10 MILLION FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THIS WILL BE ADEQUATE FOR DELIVERIES DURING BALANCE THIS FISCAL YEAR AND AT LEAST PART OF NEXT FISCAL YEAR. WE WILL DISCUSS FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS FOR BALANCE OF PACKAGE DURING ANNUAL REVIEWS. OUR POSITION, OF COURSE, WILL BE GOVERNED BY FUTURE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION EFFECTING CREDIT AVAILABILITY.

(E) CONSIDERING PROBLEMS WE FACED, ARMS PACKAGE IS IN OUR OPINION A REASONABLE MEETING OF JORDAN'S REQUIREMENTS (WHICH ARE TO A LARGE EXTENT POLITICAL), AND IN A CONCRETE WAY DEMONSTRATED OUR DESIRE CONTINUE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH JORDAN. GP-1. RUSK

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DELIVER TO ACTION OFFICER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS FEB 11.

1. AT APPROPRIATE TIME, WE PLAN TO USE THE FOL EITHER AS  
A STATEMENT OR IN ANSWER TO PRESS QUERIES:

"WE HAVE DECIDED TO RESUME ARMS SHIPMENTS TO JORDAN AS WE HAVE  
DONE IN THE CASE OF OTHER NEAR EASTERN COUNTRIES. DETAILS HAVE  
NOT YET BEEN NEGOTIATED WITH THE JORDANIAN GOVT. WE CONTINUE  
TO BELIEVE THAT RESTRAINT ON ALL ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE AREA  
IS ESSENTIAL TO STABILITY IN THE AREA."

2. IF THE DEPTS SPOKESMAN IS ASKED "WHY JORDAN?" HE WILL REPLY,  
"WE CONSIDER THAT CONTINUED U.S. AND OTHER WESTERN TIES WITH

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PAGE 02 STATE 113629

PAGE 2 RUEHC 113629 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~  
JORDAN ARE IMPORTANT TO AREA STABILITY."

IF ASKED "WHAT ARE WE DOING FOR ISRAEL?" HE WILL SAY "I REFER YOU TO THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL'S VISIT TO THE U.S. WE STAND BY THE POSITION DESCRIBED IN THAT COMMUNIQUE."

"IF ASKED WHY WE ARE SHIPPING ARMS IF WE BELIEVE THAT RESTRAINT ON ALL SHIPMENTS TO THE AREA IS ESSENTIAL TO STABILITY IN THE AREA, HE WILL REPLY, "IN MAKING THIS DECISION WE HAVE TAKEN THAT FACTOR FULLY INTO CONSIDERATION."

3. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, PREFER NOT TO SAY ANYTHING UNTIL THE GOJ HAS AGREED TO OUR PACKAGE. WE WILL ONLY DO SO IF THERE IS UNDUE SPECULATION IN THE PRESS.

4. APPRECIATE YOUR EARLY COMMENTS ON ABOVE PRESS GUIDANCE AND TIMING. GP-3 RUSK

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APPROVED BY: NEA/RODGER P. DAVIES  
NEA/IAI/MR. ATHERTON  
IO/UNP/MR. DAY (SUBS)  
S/S/MR. GRIBBLE

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INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 3271  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2233  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0821

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REF: AMMAN 3280; STATE 111229 AND STATE 110500

FYI: ISRAELI MINISTER EVRON INFORMED US FEBRUARY 8 THAT JARRING WILL BE ASKED TO TRANSMIT TO JORDAN SAME MESSAGE PASSED IN CAIRO DURING HIS VISIT AMMAN SUNDAY. WE OF COURSE HAVE NO IDEA HOW JARRING WILL PLAY THIS. END FYI.

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PAGE 01 STATE 111229

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DELIVER ACTION OFFICER OPENING OF BUSINESS FEB 7

REF: AMMAN 3289

1. STATE 110500 WAS DRAFTED PRIOR TO RECEIPT YOUR 3280 AND  
MAY BE TAKEN AS FULL RESPONSE TO PROPOSALS FOR ACTION CONTAINED  
THEREIN.

2. RE PARA 3 STATE 110500, ISRAELI MINISTER EVRON HAS NOW

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INFORMED US GOI SEES NO OBJECTIONS TO OUR PROCEEDING AS OUTLINED

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PAGE 02 STATE 111229

TO HARMAN YESTERDAY. WE TOOK OCCASION TO CONVEY TO EVRON YOUR SENSE OF URGENCY ABOUT GETTING JARRING TO TELL JORDANIANS OF POSITION WHICH GOI REQUESTED JARRING PASS TO UARG. EVRON SAID HE WOULD SO ADVISE HIS GOVERNMENT IMMEDIATELY. GP-3 RUSK

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PAGE 01 STATE 109809

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REF: AMMAN 3269

DELIVER TO ACTION OFFICER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS FEBRUARY 4

For FYI - DEPARTMENT WILL BE CONSIDERING AT UNDER SECRETARY LEVEL  
FEBRUARY 5 RANGE OF PROBLEMS RAISED REFTEL. WHILE REALIZING DIFFICULTIES  
INVOLVED FOR YOU, HOPE THAT MEANWHILE YOU CAN FORESTALL

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ANY JORDANIAN ACTION RE SECURITY COUNCIL BY DRAWING ON FOLLOWING:

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PAGE 02 STATE 109809

END FYI

2. AS TALHOUNI IS AWARE FROM OUR STATEMENT ON JANUARY 15 WE OPPOSE ANY UNILATERAL RESOLUTION OF THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM. WE HAVE MADE THIS ABUNDANTLY CLEAR TO THE ISRAELIS. WE HAVE REITERATED OUR POSITION SPECIFICALLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE ISRAELI ACTION ABOUT WHICH THE ARABS ARE CONCERNED.

3. AS WE HAVE INDICATED IN STATE'S 105874, WE AT VARIOUS LEVELS HAVE BEEN URGING THE ISRAELIS, IN CONTEXT OF JARRING MISSION, TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE UK RESOLUTION AS BASIS FOR SETTLEMENT. WE ARE CONTINUING TO PRESS THEM.

4. WE CONSIDER THE JARRING MISSION STILL PROVIDES BEST CHANCE FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS SETTLEMENT. WERE THE ARABS TO RAISE JERUSALEM PROBLEM IN SECURITY COUNCIL NOW, IT COULD JEOPARDIZE WHATEVER CHANCES JARRING'S TALKS HAVE FOR SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT OF THIS AND OTHER ASPECTS OF PROBLEM.

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NLJ-S 98001  
By 12/12/14 NARA, Date 8/14/01

~~SECRET~~ 712

PAGE 01 STATE 106935

83  
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO MM 01/031 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: RBHOUGHTON: IO/UNP: ARDAY  
APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY  
AID/AA/NEA: MR. WHEELER  
IO: MR. SISCO  
NEA: MR. DAVIS  
NEA: MR. HANDLEY  
M: MR. ROSTOW  
U: MR. KATZENBACH  
S/S: MR. MEEHAN

R 302113Z JAN 68  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0000

~~SECRET~~ STATE 106935

EXDIS:

REF: AMMAN'S 2815

1. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY TO PRIME MINISTER TALHOUNI:

BEGIN QUOTE

2. DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

I AM WRITING WITH RESPECT TO SOME OF THE CONCERNS ABOUT U S GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARDS JORDAN YOU EXPRESSED IN RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH AMBASSADOR SYMMES. I WANT TO CONFIRM HIS

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# TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 106935

ASSURANCES OF OUR SUPPORT FOR JORDAN IN MEETING THE PROBLEMS THAT CONFRONT YOUR EXCELLENCY'S GOVERNMENT IN THESE DAYS.

3. THE RECORD OF AMERICAN-JORDANIAN RELATIONS OVER THE PAST TWO DECADES MANIFESTS THE SUPPORT WHICH MY GOVERNMENT HAS CONSISTENTLY PROVIDED TO THE KINGDOM. WHILE I KNOW I NEED NOT DWELL ON THE HIGH REGARD WHICH PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAS FOR HIS MAJESTY KING HUSSEIN, UNDERLYING THOSE FRIENDLY TIES BETWEEN THE LEADERS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES IS A STRONG FABRIC OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN JORDANIAN AND AMERICAN OFFICIALS AS WELL AS THE PRIVATE CITIZENS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THE RECENT ARAB-ISRAEL HOSTILITIES HAVE CREATED PROBLEMS IN OUR RELATIONS, BUT THESE ARE NOT INSURMOUNTABLE AND ARE, IN FACT, BEING OVERCOME.

4. BY NOW YOU ARE AWARE OF OUR DECISION TO RESUME ARMS SHIPMENTS TO JORDAN. WE ARE NOW NEGOTIATING A PL-480 PROGRAM FOR JORDAN. WE ARE CONTINUING OUR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AND ARE ANXIOUS TO ASSIST JORDAN IN AGGRESSIVELY PURSUING ITS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. THESE ACTIONS CONSTITUTE CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF OUR FIRM INTENTION TO CONTINUE OUR TRADITIONAL POLICY TOWARD JORDAN.

5. IN THIS CONNECTION, I REGRET THE INTERPRETATIONS THAT MAY HAVE BEEN PLACED ON THE DISCONTINUANCE OF BUDGETARY SUPPORT AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME. LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT OUR DECISION WAS BASED SOLELY ON FISCAL CONSIDERATIONS, I.E., PLEDGES OF ARAB FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR JORDAN REACHED AT THE KHARTOUM CONFERENCE, OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS RECEIVED BY JORDAN, AND JORDAN'S VERY STRONG FOREIGN EXCHANGE POSITION. CONGRESS HAS CUT BACK OUR FOREIGN AID RESOURCES AND WE WOULD JEOPARDIZE OUR OTHER AID PROGRAMS TO JORDAN IF WE WERE TO PROVIDE BUDGET SUPPORT THAT DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE CURRENTLY NEEDED. AS AMBASSADOR SYMMES HAS CONFIRMED TO YOUR EXCELLENCY, WE CONTINUE OUR INTEREST IN JORDAN'S FINANCIAL WELL BEING AND ARE PREPARED TO REVIEW YOUR GOVERNMENT'S BUDGETARY SITUATION WHENEVER YOU CONSIDER THAT SUCH A REVIEW IS WARRANTED.

6. THE MAJOR PROBLEM IN THE AREA IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PEACE WHICH IS JUST AND LASTING. ITS ACHIEVEMENT IS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO ALL OF US, AND BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES ARE DEDICATED TO THIS GOAL. LET THERE BE NO DOUBT, YOUR EXCELLENCY, THAT OUR

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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 STATE 106935

EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD HAVE BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE UNREMITTING. WE WELCOME AS A FIRST STEP THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S ADOPTION ON NOVEMBER 22 OF THE RESOLUTION UNDER WHICH U N SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE JARRING WAS APPOINTED. AMBASSADOR JARRING'S MISSION PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY TO WORK TOWARD SETTLEMENT WHICH IS NOT LIKELY TO RECUR. IT IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE THAT THE PARTIES MAKE THE MOST OF THIS OPPORTUNITY BY COOPERATING ENERGETICALLY AND WITH AS MUCH FLEXIBILITY AS POSSIBLE IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

7. THE UNITED STATES, FOR ITS PART, IS FULLY COMMITTED TO SUPPORTING AMBASSADOR JARRING'S EFFORTS. AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG SAID IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON NOVEMBER 22 "THE DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WILL BE EXERTED IN SUPPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO ACHIEVE A FAIR, EQUITABLE AND DIGNIFIED SETTLEMENT SO THAT ALL IN THE AREA CAN LIVE IN PEACE, SECURITY AND TRANQUILITY." JORDAN CAN COUNT ON THE UNITED STATES TO DO ALL IT CAN TO FURTHER A JUST AND REASONABLE SETTLEMENT. WE ARE DEEPLY CONSCIOUS OF THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE TWO ISSUES OF JERUSALEM AND THE WEST BANK HAVE FOR JORDAN. WHEN KING HUSSEIN RECENTLY VISITED THE UNITED STATES, WE EXPLAINED TO HIM OUR POSITION ON THESE PROBLEMS. OUR POLICY ON THIS HAS NOT CHANGED.

8. YOUR EXCELLENCY AND YOUR CABINET COLLEAGUES HAVE DONE MUCH TO HELP MAINTAIN AN ATMOSPHERE ENHANCING THE PROSPECTS FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN SITUATION. I HAVE NOTED IN PARTICULAR THE ACTIONS YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN IN SEEKING TO PREVENT TERRORISM AND IN ENCOURAGING THE RESUMPTION OF NORMAL ACTIVITIES ON THE WEST BANK, SUCH AS THE OPERATION OF SCHOOLS AND COMMERCIAL TRAFFIC.

9. I AM KEENLY AWARE OF THE MANY SERIOUS PROBLEMS FACING YOUR EXCELLENCY AND THE KINGDOM AS A WHOLE, INCLUDING THE MAJOR ONE OF ALLEVIATING THE TRAGIC PLIGHT OF THE REFUGEES. MY GOVERNMENT HAS, OF COURSE, CONTINUED ITS VERY SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO MEET THE MORE RECENT EMERGENCY SITUATION. WE HAVE ALSO SUPPORTED THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND SECURITY COUNCIL ACTIONS ON THIS PROBLEM THAT WERE TAKEN DURING RECENT MONTHS. THESE INCLUDED RESOLUTIONS CALLING UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO FACILITATE THE RETURN OF THOSE INHABITANTS WHO

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 106935

HAD FLED FOLLOWING THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES, RESOLUTIONS WHICH WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE MUST BE IMPLEMENTED TO THE FULLEST EXTENT POSSIBLE. WE HAVE REPEATEDLY MADE CLEAR TO ALL CONCERNED, BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, OUR POSITION ON THE "NEW REFUGEES", AS WELL AS ON THE NEED FOR AN OVERALL SOLUTION TO THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT MY GOVERNMENT REMAINS DEDICATED TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT A JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM SHOULD AND MUST BE FOUND. THE PRESENT EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH CONDITIONS OF PEACE AFFORD AN OPPORTUNITY TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THIS PROBLEM AT LAST.

10. IN CLOSING, LET ME SAY THAT WE RECOGNIZE YOUR EXCELLENCY'S APPOINTMENT AS PRIME MINISTER LAST OCTOBER AS A REAFFIRMATION OF THE SPECIAL CONFIDENCE THAT KING HUSSEIN HAS LONG PLACED IN YOUR LEADERSHIP. WE CONTINUE TO WISH YOU SUCCESS AS JORDAN GRAPPLES WITH THE MANY DIFFICULT PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM THE JUNE WAR. WE WANT TO HELP WHEREVER AND TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE. I HOPE THAT YOUR EXCELLENCY WILL CONTINUE THE FRANK AND FRIENDLY DIALOGUE THAT YOU HAVE ALREADY ESTABLISHED WITH AMBASSADOR SYMMES IN WHOM I REPOSE COMPLETE CONFIDENCE. SINCERELY, DEAN RUSK. END QUOTE.

11. WE ASSUME THAT THE GOJ WILL TREAT THIS LETTER AS CLASSIFIED AND WILL NOT RELEASE ANY PART OF IT WITHOUT OUR CONSENT.  
GP-3. RUSK

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TELEGRAM

127 43

~~SECRET~~ 433

PAGE 01 STATE 106739

83  
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO MM 01/03: R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:RBHOUGHTON  
APPROVED BY: NEA- MR DAVIES  
IO- MR DAY  
NEA/PAF- MR COHN  
IAI- MR ATHERTON  
S-S MR MEEHAN

P R 300152Z JAN 68  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0683  
AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI 0623  
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0738  
USMISSION USUN NY 1974

~~SECRET~~ STATE 106739

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 3153

RE PARA 6 REFTEL, DEPARTMENT CONCURS WE SHOULD TAKE NO FURTHER ACTION WITH JORDANIANS CONCERNING UK RESOLUTION AT THIS TIME AND THAT RAWALPINDI SHOULD NOT RAISE MATTER WITH HUSSEIN. GP3. RUSK

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By 16/LL NARA, Date 8/19/01

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

128 CF

~~SECRET~~ 825

PAGE 01 STATE 105990

2  
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO MM 01, /031 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: MWWILEY  
APPROVED BY: NEA: WJHANDLEY  
NEA/ARN: RBHOUGHTON  
S/S: JWDAVIS

2

R 270432Z JAN 68  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0658  
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0824  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0493

~~SECRET~~ STATE 105990

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 3080

DEPARTMENT AGREES IT PREFERABLE NOT RAISE AT THIS TIME WITH GOJ  
SUBJECT OF SKY HAWKS FOR ISRAEL. THIS TOPIC HAS NOT ARISEN  
IN DISCUSSIONS WITH KHAMMASH OR SHARAFT. IT MAY COME UP IN  
LATER STAGES OF CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS AND WE WILL INFORM YOU  
IF IT DOES.

GP-3 RUSK

PAGE 2 RUEHC 105990 ~~SECRET~~

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By 18/122 NARA, Date 8/14/01

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NLJ-S 98031

By 15/11 NARA, Date 8/14/01

129 3

SECRET 546

PAGE 01 STATE 105874

85  
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO MM 01, /031 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: RBHOUGHTON  
APPROVED BY: M: EUGENE V. ROSTOW  
NEA/PAF: MR. COHN  
NEA/MR DAVIES  
IO/MR. SISCO  
NEA/IAI: MR. ATHERTON  
S/S: MRS. DAVIS

P 270146Z JAN 68  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0654  
INFO AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI PRIORITY 0610

~~SECRET~~ STATE 105874

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN'S 3129

1. RE PARA TWO OF REFTEL, WE HAVE URGED ISRAELIS AT VARIOUS LEVELS TO INDICATE THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF UK RESOLUTION AS A BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT. FROM OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS IT IS CLEAR THAT THEY PURPORT NOT TO UNDERSTAND THAT JORDAN ACCEPTS THE UK RESOLUTION AS AN INTEGRAL WHOLE, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF WHICH HAS TO BE NEGOTIATED ONCE ALL PARTIES HAVE ACCEPTED IT. FOR EXAMPLE, ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IT IS A PART, AND NOT A PRECONDITION, OF A FINAL

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 105874

PAGE 2 RUEHC 105874 ~~SECRET~~

SETTLEMENT WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF UK RESOLUTION WHICH INTER ALIA "CALLS FOR WITHDRAWAL TO SECURE AND RECOGNIZE BORDERS." SEE DEPTTEL 102083. IN ORDER THAT OUR CONTINUED DIALOGUE WITH THE ISRAELIS HAVE MAXIMUM EFFECT IT IS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT THE JORDANIANS MAKE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TO JARRING THAT THEIR INTERPREATION OF THE UK RESOLUTION IS THAT IT IS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION INTOTO, AND ALL ELEMENTS ARE SUBJECT OF APPROPRIATE DISCUSSION AND AGREEMENT.

2. YOU SHOULD RAISE THIS ISSUE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH THE GOJ. IF YOU BELIEVE THAT THE MATTER SHOULD BE RAISED WITH HUSSEIN PLEASE SO INFORM EMBASSY RAWALPINDI.

3. FOR RAWALPINDI: YOU SHOULD TAKE NO ACTION PENDING WORD FROM AMMAN. GP-3. RUSK

**EXPOSE**

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TELEGRAM

130/48

~~SECRET~~ 851

PAGE 01 STATE 104256

81  
ORIGIN SS 25

INFO MM 012/026 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:RBHOUGHTON  
APPROVED BY: NEA/RODGER P DAVIES  
NEA/P:MR. WHEELOCK (SUBSTANCE)  
S/S-MR. KELLY

R 250130Z JAN 68  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0633

~~SECRET~~ STATE 104256

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN'S 3039.

1. WE HAVE DISCUSSED QUESTION OF PUBLICITY WITH KHAMMASH. HE AGREES WITH US THAT WE SHOULD MAINTAIN SILENCE ABOUT HIS VISIT AND ALSO CONCERNING DECISION ON ARMS FOR THE TIME BEING. PUBLICITY AT THIS TIME COULD COMPLICATE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WE ARE UNDERTAKING WITH KHAMMASH AND HE REALIZES THIS.
2. WE HAVE NOT HAD ANY DIFFICULTY MAINTAINING THIS POSITION SO FAR. IF QUERIED, DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO SAY THAT HE HAS NOTHING FURTHER TO SAY ON MATTER OF JORDAN

PAGE 2 RUEHC 104256 ~~SECRET~~  
ARMS. GP-3. RUSK

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NLJ-S 08001

By: *g/ll* NARA, DMS 8/14/01

131 29

~~SECRET~~ 704

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PAGE 01 STATE 103023

45  
ORIGIN SS 25

INFO MM 01, /026 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/IAI:ALATHERTON/NEA/ARN:RBHOUGHTON  
APPROVED BY: M: EUGENE V. ROSTOW  
IO: MR. SISCO  
NEA: MR. BATTLE  
S/S: MR. WALSH

R 231827Z JAN 68  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0620  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0673  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1821

~~SECRET~~ STATE 103023

EXDIS

NOFORN

FYI AS WE INDICATED DEPTTEL 102083 (PARA 3A), WE FEEL KING'S IDEAS WORTH PUTTING FORWARD TO JARRING, THOUGH WE DOUBT ISRAELIS WILL ACCEPT PROPOSAL AS FORMULATED. LOOKING AHEAD, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ISRAELI REACTION MAY WELL BE TO INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS KING'S PROPOSAL, PROVIDED HE DESIGNATES REPRESENTATIVE TO TALK TO THEM DIRECTLY ABOUT IT. WE WOULD HOPE THAT JARRING COULD FIELD THIS PROBLEM IN FIRST INSTANCE AND, IF KING

PAGE 2 RUEHC 103023 ~~SECRET~~  
DECLINES DIRECT DISCUSSIONS AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED, THAT JARRING

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 103023

MIGHT MAKE EFFORT TO GET SUBSTANTIVE REPLY FROM ISRAELIS TO CONVEY TO KING. IF JARRING UNSUCCESSFUL IN THIS EFFORT AND PROGRESS BEING STYMIED BY ISRAELIS' INSISTENCE ON DIRECT DISCUSSIONS AT THIS EARLY STAGE, OUR INTENTION WOULD BE TO WEIGH IN WITH ISRAELIS, REMINDING THEM THAT WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY MADE CLEAR NEED TO BE FLEXIBLE REGARDING MODALITIES OF NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS STRICTLY FOR YOUR INFO ONLY. END FYI.

GP-3  
RUSK

EXD-6

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Department of State

132  
**TELEGRAM**  
45

~~SECRET~~ 857

PAGE 01 STATE 102083

81  
ORIGIN SS 25

INFO MM 01/026 R

DRAFTED BY IO JJSISCO  
APPROVED BY IO JOSEPH J SISCO  
NEA MR BATTLE(DRAFT)  
S/AH GOV HARRIMAN(DRAFT)  
S/S JPWALSH  
M MR ROSTOW(DRAFT)

R 200111Z JAN 68  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0595  
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0652  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1779

~~SECRET~~ STATE 102083

EXDIS

REFERENCE AMMAN'S 3041

1. DEPT HAS STUDIED CAREFULLY YOUR REPORT OF HUSSEIN QUOTE PERSONAL IDEAS UNQUOTE AS A WAY TO BREAK PRESENT STALEMATE THAT APPEARS TO HAVE DEVELOPED RE JARRING MISSION AS A RESULT BOTH SIDES EXPRESSING THEIR INITIAL POSITIONS IN NEAR MAXIMUM TERMS. IT IS, OF COURSE, VERY DIFFICULT FOR DEPT TO MAKE PRECISE JUDGEMENT OF HUSSEIN'S IDEAS BECAUSE OF THEIR VERY GENERAL CHARACTER. AS WE UNDERSTAND THEM, WE ARE ENCOURAGED THAT HE DOES NOT SEEM

PAGE 2 RUEHC 102083 ~~SECRET~~

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By is NARA, Date 5-28-03

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PAGE 02 STATE 102083

TO BE TALKING SPECIFICALLY IN TERMS OF WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES TO THE PRE-JUNE 5 POSITIONS AND THEREFORE BY IMPLICATION AT LEAST RECOGNIZES THE NEED FOR TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS. WE RECALL THAT DURING INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS AT USUN BOTH KING AND RIFAI ACCEPTED IDEA THAT TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT.

2. OUR OBJECTIVE IS OBVIOUSLY TO ENCOURAGE ALL THE PARTIES, INCLUDING HUSSEIN, TO BEGIN TO MOVE FROM THE GENERAL TO THE SPECIFIC AND TO PUT FORWARD IDEAS WHICH WILL STIMULATE A SERIOUS EXCHANGE OF VIEWS LOOKING TOWARD A CONCRETE SETTLEMENT. IN DOING SO, WE WILL WANT TO TAKE GREAT CARE NEITHER TO QUARTERBACK THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH JARRING TO DATE HAS BEEN HANDLING WITH GREAT CARE AND SKILL, NOR TO BE TAGGED WITH ONE OR ANOTHER PROPOSAL OR BLUEPRINT WHOSE FAILURE WILL BE BLAMED ON US. WE ARE ENCOURAGED THAT HUSSEIN FEELS STRONG ENOUGH AND FREE ENOUGH TO PUT FORWARD SOME IDEAS EVEN IN ADVANCE OF THE UAR, BUT WE WILL WANT TO AVOID TOO CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH SPECIFICS AT THIS STAGE PARTICULARLY IF AN INITIATIVE FAILS AND RADICAL ELEMENTS TRY TO USE SUCH FAILURE TO UNDERMINE KING.

PAGE 3 RUEHC 102083 ~~SECRET~~

3. IN LIGHT FOREGOING THEREFORE SUGGEST YOU MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. WE BELIEVE KING'S WILLINGNESS PUT FORWARD QUOTE PERSONAL IDEAS UNQUOTE TO JARRING IS CONSTRUCTIVE, AND PROPOSAL WOULD BE FIRST OF ITS SPECIFIC TYPE THAT WE KNOW OF DURING JARRING MISSION, ALTHOUGH YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT IN ITS PRESENT FORM WE DO NOT THINK IT IS MUCH OF A STARTER.

B. PROPOSAL CALLING FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM WEST BANK, IN RETURN FOR ASSURANCES THAT WEST BANK WILL BE A DEMILITARIZED ZONE WITH ONLY JORDANIAN CIVIL AND POLICE PERSONNEL PRESENT TO GOVERN IT COULD BE BEGINNING OF AT LEAST INDIRECT DIALOGUE AND GENERAL EXCHANGE OF CONSTRUCTIVE IDEAS. THIS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY CASE IF JORDANIANS WERE TO FORMULATE PROPOSAL IN SUCH A WAY TO MAKE CLEAR IT WAS WITHIN CONTEXT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF QUOTE A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 STATE 102083

EAST UNQUOTE STATED IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF NOV 22, 1967 SC RES AND REFLECTIVE OF JORDANIAN WILLINGNESS TO WORK OUT THIS PROPOSAL IN CONTEXT OF SUBPARA (II) OF PARA 1 OF NOV 22ND RES, WHICH

PAGE 4 RUEHC 102083 ~~SECRET~~  
READS:

QUOTE TERMINATION OF ALL CLAIMS OR STATES OF BELLIGERENCY AND RESPECT FOR AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF EVERY STATE IN THE AREA AND THEIR RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES FREE FROM THREATS OR ACTS OF FORCE; UNQUOTE.

C. FYI WE NOTE IN PAR 1 OF NJA-6818 THAT PROPOSAL IS DESCRIBED TO THE EFFECT: "FOR ASSURANCES THAT THE JORDANIANS WILL MAINTAIN THE ENTIRE REPEAT THE ENTIRE WEST BANK AS A DEMILITARIZED ZONE." IF THIS IS INTENDED TO PRECLUDE TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS THERE ARE OBVIOUS SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES AHEAD AND IT IS INCONSISTENT WITH INDICATIONS GIVEN BOTH BY KING AND RIFAI DURING UN SESSIONS OF A WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER SUCH ADJUSTMENTS. END FYI. WOULD HOPE YOU CAN GET ACROSS TO HUSSEIN THE ADVANTAGE OF PUTTING FORWARD HIS IDEAS IN MANNER SO AS NOT TO PRECLUDE MUTUAL TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS. YOU RECALL SC RES LEFT OPEN FROM WHERE TO WHERE ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS WOULD TAKE PLACE.

PAGE 5 RUEHC 102083 ~~SECRET~~

D. FYI. WE NOTE JORDANIANS HAVE ALREADY WORKED OUT A MORE MODEST PROPOSAL (PARA 4 NJA-6818), WHICH WE ASSUME THEY MAY WANT TO PUT FORWARD AT A LATER STAGE AND WHICH SEEMS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT TO NEED FOR SOME TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS. WE WILL VERY LIKELY WANT TO TALK OVER THESE IDEAS AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME BOTH WITH THE ISRAELIS AND JARRING DEPENDING UPON PRECISE NATURE OF THE PROPOSITIONS PUT FORWARD BY HUSSEIN TO JARRING. END FYI. YOU SHOULD AVOID GIVING ANY SPECIFIC INDICATION OF A WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT KING'S IDEAS WITH ISRAELIS AT THIS JUNCTURE. SUGGEST THEREFORE THAT YOU INDICATE TO KING THAT IN GENERAL

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 04 STATE 102083

WE FEEL IDEAS ARE WORTH PUTING FORWARD TO JARRING AND THAT WE ARE KEEPING VERY OPEN MIND REGARDING HOW BEST TO EXERCISE OUR POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC INFLUENCE AT LATER STA. WITHOUT SPECIFIC US ENDORSEMENT OF SUBSTANCE, HE CAN BE ASSURED THAT WE WILL ON A CONTINUING BASIS TAKE THE LINE WITH THE ISRAELIS THAT ALL IDEAS PUT FORWARD BY THE OTHER SIDE SHOULD BE EXPLORED CAREFULLY AND NOT REJECTED WITHOUT FULL CONSIDERATION. GP-3. RUSK

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

133

27

SECRET 356

PAGE 01 STATE 101372

41  
ORIGIN SS 25

INFO MM 01,7026 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA:IAI:ALATHERTON  
APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY  
NEA-MR. BATTLE, NEA-MR. DAVIES, AF-MR. ROOT (INFO), DOD-MR.  
SCHWARTZ (DRAFT), SOV-MR. TOON, S/S-MR. WALSH, WHITE HOUSE-MR.  
SAUNDERS

P 191722Z JAN 68  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0590  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0759  
CAIRO 1198  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0453  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0219  
AMEMBASSY ADEN 0246  
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0165  
AMEMBASSY RABAT 0502  
AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0841  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0247  
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0220  
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0648  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 2707  
AMEMBASSY PARIS 2460  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0940  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1774  
CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA

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By ag/ll NARA, Date 8/14/01

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 101372

EXDIS

REF: 101371

FYI: UNDER EXTENSION 1966 AGREEMENT REFERRED TO IN REFTL,  
OUR COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL IS FOR SALE OF 30 SUBSONIC A-4  
SKYHAWKS (INCLUDING SIX TRAINERS), IN ADDITION TO 48 BEING  
DELIVERED UNDER BASIC AGREEMENT. NO OTHER MILITARY SUPPLY COMMITMENT  
S  
MADE DURING ESHKOL VISIT. END FYI.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

134 Ze

CONFIDENTIAL 417

PAGE 01 STATE 101371

42  
ORIGIN SS 25

INFO MM 01, /026 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA:IAI:ALATHERTON  
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P R 191722Z JAN 68  
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 101371

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 101371

EXDIS

1. ACCORDING NYTIMES JANUARY 13, (A) PRESIDENT JOHNSON PROMISED PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL QTE MORE AMERICAN SKYHAWK A-4 FIGHTER-BOMBERS TO HELP ISRAEL MAINTAIN HER MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER THE ARAB STATES UNQTE, (B) DETAILS NOT YET WORKED OUT BUT ADDITIONAL PLANES WOULD PROBABLY NUMBER ABOUT TWENTY, (C) NO COMMITMENT MADE ON ISRAELI REQUEST FOR FIFTY F-4 PHANTOMS, QTE MOST ADVANCED OPERATIONAL PLANE IN AMERICAN ARSENAL UNQTE, FOR WHICH ISRAEL PRESSING AND (D) POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER AGREEMENTS NOT RULED OUT, DEPENDING ON SCALE OF SOVIET ARMS SHIPMENTS TO ARABS.

2. DRAWING UPON FOLLOWING POINTS, ACTION ADDRESSEES MAY IN THEIR DISCRETION APPROACH HOST GOVERNMENTS AT APPROPRIATELY HIGH LEVEL IN EFFORT PLACE IN PERSPECTIVE THIS AND OTHER RECENT PUBLICITY ABOUT US POSITION ON AIRCRAFT FOR ISRAEL GENERATED BY ESHKOL

PAGE 3 RUEHC 101371 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
VISIT AND WHERE APPLICABLE LAY GROUNDWORK FOR SERIOUS EFFORT ACHIEVE ARMS LIMITATION.

A. JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED FOLLOWING ESHKOL VISIT NOTES THAT WE ARE KEEPING ISRAEL'S MILITARY DEFENSE CAPABILIT UNDER REVIEW.

B. MEANWHILE, WE ARE CONTINUING DELIVERY OF SKYHAWKS UNDER OUR 1966 AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL AND, IN LIGHT OF DELIVERIES TO OTHER STATES IN AREA SINCE JUNE WAR, HAVE AGREED TO EXTENSION OF 1966 AGREEMENT IN ORDER TO PROVIDE ISRAEL LIMITED NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL PLANES OF SAME TYPE. WE HAVE THEREFORE GIVEN RESTRAINED, PARTIAL AND MEASURED RESPONSE TO ISRAELI REQUEST FOR AIRCRAFT TO REPLACE WARTIME LOSSES AND COUNTER BUILDUP ELSEWHERE IN AREA.

C. IT IS OUR EARNEST HOPE THAT, BY NOT INTRODUCING NEW-TYPE (PHANTOM) AIRCRAFT INTO AREA AT THIS TIME, WE HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO DAMPENING OF ARMS RACE AND TO PROSPECTS FOR JUST AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. WHETHER ARMS SUPPLY SITUATION REMAINS STABILIZED WILL DEPEND ABOVE ALL ON WHETHER OUR RESTRAINT IS MATCHED BY

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PAGE 03 STATE 101371

CORRESPONDING RESTRAINT ON PART OF SOVIETS AND THOSE COUNTRIES

PAGE 4 RUEHC 101371 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
WHICH RECEIVE ARMS FROM THEM. WE HOPE SOVIETS CAN BE BROUGHT TO UNDERSTAND FULL WEIGHT AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS FACT. WHETHER SITUATION REMAINS STABILIZED WILL ALSO DEPEND ON WHETHER THERE IS MOVEMENT TOWARD PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AS ENVISAGED IN NOVEMBER 22 SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND JARRING MISSION, OR RETROGRESSION TOWARD VIEW THAT COUNTRIES OF AREA MUST PREPARE FOR ANOTHER MILITARY ROUND.

D. IN TALKS WITH ESHKOL, WHILE PUTTING ASIDE FOR TIME BEING QUESTION OF SIGNIFICANT NEW ARMS SUPPLY TO ISRAEL, WE EMPHASIZED NEED TO EXPLORE, FLEXIBLY AND IMAGINATIVELY, ALL PATHS TO PEACE. JOINT STATEMENT AT CONCLUSION VISIT EXPRESSED ISRAELI AS WELL AS USG SUPPORT FOR NOV 22 SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND JARRING MISSION. WE SHALL CONTINUE USE OUR INFLUENCE WITH ISRAEL TO GIVE TOP PRIORITY TO SEARCH FOR PEACE. WE COUNT ON ARAB GOVERNMENTS SIMILARLY TO MAKE CONSTRUCTIVE USE OF PRESENT OPPORTUNITY TO HELP JARRING MISSION DEVELOP MOMENTUM TOWARD PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

GP-3. RUSK

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EXDIS

1. JORDANIAN AMB SHARAF CALLED ON IO ASST SECTY SISCO JAN 15 FOR DISCUSSION QUOTE PROBLEMS OF MUTUAL INTEREST UNQUOTE. FOL TOPICS DISCUSSED.
2. JARRING MISSION. SHARAF SAID GOJ HAS REPORTED TO HIM ITS CONCERN OVER SLOW PACE MISSION ON MATTERS SUBSTANCE. ISRAELIS HAVE SIMPLY REPEATED PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON THEIR POSITION

PAGE 2 RUEHC 99814 ~~SECRET~~  
AND HAVE NOT ACKNOWLEDGED PRINCIPLE OF WITHHOLDING

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# TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 99814

COULD ENSUE IF ISRAELI POSITION REMAINS UNCHANGED AND THIS COULD CREATE DIFFICULTIES NOT ONLY FOR ARAB SIDE BUT FOR ISRAELI AND US INTERESTS. TERRORISM COULD ESCALATE. GOJ APPRECIATIVE MOVEMENT ON RELEASE SHIPS FROM SUEZ AND EXCHANGE POW'S BUT BELIEVES THEY USEFUL PRIMARILY FOR PUBLICITY PURPOSES. GESTURES DO NOT AID REAL MOVEMENT TOWARD IMPLEMENTATION SC RESOLUTION WHICH CLEARLY CALLS FOR WITHDRAWAL AS ONE OF PRINCIPLES.

2. SISCO SAID THAT WHILE WE SHARED GOJ VIEW THAT JARRING MISSION IS MOVING SLOWLY, REALISTICALLY, GOJ SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT MISSION DEMONSTRATES THAT IT IMPOSSIBLE TO ATTAIN INSTANT PEACE. MORE TIME IS NEEDED TO WORK THINGS OUT AND WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT TOO RAPID PROGRESS. HOWEVER, OUR ASSESSMENT AS TO IMPORTANCE RELEASE OF SHIPS AND POW EXCHANGE DIFFERENT FROM GOJ'S. WE FIND SUCH GESTURES IMPORTANT STIMULI FOR FURTHER PROGRESS ON SETTLEMENT AND AS INDICATION SOME FLEXIBILITY ON PART TWO SIDES. WE CONSTRUE THESE DEVELOPMENTS AS INDICATORS CLIMATE IN AREA NOT TOO BAD. AS TO JARRING TALKS, THESE WERE ONLY EXPLORATORY, AND IT NOT TOO SURPRISING THAT ALL SIDES

PAGE 3 RUEHC 99814 ~~SECRET~~

EXPRESSED THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS IN RELATIVELY MAXIMAL TERMS.

3. ARAB SUMMIT. SISCO ASKED IF POSTPONEMENT ARAB SUMMIT WOULD HAVE EFFECT ON PRINCIPLE REACHED KHARTOUM MEETING, NAMELY, THAT JORDAN AND UAR FREE TO PURSUE POLITICAL SOLUTION ON THEIR OWN. HAD SUMMIT POSTPONEMENT REDUCED JORDAN'S FLEXIBILITY? SHARAF REPLIED NEW SUMMIT COULD HAVE PROVIDED CLEARER MANDATE FOR ARAB STATES CONCERNED TO FOLLOW. HE PERSONALLY BELIEVED HOWEVER, THAT EVEN IF JORDAN OR UAR FELT IT COULD MOVE ON SETTLEMENT, NEITHER WOULD DO SO ALONE. BOTH COULD DO IT BUT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE HAVE GENERAL ARAB ACQUIESCENCE ON ANY CONTEMPLATED MAJOR MOVES. THUS, WHILE KHARTOUM FLEXIBILITY STILL VALID, IT DOUBTFUL ANY COUNTRY WOULD CHOOSE BE TOO FLEXIBLE ON OWN HOOK.

4. INTERNATIONAL POSITION. SHARAF SAID THAT IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN EQUATION WAS STAGNATION OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. IT HAD NOT EXERTED SUFFICIENT INFLUENCE TO GET SUBSTANTIVE MOVEMENT ON PROBLEM. AMERICAN POLICY, FOR EXAMPLE, COULD HAVE PUSHED

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P GE 03 STATE 99814

ISRAEL TO MOVE FASTER ON IMPLEMENTATION SC RESOLUTION. INSTEAD, AMERICAN ANNOUNCEMENT OF RENEWED ARMS AND PLANES SHIPMENT TO

PAGE 4 RUEHC 99814 ~~SECRET~~

ISRAEL NOT HELPFUL. TALK OF POSSIBLE RELEASE OF PHANTOMS AND GENERAL BUILD-UP IN PRESS OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY NEEDS AT TIME OF ESHKOL VISIT SERVED TO DIVERT ATTENTION AMERICAN PUBLIC FROM REAL PROBLEM, NAMELY, IMPLEMENTATION OF SC RESOLUTION AND, IN PARTICULAR, THE WITHDRAWAL PORTION THAT RESOLUTION. ARABS NOT CLEAR WHETHER US IMPRESSED IMPORTANCE OF WITHDRAWAL ON PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL AND SUSPECT EMPHASIS MUST HAVE BEEN ON ISRAEL'S SECURITY NEEDS. ALTHOUGH HE, PERSONALLY, BELIEVED JOINT COMMUNIQUE MEANT EXACTLY WHAT IT SAID ON ARMS, OTHER HAVE ALREADY POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT PRESS REPORTED SOME 28 SKYHAWKS, IN ADDITION TO 48 PREVIOUSLY RELEASED, WOULD ALSO BE SENT TO ISRAEL. THIS KIND OF INFORMATION CAN ONLY COMPLICATE POSITION ARAB MODERATES.

5. SISCO REPLIED GOJ COULD BE REASSURED THAT US POSITION IN SUPPORT OF DURABLE AND STABLE PEACE IN ME, AS REFLECTED IN PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT OF JUNE 19 AND THOSE OF AMB GOLDBERG AT UN, HAD NOT CHANGED. WE PLACED CONSIDERABLE EMPHASIS ON THIS POINT IN OUR TALKS WITH ISRAELIS. WE ALSO PLACED EMPHASIS, AS JOINT COMMUNIQUE STATED, ON IMPORTANCE JARRING MISSION AND

PAGE 5 RUEHC 99814 ~~SECRET~~

SC RESOLUTION. COMMUNIQUE VERY POSITIVE ON QUESTION OF NEED TO ACHIEVE AND WORK FOR PEACE IN ME. IN FACT, WE FIND THAT COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE IN SUPPORT OF SC RESOLUTION STRONGEST YET MADE BY AN ISRAELI AUTHORITY. AS FOR ARMS POLICY, SISCO HAD NOTHING TO ADD TO COMMUNIQUE; WE WOULD KEEP MATTER UNDER REVIEW IN LIGHT ALL RELEVANT FACTORS. SISCO NOT IN POSITION TO COMMENT OR CONFIRM SPECULATIVE ARTICLES RE ARMS TO ISRAEL. US CONTINUES BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT BEST ARMS POLICY FOR ME WOULD BE ONE OF LIMITATION. IN THIS CONNECTION, THERE STILL NO SIGNS SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO MOVE AHEAD ON THIS MATTER. REGARDLESS OF FACT SOVIET RESOLUTION SUBMITTED TO SC FOR FIRST TIME INCLUDED APPROPRIATE

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P GE 04 STATE 99814

REFERENCE TO ARMS LIMITATION. AS TO JORDAN'S MILITARY NEEDS, AMB AWARE ARRANGEMENTS IN TRAIN FOR DETAILED DISCUSSIONS IN WASH LATER THIS WEEK.

6. SHARAF SAID HE WAS REASSURED BY SISCO'S EXPLANATION US POSITION RE RESOLUTION. JOINT COMMUNIQUE AT END ESHKOL VISIT, HOWEVER, MENTIONED QTE SPIRIT UNQTE OF THE RESOLUTION AND NOT RESOLUTION ITSELF. THIS CAUSED SOME CONCERN IN ARAB WORLD AS PARTIAL US RETREAT FROM RESOLUTION. SISCO SAID GOJ SHOULD NOT

PAGE 6 RUEHC 99814 ~~SECRET~~

ATTACH UNDUE IMPORTANCE TO WORD QTE SPIRIT UNQTE. US POSITION ON SC RES AMPLY CLEAR. AS FOR WITHDRAWAL, US POSITION REMAINS AS STATED IN UK RES IN PRESIDENT'S FIVE PRINCIPLES, AND IN GOLDBERG STATEMENTS IN SC. GP-3 RUSK

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FROM : Department of State

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
COPY NO. \_\_\_\_\_ SERIES

LAB TAR TR XMB

SUBJECT : Status of Talks With Ambassador Jarring

AIR ARMY NAVY OSD

REF : STATE 80712

USIA NSA CIA

SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION

For background of addressee posts there is enclosed a paper on the status of talks with Ambassador Jarring which was prepared in connection with the visit of Prime Minister Eshkol. The paper has been updated to reflect Ambassador Jarring's visits to Jerusalem and Amman, January 7 - 10. If the subject is raised in private discussions, you should (a) stress that the Jarring mission is still at an early stage, and (b) draw on para 5 STATE 80712 as appropriate.

RUSK

Enclosures:

- Summary of Status of Jarring Mission
- FOR LONDON, PARIS, MOSCOW ONLY: State 80712

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GROUP 3

In  Out

Drafted by: NEA/IAI: HPrecht:cr

Drafting Date: 1/12/68

Phone No.: 4523

Contents and Classification Approved by: NEA/IAI: Mr. Atherton

Clearances: UNP: Miss Brown (subs) NEA/ARN: Mr. Houghton (draft) NEA/UAR: Mr. Parker (subs) S/S: Mr. AFN: Mr. Root (subs) NEA/ARP: Mr. Dinsmore EUR - Mr. Houghton Q/Donohue

VISIT OF LEVI ESHKOL  
PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL  
January 7-8, 1968

Status of Talks with Ambassador Jarring

The Foreign Ministries in Israel and the three Arab states visited by Ambassador Jarring have described their discussions with him to our Embassies as follows:

Jarring's Work - Jarring's first talks have been exploratory and clearly preliminary to substantive negotiations. He has explained to the parties that he will not suggest solutions and appears not to consider himself a mediator like Bunche or Bernadotte. He has transmitted both sides' views on his mission, without attempting to modify them. Aside from a few probes re definition of terms, ("secure and recognized boundaries," and a "just" refugee solution), he has sought mainly to lay ground work by obtaining agendas for future GOI-UAR and GOI-GOJ discussions. Jarring has also encouraged good faith gestures on prisoner exchanges, the return of "new refugees," and the release of ships blocked in the Canal. By the Israelis, Jarring is described as discouraged and pessimistic. Cairo said he was pleased by Nasser's frankness.

Lebanese Position - Foreign Minister Hakim has gone further than other Arab leaders -- and drawn their displeasure -- in expressing substantive views on boundaries, the Canal and Jerusalem. Lebanese leaders are gloomy and reported to believe that Jarring can succeed only if U.S. pressure is exerted on Israel.

Jordanian Position - Foreign Minister Rifai stressed to Jarring the GOJ's willingness to give him complete cooperation in the search for a settlement within the framework of the UN Resolution. The Jordanians refused to accept a copy of the GOI "agenda for peace" (see below), characterizing it as an unacceptable departure from the framework of the UN Resolution. The only stated precondition for talks set by Jordan is that the Israelis declare their unqualified acceptance of the Resolution and their agreement to implement it in its entirety. Subsequently, Rifai told our Ambassador progress in negotiations depends on Israel's acceptance of the principle of negotiating through Jarring and a clear commitment as to its intentions re withdrawal. We understand the GOJ position (possibly not divulged to Jarring) includes: Agreement to permanent and secure boundaries following withdrawal; reciprocal border rectifications and demilitarization arrangements; direct negotiations only following an Israeli withdrawal; GOI withdrawal from Arab Jerusalem as part of withdrawal required by the Resolution; a reserved position on Jerusalem internationalization, (though beyond Jarring's mandate, it could be considered if also applicable to the Israeli sector). Jarring told the GOI that the Jordanians were "ready for peace." In our opinion, the Jordanians might agree to participate in some form of negotiations with Israel under two conditions: (1) if they obtain the sanction of the Arab Summit or at least Nasser, and (2) if they are convinced that negotiations would bring a satisfactory settlement justifying the political risk involved in negotiating with the Israelis.

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UAR Position - In general outline, Foreign Minister Riad's presentation to Jarring has resembled the Jordanian position. The Israelis have described the UAR as insisting on withdrawal as a precondition to talks. Reports from Cairo are that Riad interprets the Resolution to require Israeli withdrawal to June 4 lines as a "preliminary step" to "the attainment of a settlement." It is unclear whether this would require withdrawal before talks or only before the consummation of a settlement. The Egyptians presumably are keeping their options open on this. They may be willing to participate in indirect substantive discussions before withdrawal, providing they are certain that withdrawal is guaranteed. The Egyptians may hope to reserve as a face-saving condition for a settlement that withdrawal must precede in time rather than accompany the implementation of any Arab concessions-- e.g., on the Canal.

Riad said Egypt would not pay the high political price for direct negotiations which held no apparent benefit for them in the absence of prior GOI acceptance of the UN Resolution and withdrawal. Because of its superior ability to withhold peace, we believe the UAR will be much tougher than the GOJ on coming to the bargaining table with Israel.

Riad has not said much of detailed substance to Jarring. In the UAR view, the Resolution required the Arabs to accept the existence of Israel in the area and required Israel to withdraw and agree to a refugee solution. Riad says the UAR thinks Israel should now come forward with plans for meeting its two obligations.

In response to Jarring's inquiry, the UAR refused to release convicted Israeli spies in exchange for POW's held by Israel, although they said they have released 219 Jews from custody. The Egyptians have agreed in principle to the removal of ships trapped in the Canal on the assumption there will be no GOI participation and that they will deal directly with General Bull of UNTSO. They maintain officially that they do not need Israeli consent to the operation, but the fact they are going through Bull indicates that they know such consent is necessary.

Israeli Position - Foreign Minister Eban has told Jarring that the GOI seeks an "integral peace settlement" which would include formal and juridical elements. Eban said that a settlement cannot be achieved without a meeting of the parties, although in the initial stages the GOI would agree to Jarring's acting as chairman of a discussion between the parties as Bunche did in 1949. Eban gave Jarring a proposed "agenda for peace," as a basis for Israeli-UAR talks, listing as topics to be discussed, political and juridical, territorial and security, navigation and economic issues, (but not refugees), and suggested that the two parties, in secret if necessary, discuss together and agree on an agenda for more formal exchanges. It is, of course, possible that indirect talks in the preliminary stage could be extended to substantive issues while the GOI continues to maintain a public position on direct negotiations. However, Eban has not repeated to Jarring nor have recent GOI public or private statements shown, the apparent degree of flexibility on direct negotiations Eban indicated here last fall. At most, there remain ambiguities about what the GOI means by "direct negotiations."

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In view of the preliminary stage of the talks and GOI insistence on the principle of direct negotiations, little of substance has been discussed with Jarring in Jerusalem. In reply to Jarring's question about the possibility of a Canal opening simultaneously with arrangements for borders and withdrawal, Eban said that with the UAR, peace, recognition, and navigation were interconnected. He said it might be possible to deal with the Canal separately if free navigation was assured. He declined to be drawn into a discussion of possible borders, noting only that the GOI certainly did not consider final borders as identical to the cease-fire lines and that the determination of boundaries could not be made by "remote control," (by which he presumably meant indirect negotiations).

Israel has agreed to the unconditional return of 500 UAR POW's. Its position on the release of ships blocking the Canal is somewhat ambivalent. While Eban has assured Ambassador Barbour that Israel would raise no political objections, it seems that the GOI will insist on at least an indirect request from the Egyptians for permission to remove the ships or on approving the specific physical arrangements made for their removal.

At Jarring's suggestion, Eban agreed to propose an agenda for talks with Amman which Jarring visited for the second time January 7-10. Like the paper drawn up for discussions with the UAR, the Israeli "agenda for peace" with Jordan was intended as the basis for discussions between the parties to define "the problems they seek to solve." Israel proposed the following items for the agenda: (1) replacement of the ceasefire by a peace treaty, (2) establishment of agreed boundary and security arrangements, (3) a solution for the refugee problem, (4) economic cooperation, (5) access to sites of special religious significance. The Israelis promised to make constructive proposals under each item.

In summary, the parties have limited themselves to statements of their maximum positions on conditions for the Jarring mission and have declined to advance substantive suggestions for a settlement. If Jarring persists in his refusal to put forward ideas, the prospect for the opening of meaningful negotiations is exceedingly dim.

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NEA/ARN: Mr. Houghton (draft) ~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

NEA/UAR: Mr. Parker (draft)



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PAGE 01 STATE 98452

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TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0552

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LIMDIS

1. NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE BY HEDRICK SMITH JANUARY 12 REPORTS US HAS PRIVATELY INFORMED JORDAN THAT WASHINGTON WOULD RELAX ITS BAN ON ARMS SALES TO HER AND WAS READY TO ENTER INTO DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS ON JORDAN'S ARMS REQUESTS. ARTICLE STATES NO TIMETABLE ON ARMS DELIVERIES. MAIN SUBJECT OF ARTICLE IS REPORT USG DECIDED SELL ADDITIONAL A-4'S TO ISRAEL. (SEE SEPTEL)

2. IN CIRCUMSTANCES WE WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO MAKE STATEMENT ON JORDAN ARMS IN THE RELATIVELY NEAR FUTURE AND PROPOSE DOING SO ALONG FOLLOWING LINES: QUOTE ON OCTOBER 24, USG

PAGE 2 RUEHC 98452 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ANNOUNCED RELEASE OF SELECTIVE LIMITED AMOUNTS OF MILITARY SUPPLIES TO VARIOUS ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL. JORDAN WAS AT THAT TIME EXCEPTED FROM THE LIMITED RELAXATION OF OUR ARMS

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PAGE 02 STATE 98452

POLICY. AT THE BEGINNING OF JANUARY THE USG DECIDED TO INCLUDE JORDAN AMONG THOSE COUNTRIES EXCEPTED FROM THE ARMS FREEZE. WE ARE PRESENTLY STUDYING ARMS REQUESTS FROM JORDAN. UNQUOTE

- 3. WE WOULD INFORM CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP PRIOR TO USE.
- 4. EMBASSY COMMENTS REQUESTED URGENTLY.

GP-3 KATZENBACH

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138  
TELEGRAM

50

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PAGE 01 STATE 90180

85  
ORIGIN SS 25

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CAIRO 1044  
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EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 2779

1. WE AGREE THAT THE LESS SPECULATION IN ARAB CAPITALS ON JARRING MISSION THE BETTER (REFTEL). HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF SYG'S PROGRESS REPORT ON JARRING MISSION, CIRCULATED DECEMBER 26, (USUN 3237), WE WOULD HESITATE AT THIS POINT REQUEST SYG TO TAKE FURTHER INITIATIVE ON SUBJECT. WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT JARRING'S

PAGE 2 RUEHC 90180 ~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 02 STATE 90180

REPORT THAT QTE EACH OF THE GOVERNMENTS VISITED AGREED THAT THE  
DETAILS OF THE CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM SHOULD BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL  
UNQTE WILL HAVE SALUTARY EFFECT.

2° BELIEVE CAIRO'S 1220 ALSO AUGURS WELL FOR FUTURE MATURE,  
REASONED JARRING-NASSER TALKS.

RUSK

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139

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PAGE 01 STATE 89800

44  
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SS: MR. MEEHAN

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TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0440

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EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 2770

WE ARE NOT INCLINED MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT ALONG LINES SUGGESTED REFTEL. HOWEVER, YOU MAY ASSURE RIFA'I THAT REPORT ON YOUR CONVERSATION WITH HIM HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED TO WASHINGTON WHERE THERE IS UNDERSTANDING OF BASIS HIS CONCERN. YOU MAY ADD THAT USG WILL CONTINUE TO EXERCISE MAXIMUM RESTRAINT IN CONSIDERING ARMS SUPPLIES TO AREA.

GP-3. RUSK

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NLJ-S 98001  
By AS/CR NARA, Date 8/14/01

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Department of State

140  
TELEGRAM  
27

~~SECRET~~ 88 2

PAGE 01 STATE 89267

45  
ORIGIN SS 25

INFO MM 01/026 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA:RPDAVIES  
APPROVED BY: NEA:WILLIAM J. HANDLEY  
S/S-O: DO'DONOHUE

R 241905Z DEC 67  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0431

~~SECRET~~ STATE 89267

EXDIS

AMBASSADOR FROM DAVIES

EMBTTEL 2768

WE ARE HOPEFUL FOR EARLY DECISION ON OUR RECOMMENDATIONS ON  
JORDAN ARMS. IN INTERIM, WE WILL BEAR YOUR RECOMMENDATION  
IN MIND.

MERRY CHRISTMAS.

GP-1. RUSK

PAGE 2 RUEHC 89267 ~~SECRET~~

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141  
**TELEGRAM**

47

~~SECRET~~ 719

PAGE 01 STATE 89232

83  
ORIGIN SS 25

INFO MM 01/026 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA:RPDAVIES  
APPROVED BY: NEA:RPDAVIES  
S/S-DO'DONOHUE

R 232121Z DEC 67  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0429

~~SECRET~~ STATE 89232

EXDIS

1. BELIEVE EXDIS DESIGNATION WILL PROVIDE SUFFICIENT PROTECTION  
INFORMATION CONCERNING THE JARRING MISSION.

2. WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF JARRING'S PLANS.

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By 18/122 NARA, Date 9/14/01

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TELEGRAM

142 43

~~SECRET~~ 874

2

PAGE 01 STATE 87083

80  
ORIGIN SS 25

INFO MM 01, /026 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:RBHOUGHTON  
APPROVED BY: U - NICHOLAS DE B KATZENBACH  
NEA - LUCIUS D. BATTLE  
NEA - RODGER P. DAVIES  
NEA/RA - SIDNEY SOBER (IN SUBSTANCE)  
S/S - MR. KELLY  
H - MISS FOLGER

P 200141Z DEC 67  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0394  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 1876  
CINCSRIKE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 87083

EXDIS

"CORRECTED COPY FOR MRN ONLY:

THE MESSAGE SENT YOU AS STATE 87082, SUBJECT: ARMS FOR JORDAN;  
THE MRN SHOULD BE CORRECTED TO READ STATE 87083." RUSK

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43

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PAGE 01 STATE 87083

80  
ORIGIN SS 25

INFO MM 01, /026 R

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NEA - RODGER P. DAVIES  
NEA/RA - SIDNEY SOBER (IN SUBSTANCE)  
S/S - MR. KELLY  
H - MISS FOLGER

P R 200141Z DEC 67  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0394  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 1876  
CINCSTRIKE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 87083

EXDIS

SUBJECT: ARMS FOR JORDAN

AMMAN 2635

FYI DEPARTMENT FULLY APPRECIATES URGENCY EARLY DECISION ON JORDAN ARMS AS EMPHASIZED PARA 4 REFTEL AND WE ARE ACTIVELY WORKING TOWARDS THAT END. INFORMAL CONGRESSIONAL SOUNDINGS HAVE BEEN MADE WITHOUT APPARENT ADVERSE REACTIONS. PRESIDENTIAL TRIP TO AUSTRALIA FOR HOLT FUNERAL MAY DELAY DECISION. END FYI.  
GP-3. RUSK

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1426  
**TELEGRAM**  
43

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PAGE 01 STATE 87083

80  
ORIGIN SS 25

INFO MM 01,1026 R

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APPROVED BY: U - NICHOLAS DE B KATZENBACH  
NEA - LUCIUS D. BATTLE  
NEA - RODGER P. DAVIES  
NEA/RA - SIDNEY SOBER (IN SUBSTANCE)  
S/S - MR. KELLY  
H - MISS FOLGER

P 200141Z DEC 67  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0394  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 1876  
CINCSTRIKE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 87083

EXDIS

"CORRECTED COPY FOR MRN ONLY:

THE MESSAGE SENT YOU AS STATE 87082, SUBJECT: ARMS FOR JORDAN;  
THE MRN SHOULD BE CORRECTED TO READ STATE 87083." RUSK

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By 15/10 NARA, Date 3/4/01

143  
6

SECRET 711

PAGE 01 STATE 79171

2

ORIGIN SS 25

INFO MM 01, /026 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:RBHOUGHTON  
APPROVED BY: THE UNDER SECRETARY  
U: AHARTMAN (REDRAFTED)  
ODD/ISA: MR SCHWARTZ (SUBS)  
S/S: MR HOUDEK  
NEA/ MR BATTLE  
NEA/RA: MR SOBER

P 050023Z DEC 67  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0307

~~SECRET~~ STATE 79171

EXDIS

AMMAN'S 2396 AND 2465

1. FYI: QUESTION US PROVISION OF ARMS TO JORDAN NOW UNDER ACTIVE DISCUSSION AT HIGH LEVEL FOLLOWING WHICH THERE WILL BE CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS. WE ARE QUITE AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE TO JORDAN OF AN AFFIRMATIVE DECISION BEFORE CHRISTMAS. ALTHOUGH WE WILL TRY, IT IS PROBLEMATICAL WHETHER CONSULTATIONS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL RECESS FOR CHRISTMAS. SUBJECT HAS ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED AT SIG MEETING. END FYI.
2. IN MEANTIME, HOPE YOU CAN PERSUADE KING AND KHAMMASH BE

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PAGE 02 STATE 79171

PAGE 2 RUEHC 79171 ~~SECRET~~  
PATIENT. YOU MIGHT INFORM THEM (WITHOUT MENTIONING SIG) HIGH  
LEVELS US GOVERNMENT URGENTLY REVIEWING ISSUE AND THAT YOU  
HOPE FOR DECISION SHORTLY AFTER CONGRESSIONAL ACTION COMPLETED  
AID APPROPRIATION. YOU MIGHT ADD THAT YOU ARE CONFIDENT USG  
FULLY APPRECIATES URGENCY JORDAN'S REQUIREMENTS AND THAT YOU  
PERSONALLY ARE THEREFORE HOPEFUL FINAL RESULT. GP-3. RUSK

EXDISE

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144  
43

SECRET 252

2

PAGE 01 STATE 69888

85  
ORIGIN SS 25

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, /025 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:RBHOUGHTON  
APPROVED BY: NEA:LDBATTLE  
NEA/IAI:MR. ATHERTON  
S/S:JPW

.....  
O R 160052Z NOV 67 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0197  
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0222  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0067  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 0875  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0637

~~SECRET~~ STATE 69888

EXDIS

INFORM ACTION OFFICER OPENING OF BUSINESS NOVEMBER 16.

REF: AMMAN 2236 AND TEL AVIV 1511

YOU MAY INFORM TOUGAN WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE ISRAELI BUILD-UP  
ALONG LINES DESCRIBED REFTEL BUT ARE CONTINUING TO FOLLOW  
MATTER CLOSELY.

PAGE 2 RUEHC 69888 ~~SECRET~~

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145  
**TELEGRAM**

47

~~SECRET~~ 407

PAGE 01 STATE 65525

2

82  
ORIGIN SS 25

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /025 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA:ARN:RBHOUGHTON; NEA:IAI:ALATHERTON, JR  
APPROVED BY: S/S:JPWALSH

.....

O R 07004Z NOV 67 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0144  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0163  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 0627  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0436  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0053

~~SECRET~~ STATE 65525

EXDIS

DELIVER TO ACTION OFFICERS OPENING OF BUSINESS NOVEMBER 7

REF: TEL AVIV 1411 AND AMMAN 2155

SUBJ: ISRAEL-JORDAN TENSION

1. FOR AMMAN: YOU MAY INFORM TALHOUNI THAT WE HAVE ONLY

PAGE 2 RUEHC 65525 ~~SECRET~~

RECENTLY PRESSED RESTRAINT ON ISRAELIS IN LIGHT CURRENT  
TERRORISTIC INCIDENTS. RECENT INCREASE IN TERRORISTIC  
ACTIVITIES OBVIOUSLY PRESENTS PROBLEMS TO ISRAELI GOVERNMENT.  
WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE HOWEVER THAT ISRAELIS PLANNING ATTACK

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By lis, NARA, Date 6-9-03

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PAGE 02 STATE 65525

AGAINST EITHER JORDAN OR SYRIA. WE DO KNOW THAT IDF HAS REINFORCED FORCES IN BEIT SHEAN AREA IN ORDER INCREASE ITS CAPABILITY CONTROL INFILTRATION. WE ARE FOLLOWING SITUATION CLOSELY AND HOPE GOJ IS CONTINUING MAXIMUM EFFORT STOP INFILTRATION.

2. FOR TEL AVIV: ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM AMBASSADOR HARMAN, ISRAELI COUNSELOR YAISH CALLED NOVEMBER 6 TO STATE THAT ISRAELIS SEE GRAVE IMPLICATIONS IN NOVEMBER 5 EXCHANGE OF FIRE ON JORDAN BORDER (USDAO AMMAN 555, USDAO TEL AVIV 1563). ISRAELIS INTERPRET THIS INCIDENT AS FURTHER INDICATION THAT JORDANIAN ARMY, RATHER THAN ATTEMPTING PREVENT INFILTRATION, IS NOT ONLY ASSISTING INFILTRATORS BUT ENGAGING IN INDISCRIMINATE ARTILLERY SHELLING OF CIVILIAN CENTERS -- A PRACTICE PREVIOUSLY FOLLOWED ONLY BY SYRIANS.

PAGE 3 RUEHC 65525 ~~SECRET~~

WE CONTINUE BELIEVE GOJ MAKING GENUINE EFFORT CONTROL TERRORISM. IT NOT CLEAR WHETHER ISRAELI EMBASSY APPROACH REPRESENTS LOCAL INITIATIVE OR WAS UNDERTAKEN ON GOI INSTRUCTIONS, BUT COMPARISON OF JORDANIAN ACTION WITH EARLIER SYRIAN ACTIONS HAS POSSIBLY OMINOUS OVERTONES. IF IN EMBASSY'S JUDGMENT THERE IS ANY RISK ISRAELIS MAY IN FACT BE CONTEMPLATING REPRISAL AGAINST JORDAN, IT SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO GOI THAT WE ASSUME BITAN'S ASSURANCES REPORTED TEL AVIV 1411 STILL STAND.

GP-3.  
RUSK

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146  
**TELEGRAM**

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NLJ-S 98001  
By 102 NARA, Date 8/14/01

~~SECRET~~ 310

PAGE 01 STATE 58791

42  
ORIGIN SS 25

INFO SSD 00, NSCE 00, /025 R

02

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:RBHOUGHTON  
APPROVED BY: NEA: LUCIUS D. BATTLE  
H: MR. MACOMBER  
DEFENSE: MR. SCHWARTZ  
S/S: MR. WALSH  
CLEARED WITH KATZENBACH

.....  
O 241759Z OCT 67 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0052

~~SECRET~~ STATE 58791

EXDIS

1. WILL BE KNOWN SHORTLY THAT WE ARE GOING TO PROCEED IN  
RELEASING SELECTIVELY CERTAIN ITEMS UNDER OUTSTANDING ARMS  
AGREEMENTS SUSPENDED FOR OVER FOUR MONTHS, FOR SHIPMENT TO  
ISRAEL AND SELECTED ARAB STATES BUT NOT INCLUDING JORDAN.  
WE ARE KEENLY AWARE DIFFICULTIES WHICH THIS ACTION PRESENTS  
FOR OUR RELATIONS WITH JORDAN AND TO YOU IN ANSWERING QUERIES  
CONCERNING IT. WE BELIEVE FRANKNESS HERE IS IN ORDER.

2. PROBLEM LIES IN LARGE BODY CONGRESSIONAL OPINION THAT GOJ  
ATTACKED ISRAEL IN FACE (A) LEGAL CONDITIONS U.S. PROVIDED MILITARY  
EQUIPMENT FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES ONLY AND (B) ISRAEL APPEAL

PAGE 2 RUEHC 58791 ~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 02 STATE 58791

(WHICH WE WELL KNOWN HERE) TO JORDAN FOR MUTUAL RESTRAINT. ALTHOUGH WE THINK WE UNDERSTAND REASONS FOR HUSSEIN'S MOSCOW VISIT, IT DID NOT HELP OUR PUBLIC OR CONGRESSIONAL PROBLEM. OUR PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH KHAMMASH WERE BASED ON BELIEF THAT CONGRESSIONAL SITUATION WOULD IMPROVE AS AID BILL PROGRESSED. UNFORTUNATELY, OPPOSITE HAS HAPPENED AND SITUATION HAS BECOME AGGRAVATED AS CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE CONTINUED. SUCH IS DEPTH OF FEELING THAT TO PROCEED AT THIS JUNCTURE COULD SERIOUSLY ENDANGER ADMINISTRATION'S MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.

3. THESE ARE FACTS OF PROBLEM BUT WE LEAVE TO YOUR DISCRETION WHICH OF THESE YOU USE IN APPROACH GOJ AND WHOM YOU APPROACH. IN YOUR APPROACH, YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT QUESTION OF RESUMPTION OF MILITARY SHIPMENTS TO JORDAN REMAINS OPEN. WE ARE CONTINUING TO KEEP MATTER UNDER VERY CLOSE REVIEW. WE EXPECT ARMS SUPPLY QUESTION WILL BE DISCUSSED DURING KING'S VISIT HERE IN NOVEMBER.

GP-3 KATZENBACH

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