

**PROCESSING NOTE**

The Archives staff numbered the documents contained in the National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Volume V as one file. However, the documents filed in the Cables portion of Volume V are contained in Box 147, and the documents contained in the Memos of Volume V are contained in Box 148. The withdrawal sheets for the documents in the Cables portion are in Box 147, and the withdrawal sheets for the Memos portion are in Box 148.

REGINA GREENWELL  
Senior Archivist

September 25, 2001

Volume 5, cables: documents 1-281  
Volume 5, memos: documents 282-347

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
001	<del>cable</del>	Amman 237 <del>Open 6/17/03 NJT/RAC 02-233</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>5</del>	<del>1/14/69</del>	<del>A</del>
004	<del>cable</del>	Amman 246 <del>Sanitized 12-5-03 NJ 02-250 same sanitization 12/12/18 per NJ 15-41</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>1/15/69</del>	<del>A</del>
008	<del>cable</del>	Amman 277 <del>Open 6/17/03 NJT/RAC 02-233</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>1/16/69</del>	<del>A</del>
014	<del>cable</del>	Amman 49 <del>Sanitized 12-5-03 NJ 02-250 same sanitization 12/12/24, NY 15-41, NJ 78812</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>1/4/69</del>	<del>A</del>
016	<del>cable</del>	Amman 65 <del>Sanitized 12-5-03 NJ 02-250 same sanitization 12/12/18 per NJ 15-41</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>1/6/69</del>	<del>A</del>
025	<del>report</del>	Mideast Scenario <del>Open 3-2-04 NJ 03-201</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>11/25/68</del>	<del>A</del>
026	<del>cable</del>	Amman 75 <del>Open 2-27-04 NJ 03-202</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>1/7/68</del>	<del>A</del>
032-1	<del>cable</del>	Tehran 6916 <del>Sanitized 9/26/02 per NJT 001-147-2-8 same sanitization 7/21/15 per NJT/RAC 15-36</del>	<del>C</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>10/12/68</del>	<del>A</del>
033	<del>cable</del>	Amman 6999 - Sanitized per RAC <del>Sanitized 12-5-03 09/19/2000 same sanitization 7/21/15 per NJT/RAC 15-36</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>10/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
040	<del>cable</del>	Amman 6447 <del>Open 12/4/02 per NJ 502-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>9/3/68</del>	<del>A</del>
041	<del>cable</del>	Amman 6417 <del>Open 12/4/02 per NJ 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>8/31/68</del>	<del>A</del>
043	<del>cable</del>	Amman 6250 <del>Sanitized 9/26/02 per NJT 001-147-2-10 same sanitization 7/21/15 per NJT/RAC 15-36</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>8/20/68</del>	<del>A</del>

Collection Title National Security File, Country File

Folder Title Jordan, Vol. V, Cables

Box Number 147

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
044	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 6219 open 12/4/02 per NLS 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>8/19/68</del>	<del>A</del>
045	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 6209 open 12/4/02 per NLS 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>8/18/68</del>	<del>A</del>
046	cable	Amman 6193 <i>sanitized 12-5-05 NLS 02-250 same sanitization 7/21/15 per NLS/RAC 15-30</i>	S	2	8/17/68	A
048	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 6066 open 12/4/02 per NLS 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>6</del>	<del>8/8/68</del>	<del>A</del>
049	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 6021</del> <i>open 5/10/10 per NLS 15-42</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>8/4/68</del>	<del>A</del>
050	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 6013 open 12/4/02 per NLS 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>8/3/68</del>	<del>A</del>
055	cable	Amman 5773 <i>sanitized 12-5-03 NLS 02-250 same sanitization 7/21/15 per NLS/RAC 15-30</i>	S	2	7/17/68	A
056	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 5765 open 12/4/02 per NLS 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>7/17/68</del>	<del>A</del>
057	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 5739 open 12/4/02 per NLS 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>5</del>	<del>7/16/68</del>	<del>A</del>
064	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 5147 open 12/4/02 per NLS 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>6/3/68</del>	<del>A</del>
077	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 4624 open 12/4/02 per NLS 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>4</del>	<del>5/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>
079	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 4607 open 12/4/02 per NLS 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>5</del>	<del>5/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>

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**Folder Title** Jordan, Vol. V, Cables

**Box Number** 147

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
<del>082</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 4572</del> open 5/10/10 per NLJ 15-42	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>4/30/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<i>Sanitized 12-5-03 NLJ/RA 02-234</i>						
<del>083</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 4570</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>4/29/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<i>open 12-5-03 NLJ/RA 02-234</i>						
<del>085</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 4526</del> open 12-5-02 NLJ 02-207	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>4/25/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>095</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 4309</del> open 3-13-06 NLJ 05-95	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>4/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>100</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 4290</del> open 12/4/02 per NLJ 02-207	<del>S</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>4/9/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>102</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 4268</del> open 3-13-06 NLJ 05-95	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>4/9/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>107</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 4238</del> open 12/4/02 per NLJ 02-207	<del>S</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>4/5/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>108</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 4236</del> open 12/4/02 per NLJ 02-207	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>4/5/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>114</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 4200</del> same sanitization 12/12/18 per NLJ 15-41	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>4/4/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<i>Sanitized 12-5-03 NLJ 02-250</i>						
<del>116</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 4189</del> same sanitization 12/12/18 per NLJ 15-41	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>4/4/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<i>Sanitized 12-5-03 NLJ 02-250</i>						
<del>120</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 4151</del> same sanitization 5/10/10 per NLJ 15-42	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>4/2/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<i>Sanitized 12-5-03 NLJ/RA 02-234</i>						
<del>122</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 4112</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>3/30/68</del>	<del>A</del>

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
<i>open 12-5-03 NW/RAZ 02-234</i> <del>123</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 4411</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>3/30/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>128</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 4057</del> <i>open 12/4/02 per NIS 02-207</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>3/27/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>130</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 4030</del> <i>open 12/4/02 per NIS 02-207</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>4</del>	<del>3/26/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<i>open 12-5-03 NW/RAZ 02-233</i> <del>133</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 4004</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>3/25/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>137</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 3911</del> <i>open 12/4/02 per NIS 02-207</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>3/20/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>138</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 3903</del> <i>open 12/4/02 per NIS 02-207</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>3/20/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>139</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 3894 - corrected copy</del> <i>open 12/4/02 per NIS 02-207</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>3/20/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>140</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 3894</del> <i>open 12/4/02 per NIS 02-207</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>3/20/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>142</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 3873</del> <i>open 12/4/02 per NIS 02-207</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>5</del>	<del>3/19/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>143</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 3873 - corrected copy, Section</del> <i>+ open 6-2-05</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>4</del>	<del>3/19/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>145</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 3864</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>3/18/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<i>open 12-5-03 NW/RAZ 02-233</i> <del>147</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 3844</del> <i>open 12/4/02 per NIS 02-207</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>3/16/68</del>	<del>A</del>

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
148	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 3839, Section 1- OPEN 12/14/02 PER NLJ 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>6</del>	<del>3/15/68</del>	<del>A</del>
153	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 3810 OPEN 12/14/02 PER NLJ 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>3/14/68</del>	<del>A</del>
154	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 3809</del> <i>Sanitized 12/14/02 PER NLJ 02-207</i> <i>12/12/18 PER NLJ 15-41</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>3/14/68</del>	<del>A</del>
157	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 3794 OPEN 12/14/02 PER NLJ 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>3/14/68</del>	<del>A</del>
159	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 3789 - corrected copy</del> <i>dup. #160</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>3/13/68</del>	<del>A</del>
160	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 3789</del> <i>dup. #159. this file</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>3/13/68</del>	<del>A</del>
164	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 3782</del> <i>open 125-03 NLJ 02-250</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>7</del>	<del>3/13/68</del>	<del>A</del>
166	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 3768 OPEN 12/14/02 PER NLJ 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>3/12/68</del>	<del>A</del>
167	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 3760</del> <i>Sanitized 4/18/06 NLJ 05-94</i> <i>open 5/10/14 per NLJ 15-42</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>3/12/68</del>	<del>A</del>
171	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 3685 OPEN 12/14/02 PER NLJ 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>3/5/68</del>	<del>A</del>
172	<del>airgram</del>	<del>A-229 to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem</del> <i>OPEN 12/14/02 PER NLJ 02-207</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>5</del>	<del>2/20/68</del>	<del>A</del>
174	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 3648</del> <i>open 9/26/02</i>	<del>S</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>3/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
181	cable	State 249673 to Amman <i>open 6/17/03 NLJ/RAC 02-233</i>	S	3	10/3/68	A
191	cable	State 200965 to Amman <i>sanitized 12-5-03 NW 02-250 same sanitization 7/21/15 per NLJ/RAC 15-326</i>	S	2	7/12/68	A
202	cable	State 144870 to Amman <i>open 12/4/02 per NLJ 02-207</i>	S	4	4/11/68	A
213	cable	State 136818 to Amman <i>open 6/17/03 NLJ/RAC 02-233</i>	S	2	3/27/68	A
224	cable	State 125943 to Amman <i>open 9/26/02</i>	S	2	3/7/68	A
225	cable	State 124565 to Amman <i>open 6/17/03 NLJ/RAC 02-233</i>	S	2	3/5/68	A
228	cable	Amman 7258 <i>open 12/4/02 per NLJ 02-207</i>	S	1	10/30/68	A
229	cable	Amman 7226 <i>open 12/4/02 per NLJ 02-207</i>	S	1	10/28/68	A
230	cable	Amman 6450 <i>open 12/4/02 per NLJ 02-207</i>	S	1	9/4/68	A
232	cable	Amman 6424 <i>open 3/13/06 NW 05-95</i>	S	1	8/31/68	A
233	cable	Amman 732 <i>sanitized 12-5-03 NW 02-250 same sanitization 7/21/15 per NLJ/RAC 15-326</i>	S	2	8/16/67	A
235	cable	Amman 5985 <i>open 12/4/02 per NLJ 02-207</i>	S	2	8/2/68	A

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236	cable	Amman 4640 <del>Sanitized 9/26/02</del> <del>per NLS 001-147-2-83</del> same sanitization 7/21/15 per NLJ/RAC 15-36	S	1	5/2/68	A
<del>237</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 4634</del> <del>open 12/4/02 per NLS 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>5/2/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>239</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 4267</del> <del>open 12/4/02 per NLS 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>4/8/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>240</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 4119</del> <del>open 12/4/02 per NLS 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>3/30/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>241</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 3666</del> <del>open 12/4/02 per NLS 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>3/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>242</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>State 251351 to Amman</del> <del>open 12/4/02 per NLS 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>10/7/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>243</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>State 223184 to Tel Aviv</del> <del>open 12/4/02 per NLS 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>8/17/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>247</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>State 156687 to Amman</del> <del>same sanitization per NLS 02-207 12/4/02</del> same sanitization 12/12/18 per NLJ 15-41	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>5/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>249</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 6242</del> sanitized 12-5-03 NLS 02-250 same sanitization 7/21/15 per NLS/RAC 15-36	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>8/19/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>252</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 5449 corrected copy</del> <del>open 12/24/02 per NLS 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>6/22/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>253</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 4855</del> <del>open 12/4/02 per NLS 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>5/15/68</del>	<del>A</del>
256	cable	Amman 4321 - Sanitized by RAC, 9/11/2000 <del>same sanitization 7/21/15 per NLJ/RAC 15-36</del> More info released 12-5-03 NLS 02-248	S	2	4/11/68	A

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
<del>257a</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 4266 open 12/4/02 per NLS 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>4/8/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>258</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 4266 (dup., #257A) open 12/4/02 per NLS 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>4/8/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>259</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 4098</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>3/29/68</del>	<del>A</del>
		OPEN 10.28.04 NW/RAC 02.235				
262	cable	Amman 3977 sanitized 12.5.03 NW/RAC 02.230 same sanitization 7/21/15 per NLS/RAC 15-36	S	1	3/23/68	A
<del>265</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 4058 open 12/4/02 per NLS 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>3/27/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>267</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 3912 open 12/4/02 per NLS 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>3/20/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>274</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 3758 open 12/4/02 per NLS 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>3/11/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>275</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 3749 open 12/4/02 per NLS 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>3/9/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>276</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>Amman 3667</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>3/2/68</del>	<del>A</del>
		open 12.5.03 NW/RAC 02.234				
<del>277</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>State 207551 to Amman open 12/4/02 per NLS 02-207</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>7/23/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>281</del>	<del>cable</del>	<del>State 127184 to Amman</del>	<del>S</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>3/8/68</del>	<del>A</del>
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DEPT PASS CINCSTRIKE, JIDDA, RAWALPINDI, DHAHRAN

REF: STATE 5129

SUBJ: DELIVERY OF F-104 AIRCRAFT TO JORDAN

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC02-233  
By *id*, NARA, Date 6-6-03

COUNTRY TEAM MESSAGE

SUMMARY: THE PROBLEMS FORESEEN BY THE DEPT WITH THE IMMINENT ARRIVAL OF F-104 AIRCRAFT IN JORDAN ARE LIKELY TO EMERGE LATER IN THE YEAR (E.G., AUGUST OR SEPTEMBER) RATHER THAN DURING THE MARCH-JUNE PERIOD OF THEIR ASSEMBLY AND TESTING. ARRANGING FOR ASSEMBLY AND TURNOVER IN ANOTHER COUNTRY THEREFORE WOULD NOT EASE THESE PROBLEMS MATERIALLY, BUT THIS ACTION MIGHT DAMAGE THE CREDIBILITY OF US COMMITMENTS AND THUS HARM HUSSEIN AS WELL AT A TIME WHEN THE REGIME MAY BE FACING INTERNAL PROBLEMS. WE MAY BE ABLE TO CIRCUMVENT THE PROBLEM BY ENCOURAGING SUPPLEMENTARY TRAINING IN PAKISTAN, FOR EXAMPLE, DURING THE PERIOD OF GREATEST RISK AND AFTER TURNOVER OF THE AIRCRAFT IN JORDAN HAS OCCURRED. IN ANY EVENT, WE BELIEVE THE JORDANIANS WILL BE CAUTIOUS IN EMPLOYMENT OF THE F-104S, AND THEN ONLY FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES, REALIZING THAT FURTHER TRAINING OF CREWS AND EXPERIENCE IN GROUND CONTROL PROCEDURES WILL BE ESSENTIAL. GENERAL KHAMMASH ALSO WANTS REASONABLY ADEQUATE ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSES AROUND THE AIRFIELDS BEFORE RISKING ISRAELI REPRISALS, AND THIS WILL REQUIRE TIME. WITHOUT DISCOUNTING THE IMPLICATIONS OF ISRAELI LOSSES IN ENGAGEMENTS WITH F-104S, OR THE TOTAL LOSS OF THE F-104 SQUADRON, WE BELIEVE ON BALANCE THAT THEY POSE FEWER RISKS THAN DELAYS AND HESITATIONS ON OUR PART. THE PHANTOM DECISION REINFORCES OUR THINKING, SINCE JORDANIANS ARE LIKELY TO REGARD US DELAYS OR ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS AS EVIDENCE OF ONE-SIDEDNESS. END SUMMARY

1. GEN KHAMMASH REPORTEDLY RETURNS FROM CAIRO TODAY, AND WE WILL TRY TO SEE HIM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT HIS REACTIONS TO OUR SOUNDINGS WILL SIGNIFICANTLY AMEND THE FOLLOWING REVIEW OF THE F-104 SITUATION AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US (REFTEL).

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-2-Page, AMMAN 237 Section 1 of 2, January 14, 1969 NODIS

2. FIRST, WE EXPECT THE JORDANIANS TO BE CAUTIOUS IN EMPLOYMENT OF F-104S. THE DEPT'S MESSAGE WAS IN SOME RESPECTS INACCURATE IN DESCRIBING THE PRESENT SITUATION AS ONE OF NO AIRCRAFT, NO ENGAGEMENTS. JORDAN HAS 11 HAWKDER HUNTERS, BUT HUSSEIN HAS SUCCESSFULLY RESISTED PRESSURE TO USE THEM. LACKING TOP COVER, OF COURSE, THEY COULD NOT BE USED EFFECTIVELY. WITH THE ADDITION OF 18 AIRCRAFT OF MUCH HIGHER PERFORMANCE, WE SUSPECT HE WOULD BE SOMEWHAT MORE WILLING TO COMMIT AT LEAST PART OF HIS AIR FORCE IN FUTURE ENGAGEMENTS, BUT NOT RPT NOT NECESSARILY TO COUNTER ISRAELI AIR ATTACKS ON FEDAYEEN CONCENTRATIONS. WE THINK IT WOULD BE A TOSS-UP WHETHER HE WOULD USE AIRCRAFT AGAINST A MAJOR RPT MAJOR ISRAELI AIR ATTACK ON IRAQI ARMY UNITS. AN ISRAELI AIR ATTACK ON A CIVILIAN TARGET SUCH AS IRBID OR A LONG DRAWN-OUT PUNISHING ATTACK ON JORDANIAN ARMY POSITIONS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY REQUIRE HIM TO MAKE A FACE-SAVING GESTURE WITH THE 104S; AND ULTIMATELY THE JORDANIANS WILL PROBABLY TRY TO SCARE OFF ISRAELI RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS, FORCING THE ISRAELIS AT A MINIMUM TO INCREASE THE NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT USED TO PROTECT THE RECONN AIRCRAFT, AN EXPENSIVE OPERATION.

3. ANOTHER CONTRIBUTION TO JORDANIAN CAUTION IS THE FACT THAT JORDANIAN PILOTS WILL REQUIRE SEVERAL ADDITIONAL MONTHS ADVANCED AND COMBAT FLIGHT TRAINING AFTER ACTUAL TURNOVER OF THE 104S. THE FIRST FOUR LINE COMBAT PILOTS WILL NOT BE OUT OF CONUS TRAINING UNTIL 15 MARCH, AND ONLY 12 PILOTS WILL BE ON STATION BY THE FIRST WEEK IN MAY. TRAINING OF AIR CONTROLLERS IN ATTACK GEOMETRY OF THE 104 WOULD ALSO BE NECESSARY. MOREOVER, KHAMMASH UNDOUBTEDLY WANTS TO ESTABLISH REASONABLY ADEQUATE ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSES AROUND HIS AIRFIELDS, AND COMPLETE THE AIRCRAFT REVETMENTS, BEFORE COMMITTING THE ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT TO ENGAGEMENTS WHICH PROBABLY WOULD IN TURN RESULT IN ISRAELI REPRISALS AGAINST THE BASES THEMSELVES. FOUR STEEL-REINFORCED CONCRETE REVETMENTS ARE NEARING COMPLETION AT H-5. THREE MORE ARE UNDER CONSTRUCTION, WITH 11 OTHERS SCHEDULED FOR COMPLETION IN APRIL. THE UK TIGERCAT MISSILES ARE NOT DUE TO ARRIVE UNTIL JUNE AT THE EARLIEST, AND TRAINING AND INSTALLATION PROBABLY WOULD CHEW UP SOME TIME BEFORE THEY COULD BE CONSIDERED OPERATIONAL. KHAMMASH MEANWHILE IS SEEKING ADDITIONAL ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS SUCH AS QUAD-MOUNTED 50 CALIBER MACHINE GUNS TO COUNTER LOW-ALTITUDE ATTACKS.

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4. PRESUMING ASSEMBLY, TESTING, AND TURNOVER IN JORDAN, THE FULL COMPLEMENT OF 18 104S WOULD NOT BE READY FOR OPERATIONAL USE UNTIL MID-JUNE AT THE EARLIEST. IN ALLOWING TIME FOR ADDITIONAL TRAINING, AND INSTALLATION OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSES, THE CRITICAL PERIOD DURING WHICH ISRAELI-JORDANIAN ENGAGEMENTS MIGHT OCCUR WOULD, WE BELIEVE, BE AUGUST OR SEPTEMBER, BARRING AN ALL-OUT ISRAELI OFFENSIVE BEFORE THEN. IN OTHER WORDS, THE POSSIBLE ASSEMBLY AND TESTING OF THE AIRCRAFT IN PAKISTAN OR SAUDI ARABIA FOR THE PERIOD OF MARCH -JUNE WOULD HAVE RELATIVELY LITTLE BEARING ON THE SITUATION. A MORE USEFUL TACTIC WOULD BE TO ENCOURAGE SUPPLEMENTARY FLIGHT TRAINING IN PAKISTAN, FOR EXAMPLE, AFTER THE 104S HAVE BEEN TURNED OVER TO THE JORDANIANS. THIS MIGHT SERVE TO PROLONG THE PERIOD DURING WHICH THEY WOULD NOT BE USED IN JORDAN.

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(NOT PASSED TO CINCSTRIKE, JIDDA, RAWALPINDI, DHAHRAN BY OC/T)

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5. GIVEN THE ABOVE ESTIMATE OF THE RISKS INVOLVED FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, WE BELIEVE IT FAR MORE IMPORTANT TO ATTEND TO THE THREAT TO THE CREDIBILITY OF THE US UNDERTAKINGS. IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS, THE KING, PRIMIN, CROWN PRINCE, AND OTHER JORDANIAN OFFICIALS HAVE VOLUNTEERED THEIR GRATIFICATION WITH THE HARD EVIDENCE THAT WE WERE INDEED COMING THROUGH WITH OUR MILITARY COMMITMENTS. PRIMIN TALHOUNI IN FACT TOLD ME LAST WEEK THAT HE WAS GOING TO USE THE FACT OF OUR ACCELERATED DELIVERY SCHEDULES IN HIS FUTURE DISCUSSIONS IN PARLIAMENT. ANY DELAYS OR SEEMING HESITATIONS ON OUR PART WILL RE-AROUSE JORDANIAN SUSPICIONS. HOWEVER ENERGETICALLY WE TRY TO COMBAT THE IMPRESSION, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR THE JORDANIANS TO AVOID CONCLUDING THAT THE US IS WILLING TO COUNTENANCE THE EMPLOYMENT OF US-MANUFACTURED AIRCRAFT AGAINST JORDANIANS, BUT NOT THE OTHER WAY. THE PHANTOM DECISION MAKES OUR PROBLEM IN THIS REGARD EVEN MORE DIFFICULT, SINCE THE JORDANIANS COULD ARGUE WITH CONVINCING JUSTIFICATION THAT THEIR F-1Ø4S WILL ONLY BE USED FOR DEFENSE.

6. WHILE AGREEIN THAT THE USE OF AIRCRAFT AND ROCKETS HAVE MORE IMPACT ON WORLD OPINION, IT IS NEVERTHELESS A FACT THAT US-MANUFACTURED AMMUNITION AND EQUIPMENT ARE NOW BEING USED BY BOTH JORDAN AND ISRAEL AGAINST EACH OTHER.

7. WE ALSO SHOULD NOT OVERLOOK THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE PRESENCE OF AN F-1Ø4 SQUADRON IN JORDAN, COUPLED WITH ENHANCED ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSES, MIGHT IN FACT PROVIDE A MODEST DETERRENT TO ISRAELI MILITARY ACTIVITIES. IN A MINOR FASHION, IT RESTORES SOME BALANCE IN THE ISRAELI-JORDANIAN CONTEXT. ITS ABSENCE FROM JORDAN INSTITUTIONALIZES AN IMBALANCE.

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8. A FURTHER MAJOR CONSIDERATION IN OUR THINKING IS THE LIKELIHOOD THAT, GIVEN THE INCREASING TENSIONS IN THE AREA, THE CONTINUED ABSENCE IN THE PROGRESS OF THE PEACEMAKING PROCESS, AND THE GROWTH OF FEDAYEEN STRENGTH, THE JORDANIAN REGIME IS LIKELY TO BE IN A DELICATE INTERNAL POSITION BEFORE MID-YEAR. ONE OF OUR KEY OBJECTIVES IS TO PREVENT A SHIFT IN ITS INTERNATIONAL POLICIES OR EVEN SOME PRO FORMA ACCOMMODATION TO THE FEDAYEEN. ONE MAJOR ASSET WHICH HUSSEIN POSSESSES, AND WHICH WE MUST NOT ALLOW TO BE UNDERMINED, IS THE LOYALTY OF THE MILITARY FORCES. TO RETAIN THEIR CONFIDENCE, HE MUST BE ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT RELIANCE ON THE US FOR MILITARY SUPPLIES IS MEANINGFUL.

9. FINALLY, WE QUESTION WHETHER THE WORST OUTCOMES ENVISAGED IN THE REFERENCED MESSAGE (E.G., DESTRUCTION OF SOME IDF AIRCRAFT OR THE TOTAL DESTRUCTION OF THE F-104 SQUADRON) WOULD BE AS DAMAGING TO THE US POSITION AS FORESEEN. THESE WOULD NOT LOSE HUSSEIN HIS THRONE. A FAILURE ON HIS PART TO USE THE AIRCRAFT HE HAS TOLD THE PUBLIC HE HAS OBTAINED WOULD, HOWEVER, UNDERMINE HIM SERIOUSLY, PERHAPS FATALLY.

10. CONCLUSIONS: WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND: (A) THAT WE CEASE CONSIDERATION OF THE TACTIC OF DELIVERY OF THE AIRCRAFT TO ANOTHER COUNTRY FOR ASSEMBLY AND TESTING; (B) THAT WE PROCEED ON SCHEDULE WITH THE SENDING OF THE MMT/MTU FOR REASONS OUTLINED HEREIN AND IN USDAO AMMAN 0023; BUT (C) WE TRY TO ENCOURAGE KHAMMASH TO SEND THE AIRCRAFT AND CREWS (AFTER TURNOVER IN JORDAN) TO PAKISTAN, FOR EXAMPLE, FOR ADVANCED TRAINING AND TO BE "ON CALL" FOR AS LONG A PERIOD AS FEASIBLE. (WE BELIEVE WE CAN SOUND OUT KHAMMASH ALONG ABOVE LINES WITHOUT ALARMING HIM, AND MAY INDEED GET FURTHER INSIGHT INTO HIS THINKING.)

11. HAVING THE US TRAINING TEAM COMMUTE BETWEEN AMMAN AND H-5 IS NOT UNREASONABLE FOR THE LIMITED PERIOD FORESEEN. AIR TRANSPORT IS AVAILABLE. FLIGHT TIME TO H-5 IS 30-35 MINUTES, INCLUDING GROUND TRANSPORT, TOTAL COMMUTING TIME EACH DAY IS ONE HOUR, FORTY MINUTES, NOT UNUSUAL IN THE US. FURTHER, THEATERS, ENTERTAINMENT, SOCIAL ACTIVITIES AND GOOD HOTELS ARE AVAILABLE IN AMMAN, MUCH PREFERRED TO AUSTERE QUARTERS AND ABSENCE OF OFF-DUTY FACILITIES AT H-5.

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EXDIS

REF: STATE 006595

1. REFERENCE TO STATE 287261 (NOTAL) IN AMMAN 246 IS CORRECT.  
PARAS 6-9 OF STATE 287261 DESCRIBE SECRETARY-KUWAITI FONMIN DIS-  
CUSSION ON US/UAR RELATIONS.

SYMMES

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By ag/ll, NARA, Date 10/12/01

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APPROVED BY: IO:JJ SISCO  
NEA:MR. HART  
NEA/IAI:MR. ATHERTON  
S/S:MR. WALSH  
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1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OUR REPLY TO RECENT SOVIET APPROACHES ON MIDDLE EAST WITH SECRETARY GAVE SOVIET CHARGE WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 15. FINAL VERSION HAD BEEN MODIFIED IN MINOR RESPECTS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF SOME BUT NOT ALL COMMENTS RECEIVED FROM ISRAELIS AND BRITISH (FRENCH COMMENTS NOT RECEIVED AT TIME FINAL TEXT PREPARED.)

2. AMMAN SHOULD GIVE COPIES CONFIDENTIALLY TO GOJ. IN DOING SO SHOULD NOTE THAT IT MUST BE REGARDED AS REPLY TO SPECIFIC SOVIET COMMUNICATIONS AND NOT AS BROAD AND COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT OF US POLICY. (FYI THE NECESSITY TO REBUT AND GET STRAIGHT SOVIET ARGUMENTS AND ASSERTIONS INEVITABLY GIVES THE REPLY A FLAVOR WHICH THE ARABS MAY INTERPRET AS BEING UNBALANCED AGAINST THEM. WE SHOULD ENDEAVOR MAKE CONTEXT CLEAR WITHOUT BEING DEFENSIVE ABOUT TEXT.) AMMAN SHOULD ALSO EMPHASIZE US DESIRE THAT US-USSR CONSULTATIONS AND EXCHANGES REGARDING ME

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BE CARRIED ON IN CONTEXT OF SUPPORT FOR JARRING MISSION AND SC NOVEMBER 22 RES. ALL OUR EFFORTS CONTINUE BE DIRECTED TO ASSISTING JARRING IN CARRYING OUT HIS MANDATE AND ARE DESIGNED TO IMPROVE HIS CHANGES FOR SUCCESS.

3. WE ARE PROVIDING COPIES TO ISRAELIS, BRITISH AND FRENCH HERE.

4. EMBASSY MOSCOW SHOULD MAKE COPY AVAILABLE TO JARRING.

5. BEGIN TEXT: WE HAVE STUDIED THE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT PRESENTED TO SECRETARY RUSK ON DECEMBER 30. THESE COMMUNICATIONS HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON WHO REQUESTS THAT THIS RESPONSE OF THE US GOVERNMENT BE TRANSMITTED TO CHAIRMAN KOSYGIN.

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO STUDIED THE ORAL COMMUNICATION ON THE ME PRESENTED TO UNDER SECRETARY ROSTOW BY MINISTER TCHERNIAKOV ON DECEMBER 19, 1968.

THE US GOVERNMENT WELCOMES THE DESIRE OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO COOPERATE WITH IT IN ASSISTING AMB JARRING IN HIS EFFORTS TO PROMOTE AGREEMENT ON A PEACEFUL AND ACCEPTED SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT IN THE ME. THE UNITED STATES VALUES THE CONTINUING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH THE SOV GOVT CONCERNING THE ME, IN PARTICULAR SINCE A CONTINUED IMPASSE CONTAINS DANGERS OF VIOLENCE THAT COULD THREATEN THE STATE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

THE US GOVT HAS NOTED CERTAIN CONSTRUCTIVE ELEMENTS IN THE LATEST COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE GOVT OF THE SOVIET UNION, PARTICULARLY THE RECOGNITION REFLECTED IN THOSE COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT A SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE BASED UPON AGREEMENT AMONG THE PARTIES TO ESTABLISH A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE ME, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE SC RES OF NOV 22, 1967.

THE US GOVT NOTES THAT CERTAIN OTHER ASPECTS OF THE SOV GOVT'S COMMUNICATIONS REITERATE POSITIONS AND OPINIONS WHICH DO NOT ACCORD WITH US VIEWS ON RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE HOSTILITIES IN JUNE, 1967, AND FOR THE IMPASSE IN THE JARRING MISSION, AND ON THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF THE SC RES.

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THE US CONSIDERS IT IMPORTANT THAT THERE BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON THIS VITAL SUBJECT, AND THEREFORE OFFERS THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS:

1. THE US REGARDS IT AS A MATTER OF THE HIGHEST PRIORITY THAT THE SOVIET UNION, AND US AND OTHER COUNTRIES USE THEIR FULL INFLUENCE TO ARREST THE DANGEROUS INCREASE IN ARAB TERRORISM IN THE AREA. TERRORISM LEADS INEVITABLY TO REPRISAL. THE CYCLE OF TERRORISM AND REPRISAL, IN THE JUDGEMENT OF THE US, MAY IMPERIL THE VERY POSSIBILITY OF REACHING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT PURSUANT TO THE SC RES OF NOV 22, 1967. TERRORIST ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED OR TOLERATED BY SOME GOVERNMENTS, AND THE REPRISALS THEY PROVOKE, CONSTITUTE A MOST SERIOUS VIOLATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

2. THE SOV COMMUNICATIONS RAISE AGAIN THE QUESTION OF ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF THE NOV 22 RES AND ITS READINESS TO IMPLEMENT IT. IN THE VIEW OF THE US, ISRAEL HAS ACCEPTED AND AGREED TO IMPLEMENT THE RES BY MEANS OF AGREEMENT.

IT SEEMS EVIDENT THAT THE ARABS INTERPRET THESE TERMS DIFFERENTLY FROM THE ISRAELIS. IN THE VIEW OF THE US, THE PARTIES SHOULD NOW PURSUE THE PROCESS OF CLARIFYING THEIR POSITIONS ON KEY SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES RATHER THAN DEBATING THIS POINT FURTHER. THE US TAKES THE PLAN GIVEN TO US BY MIN TCHERNIAKOV ON DEC 30 AS AN INDICATION OF SOV AGREEMENT WITH THIS POSITION.

3. THE US GOVT IS GLAD TO NOTE THAT THE SOV GOVT CONSIDERS THAT THE POINTS MADE TO FONMIN RIAD BY SECT RUSK CONTAIN CONSTRUCTIVE CONSIDERATIONS. IT WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE, HOWEVER, THAT ALL THE POINTS MADE BY THE SECRETARY, INCLUDING SPECIFICALLY THAT RELATED TO ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, WERE BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE PART OF A SETTLEMENT AGREED BETWEEN THE PARTIES WHICH BROUGHT A JUST AND LASTING PEACE TO THE AREA. THE US DOES NOT SHARE THE VIEW, EXPRESSED IN THE SOV COMMUNICATION, THAT THE UAR RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO SECT RUSK'S REMARKS. IT HAD EXPECTED THAT THE UAR WOULD BE PREPARED TO MOVE FURTHER IN CLARIFYING ITS POSITION THAN IT HAS SO FAR BEEN WILLING TO DO. THE US CONTINUES TO HOPE THAT THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENTS WILL ULTIMATELY HAVE THIS RESULT.

4. BOTH THE SOV COMMUNICATIONS OF DEC 19 AND DEC 30

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MISCONSTRUE THE VIEWS OF THE US ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ISRAELI REFERENCE TO THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS IN FONMIN EBAN'S STATEMENT TO AMB JARRING OF NOV 4. THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS CLEARLY SPECIFIED THAT THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINES WERE NOT DEFINITIVE POLITICAL BOUNDARIES BUT COULD BE CHANGED BY AGREEMENT IN THE TRANSITION FROM ARMISTICE TO A CONDITION OF TRUE PEACE. AS THE US EMPHASIZED IN ITS COMMUNICATION OF SEPT 29, 1968, THE HEART OF US POLICY SINCE JUNE 5, 1967 HAS BEEN THAT THIS TRANSITION MUST TAKE PLACE. THIS CONTINUES TO BE US POLICY. AT THE SAME TIME, IT HAS BEEN AND REMAINS US POLICY, AS PRES JOHNSON SAID ON SEPT 10, 1968, THAT THE SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES REQUIRED BY THE SC RES OF NOV 22, 1967, CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT REFLECT THE WEIGHT OF CONQUEST. THESE PRINCIPLES ARE REFLECTED IN THE SC RES WHICH CALLS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE BUT DOES NOT SPECIFY THAT THE SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES TO WHICH ISRAELI FORCES WOULD WITHDRAW SHOULD BE IDENTICAL WITH THE LINES HELD PRIOR TO JUNE 5, 1967, OR ON ANY OTHER DATE. IN THE VIEW OF THE US, THE ESSENTIAL PURPOSE OF THE RES IS TO ACCOMPLISH THIS TRANSITION TO A CONDITION OF PEACE, AND AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES ON ITS ELEMENTS, AND NOT RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE. THE US IS CONVINCED THAT CONTINUATION OF THE FRAGILE ARMISTICE OF THE LAST TWENTY YEARS WOULD BE A BURDEN TO WORLD PEACE. THE US CANNOT SPEAK FOR ISRAEL, BUT BELIEVES IT IMPORTANT TO MAKE ITS OWN VIEWS ON THIS MATTER CLEAR ONCE MORE TO THE SOV GOVT.

5. IN ITS COMMUNICATION OF DEC 30, THE SOV GOVT STATES THAT INNER QTE THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM END INNER QTE OF A ME SETTLEMENT IS A WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM INNER QUOTE THE END INNER QTE ARAB TERRITORIES THEY OCCUPY PURSUANT TO THE CEASE-FIRE RESES TO THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINES OF JUNE 5, 1967. THE US DOES NOT REGARD THIS AS A CORRECT INTERPRETATION OF THE RES OF NOV 22, 1967; THAT RES DOES NOT USE THE LANGUAGE EMPLOYED IN THE SOVIET NOTE. THE RES, IN THE VIEW OF THE US, REQUIRES ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL BEGIN INNER QTE FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN THE RECENT CONFLICT END INNER QTE TO SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES, TO BE ESTABLISHED BY AN AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES PURSUANT TO PARA 3 OF THE RES. WE BELIEVE THIS IS THE INTENDMENT OF PARA 2 OF THE SOV PLAN GIVEN THE US ON DEC 30.

6. THAT PLAN SEEMS IN FORM TO BE AN AGREEMENT TO MAKE AN

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AGREEMENT -- A PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT AMONG THE PARTIES DEALING WITH THE ISSUES SPECIFIED IN THE SC RES OF NOV 22, 1967. THIS PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT EXPRESSLY CALLS FOR FURTHER CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES, TO BE ORGANIZED BY AMB JARRING, THROUGH WHICH THE DEFINITIVE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL AGREEMENT REQUIRED BY PARA 3 OF THE RES WOULD BE REACHED.

THE US FINDS THE IDEA OF A PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT OR UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE PARTIES A USEFUL ONE, WHICH COULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR AMB JARRING TO HOLD PRODUCTIVE MEETINGS WITH THE PARTIES, AND ASSIST THEM TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A DEFINITIVE PLAN FOR FULFILLING ALL THE PROVISIONS OF THE SC RES, AND ON AN AGREED TIME SCHEDULE FOR CARRYING OUT SUCH A PLAN. THE US IS OF THE VIEW THAT THE AGREEMENT CONTEMPLATED BY THE PLAN SHOULD COMPRISE ALL ASPECTS OF THE SETTLEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EACH OF ITS NEIGHBORS, AS A BEGIN INNER QTE PACKAGE END INNER QTE, BEFORE ANY STEPS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE SETTLEMENT BE CARRIED OUT.

7. THE US HAS FOUND CERTAIN PROBLEMS OF TEXTUAL INTERPRETATION IN ANALYZING THE SOVIET DRAFT PLAN. FOR EXAMPLE, PARA 2 SPEAKS OF AGREED PROVISIONS WITH REGARD TO SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES (WITH CORRESPONDING MAPS ATTACHED), WHILE PARA 4 CONTEMPLATES WITHDRAWAL TO THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINES OF JUNE 5. PARAGRAPH 2, AGAIN, RECOGNIZES THE POSSIBLE UTILITY OF DEMILITARIZED ZONES, AS MENTIONED IN THE RES. BUT PARA 4 CALLS FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF ARAB TROOPS INTO TERRITORIES FROM WHICH ISRAEL WITHDRAWS. PARA 4 MENTIONS RESTORING THE SITUATION ON THE FRONTIER BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UAR WHICH EXISTED IN MAY, 1967. BUT THAT SITUATION, IN THE VIEW OF THE US, WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE WAR. AND THE PREAMBLE OF THE SOVIET PLAN CALLS FOR A CONDITION OF PEACE, NOT OF ARMISTICE. PARA 4 ALSO MAKES NO MENTION OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION FOR ISRAELI VESSELS IN THE SUEZ CANAL. PARA 5 SUGGESTS THAT ISRAEL TROOP WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE COMPLETED BEFORE THE OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS BECOME BINDING ON THE LATTER. THIS PROCEDURE APPEARS INCONSISTENT WITH PARA 2 WHICH RECOGNIZES THE PRINCIPLE OF A BEGIN INNER QTE PACKAGE END INNER QTE SETTLEMENT, AND WITH THE SECONARDY INTRODUCTORY PARA WHICH RECOGNIZES THE NEED FOR AGREEMENT ON A PLAN FOR FULFILLMENT OF OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE SC RES AT THE SAME TIME AS THERE IS AGREEMENT ON A TIMETABLE AND PROCEDURE FOR ISRAELI

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WITHDRAWAL.

8. THE US IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE FORM IN WHICH THE TWO GOVERNMENTS COULD EMBODY THEIR VIEWS ON HOW TO ACHIEVE A BEGIN INNER QTE PACKAGE END INNER QTE AGREEMENT AMONG THE PARTIES, TO BE NEGOTIATED IN DETAIL NOT BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES, BUT BY THE PARTIES, MEETING WITH AMB JARRING.

9. THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE AGREED THAT WHILE BOTH GOVERNMENTS SHOULD DO EVERYTHING IN THEIR POWER TO ASSIST AMB JARRING AND THE PARTIES TO REACH AGREEMENT, PEACE CANNOT BE IMPOSED BY THEM, BUT SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED BY THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES. THE UNITED STATES HAS NO OBJECTION TO AN AGREED TIMETABLE FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, IF SUCH A TIMETABLE IS MADE PART OF THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES. IT CONSIDERS THAT A TIMETABLE FOR FULFILLING THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES SHOULD BE ONE OF THE PROBLEMS TAKEN UP BY AMBASSADOR JARRING WITH THEM.

THE UNITED STATES SHOULD, HOWEVER, COMMENT AT THIS POINT ON TWO PROBLEMS OF SECURITY RAISED IN THE SOVIET COMMUNICATIONS.

10. THE SOVIET STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 19 IN PARAGRAPH 2, REFERS TO THE UNITED STATES COMMENT OF NOVEMBER 8 REGARDING ISRAELI TERRITORIAL CLAIMS RESPECTING THE UAR AND ADDS THE REMARK THAT ISRAEL HAS RAISED QTE THE QUESTION ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF STATIONING HER FORCES AT SHARM-AL-SHEIKH. UNQTE IN THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES, THE PROCESS OF REACHING AGREEMENT AND ACHIEVING A PEACEFUL AND ACCEPTED SETTLEMENT, AS PROVIDED IN THE NOVEMBER 22, 1967, RESOLUTION, MUST INVOLVE NEGOTIATION OF THE MEANS FOR CARRYING OUT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF A SETTLEMENT AS SET FORTH IN THAT RESOLUTION, INCLUDING THE GUARANTEE OF MARITIME RIGHTS DEALT WITH IN PARAGRAPH 2 (A) OF THE RESOLUTION. IT MUST BE CLEARLY APPRECIATED THAT THE JUNE, 1967, CONFLICT WAS TOUCHED OFF BY THE ISSUE OF RIGHTS OF PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN. ONLY THE MOST SECURE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE GUARANTEE OF THESE RIGHTS WILL MAKE POSSIBLE THE REALIZATION OF OUR HOPES FOR PEACE. THE CHOICE AMONG POSSIBLE MEANS OF IMPLEMENTING PARAGRAPH 2(A) OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION IS FOR THE PARTIES, WORKING WITH AMBASSADOR JARRING.

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11. WITH RESPECT TO DEMILITARIZATION OF THE SINAI, THE EVENTUAL DECISION ON THIS POINT ALSO WILL DEPEND ON THE PARTIES THEMSELVES. THE UNITED STATES FINDS IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE PARTIAL DEMILITARIZATION SUGGESTED BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD PROVIDE THE CONDITIONS OF SECURITY NECESSARY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE. THE 1967 WAR BEGAN AS A DIRECT RESULT OF EVENTS IN SINAI, AND ACTIVITIES IN THIS AREA HAD LED TO THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES TEN YEARS EARLIER. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE, IN THE FACE OF THIS HISTORY, HOW A LASTING PEACE CAN BE BASED ON ONLY PARTIAL DEMILITARIZATION OF THIS SENSITIVE AREA.

12. THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT AN UNDERSTANDING WITH RESPECT TO ARMAMENT LEVELS AND ARMS LIMITATION IS A VITAL ASPECT OF THE QUEST FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IT CONTINUES TO REGRET SOVIET POLICY IN THIS REGARD, AND URGES THAT THE PROBLEM BE VIEWED AS AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT OF THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN CRISIS.  
END TEXT

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7148  
INFO USINT CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 0246

EXDIS

REF: NJA-7147, 7150

SUBJ: US/UAR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

SANTIZED  
Authority NJ 15-41  
By CTS, NARA, Date 7/31/18

1. WHEN I SAW HIM ON 14TH FONMIN RIFAI INTRODUCED THE MATTER OF THE REESTABLISHMENT OF US/UAR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BY ALLUDING TO REPORTS HE SAID HE HAD RECEIVED ON RECENT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE EMIR OF KUWAIT AND US OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON. RIFAI SAID HE UNDERSTOOD FROM THE KUWAIT REPORTS THAT THE USG EXPECTS THE UARG TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN REESTABLISHING RELATIONS. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT QUOTE MECHANICAL OBSTACLES UNQUOTE SHOULD NOT STAND IN THE WAY OF THEIR REESTABLISHMENT, ADDING HIS HOPE THAT JORDAN MIGHT SERVE AS MIDDLEMAN IN ORDER TO PREVENT THESE QUOTE MECHANICS UNQUOTE FROM OBSTRUCTING THE PROCESS.

2. RIFAI THEN PROVIDED SOME FURTHER BACKGROUND INFORMATION

[REDACTED]. HE EXPLAINED THAT SOME TIME AGO KING HUSSEIN HAD AUTHORIZED HIM TO DISCUSS WITH THE UAR WHAT JORDAN COULD DO TO HELP REESTABLISH UAR RELATIONS WITH BOTH IRAN AND THE US. RIFAI HAD ACCORDINGLY ARRANGED A MEETING FOR UAR FONMIN RIAD AND IRANIAN FONMIN ZAHEDI IN WHICH ZAHEDI HAD INDICATED IRAN EXPECTS THE UAR TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO RENEW RELATIONS SINCE IT HAD TAKEN THE INITIATIVE IN BREAKING THEM.

3.4(b)(1)

3. RIFAI ADDED THAT HE HAD INTENDED TO BE IN CAIRO TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT OF BOTH IRANIAN AND US RELATIONS WITH THE UAR WHEN

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 00246 151222Z

GROMYKO'S SUDDEN CAIRO VISIT IN DECEMBER HAD CAUSED HIM TO POSTPONE HIS PLANS. THE PHANTOM ANNOUNCEMENT HAD POSED A FURTHER OBSTACLE SO FAR AS THE UAR WAS CONCERNED. RIFAI INDICATED, HOWEVER, THAT HE BELIEVES THE UAR IS NOW INCLINED TO RENEW RELATIONS BUT WILL WATCH THE EARLY DAYS OF THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION BEFORE PROCEEDING. MEANWHILE, HE, RIFAI, WAS KEEPING A CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE UAR ON THE MATTER.

4. I COMMENTED TO THE FONMIN THAT OVER THE PAST MONTHS WE HAD INDICATED WE WERE WILLING TO REESTABLISH RELATIONS AND THAT THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO ME SHOWED THAT IT WAS THE UAR THAT HAD DECIDED NOT TO PROCEED. RIFAI INDICATED HE WOULD BE VERY INTERESTED IN CURRENT USG THINKING ON THIS MATTER AND PARTICULARLY WHETHER THE USG ENVISAGED THAT THE UAR WOULD BE EXPECTED TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN PROPOSING RENEWAL OF RELATIONS. RIFAI DID NOT MAKE CLEAR WHETHER THE QUESTION OF A UAR INITIATIVE WAS THE MECHANICAL OBSTACLE HE HAD IN MIND.

5. IF DEPARTMENT HAS NO OBJECTION, I WOULD LIKE TO GO BACK TO RIFAI IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS WITH AN EXPLANATION OF OUR POSITION. I PRESUME WE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO RIFAI ACTING IN THE MODEST MIDDLEMAN'S CAPACITY HE FORESEES; BUT I THINK IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR ME TO SPELL OUT TO HIM OUR IMPRESSION (NOTED IN STATE 2872HD#) THAT NASSER MAY EXPECT SOME SPECIAL US GESTURE. REQUEST GUIDANCE.

SYMMES

NOTE: #REFERENCE PARA 5 BELIEVED TO BE 287261.  
EXDIS ADDED PER S/S-O - MR. STEMPEL. 1/15/69.



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PAGE 01 STATE 008070

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DRAFTED BY:NEA/UAR:RBPARKER  
APPROVED BY:NEA:RODGER P. DAVIES  
S/S:MR. HAWLEY  
NEA/ARN:MR. SEELYE  
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
USINT CAIRO

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EXDIS

REF: AMMAN'S 0246 AND CAIRO'S 0112

AGREE WITH CAIRO'S RECOMMENDATION WE SHOULD THANK RIFAI FOR HIS INTEREST BUT NOT GET HIM INVOLVED IN MEDIATING BETWEEN US AND UAR AT THIS JUNCTURE. SUGGEST YOU INFORM HIM BILATERAL CHANNELS ALREADY IN OPERATION ARE MORE THAN ADEQUATE FOR TASK IF EGYPTIANS ARE INTERESTED IN MOVING FORWARD.

GP-1 RUSK

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By ng/ll, NARA, Date 012/01

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7159  
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AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 0278

EXDIS:

REF: STATE 7299

SUBJ: US RESPONSE TO SOVIET PROPOSALS

1. BEFORE OFFICIAL LUNCH ON JANUARY 16 I SAW FONMIN RIFAI PRIVATELY AND MADE OBSERVATIONS ON US REPLY TO SOVIET ME PROPOSALS AS SET FORTH IN PARA 2 REFTEL. I PROMISED HIM A COPY OF THE REPLY AS SOON AS IT WAS TYPED. RIFAI SAID HE UNDERSTOOD AND APPRECIATED THESE OBSERVATIONS.

2. SUBSEQUENTLY, AT LUNCH, I PASSED RIFAI COPY OF US REPLY. RIFAI ASKED ME TO PASS ON TO DEPT HIS DEEP APPRECIATION FOR SHARING THIS DOCUMENT WITH HIM. HE SAID HE LOOKED FORWARD TO REUMKF IT AND PROMISED TO BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH ME WHEN HE HAD DONE SO. SYMMES

GP-3

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7165  
INFO USINT CAIRO

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EXDIS

REF: STATE 8070, CAIRO 0112, AMMAN 0246

1. WE CERTAINLY UNDERSTAND IT MAY NOT BE NECESSARY OR DESIREABLE TO HAVE RIFAI OR ANY OTHER OUTSIDER BECOME INVOLVED AS MIDDLEMAN WITH UAR. SIMPLY DECLINING RIFAI'S OFFER, HOWEVER, WILL NOT STIFLE THE ACTIVE INTEREST HE AND THE KING HAVE IN THIS MATTER.

2. IN VIEW OF RIFAI'S PRIDE AND SENSITIVITY AND THE UNDERSTANDABLE JORDANIAN INTEREST, I THINK IT WOULD BE WELL TO COUPLE OUR DECLINING OF JORDANIAN MEDIATION WITH AT LEAST A GENERAL OUTLINE OF OUR CURRENT POSITION. BEFORE I GO BACK AS SUGGESTED IN STATE 8070, DEPT MAY WISH TO CONSIDER WHETHER THERE IS ANYTHING ADDITIONAL I MIGHT SAY.

SYMMES

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DEPT PASS CINCSTRIKE, JIDDA, RAWALPINDI, DHAHRAN

REF: AMMAN 237, STATE 5129

SUBJ: F-104 AIRCRAFT FOR JORDAN

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 02-033  
By *ms* NARA, Date *6.6.03*

1. CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL KHAMMASH HIMSELF PROVIDED OPPORTUNITY FOR SOUNDINGS ABOUT F-104 HANDLING (PROPOSED STATE 5129) WHEN HE VOLUNTEERED TO EMBASSY OFFICER ON EVENING JANUARY 15 THAT, AT JUST-CONCLUDED CAIRO MEETING OF UAR-IRAQI-SYRIAN-JORDANIAN DEFENSE MINISTERSHANC CHIEFS OF STAFF, EGYPTIOANS HAD INFORMED HIM THAT THEY HAD INTELLIGENCE THAT THE US HAD QUOTE CANCELLED A TRAINING BASE AT AQABA UNQUOTE. THE SUBJECT EMERGED DURING DISCUSSIONS OF A POSSIBLE ISRAELI ATTACK ON JORDEN BEFORE JANUARY 20. ACCORDING TO KHAMMASH, EGYPTIANS CAREFULLY WATCH US MOVES IN MIDDLE EAST FOR SIGNS THAT ISRAELIS MAY ATTACK, ON PRESUMPTION THAT US WOULD TAKE EVERY PRECAUTION TO PREVENT LOSS AMERICAN LIVES. EGYPTIOANS CITED THIS ALLEGED US DECISION AS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF IMPENDING ISRAELI ATTACK. KHAMMASH OF COURSE DENIED THAT THERE WAS TO BE AN AMERICAN BASE IN AQABA, AND THOUGHT NO MORE ABOUT THE MATTER UNTIL HIS RETURN TO AMMAN WHEN, AS HE SAID, QUOTE THE FIRST THING UNQUOTE HE WAS TOLD WAS THAT THE US HAD POSTPONED THE ARRIVAL OF THE MOBILE TRAINING TEAM EQUIPMENT. HE DREW THE CONCLUSION THAT IT WAS THIS DECISION TO WHICH THE EGYPTIANS HAD BEEN REFERRING. (NOTE: WE INFORMED JORDANIANS OF THE POSTPONEMENT ON JANUARY 13.)

2. KHAMMASH WAS MOST UPSET WITH THE POSTPONEMENT AND ASKED THE REASONS BEHIND IT. HE SAID IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN NOT ONLY TO HIS AIR FORCE BUT ALSO THE THE OTHER ARAB GOVTS, WHICH WERE CRITICAL OF JORDAN'S RELIANCE ON THE US.

3. EMBOFF SAID THAT ONLY A SHORT DELAY WAS ENVISAGED. THE US WAS NOT BACKING OUT OF ITS COMMITMENT TO SUPPLY THE F-104S. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE SAID, WE WERE UNDERSTANDABLY AWARE OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF F-104 DELIVERIES AT THIS TIME WHEN AREA TENSIONS SEEM TO BE INCREASING. HE ASKED KHAMMASH WHAT PLANS HE HAD FOR THE F-104S, IN VIEW OF THE FORMIDABLE ISRAELI CAPEITIES TO KNOCK THEM OUT OF THE SKY, OR ATTACK THEIR BASE.

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4. KHAMMASH SAID THAT NO AIRCRAFT WERE GOING TO BE SENT UP AGAINST THE ISRAELIS UNTIL THE ARABS WERE READY, AND THIS MEANT THE AIRCRAFT OF THE UAR, SYRIA, AND IRAQ, AS WELL AS JORDAN. THIS DECISION HAD BEEN MADE AT THE RECENT CAIRO MEETING, DESPITE THE PARTICIPANTS' CURRENT CONCERN WITH A POSSIBLE ISRAELI ATTACK. TO ILLUSTRATE, HE SAID, THE 11 HAWKER HUNTERS CURRENTLY STATIONED AT AMMAN WERE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO MAZZAH. EAST OF DAASCUS. HABBANIYAH IN IRAQ HAD ALSO BEEN PROPOSED (WHICH IN VIEW OF THE IRAQI USE OF HUNTERS WOULD MAKE MORE SENSE) BUT RJAF COMMANDER KURDI PREFERRED SYRIA AS A SAFEHAVEN.
5. KHAMMASH IN FACT SAID THAT HE COULD STALL THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE F-104S UNTIL THE END OF 1969. CONFIRMING WHAT HE HAD SAID IN THE PAST, HE NOTED THAT HE WAS CONSIDERING SENDING THE F-104S AND THEIR CREWS TO PAKISTAN FOR ADVANCED TRAINING. THE PAKISTANIS HAD AGREED TO THE IDEA IN PRINCIPLE SOME TIME AGO, HE ADDED.
6. KHAMMASH WAS EMPHATIC AND OUTSPOKEN IN DECLARING THAT ANY US DELAYS OR CHANGES IN PLANS FOR THE F-104S WOULD HAVE THE GRAVEST IMPLICATIONS FOR THE KING AND THE US POSITION IN JORDAN. ALL CONVEIVABLE EFFORTS MUST BE MADE, HE STRESSED, TO ENSURE THAT THE F-104S ARRIVED ON SCHEDULE.
7. COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: KHAMMASH'S COMMENTS REINFORCE OUR CONCLUSIONS OUTLINED IN AMMAN 237. THE CRITICAL OBJECTIVE IS TO GET THE PLANES TO JORDAN PROMPTLY FOR ASSEMBLY AND TURNOVER, PROVING THE SINCERITY OF THE US COMMITMENT. TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD AROUSE THE SUSPICIONS OF JORDANIAN MILITARY OFFICERS AND EXCITE CRITICISM FROM OTHER ARAB CAPITALS.
8. WHILE WE MUST TAKE WITH A GRAIN OF SALT HIS ASSERTION THAT THE AIRCRAFT WILL NOT HAVE TO BE USED UNTIL THE END OF 1969, WE BELIEVE HE IS SINCERE IN WANTING TO GIVE HIS CREWS ADEQUATE TRAINING BEFORE THROWING THEM AGAINST THE ISRAELIS. HE IS BY NATURE CAUTIOUS AND PRUDENT.
9. I THEREFORE STRONGLY RECOMMEND AGAIN: (A) THAT WE SEND THE MOBILE TRAINING TEAM PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE AND CONTINUE WITH OUR ORIGINAL PLANS TO DELIVER THE FIRST INCREMENT OF THE F-104S COMMENCING MARCH 1; AND (B) THAT, IF THIS DECISION IS MADE WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS IT BE COMMUNICATED TO KHAMMASH BY EMBASSY LONDON. (AT THE KING'S REQUEST, KHAMMASH IS LEAVING TODAY, JAN 16, FOR LONDON AND HE MAY FEEL COMPELLED TO MENTION THIS DISCUSSION TO HUSSEIN, WITH UNPREDICTABLE RESULTS. KHAMMASH SAID HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH EMBOFF STODDART IN LONDON.) SYMMES  
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EXDIS

SUBJ: SOVIET PROPOSAL

1. HUSSEIN PROBABLY WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH ME TOMORROW, THE 4TH BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR LONDON ON THE 5TH. I SHOULD LIKE TO BE PREPARED FOR ANY QUESTIONS HE MAY HAVE ABOUT THE RECENT SOVIET PROPOSAL.

2. UNLESS INSTRUCTED OTHERWISE I WOULD PROPOSE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE US HAS INDEED RECEIVED A DETAILED PROPOSAL WHICH THE SOVIETS WANT TO KEEP CONFIDENTIAL, AND THAT THE UK AND FRANCE ALSO HAVE BEEN APPROACHED. I WOULD SAY THAT THE US PLANS AN EARLY RESPONSE IN ORDER TO KEEP THE MOMENTUM GOING IN THESE US-USSR EXCHANGES. MOREOVER, AT FIRST GLANCE THE US SAW SOME POSITIVE, CONSTRUCTIVE FEATURES IN A PROPOSAL WHICH, HOWEVER, ALSO REPEATED FORMER POSITIONS AND HAD INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS. ASIDE FROM THIS, IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR ME TO ASCERTAIN IF HUSSEIN KNOWS WHETHER THE UAR HAD IN FACT GIVEN ITS APPROVAL TO THE PROPOSAL DURING GROMYKO'S RECENT VISIT TO CAIRO. PLEASE CABLE IMMEDIATE FOR OPENING OF BUSINESS ON THE 4TH WHETHER ABOVE LINE IS SATISFACTORY, AND WHETHER OTHER POINTS SHOULD BE COMMUNICATED.

3. WE FIND OURSELVES IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE INITIAL REACTIONS AS CONVEYED BY UNDER SECRETARY ROSTOW AND ASSISTANT ASCRETARY HART (STATE 00002, 00003 AND 00011). WE WERE ESPECIALLY STRUCK BY THE SOVIET EMPHASIS ON RELYING ON CONTACTS THROUGH JARRING AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS. DEVELOPMENT OF AN AGREED PACKAGE PLAN UNDER JARRING ADAPTS

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ITSELF WELL TO HUSSEIN'S RENEWED EMPHASIS TO ME ON DECEMBER 28TH THAT THE JARRING UMBRELLA MUST BE KEPT OPEN.

4. THE SOVIETS HAVE ONCE AGAIN FUZZED THE SYRIAN PROBLEM, WHICH IN THE END MAY PROVE MORE TROUBLESOME THAN HUSSEIN, FOR EXAMPLE, FORESEES. HIS ARGUMENT, AND APPARENTLY NASSER'S AS WELL, IS THAT SYRIA COULD BE PUT ASIDE IF JORDAN AND THE UAR AGREED ON THE REST OF THE PACKAGE. I AM NOT NEARLY SO CONFIDENT THAT ARAB PUBLIC PRESSURES WOULD PERMIT THIS. THE NEAR OMISSION OF THE JERUSALEM ISSUE FROM THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IS ALSO A WEAKNESS, AND I THINK IT IS UNREALISTIC FOR THEM TO CONTINUE PURSUING WHAT SEEMS CLOSE TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE IN THE SINAI, GAZA AND SHARM AL-SHAYKH.

5. IN GENERAL, I WOULD EXPECT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO BE REGARDED QUITE FAVORABLY BY THE JORDANIANS, AND, WITH SKILLFULLY HANDLED LEAKS, THE PROPOSAL COULD PUT THE US OFF-BALANCE IN ARAB EYES GENERALLY. IT IS THEREFORE REASSURING TO KNOW WE INTEND TO TAKE AS POSITIVE A LINE AS POSSIBLE IN OUR RESPONSE.

GP-1. SYMMES

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TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE  
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EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 42

WE INFORMED FONOFF 1645 LOCAL THAT MESSAGE HAD BEEN PASSED TO GOJ WHICH WAS TAKING STEPS TO PREVENT ANYTHING HAPPENING ON AQABA SIDE. ASKED WHETHER ANY DETAILS AVAILABLE THAT MIGHT ASSIST. FONOFF CHECKED AND REPLIED NO RPT NO DETAILS AVAILABLE.

GP-1. BARBOUR

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:TWSEELYE  
APPROVED BY: NEA:RODGER P DAVIES  
NEA/IAI:ALATHERTON  
NEA-MR. HART  
S/S-MR. WALSH  
66604

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH  
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS:

SUBJECT: ALLEGED PLAN TO ATTACK EILAT FROM AQABA

REF: TEL AVIV 43

AMBASSADOR SHOULD IMMEDIATELY INFORM KING HUSSEIN THAT GOI HAS INFORMATION INDICATING A PLAN UNDERWAY TO ATTACK EILAT FROM AQABA. RECALLING KING HUSSEIN'S PREVIOUS ASSURANCES THAT THERE WOULD BE NO REPETITION OF EARLIER ATTACK ON EILAT, AMBASSADOR SHOULD STRONGLY URGE KING TAKE NECESSARY STEPS TO PRECLUDE ANY SUCH ATTACK. GP-1. RUSK

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APPROVED BY: NEA:RODGER P. DAVIES  
NEA/IAI:ALATHERTON  
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TO BE HELD UNTIL OPENING OF BUSINESS JANUARY 4.

SUBJ: SOVIET PROPOSAL

REF: AMMAN 44 AND STATE 11.

1. IN YOUR MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN, YOU AUTHORIZED STATE FOLLOWING:

A. WE HAVE RECEIVED A DETAILED PROPOSAL FROM THE SOVIETS AS HAVE THE UK AND FRANCE. WHILE SOVIET PROPOSAL REPEATS FORMER POSITIONS AND HAS CONTRADICTIONS, IT CONTAINS SIGNIFICANT INNOVATIONS RESPONSIVE TO U.S. INSISTENCE ON NEED FOR AGREEMENT AMONG PARTIES TO CONFLICT.

B. WE DO NOT KNOW IF PROPOSAL REPRESENTS MOVEMENT ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES OR MERELY BARGAINING TACTIC. HOWEVER, WE GIVING SOVIET POSITION MOST CAREFUL STUDY IN LIGHT INDICATIONS OF SOME MOVEMENT NOW TOWARD VIABLE SETTLEMENT.

2. IF YOU DEEM IT USEFUL, YOU AUTHORIZED IN STRICT CONFIDENCE

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PAGE 02 STATE 001347

TO REVIEW WITH KING IN GENERAL TERMS TEXT OF SOVIET STATE-  
MENT II (RPT II) TRANSMITTED AT END OF STATE 294347.

3. AGREE IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR YOU TO ASCERTAIN IF HUSSEIN  
KNOWS WHETHER UAR GAVE ITS APPROVAL TO NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL  
DURING GROMYKO'S RECENT VISIT TO CAIRO. GP-3. RUSKI

SECRET

EXDIS  
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

13

SECRET 057

PAGE 01 AMMAN 00050 041710Z

49  
ACTION SS 30

2

INFO SSO 00, CCO 00, NSCE 00, /030 W

029404

O P 041642Z JAN 69  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE  
SECSTATE WASHDC 7065  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 0050

EXDIS

SUBJ: POSSIBLE ATTACK ON EILAT

REF: TEL AVIV 51 (NOTAL)

1. WE CONVEYED TO ZAID RIFAI, KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY AND  
SEC GEN ROYAL DIWAN, SUBSTANCE OF ISRAELI STATEMENT IN PARA  
ONE REFTEL, STRESSING IT WAS INTENTION OF FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATION  
PLOTTERS TO QUOTE IMPLICATE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT UNQUOTE.

2. RIFAI ASSERTED THAT PROMPT ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN  
AS SOON AS I HAD PASSED INFORMATION THROUGH  
HIM TO KING. THEY WERE TAKING EVERY POSSIBLE PRECAUTION,  
HE ADDED, AND FELT THAT THEY HAD THE SITUATION IN HAND  
ALTHOUGH THEY COULD NOT FORECLOSE EVERY SINGLE CONTINGENCY.  
FORCES IN AQABA WERE ON THE ALERT, AND GOJ WAS PREPARED TO  
USE BRUTE FORCE TO PREVENT AN INCIDENT, OR TO STOP IT IN  
THE EVENT THE PLOTTERS ESCAPED DETECTION. WE WILL INFORM UK EMBASSY.

GP-3. SYMMES

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S 98001

By ag/ell, NARA, Date 10/2/00

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TELEGRAM

14

SECRET 066

PAGE 01 AMMAN 00049 041728Z

41  
ACTION SS 30

INFO CCO 00,SSO 00,NSCE 00, /030 W

029421

2

O P 041620Z JAN 69 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7064  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

Declassified Base: NW# 78812 Date: 08-19-2002


~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 0049

EXDIS

SUBJ: REPORTS OF POSSIBLE ATTACK ON EILAT AREA

1. UK EMBASSY HERE CONFIDED TO US THAT SUBSTANCE OF TEL AVIV 43 HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO THEM THROUGH DEPARTMENT. THIS MORNING, THE 4TH, UK MILITARY ATTACHE WAS TOLD BY JAA DIRECTOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (DMI) THAT JORDANIANS HAD BROKEN UP A FEDAYEEN OPERATION AIMED AT EILAT AND SCHEDULED FOR EITHER THE NIGHT OF JANUARY 1 OR 2. DMI REPORTEDLY SAID THAT 30 RPT 30 MEN WERE INVOLVED, BUT DID NOT IDENTIFY FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATION. JORDANIAN OFFICIALS CONFISCATED MORTARS AND ROCKETS (POSSIBLY BAZOOKAS) THE FEDAYEEN HAD INTENDED TO EMPLOY, BUT APPARENTLY DID NOT DETAIN THE 30 MEN. THE OFFICIALS REPORTEDLY TOLD THE FEDAYEEN THAT SUCH AN ACTION COULD NOT BE CARRIED OUT BECAUSE OF THE RISK TO AN AMERICAN AND A BRITISH FLAG VESSEL DUE TO ARRIVE IN AQABA SHORTLY THEREAFTER. IT WAS NOT MADE CLEAR TO THE BRITISH MILITARY ATTACHE WHETHER OR NOT THIS LATTER STORY WAS A RUSE TO CONFISCATE THE WEAPONS AND PREVENT A BIGGER PROBLEM FROM DEVELOPING.

EO50x1 DOS  
EO50x6 CIA



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NW#: 78812

DocId: 34660664

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
Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 00049 041728Z

EO50x1 DOS  
EO50x6 CIA



MEANWHILE, UK EMBASSY DCM PETER TRIPP IS SAYING FAREWELL.

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TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 AMMAN 00049 041728Z

TO KING TODAY AND PLANS TO RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT INFORMATION  
IN PARA ONE ABOVE.

8. ZAID RIFAI, KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY, HAS PASSED  
WORD THAT KING HAS NOTHING TO DISCUSS WITH ME BEFORE HIS  
DEPARTURE.

GP-1. SYMMES

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~~SECRET~~  
21



Department of State

15  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 832

PAGE 01 AMMAN 00045 040901Z

2

12  
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

028164

O P 040840Z JAN 69 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE  
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7062

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 0045

EXDIS

SUBJ: POSSIBLE ATTACK ON EILAT AREA

1. IT IS MOST IMPORTANT, WE BELIEVE, THAT SOME MINIMUM DETAILS OF ISRAELI INFORMATION ABOUT POSSIBLE ATTACK BE OBTAINED. WOULD THE POSSIBLE ATTACK BE MOUNTED BY A DISAFFECTED JAA UNIT OR BY FEDAYEEN? IF THE LATTER, WHICH GROUP? IS THERE INFORMATION ABOUT THE TIMING? THESE MINIMUM DETAILS WOULD NOT COMPROMISE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES.

2. AS IT IS, ALMOST ANYTHING THAT MIGHT HAPPEN IN THE AQABA-EILAT OR WADI ARABAH AREAS DURING THE NEXT WEEK OR SO COULD BE BLAMED ON JORDANIAN NEGLIGENCE OR DISREGARD OF A WELL-MEANT WARNING. PREVENTING A SERIOUS INCIDENT IN THE EILAT AREA IS IMPORTANT. WE HAVE ALWAYS ASSUMED, AND BELIEVE

HUSSEIN SHARES THIS VIEW, THAT ISRAEL WILL NOT TAKE RISKS WITH REGARD EILAT AND MIGHT WELL SEIZE AQABA AND OTHER TERRITORY IF EILAT WERE ATTACKED.

3. I MAY SEE HUSSEIN TODAY. PLEASE FLASH ANY INFORMATION YOU MAY DEVELOP.

GR:1 SYMMES

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NLJ-S 98001

By 15/01 NARA, Date 10/2/01

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

16

~~SECRET~~ 650

2

PAGE 01 AMMAN 00065 061436Z

51  
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, /030 W

034425

PIR 061355Z JAN 69  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY  
SECSTATE WASHDC 2070  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 0065

EXDIS:

3.4(b)(1)

REF: [REDACTED] AMMAN 49 AND 50

SUBJ: POSSIBLE ATTACK ON EILAT

SANITIZED  
Authority NJ 15-41  
By CTS, NARA, Date 7/31/18

1. OVER THE WEEKEND WE HAVE DONE SOME FURTHER CHECKING OF THE CONFLICTING STORIES ABOUT JORDANIAN EFFORTS TO PREVENT A FEDAYEEN OPERATION DIRECTED AT EILAT. [REDACTED] HAS ASCERTAINED THAT THE THIRTY FEDAYEEN ALLEGEDLY PICKED UP BY THE JORDANIANS MAY IN FACT HAVE BEEN THIRTY CAMELS, CARRYING ARMS AND AMMUNITION SMUGGLED FROM SINAI, WHICH WERE INTERCEPTED BY JORDAN SECURITY FORCES NEAR AQABA IN LATE DECEMBER. THE EXCUSE ALLEGEDLY GIVEN BY THE JORDANIANS FOR BREAKING UP THE FEDAYEEN OPERATION (I.E., THAT AN AMERICAN AND BRITISH VESSEL SHORTLY WERE COMING TO AQABA) WOULD SEEM TO HAVE BEEN A DISTORTION OF STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE BASIC JORDANIAN CONCERN ABOUT AQABA'S SECURITY. THE PALACE HAS MADE CLEAR TO FEDAYEEN LEADERS THAT THE LOSS OF AQABA IN AN ISRAELI REPRISAL WOULD DAMAGE JORDAN SEVERELY, AND HAS CITED AS AN EXAMPLE THE FACT THAT US AND BRITISH MILITARY EQUIPMENT (ESPECIALLY TANKS) WERE REGULARLY BEING CONVEYED TO JORDAN THROUGH AQABA.

3.4 (b)(1)

2. MEANWHILE, OUR DATT REVIEWED DEVELOPMENTS WITH THE DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (DMI) AND RECEIVED AN ACCOUNT IDENTICAL IN ALL PARTICULARS WITH THAT OBTAINED BY [REDACTED] (PARA 3 THROUGH 5 OF AMMAN 49 AND [REDACTED]). WE HAVE SUPPLIED BRITISH EMB HERE WITH THIS ACCOUNT, DESCRIBING IT AS HAVING BEEN OBTAINED BY DATT. WE HAVE NO FURTHER OBJECTION, THEREFORE, TO RELAYING

3.4(b)(1)

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 00065 061436Z

THIS INFORMATION TO BRITISH IN WASHINGTON OR LONDON.

3. <sup>3.4(b)(1)</sup> [REDACTED] HAS ALSO LEARNED THAT THE KING CHAIRED TWO MEETINGS WITH SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE, AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES ON THURSDAY, JAN THREE, AND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING MY RELAY OF EBAN'S WARNING, TO DISCUSS THE EILAT SITUATION. THE KING TOLD UK EMB DCM TRIPPI ON THE FOURTH THAT THE JAA GARRISON COMMANDER IN AQABA HAD BEEN REPLACED BY AN OFFICER WHOSE ANTI-FEDAYEEN SENTIMENTS WERE WELL-KNOWN.

4. WE CONCLUDE FROM THE ABOVE THAT THE GOU HAS INDEED TAKEN EXTENSIVE STEPS TO PREVENT AN OPERATION AGAINST EILAT.

5. HUSSEIN REPORTEDLY ALSO TOLD TRIPP THAT HIS PROBLEMS WITH THE PLO AND FATAH WERE BEING HANDLED SATISFACTORILY, BUT THAT HE WAS HAVING TROUBLE WITH BA'ATHIST-CONTROLLED GROUPS. HE ALLEGED THAT HE WAS HAVING SOME ROUNDED UP. IN THIS CONNECTION, KING TOLD ME ON TWENTY-EIGHTH THAT THE POPULAR FRONT (I.E., PFLP) WAS STILL GIVING HIM TROUBLE.

GP-3. SYMMES

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

17  
**TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ 599

02

PAGE 01 AMMAN 00042 031435Z

44  
ACTION SS 30

INFO CCO 00,SSO 00,NSCE 00, /030 W

023458

0 031415Z JAN 69 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE  
SECSTATE WASHDC 7058

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 0042

EXDIS

REF: TEL AVIV 43

AT THREE FORTY-FIVE LOCAL INFORMED CHIEF OF STAFF GEN'L  
KHAMMASH AND KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY ZAID RIFAI OF  
CONTENTS REFTEL. ZAID IS NOW INFORMING KING HUSSEIN, AND  
BOTH ARE TAKING STEPS TO PREVENT ANYTHING FROM HAPPENING  
FROM JORDANIAN SIDE AQABA. ZAID REQUESTED THEY BE SUPPLIED  
URGENTLY WITH ANY DETAILS THAT MIGHT ASSIST THEM TAKE  
EFFECTIVE PREVENTIVE ACTION.

SYMMES

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S 98001

By agill, NARA, Date 10/2/01

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

18

SECRET- 180

PAGE 01 AMMAN 08100 301334Z

2

49  
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

*Postow*

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003736

R 301305Z DEC 68  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7031

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 8100

EXDIS:

REF: STATE 292142

I GAVE HUSSEIN THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE (REFTEL) AT MEETING ON 28TH (OTHER SUBJECTS REPORTED SEPTELS). HUSSEIN APPEARED TOUCHED BY CONTENTS OF PRESIDENTS'S MESSAGE. HE READ IT CAREFULLY AND THEN SAID IT WAS A "VERY NICE MESSAGE" AND THAT HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR IT.  
GP-3.

SYMMES

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NLJ-S 98001

By 15/100, NARA, Date 10/2/01

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

19  
292074  
292074  
24 DEC 68 22 36  
FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN  
INFO: " TEL AVIV  
Info: USUN NEW YORK

STATE 292074

NODIS

SANDSTORM

Amman's 6994

1. We share your view that efforts to reach an Arab-Israel settlement are at an impasse and that some changes in tactics will be necessary if progress toward a settlement is to be made. These could be in the direction of (a) a more active U.S. role with the parties making more explicit to them and publicly what we are prepared to support and what we will not support; (b) an effort to concert with the Soviets in order to bring the UAR to acceptance of a contractual, agreed peace as the price of Israeli withdrawal; and, (c) more intensive U.S. efforts with Israelis to secure GOI commitment to principle of withdrawal (Jerusalem, Gaza and minor border adjustments aside) in context of peace. In any event, we plan to operate within the context of the November 22 Resolution keeping Jarring in play, if possible, and avoiding a direct U.S. involvement in the mediatory process. This, of course, will be subject to review by the new administration.

2. Covert Israeli-Jordanian negotiations seem also to be at impasse.

Drafted by: *RPD* NEA:RPD *RPD* 12/24/68  
Tel. Ext. 2107  
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Parker T. Hart  
Clearances: IAI - Mr. Atherton IO - Mr. *RPD* Sisco U - The Under Secretary S/S - Mr. Parker  
ARN - Mr. *RPD* Seelye

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, # 359  
By *ry* NARA, Date 9-13-04

~~SECRET~~

Classification

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~~SECRET/NODIS~~

*Classification*

Whether the Israelis sought to lull us into inactivity by assuring us repeatedly of progress being made in these talks or whether they simply unable to assess the limits of the possible insofar as Hussain's options are concerned, process seems moribund until such time as one or the other government tables alternative proposals.

3. Your recommendations are along lines of our thinking here. Trend has been toward making more specific U.S. ideas on issues involved in a settlement and clarifying what we are prepared to support. Thus, we agree that when you or Ambassador Barbour sees occasion to feed in ideas or opportunities for substantive probing, you should do so. A necessary caveat is that this must be in the context of an informal exchange of views unless subject is an established U.S. position and should be limited to the two or three decision makers on each side who count and whose discretion can be relied upon.

4. Reftel came as we were clearing letter suggesting you raise with Zaid Rifa'i or other the possibility of Jordan tabling counter proposals to the Allon Plan along lines of recognizing Israel's legitimate concern at security on the West Bank and exploring various interim arrangements which would obtain until Israel is assured of Jordan's capability and willingness to prevent hostile actions being mounted from area against Israel. Joint patrols, UN force with Jordanian and Israeli liaison contingents, or Israeli military enclaves maintained for a limited period, until a regime of peace and security established were ideas that came to mind. These would provide reasonable security assurances for Israel and at the same time give regime stronger grounds for moving against any Palestinian irredentist movements as prolonging Israeli presence. You may wish to touch on these in your forthcoming

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

*Classification*

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Classification

discussion with King Hussain along with other thoughts in Paragraph 4A of reftel.

You might stress to King that an articulated GOJ position on these questions would be useful in flushing out a possible Israeli fallback position to Allon Plan.

5. You should assure King that USG will be actively engaged in supporting moves toward a settlement in the context of the November 22 Resolution.

6. There has been a small working group (NEA-IO-L) which has been engaged in planning on an ad hoc basis for a settlement since August of 1967. Some of the "think pieces" are currently being revised and will be pouched to both posts for comment and background use in informal discussions.

7. We are considering ways of making public more detailed USG views on what we would consider a fair and reasonable settlement under the November 22 Resolution. Recommendations now being formulated for this or next administration.

GP-1

END

RUSK

~~SECRET/NODIS~~  
Classification



Department of State

20 WF  
**TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

R 301440Z DEC 68  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7035  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ SECTION ONE OF TWO AMMAN 8105

CONTROL : 8010Q  
RECEIVED : Dec 31,  
6:17AM

NODIS

SANDSTORM

SUBJ: MY DISCUSSION WITH HUSSEIN ON 28TH

*Restow*

REF: STATE 292074

SUMMARY: WITH THE AUTHORITY GIVEN ME IN STATE 292074, I BROACHED WITH THE KING THE ISSUE OF SECRET ISRAELI-JORDANIAN CONTACTS. I AM CONVINCED THAT THE KING WELCOMED THIS INITIATIVE. IN ADDITION TO SUPPLYING CONSIDERABLE DETAILS ABOUT SUBSTANCE OF THESE CONTACTS, THE KING MADE CLEAR THAT THE CHANNEL WITH ISRAEL WAS STILL OPEN IF THE ISRAELIS WANTED TO USE IT, BUT IT WAS UP TO THEM, HE EMPHASIZED. HE SAID HE COULD DO NOTHING MORE UNLESS OR UNTIL THE ISRAELIS BECAME MORE FORTHCOMING. HE STRESSED THAT SECRET TALKS WITH ISRAEL COULD ONLY BE COMPLEMENTARY TO, NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR, TALKS THROUGH JARRING. END SUMMARY.

1. DURING MY LENGTHY MEETING WITH HUSSEIN ON 28TH, I TOLD HIM THAT I WANTED TO RAISE A VERY SENSITIVE MATTER WHICH I HAD WANTED TO DISCUSS WITH HIM FOR A LONG TIME BUT FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS HAD BEEN UNABLE TO DO SO. I SAID I WAS REFERRING SPECIFICALLY TO THE PAPER HE HAD GIVEN GOVERNOR SCRANTON REGARDING SECRET CONTACTS JORDAN HAD HAD WITH ISRAEL. I HAD KNOWN GENERALLY ABOUT THESE CONTACTS BUT I HAD NOT BEEN IN A POSITION TO DISCUSS THEM WITH HIM. I PERSONALLY HAD DETECTED INDICATIONS THAT IN THE COMING WEEKS THERE MIGHT BE IN SOME WAYS A MORE ACTIVE U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE-MAKING PROCESS UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES. I WISHED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE U.S. CONTINUES TO WANT TO REINFORCE AND COMPLEMENT THE JARRING MISSION IN CONSTRUCTIVE WAYS. I ALSO WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT WE STAND FIRMLY BY THE ASSURANCES THAT HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO HIM. MY PRESENT APPROACH TO HIM WAS A PURELY PERSONAL AND INFORMAL ONE. I PARTICULARLY WANTED HIM TO KNOW THAT I COULD PASS ON IN A SECURE WAY ANYTHING FURTHER HE WISHED US TO KNOW ABOUT SENSITIVE CONTACTS HE HAD HAD WITH THE ISRAELIS. IT SEEMED TO ME THERE WAS MUTUAL BENEFIT IN OUR BEING ABLE TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER IN DETAIL IN THE COMING WEEKS. I ADDED THAT I HAD NEVER DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT WITH ANYONE IN HIS

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Authority FRUS, Vol. XX Item 373  
By ly NARA, Date 9-13-01

~~SECRET~~

-2-Page, AMMAN 8105, December 31, 1968 NODIS/SANDSTORM

GOVERNMENT; FOR EXAMPLE, I HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT ABDUL MUN'IM RIFAI PROBABLY WAS NOT PRIVY TO THE SENSITIVE CONTACTS WITH ISRAEL. (THE KING AFFIRMED THAT THIS WAS TRUE.) I THEN REFERRED TO THE KING'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO ENGLAND AND SAID I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HIM TO LET ME KNOW IF THERE IS ANY JORDANIAN OFFICIAL NOW IN THE KNOW WITH WHOM I MIGHT DISCUSS THIS GENERAL SUBJECT IF NECESSARY DURING HIS ABSENCES FROM THE COUNTRY. I ADDED THAT I PERSONALLY BELIEVED THERE WAS "GIVE" IN MOST ASPECTS OF THE ISRAELI POSITION AND IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR HIM TO TRY TO FLUSH OUT THEIR ATTITUDES PARTICULARLY ON HOW WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WEST BANK WOULD BE ORGANIZED.

2. THE KING RESPONDED THAT HE INDEED THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR US TO HAVE SUCH AN INFORMAL RELATIONSHIP IN THE COMING PERIOD BECAUSE HE VERY MUCH HOPED THE UNITED STATES WOULD TAKE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE, BUT STILL UNDER THE AEGIS OF JARRING. HE SAID HE WOULD THINK OVER THE SITUATION IN THE COMING DAYS BEFORE HE DEPARTS AND WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH ME TO LET ME KNOW WITH WHOM I MIGHT TALK DURING HIS ABSENCES IF THAT WERE NECESSARY. MEANWHILE HE WANTED TO BRIEF ME ON WHAT HAD TRANSPIRED SO FAR.

3. HUSSEIN SAID THAT TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS HAVE GONE ON "FOR SOME LONG TIME." IN SPITE OF ALL THE CONTACTS, HOWEVER, THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCERNIBLE GIVE IN ANY SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE ISRAELI POSITION. QUOTE. IN EFFECT, THE ISRAELIS KEEP GIVING US THEIR GENERAL POSITION AND WE KEEP GIVING THEM OURS. UNQUOTE. AS FAR AS JORDAN IS CONCERNED, THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION CONTAINS THE PRINCIPLES UNDER WHICH A SETTLEMENT IS TO BE WORKED OUT. THE PRINCIPLES DO NOT ALLOW FOR ANY BARGAINING. IT IS DETAILS UNDER THE PRINCIPLES THAT NEED TO BE DISCUSSED. IN REGARDS TO PRINCIPLES, HOWEVER, JORDAN HAD TO MAKE PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT IT MUST HAVE THE JARRING UMBRELLA: THAT IS, THAT WHILE DETAILS MIGHT BE DISCUSSED BY SECRET CONTACTS, SUCH DISCUSSIONS WERE ONLY AN AID AND COULD NOT BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR REACHING ARGREEMENT UNDER THE AEGIS OF JARRING. ANYTHING DISCUSSED IN SECRET WITH ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE KNOWN TO JARRING TO BE PASSED ON OFFICIALLY.

4. ANOTHER ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLE FOR JORDAN IS THAT THE UAR MUST BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE JARRING PROCESS. JORDAN AT THIS TIME WAS UNABLE TO GO IT ALONE. HUSSEIN INDICATED THAT EVEN IF HE WERE WILLING TO GO ITALONE HE THOUGHT ANY SEPARATE SETTELEMENT REACHED WITH ISRAEL WOULD NOT ENDURE. HUSSEIN REFERRED PARENTHETICALLY TO RECENT US-UAR DISCUSSIONS OF THE SEVEN POINTS AND EMPHASIZED THAT WE SHOULD NOT CONSIDER THAT SYRIA PRESENTS A PROBLEM. JORDAN AND THE UAR ARE NOT IN A POSITION COMPLETELY TO DISREGARD SYRIA AND COULD MAKE NO PUBLIC STATEMENT TO THAT EFFECT. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE BETWEEN ISRAELI AND JORDAN AND THE UAR, SYRIA COULD BE LEFT ASIDE.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-Page, AMMAN 8105 December 31, 1968, NODIS/SANDSTORM

5. A THIRD ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLE FOR JORDAN IS THAT ISRAEL MUST PUBLICLY ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL FROM TERRITORY OCCUPIED IN JUNE 1967. THE RESOLUTION PROVIDES THAT THERE SHALL BE NO TERRITORIAL AGGRESSION. IT ALSO PROVIDES THAT BOUNDARIES ARE TO BE DISCUSSED AND THAT THERE MAY BE SOME TERRITORIAL MODIFICATIONS; BUT UNLESS THE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL IS ACCEPTED BY ISRAEL, JORDAN WILL BE UNABLE TO MOVE FURTHER TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

6. A FINAL PRINCIPLE IS THAT ANY TERRITORIAL CHANGES MUST BE MADE ON A BASIS OF "RECIPROCITY." HUSSEIN USED THE WORD "RECIPROCITY" SEVERAL TIMES DURING HIS CONVERSATION. I THINK HE MEANT THAT IF JORDAN AGREES TO A TERRITORIAL CHANGE IN ONE PLACE IT WILL HAVE TO BE COMPENSATED BY SOME TERRITORY ELSEWHERE ON AT LEAST A FACE-SAVING BASIS. HE USED THE WORD "RECIPROCITY" IN DISCUSSING SECURITY AS WELL. HE STRESSED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT HE HAD TOLD THE ISRAELIS REPEATEDLY THAT SECURITY MUST BE WORKED OUT ON A BASIS OF RECIPROCITY. HE IS FULLY PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE NOTION THAT ISRAEL HAS SECURITY CONCERNS, BUT HE ALSO EXPECTS ISRAEL TO RECOGNIZE THAT JORDAN HAS SECURITY CONCERNS.

7. HUSSEIN DISCUSSED SOME OF THE SPECIFICS THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE THROWN OUT IN THE SECRET CONTACTS. WITH REGARD TO TERRITORY, THE ISRAELIS HAVE SAID THEY WANT A 12-KILOMETER-WIDE STRIP RUNNING ALONG THE JORDAN RIVER FROM THE NORTH (TIBERIAS) TO A POINT A FEW MILES NORTH OF JERICO. JORDAN WOULD BE  
BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

R 301440Z DEC 68  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7036  
STATE GRNC  
BT

CONTROL : 7989Q  
RECEIVED : Dec. 31, 1968  
2:40AM

~~SECRET~~ SECTION TWO OF TWO AMMAN 8105

NODIS/SANDSTORM

ALLOWED TO HAVE CORRIDORS ACROSS THIS STRIP. THE ISRAELIS HAVE NOTED ALSO THAT THEY EXPECT BOUNDARY CHANGES IN THE WEST. HUSSEIN MENTIONED NO SPECIFICS WITH REGARD TO LATROUN AND QALQILIYA, BUT HE SAID THAT IN ADDITION TO THE BOUNDARY CHANGES THE ISRAELIS INSIST UPON THE NEW WESTERN FRONTIER BEING COMPLETELY OPENED FOR ALL ISRAELIS. THE ISRAELIS ALSO WANT A STRIP OF TERRITORY RUNNING TO THE HEBRON AREA (SIC). THEY HAVE INDICATED IN A GENERAL WAY THAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER GIVING JORDAN ACCESS TO MEDITERRANEAN PORT FACILITIES. WITH REGARD TO GAZA, THEIR LAST WORD WAS THAT THEY WANT TO KEEP IT, BUT THERE WERE SOME INDICATIONS THEY MIGHT BE WILLING TO DISCUSS ITS FUTURE.

8. FAR FROM GIVING ANYTHING ON JERUSALEM THE ISRAELIS HAVE TAKEN A VERY HARD LINE, AND HUSSEIN SAID THAT HE COULD SEE THAT ALL JORDAN WOULD GET WAS " ACCESS TO THE HOLY PLACES." HUSSEIN SAID THAT " SOVERIGNTY" OVER WHAT IT PREVIOUSLY HAD IN JERUSALEM IS IMPORTANT TO JORDAN AND THAT THE ISRAELIS SO FAR HAD GIVEN HIM NO HOPE OF AN ARRANGEMENT IN JERUSALEM AS "A CITY OF PEACE" WHICH WOULD NO LONGER BE THE CAUSE OF DIVISION BETWEEN ARABS AND ISRAELIS BUT WOULD BE THE PLACE WHERE THEY WOULD MEET. HE DID NOT GO INTO ANY DETAILS OF WHAT KIND OF PRACTICAL ADMINISTRATION THIS WOULD ENTAIL IN HIS VIEW, AND BECAUSE THERE WAS SO MUCH ELSE TO DISCUSS I DECIDED NOT TO PROBE HIM FOR DETAILS.

9. ON REFUGEES THE KING SAID THE ISRAELIS WERE PROPOSING THAT JORDAN AND ISRAEL FORM A SORT OF BILATERAL COMMITTEE TO DISCUSS THE STATUS AND DISPOSITION OF THE REFUGEE. THE KING HAD RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO JORDAN AND JORDAN'S POSITION IS THAT THE EXISTING UN RESOLUTIONS ON REFUGEES MUST BE APPLIED, AT LEAST IN PRINCIPLE. HE BELIEVED FIRMLY THAT JORDAN AND ISRAEL ALONE COULD NOT EFFECTIVELY SETTLE THE REFUGEE PROBLEM AND THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST BE INVOLVED.

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-2-Page, AMMAN 8105 December 31, 1968, NODIS/SANDSTORM

10. THE KING SAID THE ISRAELIS WERE STILL INSISTING UPON SIGNING SOME KIND OF " GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT" DOCUMENT. JORDAN DID NOT TAKE THE POSITION THAT IT WOULD NEVER SIGN ANY KIND OF DOCUMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE WAY THE ISRAELIS KEPT PUTTING IT, IT APPEARED THAT THEY WANTED A GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT PEACE TREATY OF THE TRADITIONAL SORT. THIS WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE.

11. I SUGGESTED THAT SUBMITTING COUNTER-PROPOSALS TO ALLON PLAN CONCEPTS MIGHT HELP TO FLUSH OUT ISRAELI "GIVE". DRAWING ON STATE 292074 AND AMMAN 7992, I ADVANCED SEVERAL ILLUSTRATIVE IDEAS. THE KING DID NOT RESPOND SPECIFICALLY BUT COMMENTED THAT ISRAELIS INSISTENCE ON A DEMILITARIZED WEST BANK GAVE HIM NO PROBLEMS. AS HE HAD ALREADY INDICATED TO ME, HE WAS PREPARED TO MAINTAIN ONLY PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES ON THE WEST BANK. ON THE OTHER HAND, THINGS LIKE THE ALLON PLAN WOULD GIVE HIM A PROBLEM, AND HE HAD STRESSED TO THE ISRAELIS THAT JORDAN ALSO HAD SECURITY INTERESTS. SECURITY WAS RECIPROCAL, HE REITERATED, BUT, EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, SECURITY WOULD BE A FRUIT OF PEACE AND WOULD FLOW FROM AN ACCEPTABLE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION.

12. HUSSEIN CONCLUDED THIS SECTION OF THE CONVERSATION BY SAYING THAT DESPITE THE NEGATIVE SUMMARY HE HAD GIVEN ME HE WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE CHANNEL IS STILL OPEN IF THE ISRAELIS WANT TO USE IT. IT IS UP TO THEM. THE BALL IS IN THEIR COURT. QUOTE. UNLESS THEY ARE WILLING TO HELP ME ON THE PRINCIPLES I HAVE OUTLINED, I CAN DO NOTHING MORE. UNQUOTE. WHEN THE KING MENTIONED THIS TO ME ANOTHER TIME, I EMPHASIZED TO HIM THAT WE WOULD NOT BE SAYING ANYTHING TO THE ISRAELIS ABOUT THIS DISCUSSION AND THAT I ASSUMED THAT HE ALREADY HAD TOLD THE ISRAELIS THAT THE BALL WAS IN THEIR COURT. HE INDICATED THAT THIS WAS THE CASE.

13. AS I WAS LEAVING THE KING SAID ONCE AGAIN THAT HE APPRECIATED HAVING HAD THIS CONVERSATION AND THAT HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH ME BEFORE HE LEFT TO LET ME KNOW IF THERE WERE ANY LATE DEVELOPMENTS AND ALSO WHOM I MIGHT TALK TO IN HIS ABSENCE.

14. SUGGEST DEPT PASS TO TEL AVIV AND USUN. SYMMES

GP-1

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(NOT PASSED TO TEL AVIV AND USUN BY OC/T)

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Department of State

W#  
TELEGRAM  
21  
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R 191415Z DEC 68  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6994  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 7992

5 6 8 9Q  
DECEMBER 20, 1968  
1:46 A.M.

NODIS SANDSTORM

SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS IN MOVING TOWARD ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT

SUMMARY: THE FOLLOWING REPORT GIVES OUR VIEWS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION AND RECOMMENDS TACTICS IN THE NEXT STAGES. END SUMMARY

1. HERE IN AMMAN WE HAVE A DEFINITE FEELING OF HAVING ARRIVED AT AN IMPASSE IN EFFORTS TO REACH AN ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT. WE HAVE REPORTED THE GLOOMY ATTITUDES OF SENIOR JORDANIANS CAUSED BY THE HIATUS IN JARRING'S ACTIVITIES AND THEIR INCREASING STRESS ON THE NEED FOR BUILDING UP A STRONGER DEFENSIVE MILITARY POSTURE IN ORDER TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH ISRAEL. SEVERAL OF MY DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS TO THE PALACE AND PRIME MINISTRY SHARE MY OWN OBSERVATIONS OF THE CURRENT PURPOSELESS DRIFT IN JORDANIAN POLICY--WITH ITS OVERTONES OF PESSIMISM. THE PIECE OF PAPER HANDED TO GOVERNOR SCRANTON BY KING HUSSEIN (AMMAN 7822) GRAPHICALLY SUMMARIZED HUSSEIN'S OWN CONCLUSION THAT JORDANIAN CONTACTS WITH ISRAEL, BOTH DIRECT AND INDIRECT, HAVE FAILED TO PRODUCE PROGRESS TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. THE KING EMPHASIZED HE COULD DO NO MORE. IN EFFECT, THE JORDANIANS ARE NOW LEAVING THE INITIATIVE TO OTHERS.

2. MY OWN READING OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IS THAT THE JORDANIANS (WITH STRONG BEHIND-THE-SCENES SUPPORT FROM THE UAR AND OTHER ARABS) ARE ALSO CLEARLY PUTTING A CHALLENGE TO THE US, AND PARTICULARLY TO THE NEW ADMINISTRATION. IN MANY WAYS IT IS AN UNREALISTIC CHALLENGE AND THEIR EXPECTATIONS FOR POLICY CHANGES AND NEW INITIATIVES CERTAINLY EXCEED THE POSSIBILITIES. NEVERTHELESS, THE SEEMING IMPASSE COUPLED WITH THIS ARAB CHALLENGE AND EXPECTATION REQUIRE US IN OUR OWN INTEREST TO DEVELOP REVISED TACTICS.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

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3. ASIDE FROM THE FACT THAT OUR PRESENT TACTICS ARE NOT PRODUCING PROGRESS, THERE ARE OTHER REASONS SUGGESTING A CHANGE:

A. TIME IS RUNNING OUT. BEGIN UNDERLINE IN MANY RESPECTS, NOT JUST PSYCHOLOGICALLY, WE ARE FARTHER REMOVED FROM A SETTLEMENT NOW THAN A YEAR AGO, END UNDERLINE IN THE FIRST FLUSH OF ENTHUSIASM FOR THE JARRING MISSION.

BZ. BEGIN UNDERLINE JUDGED REALISTICALLY, WE ARE NOT GOING TO GET A NICE TIDY SETTLEMENT THAT WILL PROVIDE PERFECT SECURITY AND ALL OF THE USUAL TRAPPINGS OF INTERNATIONAL INTERCOURSE FOR ISRAEL. END UNDERLINE AFTER THE WAVE OF REALISM FOLLOWING JUNE 1967 CONFLICT, THE ARABS IN RECENT MONTHS

HAVE BECOME LESS, RATHER THAN MORE, WILLING TO COMPROMISE ON THE ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL AS A STATE WITH WHICH THEY WILL ENTERTAIN NORMAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. (IN MANY WAYS THE ARABS DO NOT HAVE NORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH EACH OTHER.) I SHARE THE OPINION OF AMB BARBOUR, AS CONVEYED TO FONMIN EBAN (TEL AVIV 6153), THAT THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY IN THE FIRST INSTANCE OF FULL PEACE AND RPT AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS. IN FACT, WHILE WE HAVE WAITED AND WATCHED JARRING WRESTLE WITH THIS PROBLEM, WE MAY HAVE MISSED OPPORTUNITIES TO SETTLE FOR LESS PERFECT ARRANGEMENTS.

C. AS SEEN FROM AMMAN, BEGIN UNDERLINE THE ISRAELI GOVT'S CONTINUING INABILITY TO DEVELOP A CONSENSUS END UNDERLINE NOT ONLY MAKES IT UNLIKELY JARRING CAN SUCCEED BUT IS THE MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCK IN THE PATH OF A BREAKTHROUGH IN THE PURELY JORDANIAN-ISRAELI CONTEXT OF A SETTLEMENT. MORE AND MORE ISRAELI SPOKESMEN SEEM TO DEFINE ISRAELI SECURITY CONCERNS IN TERMS OF ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY. THE ISRAELIS SEEM UNABLE TO GRASP THAT THE ALLON PLAN AND ITS VARIATIONS ARE NOT ONLY UNACCEPTABLE TO JORDAN BUT THAT IT ALSO REPRESENTS THE KIND OF ARRANGEMENT THAT WOULD PERPETUATE HOSTILITY. SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS ELSEWHERE DURING THE TWENTIETH CENTURY HAVE DEMONSTRATED THEY ARE MORE LIKELY TO BREED SUBSEQUENT TROUBLE AND IRREDENTISM THAN TO GUARANTEE SECURITY.

D. BEGIN UNDERLINE THE ISRAELI "CLARIFICATION PROCESS" WITH JORDAN THUS HAS BEEN SINGULARLY UNREALISTIC, UNSPECIFIC, AND UNPRODUCTIVE. END UNDERLINE I HAVE BEEN BAFFLED (AND INDEED SUSPICIOUS) ALL ALONG ABOUT WHAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE TOLD US BUT HAFUASSUMED IT WAS BECAUSE I WAS NOT PRIVY TO CLOSELY HELD DETAILS. YET, IF WE ARE TO TAKE HUSSEIN'S COMMENTS TO GOV SCRANTON SERIOUSLY, THEN I THINK WE MUST CONCLUDE THAT EVEN IF THE ISRAELIS HAVE NOT JUST BEEN PULLING WOOL OVER OUR EYES, THEY HAVE DEFINITELY MOVED TOO SLOWLY AND HAVE FAILED TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE REALITIES AS FAR AS JORDAN IS CONCERNED.

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-3- SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 7992, DECEMBER 19. NODIS/SANDSTORM

E. OUR ASSURANCES TO HUSSEIN (AMMAN 7548) SEEM EMBARRASSINGLY EXPLICIT WHEN, TOGETHER WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION, THEY ARE PUT UP AGAINST THE POSITION EBAN OUTLINED TO JARRING EARLY THIS MONTH (TEL AVIV 6401). MORE OMINOUSLY, HOWEVER, THE COMMENTS OF RAFAEL (STATE 280109) INDICATE THAT ISRAEL STILL HAS EXPECTATIONS THAT JORDAN COULD AGREE TO MORE SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS ON THE WEST BANK AND IN JERUSALEM THAN WE HAVE PREDICTED. THESE EXPECTATIONS ARE UNREALISTIC. BEGIN UNDERLINE EVEN IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THAT HUSSEIN DID AGREE TO SUCH ISRAELI TERRITORIAL DEMANDS, HOWEVER, I QUESTION WHETHER FROM OUR STANDPOINT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT COULD CONSTITUTE A LASTING PEACE. END UNDERLINE OUR ASSURANCES TO JORDAN AND JORDAN'S OWN INTERNAL SITUATION PLACE VERY DECIDED CONSTRAINTS ON THE BARGAINING SITUATION. AT THE LEAST, HUSSEIN SEES OUR ASSURANCES AS HIS FINAL, FALLBACK POSITION. WE MUST ACCEPT THIS FACT OURSELVES AND CONTINUE TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE ISRAELIS.

F. I FINALLY COME BACK TO THE POINT THAT IN STRESSING THAT "THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT MUST BE THE PARTIES TO THE PEACE", WE MAY HAVE SOMETIMES BEEN BEMUSED INTO FOREGETTING THAT WE ARE A VERY INTERESTED PARTY, WITH HIGH STAKES OF OUR OWN. BEGIN UNDERLINE THE PAST YEAR HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT IF WE LEAVE THIS PEACEMAKING PROCESS TO THE ISRAELIS AND THE ARABS, THERE IS GOING TO VIRTUALLY NO FORWARD MOVEMENT. END UNDERLINE  
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TELEGRAM

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R 191415Z DEC 68  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6995  
STATE GRNC  
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5 6 9 OQ  
DECEMBER 20, 1968  
12:53 A.M.

~~SECRET~~ FINAL SECTION OF 2 AMMAN 7992

NODIS SANDSTORM

SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS IN MOVING TOWARD ARAB - ISRAEL SETTLEMENT

G. UNLESS WE CAPITALIZE ON THE EXISTING POSSIBILITIES IN THE PARTIES' STATED ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION, BEGIN UNDERLINE WE MAY WELL DRIFT FURTHER INTO THE SITUATION THAT HUSSEIN FORESEES: AN INCREASE IN INCIDENTS, TENSIONS, AND EXTREMISM END UNDERLINE (WHICH HUSSEIN WAS CAREFUL TO EXPLAIN WOULD OCCUR "OF BOTH SIDES"). UNFORTUNATELY, THE FACT THAT THIS TRAGEDY HAS ALREADY PLAYED TO A FULL HOUSE FOR TWENTY-ONE YEARS DOES NOT MEAN IT MAY NOT HAVE AN EVEN LONGER RUN.

4. IN PROPOSING REVISED US TACTICS, I AM NOT SUGGESTING US INTERVENTION IN THE MEANINGLESS OR NEGATIVE SENSE OFTEN ADVOCATED BY THE ARABS (E.G., ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON ISRAEL). ANOTHER CONSIDERATION IS THAT JARRING MIGHT BE FINISHED WITH THE ISRAELIS IF HE PUT FORTH HIS OWN PLANS. THIS CONSTITUTES AN ADDED REASON FOR US TO MOVE AHEAD IN A MORE ENTERPRISING FASHION--TO COMMUNICATE A MUSCULAR SENSE OF URGENCY--BUT IN A MANNER THAT WOULD NOT UNDERCUT JARRING. THIS CAN BE DONE AS OUTLINED BELOW:

A. DURING THE PAST YEAR WE HAVE NOT TALKED SUBSTANCE ENOUGH WITH THE PARTIES ON A REGULAR AND CONTINUING BASIS. WE PERHAPS HAVE BEEN OVERLY CAUTIOUS ABOUT GIVING ANY IMPRESSION OF UNDERCUTTING THE JARRING MISSION. AT SPORADIC INTERVALS IN NEW YORK OR WASHINGTON WE HAVE GOTTEN DOWN TO THE HEART ISSUES, AS IN THE SECRETARY'S NOV 2 MEETING WITH RIAD. BUT THERE HAS BEEN VITURALLY NO MOVEMENT IN THE INTERIMS. AMB BARBOUR'S QUESTION WHETHER TO PASS CERTAIN ISRAELI COMMENTS TO THE JORDANIANS (PARA 5 OF TEL AVIV 6404) SUGGEST A NEED TO DECIDE WHETHER THE AMBASSADORS ON THE SPOT SHOULD BECOME MORE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN AN EXERCISE FROM WHICH WE HERETOFORE HAVE BEEN RELATIVELY DETACHED. I BELIEVE AS FAR AS JORDAN IS CONCERNED WE HAVE MISSED SEVERAL STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR MORE INTENSIVE, SUBSTANTIVE PROBING AND THAT THESE NEED NOT HAVE

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-2- FINAL SECTION 2 OF 2 AMMAN 7992, DECEMBER 19. NODIS/SANDSTORM

ENDANGERED JARRING'S MISSION. GIVEN THE ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF THE JORDAN REGIME, INEVITABLY WE MUST DEAL WITH HUSSEIN AND ONE OR TWO CLOSE ADVISERS IF WE ARE TO GET ANYTHING DONE AT ALL. I PERSONALLY WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH HUSSEIN, FOR EXAMPLE, WHETHER HE COULD SERIOUSLY ENTERTAIN THE IDEA OF ISRAELI SECURITY ENCLAVES OR SECURITY CORRIDORS ON THE WEST BANK, AND WHERE, AND FOR HOW LONG. I WOULD RECOMMEND ASCERTAINING WHETHER HUSSEIN COULD ACCEPT SOME KIND OF PHASED WITHDRAWAL BY WHICH ISRAELI MILITARY ENCLAVES, PERHAPS UNDER UN AEGIS, MIGHT REMAIN ON THE WEST BANK TEMPORARILY WHILE A REGIME OF PEACE AND SECURITY WAS BEING ESTABLISHED. SIMILARLY, I THINK WE NEED TO ELICIT HUSSEIN'S VIEWS REGARDING THE ISRAELI CONCEPT OF "OPEN BORDERS" AND "FREE ACCESS" TO THE MEDITERRANEAN. WE STAND TO LOSE MORE TIME AND OPPORTUNITIES IF WE LEAVE ENTIRELY TO THE ISRAELIS THE PROBING OF THE JORDANIAN POSITION (PARTICULARLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE EXERCISE OF THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS WHICH HUSSEIN CATEGORICALLY SAYS HAS FAILED).

B. I ALSO RECOMMEND THAT WE UNDERTAKE MORE INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PARTIES ON THE OUTLINES OF A PRAGMATIC AND HONORABLE SOLUTION TO THE JERUSALEM PROBLEM. THIS IS A KEY. I THINK WE SHOULD AIM AT A SOLUTION WHICH, AT A MINIMUM, REMOVES FROM UNILATERAL ISRAELI JURISDICTION THE ARAB INHABITANTS OF JERUSALEM.

C. I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THERE IS A WASHINGTON TASK FORCE ON THE ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM IN BEING, BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THE PROPOSED SHIFT IN OUR POLICY AND TACTICS WOULD REQUIRE A TIGHTLY CONTROLLED GROUP IN WASHINGTON TO WORK FULL TIME ON THIS PROBLEM IN THE SAME MANNER AS HAS BEEN DONE FOR VIET-NAM OR BERLIN. THE MERE FORMATION OF A TASK FORCE WOULD HAVE SUBSTANTIVE IMPACT OF SOME DIMENSION.

D. FINALLY, I RECOMMEND THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO PUBLISHING OR "LEAKING" SPECIFIC AND DETAILED USG VIEWS ON WHAT WE WOULD CONSIDER WOULD BE A FAIR AND REASONABLE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION. I WOULD SEE THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS FRANKLY TO PUT PUBLIC PRESSURE ON THE MORE STUBBORN OF THE THREE PARTIES--THE UAR AND ISRAEL.

5. DEPT PLEASE PASS TEL AVIV.  
SYMMES  
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NOTE: NOT PASSED TEL AVIV BY OC/T 12/20/68.

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2068  
STATE GRNC  
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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 0055

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1969 JAN 6 AM 8 52

NODIS

SANDSTORM

REF: AMMAN 8105

1. HUSSEIN HAD INDICATED THAT HE MIGHT GET IN TOUCH WITH ME AGAIN BEFORE LEAVING FOR LONDON, TO FOLLOW UP OUR CONVERSATION OF THE 28TH (REFTEL). ON THE FOURTH, HE INFORMED ME THROUGH ZAID RIFAI, SEC GEN OF THE ROYAL DIWAN, THAT HE HAD GIVEN CONSIDERABLE FURTHER THOUGHT TO OUR CONVERSATION AND HAD DECIDED THAT, IF ANYTHING CAME UP WITH RESPECT TO THAT SUBJECT, I SHOULD EITHER WAIT FOR HIM TO RETURN AMMAN OR, IF THE TIME FACTOR WERE CRITICAL, SEND SOMEONE TO LONDON.
2. BECAUSE ZAID RIFAI IS ACCOMPANYING THE KING TO LONDON IT IS A REASONABLE PRESUMPTION THAT ONLY THE KING AND ZAID RIFAI ARE PRIVY TO THIS SUBJECT.
3. I ALSO CONCLUDE THAT THE KING BELIEVES VERY STRONGLY THAT:
  - A. ANY INITIATIVE FOR RENEWED CONTACTS RESTS WITH ISRAELIS;
  - B. SUCH CONTACTS DEFINITELY WOULD BE SUBSIDIARY TO THE JARRING MISSION;
  - C. HE EXPECTS NO ACTIVITY THROUGH EITHER CHANNEL IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
4. DEPT MAY WISH PASS TEL AVIV.

GP-1. SYMMES  
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TELEGRAM <sup>23</sup>

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APPROVED BY:M-MR• ROSTOW  
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P R 070108Z JAN 69  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

~~SECRET~~ STATE 002016

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 0071

1. AMMAN 0071 ARRIVED DURING CALL BY ISRAELI AMBASSADOR RABIN ON UNDER SECRETARY ROSTOW. ROSTOW CONVEYED SUBSTANCE OF REFTEL TO RABIN, URGING GOI EXERCISE GREATEST PRUDENCE TO AVOID EXACERBATING ALREADY VOLATILE AREA SITUATION.

2. FOR TEL AVIV: EMBASSY SHOULD MAKE PARALLEL APPROACH TO GOI.

GP=3. RUSK

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NLJ-S 98001

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Department of State

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**TELEGRAM**

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NLJ-S 08001  
By 76/ll, NARA, Date 10/2/01

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 00071 062025Z

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ACTION SS: 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCD 00, /030 W

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0 P 061911Z JAN 69 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2075:  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
INFO AMEMBASY LONDON PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 0071

EXDIS:

SUBJ: POSSIBLE ATTACK ON EILAT

1. VICEROY PRINCE HASSAN HAS JUST PASSED URGENT MESSAGE TO US IN WHICH HE REVEALED GREAT CONCERN OVER THIS AFTERNOON'S BBC BROADCAST (POSSIBLY CARRIED OTHER AREA STATIONS AS WELL) THAT ISRAELI IDF SOUTHERN SECTOR COMMANDER HAD STATED THAT ATTACK ON EILAT WOULD BE MET WITH IMMEDIATE ATTACK ON AQABA. ASKED US TO MAKE CLEAR TO ISRAELIS THAT JORDAN HAD DONE EVERYTHING IT POSSIBLY COULD TO PREVENT INCIDENTS IN AQABA/EILAT AREA.

2. I STRONGLY RECOMMEND WE MAKE REPRESENTATIONS TO ISRAELIS IN WASHINGTON AND TEL AVIV POINTING OUT: A) WE CONVINCED GOJ HAS INDEED DONE EVERYTHING IT CAN TO PREVENT INCIDENTS IN THIS AREA; B) KING HELD MEETING WITH TOP SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE, AND JAA AUTHORITIES SATURDAY, THE 4TH, TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT NO PRECAUTIONS WERE OVERLOOKED (AND INCIDENTALLY TOLD BRITISH THAT JAA AREA COMMANDER IN AQABA HAD BEEN REPLACED); AND C) BOTH GOJ AND US DISTURBED BY RECENT THREATENING, ALMOST INFLAMMATORY STATEMENTS (E.G., ALLON AND IDF AREA COMMANDER) IN A SENSITIVE SITUATION CHARACTERIZED BY WIDESPREAD ARAB EXPECTATIONS, HOWEVER UNREASONABLE THAT ISRAELIS WOULD TAKE STRONG MILITARY ACTION AGAINST LEBANON OR JORDAN PRIOR JANUARY 29TH.

3. SINCE WE ARE VERY MUCH PARTY TO THIS AFFAIR (BY PASSING EBAN WARNING TO HUSSEIN, AND BY FOLLOWING UP AT LOWER LEVELS TO ENSURE THAT GOJ PRECAUTIONS ACTUALLY BEING TAKEN, BELIEVE WE HAVE RIGHT TO EXPECT ISRAELIS TO EXERCISE MORE THAN USUAL RESTRAINT.

GP-3. SYMMES

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November 25, 1968

25  
*(Handwritten initials)*

MID-EAST SCENARIO FOR THE NEXT MONTH

Refusing to see Hussein's emissary would be a real blow to our relationship with him. But when we see him depends (a) on how soon we can make up our minds what to tell him, (b) on how soon we could get to the Israelis if we wished to beforehand and (c) on the timing of Israel-Jordan meetings.

The main question is how much more we feel we could do to move Israel off the Allon Plan. This is tricky business, but we're at a crucial juncture. Now may be the time for a follow-up to the Ball mission. An emissary could take this line: We're with you on peace. Hussein tells us he is ready for peace provided he can defend the peace terms before Arab critics. The time has come to talk specifically about the terms of a settlement.

One risk in this is that the Israelis will object to our stepping in; they'd prefer to be left alone with Jordan. The other risk is that not stepping in now will make settlement highly unlikely.

If we sent an emissary, our scenario might look like this:

December 2: Jarring sees Eban on Cyprus (already scheduled). Jarring plans to go on to Cairo; he has left the door open on visiting Amman. Then Jarring will be off to Moscow for Christmas.

December 4 or after: US emissary to Jerusalem.

*early*  
December ? : Israel-Jordan meeting in Europe.

December ? : Jordanian emissary in Washington.

January ? : Top level Israel-Jordan meeting.

January ? : Jarring starts another round in which he is thinking of advancing specific ideas.

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NLJ 03-201  
By *iso*, NARA, Date *12-16-03*

H. H. S.



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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26  
Roktaw

R 070845Z JAN 69  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2077  
STATE GRNC  
BT

1 2 4 6Q  
JANUARY 7, 1968  
4:34 A.M.

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 0075

NODIS/SANDSTORM

1. JEAN MARIE MERILLON, THE NEW FRENCH AMB, AFTER REMARKING TO ME ON THE SIXTH THAT IT WAS HARDLY NECESSARY FOR HUSSEIN TO GO TO LONDON FOR SURGERY, SINCE ANY HOSPITAL WOULD BE GLAD TO SEND A SURGICAL TEAM TO AMMAN, SPECULATED THAT HUSSEIN ACTUALLY WANTED TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEE EBAN. HE THEN SAID THAT HE POSSESSED INFORMATION FROM QUOTE AN ABSOLUTELY RELIABLE SOURCE UNQUOTE THAT HUSSEIN AND EBAN HAD MET TOGETHER DURING HUSSEIN'S LAST STAY IN THE UK. HE SAID THAT THIS INFORMATION WAS NOT OBTAINED FROM ANYONE PRESENT AT THE MEETING, BUT REITERATED THAT IT WAS RELIABLE.

2. IT MAY BE WORTH NOTING IN THIS CONNECTION THAT MERMILLON JUST RETURNED FROM A SHORT VISIT TO PARIS. FRENCH EMB OFFICERS HAVE DESCRIBED HIM AS A COMER IN THE FOREIGN SERVICE AND A PROTEGE OF COUVE DE MURVILLE. HE MAY HAVE ACCESS TO SPECIAL INFORMATION.

GP-1

SYMMES

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By is, NARA, Date 2-17-04

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Department of State

27  
TELEGRAM

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By 15102 NARA, Date 10/2/01

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 07260 301422Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

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P 301300Z OCT 68  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6632  
INFO USINT CAIRO PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
USUN NY 1189

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 7260

EXDIS

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION: DISCUSSION WITH PRIMIN TALHOUNI

1. ON 30TH I HAD A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT SITUATION WITH PRIMIN TALHOUNI. I TOLD HIM WE WERE GRATIFIED BY GOJ ACTIONS TO PERSUADE UAR FONMIN RIAD TO REMAIN IN NEW YORK AND ALSO BY CONTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE DISPLAYED BY FONMIN RIFAI IN HIS RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARY AND AMB WIGGINS.

2. AFTER RECAPITULATING JORDANIAN POLICY TOWARD JARRING IN WELL-KNOWN TERMS, TALHOUNI EMPHASIZED THAT JORDAN CONSIDERS IT ESSENTIAL THAT EBAN BE ABLE TO SAY UPON HIS RETURN TO NEW YORK THAT ISRAEL ACCEPTS THE RESOLUTION AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION. HE SAID THAT UNLESS THERE IS SOME PUBLIC COMMITMENT BY ISRAEL TO AT LEAST THE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL, THE ARABS ARE IN AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION TO PROCEED TO THE "NEXT STEPS." SUCH A STATEMENT BY ISRAEL NOT ONLY HELPS NASSER SAVE FACE (AND JORDAN CONTINUES TO WANT THE UAR TO GO ALONG WITH IT) BUT IT WILL ALSO BE IMPORTANT FOR JORDAN IF IT TURNS OUT THAT JORDAN WILL HAVE TO PROCEED ALONE IN FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH JARRING AND WITH ISRAEL. THUS, WITH OR WITHOUT THE UAR, JORDAN MUST HAVE THIS STATEMENT FROM ISRAEL. TALHOUNI CONTINUED THAT IT WENT WITHOUT SAYING THAT JORDAN IS STILL WAITING TO HEAR SOME DETAILS OF THE ISRAELI POSTION ON SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES.

3. TALHOUNI STRESSED THAT EBAN'S RETURN IS VERY MUCH A

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WATERSHED IN THE MINDS OF THE ARABS. HE ASSERTED THAT THE ISRAELIS KNOW WHAT JORDAN WANTS AND WHAT JORDAN NEEDS. IF, AFTER ALL THESE WEEKS OF PATIENT WAITING ISREAL IS NOT ABLE OR WILLING TO PRODUCE, HE DID NOT SEE WHERE JORDAN COULD GO NEXT. TALHOUNI MENTIONED THAT ATTITUDES ON THE WEST BANK TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT HAVE APPRECIABLY HARDENED IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION HE HAS RECEIVED THE PEOPLE ON THE WEST BANK ARE MORE AND MORE DESPAIRING OF A SOLTUION AND INCREASINGLY TURNING TO THE IDEA OF RESISTANCE TO THE OCCUPATION. (NOTE AMMAN 7257) SIMILAR ATTITUDES ABOUND ON THE EAST BANK.

4. TALHOUNI CONCLUDED THIS PART OF OUR CONVERSATION BY ASKING THAT I BRING HIS REMARKS TO THE ATTENTION OF WASHINGTON AND SPECIFICALLY REQUEST THAT THE ISRAELIS BE URGED TO INSURE THAT EBAN TAKES "WHAT IS NEEDED" BACK TO NEW YORK.

SYMMES

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 07237 291101Z

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6620  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USUN 1187

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EXDIS

REF: STATE 253744

SUBJ: PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN

1. I CALLED ON KING HUSSEIN OCT 28 TO REVIEW WITH HIM MY RECENT CONSULTATIONS. I SAID I WISHED TO REITERATE THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRESIDENT'S RECENT MESSAGE TO HIM AND TO STRESS HOW IMPRESSED I HAD BEEN BY THE GENERAL ATTITUDE OF SUPPORT AND SYMPATHY FOR JORDAN THAT I HAD FOUND IN WASHINGTON. THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION IN HIS MIND THAT THE USG CONTINUES TO SUPPORT JORDAN AND ITS EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL UNDER THE SC RESOLUTION OF NOV 1967. I NOTED THAT THESE ASSURANCES HAD ALSO BEEN GIVEN IN VARIOUS WAYS RECENTLY TO PRIMIN TALHOUNI, FONMIN RIFAI AND AMB SHARAF.

2. THE KING THANKED ME AND SAID HE HAD BEEN VERY GRATEFUL FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, " ESPECIALLY AT THE TIME IT WAS SENT". HE HAD CONTINUED TO DELAY RESPONDING TO THE MESSAGE BECAUSE OF " THINGS NOW GOING ON". DEPENDING ON HOW SOME OF THESE MATTERS WORKED OUT, HE WOULD WANT TO TAKE THEM UP IN HIS RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE. HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD KNOW BETTER IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS WHAT HE MIGHT WANT TO PUT IN HIS RESPONSE. SYMMES

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6577  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 7114

EXDIS

REF: LONDON 13618

SUBJ: KHAMMASH PROPOSAL FOR VISIT

PRODUCTIVE TRIP BY KHAMMASH COULD OBVIOUSLY BE HELPFUL TO  
REGIME IN COPING WITH STRESSES GENERATED BY PHANTOM ANNOUNCEMENT.  
ANY EVENT, BELIEVE DESIRABLE AVOID OUTRIGHT TURN DOWN HIS  
PROPOSAL. SUGGEST REPLY BE IN TERMS DEFERRAL STRESSING VALUE  
OPPORTUNITY TALK WITH AMBASSADOR FOLLOWING HIS CONSULTATIONS.

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By 11/11, NARA, Date 10/2/00

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R 171450Z OCT 68  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6563  
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
USUN NY 1181

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EXDIS

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION: RIFAI REPORT

REF: USUN 7135

DURING CALL OCT 17, DEPRIMIN TOUGAN READ ME EXTENSIVE EXCERPTS FROM TELEGRAM DATED OCT 16 FROM FONMIN RIFAI IN NY. RIFAI QUOTED JARRING AS STATING HE STILL HAD NOTHING FROM EBAN WITH RESPECT TO JORDAN. JARRING HAD AFFIRMED THAT EBAN HAD PROMISED A DOCUMENT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS BUT HAD SUBSEQUENTLY ASKED FOR MORE TIME. RIFAI ALSO SAID THAT JARRING THOUGHT THE DOCUMENT WOULD PROBABLY APPLY ONLY TO THE UAR, EBAN AGAIN TAKING THE POSITION THAT THE JORDANIANS KNEW SEPARATELY OF ISRAEL'S VIEWS ON SECURE BOUNDARIES. RIFAI REPORTED THAT HE HAD EMPHASIZED TO JARRING THAT HIS WAS SIMPLY NOT THE CASE. TOUGAN COMMENTED THAT THEY HAD HEARD THIS LINE PREVIOUSLY FROM JARRING AND SAID THAT THEY, THE JORDANIANS, HAD REPEATEDLY DENIED THEY HAD ANYTHING AND STRESSED THE NEED FOR A CLEAR STATEMENT OF ISRAEL VIEWS. TOUGAN COMMENTED RATHER BITTERLY ABOUT ISRAEL'S COALITION GOVT, WONDERING IF IT COULD BRING ITSELF TO DO ANYTHING CONSTRUCTIVE.

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6543  
INFO USUN NY 1174  
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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EXDIS

SUBJ: PROPOSED ISRAELI DOCUMENT FOR JARRING

REF: USUN 7072

1. WE ARE DISTURBED BY INDICATION PARA 11 REFTEL THAT ISRAELIS NOT PLANNING TO INCLUDE ANYTHING WITH RESPECT TO JORDAN IN DOCUMENT OR DOCUMENTS THEY ARE SCHEDULED TO GIVE JARRING. FACT THAT RIFAI HAD GONE TO LONDON SEEMS TO US IRRELEVANT SINCE HE IS EXPECTED RETURN TO NY VERY SHORTLY. WE RECALL PARTICULARLY PARA SIX OF USUN 6819 IN WHICH JARRING SAID HE WAS PRESSING EBAN FOR INFO ON WHAT ISRAEL MEANT BY SECURE BOUNDARIES, SAYING HE COULD NOT FACE RIFAI AGAIN WITHOUT THIS, THE LATTER BEING IN AN INCREASINGLY PESSIMISTIC MOOD UNLESS HE HAS A CLEAR NOTION OF ISRAELI REAL INTENTIONS. AS ASSTSEC SISCO POINTED OUT IN PARA FIVE USUN 6819, THE JORDANIANS AT BEST APPEAR ENTITLED TO FEEL CONFUSED OR UNCERTAIN AS TO WHAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE IN MIND. WE HAVE SEEN NOTHING TO CONTRADICT THIS VIEW.

2. AS IT APPEARS FROM HERE, GRAVE DOUBTS WILL BE GENERATED WITH THE JORDANIANS AS TO THE EFFICACY AND SERIOUSNESS OF EFFORTS IN NY IF THE ISRAELIS DO NOT CARRY THROUGH QUICKLY, AND IN REASONABLE TERMS, ON EBAN'S UNDERTAKING IN HIS SPEECH, AS WELL AS HIS INDICATIONS TO JARRING AND TO US, TO EXCHANGE REAL SUBSTANCE THROUGH JARRING. PERHAPS THIS SHOULD BE IN A SEPARATE DOCUMENT FROM THAT GIVEN THE UAR.

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
O RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6537  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
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EXDIS:

SUBJ: PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN

REF: STATE 253744 AND LONDON 13455

1. SUMMARY - GIST OF PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO HUSSEIN GIVEN TO PRIMIN TALHOUNI OCT 12 ALONG WITH FURTHER EXPLANATIONS BASED ON DEPT'S GUIDANCE. PRIMIN EXPRESSED APPRECIATION BUT REVIEWED US ACTIONS ON AID, ARMS, AND NEAR EAST ISSUES AT THE UN AS DEMONSTRATING LACK OF BALANCE IN US POSITION TOWARD JORDAN AS COMPARED WITH ISRAEL. ASSERTED THESE ACTIONS EMBARRASSED FRIENDS OF US AND STIMULATED HEAVY PRESSURES FROM THE PUBLIC AGAINST THOSE FRIENDS. THESE PRESSURES HAD BEEN WITHSTOOD BUT IT WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT.

2. I ACKNOWLEDGED SOME DELAYS AND PROBLEMS INHERENT IN OUR SYSTEM AND THE COMPLEXITY OF THE SITUATION BUT STRESSED THE GREAT STRENGTH OF OUR FUNDAMENTAL POLICIES AND DETERMINATION TO CARRY THROUGH ON THEM. I ALSO SUGGESTED AS A PERSONAL OBSERVATION THAT CLEARING AWAY THE PHANTOM ISSUE MIGHT MAKE OUR DIALOGUE WITH THE ISRAELIS ON MORE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS EASIER. MEETING WAS CORDIAL AND OVERALL EFFECT OF PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE, PARTICULARLY REAFFIRMATION OF INTENTIONS CONTINUE WORK FOR A SOLUTION, SEEMED USEFUL. END SUMMARY  
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3. I INFORMED PRIMIN TALHOUNI MORNING OCT 12 OF GIST MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO KING HUSSEIN AS DELIVERED IN LONDON, DRAWING EXTENSIVELY ON COPY WHICH I EXCUSED MYSELF FROM GIVING TO HIM.

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Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, # 278

By H NARA, Date 9-19-01

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DEPRIMIN TOUGAN PRESENT. I ALSO DREW ON STATE 252286 MAKING PARTICULARLY POINTS (A) CLEAR EXPRESSION CONGRESSIONAL VIEWS; (B) NEGOTIATIONS MAY TAKE SOME TIME AND AGREEMENT NECESSARY ON RANGE OF POINTS BEFORE ANY AIRCRAFT WOULD ACTUALLY BE SENT TO AREA; (C) SOVIET DELIVERIES TO ISRAEL'S NEIGHBORS AND FACT THAT SO LONG AS SOURCE FOR REPLACEMENT OF HIGH PERFORMANCE AIRCRAFT IN DOUBT, THIS IN ITSELF DESTABILIZING; AND (D) OUR REAFFIRMED INTENTION WORK FOR SOLUTION BASIC PROBLEM.

4. TOUGAN COMMENTED THAT THEY HAD THOUGHT OF CALLING ME IN YESTERDAY AND BOTH HE AND PRIMIN EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR INFORMATION AND BACKGROUND. TALHOUNI SAID THAT WHILE HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT KING'S REACTION MESSAGE WOULD BE, OF COURSE, HE WOULD GIVE THE PRESENT VIEWS OF THE KING'S GOVT. TALHOUNI THEN GAVE A LONG AND CLOSELY REASONED ACCOUNT OF EVENTS OF THE PAST YEAR, CULMINATING IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PHANTOM DECISION, WHICH HE SAID LED HIM TO FEEL THERE WAS A BASIC AND DISTURBING LACK OF BALANCE IN THE RELATIONSHIPS OF THE US WITH ISRAEL AND WITH JORDAN. HE CITED THE SUSPENSION OF BUDGET SUPPORT, THE PROTRACTED BAN ON ARMS SHIPMENTS TO JORDAN, AND VARIOUS STANDS TAKEN BY THE US AT THE UN AS EXAMPLES OF THE KIND OF MOVES WHICH THE JORDAN PUBLIC COULD NOT UNDERSTAND AND WHICH WERE AN EMBARRASSMENT AND A SOURCE OF MOUNTING CRITICISM OF THE KING AND GOVT BY ALL WALKS OF LIFE IN JORDAN. HE EMPHASIZED HE WAS NOT ASKING FOR A RESUMPTION OF BUDGET SUPPORT BUT WAS ILLUSTRATING THE KIND OF THINGS WHICH HAD BEEN PILED ONE ON ANOTHER AND MADE IT HARD FOR ARAB FRIENDS OF THE US. DURING THE ARMS BAN JORDAN HAD BEEN UNDER TREMENDOUS PRESSURE TO ACCEPT SOVIET ARMS AND THE SOVIETS HAD INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO SUPPLY. THE JORDAN GOVT, HOWEVER, HAD DECIDED THAT THE WISEST COURSE WAS TO MAINTAIN ITS TIES WITH THE US. HE MENTIONED TOO THE DELIVERY OF SKYHAWKS TO ISRAEL WHILE JORDAN WAS STILL UNDER THE BAN. ALSO JORDAN HAD EXPECTED A MAJOR EFFORT BY THE US TO HELP CLEAR THE WAY FOR REAL PROGRESS AFTER LAST NOVEMBER'S SC RESOLUTION.

5. WITH RESPECT TO THE SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT, TALHOUNI SAID THIS OPENED THE WAY TO THE SOVIETS TO SUPPLY MORE AIRCRAFT WHICH WOULD TEND NULLIFY WHATEVER ADDITIONAL SECURITY THESE PLANES WERE EXPECTED TO GIVE ISRAEL. ALSO THERE WAS THE FACT THESE WOULD BE VIEWED BY THE ARABS IN THE LIGHT OF THE USE OF THE SKYHAWKS SUPPLIED WITH MODERN ROCKETS (SIC) IN THE ATTACK ON

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SALT IN WHICH INNOCENT CIVILIANS HAD BEEN KILLED. HE SAID HE WAS DISTRESSED BY THE TIMING OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT AND DEEPLY CONCERNED FOR THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF SUCH ACTIONS ON THE US IMAGE IN THE AREA AND THE POSITION OF THE PEOPLE WHO CONTINUE CLOSE TIES WITH THE US. CERTAINLY UP UNTIL NOW KING HUSSEIN HAD BEEN ABLE TO STAND OFF ALL PRESSURES AND ATTACKS ON HIS POLICY, BUT THIS WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT.

6. TALHOUNI SAID THAT WHILE IT WAS NOT FOR HIM TO SUGGEST WHAT US POLICY SHOULD BE, HE COULD NOT ESCAPE THE CONCLUSION THAT US INTERESTS HAD SUFFERED FROM VARIOUS ACTIONS IN THE PAST YEAR, MENTIONING IN THIS CONNECTION THE ENTRY OF ADDITIONAL SOVIET SHIPS INTO THE MEDITERRANEAN. HE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN FOR IMPLICATIONS OF THE DELAY IN RATIFICATION OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AS SYMPTOMATIC OF US PROBLEMS TODAY.

7. TALHOUNI SAID THE PRESS HAD ASKED HIM TO COMMENT ON THE AIRCRAFT NEGOTIATIONS ANNOUNCEMENT AND HE HAD REFUSED JUST AS HE HAD REFUSED BE DRAWN OUT ON THE EBAN SPEECH. TOUGAN SAID THAT THEY HAD JUST RECEIVED A TELEGRAM FROM FARRA IN NEW YORK REPORTING A DECISION OF THE ARAB DELEGATES AT THE UN TO ASK THEIR GOVERNMENTS TO EXPRESS TO RESPECTIVE AMERICAN AMBASSADORS THEIR CONCERN AND DISPLEASURE FOR THE PHANTOMS ANNOUNCEMENT AND TO URGE TRADE UNIONS AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS IN THE COUNTRY TO TELEGRAPH THEIR PROTESTS TO THE US AND THE UN. TALHOUNI SAID THAT JORDAN OBVIOUSLY WAS NOT GOING TO STIR UP THE LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE STREET AGAINST THE US IN SUCH A WAY, BUT THIS WAS AN EXAMPLE OF THE KIND OF PRESSURES THEY WERE UNDER. TALHOUNI ALSO DESCRIBED THE LATEST MEETING WITH NASSER IN WHICH NASSER HAD SAID THAT IT WAS ONLY ON ACCOUNT OF HUSSEIN THAT HE HAD BEEN PERSUADED TO MAKE A PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF THE SC RESOLUTION. THIS DECISION HAD, NASSER SAID, GIVEN HIM COUNTLESS HEADACHES WITH HIS OWN PEOPLE AND HE MAINTAINED IT BECAUSE OF HUSSEIN.

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8. AFTER HEARING TALHOUNI OUT, AS HE HAD ME, I SAID I WOULD REPORT FULLY HIS COMMENTS. I SAID I ALSO WISH TO REAFFIRM THAT I KNEW THAT THE HIGHEST LEVELS IN THE USG ADMIRED AND APPRECIATED THE WISDOM AND COURSE HE AS WELL AS THE KING HAD FOLLOWED IN THIS LONG DIFFICULT PERIOD. WE KNEW THAT DELAYS AND SOMETIMES OUR ACTIONS RESULTED IN PROBLEMS FOR THEM. THESE ELEMENTS WERE INEVITABLE IN OUR SYSTEM AND THE COMPLEX SITUATION WITH WHICH WE WERE DEALING. WITH RESPECT TO BUDGET SUPPORT, THE FACTS OF THE FISCAL SITUATION HAD MADE THE ACTION INEVITABLE BUT WE HAD TRIED TO SHOW OUR SUPPORT FOR JORDAN IN OTHER WAYS. HE SHOULD NOT OVERLOOK, HOWEVER, THE GREAT STRENGTH OF OUR FUNDAMENTAL POLICIES AND OUR DETERMINATION TO CARRY THROUGH ON THESE. ONE OF THESE POLICIES WAS TO WORK FOR A BASIC SOLUTION WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH CONDITIONS OF REAL PEACE IN THE AREA. THIS REQUIRED COOPERATION OF ALL. I NOTED THE REAFFIRMATION OF OUR INTENTIONS IN THE MESSAGE TO THE KING AND THE STATEMENTS OF AMB WIGGINS IN NEW YORK.

9. WITH RESPECT TO THE AIRCRAFT NEGOTIATIONS DECISION, I SAID THAT SPEAKING APART FROM INSTRUCTIONS AND AS AN OBSERVER, I SAW REAL VALUE IN HAVING CLEARED AWAY AN ISSUE WHICH HAD SERVED ONLY TO CONFUSE MORE BASIC PROBLEMS IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS. AGAIN STRESSING IT WAS MY PERSONAL VIEW I SAID THAT ENTRY INTO NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR US TO TALK WITH THE ISRAELIS ABOUT A SOLUTION OF THE BROADER PROBLEMS SO LONG AS ISRAEL HAD NO INDICATION OF SOURCE FOR REPLACEMENT OF ITS LOSSES WHILE SOVIET PLANES WERE BEING SUPPLIED TO ITS

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NEIGHBORS, ISRAEL'S PREOCCUPATION WITH ITS ULTIMATE SECURITY PROMPTED IT TO HANG ON TO EVERY TACTICAL ADVANTAGE IT HAD AND MADE IT UNRESPONSIVE TO OUR SUGGESTIONS FOR MOVES WHICH IT CLAIMED MIGHT UNDERMINE THAT SECURITY. I STRESSED I DID NOT KNOW THE EXTENT TO WHICH THIS MIGHT PLAY A PART BUT SAID I THOUGHT IT COULD BE IMPORTANT.

6. I CLOSED WITH A RENEWED REQUEST FOR UNDERSTANDING OF THE COMPLEX FACTORS THAT HAD ENTERED INTO THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION. I SAID I BELIEVED THEY SHOULD SEE IN OUR GENUINE EFFORTS IN NEW YORK AND ELSEWHERE EVIDENCES OF THE REAL AND FUNDAMENTAL SUPPORT WHICH WE HAD AGAIN REAFFIRMED TO JORDAN. I AGAIN REFERRED TO APPRECIATION OF THE WISDOM AND UNDERSTANDING TALHOUNI AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAD SHOWN IN THEIR HANDLING OF SUCH MATTERS.

11. COMMENT: THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE WAS OBVIOUSLY APPRECIATED. ALTHOUGH TALHOUNI EXPRESSED CONCERN FOR THE EFFECT OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT, THE MEETING WAS VERY CORDIAL AND TALHOUNI'S AND TOUGAN'S PRESENTATIONS RELAXED AND THOUGHTFUL. COMMENTS AS TO TALHOUNI'S OWN WISE HANDLING OF AFFAIRS PRODUCED A PLEASED SMILE.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6939

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EXDIS

FOR ELIOT, NEA/IRN

THERE HAS BEEN PLANE CRASH IN IRAN THIS MORNING ABOUT WHICH SKIMPY DETAILS HAVE APPEARED IN AFTERNOON PRESS AND ABOUT WHICH YOU MAY BE RECEIVING INQUIRIES. ALL QUESTIONS SHOULD BE REFERRED  MEYER

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NARA, Date 03-13-2015

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FM USMISSION USUN NY  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3804  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
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EXDIS

ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TEKOA'S MTG WITH AMBASSADOR WIGGINS OCT 11

SUMMARY: ISRAELI AMB TEKOA BRIEFED US OCT 11 ON STATUS OF DOCUMENT ISRAEL WILL SUBMIT TO JARRING. HE POINTED UP FACT THAT ISRAELI DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEMS ARE RESTRICTING ELEMENT AND STRESSED DOCUMENT IS ONLY BEGINNING STEP. HOWEVER HE DECLARED THERE WOULD BE SUFFICIENT IN DOCUMENT TO OPEN UP DIALOGUE IF EGYPTIANS WOULD RESPOND. JARRING WOULD THEN HAVE BASIS FOR CONTINUING MISSION. HE QUESTIONED WHETHER IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE INCLUDING MATTERS AFFECTING JORDAN SINCE RIFAI IS NOW CONSULTING KING. HE THOUGHT DOCUMENT WOULD BE READY MONDAY.

1. ISRAELI AMB TEKOA MET WITH WIGGINS OCT 11 P.M. BUFFUM AND PEDERSEN PRESENT

2. BUFFUM, WHO BEGAN CONVERSATION BECAUSE WIGGINS DELAYED FEW MINUTES BY BUSINESS, ASKED HOW PREPARATION OF ISRAELI DOCUMENT FOR JARRING WAS COMING ALONG. HE RECALLED THIS IS CRITICAL JUNCTURE AND WE NEED TO BE FOREWARNED. JARRING HAS BEEN MAKING CLEAR TO US THAT HE NEEDS AS PRECISE IDEA AS POSSIBLE OF ISRAELI VIEWS OF ITS TERRITORIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURE BORDERS.

3. TEKOA MENTIONED THAT EBAN SAID DOCUMENT WOULD GO INTO SOME DETAIL ON ALL ESSENTIAL CONTENTIOUS ISSUES. TEKOA INDICATED

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MAP WOULD NOT BE PART OF DOCUMENT, EXPLAINING THAT THIS WOULD BE COMPLICATED AND DOCUMENT NEEDS TO BE COMPLETED IN DAY OR TWO. HE STATED THAT SITUATION WAS BASICALLY CHANGED AFTER EBAN'S SPEECH. EGYPTIAN FONMIN RIAD HAD BEEN HELPFUL BECAUSE HE WAS SO NEGATIVE, AND NOW ISRAEL HAS NO PROBLEM REGARDING ITS PUBLIC IMAGE. WHILE ISRAEL'S INTERNATIONAL IMAGE IS PROPITIOUS, THERE HAS BEEN STRONG NEGATIVE REACTION IN ISRAEL. THIS COMPLICATES PREPARATION OF DOCUMENT IN JERUSALEM.

4. TEKOAH CONTINUED THAT ISRAEL HAD MADE IMPORTANT DEPARTURE. IF EGYPT WILL SEIZE OPPORTUNITY THERE CAN BE PROGRESS. HE SAID HE HOPED IT UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS PROVIDES AN OPENING. IT IS FIRST STEP IN PROCESS OF CLARIFICATION. RETURNING TO ASPECT OF TERRITORY, HE SAID, THIS IS COMPLICATED AND DIFFICULT. IF DOCUMENT IS WANTED PROMPTLY, LET'S AVOID BEING OVERLY SPECIFIC. IT WILL DEPEND ON WHAT EGYPTIANS SAY. WHAT DO THEY THINK SECURE BOUNDARIES SHOULD BE. ISRAEL WOULD LIKE TO HEAR EGYPTIANS SAY THEIR CONCEPT IS SO AND SO.

5. BUFFUM SAID DOCUMENT IS NEEDED WHICH WILL PROMPT EGYPTIANS TO GIVE POSITIVE REPLY. OVER PAST YEAR THEY HAVE TOLD US THEY REALIZE CERTAIN TERRITORIAL RECTIFICATIONS WILL BE NEEDED. THEY FEAR ISRAEL HAS MAJOR TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS, AND UNTIL THEY ARE CLEARLY DIS-ABUSED OF THIS IDEA, THEY WILL CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THIS.

6. TEKOAH REPLIED THAT IF JARRING USES ALL AMMUNITION ISRAEL HAS GIVEN HIM, HE CAN ASSURE EGYPTIANS THEIR SUSPICIONS ARE WRONG. HE IS NOT USING ALL THAT WE GIVE HIM. HOWEVER, TEKOAH WENT ON, PERHAPS THEY WILL SEE SOMETHING HELPFUL IN THIS DOCUMENT. THERE IS SUFFICIENT IN IT TO OPEN UP DIALOGUE. BEAR IN MIND, HE SAID, ON THEIR SIDE THERE IS A WALL, ON OURS WILLINGNESS TO EXPLORE VARIOUS AVENUES.

7. BUFFUM SAID THAT WE HAD LEARNED FROM THREE PRESS SOURCES THAT AFTER RIAD'S FORMAL PRESS CONFERENCE OCT 10 HE HAD SAID WITHDRAWAL NEED NOT BE FIRST STEP AND FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION PERTAINED TO ALL WATERWAYS. TEKOAH COMMENTED THAT EGYPTIANS HAVE NOT SAID THIS TO JARRING.

8. TEKOAH STATED IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD THAT ISRAEL IS PARTY READY TO DO ITS UTMOST WHILE EGYPT IS PICTURE OF INTRANSIGENCE. HE SAID DOCUMENT IS REALLY SECOND STEP BECAUSE EBAN IN HIS

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SPEECH SAID ISRAEL IS READY TO START EXCHANGES ON SUBSTANCE. IT TOOK ISRAEL A LONG TIME TO TAKE THIS FIRST STEP. JARRING WOULD HAVE BASIS FOR CONTINUING HIS MISSION IF HE GETS WRITTEN REPLY FROM EGYPT. HE COULD THEN SAY BOTH PARTIES ACCEPT RESOLUTION AND ARE CONTINUING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. THE MEETINGS COULD BE HELD IN GENEVA OR STOCKHOLM FOR EXAMPLY WHERE FONMINS WOULD GO TO HIM.

9. WIGGINS SAID ISSUE IS FOR ISRAEL TO PUT FORTH A STATEMENT WHICH EGYPT WOULD FIND IMPOSSIBLE TO TURN DOWN. ISRAEL SHOULD NOT GIVE EGYPT THE CHANCE TO CHARGE ISRAEL IS MERELY MAKING PROPAGANDA. DOCUMENT SHOULD CONTAIN AS LITTLE AMBIGUITY AS POSSIBLE.

10. TEKOAH REPLIED REAL QUESTION IS WHETHER EGYPTIANS ARE NOW GENUINELY READY. EBAN'S SPEECH OFFERS MATERIAL FOR DIALOGUE. IT MUST BE REALIZED WE HAVE MOVED VERY FAR. JARRING HAS SUGGESTED THAT FOR ISRAEL SINAI IS MATTER OF SECURE BOUNDARIES AND NAVIGATION. POSSIBLY DOCUMENT WILL BE ALONG THESE LINES.

11. BUFFUM REMARKED WE HAVE HEARD THAT ARABS KHARTOUM FORMULATION ACTUALLY PERTAINED TO NO FORMAL PEACE TREATY, RATHER THAN NO PEACE. HE ASKED WHETHER ISRAELI DOCUMENT WOULD BE CONFINED TO UAR ALONE. TEKOAH POINTED OUT RIFAI IS IN LONDON NOW AND ISRAELIS WONDER IF IT IS WORTH PUTTING IN SOMETHING ABOUT JORDAN NOW. OUR MINDS, HE SAID, ARE NOT MADE UP ON THIS POINT. HE ADDED THAT JORDAN KNOWS ISRAEL'S VIEWS ON TERRITORY. HE SAID HE THOUGHT DOCUMENT SHOULD BE READY BY MONDAY WHEN MEETING WITH JARRING WOULD PROBABLY BE SET.

12. BUFFUM SAID IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT RIAD SEEMS TO BE THREATENING TO TAKE MATTER AGAIN TO SC. TEKOAH REPLIED THAT IF THEY INSIST ON THIS, IT WILL SHOW EGYPTIANS NOT SERIOUS AT THIS STAGE BECAUSE DEBATE WILL ONLY COMPLICATE MATTERS.

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WIGGINS

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 06999 101906Z

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6523

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 6999

EXDIS:

C O R R E I C T E I D I C O P Y (TEXT)

FOR SEELYE NEA/ARN AND SYMMES FROM DUNCAN

SUBJECT: SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT SALE TO ISRAEL

25X1A

IN VIEW REPRESENTATION BY KING HUSSEIN TO AMB SYMMES AND  
[REDACTED] REPORTS, PARTICULARLY [REDACTED] REGARDING DESIRE FOR 25X1A  
MAXIMUM NOTICE AND OFFSET IN EVENT USG DECIDED SELL  
PHANTOMS TO ISRAEL, IS THERE ANYTHING FURTHER TO GUIDANCE  
CONTAINED STATE 252286, THAT I MIGHT BE AUTHORIZED TO SAY  
TO SENIOR OFFICIALS HERE. SINCE NO USG OFFICIALS PRESENTLY  
IN TOUCH WITH KING AND IMMEDIATE ENTOURAGE, THERE NO WAY OF  
KNOWING WHAT HIS REACTION IS. WE UNDERSTAND KHAMMASH HAS  
BEEN CALLED TO LONDON BY KING AND WILL DEPART OCT 13 OR 14.  
HE COULD PROVIDE CHANNEL TO KING IF THERE WERE ANYTHING  
SIGNIFICANT TO PASS. IN ABSENCE OF KING AND OTHER LEADERS  
CABINET MAY FEEL IMPELLED TO TAKE SOME PUBLIC, PREJUDICIAL  
POSITION. I RECOGNIZE THAT IF GIVEN LOW KEY TREATMENT,  
THIS MAY PASS WITHOUT MAJOR REPERCUSSIONS IN VIEW OTHER  
IMPORTANT STAKES FOR JORDANIANS. BUT PENCHANT FOR RASH  
ACTION AND POSSIBILITY OUR RELATIVE SILENCE WILL BE  
MISINTERPRETED ARGUE FOR ANY REASSURING INDICATIONS  
WE CAN GIVE.

DUNCAN:

Presidential Library review State Dept. equity required

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Approved For Release 2000/09/19 : NLJ-001-147-2-9-0

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 12AC 15-36

By Uus NARA, Date 05-13-2015

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

34 28

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 06984 091546Z

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ACTION SS 30

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R 091515Z OCT 68  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6516  
INFO USUN NY 1164

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 6984

02

EXDIS

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION AND DP'S

REF: STATE 251461; AMMAN 6972

1. IN CONNECTION PROBLEM POSED BY POSSIBLE SHIFT IN GOJ ATTITUDE TOWARD DP'S, AIMED AT TRANSFERRING RESPONSIBILITY TO UNRWA (AMMAN 6972), BELIEVE JARRING'S EXPRESSED INTENTION (STATE 251461) SEEK PROMOTE EARLY RETURN DP'S TO WEST BANK SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACRIUNT AND MIGHT HELP SUPPORT THOSE IN JORDAN WHO FAVOR MAINTENANCE OF CLEAR-CUT SEPARATE STATUS FOR THE DP'S.

2. AS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY SAID, ANY VISIBLE PROGRESS TOWARD RETURN OF THOSE DISPLACED FROM THE WEST BANK WOULD HAVE GREAT IMPACT IN JORDAN AND HELP PEACE-MAKING EFFORTS EVEN THOUGH SUCH A GESTURE ALONE WOULD NOT SATISFY ALL CURRENT GOJ TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS.

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By AS/LL, NARA, Date 10/2/01

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 06924 051002Z

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INFO SSO 00,1030 W

R 050915Z OCT 68  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6498  
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 6924

EXDIS:

SUBJECT: CARADON PROPOSALS

REF USUN 6860

PLEASE REPEAT TO AMMAN USUN 6809.  
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By 15/11, NARA, Date 10/10/10

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By ns/lh NARA, Date 10/2/01

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 06877 021329Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

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R 021149Z OCT 68  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6884  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
USINT CAIRO  
USUN 1161

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 6877

EXDIS:

SUBJ: ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT

I MET SEPARATELY ON SECOND WITH CROWN PRINCE HASSAN AND PRIMIN TALHOUNI TO OBTAIN THEIR UP-TO-DATE ESTIMATE OF THE PRESENT SITUATION BEFORE LEAVING CONSULTATION. THEIR GENERAL ATTITUDE IS ONE OF " GREAT EXPECTATIONS" AND A KIND OF DEPESERATE HOPE THAT SOMEHOW OR OTHER SOME SIGNIFICANT SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT CAN BE MADE THIS MONTH IN NEW YORK.

2. NEITHER CONVERSATION PRODUCED ANYTHING NEW ALTHOUGH TALHOUNI CONFIRMED OTHER REPORTS (LONDON 13029) BEIRUT 13071) THAT NASSER HAS AGAIN GIVEN JORDAN THE GO-AHEAD TO TALK TO ISRAEL ABOUT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL PARTS OF THE RESOLUTION UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF JARRING. THE UAR ALSO IS WILLING ITSELF TO PROCEED TO TALKS UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES IF ISRAEL WILL PUBLICLY STATE THAT IT ACCEPTS THE RESOLUTION AND WILL PROCEED TO IMPLEMENT IT THROUGH AGREEMENTS DEVELOPED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF AMB JARRING. TALHOUNI INDICATED THAT JORDAN IS WELL AWARE THAT BEFORE AGAIN STATING ITS SUPPORT OF JORDAN'S POSITION, NASSER HAD FIRST CAREFULLY ANALYZED ALL THE PORTENTS. NASSER HAD CALCULATED THAT THE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES SUPPORT KING HUSSEIN AND THE MODERATE POSITION OF JORDAN MORE THAN THEY SUPPORT ANY OTHER PERSON OR POLICY IN THE ARAB WORLD. THUS,

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# AIRGRAM

DEF 19-9 US-JORDAN

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TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA

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 A-470  
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 TO : Department of State

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RECEIVED HANDLING INDICATOR  
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE 37  
 SEP 26 9 41 AM 1968  
 RS/AN  
 ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy AMMAN DATE: September 23, 1968  
 SUBJECT : Publicity Concerning Jordanian Pilot Training in the U.S.  
 REF : State 230649, 224665

COPY NO. 2 SERIES B

EXDIS

Zaid Rifa'i, Secretary General of the Royal Diwan, and General Khammash, Jordan Army Chief of Staff, have been reminded respectively by the reporting officer and Colonel Cosgrove, Defense Attache, of Jordanian obligations under the March 1968 Memorandum of Understanding concerning any publicity for the Jordanian pilot training program in the United States. We also explained to the two Jordanians the guidelines on publicity which the U.S. intends to observe (State 230649).

The two Jordanians indicated that they were fully aware of the sensitivities involved in this matter and that the government would honor its commitment. General Khammash commented jokingly that he had found he had to take into account U.S. internal sensitivities in the same way he coped with similar situations locally.

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 By [Signature] NARA, Date 9-19-01

Group 4  
 Downgraded at 3-year intervals.  
 Declassified after 12 years.

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Drafted by: POL:MDraper/clc 9/19

Contents and Classification Approved by:  
 DCM:ESDuncan

Clearances: *gnc* DATT:Col. GVCosgrove

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Department of State

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Jordan

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SECRET 246

PAGE 01 AMMAN 06676 181325Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO 1030 W

R 181244Z SEP 68  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6387  
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USINT CAIRO  
USUN NY 1149

02

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 6676

EXDIS

SUBJ: HUSSEIN'S VIEWS ON TALKS IN NEW ZERK

REF: AMMAN 6653

BRITISH AMBASSADOR ADAMS TOLE ME THAT, DURING HIS MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN ON SEPT 17, HE HAD ASKED THE KING HOW HE SAW THE FONMIN'S MEETING IN NEW YORK. WITH REGARD TO WHETHER OR NOT JORDAN WOULD MEET SEPARATELY WITH THE ISRAELIS IN NEW YORK, THE KING HAD COMMENTED THIS WOULD VERY MUCH DEPEND ON WHAT DEVELOPED AND WHETHER OR NOT JARRING COULD SHOW THAT SOMETHING WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY SUCH MEETINGS. ADAMS AGREED WITH ME THAT THIS WAS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH WHAT THE KING SAID TO ME (AMMAN 6653). SYMMES

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By 15/lll NARA, Date 10/2/01

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 06653 171658Z

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6372  
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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 6653

EXDIS:

SUBJ: HUSSEIN'S VIEWS ON US POLICIES AND FORTHCOMING OPPORTUNITIES AT UNGA

DEPT PASS BALL/SISCO

1. SUMMARY: KING HUSSEIN ON SEPT 17 EXPLAINED TO ME HIS REASONS FOR HIS COMMENTS ABOUT THE US ROLE IN THE PEACE-MAKING PROCESS, WHICH HE HAD MADE IN HIS POLICY STATEMENT OF SEPT 13. IN DESCRIBING THE FORTHCOMING UNGA AS PERHAPS THE "LAST CHANCE" TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, HE STRESSED THAT HE HAD AUTHORIZED FONMIN RIFAI TO MISS NO OPPORTUNITIES TO PROMOTE A SETTLEMENT, INCLUDING MEETING PRIVATELY WITH ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK, IF GIVEN ANY INCENTIVE TO DO SO.

2. KING HUSSEIN SUMMONED ME TODAY AND SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE SITUATION BEFORE LEAVING ON HIS TRIP. IN PARTICULAR, HE WANTED TO BE CERTAIN THAT THE HIGHEST AUTHORITIES OF THE USG WERE AWARE OF HIS RECENT POLICY STATEMENT TO THE PRIMIN (AMMAN 6616). WITH CONSIDERABLE EMOTION HE SAID HE REGRETTED HAVING HAD TO SAY WHAT HE DID ABOUT US POLICY (PARA 3C OF AMMAN 6616, FULL TRANSLATION OF RELEVANT PASSAGE BY SEPTTEL), BUT HE BELIEVES DEEPLY THAT THE US OWES IT TO ITSELF, TO ITS ARAB FRIENDS, AND TO ISRAEL TO USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH ISRAEL TO BRING ABOUT AN ACCEPTABLE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. HUSSEIN CONTINUED THAT IF HEI WERE A MODERATE ISRAELI,

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By ly NARA, Date 9-26-01 6707212



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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 06653 171658Z

HE WOULD ALSO FEEL LET DOWN BY THE USG FAILURE TO TAKE STEPS THAT WOULD ENABLE MODERATE ISRAELIS TO PURSUE POLICIES LEADING TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. AS IT IS, THE FAILURE OF THE US TO TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE TO INFLUENCE A SETTLEMENT ONLY ENCOURAGES THE EXTREMISTS IN ISRAEL.

3. THE KING SAID HE DID NOT SEE WHAT MORE HE HIMSELF COULD DO. SURELY THE US MUST SEE BY NOW THAT JORDAN IS WILLING TO PROCEED TO AN HONORABLE SETTLEMENT. HE MENTIONED TWICE IN THE CONVERSATION THAT HE HAS ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO THE PRIMIN AND THE FONMIN THAT THE LATTER IS TO MISS NO OPPORTUNITY IN NEW YORK TO ADVANCE TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. THIS INCLUDES, IF NECESSARY, MEETING PRIVATELY WITH ISRAELI OFFICIALS "IF JORDAN IS GIVEN ANY INCENTIVE TO DO SO." MOREOVER, HE IS GOING TO TAKE THE STRONGEST LINE HE CAN WHEN HE VISITS NASSER NEXT WEEK TO PRESS THE UAR TO BE AS FORTHCOMING AS POSSIBLE IN NEW YORK.

4. SHIFTING AGAIN TO HIS VIEW OF US POLICY, HUSSEIN COMPLAINED THAT NOT ONLY HAS THE US FAILED TO TAKE THE ACTIVE ROLE IT PROMISED WHEN THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION WAS BEING DEVELOPED "BUT NOW WE HAVE THIS PHANTOM AFFAIR." (KING'S REMARKS ABOUT PHANTOMS AND OTHER MILITARY MATTERS ARE REPORTED SEPARATELY.) HE REQUESTED I ALSO INFORM WASHINGTON THAT VARIOUS RECENT STATEMENTS ABOUT PHANTOMS ARE CAUSING HIM AND OTHER FRIENDS OF AMERICA EXTREME DIFFICULTY IN DEFENDING THEIR CONTINUING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S.

5. IN RESPONDING TO HUSSEIN, I ASSURED HIM THE EMBASSY HAD FULLY REPORTED HIS POLICY STATEMENT OF SEPT 13. I SAID I HAD CALLED WASHINGTON'S ATTENTION IN PARTICULAR TO HIS VIEWS ABOUT US RESPONSIBILITY WITH REGARD TO THE SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, AND THAT I WOULD IMMEDIATELY REPORT TO WASHINGTON THE FURTHER COMMENTS HE HAD JUST MADE TO ME. I TOLD HIM AMB BALL AND SISCO HAD JUST SEEN JARRING IN PARIS AND THAT THEY HAD AGAIN ASSURED HIM WE WOULD DO ANYTHING WE COULD TO HELP HIS MISSION. BALL AND SISCO HAD FOUND JARRING SOMEWHAT GLOOMY ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR A SETTLEMENT BUT STILL INTENT ON MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A BREAKTHROUGH DURING THE GA SESSION IN NEW YORK. I EMPHASIZED I WAS CERTAIN WE COULD BE COUNTED ON TO DO OUR UTMOST IN THE CONTEXT OF CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORTS OF THE PARTIES THEMSELVES BUT WE COULD NOT BRING ABOUT PEACE BY FIAT.

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PAGE 03: AMMAN 06653 171658Z

6. THE KING REMARKED SEVERAL TIMES THAT NEW YORK REPRESENTS THE LAST CHANCE TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. AFTER THAT, THE PICTURE WILL BE VERY BLACK INDEED AND, ON THE ARAB SIDE, OTHER ALTERNATIVES WILL HAVE TO BE EXAMINED. AS HE HAD SAID SO OFTEN OVER THE PAST MONTHS, "THIS LAST CHANCE FOR PEACE MUST NOT BE LOST."  
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PAGE 01 AMMAN 06447 031617Z

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6285  
INFO USINT CAIRO

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-207  
By js, NARA, Date 11-20-02

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 6447

EXDIS

SUBJ: HUSSEIN'S INFORMATION ON PRESENT SITUATION IN UAR

1. KING HUSSEIN ON THIRD TOLD ME PRESIDENT NASSER HAD SENT HASSAN SABRI AL-KHOULI TO LONDON DURING HIS RECENT HOSPITALIZATION (AMMAN 5931) TO GIVE HIM NASSER'S PERSONAL READING OF GENERAL SITUATION. THE KING PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING DETAILS FROM HIS TALKS WITH AL-LHOULI AND SUBSEQUENT INFORMATION FROM GENERAL KHAMMASH AND THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO:

2. STATE OF NASSER'S HEALTH. NASSER'S PHYSICAL CONDITION IS MUCH WORSE THAN THE PUBLIC IS AWARE. AS IS GENERALLY KNOWN, HIS DIABETES CONTINUES AND THIS HAS AFFECTED HIS CIRCULATION. A MORE SERIOUS CONDITION, HOWEVER, IS SOME KIND OF SPINAL TROUBLE THAT IS CAUSING PARTIAL PARALYSIS IN NASSER'S LEGS. THE VARIOUS SPECIALISTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO DIAGNOSE THE SPINAL CONDITION. IT DOES NOT SEEM TO BE A SLIPPED DISC AND APPARENTLY IS NOT A CANCER. THE KING SAID APPARENTLY IT IS A "NEURAL PROBLEM". NASSER IS BACK IN CAIRO AND WILL CONCENTRATE ON WORKING ON ARAB SOCIALIST UNION PROBLEMS.

3. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE US. THE KING SAID NASSER AND VARIOUS EGYPTIANS ARE TAKING THE LINE THAT JORDAN OUGHT TO DO MORE TO HELP BRING ABOUT THE RESUMPTION OF US/UAR RELATIONS. THE KING REMARKED TO ME THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT HE OR THE US COULD OR SHOULD DO. APPARENTLY THE UAR HAD BEEN PLEASED BY THE RECENT PRESIDENTIAL VETO OF THE LONG STAPLE COTTON LEGISLATION BUT STILL FELT THE

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 06447 031617Z

NEED OF A "FURTHER GESTURE" BEFORE RESUMING RELATIONS. THE KING SAID HE IS IMPRESSED BY THE STRONG DESIRE FOR RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS WITH THE US AND HE HAS CONTINUED TO URGE THE UAR TO WORK TOWARD THAT END. HE GATHERED, HOWEVER, THAT THE REGIME CONSIDERS ITSELF SO WEAK AT THE MOMENT THAT IT CANNOT RISK DOING SO WITHOUT SOME GESTURE FROM THE US. HUSSEIN HAD NOTHING TO SUGGEST IN THAT CONNECTION.

4. INTERNAL SITUATION IN UAR. THE REGIME IS INCREASINGLY WORRIED BY SERIOUS UNREST IN VARIOUS SECTORS OF EGYPTIAN SOCIETY. THEY PARTICULARLY FEAR THAT COMMUNISTS ARE MAKING INROADS AMONG THE STUDENTS BUT THERE ARE VARIOUS OTHER DISSIDENT GROUPS AS WELL. THE KING SAID HE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE UAR HAS BECOME SO HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON THE KHARTOUM PAYMENTS THAT IF THESE PAYMENTS NOW CEASED, THE UAR ECONOMY WOULD GO UNDER "INSIDE OF FOUR MONTHS." IN CONNECTION WITH THE UAR INTERNAL SITUATION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE KHARTOUM PAYMENTS, THE KING SAID NASSER FEELS STRANGLERED BY SAUDI PRESSURES. THE SAUDIS WANT HIM TO ADOPT AN OFFENSIVE MILITARY STRATEGY AGAINST THE ISRAELIS, AND NASSER BELIEVES THEY WILL PULL THE RUG FROM UNDER HIM IF HE MAKES ANY MOVES TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT UNDER THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION. THE KING MENTIONED PARENTHETICALLY THAT HE HOPED FRIENDS OF SAUDI ARABIA WHO BELIEVED IN PEACE MIGHT TRY TO GET THIS ALLEGED PRESSURE ON NASSER LIFTED. NASSER NOW FEELS THE PRESSURE SO STRONGLY THAT IT IS PREVENTING HIM FROM PROCEEDING TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE KING MENTIONED AN "EXTREMISM" OF ANOTHER KIND HAS JUST COME FROM TUNISIA. THE TUNISIAN DELEGATE'S ATTACK ON THE UAR IN THE ARAB LEAGUE MEETING IS "IRRESPONSIBILITY FROM THE RIGHT" IN THE KING'S OPINION.

5. UAR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS. IN HIS RECENT VISITS TO THE SOVUNION NASSER HAD ATTEMPTED TO OBTAIN SOVIET AGREEMENT TO AND HELP FOR FORMING TWO ADDITIONAL ARMORED DIVISIONS. NASSER HAD ARGUED THESE DIVISIONS WERE NECESSARY TO ENABLE THE UAR TO STAND UP TO ISRAEL DURING NEGOTIATIONS. THE UAR CANNOT AFFORD TO NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAEL FROM A POSITION OF WEAKNESS. THE SOVIETS HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO THE FORMATION OF ONE ADDITIONAL ARMORED DIVISION BUT STRESSED THEY WILL NOT SUPPORT ANY FURTHER UAR

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 06447 031617Z

MILITARY BUILDUP IN THE CONTEXT OF AN OFFENSIVE STRATEGY.  
I ASKED THE KING IF THIS MEANT THERE WOULD BE ADDITIONAL  
SOVIET TANKS GOING TO THE UAR. HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW  
BUT BELIEVED THE NEW DIVISION WOULD BE FORMED FROM EXISTING  
STOCKS. THE KING MENTIONED THAT THERE ARE GROWING RIFTS  
WITHIN THE UAR ARMY ITSELF AND SOME OF THE UAR MILITARY  
HAVE BECOME EXTREMELY ANTI-SOVIET.

6. DEPT MAY WISH SEND SUBSTANCE OF PARA FOUR TO JIDDA.

SYMMES

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 06417 311257Z

WITH HIM. JARRING HAD SAID, "I KNOW WHY THEY DON'T WANT TO TELL ME THEIR SUBSTANTIVE POSITION." JARRING TOLD THE JORDANIANS EBAN HAD CONCLUDED THE LAST CONVERSATION BY SAYING ISRAEL WILL MAKE IT POSITION ON BOUNDARIES KNOWN WHEN THEY MEET WITH JORDAN "EITHER WITH OR WITHOUT JARRING."

3. RIFAI SAID HE HAS NOT YET SEEN THE WRITTEN ISRAELI ANSWERS TO THE UAR QUESTIONS BUT IS TO BE BRIEFED ON THIS WHEN HE GETS TO CAIRO. HE SAID HE CONSIDERS THIS "DIALOGUE" A FUTILE EXERCISE BECAUSE FROM WHAT HE HAS HEARD, THE ISRAELIS INCLUDED IN THEIR ANSWERS THE SAME POSITIONS THEY HAVE TAKEN FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE JARRING MISSION.

4. RIFAI WONDERED ALOUD "WHERE TO GO FROM HERE." JARRING DOES NOT EXPECT TO COME BACK TO AMMAN BEFORE HE GOES TO NEW YORK IN THE LAST WEEK OF SEPT BU HAD AGAIN EXPRESSED THE HOPE HE WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTACT ALL OF THE FONMINS IN NEW YORK AT THAT TIME. RIFAI SAID WHILE IN CAIRO HE INTENDS TO URGE FONMIN RIAD TO GO TO NEW YORK. HE CONCLUDED "EITHER WE SHALL FIND AN OPENING WHEN THE FONMINS ARE IN NEW YORK OR WE SHALL HAVE TO RAISE THE MATTER AGAIN IN THE SC OR THE UNGA."

5. FOR BERGUS CAIRO: I MENTIONED TO RIFAI I HOPED HE WOULD SEE YOU WHILE HE IS IN CAIRO. HE SAID HE WOULD WELCOME SEEING YOU, THAT HE WILL BE STAYING IN THE HILTON AND THAT HE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION AT ALL TO YOUR TAKING THE INITIATIVE TO ARRANGE A MEETING. I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO DO SO.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~ 764

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 06416 311035Z

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ACTION SS 30

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R 311025Z AUG 68  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6269

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 6416

EXDIS

REF: STATE 230649

SUBJ: PUBLICITY RE JORDANIAN PILOT TRAINING

PLEASE CONFIRM THAT FIRST SENTENCE PARA FOUR REFTEL  
READS AS FOLLOWS: YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO STATE IN RESPONSE  
TO SPECIFIC QUERY HOW MANY JORDANIANS ARE IN TRAINING  
AT ANY PARTICULAR TIME.  
GP-4

SYMMES

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S 98001  
By ag/ll, NARA, Date 10/2/01

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 06219 191257Z

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ACTION SS 30

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-207  
By ilo NARA, Date 11-20-02

P R 191200Z AUG 68  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6180  
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USINT CAIRO  
USUN 1110  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 6219

EXDIS

SUBJ: JARRING TALKS IN AMMAN, AUG 16

REF: AMMAN 6208 AND 6209

1. BRITISH CHARGE TRIPP SAW FONMIN RIFAI THIS MORNING AND WAS GIVEN SUBSTANTIALLY SAME REVEIW OF TALKS WITH JARRING PROVIDED IN AMMAN 6208. TRIPP SAID HE FOUND RIFAI IN EXTREMELY DEPRESSED MOOD. RIFAI SAID HE SAW NO HOPE FOR JARRING MISSION UNLESS U.S. COULD INFLUENCE ISRAEL TO COME FORWARD WITH SOME SPECIFIC SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSALS THAT WOULD JUSTIFY JORDAN'S PROCEEDING TO JOINT MEETINGS. TO TRIPP'S QUERY WHETHER AN UNEQUIVOCAL PUBLIC ISRAELI STATEMENT OF ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT, RIFAI REPLIED THAT JORDAN WOULD STILL NEED SOME SPECIFIC INDICATIONS OF THE ISRAELI SUBSTANTIVE POSITION BEFORE PROCEEDING TO JOINT MEETINS. (COMMENT: APPARENTLY RIFAI AND OTHER JORDANIANS CONSIDER THAT THE ISRAELIS RECORD WITH REGARD TO ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION HAS BEEN SUCH THAT EVEN AN UNQUALIFIED STATEMENT OF ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION AT THIS POINT WOULD HAVE LITTLE VALUE.)

2. TRIPP HAD ASKED RIFAI IF HE FOUND THE SC RESOLUTION ON SALT SATISFACOTORY. RIFAI HAD RESPONDED IT WAS MORE THAN HE EXPECTED TO GET BUT HE DOUBTED IT WOULD PREVENT FURTHER

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 06219 191257Z

REPRISALS. IF THERE IS ANOTHER REPRISAL RAID, JORDAN WILL INSIST ON SANCTIONS EVEN IF IT MEANS GETTING NO RESOLUTIONS. THE REAL NEED WAS U.S. PRESSURE ON ISRAEL. TRIPP SAID HE HAD TAXED RIFAI AS TO JUST WHAT KIND OF INFLUENCE HE EXPECTED THE U.S. TO PUT ON ISRAEL EITHER WITH REGARD TO GETTING SPECIFIC PROPOSALS MADE TO JARRING OR IN THE EVENT OF ANOTHER REPRISAL RAID. RIFAI'S RESPONSES HAD BEEN QUITE UNREALISTIC, BUT TRIPP SAID HE WAS IMPRESSED WITH THE DEGREE OF FRUSTRATION AND HOPELESSNESS DISPLAYED BY RIFAI IN MAKING THEM.

3. TRIPP SAID RIFAI SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME SPECULATING AS TO WHAT JORDAN COULD DO NEXT, GIVEN THE LIKELY FAILURE OF THE JARRING MISSION. THE SEPT 1 ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL MEETING IS CLEARLY REGARDED AS A WATERSHED AND RIFAI APPEARS TO FEAR THAT JORDAN WILL BE FORCED BY THE OTHER ARABS TO MODIFY THE MODERATE POLICIES IT HAS FOLLOWED TOWARD JARRING UP TO NOW.

4. COMMENT: RIFAI'S REMARKS TO TRIPP AS TO WHAT COURSE JORDAN MIGHT BE FORCED TO TAKE, ASSUMING THE FAILURE OF JARRING AND THE ANTICIPATED PRESSURES IN THE FORTHCOMING ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL MEETING, HAVE STRONGLY ECHOED IN OTHER REPORTS WE HAVE HAD OF DISCUSSIONS AMONG JORDANIAN OFFICIALS IN THE PAST FEW DAYS. THE GENERAL TENOR OF THESE DISCUSSIONS IS THAT THE OTHER ARABS WILL ARGUE THAT PREPARATIONS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT ARE HOPELESS AND THAT PREPARATIONS MUST BE MADE FOR AN INEVITABLE NEW ROUND WITH ISRAEL. IN THE MEANTIME, THE KING MAY BE FORCED TO MAKE SOME KIND OF CLOSER ARRANGMENT WITH THE FEDAYEEN OR RISK LOSING HIS REMAINING SUPPORT WITHIN THE COUNTRY. THE DEGREE OF HOPELESSNESS WAS WELL PUT BY RIFAI WHEN HE SAID HE DREADS EACH VISIT BY JARRING BECAUSE OF THE QUESTIONS PUT TO HIM AFTERWARD ABOUT WHAT THE VISIT ACCOMPLISHED. HE SAID MOST OF HIS FRIENDS NOW ARE ASKING HIM "WHAT DO YOU DO WHEN JARRING COMES TO AMMAN EXCEPT DRINK TEA."

5. WE REPORT THESE VARIOUS ATMOSPHERICS TO UNDERLINE OUR BELIEF THAT THIS FORTHCOMING ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL MEETING COULD BE ONE OF THOSE PSYCHOLOGICAL FORKS IN THE ROAD THAT WILL DETERMINE WHETHER WE HAVE ANY HOPE OF REACHING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OR NOT. MUCH DEPENDS ON WHETHER THE ISRAELIS CAN BE BROUGHT TO SAY SOMETHING CONSTRUCTIVE FOR

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JARRING TO REPORT TO RIFAI ON THE TWENTY-THIRD.

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 06209 181345Z

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ACTION SS 30

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-207  
By ia NARA, Date 11-20-02

P R 181245Z AUG 68  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6174  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
USINT CAIRO  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
USUN 1094

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 6209

EXDIS

SUBJ: COMMENT ON JARRING TALKS IN AMMAN

REF: AMMAN 6208

1. RIFAI'S REPORT ON DISCUSSIONS WITH JARRING ON THE FIFTEENTH CONFIRMS THAT ISRAEL HAS REVERTED TO INSISTENCE ON DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AND HAS GONE BACK ON ITS STATED WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS SUBSTANCE INDIRECTLY IN THE INTERIM BETWEEN NOW AND THE OPENING OF THE UNGA. BALL'S PRESENTATION TO THE JORDANIANS, BASED ON HIS TALKS IN ISRAEL, HAS BEEN NULLIFIED BY WHAT EBAN SAID TO JARRING. THE "OTHER CHANNELS" THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE SO SUBTLY HINTED TO US ABOUT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN A RED HERRING.

2. THE JORDANIANS ARE NOT ASKING FOR THE ISRAELIS' COMPLETE SUBSTANTIVE POSITION AND ARE NOT TRYING TO SUBSTITUTE INDIRECT TALKS FOR ULTIMATE JOINT MEETINGS. JORDAN IS PREPARED TO PROCEED TO JOINT MEETINGS (WITH JARRING PRESENT) IN NEW YORK NEXT MONTH IF IT CAN ONLY HAVE SOME INDICATION OF SPECIFIC LINES PROPOSED BY ISRAEL AS "SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES." JORDAN HAS INDICATED THAT IT RECOGNIZES THERE COULD ONLY BE LIMITED PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES ON A DEMILITARIZED WEST BANK. JORDAN HAS INDICATED A CERTAIN FLEXIBILITY WITH RESPECT TO JERUSALEM AND THE REFUGEES. IT SIMPLY MUST HAVE SOME PEG ON WHICH TO HANG ITS PROCEEDING TO JOINT TALKS.

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IT SEEMS TO US THIS IS NOT UNREASONABLE BECAUSE JORDAN'S PROCEEDING TO JOINT TALKS WOULD BE A SUBSTANTIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY FOR ISRAEL, WHICH COULD THEN, HAVING ACHIEVED THAT VICTORY, MAKE IMPRACTICABLE PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD ABORT THE ACTUAL TALKS. JORDAN NEEDS SOME EVIDENCE OF SINCERITY TO SHOW OTHERS.

3. IN THE PRESENT FORTHCOMING AND MODERATE ATTITUDE OF THE JORDANIAN REGIME WE HAVE A WASTING ASSET. HOW MUCH LONGER THE VICIOUS CYCLE OF FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES AND REPRISAL RAIDS WILL PERMIT THE REGIME TO FOLLOW ITS PRESENT COURSE IS BECOMING QUITE PROBLEMATIC. THE REGIME BADLY NEEDS PROGRESS TOWARD A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN ORDER TO ARREST THE PRESENT DRIFT. WE HAVE ALREADY PUT ON RECORD SEVERAL TIMES OUR VIEW THAT THE USG MUST TAKE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN INFLUENCING THE PARTIES TO REACH A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. UNLESS THERE IS SOMETHING THAT WE DO NOT SEE, IT SEEMS TO US THAT ISRAEL HAS GIVEN BOTH JARRING AND US THE RUN-AROUND IN RECENT WEEKS. I THINK IT IS TIME FOR US TO TAKE ACTIVE STEPS WITH ISRAEL TO GET THIS MATTER OFF DEAD CENTER, AND I WOULD VERY MUCH HOPE THIS COULD BE DONE BEFORE JARRING SEES EBAN ON TUESDAY, THE TWENTIETH.

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TO DIRECTOR  
FROM AMMAN  
181345Z  
18 OCT 67

AMMAN 18 OCT 67  
181345Z  
TO DIRECTOR  
FROM AMMAN

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P R 171209Z AUG 68  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6172  
INFO USUN NY 1096  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 6193

LIMIDS

SUBJ: DANGER OF FURTHER ISRAELI REPRISAL RAIDS

1. COMMENTS BY ISRAELI OFFICIALS (OF EBAN STATEMENT TO JARRING PARA 6 STATE 220328 WHICH SEEMS ANTICIPATE CONTINUING REPRISALS) AND OTHER SIGNS SUCH AS OBSERVED CONTINUING ISRAELI OVERFLIGHTS OF JORDAN INDICATE GOI MAY NOT BE DETERRED FROM FURTHER REPRISALS BY SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION.

2. WHILE WE DO NOT WISH TO BE UNDULY ALARMIST, WE ARE GRAVELY CONCERNED THAT ANOTHER MASSIVE ISRAELI MILITARY ACTION, PARTICULARLY AT THIS JUNCTURE, COULD BE THE STRAW THAT BREAKS THE CAMEL'S BACK. THE KING HAS COME UNDER GREAT CRITICISM AND PRESSURE SINCE THE SALT RAID SIGNIFICANTLY WORSE THAN ANYTHING PREVIOUSLY ENCOUNTERED. IN THIS CONNECTION, SEE [REDACTED] HIS POLICY OF COOPERATION WITH THE US IS BEING QUESTIONED MORE DEEPLY AND BITTERLY AND ALSO MORE WIDELY THAN EVER BEFORE. WE FRANKLY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE REGIME COULD MAINTAIN ITS MODERATE POSTURE AND SURVIVE IN THE FACE OF REACTION TO ANOTHER SUCH RAID.

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3. WE ACCORDINGLY URGE THAT WE MAKE AN EARLY DEMARCHE TO THE ISRAELIS AT HIGHEST LEVELS, WARNING OF THE DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR ALL OUR INTERESTS FROM ANY

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By Ucd NARA, Date 05-13-2015



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FURTHER RETALIATORY MILITARY ACTIONS AND EMPHASIZING THAT WE FORESEE ISOLATION INTERNATIONALLY IN ANY FURTHER SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERATION OF SUCH REPRISALS. WE RECOGNIZE SOME KEY ISRAELI OFFICIALS ARE INCLINED DISPARAGE LARGER US INTEREST IN MAINTAINING THIS REGIME WHICH GOES BEYOND ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT. WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND OUR INTERESTS AGAIN BE STRESSED TO GOI ALONG LINES STATE 143620 OF APRIL 8.

4. WITH RESPECT TO THE FEDAYEEN PROBLEM PER SE, WE BELIEVE IT SHOULD BY NOW BE CLEAR THAT THE SITUATION HAS BECOME MORE DIFFICULT, THE FEDAYEEN MORE ASSERTIVE, AND THE CAPACITY OF THE GOVT TO CONTROL THEM MORE CIRCUMSCRIBED BY EACH SUCCEEDING MAJOR REPRISAL. FYI NOFORN: ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN WE DO HAVE WORD THAT THE KING WAS ABLE TO EXTRACT FROM FEDAYEEN LEADERS BEFORE HE DEPARTED FOR LONDON A PROMISE THEY THEY WOULD DEESCALATE THEIR ACTIVIES PENDING OPPORTUNITY TO EVALUATE THE OVERALL EFFECT OF THEIR ACTIVITIES [REDACTED]. THIS INCIDENTALLY IS ANOTHER FACET OF THE KIND OF APPROACH HE HAS BEEN TRYING TO APPLY FOR SOME TIME TO BRING FEDAYEEN UNDER CONTROL AND ANY PAUSE SHOULD NOT BE SEIZED BY THE ISRAELIS TO ARGUE THAT THEIR REPRISALS NOW HAVE THE FEDAYEEN ON THE RUN. SYMMES.

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~~SECRET~~ 622

PAGE 01 AMMAN 06142 131341Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P R 131324Z AUG 68  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO USUN NY PRIORITY 1094  
SECSTATE WASHDC 6137  
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 6142

EXDIS

SUBJ: ISRAEL/JORDAN

REF: USUN 6175

JORDANIAN OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN CATEGORIC THAT SKYHAWKS WERE IDENTIFIED IN AUG 4 INCIDENT. THEY ALSO CLAIM THAT ONE WAS OBSERVED TO HAVE CRASHED IN JERICHO AREA. WE HAVE NO RPT NO INDEPENDENT CONFIRMATION OF EITHER ASSERTION. SYMMES  
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By 26/ll NARA, Date 10/2/01

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NLJ 02-207  
By iss, NARA, Date 11-20-02

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ACTION SS 30

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R 080700Z AUG 68  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6100

~~SECRET~~ SECTION ONE OF TWO AMMAN 6066

EXDIS

SUBJECT: NEW JET AIRCRAFT FOR ISRAEL

SUMMARY: THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO EVALUATE PROBABLY CONSEQUENCES ON US INTERESTS IN JORDAN OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF A SALE OF PHANTOM JETS TO ISRAEL AND TO SUGGEST ALTERNATIVES FOR THE HANDLING OR THE TIMING OF AN ANNOUNCEMENT IF A DECISION TO SELL IS INESCAPABLE. END SUMMARY

1. WE APPRECIATE THAT IN ANY ARMS SUPPLY SITUATION THERE ARE VARIOUS FACTORS OF TIMING, ANTICIPATION OF FUTURE REQUIREMENTS AND AVAILABILITY OR NON-AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF SUPPLY THAT MUST BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. WE ARE AWARE OF HOW THESE FACTORS ARE INVOLVED IN THE ISRAELI REQUEST FOR PHANTOM AIRCRAFT. WE RECOGNIZE THE ISRAELI REQUEST IS BASED ON A STATED NEED TO MEET ANTICIPATED QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE MILITARY AIRCRAFT DEFICIENCIES IN THE 1970-71 TIME FRAME. WE ARE AWARE OF THE UNLIKELIHOOD THE FRENCH GOVT WILL RELAX ITS EMBARGO ON SUPPLYING MIRAGE AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL. MEANWHILE, WE HAVE READ VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES WITH REGARD TO SOVIET SUPPLY AND TRAINING OF UAR AND OTHER ARAB AIR FORCES INDICATING POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN ARAB CAPABILITIES TO EXPLOIT THEIR QUANTITATIVE SUPERIORITY.

2. IT HAS SOMETIMES BEEN SAID THAT US MISSIONS IN ARAB COUNTRIES HAVE TENDED TO EXAGGERATE THE PROBABLE EFFECTS OF US MILITARY AND OTHER TYPES OF ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL AND THAT IN THE ACTUAL EVENT WE HAVE ALWAYS MANAGED TO LIVE THROUGH THE ARAB REACTIONS. IN FACT, WE HAVE USUALLY

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ESCAPED THE TYPE OF EXTREME REACTION THAT LED THE ARABS, FOR EXAMPLE, TO BREAK WITH THE FRG WHEN THE GERMAN TANK DEAL LEAKED IN EARLY 1965. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS NO ESCAPING THE CONCLUSION THAT EACH TIME THERE HAS BEEN SUCH A DEAL WE HAVE LOST SUPPORTERS IN THE ARAB WORLD AND DEEPENED THE CONVICTION OF THE VAST MAJORITY OF ARABS THAT THE US IS BASICALLY UNSYMPATHETIC TO ARAB INTERESTS. WHATEVER THE DEGREE OF EPHEMERALITY OR SUPERFICIALITY OF PREVIOUS ARAB REACTIONS TO US ARMS SALES TO ISRAEL, CERTAINLY NO ONE WOULD ARGUE THAT THEY HAVE BEEN GOOD FOR OUR INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

3. TODAY THERE IS A MUCH DIFFERENT PSYCHOLOGICAL SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST THAN HAS EXISTED AT THE TIME OF OUR PREVIOUS ARMS DEALS WITH ISRAEL. ISRAEL IS IN OCCUPATION OF LARGE AMOUNTS OF ARAB TERRITORY, PEOPLED BY HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF ARABS. LEAVING ASIDE THE MERITS OF THE JUSTIFICATION ADVANCED BY ISRAEL FOR REPRISAL RAIDS, THE FACT IS THAT ISRAEL OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS HAS USED ITS AIR POWER IN SEVERAL LARGE-SCALE RAIDS INTO JORDANIAN TERRITORY, LITERALLY WITHOUT AERIAL CHALLENGE OR RESPONSE ON THE PART OF EITHER JORDAN OR THE OTHER ARAB STATES. THE SUPPOSED ARAB AIR SUPERIORITY TO WHICH ISRAELI AMBASSADOR RABIN REFERRED IN HIS RECENT STATEMENTS IS WHOLLY MEANINGLESS AS REGARDS JORDAN. IN NOT A SINGLE INSTANCE SINCE THE JUNE WAR HAS AN ARAB AIRCRAFT RISEN TO CHALLENGE THE ISRAELI AIRCRAFT THAT HAVE REGULARLY USED JORDANIAN AIR SPACE, NOT ONLY FOR RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES, BUT, AS IN THE SALT RAID, TO DROP BOMBS, ROCKETS, AND NAPALM ON VARIOUS JORDANIAN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN TARGETS. THE LOCAL PRESS HEADLINED THE FACT THAT "AMERICAN-SUPPLIED SKY HAWKS" WERE USED IN THIS LAST RAID. ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE THERE ARE SOME JORDANIANS WHO RECOGNIZE THE FEDAYEEN AS THE CAUSE OF THESE ISRAELI REPRISAL RAIDS, THE VOICES OF SUCH PEOPLE ARE LESS AND LESS TO BE HEARD IN JORDAN. THE GENERAL REACTION IN JORDAN HAS BEEN HUMILIATION, DESPAIR, ANTI-PATHY TOWARDS THE HASHEMITE REGIME, AND TRANSFERRED HATRED OF THE US BECAUSE OF ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL.

4. AT THE SAME TIME THE US AND THE MORE INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS OF THE SC HAVE CONTINUED TO GIVE STRONG PUBLIC SUPPORT TO THE NOV 22 SC RESOLUTION AND THE EFFORTS OF

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AMB JARRING AND OTHERS TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CRISIS. AMB JARRING HAS JUST BEGUN RENEWED EFFORTS TO MAKE SOME PROGRESS IN HIS MISSION BEFORE THE AUTUMN UNGA SESSION. WE GATHER BOTH FROM PUBLIC MEDIA AS WELL AS CLASSIFIED INFORMATION THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS PLACED SOME LIMITS ON ITS WILLINGNESS TO SUPPLY ADDITIONAL ARMS TO THE UAR AND HAS INDICATED IT EXPECTS THE UAR TO WORK TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

5. IT IS IN THIS GENERAL CONTEXT THAT WE FEEL OBLIGED TO PUT ON RECORD THAT WE BELIEVE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A DECISION TO SUPPLY PHANTOM AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL WILL HAVE A SERIOUSLY ADVERSE EFFECT ON OUR RELATIONS WITH JORDAN. SPECIFICALLY, IT WILL DO DAMAGE TO THE CREDIBILITY OF BOTH OUR STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR THE HASEMITE REGIME AND OUR STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR THE JARRING MISSION.

6. IT WOULD BE JRSH TO TRY TO PREDICT THE VARIOUS FORMS THAT JORDANIAN REACTIONS, OFFICAL AND PRIVATE, MIGHT TAKE. WE SIMPLY DO NOT KNOW. WHILE WE HOPE THAT PUBLIC DISORDER IN JORDAN COULD BE HELD IN CHECK, WE ARE CONCERNED BY THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF LARGE NUMBERS OF ARMED FEDAYEEN IN THIS COUNTRY. SIMILARLY THE EFFECTS ON JORDAN'S OFFICIAL POLICY ARE PROBLEMATICAL. AS DEPT IS AWARE, JORDANI IS NOT ENTIRELY SATISFIED WITH OUR ARMS PACKAGE. WHETHER JUSTIFIED OR NOT, THERE CONTINUES TO BE WIDESPREAD GRUMBLING THAT THE US ARMS PACKAGE IS GREATLY INFERIOR TO WHAT JORDAN MIGHT OBTAIN FROM THE SOVIET UNION. THE REGIME'S PRESENT DEPENDENCE ON SUBSIDIES FROM SAUDI ARABIA, LIBYA AND KUWAIT, PLUS CONTINUING RESENTMENT (WITH CONSEQUENT EFFECTS ON OUR POTENTIAL LEVERAGE) OF THE WAY WE HANDLED THE LIFTING OF THE ARMS EMBARGO AND THE SUSPENSION OF BUDGETARY SUPPORT COULD HAVE UNPREDICTABLE EFFECTS ON THE REGIME'S FREEDOM OF MANEUVER IN RESISTING INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PRESSURES TO TAKE A MORE ANTI-AMERICAN LINE OR TO RESIST POPULAR REACTION AGAINST THE US. WHERE THIS POTENTIAL SITUATION WOULD LEAVE US IN TERMS OF OUR ABILITY OF CONTINUE TO TRY TO INFLUENCE THE JORDANIAN LEADERSHIP IN POSITIVE DIRECTIONS TOWARD THE MAKING OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IS OPEN TO QUESTION. OUR JUDGMENT IS THAT OUR ALREADY SERIOUSLY DIMINISHED CREDIBILITY AND RECEPTIVITY IN JORDAN COULD BE DIMINISHED TO AN EVEN GREATER EXTENT.

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ACTION SS 30

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6101

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EXDIS

SUBJECT: NEW JET AIRCRAFT FOR ISRAEL

7. WE THEREFORE FEEL OBLIGED TO RELATE THE ISRAELI REQUEST FOR PHANTOM AIRCRAFT TO US NATIONAL OBJECTIVES IN JORDAN. OUR JUDGMENT IS THAT, AS FAR AS JORDAN IS CONCERNED, OUR OBJECTIVE OF TRYING TO INFLUENCE THE PARTIES TO REACH A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT COULD BE SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED. SINCE OUR SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES IN JORDAN ARE ALL LINKED TO OUR LARGER OBJECTIVE OF BRINGING ABOUT AN ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE, IT SEEMS TO US THE SUPPLYING OF PHANTOM AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL REMAINS OPEN TO SERIOUS QUESTION.

8. IF, HOWEVER, THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF ISRAEL ARE CONSIDERED OVER-RIDING IN THIS INSTANCE, WE WOULD STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT NO PUBLIC ACCOUNCEMENT ACCOMPANY A DECISION TO SUPPLY THESE AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL. CONSIDERING THE GROWTH IN PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL SYMPATHY FOR ISRAEL'S POSITION, KEEPING SECRET A DECISION TO SUPPLY PHANTOMS MIGHT BE DIFFICULT, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT THE POSSIBILITY SHOULD AT LEAST BE EXPLORED. WHEN IT IS IN THEIR INTEREST, THE ISRAELIS HAVE SHOWN THEY CAN KEEP SECRETS. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, PRESSURES FOR ACTION NOW RPT NOW ON PHANTOMS ARE SAID TO BE JUSTIFIED BY LEAD TIMES INVOLVED, WITH THE PLANES THEMSELVES NOT EXPECTED TO BE ACTIVE IN ISRAEL'S INVENTORY UNTIL 1970-71 IN ANY EVENT. WE WONDER IF IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE US TO TAKE SOME OF THE PRELIMINARY STEPS ON ITS OWN INCLUDING PRODUCTION PLANNING OR ORDERS, PERHAPS TAKING ACCOUNT OF ISRAELI CONFIGURATION REQUIREMENTS, IN ORDER TO REDUCE OR ELIMINATE SIGNIFICANT LEAD TIME LOSSES. WITH

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APPROPRIATE SECRET ASSURANCES TO ISRAEL ON FUTURE CONTINGENCIES FOR SUPPLY, WE WOULD HOPE PRESSURES BEING GENERATED FOR EARLY PUBLIC COMMITMENT COULD BE RELAXED.

9. IN THE EVENT THAT THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES ARE NOT PERSUASIVE AND COMPELLING, AND AN ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT PHANTOMS IS INEVITABLE, WE HOPE THE TIMING AND NATURE OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT CAN BE SUCH AS TO LESSEN THE IMPACT IN JORDAN AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE.

10. THE TIMING CERTAINLY SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE EMOTIONAL RESIDUE OF THE AS-SALT RAID AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF FUTURE SIMILAR RAIDS. IT WOULD PUT THE US IN A VERY INVIDIOUS POSITION IF THE ANNOUNCEMENT WERE MADE WITHIN, SAY, THE NEXT THIRTY DAYS, OR IF THE ISRAELIS USED HEAVY AIRPOWER IN A SIMILAR RAID SHORTLY AFTER SUCH AN ANNOUNCEMENT. WE WOULD HOPE WE COULD GET SOME ISRAELI GUARANTEES ON THE LATTER ASPECT.

11. FOR SIMILAR REASONS, THE ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WHAT, IF ANYTHING, DEVELOPS FROM A SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION OR DEBATE ON THE AS-SALT AFFAIR.

12. SEVERAL KEY PERIODS BETWEEN NOW AND THE UNGA CHRISTMAS RECESS WOULD BE ESPECIALLY UNSUITABLE FOR SUCH AN ANNOUNCEMENT (E.G., (A) WHILE JARRING IS CONFERRING WITH THE ARABS IN THE AREA; (B) WHILE RIAD OR RIFAI, OR BOTH, ARE IN NEW YORK, WHEN OPPORTUNITIES FOR SPECIAL NEGOTIATIONS OR TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS ARE AT LEAST A REMOTE POSSIBILITY; (C) NOVEMBER 22 RESOLUTION ANNIVERSARY DATE AND THEREABOUTS; OR (D) FOR THAT MATTER, AS LONG AS JARRING HAS NOT ADMITTED DEFEAT.)

13. AS FOR THE NATURE OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT, ASSUMING TIMING PROBLEMS SOMEHOW COULD BE RESOLVED, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF IT WERE ACCOMPANIED BY SOME COMBINATION OF THE FOLLOWING?

- A) A UNILATERAL ISRAELI ANNOUNCEMENT OF ITS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF JORDAN;
- B) A STATEMENT OF US INTENTIONS AS REGARDS JERUSALEM (E.G., WE WOULD FAVOR INTERNATIONALIZATION IF SATISFACTORY

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ARRANGEMENTS ARE NOT OFFERED HUSSEIN):

C) A TOKEN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL;

D) A US INTERPRETATION OF ANY UNDERSTANDING WE HAD GOTTEN FROM ISRAEL AS TO MODALITIES OR AIMS IN A SETTLEMENT (WHICH COULD BE REGARDED AS ISRAELI "GIVE")

E) A DIPLOMATICALLY PHRASED US EXPLANATION THAT ISRAELI STUBBORNNESS ON THE ROAD TO A SETTLEMENT WOULD CAUSE US TO REVIEW OUR DECISION; OR

F) A PUBLIC REITERATION OF US SUPPORT FOR THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND CONTINUING INDEPENDENCE OF THE JORDANIAN REGIME; PLUS

G) ISRAELI ADHERENCE TO THE NPT AND IRONCLAD GUARANTEES ON INSPECTION OF DIMONA.

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SUBJ: COOPERATION BETWEEN FATAH AND JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES:

JOINT EMBASSY/DATT MESSAGE

1. EXTRACTS REFTEL WERE PASSED TO GEN KHAMMASH AND TO ZAID RIFA'I, KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY ON TWENTY-NINTH. BOTH MEN FLATLY DENIED ISRAELI ALLEGATIONS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES AND FATAH. KHAMMASH SAID IT WAS AGAINST JORDAN'S NATIONAL INTEREST TO AID AND ABET COMMANDOS IN CROSSING RIVER. HIS RECENT INSPECTION OF TROOP UNITS IN THE VALLEY LED HIM TO BELIEVE THAT SUCH ALLEGATIONS WERE WILDLY EXAGGERATED. AS TO FATAH MANNING JORDANIAN CHECKPOINTS, KHAMMASH TESTILY REMARKED "HOW DO THEY KNOW THEY ARE FATAH!" HE CLAIMED THAT THESE INDIVIDUALS WERE FROM 421ST PLA, WHICH IS PART OF IRAQI ARMY FORCE IN JORDAN. HE STATED THAT, IN ORDER TO CONTROL ACTIVITIES OF INDIVIDUALS OF THIS UNIT, THE IRAQI HQ AND HIS GHQ HAVE ARRANGED FOR JOINT MANNING OF JAA ROADBLOCKS AND CHECKPOINTS IN CERTAIN AREAS.

2. KHAMMASH AND RIFA'I WERE INTERESTED IN THE DESCRIPTION OF THE INTERROGATION OF THE CAPTURED FATAH. KHAMMASH SAID HE WOULD ORDER AN INVESTIGATION AND THAT, IF ANY EVIDENCE

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SHOULD EMERGE SUBSTANTIATING THE ISRAELI REPORT, HE WOULD ENSURE THAT PUNISHMENT WAS METED OUT.

3. RIFA'I ARGUED THAT THE COMPARATIVE LULL IN INCIDENTS OVER THE PAST MONTH WAS EVIDENCE OF JORDANIAN SUCCESS IN HOLDING BACK THE FATAH, DESPITE HAVING ONLY ONE-QUARTER THE NUMBER OF ISRAELI TROOPS "TO GUARD ISRAEL," RIFA'I ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT INCIDENT RATE HAD RECENTLY INCREASED.

4. COMMENT: NOFORN THE JORDANIAN REACTION WAS ABOUT WHAT WE EXPECTED. THEY AUTOMATICALLY DENY THE GENERAL CHARGES LEVELED AGAINST THEM; BUT THEY REVEAL INTEREST IN THE SPECIFICS. IN THEIR RESPONSES, BOTH MEN HAVE AT LEAST TACITLY ADMITTED THAT JORDANIAN CONTROL MEASURES ARE NOT ALWAYS OBSERVED, AND THAT SOME LOW-LEVEL COOPERATION BETWEEN FATAH AND THE JAA OCCASIONALLY OCCURS. WE BELIEVE THAT PASSING ON SUCH REPORTS IS USEFUL WHEN THEY CONTAIN THE DETAILED INFORMATION SUCH AS THAT CONTAINED IN PARA 3.D. CONCERNING THE CAPTURED INFILTRATOR. SUCH INFORMATION COULD BE HELPFUL TO KHAMMASH IN PARTICULAR IN MAKING MORE EFFECTIVE THE DIRECTIVES HE STATES HE HAS ISSUED. JORDANIANS TEND TO REGARD GENERALIZED REPORTS OR CHARGES AS AIMED MORE AT AMERICANS, SEEKING TO CONVINCING THEM THAT ISRAELI REPRISALS ARE JUSTIFIED.

5. SUPPLEMENTARY COMMENT: FOREGOING WAS DRAFTED PRIOR TO MY SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH KING HUSSEIN AND FORMIN RIFAI (AMMAN 6013, 6014) ON AUGUST THIRD. IN BOTH CASES I REFERRED TO THESE ISRAELI ALLEGATIONS AND ALSO CALLED THEIR ATTENTION TO KOL ISRAEL BROADCAST ON MORNING OF THIRD WHICH EMPHASIZED ACCUSATIONS OF JORDANIAN COOPERATION WITH FEDAYEEN WHICH WERE MADE IN TEKOAH'S LETTER TO U THANT THE DAY BEFORE. KING HUSSEIN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT GENERALI KHAMMASH AND ZAID HAD MENTIONED ISRAELI ALLEGATIONS TO HIM. IT WAS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT HE MADE HIS REMARKS ABOUT PROBABLE INCREASE IN FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES WHICH I REPORTED IN AMMAN 6013.

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EXDIS

SUBJ: KING'S COMMENTS ON JARRING MISSION AND EBAN'S POINTS

1. FOLLOWING THE MEETING WITH FONMIN RIFAI ON 3RD REPORTED SEPTEL I SAW KING HUSSEIN AND REVIEWED BRIEFLY MY CONVERSATION WITH RIFAI. I SAID I HOPED KING WOULD AGREE IT IS IMPORTANT FOR JORDAN TO KEEP INDIRECT PROCESS OF DIALOGUE GOING BY COMMENTING AS POSITIVELY AS POSSIBLE ON EBAN'S POINTS. I ALSO TOLD HUSSEIN I WOULD BE INTERESTED IN ANY GENERAL COMMENTS HE MIGHT HAVE ON HOW HE SEES THE CURRENT SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO THE JARRING MISSION.

2. HUSSEIN RESPONDED THAT ALTHOUGH HE HAD SEEN NOTHING NEW AND EXCITING IN EBAN'S POINTS AND IN FACT WAS CONCERNED BY THE HARD-LINE ASPECTS OF SOME OF THE POINTS, HE CERTAINLY WANTED TO DO ANYTHING POSSIBLE TO STIMULATE THE ISRAELIS TO PROVIDE SPECIFIC DETAILS OF SUBSTANCE. HE THEREFORE ENDORSED WHAT RIFAI HAD SAID IN RESPONSE TO EBAN'S PROPOSALS. HE HOPED THAT IN CONVEYING THE JORDANIAN COMMENTS WE COULD URGE THE ISRAELIS TO COME UP WITH SOME SPECIFICS WHEN THEY NEXT SEE MR. JARRING.

3. COMMENTING ON THE CURRENT SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE JARRING MISSION, HUSSEIN SAID THAT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS MAKE IT EVEN MORE URGENT FOR THERE TO BE SOME SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS.

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TIME HAS NEVER BEEN ON THE SIDE OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT BUT NOW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARAB WORLD ARE WORKING AGAINST A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. HE REFERRED TO THE SITUATION IN IRAQ AND SYRIA, AND HE SAID HE ANTICIPATES A LONG PERIOD OF INSTABILITY IN IRAQ AND AN ACCENTUATION OF EXTREMISM IN SYRIA. HE BELIEVES THESE DEVELOPMENTS PLUS THE DECLINE IN NASSER'S POSITION IN THE UAR WILL BUILD UP ADDED PRESSURES IN THE ARAB WORLD AGAINST THOSE MODERATES WHO DESIRE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. HE NOTED THAT IN ADDITION TO THE INTERNAL PROBLEMS NASSER HAS WITH STUDENTS AND OTHER ELEMENTS, THESE EXTERNAL ARAB PRESSURES WILL MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR HIM OR ANY OTHER UAR REGIME TO MOVE TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

4. THE KING THEN SAID THAT FOLLOWING NASSER'S LATEST TRIP TO MOSCOW HE HAD NOTICED BUILD UP IN POPULAR SUPPORT OF THE FEDAYEEN. PEOPLE ARE USING THE ARGUMENT THAT FEDAYEEN PRESSURE IS THE ONLY WEAPON THE ARABS HAVE AGAINST THE ISRAELIS. HE ALSO IMPLIED THAT THIS NOW IS THE LINE BEING TAKEN BY THE UAR. HE SAID HE DOES NOT KNOW IF THIS VIEW IS ENDORSED BY THE SOVIETS BUT HE FOUND IT STRANGE THAT SUCH A SHIFT HAD TAKEN PLACE FOLLOWING NASSER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW. HE THEREFORE EXPECTS AN INCREASE RATHER THAN A DECREASE IN FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES AND IN POPULAR SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT FOR THE FEDAYEEN. HE SAID HE WOULD HOPE THAT EVEN ISRAEL COULD SEE THAT WE MUST MOVE FAST TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, OTHERWISE THERE COULD BE A LONG PERIOD OF INSTABILITY AND EVEN "SOME EXPLOSIONS" IN THE AREA. THIS WOULD NOT BE IN ISRAEL'S INTERESTS AND CERTAINLY NOT IN HIS OWN.

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SUBJ: JARRING MISSION: JORDANIAN COMMENTS ON EBAN'S POINTS

REF: STATE 212831; AMMAN 5934

1. ON THIRD I MET WITH FONMIN RIFA'I TO URGE THAT JORDAN RESPOND TO ISRAELI OVERTURES SUCH AS EBAN POINTS CONVEYED THROUGH BALL DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO AMMAN. USING GENERAL LINE IN STATE 212831 I SAID WE HOPED JORDAN WOULD LOSE NO OPPORTUNITY TO BE RESPONSIVE TO ANY INDIRECT ISRAELI OVERTURES SO THAT PROGRESS ON SUBSTANCE COULD BE ACHIEVED BETWEEN NOW AND THE UNGA MEETINGS IN THE AUTUMN. I STRESSED OUR BELIEF THAT EBAN'S USE OF TALL AS INDIRECT CHANNEL WAS FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT ISRAEL IS NO LONGER INSISTING ON DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AS PRECONDITION FOR THE DISCUSSION OF SUBSTANCE. I REFERRED ALSO TO BALL'S IMPRESSION OF POLICY DISARRAY IN ISRAELI GOVT AND OUR VIEW OF IMPORTANCE OF USING ALL POSSIBLE MEANS TO KEEP PUSHING THE ISRAELIS TO ADOPT SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS.

2. RIFA'I RESPONDED THAT JORDAN VERY MUCH WANTS TO SEE PROGRESS BETWEEN NOW AND THE UNGA. IN FACT, AS FAR AS

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JORDAN IS CONCERNED, PROGRESS MUST BE MADE WELL BEFORE THE UNGA MEETINGS BECAUSE OF THE ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL MEETING NOW SET FOR SEPT 3. JORDAN AND THE UAR MUST HAVE SOMETHING TANGIBLE TO PRESENT TO THE ARAB FONMINS AT THAT TIME. RIFAI SAID HE COULD SPEAK FOR THE UAR ALSO IN STRESSING THE "EAGERNESS" OF BOTH THE UAR AND JORDAN TO GET DOWN TO SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. HE AGAIN RECOUNTED HIS VARIOUS DISCUSSIONS OF THE JORDANIAN SUBSTANTIVE POSITION WITH JARRING. HE SAID HE IS NOT TRYING TO BE OBSTRUCTIVE WHEN HE SAYS THAT THE QUESTIONS PUT TO THE UAR AND THE POINTS BROUGHT BY BALL FROM EBAN ARE TOO GENERAL AND TOO VAGUE TO JUSTIFY SPECIFIC COMMENT. HE COULD NOT SEE WHAT COULD BE SAID IN RESPONSE EXCEPT THAT JORDAN STILL WANTS TO KNOW WHAT ACTUAL BOUNDARIES EBAN HAS IN MIND WHEN HE TALKS ABOUT "NOT ALL BUT A GREAT DEAL" OF TERRITORY. WHAT SPECIFICALLY ARE THE "CERTAIN TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS" THAT ISRAEL WOULD GIVE? HE HAD PUT THESE QUESTIONS TO JARRING ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS AND JARRING HAD PROMISED TO GET SPECIFIC SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSIVE FROM EBAN. SO FAR, THESE WERE NOT FORTHCOMING.

3. IN THE COURSE OF REVIEWING JORDAN'S POSITION, RIFAI STATED THAT JORDAN REMAINS READY TO ENTER INTO JOINT MEETINGS (WITH JARRING PRESENT) IF IT FINDS THERE ARE SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS THAT CAN PROFITABLY BE DISCUSSED. THESE WOULD HAVE TO BE SOMETHING MORE THAN GENERALITIES LIKE THE POINTS THAT EBAN GAVE TO BALL. MOREOVER, RIFAI SAID ONCE AGAIN THAT HE BELIEVES HE WOULD BE ABLE TO SHOW THAT PROGRESS IN GETTING SUBSTANTIVE DETAILS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED BEFORE THE UNGA MEETINGS.

4. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ALONG THESE LINES, I FINALLY ASKED RIFAI IF HE WOULD AUTHORIZE ME TO REPORT THAT IN COMMENTING ON EBAN POINTS HE HAD SAID SOMETHING LIKE THE FOLLOWING WHICH MIGHT BE CONVEYED TO ISRAEL: THE GOJ HAD APPRECIATED MR. BALL'S HELPFULNESS IN CONVEYING MR. EBAN'S POINTS AND HAD BEEN INTERESTED IN THEM. THE GOJ WELCOMED THE IMPLICATION IN MR. EBAN'S POINTS THAT ISRAEL AGREES IN PRINCIPLE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE GOJ HAS ALREADY REQUESTED AMB. JARRING TO OBTAIN FROM THE ISRAELI GOVT SPECIFIC STATEMENTS OF WHAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER "SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES." JORDAN IS FRANK TO SAY IT WOULD EXPECT TO GO BACK TO THE JUNE 4 BOUNDARIES, IF, HOWEVER, ISRAEL

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HAS SOME SPECIFIC RECTIFICATIONS TO PROPOSE, JORDAN WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER THESE. IT CANNOT CONSIDER THEM UNLESS THEY ARE PORPOSED. JORDAN HAS ALREADY STATED TO AMB JARRING THAT IT WOULD NOT ANTICIPATE STATIONING ITS ARMY ON THE WEST BANK AFTER A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO LIMIT ITSELF TO MINIMUM FORCES NEEDED FOR THE PRESERVATION OF PUBLIC SECURITY. THE GOJ, OF COURSE, FOUND MR. EBAN'S STATEMENT OF THE ISRAELI POSITION ON JERUSALEM UNACCEPTABLE. THEY WOULD LIKE THE GOI TO BE MORE SPECIFIC AND FORTHCOMING ON JERUSALEM AND IN PARTICULAR WOULD LIKE TO HEAR THESE IDEAS THROUGH MR. JARRING.

5. RIFAI SAID HE WOULD AGREE TO MY REPORTING THE FOREGOING AS A JORDANIAN RESPONSE IF I BELIEVED THAT THIS WOULD HELP TO BRING ABOUT MORE SPECIFIC ISRAELI SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSALS TO JARRING WHEN EBAN SEES HIM IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. HE SAID ALSO THAT I SHOULD TELL KING HUSSEIN ABOUT OUR DISCUSSION WHEN I SAW HUSSEIN LATER IN THE DAY. AFTER REVIEWING "JORDAN'S RESPONSE" ONCE MORE, I TOLD RIFAI I INTENDED TO INFORM WASHINGTON AND USUN THAT HE HAD MADE THESE COMMENTS ON THE EBAN PROPOSALS AND THAT HE HAD STRESSED JORDAN'S HOPE THAT ISRAEL COULD GIVE JARRING THE SPECIFICS THAT HAD BEEN PROMISED IN THE LAST FEW MEETINGS. RIFAI SAID HE HAD NO OBJECTION.

6. WITH REGARD TO THE ISRAELI QUESTIONS PUT TO THE UAR, RIFAI TOLD ME HE HAD NOW LEARNED THAT JARRING HAD RECEIVED THE TWO QUESTIONS BROUGHT BY BALL IN THE FORM OF THREE WITH THE SAME SUBSTANCE. HE SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE UAR WOULD BE RESPONSIVE TO THESE QUESTIONS SINCE THEY HAD ALREADY BEEN FORTHCOMING IN MUCH MORE DETAIL TO JARRING. AS IN PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS I AGAIN URGED RIFAI TO RECOMMEND TO THE UAR THAT, NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR BELIEF THEY HAD ALREADY GIVEN JARRING SUBSTANTIVE DETAILS, THEY KEEP THE BALL ROLLING. IF NECESSARY LET THEM RESTATE WHAT THEY HAVE ALREADY SAID TO JARRING AS A RESPONSE TO THE ISRAELI QUESTIONS. RIFAI SEEMED TO BUY THIS IDEA.

7. COMMENTS ON THE BASIS OF THIS DISCUSSION, I BELIEVE WE HAVE ENOUGH TO GO BACK TO THE ISRAELIS WITH A SUBSTANTIVE REACTION FROM JORDAN. I THINK WE COULD STRESS TO THE ISRAELIS THAT WE THINK IT IS NOW UP TO THEM TO GIVE JORDAN THROUGH JARRING SOME SPECIFICS WITH REGARD TO WHAT THEY MEAN

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BY "SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES" AND "CERTAIN NON-TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS". IF THEY COULD SAY TO JARRING THAT THEY ARE READY TO WITHDRAW TO SUCH BOUNDARIES, THIS COULD BE USED AS EVIDENCE OF THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL AND WOULD GIVE ADDED STIMULUS TO CONTINUANCE OF INDIRECT DISCUSSIONS. I THINK IT IS ESPECIALLY SIGNIFICANT THAT RIFAI STATED THAT JORDAN IS STILL WILLING TO PROCEED TO JOINT MEETINGS IF SOME SUBSTANTIVE DETAILS CAN BE DEVELOPED BEFORE THE UNGA MEETINGS.

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ON THIRD I EXPECT TO HAVE SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH FONMIN RIFAI AND KING HUSSEIN. MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN IS FOR PURPOSE OF ASSESSING HIS PERSONAL REACTION TO BALL/SISCO TALKS AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS. I PLAN, HOWEVER, TO TAKE SAME LINE WITH HIM I HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO TAKE WITH RIFAI IN REFTEL. I WOULD APPRECIATE ANY OTHER GUIDANCE OR COMMENTS THE DEPT MAY HAVE PRIOR TO THESE MEETINGS.  
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EXDIS

SUBJECT: ARAB-ISRAEL; JORDANIAN CONCERN ABOUT ISRAELI POSITION;  
AS CONVEYED BY BALL

REF AMMAN 5901; BEIRUT 11146

1. SUMMARY: FONMIN RIFAI EXPLAINED THAT JORDAN HAD BEEN DISTURBED BY THE APPARENT DIFFERENCES IN ISRAELI POSITION AS SPELLED OUT, RESPECTIVELY, BY JARRING AND BALL, SENSING THAT LATTER'S VERSION WAS RELATIVELY MORE DISCOURAGEING. FOR EXAMPLE, ALTHOUGH JARRING HAD NEVER EVEN DISCUSSED OUTLINES OF JERUSALEM ARRANGMENT WITH ISRAELIS, BALL CONVEYED THE DIFFICULT-TO-UNDERSTAND CONCEPT OF SOME KIND OF JORDANIAN PRESENCE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A UNITED JERUSALEM REMAINING THE CAPITAL OF ISRAEL. SIMILRLY, ISRAEL HAD BEEN REMARKABLY UNSPECIFIC WITH JARRING AS REGARDS THE TERRITORIES IT MIGHT WANT TO KEEP WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF "SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES," WHILE BALL HAD REPORTED THAT JORDAN WOULD REGAIN "MOST BUT NOT ALL" OF THE LAND AND PEOPLE IT HAD LOST. THE FACT THAT BALL HAD CONVEYED THE IMPRESSION THAT ISRAEL WAS SINGLING OUT JORDAN FOR PRIORITY ATTENTION HAD PROMPTED RIFAI'S LAST VISIT TO CAIRO, WHERE UAR-GOU AGREEMTNT WAS REACHED TO THE EFFECT THAT NO PIECEMEAL SETTLEMT WOULD BE MADE, I.E., THAT ANY JERUSALEM ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE PART OF AN OVER-ALL SETTLEMENT. FINALLY, IN VIEW OF THE PROGRESS

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REPORTED BY JARRING ON CERTAIN ASPECTS OF AN OVER-ALL SETTLEMENT, THE JORDANIANS HAD BEEN DISCOURAGED BY BALL'S IMPRESSION THAT ISRAELI SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS WERE UNLIKELY TO BE DEVELOPED UNLESS AND UNTIL SOME KIND OF DIALOGUE, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, WAS BEGUN WITH THE PARTIES TO A SETTLEMENT.

2. BY THE END OF MY MEETING WITH RIFAI, I BELIEVE THAT WHATEVER DIFFERENCES THE JORDANIANS SAW IN THE TWO BALL/SISCO MEETINGS IN AMMAN, WHETHER OF A SEMANTIC OR ATMOSPHERIC NATURE, HAD BEEN RESOLVED SATISFACTORILY. NEVERTHELESS, AT THIS JUNCTURE, IT APPEARS CLEAR THAT: (A) JORDANIANS WILL NOT RESPOND TO EBAN'S OVERTURES AS CONVEYED BY BALL, BEING FULLY CONVINCED THAT THEY HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENTLY FORTHCOMING IN THEIR OWN PAST RESPONSES TO JARRING'S PROBES; (B) THEY WILL CONTINUE TO RELY ON JARRING TO BE A PARTICIPANT IN ANY KIND OF DIALOGUE, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, WITH THE ISRAELIS; (C) THERE ARE SEMANTIC DIFFERENCES OF REAL IMPORTANCE IN SUCH TERMS AS "JOINT MEETINGS" OR "DIRECT MEETINGS"; (D) JORDANIANS HAD BEEN IMPRESSED WITH BALL'S FRANKNESS, DIRECTNESS, AND OBVIOUS SINCERITY IN SEARCHING FOR WAYS TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS; AND (E) FINALLY AND MOST IMPORTANT, UNLESS SOME PROGRESS WAS MADE IN SUBSTANCE PRIOR TO THE UNGA MEETINGS, PREFERABLY IN THE FORM OF ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO THE "PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL," THERE WAS LITTLE CHANCE THAT RIAD WOULD PARTICIPATE IN "JOINT MEETINGS" IN NEW ORK OR ANYWHERE ELSE, (THERBY UNDERCUTTING WHATEVER JORDAN MIGHT OTHERWISE BE WILLING TO DO). END SUMMARY.

3. ON TWENTY-NINTH I HAD FULL DISCUSSION WITH FONMIN RIFAI OF HIS CURRENT READING THE JARRING MISSION AND JORDANIAN REACTION TO THE BALL/SISCO VISIT. RIFAI SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT ON THE JORDANIAN SIDE THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE IN UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT BALL SAID TO THE KING ON THE ONE HAND AND TO TALHOUNI AND HIMSELF ON THE OTHER SO FAR AS US POLICY WAS CONCERNED. THEY UNDERSTOOD ALL OF THE RESERVATIONS THAT BALL PLACED ON HIS PRESENTATION OF WHAT HEHAD LEARNED IN ISRAEL. THEY HAD BEEN IMPRESSED WITH BALL'S FRANKNESS AND DIRECTNESS AND WITH HIS OBVIOUS SINCEREITY IN SEARCHING FOR WAYS TO ACHIEVE SOME PROGRESS. IT WAS THE "OBJECTIVE FACTS" OF THE ISRAELI POSTION THAT HAD DISTURBED THE JORDANIANIANS AND NOT WHAT BALL HAD SAID ABOUT THE US POSITION. RIFAI SAID THE JORDANIANS THOUGHT BALL HAD PLACED GREATER EMPHASIS ON CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE ISRAELI

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POSITION IN HIS TALK WITH THE PRIMIN. SPECIFICALLY, BALL'S IMPRESSION THAT ISRAEL IS NOT LIKELY TO DEVELOP A SUBSTANTIVE POSITION WITHOUT DIRECT TALKS HAD BEEN VERY DISTURBING TO TALHOUNI. RIFAI COMMENTED THAT IN HIS MEETING WITH THE KING BALL APPARENTLY HAD NOT LEFT THE SAME IMPRESSION OF ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE AS HE HAD IN THE MEETING WITH TALHOUNI.

4. I POINTED OUT TO RIFAI BALL DID NOT SAY THAT UNLESS THERE WERE DIRECT TALKS THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT DEVELOP A SUBSTANTIVE POSITION. BALL HAD STRESSED THAT ALL POSSIBLE WAYS TO ENGAGE IN SOME "PROCESS OF DIALOGUE" SHOULD BE EXPLOITED IN ORDER TO STIMULATE ISRAELI DECISIONS OF SUBSTANTIVE NATURE. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION ALONG THE LINES OF THIRD PARA OF BEIRUT 11146, RIFAI SEEMED TO HAVE A BETTER GRASP OF BALL'S POINT.

5. NEVERTHELESS RIFAI THOUGHT BALL'S PRESENTATION OF THE ISRAELI POSITION SHOWED IT TO BE CONSIDERABLY STIFFER THAN THE POSITION AS CONVEYED BY JARRING. JARRING HAD TOLD RIFAI THAT IN HIS LAST MEETING WITH RAPHAEL HE HAD EMPHASIZED HE DID NOT ENVISAGE DIRECT TALKS "AFTER A FEW MEETINGS" BUT RATHER WHEN THERE HAD BEEN SOME PROGRESS ACHIEVED ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AND THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION NECESSITATED AND JUSTIFIED JOINT MEETINGS. RAFAEL HAD SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS. RIFAI NOTED THAT THERE ARE ALSO "SOME SEMANTIC DIFFERENCES." THE JORDANIANS AND THE UAR UNDERSTAND "JOINT" TO MEAN "WITH JARRING" WHILE "DIRECT" MEANS TO THEM "BILATERAL MEETINGS WITHOUT JARRING PRESENT."

6. WITH REGARD TO DIFFERENCES IN THE ISRAELI POSITION AS CONVEYED BY BALL AND JARRING, RIFAI SAID THAT WITH JARRING THE ISRAELIS HAD NEVER MENTIONED ANYTHING REGARDING TERRITORIES THEY WOULD LIKE TO KEEP WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF "SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES". MOREOVER, THEY HAD NEVER DISCUSSED JERUSALEM WITH JARRING. THEY HAD MENTIONED THE FUTURE OF GAZA TO JARRING, AND JARRING HAD TOLD JORDAN THAT HIS UNDERSTANDING IS ISRAEL WOULD AGREE TO WITHDRAW FROM GAZA AND PLACE IT UNDER UN ADMINISTRATION. (RIFAI NOTED THAT CAIRO HAS THE SAME UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISRAELI POSITION ON GAZA.)  
SYMMES

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INFO /030 W

R 301115Z JUL 68  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6036  
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
USINT CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

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~~SECRET~~ FINAL SECTION OF TWO AMMAN 5934/2

EXDIS

SUBJECT: ARAB-ISRAEL; JORDANIAN CONCERN ABOUT ISRAELI POSITION  
AS CONVEYED BY BALL

REF AMMAN 5901; BEIRUT 11146

7. RIFAI CONSIDERS A FURTHER DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WHAT HAD BEEN BROUGHT BY BALL AND WHAT HAD COME OUT OF TALKS WITH JARRING TO BE EBAN'S EMPHASIS TO BALL THAT JORDAN HAS PRIORITY INSOFAR AS A SETTLEMENT IS CONCERNED. THIS HAD BEEN THE PRIMARY REASON FOR HIS RECENT VISIT TO CAIRO, RIFAI SAID. HE HAD WANTED TO CLARIFY IN CAIRO WHETHER, IF JERUSALEM TURNED OUT TO BE AN OBSTACLE TO SETTLEMENT, THE EGYPTIANS WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT JORDAN. JUST AS JORDAN HAD ALWAYS MENTIONED THE FUTURE OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AS AN ULTIMATE PROBLEM IN THEIR TALKS WITH JARRING, THEY HAD WANTED TO MAKE SURE THAT THEY WOULD HAVE UAR SUPPORT ON THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM. RIFAI SAID RIAD, AND SUBSEQUENTLY NASSER, HAD AGREED ON THE PRICIPLE OF THE "UNITY OF SOLUTIONS". THERE WOULD BE NO SETTLEMET BY ANY STATE UNLESS THE RIGHTS OF ALL HAD BEEN PROTECTED. THUS THE ISRAELI ATTEMPT TO SINGLE OUT JORDAN, AND PARTICULARLY WHAT EBAN SAID TO BALL ABOUT JERUSALEM, HAD BEEN MOST DISCOURAGING.

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8. RIFAI SAID HE IS NEVERTHELESS ENCOURAGED ABOUT THE GENERAL SITUATION. AS LONG AS JARRING CONTINUES, THERE IS SOME HOPE. BUT, HE HAD TO STRESS THAT JORDAN IS STILL WAITING TO HEAR JARRING WHETHER OR NOT ISRAEL HAS COME UP WITH SOME SPECIFICS ABOUT "SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES." HE VOLUNTEERED THAT HE HAD OVERSTRESSED THE WORD "MAP" WHEN HE WAS TALKING TO BALL. NEVERTHELESS, IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT JARRING IS TO GET SOME SPECIFIC STATEMENTS FROM ISRAEL WITH REGARD TO LINES ON THE GROUND. THIS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE A MAP BUT IT WOULD BE A CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT ISRAEL HAS IN MIND ON BOUNDARIES. THUS, IT HAD HIT HIM VERY HARD WHEN BALL SAID HE DOUBTED ISRAEL WOULD COME UP WITH A MAP OR, FOR THAT MATTER, ANY SPECIFICS ABOUT BOUNDARIES. ABOUT FOUR DAYS AGO JARRING HAD SENT WORD HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE RIFAI IN EUROPE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. ASSUMING JARRING HAS SOME NEW OR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM ISRAEL, PRESUMABLY WITH REGARD TO SUCH SPECIFICS, RIFAI HAD RESPONDED HE WOULD BE GLAD TO MEET WITH JARRING IN EUROPE IF HE WOULD GIVE HIM A DATE AND SOME IDEA OF WHAT WAS INVOLVED. OTHERWISE, HE WOULD BE GLAD TO SEE HIM IN AMMAN WHEN HE COMES OUT TO THE AREA.

9. RIFAI TURNED TO THE UAR POSITION ON THE POSSIBILITY OF JOINT MEETINGS. HE SAID RIAD AND NASSER HAD BEEN QUITE FIRM ABOUT REFUSING TO ENTERTAIN THE IDEA OF JOINT MEETINGS IN NEW YORK OR ANYWHERE ELSE. HE THEREFORE HAD TO SAY TO ME VERY FRANKLY THAT UNLESS THERE HAD BEEN SOME PROGRESS ON SUBSTANCE BETWEEN NOW AND THE UNGA MEETINGS, HE DOUBTED VERY STRONGLY RIAD WOULD GO TO NEW YORK. THIS WOULD MEAN IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR JORDAN TO PROCEED TO JOINT MEETINGS IN NEW YORK. "THOSE ARE THE HARD FACTS." NEVERTHELESS, IF SOME PROGRESS COULD BE ACHIEVED, HE BELIEVED HE COULD ULTIMATELY PERSUADE THE UAR TO PROCEED TO JOINT MEETINGS. SPECIFICALLY, BETWEEN NOW AND SEPTEMBER, THE ISRAELIS WOULD NEED TO SAY SOMETHING TO JARRING ABOUT AGREEING TO THE "PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL." THE UAR HAD ACCEPTED THE RESOLUTION AND HAD GIVEN JARRING ALL KINDS OF SPECIFICS. FOR EXAMPLE, IT HAD AGREED TO PLACE GAZA UNDER A UN ADMINISTRATION. IT HAD ALSO MADE FORTHCOMING STATEMENTS ABOUT THE REFUGEE PROBLEM; CANAL TRANSIT; TRANSIT OF THE STRAITS OF TIRAN; AND TERMINATING THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY. THE UAR HAD HAD NOTHING IN RETURN FROM ISRAEL AND FELT HUMILIATED.

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IN VIEW OF WHAT RIAD HAD ALREADY TOLD JARRING ABOUT THE UAR POSITION ON A SETTLEMENT, THE TWO QUESTIONS ISRAEL HAD GIVEN TO JARRING WERE RIDICULOUS. I COMMENTED TO RIFAI THAT IT INDEED THAT UAR AND JORDAN CONSIDER THEY HAD ALREADY GIVEN JARRING SPECIFICS, THERE WAS NO REASON THEY COULD NOT REFER TO THESE SPECIFICS IN RESPONDING TO ISRAELI QUESTIONS PUT BY JARRING. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO KEEP THE PROCESS OF DIALOGUE GOING. RIFAI ACKNOWLEDGED THIS. HE SAID "WE SHOULD NOT BE DOGMATIC" ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE UAR'S PROCEEDING TO JOINING MEETINGS. MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON WHAT COULD BE DONE BETWEEN NOW AND THE UNGA SESSIONS.

10. WITH REGARD TO WHETHER JORDAN WOULD RESPOND TO EBAN'S POINTS AS CONVEYED BY BALL, RIFAI SAID HE DID NOT SEE THAT THERE IS ANYTHING TO SAY. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF JERUSALEM. JORDAN HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED ALL OF EBAN'S POINTS WITH JARRING AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. JORDAN HAD PRESSED JARRING TO GET SPECIFIC REACTIONS FROM ISRAEL. JARRING HAD BEEN TOLD BY THE ISRAELIS THAT JORDAN ALREADY KNEW ISRAEL'S

RESPONSES, BUT THIS IS SIMPLY NOT TRUE. JORDAN HAS NOTHING EXCEPT VAGUE STATEMENTS MADE BY EBAN THAT JORDAN WOULD GET BACK MOST BUT NOT ALL OF WHAT IT HAD LOST. THIS BEGS THE QUESTION. WHAT IS "MOST BUT NOT ALL"? JARRING HAD REPEATEDLY TOLD ISRAEL THAT JORDAN HAD TOLD HIM IT HAD RECEIVED NO SPECIFICS OF WHAT ISRAEL WAS PREPARED TO DO IN IMPLEMENTING THE RESOLUTION. THE IMPORTANT THING IS FOR RAPHAEL OR EBAN TO GIVE JARRING SOME SPECIFICS. JORDAN CAN HARDLY SAY MORE THAN IT HAS UNTIL ISRAEL SAYS SOMETHING. HE STRESSED THAT AS FAR AS DISCUSSION OF EBAN'S POINTS ARE CONCERNED, JORDAN CONSIDERS JARRING HAS ITS REACTION TO ALL OF THEM. IT IS NOW UP TO ISRAEL TO SAY SOMETHING SPECIFIC TO JARRING.

11. AS A FINAL POINT ON THE SUPPOSED DIFFERENCES IN WHAT BALL SAID TO THE KING AND TO THE PRIME MINISTER, RIFAI MENTIONED THERE ALSO HAD BEEN A "MECHANICAL DIFFICULTY." HE IMPLIED THAT HE WOULD HAVE LIKED TO TALK TO BALL SEPARATELY TO GIVE HIM A SENSE OF WHAT HE HAD DERIVED FROM HIS VARIOUS CONVERSATIONS WITH JARRING. THE TRANSLATION PROBLEM AND THE PRESENCE OF TALHOUNI AND FARRA HAD MADE IT DIFFICULT TO STEER THE CONVERSATION. IT WAS CLEAR TO ME THAT RIFAI WAS NOT

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SUGGESTING THERE WERE ANY SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HIM AND THE PRIMIN AND FARRA BUT RATHER THAT THE EMPHASES WITHIN THE CONVERSATION RESULTED FROM TALHOUNI'S MANNER OF CONDUCTING THE MEETING.

12. COMMENT: I THINK THIS CONVERSATION HAS RESOLVED WHATEVER DIFFERENCES THE JORDANIANS SAW IN BALL'S TWO MEETINGS WHILE IN AMMAN. IT ALSO INDICATES THAT THE JORDANIANS DO NOT INTEND TO RESPOND TO EBAN'S POINTS THROUGH US AT THIS TIME AND THAT THEY EXPECT JARRING TO GET THIS PARTICULAR DIALOGUE OFF THE GROUND. AS FAR AS JORDAN IS CONCERNED THE NEXT MOVE IS FOR THE ISRAELIS TO COME UP WITH SOME SPECIFICS IN THEIR NEXT MEETING WITH JARRING. I AM CONVINCED THAT THERE ARE NO OTHER SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS GOING ON BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN. I THEREFORE BELIEVE OUR BEST BET FOR GETTING SOME SUBSTANTIVE DIALOGUE IS TO ENCOURAGE THE ISRAELIS TO BE RESPONSIVE TO JARRING AS EBAN AND RAPHAEL HAVE PROMISED.  
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AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
USUN 1053  
USINT CAIRO

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 5810

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA. NUMBERED 5, LINE 6)

EXDIS

SUBJ: BUNDY'S JULY 18 TALK WITH KING HUSSEIN

PASS BALL/SISCO

SUMMARY

1. IN HIS JULY 18 TALKS WITH BUNDY, KING HUSSEIN SOUGHT BUNDY'S IMPRESSIONS OF ISRAEL, SHOWING SPECIAL INTEREST IN ATTITUDES OF DAYAN. KING STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF PROGRESS TOWARD A SETTLEMENT BY THE YEAR'S END, AND THE NECESSITY OF HAVING SOMETHING TANGIBLE IN THE FORM OF EXPECTATION OF A "JUST" SOLUTION BEFORE HE COULD DIRECTLY CONFRONT THE FEDAYEEN. HUSSEIN ALSO INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER SOME TERRITORIAL "GIVE AND TAKE" IN ANY SETTLEMENT. THE KING WAS WORRIED BY THE IRAQI COUP, AND APPEARED CONCERNED THAT SOONER OR LATER IRAQ AND SYRIA MIGHT MOVE CLOSER TOGETHER.

2. BUNDY STRESSED THAT HE BELIEVED THE ISRAELIS GENUINELY WANT PEACE. HE ENCOURAGED THE KING NOT TO WASTE ANY OPPORTUNITY FOR INDIRECT EXAMINATION OF THE ISSUES WITH KEY ISRAELI LEADERS SUCH AS DAYAN, AND HE UNDERLINED THE THEME THAT ALL AVENUES

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LEADING TO AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWPOINTS SHOULD BE EXPLORED CAREFULLY. BUNDY ALSO CONVEYED DAYAN'S WARNING THAT IF FEDAYEEN FORAYS INTO ISRAEL CONTINUE, ISRAEL MIGHT BE FORCED AGAIN TO STRIKE AT JORDAN, CAUSING FURTHER POPULATION DISPLACEMENT. BUNDY ADVISED THE KING THAT PARTIES THEMSELVES HAVE MAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACHIEVING SETTLEMENT AND SHOULD NOT EXPECT USG OR OTHER OUTSIDE GOVTS TO DO IT FOR THEM. BUNDY SAID HE SENSED THAT THE KING HAS NO CURRENTLY ACTIVE DIALOGUE WITH ISRAELIS BUT THAT HE MIGHT, UNDER SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, UNDERTAKE AN INITIATIVE WITH THE ISRAELIS. MEANWHILE KING APPEARS TO HOPE SOMEONE ELSE WILL DO THE JOB FOR HIM OR AT LEAST GET OUT IN FRONT. END OF SUMMARY.

1. BUNDY HAD AUDIENCE JULY 18 WITH KING HUSSEIN. CROWN PRINCE HASSAN AND KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY, ZAID RIFA'I, ALSO WERE PRESENT. BUNDY DID NOT HAVE OPPORTUNITY BEFORE DEPARTURE TO CLEAR FOLLOWING REPORT OF HIS CONVERSATION, WHICH HE GAVE US ORALLY.

2. BUNDY SAID HIS GENERAL IMPRESSION WAS SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH HE HAD ACQUIRED DURING KING'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON LAST SUMMER. HUSSEIN KNOWS THE PROBLEMS THAT HE FACES, AND HE APPEARS TO REALIZE THAT SOONER OR LATER HE WILL HAVE TO MAKE A STAB AT SOLVING THEM. BUNDY FELT, HOWEVER, THAT HUSSEIN HOPED SOMEONE ELSE WOULD ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT FOR HIM AND THAT AT LEAST HE, HUSSEIN, WOULD WANT SOMEONE ELSE WITH HIM IF NOT OUT IN FRONT. BUNDY THOUGHT HUSSEIN HAD REGAINED SOME OF THE CONFIDENCE HE LACKED DURING THE SUMMER OF 1967, WHEN BUNDY FOUND HIM "VERY SHAKY".

3. HUSSEIN ASKED BUNDY TO TALK ABOUT HIS VISIT TO ISRAEL. BUNDY SAID HE THOUGHT THE ISRAELIS REALLY MEANT IT WHEN THEY SAID THEY WANT PEACE BUT THAT OF COURSE THEY WANT IT ON A SECURE BASIS. ALLUDING TO THE FACT THAT AMB BALL HAD CONVEYED TO THE JORDANIANS ONLY THE DAY BEFORE EBAN'S COMMENTS ON THE OUTLINE OF SETTLEMENT, AND HIS DESIRE FOR A JORDANIAN RESPONSE, BUNDY EMPHASIZED THAT ANY AVENUE DIRECTED AT FEELING OUT THE RESPECTIVE POSITIONS WAS WORTH EXPLORING. HUSSEIN COMMENTED THAT THE ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS MIGHT BE ABLE TO DO THIS LATER IN THE SUMMER IN NEW YORK. THE KING ALSO VOLUNTEERED HE CONSIDERED HIGHLY IMPORTANT THERE BE SOME MEANINGFUL PROGRESS BY THE END OF THE YEAR. (BUT BUNDY

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AGAIN FELT THAT BY PROGRESS THE KING DID NOT MEAN JORDANIAN INITIATIVES.)

4. KING WAS MOST INTERESTED IN DAYAN. BUNDY TOLD HIM HE THOUGHT THAT DAYAN, IN THE ABSENCE OF PEACE, WAS THE FIRMIEST OF ISRAELIS; YET HE WOULD BE THE MOST MODERATE OF ALL AND ESSENTIALLY THE MOST HELPFUL TO THE ARABS ONCE PEACE AND ISRAEL'S SECURITY WAS ACHIEVED. THE KING AGREED WITH THESE COMMENTS. BUNDY REPEATED TO HUSSEIN WHAT DAYAN HAD SAID TO HIM ABOUT THE CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS AND FEDAYEEN RAIDS. IF JORDAN WERE UNSUCCESSFUL IN CONTROLLING THE FEDAYEEN SITUATION IN THE VALLEY (IMPLICATION BEING BEISAN AREA), ISRAEL WOULD AGAIN HAVE TO TAKE FIRM ACTION AND THIS MIGHT MEAN MORE JORDANIANS WOULD BE DISPLACED. BUNDY DID NOT USE DAYAN'S ARGUMENT THAT DEEDS, NOT WORDS, WERE WHAT COUNTED, BUT HE REPEATED DAYAN'S COMMENT THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE KING'S OWN INTEREST TO CONTROL THE FEDAYEEN. HUSSEIN RESPONDED THAT HE COULD NOW MEET ANY DIRECT FEDAYEEN CHALLENGE TO HIS AUTHORITY BUT THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS BETTER TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION WITH INDIRECT TACTICS FOR THE TIME BEING. HUSSEIN FELT STRONGLY THAT HE HAD TO HAVE SOMETHING TANGIBLE, THE EXPECTATION OF A "JUST" SOLUTION, IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY A DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH THE FEDAYEEN.

5. BUNDY COMMENTED TO US THAT HUSSEIN USED THE WORD "JUST" FREQUENTLY AND IN MUCH THE SAME MANNER THE ISRAELIS USED THE WORD "PEACE". A SETTLEMENT IN WHICH ALL PARTIES HAD CONFIDENCE WAS THE ONLY SOLUTION, SAID THE KING. HE OBVIOUSLY CONSIDERS THAT ISRAEL HAS GIVEN THE ARABS THIN SOUP SO FAR. NEVERTHELESS, HE SAID HE WAS CONTINUING TO PRESSURE NASSER TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE WITH JARRING, (WHICH BUNDY TOOK AS A REFERENCE TO THE ISRAELI "TWO QUESTIONS" POSED TO THE UAR THROUGH JARRING), AND SAID THAT SOME PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE SINCE THE KHARTOUM CONFERENCE.

6. BEFORE THE KING ARRIVED AT THE MEETING, BUNDY HAD BEEN TOLD BY RIFA'I THAT ISRAELI TERMS PROPOSED FOR JERUSALEM WERE "IMPOSSIBLE". WHEN JERUSALEM CAME UP WITH THE KING, THE LATTER WAS NOT SO FLATLY ASSERTIVE. BUNDY REFERRED BRIEFLY TO PRESIDENT HELOU'S IDEA OF DELIBERATELY LEAVING THE JERUSALEM QUESTION "UNSETTLED", AND OBTAINING AGREEMENT ON ALL OTHER ISSUES FIRST, BUT THE KING WAS UNRESPONSIVE.

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HUSSEIN REPEATED HIS FREQUENTLY-USED DISCRPTION OF ISRAEL AS POSSESSING THREE FACES: THE EXTREMIST ONE, WHICH SEEKS THE DOWNFALL OF JORDAN AND ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THE EAST BANK; THE SEEMINGLY REASONABLE FACE, WHICH WANTS A PALESTINIAN ENTITY; AND THE MODERATE FACE. THE KING SAID HE HAS BEEN TRYING TO FIND THE THIRD FACE. HE AGVE BUNDY THE IMPRESSION THAT VARIOUS TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS FAVORABLE TO ISRAEL COULD BE CONSIDERED, AND THAT, FOR EXAMPLE, SOME TERRITORY COULD BE GIVEN ISRAEL IN RETURN FOR FREE JORDANAIN PASSAGE TO THE MEDITERRANEAN.

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5959  
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
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AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
USUN 1049

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EXDIS

SUBJ: TYING CANAL PASSAGE TO REFUGEE SOLUTION

REF: STATE 197670

1. CANADIAN (TURNER) ACCOUNT OF JARRING-RIAD MEETING IN STOCKHOLM JUNE 25 AKRETEL. OUTLINED A HARDER UAR POSITION AS REGARDS CONNECTION BETWEEN REFUGEE SOLUTION AND FREE PASSAGE THAN WE HAD PREVIOUSLY UNDERSTOOD TO BE CASE, I.E., QUOTE AS TO ISRAELI SHIPS, UAR WOULD AGREE TO THEIR FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH CANAL AS SOON AS AGREED SOLUTION OF REFUGEE PROBLEM IS IMPLEMENTED. UNQUOTE. TURNER THEN COMMENTED THIS MIGHT TAKE 20 YEARS AND RIAD REPORTEDLY AGREED. EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

2. JORDANIAN ACCOUNT OF RIAD-JARRING MEETING MARCH 7 [REDACTED] IS SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT, I.E., QUOTE UAR WILL ACCEPT ISRAELI SHIPS THROUGH SUEZ AS PART OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN RESOLUTION PROVIDED A SOLUTION TO THE REFUGEE PROBLEM CAN BE AGREED ON. UNQUOTE. JORDANIAN SOURCE MADE CLEAR THAT "AGREED SOLUTION" IS DIFFERENT IN TERMS OF TIME AND ARRANGEMENTS THAN AN IMPLEMENTED SOLUTION AND THAT RIAD INTENDED THIS AS A FLEXIBLE AND EXPLOITABLE SOLUTION.

3. MEMCON GHORBAL-PARKER DATED JULY 5 JUST RECEIVED SEEMS PUT

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

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NARA, Date 08-13-2015

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UAR POSITION SOMEWHAT BETWEEN THE EXTREMES. AT AN EARLY  
SUITABLE OPPORUTNITY, FOR EXAMPLE, IN JORDANIAN EXPLANATIONS OF  
CURRENT RIAD POSITION, WE INTEND EXPLORE WHAT THEY NOW UNDERSTAND  
ON THIS POINT AND WHETHER THERE HAS IN FACT BEEN CHANGE. SYMMES  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5951

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EXDIS

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REF: AMMAN 5739

SUBJ: EASTERN ARAB COMMAND

1. ON INITIATIVE KING HUSSEIN, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ROYAL CABINET ZAID RIFAI BRIEFED ME SIXTEENTH ON PROPOSED EASTERN ARAB COMMAND. ZIAD SAID HUSSEIN WISHED WASHINGTON TO BE FULLY AWARE OF BACKGROUND THIS DEVELOPMENT IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDING. HE OUTLINED THE SITUATION AS FOLLOWS:

2. FOLLOWING JUNE WAR, AND PARTICULARLY AFTER ISRAEL HAD RESUMED ITS REPRISAL RAIDS, JORDAN HAD BEEN DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT SO-CALLED "40 KM GAP" BETWEEN SYRIAN AND JORDANIAN LINES ON ISRAELI FRONT. JORDANIANS JUDGED THEY COULD CONTAIN ANY ISRAELI AGGRESSION ACROSS VALLEY AGAINST EAST BANK LONG ENOUGH TO INVOKE INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES AGAINST ISRAEL. ON THE OTHER HAND, JORDAN HAS FELT THAT ISRAEL COULD EASILY (ZAID SAID WITHIN FOUR HOURS) POUR THROUGH "40 KM GAP" TO ENVELOP IRBID AND SALT AREAS. WITH THESE FACTORS IN MIND, JORDANIANS FOR MONTHS HAD BEEN URGING SYRIANS TO FILL THE "GAP" OR ALLOW OTHER ARAB FORCES TO FILL IT. JORDANIANS HAD EMPHASIZED NEED FOR COORDINATION OF ARAB MILITARY FORCES IN THIS RESPECT. SYRIAN RESPONSE OVER PERIOD OF MONTHS CONSISTENTLY HAD BEEN THAT THEY WOULD NOT COORDINATE MILITARILY WITH "REACTIONARY" ARAB STATES LIKE JORDAN. ISRAELI THREATS IN RECENT WEEKS AGAINST NORTH JORDAN AREA HAD MADE THIS PROBLEM

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MORE AND MORE SENSITIVE AND JORDAN HAD ALSO ASKED OTHER ARAB STATES TO PERSUADE SYRIA TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT DEFENDING THE " GAP".

3. SUDDENLY, ABOUT THREE WEEKS AGO, THE SYRIANS HAD AGREED TO PARTICIPATE IN A JOINT DEFENSIVE COMMAND ARRANGMENT WITH JORDAN. SUBSEQUENTLY, GENERAL KHAMMASH HAD GONE TO BAGHDAD AND HAD MET WITH SYRIAN AND IRAQI COMMANDERS. THE SYRIANS AND IRAQIS HAD INSISTED THAT THE COMMAND WOULD BE PLACED UNDER AN IRAQI CHIEF OF STAFF AND IRAQI DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF. A SYRIAN WOULD BE DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS AND THE SENIOR JORDANIAN OFFICER WOULD BE PLACED IN CHARGE OF A MILITARY " ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT". THE JOINT COMMAND ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE INVOKED ONLY IN CASE OF ISRAELI AGGRESSIVE ATTACKS ON ONE OF THE THREE COUNTRIES. THE INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL MILITARY COMMANDS WOULD REMAIN INTACT.

4. THE JORDANIAN REACTION TO THESE PROPOSALS HAS BEEN TO SAY THAT JORDAN WOULD HAVE AN INSUFFICIENT VOICE IN THE COMMAND STRUCTURE. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSIONS IT WAS PROPOSED THAT NEITHER JORDANIAN NOR SYRIAN OFFICERS WOULD BE GIVEN POSTS IN THE COMMAND STRUCTURE BUT IRAQI OFFICERS WOULD STILL BE APPOINTED CHIEF OF STAFF AND DEPUTY. THE SYRIANS ADDITIONALLY AGREED, UNDER JORDANIAN AND IRAQI PRODDING, TO MOVE THEIR MILITARY DEFENSIVE LINES SOUTH AND WEST TO CLOSE THE "40 KM GAP". (ACCORDING TO ZAID, THIS MOVEMENT OF TROOPS IS NOW IN PROGRESS AND THE SYRIAN LINES WOULD BE ON AN AXIS WEST OF THE SHAIKH MESKIN-DERA HIGHWAY.)

5. ZIAD SAID THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS SENSITIVE TO THE PARALLEL THAT MIGHT BE DRAWN BETWEEN THIS PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT AND THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO JUNE 1967. THE KING AND OTHERS WERE ALSO SUSPICIOUS OF POSSIBLE SYRIAN MOTIVES BECAUSE OF SOME " ABSOLUTELY RELIABLE" INTELLIGENCE ABOUT SYRIAN CONTACTS WITH ISRAEL THAT HAD RECENTLY BECOME AVAILABLE TO JORDAN (REPORTED SEPARATELY). FOR MILITARY REASONS, (INCLUDING MORALE FACTORS IN THE JORDANIAN ARMY), GENERAL KHAMMASH WAS IN FAVOR OF PROCEEDING WITH THE COMMAND ARRANGEMENT. KHAMMASH HAD BEEN DISPATCHED TO DISCUSS IT WITH KING FAISAL WHO HAD COMMENTED THAT JORDAN MUST MAKE ITS OWN DECISIONS IN RESPECT TO THE COMMAND, THAT HE HAD NO OBJECTIONS TO IT, AND, IN ANY CASE, SAUDI ARABIAN TROOPS WOULD REMAIN INDEPENDENT. OTHER ADVISERS OF

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HUSSEIN HAD STRESSED FAVORABLE FACTORS AND JUSTIFICATIONS SIMILAR TO THOSE ADVANCED BY KHAMMASH IN DISCUSSION WITH DUNCAN (AMMAN 5739).

6. ZAID SAID KING HUSSEIN HAD FINALLY CONCLUDED HE HAD NO ALTERNATIVE TO PROCEEDING WITH THE PROPOSED COMMAND. THE ARRANGEMENT WOULD REMAIN SECRET. IT WOULD BE ENTIRELY FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES. IT WOULD NOT GO INTO EFFECT EXCEPT IN THE EVENT OF ISRAELI AGGRESSION. IN ANY DISCUSSIONS OF THE MATTER JORDANIANS WOULD REPRESENT IT AS A SOLELY DEFENSIVE ARRANGEMENT DERIVING FROM THEIR INTRA-ARAB DEFENSE OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM OTHER ARRANGEMENTS, SUCH AS THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY PACT AND THE UNIFIED ARAB COMMAND. THEY WOULD STRESS ISRAELI REPRISAL RAIDS HAD FORCED THEM TO SUCH CO-ORDINATION FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES.

7. AFTER HEARING ZIAD OUT, I ASKED IF KHAMMASH HAD REPORTED TO THE KING ON DUNCAN'S APPROACH OF JULY 13. ZIAD SAID KHAMMASH HAD NOT, PRESUMABLY BECAUSE OF THE KING'S ABSENCE IN THE SOUTH. I THEREFORE OUTLINED MY INSTRUCTIONS IN STATE 200965 AND ASKED THAT ZAID PASS MY REMARKS TO THE KING. I SAID I HOPED THAT IF PROPOSED ARRANGMENT DID MATERIALIZE, IT WOULD BE KEPT SECRET AND TREATED IN LOW KEY MANNER. AT SAME TIME IT SEEMED MOST IMPORTANT THAT ANY DISCUSSIONS, EVEN IN SECRET FRAMEWORK, BE GIVEN ENTIRELY DEFENSIVE EMPHASIS. SYMMES

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R 160940Z JUL 68  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5935  
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
USINT CAIRO  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
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SUBJ: PROPOSED EASTERN ARAB COMMAND

REF: STATE 200965

1. DUNCAN AS CHARGE CALLED ON CHIEF OS STAFF KHAMMASH SUNDAY JULY 14 TO ALERT LATTER TO USG CONCERN OVER POSSIBLE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ANNOUNCEMENT OF FORMATION OF AN EASTERN ARAB COMMAND. APPROACH COUCHED IN TERMS SEEKING FURTHER INFORMATION AND DESCRIBING OUR PRELIMINARY CONCERNS. DUNCAN POINTED OUT AMB HAD NOT YET HAD CHANCE TO STUDY MATTER AND WOULD WISH FOLLOW UP.

2. KHAMMASH SAID HE HAD TAKEN STEPS BRING MATTER OUR ATTENTION EARLIER BECAUSE HE WANTED US TO BE FULLY INFORMED. HE SAID NEGATIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS HAD BEEN EXAMINED BUT THESE HAD TO BE WEIGHED AGAINST CRITICAL PROBLEMS FORCED UPON JORDAN. WHOLE ARRANGEMENT WAS CAST IN DEFENSIVE TERMS AND AS PRACTICAL MATTER WOULD HAVE LITTLE REAL MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE. RATHER, IT WAS DESIGNED DEAL WITH CERTAIN PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS WHICH WERE BOTH REAL AND CRITICAL. NEED TO MOVE ALONG

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THESE LINES FORCED UPON JORDAN BY MASSIVE ISRAELI PRESSURE WITH SUCH TRAGIC BLACKEYES AS IRBID PLUS CONTINUING THREATS OF MAJOR MILITARY ACTION TO SEIZE LAND ON EAST BANK. KHAMMASH QUOTED RECENT THREATENING STATEMENTS BY ISRAELI OFFICIALS INCLUDING FRENCH NEWS CORRESPONDENT QUOTATION OF DAYAN AS SAYING "WE WILL MEET IN IRBID."

3. JORDANIAN INITIATIVES TOWARD COORDINATION HAD NUMBER OF MOTIVATIONS. TO SOME EXTENT THERE WAS ACTUAL PHYSICAL NEED FOR SYRIAN AND IRAQI HELP IF ISRAELIS DID ATTACK EAST BANK. EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, JORDANIAN LEADERSHIP WAS BEING BLAMED FOR FACING PROBLEM OF RECURRING ISRAELI STRIKES ALONE AND FAILING COPE WITH IT. THIS BROUGHT GROWING CRITICISM ON BOTH JORDAN LEADERSHIP AND ITS AMERICAN FRIENDS. ANOTHER ESSENTIAL OBJECTIVE WAS TO CONFRONT IRAQIS AND SYRIANS WITH REALITIES OF SITUATION AND BY INVOLVING THEM, FORCE THEM TO ACCEPT AND FOLLOW RESPONSIBLE POLICIES. ANOTHER MAJOR OBJECTIVE WAS TO COMMIT SYRIANS AND IRAQIS TO HELP COPE WITH FEDAYEEN PROBLEM IN ACCORD WITH MORE SECRET VIEWS EXPRESSED BY IRAQI AND SYRIAN LEADERSHIP.

4. KHAMMASH COMMENTED THAT UAC WAS AFTER ALL STILL IN EXISTENCE ON PAPER AS WAS ARAB COLLECTIVE SECURITY PACT. KHAMMASH SAID NO ONE SHOULD HAVE ANY ILLUSIONS OR BE EXCITED ABOUT THE ROLE OF EITHER THE IRAQIS OR THE SYRIANS. THE LEADERSHIP IN BOTH CASES KNEW THE FACTS OF LIFE AND HAD NO INTENTION OF GETTING INVOLVED WITH ISRAEL IF THEY COULD HELP IT. CERTAINLY THEY HAD NO INTENTION OF TAKING ANY INITIATIVE. WHEN AFTER HIS RECENT RETURN FROM LONDON HE HAD GONE TO IRAQ TO EXPLORE THE ROLE OF IRAQI FORCES AND APPROPRIATE REACTION TO ISRAEL PRESSURE, HE HAD FOUND THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP VERY REALISTIC AND CAUTIOUS. KHAMMASH HAD KNOWN THE KEY IRAQI OFFICIALS SUCH AS PRESIDENT ARIF AND CS FAYSAL ANSARI A LONG TIME AND HAD TALKED FRANKLY WITH THEM. THE IRAQIS HAD CHOSEN MOHAMMED NURI KHALIL, IRAQI 5TH DIV COMMANDER, FOR THE NEW COMMAND. KHAMMASH KNEW HIM AS A STEADY, CAUTIOUS MAN.

5. KHAMMASH POINTED OUT THAT THE IRAQIS HAVE BEEN IN JORDAN ALL ALONG. GOJ HAD HAD THEM ON THE WAY OUT WHEN THE ISRAELIS HIT JORDANIANS ON MARCH 21 (AMMAN 4045.) THIS AND SUCCESSIVE ISRAELI ACTIONS HAD BOTH FORCED GOJ TO HAVE IRAQIS

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COME BACK AND UNDER EACH SUCCEEDING ISRAELI PRESSURE, GIVE THEM A LARGER ROLE. AFTER IRBID HE HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO HAVE THEM MOVE FURTHER FORWARD. TO PUT THE IRAQIS ON THE SPOT HE HAD BOLDLY SUGGESTED EVEN FURTHER FORWARD COMMITMENT. TO THIS THE IRAQIS HAD BEHAVED VERY SKITTISHLY JUST AS HE EXPECTED AND HAD MADE MANY EXCUSES SUCH AS SUPPLY LINES LIMITING THEIR ABILITY TO HELP. IN ANY EVENT THE IRAQIS HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE AGREEMENT FOR COORDINATION WOULD NOT BRING ANY MORE TROOPS. THEY HAD DESCRIBED FRANKLY THEIR PROBLEM IN SOUTH IRAQ WHERE THEY HAD BEEN DEALING WITH AN ARMED COMMUNIST UPRISING AND ANTICIPATE FURTHER TROUBLE. IN THE NORTH THEY DO NOT TRUST BARZANI AND FEAR THE KURDS WILL MOVE AGAIN BEFORE MANY MONTHS.

6. STRATEGY WITH THE SYRIANS, KHAMMASH SAID, WAS MULTI-FACETED. THE JORDANIANS HAD BEEN SEEKING FOR SOME TIME TO BUILD A RELATIONSHIP WHICH WOULD EASE THE SYRIAN PRESSURE ON THE JORDANIAN INTERNAL SCENE. IT WAS CLEAR TO HIM THAT THE SYRIANS WERE DESIROUS OF DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO AVOID THEIR OWN DEEPER INVOLVMENT WITH THE ISRAELIS. THIS, UNFORTUNATELY, WAS NOT SO APPARENT TO OTHERS IN THE JAA. THERE WERE ALSO THE CONTINUING AND INCREASING COMPLAINTS THAT THE SYRIANS WERE WELL AND BOUNTIFULLY EQUIPPED BY THE SOVIETS. COORDINATION THROUGH THE PLANNED COMMAND RELATIONSHIP WOULD MAKE THE SYRIANS SHARE RESPONSIBILITY IN ANY FUTURE BLOWS AND WOULD OPEN JORDAN FORCES' EYES TO THE REALITIES IN SYRIA. KHAMMASH ADDED THAT HE HAD FOUND THE SYRIAN CHIEF OF STAFF EVEN MORE DOVISH THAN THE IRAQIS. HE NOTED THAT OTHER SYRIAN OFFICIALS NOW IN KEY POSITIONS IN MILITARY MATTERS INCLUDED A FORMER SYRIAN LIAISON OFFICER TO THE UAC WHO WAS VERY ANTI-REGIME IN SYRIA AND THE NEW AIR FORCE COMMANDER FARID HAYDAR WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN BOUNCED BY THE SAME REGIME. THESE MEN WERE REALISTS AND ARE NOT GOING TO GIVE ANYBODY ANY TROUBLE. KHAMMASH POINTED TO THE RECENT SYRIAN-JORDANIAN MILITARY EXERCISES IN WHICH GENUINE SYRIAN ADMIRATION FOR JORDANIAN EQUIPMENT WAS STIMULATED AS THE KIND OF BENEFIT JORDAN AND ITS FRIENDS REAP FROM THE RELATIONSHIPS UNDER THE MYW ARRANGEMENTS. (SEPTEL AND AMMAN USDAO 0278 JULY 68 PARA 4).

7. KHAMMASH SAID HE HAD BEEN OUTSPOKEN TO BOTH THE SYRIANS AND IRAQIS TO EFFECT IT WAS FEDAYEEN THAT GOT EVERYONE INTO

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TROUBLE IN '56 AND AGAIN IN '67, AND IF THEY WERE NOT STOPPED THEY WOULD DRAG EVERYONE TO DESTRUCTION AGAIN. KHAMMASH SAID THE LEADERSHIP OF IRAQ EXPRESSED FULL AGREEMENT AND THE SYRIAN OFFICERS HE HAD TALKED TO, INCLUDING THE CHIEF OF STAFF, INDICATED THIS WAS THE SYRIAN VIEW. THE SYRIANS IN THE PAST HAD BEEN ABLE TO CHANNEL FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY OUT THROUGH JORDAN LETTING JORDAN TAKE THE LUMPS AND METICULOUSLY KEEPING THEMSELVES OUT OF DIRECT INVOLVEMENT. THIS WAS BECOMING HARDER FOR THE SYRIANS. ALSO BOTH IRAQIS AND SYRIANS ACKNOWLEDGED THEY WERE HAVING GROWING INTERNAL PROBLEMS FROM THE FEDAYEEN TYPES. KHAMMASH SAID HE FELT THE KIND OF COORDINATION ENVISAGED IN THE NEW COMMAND WAS ESSENTIAL TO FORCE RESPONSIBILITY ON THE IRAQIS AND SYRIANS AND ENABLE GOJ TO HAVE A PRACTICAL DIALOGUE WITH EACH OTHER ON THIS MATTER.

8. DUNCAN THANKED KHAMMASH FOR THE ELABORATION OF HIS THINKING AND INDICATED WE HAD BEEN AWARE OF SOME OF THE MAJOR POINTS HE HAD RAISED. HE EXPLAINED THAT OUR CONCERN HAD NOT BEEN ADDRESSED TO THE PRACTICAL MILITARY EFFECTS BUT TO THE EXTERNAL PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTION. DUNCAN SAID ALSO HE WOULD BE BRIEFING ME ON MY RETURN SUNDAY EVENING AND THAT HE EXPECTED THAT I WOULD HAVE FURTHER THOUGHTS ON THE MATTER.

9. COMMENT: KHAMMASH IS OBVIOUSLY VERY FAR DOWN THE ROAD ON THE PROPOSITION. AS HE IMPLIED, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT HE IS SPEAKING FOR THE KING ON THIS. DUNCAN FOUND HIM VERY CONVINCED OF THE CORRECTNESS OF HIS RATIONALES AS TO THE NEED FOR THE STEPS HE HAS BEEN TAKING AND THE BALANCE OF ADVANTAGES WHICH THESE ARE GOING TO BRING JORDAN. CERTAINLY THE ISRAELIS MUST SHARE A MAJOR BLAME FOR THE FACT THE IRAQIS ARE STILL IN JORDAN TODAY. GIVEN THE CURRENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT AND THE BACKGROUND, WE BELIEVE IT HIGHLY IMPROBABLE OUR REPRESENTATIONS COULD STOP THE ARRANGEMENT. DUNCAN DETECTED SOME SIGNS OF SERIOUS UNDERLYING FRTRAIN IN KHAMMASH WHEN THE LATTER REALIZED DUNCAN HAD NOT IMMEDIATELY BOUGHT HIS PRESENTATION. AT EARLIEST SUITABLE OPPORTUNITY I WILL PURSUE THE MATTER FURTHER WITH THE KING AND PERHAPS KHAMMASH, STRESSING OUR CONCERN FOR THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REPERCUSSIONS. MY PRESENT READING, HOWEVER, IS THAT THE JORDANIANS ARE COMMITTED TO SOMETHING ALONG THE INDICATED LINES AND THAT OUR BEST BET WILL BE TO WORK TO MINIMIZE POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS. I WILL PARTICULARLY STRESS IMPORTANCE OF STICKING TO DEFENSIVE NATURE OF ARRANGE-

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MENT IN ANY JORDANIAN PUBLIC STATEMENTS ABOUT NEW COMMAND.

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P 050649Z JUL 68  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5878  
INFO USUN PRIORITY 1032

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 5605

EXDIS:

SUBJ: BALL VISIT

REF: STATE 196073: AMMAN 5603

KING HUSSEIN CONFIRMS AMBASSADOR BALL VISIT JULY 17 MOST WELCOME. DUNCAN.

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PI 040930Z JUL 68  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5877  
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 5603

EXDIS

REF STATE 196073

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BALL VISIT

INFORMED FOM MIN RIFAI MORNING JULY 4 BALL-SISCO SCHEDULED VISIT AMMAN JULY 17. RIFAI EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION VISIT AND GAVE PRELIMINARY RESPONSE THAT HE FORESAW NO PROBLEM RE DATE. EXPLAINED, HOWEVER, HE MUST INFORM PRIMIN AND KING, BOTH OF WHOM TRAVELLING OUTSIDE AMMAN TODAY. RIFAI UNDERTOOK CONFIRM DURING EVENING JULY 4 THAT DATE ACCEPTABLE.  
DUNCAN

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R 251439Z JUN 68  
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5835

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 5494

EXDIS:

SUBJ: ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM; IMPORTANCE OF ISRAELI PUBLIC  
ACCEPTANCE OF PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL

REF: STATE 188982; AMMAN 5351, 5449; TEL AVIV 4232;  
REYKHAVIK 533 (SECTO 4)

1. WE HAVE READ WITH INTEREST VARIOUS VIEWS IN REFTELS ON HOW TO BRING ABOUT PRODUCTIVE ARAB-ISRAELI CONTACTS UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES. WE NOTE FROM REYKJAVIK 533 THAT US AND UK SHOULD HAVE FURTHER TALKS IN ENXT FEW DAYS. DEPT MAY FIND FOLLOWING COMMENTS USEFUL IN PREPARATION FOR THOSE FURTHER TALKS.

2. WITH REGARD TO EBAN'S CONCERN OVER " PARALYSIS IN THE GOJ'S POSITION" AMMAN 5449 (NODIS) INDICATES THAT JORDANIANS ARE STILL WILLING TO PROCEED TOWARD PRACTICAL " NEXT STEPS" UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES. ON JORDANIAN SIDE, HOWEVER, KING HUSSEIN AND HIS PRINCIPAL ADVISERS HAVE BECOME DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF ISRAELI INTENTIONS AS A RESULT OF SERIES OF RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES (AMMAN 5457 AND PARA 4 AMMAN 5456). THESE JORDANIAN SUSPICIONS HAVE BEEN COMPOUNDED BY JARRING'S INABILITY TO OBTAIN ANY PRACTICAL INDICATIONS OF ISRAEL'S SUBSTANTITVE POSITON. WE BELIEVE THIS PRECISELY EXPLAINS " THE HITCH" (TEL VIV 4241) AND WESEE NO OBJECTIONS TO SO INFORMING EBAN.

3. IN MEETING WITH DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY DAVIES ON JUNE 15, GOJ FOMIN FIFAI ASSERTED THAT ISRAELI PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF THE " PRINCIPLE" OF WITHDRAWAL WOULD ENABLE ARAB LEADERS TO MOVE TOWARD " MORE PRACTICAL MEASURES" TO IMPLEMENT THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION (PARA 2 AMMAN 5351). RIFAI EMPHASIZED THAT ACCEPTANCE OF THE

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PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL COULD NOT HURT ISRAELIS POSITION IN ANY WAY SINCE IT WOULD REQUIRE NO CHANGE ON THE GROUND IN THE ACTUAL SITUATION. RIFAI URGED DAVIES TO MAKE THIS POINT CLEAR IN WASHINGTON AND ISRAEL. PARA 21 OF STATE 188982 MENTIONED POSSIBLE UAR WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE IF THE ISRAELIS WOULD GIVE A CLEAR INDICATION OF AN INTENTION TO WITHDRAW. THUS, IT SEEMS TO US THAT PERHPAS BOTH THE GOJ AND UARG MIGHT BE PREPARED ON THEIR SIDE TO MAKE SOME MOVES IF WE COULD GET ISRAEL TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT REGARDING ACCEPTANCE OF THE " PRINCIPLE" OF WITHDRAWAL. I WOULD STRESS THAT SUCH AN ISRAELI STATEMENT WOULD HAVE TO CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND ALSO UNACCOMPANIED BY THE USUAL RESERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS THAT HAVE PREVIOUSLY CHARACTERIZED ISRAELI STATEMENTS ON THEIR " ACCEPTANCE" OF THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION. WE, OF COURSE, RECOGNIZE THAT IT IS LOGICAL TO DEDUCE FROM PREVIOUS GOI STATEMENTS THAT ACCEPTANCE OF THE " PRINCIPLE" OF WITHDRAWAL IS IMPLIED, AND WE HAVE AKEN THIS LINE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE JORDANIANS. THE JORDANIAN REACTION IS THAT IF WE ARE CORRECT IT SHOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT FOR THE ISRAELIS TO REFER SPECIFICALLY AND PUBLICLY TO THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE " PRINCIPLE" OF WITHDRAWAL.

4. RECENT OFFICIAL CALRIFICATIONS OF GOI POLICY FOLLOWING THE DAYAN STATEMENT AND SURFACING THE ALLON PLAN APPEAR FROM HERE TO INDICATE THE GOI MAY NOW BE IN A POSITON TO STATE PUBLICLY THAT ACCEPTANCE OF THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION IMPLIES ACCEPTANCE OF THE " PRINCIPLE" OF WITHDRAWAL. IN OUR VIEW, VARIOUS PUBLIC STATEMENTS MADE BY THE US AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS THAT SUPPORT THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION FULLY PROTECT THE ISRAELI INTEREST IN " SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUDNARIES". MOREOVER, IN FONMIN RIFAI'S OWN WORDS" A" ACCEPTANCE OF THE 'PRINCIPLE' WOULD NOT REQUIRE ANYTHING TO HAPPEN ON THE GOUND EITHER NOW OR IN THE FUTURE".

5. IF THE ISRAELIS COULD BE PRESUADED TO MAKE SUCH A PUBLIC STATEMENT ACCEPTING THE " PRINCIPLE" OF WITHDRAWAL BEFORE JARRING'S FORTHCOMING MEETINGS IN EUROPE WITH RIAD AND RIFAI, THIS MIGHT BE JUST THE THING TO ENABLE JARRING TO GET THE PARTIES TO RHODES TYPE MEETINGS IN NEW YORK AFTER HIS VACATION.

6. DEPT PLEASE REPEAT AS APPROPRIATE. SYMMES

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5841

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REF: AMMAN 5494, 5449

1. FONMIN RIFAI TOLD CONGEN CAMPBELL AND ME TODAY HE IS TO SEE AMB JARRING ON JULY 6 AND FONSEC STEWART ON JULY 11. RIFAI SAID HE BELIEVES ON BASIS OF REPORTS FROM JORDANIAN AMB SHARAF AND UN REP AL-FARRA THAT JARRING MISSION IS "STALEMATED" AND HE PLANS TO ASK JARRING WHY MISSION HAS GROUND TO HALT. HE NOTED THAT JARRING IS TO REPORT AT END OF JULY BUT SAID HE HAD NO NOTION OF IMPORT OR INTENT OF THAT REPORT.

2. HE DID NOT RESPOND TO MY SUGGESTION THAT THERE MAY BE SOME MOVEMENT THAT WOULD GIVE RESTRAINED REASON FOR OPTIMISM.

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