



Department of State

147
TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 211

PAGE 01 STATE 55227

80
ORIGIN SS 70

INFO /070 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: RBHOUGHTON
APPROVED BY: NEA/ARN: RBHOUGHTON
WHITE HOUSE: HSAUNDERS

R 172031Z OCT 67
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0009

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 55227

LIMDIS

WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT HATIM ZU'BI HAS ASKED THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR TO MAKE TENTATIVE APPOINTMENTS EITHER IN NEW YORK OR WASHINGTON FOR KING HUSSEIN WITH THE HEAD OF THE IBRD AND ALSO AN APPOINTMENT WITH PETER GRACE. THE JORDANIANS HAVE NEVER OFFICIALLY INFORMED US THAT THE KING WAS COMING TO WASHINGTON OR THAT HE EXPECTED TO SEE THE PRESIDENT. WE WOULD, THEREFORE, APPRECIATE ANY MORE PRECISE INFORMATION AS TO THE TIMING OF HIS VISIT AND WHETHER HE, IN FACT, EXPECTS TO SEE THE PRESIDENT.

GP-3. RUSK

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 26001
By 19/100, NARA, Date 8/14/01



Department of State

TELEGRAM

NSC

148

02

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 STATE 54416

81
ORIGIN SS 25

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /025 R

DRAFTED BY: IO: JJSISCO
APPROVED BY: IO: JOSEPH J. SISCO
USUN: AMB GOLDBERG (SUBS)
NEA: MR. BATTLE (DRAFT)
S/S: MR. WALKER

O 142135Z OCT 67 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0167
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0428
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0129

~~SECRET~~ STATE 54416

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 1876

1. FYI YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT WE ARE DEVELOPING SOME NEW IDEAS FOR POSSIBLE SC ACTION AND THEREFORE DO NOT WISH AT THIS POINT TO NEGOTIATE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE WITH KING HUSSEIN ON BASIS HIS DRAFT. MOREOVER, SITUATION IN NEW YORK IS FLUID AND NUMBER OF IDEAS ARE EMERGING FROM VARIOUS QUARTERS, END FYI.

2. THEREFORE WE SUGGEST YOU MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO KING

PAGE 2 RUEHC 54416 ~~SECRET~~
HUSSEIN:

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(A) WE WISH TO ASSURE KING HUSSEIN THAT U S IS ANXIOUS TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE A CONSTRUCTIVE RESULT FROM THE SC. WE ARE NOT OPPOSED TO SC CONSIDERATION IN PRINCIPLE, BUT WE WISH TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT A BROAD CONSENSUS IN THE COUNCIL AND AMONG THE PRINCIPAL PARTIES CONCERNED IS ACHIEVED IN ADVANCE ON WHAT THE CONCRETE RESULTS SHOULD BE BEFORE WE MOVE IN TO THE SC.

(B) CANDIDLY WE DO HAVE SOME DIFFICULTIES WITH JORDANIAN DRAFT AS WELL AS THE NEED FOR CLARIFICATION FROM JORDANIANS AS TO MEANING OF CERTAIN LANGUAGE. FOR EXAMPLE, WHAT DOES PARA 2(B) MEAN? DOES THIS MEAN ARAB RENUNCIATION OF BELLIGERENCY, AND IF SO WHAT IS THE PRACTICAL MEANING OF THIS RENUNCIATION? IN THE SAME PARA WHAT ARE THE BACKGROUND AND REASONS FOR ADDING THE WORD "REDRESSING"? SHOULD WE ASSUME FROM PARA 3 THAT THE FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS IS LINKED TO SOLUTION OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM? THESE ARE ONLY ILLUSTRATIVE AND WE HAVE NUMBER OF OTHER QUESTIONS, PARTICULARLY WHEN WE COMPARE

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THIS DRAFT WITH THE COMMON GROUND TENTATIVELY ACHIEVED AT THE END OF THE ESSGA BY THE US AND USSR. THIS DRAFT REPRESENTS A RETROGRESSION FROM THAT COMMON GROUND.

(C) HOWEVER, WE ARE VERY ANXIOUS TO TALK FURTHER TO THE JORDANIANS IN DETAIL, AS A FOLLOW-UP TO THE TWO RECENT CONVERSATIONS WHICH AMB. GOLDBERG HELD WITH EDUCATION MINISTER AL-AMERI AND DEP FONMIN RIFA'I. KING HUSSEIN SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT NOW THAT GA DEBATE ON ME HAS BEEN POSTPONED FOR ANOTHER WEEK INTENSE CONSULTATIONS ARE GOING ON IN NEW YORK CENTERING ON VARIOUS IDEAS AND THAT IN OUR JUDGMENT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE LANGUAGE EITHER IN AMMAN OR CAIRO. WE THEREFORE URGE THAT KING PROMPTLY DISPATCH DEP FONMIN RIFA'I TO NEW YORK SO THAT AMB. GOLDBERG CAN CONDUCT DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM IN CONTEXT OF THE FLUID SITUATION AND EXTENDED CONSULTATIONS NOW GOING ON THERE.

3. FYI WHILE WE DO NOT BELIEVE YOU NEED GET INTO THIS IN

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PARTICULAR, IN ADDITION TO POINTS MADE ABOVE WE ALSO HAVE CONSIDERABLE TROUBLE WITH INCLUSION OF THE 4TH OF JUNE

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LANGUAGE IN PARA 2(A), WHICH BY THE WAY, WAS NOT INCLUDED IN VERSION I OF THE COMMON GROUND ACHIEVED BY U S AND USSR. YOU HAVE SEEN FROM DETAILED REPORTS WE HAVE SENT YOU THAT THE LINE WE ARE TAKING HERE IS THAT: (A) OUR BASIC APPROACH IS BASED ON FIVE PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED BY PRES. JOHNSON IN JUNE 19 STATEMENT; AND (B) WE ARE STANDING BY US-USSR DRAFT, PROVIDED IT IS CLEAR WHAT IT MEANS, PROVIDED THE SPONSORS AGREE TO COMMON INTERPRETATION, AND THE PRINCIPAL PARTIES CONCERNED ARE WILLING TO TAKE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN CONNECTION THEREWITH. IF YOU FIND IT HELPFUL YOU CAN ALSO RAISE THE QUESTION WITH THE JORDANIANS THAT WE ARE NOT CLEAR, FOR EXAMPLE, WHETHER THEY HAVE IN MIND THE NEED FOR A CLEARCUT INTERPRETATION OF ANY RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY SC.

4. FYI YOU SHOULD ALSO KNOW THAT IN THE LAST 24 HOURS WE HAVE HAD MEETINGS AT HIGH LEVEL TO REVIEW WHOLE SITUATION AND THAT WE HAVE DEVELOPED A POSSIBLE FRESH APPROACH. BY THE TIME GOLDBERG WOULD SEE RIFA'I WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO TALK TO THEM, NOT SO MUCH IN TERMS OF DIFFICULTIES THAT WE FIND WITH THEIR DRAFT, BUT MORE IN TERMS OF SOME OTHER IDEAS WHICH MAY HAVE

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GOTTEN OFF THE GROUND BY THEN. END FYI.

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ORIGIN SS 25

ENPO 1025 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA:IAI: JHBAHTI
APPROVED BY: M:EVROSTOW
NEA: MR DAVIES
NEA/IAI: MR ATHERTON
M: MR GREY
S/S: MR MEEHAN

132006Z OCT 67
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0157
USMISSION USUN NY 0402
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0122
AMEMBASSY LONDON 0505

~~SECRET~~ STATE 53673

EXDIS

IN COURSE ROSTOW TALK WITH HARMAN AND EVRON OCTOBER 11, HARMAN ASKED WHAT HUSSEIN SAYING ABOUT TACTICS IN UN. ROSTOW SAID HUSSEIN SUPPORTS IDEA JOINT US-USSR RESOLUTION BUT HAD PRODUCED OWN VERSION. THIS VERSION NON-STARTER SINCE STRESSED WITHDRAWAL TO JUNE 4 LINES. HUSSEIN HAD BITTERLY REPROACHED USG FOR NOT ARRANGING SETTLEMENT IN JULY. HE WANTS UN RESOLUTION PRIOR ANY PRIVATE TALKS ON SETTLEMENT.

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By 18/122 NARA, Date 6/14/01

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150

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PAGE 01 STATE 52869

81
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INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /025 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: RBHOUGHTON: UNP: ARDAY
APPROVED BY: M: EVROSTOW
NEA: DAVIES
IO: POPPER
S/S: MEEHAN

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O R 121929Z OCT 67 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0138
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0371

~~SECRET~~ STATE 52869

EXDIS

AMMAN 1797

1. YOU MAY INFORM KING HUSSEIN THAT WE HAVE ALWAYS FELT THAT DISCUSSION OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS WOULD BE MORE FRUITFUL IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAN IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. FROM A PROCEDURAL POINT OF VIEW WE DO NOT THINK, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO GO THROUGH THE STEP OF PROPOSING A RESOLUTION TO MOVE THE ISSUE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE ITEM IS ALREADY ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL AGENDA.

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2. HOWEVER, WE FEEL IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT DISCUSSIONS BE

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PURSUED IN THE DAYS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD TO SEE WHETHER WE CAN FIND SUFFICIENT COMMON GROUND BOTH IN LANGUAGE AND INTENT TO ENSURE THAT SC PROCEEDINGS WOULD BE CONSTRUCTIVE. WHILE WE APPRECIATE THE FACT THAT THE KING HAS HAD TO MAKE CHANGES IN TEXT ON THE INSISTENCE OF THE UAR, NEVERTHELESS THESE REPRESENT CONSIDERABLE DEPARTURE FROM WHAT WE HAD DISCUSSED WITH THE SOVIETS AT THE END OF THE ESSGA. AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG WILL BE DISCUSSING SPECIFICS WITH JORDANIAN DEL AT EARLY DATE, AND WE WILL KEEP YOU FULLY INFORMED.

3. YOU SHOULD ALSO INFORM THE KING THAT WE VERY MUCH APPRECIATE AND ADMIRE THE EFFORTS HE HAS MADE OVER THE PAST WEEKS TO DEVELOP A MODERATE ARAB POSITION IN AN EFFORT TO WORK OUT A PERMANENT SOLUTION TO THE PRESENT CRISIS. WE HAVE BY NO MEANS GIVEN UP HOPE THAT A JUST SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND AND YOU MAY ASSURE HIM THAT WE ARE DEVOTING OUR ENERGIES TOWARD THAT END. OUR POSITION HAS NEITHER SOFTENED NOR HARDENED AND REMAINS BASED ON THE FIVE POINTS DESCRIBED IN THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT OF JUNE 19. HIS LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT IS BEING STUDIED AND WILL BE

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ANSWERED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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81
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INFO /025 R

DRAFTED BY: USUN: UCATES & IO: UJSISCO
APPROVED BY: IO: U J SISCO
S/S: MR KELLY

P 110054Z OCT 67
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0000
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0000
CAIRO 428
USMISSION USUN NY 0000

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EXDIS

SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST CRISIS: JORDANIAN TALKS

1. GOLDBERG AND SISCO TALKED AFTERNOON OF OCTOBER 9 WITH EDUCATION MINISTER AL-AMERI, AMB. SHARAF AND DEP FONMIN RIFAI OF JORDAN IN NEW YORK.

2. AL-AMERI OPENED WITH COMMENT THAT THE SC WOULD BE A GOOD PLACE TO START TO MOVE TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT OF THE ME PROBLEM. HE NOTED THAT IN THE PREVIOUS MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG THEY HAD BEGUN TO TALK OF A TEXT AND ASKED WHETHER THE UNITED STATES HAD GONE FARTHER WITH REGARD TO DEVELOPING THE BEST TEXT WHICH COULD BE PRESENTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

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3. GOLDBERG REPLIED THAT WE WERE NOT AGAINST SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION OF THE MATTER; THAT IN OUR JUDGMENT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS THE MOST APPROPRIATE BODY, AS WE HAD RECOMMENDED LAST SPRING WHEN THE SOVIETS REQUESTED GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONSIDERATION.
THE UNITED STATES OPINION HAD NOT CHANGED.

4. IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS TO RESUME ITS SESSIONS WE HAVE NO OBJECTION, BUT WE URGE CAUTION WITH REGARD TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY UNITED STATES INITIATIVES, THE UNITED STATES NOW BEING QUOTE GUN-SHY UNQUOTE. ANY INITIATIVE SHOULD BE TAKEN ON THE BASIS OF AN UNDERSTANDING AS TO ACTUALLY WHERE WE ARE GOING. HE COMMENTED THAT WE RECEIVED WITH INTEREST THE VIEWS OF THE KING OF JORDAN THROUGH OUR EMBASSY IN AMMAN. THE U.S. WELCOMED THIS APPROACH AND IS EXAMINING IT ALTHOUGH IT HAD JUST COME IN TODAY. GOLDBERG STATED HE WAS GOING TO WASHINGTON TUESDAY TO DISCUSS IT. HE NOTED THAT HE WOULD ALSO BE TALKING TO SOVIETS IN WASHINGTON AND COMMENTED HE COULD GIVE A BETTER REPLY TO THE MINISTER AFTER WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS. WE WISH TO BE HELPFUL BUT ONLY IN A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY. AN EXTREME POSITION WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL. OUR WISH TO BE EVEN-HANDED REMAINS OUR BASIC APPROACH. HE POINTED THAT PART OF OUR DIFFICULTY LIES IN THE FACT THAT WE HAVE NO FIRM AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS AS TO FIRST JUST WHAT ARAB NATIONS THE SOVIETS WERE SPEAKING FOR AND/OR ABOUT AND THAT WE CANNOT OPERATE IN A POSITION THAT IS OPEN-ENDED WITH REGARD TO SOVIET COMMITMENTS AND CLOSED WITH REGARD TO OURS. ARE WE ONLY CONSIDERING JORDAN, THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND SYRIA OR MUST ALL THE MIDDLE EAST BE CONSIDERED? THE LAST TIME THE SOVIET MOVE WAS SUBJECT TO THE VETO OF ANY ARAB COUNTRY. GOLDBERG ASKED WHETHER SUCH WAS THE SITUATION NOW.

5. IN THE SECOND PLACE, APPARENTLY THE DRAFT THE SOVIETS SUBMITTED TO THE ARABS WAS NOT THE DRAFT THAT WE HAD DISCUSSED WITH THEM AND AGREED TO. THE SOVIETS SEEM TO HAVE REPORTED PART OF THE DRAFT APPARENTLY PUTTING IN PARAGRAPH 2 BUT NOT PARAGRAPH 3. GOLDBERG INTENDED QUOTE TO CLARIFY THIS MATTER IN WASHINGTON ON TUESDAY. UNQUOTE UNFORTUNATELY WE STILL DO NOT KNOW WHICH DRAFT THE SOVIETS SHOWED TO JORDAN AND OTHER ARABS. HE HAD AN IMPRESSION THAT THE DRAFT THE KING OF JORDAN WAS PUTTING FORWARD REPRESENTED A QUOTE CROSS-OVER UNQUOTE BETWEEN TWO VERSIONS. BETWEEN WHAT WE HAD DISCUSSED WITH THE SOVIETS AND WHAT THE SOVIETS HAD DISCUSSED

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WITH THE ARABS. THUS U.S. TALKS IN WASHINGTON TOMORROW WITH THE SOVIETS WILL BE EXPLORATORY. GOLDBERG ADDED THAT HIS TALKS WITH GROMYKO HERE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE ASSEMBLY DID NOT REVEAL WHICH DRAFT SUBMITTED TO SOVIETS.

6. GOLDBERG URGED THAT WE BE SURE WE ARE ALL TALKING ABOUT THE SAME THING. FOR THE US PART, WE WOULD UNDERTAKE: (1) US INTERNAL TALKS RE THE JORDANIAN PROPOSAL; (2) US DISCUSSIONS WITH THE JORDANIAN DELEGATION BEFORE A REPLY TO AMMAN; (3) US QUESTIONS TO THE SOVIETS ON THEIR CURRENT POSITION, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF THE JORDANIAN KING'S TRIP TO MOSCOW, SINCE OUR IMPRESSION WAS THAT MOSCOW TALKED WITH THE KING ABOUT SPECIFIC LANGUAGE.

7. THE MINISTER SAID THAT THE MOSCOW TALKS GAVE NO INDICATION ON FINAL WORDING NOR DID ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSAL COME OUT OF MOSCOW. ALTHOUGH THE TALKS WERE USEFUL THEY LEAVE US A VERY SHORT TIME IN WHICH TO OPERATE PRIOR TO GA OR SC CONSIDERATION. GOLDBERG ASKED WHY THIS DRIVE FOR SHARP IMMEDIATE ACTION. THERE WAS NO REAL RUSH NOW AND HE URGED THAT WE NOT BE IMPETUOUS EITHER IN SC OR IN GA. THE GA HAD LEFT THE MATTER IN THE HANDS OF THE PRESIDENT AND WE WERE WELL ADVISED TO GIVE THE MATTER THOUGHTFUL CONSIDERATION. A GA DEBATE NOW WOULD MERELY BE REPETITIOUS.

8. THE FONMIN SAID THAT HE DID NOT FAVOR A CONTROVERSIAL DISCUSSION BUT THE MIDDLE EAST ISSUE HAS "HIGH PRIORITY" AND SHOULD BE DISCUSSED EARLY UNLESS SOMEONE DELAYS IT. THE ARABS ARE AWARE THAT THE SC IS SEIZED OF IT BUT IF SC CONSIDERATION IS NOT IMMINENT WHAT SHOULD WE DO.

9. RIFA'I COMMENTED THE SC MEETING COULD BE SCHEDULED SUBJECT TO CONSULTATIONS. HE WONDERED WHETHER WE SHOULD START WITH SPEECHES IN ORDER TO GET SOME ACTION. GOLDBERG SAID THAT THE DEBATE WOULD NOT ENHANCE THE SOLUTION BUT REPEATED THE US WOULD NOT DRAG ITS HEELS. HE COMMENTED THE JORDANIANS WERE IN A GOOD POSITION TO JUDGE THE GOOD OR EVIL OF THE SITUATION. HE URGED HOWEVER THAT WE CONSULT EARLY AND FRANKLY. HE COMMENTED WE HAVE TALKED TO THE UK BUT NOT TO THE FRENCH.

10. RIFA'I ASKED WHETHER THE GOLDBERG-GROMYKO PAPER WAS UP FOR CONSIDERATION. GOLDBERG SAID THAT WE COULD PROCEED FROM THAT

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PAPER AND WANTED TO CONSULT BROADLY. HOWEVER, WE WON'T TALK ABOUT A TEXT BUT FROM A GENERAL VIEWPOINT. WE STILL HAVE TO BE ASSURED OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDE AND WE COULD DISCUSS MATTER WITH ARAB STATES.

11. GOLDBERG ALSO SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE RIFAI TO BE DEFINITE IF HE IS GOING TO AMMAN. HE HAD AN IMPRESSION THE JORDANIANS FELT US WAS HARDENING ITS POSITION BUT GOLDBERG COMMENTED THIS NOT TRUE. IT WAS JUST THAT WE DID NOT WANT THE DEAL TO BE OPEN-ENDED IN ONE DIRECTION. (I.E., SOVIETS AGREE ONLY TO WHAT ARABS AGREE TO) AND CLOSED IN THE OTHER, I.E. US MUST STAND BY OUR AGREEMENT, REGARDLESS OF ISRAELI VIEWS. SO HE SUGGESTED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS BE EXPLAINED VERY CLEARLY TO THE KING. GOLDBERG SAID THAT WE DO NOT ACCEPT THAT THE MATTER CAN ONLY BE QTE NEGOTIATED DOWNWARD UNQTE. GOLDBERG REPEATED THAT ALTHOUGH FOR TWO MONTHS WE HAD NOTHING FROM SOVIETS, NOW DOBRYNIN SAID THAT THEY WANTED TO TALK TO HIM AND THAT HE WILL SEE THEM IN WASHINGTON. WE ARE NOT ADVERTISING THESE CONVERSATIONS BUT THEY WILL TAKE PLACE TUESDAY. HE NOTED THAT WHAT THE US HAD PROPOSED PREVIOUSLY HAD NOT BEEN ACCEPTED BY ARABS, BUT THAT WE WILL SHORTLY HAVE A COMMENT ON WHAT THE SOVIETS SUGGESTED AND OUR REPLY. BUT BASICALLY HE POINTED OUT THE US POSITION HAS NOT CHANGED.

12. AMBASSADOR SHARAF COMMENTED HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THE US POINT OF VIEW HAD HARDENED AND WHAT WORRIED JORDAN WAS THE FORM THAT THE US AND QTE POSSIBLY UNQTE THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD BE PUT IN. HE WAS HAPPY THAT GOLDBERG EXPLAINED THE CONSULTATIONS THAT WERE GOING ON AND SAID THAT JORDAN ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE AMERICAN'S INTERPRETATIONS THEMSELVES, WHETHER OR NOT THE SOVIETS ACCEPTED THEM.

13. GOLDBERG STATED WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS THAT THE PARTIES MUST ACCEPT A SOLUTION. IT COULD NOT BE IMPOSED UPON THEM. HE SAID OUR POSITION HAS NOT HARDENED. WE ARE NOT CLEAR AS TO THE SOVIET INTERPRETATION BUT THE PARTIES MUST BE CONSULTED AND WE DO NOT WANT OUR VIEW TO BE WATERED DOWN. IT WAS CLEAR WHEN WE TALKED TO THEM AGAIN WE WANTED TO MAKE SURE OUR INTERPRETATION UNDERSTOOD.

14. SPEAKING TO JORDANIANS PRESENT AS FIRENDS, HE SAID QTE I WANT YOU TO KNOW WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT UNQTE. GOLDBERG REITERATED WE HAD HAD NO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH ANY ONE.

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ALTHOUGH RUMORS WERE SPREAD ABOUT.

15. AMBASSADOR RIFAI SAID THERE WERE SEVERAL VERSIONS GOING ABOUT. ONE THAT THE AMERICAN POSITION WAS TOUGHENING MIGHT HAVE REFERRED TO THOSE QTE OMISSIONS UNQTE (REFERRING TO SOVIET OMISSIONS OF INITIAL AMERICAN PROPOSALS). FOR EXAMPLE, RIFAI SAID THERE WAS A DATE IN ONE VERSION AND IN THE OTHER IT WAS OMITTED. WAS THIS SIGNIFICANT?

16. GOLDBERG SAID WE HAD ONE VERSION WITHOUT A DATE WITH STRONGER LANGUAGE AND WE HAD ALSO ANOTHER VERSION. WE COULDN'T SAY WHICH VERSION THE SOVIETS SHOWED TO THE ARABS UNTIL WE TALKED TO THE SOVIETS. IN ANY EVENT THE BASIC US POSITION HAS NOT CHANGED.

17. THE MINISTER ASKED WHICH VERSION WAS THE CLOSEST TO US VIEWS. GOLDBERG SAID HE DID NOT KNOW SINCE WE HAD TRIED OUT SEVERAL VERSIONS ON THE SOVIETS.

18. AMBASSADOR SHARAF COMMENTED THAT THIS PROBLEM WAS LINKED TO IMPLEMENTATION. HE REPEATED IT WAS THE DETAILS THAT WORRIED THE ARABS.

19. GOLDBERG AGREED THAT WE SHOULD BE CLEAR WHAT IS MEANT BY WITHDRAWAL. WE WANTED (1) PRINCIPLE AND (2) THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRINCIPLE WITH ISRAEL WITHDRAWAL TIED IN WITH TERMINATION OF BELLIGERENCY. WE MUST BE SPECIFIC AND EVEN HANDED TO EACH PARTY. IT WAS ALL RIGHT TO TALK OF LANGUAGE IF WE AGREED ON BASIC CONCEPTS. IF WE FIRST UNDERSTAND ONE ANOTHER THE MODALITIES CAN BE WORKED OUT. THIS ALL MUST BE CLARIFIED WITH THE SOVIETS. WITHDRAWAL IN SPECIFIC LANGUAGE AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTS BY ARABS INCLUDING RECOGNITION AND RENUNCIATION OF BELLIGERENCY. ONCE THESE ACHIEVED WE MUST HAVE GUARANTEES. WE CANNOT LEAVE THIS MATTER OPEN. WATERWAYS AND REFUGEES ARE JUST WORDS UNLESS THEY ARE DEFINED. GOLDBERG COMMENTED QTE IF I WERE A JORDANIAN I WOULD NOT AGREE TO ANYTHING I DID NOT UNDERSTAND. UNQTE HE SAID WE COULDN'T BE FUZZY. WE MUST START OUT BY SEEING IF WE CAN UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER. IF OUR INTERPRETATION IS OK WE CAN THEN CONSIDER LANGUAGE.

20. SHARAF SAID WHAT WORRIES THEM WAS THE INTERPRETATION OF WITHDRAWAL AND OF JERUSALEM. SHARAF SAID WITHDRAWAL MUST INCLUDE

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ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM JERUSALEM.

21. GOLDBERG REPLIED THAT AS FAR AS U.S. WAS CONCERNED JERUSALEM WAS INTERNATIONAL AND DID NOT BELONG TO EITHER SIDE.
22. THE MINISTER COMMENTED BOTH SIDES WERE AGAINST THIS INTERPRETATION.
23. GOLDBERG THEN COMMENTED THAT THERE WAS A LOT OF LOOSE TALK ABOUT AGGRESSION. HE SAID THE THOUGHT WE OUGHT TO THINK THIS OUT AND AVOID AN ARGUMENT OVER AGGRESSION. WE WOULD BE WRAPPED UP IN AN ARGUMENT AS TO WHETHER THE AGGRESSION HAD BEEN ENGENDERED BY ISRAEL OR THE UAR AND WHO HAD FIRED THE FIRST SHOT ON JORDANIAN FRONT. HE COMMENTED THAT THE MATTER OF AGGRESSION HAD BEEN PUT ON THE AGENDA BY THE SOVIETS BUT HE DID NOT WANT THIS TO BE A MATTER OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND JORDAN. OUR INDICATIONS WERE THAT THE SOVIETS HAD RAISED THIS MATTER TO TALK ABOUT VIETNAM AND THE MIDDLE EAST.
24. AL-AMERI COMMENTED THAT JORDAN IS STEPPING FORWARD TOWARD THE US BUT WE DON'T SEE ANY US MOVES TOWARDS JORDAN WITH THE SAME SPEED. HE HOPED THE US WILL HELP SAVE THE ENTITY OF JORDAN. GOLDBERG SAID WE PROPOSED TO GIVE THOUGHTFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE KING'S PROPOSAL. THE MINISTER SAID TO INTERNATIONALIZE JERUSALEM WOULD BE TO TAKE JERUSALEM AWAY FROM JORDAN AND SECONDLY HE WAS NOT CLEAR WITH REGARD TO ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AS WHETHER IT MEANT TO THE JUNE 5 LINES.
25. GOLDBERG COMMENTED THAT WE COULD NOT USEFULLY DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF THIS NOW.
26. AMBASSADOR SHARAF ASKED THAT THERE BE CONTINUOUS CONSULTATIONS ON THE SUBJECT.
27. GOLDBERG AGREED BUT COMMENTED THAT TODAY WE ARE DISCUSSING ONLY PROCEDURE NOT SUBSTANCE.
28. IN A CONVERSATION LEAVING THE ROOM AMBASSADOR RIFAI COMMENTED TO MISOFF GREAT INTEREST IN RECEIVING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN AMMAN INFORMATION ON US TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS AND REPORTS ON FURTHER US CONSIDERATION OF THE PROBLEM.

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SECRET

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ORIGIN SS 25

INFO /025 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: RBHOUGHTON
APPROVED BY: M: E V ROSTOW
NEA: MR DAVIES
NEA/RA: MR SOBER
DOD: MR BARRINGER
S/S: MRS DAVIS

R 080111Z SEP 67
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0405

~~SECRET~~ STATE 34026

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 1278

REGRET WE STILL NOT IN POSITION TO MOVE ON SUSPENDED GRANT MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN. PROBLEM ONE OF TIMING AND NOT INTENTION. MOVEMENT ON PROGRAM STILL RELATED CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON FOREIGN AID BILL WHICH EXPECTED GO INTO CONFERENCE COMMITTEE AROUND MID-SEPTEMBER.

GP-1. RUSK

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~~SECRET~~

PP RUEHC 6270Q
DE RUQMKG 3510A 0511140
ZNY SSSSS ZZH 1968 FEB 21 AM 7 49
P 201135Z FEB 68
FM ANEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4708
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3510

MODIS

SUBJ: CARBINES FOR PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM

REF: AMMAN 3260 AND 3261

1. WE HAVE HAD NO REPLY TO AMMAN 3260 AND 3261 REQUESTING EARLIEST POSSIBLE SHIPMENT OF CARBINES, REVOLVERS AND RELATED AMMUNITION AND PSARES TO REINFORCE ANTI-TERRORIST INFILTRATION PROGRAM IN JORDAN.
2. AMMAN 3509 INDICATES GRAPHICALLY THAT SECURITY FORCES DEFINITELY NEED SUPPORT OF THEY ARE GOING TO CARRY OUT IC G'S ANTI-TERRORIST POLICIES IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. AS RECOMMENDED IN AMMAN 3260, REQUEST FAVORABLE REPLY EARLIEST. AIR SHIPMENT HAS NOW BECOME MORE URGENT. SYMMES
GP-3.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-121
By ms NARA, Date 4-2-03

~~SECRET~~

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Department of State

8
TELEGRAM

155

~~SECRET~~

PP RUEHCR
DE RUQMKG 3486A 0501145
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 191140Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4639
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1289
STATE GRNC
BT

5 5 9 1Q
1968 FEB 19 AM 8 54

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3486

NODIS

DEPT PASS TO USMISSION USUNNY

SUBJ: ISRAEL-JORDAN

REF: AMMAN 3479 AND 3459

ISRAEL'S APPARENT RUSH TO EXPLOIT THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF ARRANGEMENT OF THE CEASEFIRE INCLUDING DISTORTION OF GOJ INITIATIVE IN MATTER WILL NOT HELP CONVINCED JORDANIANS THEY CAN RELY ON ISRAELIS NOT TO SEEK TO EXPLOIT CONTACTS SUCH AS THOSE PROPOSED FOR MILITARY COMMANDERS.

GP-3. SYMMES
BT

NOTE: NOT PASSED USUN BY OC/T.

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NLJ-S 98001
By lll NARA, Date 8/14/01



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TELEGRAM

#7

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 E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
 NLJ-S 98001
 By 6/22/00 NARA, Date 8/1/01

156

SECRET

CONTROL: 54310
 RECD: FEBRUARY 17, 1968
 9:38 A.M.

PP RUEHCR
 DE RUGMKG 3479A 0481215
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 P R 171210Z FEB 68
 FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
 TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4688
 INFO RUMAT/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1288
 RUEHCR/USMISSION USUN NY 705
 STATE GRNC
 RT

1. Restow
2. ~~Handover~~ HS
3. Let.

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3479

MODIS

REF: STATE 117012

1. OUR 3464 AND 3469 APPARENTLY CROSSED WITH STATE REFTEL. DEPT MAY WISH CONSIDER WHETHER IT DESIRES MODIFY INSTRUCTIONS TO ME IN LIGHT OF THESE MESSAGES.
2. I WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO REVIEW WITH KING PERSONALLY WHETHER HE WOULD BE WILLING TO APPOINT OFFICER OF GENERAL RANK TO MEET WITH ISRAELIS IN PRESENCE UN OFFICER. I DO NOT BELIEVE HE WOULD REJECT IDEA OUT OF HAND BUT UNTIL THE ISRAELIS HAVE ACCEPTED UN PRESENCE AT MEETING, WHICH HAS LONG BEEN JORDANIAN SINE QUA NON, HE WOULD PROBABLY REGARD QUESTION AS THEORETICAL.
3. ESTABLISHMENT OF A DISCREET AND EFFECTIVE CHANNEL

PAGE 2 RUGMKG 3479A ~~SECRET~~
 SEEMS TO US TO BE KEY TO PROBLEM OF DISCUSSING ON SPOT ARRANGEMENTS OF CEASE FIRE AND IF PROPERLY NURTURED SUCH CHANNEL COULD LEND ITSELF TO EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON TERRORISTS. KING AND PRIN TALHOUNI HAVE IN PAST FEW DAYS DISCUSSED THIS PROBLEM WOTH ME AND HAVE GIVEN RINGING ENDORSEMENT TO DAUD AS TRUSTED OFFICER WITH EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH ISRAELIS AND ONE WHO IS DISCREET ABOUT HIS MEETINGS. WE RECOGNIZE ISRAELIS HAVE FOUND DAUD TOUGH TO DEAL WITH IN PAST, BUT WE WOULD EMPHASIZE HE IS MAN WHO HAS DIRECT LINE TO KING. ISRAELIS ALSO PROBABLY WISH TO DEAL WITH SOME OFFICER WHO WOULD GIVE THESE TALKS APPEARANCE OF "SUMMIT TALKS" OR "DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS", BUT IT IS PRECISELY THIS WHICH JORDAN WISHES TO AVOID AT THIS STAGE.

SECRET

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~~SECRET~~

-2- AMMAN 3479, FEBRUARY 17

4. AS WE SEE IT THERE IS A LOT TO BE GAINED FROM EVEN LIMITED CONTACT FOR LIMITED PURPOSES. HERE AGAIN, ISRAELIS MAY BE CONFUSING FORM AND SUBSTANCE. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO BUILD LIMITED CONTACT FOR LIMITED PURPOSES INTO SOMETHING MUCH MORE PERMANENT AND EXTENSIVE-- IF THE ISRAELIS ARE WILLING TO DO IT UNDER A UN UMBRELLA

PAGE 3 RUONKG 3479A ~~SECRET~~
AND ALSO WILL KEEP IT QUIET. IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE OF ISRAELI RECORD OF SURFACING CONTACTS THAT I AM RELUCTANT TO SEE US INVOLVE US PRESTIGE IN URGING KING TO ASSIGN A GENERAL OFFICER TO MEET WITH ISRAELIS FOR PURPOSES SPECIFIED. I HOPE WE CAN RATHER PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF URGING THE ISRAELIS TO BUILD ON THE JORDANIAN WILLINGNESS TO WORK THROUGH DAUD UNDER A UN UMBRELLA.

OP-1. SYMMES

PT

NOTE: NOT PASSED USUN BY OC/T 2/17/68

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

157 / 7

OO RUEHCR
DE RUQMKG 3470A 0471735
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 161730Z FEB 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4680
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3470

5133Q
1968 FEB 16 PM 12 47

NODIS

REF: TEL AVIV 2531 AND AMMAN 3464

SUBJECT: ISRAEL-JORDAN

TEL AVIV REFTEL CROSSED AMMAN 3464 WHICH REAFFIRMS THAT
DAOUD WAS NOT IN JORDAN FEB 12. FROM ALL INFORMATION
AVAILABLE TO US DAOUD'S ILLNESS IN NEW YORK HAS BEEN
GENUINE AGREE DESIRABLE TEL AVIV DRAW ON THIS
INFORMATION AND AMMAN 3464 TO CLARIFY WITH RAFAEL
SITUATION RE DAOUD.

GP-3. SYMMES

NOTE: DEPT PASSED TEL AVIV 2/16/68

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S-98001
By RG/L NARA, Date 8-14-01



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

158

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 3461A 0471400
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R-161355Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4671
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3461

5067Q
1968 FEB 16 AM 10 00

Rd

NODIS

SUBJ: JORDANIAN REQUEST FOR ANTI-INFILTRATION EQUIPMENT

REF: AMMAN 3047: STATE 104263

1. AFTER EVENTS OF PAST FEW DAYS IT IS CLEAR WE NEED TO MOVE FORWARD IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE TO HELP JORDANIANS TO EXERCISE BETTER CONTROL OF TERRORIST INFILTRATIONS. I CONSIDER IT PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO RESPOND QUICKLY TO REQUEST FOR ANTI-INFILTRATION EQUIPMENT REPORTED IN REFTEL. IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING EFFECTIVE ADDITIONAL CONTROL MEASURES, SUCH EQUIPMENT, IF AVAILABLE, COULD PROVIDE JORDANIAN LEADERSHIP A MUCH NEEDED ENCOURAGEMENT TO INTENSIFY THEIR PRESENT EFFORTS. THIS

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3461A ~~SECRET~~
INITIATIVE BY THE JORDANIANS MIGHT ALSO BE USED AS EVIDENCE TO ISRAEL OF JORDANIAN WILL TO ACT ON THE MATTER.

2. WE APPRECIATE EQUIPMENT DISCUSSED IN OUR TELEGRAM OF JAN 19 MIGHT NOT BE AVAILABLE OR THAT IT MAY BE TOO TECHNICAL TO LEND ITSELF TO EXPEDITIOUS INSTALLATION IN THE JORDAN VALLEY TERRAIN. IF WE HAVE NO SUITABLE EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE, OR IF FOR SOME REASON WE DO NOT WISH TO MAKE IT AVAILABLE, I WOULD LIKE TO BE INFORMED EXPEDITIOUSLY. IT IS TIME WE RESPONDED IN SOME WAY TO THE JORDANIANS ON THIS MATTER. OUR CONTINUING SILENCE MAY BE INTERPRETED AS INDIFFERENCE TO JORDANIAN REQUEST OR EVEN AN UNWILLINGNESS TO HELP. I AM SURE THAT WASHINGTON IS WELL AWARE OF NATURE OF TERRAIN WE ARE TALKING ABOUT. IT MIGHT BE WELL TO KEEP IN MIND, HOWEVER, THAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT A LIMITED NUMBER OF FORDS ACROSS RIVER AND TRANSIT AREAS IN JORDAN. WE WOULD HOPE WE COULD FIND SOME KING OF EQUIPMENT TO MONITOR THESE MAJOR TRANSIT AREAS EVEN THOUGH WE COULD NOT EXPECT COMPLETELY TO CURTAIL TERRORIST CROSSINGS.
GP-1. SYMMES

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By g NARA, Date 7-31-01

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159
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

7

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 3405A 0450745
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 140740Z FEB 68
FM ANEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4635
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3405

CN: 4160Q

February 14, 1968

3:26 a.m.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-155
By 10, NARA, Date 6-9-03

MODIS

SUBJ: JORDAN-ISRAEL CONTACTS

DEPT PASS TEL AVIV

1. KING HUSSEIN SHOWED ME FEB 13 A STATEMENT IN ENGLISH THAT APPEARED TO BE THE EXACT REPLICIA OF THE MESSAGE REFERRED TO BY BITAN IN TEL AVIV 2431. I ASKED THE KING IF HE HAD REPLIED. HE SAID THAT THE MESSAGE HAD BEEN BROUGHT BY ANWAR NUSEIBEH. HE HAD SENT BACK A MESSAGE THROUGH HIM TO THE EFFECT THAT IN JORDAN'S VIEW THE FAILURE SO FAR OF THE JARRING MISSION AND THE WORSENING POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION WERE THE RESULT OF ISRAELI ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM AND AGAINST THE REFUGEES AND ISRAEL'S CONTINUED FAILURE TO

PAGE 2 RUQMKG3405A ~~SECRET~~

ACCEPT THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION. HE REITERATED HIS DESIRE FOR PEACE WITH HONOR AND HIS WILLINGNESS TO WORK WITH JARRING TOWARD A SETTLEMENT UNDER TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION. SPECIFICALLY, WITH REGARD TO HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS, HE ASKED NUSEIBEH TO INFORM THE ISRAELIS THAT HE HAD AGAIN SENT A MESSAGE TO COL. MOHAMMAD DAUD TO RETURN IMMEDIATELY TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE ISRAELIS AT THE BRIDGE. HE SAID THAT DAUD HAD BEEN ILL AND HAD HAD AN OPERATION IN NEW YORK BUT THAT HE EXPECTED HIM TO REPORT TO JORDAN SHORTLY.

2. I TOOK OCCASION TO STATE TO HIS MAJESTY THAT I CONSIDERED TERRORISTS HIDING BEHIND INNOCENT WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS AND VALLEY VILLAGES TO BE THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF THE CONTINUING SERIOUS FIRE FIGHTS IN THE JORDAN VALLEY. I SAID WE ARE CONVINCED TERRORISTS ARE INITIATING FIRE FIGHTS THAT THEN ESCALATE. I POINTED OUT WE UNDERSTOOD, EVEN THOUGH WE DO NOT AGREE WITH, HIS REASONS FOR NOT WISHING TO RE-INTRODUCE UNTSO OBSERVERS OR SOME OTHER UN PRESENCE ALONG THE CEASE FIRE LINE. WE BELIVE, HOWEVER, THAT AN EFFECTIVE WAY IS NEEDED TO PREVENT THESE INCIDENTS FROM ESCALATING.

~~SECRET~~

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 3 RUGMKG3405A ~~SECRET~~

WHILE WE STRONGLY DISAPPROVE OF ISRAELI RETAILIATION, I COULD ONLY SAY REALISTICALLY THAT SO LONG AS TERRORISTS WERE OPERATING IN THE VALLEY AS AT PRESENT, THE ISRAELIS APPEARED LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO FIRE AT THEM.

3. KING GENERALLY ASSENTED TO MY COMMENTS AND INDICATED HE PLANNED FOR DAUD TO SERVE AS AN EFFECTIVE CONTACT WITH ISRAELIS TO PREVENT ESCALATION OF FIRE FIGHTS. SYMMES
GP-1.
BT

Not passed Tel Aviv by OC/T.

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

160
TELEGRAM

(5)

~~SECRET~~

PP RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 3373A 0431130
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 121115Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4616
STATE GRNC
BT

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-155
By us, NARA, Date 6-9-03

1968 FEB 12 AM 8 30
03509 *φ*

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3373

Rhetor

NODIS

REF: STATE 113656, TEL AVIV 2481

DEPT PASS TEL AVIV

SUBJ: ISRAEL-JORDAN

1. WE SUSPECT ANWAR NUSEIBEH MAY BE EMISSARY TO KING FROM ISRAELIS. ON FEB 11, BEFORE RECEIPT STATE 113656 (TRANSMITTING TEL AVIV REFTTEL), KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY RIFA'I TOLD US THAT NUSEIBEH HAD ARRIVED AMMAN PREVIOUS DAY. RIFA'I SAID NUSEIBEH HAD BROUGHT MESSAGE FROM ISRAELIS ASKING WHY COL MUHAMMAD DAUD, FORMER SENIOR JORDANIAN DELEGATE IJMAC, HAD NOT YET TAKEN UP LIAISON FUNCTION AT BRIDGE. RIFA'I DID NOT GIVE ANY FURTHER DETAILS OF NUSEIBEH'S TALKS BUT DID ADD THAT KING HAS SENT FURTHER MESSAGE TO DAUD IN NEW YORK, WHERE HE STILL ON SICK LEAVE, ASKING DAUD TO RETURN SOONEST. WE WILL ENQUIRE FURTHER ON NATURE OF NUSEIBEH TALKS HERE WITHOUT REVEALING INFORMATION FROM ISRAELIS OF ANY POSSIBLE MISSION.

2. I AM PLEASED BITAN AFFIRMED THAT TONE OF GOI'S MESSAGE WAS NOT THREATENING SINCE WE BELIEVE GOI THREAT OF LAST OCTOBER CONTRIBUTED TO STALLING PROGRESS TOWARDS MEETING OF TYPE ISRAELIS ARE APPARENTLY ONCE AGAIN PROPOSING. AT SAME TIME, I AM NOT SANGUINE THAT KING WILL FEEL HE CAN BE RESPONSIVE TO THIS ISRAELI OVERTURE UNTIL HE FEELS BETTER PROTECTED AGAINST POSSIBLE PUBLIC CRITICISM OF SUCH CONTACT. HE HAS NO FAITH SUCH TALKS CAN LONG BE KEPT SECRET AND IS CONVINCED THAT ONLY SUBSTANTIAL FORWARD MOVEMENT TOWARD SETTLEMENT UNDER JARRING MISSION CAN PROVIDE HIM SUFFICIENT PROTECTION. FOR THIS REASON I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT GOI HAS FOUND IT POSSIBLE COME OUT PLAINLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY IN FAVOR OF "ACCEPTANCE" OF NOV 22 SC RESOLUTION.

GP-1 SYMMES
BT

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Department of State

161
JORDAN
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

FRM/005
PP RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 3261A 0331745
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 021650Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4549
STATE GRNC
BT

CONTROL: 621Q
RECEIVED: February 2, 1968
1:52 p.m.

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3261

NODIS

REF: STATE 30887, 46871: ANCAN 518

SUBJ: ARMS FOR JORDAN/CARBINES FOR PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM

1. BY SEPARATE MESSAGE (AMMAN 3200) WE ARE RECOMMENDING FAVORABLE ACTION ON PUBLIC SECURITY DIRECTOR, MAJ GEN MA'AN ABU NUWAR, REQUEST FOR EARLY AIR SHIPMENT OF 1000 CARBINES AND 2500 CAL 38 REVOLVERS AND RELATED AMMUNITION AND SPARES WHICH HE STATES ARE URGENTLY NEEDED TO REINFORCE ANTI-TERRORIST INFILTRATION WORK.

2. PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM RECOMMENDED IN AMMAN 518 JUL 26, 1967 WAS APPROVED EXCEPT FOR WEAPONS COMPONENT WHICH ACCORDING TO STATE 30887 CAME UNDER ARMS BAN REQUIRING WHITE HOUSE DETERMINATION. SINCE BAN HAS BEEN LIFTED FOR JORDAN, WE HOPE PROGRAM CAN BE APPROVED AND INDICATED WEAPONS, AMMUNITION AND ACCESSORIES AIRSHIPPED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, UTILIZING RECENTLY REINSTITUTED JUNCTION RUN FLIGHT. SYMMES

GP-3
BT

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NLJ/RAC 02-121
By iso, NARA, Date 4-2-03

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162
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

5

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 3234A 0321600
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 011550Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4530
STATE GRNC
BT

CN: 209Q
1968 FEB 1 PM 1:56

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3234

NODIS

REF: STATE 106007 AND AMMAN 3233

IN LIGHT OF WIDE DISTRIBUTION PRESUMABLY BEING GIVEN ALL RESPONSES TO STATE 106007, WE REFRAINED FROM COMMENTING IN OUR 3233 UPON THE IMPLICATIONS OF KHAMMASH CURRENT ARMS DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON. THE RESULTS OF THESE TALKS WILL OF COURSE NEED TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN EVALUATING THE BUDGET ESTIMATES AND ANALYTICAL MATERIAL CONTAINED OUR TEL. IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR DETERMINING THE APPLICABILITY OF THESE CONGRESSIONAL AMENDMENTS, WE HOPE THAT THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF OUR DECISION ON ARMS SUPPLY TO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH JORDAN AND OUR AREA INTERESTS WILL BE BORNE IN MIND.

GP-3

SYMMES

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S-98001
By RG/SL, NARA, Date 8-14-01

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

WA
TELEGRAM

163 / 5

~~SECRET~~

7 8 8 4Q
JANUARY 31, 1968
5:59 A.M.

OO RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 3197A 0311005
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 310955Z JAN 68 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4508
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3197

FS

NODIS

SUBJECT: JORDAN ARMS

REF: STATE 106907

1. I TOOK OCCASION OF DELIVERY LETTER FROM SECRETARY TODAY (STATE 106935) TO SPEAK TO PRIMIN TALHOUNI ALONG LINES REFTEL. KING IS KEY FIGURE, HOWEVER, AND I APPRECIATE HAVING REFTEL SO I MAY BE PREPARED SPEAK WITH HIM IMMEDIATELY ON HIS RETURN. ANY FURTHER DETAILS WOULD BE MOST VALUABLE.

2. MEANWHILE, I RECOMMEND THAT GEN. KHAMMASH BE URGED TO SEND FURTHER PROGRESS REPORT TO HUSSEIN TO BE DELIVERED EITHER IN TEHRAN OR TO BE WAITING FOR KING ON HIS RETURN TO AMMAN. I CONSIDER THAT AT THIS POINT EVEN GENERAL REASSURANCES FROM KHAMMASH WOULD CARRY CONSIDERABLY MORE WEIGHT THAN ANY SIMILAR MESSAGE THAT I MIGHT PRESENT AT THIS STAGE.

GP-3 SYMMES
BT

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NLJ-S-98001
By RGJL, NARA, Date 8-14-01

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TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

164 / 5

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMG 3047A 0191330
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 191320Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4415
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3047

4537Q
1968 JAN 19 AM 9 02

NODIS

SUBJ: JORDANIAN REQUEST FOR HELP WITH ANTI-TERRORIST MEASURES

1. IN CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF JAN 9 MAJGEN MUHAMMAD RASIL KILANI, CHIEF OF GOJ GA GENERAL INTELIGENCE DIRECTORATE (GID), REQUESTED ASSISTANCE FROM THE USG IN THE FIELD OF TERRORIST INTERDICTION AND SUPPRESSION. GEN. KILANI STATED THAT THE GOJ WISHES TO ACCOMPLISH TWO THINGS: (A) COMPLETELY STOP THE FLOW OF TERRORISTS THROUGH JORDAN AND BREAK UP THEIR ORGANIZATIONS; AND (B) DO THIS IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT WILL NOT INCITE THE PEOPLE OF JORDAN (WHO ARE GENERALLY PRO-TERRORIST) TO INSURRECTION AGAINST THE REGIME.

PAGE 2 RUQMG 3047A ~~SECRET~~

2. GEN. KILANI SAID THAT ONE OF HIS MAIN CONCERNS IS THAT IF THE TERRORISTS BUILD AN EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, SOONER OR LATER THIS COULD BE USED AGAINST THE GOJ INSTEAD OF THE ISRAELIS. KING AND PM ALREADY BELIEVE THIS INTENT. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD BEEN EXPOSED TO SOME OF THE PHILSOPHY AND TACTICS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY WHEN HE HAD BEEN A STUDENT AT THE COUNTERINSURGENCY SCHOOL AT FORT BRAGG, HE FELT THAT BETWEEN THE US ARMY AND CIA THERE COULD BE DEVELOPED A SET OF TACTICS WHICH WOULD HELP JORDAN IN THIS PROBLEM.

3. RASOUL SAID THAT HE WAS NOT ASKING FOR "EXPERTS" TO BE SENT TDY FROM THE US, BUT RATHER ASKING FOR A THOROUGH REIEW OF THE JORDAN/ ISRAEL CEASE-FIRE LINE SITUATION WHICH WOULD MAKE SOME CONCRETE RECOM- MENDATIONS. HE EXPECTED THAT THE RECOMMENDATIONS MIGHT VERY WILL ENTAIL USE OF SOME NEW AND SOPHISTICATED TECHNICAL DEVICES, WHICH HE WOULD THEN REQUEST AND EMPLOY OPERATIONALLY. WHILE HE WOULD NOT SHRINK FROM USING ARMED FORCE WHEN NECESSARY, HE WOULD LIKE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE TO BE ABLE TO KEEP THE ANTI-TERRORIST COMPAIGN "UNDER COVER" AND AVOID ALERTING THE PEOPLE TO THE GOJ'S REAL INTENT.

4. EMBOFF AGREED TO REPORT KILANI'S REQUEST. EMBOFF LATER ASKED

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Authority FRUS Vol. xx # 54

By h NARA, Date 7/3/01

~~SECRET~~

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-2-, AMMAN 3047, JANUARY 19

RASOUL'S DEPUTY WHETHER GID WAS HAVING SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH VILLAGERS AND REFUGEES WHEN IT WORKED AGAINST VARIOUS TERRORIST GROUPS, AND HE ANSWERED THAT THE PROBLEM WAS QUITE SERIOUS AND PROMISED TO BECOME MORE SO IF THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT ISSUE REMAINED STAGNATED.

5. EMBOFF UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT RASOUL THINKING ALONG LINES OF INSTALLING ANTI-INFILTRATION DEVICES ON JORDANIAN SIDE OF THE CEASE-FIRE LINE UNDER SOME PRETEXT WHICH WOULD CONVINCED PEOPLE THAT THESE WERE PROTECTIVE DEVICES. HE ALSO SEEMED TO BE SEARCHING FOR NEW IDEAS TO USE IN CONVINCING THE POPULATION THAT ANTI-TERRORIST ACTIVITY WAS EITHER NOT GOING ON OR WAS IN FACT AIMED AT ANOTHER TARGET. RASOUL GAVE NO HINT TO SUGGEST HE WOULD CONSIDER COOPERATING WITH ISRAEL IN THIS ACTIVITY.

6. COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: (A) JORDANIAN LEADERSHIP HAS CONSISTENTLY MAINTAINED ANTI-TERRORIST POSTURE. BEST RECENT EVIDENCE THAT THIS POSTURE IS GENUINE HAS BEEN PROVIDED BY OBVIOUS DISMAY OVER EILAT INCIDENTS WHICH THEY FEAR CAN TRIGGER REPRISAL AGAINST AQABA, WITH BOTH POLITICAL AND LOGISTICAL DAMAGE TO JORDAN. AT THE SAME TIME, POPULAR SUPPORT FOR SPIRIT OF RESISTANCE PERSONIFIED BY INFILTRATORS

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 3047A ~~SECRET~~

IS GROWING ALONG WITH CONTINUED FRUSTRATION OF HOPES FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTION. CAPACITY OF LEADERSHIP TO ENFORCE ANTI-TERRORIST INFILTRATION CAMPAIGN IS CORRESPONDINGLY BEING ERODED. (C) ON TOP OF THIS COMPLICATION, PHYSICAL PROBLEMS OF POLICING CEASE-FIRE LINE WHICH PROVIDES

GOOD INFILTRATION ACCESS AT MANY POINTS IMPOSE PRACTICAL LIMITS ON WHAT CAN BE DONE EVEN WITH THE BEST OF WILL. (D) ALSO IT IS ONLY REALISTIC TO RECOGNIZE THAT WILL TO ENFORCE MEASURES WILL VARY DOWN THROUGH THE RANK AND FILE AND THAT THERE WILL BE LOOPHOLES. (E) GIVEN PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUED SLOW PROGRESS TOWARD A SOLUTION (ASSUMING CONTINUED PROGRESS), THE PROBLEM OF INFILTRATION AND TERRORISM PROMISES TO INCREASE. (F) WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO JUDGE THE PRACTICAL MERIT OF SOPHISTICATED INFILTRATION MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE EMPLOYED PURSUANT TO RASOUL'S THINKING. WE BELIEVE THIS SHOULD BE EVALUATED AND THAT

WE SHOULD RESPOND AS CONSTRUCTIVELY AS POSSIBLE TO THIS OVERTURE. OVER AND ABOVE THE POSSIBLE PRACTICAL EFFECTS ON REDUCING TERRORIST INFILTRATION, WE HAVE MAJOR CONCERN FOR REDUCING TENSIONS ON BOTH SIDES OVER ISSUE AND MOVES SUCH AS THIS MAY HELP. INCIDENTALLY, GOJ WOULD LIKELY FIND FUTURE USE FOR SUCH EQUIPMENT ALONG ANY PERMANENT FRONTIER WITH ISRAEL FOR SOME TIME TO COME AS WELL AS ALONG SYRIAN FRONTIER.

7 SUGGEST DEPT MAY WISH REPEAT TO EMBASSY TEL AVIV.

GP-2

SYMMES



Department of State

165
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

3

PP RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 3040A 0181530
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 181715Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4409
STATE GRNC

4229Q

1968 JAN 18 PM 1 08

BT

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3040

NODIS

ROGER CHANNEL

FOR INR HUGHES AND NEA BATTLE

SUBJ: TERRORIST PLANS TO ASSASSINATE ISRAELI OFFICIALS

1. AT THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION TODAY, KING HUSSEIN SAID, THERE WAS A VERY SENSITIVE MATTER THAT HE FELT HE SHOULD MENTION TO ME. HE THEN EXPLAINED THAT WHEN HE WAS IN SAUDI ARABIA LAST WEEK HE HAD HEARD FROM A "HIGH

PAGE 2, RUQMKG 3040A ~~SECRET~~
LEVEL" THAT "SOME OF THE ARAB TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS" ARE PLANNING THE ASSASSINATION OF CERTAIN ISRAELI OFFICIALS, WITH MOSHE DAYAN BEING A PRINCIPAL TARGET. (THE KING SAID HE HAD VOICED HIS STRONG DISAPPROVAL OF SUCH A COURSE OF ACTION, AND IMPLIED THAT HIS SOURCE ALSO DISAPPROVED OF THESE ALLEGED TERRORIST PLANS.) WITH SOME EMBARRASSMENT HE SAID HE LEFT IT TO ME AS TO HOW OR WHETHER THESE REPORTS SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE GOI. HE SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT HE IS OPPOSED TO TERRORISM IN GENERAL AND TO ASSASSINATION OF INDIVIDUALS IN PARTICULAR.

2. IN CONNECTION WITH TERRORISM, KING HUSSEIN SAID HIS INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IS THAT THE SITUATION IS BECOMING MUCH WORSE. MORE TERRORISTS ARE COMING FROM SYRIA AND OTHERS ARE COMING IN FROM GAZA AND IRAQ. HE HAS ISSUED ORDERS TO INSURE THAT THE SITUATION IN SOUTH JORDAN IS CLEANED UP COMPLETELY. HE BELIEVES THAT TERRORIST THREATS CAN BE HANDLED MORE EASILY IN THAT REGION BUT THE SITUATION OPPOSITE THE WEST BANK, REMAINS DIFFICULT. HE VOLUNTEERED

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, #50

By *h* NARA, Date 7-31-01

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-2-, AMMAN 3040, JANUARY 18

THAT ONE PURPOSE OF HIS FORTHCOMING TRIP TO BAGHDAD (WHICH WILL NOW BE DELAYED UNTIL EARLY FEBRUARY) WILL BE TO SPEAK TO THE IRAQIS ABOUT GETTING PLO AND TERRORIST ELEMENTS OUT OF JORDAN. HE NOTED PARENTHETICALLY THAT HE EXPECTS HE AND OTHERS MAY ALSO BECOME TERRORIST TARGETS.

3. COMMENT: FROM THE WAY THE KING SPOKE TO ME ABOUT THE TERRORIST PLANS AGAINST ISRAELI OFFICIALS, I JUDGE THAT HE HAD RECEIVED SOME FAIRLY HARD INFORMATION THAT SOME OF THE TERRORIST GROUPS MAY TRY HARD TO GET DAYAN. I LEAVE TO THE DEPT HOW BEST TO GET THIS INFORMATION CONVEYED TO THE ISRAELIS, WITHOUT COMPROMISING KING HUSSEIN AS SOURCE.

GP-1

SYMMES

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

166
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

(5)

PP RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 2997A 0131500
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 131455Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4383
STATE GRNC
BT

3 0 3 9Q
1968 JAN 13 AM 10:39

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2997

Seen by Mr. Rostow

NODIS

REF STATE 95444

SUBJ/ KHAMMASH VISIT

1. GENERAL KHAMMASH INFORMS US HE PLANS PROCEED FROM CAIRO JANUARY 14 TO LONDON AND DEPART LONDON JANUARY 17 FOR WASHINGTON. HE WILL BE PREPARED FOR FIRST BUSINESS SESSION JANUARY 19 (FRIDAY), TO CONTINUE THROUGH WORK WEEK BEGINNING JAN 22 UNTIL COMPLETION.

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 2997A ~~SECRET~~

2. KHAMMASH DOES NOT WANT JORDAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON OR OTHER MEMBERS OF EMBASSY INCLUDED IN BUSINESS MEETINGS; HE WISHES AVOID PUBLICITY OF ARRIVAL AND IS NOT NOTIFYING JORDAN EMBASSY WASHINGTON OF ARRIVAL TIME.

3. IN LONDON KHAMMASH HOPES MEET WITH STODDARD.

4. REQUEST DEPARTMENT, MAKE ANY APPROPRIATE DISTRIBUTION INFORMATION REGARDING KHAMMASH VISIT.

GP-3 SYMMES

BT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S-98001

By RG/SL, NARA, Date 8-14-01

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

167
TELEGRAM
6

~~SECRET~~

PP RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 2947A 0101545
ZNY SSSSS
P 101540Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4352
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2947

2130Q

1968 JAN 10 AM 11 33

NODIS

REF: STATE 95444

KHAMMASH TOLD EHUOFF JAN 9 THAT HE TENTATIVELY PLANNED DEPART JORDAN FOR WASHINGTON JAN 15 OR 16. KHAMMASH PRESENTLY ACCOMPANYING KING ON TWO DAY VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA AND IS ALSO TO GO WITH HUSSEIN TO CAIRO JAN 18. WE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH KHAMMASH AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOR MORE PRECISE DETAILS ON HIS WASHINGTON TRAVEL PLANS.

GP-3. DUNCAN

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S-98001

By RGD, NARA, Date 8-14-01

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

168
TELEGRAM

6

~~SECRET~~

PP RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 2938A 0101030
ZNY SSSSS
P 101025Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4349
STATE GRNC
BT

CONTROL : 2048Q
RECD : Jan. 10, 1968
6:49 A.M.

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2938

Robert

NODIS

SUBJECT: ARMS FOR JORDAN

1. KNOWLEDGE THAT KING HAS BEEN TOLD USG PREPARED TO RESUME ARMS SUPPLY TO JORDAN IS SPREADING IN AMMAN. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT NEWS ITEM WILL SHORTLY FIND WAY INTO BEIRUT PRESS AND ELSEWHERE.

2. SUGGEST DEPT MAY WISH CONSIDER EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT BY DEPT SPOKESMAN ABOUT OUR DECISION ON ARMS SUPPLY. IDEALLY ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD SIMPLY STATE DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN TO RESUME ARMS SUPPLY TO JORDAN DETAILS OF WHICH, IN ACCORDANCE OUR NORMAL PRACTICES, WE DO NOT DISCUSS. WORDING PARTICULARLY WHICH COULD BE INTERPRETED AS DOWNGRADING TYPE OR QANTITY OF ARMS TO BE SUPPLIED WOULD CREATE PROBLEMS.

3. WOULD BE HELPFUL IF ANNOUNCEMENT COULD INCLUDE

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 2938A ~~SECRET~~
FACT OUR DECISION TO RESUPPLY WAS TAKEN LAST WEEK. LATTER POINT WOULD INDICATE TO ARAB PUBLIC, WHICH VERY SENSITIVE ON THIS QUESTION, THAT MATTER HAD NOT BEEN CONCERTEED BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND PRIMIN ESHKOL DURING THEIR JANUARY 7-8 MEETINGS.

4. WILL APPRECIATE GUIDANCE AND ADVICE OF DEPARTMENT'S PLANNING IN THIS CONNECTION.

GP-1. DUNCAN
BT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S-98001

By RG/ST, NARA, Date 8-14-01

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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6 169

OO. RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 2913A 090658
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 090650Z JAN 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4337
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2913

1741 Q
Jan 9, 1968
7:08 A.M.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-155
By is, NARA, Date 6-9-03

NODIS

REF: STATE 94729

DELIVER TO ACTION OFFICER OPENING OF BUSINESS JANUARY 9

1. UPON RECEIPT REFTTEL ABOUT NOON JAN 7 I SOUGHT IMMEDIATE AUDIENCE WITH KING HUSSEIN (WHO WAS IN MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER AND SENIOR SECURITY OFFICIALS) AND READ HIM QUOTED ORAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT. HUSSEIN EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR MESSAGE, BUT INDICATED HE HAD SOME RESERVATIONS REGARDING POSSIBLE TRIP BY GENL KHAMVASH AND THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO GET IN TOUCH WITH ME LATER. FROM WHAT WAS SAID DURING OUR BRIEF MEETING,

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 2913A ~~SECRET~~
AND IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATIONS EMBOFFS AND I HAD WITH OFFICIALS CLOSE TO KING INCLUDING GENL KHAMMASH, IT BECAME CLEAR THIS MORNING THAT IN A MEETING WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR JAN 6 HUSSEIN HAD AGREED RECEIVE HIGH LEVEL SOVIET MILITARY DELEGATION TO ARRIVE JAN 11.

2. I WAS FINALLY ABLE TO ARRANGE FURTHER MEETING WITH KING THIS EVENING (JAN 8). IN LONG CONVERSATION THAT TRNSPIRED, IT BECAME CLEAR THAT HUSSEIN HAD BY JAN 5 WRITTEN OFF POSPOECTS OF FAVORABLE RESPONSE BY US TO WHAT HE CONSIDERS HIS LEGITIMATE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND HAD MADE DECISION IN OWN MIND THAT HE HAD NO REAL OPTION BUT TO GO SOVIET SO FAR AS MILITARY REQUIREMENTS WERE CONCERNED.

3. IN OUR DISCUSSION THIS EVENING I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY EMBOFF WHO HAS KNOWN KING FOR SOME YEARS. (EMBOFF SAID LATER HE HAS NEVER SEEN HUSSEIN SO UPSET OR SO

~~SECRET~~

PAGE TWO AMMAN 2913, Jan. 9, 1968 NODIS

UNRESPONSIVE TO LOGICAL ARGUMENTATION.) WE REVIEWED LONG AND HOSRT-TERM DANAGERS TO BOTH OUR INTERESTS FROM SOVIET ARMS SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH JORDAN. KING MAINTAINED THAT US RESPONSE HAD COME TOO LATE AND HE HAD NOW GONE TOO FAR TO CANCEL THE SOVEIT MISSION. (A FORMULATION OF THE JORDANIAN'S POSITION RECEIVED FROM THE KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY BEFORE THE MEETING WAS THAT IF WORD HAD BEEN RECEIVED OF THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO ON SHIPMENT OF ARMS TO JORDAN BY JAN 5 THE DATE OF THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR'S DEFINITIVE PROPOSAL- HUSSEIN'S HANDS WOULD HAVE BEEN FREE TO SEND GENL KHAMMASH TO WASHINGTON BY JAN 10.) IN OUR DISUCSSION I EMPHASIYJD AMONG OTHER THINGS THAT WE WERE NOT AWARE OF A DEADLINE FOR OUR REPLY AND THAT SINCE HTE KING NOW HAD WHAT HE WANTED FROM US HIS REACTION WOULD BE SUBJECT TO SERIOUS MISINTERPREATION. HUSSEIN FINALLY REAFFIRMED HIS UNDERTAKING AND POSITION THAT HE HAD NO DESIRE OR INTENTION PROCURE ANY ARMS FROM SOVIET BLOC SO LONG AS JORDAN WAS ABLE TO OBTAIN FROM FREE WORLD SOURCES IN GENERAL AND FROM US IN PARTICULAR ARMS FOR LEGITIMATE SELF DEFNESE AND SECURITY.

4. KING THEN SUMMONED PRIMIN TALHOUNI AND ZAID RIFA'I. AFTER EXTENSIVE PRIVATE CONSULATION WITH THEM AND KHAMMASH IN ANOTHER ROOM, HE TOLD ME HE HAD DIRECTED THAT THE SOVIETS BE ASKED TO POSTPONE THEIR MISSION AND THAT HE WOULD ACCEPT OUR INVITATION TO SEND GENL KHAMMASH TO WASHINGTON. HE SAID HE WAS UNABLE TO FIX A DATE IMMEDIATELY BUT UNDERTOOK TO LET US KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, WITH THE EXPECTATION THAT KHAMMASH WOULD ARRIVE AS CLOSE TO JAN 10 AS POSSIBLE.

5. IN DISCUSSIONS LATE THIS AFTERNOON WITH ZAID RIFA'I, THE KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY, AND SUBSEQUENTLY IN THE MEETING WITH THE KING IN WHICH GENL KHAMMASH PARTICIPATED, THE JORDANIANS EMPHASIZED THAT GENL KHAMMAHS'S " EMERGENCY LIST" OF LAST AUGUST HAD BEEN A LIST OF PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS AT THAT TIME BUT THAT IT IS NOW INCOMPLETE. HAD DELIVERIES BEGUN IN OCTOBER AS ORIGINALLY EXPECTED IT WOULD HAVE HAD A GREAT PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT. NOW, KHAMMASH STRESSED, HE MUST ADDRESS HIMSELF TO CERTAIN BASIC OVERALL REQUIREMENTS. WHILE HE DID NOT WISH TO BE SPECIFIC ON THOSE IN THE CONVERSATION THIS EVENING, WE UNDERSTAND HE HASIN MIND REPLACEMENTN OF A TLEAST SOOME OF HIS JUNE BATTLE LOSSES OF TANKS (SEE USDAO JAN 68) AND A BEGINNING ON HIS SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT PROGRAM. JORDANIN TANK LOSSES IN JUNE WERE OVER 150. ON THE BASIS OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION WE JUDGE THAT WHAT KHAMMASH HAS IN MIND IS SOMETHING BETWEEN 50 AND 75 M43S. ON AIRCRAFT, THE JORDANINSIARE NO LONGER INTERESTED IN

~~SECRET~~

PAGE THREE AMMAN 2913, JAN. 9, 1948 NODIS

THE F-104 AND ARE TALKING ABOUT EITHER THE LIGHTNING OR MIRAGE. AT THIS STAGE HE WILL PROBABLY BE LOOKING TO THE US MAINLY FOR SUPPORT ON THE AIRCRAFT QUOTATION

AND, PERHAPS, A LIQUIDATION OF THE 104 DEAL. IN THE CONVERSATION TONIGHT KHAMMASH ALSO EXPRESSED GREAT INTEREST IN ADDITIONAL ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN CAPABILITY.

PAGE 6. RUOMKG 291E A ~~SECRET~~

6. IN SUMMARY, THE PASSAGE OF TIME HAS MADE INSUFFICIENT THE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS ON ARMS WITH WHICH THE JORDANIANS WERE PREPARED TO LIVE. THE REACTION TODAY OF THE KING AND HIS ADVISORS INCLUDING THE PRIMIN CONVINCED ME THAT IN FACT THE KING HAD GIVEN UP ON RECEIVING AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE AND HAD TAKEN THE BASIC DECISION TO GO TO THE SOVIETS-- A DECISION WHICH HE HAS AT LEAST TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED. OUR DISCUSSION WITH GENL KHAMMASH WILL I THINK BE DECISIVE AS TO WHETHER THE SOVIETS HAVE ANOTHER CHANCE TO TAIN ENTREE HERE OR NOT. PHASING AND STAGING OF DELIVERIES CAN, WE BELIEVE, IT WILL BE WORKED OUT BUT WE MUST BE PREPARED TO COMMIT OURSELVES ALONG THE LINES OUTLINED ABOVE. THE KING HAS FULLY REAFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT THAT IF HE CAN BE ASSURED THAT WHAT HE CONSIDERS LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS ARE TO BE MET HE WILL MAKE NO PROCUREMENT FROM THE SOVIET BLOC.

GP-1 SYMMES

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OO RUEHC
DE RUQMG 2832A 3641830
ZNY SSSS ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2832

0 6 9 3 7Q
1967 DEC 30 PM 330

NODIS

REF STATE 91343, AMMAN 2831

1. I SAW KING HUSSEIN THIS AFTERNOON TO TAKE UP REFTTEL. I TOLD HIM I HAD ANOTHER PERSONAL MESSAGE FOR HIM FROM THE PRESIDENT AND EXPLAINED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD LIKE ASSURANCES WE WOULD NOT SUBSEQUENTLY BE FACED WITH JORDAN'S ACCEPTANCE OF SOVIET ARMS OFFERS.
2. KING RESPONDED THAT PROVIDING SUCH ASSURANCES GAVE HIM NO DIFFICULTY AT ALL. THIS HAD ALWAYS BEEN HIS UNDERSTANDING OF ARMS ARRANGEMENTS WITH US. HE HAS NO DESIRE TO BUY ARMS

PAGE TWO RUQMG 2832A ~~SECRET~~
FROM THE SOVIETS PROVIDED HIS LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS CAN BE MET BY THE UNITED STATES. HE SAID HE REALIZED THAT RESUMPTION OF SHIPMENTS WOULD NOT "BRING TANKS TO JORDAN IMMEDIATELY". BUT HE DID NEED TO HAVE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THE USG IS PREPARED TO DO FOR JORDAN. IN GIVING US ASSURANCES ABOUT NOT GOING TO THE SOVIETS HE DID NOT WANT TO BE LEFT IN POSITION OF HAVING SOME OF HIS ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS UNSATISFIED.

3. I RESPONDED THAT SHIPMENTS TO BE RESUMED INITIALLY WOULD INCLUDE SOME OF ITEMS ON GENERAL KHAMMASH'S "EMERGENCY LIST." I SAID I SAW THIS AS AN IMPORTANT BEGINNING. IT WOULD REMOVE PRESSURES FROM HIM AND WOULD GIVE US ALL TIME TO SEE WHAT SUCCESS JARRING WOULD HAVE. WE WOULD ALL GAIN TIME TO FORM A BETTER PICTURE OF WHAT KIND OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT JORDAN WOULD NEED IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

4. THE KING SAID HE WOULD WANT IN ANY CASE TO HAVE GENERAL KHAMMASH PROCEED AT ONCE TO THE US TO DISCUSS JORDAN'S REQUIREMENTS. I SAID I RECOGNIZED HE WOULD WANT KHAMMASH

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, # 29
By M NARA, Date 7-31-01

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-2- 2832 FROM AMMAN DECEMBER 30, 1967 (NODIS)

PAGE THREE RUQMKG 2832A ~~SECRET~~
TO DISCUSS JORDAN'S REQUIREMENTS IN DETAIL AT SOME POINT,
BUT I BELIEVED IT SHOULD BE PUT OFF UNTIL THINGS HAD SETTLED
A BIT, UNTIL WE COULD SEE WHERE WE STOOD.

5. AT THIS POINT KING ASKED IF I COULD WAIT WHILE HE CALLED
KHAMMASH TO THE PALACE TO JOIN OUR DISCUSSION.
WHEN KHAMMASH ARRIVED WE WENT OVER MOST OF THE SAME GROUND
AGAIN WITH KHAMMASH EMPHASIZING THAT HE COULD NOT KEEP THE
ARMY LOYAL TO THE KING IF JORDAN WAS ONLY TO BE PROVIDED
WITH A "FEW SPARES" AND OTHER EQUIPMENT FROM HIS "EMERGENCY
LIST." HE WAS NOT ASKING FOR ALL OF JORDAN'S NEEDS AT ONCE,
BUT HE BELIEVED HIS MAJESTY WOULD HAVE TO HAVE A CLEAR UNDER-
STANDING OF WHAT THE USG PROPOSES TO DO BEYOND THE "EMERGENCY
LIST." DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS COULD BE POSTPONED, BUT JORDAN
WAS FACED WITH A SUMMIT MEETING ON JAN 17 AND HAD
TO BE IN A POSITION TO STATE AUTHORITATIVELY THAT ITS
NEEDS WERE GOING TO BE MET BY THE USG. REVIVAL OF THE UAC
IS ON THE SUMMIT AGENDA, AND HE (KHAMMASH) HAS ALREADY BEEN
TOLD THAT JORDAN AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES AT THE SUMMIT
WILL BE EXPECTED TO INDICATE HOW THEIR RE-EQUIPPING IS

PAGE FOUR RUQMKG 2832A ~~SECRET~~
BEING ACCOMPLISHED. BEYOND THIS, THERE IS THE SERIOUSLY
DETERIORATING MORALE OF THE JORDAN ARMY TO BE CONSIDERED.
THEY HAD TO HAVE AN IDEA OF WHAT COMES AFTER THE "EMERGENCY
LIST."

6. DISCUSSION WENT BACK AND FORTH OVER THE SAME GROUND.
THE KING AT ONE POINT INTRODUCED THE ISRAELI F-4 PHANTOM
REQUEST AND SAID HE EARNESTLY HOPED THE USG WOULD NOT TAKE
THIS STEP. IN THE COURSE OF OUR CONVERSATION I, OF COURSE,
EMPHASIZED THAT BUYING SOVIET ARMS MIGHT HELP TO MEET A
SHORT-TERM PROBLEM BUT WOULD IN ITS TRAIN BRING A HOST OF
LONG-TERM PROBLEMS. THE KING'S COMMENT WAS "I AM SORRY TO
HAVE TO SAY THAT YOU WILL HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE IF THAT
HAPPENS."

7. OUR DISCUSSION WAS CONCLUDED WITH THE KING SUGGESTING AN
ORAL MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT. WE WENT OVER THE SUBSTANCE
OF SUCH A MESSAGE SEVERAL TIMES, AND IT HAS BEEN TRANS-
MITTED SEPARATELY.

~~SECRET~~

-3- 2832 FROM AMMAN DECEMBER 30, 1967 (NODIS)

PAGE FIVE RUQMKG 2832A ~~SECRET~~

8. COMMENT: I TRIED THROUGHOUT CONVERSATION TO TALK THE KING INTO GOING ALONG WITH A GENERAL STATEMENT OF RESUMPTION OF SHIPMENTS AT THIS TIME AND PUTTING OFF A KHAMMAS VISIT UNTIL WE COULD SEE WHERE THINGS WERE GOING. BOTH HE AND KHAMMASH WERE PREPARED FOR SUCH MOVES ON MY PART AND HAD NO INTENTION OF LEAVING THINGS FUZZY. ALTHOUGH THEY DID NOT SAY SO, IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT KHAMMASH'S VISIT WOULD MEAN MUCH TO THEM PSYCHOLOGICALLY. IT WOULD BE A SIGN THAT WE HAD MOVED BACK TOGETHER AND WOULD BE SO INTERPRETED BY JORDANIANS AND OTHER ARABS. BOTH THE KING AND KHAMMASH MADE A SPECIAL POINT OF EMPHASIZING "LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS," AND THEY REITERATED STATEMENTS MADE IN OTHER RECENT CONVERSATIONS TO THE EFFECT THAT IF JARRING IS SUCCESSFUL, THEIR LONGER TERM MILITARY REQUIREMENTS WOULD CHANGE. ALTHOUGH THEY WERE FAIRLY INSISTENT THAT THEY WILL NEED TO KNOW BEFORE JANUARY 17 WHAT WE ARE PREPARED TO DO (WITH THE IMPLICATION THAT THIS MEANS THE LONGER TERM), WE BELIEVE THAT DISCUSSIONS WITH KHAMMASH NEED NOT TAKE THE FORM OF A COMPLETE LONG-TERM STATEMENT OF FORCE GOALS AND EQUIPMENT. IT SEEMS TO US THAT IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE KING AND KHAMMASH IF

PAGE SIX RUQMKG 2832A ~~SECRET~~

WE APPROACHED THE PROBLEM IN STAGES. WE COULD RESUME SHIPMENT OF OUR RECOMMENDED LIST NOW AND TRY TO AGREE WITH KHAMMASH ON MAKING UP SOME OF JORDAN'S OTHER LOSSES AND DEFICIENCIES IN A SERIES OF STAGES. THIS WILL ENABLE BOTH SIDES TO BUY TIME AND PROVIDES, WE BELIEVE, SUFFICIENT SCOPE FOR KHAMMASH'S DISCUSSIONS TO SATISFY THE KING BEFORE THE SUMMIT MEETING.

9. THE OBJECT OF THIS WHOLE EXERCISE HAS BEEN TO BUY TIME, TO MAINTAIN OUR POSITION HERE WHILE A MIDDLE EASTERN SETTLEMENT IS BEING WORKED OUT. THIS OBJECT IS STILL IMPORTANT TO US, AND THEREFORE WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT KHAMMASH BE INVITED TO PROCEED TO WASHINGTON AS REQUESTED BY THE KING.

GP-1.

SYMMES

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OO RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 2831A 3641545
ZNY SSSSS
O 301545Z DEC 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2831

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1967 DEC 30 PM 3 27

Pastor

NODIS

REF STATE 91434

1. WHEN I SAW HIM TODAY TO DISCUSS REFTEL (CONVERSATION REPORTED SEPARATELY), KING HUSSEIN REQUESTED FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE BE PASSED TO PRESIDENT ON URGENT BASIS:
2. QTE I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN A FRIEND OF THE WEST AND I HAVE NO DESIRE TO BUY ARMS FROM THE SOVIET UNION. FOR THIS REASON I HAVE WAITED SOME MONTHS FOR THE US TO DECIDE WHETHER IT WILL RESUME THE SUPPLY OF THE LEGITIMATE ARMS REQUIREMENTS OF MY COUNTRY. I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE THAT WE

PAGE TWO RUQMKG 2831A ~~SECRET~~
HAVE BEEN PATIENT. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT IF THE USG WILL SUPPLY OUR NEEDS, I HAVE NO INTENTION OF BUYING ANY OF OUR MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM THE SOVIET UNION. IN MAKING THIS ASSURANCE I HAVE TO ASSURE THAT IN DUE COURSE OUR LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS WILL BE MET. IT IS IMPERATIVE FOR ME THAT WE REACH A GENERAL UNDERSTANDING ON THESE LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS PRIOR TO THE SUMMIT MEETING ON JANUARY 17 SINCE AT THAT TIME I SHALL HAVE TO ASSURE THE OTHER ARAB STATES THAT OUR ARMS NEEDS WILL BE MET. GIVEN THE TIME FACTOR, I SEE NO OTHER WAY TO REACH THE NECESSARY UNDERSTANDINGS THAN TO SEND MY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GENERAL AMER KHAMMASH TO WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY TO DISCUSS OUR REQUIREMENTS WITH THE APPROPRIATE AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. IN THIS WAY I SHALL BE ABLE TO PUT OFF DISCUSSING MY MILITARY REQUIREMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IF YOU PREFER, WE SEE NO NEED FOR ANY PUBLICITY CONCERNING GENERAL KHAMMASH'S VISIT. I HOPE ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIM TO PROCEED TO WASHINGTON CAN BE MADE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. UNQTE.
GP-1. SYMMES

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS. Vol. XX, #29, footnote 3
By *lf* NARA, Date 7-31-01



Department of State

#6
172
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PP RUEHC
DE RUOMKG 2768A 3571630
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 231625Z DEC 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4256
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2768

CONTROL: 5717Q
RECD: DECEMBER 23, 1967
12:00 P.M.

NODIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY BATTLE FROM AMBASSADOR

SUBJECT: JORDAN ARMS

1. THERE SEEMS NO QUESTION THAT FIRST OF YEAR IS BECOMING A MAGIC DATE FOR KING HUSSEIN AND THAT HE IS WORKING HIMSELF UP TO A DECISION. RECOGNIZING WE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO PRODUCE A DECISION BY END OF NEXT WEEK, I HAVE BEEN CASTING ABOUT FOR WAYS TO INFLUENCE HIM NOT TO ACT PRECIPITATELY AND OPT FOR SOVIET ARMS. IN THIS CONNECTION IT OCCURRED TO ME WE MIGHT WANT TO CONSIDER THE USEFULNESS OF STIMULATING AN APPROACH FROM KING FAISAL TO HUSSEIN.

2. FROM THE STANDPOINT OF JORDAN, IT SEEMS TO ME WE HAVE VERY LITTLE TO LOSE FROM ENLISTING FAISAL, PARTICULARLY IF WE DO SO IN A CONTEXT OF MOVING TOWARDS RESUMPTION OF ARMS SHIPMENTS TO JORDAN. WE HAVE MADE VERY CLEAR TO

PAGE 2 RUOMKG 2768A ~~SECRET~~
HUSSEIN AND TO JORDANIAN OFFICIALS GENERALLY OUR CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE SAUDIS SHARE OUR CONCERN, AND JORDANIANS KNOW THAT WE ARE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH FAISAL ON THIS GENERAL SUBJECT. HOWEVER, THERE HAVE BEEN ENOUGH PUBLIC REPORTS THAT JORDAN MAY BE ON THE VERGE OF ASKING FOR SOVIET ARMS TO JUSTIFY SAUDI INTEREST AT THIS TIME. FINALLY, THE SAUDI PURSE STRINGS WOULD OBVIOUSLY SHOW, AND THIS WOULD BE STRONG PRESSURE WITHOUT HAVING TO BE TOO APPARENT.

3. IF IT WERE DECIDED TO ASK FAISAL TO MAKE SUCH AN APPROACH, I WOULD HOPE, OF COURSE, THAT IT COULD BE REPRESENTED AS FAISAL'S OWN INITIATIVE AND NOT SIMPLY AN EXPRESSION OF OUR PROMPTING.

GP-1. SYMMES
BT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S-98001
By RGDL, NARA, Date 8-14-01



Department of State

173
TELEGRAM

#5

~~SECRET~~

PP RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 2756A 3571345
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 231335Z DEC 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4249
STATE GRNC
BT

057079

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2756

367 DEC 25 AM 10 25

NODIS

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION

REF: AMMAN 2707

RE PARA 9 REFTEL WOULD APPRECIATE DEPT'S GUIDANCE.

SYMMES
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

~~SECRET~~

NLJ-S-98001
By RG/L, NARA, Date 8-14-01

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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174
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~~SECRET~~

Action

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 2743A 3551628
ZNY SSSSS ZZH

Info

R 211621Z DEC 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4247
STATE GRNC

1967 DEC 21 PM 2 19

BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2743

052179

NODIS

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION

1. HAVING HEARD NOTHING DIRECTLY FROM ANY GOJ OFFICIALS WITH REGARD TO TALKS WITH JARRING, I CALLED ON ABDUL MUNIM RIFAI TODAY.
2. RIAI SAID HE HAD NOT CALLED ME FOR BRIEFING BECAUSE TALKS WITH JARRING HAD FOLLOWED COURSE HE HAD OUTLINED WHEN HE LAST SAW ME. HE THEN GAVE ME A RUN DOWN CONSISTENT WITH REPORT CONTAINED IN AMMAN 2707 NODIS, ADDING THAT HE AND OTHER GOJ OFFICIALS WHO HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE TALKS WITH JARRING WERE ENCOURAGED. HE MENTIONED THAT THE GOJ WAS UNHAPPY THAT LEBANON AND THE UAR HAD GOTTEN INTO SUBSTANCE WITH JARRING BUT SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE ANY DAMAGE HAD BEEN DONE. LEBANESE KNMIN HAKIM IS NOW TRYING TO SET UP A MEETING WITH FONMIN RIAD AND RIFAI IN BEIRUT ON JAN WE PRIOR TO RESUMING A ROUND OF SUBSTANTIVE TALKS WITH JARRING BEFORE THE JAN 17 SUMMIT. RIFAI SAID HE HOPES TO PERSUADE HAKIM AND RIAD TO PREVENT INFORMATION LEAKS, AS WELL AS TO PROMOTE BETTER COORDINATION ON SUBSTANCE TO BE DISCUSSED WITH JARRING. HE COMMENTED THAT RIAD AND HAKIM TEND TO ADOPT TOO INFLEXIBLE A NEGOTIATING POSTURE, AND EXPRESSED DISPLEASURE THAT BOTH HAKIM AND RIAD HAD SEEN FIT TO TAKE POSITIONS ON THE JERUSALEM QUESTION, FOR EXAMINE, WHEREAS HE, RIFAI, HAD NOT RAISED IT BUT HAD LEFT IT TO JARRING TO MENTION AS A POSSIBLE PROBLEM.
3. RIFAI MENTIONED THAT HIS MAIN CONCERN AT THE MOMENT IS TIMING OF FURTHER TALKS WITH JARRING. HE HAD HEARD ON THE RADIO THIS MORNCR LJTHAT JARRING MAY BE GOING BACK TO NEW YORK ALSO SPENDING CHRISTMAS HOLIDAYS IN NICOSIA. THIS BOTHERED HIM BECAUSE HE HOPES JARRING WILL BE ABLE TO SEE UAR OFFICIALS AGAIN AFTER THE JANUARYF FONMIN MEETING IN BEIRUT AND BEFORE BREZHNEV ARRIVES IN CAIRO (JAN 6). BREZHNEV IS TO BE IN UAR FOR EIGHT DAYS, ANDWOULD MEAN THAT UAR OFFICIALS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S-98001

~~SECRET~~

By RGDL NARA, Date 8-14-01

~~SECRET~~

-2- AMMAN 2743, DECEMBER 21

WOULD HAVE NO TIME FOR SUBSTANTIVE TALKS WITH JARRING BEFORE THE SUMMIT UNLESS JARRING GETS THERE BEFORE BREZHNEV'S ARRIVAL. HE ASKED ME TO LET HIM KNOW ANYTHING YOU MIGHT LEARN FROM USUN NEW YORK ABOUT JARRING'S RETURN TO THE AREA.

4. WE RECOGNIZE FOREGOING INFORMATION NOT HIGHLY SENSITIVE BUT, PENDING DEPT'S ADVICE ON HANDLING JARRING MISSION TRAFFIC, WE ARE KEEPING OUR MSGS CONTAINING PARTICIPANT'S VIEWS UNDER NODIS CAPTION.

GP-1 SYMMES.

BT

~~SECRET~~

WH

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

~~SECRET~~

2

Action

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 2707A 3540750
ZNY SSSSS ZZK
R 200745Z DEC 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4224
STATE GRNC
BT

CONTROL: 4786Q
RECEIVED: Dec. 20, 1967
4:30AM

Info

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2707

NODIS

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

1. FOLLOWING IS REPORT ON JARRING TALKS IN BEIRUT AND AMMAN BASED ON AND OFFICIAL ON MEMORANDUM SUMMARIZING JARRING TALKS HERE. 3.3(b)(1)

2. JARRING-HAKIM CONTACTS. LEBANESE FONMIN GEORGE HAKIM HAS INFORMED JORDANIANS THAT HE WENT INTO DETAIL WITH JARRING ON SEVERAL MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE. HAKIM STATED HE HAD ASSERTED TO JARRING THAT: (A) " WITHDRAWAL" OF ISRAELI FORCES HAD TO BE TO JUNE 4 LINES BUT QUALIFIED THIS WITH

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 2707A ~~SECRET~~
OBSERVATION THAT IF THIS PROVED IMPOSSIBLE THEN WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE " SUBSTANTIALLY" TO THOSE LINES. (B) AS FAR AS LEBANON WAS CONCERNED, THE PASSAGE OF ISRAELI SHIPPING THROUGH SUEZ WAS ACCEPTABLE BUT HE DOUBTED THE EGYPTIANS WOULD FEEL THE SAME. (C) JERUSALEM WOULD BE AN ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT PROBLEM BUT SOME SORT OF COMPROMISE WAS VITAL.

3. IN ALL CASES HAKIM HAD, IN GOJ'S OPINION, GONE BEYOND UAR-GOL-GOJ AGREEMENT TO STICK TO GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN FONMINS' INITIAL ROUND WITH JARRING. THE JORDANIANS HAVE REPORTEDLY INFORMED HAKIM THAT FOREGOING STATEMENTS DID NOT REPRESENT AGREED POSITIONS AND THAT HE HAD ERRED IN GETTING INTO SUBSTANCE SO SOON, ESPECIALLY ON MATTERS IN WHICH LEBANON WAS NOT DIRECTLY CONCERNED. JORDANIANS, HOWEVER, ACKNOWLEDGE PRIVATELY THAT THEY ARE NOT OVERLY CONCERNED ABOUT THIS BECAUSE THEY CONSIDER LEBANESE VIEWS NOT TO BE PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT AND BELIEVE JARRING VIEWS THEM THE SAME WAY.

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 15-35

By ch NARA, Date 3-10-15

~~SECRET~~

-2-Page, AMMAN 2707, December 20, 1967 NODIS

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 2707A ~~SECRET~~

4. JARRING-GOJ CONTACTS. JARRING'S FIRST CONTACTS IN AMMAN WERE CHARACTERIZED BY AN INFORMAL "GETTING ACQUAINTED" APPROACH. NEITHER HE NOR THE JORDANIANS WITH WHOM HE TALKED PRESSED FOR ANY SPECIFICS ON ITEMS FOR A POSSIBLE SETTLEMENT.

5. THE JORDANIAN PRESENTATION STRESSED THAT (A) JORDAN IS INTERESTED IN PEACE, (B) JORDAN ACCEPTS THE RIGHT OF ALL TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY, (C) JORDAN IS PREPARED TO COOPERATE 100 PER CENT WITH JARRING IN ACHIEVING THIS PEACE, (D) THE UN RESOLUTION CONTAINS ELEMENTS NECESSARY FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION AND IF IT IS IMPLEMENTED FAIRLY IT SHOULD PRODUCE THE KIND OF PEACE WHICH ALL PARTIES WANT. (E) JORDAN'S SECURITY FACES A GREATER THREAT THAN DOES ISRAELI SECURITY. FOR THIS REASON, IT IS MORE ANXIOUS THAN ANYONE TO IMPLEMENT A RESOLUTION WHICH OFFERS THE PROSPECTS OF PEACE. (F) IF ISRAELIS FEEL THE SAME WAY, REACHING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE SIMPLE.

6. JARRING COMMENTED THAT HIS TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS HAD GIVEN HIM EVERY INDICATION THEY WERE JUST AS ANXIOUS

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 2707B ~~SECRET~~

FOR PEACE AS WAS JORDAN. THEY ALSO PROMISED TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH HIM IN HIS MISSION. HE STATED THAT WHILE THE ISRAELIS DESIRE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS THEY HAD TOLD HIM THEY REALIZED THESE WERE NOT POSSIBLE AT THIS STAGE.

7. AT THE END OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE JORDANIAN LEADERSHIP, JARRING NOTED THEY HAD NOT BROUGHT UP THE SUBJECT OF JERUSALEM. HE SAID HE PRESUMED THIS WAS BECAUSE THE JORDANIANS CONSIDERED THAT THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES THEY HAD OUTLINED TO HIM APPLIED TO JERUSALEM AS WELL AS TO ALL OTHER PARTS OF THE TERRITORY JORDAN HAD HELD ON JUNE 4. THE JORDANIANS CONFIRMED THAT HIS UNDERSTANDING ON THIS WAS CORRECT. JARRING'S FINAL OBSERVATION WAS "THERE IS NOTHING YOU HAVE SAID SO FAR WHICH I CAN TAKE ISSUE".

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-3-PAGE, AMMAN 2707, December 20, 1967 NODIS

8. THE JORDANIANS EXPECT JARRING TO MAKE ONE MORE ROUND OF CONTACTS BEFORE THE ARAB SUMMIT NOW SCHEDULED FOR JAN 17. THEY VISUALIZE SEVERAL FURTHER ROUNDS BEING

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 2707A ~~SECRET~~
NECESSARY, WITH JARRING EACH TIME GETTING DEEPER INTO MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE. JARRING IN THIS ROUND GAVE NO INDICATION THAT ISRAELIS HAD MADE ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS OR SUGGESTED ANY PARTICULAR AGENDA FOR THIS OR FUTURE ROUNDS.

9. COMMENT: BEARING IN MIND JORDANIAN SENSITIVITIES ABOUT LEAKS OF INFORMATION CONCERNING THE JARRING MISSION (AMMAN 2670) WE SUGGEST DEPT MAY WISH TO CONSIDER SETTING UP A SPECIAL SERIES OF MESSAGES BEARING ON THIS MISSION. WE LEAVE TO DEPT'S DISCRETION FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF THIS MESSAGE AND REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS REHANDLING OF SUBSEQUENT MESSAGES.

GP-3 SYMMES

BT

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

176
6

~~SECRET~~

Action

Info

RR RUEHCR
DE RUQMKG 2353A 326855
ZNY SSSSS ZW
R 210850Z NOV 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN - CORRECTED COPY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4044
STATE GRNC
BT

5947Q
1967. NOVEMBER 23 AM 12:38

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2353

NODIS

REF: STATE 68321

SUBJECT: ARMS FOR JORDAN

1. DURING MY CALL ON CROWN PRINCE ON 21ST, HE ASKED IF I COULD GIVE HIM ANY INFORMATION REGARDING U.S. ARMS FOR JORDAN AS RESULT KING'S RECENT TRIP. I SAID I COULD ADD NOTHING NEW TO WHAT HAD BEEN SAID TO KING DURING HIS WASHINGTON VISIT. (I HAD NOT SEEN REFTTEL YESTERDAY.) I HAD

HEARD SECRETARY MCNAMARA TELL KING HUSSEIN AT DINNER ON NOV 8 THAT WE REMAIN SYMPATHETIC TO JORDAN'S REQUEST FOR SOME ARMS. WE HAVE VERY SPECIAL PROBLEM, HOWEVER, IN SUPPLYING ARMS TO JORDAN AT THIS TIME BECAUSE OF CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN AID BILL. WE WILL KEEP JORDANIAN REQUEST UNDER CONTINUING SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION IN HOPE OF MOVING FAVORABLY AS SOON AS AREA SITUATION AND CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES PERMIT. I ADDED THAT MY PERSONAL BELIEF IS THAT PASSAGE OF A PRACTICAL MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTION WOULD GO FAR TOWARD CREATING PROPER CLIMATE FOR RESUMPTION SHIPMENTS TO JORDAN. CROWN PRICE THANKED ME AND DID NOT PURSUE DISCUSSION

FURTHER.

2. DEPT REPEAT AS APPROPRIATE.

GP-1. SYMMES
BT

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S-98001

~~SECRET~~

By RG/L NARA, Date 8-14-01

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

6
W 70 177

~~SECRET~~

Action

Info

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 2353Q 3260855
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 220850Z NOV 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4044
STATE GRNC
BT

5 9 4 7Q
1967 NOV 22 AM 6 45

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2353

NODIS

REF: STATE 68321

ARMS FOR JORDAN

1. DURING MY CALL ON CROWN PRINCE ON 21ST, HE ASKED IF I COULD GIVE HIM ANY INFORMATION REGARDING U.S. ARMS FOR JORDAN AS RESULT KING'S RECENT TRIP. I SAID I COULD ADD NOTHING NEW TO WHAT HAD BEEN SAID TO KING DURING HIS WASHINGTON VISIT. (I HAD NOT SEEN REFTEL YESTERDAY.) I HAD HEARD SECRETARY MCNAMARA TELL KING HUSSEIN AT DINNER ON NOV 8 THAT WE REMAIN SYMPATHETIC TO JORDAN'S REQUEST FOR SOME ARMS. WE HAVE VERY PERSONAL PROBLEM, HOWEVER, IN SUPPLYING ARMS TO JORDAN AT THIS TIME BECAUSE OF CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN AID WILL. WE WILL KEEP JORDANIAN REQUEST UNDER CONTINUING SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION IN HOPE OF MOVING FAVORABLY AS SOON AS AREA SITUATION AND CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES PERMIT. I ADDED THAT MY PERSONAL BELIEF IS THAT PASSAGE OF A PRACTICAL MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTION WOULD GO FAR TOWARD CREATING PROPER CLIMATE FOR RESUMPTION SHIPMENTS TO JORDAN. CROWN PRINCE THANKED ME AND DID NOT PURSUE DISCUSSION FURTHER.

2. DEPT REPEAT AS APPROPRIATE.

GP-1.
SYMMES

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S-98001

By RC/SL, NARA, Date 8-14-01

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

(W) Id 178

~~SECRET~~

Action

Info

CONTROL : 5214Q
RECEIVED : NOVEMBER 20, 1967 7:31AM

*X R cy
1 - Prunier 11/21
2 - Davis
3 - [unclear]*

00 RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 2300A 3241140
ZNY SSSSS
O 201133Z NOV 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4017
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 2300

*F
S*

NODIS

REF: STATE 71787

SUBJECT: JORDAN-UAR POSITION ON BRITISH DRAFT RESOLUTION

1. IN INITIAL CALL BY AMBASSADOR ON TALHOUNI IN HIS CAPACITY AS FONMIN, TALHOUNI CONFIRMED HE HAD TELEGRAM MORNING NOV 20 FROM KING HUSSEIN CONFIRMING THAT US SUPPORTS UK DRAFT RESOLUTION. AMBASSADOR REVIEWED US POSITION ALONG LINES CONVEYED KING PER REFTEL. TALHOUNI AND DEPUTY PRIMIN TOUQAN WHO JOINED CONVERSATION EXPRESSED RELIEF WITH ASSURANCE THAT US WILL SUPPORT UK RESOLUTION SINCE THEY AGREE ACTION IS NECESSARY IN TEREST AREA STABILITY.

2. TALHOUNI THEN REVIEWED HIS TRIP TO CAIRO FOR PURPOSE, AT DIRECTION OF KING (AMMAN 2267), OF EXPLORING WHETHEJ NASSER'S POSITION HAD CHANGED FROM THAT PREVIOUSLY AGREED WITH KING HUSSEIN. TALHOUNI SAID HE HAD SEEN NASSER AND ACTING FONMIN

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 2300A ~~SECRET~~
FIQI AND HAD BEEN ASSURED THERE WAS NO CHANGE. NASSER AFFIRMED THAT HE AGREED TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S FIVE POINTS BUT EXPLAINED THAT HE DID NOT CONSIDER THAT THE AMERICAN DRAFT WAS FULLY COMPATIBLE WITH THESE. HE HAD EXPLAINED THIS POSITION IN COMMENTS ON THE AMERICAN DRAFT WHICH HAD BEEN SENT IN A LETTER TO FORMER TREASURY SECRETARY ANDERSON IN BAGHDAD. (TALHOUNI COMMENTED TO AMBASSADOR THAT HE, TOO, HAD HAD DIFFICULTY WITH THE AMERICAN DRAFT. THE AMBASSADOR

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S-98001

By RG157, NARA, Date 8-14-01

~~SECRET~~

-2-Page, AMMAN 2300, November 20, 7:31AM NODIS

BROUGHT OUT IN THIS CONVERSATION AND SUBSEQUENTLY IN BRIEF SEPARATE TALK WITH TOUQAN THAT US HAD AGRRED WITH HUSSEIN ON CERTAIN AMENDMENTS BUT THAT RIAD HAD REFUSED. HE ALSO REVIEWED BASIS OUR ADHERENCE TO US DRAFT UNTIL DECISION REACHED GIVE OUR SUPPORT TO UK DRAFT.)

3. TALHOUNI SAID HE RECEIVED FULL TEXT OF BRITISH DRAFT FOLLOWING RETURN FROM CAIRO. HE FOUND IT SATISFACTORY AND, FOLLOWING CONSULTATIONS WITH KING HUSSEIN IN PARIS, SENT TELEGRAM TO NASSER EXPRESSING IN STRONGEST TERMS JORDAN'S SUPPORT FOR UK DRAFT. KING HAD VIRTUALLY DICTATED THE TELEGRAM BY PHONE. TALHOUNI REPORTED FRUTHER THAT HE HAD CONTACT ON EVENING OF NOVEMBER 19 WITH UAR AKTING FONMIN FIQI IN WHICH

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 2300A S E C R E T

HE, TALHOUNI, HAD REAFFIRMED JORDAN'S SUPPORT FOR THE UK DRAFT. FIQI HAD INDICATED THAT THE UAR ALSO SUPPORTS THE DRAFT BUT THAT A NUMBER OF THE OTHER ARAB STATES, INCLUDING SUDAN, LEBANON AND TUNISIA, ARE HOLDING BACK. SYRIAN OPPOSES IT. TALHOUNI SAID THAT SO LONG AS JORDAN AND THE UAR SUPPORTED THE DRAFT THERE SHOULD BE NO PROBLEM.

4. BOTH AMBASSADOR AND DCM DETECTED A SLIGHT RESERVE IN TALHOUNI'S PRESENTATION AS TO THE DEGREE OF CERTAINTY OF UAR SUPPORT. THEY PROBLED FURTHER IN SUBSEQUENT TALK WITH TOUQAN. TOUQAN SAID UAR SUPPORTS THE RESOLUTION BUT HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD TEND TO PUT THIS IN A RESERVED WAY, PEJHAPS ALONG LINES THAT JORDAN WAS THE MOST DAMAGED BY THE WAR AND WANTED THE RESOLUTION AND THE UAR THEREFORE WOULD NOT OPPOSE IT.

5. DEPT. PLEASE REPEAT AS APPROPRIATE.

SYMMES.

BT

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE, COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

119541

179

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

22 FEB 68 10 47 Z

(Handwritten initials)

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN

Info:

INFO.: Amembassy TEL AVIV
USUN NEW YORK

STATE 119541

NODIS

SUBJECT: Israel-Jordan Security

REF.: Amman 3479, Tel Aviv 2592

1. In light of Tel Aviv reftel suggest you approach Hussein to determine his willingness to appoint Brigadier to meet with Israelis in presence UN officer. We would hope officer of Brigadier rank rather than of higher General rank might make easier GOJ's political problems (Amman's 3479). While we fully appreciate considerations which make Daoud ideal representative to Jordanians, he seems to be persona non grata with Israelis and consequently would appear a non-starter. If Israelis agree we shall impress upon them necessity of secrecy.

2. If Hussein agrees above, we will then endeavor again persuade Israelis accept UN presence.

END

KATZENBACH

GP-3

(Handwritten initials)

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

NEA/ARN:RBHouston:lab 2/22/68 5617

classification approved by:

NEA - Lucius D. Battle

Clearances:

IO - Mr. Bishop
NEA - Mr. Davies

S/S - Mr. Walsh

DECLASSIFIED
EO. 12958 Sec. 3.5

~~SECRET~~

Classification

FORM 8-65

DS-322
By RG/SL, NARA, Date 8-14-01

119314

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~

6

B

180

Origin ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN

22 FEB 68 00 59z

Info:

STATE 119314
JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE
SUBJECT: Jordanian Request for Anti-Infiltration EquipmentN O D I S

REF: Amman 3047 and 3461; State 104263

1. Department, in consultation with DOD, has been sympathetically considering GOJ request for anti-infiltration equipment, and appreciates urgency of early US response (refrels).
2. Substantive reply to GOJ difficult at this point in absence of specifics, i.e., type of anti-infiltration system desired and quantity and type of devices which would be most suitable. We believe best way to develop latter data would be preliminary GOJ-USG discussions, and suggest following possibility for such talks:

A. Embassy and GOJ reps could meet with Dr. Ralph Zirkind, DOD anti-infiltration expert, who will be in Beirut during early March (State 116728). (FYI: Zirkind has played

Drafted by: NEA/ARN:RPPaganelli/ DOD/ISA:CQuinn:dmg 2/21/68	Tel. Exi. 2700	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA:Lucius D. Battle
Clearances: NEA/IAI - Mr. Lambrakis NEA/ARN - Mr. Houghton NEA - Mr. Davies	S/S - Mr. Shepard	

~~SECRET~~DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S-98001By R6/SL NARA, Date 8-14-01

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy AMMAN

~~SECRET~~

major role in setting up anti-infiltration system in Israel. End FYI.)

B. Reps should come prepared to discuss following:

1. Current threat description; i.e., people and/or vehicles.

2. Equipment in current inventory applicable to this problem including night vision aids.

C. Dr. Zirkind plans being in Beirut 11-12 March.

3. Embassy may indicate to GOJ our sympathetic interest in assisting them develop anti-infiltration techniques while conertaining Jordanian views on preliminary steps suggested above. We intend to keep US role secret. Embassy should also be aware that GOJ will have to bear the cost of equipment and maintenance of any anti-infiltration system that may be developed with US assistance.

GP-3

END

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119313

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

(3)

B 181 3

Origin ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN

22 FEB 68 00 57z

Info: STATE 119313

NODIS

SUBJECT: Carbines for Public Safety Program

REF: Amman 3510

F₉

We anticipate no problem in approving carbines, revolvers, and related ammunition and spares for Jordanian security forces as soon as King agrees to our arms package. If King rejects our offer and accepts Soviet arms Conte amendment would probably preclude ~~me~~ our going ahead, inter alia, with public safety program.

End

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-121
By us, NARA, Date 4-2-03

Drafted by: <u>MW</u> NEA/ARN:MWwiley:psw 2/21/68	Tel. Ext. 3236	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Rodger P. Davies
Clearances: AID/NESA - R. Fitzmaurice S/S ME Shepard NEA/ARN - Mr. Houghton <u>PH</u>		

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

117102

182

(8) (B)

Origin ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN PRIORITY
Amembassy TEL AVIV PRIORITY
Info: USUN NEW YORK

17 FEB 68 01 22z

STATE 117102

NODIS

Ref: AMMAN 3373, TEL AVIV 2481.

1. In light dangerous situation in Jordan Valley, Department strongly favors meeting between Israeli and Jordanian military at higher level than Colonel to establish more effective means of communication between two armies for use inter alia in arranging ceasefires and possibly for controlling terrorism. Along with stationing of UN observers in Jordan Valley, we feel such a meeting could make significant contribution to defusing of situation.

Accordingly, we request following courses of action:

- 2. For Embassy Tel Aviv. You should inform GOI that we are urging Government of Jordan to accept meeting with Israelis between officers of General rank. As Israelis aware, such a meeting presents serious political risk for Jordan. We consequently urge Israeli acceptance of meeting with UN officer present. We cannot see how this could in any way jeopardize Israeli position and it presumably would make meeting which Israelis and Jordanians desire possible.
- 3. For Amman. You should urge Jordanians to appoint officer of General rank to meet with Israelis in presence UN officer. You may inform GOJ that we are

Drafted by: NEA/ARN:RBHoughton/mc 2/16/68	Tel. Ext. 5617	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Rodger P. Davies
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Clearances:
IO - Mr. Sisco
NEA/IAI - Mr. Bahti

NEA - Mr. Battle
S/S - Mr. Walker

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

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Authority FRus, Vol. 44, # 85
By *[Signature]* NARA, Date 7-31-01

Page 2 of telegram to AMMAN, TEL AVIV and USUN

~~SECRET-NODIS~~

urging Israelis to accept UN presence at meeting.

4. For USUN. Suggest Goldberg inform Bunche of our intended approaches to GOI and GOJ. He may wish to inform General Bull. Assume Bunche will appreciate sensitivity of efforts to establish such high-level talks, particularly from point of view of Jordan.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

~~SECRET-NODIS~~

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

Classification

16 FEB 68 17 36z

GP

Origin
Info

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN PRIORITY
Amembassy TEL AVIV PRIORITY

STATE

NODIS

SUBJECT: JORDAN-ISRAEL CONTACTS

Ref: TEL AVIV 2531

Assume Embassy Amman will confirm Daoud was both ill and absent
at time of last meeting between Jordanians and Israelis. We
have already confirmed this to Israeli Minister in Washington.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S-98001

By RG/SL, NARA, Date 8-14-01

Drafted by: NEA/ARN:RBHoughton/mc 2/16/68
Tel. Ext. 5617
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Rodger P. Davies *RPM*

Clearances: NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton *ALA* S/S - Mr. Meehan

F

104263

185

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

(u)

Origin ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN

25 JAN 60 01 59z

Info: STATE 104263

NODIS

Ref: AMMAN 3047.

We are studying GOJ request for assistance in controlling terrorist activity and we will be in touch with you soonest.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

NEA/ARN:RBHoughton/mc 1/24/68

Tel. Ext.

5617

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: NEA:Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

DOD/ISA - Mr. Evans (in substance)

S/S - Mr. Kell *[Signature]*

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S-98001

By RGJL NARA Date 8-14-01

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

096561

(5)

186

~~SECRET~~

Origin ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE

10 JAN 60 22 52z

Info: STATE 96561

NODIS

Ref: Amman's 2938

1. If at all possible we wish to avoid any publicity on arms package at this particular time for following reasons:
2. In light of speculation following communique of Eshkol visit, you can understand that publicity while the Prime Minister is still here would create especially unhelpful problems and pressures. Besides, announcement before Eshkol leaves on January 12 would inevitably link the two matters in public eye no matter what we said. This obviously not in anyone's interest. Furthermore, we still have some Congressional consultations to carry out. We recognize the danger of leaks as outlined in reftel. In present circumstances, however, we would be forced to reply to inquiries on Jordan arms with a "no comment". We would hope, however, not to be put in the position of having to say anything until Khamash visit and you might want to point out GOJ interest in avoiding publicity a little longer.
3. We will be sending you instructions on type of announcement to be made at appropriate time.
4. You should, of course, assure Hussein that our position in this regard

Drafted by: NEA/ARN:RBHoughton/mc 1/10/68	Tel. Ext. 5617	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: M - Eugene V. Rostow
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Clearances:
NEA - Mr. Battle
H - Mrs. Folger

White House - Mr. Saunders
S/S - Mr. Walsh

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

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NLJ-S-98001

By RG/SL NARA, Date 8-14-01

Page 2 of telegram to AMMAN

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does not alter the decision we made on arms. We simply have a tactical problem in handling publicity.

GP-3

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

5
0954 WAH
187
9 JAN 60 16 40Z
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Origin ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE

Info: STATE 95444

NODIS

Ref: Amman 2913

You may inform GOJ that "around January 10" date for Khammash visit is in no way sacrosanct. It was proposed simply because we thought the King wanted Khammash to come before the Summit Conference. A later date would be perfectly acceptable to us, and possibly even preferable, in that it would give us more time to work out our position.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S-98001
By RG/SJ, NARA, Date 8-14-01

Drafted by: NEA/ARN:RBHoughton/mc 1/9/68
Tel. Ext. 5617
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Rodger P. Davies RPD

Clearances: Lucius D. Battle RKD

s/s - Mr. Walsh XPW
DOD - Mr. Murray (in substance) R.M.

~~SECRET~~

Classification

091343

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

4 RE 188

Origin ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN PRIORITY
Info: STATE 91343
NODIS

30 Dec 67 00 10z

1. You should ensure that King Hussein knows that message sent in DEPTTEL 89454 was a personal one directly from President Johnson. The President would like assurance that if we move to meet some of Jordan's military needs we will not subsequently be faced with Jordan's acceptance of Soviet offers. We leave to your judgment how best to elicit such assurances.
2. FYI You will recall that both ground and air sales packages negotiated with Jordan had condition that Jordan would not acquire/military equipment from US and other Free World sources. other than/~~Western European sources~~ This condition still obtains and part of recommended package would come under existing sales agreement. The King may consider our response minimal particularly in face of termination of budget support but decision taken in light of possible adverse domestic and Congressional reaction and represents an effort to manifest continuing US support of Hussein's regime. END FYI.

GP-3

END

RUSK

Drafted by: NEA:RPDavies:av	Tel. Ext. 2107	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - William J. Handley
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Clearances:

S/S Mrs. Davis
White House Mr. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
Authentic FRUs, Vol. XX, #29, footnote 2
By *[Signature]* NARA, Date 7-31-01

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CIA

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Defense

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

June 11, 1968

MEMO FOR RUTH BOOTH

These original documents were found among Mr. McGeorge Bundy's files. Apparently they should be with the President's papers, so I am sending them on to you.

No further action is required on any of them.

Hal S.
Harold H. Saunders

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S-98001
By RG157 NARA, Date 8-14-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 27, 1967

TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH KING HUSSEIN

King's State of Mind

The King is still emotionally disturbed by recent events, although more composed than he was, and perhaps undecided as well between his traditional moderation and the mood of Arab nationalism and unity of early June. He is bitter towards the West, USSR, Nasser, other Arab leaders and toward himself above all because of the debacle. At bottom, he probably wants to be moderate and realistic in his approach to problem, but he is afraid to risk positions drastically at variance with present extremist Arab opinion. He has been proposing an Arab Summit Conference, which Nasser and some others have been avoiding. His object has been to challenge Nasser at such a meeting, and more Arab opinion towards moderation. Hussein will visit Nasser on his way home. He has made a number of inconsistent statements in recent days, but he handled himself yesterday on television with care and skill. He is enjoying the praise he has received in Arab circles for fighting bravely, and is probably unaware of the depth of the bitterness he created by making a deal with Nasser, and by attacking Jerusalem.

The message he takes away will inevitably be one for Nasser and other Middle Eastern leaders.

His Objectives

To determine U.S., Soviet, and Israeli position towards Jordan and himself, especially with regard to our economic and military assistance program and our position on boundary problems for Jordan. He has publicly committed himself to the return of the West Bank and of Jerusalem; but he appears not to have the slightest notion of how to do so.

Our Objectives

1. To affirm our continued interest in him and in his country. It is basic that he be encouraged to stand up now for himself and for Jordan, not for the loose and divided Arab community as a whole.
2. To make it clear again that we did not know of the onset of hostilities, that we tried to prevent them, using the same words with the UAR and with Israel, and that we were not involved, directly or indirectly.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. To inform him we intend to continue our economic and some of our military assistance programs for him, and for other moderate states in the Middle East, and to make sure he understands the extent of our present assistance to such states.

4. To discuss with him our basic objective of achieving a more durable and more stable situation than that existing prior to June 5, and make clear that our commitments on territorial integrity will be fulfilled in that context.

5. To assure him of our support for a just and permanent solution for the refugees.

6. To ask for his views on possible solutions for the West Bank and Jerusalem problems, and on the future relationship between Israel and Jordan more generally, as well as his opinion on broader issues involved in the conflict.

Talking Points

His Majesty may be assured of continued United States support both for Jordan and for himself, and for other Arab nations which adopt constructive policies. We regret the tragic events of early June, the mistakes made, the death and destruction that ensued; it is imperative that we work together to see if a better and more durable settlement can be reached. Reiterate again that we strongly advised Israel and UAR not to start hostilities, that we did not know of the outbreak of hostilities in advance, and that our posture has been and remains even-handed.

His Majesty may be assured that we intend to continue our economic assistance programs. We are also prepared to resume some military assistance but we are not yet clear on either the scale nor the type of equipment. We wish to avoid an arms race and are consequently urgently reviewing the supply of lethal equipment such as aircraft and tanks to all Middle Eastern states.

The states of the Middle East, with the help of the world community, must find an answer to the refugee problem. We should be most interested in the King's views on this subject, from the point of view of Jordan's national interest. Our objective, difficult as it may be of achievement, is a durable peace permitting all states to develop the full extent of their potentialities.

If he asks which kind of refugee plan we support, we suggest that you answer that it is too soon to choose. If Jordan and Israel could establish an economic link between their two countries, and perhaps others as well, the refugee problem would have a completely new appearance. If, however, progress of this kind proves impossible, we shall have to fall back on one or another of the older plans for resettlement.

As for Jerusalem, again, we have advised Israel against unilateral action to settle the status of Jerusalem. We recognize and share the interest of the three great religions in the Holy Places. As the King knows, we have never agreed either with Israel or with Jordan about the status of Jerusalem. And during the period of Jordanian control there were legitimate grievances on the part of all three religions. An arrangement should be worked out now which takes fully into account all interests in the problem. We stand ready to play our full part in such a negotiation.

The United States commitment to the territorial integrity of all states of the area is valid. We have acted in the past in support of this principle in behalf of many Middle Eastern states, including the UAR, Lebanon, and others. We shall do so in the future.

However, there must be a realistic approach to the problems of the area, taking fully into account the political consequences of Nasser's folly, the hostilities themselves, and the strong Soviet pressures.

We have been assured by Israel that its ultimate purposes are moderate, and that territorial claims will be subordinated to the goal of achieving peace. As the King realizes, the most difficult territorial problems are those between Jordan and Israel, in view of the past history of the West Bank, and the controversies over its legal status, which have never been finally resolved. Israel has not reached a conclusion on these questions. This is the moment to influence that conclusion.

Against this background, Israel's reluctance to yield territory unless it has some tangible assurances as to its own integrity is understandable from its point of view. There are many ways in which this condition can be satisfied. We have strongly advised the Israelis that we are unwilling to accept fait accompli solutions, and urged them not to take unilateral action either about the West Bank or about Jerusalem. We have intervened energetically to persuade Israel to encourage residents of the West Bank to remain in their homes, and to allow West Bank residents on the East Bank to return.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 4 -

On the other hand, it is not practical after all that has happened to ask the Israelis to withdraw until the main terms of a political settlement are clearly agreed, at least in private. We have been thinking, for example, that at some point in the settlement process the Security Council or the General Assembly could declare that the state of war between Israel and other Middle Eastern states is ended, and that no one can legitimately claim rights of belligerency any longer. Such a declaration could be acknowledged by each government, thus starting a movement in the right direction.

While, as you have said, the continuance of hostilities and near hostilities in the Middle East has become a world problem not a regional one, we do not feel that the United States Government is in a position itself to initiate moves for a settlement of this problem. In this situation the attitudes of Jordan and Israelis are paramount. There is little the international community can do until both sides approach the problem of settlement on realistic terms. We are willing to help the parties reach agreement. But nothing can be done until they accept their own responsibilities.

In this setting, it would be helpful and important to hear King Hussein's views on the main outstanding issues between Israel and Jordan, and on the five principles you announced on June 19. How does he see the future of Jordan's relationship with Israel?

In the light of his answer, you may wish to draw on the covering memorandum, encouraging the King to explore the possibilities of agreement with Israel. We are ready to help in private. You should let him understand the risks for him and for Jordan of allowing the situation to drag on indefinitely in its present pattern.

You might ask the King for his ideas on a possible private intermediary. We are inclined to think that the Shah would be a candidate to consider. The Turkish Foreign Minister would also be a possibility.

In the meantime, we hope both Israel and Jordan will cooperate to deal with the present situation on the West Bank humanely. The people should be helped in their present plight.

We hope that Jordan and Israel will both follow a two-pronged policy in the period ahead: trying as hard as they can for a basic settlement, and making arrangements which ensure the welfare of the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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- 5 -

local population in the meantime, and do not prejudice a constructive outcome.

The King will undoubtedly want to know--as Nasser will--your views on a wider range of topics.

I recommend that you stress these additional points:

(1) a condition of peace can be approached in stages, and does not necessarily require a treaty of peace in the first instance. There is no treaty of peace as yet between Germany and the Soviet Union, regrettable as that fact is.

(2) an end of all claims of belligerent rights should open the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal forthwith. The world community would expect the UAR to meet its clear responsibilities under international law.

(3) we deeply regret the decision of certain countries to break diplomatic relations with us. We should be glad to resume normal and friendly relations with them when conditions are appropriate on both sides.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Memos & Misc.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 21, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWR:

Just in case Jerusalem ends up in the UN Security Council, I thought you ought to have the attached for background. We may still be able to hold the Jordanians back but this indicates the seriousness of the problem.



Hal Saunders

Att: Amman 3498, 2/19/68

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S-98001
By RG 152, NARA, Date 8-14-01



Department of State

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TELEGRAM
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 302

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-155
By us NARA, Date 6-9-03

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ACTION NEA 15

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, NSAE 00, NSCE 00, SSO 00, USIE 00, CCO 00, GPM 03,
H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SC 01, SP 02, SS 20, SAH 03,
IO 13, ACDA 16, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, RSR 01, /133 W

- ___ BOWDLER
- ___ BUDGET
- ___ DAVIS
- ___ FRIED
- ___ GINSBURGH
- ___ HAMILTON
- ___ JESSUP
- ___ JOHNSON
- ___ JORDEN
- ___ KEENE P
- ___ LEONHART
- ___ ROCHE
- ___ SAUNDERS
- ___ TAYLOR

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4695
INFO RUQMJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 1441
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1294
USMISSION UN NY 711

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTIONS AMMAN 3498

SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER AGREES POSTPONE JORDAN REQUEST FOR SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON JERUSALEM

1. SUMMARY: PRIMIN TALHOUNI HAS AGREED TO HOLD OFF FOR A BRIEF PERIOD REQUESTING A SC MEETING ON JERUSALEM. HE HAD CALLED ME IN THIS MORNING TO INFORM ME JORDAN WAS ASKING FOR SC MEETING BUT I WAS ABLE TO PERSUADE HIM AND ABDUL MUN'IM RIFA'I, WHO WAS PRESENT, TO HOLD OFF FOR A "FEW MORE DAYS." IN AGREEING TO DO SO PRIMIN REQUESTED I OBTAIN CLARIFICATION AS TO WHAT USG INTENDS TO DO IF ISRAEL DOES NOT CEASE ITS EXPROPRIATION AND OTHER ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM.

2. PRIMIN TALHOUNI SUMMONED ME THIS MORNING TO MEET WITH HIM AND MINISTER OF STATE FOR FONAFFS ABDUL MUNIIM RIFA'I. HE

PAGE 2 RUQMG 3498A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EXPLAINED HE WISHED TO TAKE UP AGAIN THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 AMMAN 00001 191910Z

AND TO INFORM ME THAT JORDAN HAD DECIDED TO TAKE THE MATTER TO THE SC. HE SAID THAT, GIVEN THE INTENSITY OF INTERNAL JORDANIAN FEELING AND ARAB AND MOSLEM FEELING ON THIS MATTER, GOJ SAW NO ALTERNATIVE TO PROCEEDING WITH A REQUEST FOR A SC MEETING. HE REFERRED TO AMB AL-FARRA'S RECENT CONVERSATION WITH AMB GOLDBERG. (USUN 3812, STATE 117356) HE RECALLED THAT THROUGH ME HE HAD BROUGHT THE QUESTION TO THE URGENT ATTENTION OF THE USG. HE SAID ISRAELI ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM HAD BEEN RAISED THREE TIMES WITH JARRING, AND AL-FARRA ALSO HAD BROUGHT THE JERUSALEM SITUATION TO THE ATTENTION OF THE UNSECGEN IN NEW YORK.

3. REGRETTABLY, THE PRIMIN SAID, GOJ HAD OBTAINED NO POSITIVE ANSWER FROM JARRING, WHO REPORTED ISRAELIS WERE CALLING CURRENT ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM "MUNICIPAL REFORM." TWO DAYS AGO GOJ HAD RECEIVED TELEGRAM FROM AL-FARRA REPORTING HIS INTERVIEW WITH AMB GOLDBERG. ACCORDING TO REPORT GOLDBERG SAID US HAD MADE DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS WITH ISRAEL ON JERUSALEM, BUT GOLDBERG HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO POINT TO ANY POSITIVE RESULTS OF US INTERVENTION. PRIMIN THEN SAID THAT HIS REQUEST TO ME ALSO HAD PRODUCED NO POSITIVE RESULTS ON STOPPING ISRAELI ACTIONS. ALTHOUGH JORDAN

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3498A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WAS GRATEFUL FOR US STATEMENTS AND EFFORTS, UNFORTUNATELY THESE ARE NOT ENOUGH.

4. THUS, SAID THE PRIMIN, WE HAVE RECONSIDERED THE MATTER THOROUGHLY. DESPITE US AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS WE HAVE GOTTEN NOWHERE. IN VIEW OF THE STRONG PRESSURES ON US FROM OUR OWN PEOPLE AND FROM ARAB PUBLIC OPINION GENERALLY AND SCLECC CURRENT INFORMATION FROM JERUSALEM INDICATES THAT THE ISRAELIS, IF ANYTHING, HAVE INTENSIFIED THEIR ACTIVITIES TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM, WE HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO GO TO THE SC. IN FURTHER EXPLANATION OF THIS DECISION, THE PRIMIN SAID THAT A "NATIONAL MEETING" IS TO BE HELD IN AMMAN ON TWENTY FIRST, AND THE GOVT HAS BEEN NOTIFIED THAT THE MEETING WILL INSIST UPON REFERRING JERUSALEM TO THE SC. MOREOVER, THE PRIMIN SAID, A SECRET MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF DEPUTIES IS TO BE HELD TOMORROW AND HE HAS BEEN WARNED IT WILL ALSO INSIST UPON REFERRING THE MATTER TO THE SC. HE IMPLIED THAT THE GOVT FELT IT COULD NOT STAND UP TO THESE PRESSURES

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Department of State

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 AMMAN 00001 191910Z

AND, THEREFORE, MUST ACT BEFORE BEING FORCED TO ACT. (TODAY'S PRESS REPORTED THAT WEDNESDAY MEETING HAS BEEN CALLED BY "PREPARATORY COMMITTEE TO SAVE JERUSALEM" AND THAT GOVT OFFICIALS, DEPUTIES, RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND INTELLECTUALS HAVE BEEN

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 3498A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
INVITED.)

5. I RESPONDED THAT I WAS VERY UNHAPPY TO HEAR THE PRIMIN'S DECISION AND THAT I HOPED IT WAS NOT FINAL. I SAID I BELIEVED JORDAN'S GOING TO THE SC ON THIS MATTER WOULD RISK FAILURE OF THE JARRING MISSION. I REMINDED HIM THAT HE KNOWS ALREADY THE US POSITION ON JERUSALEM WHICH, IN EFFECT, SUPPORTS THE FULL POSITION OF NEITHER JORDAN NOR ISRAEL ON THE MATTER. I COULD UNDERSTAND THE CURRENT PRESSURES HE FACES WITH REGARD TO JERUSALEM SPECIFICALLY, IN FACT, WE ARE WELL AWARE OF WHAT IS GOING ON IN JERUSALEM AND, AS HE KNEW, HAD TAKEN STEPS TO MAKE OUR POSITION KNOWN. NEVERTHELESS,

JERUSALEM IS ONLY A PART OF THE WHOLE PROBLEM WHICH JARRING IS NOW TRYING TO SETTLE. MOREOVER, IN ALL FRANKNESS I FELT I HAD TO REMIND HIM THAT WE SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR WORKING TOWARD A SETTLEMENT. IT SEEMED TO ME THAT OUR PRESENT DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF THE JARRING MISSION WERE THE BEST WAY TO PROCEED, AND I THEREFORE HOPED HIS GOVERNMENT COULD FURTHER POSTPONE THE DECISION TO GO TO THE SC. I TURNED TO RIFA'I AND ASKED WHAT HE THOUGHT JORDAN WOULD GET OUT OF GOING TO THE SC AT THIS TIME. ANSWERING MY OWN QUESTION, I SAID THERE WOULD BE MANY RECRIMINATIONS AND SPEECHES BUT PROBABLY NOTHING CONCRETE WOULD COME OUT OF SUCH A MEETING. WE WOULD STILL

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 3498A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BE LEFT WITH TRYING OTHER WAYS TO PERSUADE ISRAEL TO DESIST FROM ITS UNILATERAL ACTIONS TO CHANGE THE CHARACTER OF THE CITY. I MENTIONED TO HOWAR CASE (STATE 116833) AS A LATE INDICATION OF THE WAY THE USG SEES THE JERUSALEM PROBLEM AND AGAIN URGED THEY DELAY THEIR DECISION FURTHER WHILE CURRENT APPROACHES WERE FULLY TESTED .

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 04 AMMAN 00001 191910Z

6. PRIMIN BROUGHT UP THE REPORTED STATEMENT OF ISRAELI PRES SHAZAR THAT NO POWER IN THE WORLD COULD MAKE ISRAEL DESIST FROM ITS ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM. I SAID MY INFORMATION INDICATED SHAZAR'S STATEMENT HAD NOT BEEN ACCURATELY REPORTED IN WORLD PRESS. RIFA'I THEN SAID THAT GOING TO THE COUNCIL WOULD SERVE TWO PURPOSES IN HIS VIEW--IT WOULD SURELY PRODUCE A RESOLUTION CALLING UPON ISRAEL TO DESIST FROM ITS ACTIONS AND HOPEFULLY THIS WOULD RESTRIAN ISRAEL. EVEN IF IT DID NOT, IT WOULD ENCOURAGE ARAB PROPERTY OWNERS NOT TO ACCEPT COMPENSATION AND NOT TO GO ALONG WITH ISRAEL'S ILLEGAL ACTIONS.

7. AT THIS POINT, THE PRIMIN EXPANDED OUR DISCUSSION INTO A REVIEW OF THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE JARRING MISSION AND THE RECENT ISRAELI ACTIONS IN THE VALLEY. RIFA'I COMMENTED THAT JORDANIAN OFFICIALS ARE GIVING LIP SERVICE TO THE IDEA THAT THERE HAS BEEN FORWARD

PAGE 6 RUQMKG 3498/IA ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
MOTION WITH REGARD TO JARRING'S MISSION. IN FACT, HE SAID THERE HAS BEEN NO PROGRESS, AND JORDAN, SPECIFICALLY ON THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM, IS PAYING THE PRICE FOR THIS INACTIVITY. THE PRIMIN ADDED THAT THIS INACTIVITY IS DIGGING THE GRAVES OF THE PRESENT JORDANIAN REGIME AND IS HOLDING JORDAN UP TO RIDICULE IN THE ARAB WORLD AND EVEN INTERNATIONALLY. IT WAS POSSIBLE A SC RESOLUTION IN SUPPORT OF THE JORDANIAN POSISITION ON JERUSALEM COULD EVEN STRENGTHEN THE JARRING MISSION. IN ANY CASE SUCH A RESOLUTION WOULD BE BETTER THAN DOING NOTHING. I SAID I COULD NOT AGREE BECAUSE OF THE ADVERSE EFFECTS I THOUGHT IT WOULD HAVE ON THE JARRING MISSION.

8. AFTER MORE DISCUSSION ALONG THESE LINES, TALHOUNI AND RIFA'I FINALLY AGREED TO HOLD OFF GOING TO THE COUNCIL FOR A FEW MORE DAYS IN EXCHANGE MY UNDERTAKING TO REPORT OUR CONVERSATION URGENTLY TO WASHINGTON AND TO ASK (1) FOR AN URGENT CLARIFICATION OF USG VIEWS ON JERUSALEM AND (2) WHETHER THE USG COULD AND WOULD TAKE ADDITIONAL ACTIONS TO BRING ABOUT CESSATION OF CURRENT ISRAELI EXPROPRIATION ACTIVITIES IN JERUSALEM. MEANWHILE, THE PRIMIN SAID HE WOULD TELL THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES AND THE "NATIONAL MEETING" THAT THE GOVT WOULD STUDY THE QUESTION OF GOING TO THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 300

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ACTION NEA 15

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, NSAE 00, NSCE 00, SSO 00, USIE 00, CCO 00, GPM 03,
H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SC 01, SP 02, SS 20, SAH 03,
IO 13, ACDA 16, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, RSR 01, /133 W

O P 191642Z FEB 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4696
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 1442
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1295
USMISSION USUN NY 712

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SECTIONS AMMAN 3498

COUNCIL. HE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT UNLESS IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS I COULD SHOW HIM SOME ADVANTAGE IN DELAYING FURTHER--AN ADVANTAGE THAT HAD CONCRETE AND TANGIBLE EFFECTS SO FAR AS JORDAN IS CONCERNED--JORDAN WOULD BE FORCED TO GO TO THE COUNCIL.

9. COMMENT: I THINK TALHOUNI AND RIFA'I ACCEPT WE HAVE MADE EFFORTS IN THIS MATTER AND ARE GRATEFUL. THEIR PROBLEM IS TO GET RESULTS, AND THEY HAVE BECOME CONVINCED SC RESOLUTION BETTING THAN NOTHING. I AM FRANKLY SURPRISED THAT TALHOUNI, WHO IS WELL KNOWN FOR HIS UNWILLINGNESS TO FACE UNPOPULARITY, AGREED TO GO ALONG

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3498/2A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WITH ANY FURTHER DELAY. I AM AFRAID, THEREFORE, THAT WE HAVE ONLY A FEW MORE DAYS IN WHICH TO PRODUCE SOMETHING TANGIBLE AS RESULT OUR EFFORTS.

10. ACTION REQUESTED: REQUEST SPECIFIC GUIDANCE FROM THE DEPT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

200

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, February 15, 1968
6:00 p.m.

Rec'd
6:20 p

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Jordan Arms Package

This is to refresh your memory as to the details of the proposed arms agreement with Jordan. There are three main parts to the package: (1) about \$10 million worth of equipment we had agreed to send to Jordan before the war broke out last June; (2) about \$38 million in new ground equipment including 88 Patton tanks; and (3) 18 F-104 jet fighters (\$33 million). Just in case you want more details, I've attached a more complete list. On a lot of the smaller items there are specifics which no one has yet tried to work out.

King Hussein has expressed initial disappointment with the package and the draft memo of understanding we proposed. Our first response will be to help out with his problems in the wording of the memo and to urge him to accept the package as is and get on with delivery. However, we may have a little more bargaining to do yet. He is obviously relieved that we have come this far, and we should be able to bring him around.

W. A. Rostow

Attachment.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S-98001
By KG/SJL, NARA, Date 9-14-01

2000

JORDAN ARMS PACKAGE

Equipment under FY 1966-67 MAP Grant (\$3.8 million)

- 61 radios and related equipment
- Public address systems
- Parachutes
- 30 vehicles
- 20 target drones
- mortar sites
- 1 million rounds of small arms ammunition
- miscellaneous spare parts

Remainder of equipment from 1965, delivery of which was suspended (\$7.0 million)

- 293 radios and related equipment
- protective clothing
- parts for armored personnel carriers, M-48 tanks, vehicles, weapons and electronic equipment

Ground Forces equipment newly agreed to (\$30.5 million)

- 88 M-48A1 Tanks
- 23 105mm Howitzers
- 43 Armored Personnel Carriers
- 4 40 mm self propelled anti-aircraft guns
- 138 106 mm jeep mounted recoilless rifles
- 40 2-1/2 ton trucks
- 3 81 mm mortars
- \$3 million in 1 and 3 ton vehicles
- \$2 million in small arms
- \$12.8 million in ammunition
- Engineering equipment
- spare parts
- Radios and related equipment
- Telephones and related equipment

Air Force equipment (\$33.3 million)

- 18 F-104 aircraft, with necessary auxiliary equipment and spare parts
- Ground control radar system worth approximately \$2.8 million
- An agreement to consider the supply of 18 additional aircraft at some future date

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S-98001
By KGJL, NARA, Date 8-14-01

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 14, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK MOOSE

This is just to let you know that Bob McCloskey is making the announcement on our Jordan arms package today at noon.

Just for the record, Secretary Rusk made one slight change in the text of the statement as I gave it to you the other day. The complete text now reads: " We are prepared to resume arms shipments to Jordan as we have done in the case of other Near Eastern countries. Details are now being negotiated with the Jordan Government. We continue to believe that restraint on all arms shipments to the area is essential to the stability of the area. "

Since the President wished to keep this low key, I should think George would simply want to stand on McCloskey's statement and refer further questions to him. If by any remote chance, he is pressed to explain why we chose to go ahead at this time, he might say strictly on background that we have always felt that the stability of Jordan is crucial to efforts to achieve a peace settlement. FYI, what lies behind that statement is our desire to keep the USSR from rushing in with military aid--a danger which even the Israelis recognize. I doubt George should get into that angle, but if anybody is particularly interested, I would be glad to furnish a public statement made by General Dayan to the effect that he would rather see American arms in Jordan than Soviet arms.



Harold H. Saunders

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S-98001
By RGDL, NARA, Date 8-14-01

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

February 14, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Hussein's First Reaction to Our Arms Package

While Hussein seemed more relaxed and friendly than Symmes has seen him for some time, his first response is that our package doesn't meet Jordan's needs. He told Harry that if this was the best we could do, he "is still faced with the question whether it was not in Jordan's best interest to find arms from another source."

His main objections are that the delivery dates are too far in the future, that he is getting far too few tanks, that F-104s are the wrong kind of airplane and that the agreement we drafted ties his hands (he's worried about its leaking). Part of the problem is that he's trying for an arms agreement as good as the immediate-delivery, no-apparent-strings deal Nasser got from the Russians. Hussein says he may have to show his agreement with us to other Arabs, and this could embarrass him.

So far, he hasn't rejected the offer. He alone knows whether he's bluffing about turning to Moscow. Apparently our offer did cheer him up, and we know he sees dangers in any deal with the Russians, so he may well be trying to bargain for the best he can get.

Whether he is bargaining or not, it looks as if we can bring him around by upping our offer. We might be able to work this with some fairly minor changes in the package or ring in a bit of Saudi financial help. The big question is whether to chance that this is a bluff and that if we sit tight he'll accept our present offer. State and Defense are working on this now, but we wanted you to know that the ball is now back in our court.

John Foster
John Foster

Hal Saunders
Hal Saunders

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S-98001
By RG/DL, NARA, Date 8-14-01

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 12, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK MOOSE

SUBJECT: Low Key Announcement on Jordan Arms

State may announce today at noon our resumption of arms shipments to Jordan. However, in view of the fighting over the weekend, they agree that we might be better to delay until tomorrow and Walt has asked that Secretary Rusk personally OK timing of the announcement. In any case, to make the most out of this ^{announcement,} ~~argument,~~ we probably will have to do it tomorrow at the latest.

Following is the line State intends to use: "We are prepared to resume arms shipments to Jordan as we have done in the case of other Near Eastern countries. Details have not yet been negotiated with the Jordan Government. We continue to believe that restraint on all arms shipments to the area is essential to the stability of the area." If any reporter tries to pin us down on our specific rationale, State will say very simply that we consider that the US and other Western ties to Jordan are important to the stability of the area. (That means that a Soviet presence in Jordan would not help us reach a peace settlement.) If asked what we are doing for Israel, we would refer the questioner to the Eshkol-Johnson communique.

I will try to keep you posted on the timing of State's move, but I thought you would want to have this background as early as possible.



Harold H. Saunders

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S-98001
By RG/SL, NARA, Date 8-14-01

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

204
INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

Friday
February 9, 1968
12:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

*Rec'd
1051*

State and Defense this afternoon are winding up their Congressional consultations on the Jordan arms package. Secretary Rusk's final recommendation should be over early tomorrow.

He is also considering recommending that you invite General Khammash in for a short reassuring talk before he leaves.

On the chance that you might be seeing Khammash, and knowing that you will want to talk to Gene Black when he returns, I thought you would be interested in the attached report of Black's talk with Hussein. You will note that, as important as the arms are, at the top of King Hussein's request for US help is that we put our muscle into support of the peacemaking process.

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Authority NLS96-206 (#13)
By g/cb NARA, Date 7/31/01

Walt R.

Amman 3316, 2/7/68

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~ 907

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03316 071659Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO MM 01/031 W

R R 071600Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4587
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1246
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1253
USMISSION USUN NY 677

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3316

EXDIS

SUBJ: EUGENE BLACK'S CALLSON KING HUSSEIN

1. I ACCOMPANIED EUGENE BLACK AND HIS ASSISTANT JOSEPH REED
IN CALL ON KING HUSSEIN ON SIXTH.

2. BLACK EXPLAINED THAT IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY AS SPECIAL
ADVISER TO PRESIDENT ON EAST ASIAN ECON DEVELOPMENT HE HAD
NO OFFICIAL MISSION IN JORDAN BUT NEVERTHELESS HAD GREAT

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3316A ~~SECRET~~
INTEREST IN MIDDLE EAST AS PRIVATE AMERICAN. PRESIDENT
JOHNSON HAD ASKED THAT HE REPORT HIS REACTIONS AND OBSER-
VATIONS WHEN HE RETURNS TO WASHINGTON. BLACK SAID DURING
HIS TALKS IN KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA AND UAR HE HAD BEEN IM-
PRESSED BY EXTENT TO WHICH VARIOUS ARAB LEADERS SEEM BELIEVE
(1) ISRAEL DOES NOT REALLY WANT PEACE AND IS BECOMING
INCREASINGLY INFLEXIBLE AND EXPANSIONIST; (2) US HAS BECOME
IDENTIFIED WITH ISRAELI POLICY AND IS NOT RESPONSIVE ARAB
VIEWS; (3) US SO OCCUPIED IN FAR EAST IT DISINTERESTED IN

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 AMMAN 03316 071659Z

MIDDLE EAST AND LESS AND LESS INFLUENTIAL IN MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS. IN CAIRO HE HAD FOUND CONSIDERABLE PESSIMISM REGARDING JARRING MISSION. EVERYWHERE HE HAD FOUND GLOOMINESS CONCERNING RECENT SOVIET SUCCESSES IN THE AREA. IN COURSE HIS REMARKS BLACK ALSO REFERRED TO KING FAISAL'S APPROACH TO HIM ON JORDAN ARMS AND SAID HE HAD NOW BEEN INFORMED FROM WASHINGTON THAT JORDAN'S ARMS NEEDS ARE RECEIVING ACTIVE AND SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION. BLACK CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE WOULD LIKE KING'S FRANK COMMENTS ON FOREGOING SUMMARY.

3. KING HUSSEIN WENT THROUGH PRESENTATION HE HAS MADE TO

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3316A ~~SECRET~~

RECENT US VISITORS EMPHASIZING HIS BELIEF THAT AFTERMATH OF JUNE HOSTILITIES HAD CREATED A REAL CHANCE FOR AREA PEACE. HE RECITED HIS EFFORTS AT KHARTOUM AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO BRING ABOUT A CONSENSUS LEADING TO THE UK RESOLUTION OF NOV 22, 1967. HE SAID JORDAN IMMEDIATELY INFORMED JARRING OF ITS UNCONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION. OTHER ARABS IMMEDIATELY INVOLVED HAD ALSO TRIED TO COOPERATE WITH JARRING. BUT AFTER SEVERAL VISITS JARRING STILL HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO INDICATE WHETHER ISRAEL ACCEPTS THE RESOLUTION. MEANWHILE ISRAEL HAS FOLLOWED A RUTHLESS AND ARROGANT POLICY OF EXPROPRIATION, DEPORTATION, DEPRIVAL OF PERSONAL RIGHTS, AND OTHER ACTIONS THAT CONSIDERED ALL TOGETHER INDICATED THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT WANT TO LIVE AT PEACE WITH ITS NEIGHBORS.

4. ACKNOWLEDGING BLACK'S REMARK THAT THE USG HAS ONLY LIMITED INFLUENCE WITH ISRAEL OR ANY OTHER INDEPENDENT GOVT, KING HUSSEIN QUESTIONED NEVERTHELESS WHETHER US HAS EXERCISED THE CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE IT DOES HAVE WITH ISRAEL. HE THEN SAID THAT SINCE THE SAMUA RAID HE HAS COME INCREASINGLY TO QUESTION WHETHER USG REALLY UNDERSTANDS NATURE OF ITS

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 3316A ~~SECRET~~

INTERESTS IN MIDDLE EAST AND, IF IT DOES, WHETHER IT WILLING OR ABLE TO TRY TO MAINTAIN AND PROMOTE THEM. HE BRIEFLY

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 03316 071659Z

CITED SUSPENSION US ARMS SUPPLY AS ONE OF SEVERAL SERIOUS DISAPPOINTMENTS TO JORDAN. BUT, HE EMPHASIZED, IMPORTANT AS ARMS SUPPLY IS TO JORDAN (AND AGAIN HE INDICATED HE WOULD GO TO SOVIETS IF NECESSARY), THE JARRING MISSION AND THE UK RESOLUTION ARE EVEN MORE IMPORTANT. THEY REPRESENT A "LAST CHANCE FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST." KING REFERRED TO ASSURANCES US WOULD PUT "MUSCLE" INTO ITS SUPPORT OF UK RESOLUTION. USG NOW HAS CHANCE TO ACT. QUESTION IS WILL USG ACT AND, IF SO, WHEN. TIME WAS RUNNING OUT. IF THE MATTER WENT BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE CHANCE FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WOULD BE LOST. THE RUSSIANS WOULD INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE AT US EXPENSE, AND THE ULTIMATE RESULT WOULD BE CHAOS WHICH WAS IN NO ONE'S INTEREST, INCLUDING ISRAEL'S. KING CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE ALSO SHARED BELIEF OF THOSE ARAB LEADERS WHOSE VIEWS HAD BEEN SUMMARIZED BY BLACK. HE HOPED THEREFORE BLACK WOULD PASS HIS VIEWS TO PRESIDENT AND OTHER US OFFICIALS.

PAGE 5 RUGMKG 3316A ~~SECRET~~

5. AFTER KING HAD CONCLUDED HIS REMARKS, I TOOK OCCASION TO PASS ON TO HIM SUBSTANCE OF STATE 110500. HE EXPRESSED THANKS BUT INDICATED IN PLEASANT WAY THAT WHAT HE NEEDS AND WANTS ARE CONCRETE RESULTS RATHER THAN ASSURANCES WE ARE PRESSING ISRAELIS AND HOPE THEY WILL PRODUCE.

6. BLACK IS TO MAKE FAREWELL COURTESY CALL ON KING ON EIGHTH.

GP-1 SYMMES

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Jordan
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~~SECRET~~

Friday, February 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Briefing American Jewish Leaders

In response to your query whether we should brief Jewish leaders on your aircraft decision, I have taken discreet soundings in a number of quarters and have reached these two conclusions:

1. The Jewish community is relaxed and there is no immediate need to brief on this subject by itself. Right after Prime Minister Eshkol's visit, we and the Israeli Embassy thought Jewish leaders might not buy the indefinite language of the joint statement, especially against the background of earlier press stories playing up the Phantoms. However, the Embassy seems to have done a good job quieting their nervousness, and they seem content to live with the reassuring tone of the joint statement. Even Eppie Evron, who has to do much of the calming, feels we can live with the present situation. Neither Luke Battle nor our Jewish contacts on the Hill feel much pressure.

2. We will have to do something when you make your decision on an arms package for Jordan. A memorandum recommending a package including both aircraft and tanks is before Secretaries Rusk and McNamara today and will be over shortly. If you approve this or any substantial part of it, I think then we will need to have a real heart-to-heart talk with the Jewish leaders. We can't expect the Israelis to support us actively, but there is no question that their attitude toward Jordan has changed in the last two months, as Prime Minister Eshkol indicated to you. Without violating Eshkol's confidence, we ought to be able to make a reasonable case.

Since the time of your decision on Jordan is not far off, I will prepare a line, but I suggest you tackle that decision first.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

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Authority NLS 96-193
By 7 NARA, Date 7-31-01

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

January 25, 1968

SUBJECT: Where We Stand with General Khammash

I think the attached from Dick Helms is worth passing to the President. However, I don't know how much of this he got at lunch Tuesday, and my covering note may be redundant.

The main purpose of this note is to tell you where we stand and what we're planning. I'd appreciate a word if this looks like more than the President will accept.

Khammash's ground force list totals \$117 million. This includes 200 M-48A-3 tanks with deisel engines and 105 mm. guns @ \$150,000. He also wants 36 multipurpose aircraft. European models are too expensive, and he'd settle for either the F-104 or F-5.

Harry Schwartz has tentatively worked out with Luke a counter-proposal which:

--On the ground starts with the purpose of replacing Jordan's war losses less some tanks (88 M-47 A-1s instead of 200 M-48A-3s) and artillery. This would make a \$54 million ground package over 2-1/2 years (FY 68, \$15m.; FY 69, \$25m; FY 70, \$14m.).

--~~In~~ the air, would release the 12 F-104s ready for delivery from the 1966 contract and would add 6 more in 1970. Some of these are already paid for, but this would add \$13 million in FY 68 and \$6.5 million in FY 69.

This may not be enough to satisfy Hussein. It cuts his tank request way back, and it leaves him with nothing but light artillery.

Even at that, it would be painful for us. He can pay cash for the FY 68 slice, but the real problem is selling tanks and planes to Jordan. We can argue that the planes are from an old contract (which the Israelis accepted with the first 48 Skyhawks), but there has been a war since. We are still trying to bring the Brits in so we can make it tanks or planes, but that angle won't be clear for several days.

In the attached, I have alerted the President to Khammash's request while trying not to provoke a reaction from him until Defense makes a formal proposal it believes it can sell to Khammash. But I do want you to know what a painful decision blocking the USSR in Jordan may require. Above all, do you believe from talking with the President that tanks and/or planes are in the ballpark?

Yes No

Harold H. Saunders *Hal*

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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~~SECRET~~

January 25, 1968

Mr. President:



EO 13526
3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs



Khammash has come in with a list of ground equipment totaling \$117 million and including 200 M-48A-3 tanks. He also wants 36 multipurpose aircraft. He is looking to us for either the F-104's we contracted for in 1966 or the F-5. He appears to have rejected British and French planes because they are too expensive.

Defense is putting together a negotiating response far short of Khammash's request and will be back to us when it has a concrete proposal. They're trying to see whether we can avoid selling either tanks or planes. *I doubt they can.*

In order to avoid the appearance of trying to slip one over on the Israelis, Luke Battle today told Harman that Khammash is here.

W. W. Rostow

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

EO 13526
3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

25 January 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

1. [Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

[Redacted] I was impressed by his detailed discourse on the mood in Jordan, the vulnerability of King Hussein, the conversations with the Soviet leaders in Moscow and Amman and Hussein's desire to achieve peace with Israel -- even at great risk to himself and the future of his dynasty.

2. This conversation re-enforces my impression that the situation in Jordan is fragile, that Jordan remains an essential element of any favorable solution in the Middle East and that time is running out for Hussein's moderate regime.

3. Hussein is caught in the middle between the radical Arab forces centered in Syria which support an escalation of terrorism and resistance and an insistent Israeli position that Jordan can and must assume the responsibility for these hostile acts. Each incident -- particularly those which lead to an Israeli punitive retaliatory move involving Israeli aircraft against a Jordan that has no air defense -- further undermines Hussein's position. Hussein becomes more vulnerable to the charges that he has been unable to demonstrate any capacity for recovery from the June war.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 15-40

By CH NARA, Date 12-6-15

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- 2 -

4. [redacted] he regards a public commitment to provide Jordan arms as primarily a political action that is essential in the short-term to Jordan's survival. If peace with Israel can be achieved, the delivery of the arms will not be necessary. If some sort of settlement with Israel is not achieved, the question of Jordan's survival will probably become acute before any significant arms deliveries are possible.

3.3(b)(1)

5. [redacted]

[redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

Dick

Richard Helms
Director

cc: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

~~SECRET~~

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CHAIRMAN

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Mr. Rostow, White House

1. Rostow
2. Saunders

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MR. ROBERT M. HENNING

THE TOWN CHURCH OF BIVENS

CITY OF



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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

CM-2929-68
21 Jan 1968

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208a

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: ARMS FOR JORDAN

1. I met with Major General Khammash, Chief of Staff, Jordan Arab Army, from 1030 until 1130 hours on 20 January. He did most of the talking, responding readily and, I think, quite frankly to my questions. Not necessarily in the order set forth he made these points:

a. Soviet presence and influence in the Middle East is increasing. The United States must take action to establish stability. Jordan, a moderate State, is a key factor.

b. The JAA must have arms to replace the heavy losses suffered in June. Army morale is precarious, and time is running out for King Hussein. The USG invitation for him to travel to the U.S. to discuss arms came at the eleventh hour; the King had already agreed to receive a Soviet military mission headed by two Russian lieutenant generals to discuss arms supply. Apropos of this, when he visited Moscow with King Hussein, he had met with Marshals Grechko and Yakubovskiy. The latter had handed him a pad of paper and urged him to list anything and everything the JAA wanted; the Soviets would respond freely, promptly and fully.

c. He does not trust the Soviets; they are double-dealers who pursue different courses at various levels. They seek to create dissention and turmoil upon which they can capitalize.

d. The Syrians are madmen, uncontrollable; undoubtedly there will be another change of government. Iraq is also unstable. Jordan can be stable and a moderating influence if, but only if, the U.S. provides them arms and does not drive the King into Soviet hands. The Jordanians value and want to continue their long-term ties with the U.S.

e. At the Cairo meeting, just before he left for the U.S., Nasser was told by Hussein that Khammash was going to seek arms from the U.S. Nasser expressed no opposition, seeming to adopt a "wait-and-see" attitude.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-120
By isa, NARA, Date 4-9-03

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f. King Faisal and the Shah are greatly concerned about British withdrawal from Aden and the Persian Gulf. The U.S. is the only power which can face the Soviets because the only thing they fear is U.S. strength. Hence, as the greatest power in the world, the U.S. must act to thwart Soviet Middle East ambitions.

g. The Israelis are stupid not to seek a just settlement now before it is too late. Moreover, a punitive attack against Jordan in reprisal for Syrian terrorism will foreclose on any chance of a peaceful settlement because the moderate Arabs will be overwhelmed by the extremists in gaining public support.

h. He can accept a demilitarized West Bank. He thinks the Pope's proposals re Jerusalem are unacceptable to Jews and Muslims alike.

2. As to military items, General Khammash said:

a. Despite reports to the contrary, he wants three squadrons (12 UE each) of F-104's. He wants a versatile aircraft and does not believe Mirages or Lightnings meet his needs. Also, Jordan has no money to buy aircraft or for expensive maintenance and operations. Therefore, he wants as small a force as is compatible with defense needs.

b. He wants about 175 M-48 A-3's with 105 m.m. guns. This will replace his war losses and wear out.

c. He is greatly in need of AAA, not missiles because of their expense, but the Quad 50-caliber machine guns and the M-42. Also, he requires some APC's.

3. Comment: General Khammash was serious and determined in attitude throughout our conversation. I got the strong impression that he is a very worried soldier. He said time and again that time is running out; Jordan must have favorable action from the U.S.; the King's position is fragile; the Israeli's must be forced to deal sensibly; etc. However, he was always coherent and articulate. I judge that he knows his job and spoke the truth as he sees it. In sum, he made a good impression on me. Also, from the military point of view, I concur generally in his estimate of his military hardware requirements.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~SECRET~~

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Research
Memorandum

RNA-2, January 12, 1968

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *by h.c.d.*
Subject: The Jarring Mission: Arab and Israeli Views Contrast

ADVANCE COPY
Seen by Mr. Rostow

With the UN mediation effort in its exploratory stage, this paper traces the hopes and reservations of the parties and the sources of these attitudes in local tradition and in past experience with the UN-patrolled armistice.

ABSTRACT

When the Arab leaders at Khartoum decided they must seek a political settlement, they naturally looked to a mediator as the nearest equivalent to the accepted means of settling serious quarrels in Arab life. The procedure of the mediator (hakim or wasit) is a fixed ritual in Arab culture and all of its steps must be followed. When entered in good faith, even an oral agreement reached through a hakim is more binding than the most formal treaty made "under duress." Although the Jarring mission is seen in this guise by the Arabs, it is actually a much more complex multilateral operation which may or may not be able to fill their expectations.

Without some form of go-between, however, negotiations are not likely to start at all. To the Arabs, it seems so obvious that everyone should know the proper way to proceed that they interpret Israel's demand for direct talks as bad faith or sabotage.

The Israelis, however, have been negatively conditioned toward UN auspices by the long history of UN administration of the Armistice. Israelis feel that

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-155
By *ms* NARA, Date *6-9-03*

GROUP 3
Excluded from automatic
downgrading at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

the truce supervisory machinery acted through the years to shelter the Arabs from the consequences of terrorist and other hostile acts, and thus abetted them in their refusal to sue for peace. The several mixed Armistice Commissions were not, as they are sometimes pictured, occasions where the Arabs and Israelis worked out their problems face to face, even though they met in the same room. When the MACs met at all, they were generally bitter and deadlocked confrontations that could be resolved only by the vote of the neutral chairman; for nearly a decade, the Syrian and Egyptian MACs were inoperative. Arabs and Israelis in fact have never met face to face except for limited and strictly technical purposes. The only real precedent to UN mediation was the first effort of Count Bernadotte in 1948. It was rejected by both sides, since each then felt that it could do better by force. The atmosphere is now quite different; still, insistence by either party in its mode of negotiation could prevent any further movement toward peace. And of the five, the Arabs are the most strongly wedded to their characteristic negotiating pattern.

The several parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict approach the UN mediation effort with varying expectations conditioned by their experience with past UN peace-keeping efforts in the area and, in the Arab case, by the body of custom surrounding the function of the mediator (hakim or wasit) the role in which they see the Jarring mission.

Mediation in Arab Tradition

The ancient and still universally accepted device of the mediator for composing inter-tribal or inter-family quarrels is an obvious parallel to the UN mission. The Arabs in fact sought international mediation because it is the nearest diplomatic device to their customary recourse in similar situations and therefore more easily acceptable both to governments and to the people at large.

In Arab society this device has two purposes: first, to end without loss of face differences that have been, or would otherwise become, blood feuds. To this end, custom decrees that the parties to a quarrel do not meet face to face. Their code requires bloodshed were they to meet at the beginning of this process; therefore, the first aim of the ritual is to separate the parties, who outwardly maintain postures of unyielding belligerency. In fact, mediation is seldom invoked (and even more rarely successful) until one side or both are ready to give up. When they are, a solution usually can be reached rather quickly. Each side confides its bargaining points to the mediator who gradually narrows the dispute, going from one party to the other, until he arrives at terms both can accept. The parties can and do make substantial concessions because they can seem to bow not to their enemy, but to the reasoned will of the general community embodied in the mediator. Only in the last act do the parties meet on neutral ground under carefully arranged auspices of the mediator, and by that act they symbolically ratify the terms already separately agreed upon. An essential ingredient thus is a reasonable expectation that negotiation will be successful.

When Israel insists upon face-to-face negotiations from the start, it is defeating the whole purpose of this ritual, and posing a condition that Arabs find impossible, however sensible it seems to others. Beyond the considerations of "face," this modus is important to the life of an agreement. Among Arabs, if a peace is to endure there must be no ostensible "winner" nor "loser." For a "loser" is honor-bound whenever he can, to reopen the quarrel and seek revenge. Even if this course is suicidal, he has no choice. Agreed terms arranged through the mediator, however, can be lived with honorably by both sides provided there is no subsequent offense.

Mediation May Be an Indefinite "Freeze"

But there is no customary time-limit within which mediation must take place. When the parties cannot or do not wish to pursue a quarrel by violence, yet cannot come to terms, the mediator can serve instead as a means to shelve the dispute indefinitely without touching the issues involved. There is no settlement. The parties are technically in conflict, but as long as the matter is under mediation--even if that process is more or less a fiction--they are absolved of the obligation of blood feud provided the other side also observes the truce.

This suspension-of-quarrel can be an extremely touchy balance that breaks down at the merest hint of non-compliance on either side. But it can also wear well over long periods of time. A classic case is the dispute between Saudi Arabia and the UK over Buraimi oasis, which has been at issue since 1924 and technically under arbitration since 1954. (In this case, the antagonists did meet face to face in the presence of neutral members of an arbitral commission.) Neither party has been willing to meet the other's terms but neither now wants to press the issue, and the device of a suspended arbitration gives them warrant not to do so.

Tradition thus allows equally for mediation that is an active search for settlement (which, in the present situation, Jordan obviously needs), or mediation that marks an indefinite stalemate, which the more obstinate Arab countries seem to contemplate. Israel evidently fears that mediation will leave it with an open-ended situation of neither war nor peace or at best with a "no winner no loser" proposition, unless the Arabs are kept under constant pressure. Its reserve about the usefulness of mediation is not new. On July 29, 1948 Mr. Sharett told the Provincial State Council in a policy speech:

"...We reject the specific approach of mediation, an approach which regards its function as being to find a compromise between the compromise we have accepted and the extreme and unyielding attitude of the other side. We reject this approach, and express our distrust of mediation.... If the other side can be induced to enter into direct negotiations with us and to sit down to a table with us as equals, with each recognizing the independence of the other, and with each recognizing the existence of the other as a sovereign and enduring State, such mediation might be successful."

Nevertheless, mediation did take place in 1949: there was no other feasible approach.

Israel's insistence on face-to-face talks aims at a formal peace treaty that would clearly establish the Arab defeat and that world opinion will help it to enforce. The Israelis probably also feel that forcing direct talks would demonstrate the weakness and disunity of the Arab governments to their respective peoples, undercut the defiant propaganda and finally convince ordinary Arabs that further resistance is impossible.

In the present atmosphere no Arab government would be ready to risk direct negotiations, and Israeli intransigence on this point is nearly certain to freeze the status quo and prevent any forward movement. Most Arabs assume, moreover, that everyone knows the accepted rules in such cases. They interpret Israel's rigid stand as evidence of bad faith, especially when reinforced by Israeli statements that indicate its intention to hold on to the occupied territories.

UN Mediation Differs from the Tradition

There is a significant difference, however, between the Jarring mission and traditional mediation. The go-between normally faces a bilateral situation, whether

between kinship groups or governments. The UN mediator, on the other hand, is dealing on the Arab side with a concert of shifting and imperfectly reconciled positions barely held together by summit meetings that may limit the negotiators, or could break down negotiations altogether. And while the traditional mediator acts as an individual, Jarring draws his authority from a political structure, the UN, in which the antagonists themselves and a welter of other special interests are represented. Jarring can serve as a channel for exchange of views to the extent that the parties allow him to do so. But though he is a symbol of the world community's concern, he is also a symbol of the fact that that concern is too feeble or too divided to permit of enforcement, and he cannot take major initiatives.

Effects of UN Precedents

1. The 1948 War and Mediated Truce

Naturally, the attitudes of both sides toward the Jarring mission also reflect their experience of seventeen years with other UN peace-keeping machinery. In fact, only one UN mechanism in the Near East is a true precedent: only the 1948 mission of Count Bernadotte entered a war situation and dealt with the central issues to the conflict. It was premature, and it failed. The first truce on June 11, 1948 lasted only four weeks during which both sides ignored the stand-fast provision of the truce and used the breathing space to regroup and improve their positions. Arab public opinion demanded a resumption of the war after a newspaper campaign convinced them that they were winning and were forced by the truce to forego their victory. The Egyptians first reopened the fighting; however, the Israeli command had meanwhile planned four separate offensives which they pursued energetically as soon as the ceasefire broke down.

The second truce on July 18 was not negotiated but imposed under threat of stiff economic sanctions, and Count Bernadotte was given a staff of mixed nationality (the UN Truce Supervisory Organization, UNTSO) to police the truce and control incidents. UNTSO was not strong enough, however, nor was it given authority, to enforce the peace terms that Count Bernadotte devised, and which were approved by the UN. Neither of the combatants was happy with this plan, and on October 3 the Israeli Foreign Minister formally rejected it.*

This time, it was the Israeli army that felt cheated of its victory. On July 26, eight days after the truce, Israel seized the New City of Jerusalem. Then, in mid-October, Israeli forces opened two full-scale offensives, taking the Negev, widening the corridor above Jerusalem and clearing the eastern shore of Lake Tiberias up to and over the Lebanese border. In December 1948-January 1949 Israel reduced the Egyptian salient at al-Auja, threatening the Sinai peninsula, and in March 1949 commenced expanding its hold on the southern Negev, toward Aqaba. These moves were halted only by vigorous British pressure and in fact British troops invested Aqaba at the request of the Jordanian government.

Thus the severest of the first Arab-Israel fighting and all of the major Arab territorial losses occurred during periods of nominal truce. The UN machinery was flouted quite easily by both sides and came to be regarded by Israel as a

*Meanwhile on September 17 Count Bernadotte was assassinated by members of the Israeli irregular Stern Group.

surmountable obstacle and by the Arabs as a necessary though inadequate protection. The Bernadotte plan, which was voted by the UN, was actually much more favorable to the Arabs than the later fortunes of war. In after years the Arabs, conveniently forgetting that they had once rejected it as stoutly as the Israelis, blamed the UN for failing to enforce its plan.

2. Armistice Negotiations

For those who now urge direct negotiations, the armistice negotiations in 1949 are not a good example, and their outcome does not persuade the Arabs that direct discussions would be desirable. Four separate agreements were made: with Egypt on the island of Rhodes, February 24, 1949; with Lebanon March 23, 1949, at Ras Naqura; with Jordan, completed July 17 also at Rhodes; and with Syria July 20. The Iraqis, having turned over their front line and their interests to Jordan, had withdrawn and refused to enter any armistice at all. In the intervening years Israel has been extremely sensitive to that fact whenever Iraqi troops entered adjacent states.

The armistice talks were purely military in character, army officers serving as the principals on both sides. In substance, they were limited to the mechanics of establishing cease-fire lines and giving indefinite duration to the cease-fire. The negotiations owed a great deal to the presence and remarkable performance of Dr. Ralph Bunche, who succeeded Count Bernadotte as mediator. Even though he eventually prevailed on Arab and Israeli delegates to sit down at the same table at Rhodes, the Arabs nevertheless took great care not to imply recognition of Israel's existence as a state, and the central political issues were not touched upon. Minor territorial adjustments were made in favor of Lebanon, which had taken virtually no part in the fighting, and there was some minor trading along the very long and involved Jordanian line. A Palestine Conciliation Commission was set up to tackle the political problems, but it proved ineffective. When this political body met in Lausanne, the Arabs consistently refused to meet face-to-face with the Israelis, or even in the same room.

However, the Arabs later found that Israel had made some gains by what they regarded as sharp practice at the expense of Arab inexperience. At Rhodes, for example, the Israelis used a very blunt crayon on a small-scale map in laying out the demarcation lines. On the ground, this broad line gave a four or five mile differential of which Israel took advantage when surveying, and this accounted for some of the anomalies of divided villages, villages cut off from fields and water sources, and other like features. In this way Israel acquired by only a few feet the last link in the Haifa-Jerusalem rail line--but at the cost of a border that could not be administered equitably and that led to innumerable clashes and incidents.

3. The Mixed Armistice Commissions

After the Armistice, UNTSO was supplemented by four Mixed Armistice Commissions, in which two delegates of each of the respective adversaries met with a neutral UN chairman. But although these organizations functioned quite well in

preventing or ending armed clashes, they were not a matter of Arabs and Israelis working together towards a durable peace. For the purpose of the MACs was merely to police the armistice and determine violations of its terms. They acted solely on complaints of either of the parties that the armistice had been violated, and they did not approach political issues. Like the Armistice delegations, they were made up solely of military officers. (The chief of Israeli MACs was attached to the Armistice Section of the Foreign Ministry and wore mufti, but he was still a Colonel on active duty.)

Although some MAC's achieved short periods of smooth operation, their overall history was stormy. Both sides tried to manipulate the MAC's and to fake evidence, the Arabs quite transparently, the Israelis sometimes with great sophistication. In general, the Arabs, particularly the Jordanians and Lebanese, were more cooperative, since they were the weaker power in each case. Israeli officers, who knew they could manage the border to advantage by their own strength, tended to be arrogant and take a hard line.

Genuine discussion in the MAC's were rare: as a rule, the adversaries maintained opposite positions on each complaint and the chairman, after a UN staff investigation, cast the tie-breaking vote or reserved his position which had the effect of burying that particular case. Each side tried to score on the other in debate and in the number of complaints. Neither side ever acknowledged itself in the wrong and each held adverse decisions against the UN.

Finally, the MAC's were suspended or boycotted for long periods. Only the Israel-Lebanon MAC met regularly and without acrimony. The Israel-Syrian MAC did not meet from 1959 until January 1967 because Syria insisted on discussing the status of the Demilitarized Zone, on which Israeli agriculture was encroaching, and Israel refused to countenance "political" topics. After 1956, Egyptian and UN officers met without Israel, which took its complaints against Egypt directly to the UN through the UN Emergency Force in Gaza. The Israel-Jordan MAC met regularly, and arranged sporadic police cooperation against infiltrators, but it was more usually at loggerheads.

Each MAC finding was taken as a separate case, and many of them went against Israel; the Israelis, on their part, saw each of their reprisal actions as the climax of a long chain of incidents that fully justified their action. Israel came to regard the MAC's as a shield behind which the Arabs found shelter while sniping at them. Their long annoyance with this pattern and the ease with which the UAR achieved the withdrawal of UNEF are among the chief reasons why Israel is resisting the interposition of the UN in final peace negotiations or the perpetuation of UN machinery in the area.

Any approach to peace that is to succeed must at the start take account of the fact that a first and conditioning issue is the very mode of negotiation. Only if some workable modus operandi is found can Arab-Israeli relations move off dead center--and even so they will move slowly. At best, negotiations will be long, arduous, and often discouraging. A successful outcome will need to let the Israelis feel that a durable peace has been achieved on the basis of Israel's victory, while the Arab governments will want to be able to present any solution as not being a total defeat for the Arabs nor ignominious acceptance of Israeli demands. This is an immensely difficult but not an impossible task (cf. the Cuban crisis in which the US and USSR, from their separate terms of reference, can each claim a victory). The alternative is the freezing of the present new cease-fire lines into "boundaries" and at best an uneasy truce punctuated by incidents.

PROCESSING NOTE

The document originally filed as #210 in the National Security File (NSF), Country File, Jordan, Vol. IV (letter from Henry J. Tasca to Walt Rostow, 1/11/68) was misfiled in that file by the National Security Council staff. When the staff of the Johnson Library processed that file, we transferred the document to its proper location: National Security File, Country File, Morocco, Volume II. It is numbered as document #20 in that file.

There is no longer a document #210 in the NSF, Country File, Jordan, Vol. IV.

REGINA GREENWELL
Senior Archivist

August 6, 2001

211

FEA012
PP WTE10
DE WTE 282

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP 0247

fo
F
Just told Rostow

Received: Washington CommCen
11:20 AM wednesday 10 Jan 1968

Received: LBJ Ranch CommCen
11:54 AM Wednesday 10 Jan 1968

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

JANUARY 10, 1968

SUBJECT: PL 480 AGREEMENT FOR JORDAN

SECRETARY FREEMAN, BILL GAUD AND CHARLIE SCHULTZ RECOMMEND YOU APPROVE A \$2.1 MILLION WHEAT AGREEMENT FOR JORDAN. TREASURY CONCURS. THIS WOULD COVER 30,000 TONS FOR DOLLARS OVER TWENTY YEARS.

THIS AGREEMENT WILL PARTLY SUBSTITUTE FOR AID DOLLARS. SINCE JORDAN FOR THE MOMENT IS RECEIVING ALL THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE AID IT NEEDS, WE SUSPENDED OUR BUDGET SUPPORT AS THE FINAL QUARTER OF 1967. OUR STRATEGY IS TO COMBINE THIS PL 480 DEAL AND \$3 MILLION IN AID TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FUNDS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THAT LAST QUARTER OF BUDGET SUPPORT TO CUSHION THE TRANSITION TO NO SUPPORT IN 1968. WE PLAN TO USE THE AID MONEY FOR FEASIBILITY STUDIES THAT WILL HELP THE JORDANIANS USE THE ARAB MONEY THEY HAVE TO GOOD PERMANENT ADVANTAGE.

THIS WOULD BE USEFUL POLITICALLY, TOO. IT IS ONE OF THE FEW POSITIVE THINGS WE'VE BEEN ABLE TO DO. THE JORDANIANS ARE UPSET THAT WE ARE ENDING BUDGET SUPPORT, AND WE ARE JUST BARELY SCRAPING THROUGH ON THE MILITARY SIDE. WE GOT OUR RESPONSE ON ARMS OUT THE DAY AFTER HUSSEIN HAD AGREED TO RECEIVE SOVIET MISSION. HARRY SYMMES HAD TO PERSUADE HUSSEIN TO WITHDRAW A LETTER STATING THAT OUR RESPONSE HAD COME TOO LATE AND TO PUT OFF THE SOVIET VISIT. HE SUCCEEDED, BUT WE MAY STILL HAVE A HARD ENOUGH TIME RESPONDING ADEQUATELY TO HIS ARMS REQUESTS. A MOVE ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE WOULD HELP A LITTLE. NOW THAT WE HAVE ISRAELI ACQUIESCENCE TO OUR BLOCKING THE SOVIETS IN JORDAN, I THINK WE NEED TO GET BACK INTO BUSINESS IN EVERY WAY WE REASONABLY CAN. FORTUNATELY, PL 480 IS ONE OF THE FEW RESOURCES WE CAN USE RELATIVELY FREELY.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, Vol. XX # 43

By 14 NARA, Date 7-31-01

YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THIS IS THE FIRST SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT TO BE PROCESSED UNDED THE NEW "SYMINGTON AMENDMENT" TO THE AID BILL WHICH REQUIRES THE PRESIDENT TO "TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION" WHETHER SUCH AID WILL BE DIVERTED TO MILITARY ENDS OR ENABLE THE RECIPIENT TO SUPPORT UNNECESSARY MILITARY EXPENDITURES. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE KEPT THE JORDANIAN MILITARY BUDGET WITHIN AGREED LIMITS. THE PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES HAS BEEN QUITE HIGH BUT DECLINING. THE JORDANIANS ARE THE ONLY ARAB COMBATANTS IN THE JUNE WAR THAT HAVE NOT PURCHASED SUBSTANTIAL REPLACEMENTS FOR THEIR LOSES.

WE WOULD LIKE TO GET THIS OUT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE SINCE A SOVIET ECONOMIC MISSION IS ALREADY IN JORDAN.

APPROVE-----✓-----

CALL ME-----

DTG: 101720Z JAN 68

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

January 10, 1968

FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: WALT ROSTOW
SUBJECT: PL 480 Agreement for Jordan

OK - wire
2/1a
Sent Rostow via wire
CAP 80247

Secretary Freeman, Bill Gaud and Charlie Schultze recommend you approve a \$2.1 million wheat agreement for Jordan. Treasury concurs. This would cover 30,000 tons for dollars over twenty years.

This agreement will partly substitute for AID dollars. Since Jordan for the moment is receiving all the foreign exchange aid it needs, we suspended our budget support as of the final quarter of 1967. Our strategy is to combine this PL 480 deal and \$3 million in AID technical assistance funds as a substitute for that last quarter of budget support to cushion the transition to no support in 1968. We plan to use the AID money for feasibility studies that will help the Jordanians use the Arab money they have to good permanent advantage.

This would be useful politically, too. It is one of the few positive things we've been able to do. The Jordanians are upset that we are ending budget support, and we are just barely scraping through on the military side. We got our response on arms out the day after Hussein had agreed to receive a Soviet mission. Harry Symmes had to persuade Hussein to withdraw a letter stating that our response had come too late and to put off the Soviet visit. He succeeded, but we may still have a hard enough time responding adequately to his arms

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol. XX #43
By *[initials]* NARA, Date 7/3/01

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

requests. A move on the economic side would help a little. Now that we have Israeli acquiescence to our blocking the Soviets in Jordan, I think we need to get back into business in every way we reasonably can. Fortunately, PL 480 is one of the few resources we can use relatively freely.

You should know that this is the first substantial agreement to be processed under the new "Symington amendment" to the aid bill which requires the President to "take into consideration" whether such aid will be diverted to military ends or enable the recipient to support unnecessary military expenditures. As you know, we have kept the Jordanian military budget within agreed limits. The percentage of total expenditures has been quite high but declining. The Jordanians are the only Arab combatants in the June war that have not purchased substantial replacements for their losses.

We would like to get this out as quickly as possible since a Soviet economic mission is already in Jordan.

Approve ✓

Call me _____

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

124

211b

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

JAN 10 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: P. L. 480 Program for Jordan

In the attached memorandum, Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud request your authority to negotiate a \$2.1 million sales agreement, providing 30,000 tons of wheat, with Jordan. The credit terms would involve dollar repayment in twenty years, including two years' grace.

This agreement will partially substitute for AID dollars. We have informed the Jordanians that cash grants for budget support, which declined from \$40 million in FY 1961 to \$32 million in FY 1966, will be discontinued in 1968. Jordan does not need this assistance at the present time because her reserves are at an all-time high as a result of cash donations from other Arab countries.

In negotiating this agreement, we will also tell the Jordanians that we do not plan to make the final \$6.2 million payment toward the \$27 million in budget support which they expected in CY 1967. Instead, we intend to substitute \$3 million in AID funds to finance feasibility studies of promising development projects and this proposed \$2 million P. L. 480 agreement. If this strategy is successful, it will help to orient Jordanian thinking toward pressing for economic development.

Jordan's self-help measures in the agricultural sector have been satisfactory. The conditions included in this agreement would encourage the government to continue and expand those activities which seem likely to lead to further increases in production.

The Freeman/Gaud memo contains an attachment describing Jordan's military expenditures, in keeping with the "Symington amendment" to the Foreign Assistance Act. Since "unnecessary" military expenditures do not "materially interfere" with Jordan's development, there is no problem in this case.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S-98001
By RG/SJ, NARA, Date 8-14-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

I recommend that you approve this P. L. 480 proposal. The amounts involved are within your 1968 budget targets.

Charles L. Schultze

Charles L. Schultze
Director

Attachment

Approve

Disapprove

NOV 10 1968

OFFICE
RECEIVED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

211c

JAN 5 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Public Law 480 Program with Jordan

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate with Jordan a PL 480 sale of 30,000 tons of wheat for \$2.1 million under terms of a dollar credit payable over 20 years at 2½ percent interest, including a two year grace period at 2 percent interest, and an initial payment of 5 percent. The Department of State concurs in this recommendation as does the Treasury Department.

Need for Program

While the 1967 crop is estimated at 170,000 tons against the drought damaged crop of 101,000 tons in 1966, the influx of displaced persons in addition to those cared for by UNRWA or other agencies has placed new requirements on the Government of Jordan to assure adequate food stocks. The World Food Program is now feeding an estimated 100,000 non-UNRWA refugees and we would like to see the Government of Jordan in a position to accept some of the responsibility for these refugees. Also, in view of the disruption of food supply lines resulting from the June conflict a carryover equal to three months supply needs to be established early in 1968.

Rather than provide further dollar U. S. budget support of \$6.2 million remaining for calendar year 1967, we propose to negotiate this \$2.1 million PL 480 program together with an offer of up to \$3 million of foreign assistance grant funds for feasibility studies of development possibilities. This would have the advantage that the PL 480 portion would represent wheat or flour purchases in the United States on credit with dollar repayment. For calendar year 1968, we have informed the Jordanian Government that U. S. budget support payments would be suspended. The hardening of terms of this proposed program compared with previous PL 480 programs with Jordan reflects the relatively strong current financial position resulting from Arab Nation contributions to Jordan related to the present Middle Eastern situation.

Usual Marketing Requirements

There are no usual marketing requirements, but in the event that Jordan purchases any quantities commercially during the effective period of the proposed agreement the United States will be given a fair chance to participate in supplying such quantities.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S-98001
By RG/SL, NARA, Date 8-14-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Self-Help Efforts

The overall agricultural production index has more than doubled since 1960. Almost all of Jordan's arable land is devoted to food production, and 30,000 acres in the fertile East Ghor area has been intensively developed for irrigated farming.

The government allocates some 20 percent of budget expenditures for items related to agriculture. There are no subsidies and virtually no crop limitations. No duties or quotas are assigned to imports of fertilizers and agricultural machinery, and foreign exchange is readily available to private importers of these items.

A.I.D. and other bilateral assistance has helped to establish agricultural cooperatives and an agricultural credit corporation. A total of 840 miles of farm-to-market roads has been completed and an agricultural extension service provided for the entire country. Intensive research in the selection of improved wheat varieties is under way.

The proposed sales agreement includes the following self-help measures to be undertaken by Jordan:

1. Increase the resources available to local cooperatives in their programs of farm credit to finance supplies of producer goods, marketing and other agricultural activities;
2. Intensify efforts to increase wheat production in semi-arid areas through use of conservation practices and the institution of credit facilities;
3. Provide continued protection to the Wadi Ziglab watershed through erosion control measures;
4. Expand and coordinate agricultural research and extension activities so that research will be focused on local needs and its results will be more widely applied;
5. Take steps to establish an organization to conduct a coordinated national soil and water conservation program.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

Recommendation

That you authorize us to proceed with the PL 480 agreement as described above.

December 26 1967

William J. Gaud

Administrator

Agency for International Development

Quill K. Funn

Secretary

Department of Agriculture

Attachment:

Review of Proposed P.L. 480 Agreement
With Jordan Per Section 620(s) of the
Foreign Assistance Act, as amended

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

Date: _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ATTACHMENT

REVIEW OF PROPOSED P.L. 480 AGREEMENT WITH JORDAN
PER SECTION 620(s) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT,
AS AMENDED

The Symington amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 requires the President before selling agricultural commodities under P.L. 480 to take into account (1) the percentage of the recipient or purchasing country's budget which is devoted to military purposes, and (2) the degree to which the recipient or purchasing country is using its foreign exchange resources to acquire military equipment.

As a condition of our previous economic aid, Jordan agreed to limit its military expenditures to a level agreed between the GOJ and USG. In previous years, this limitation has been established by negotiation between the two governments and has represented the minimum level necessary to maintain the stability of the regime. The GOJ held its military expenditures to approximately the agreed level up to June 1967.

The percentage of Jordan's budget devoted to military purposes had been declining. For Jordanian fiscal years (ending March 31) it was 53% in 1964, 49% in 1965 and 46% in 1966. The Jordanian fiscal year was shifted to a calendar year basis in 1966. Embassy estimates for the nine month interim fiscal year in 1966 (April - December) show 41% for military expenditures. Their estimates for calendar year 1967 show a rise to 48% but this includes the extraordinary expenditures related to the hostilities of June 1967. These increased budgetary expenditures were financed from emergency grant assistance from the Arab countries.

Jordan has additional funds for military purposes outside its budget. Most of this money is in the form of grants from other Arab countries, however, and its expenditure does not cause a substantial diversion of Jordan's resources away from development.

In arriving at an agreed level, the USG has periodically reviewed Jordanian military requirements. Since the June hostilities with Israel, the GOJ has made no major arms purchases with the exception of a limited number of subsonic Hawker-Hunter aircraft purchased from the UK as partial replacements for the Hawker-Hunters lost in the June war. It is likely that the GOJ will continue to agree

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

to limit its military expenditures provided there is not a major change in the nature of our relationships. In this context we, as in the past, will continue to review Jordan's military requirements and seek to obtain GOJ agreement to limit military expenditures to the minimum required to maintain the stability of the regime.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

January 10, 1968

Jordanian Ambassador Sharaf came in this afternoon at his request for a general discussion since we had not talked for a couple of months. Our conversation mostly ranged over the familiar problems of Arab-Israeli settlement although he obviously had a special interest in whatever I might say about the Eshkol visit.

When he asked me whether there was any special interpretation I could provide on the Eshkol communique, I stuck to the general guidance in State's outgoing telegram on the subject. I agreed with him that its tone was restrained. I said I felt that it was consistent with the President's June 19 insistence on arms limitation and that it focussed primarily on the problems of achieving peace. He simply mentioned the importance of the US not supplying Phantoms to Israel, and we dropped the subject.

On the general problem of settlement, his main theme was that he feels Arab world sentiment is crystalizing in favor of Arab guerrilla warfare against Israel. When I asked him whether he felt this problem would be solved if the Israelis withdrew, he said he felt a sufficiently new atmosphere would be created in Jordan and Egypt to make the problem manageable and that Syria would then be isolated. The key to any steps toward peace settlement is Israeli withdrawal.

I said I thought the main problem at the moment is to figure out how to engage negotiating gears. There are hardliners and flexible thinkers on both sides; the problem is to give the flexible factions a chance to get together and to work out some firm propositions to use in bringing their hardliners around. I did not see Israel's insistence on direct negotiations as pure obstinacy since I felt Eshkol needed to give his divided Cabinet something precise to chew on before he brought it to the point of decision. I told him again that I thought his government would find Israel more flexible than its public position seemed once a dialogue could begin.

When he mentioned the importance of the US using its influence, I said we had been careful for the moment not to get in Ambassador Jarring's way but that we certainly didn't exclude involving ourselves at some point if we could help.

He returned to arms limitation and said we should get together with the USSR. I said there are two ways to go at limitation--restraint by suppliers and restraint by receivers. Both are difficult, but we are doing what we can. If the Arabs feel strongly, why don't they go to the USSR and urge Soviet leaders to cooperate with the US in restraining the arms race.

cc: Mr. Rostow
Mr. Davies

2/4
Harold H. Saunders

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S-98901
By RJD/NARA, Date 6-14-01

~~SECRET~~

Received Washington CommCen
2:11 P.M. EST Tuesday 9 Jan 68

Received LBJ Ranch CommCen
2:40 P.M. CST Tuesday 9 Jan 68

EEA980
OO WTE10
DE WTE 245

M

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80213

~~SECRET~~

JANUARY 9, 1968

IT WAS A CLOSE THING WITH HUSSEIN, AS THE FOLLOWING CABLE
SHOWS. WE SHALL HAVE TO TALK TO THE JORDANIANS ABOUT MORE THAN ARMS.

AMMAN 2912

1. WE HAVE HAD A SERIES OF VERY GRIM DISCUSSIONS WITH
JORDANIANS TODAY. WITH CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY WE HAVE
JUST OBTAINED KING HUSSEIN'S AGREEMENT TO POSTPONING
THE VISIT OF A HIGH-LEVEL SOVIET MILITARY DELEGATION
(TWO LIEUTENANT-GENERALS AND FOUR OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS
SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN JORDAN ON THE ELEVENTH) PENDING
DISCUSSIONS OF GENERAL KHAMMASH WITH OUR MILITARY PEOPLE
IN WASHINGTON. (KHAMMASH'S TRAVEL PLANS WILL BE SUBJECT
SUBSEQUENT MESSAGE. THE KING HAS ALSO AGREED TO WITHDRAWAL
OF A LETTER WRITTEN BY ZAID RIFA'I TO ME INCORPORATING THE
KING'S RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S ORAL MESSAGE I DELIVERED
TO THE KING YESTERDAY. I OBTAINED THE KING'S AGREEMENT TO WITH-
DRAWAL OF THIS LETTER, WHICH STATED BASICALLY THAT OUR RESPONSE
HAD COME TOO LATE, AGAINST MY PERSONAL ASSURANCES TO HIM
THAT THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE IMPLIED THAT THE "LEGITIMATE
REQUIREMENTS" OF JORDAN WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN A POSITIVE
WAY WITH KHAMMASH IN WASHINGTON. THE NATURE OF THESE "LEGITI-
MATE REQUIREMENTS" AS THE EMBASSY UNDERSTANDS THEM FROM THE
KING AND KHAMMASH WILL BE SPELLED OUT IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol. XX # 42
By NARA, Date 7-3-01

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

3. TODAY'S SITUATION CAME ABOUT PRIMARILY BECAUSE WE WERE LATE IN RESPONDING TO THE KING'S ORAL MESSAGE OF DECEMBER TO THE PRESIDENT. BEYOND THAT, HOWEVER, THE KING APPARENTLY HAD DECIDED WE WERE ONLY STRINGING HIM ALONG, THAT WE HAD NO INTENTION OF DISCUSSING OR SUPPLYING MORE THAN TOKEN ARMS TO JORDAN, AND THAT IN EFFECT WE HAD CALLED HIS HAND. RELIABLE JORDANIAN SOURCES AND AN EMBASSY OFFICER WHO KNOWS HIM WELL SAID THE KING HAS BEEN UNDER CONSIDERABLE PSYCHOLOGICAL TENSION ON THIS MATTER. MY OWN LIMITED EXPERIENCE WITH HUSSEIN CONFIRMS THAT HE HAS BECOME QUITE DESPERATE AND SOMEWHAT OVERWROUGHT. PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL'S VISIT AND THE RECENT SERIES OF DIFFICULTIES ON THE BORDER HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO HIS SENSE OF BEING CORNERED. WE ARE ALSO INFORMED HE HAS DEVELOPED A DEEP SENSE OF GUILT ABOUT THE EVENTS OF JUNE.

4. I WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT IN AGREEING (1) TO POSTPONE THE VISIT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY DELEGATION (2) TO WITHDRAW THE LETTER AND (3) TO SEND GENERAL KHAMMASH TO WASHINGTON THE KING UNDERSTANDS WE SERIOUSLY INTEND TO COME TO A MEETING OF THE MINDS WITH GENERAL KHAMMASH ON WHAT ARMS WE ARE WILLING TO SUPPLY TO JORDAN. KHAMMASH WILL HAVE FULL POWERS TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER. I THINK HE AND THE KING RECOGNIZE THEY MAY NOT GET ALL THEY WANT, BUT THEY DO EXPECT MORE THAN TOKEN SATISFACTION AND PLAYING FOR TIME. IF WE ARE NOT ABLE TO AGREE ON "LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS", THEN THE KING WILL CONSIDER HE HAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO RESCHEDULING THE VISIT OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION AND, PRESUMABLY, ACCEPTING SOVIET OFFERS.

5. KING HUSSEIN REQUESTED MY PERSONAL UNDERTAKING THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD WE REVEAL THAT AT OUR REQUEST (1) HE HAD POSTPONED THE SOVIET VISIT OR (2) WITHDRAWN ZAID RIFA'I'S LETTER. I ASSURED HIM HE WOULD BE PROTECTED IN BOTH CASES.

SYMMES

NOTE: ABOVE TEL BEING SERVICED FOR OMISSION OF NUMBERED PARA TWO (2)

DTG: 09/1911Z JAN 68

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

January 9, 1968

213a

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

It was a close thing with Hussein, as the following cable shows. We shall have to talk to the Jordanians about more than arms.

AMMAN 2912

*sent back
via wire
CAP 80213*



Department of State

TELEGRAM

213-6

6

~~SECRET~~

OO RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 2912A 090650
ZNY SSSSS
O 090645Z JAN 68 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4336
STATE GRNC
BT
SECRET AMMAN 2912

CONTROL : 1715Q
RECD : JAN. 9, 1968
5:06 A.M.

*For the President from
Walt Rostow*

*It was a close thing
with Hussein, as the
following cable
shows. We shall
have to talk
to the Jordanians
about more
than arms.*

NODIS

FOR ASST SECY BATTLE OR DEPUTY ASST SECY DAVIES

DELIVER OPENING OF BUSINESS JANUARY 9

1. WE HAVE HAD A SERIES OF VERY GRIM DISCUSSIONS WITH JORDANIANS TODAY. WITH CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY WE HAVE JUST OBTAINED KING HUSSEIN'S AGREEMENT TO POSTPONING THE VISIT OF A HIGH-LEVEL SOVIET MILITARY DELEGATION (TWO LIEUTENANT-GENERALS AND FOUR OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN JORDAN ON THE ELEVENTH) PENDING DISCUSSIONS OF GENERAL KHAMMASH WITH OUR MILITARY

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 2912A ~~SECRET~~

PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON. (KHAMMASH'S TRAVEL PLANS WILL BE SUBJECT SUBSEQUENT MESSAGE. THE KING HAS ALSO AGREED TO WITHDRAWAL OF A LETTER WRITTEN BY ZAID RIFA'I TO ME INCORPORATING THE KING'S RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S ORAL MESSAGE I DELIVERED TO THE KING YESTERDAY. I OBTAINED THE KING'S AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAWAL OF THIS LETTER, WHICH STATED BASICALLY THAT OUR RESPONSE HAD COME TOO LATE, AGAINST MY PERSONAL ASSURANCES TO HIM THAT THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE IMPLIED THAT THE "LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS" OF JORDAN WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN A POSITIVE WAY WITH KHAMMASH IN WASHINGTON. THE NATURE OF THESE "LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS" AS THE EMBASSY UNDERSTANDS THEM FROM THE KING AND KHAMMASH WILL BE SPELLED OUT IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, Vol. XX # 42

By *ry* NARA, Date 8-14-01

~~SECRET~~

~~PAGE 2 AMMAN 2912, Jan 9, 1968 NODIS~~

3. TODAY'S SITUATION CAME ABOUT PRIMARILY BECAUSE WE WERE LATE IN RESPONDING TO THE KING'S ORAL MESSAGE OF DECEMBER 4 TO THE PRESIDENT. BEYOND THAT, HOWEVER, THE KING APPARENTLY HAD DECIDED WE WERE ONLY STRINGING HIM ALONG, THAT WE HAD NO INTENTION OF DISCUSSING OR

~~PAGE 3 RUQMKG 2912A SECRET~~

SOME SUPPLYING MORE THAN TOKEN ARMS TO JORDAN, AND THAT IN EFFECT WE HAD CALLED HIS HAND. RELIABLE JORDANIN SOURCES AND AN EMBASSY OFFICER WHO KNOWS HIM WELL SAID THE KING HAS BEEN UNDER CONSIDERABLE PSYCHOLOGICAL TENSION ON THIS MATTER. MY OWN LIMITED EXPERIENCE WITH HUSSEIN CONFIRMS THAT HE HAS BECOME QUITE DESPERATE AND WHAT OVERWROUGHT. PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL'S VISIT AND THE RECENT SERIES OF DIFFICULTIES ON THE BORDER HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO HIS SENSE OF BEING CORNERED. WE ARE ALSO INFORMED HE HAS DEVELOPED A DEEP SENSE OF GUILT ABOUT THE EVENTS OF JUNE.

4. I WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT IN AGREEING (1) TO POSTPONE THE VISIT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY DELEGATION (2) TO WITHDRAW THE LETTER AND (3) TO SEND GENL KHAMMASH TO WASHINGTON THE KING UNDERSTANDS WE SERIOUSLY INTEND TO COME TO A MEETING OF THE MINDS WITH GENL KHAMMASH ON WHAT ARMS WE ARE WILLING TO SUPPLY TO JORDAN. KHAMMASH

GENERAL

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WILL HAVE FULL POWERS TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER. I THINK HE AND THE KING RECOGNIZE THEY MAY NOT GET ALL THEY WANT, BUT THEY DO EXPECT MORE THAN TOKEN SATISFACTION AND PLAYING FOR TIME. IF WE ARE NOT ABLE TO AGREE ON "LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS", THEN THE KING WILL CONSIDER HE HAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO RESCHEDULING THE VISIT OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION AND, PRESUMABLY, ACCEPTING SOVIET OFFERS.

5. KING HUSSEIN REQUESTED MY PERSONAL UNDERTAKING THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD WE REVEAL THAT AT OUR REQUEST (1) HE HAD POSTPONED THE SOVIET VISIT OR (2) WITHDRAWN ZAID RIFA'I'S LETTER. I ASSURED HIM HE WOULD BE PROTECTED IN BOTH CASES.

GP-1 SYMMES

BT

~~SECRET~~

NOTE:
ABOVE TEL BEING SERVICED FOR OMISSION OF NUMBERED
PARA TWO (2).