

EEA965  
OO WTE10  
DE WTE 227

~~SECRET~~

214  
Received Washington CommCen  
6:14 P.M. EST Monday 8 Jan 68

*ps*  
FROM: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM (HEYDEN)  
TO : THE PRESIDENT  
CITE: CAP80198

Received LBJ Ranch CommCen  
5:37 P.M. CST Monday 8 Jan 68

~~SECRET~~

## N E A R E A S T

### JARRING MISSION

AN ISRAELI FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIAL TOLD EMBASSY TEL AVIV THAT UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE JARRING UNDERSTANDS GENERAL BULL WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ARRANGING THE RELEASE OF THE SHIPS IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF CANAL. HE ALSO SAID THAT FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN HAS PROVIDED JARRING WITH A POSSIBLE AGENDA FOR TALKS WITH JORDAN, WHICH ALSO REFERS TO POSSIBLE PROCEDURES WHEREBY TALKS COULD BE INITIATED.

### ARAB SUMMIT POSTPONEMENT

EMBASSY RABAT CONFIRMS THAT THE ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE SCHEDULED AT RABAT FOR JANUARY 17 HAS BEEN POSTPONED. THE DIRECTOR OF THE MOROCCAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S CABINET INFORMED THE EMBASSY TODAY THAT A NEW DATE FOR THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE IS NOT EXPECTED TO EMERGE FROM THE CURRENT ARAB LEAGUE MEETING AT CAIRO.

### UK ARMS TO ISRAEL

IN DENYING TO EMBASSY LONDON THAT THERE ARE ANY ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS OR DISCUSSIONS FOR PROCUREMENT OF HARRIER AIRCRAFT, THE ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACHE SAID THAT THE AIRCRAFT IS NOT COST EFFECTIVE AND WOULD REQUIRE IMPROVEMENTS TO BE OF INTEREST. AS FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE CHIEFTAIN TANK, THE ATTACHE NOTED THAT NO PURCHASE DECISION HAS BEEN MADE AND NONE WILL BE BEFORE MARCH.

## E A S T A S I A

### BRITISH WITHDRAWAL EAST OF SUEZ

AUSTRALIAN ACTING HIGH COMMISSIONER MORRISON INFORMED EMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR TODAY THAT MALAYSIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER PAZAK REACTED BITTERLY TO COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY THOMSON'S STATEMENT THAT THE UK HAS TENTATIVELY DECIDED TO WITHDRAW ALL TROOPS FROM MALAYSIA/SINGAPORE BY MARCH 31, 1971. IN RAZAK'S VIEW, THE ANGLO-MALAYSIAN DEFENSE AGREEMENT IS NOW ONLY A SCRAP OF PAPER. MORRISON BELIEVES THE UK DECISION WILL BE UNAFFECTED BY MALAYSIAN PROTESTS.

DTG: 082314Z JAN 68

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-155  
By *isa*, NARA, Date 6-9-03

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Jordan*

215

January 4, 1968

Mr. President:

Arthur Krim's comments on the attached are:

"I agree in principle with the memo, provided the President decides to deliver Phantoms to Israel. Otherwise, I think there will be a problem. If the President's decision is not to deliver Phantoms I believe there would be a serious problem."

*Walt  
this is what our friends  
say - what we do (C  
phantoms*

Received: Washington CommCen  
6:26 PM EST Wednesday 3 Jan 1968

Received: LBJ Ranch CommCen  
7:41 PM CST Wednesday 3 Jan 1968

VZCZCEEA;54  
PP WTE10  
DE WTE 90

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

215a

FROM: WALT ROSTOW  
TO : THE PRESIDENT  
CITE: CAP80080

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

JANUARY 3, 1968

KING HUSSEIN HAS RESPONDED TO YOUR REQUEST FOR ASSURANCE AGAINST GETTING SOVIET ARMS WITH THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE:

"I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN A FRIEND OF THE WEST AND I HAVE NO DESIRE TO BUY ARMS FROM THE SOVIET UNION, FOR THIS REASON I HAVE WAITED SOME MONTHS FOR THE US TO DECIDE WHETHER IT WILL RESUME THE SUPPLY OF THE LEGITIMATE ARMS REQUIREMENTS OF MY COUNTRY. I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE THAT WE HAVE BEEN PATIENT. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT IF THE USG WILL SUPPLY OUR NEEDS, I HAVE NO INTENTION OF BUYING ANY OF OUR MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM THE SOVIET UNION. IN MAKING THIS ASSURANCE I HAVE TO ASSUME THAT IN DUE COURSE OUR LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS WILL BE MET. IT IS IMPERATIVE FOR ME THAT WE REACH A GENERAL UNDERSTANDING ON THESE LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS PRIOR TO THE SUMMIT MEETING ON JANUARY 17 SINCE AT THAT TIME I SHALL HAVE TO ASSURE THE OTHER ARAB STATES THAT OUR ARMS NEEDS WILL BE MET. GIVEN THE TIME FACTOR, I SEE NO OTHER WAY TO REACH THE NECESSARY UNDERSTANDINGS THAN TO SEND MY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GENERAL AMER KHAMMASH TO WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY TO DISCUSS OUR REQUIREMENTS WITH THE APPROPRIATE AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. IN THIS WAY I SHALL BE ABLE TO PUT OFF DISCUSSING MY MILITARY REQUIREMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IF YOU PREFER, WE SEE NO NEED FOR ANY PUBLICITY CONCERNING GENERAL KHAMMASH'S VISIT. I HOPE ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIM TO PROCEED TO WASHINGTON CAN BE MADE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE."

SECRETARY RUSK RECOMMENDS YOU SEND THE FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE IN REPLY:

"I APPRECIATE THE ASSURANCES YOU HAVE GIVEN ME IN YOUR ORAL MESSAGE OF DECEMBER 30 WITH REGARD TO JORDANIAN PROCUREMENT OF ARMS FROM THE SOVIET BLOC. ON OUR PART, WE ARE PREPARED IN PRINCIPLE TO RESUME ARMS SHIPMENTS TO JORDAN AND WOULD BEGIN WITH THE FOLLOWING ITEMS FROM THE PRIORITY REQUIREMENT LIST WHICH GENERAL KHAMMASH GAVE TO COLONEL JORDAN IN LONDON AUGUST 1967:

106 MM RIFLES

2-1/2-TON TRUCKS

COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT

AERIAL TARGET DRONE SYSTEMS

AMMUNITION

AND SPARE PARTS FOR PREVIOUSLY DELIVERED US EQUIPMENT.

WE WELCOME GENERAL KHAMMASH'S CONTEMPLATED VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND WOULD EXPECT TO DISCUSS WITH HIM DETAILS (INCLUDING QUANTITIES) OF THE ABOVE SHIPMENTS AND VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE ARMS QUESTION IN GENERAL. WE WOULD HOPE HE MIGHT ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON AROUND JANUARY 8."

YOU WILL NOTE THAT THE SECRETARY'S DRAFT DELIBERATELY AVOIDS DIRECT RESPONSE TO THE KING'S ASSUMPTION THAT HIS REQUIREMENTS WILL BE MET. HOWEVER, THE SECRETARY POINTS OUT THAT THE KING WILL INTERPRET THIS REPLY AS ASSURANCE THAT EITHER WE OR OTHER WESTERN SOURCES WILL MEET HIS LEGITIMATE NEEDS. IN OTHER WORDS, THIS INITIAL PACKAGE WILL BE JUST THE FIRST INSTALLMENT IN A RENEWED MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP, ALBEIT TO A PROBABLY SMALLER JORDAN ARMY.

THE ISRAELIS SEEM FAIRLY RELAXED ABOUT THIS FOR THE MOMENT, ALTHOUGH THEIR ACQUIESCENCE MAY ASSUME THEY'LL GET PHANTOMS AS WELL AS SKYHAWKS. THEY SEEM FINALLY TO HAVE REALIZED THE DANGERS OF A SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN YEMEN.

IN ANY CASE, HUSSEIN NOW WANTS FRENCH MIRAGE AIRCRAFT OR BRITISH LIGHTNINGS RATHER THAN OUR F-104 AND HE MAY BE PERSUADED TO STANDARDIZE HIS TANK CORPS ON THE BRITISH CENTURION. BUT WE PROBABLY WON'T ALWAYS BE ABLE TO GET AWAY WITH THE SORT OF HARMLESS EQUIPMENT ON THIS LIST.

SECRETARY RUSK RECOMMENDS WE MOVE QUICKLY IF YOU ARE READY TO TAKE THIS STEP. THERE IS SOME ADVANTAGE TO BOTH JORDANIANS AND ISRAELIS IN NOT HAVING IT APPEAR THAT YOUR DECISION FOLLOWED YOUR TALK WITH ESHKOL. BESIDES, A SOVIET "ECONOMIC MISSION" INCLUDING THREE MILITARY EXPERTS IN MUFTI IS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN JORDAN ON JANUARY 5, AND YOUR MESSAGE WOULD BRING GENERAL KHAMMASH TO WASHINGTON NEXT MONDAY IN ORDER TO REACH SOME UNDERSTANDING BEFORE THE ARAB SUMMIT UNCERTAINLY SCHEDULED FOR JANUARY 17.

THIS IS A PAINFUL DECISION BUT I DON'T SEE ANY OTHER WAY TO KEEP THE SOVIETS OUT AT THIS POINT. FORTUNATELY, THE ISRAELIS SEEM MORE MANAGEABLE NOW THAN THEY DID EVEN SIX WEEKS AGO.

APPROVE MESSAGE TO HUSSEIN-----

CALL ME-----

DTG: 032326Z JAN 68

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED  
EO. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S-98001  
By RG/SJ NARA, Date 9-17-01

215-b

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

January 3, 1968

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WALT ROSTOW

*sent Rostow  
via wire  
CAP 80080*

King Hussein has responded to your request for assurance against getting Soviet arms with the following message:

"I have always been a friend of the West and I have no desire to buy arms from the Soviet Union. For this reason I have waited some months for the US to decide whether it will resume the supply of the legitimate arms requirements of my country. I hope you will agree that we have been patient. I can assure you that if the USG will supply our needs, I have no intention of buying any of our military equipment from the Soviet Union. In making this assurance I have to assume that in due course our legitimate requirements will be met. It is imperative for me that we reach a general understanding on these legitimate requirements prior to the Summit meeting on January 17 since at that time I shall have to assure the other Arab states that our arms needs will be met. Given the time factor, I see no other way to reach the necessary understandings than to send my Chief of Staff Major General Amer Khammash to Washington immediately to discuss our requirements with the appropriate American authorities. In this way I shall be able to put off discussing my military requirements with the Soviet Union. If you prefer, we see no need for any publicity concerning General Khammash's visit. I hope arrangements for him to proceed to Washington can be made as soon as possible."

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S-98001  
By RGDL NARA, Date 8-14-01

Secretary Rusk recommends you send the following oral message in reply:

"I appreciate the assurances you have given me in your oral message of December 30 with regard to Jordanian procurement of arms from the Soviet Bloc. On our part, we are prepared in principle to resume arms shipments to Jordan and would begin with the following items from the priority requirement list which General Khammash gave to Colonel Jordan in London August 1967:

106 mm rifles

2-1/2-ton trucks

communications equipment

aerial target drone systems

ammunition

and spare parts for previously delivered US equipment.

We welcome General Khammash's contemplated visit to Washington and would expect to discuss with him details (including quantities) of the above shipments and various aspects of the arms question in general. We would hope that he might arrive in Washington around January 8."

You will note that the Secretary's draft deliberately avoids direct response to the King's assumption that his requirements will be met. However, the Secretary points out that the King will interpret this reply as assurance that either we or other western sources will meet his legitimate needs. In other words, this initial package will be just the first installment

in a renewed military supply relationship, albeit to a probably smaller Jordan army.

The Israelis seem fairly relaxed about this for the moment, although their acquiescence may assume they'll get Phantoms as well as Skyhawks. They seem finally to have realized the dangers of a Soviet military presence in Yemen.

In any case, Hussein now wants French Mirage aircraft or British Lightnings rather than our F-104 and he may be persuaded to standardize his tank corps on the British Centurion. But we probably won't always be able to get away with the sort of harmless equipment on this list.

Secretary Rusk recommends we move quickly if you are ready to take this step. There is some advantage to both Jordanians and Israelis in not having it appear that your decision followed your talk with Eshkol. Besides, a Soviet "economic mission" including three military experts in mufti is scheduled to arrive in Jordan on January 5, and your message would bring General Khammash to Washington next Monday in order to reach some understanding before the Arab summit uncertainly scheduled for January 17.

This is a painful decision but I don't see any other way to keep the Soviets out at this point. Fortunately, the Israelis seem more manageable now than they did even six weeks ago.

Approve message to Hussein \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

January 2, 1968

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Oral Message to King Hussain on Arms Supply

Recommendation:

That you send the enclosed telegram to Ambassador Symmes as a reply to King Hussain's oral message of December 30.

Discussion:

The enclosed draft telegram authorizes Ambassador Symmes to convey your response to King Hussain's oral message of December 30 giving assurances that Jordan has no intention of acquiring Soviet arms. The assurance is predicated on the King's assumption that we can reach a general understanding that Jordan's "legitimate requirements" for arms can be met. The proposed reply accedes to the King's request to send his Chief of Staff to Washington prior to the Arab Summit meeting now scheduled for January 17.

The King will almost certainly interpret the reply as an assurance that Jordan's legitimate arms requirements will be met either from other western sources or by us if he foregoes Soviet offers.

He has told us he does not want the F-104 aircraft we previously agreed to sell him, but will seek to acquire either the French Mirage or the British Lightning. We believe that having lost most of his modern U.S. M-48's to Israel, Hussain may be persuaded to standardize on the British Centurion, now the mainstay of his armored units, if we do not wish U.S. tanks in Jordan. For most of his other requirements, Hussain will look to us. Thus, it is unlikely that the sales recommended to you earlier and referred to in this draft

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

GROUP 1

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NLJ-S-98001


By RG/DL NARA, Date 8-14-01

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

-2-

will be more than an initial increment in a renewed military supply relationship, albeit to a probably smaller Jordan Army.

I recommend strongly that you approve transmission of this message. Time is running out on this difficult decision and delay can expose our position in Jordan and the moderate Arab states to most serious risks. A Soviet "Economic Mission," including three military experts in mufti is scheduled to arrive in Amman January 5. A Soviet breakthrough in Jordan would have dangerous implications for orientation of the region in Cold War terms, and for chances of achieving a just and enduring Near East settlement.



Dean Rusk

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~~SECRET/NODIS~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

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01333 9-4 7 2 9  
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FOR OC/T USE ONLY

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

Origin  
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE

STATE 94729

NODIS

Ref: AMMAN's 2831

1. President has requested following oral message be passed to King Hussein in reply King's message of December 30:
2. QUOTE I appreciate the assurances you have given me in your oral message of December 30 with regard to Jordanian procurement of arms from the Soviet Bloc. On our part, we are prepared in principle to resume arms shipments to Jordan and would begin with the following items from the priority requirement list which General Khammash gave to Colonel Jordan in London August 1967:

106 mm rifles

2-1/2-ton trucks

communications equipment

aerial target drone systems

ammunition

and spare parts for previously delivered US equipment.

We welcome General Khammash's contemplated visit to Washington and would expect to discuss with him details (including quantities) of the above shipments and various aspects of the arms question in general. We would

The Secretary *fw*

Drafted by: NEA/ARN:RBoughton/mc 1/2/68	Tel. Ext. 5617	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
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Clearances: NEA - Mr. Davies <i>RMD</i> NEA - Mr. Battle <i>RMD</i> DOD/ISA - Mr. PC <i>RMD</i>	s/s -O; Mr. Wise <i>fw</i> S/C - Mr. Bowie <i>fw</i> White House - Mr. Wotring
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~~SECRET~~  
Classification

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority FRUS, Vol. XX # 37  
By *fw* NARA, Date 7-31-01

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

January 10.

hope that he might arrive in Washington around ~~XXXXXXXX~~ END QUOTE

3. FYI We would resume arms shipments to Jordan with the \$6.5 million package contained in Amman's 2396. END FYI.

GP-1.

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

CORRECTIONS MADE ON THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MADE ON ALL COPIES  
BEFORE THE TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/T(A), Room 6243

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, Vol. XX #37  
By 6 NARA, Date 7-31-01

215-e  
President, per Jim Jones

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE, BY CHECKING  
THE APPROPRIATE BOX

~~SECRET~~

Classification

State not per

FOR CCIT USE ONLY

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE

STATE

MODIS

Ref: AMMAN's 2891.

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ammunition

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We welcome General Khammash's contemplated visit to Washington and would expect to discuss with him details (including quantities) of the above shipments and various aspects of the arms question in general. We would

The Secretary

Typed by: NEA/ARN:R.../mc 1/2/68

Tel. Ext. 5617

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

Clearances: NEA - Mr. Davies  
NEA - Mr. Battle

S/S -  
S/C - Mr. Bowie

CORRECTIONS MADE ON THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MADE ON ALL COPIES  
BEFORE THE TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/TIA, Room 6243

Page 2 of telegram to AMMAN

~~SECRET~~

Classification

hope that he might arrive in Washington around January 8. <sup>10.</sup> END QUOTE

3. FYI We would resume arms shipments to Jordan with the \$6.5 million package contained in Amman's 2396. END FYI.

GP-1.

END

215-f~~SECRET~~

Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE

STATE

NODIS

Ref: AMMAN's 2831

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The Secretary

NEA/ARN:RBHoughton/mc 1/2/68

5617

NEA - Mr. Davies  
 NEA - Mr. Battle  
 DOD/ISA - Mr. PC Warnke

S/S -  
 S/C - Mr. Bowie  
 White House -

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority FRUS, Vol. XX# 37  
 By            NARA, Date 7-31-01

2

AMMAN

~~SECRET~~

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3. FYI We would resume arms shipments to Jordan with the \$6.5 million package contained in Amman's 2396. END FYI.

GP-1.

END

~~SECRET~~

*S. Jones W 10*

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~~SECRET~~, AMMAN 2831

NODIS

REF STATE 91434

1. WHEN I SAW HIM TODAY TO DISCUSS REFTEL (CONVERSATION REPORTED SEPARATELY), KING HUSSEIN REQUESTED FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE BE PASSED TO PRESIDENT ON URGENT BASIS:

2. QTE [ I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN A FRIEND OF THE WEST AND I HAVE NO DESIRE TO BUY ARMS FROM THE SOVIET UNION. FOR THIS REASON I HAVE WAITED SOME MONTHS FOR THE US TO DECIDE WHETHER IT WILL RESUME THE SUPPLY OF THE LEGITIMATE ARMS REQUIREMENTS OF MY COUNTRY. I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE THAT WE

PAGE TWO RUQMKG 2831A ~~SECRET~~

HAVE BEEN PATIENT. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT IF THE USG WILL SUPPLY OUR NEEDS, I HAVE NO INTENTION OF BUYING ANY OF OUR MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM THE SOVIET UNION. IN MAKING THIS ASSURANCE I HAVE TO ASSUME THAT IN DUE COURSE OUR LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS WILL BE MET. IT IS IMPERATIVE FOR ME THAT WE REACH A GENERAL UNDERSTANDING ON THESE LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS PRIOR TO THE SUMMIT MEETING ON JANUARY 17 SINCE AT THAT TIME I SHALL HAVE TO ASSURE THE OTHER ARAB STATES THAT OUR ARMS NEEDS WILL BE MET. GIVEN THE TIME FACTOR, I SEE NO OTHER WAY TO REACH THE NECESSARY UNDERSTANDINGS THAN TO SEND MY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GENERAL AMER KHAMMASH TO WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY TO DISCUSS OUR REQUIREMENTS WITH THE APPROPRIATE AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. IN THIS WAY I SHALL BE ABLE TO PUT OFF DISCUSSING MY MILITARY REQUIREMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IF YOU PREFER, WE SEE NO NEED FOR ANY PUBLICITY CONCERNING GENERAL KHAMMASH'S VISIT. I HOPE ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIM TO PROCEED TO WASHINGTON CAN BE MADE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. UNQTE.

GP-1. SYMMES

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, #29, Footnote 3

By *S* NARA, Date 7/3/01

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DE RUQMKG 2832A 3641830  
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1967 DEC 30 PM 330

NODIS

REF STATE 91343, AMMAN 2831

1. I SAW KING HUSSEIN THIS AFTERNOON TO TAKE UP REFTTEL. I TOLD HIM I HAD ANOTHER PERSONAL MESSAGE FOR HIM FROM THE PRESIDENT AND EXPLAINED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD LIKE ASSURANCES WE WOULD NOT SUBSEQUENTLY BE FACED WITH JORDAN'S ACCEPTANCE OF SOVIET ARMS OFFERS.

2. KING RESPONDED THAT PROVIDING SUCH ASSURANCES GAVE HIM NO DIFFICULTY AT ALL. THIS HAD ALWAYS BEEN HIS UNDERSTANDING OF ARMS ARRANGEMENTS WITH US. HE HAS NO DESIRE TO BUY ARMS

PAGE TWO RUQMKG 2832A ~~SECRET~~  
FROM THE SOVIETS PROVIDED HIS LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS CAN BE MET BY THE UNITED STATES. HE SAID HE REALIZED THAT RESUMPTION OF SHIPMENTS WOULD NOT "BRING TANKS TO JORDAN IMMEDIATELY". BUT HE DID NEED TO HAVE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THE USG IS PREPARED TO DO FOR JORDAN. IN GIVING US ASSURANCES ABOUT NOT GOING TO THE SOVIETS HE DID NOT WANT TO BE LEFT IN POSITION OF HAVING SOME OF HIS ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS UNSATISFIED.

3. I RESPONDED THAT SHIPMENTS TO BE RESUMED INITIALLY WOULD INCLUDE SOME OF ITEMS ON GENERAL KHAMMASH'S "EMERGENCY LIST." I SAID I SAW THIS AS AN IMPORTANT BEGINNING. IT WOULD REMOVE PRESSURES FROM HIM AND WOULD GIVE US ALL TIME TO SEE WHAT SUCCESS JARRING WOULD HAVE. WE WOULD ALL GAIN TIME TO FORM A BETTER PICTURE OF WHAT KIND OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT JORDAN WOULD NEED IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

4. THE KING SAID HE WOULD WANT IN ANY CASE TO HAVE GENERAL KHAMMASH PROCEED AT ONCE TO THE US TO DISCUSS JORDAN'S REQUIREMENTS. I SAID I RECOGNIZED HE WOULD WANT KHAMMASH

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, # 29  
By h NARA, Date 7-31-01

~~SECRET~~

-2- 2832 FROM AMMAN DECEMBER 30, 1967 (NODIS)

PAGE THREE RUQMKG 2832A ~~SECRET~~  
TO DISCUSS JORDAN'S REQUIREMENTS IN DETAIL AT SOME POINT,  
BUT I BELIEVED IT SHOULD BE PUT OFF UNTIL THINGS HAD SETTLED  
A BIT, UNTIL WE COULD SEE WHERE WE STOOD.

5. AT THIS POINT KING ASKED IF I COULD WAIT WHILE HE CALLED  
KHAMMASH TO THE PALACE TO JOIN OUR DISCUSSION.  
WHEN KHAMMASH ARRIVED WE WENT OVER MOST OF THE SAME GROUND  
AGAIN WITH KHAMMASH EMPHASIZING THAT HE COULD NOT KEEP THE  
ARMY LOYAL TO THE KING IF JORDAN WAS ONLY TO BE PROVIDED  
WITH A "FEW SPARES" AND OTHER EQUIPMENT FROM HIS "EMERGENCY  
LIST." HE WAS NOT ASKING FOR ALL OF JORDAN'S NEEDS AT ONCE,  
BUT HE BELIEVED HIS MAJESTY WOULD HAVE TO HAVE A CLEAR UNDER-  
STANDING OF WHAT THE USG PROPOSES TO DO BEYOND THE "EMERGENCY  
LIST." DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS COULD BE POSTPONED, BUT JORDAN  
WAS FACED WITH A SUMMIT MEETING ON JAN 17 AND HAD  
TO BE IN A POSITION TO STATE AUTHORITATIVELY THAT ITS  
NEEDS WERE GOING TO BE MET BY THE USG. REVIVAL OF THE UAC  
IS ON THE SUMMIT AGENDA, AND HE (KHAMMASH) HAS ALREADY BEEN  
TOLD THAT JORDAN AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES AT THE SUMMIT  
WILL BE EXPECTED TO INDICATE HOW THEIR RE-EQUIPPING IS

PAGE FOUR RUQMKG 2832A ~~SECRET~~  
BEING ACCOMPLISHED. BEYOND THIS, THERE IS THE SERIOUSLY  
DETERIORATING MORALE OF THE JORDAN ARMY TO BE CONSIDERED.  
THEY HAD TO HAVE AN IDEA OF WHAT COMES AFTER THE "EMERGENCY  
LIST."

6. DISCUSSION WENT BACK AND FORTH OVER THE SAME GROUND.  
THE KING AT ONE POINT INTRODUCED THE ISRAELI F-4 PHANTOM  
REQUEST AND SAID HE EARNESTLY HOPED THE USG WOULD NOT TAKE  
THIS STEP. IN THE COURSE OF OUR CONVERSATION I, OF COURSE,  
EMPHASIZED THAT BUYING SOVIET ARMS MIGHT HELP TO MEET A  
SHORT-TERM PROBLEM BUT WOULD IN ITS TRAIN BRING A HOST OF  
LONG-TERM PROBLEMS. THE KING'S COMMENT WAS "I AM SORRY TO  
HAVE TO SAY THAT YOU WILL HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE IF THAT  
HAPPENS."

7. OUR DISCUSSION WAS CONCLUDED WITH THE KING SUGGESTING AN  
ORAL MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT. WE WENT OVER THE SUBSTANCE  
OF SUCH A MESSAGE SEVERAL TIMES, AND IT HAS BEEN TRANS-  
MITTED SEPARATELY.

~~SECRET~~

-3- 2832 FROM AMMAN DECEMBER 30, 1967 (NODIS)

PAGE FIVE RUQMKG 2832A ~~S E C R E T~~

8. COMMENT: I TRIED THROUGHOUT CONVERSATION TO TALK THE KING INTO GOING ALONG WITH A GENERAL STATEMENT OF RESUMPTION OF SHIPMENTS AT THIS TIME AND PUTTING OFF A KHAMMAS VISIT UNTIL WE COULD SEE WHERE THINGS WERE GOING. BOTH HE AND KHAMMASH WERE PREPARED FOR SUCH MOVES ON MY PART AND HAD NO INTENTION OF LEAVING THINGS FUZZY. ALTHOUGH THEY DID NOT SAY SO, IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT KHAMMASH'S VISIT WOULD MEAN MUCH TO THEM PSYCHOLOGICALLY. IT WOULD BE A SIGN THAT WE HAD MOVED BACK TOGETHER AND WOULD BE SO INTERPRETED BY JORDANIANS AND OTHER ARABS. BOTH THE KING AND KHAMMASH MADE A SPECIAL POINT OF EMPHASIZING "LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS," AND THEY REITERATED STATEMENTS MADE IN OTHER RECENT CONVERSATIONS TO THE EFFECT THAT IF JARRING IS SUCCESSFUL, THEIR LONGER TERM MILITARY REQUIREMENTS WOULD CHANGE. ALTHOUGH THEY WERE FAIRLY INSISTENT THAT THEY WILL NEED TO KNOW BEFORE JANUARY 17 WHAT WE ARE PREPARED TO DO (WITH THE IMPLICATION THAT THIS MEANS THE LONGER TERM), WE BELIEVE THAT DISCUSSIONS WITH KHAMMASH NEED NOT TAKE THE FORM OF A COMPLETE LONG-TERM STATEMENT OF FORCE GOALS AND EQUIPMENT. IT SEEMS TO US THAT IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE KING AND KHAMMASH IF

PAGE SIX RUQMKG 2832A ~~S E C R E T~~

WE APPROACHED THE PROBLEM IN STAGES. WE COULD RESUME SHIPMENT OF OUR RECOMMENDED LIST NOW AND TRY TO AGREE WITH KHAMMASH ON MAKING UP SOME OF JORDAN'S OTHER LOSSES AND DEFICIENCIES IN A SERIES OF STAGES. THIS WILL ENABLE BOTH SIDES TO BUY TIME AND PROVIDES, WE BELIEVE, SUFFICIENT SCOPE FOR KHAMMASH'S DISCUSSIONS TO SATISFY THE KING BEFORE THE SUMMIT MEETING.

9. THE OBJECT OF THIS WHOLE EXERCISE HAS BEEN TO BUY TIME, TO MAINTAIN OUR POSITION HERE WHILE A MIDDLE EASTERN SETTLEMENT IS BEING WORKED OUT. THIS OBJECT IS STILL IMPORTANT TO US, AND THEREFORE WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT KHAMMASH BE INVITED TO PROCEED TO WASHINGTON AS REQUESTED BY THE KING.

GP-1.

SYMMES

BT

~~SECRET~~

LBJ RANCH - PRESIDENTIAL INSTRUCTION CONTROL

216

President's Instruction:

Make the views expressed in the first paragraph my views. Let's get their reaction first. I'm not going to hug him to give him some arms.

LBJ/Jones/mf  
12-28-67  
9:30p

President's Instruction Relayed To:	By:	Time	Date
<i>Rostow</i>	<i>Jms</i>		<i>12-29</i>

Comments:

~~SECRET~~

216a

VR  
DT

EEA709  
O WTE10  
DE WTE 3174

Received Washington CommGen  
5:41 P.M. Thursday 28 Dec 67

Received LBJ Ranch CommGen  
6:34 P.M. Thursday 28 Dec 67

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP671220

~~SECRET~~

DECEMBER 28, 1967

ON YOUR INSTRUCTION WE PASSED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE  
TO KING HUSSEIN:

"THE PRESIDENT HAS INDICATED THAT HE WILL MAKE DECISION  
ON JORDAN ARMS RECOMMENDATION BY NEW YEAR'S. HE IS INCLINED  
TO BE SYMPATHETIC TO JORDAN'S NEEDS, AND HOPES THE KING WILL  
NOT MAKE A MAJOR DECISION BEFORE HEARING FROM US."

WE CONTINUE TO GET REPORTS FROM JORDAN THAT TIME IS  
RUNNING OUT AND THAT KING HUSSEIN FEELS IT NECESSARY TO MAKE  
SOME DECISION ON SOVIET ARMS BY THE FIRST OF THE YEAR. WE  
HAVE STRUNG HIM ALONG SINCE MID-AUGUST AND DOUBT WE CAN DO  
SO MUCH LONGER.

THE PACKAGE WHICH NICK KATZENBACH RECOMMENDS WOULD TOTAL  
ABOUT \$6.5 MILLION OF SPARE PARTS, AUTOMOTIVE AND COMMUNICATIONS  
GEAR, SOME ANTI-TANK GUNS AND AMMUNITION. WE ALL KNOW THE  
ISRAELIS WON'T LIKE THIS BUT WE HAVE BEEN INTERESTED TO NOTE  
IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS A MUCH MORE RELAXED ISRAELI ATTITUDE  
TOWARD HUSSEIN. IN ANY CASE, THIS EQUIPMENT WILL NOT AFFECT  
THE ISRAELI-JORDANIAN ARMS BALANCE.

SINCE THIS IS A TOKEN MOVE TO REOPEN THE DOOR AND BLOCK  
THE SOVIETS, I SHOULD THINK WE COULD SELL IT TO THE ISRAELIS  
WHO WILL NOT WANT TO JEOPARDIZE THEIR AIRCRAFT REQUESTS BY  
MAKING A FUSS OVER SUCH AN INCONSEQUENTIAL PACKAGE FOR JORDAN.

IF YOU ARE READY TO GO AHEAD, THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE TO  
AUTHORIZE AMBASSADOR SYMMES TO OFFER THIS PACKAGE TO HUSSEIN.

APPROVE-----

DISAPPROVE-----

CALL ME-----

DTG: 282341Z DEC 1967

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority FRUS, Vol. 44, # 26  
By h NARA, Date 7-31-01

~~SECRET~~

1967 DEC 29 00 35

216-8

EEA709  
CVLWTE 10  
DE WTE 3174

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP671220

*file*

DEC 28 PM 0:15

THURSDAY

~~SECRET~~

DECEMBER 23, 1967

ON YOUR INSTRUCTION WE PASSED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE  
TO KING HUSSEIN:

"THE PRESIDENT HAS INDICATED THAT HE WILL MAKE DECISION  
ON JORDAN ARMS RECOMMENDATION BY NEW YEAR'S. HE IS INCLINED  
TO BE SYMPATHETIC TO JORDAN'S NEEDS, AND HOPES THE KING WILL  
NOT MAKE A MAJOR DECISION BEFORE HEARING FROM US."

WE CONTINUE TO GET REPORTS FROM JORDAN THAT TIME IS  
RUNNING OUT AND THAT KING HUSSEIN FEELS IT NECESSARY TO MAKE  
SOME DECISION ON SOVIET ARMS BY THE FIRST OF THE YEAR. WE  
HAVE STRUNG HIM ALONG SINCE MID-AUGUST AND DOUBT WE CAN DO  
SO MUCH LONGER.

THE PACKAGE WHICH NICK KATZENBACH RECOMMENDS WOULD TOTAL  
ABOUT \$6.5 MILLION OF SPARE PARTS, AUTOMOTIVE AND COMMUNICATIONS  
GEAR, SOME ANTI-TANK GUNS AND AMMUNITION. WE ALL KNOW THE  
ISRAELIS WON'T LIKE THIS BUT WE HAVE BEEN INTERESTED TO NOTE  
IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS A MUCH MORE RELAXED ISRAELI ATTITUDE  
TOWARD HUSSEIN. IN ANY CASE, THIS EQUIPMENT WILL NOT AFFECT  
THE ISRAELI-JORDANIAN ARMS BALANCE.

SINCE THIS IS A TOKEN MOVE TO REOPEN THE DOOR AND BLOCK  
THE SOVIETS, I SHOULD THINK WE COULD SELL IT TO THE ISRAELIS  
WHO WILL NOT WANT TO JEOPARDIZE THEIR AIRCRAFT REQUESTS BY  
MAKING A FUSS OVER SUCH AN INCONSEQUENTIAL PACKAGE FOR JORDAN.

IF YOU ARE READY TO GO AHEAD, THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE TO  
AUTHORIZE AMBASSADOR SYMMES TO OFFER THIS PACKAGE TO HUSSEIN.

APPROVE-----

DISAPPROVE-----

CALL ME-----

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, Vol. xx, # 26

By *h* NARA, Date 7-31-01

DTG: 282341Z DEC 1967

~~SECRET~~

216-c

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED  
WHCA

*file*

WTE DE WTE1  
FROM LARRY TEMPLE  
TO WALT ROSTOW  
~~SECRET~~

#40

1967 DEC 26 20 37

THE PRESIDENT APPROVED THE PROPOSED MESSAGE TO BE DELIVERED BY  
AMBASSADOR SYMMES

BT KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK

~~SECRET~~

M

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S-98001  
By RGJL NARA, Date 8-14-01

216-d

~~SECRET~~

1967 DEC 26 20 13

VZCZCEFA063  
OO WTE1  
DE WTE 3086

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP671161

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

DECEMBER 26, 1967

TO CARRY OUT YOUR INSTRUCTION THIS MORNING, STATE  
PROPOSES THAT AMBASSADOR SYMMES PASS THE FOLLOWING TO  
KING HUSSEIN:

"THE PRESIDENT HAS INDICATED THAT HE WILL MAKE DECISION  
ON JORDAN ARMS RECOMMENDATION BY NEW YEAR'S. HE IS  
INCLINED TO BE SYMPATHETIC TO JORDAN'S NEEDS, AND HOPES  
THE KING WILL NOT MAKE A MAJOR DECISION BEFORE HEARING  
FROM US."

APPROVED-----

DISAPPROVED-----

SEE ME-----

~~SECRET~~

DTG: 261947Z DEC 67

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S-98001  
By RG/JL NARA, Date 8-14-01

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

PRESERVATION COPY

216-e

~~SECRET~~

December 26, 1967

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WALT ROSTOW

*sent Rostow  
via wire  
CAP 67/1161*

To carry out your instruction this morning, State proposes that Ambassador Symmes pass the following to King Hussein:

"The President has indicated that he will make decision on Jordan arms recommendation by New Year's. He is inclined to be sympathetic to Jordan's needs, and hopes the King will not make a major decision before hearing from us."

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S-98001  
By RG/JA NARA, Date 8-14-01

216-f

Jordan

OO WTEI  
EE WTE 3886

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP 71161

~~SECRET~~

DECEMBER 26, 1967

TO CARRY OUT YOUR INSTRUCTION THIS MORNING, STATE  
PROPOSES THAT AMBASSADOR SYMMES PASS THE FOLLOWING TO  
KING HUSSEIN:

"THE PRESIDENT HAS INDICATED THAT HE WILL MAKE DECISION  
ON JORDAN ARMS RECOMMENDATION BY NEW YEAR'S. HE IS  
INCLINED TO BE SYMPATHETIC TO JORDAN'S NEEDS, AND HOPES  
THE KING WILL NOT MAKE A MAJOR DECISION BEFORE HEARING  
FROM US."

APPROVED-----✓-----

DISAPPROVED-----

SEE ME-----

DTG: 261947Z DEC 67

~~SECRET~~

*12/26/67*  
*message sent 3:20 P.M. Washington Time*  
*L.T.*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S-98001  
By RG1SL, NARA, Date 8-14-01

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

INFORMATION

ps  
10  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

217

Thurs., Dec. 7, 1967  
3:30 p. m.

Rec'd  
3/4/8

Mr. President:

Herewith Senator Ribicoff and Hussein chat.

If the Senator stays put in support of some U. S. arms for Jordan, it could be helpful (see last sentence, page 2).

W. R.

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S-98001  
By RG/SL, NARA, Date 8-14-01

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

217a

Thursday, December 7, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR SYMMES (Amman, 2519)

SUBJECT: Tour d'Horizon of Senator Ribicoff with King Hussein

King Hussein received Senator Ribicoff and Mr. Granquist with me this morning. Senator Ribicoff had been received earlier by Prime Minister Talhouni and Deputy Prime Minister Touqan and had had extensive discussion of the Arab-Israeli problem in which he delved into the specifics of a possible settlement.

In the meeting with the King, the Senator referred to those earlier discussions. He said he had just come from Israel where he had had talks with Prime Minister Eshkol and Foreign Minister Eban. He had discussed with Prime Minister Talhouni his own personal views re possible steps towards peace in the area.

The Senator threw out specific examples of mutuality of Israeli-Jordanian interest in such areas as Eilat/Aqaba port development, joint potash development in the Dead Sea, Jordan use of Ashdod or Haifa, joint tourist development in Jerusalem, joint development of water and agricultural resources and settlement of the refugee problem. The Senator also outlined the possibility of Jordan supervision of Muslim shrines in Jerusalem.

The Senator then led into the Israeli view that direct negotiations are necessary to move toward an Arab-Israeli settlement of a lasting nature. He said he recognized that the King could not move alone and that it would be necessary for him to consult his Arab allies but he wondered how the King saw the possibility of direct negotiations.

The King responded by providing a general outline of recent Jordanian policy. He stressed that he saw the forthcoming summit meeting (for which a definite date had not been set) as chiefly a means by which he would obtain flexibility to pursue policies in Jordan's interest. Jordan would press for an early summit meeting in Rabat, perhaps by the twelfth. He elaborated on human, economic and political problems posed for Jordan by the latest crop of refugees, by perennial difficulties arising from the 1948 war,

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-155  
By *iso* NARA, Date *6-9-03*

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

and from continued, strident attacks on Jordan's policies of moderation by various Arab extremists. He said he could not, in these circumstances, move to direct negotiations, but in response to appointed questions from Senator Ribicoff he said he was not against direct negotiations in principle. That stage could only be reached through the Jarring mission and "with the help of friends."

The King also told the Senator that he had no objection to and, in fact, would favor the Senator's passing on his views to Government of Israel leaders on a confidential basis. Because of enemies of moderation in the Arab world, however, he did not wish these views on the possibility of direct negotiations to be publicly attributed to him.

The King strongly reiterated his opposition to terrorist activity. He stressed that even the Israelis would have to admit that those they had arrested were not Jordanian and that their arms and other equipment, as well as their training and briefing, had been supplied by Syria. He also pointed out the possibility that the Syrians are falsely briefing and misleading infiltrators in order deliberately to compromise Jordanian efforts against terrorism in the eyes of the Israelis.

The King outlined in well-known terms Jordan's situation with regard to arms requirements. He stressed that he had almost reached the limits of his ability to deal with this situation. He is beginning to see danger points in his own army which, he said frankly, is his only guarantee of continued stability and moderation.

The army's morale continues to deteriorate as they see other Arab states and Israel supplied with new equipment while they get nothing. The King stressed that he has been forced to accept the presence of other Arab troops in his territory, and this is an added danger. On the other hand, he cannot ask for the removal of these troops so long as he obtains no military equipment. The Soviets have offered to supply him with arms, and he will soon be faced with having to turn to that source if there is no other alternative. The King said this was a most unpleasant alternative for him and that he did not consider it in the interest of the U. S. or other states in the area for him to be forced to make this choice.

The Senator agreed with the King and asked me to brief him and the King on the present status of U. S. arms supply to Jordan, which I then did. The Senator also said he intended to discuss this situation with Ambassador Barbour on his return to Israel with a view to giving his personal endorsement of a resumption of U. S. military shipments to Jordan.

The conversation throughout was frank and cordial. Senator Ribicoff's sincerity and objectivity seemed to me to make a distinctly favorable impression on the King.

INFORMATION

218

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, December 6, 1967  
6:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Dick Helms files a strong case for U. S. arms aid to Jordan -- from an intelligence perspective.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

*Log 4605*

Attachment: Memo for the Director (CIA), 5 Dec 1967 from Sherman Kent, "Implications of Jordan Receiving Arms from the US, the USSR, France, or Other Western Powers.

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS. 019. 026. 002/6  
By jc/jd. NARA. Date 4-12-02

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Walt Rostow

by 6HS

4605

219

In light of a pending decision with regard to arms for Jordan, I pass to you a paper on this subject for whatever help it may be. It was prepared for me by the Office of National Estimates and represents this Agency's views.

*Rich*  
Richard Helms

Attachment - 1  
Implications of Jordan Receiving Arms from the US, the USSR, France, or Other Western Powers.

5 December 1967  
(DATE)


~~SECRET~~

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

**DECLASSIFIED** (47)

Authority RAC 001-147-1-24

By ly NARA, Date 9-13-01



4605

by memo  
sent to H. Saunders

219a

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

5 December 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Implications of Jordan Receiving Arms from the US,  
the USSR, France, or Other Western Powers

I. INTRODUCTION

1. King Hussain feels a strong need to re-equip his armed forces after their heavy losses in the June war. This need springs more from political and psychological reasons than from military ones. Failure to get arms would give rise to severe domestic dissidence -- particularly from the officer corps on whose support Hussain depends. It would also weaken him politically in the rest of the Arab world -- inviting invidious comparison between the holdup in US resumption of arms sales to Jordan -- but not to Israel -- and the promptness with which Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi losses have been made good by the Soviets. Moscow has offered arms to Jordan on liberal terms. The \$100 million annual subsidy to Jordan from conservative oil-rich states will enable

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Authority NLJ.001.48.001/4

By felg. NARA. Date 4-12-02

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GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Hussain to pay Western prices, and he would still prefer to rely chiefly on the US or, failing this, on French, British, and other Western European sources for his needs. He does so partly because his forces already use Western arms, partly because he fears Soviet influence, and perhaps most of all, because he feels a strong need for evidence that the US and the West, to which he has always looked for support, have not deserted him. If he does not meet with reasonable satisfaction from the US and the West he would take Soviet arms.

2. If the US refuses to supply any equipment at all and thus appears to be abandoning Jordan, other countries in the area would reassess their own relations with the US. Some, pro-US in orientation, would feel obliged to reinsure their positions by seeking closer relations with other states -- for example, Saudi Arabia might improve relations with Egypt, or even open diplomatic relations with the USSR. Any apparent abandonment of Jordan would in time also be observed with concern in Lebanon, Libya, Ethiopia, and other area states. Radical forces in the Arab world would be heartened.

- 2 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

## II. ARMS FROM THE USSR

3. For Hussain to accept Soviet arms would mean that the USSR had established a position in another country heretofore largely closed to it. It would mean that all major Arab forces were standardized on Soviet equipment. The Israelis would raise an alarm about this and would urgently request additional US arms to offset those the Soviets supplied to Jordan. Such a development would serve to identify the US more closely with Israel and the Soviets with the Arabs. Prospects for movement toward an accommodation between the Arabs and Israel would probably be further dimmed.

4. In Jordan itself acceptance of Soviet arms would make preservation of Western influence increasingly difficult. In time, Jordan would be likely to come to share the antipathy of the radical Arabs toward the US and the West, and at best would adopt a neutralist stance. The acceptance of Soviet arms would probably improve Hussain's popularity in the short term, but would encourage the revolutionary forces that constitute the underlying threat to continuation of the monarchy.

5. We believe that Soviet aims in offering arms to Jordan are political, not military. By this move the Soviets do not have

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

it in mind to facilitate eventual military operations of their own in the area. Soviet policy almost certainly does not contemplate direct military intervention in intra-regional quarrels there. Moreover, Jordan, like those Arab states already equipped with Soviet weapons, would probably be unwilling to permit Soviet forces to use its territory except in the highly unlikely event that they were offered for use against Israel.

### III. ARMS FROM WESTERN EUROPEAN SOURCES

6. Damage to US-Jordanian relations by US refusal to sell arms might be mitigated somewhat if the US facilitated acquisition of arms from other Western sources. Britain and France appear to be the most likely sources of the arms Jordan wants, but others, such as Belgium and Sweden, manufacture limited types of armaments.

#### France

7. De Gaulle's recent sharp condemnation of Israel and his suspension of military supplies to Israel on the eve of the war have already enhanced France's image in the Arab world. Sales of French arms, even through a third country intermediary, would

~~S E C R E T~~

further boost French prestige in both Jordan and in other Arab countries; it is not likely to benefit the US position in Jordan. While France could supply virtually all the categories of arms that Jordan wants, Jordan is particularly interested in French supersonic aircraft. Direct sales of French equipment to Jordan, especially of such significant items as Mirage aircraft, would bring a further deterioration of French-Israeli relations.

The UK

8. The UK has long been a major source of military supply for Jordan and has already provided a few aircraft since the war, though the British appear to be encountering difficulties in finding enough Hawker-Hunters to replace the two squadrons Jordan lost in the war. (The specific model Jordan wants is no longer in production.) Britain would be eager to earn hard currency from arms sales to Jordan and would not be much concerned at Israel's reaction. While the Jordanians have not so far pressed for ground equipment, they are familiar with British weapons and would probably prefer them as a first alternative to US equipment.

~~S E C R E T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

IV. ARMS FROM THE US

9. US agreement to provide a substantial proportion of the \$15-20 million in arms that Jordan has requested would help to slow the decline in US influence in the Arab world evident since the Arab-Israeli war. It would be interpreted both in Jordan and by other Arab regimes friendly to the US as tangible evidence that the US is not abandoning them. While provision of US arms would by no means fully restore US prestige in Jordan or in the area, particularly as long as Israel continues to occupy important Arab territories, it would encourage the moderate Arabs, for whom Hussain is at present the foremost spokesman, to maintain their relations with the US. It would also help Hussain maintain his moderate course in seeking an arrangement with Israel.

10. No matter what the source of Hussain's arms, there is not likely to be any significant effect on the military balance between the Arab states and Israel. Nonetheless, the latter would protest vigorously if the US resumed arms supply to Jordan. Tel Aviv would be certain to use shipments of arms to Jordan from any source as an argument for additional US aid.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

*Sherman Kent*

SHERMAN KENT  
Chairman

- 6 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 22, 1967

*file*  
220

~~SECRET~~

Lois:

You should probably put a copy of the attached in your files. It is the only record we will have in the White House of the President's meeting with King Hussein on November 8.

*Hal*

Hal Saunders

~~SECRET~~

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STA  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

1. Hussein visit
2. Bundy
- ✓ 3. WWR 220a

November 11, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

SUBJECT: Meeting Between President Johnson,  
King Hussein and Secretary Rusk on  
Wednesday, November 8 at 5:30 p.m.

Following the meeting between the President and the King, Secretary Rusk gave me some of the highlights of the discussion.

The meeting was cordial and a few minutes were spent in pleasantries, including the presentation of a cigarette lighter to His Majesty by President Johnson.

Discussions centered on the U.S. resolution currently before the Security Council. The President pressed the King to support the U.S. resolution. He pointed out that the resolution is to be a compromise resolution. The Government of Israel is not happy with the text; the Arabs are not happy with the text. It is difficult to draft a resolution that makes both sides happy, but it is imperative that both sides accept the resolution if it is to be implemented.

King Hussein tried his best to get precision on the clause with respect to withdrawal of Israeli forces. The President replied that it was difficult to be precise in one part and not on the others. There were imprecise statements in the resolution in several respects. The King then said that if it was impossible to be precise as to when or where withdrawal should take place, he hoped that it would be possible to be precise with regard to the question of who was to withdraw. The phraseology of the resolution calling for withdrawal from occupied territories could be interpreted to mean

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-155  
By us NARA, Date 6-9-03

~~SECRET~~  
GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

~~SECRET~~

2.

that the Egyptians should withdraw from Gaza and the Jordanians should withdraw from the West Bank. This possibility was evident from the speech by Prime Minister ~~Eban~~ <sup>Ben Gurion</sup> in which the Prime Minister had referred to both Gaza and the West Bank as "occupied territory".

The President agreed to talk with Ambassador Goldberg in New York and he and Secretary Rusk told the King that we would be back in touch with him by noon the following day with respect to his suggestion for inclusion of the word "Israeli" before the word withdrawal in the resolution.

The President urged strongly that the Jordanians support the U.S. resolution, and expressed the hope that Jordan would try to get the UAR on board also. The U.S. will use its leverage to bring about a settlement. We have to move one step at a time, however, and the King must understand that we too have problems.

After the King left the President's office, he had a brief exchange with Secretary Rusk concerning the provision of arms to Jordan. I heard him say that he hoped for an answer before he departed from the U.S. The Secretary later told me that he had predicated this hope on there being progress made in New York.



Lucius D. Battle

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~  
(Classification)

19786

221a  
7

4381

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
INR BRIEFING NOTE

GIST: JORDANIAN REPORTS OF ISRAELI BUILDUP PREPARATORY TO AN  
ATTACK ON JORDAN CAN NOT BE CONFIRMED BY US SOURCES IN ISRAEL

TO: The Secretary  
FROM: The Director, INR

A.C.D.L.

DATE: Nov. 16, 1967  
TIME: 4:30 PM

COMMENTS CONTAINED IN INR BRIEFING  
NOTES ARE INITIAL AND TENTATIVE.

SOURCE(S)

Amman 2236, Nov 15

CLASS./CONTROL(S)

S/EXDIS Deputy Prime Minister Touqan told the US Charge on November 15 he had reports from a variety of sources, including "eyewitnesses and several 'highly placed diplomats,'" that Israel has massed sizeable additional forces, including 200 tanks, along the northern Jordan River line during the last two days. Prime Minister Talhouni was calling in Arab ambassadors that PM to review the situation. Touqan gravely concerned that Israeli plans a major blow against Jordan and hoped the US could dissuade the Israelis. Touqan expressed interest in the Charge's remark that movements might be troop rotations in the area the Israelis had told us about, but Touqan felt sure that there was more to it.

RNA Comment:

Jordan has been the chief source of numerous reports over the past month alleging Israeli military buildups and imminent attacks on either Jordan or Syria, or both, because of the increase in Arab terrorist activity since mid-September. None of these reports was substantiated. In reply to Touqan's latest fears, the Embassy in Tel Aviv reported that the US Defense Attache's reconnaissance of the Beisan Valley on November 12 had not revealed any buildup and that another recon would be made of the area on November 16 (Tel Aviv 1511, November 15, SECRET - copy attached). In a further reply on November 16, DATT in Tel Aviv remarks in his 1612 (CONFIDENTIAL)(copy attached) that the movement and numbers of tanks, half-tracks and other armor and units were consistent with rotation plans the Israelis had informed him of in advance, on November 10 (USDAO 1581, November 11, CONFIDENTIAL)(copy attached). In the November 16 message, DATT conceded that the Israeli Defense Force is capable of mobilising and concentrating many brigades within 24 hours, but reported that he had no evidence that it was doing so. High IDF officials had denied that larger than normal forces were facing Jordan.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 15-39

By uuu NARA, Date 02-09-2015

INR OFFICE

RNA/NE

BRIEFER

Vaccaro

EXTENSION

2908

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

(Classification)

~~SECRET~~

222

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR

November 6, 1967

SUBJECT: Hussein-Rusk Talk

Harry Symmes has dictated a long memcon which probably won't be over till late in the evening. He did, however, give me a brief rundown of the subjects covered:

--Refugees. The King agreed that, if given a private choice, most of the refugees would choose resettlement. He wouldn't commit himself on whether we could begin doing things now to move toward that end, but he left the impression that he'd be willing to consider.

--Arms. The King accepted the idea of arms control in the context of a settlement, regretted the timing of our resumption of military shipments to Israel. The Secretary explained the Congressional problem, partly in terms of the Arabs' having upset the delicate pre-June balance of arms in the area by their own acts. Mentioned our opposition to nuclear weapons in the area. Discussed Soviet intent in rearming the Arabs.

--UN. The Secretary said we're prepared to use our muscle in support of a settlement when there is something definite to support. But our position alone could not settle the problem; the parties had to come to terms somehow.

--Hussein said it was important to define withdrawal now so there is no misunderstanding later. The Secretary gave him about the same answer Goldberg had.

--Hussein and Sisco discussed the difference between Hussein's claim that he and Nasser got a go-ahead at Khartoum to work out a political settlement and the way the Arabs have been acting as a group in New York. We thought it important for Hussein to lead and bring other Arabs with him rather than letting them limit him as they had in July.

--Soviet intent uncertain.

--UAR. Nothing new. We want good relations. If they can't say anything nice about us, they could at least keep quiet.

--Economic. Hussein described the dislocation resulting from loss of the West Bank.

The above is rough and does not include the Secretary's private half hour alone with the King. However, it does sketch the range of luncheon conversation. Harry said the atmosphere was excellent.

*Hal*  
Hal Saunders

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-154  
By no, NARA, Date 7-31-03

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

~~CLASSIFICATION~~  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

4381

221

11/17/67  
Date  
Saunders

FOR: Mr. Walt W. Rostow  
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

JF

For your information and files.

Enclosures:

5/5 19786, c47

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

~~CLASSIFICATION~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY ju ON 11-18-91



MEMORANDUM

(u) BB FS 223

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Mr Saunders  
& Sp (Kathy)  
notified  
11/1/67  
ren

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, October 31, 1967

Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk has asked me to let you know his personal feelings about your seeing King Hussein. He had hoped to mention this at lunch today, but there wasn't time.

He appreciates your desire to keep these visitors to a minimum and concurs in your not trying to have Hussein to lunch if you feel that makes too heavy a load. However, he does feel it's important for you to see Hussein while he is here. Therefore, he would like your permission to extend an invitation for an office meeting.

Hussein will land in New York November 2 and will come to Washington November 6. He will see Arthur Goldberg in New York, and Secretary Rusk would talk to him here before he saw you. Hussein is set to speak to the Press Club and to meet with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

I would like to add my own endorsement. Hussein is uncertain about our position, and a talk with you would significantly reassure him. We'll have precious little to maintain our ties with him, since Congress will make military and economic aid difficult. Yet he is the Jordanian most likely to negotiate peace with Israel. A peace settlement would be such a great achievement that I think he warrants this investment of your time.

I gather Jim Jones is tentatively holding 5:30 p. m. on November 8 open pending your decision.

W.W. Rostow

I'll see him at 5:30 p. m. on the 8th \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S-98001  
By RGS/L NARA, Date 8-14-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
W. MARVIN WATSON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

11 7 AM 13 OCT 1967

Mr. President:

Secretary Ruak has asked me to let you know his personal feelings about your seeing King Hussein. He had hoped to mention this at lunch today, but there wasn't time.

He appreciates your desire to keep these visitors to a minimum and concurs in your not trying to have Hussein to lunch if you feel that makes too heavy a load. However, he does feel it's important for you to see Hussein while he is here. Therefore, he would like your permission to extend an invitation for an office meeting.

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W. Marvin Watson

I'll see him at 5:30 p. m. on the 8th

See me

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8  
NW-2-88001  
By SP-1 NARA, Date 8-14-01

Handwritten notes in top left corner, including "F2 233" and "Mr. [unclear]".

~~SECRET~~

224

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR

Subject: Comment on Hussein's Conversation with DeGaulle

1. King Hussein's points are close to ours, but that's not the problem. He and Nasser accepted the US-USSR resolution before Hussein went to Moscow, but both see our efforts to define what it means as backsliding. So Hussein's comments still leave unresolved the definition of the end of belligerency and the timing of implementation.
2. From this and other reports, Hussein seems to have pinned Nasser down on allowing the Israeli flag through the Canal as part of an overall settlement. While Hussein does not link the Canal opening with refugee settlement, Nasser may still do so to put off the day when he has to let the Israelis through the Canal.
3. However, Sir Harold Beeley's talks in Cairo (attached) are interesting on the nature of a refugee settlement. Nasser still clearly links refugees and Canal passage, but two points are interesting: (1) He agrees to exchange promises and match implementation for implementation (though it's hard to see how this would work out since implementing a refugee settlement will take so long). (2) He defines the Israeli promise in terms of repatriation or compensation. This is not really new, and its acceptability to Israel depends on the repatriation being minimal (maybe 50,000). But it does seem to indicate some flexibility. (Comment: I gave you last night a note on Evron's rejection of any linkage.)
4. DeGaulle just isn't concentrating on substance and seems more interested in saying what the Arabs want to hear. His one contribution was to counsel Hussein not to go off the deep end but to bide his time. His openness on arms for Jordan would help us. I just hope political pressure on him will be so great that he'll allow the Israelis to find a similar loophole.

All in all, I think when Hussein gets to New York and talks with Goldberg, we ought to be able to reach a meeting of minds with him on the UN resolution. But we still may be a bit apart on the final terms.

*Hal*

Hal Saunders

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-151  
By us NARA, Date 5-16-03

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

2248  
**TELEGRAM**

28

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 494

PAGE 01 251224Z

51  
ACTION SS 70

INFO FILE 01, /071 W

WAR

R 250835Z OCT 67  
FM CAIRO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3923

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CAIRO 834

LIMDIS

- 1. TESH, HEAD BRITISH INTERESTS SECTION, GAVE ME FOLLOWING RUNDOWN ON BEELEY MISSION:
  - A. BOTH SIDES AGREED TO FULL RESTORATION RELATIONS DURING FIRST HALF DECEMBER.
  - B. EGYPTIANS WISH CONSULL WITH ALGERIANS AND SYRIANS BEFORE ANNOUNCEMENT BUT FORESEE NO DIFFICULTIES. THEY HAD ALREADY TOUCHED BASE WITH IRAQIS AND SUDANESE.
  - C. RESTORATION OF RELATIONS TO BE AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL.
  - D. RESTORATION WAS UNCONDITIONAL ON BOTH SIDES. IN HIS TALK WITH BEELEY NASSER CAME AS CLOSE AS HE PROBABLY EVER WILL TO APOLOGIZING FOR BIG LIE SPEAKING VERY MUCH ALONG LINES FONMIN RIAD USED IN HIS RECENT CONVERSATION WITH ASST SECRETARY BATTLE. BRITISH DID NOT RAISE QUESTION OF MOB DAMAGE TO PROPERTY UNTIL AFTER REPEAT AFTER

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 834 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
AGREEMENT RE RESUMPTION HAD BEEN REACHED. FEKI SAID THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY IN SETTLING THIS QUESTION.

E. NASSER REPEATED UNDERTAKING REEXAMINE POSSIBILITY OF

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-155  
By us NARA, Date 6-9-03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 251224Z

OPENING SOUTHERN END CANAL RELEASE TRAPPED SHIPS, BUT BEELEY DOUBTS THAT ANYTHING WILL COME OF THIS. NASSER SAID HE WOULD NOT OPEN CANAL UNTIL ISRAELIS LEFT SINAI. HE SAID HE WOULD PROMISE TO ALLOW ISRAEL FLAG SHIPPING USE CANAL IF ISRAELIS WOULD PROMISE REPATRIATE OR COMPENSATE ARAB REFUGEES. HE WOULD IMPLEMENT HIS PROMISE AS ISRAELIS IMPLEMENTED THEIRS. HE SAID QUESTION OF ISRAEL CARGOES ON THIRD COUNTRY SHIPS WAS NEGOTIABLE.

F. BEELEY WAS ALSO INSTRUCTED REPORT TO HMG HIS ASSESSMENT OF STAYING POWER OF NASSER REGIME. HE DID NOT SPELL OUT TO TESH WHAT HIS CONCLUSIONS WOULD BE. FROM MY OWN LENGTHY PRIVATE TALK WITH BEELEY ON OCTOBER 17, I AM FAIRLY CERTAIN HE WILL STATE THAT NASSER IS GOING TO BE AROUND FOR A WHILE.  
RBERGUS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

224-c

44

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 483

PAGE 01 LONDON 03272 241929Z

92  
ACTION SS 70

INFO /070 W

- R 241810Z OCT 67
- FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
- TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9519
- INFO AMCONSUL ADEN 221
- AMEMBASSY AMMAN 261
- AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 250
- AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 113
- AMEMBASSY JIDDA 409
- AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 299
- USMISSION USUN 800
- AMEMBASSY ALGIERS UNN
- AMCONSUL DHAHRAN UNN
- AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM UNN
- AMEMBASSY KUWAIT UNN
- AMEMBASSY TEHRAN UNN
- AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI UNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 3272

PAGE 2 RUDTCR 3272 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
LIMDIS=NOFORN EXCEPT UK

SUBJ: UK/UAR

REF: LONDON 3093 (NOTAL); USUN 1670, PARA 4

1. FOL. RE BEELEY MISSION CONFIDED ON BACKGROUND BASIS OCT 24 BY FONOFF'S MALLET (ACTING HEAD, N. AND E. AFRICA DEPT.) AND WALKER (UAR DESK). WALKER ACCOMPANIED BEELEY TO CAIRO.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-155  
By ms, NARA, Date 6-9-03

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 LONDON 03272 241929Z

A. NASSER AND BEELEY AGREED DIP. RELS. WOULD BE RESTORED SOMETIME DURING FIRST 15 DAYS DECEMBER. THIS TIMING SUPPOSED TO BE HELD IN STRICT CONFIDENCE, FOR NASSER FIRST WANTS TO "CONDITION" ALGERIANS AND SYRIANS. HE SAID HE WOULD GO AHEAD EVEN IF THEY OBJECTED. IRAQIS, SUDANESE AND RELEVANT AFRICANS HAVE AGREED.

B. RESPONSE BEELEY'S SUGGESTIONS, NASSER AGREED: (1) TO ENCOURAGE FLOSY AND NLF TO COMPOSE DIFFERENCES AND FORM SOUTH ARABIAN GOV'T; (2) TO SPEAK TO MINISTER OF GUIDANCE RE INFLAMMATORY

PAGE 3 RUDTCR 3272 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
"VOICE OF ARABS" BROADCASTS.

C. IN CONTEXT BEELEY'S PITCH FOR UNBLOCKING SOUTHERN END SUEZ CANAL TO FREE STRANDED SHIPS, NASSER SAID THAT BEFORE ISRAELI FLAG VESSELS USED CANAL, PALESTINE REFUGEES MUST BE ASSURED CHANCE TO RETURN TO HOMES OR ELSE COMPENSATED. QUESTION OF ISRAELI CARGOS THROUGH CANAL "NEGOTIABLE".

2. MALLET ADDED FOL. INFO IN REPLY EMBOFF'S QUERIES.

A. UAR OFFICIALS DID NOT RAISE QUESTION OF UK MILITARY PRESENCE PERSIAN GULF.

B. BEELEY NOTED HMG'S EXPECTATION OF COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE TO ALEXANDRIA AND PORT SAID CONSULATES, BUT ASSURANCE OF COMPENSATION NOT RPT. NOT MADE PRECONDITION FOR DIP. RELS. IN FACT, NEITHER SIDE SOUGHT PRECONDITIONS.

C. RE "BIG LIE", BRITISH ARE REASONABLY SATISFIED WITH VARIOUS PRIVATE APOLOGIES BY UAR OFFICIALS AND "EXPLANATIONS" IN

PAGE 4 RUDTCR 3272 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CAIRO PAPERS.

D. LONDON PRESS ACCOUNTS TO CONTRARY, UAR OFFICIALS DID NOT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

**TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 LONDON 03272 241929Z

SEEK NOR DID BEELEY OFFER ANY BRITISH LOAN. BEELEY REMINDED EGYPTIANS THEY OWED BRITISH CONSIDERABLE MONEY.

BEGIN NOFORN:

3. RESPONSE FURTHER QUESTIONS ON ECONOMIC RELATIONS, MALLET SAID UK OFFICIALS BEGINNING TODAY TO EXAMINE PROBLEM OF HOW TO RECOVER UAR DEBTS. WHILE THERE NO ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION FOR EASING UAR'S REPAYMENT SCHEDULES, MIGHT BE POLITICAL JUSTIFICATION LATER. HMG STILL NOT FURNISHING CREDIT COVER FOR UAR PURCHASES HERE. MALLET DOUBTED ANY EASING OF TERMS WOULD OCCUR BEFORE DECEMBER, AND THOUGHT RELIEF IF ANY THEREAFTER WOULD BE VERY SLIGHT.

END NOFORN.

GP-3 BRUCE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*L 225*

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, October 4, 1967  
10:45 a.m. *S*

Mr. President:

This cable, pages 2-3, gives you  
a feel as to where Hussein and Nasser  
are going -- or trying to go.

*Walt*. Rostow

Amman 1692

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, October 2, 1967

225a

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BURNS (Amman 1692)

I met with Hussein late afternoon on October 1 to give him our reading of the current Israeli position on negotiations, and our general reaction to the Arab position taken at Khartoum. After completing the presentation of points on negotiations, I recalled to Hussein his comment to me some days ago that he doubted the Israelis were interested in negotiations with him and noted that obviously they were interested.

Hussein expressed appreciation for the department's views, but made no direct comment pro or con negotiations. Later in the conversation, however, he referred to the report given him by Hatem Zu'Bi (Government of Jordan's Minister of National Economy) about Zu'Bi's meeting in Rio with Mr. Rostow. According to Zu'Bi, Mr. Rostow had said Washington had expected after the Khartoum Conference that Hussein would take "some initiative." The King interpreted this to mean the United States Government expected the King to enter direct negotiations with the Israelis. The King indicated that if this interpretation were correct, he was unhappy that the United States Government was trying to pressure him into direct negotiations. I replied that I had had a report of Mr. Rostow's meeting with Hatem Zu'Bi and it was clear from this report that Mr. Rostow had not specified direct negotiations. There were forms of initiative other than direct negotiations. Mr. Rostow had indicated that an initiative was desirable, and I reminded Hussein I had said the same thing to him after Khartoum. Mr. Rostow had said that when King Hussein decided he wanted to go forward, our influence and our good offices would be available in behalf of a fair and durable agreement. When the King told us his ideas about procedure, we would respond. Regarding direct negotiations, the message I had just read him had specifically indicated that we were not trying to decide for him, nor were we taking the responsibility for advising him, on how to proceed. Such decisions were for the King alone to make.

The King then said he was glad to have this opportunity prior to his departure to Moscow to review with me his September 30 Cairo discussions and his talking about next steps aimed at a solution of the present Arab-Israeli impasse.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLT 94-405 (#82a)  
By isp/ly NARA, Date 7-31-01

Hussein stated he had secured Nasser's agreement to discuss in Moscow a draft United Nations' resolution, to be introduced at the Security Council, hopefully by the US and the USSR. This resolution would be similar to the US-USSR draft resolution, presented to the Arabs last July, which had provided for a linking of Israeli withdrawal with Arab agreement to end their state of belligerency against Israel, as well as for a role for a United Nations' representative to work out details to implement this resolution. Nasser had asked only that the original US-USSR draft be rephrased to make it appear as if it were not precisely the same document which the Arabs had, to Nasser's regret, rejected last summer. Nasser fully agreed that in order to ensure renewed US-Soviet support all substantive points of the US-USSR draft must be retained. (Nasser and Hussein did not compose a new draft. According to Royal Protocol Chief Rifa' I, the Jordanians were writing one, which Nasser had agreed to buy sight unseen. When I saw Hussein the drafting task had not been completed.)

Hussein stated the Egyptians had cautioned him that the United States Government had already made it clear that it would insist on certain interpretations of the general provisions in any draft resolution which it might support. These interpretations included: (A) Israeli withdrawal would be to agreed, I. E., negotiated, boundaries; (B) border rectifications were to be negotiated for the West Bank and Syrian heights; (C) internationalization of both Gaza and Jerusalem; (D) demilitarization of Sinai, and presumably at least part of the West Bank; (E) opening of Tiran and Suez to Israeli ships; (F) the United Arab Republic Foreign Minister would have to stand up in the General Assembly and announce the United Arab Republic's acceptance of the resolution. (Hussein said he had been informed that Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad had told Ambassador Goldberg that he would do this only after Eban had announced to the General Assembly that Israel would withdraw. I said if the Security Council passed a resolution acceptable to the United Arab Republic and Jordan, it would seem to me an advantage for the United Arab Republic and Jordan to register their acceptance immediately, no matter what any one else did.)

Hussein said the Egyptians had received this information on United States Government stipulations from Yugoslav and Iranian sources. He added that he had been given to understand that President Johnson had listed several if not all of the above specifics in a message to President Tito. Although the United States position on internationalization of Jerusalem was well-known, some of the other specifics were news to Hussein and greatly disturbed Hussein and the Egyptians, who interpreted as deliberately

tailored to meet Israeli desires and at the same time to humiliate the Arabs. Hussein said he and Nasser felt, too, that neither Washington nor Moscow appeared willing to shoulder the responsibilities they would have to shoulder if a just and durable peace were to be achieved. I replied that I could not agree with this analysis. As for the reported US stipulations, I would ask Washington for direct and authoritative information in this regard for relay to Hussein on his return from Moscow.

I asked the King what President Nasser's present attitude was concerning the opening of Suez to Israeli ships. The King replied that Nasser viewed the opening of Suez as a question tied to an overall solution of the Palestine problem, not just to the ending of belligerency. The King indicated he agreed with this view. I said that if this was their attitude then perhaps the Arabs should consider working up a resolution which would in effect tackle the solution of the so-called Palestine problem, since it seemed clear to me that the Israelis were not going to withdraw from the Canal area unless their ships could pass through: the King said he considered nevertheless that a rephrased version of the US-USSR July draft was the first and indispensable step to any larger solution.

At the conclusion of my interview with Hussein, he said that if a political solution could not be worked out through the UN, he and Nasser would be left with two alternatives--either to negotiate directly with the Israelis "which would be tantamount to a complete capitulation to the Israelis" or to shift direction to the long-term objective of regaining the occupied territories by force. Hussein said that what he sought was a just and honorable peace, and he implied that although he could be flexible about how this was to be achieved, never would he or any Arab "capitulate to the Israelis." If peace were to be achieved, said Hussein, US and Soviet support for a Security Council resolution such as he had outlined would be requisite.

SEPTEMBER 29, 1967

Office of the White House Press Secretary  
(San Antonio, Texas)

*Jordan*  
226

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THE WHITE HOUSE

President Johnson today announced his intention to nominate Harrison M. Symmes, of North Carolina, to be United States Ambassador to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Symmes will succeed Findley Burns, Jr., a career Foreign Service officer, who is returning to Washington for reassignment.

Mr. Symmes, a Foreign Service officer, was born November 11, 1921, in Wilmington, North Carolina. He attended the University of North Carolina and was granted a Bachelor of Arts degree in 1942. He received a Master of Arts degree from George Washington University in 1948. Mr. Symmes is a member of two national academic societies, Phi Beta Kappa and Pi Gamma Mu.

Prior to his entry into the Foreign Service in 1947, Mr. Symmes served four years as a Second Lieutenant in the United States Army. His first Foreign Service position was Vice Consul in Alexandria, Egypt, and from there he was transferred to Damascus.

In 1952 he was assigned to Arabic Language and Area Training at the Foreign Service Institute. He was assigned to Kuwait in 1954, later transferred to Washington and in 1957 became Chief of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Branch, Division of Research for Near East and Africa; and subsequently a Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Near East, South Asian and African Affairs. From 1959-1962 he served in Benghazi and Tripoli.

He completed a year of study at Harvard University in 1962, and was then assigned to the Department as Deputy Director, and later became Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs; Country Director of Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs; and most recently, Director, Mid-Career Officer Program, Office of the Director General of the Foreign Service.

In addition to being proficient in Arabic, he speaks French.

Mr. Symmes is married to Joan M. Shanahan Symmes, and they have one son and two daughters. They presently reside in Alexandria, Virginia.

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~~SECRET~~

WWR:

September 14, 1967

I just want to be sure you see the attached. Although it doesn't represent majority opinion in the Jordanian government, it's interesting as the view of a veteran prime minister, albeit a bit of a hot-head.

It's frightening to see this doctrine of guerrilla warfare creep into hitherto rational Jordan. Tal, in my conversation with him in March, for instance, took a cold and rational view of how to solve the refugee problem--"don't tackle it head-on but just give us time to employ and absorb the refugees." Quite a contrast from the view of his Palestinian countryman that "the refugee problem will never go away."

But his basic point seems to me a valid one: Jordan needs a "psychological umbrella" for a political settlement. Unfortunately, Tal's solution is exactly the wrong one for anyone who hopes to see the end of belligerency. Any move in this direction would immediately cause the Israelis to say it's impossible to deal with Hussein and to batten down the hatches.

This points up the greatest need on the Arab side--a face-saving device for a settlement. We've offered one in the hopes for a better life (President on 19 June), but the Arabs aren't up to that yet.

*Hal*

Hal Saunders

Att:

[Redacted box]

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 13, 1967

FS  
228

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Jordanian Ambassador Sharaf

The new Jordanian Ambassador came in to see me this morning as one stop in his initial round of courtesy calls. We had met when he presented his credentials a couple of weeks ago.

He began by saying that we are entering a crucial period and that it is important for the US to encourage its friends. I agreed that the last two months had seen all of us in a peculiar state of indecision. The Arabs for their part had been busy consulting and developing a position. We on our side have been hamstrung by the violence of Congressional opposition to the aid program and the debate over it, which we have not wanted to upset by moving too quickly on the delicate Mid-East scene.

The Ambassador went on to say that our friends in the Arab countries expect us to make good on our pledge of support for the territorial integrity of all states. He pointed out that this pledge has been made numerous times at the highest levels of government, both in public and in private to Arab heads of state. He knows we would be standing behind it if Israel had been attacked and therefore believes that the governments like his, which have been consistently friendly with the US, are reasonable in expecting the USG to honor that pledge.

He said that, in his initial talks here, he had come to understand our position of linking troop withdrawal to the end of belligerency and an overall political settlement. But he was frankly worried, after some of these talks, that we were overemphasizing form at the expense of substance. He said there were numerous practical arrangements that could be made with Israel, but we must realize that a formal peace treaty or formal recognition is beyond the capacity of any Arab government.

I said I could appreciate the possibility that we might have spoken too much the language of Western jurisprudence in hammering on the theme of ending belligerency. A clearer way to make our point, I thought, was to go back to the simple language of the President's 19 June speech. What is at stake here is the creation of a situation in which the right of Israel, as well as of the Arab states, to exist is recognized. I knew from my own talk with King Hussein in March

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S-98001

By RC/SL NARA, Date 9-14-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

that he was quite prepared to live and let live with Israel. I could not be so sure, however, that Nasser shared that view. I couldn't claim to know Nasser's intentions, and was interested in his view. But I could have been convinced easily in early June that Nasser was dead serious about cutting off Israel's oil lifeline. What did he think Nasser intended? Was Nasser ready to live and let live like King Hussein?

Appreciating fully Arab feelings that Israeli encroachment over the years had constituted a continuous threat, I told him quite frankly that, from our Israeli contacts, I was certain that the Israelis had felt their existence threatened last May and June. Whatever disclaimers he might make about Arab rhetoric and propaganda, he ought to realize that the combination of Arab threats and military movements had convinced Israeli leaders that the immediate Arab objective was to destroy Israel then and there. Our main objective in moving toward a settlement is to end the situation in which either side feels that its existence is threatened. Call this what you will--the end of belligerency or a series of practical arrangements--the sine qua non in our eyes is this genuine condition of peace. I told him we have very little stake in the forms or tactics of arriving at such a peace, and I was sorry that he had the impression that we were concentrating on form rather than on substance.

In parting, I told him that I appreciated his articulate, precise and unemotional argument of the Arab case. I felt many Americans just dismissed Arab arguments as propaganda since so many Arab spokesmen harrangued us rather than trying to present evidence and argument in the rational ways Americans understand. I urged him to expand his circle of contacts as widely as possible, including Members of Congress, since one of the Arab countries' major obstacles was to overcome the image of hostility and irrationality that had been created by the televising of the UN debates in June and July.

Harold H. Saunders

CONFIDENTIAL

*Jordan*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*L 229*  
*S*

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday  
September 5, 1967 -- 7:30 p.m.

EO 13526  
3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

Mr. President:

This is a  report of some  
importance -- if true -- on the Arab  
summit.

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)

What makes it impressive is that  
it is not inconsistent with the other  
report attached from Saudi Arabia.

In the latter you will be particularly  
interested in Nasser's presentation of  
the evolution of his relations with the  
U. S.

*W. Rostow*  
Rostow

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 15-40

By CH NARA, Date 12-6-15

~~SECRET~~  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

3416

229a

5 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

This is the message Secretary Rusk mentioned at lunch today.

I had requested permission from Secretary Rusk to disregard an instruction from the Ambassador that we not distribute this message, rather than we all await the Ambassador's own description of a conversation [redacted] into which this material would be incorporated.

3.3(b)(1)

The message is not in quotation marks, because it is our Station Chief's write-up of the main points [redacted] made to him.

3.3(b)(1)

*Dick*  
Richard Helms

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 15-40  
By CH NARA, Date 12-6-15

~~SECRET~~

3416

2296

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 001-147-1-32  
By g NARA, Date 8-3-01

The following are highlights of the Khartoum Conference from King Husayn on 2 September:

1. The Conference was a complete victory for the moderates, exceeding all expectations. Its success is attributed to the spadework Husayn had done before the Conference and UAR President Nasir's surprising moderation.
2. The road for peace definitely was opened. The Arab leaders were more realistic and reasonable than at any previous conference in recent history. If the West nurtures this, real peace is within grasp.
3. UAR President Nasir is a changed man, even within the past six weeks. King Faysal agrees he had never seen Nasir so frank, humble, sincere or courageous. Nasir admitted the "Big Lie" was not true and resulted from confusion of war. If he knew then what he knows now he would not have broken relations with the United States. However, Nasir still convinced the U.S. number one objective in the area is to get him. The King suggested if this is not true, U.S. should find some way to persuade Nasir of it. This would go a long way in paving way to peace. Nasir also is disenchanted with the Russians.
4. Syria is now isolated and blamed as most responsible for provoking hostilities. Her war record is impugned. "Fatah" activity

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unanimously condemned, past and future. Isolation may force change in Syrian regime. Everyone hopes so.

5. The Yemen settlement is for real. It is the price Nasir paid for economic assistance.

6. King Husayn will probably visit the U.S. in October in one of the many trips by various Arab leaders (Hassan, Bourguiba, etc.) to world capitals to sell moderate Arab case and seek support for just settlement.

7. Iraqi President Arif agreed to withdraw Iraqi troops from Jordan when presented with evidence that Palestine Liberation Army units attached to Iraqi contingents were involved in infiltration operations into West Bank.

8. King Husayn was asked to negotiate the Algerian-Moroccan dispute which he accepted.

9. Suez will stay closed until acceptable Jerusalem settlement is made, but the opening of Suez to the Israelis will still require much work and a face-saving device.

10. Acceptance of the resolution ending belligerency or acknowledging the right to exist is almost certain. Most other details can be worked out by a United Nations negotiator. If Israel gives evidence she really wants peace, the mood of the Arabs is to meet her half way, but there is much skepticism (based on recent Israeli behaviour) whether she would not prefer occupied territories to peace.

11. Chairman, Palestine Liberation Organization, Ahmad

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Shuqayri was unanimously repudiated and all his statements expunged from the record.

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Tuesday, September 5, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR EILTS (Jidda, 896)

SUBJECT: Arab Summit

I talked last night and today with Rashad Pharaon and Saqqaf respectively about the Arab Summit. The following summarizes their comments:

From the Saudi standpoint, the meeting was a success for moderates and for the cause of realism. Nasser, obviously much chastened, had shown a great restraint. He had explained in a rational, logical fashion the UAR's past relations with the U.S. and events leading up to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Reading from his notes on Nasser's presentation, Saqqaf (source to be protected) said Nasser first gave a lengthy account of the deterioration in US-UAR relations. He recalled the McCloy mission of 1963 and the PL-480 food program. The Americans had constantly urged him to settle with Israel. He had repeatedly refused for the sake of Arabs and Palestine, despite the problems this allegedly caused for him in his relations with the U.S. Finally, U.S. concessionary food aid had been cut off. Some Arab states had criticized his earlier failure to block the Straits of Aqaba. He had not wanted war. However, on hearing of Israeli plan to attack Syria, he had at once made the necessary deployment to meet the threat. This included ordering the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Forces and placing UAR forces in Sinai and on the border. He had taken these steps unilaterally as he had had to act unilaterally in 1956. Thereafter, President Johnson had sent him a personal message not to attack. Arrangements had been made for Vice President Humphrey to visit the UAR and for Zakariya Muhyiddin

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Authority NLS 00-95  
By cb/lj NARA, Date 7-31-01

to visit the U. S. in order to discuss the situation. The Soviets had also sent him urgent message not to attack Israel. While all these exchanges were taking place, Israel had launched a surprise attack on June 5. He did not explain why the UAR was so unprepared, but implied that Amer was mainly at fault. His losses had been enormous: 500 tanks, with crews, destroyed in Gaza, 1,100 officers dead, 500 officers captured, 10,000 troops killed or missing, most of his Air Force destroyed, etc. In three days of battle he had lost one billion dollars' worth of military equipment. He had indeed lost a battle, but noted this kind of thing has happened before and will happen again. He had also explained the "big lie" of U. S. collusion with Israel by referring to Hussein's telephone call and claiming that if Hussein's figures of attacking aircraft are correct, they exceeded UAR intelligence estimates of Israeli aircraft inventory. Aircraft, therefore, had to come from the Sixth Fleet. He now knew the UAR intelligence had underestimated Israeli air capability.

Following this explanation of past UAR actions, Nasser continued. He is not able to resume the fight now. Perhaps in one or two years' time this might again be possible and the Arabs are only likely to preserve their rights if they prepare themselves for a long pull. However, the UAR and other Arab states should first seek peaceful means to recover their lost territories. The Indian government had informed him that a senior U. S. official recently told the Indian Ambassador that Israel wants to internationalize Gaza, keep Jerusalem and demilitarize Sinai, the West Bank and the Golan Hills. This would be surrender to Israel and not acceptable. Great Britain had suggested the Saudis move 20 kilometers from the East Bank of Suez to allow the Canal to be reopened. He had not yet replied, but despite the heavy loss that the Canal's continued closure imposes on the UAR, he is not prepared to reopen it until all traces of "Israeli aggression" are removed. Meanwhile, the UAR is hungry. He has food to last only six months. If other Arabs can help, he would appreciate such help. If not, he will get along best as he can. He had read reports of the Foreign Ministers and Baghdad meetings. He did not want an oil embargo or withdrawal of Arab investments from the U. S. or U. K. as some had suggested. Arabs require these assets for their own welfare and to enable them to rebuild their economies and strength.

Nasser's speech reportedly made a very favorable impact. There was general agreement the other Arab states should help. One hundred thirty five million pound figure had earlier been estimated by the Arab Foreign Ministers (sitting as Finance Ministers) as the UAR's and Jordan's annual economic shortfalls under the present conditions. Faisal volunteered to give 30 percent of this amount, but later upped it to 50 million pounds. President Arif then proposed Kuwait should give 70 million pounds. Amir of Kuwait, who had earlier apparently expected to provide only 10 or 15 million pounds, gulped. After various parties had worked on him, he finally agreed to 55 million pounds and Libya offered 30 million pounds. (According to Rashad, Saudi payment will be 36 million pounds to the UAR and 14 million pounds to Jordan. Payments will be made directly to those governments. Once the Suez Canal is reopened, payments to the UAR will cease. Until this happens, they are to be paid annually on October 15.) Both Rashad and Saqqaf allege these funds are to be used for economic recovery purposes.

Nasser had at one point also suggested that Faisal mediate his differences with U. S. Faisal did not feel he alone could do this, but indicated he is in constant contact with the U. S. government. Nasser then explained that all states which have relations with the U. S. might help in this regard. He apparently did not spell out just what he had in mind.

As indicated in the Summit announcement, the Arabs are prepared to explore the possibility of finding some peaceful solution to the current problem. Nasser had noted even the Soviets agree on the existence of Israel. However, the Arabs are not prepared to (a) make formal peace, (b) enter direct negotiations, or (c) recognize Israel. Nevertheless, according to Saqqaf, each Arab state is now free to explore the possibility of arriving at some accommodation with the Israel subject only to aforementioned caveats. Saqqaf thought Hussein might already be doing so and the UAR also is ready to do so. He acknowledged that, in the case of UAR, transit of the Suez Canal, about which Nasser is adamant, is likely to be a stumbling block.

According to Saqqaf, Shuqairi had at one point insisted no Arab leader should go it alone. He had spoken of

the need for guerrilla warfare. Shuqairi's view was not accepted and he left in a huff. As a result, Saqqaf believes Shuqairi and Plo are finished.

I asked Rashad and Saqqaf where the foregoing leaves the linkage of formula of Israeli withdrawal and Arab renunciation of rights of belligerency. Rashad claimed the subject was not specifically discussed, but if renunciation of belligerency entails allowing Israeli vessels to transit the Suez Canal, he saw no prospects. Instead, the Summit Conferees felt that something along the lines of the Tito Plan should be urged, i. e., Israeli withdrawal as a pre-condition to a discussion of all other questions. Pre-June, 5 boundaries might then be guaranteed by four powers. Saqqaf has a slightly different version and noted that neither Foreign Ministers nor the Arab Summit announcement had made any reference to a "state of war" existing with Israel. He argued this was a deliberate omission implicit in which is renunciation of Arab rights of belligerency. However, it did not mean Arab agreement to Israeli transit of the Suez Canal. Freedom of passage in the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba is not contested.

The Summit had readily agreed the oil-producing states might lift the oil embargo and this is now done.

The Arabs had also agreed to revive Arab Solidarity Pact and conduct no hostile propaganda against each other.

Comment: Both Rashad and Saqqaf believe the Arab Summit was a great success. Not unexpectedly, they argue Faisal was the "star" of the show and that his moderating influence prevailed. In varying degrees, both were also impressed with Nasser's reasonableness. They are particularly gratified at Nasser's apparent willingness to settle Yemen problem. Both contend extremism and fanaticism suffered a serious setback. Even the Algerian Foreign Minister had been surprisingly moderate. Only remaining extremists are the Syrians who were not present, but no one seemed to be concerned about this. Saqqaf believes new political climate has been established in the Arab world on

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-5-

which the U.S. ought to capitalize to attempt to move forward toward an equitable settlement. He argues the U.S. can influence Israel if it wishes to do so and that this is time for the U.S. to take a more active role. If the U.S. presses for prior Israeli withdrawal, he believes satisfactory solutions can be found to all remaining problems. I told him I did not think this was saleable to Israel, but would of course report his view.

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July 12, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President concurs with your opinion and has requested that you inform the Government of Jordan that the appointment of Mr. Abdul-Hamid Sharaf as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Government of Jordan would be agreeable to the Government of the United States.

W. W. Rostow

- cc: Protocol
- CF w/cy of Incoming
- ✓Country File w/Incoming

*Dispatched 7/12/67 Outside Dept.*

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

2660

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July 11, 1967

SECRET ENCLOSURE

Dear Mr. President:

The Department has received a communication from the American Embassy in Amman which states that the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has inquired whether this Government agrees to the appointment of Mr. Abdul-Hamid Sharaf as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Jordan to the United States. A biographic sketch of Mr. Sharaf is enclosed.

I believe that the appointment of Mr. Sharaf as Ambassador of Jordan at Washington would be satisfactory. If you concur in this opinion, I shall be pleased to inform the Jordanian Government of your approval.

Faithfully yours,

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Biographic Sketch (Secret).

The President,

The White House.

RECEIVED  
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1957 JUL -12 AM 10 01

Dear Sir:

Enclosed for you are (three)

copies:

Dear Sir



Very truly yours,

Very truly yours,

Enclosed for you are (three) copies of the report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the State of Israel, dated 1957.

Very truly yours,

Enclosed for you are (three) copies of the report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the State of Israel, dated 1957.

Very truly yours,

Very truly yours,

1957 JUL 12



WASHINGTON  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

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BIOGRAPHY

ABDUL-HAMID SHARAF

HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

Abdul-Hamid Sharaf, a bright young man and distant cousin of the King, recently resigned as Minister of Information, a post he had held through several cabinet changes since August 1965. An intelligent and sophisticated man, he has had experience in both the foreign affairs and information fields. Although pro-West, he has not hesitated to criticize Western policy on occasion. He has no personal political following, relying chiefly on his ability and his relationship to the throne for his support. Sharaf's chief drawback is an intellectual arrogance and condescending approach toward others.

Mr. Sharaf was born in Baghdad, Iraq in 1939 to an Iraqi branch of the Hashemite family. His father served briefly as Regent of Iraq before the British occupation in 1941, then fled to Jordan via Iran, where he died in 1955. Mr. Sharaf attended the American University of Beirut, earning a BA degree in philosophy in 1959 and an MA degree in international relations in 1962. He entered the Jordanian Foreign Ministry in February 1962 and was appointed chief of the Arab and Palestine Affairs Section of the ministry's Department of Political Affairs. In January 1963 he was named to a committee investigating the effectiveness of the Hashemite Broadcasting Service, and in April of that year he was named Director General of the HBS. His committee's report had been critical of the then Minister of Information, and when the man was later reappointed Minister of Information again, Sharaf attempted to resign from HBS. His resignation was not accepted, but after a long feud between Sharaf and the Minister, Sharaf was transferred to the Prime Ministry in April 1964. A few weeks after his transfer, he was

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

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By RG/DL, NARA, Date 8-17-01

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named chief of the Political Affairs Department of the Foreign Ministry. In 1965, he became assistant chief of the Royal Cabinet, a post he continued to hold until his cabinet appointment in August 1965.

Mr. Sharaf has traveled to a number of Arab countries, and after becoming a cabinet minister, visited the United Kingdom and Denmark. He came to the United States in 1960 for several weeks to do research on his Master's degree. A Sunni Muslim, he is among those claiming descent from the Prophet and entitled to the appellation of Sharif. In July 1965, he was married to a Lebanese Druze named Layla Najjar, an American University of Beirut graduate who worked for a time with the Lebanese television industry. They have a son, Nasir, born in September 1966. Mr. Sharaf speaks English, in addition to his native Arabic. He is a Mason.

Mr. Sharaf enjoys art, literature, painting, swimming and horseback riding.

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MemC ons

(Drafting Office and Officer)

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Approved in S/S  
3/15/68

## Memorandum of Conversation

12

232

E X D I S

DATE: February 23, 1968

SUBJECT: Purported Message from King Hussein

~~1. Postow~~  
2. Saunders

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Ghassan I. Shaker, Saudi-Lebanese businessman and son-in-law of former Lebanese Prime Minister Husayn Uwayni

Mr. John McCrane, associate of Robert Anderson, former Secretary of the Treasury

Mr. Lucius D. Battle, NEA, Assistant Secretary

Mr. Rodger P. Davies, NEA, Deputy Assistant Secretary

COPIES TO: Mr. Robert P. Paganelli, NEA/ARN

S/S	CIA	USUN	Amembassy BEIRUT
S/P	WH		Amembassy AMMAN
G	NEA-3		Amembassy TEL AVIV
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Ambassador Battle received Mr. Shaker at the request of Mr. Robert Anderson who said that Mr. Shaker was bearing an important message from King Hussein.

Mr. Shaker's message was in essence a request for U.S. political support for King Hussein. According to Shaker the King was now ready to step out on his own for a peace settlement in the Middle East. The King however, Shaker said, considered that his position was too weak vis-a-vis the other Arabs to make such a move unless both he and the other Arabs knew that the U.S. stood foursquare behind the King.

Mr. Shaker said that he had been made aware of the King's desire to seek unilaterally a peace settlement about a month ago. Shaker said that his source of information was a Jordan Army Brigadier who, though a distant cousin of the King, was one of the King's closest confidants; he did not name the Brigadier. Shaker said that he himself was a close personal friend of King Hussein -- they had been schoolmates. He said that he had not personally seen the King since late June 1967.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

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By is NARA, Date 6-9-03~~SECRET~~FORM DS-1254  
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Shaker stated, in response to a query from Ambassador Battle, that the Jordanian people were eager for peace and would support the King's initiative. (He distinguished, however, between Jordanians and Palestinians in Jordan.) Shaker also alleged that UAR President Nasser had given the King his go ahead though he (Nasser) refused to put this in writing. Shaker said that the King could expect opposition to his initiative from the Syrians and other extremists among the Arabs but that knowledge of full U.S. support for the King would inhibit such opponents from taking action against Hussein.

Shaker made a number of background comments on the current situation in the Middle East which he described as stagnant and depressed in the absence of any apparent movement toward settlement of the crisis. He urged the U.S. to act to protect its interests in the Middle East in the interim period during which<sup>a</sup> settlement was being worked out, and claimed that the U.S. position in the area was being eroded by French and Soviet activities because of what he regarded as U.S. inaction. Shaker said that in his business contacts in the area he noted increasing indications among the smaller Arab countries that they would soon refuse to deal with U.S. corporations.

Shaker mentioned the recent trip of Eugene Black to the Middle East. He said that the net result of the Black visit to the area was negative since it was widely believed that Black had a carte blanche from President Johnson to arrange a peace settlement. According to Shaker, when such a settlement did not occur, the result was increased disillusionment with the U.S.

Ambassador Battle responded to Mr. Shaker's comments with a general review of the U.S. position on the Middle East crisis. He assured Mr. Shaker that the U.S. was not inactive and was using its full influence to promote a general peace settlement. Ambassador Battle stated that he was generally disappointed with both the Israeli position of insisting on direct negotiations and with the Arab position of no negotiations, although there were recent indications that the Israeli position may be

becoming more flexible and he was cautiously optimistic. Specifically regarding U.S. support for Jordan, Ambassador Battle noted the recent decision to resume arms shipments and asserted that the King had been informed that he could rely on U.S. political support. Ambassador Battle continued, however, that the U.S. had hesitated to advise King Hussein to attempt to make a unilateral peace settlement since this was properly his own decision. Ambassador Battle told Mr. Shaker that the U.S. had no wand that it could wave over Israel to compel it to do U.S. bidding. He stated that we wished to maintain the good relations that we enjoyed with some Arab countries and desired to strengthen and improve our relations with those with whom our relations were poor. He deplored the apparent general attitude held by many of the Arabs that the U.S. was either barring a just settlement in the Middle East or doing nothing to improve the prospects for such a settlement. He said that he realized that the generally negative impression in Arab minds toward U.S. efforts to settle the Middle East crisis was hurting our position in the area, and regretted our apparent inability to correct that impression. Regarding Eugene Black's visit to the Middle East, Ambassador Battle said that it was unfortunate that the Black trip had apparently had a negative result. He said that Black and other prominent private Americans such as Robert Anderson had no official mandate in their periodic visits to the Middle East though the U.S. Government encouraged such trips as a means of keeping lines of communication open. In this regard he asked Mr. Shaker for suggestions that might be helpful to the U.S. Shaker then repeated that the U.S. should be working in this interim period to counter French and Soviet moves against U.S. interests in the Middle East, but he did not elaborate further.

In conclusion, Ambassador Battle thanked Mr. Shaker for his views and said that they would be carefully considered. He said that the U.S. Government welcomed such initiatives as Mr. Shaker's in calling on him as it was extremely useful in giving more perspective to those in the U.S. Government considering the Middle East situation.

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THE WHITE HO.  
WASHINGTON

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233

To Hal Saunders  
Should Walt see?

→ Room

BKS:

Don't think so. He's  
familiar enough with the  
package from our memos to  
the President. Hal

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623



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

233a

February 10, 1968

I-20792/68

*Sawyer*

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

February 10, 1968, 4:15 pm, Mr. Schwartz with General Khammash.

I told General Khammash there seemed to be no such articles (155mm guns) in the U.S. but that I thought we might be able to find some elsewhere. We would do it if possible.

General Khammash thanked me and Mr. McNamara.

*Harry H. Schwartz*  
Harry H. Schwartz  
Deputy Assistant Secretary

cc: Mr. Walt Rostow



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Authority DOD Dir. 5200.10  
By yw, NARA, Date 11-18-91

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
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UNLESS SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCTED

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ROSTOW'S OFFICE

CC: MR. ROSE BOSTON 1968 FEB 14 AM 11 30

NAVY Doc 11-18  
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*[Handwritten signature]*  
JAMES H. ...

*[Faint, mostly illegible text, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the page]*

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

1-3832768

FEBRUARY 10 1968



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

February 10, 1968

I-20791/68

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Secretary of Defense Meeting with General Khammash

Participants:

U.S. Side

Honorable Robert S. McNamara  
Secretary of Defense  
Honorable Paul C. Warnke  
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)  
Mr. Harry H. Schwartz  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of  
Defense (ISA)

Jordanian Side

Major General Amer Khammash  
Chief of Staff, Jordan  
Armed Forces

Time: Saturday, February 10, 1968, 12:30 pm

Place: Office of the Secretary of Defense

Mr. McNamara expressed his admiration for the King which General Khammash said was reciprocated; Mr. McNamara also apologized for the length of time that the General had been kept waiting in the United States and General Khammash indicated that he understood why. Mr. McNamara invited the General to expose his views on the situation in Jordan.

General Khammash made reference to the enormous pressure under which the King is now living, including the division of the country and almost daily clashes on the border, and he alluded to the restlessness of the Jordanian army. He hoped that what would be offered him would be something the King could approve. But he was worried about the results if the King did not because he considers that this mission is the last chance the King will give him in the United States. He asked for help and made the point that the maximum good political effect will flow from the rapid arrival in his country of arms from the U.S. He asked in this connection concerning air shipment of some items and the possible negotiability of the package.

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Authority DDP Dir. 5200.10  
By juw, NARA, Date 11-8-91

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The Secretary of Defense made clear that General Khammash's original list of items was for us a very tough one and would cause us most serious problems with the Congress. He pointed out also that Jordan and the U.S. have the same basic objective of stable relations between countries of the area and that this was an objective which would not primarily be met by arms. We are limited in what we can do with respect to arms particularly because of the need to justify supplying arms to both Jordan and Israel just after they have had a war. Also there is the problem of diversion of resources from economic development which the purchase of arms causes.

Mr. McNamara then briefly outlined what we could do:

1. 12 F-104s by June (possibly air-shipped, if this seems necessary) and 6 more by December.
2. We propose an annual review of the problem. In the course of such an annual review we could consider the possibility some time in the future of 18 more such aircraft.
3. We would ship the suspended MAP items, and
4. The remaining ground equipment from past sales (both of these could be shipped at an early date by sea).
5. Replace ground equipment losses, except for tanks and heavy artillery.

Mr. McNamara then pointed out that we had gotten some very recent information from the British on the availability of Centurions, specifically, that if 200 were really what Jordan needed, they could be bought in Britain, that the spares and ammunition were available - and would be available well into the 70s - that they could be converted to 105mm guns in Jordan. General Khammash's lack of interest in tanks from the British, however described, was clear. Mr. McNamara then responded that we could only make available 88 M48A1s (and this number was inserted in the draft Memorandum of Understanding which General Khammash took with him).

General Khammash expressed a strong need for 7 to 10 155mm guns which he had lost during the war and Mr. McNamara promised to see what we could do for him in this respect.

6. Mr. McNamara went on to point out that the payments would be spread over a period of 2-1/2 years and that the cost of the package described would be between \$80 and \$85 million, including the \$10 million

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Jordan has on deposit here. He said that we would need \$22 million, in addition to the \$10 million on deposit, before July 1, 1968.


When General Khammash asked what negotiating latitude there was on the planes, Mr. McNamara replied that in our opinion the F-104 is a good plane for Jordan and that others are either not available, or not as applicable to Jordan's requirements as the F-104.

He said, in response to the General's question, that a Presidential Determination under the Conte-Long Amendment would not change the type of plane which we are considering. Mr. McNamara did say, however, that, once the 18 F-104s are delivered, we could consider some time in the future another 18. As to the negotiating flexibility of other items Mr. McNamara said that, as to tanks, this depended on the acceptability of British tanks. On other items, there was some but not much because of financial considerations.


Finally, the Secretary of Defense suggested that General Khammash take the draft Memorandum of Understanding with him, ask us any questions he had, and then present it to the King. He pointed out that it could be signed in Jordan by our Ambassador if General Khammash wished to avoid making another trip to the United States.

General Khammash thanked the Secretary for all the work that had been done in his behalf and said he would now see what he could do with the King.

Approved by:

  
Paul C. Warnke  
Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA

Prepared by:

  
Harry H. Schwartz  
DASD (ISA) NESA

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
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233-c

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I. The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, through their representatives, have recently conferred concerning Jordan's need to meet in a reasonable manner its legitimate defensive requirements.

II. It is further understood that any assistance in the form of defense articles and services rendered by the United States, except for U.S. grant aid, will be on a reimbursable basis.

III. The Government of Jordan reaffirms its policy of procuring from the United States and other Free World sources all of its requirements for defense articles and defense services for its armed forces. Should Jordan find itself unable to maintain this policy, the commitments undertaken by the U.S. in this Memorandum and the Memoranda of Understanding of 18 March 1965 and 29 March 1966 will cease to be valid.

IV. Accordingly, in view of the foregoing, subject to continuing legislative authority and the availability of funds, and pursuant to other stipulations set forth below, the United States agrees to:

- a. Resume shipment of the undelivered FY 66-67 MAP grant aid.
- b. Resume shipment of the previously suspended ground force equipment sold to Jordan under the Memorandum of Understanding of 18 March 1965 and covered by sales cases (DD Form 1513 - Offer and Acceptance) UBM, UBN, UDB, UBQ, UBR, UBS, UBT, UBU, and UBW.
- c. Replace, with some exceptions, ground force equipment lost by Jordan in June by selling on a reimbursable basis the following ground

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 02-120  
By us, NARA, Date 4-9-03

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force equipment: (88) M48A1 tanks, (23) 105mm howitzers, (43) armored personnel carriers, (4) 40mm SP AAA guns, (138) 106mm jeep mounted recoilless rifles, (40) M35A2 2-1/2 ton trucks, and, as may be mutually agreed, vehicles, small arms, ammunition, spare parts, communications and engineer equipment. Subject to the conditions set forth below these articles and services are proposed for delivery during U.S. Fiscal Years 1968, 1969, and 1970. Items offered for sale to Jordan shall be subject to U.S. standard supply procedures involving quantities, availability, delivery schedule, price and other details and shall be the basis of further discussions between the two governments and will be set forth in the necessary sales agreements between these two governments..

d. Deliver 18 F104 aircraft and related equipment to Jordan at a cost of approximately \$30.5 million. Subject to Jordan's ability to operate and maintain these aircraft, deliveries could begin by June 1968.

e. Sell equipment required for a ground control radar system for the F104 and Hawker Hunter aircraft at a cost of approximately \$2.8 million.

(As in the case of the ground force equipment, the quantities, availability, delivery schedule, prices, etc., will be the subject of further discussions between the two governments.)

f. Agree to consider at some point in the future, in light of circumstances then pertaining, up to 18 additional aircraft of a type to be mutually agreed upon.

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V. In addition, as a continuing matter, the implementation of this understanding is conditioned upon:

a. Jordan's agreement to undertake Annual Reviews with the United States. These Annual Reviews, among other matters, will take into account (1) Jordan's military requirements resulting from progress towards an Arab-Israeli settlement; (2) Jordan's economic situation and the extent of its financial support from other Arab countries; (3) progress towards arms limitations in the area, and (4) the continued ability of Jordan's Armed Forces to absorb and maintain military equipment.

b. Jordan's assurance of its intent to maintain its indigenously financed military budget during CY 1968 at no more than \$56.5 million and its military manpower level at not more than 53,000. This military budget as well as Jordan's military manpower level will be the subject of an Annual Review by the two governments, and Jordan agrees that the level of its military expenditures during the term of this Memorandum of Understanding will be mutually agreed by the two governments. Consideration will also be given to reducing the manpower level of Jordan Armed Forces.

c. The Government of Jordan agrees to full secrecy on all matters concerning this offer by the United States. In the event the United States decides to make the matter public, Jordan agrees to cooperate fully with the United States with respect to the timing, method and extent of the public disclosure.

d. Jordan's assurance that it will not purchase major items of military equipment, either ground or air, from other than U.S. sources without U.S. approval.

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VI. Since the defense articles and services offered under this Memorandum, except those set forth in IV a. above, are to be furnished on a reimbursable basis, only paragraphs 2 through 5 of the classified agreement effected by an exchange of notes signed on 27 June and 29 June, 1957, as amended, shall be applicable to them. These paragraphs are set forth as Annex A hereof. In this connection, Jordan confirms that there is no inconsistency between its commitments under paragraphs 2 through 5 of the classified agreement and its commitments under other agreements to which Jordan may be a party.

\_\_\_\_\_  
For the United States of America

\_\_\_\_\_  
For the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

APPLICABLE CONDITIONS  
(Taken from Classified US-Jordan Military Assistance Agreement which Entered into Force on June 29, 1957)

2. The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan requires and shall use the military equipment, materials and services furnished by the Government of the United States solely to maintain its internal security and legitimate self-defense. The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan shall not undertake any act of aggression against any other state.

3. The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan shall not relinquish or transfer title to, or possession of, the military equipment, materials and services furnished by the Government of the United States without the prior consent of the Government of the United States.

4. The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan shall maintain the security of the military equipment, materials and services furnished by the Government of the United States.

5. The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan shall provide information concerning the utilization of the military equipment, materials and services furnished by the Government of the United States.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 02-120  
By iso, NARA, Date 4-9-03

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-154  
By ia, NARA, Date 7-31-03~~SECRET~~January 29, 1968  
S  
234

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: General Amer Khammash  
Ambassador Abdul-Hamid Sharaf  
Harold H. Saunders

To help General Khammash while away time while he waits for our answer to his military equipment requests, I invited him and Ambassador Sharaf to lunch today. We covered the following ground:

1. Soviet-Jordanian relations. Khammash said the Soviets are waiting to move into Jordan "in a big way." The military delegation they had planned to send would have included several two-star Generals. He went on to describe in familiar terms the shakiness of the Jordanian political structure and the importance of our military assistance in stabilizing it. He pointed out that if the King falls, some opportunist group will take over; he implied that leftists would be in the best position to do so.

When I asked how he and others of like mind felt about the possibility of accepting Soviet arms, he described his reaction as being similar to that of a man whose scruples are unquestionable but who has become so hungry that he has no choice but to steal a loaf of bread. He knows it is his downfall but feels he has no choice. King Hussein is fully aware that the Soviet presence in Jordan would seriously jeopardize his regime, but the alternative is being undercut by his own military.

2. Impression of Jarring mission. Apart from taking several cracks at Israeli intransigence, Khammash came quickly around to the familiar line that the US really ought to be doing Jarring's job. He could hardly be expected to overcome the obstacles in his way. The US would have to step in eventually.

3. US Role in the Arab World. He felt that some gesture is required on Israeli withdrawal or on Jerusalem even to begin to help the US recoup its losses. Both General Khammash and the Ambassador said they felt restoration with relations with Cairo would help our position a great deal. When they cited the British example, I suggested that perhaps the British had mainly improved their position by giving up their power base in the Middle East, but the Jordanians held to the idea that we too could improve our position by getting back into business with Nasser.

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4. Nasser. I asked General Khammash how he read Nasser's intentions. I said that our reports seem to reveal two or three Nassers, and General Khammash replied, "At least two." He went on to describe Nasser as "schizophrenic" (I assume he was using the term generally rather than clinically). He described how, over the past fifteen years, he has seen Nasser many times speaking to many Jordanian leaders and has watched his position shift back and forth. Nevertheless, he felt that Nasser does not intend to rely on a military solution to the present impasse. He reported that, while he (Khammash) was pushing to revive the UAC to get more money for Jordan, the Egyptians now showed very little interest in it. He did say, however, that Egyptian military training is being carried on day and night. More Soviet specialists have been brought in, largely because the leadership of Egyptian military were lost to the Israelis in the war, and Soviet specialists are needed simply as manpower to help the training. The General assured me that the Soviets are not in operational control of any Egyptian units.

5. Terrorism. When I asked who could stop the Syrians, he said he felt they could be isolated once the Israelis withdrew from occupied territory. Until then, it will be very difficult for Arab governments in general to oppose terrorists who justify their acts as efforts to liberate conquered territory. He felt general support for guerrilla-type activities is building very rapidly in the Arab world.

6. US Policy and Aspirations. I described the difference between US and Soviet methods in terms of the Soviet desire to make quick political gains as contrasted to our desire to build something solid over a longer period of time even at the expense of short-term gain. These differences of approach apply whether we are talking about economic aid projects or a formula for peace in the Mid-East. I admitted that the situation sometimes looks bleak for us and bright for the Soviets. However, we had to operate on faith that Governments like Jordan's who have genuinely tried to build solid economic foundations would come out ahead in the end, while the Socialist regimes which were being built on slogans would stagnate. We know we have to do our share, but we don't expect to perform miracles overnight. Khammash applauded this approach and felt that it was an argument for helping Jordan to become a showplace for our approach to the problems of the area!

Harold H. Saunders

cc: Mr. W. W. Rostow  
Mr. Walsh  
Mr. Houghton

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

235

5

By WHITE HOUSE  
9/2/67.

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: August 30, 1967

SUBJECT: Presentation of Credentials by Jordanian Ambassador, Abdul-Hamid Sharaf

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
S/CPR - Ambassador Symington  
Mr. Saunders, White House Staff  
NEA - Rodger P. Davies *RPD*  
H.E. Abdul-Hamid Sharaf, Ambassador of Jordan

COPIES TO:

S/S                    CIA                    AmEmbassy AMMAN  
S/P                    NEA-3  
G                      S/CPR  
INR/OD  
White House

The President expressed sympathy for the difficulties through which Jordan was passing.

Ambassador Sharaf noted that Jordan had lost half its population, its most fertile territory, and Jerusalem. The Jordanian Government had been consistently friendly to the United States, a friendship that created difficulties for its relations with some other Arab states. Now it needed the friendship and support of the United States.

The President said we are disappointed with both Israel and Jordan. We had sought to restrain Israel but had failed, and there had been no reason for Jordan to enter the war. When we had agreed to supply military equipment to Jordan, it had been on the understanding that it would not be used against Israel. This agreement had not been kept. The tragedy of the situation is that Jordan did not have to enter the fray.

Ambassador Sharaf agreed that it was tragic that Jordan had been involved and present difficulties stemmed from this act. It was difficult, however, for non-Arab friends to understand the deep emotional factor which was involved. When other Arabs were in a war with Israel, Jordan could not stand aside. In any event, Jordan hoped a formula could be devised to bring peace and a return of its territory.

The President said he and government officials were ready to discuss problems with the Ambassador whenever he wished.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/S 15218

3387

235a

CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE

September 1, 1967

TO: Mr. Walt W. Rostow  
The White House

HS  
1 - Rostow  
2 - RT.

FROM: Mr. John P. Walsh  
Acting Executive Secretary

Enclosed for White House approval prior to distribution is the memorandum of conversation between the President and H.E. Abdul-Hamid Sharaf, Ambassador of Jordan.

The President's remarks are sidelined in blue.

Enclosure:

As stated.

OK  
HHS

CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE

Clrd w/ Kathy Elder s/s  
11:40 9/2 RD

3087

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

9/1 1967

Washington, D. C. 20520

CONFIDENTIAL - ENCLOSURE

September 1, 1967

*1/1  
1/1  
1/1*

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*OK  
HKS*

Enclosure:

As stated.

CONFIDENTIAL - ENCLOSURE

11:40 AM  
RECEIVED  
ROSTOW'S OFFICE  
*Clark w/ [unclear]*

3387

NEA:RP Davies:bw 8/31/67  
(Drafting Office and Officer)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

15218

235-6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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PARTICIPANTS: The President  
S/CPR - Ambassador Symington  
Mr. Saunders, White House Staff  
NEA - Rodger P. Davies *RPD*  
H.E. Abdul-Hamid Sharaf, Ambassador of Jordan

COPIES TO:  
S/S CIA AmEmbassy AMMAN  
S/P NEA-3  
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White House

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FORM DS-1254  
3-61

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals; By *RB/SL* NARA, Date *8-14-01*  
not automatically declassified.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S-98001