



Department of State

TELEGRAM

62

SECRET 127

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05199 060715Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 060635Z JUMF68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5698

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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 5199

EXDIS

SUBJ: PRESIDENT'S ORAL MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN

REF: STATE 175976 & 176578

1. ON FIFTH I PASSED PRESIDENT'S ORAL MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN, WHO EXPRESSED WARM APPRECIATION FOR IT. HE MADE NO OTHER COMMENT ON THE MESSAGE ITSELF BUT IMPLIED IT CONTAINED WHAT HE HAD WANTED TO HEAR WHEN HE MADE HIS REQUEST ON THIRTIETH.

2. STATE 176578 WAS RECEIVED AFTER MY MEETING WITH HUSSEIN. I WILL TAKE EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO BRING PRESIDENT'S REMARKS TO KING'S ATTENTION.
GP-3

SYMMES

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By *16/11*, NARA, Date *10/2/01*

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 05147 031251Z

43
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

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P R 031210Z JUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5663
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 5147

EXDIS

REF: STATE 172646

SUBJ: ANTI-INFILTRATION DEVICES

1. EMBASSY FULLY CONCURS WITH DEPT'S POSITION THAT ISRAELI STRENGTHENING OF ITS STATIC DEFENSES IS FAR PREFERABLE POLICY TO REPRISALS OR COUNTER-TERRORISM. GOJ LEADERSHIP PRIVATELY HAS SPOKEN TO US APPROVINGLY OF THESE ANTI-FEDAYEEN MEASURES INCLUDING CONSTRUCTION OF FENCES AND EVEN LAYING OF MINE FIELDS ON WEST BANK.

2. WE ALSO AGREE THAT STATIC DEFENSE LINE CAN HAVE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. IN THIS CONTEXT, GOI REQUEST FOR OVER 400,000 ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES RAISES QUESTION WHETHER SOME OF THESE MINES MIGHT BE SOWN ON EAST BANK. IN SUCH CASE USG COULD BE ACUTELY EMBARRASSED. JAA INFORMATION IS THAT IDF PATROLS ARE PERIODICALLY ATTEMPTING CROSS RIVER PROBES. THESE PATROLS IN PAST HAVE DONE SOME MINE LAYING. MOREOVER, EVEN IF MINES ARE LAID ONLY ON WEST BANK, MINE FIELDS ONCE LAID ARE NOT ALWAYS EASILY LOCATED FOR SUBSEQUENT REMOVAL. THIS COULD POSE PROBLEM IN GETING AGRICULTURE IN A SUBSTANTIAL AREA OF WEST GHOR EVEN AFTER PEACEFUL CONDITIONS RETURN.

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 05135 031007Z

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ACTION SS 30

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R 030929Z JUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5658

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 5135

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 5084

BRIT AMB ADAMS TOLD ME JUNE 1 THAT WHEN HE SAW HUSSEIN JUST AFTER ME ON THIRTIETH KING TOLD HIM ABOUT REQUEST HE HAD PUT TO ME (AMMAN 5084). ADAMS SAID HE HAD "PREEMPTED KING" AT THIS POINT BY INTERJECTING HIS EMBASSY HAD NO INFORMATION SHOWING ISRAELI BUILDUP. KING NEVER DID GET AROUND TO ASKING FOR STATEMENT UK ATTITUDE TOWARD JORDAN'S INTEGRITY. SYMMES
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PAGE 01 AMMAN 04998 240823Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

2

R 240650Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5589
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO
USUN NY 969

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4998

EXDIS

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

REF: USUN 5214, 5272, AMMAN 4840, TEL AVIV 3830.

1. ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT MAY 22 REITERATING GOI ACCEPTANCE OF THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION IS MOST WELCOME. PERHAPS NOT SURPRISINGLY, IN VIEW OF THE MONTHS WHICH HAVE PASSED IN ACrimonious PUBLIC DEBATE AND OFFICIAL PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS OVER THE ISSUE OF "ACCEPTANCE", ISRAEL HAS AS YET FAILED TO CONVINCE MANY JORDANIANS IT HAS

ACTUALLY ACCEPTED THE RESOLUTION. IN ANY EVENT, WE INTEND TO DRAW ATTENTION GOJ LEADERSHIP TO THIS STATEMENT AND URGE THEM TO KEEP IT IN MIND AS THEY PONDER HOW TO HANDLE THIS NEW STAGE IN JARRING MISSION.

2. I SUGGEST THAT IT IS STILL AN OPEN QUESTION WHETHER IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE WE SHOULD PRESS JORDAN TO ENTER JOINT MEETINGS WITH ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVES, EVEN UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES (USUN 5214 PARA 5). OUR POSTURE OF BEING READY SO TO URGE JORDAN IS PROBABLY DESIREABLE IN ORDER TO KEEP ISRAELIS FROM RIGIDIFYING THEIR NEGOTIATING POSTURE. WE, HOWEVER, FULLY AGREE WITH AMBASSADORS GOLDBERG AND PEDERSEN THAT JORDAN MAY PULL BACK IF UAR PROVES RECALCITRANT ON RHODES-TYPE TALKS OR, TO TURN THE QUESTION AROUND, IF GOI REFUSES

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TO ADVANCE ANY SUBSTANTIVE IDEAS TO EITHER JORDAN OR THE UAR THROUGH JARRING.

3. AS STATED OUR 4840 WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE GOJ POSITION HAS ESSENTIALLY CHANGED BUT THE JORDETSIANS WILL OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO BE HANDLED WITH KID GLOVES BY THE ISRAELIS. I THINK IT MAY BE ASSUMED THE JORDANIANS WILL SEEK TO MASK THE DETAILS OF THEIR MORE SENSITIVE CONTACTS WITH THE ISRAELIS FROM THE SCRUTINY OF THE UAR AND OTHER ARAB DELEGATIONS. THE GOJ RECORD FOR MAINTAINING SECRECY ON SENSITIVE TOPICS IS NOT AT ALL BAD, PARTICULARLY WHEN THE KING HAS TAKEN A PERSONAL HAND IN THE PRECEDINGS.

4. TEL AVIV EMBASSY MAY WISH TO COMMENT ON WHAT SEEMS TO US LIKELIHOOD ISRAELIS WILL NOT BE SIMILARLY ABLE OR WILLING TO RESTRICT PUBLICITY ABOUT THEIR CONTACTS WITH THE ARABS. DIVISIONS WITHIN THE ISRAELI CABINET ABOUT WHAT WERE APPARENTLY CONSIDERED EBAN'S UNAUTHORIZED INITIATIVES ARE A PERTENT. EBAN'S FUTURE MOVES WILL PRESUMABLY BE SUBJECTED TO FURTHER CRITICAL EXAMINATION BY HIS CABINET CRITICS AND PRESS LEAKS WOULD APPEAR INEVITABLE.

5. THIS MESSAGE IS BEING SENT ON THE EVE OF HUSSEIN'S RETURN TO AMMAN FROM HIS VISITS IN LONDON AND PARIS. I EXPECT TO SEEK AN AUDIENCE WITH HIM NEXT WEEK DURING WHICH I HOPE TO PROBE HIS INTENTIONS IN HANDLING THIS NEW STAGE IN THE JARRING MISSION. AT PRESENT I CAN ONLY EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT EBAN WILL BE ABLE TO AUTHORIZE SOME SUBSTANTIVE INDIRECT TALKS WITH BOTH CAIRO AND AMMAN THROUGH JARRING BECAUSE I FEEL VERY STRONGLY WE SHOULD NOT RISK PINNING THE ROSE OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS ON JORDAN AT THIS STAGE OF THE GAME.

GP-3 SYMMES

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~~SECRET~~ 745

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04840 150937Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 150852Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5512
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION USUN NY

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4840

EXDIS

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION: ARAB MEETING WITH ISRAEL

REF: USUN 5106, 5107; OSLO 4636 (NOTAL)

1. WE HAVE NOTED UK MINISTER ROBERTS' DOUBTS ABOUT HOW FAR AND HOW FAST JORDAN MAY BE ABLE OR WILLING TO MOVE IN PROCEEDING TO JOINT TALKS WITH ISRAEL (USUN 5107). IN ADDITION, USUN 5106 DRAWS ATTENTION TO POSSIBLE AMBIVALENCE IN JORDANIAN POSITION ON JOINT MEETINGS WITH ISRAEL. IN RECENT PAST WE ALSO HAVE SENSED THIS AMBIVALENCE IN GOJ POSITION. WHILE GOJ LEADERSHIP IS ON RECORD AS PREPARED TO GO "VERY FAR, VERY FAST" AS LONG AS IT HAS UAR WITH IT IN INITIAL STAGES IN NEW YORK, WE HAVE OBSERVED INCREASING RESTRAINT ON THIS SUBJECT AT VARIOUS LEVELS IN GOJ IN RECENT DAYS. IT IS OF COURSE IMPORTANT IN THIS CONNECTION TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE GOJ HAS NEVER BEEN PREPARED TO JUMP INTO "DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS."

2. THERE ARE PROBABLY SEVERAL REASONS FOR THIS JORDANIAN BEARISHNESS AND NOT THE LEAST IS THE JORDANIAN AND GENERAL ARAB DISTRESS AND FRUSTRATION OCCASIONED BY THE RECENT SPOT-LIGHTING OF CONINUED ISRAELI UNILATERAL ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM. THE ANNIVERSARY OF LAST YEAR'S DEBACLE IS NEARLY ON THEM AND IS BRINGING WITH IT VARIOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL ATMOSPHERICS TO

COMPLICATE THE LEADERSHIP'S APPROACH TO THIS SENSITIVE SUBJECT.

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MOREOVER, INTERNATIONAL PRESS SPECULATION ABOUT A POSSIBLE SEPARATE DEAL AT THE TIME OF THE KING'S RECENT DEPARTURE FOR LONDON AGGRAVATED JORDANIAN SKITTISHNESS. ISRAELI PUBLIC AND PRIVATE HANDLING OF THE POSSIBILITY OF JOINT MEETING HAS COMPOUNDED THE PROBLEM AND WE SHARE THE REPORTED NORWEGIAN REACTION TO THE WAY FONMIN EBAN APPARENTLY TREATED THE SUBJECT IN HIS OSLO MEETINGS (OSLO 4636, PARA 4).

3. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE GOJ POSITION HAS ESSENTIALLY CHANGED BUT WE WISH TO UNDERSCORE THAT HOW JORDAN WILL PROCEED IN NEW YORK MEETINGS REMAINS A VERY DELICATE MATTER WHICH WILL REQUIRE SOME ARTISTRY IN HANDLING. WE WISH TO EMPHASIZE AGAIN THAT JORDANIANS HAVE NOT ACCEPTED "DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS." IF THE ISRAELIS PRESS PROPOSITION TO HILT, EITHER PUBLICLY OR PRIVATELY, PARTICULARLY IN THE EARLY STAGES, THEY RISK MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE JORDANIANS TO PROCEED, ALBEIT AMBIVALENTLY, IN THE DIRECTION WE WOULD ALL LIKE TO GO.

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P R 101200Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5484
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4782

EXDIS

SUBJ: JORDAN ARMS

REF: STATE 160137; LONDON 8797; STATE 161455

1. AT TIME LONDON 8797 RECEIVED, WE WERE ON VERGE OF MAKING SAME POINTS RE JORDANIANS' PROPOSED ARMS TRANSACTION WITH UK. IN LIGHT STATE 161455 RECONFIRMING NEED FOR EXAMINATION IN TERMS FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT AMENDMENTS, WE BELIEVE IT MAY BE USEFUL DRAW ATTENTION FOLLOWING PERTINENT FACTORS.

2. IN ADDITION TO PROBLEMS WITH BRITISH, THERE WOULD BE EXTREMELY BAD EFFECT HERE IF IMPRESSION SHOULD GET BACK TO JORDANIANS THAT WE MIGHT SEEK BLOCK UK TANK AND PLANE SALE. AS POINTED OUT LONDON REFTEL, POSSIBILITY THIS SALE HAS BEEN COMMON KNOWLEDGE IN US, UK, AND JORDAN GOVTS AND HAD BEEN EXPLICIT THROUGHOUT NEGOTIATIONS US PACKAGE. WE WOULD RECALL THAT, IN ADDITION REFERENCES CITED LONDON MESSAGE, JORDANIANS HAVE KEPT US INFORMED OF THEIR INTENTION FOLLOW UP WITH SAUDIS FOR HELP IN OBTAINING THE ADDITIONAL TANKS THEY HAVE REQUESTED AS WELL AS SUCH ADDITIONAL HUNTERS AS COULD BE FOUND. (SEE ESPECIALLY AMMAN 3820 MARCH 15, AS WELL AS AMMAN 3614, 3570 ET AL).

3. WITH RESPECT TO THE FAA AMENDMENT WE HAD ASSUMED THAT THE ELEMENTS OF US NATIONAL INTEREST INVOLVED IN THE SALE OF US EQUIPMENT APPLIED EQUALLY TO THE POSSIBLE BRITISH SALE AND WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AT TIME OUR SALES DECISION WAS MADE.

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04782 101222Z

MOREOVER, SINCE THE PROPOSED PURCHASES ARE CLEARLY LINKED TO A SAUDI GIFT FOR A SPECIFIC PURPOSE, THIS WOULD SEEM TO EXCLUDE CONCERNS FOR USE OF JORDANIAN RESOURCES.

4. IN CIRCUMSTANCES, THEREFORE, I URGE THAT WE CONCUR IN THE SALES UNDER DISCUSSION AS BEING REQUIRED IN THE US NATIONAL INTEREST.

SYMMES



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PAGE 01 AMMAN 04733 071651Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P 071615Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5461
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4733

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SUBJ: JORDAN ARMS

REF: STATE 159226

1. FROM OUR TALKS WITH GEN KHAMMASH AND KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY ZAID RIFAI, WE UNDERSTOOD THAT WHEN JORDANIANS SOLICITED LATEST PLEDGE OF SAUDI FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE DURING KING'S APRIL VISIT TO RIYADH, IT WAS ON UNDERSTANDING MONEY WOULD BE USED TO DEFRAY COST OF UK NOT RPT NOT US ARMS. KHAMMASH REAFFIRMED THIS MAY 3 WHEN WE POINTED OUT TO HIM IN GENERAL

PAGE 2 RUOMKG 4733A ~~SECRET~~
TERMS THERE SEEMED TO BE SOME CONFUSION OVER FORM AND USES OF SAUDI CONTRIBUTION. BRITISH AMBASSADOR INFORMED US TODAY THAT HUSSEIN HAD TOLD HIM APR 27 SAUDIS WERE PREPARED BUY ARMS FOR JORDAN TO SUPPLEMENT US ARMS PACKAGE. HUSSEIN STATED THAT MODA PRINCE SULTAN WOULD BE IN LONDON AT SAME TIME AS HUSSEIN AND HIS PARTY, IMPLYING THAT FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE TIED DOWN AT THAT TIME. HUSSEIN TOLD BRITISH AMBASSADOR THAT HE WAS PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN GETTING CENTURION TANKS BUT THERE WERE CERTAIN OTHER ITEMS AS WELL.

5. KING, RIFAI AND KHAMMASH NOW IN LONDON AND WILL REPORTEDLY REMAIN UNTIL MAY 9. KHAMMASH MAY STAY ON LONGER FOR ARMS DECISIONS. SUGGEST DEPT MAY WISH REPEAT STATE 159226 TO EMBASSY

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LONDON. BELIEVE IT MIGHT BE USEFUL DISCREETLY INFORM KHAMMASH OF CONTENTS OF STATE REFTEL AND JIDDA 3864 IN INTEREST ENCOURAGING JORDANIANS CLEAR UP MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH APPARENTLY HAVE ARISEN BETWEEN THEM AND AT LEAST SOME IN SAG LEADERSHIP. IT WOULD BE DESIREABLE EMPHASIZE TO KHAMMASH THAT SAUDIS APPEAR ANXIOUS TO HELP OUT AND THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE SAID BY JORDANIANS WHICH

PAGE 3 RUQMGK 4733A ~~SECRET~~
MIGHT RESULT IN DISCOURAGING SAUDI INITIATIVE.

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 04679 051021Z

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H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, SAH 03, AID 28,
ACDA 16, CCO 00, RSR 01, /129 W

O R 050929Z MAY 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5441
USUN 0922
INFO USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4679

DELIVER ACTION OFFICER 1500 ZULU MAY 5

SUBJ: JERUSALEM IN SC

RREF: AMMAN 4677: USUN 4945: STATE 158427

1. I HAD OPPORTUNITY EVENING MAY 4 AGAIN DISCUSS SC HANDLING
OF JERUSALEM WITH FONMIN RIFAI. I USE ARGUMENTS PROVIDED
USUN 4945, REVIEWED PRESENTATION REPORTED AMMAN 4677, AND
REQUESTED HE INFORM PRIMIN TALHOUNI I HAD NOW BEEN INSTRUCTED

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PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4679A ~~SECRET~~

PERSUADE GOJ NOT TO PURSUE THEIR APPARENT POLICY OF SEEKING FURTHER RESOLUTION ON BROADER QUESTION OF JERUSALEM.

2. RIFAI STATED HE AND PRIMIN WELL AWARE US POSITION BUT GOJ REMAINS CONVINCED THAT JORDAN MUST PRESS FOR RESOLUTION IN SC WHICH WILL INCLUDE REFERENCE TO ISRAELI UNILATERAL ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM AND DECLARE SUCH ISRAELI ACTIONS INVALID. GOJ BELIEVES JORDAN'S INTERESTS REQUIRE THIS ACTION AND THAT FIALURE TO ACHIEVE IT WILL BE GENERALLY INTERPRETED AS ANOTHER ARAB HUMILIATION AND DEFEAT. HE REPEATED HIS DESIRE COORDINATE

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04679 051021Z

CLOSELY WITH US AND SAID HE HOPED WE COULD COOPERATE FULLY IN DRAFTING OF RESOLUTION AS HE HAD EARLIER SUGGESTED (AMMAN 4659).
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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 041444Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5440
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY LONDON

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4678

EXDIS

REF: BEIRUT 8930

SUBJ: RUMORS CONCERN NG SEPARATE JORDANIAN-ISRAELI PEACE MOVES.

1. AS BEIRUT REFTEL POINTS UP, WE ARE IN ANOTHER PERIOD OF RUMORS ABOUT POSSIBLE JORDANIAN INITIATIVES TO SEEK SEPARATE ARRANGEMENTS WITH ISRAEL. WE HERE HAVE BEEN APPROACHED BY NEWSMEN AND FOREIGN DIPLOMATS WITH VARIETY OF SIMILAR RUMORS. APART FROM DIPLOMATS AND NEWSMEN, SENIOR (BUT NON-ESTABLISHMENT) JORDANIAN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING CABINET MINISTERS HAVE PROVED

PAGE 2 RUGMKG 4678A ~~SECRET~~

US FROM TIME TO TIME FOR INFORMATION ON PALACE INTENTIONS RE "SEPARATE ARRANGEMENTS" DEVELOPMENTS IN JARRING MISSION, ETC. SITUATION IS THAT THERE ARE NOT MORE THAN PERHAPS FOUR JORDANIANS WHO ARE PRIVY TO KING'S THINKING ON SUCH SENSITIVE SUBJECTS. THUS, QUITE SENIOR GOJ OFFICIALS ARE GENERALLY QUITE IGNORANT OF KING'S POLICIES AND ACTIVITIES AND ARE NOT AVERSE TO FLOATING TRIAL BALLONS AND RUMORS TO SEE WHAT THEY CAN UNCOVERS. SYRIA AND IRAQ MAY WELL BE FLOATING RUMORS OF THEIR OWN.

2. UNFORTUNATELY, AS ADDRESSEES ARE WELL AWARE, STORIES OF SEPARATE PEACE MOVES ARE BOUND TO EXCITE ARAB WORLD HOSTILITY TO HUSSEIN OR ANY OTHER ARAB LEADER TO WHOM THEY WERE ATTRIBUTED. WE HAVE NOTED CURRENT SPATE OF THREATS FROM VARIOUS

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ARAB CAPITALS. OBVIOUSLY, HOSTILITY AND SUSPICIONS
ENGENDERED NOT ONLY TEND UNDERMINE JARRING MISSION BUT INCREASE
INTERNAL TENSIONS IN JORDAN.

3. THERE IS PROBABLY LITTLE USG CAN DO ABOUT THIS KIND OF
THING. ON OTHER HAND, WE ARE CONSIDERED TO BE SOMETHING OF AN
" EMINENCE GRISE" IN THE ARAB-ISRAEL BUSINESS AND MANY OF

PAGE 3 RUGMKG 4678A ~~SECRET~~

THE RUMORS ARE TRIED OUT ON US AS IN REFTEL. WE THINK FACT
THAT HUGHES TENDED DISCREDIT HIS RUMOR AFTER COLD WATER FROM
AMB PORTER JUSTIFIES DEPT'S SENDING GENERAL GUIDANCE TO POSTS
WHERE QUESTION SEPARATE TALKS LIKELY TO ARISE. CERTAINLY WE
WE SHOULD DO NOTHING TO INITIATE SUCH DISCUSSIONS, BUT
LOW-KEY MEASURED RESPONSE LIKE AMB PORTER 'S COULD BE QUITE
USEFUL IN KEEPING FIRES FROM SPREADING. SYMMES

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L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, ACDA 16, AID 28, IO 13,
EUR 15, AF 09, RSR 01, SR 01, ORM 03, /154 W

O R 041414Z MAY 68 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5439
USUN 0921
INFO USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4677

SUBJ: JERUSALEM IN SC

REF: USUN 4945

1. WE HAVE ONLY JUST RECEIVED USUN 4945 SUGGESTING PROMPT, MAJOR APPROACH IN AMMAN ON JERUSALEM DEBATE.
2. IN RECENT DISCUSSIONS OF JERUSALEM MATTER WITH FONMIN RIFAI (INCLUDING MEETING MAY 3-AMMAN 4659) AND WITH PRIMIN TALHOUNI TODAY, I HAVE REPEATEDLY MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:
 - A. USG POSITION ON JERUSALEM (IN GENERAL AND WITH REGARD

~~PAGE 2 RUQMKC 4677A SECRET~~
 TO ISRAELI UNILATERAL ACTIONS) AS CONTAINED IN VARIOUS PUBLIC STATEMENT REMAINS UNCHANGED.
 B. WE REGARD SETTLEMENT OF JERUSALEM ISSUE AS INEXTRICABLY LINKED WITH OTHER ASPECTS OF ARAB-ISRAEL ISSUE COVERED IN NOV 22 RESOLUTION.
 C. WE CONTINUE BELIEVE JARRING MISSION IS BEST IF NOT ONLY MEANS OF DEALING WITH ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT.
 D. WE SINCERELY BELIEVE AIRING OF JERUSALEM ISSUE IN NEW YORK NOT ONLY FAILS TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARD PROGRESS OF THE

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04677 ~~041505Z~~

THE JARRING MISSION (AND ALSO FAILS TO SOLVE JERUSALEM PROBLEMS) BUT RATHER TENDS TO IMPEDE JARRING'S PROGRESS BY FURTHER EMBITTERING ATMOSPHERE. FOR THIS REASON WE SOUGHT:

(1) FIRST TO COUNSEL AGAINST SC MEETINGS ON JERUSALEM AND
(2) SUBSEQUENTLY TO PREVENT WIDENING AND PROLONGATION OF DISCUSSIONS OR ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN PASSAGE OF UNREALISTIC RESOLUTIONS. OUR EFFORTS IN NEW YORK AND ELSEWHERE WERE BASED ON FOREGOING BELIEFS, WHICH WE HAVE TRIED CLEARLY TO EXPLAIN TO OUR JORDANIAN CONTACTS AND OTHERS.

E. JORDANIAN OFFICIALS CONSTANTLY SAY ONLY US CAN SOLVE

~~PAGE 3 RUQMKG 4677A SECRET~~

PROBLEM. WHILE WE MUST DISAGREE WITH THAT GENEROUS STATEMENT, WE MUST AT SAME TIME ASK OUR JORDANIAN FRIENDS:

(1) TO CREDIT US WITH SINCERE DESIRE TO WORK WITH THEM TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND (2) TO REFRAIN FROM DRIVING PUBLIC WEDGES BETWEEN IW (HERE I HAVE CALLED ATTENTION TO TWO POST-RESOLUTION STATEMENTS OF AL-FARRA.)

F. UNFORTUNATELY NO AMOUNT OF RESOLUTIONS IS GOING TO BRING ABOUT PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, WHICH DEPENDS UPON PARTIES' GETTING TOGETHER UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES. JORDANIANS NOW HAVE TWO FAVORABLE RESOLUTIONS (AND LOTS OF FAVORABLE STATEMENTS) THAT CAN BE CALLED TO ATTENTION OF JORDANIAN AND OTHER ARAB PUBLIC OPION. WE VOTED FOR THOSE RESOLUTIONS, BUT OUR OWN JERUSALEM POLICY, AS WELL AS OUR ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM, PLACES LIMITS ON HOW MUCH FURTHER WE ARE WILLING TO GO. WE THEREFORE HOPE MATTER CAN NOW BE LAID TO REST IN NEW YORK.

3. IN CIRCUMSTANCES I BELIEVE JORDANIANS ARE WELL AWARE OUR POSITON AND THAT FURTHER APPROACHES WOULD SERVE NO USEFUL PURPOSE. IF JORDANIANS STILL APPEAR TO BE PRESSING FOR FURTHER

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RESOLUTION, THEN I THINK OUR BEST TACTIC IS TO TRY TO COME UP WITH A RESOLUTION WITH WHICH WE COULD LIVE. SINCE WE HAVE PUBLICLY DISAPPROVED UNILATERAL ISRAELI ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, I WOULD ASSUME WE COULD AGREE TO A RESOLUTION DECLARING SUCH ACTIONS INVALID. MOREOVER,

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 04677 041503Z

I THINK SUCH A RESOLUTION WOULD HAVE TO LEAVE OUT ALL REFERENCE TO TERRORISM. (PARA 2, USUN 4945). JORDANIAN GOVT FOR ALL OF ITS INABILITY COMPLETELY TO CONTROL TERRORISM CERTAINLY HAS NEVER PUBLICLY SPONSORED IT OR PRIVATELY ORGANIZED IT. REFERENCE TO TERRORISM WOULD NOT ONLY BROADEN DEBATE (WHICH IS COUNTER TO OUR STATED AIMS) BUT WOULD ALSO NOT BE GERMANE TO THE SPECIFIC JORDANIAN COMPLAINT THAT ISRAEL HAS TAKEN AND CONTINUES TO TAKE ILLEGAL UNILATERAL ACTIONS IN OCCUPIED JERUSALEM. IN THIS CASE ARABS ARE SEEKING A PEACEFUL WAY TO OBTAIN A REMEDY FOR A SPECIFIC GRIEVANCE.

4. HAVE JUST RECEIVED STATE 158427. WILL SEE PRIMIN TALHOUNI AT DINNER FOR LIBYA PRIMIN BAKKUSH TONIGHT AND WILL MAKE POINTS IN LINE WITH USUN 4945. SYMMES

~~GP-3~~

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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SECRET 123

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04676 041429Z

47
ACTION SS 30

INFO 7030 W

P R 041339Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5438
INFO USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USUN 0920

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4676

EXDIS

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION-TALHOUNI MEETINGS IN CAIRO

REF: AMMAN 4657

IN LONG MEETING I HAD TODAY WITH PRIMIN TALHOUNI FOLLOWING WERE ONLY ADDITIONAL FACTS ON CAIRO MEETINGS THAT EMERGED:

1° TALHOUNI PRESS STATEMENT REPORTED AMMAN 4665 HAD BEEN FULLY CLEARED WITH NASSER AND FONMIN RIAD AND THUS, IN TALHOUNI'S

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4676A ~~SECRET~~
OPINION, SHOWED UAR STILL VERY MUCH INTERESTED IN PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT UNDER AUSPICES JARRING.

2° UAR OFFICIALS INDICATED SOVIET UNION TELLING THEM SOVIETS WANT PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND DO NOT WANT MIDDLE EAST DISPUTE RETURNED TO SECURITY COUNCIL OR BROUGHT UP IN UNGA. TALHOUNI SAID, " SOVIETS AND UAR HAVE SAME POSITION ON JARRING MISSION."

3° IF JARRING ABLE TO TELL UAR IN NEXT MEETING THAT ISRAELIS WILL PROCEED TO IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTION, UAR READY TO GO TO NEW YORK.

4° " EVERYTHING" STILL DEPENDS ON USG. US MUST PRESS ISRAEL

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04676 041429Z

TO MAKE STATEMENTS THAT WILL ALLOW JARRING TO GET PARTIES TO
NEW YORK. SYMMES
GP-3

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TELEGRAM

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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A-323

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PRIORITY

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TO : Department of State

Attention: Assistant Legal Advisor for Treaty Affairs

RECEIVED DE STATE

L FBO AID

COPY NO. 03 SERIES B

MAY 5 12 51 PM 1968

AGR COM FRB

FROM : Amembassy AMMAN

DATE: May 3, 1968

INT LAB TAR

SUBJECT : Memorandum of Understanding Setting Forth a Military Agreement Between the Governments of the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

EXDIS

TR XMB AIR

REF : Amman A-266

S/S DEF 19-4 US-Jordan

ARMY CIA NAVY

Enclosed is corrected page 2 of the Memorandum of Understanding, signed March 28, 1968, setting forth the latest Military Agreement Between the Governments of the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

OSD USIA NSA

Any early publication or public disclosure of the contents of this document would be prejudicial to the national security of the United States.

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SYMMS

Enclosure:

Original text of corrected page 2 of Memorandum of Understanding.

att BMB

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Drafted by:

POL:RMurphy/clc

5/3/68

Contents and Classification Approved by:

DCM:ESDuncan

Clearances:

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By 15/10 NARA, Date 10/21/01



Department of State

TELEGRAM

75 / 31

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2

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04657 031422Z

45
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

0 031334Z MAY 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5422
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USINT CAIRO
USUN 0915

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4657

EXDIS

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION- TALHOUNI MEETINGS IN CAIRO

- 1. FONMIN RIFAI FURNISHED EMBOFF EVENING MAY 2 FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF TALHOUNI CONVERSATIONS WITH NASSER AND MAHMOUD RIAD IN CAIRO MAY 1-2.
- 2. TALHOUNI SAID HE FOUND NO APPARENT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN VIEWS

PAGE 2 ROOMKG 4657A ~~SECRET~~
OF NASSER AND RIAD ON JARRING MISSION. BOTH WANT MISSION TO CONTINUE AND DO NOT WANT REFERRAL TO SC.

3. UAR HAS NOT YET OFFICIALLY RECEIVED COPY JARRING'S MARCH 10 FORMULATION AND REPRESENTS THIS AS REASON FOR HAVING TAKEN NO OFFICIAL STAND ON THIS FORMULATION.

4. UAR POSITION IN GENERAL HAS NOT CHANGED FROM VIEWS EXPRESSED TO JORDANIANS DURING KING'S APRIL 6-7 VISIT TO CAIRO. HOWEVER, TALHOUNI FOUND EGYPTIANS CONSIDERABLY MORE SUSPICIOUS THAN PREVIOUSLY ABOUT ISRAELI INTENTIONS WITHDRAW FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THEY TOLD TALHOUNI THAT SOVIETS HAD EXPRESSED SIMILAR DOUBTS TO RIAD IN MOSCOW LAST MONTH ALTHOUGH SOVIETS HAD ALSO TAKEN LINE THAT JARRING MISSION SHOULD CONTINUE AND

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04657 031422Z

THAT USSR REMAINED COMMITTED TO POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

5. TALHOUNI WAS INFORMED THAT WHEN JARRING COMES TO CAIRO MAY 4 EGYPTIANS EXPECT HIM TO PRESENT HIS MARCH 10 FORMULATION OFFICIALLY. RIAD INTENDS ASK JARRING TWO QUESTIONS: (A) DOES JARRING INTERPRET HIS FORMULATION TO MEAN THAT BY ACCEPTING IT

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 4657A ~~SECRET~~

THE PARTIES ACCEPT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION? (UAR ASSUMES JARRING WILL STATE THIS IS HIS INTERPRETATION.) (B) DOES ISRAEL INTERPRET JARRING'S FORMULATION AS JARRING HIMSELF DOES? (RIFAI SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD AMB HE SENT MESSAGE TO JARRING LAST NIGHT ADVISING HIM THAT UAR EXPECTED HIM TO PRESENT HIS MARCH FORMULA OFFICIALLY IN CAIRO AND, RIFAI IMPLIED, URGING JARRING HE TRY TO AVOID BEING PLACED IN BOX OF INTERPRETING ISRAELI POSITION ON IMPLEMENTATION NEGATIVELY.)

6. IF JARRING AFFIRMS ISRAELIS AGREE WITH HIS INTERPRETATION OF THE FORMULATION, THEN UAR WILL BE PREPARED TO MEET UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES TO DISCUSS IMPLEMENTATION.

7. IF, HOWEVER, AS IN PAST, JARRING TELLS UAR THAT ISRAELIS DO NOT INTERPRET HIS FORMULATION IN THIS FASHION, UAR WILL HOLD TO ITS POSITION THAT ISRAELIS HAVE NOT AGREED TO IMPLEMENT THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION.

8. ON BASIS TALHOUNI'S ACCOUNT, RIFAI SAD HE CONCLUDED THAT IF JARRING WOULD SIMPLY STATE TO UAR THAT HE PLANNED PROCEED

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 4657A ~~SECRET~~

TO NEW YORK TO MEET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTIES " TO DISCUSS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION" THEN UAR WOULD AGREE TO DESIGNATE SOMEONE IN NEW YORK FOR THIS PURPOSE. WHATEVER EVOLVED IN NEW YORK WOULD DEPEND ON MANNER IN WHICH IT WAS HANDLED FROM THAT POINT ON.

9. RIFAI SAID THAT IF NEITHER COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPS, AS PROJECTED IN PARAS SIX OR EIGHT, WHEN JARRING IS IN CAIRO,

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Department of State

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 04657 031422Z

UAR AND JORDAN ASSUME THAT JARRING WILL SUBMIT WRITTEN REPORT TO SYG STATING HIS FAILURE TO REACH ANY AGREEMENT. UAR AND JORDAN, RIFAI SAID, WILL TRY TO PERSUADE JARRING TO MAKE HIS REPORT A PRIVATE ONE TO U THANT AND NOT RPT NOT TO SUGGEST REFERENCE TO SC.

10. IF EVENTS DEVELOP AS PROJECTED IN PARA NINE, JORDAN HOPES THAT SYG WOULD SEIZE INITIATIVE AND CALL FONMINS OF PARTIES INVOLVED TO NEW YORK TO DISCUSS WHAT STEPS COULD BE TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT RESOLUTION. RIFAI STATED THAT JORDAN WOULD RESPOND TO SUCH INVITATION AND HE HAS EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE UAR WOULD ALSO.

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 4657A ~~SECRET~~

11. COMMENT: TIME PERMITTING, IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IF CONTENTS THIS MESSAGE WERE MADE AVAILABLE TO BUNCHE FOR TRANSMISSION TO JARRING PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE TO CAIRO TOMORROW. SYMMES

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TELEGRAM
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PAGE 01 AMMAN 04653 031122Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 031054Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5419
INFO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
CINCSTRIKE

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4653

EXDIS

SUBJ: IRANIAN ARMS FOR JORDAN

REF: TEHRAN 4494

I OF COURSE SHARE AMB MEYER'S CONCERN ABOUT UNDUE ARMS BUILDUP IN MIDDLE EAST AND WOULD SUBMIT THAT OUR ARRANGEMENTS WITH JORDAN HAVE BEEN MADE WITH THAT CONCERN IN MIND. I HAVE FURTHER CONCERN, HOWEVER, THAT WE NOT ALLOW KING HUSSEIN AND GOJ TO DEVELOP THEIR ALREADY LIVELY SUSPICIOUS THAT WE INTEND TO TREAT JORDAN AS SECOND-CLASS CITIZEN BY

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4653A ~~SECRET~~
PREVENTING JORDAN ARMY FROM MAKING UP CERTAIN EQUIPMENT LOSSES THAT GOJ REGARDS AS "LEGITIMATE MILITARY DEFENSIVE REQUIREMENTS". FOR EXAMPLE, KING HUSSEIN AND GENERAL KHAMMASH FEEL VERY DEEPLY NEED TO MAKE UP 155 MM ARTILLERY LOSSES (SOME OF WHICH WERE PARADED IN JERUSALEM YESTERDAY IN THEIR JORDANIAN CAMOUFLAGE). IRAIN COMMENTS TO JORDANIASN BASED ON PARA 2 REFTTEL COULD FURTHER STIMULATE JORDANIAN SUSPICIONS OF OUR INTENTIONS TO DENY THEM "LEGITIMATE" REQUIREMENTS. WITH AIM OF AVOIDING THIS I HOPE IN FURTHER CONTACTS WITH IRANIANS OR TURKS WE CAN LAY STRESS ON ASSISTING JORDANIANS WITH AIRLIFT.
GP-3 SYMMES

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~~SECRET~~ 096

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04624 012255Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

0 011820Z MAY 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5400
INFORUEHDT/USUN IMMEDIATE 0907
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO

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NLJ 02-207
By js NARA, Date 11-20-02

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4624

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PAGE 3 PARA NO. 4)

REF: AMMAN 4607

SUBJ: JORDAN POSITION IN SC DEBATE ON JERUSALEM

1. SUMMARY. FONMIN RIFAI SAID AFTER DISCUSSING REPRESENTATIONS I MADE THIS MORNING WITH CROWN PRINCE HASSAN AND ACTING PRIMIN TOUGAN HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO INFORM ME THAT OUR DEMARCH HAD COME " SOMEWHAT LATE"

PAGE 2 RUOMKG 4624A ~~SECRET~~

AND THAT THE GOJ SAW NO ALTERNATIVE TO LETTING THE DEBATE TAKE ITS COURSE. ALTHOUGH NORMALLY A DEBATE IS EXPECTED TO LEAD TO A RESOLUTION, THE GOJ IS PREPARED TO CONSULT WITH THE USG AT ALL STAGES OF THE DEBATE TO TRY TO COME TO A COMMON POSITION ON WHAT SHOULD BE THE RESULT OF THE DEBATE. END SUMMARY.

2. FONMIN RIFAI SAID HE HAD HAD A LONG DISCUSSION WITH CROWN PRINCE HASSAN AND ACTING PRIMIN TOUGAN AFTER OUR MEETING EARLIER TODAY. (HE IMPLIED HE ALSO HAD CONSULTED BY TELEPHONE WITH PRIMIN TALHOUNI IN CAIRO.)

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04624 012255Z

THE POSITION OF THE GOJ IS THAT THE US REPRESENTATIONS
HAD COME " SOMEWHAT LATE". THE MATTER IS ALREADY IN
THE HANDS OF THE SC AND THE WHOLE WORLD EXPECTS THE
COUNCIL TO DEBATE THE MATTER. IN FACT
THE PAR 27 RESOLUTION
ITSELF HAD PROVIDED FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF
THE PARADE MATTER IF ISRAEL DID NOT COMPLY. THEREFORE
THE GOJ SAW NO ALTERNATIVE TO HAVING THE DEBATE TAKE
ITS COURSE. NORMALLY SUCH A DEBATE WOULD LEAD TO A
RESOLUTION.

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 4624A ~~SECRET~~

3. RIFAI SAID GOJ WISHED TO ASSURE USG THAT THE
GENERAL POLICY OF JORDAN IS TO DO WHATEVER IT CAN TO
HELP SAFEGUARD THE POSITION OF THE US IN THE ARAB
REGION AND NOT TO DO ANYTHING TO CAUSE EMBARRASSMENT
TO US. THE GOJ COUNTS VERY MUCH ON THE ROLE AND EFFORTS
OF THE US IN HELPING TO OVERCOME THE PRESENT CRISIS AND
DESIRES TO MAINTAIN COOPERATION
WITH THE US ALONG THE LINE. THE GOJ BELIEVES IN
NECESSITY FOR AND USEFULNESS OF MUTUAL CONSULTATIONS
AND ON ITS PART WILL DO EVERYTHING IT CAN BOTH IN
AMMAN AND IN NEW YORK TO TRY TO PROMOTE SUCH
CONSULTATIONS AT ALL STAGES OF THE DEBATE.

4. RIFAI THEN SAID THAT THE GOJ CONSIDERED THAT THE
OBSERVATIONS BROUGHT TO ITS ATTENTION EARLIER TODAY
SHOULD INDEED HAVE BEEN MADE TO THE ISRAELI
AUTHORITIES WITH THE AIM OF PERSUADING THEM TO CURB
THEIR UNILATERAL ACTIONS AND VIOLATIONS IN THE CITY
OF JERUSALEM. IT LAY IN ISRAEL'S HANDS RATHER THAN
JORDAN'S TO TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION TO SOLVE THIS
PARTICULAR ASPECT OF THE CRISIS. THE GOJ WISHED TO
ASSURE THE USG THAT IT WILL ASSIST IN EVERY WAY TO
HELP THE JARRING MISSION TO SUCCEED. RIFAI CONCLUDED
BY SAYING HE HAS SENT A SUMMARY OF OUR DISCUSSION
THIS MORNING AND HIS PRESENT RESPONSE TO JORDAN'S
PERMREP FARRA IN NEW YORK.

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 04624 012255Z

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 4624A ~~SECRET~~

5. I ASKED RIFAI TO CLARIFY WHETHER HE STILL SAW JORDAN'S AIMS AS HE HAD DESCRIBED THEM THIS MORNING, I.E. A SEPARATE RESOLUTION TO DEAL WITH ISRAEL'S DEFIANCE OF THE APR 27 RESOLUTION (INCLUDING A REQUEST FOR CHAPTER 7 PENALTIES) AND A BROADER DEBATE ON ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL ACTIONS IN THE CITY. RIFAI HEMMED AND HAWED AIBIT IN RESPONSE. HE SAID THAT HE ENVISAGED THE PROCEDURE FOR DEBATE WOULD BE AS HE HAD PREVIOUSLY OUTLINED IT TO ME BUT ON THE OTHER HAND THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT THE WHOLE THING COULD NOT BE "COMBINED IN ONE DEBATE WITH ONE ENDING." THIS WOULD BE CLEARED UP IN THE COURSE OF THE DEBATE ITSELF AND JORDAN FOR ITS PART WOULD WANT TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH THE US WITH REGARD TO ANY CONCLUSION OR RESOLUTION THAT WOULD RESULT FROM THE DEBATE.

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 4624A ~~SECRET~~

6. I PRESSED RIFAI ON THE MATTER OF SANCTIONS POINTING OUT THAT PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF EBAN'S LETTER TO THE SYG MANY MEMBERS PROBABLY WOULD CONSIDER THAT HOWEVER PROVOCATIVE ISRAEL'S DEFIANCE OF THE RESOLUTION AND HOLDING OF THE PARADE MIGHT SEEM, THE IDEA OF SANCTIONS WOULD BE ALTOGETHER DISPROPORTIONATE. THEREFORE JORDAN RISKED TAKING OF POSITIONS THAT COULD LATER PROVE TO BE EMBARRASSING. MOREOVER, SINCE SANCTIONS WERE UNLIKELY IT SEEMED TO ME THAT JORDAN SHOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO KEEP THE DEBATE IN LOW KEY AND AS RESTRICTED AS POSSIBLE. RIFAI DID NOT COMMIT THE GOJ WITH REGARD TO SANCTIONS. HE SAID HE COULD INDEED SEE THE DIFFICULTY INVOLVED IN JORDAN'S ASKING FOR SANCTIONS AND THAT AS A MATTER OF FACT JORDAN'S BASIC GOAL IS TO CALL ON ISRAEL TO DISCONTINUE ITS UNILATERAL ACTIONS AND TO HAVE THE SC DECLARE ITS UNILATERAL ACTIONS ALREADY TAKEN INVALID.

7. FYI: IN FURTHER DISCUSSION ALONG THE FOREGOING LINES RIFAI FINALLY SAID HE WANTED TO TELL ME OFF THE RECORD THAT THE GOJ HAD DECIDED IT MUST USE THE SC DEBATE ON JERUSALEM AS A SAFETY VALVE TO PREVENT THE FURTHER

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Department of State

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PAGE 04 AMMAN 04624 012255Z

DEVELOPMENT OF A SERIOUS INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION.
IT WAS ONLY BY TAKING THE MATTER TO THE SC AND BY

PAGE 6 RUQMG 4624A ~~SECRET~~

PURSUING THE DEBATE AS IT WAS NOW DOING THAT THE GOJ
HAD BEEN ABLE TO CONVINC (IT HOPED) VARIOUS INTERNAL
GROUPS TO AVOID UNCONTROLLABLE DEMONSTRATIONS TOMORROW. THE
GOVT HAD TAKEN THIS DECISION ON THE ADVICE OF THE
RESPONSIBLE SECURITY OFFICIALS. END FYI

8. RIFAI URGED THAT I REQUEST THE US DELEGATION
IN NEW YORK TO SEEK OUT THE JORDANIAN DELEGATION
IN ORDER TO CONSULT ON THIS MATTER. HE COMMENTED
THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE MISLED BY FARRA'S DEEP FEELINGS
ON THIS SUBJECT AND HE SAID HE HOPED THEREFORE
THAT WE COULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN
THE MATTER OF CONSULTATIONS. HE

ASSURED ME ONCE AGAIN THAT THE GOJ AND THE
DELEGATION IN NEW YORK WOULD WISH TO CONSULT WITH US
AT ALL STAGES OF THE DEBATE ON WHAT KING OF RESOLUTION
OR CONCLUSION WOULD BE DESIRABLE OR FEASIBLE. HE
SAID CATEGORICALLY THAT FARRA HAS NO AUTHORITY TO
DEVELOP ON HIS OWN A JORDANIAN POSITION WITH REGARD
TO A RESOLUTION, AND THAT ANY DECISIONS ALONG THESE
LINES WOULD HAVE TO BE APPROVED BY RIFAI IN UMMAN.

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~~SECRET~~ 547

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04608 011407Z

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44
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 W

P R 011335Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5390
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4608

EXDIS

SUBJ: JERUSALEM IN SC

REF: AMMAN 4607

I REVIEWED MY CONVERSATION WITH FONMIN RIFAI WITH BRIT AMB
ADAMS AT NOON TODAY. ADAMS SAID HE HAS RECEIVED NO IN-
STRUCTIONS ON SUBJECT.

GP-4 SYMMES

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~~SECRET~~ 582

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04607 011442Z

47
ACTION SS 30

02

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

0 011329Z MAY 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5389
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
USUN 0901
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4607

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-207
By isa NARA, Date 11-20-02

EXDIS

SUBJ: SC MEETING ON JERUSALEM

REF: STATE 155820

1. SUMMARY: OWING TO CONTINUED ABSENCE PRIMIN TALHOUNI IN CIARO I REVIEWED WITH FONMIN RIFAI DEPT'S INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED STATE 155820 AND DREW ON ARGUMENTATION USUN 4829. RIFAI EXPRESSED SURPRISE AT OUR STAND AND ASKED WHETHER MY INSTRUCTIONS COVERED BOTH PARADE AND PROJECTED GENERAL DEBATE ON GOI ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM. WHEN I SAID INSTRUCTIONS COVERED BOTH HE SAID HE WOULD REFLECT ON PRESENTATION, DISCUSS WITH " HIGHER

PAGE 2 RUQMG 4607A ~~SECRET~~
AUTHORITY" AND BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH ME. HE SAID GOJ CURRENTLY ENVISAGES SEEKING RESOLUTION IN RESPONSE TO GOI DEFIANCE OF SC RES OF APR 27. SANCTIONS ISSUE AROSE IN CONTEXT ISRAELI DEFIANCE THAT RESOLUTION. RIFAI SAID HE ENVISAGED LENGTHY SESSION WOULD RESULT FROM DISCUSSION OVERALL PROBLEM GOI UNILATERAL ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM. IN CONNECTION LATTER GOJ WOULD SEEK RESOLUTION DECLARING THOSE ACTS INVALID.

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04607 011442Z

2. IN MEETING WITH RIFAI THIS MORNING I EMPHASIZED PRINCIPAL REASONS WE OPPOSED SEEKING ADDITIONAL FORMAL RESOLUTION WERE: LIKELY INCREASED ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE VIS-A-VIS UN, POSSIBLE HARDENING UAR ATTITUDE TOWARDS JARRING MISSION AND PROFIT TO BE REAPED AT OUR EXPENSE BY SOVIETS AND RADICAL ARABS. I SAID THAT WE FRANKLY DID NOT WISH TO BE ISOLATED FROM ARAB OPINION AND PRESUMED THAT GOJ EQUALLY OPPOSED SUCH DEVELOPMENT. I RECALLED THAT THERE WERE THOSE IN US, WESTERN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE IN WORLD WHO WOULD DRAW ATTENTION TO FACT SC HAD NEVER IMPOSED SANCTIONS ON UAR FOR ITS DEFIANCE OF 1951 RESOLUTION ON SUEZ CANAL TRANSIT. I RECALLED THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD BEEN TOLD IN NEW YORK USG CONSIDERED UTLIMATE SETTLEMENT MUST ENCOMPASS GOJ ROLE IN JERUSALEM. THIS REMAINED OUR POSITION. GOJ HAD LONG KNOWN OUR ATTITUDE WAS THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 4607A ~~SECRET~~
SEPARATE ISSUE OF JERUSALEM OUT FROM OTHER PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN SETTLEMENT. AS I HAD BEEN TELLING HIM USG CONTINUED BELIEVE IT WAS BAD TIMING TO RAISE JERUSALEM ISSUE IN SC. WE WOULD HOPE THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER MEETINGS.

3. RECOGNIZING, HOWEVER, THAT MEETING ALREADY SCHEDULED, I SAID USG VERY MUCH HOPED THAT COURSE OF DEBATE IN COUNCIL WOULD AVOID INFLAMMATORY STATEMENTS AND THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO END UP WITH AN EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR JARRING MISSION. I STRESSED THAT UNLESS JORDAN WAS PREPARED TO MAKE IT CLEAR IT WAS NOT GOING TO PRESS FOR A RESOLUTION THE INITIATIVE TO DO SO MIGHT BE TAKEN OUT OF ITS HANDS BY SOVIETS AND OTHER SC MEMBERS ACTING ON BEHALD OF RADICAL ARABS. IN CONCLUDING I SAID I WAS SORRY TO HAVE TO INFORM RIFAI THAT, DESPITE HIS INSTRUCTIONS, THERE WAS APPARENTLY STILL NO EFFECTIVE CONTACT BETWEEN AL-FARRA AND USUN. I MENTIONED IN THIS CONNECTION QUESTION OF ROUHI KHATIB'S PROJECTED APPEARANCE AT SC. I SAID THAT AS FAR AS I UNDERSTOOD IT, GOJ POLICY WAS TO HAVE CLOSE

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 04607 011442Z

CONSULTATIONS WITH US, I FELT THAT IDEALLY THESE CONSULTATIONS SHOULD BE EVERY BIT AS INTIMATE IN NEW YORK AS IN AMMAN. I ASSURED RIFAI WE HAD BEEN MAKING EQUALLY FIRM REPRESENTATIONS TO INSRAELIS AGAINST

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 4607A ~~SECRET~~
PARADE IN GENERAL AND AGAINST ITS BEING HELD IN ARAB JERUSALEM IN PARTICULAR.

4. RIFAI'S IMMEDIATE REACTION WAS TO INDICATE HE HAD BEEN TAKEN BY SURPRISE. HE ASKED WHETHER MY INSTRUCTIONS COVERED ONLY THE ISSUE OF MAY 2 PARADE OR A DEBATE ON THE GENERAL SITUATION IN JERUSALEM, NOTING THAT AL-KHATIB HAD BEEN SENT TO NEW YORK TO ASSIST IN THE LATTER. RIFAI SAID GOJ DECISION ON SC ACTION HAD BEEN REACHED ONLY AFTER LONG AND THOROUGH CONSIDERATION. IT ENVISAGED DISCUSSION OF ENTIRE SERIES OF ISRAELI ACTIONS ON JERUSALEM AFTER FIRST DEALING WITH THE PARADE ISSUE. I ANSWERED THAT MY INSTRUCTIONS WERE INTENDED TO COVER SC ATTENTION TO THE WHOLE JERUSALEM ISSUE. I SAID OUR BASIC CONCER WAS THAT IF THE JERUSALEM DISPUTE IS FURTHER DEBATED IN THE COUNCIL AT THIS TIME, IT RISKS BROADENING OUT SO QUICKLY AND SO FAR BEYOND THE MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE THAT OUR ENTIRE PEACE EFFORT COULD BE CURTAILED.

5. RIFAI OBSERVED THAT GOJ POSITION AS OF NOW IS TO GO AHEAD WITH DEBATE WHICH SHOULD END WITH RESOLUTION. ASKED IF DEBATE COULD NOT END BY CONSENSUS, RIFAI RESPONDED "NOT IN THE CASE OF JERUSALEM, AS IT STANDS RIGHT NOW". AT THIS POINT I USED FINAL POINT STATE 155820 THAT WE UNLIKELY

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 4607A ~~SECRET~~
BE ABLE JOIN IN A CENSURE OF ISRAEL ON JERUSALEM ISSUE.

6. RIFAI THEN COMMENTED HE PREFERRED NOT TO REPLY IMMEDIATELY TO MY PRESENTATION: HE WISHED TO REFLECT ON THE POINTS WE HAD

~~SECRET~~



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 04 AMMAN 04607 011442Z

MADE AND TO DISCUSS THEM WITH HIGHER AUTHORITY. RE SANCTIONS, HE SAID HE ASSUMED WE WERE NOT CONFUSING THE QUESTION OF ISRAELI DEFIANCE OF LAST WEEKEND'S SC RESOLUTION ON THE PARADE WITH ITS DEFIANCE OF THE UN RESOLUTIONS IN GENERAL ON THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM. SHOULD SANCTIONS BE RAISED, THEY WOULD BE IN CONTEXT OF ISRAELI DEFIANCE OF THE PARADE RESOLUTION. " WE THEN WANT A DEBATE WHICH WILL END WITH THE COUNCIL DECLARING INVALID ALL ISRAELI ACTIONS AFFECTING ARAB JERUSALEM AND CALLING ON ISRAEL TO DESIST FROM THEM".

7. I STRESSED THAT " SANCTIONS" HAD NOT BEEN APPLIED TO OTHER MATTERS IN ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE. MOREOVER, IN CASE OF PARADE, SANCTION WOULD BE TOTALLY DISPROPORTIONATE AND PROBABLY UN-ATTAINABLE IN ANY CASE. WE ARE ALSO MINDFUL OF DANGERS, AS I HAD POINTED OUT, OF CREATING FURTHER NEGATIVE ATTITUDE IN ISRAEL TOWARD UN. EFFECT ON JARRING MISSION COULD BE DISTASTROUS AND WE CONTINUE TO REGARD THAT MISSION AS BEST HOPE FOR PEACE.

8. RIFAI STATED THAT GOJ ENVISAGED DEBATE, WHICH WOULD START TODAY, WOULD GO ON FOR SOMETIME. HE ADMITTED HIS PRELIMINARY REACTION MY PRESENTATION WAS THAT OUR STAND CAME AS A " RADICAL SURPRISE" TO HIM. HE SAID THAT, RESERVING THE JORDANIAN

PAGE 6 RUQMKG 4607A ~~SECRET~~

POSITION ON JERUSALEM, HE FULLY AGREED JARRING MUST BE ASSISTED IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY. HE SAID HE PERSONALLY PLACED PRINCIPAL BLAME FOR THE WEAKENING OF THE JARRING MISSION ON ISRAEL, ESPECIALLY GOI ACTIONS AFFECTING THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM. I REPLIED THAT WHILE ISRAEL HAS POSED OBSTACLES TO JARRING WE PRESENTLY CONSIDER UAR HAS BEEN THE MORE SERIOUS TROUBLEMAKER. ISRAEL HAD BEEN RESPONDING, EVEN IF INSUFFICIENTLY IN GOJ VIEW, TO OUR EFFORTS TO BE MORE COOPERATIVE WITH JARRING. IN REPLY RIFAI REFERRED TO EBAN'S PRESS CONFERENCE OF YESTERDAY WITH ITS REFERENCE TO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AND ASSERTION ALL PRINCIPLES OF NOV 22 RESOLUTION ARE SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATION (SEPTEL).

9. OUR MEETING WAS THEN INTERRUPTED BY RIFAI'S DEPARTURE

~~SECRET~~



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PAGE 05 AMMAN 04607 011442Z

FOR CABINET MEETING. HE UNDERTOOK BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH ME SOONEST AND AGREED TO TRANSMIT OUR VIEW IN FIRST INSTANCE TO ACTING PRIMIN TOUQAN AND THEN TO PRIMIN TALHOUNI ON HIS RETURN. I SAID WE WERE MAKING SIMILAR PRESENTATION TO ZAID RIFAI TODAY IN LONDON.

10. I HAVE JUST RECEIVED WORD THAT I AM TO SEE RIFAI AGAIN AT 1600 ZULU.
GP-3 SYMMES

~~SECRET~~



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80

SECRET 808

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04603 301720Z

40
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

0 301649Z APR 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5388
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
USUN 0900
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4603

EXDIS

SUBJ: JERUSALEM: JORDAN DROPS CALL FOR ARMS EMBARGO

REF: AMMAN 4596

1. KHAMMASH JUST CALLED FROM OFFICE OF FONMIN RIFAI TO INFORM ME INSTRUCTIONS ARE BEING SENT TO FARRA IN NEW YORK TO REFRAIN FROM ANY MENTION OF ARMS EMBARGO DURING SC DEBATES. RIFAI SUBSEQUENTLY GOT ON TELEPHONE TO SAY THAT HE HAD STATED IN INSTRUCTIONS THAT IF FARRA CONSIDERED IT NECESSARY,

PAGE 2 RUGMKG 4603A ~~SECRET~~

HE COULD TOUCH LIGHTLY UPON ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. I SAID TO RIFAI THAT I HOPED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WOULD NOT INCLUDE MENTION OF ISRAELI BONDS AND US CONTRIBUTIONS TO ISRAEL. HE SAID HE HAD SENT ORAL INSTRUCTIONS BY ROUHI KHATIB TO FARRA THAT HE WAS NOT TO MENTION THAT SUBJECT IN FORTHCOMING DEBATE.

2. I THANKED KHAMMASH AND RIFAI FOR THIS INFORMATION AND SUBSEQUENTLY INFORMED BRITISH AMB ADAMS. ADAMS AND I HAD CONSULTED AFTER MEETING REPORTED REFTEL AND HE HAD ALREADY RECOMMENDED TO FONOFF THAT HMG TRY TO PERSUADE KING TO COUNTERMAND GOJ INSTRUCTIONS WITH

SECRET

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04603 301720Z

REGARD TO PROPOSING ARMS EMBARGO.

3. RECOMMEND EMBASSY LONDON COORDINATE WITH FONOFF TO INSURE THEY AWARE THIS LATEST DEVELOPMENT. SYMMES GP-3.

EXDISE

~~SECRET~~



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81 (22)

27

~~SECRET~~ 827

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04600 301724Z

44
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 301540Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5386
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO
USMISSION USUN NY

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4600

EXDIS

REF: USUN 4781, 4785; CAIRO 2242

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

1. WE FIND DESCRIPTION OF HOW GOI ENVISAGES THE ROAD TO PEACE UTOPIAN (USUN 4781 PARA C, 4785 PARA G). EBAN'S FORMULATION IS ONE WHICH WE CANNOT IMAGINE JORDAN MUCH LESS THE UAR BEING ABLE TO ACCEPT, EITHER

PAGE 2 RUMK 4600A ~~SECRET~~
JOINTLY OR SEPARATELY.

2. WE HAVE RECOGNIZED ALL ALONG HOW NARROWLY FOCUSED GOI THINKING HAS BEEN ON ACHIEVEMENT OF A GENERAL PEACE TREATY. (WE SUSPECT WHEN EBAN SPEAKS OF AN AGREEMENT WITH "THE CHARACTER OF A TREATY" SUCH AGREEMENT, PARTICULARLY AS FAR AS ARAB REACTION WOULD BE CONCERNED, WOULD TO ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES BE THE SAME THING.) WHAT STRIKES US AS A NEW AND MORE COMPLICATING TWIST IN THE ISRAELI PRESENTATION IS EBAN'S PUTTING THE TREATY EVEN BEFORE THE WORKING OUT OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

3. THE CONTRAST IS PARTICULARLY SHARP BETWEEN THIS

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04600 301724Z

ISRAELI FORMULATION AND THE USG POSITION AS STATED BY AMB GOLDBERG TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL NOV 15 (USUN 2272 NOV 16) AND PERHAPS THIS CONTRAST SHOULD AGAIN BE REVIEWED WITH ISRAELIS. WHILE USG HAS INTERPRETED SC RESOLUTION AS REQUIRING SOME SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATION AMONG THE PARTIES, OUR OVERALL POSITION

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 4600 ~~SECRET~~
SEEMS FURTHER THAN EVER AWAY FROM THAT OF THE ISRAELIS. DEPTTEL 149366 RESTATING USG VIEWS ON THE MEANING OF THE TERM "IMPLEMENTING RESOLUTION" COULD BE USEFUL BASIS FOR OUR DISCUSSIONS.

4. WHAT CONCERNS US IS THAT IF THERE IS NO DIRECT USG REACTION TO EBAN'S PRESENTATION WE MAY FIND OURSELVES BEING SUCKED INTO A SITUATION PREJUDICIAL TO MOVING FORWARD ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. FURTHERMORE, IF WE AVOID THE ISSUE AS NOW POSED BY EBAN, WE RISK THE ISRAELIS TALKING THEMSELVES INTO PURSUING A PROGRAM WHICH HOLDS NO PROMISE OF PEACE.

5. RE JARRING'S IDEA TO GET A PIECE OF PAPER FROM EBAN OUTLINING THE STEPS AS GOI ENVISAGES THEM, WE ARE APPREHENSIVE THAT BECAUSE OF THE PREDICTABLY HOSTILE ARAB REACTION TO SUCH A SCENARIO, CIRCULATION OF THIS IDEA COULD DEAL A DEATH BLOW TO THE JARRING MISSION.

GP-3 SYMMES

~~SECRET~~



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TELEGRAM

82 / 8

~~SECRET~~ 154

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04572 300612Z

20
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 300505Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5373
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4572

EXDIS

PLEASE PASS SECDEF

JOINT EMBASSY/DATT MESSAGE

SUBJECT: SECDEF INQUIRY RE SAUDI FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO JORDAN

REF: (A) AMMAN 4509; (B) DEF 7558; (C) JIDDA 3783

1. REF JIDDA MSG WHICH STATES SAG CONSIDERING PAYING \$20 MILLION OF JORDAN ARMS COSTS DIRECT TO USG SEEMS CLARIFY SAUDI INTENTIONS RE ITS POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTION TO JORDAN. WE NOTE FURTHER STATEMENT THAT SAG DOES NOT PLAN ASSIST IN CONNECTION

PAGE TWO RUQMKG 4572A ~~SECRET~~
JORDANIAN HAWKER HUNTER PURCHASE FROM BRITAIN.

2. USDAO AMMAN IR'S 2 853 0204 AND 0207 67 DETAIL INTO AVAILABLE HERE ON GOJ ARMS PURCHASES IN THE UK. DATT SOUGHT CONFIRMATION AND NEW DATA FROM UKMA, AMMAN, 29 APR. JORDANIAN ARMS DEBT TO UK OF ALMOST FOUR MILLION POUNDS AS REPORTED THOSE IR'S BASICALLY UNCAHNGED, ALTHOUGH SOME PAYMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE. SINCE THOSE REPORTS, JORDAN HAS CONTRACTED FOR ADDITIONAL HAWKER HUNTER AIRCRAFT FOR AN ESTIMATED COST OF SLIGHTLY OVER ONE MILLION POUNDS, FOR A TOTAL DEBT OF APPROX FIVE MILLION POUNDS.

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By 448 NAR, Date 04-11-2016

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04572 300612Z

3. ABOVE FIGURE FIVE MILLION POUNDS (\$12 MILLION) CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN \$28 MILLION MENTIONED IN AMMAN REF A. UKMA STATES THAT GOJ HAS EXPRESSED A LONG TERM INTEREST IN ACQUIRING ADDITIONAL HUNTERS, BUT HE STRESSES THAT THIS IS FAR IN THE FUTURE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE MOST RECENT UK/GOJ DISCUSSIONS IN MARCH FOR PURCHASE OF FOUR HUNTERS OUT OF RAF INVENTORY ENVISAGES THESE AIRCRAFT BEING SENT BACK TO THE FACTORY FOR COMPLETE REBUILD WITH DELIVERY NOT EARLIER THAT MID 1969. PRICE HAS NOT BEEN AGREED BUT MAY BE APPROXIMATELY 160,000

PAGE THREE RUQMKG 4752A ~~SECRET~~
POUNDS STERLING PER AIRCRAFT. UKMA EXPECTS KING HUSSEIN WILL DISCUSS MATTER WHILE ON HIS CURRENT TRIP TO UK. ONLY OTHER SIGNIFICANT DEAL VAGUELY IN THE WIND WITH UK IS POSSIBLE GOJ INTEREST IN ADDITIONAL CENTURION TANKS.

4. COMMENT: WHILE UKMA, AMMAN, MAY NOT KNOW OF ALL ARMS DEALS, PARTICULARLY SMALL PURCHASES NEGOTIATED IN LONDON BY JORDANIAN MA, BELIEVE HE WOULD KNOW AND TELL US OF ANY MAJOR PURCHASES IN THE OFFING. IT SEEMS CLEAR FROM JIDDA REFTEL THAT THE SAUDIS AND JORDANIANS DID NOT WORK OUT FINAL DETAILS OF THE PROPOSED ADDITIONAL AID. HELP IN SOME FORM ON THE COST OF THE US PACKAGE SEEMS MORE LIKELY GIVEN THE SAUDI VIEWS EXPRESSED IN JIDDA TEL.
SYMMES

NOTE: NOT PASSED SECDEF BY OC/T.

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TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~ 301

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04570 300938Z

18
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 291714Z APR 68 ZFG
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5371
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA

2

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NLJ/RAC 02-234
By ia, NARA, Date 7-22-03

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4570

EXDIS

JOINT EMBASSY/DATT MESSAGE

SUBJECT: JORDAN ARMS

REF: JIDDA 3783

1. SAG PROPOSAL TO PAY DIRECTLY TO USG \$20 MILLION WOULD CERTAINLY BE OF GREAT ASSISTANCE TO GOJ. THE DATA SUPPLIED FAISAL BY HUSSEIN APPEARS TO BE ON THE HIGH SIDE. WE FIGURE TOTAL ARMS PACKAGE AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED AMOUNTS TO \$74.7 MILLION, WHICH INCLUDES \$32.4 MILLION

PAGE 2 RUGMKG 4570A ~~SECRET~~
GROUND PACKAGE: \$31.4 MILLION AIR PACKAGE (OF WHICH \$10 MILLION ALREADY PAID); \$1 MILLION 1965 GROUND PACKAGE; \$2.7 MILLION DUE IN NEXT TWELVE MONTHS IN PAYMENTS ON EARLIER 15 MILLION LETTER OF CREDIT; 7 MILLION FORD TRUCK CONTRACT; AND \$200,000 FOR AIRLIFT TO CONSIST OF 10 AIRCRAFT. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, AMENDMENTS PENDING WHICH WILL INCREASE THE ABOVE TOTAL. TO AVOID POSSIBLE EMBARRASSMENT BETWEEN SAUDIS AND JORDANIANS, WE SUGGEST THAT, SHOULD NEED FOR DISCUSSIONS OF DETAIL ARISE WITH THE SAUDIS, WE FOCUS ON PAYMENTS NOW SCHEDULED AND NOTE THAT ULTIMATE TOTAL IS NOT FIXED.

2. FIRST PAYMENT DUE APRIL 29 IS APPROX \$23 MILLION. JAA HQ STATES THAT IT HAS DIRECTED ITS BANK TO FORWARD

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04570 300938Z

THIS PAYMENT. WE EXPECT CONFIRMATION HERE BY LETTER APRIL 30 AT LATEST. AN ADDITIONAL \$14.8 MILLION WILL BE DUE IN VARYING AMOUNTS MONTHLY THROUGH 30 OCT 68, WITH A FURTHER \$11.8 MILLION DUE BY MARCH 69. ADDITIONAL PAYMENTS ARE TO FOLLOW THROUGH USFY 1970. SAUDI PROPOSAL OF \$20 MILLION FOR OCTOBER COULD BE APPLIED AGAINST

PAGE 3 RUQMGK 4570A ~~SECRET~~

ABOVE REMAINING BALANCES ON FMS CASES. REOPENING QUESTION OF DOWN PAYMENT UNDESIRABLE. WE RECOMMEND FINDING WAY TO FACILITATE SAUDI HELP ALONG LINES OFFERED WITHOUT TIPPING JORDANIAN HAND IN SUCH A WAY AS TO LEAD SAUDIS TO THINK FUNDS NOT URGENTLY NEEDED. ALSO BELIEVE BEST LEAVE NEGOTIATIONS TO SAUDIS AND JORDANIANS AS FAR AS POSSIBLE.

SYMMES

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SECRET 375

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04567 291734Z

47
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P 291630Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5368
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
USUN 889
USINT CAIRO

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4567

EXDIS

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION: JORDANIAN VIEW ON NEXT STEPS

1. SUMMARY: FONMIN RIFAI BRIEFED ME ON TALKS WITH JARRING ON TWENTY-EIGHTH. HE SAID JARRING FEELS THAT THE POSITIONS OF ISRAEL AND THE UAR ARE IRRECONCILABLE AND THAT THEREFORE HE MUST PRESENT A REPORT TO THE SYG IN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS. IN PRESENTING REPORT HE WILL TRY TO KEEP HIS MISSION ALIVE BUT WAS NOT SANGUINE THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO DO SO IN VIEW OF ISRAELI AND UAR POSITIONS AND PROBABLY ACRIMONIOUS SC

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4567A ~~SECRET~~

DEBATE THAT WOULD ENSUE. PRIMIN TALHOUNI IS TO FLY TO CAIRO ON THIRTIETH TO TALK TO NASSER ABOUT WHAT WILL HAPPEN NEXT.

2. FONMIN RIFAI SAID THAT PRIMIN TALHOUNI, DEPRIMIN TOUGAN AND HE HAD MET TWICE WITH JARRING YESTERDAY. IN SECOND MEETING KING HUSSEIN JOINED THEM. JARRING SAID HE WAS ENDEAVORING TO GET FINAL POSITIONS OF VARIOUS PARTIES STRAIGHT IN ORDER THAT HE COULD PREPARE A REPORT TO THE SYG WITHIN THE NEXT COUPLE OF WEEKS. JARRING IS TO GO TO ISRAEL ON THE THIRTIETH AND WILL VISIT CAIRO TWO OR THREE DAYS LATER. PRIMIN TALHOUNI IS TO FLY TO CAIRO TOMORROW TO HAVE TALKS WITH NASSER IN A FINAL EFFORT TO COORDINATE THE JORDANIAN AND UAR POSITIONS. (COMMENT: TRIP IS PRESUMABLY AN EFFORT

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By lee NARA, Date 10/2/01

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04567 291734Z

TO PERSUADE UAR TO GO TO NEW YORK UNDER JORDANIAN FORMULATION.) RIFAI SAID THAT TALHOUNI WOULD NOT REMAIN IN CAIRO TO TRY MEET WITH JARRING TOGETHER WITH THE UAR REPRESENTATIVE.

3. RIFAI COMMENTED THAT FROM HIS REMARKS TO THEM YESTERDAY, JARRING CLEARLY CONSIDERS THAT BOTH ISRAEL AND THE UAR ARE

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 4567A ~~SECRET~~

TAKING POSITIONS THAT OBSTRUCT HIS MISSION. THE DIFFICULTIES REVOLVE AROUND THE WORDS "NEGOTIATIONS" AND "IMPLEMENTATION." JARRING CONFIRMED AGAIN TO THE JORDANIANS THAT IN HIS LAST MEETING WITH RIAD HE HAD FELT UNABLE, IN RESPONSE TO RIAD'S QUESTION, TO STATE THAT HE BELIEVES ISRAEL ACCEPTS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION. (DEPT WILL RECALL JORDAN HAD TRIED TO PERSUADE JARRING TO "FUZZ" THIS POINT WITH RIAD.) JARRING EXPLAINED THAT IN ALL HONESTY HE COULD NOT TELL RIAD THAT HE UNDERSTOOD ISRAEL'S POSITION ALLOWED SUCH AN INTERPRETATION. JARRING WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE BELIEVED ISRAEL SAW THE RESOLUTION AS "A FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION." ON THE OTHER HAND, THE UAR INSISTS THAT IT WILL GO NO FURTHER UNTIL ISRAEL HAS STATED THAT IT ACCEPTS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION.

4. RIFAI SAID THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD ONCE AGAIN EMPHAIZED TO JARRING THAT JORDAN ACCEPTS THE RESOLUTION AND THAT JORDAN HAS ALSO TRIED TO BRING ALONG THE UAR. JARRING AGAIN HAD INDICATED HIS GRATITUDE FOR JORDAN'S COOPERATION AND HAD EXPRESSED NO DIFFICULTY SO FAR AS THE JORDANIAN POSITION

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 4567A ~~SECRET~~

WAS CONCERNED. HE APPARENTLY WAS PLEASED THAT THE KING WAS SENDING TALHOUNI TO SEE NASER AGAIN. THE JORDANIANS, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAD URGED JARRING TO TRY TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO STATE THEIR "ACCEPTANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION" IN ORDER TO HELP JORDAN PERSUADE THE UAR TO GO TO NEW YORK. THEY HAD TOLD JARRING AGAIN THAT THINGS COULD MOVE VERY FAR VERY FAST IF ONLY AN UMBRELLA COULD BE ESTABLISHED IN NEW YORK.

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 04567 291734Z

5. THE JORDANIANS HAD DISCUSSED WITH JARRING HOW HE SAW THINGS DEVELOPING IF HE DID MAKE A REPORT. JARRING AGREED WITH THEM THAT A SC DEBATE COULD BECOME QUITE ACRIMONIOUS. RIFAI SAID IT WAS QUITE OBVIOUS JARRING EXPECTED TO SAY SOME RATHER HARSH THINGS ABOUT BOTH THE ISRAELI AND THE UAR POSITIONS. HE ADDED THAT HE AND THE OTHER JORDANIANS INVOLVED IN THE TALKS WITH JARRING TAKE NO COMFORT FROM THE FACT THAT ISRAEL MIGHT GET A LARGE SHARE OF BLAME; THEY WOULD MUCH PREFER TO BE MOVING TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.
GP-3

SYMMES

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~~SECRET~~ 290

02

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04526 251410Z

42
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 251320Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5344
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO
USUN 882

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-207
By *js*, NARA, Date 11-20-02

Rd Stewart

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4526

EXDIS

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

IN OUR MEETING APR 24 (AMMAN 4527) THE KING ASKED WHAT I KNEW ABOUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE JARRING MISSION. I TOLD HIM I HAD HAD NO REPORT ON JARRING'S TALKS WITH THE SYG IN TEHRAN OR HIS TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS YESTERDAY. I THEN SAID THAT AT THE RISK OF HAVING THE UAR ACCUSE ME OF MISINTERPRETING ITS POSITION, I WONDERED IF THE UAR HAD NOT RECENTLY BACKED AWAY

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4526A ~~SECRET~~
SOMEWHAT FROM WHAT HE, HUSSEIN, HAD BEEN GIVEN TO UNDERSTAND IN HIS TALKS WITH NASSER. THE KING INDICATED HE HIMSELF BELIEVES THE UAR HAS BACKSLID AND ADDED HE ALSO BELIEVED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE HARDENED THEIR POSITION. IN THIS CONNECTION HE REFERRED TO WHAT THE UAR LEADERSHIP HAD SAID TO HIM ABOUT THE SOVIETS BECOMING INCREASINLY WILLING TO MAKE ARMS AVAILABLE TO CAIRO (AMMAN 4260). THE KING SAID HE HAD A FEELING THE SOVIETS HAD DECIDED A SETTLEMENT IS NOW IMPOSSIBLE. HE SAID, "IF WE COULD ONLY GET THE UAR TO NEW YORK WE WOULD HAVE NO PROBLEMS BECAUSE WE WOULD GO RIGHT AHEAD TO A SETTLEMENT ONCE WE WERE THERE." HE MENTIONED THAT AFTER HIS VISIT TO LIBYA IS COMPLETED, HE WILL SEND PRIMIN TALHOUNI BACK TO CAIRO FROM LIBYA TO RESUME DISCUSSIONS WITH THE UAR.

GP-3. SYMMES

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TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~ 533

02

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04534 251645Z

44
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 251610Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5351
INFO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
CINCSTRKE

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4534

EXDIS

REF: STATE 152271

SUBJ: IRANIAN ARMS FOR JORDAN

WE VERY MUCH APPRECIATE DEPT'S PROPOSED RESPONSE TO
IRANIANS ON QUESTION ARMS FOR JORDAN. PARA E IN
SUGGESTING IRANIAN FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO COVER COST
OF AIRLIFT SHOULD PROVIDE SHAH WITH OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW
HIS SUPPORT FOR JORDAN. AT SAME TIME OUR SUGGESTION
SHOULD INHIBIT IRANIANS FROM SAYING TO JORDANIANS
THEIR HANDS ARE TIED BECAUSE OF USG POSITION.
GP-3

SYMMES

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NLJ-S 98001
By ag/ll, NARA, Date 10/2/01

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~~SECRET~~ 550

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 04479 231507Z

44
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 231420Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5318
INFO USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NY

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4479

EXDIS

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

1. KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY ZAID RIFAI COMMENTED TODAY FOLLOWING RETURN FROM UZQEK-LONG TRIP WITH KING TO CERTAIN ARAB STATES (AMMAN 4478) THAT JARRING MISSION APPARENTLY STILL ON DEAD CENTER. JORDANIANS HE SAID WERE CONVINCED THAT PRINCIPAL OBSTACLE AT PRESENT WAS RIGID DEMAND BY UAR FOMIN MAHMOUD RIAD FOR EXPLICIT ISRAELI STATEMENT OF READINESS TO IMPLEMENT SC RESOLUTION.

PAGE 2 RUMKG 4479A ~~SECRET~~

2. RIFAI SAID GOJ HAD RECEIVED NO WORD FROM UAR OR MOSCOW ABOUT RIAD'S TALKS WITH SOVIET LEADERS.

3. PRIMIN TALHOUNI, ACCORDING RIFAI, HAS SUGGESTED TO KING THAT HE BE ALLOWED PROCEED TO CAIRO FOR PRIVATE TALKS WITH NASSER AS SOON AS KING'S STATE VISIT TO LYBIA IS COMPLETED NEXT WEEK. TALHOUNI CONSIDERS SUCH TALKS COULD BE USEFUL IN BRINGING NASSER TO ORDER GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN RIAD'S STAND.

4. RIFAI SAID JORDANIANS REMAIN CONVINCED THEY MUST GET UAR TO ACCOMPANY THEM AT LEAST TO BEGINNING OF TALKS WITH ISRAELIS

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04479 231507Z

UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES. HE GAVE NO INDICATION THAT JORDANIANS FELT THEMSELVES ABLE TO MOVE UNILATERALLY TO TALKS.

GP-3 SYMMES

RESOLUTION

FOR EXHIBIT 12... RESOLUTION OF... TO IMPROVE...
RESOLUTION... TO IMPROVE...
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RESOLUTION... TO IMPROVE...

RESOLUTION

EXHIBIT

RESOLUTION

RESOLUTION... TO IMPROVE...
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RESOLUTION

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 04447 191806Z

47
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P R 161655Z APRIL 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5297
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO
USUN 874

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4447 SECTION 1 OF 2

EXDIS
SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION

Roptow

REF: AMMAN 5352; CAIRO 2179

SUMMARY: ABDUL MUNIM RIFAI EXPRESSED EXASPERATION WITH JARRING, EBAN AND MAHMOUD RIAD IN MEETING WITH BERGUS AND ME APR 19. HIS OPTIMISM OF APR 12 HAS DISAPPEARED AND HE FEARS JARRING MISSION IS AGAIN BOGGED DOWN IN QUIBBLING

PAGE 2 RUOMKG 4447 ~~SECRET~~
OVER FORMULA. RIFAI THINKS NEXT TIME HE AND RIAD SHOULD MEET JOINTLY WITH JARRING.

1. I CALLED ON ABDUL MUNIM RIFAI MORNING APR 19 IN COMPANY WITH BERGUS FOR DISCUSSION CURRENT STATUS JARRING MISSION. AS OPENER, BERGUS READ OFF CONTENTS CAIRO 2179 TO BRING RIFAI UP TO DATE ON VIEW FROM CAIRO AS FAR AS USG UNDERSTOOD IT.

2. RIFAI COMMENTED THAT "UNFORTUNATELY JARRING HAS BECOME A PRISONER OF HIS OWN PROCEDURES AND SUGGESTIONS" AND EXPRESSED EXASPERATION THAT THE PARTIES SHOULD BE SPENDING SO MUCH TIME WORRYING ABOUT WHAT WERE JARRING'S OWN FORMULAE. ANY DIFFERENCES IN INTERPRETATION, HE SAID, COULD BE HANDLED BY PARTIES THROUGH TECHNIQUES SUCH AS LETTERS TO U THANT, FUTURE DISCUSSIONS IN SC, OR IN COURSE OF MEETINGS WITH

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04447 191806Z

JARRING

NEW YORK. RIFAI SAID HE HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM JARRING IN NICOSIA YESTERDAY WHICH TALKED OF "THE JORDANIAN AMENDMENT TO MY FORMULA." RIFAI EMPHASIZED NEITHER HE NOR ANY OTHER JORDANIAN PARTICIPANT IN DISCUSSION WITH JARRING HAD MEANT TO BE IDENTIFIED AS SPONSORS OF AN

PAGE 3 RUGMKG 4447 ~~SECRET~~

AMENDMENT. THEY HAD MERELY WANTED TO ASSIST ESTABLISH A PARTICULAR PROCEDURE TO ASSURE PROGRESS OF TALKS. JORDANIANS HAD BEEN TRYING TO ASSIST JARRING BUT FORMULA WAS MATTER BETWEEN JARRING AND U THANT. RIFAI ADDED HE AND RAID AGREED THAT IF EVERYONE INTRODUCED AMENDMENTS IT WOULD SERVE TO STOP JARRING MISSION IN ITS TRACKS.

3. RIFAI STATED THAT THE HUSSEIN-NASSER MEETINGS APR 6 IN CAIRO HAD DWELT ON POSITIONS NOT FORMULAE, AND IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT MOST PROMISING WAY TO IMPLEMENT RESOLUTION WAS TO GET DISCUSSIONS STARTED IN NY. JARRING SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD JORDANIANS THAT ISRAEL WAS UNHAPPY WITH IDEA OF HAVING UN PERMREPS HOLD DISCUSSIONS WITH JARRING SINCE REPS LACKED RANK AND AUTHORITY AND WERE ALREADY OVERBURDENED. JORDANIANS HAD REPLIED TO JARRING THAT DISCUSSIONS SHOULD START WITH PERMREPS AND UPGRADING OF REPRESENTATION WOULD DEVELOP NATURALLY WITH PROGRESS IN DISCUSSIONS. IN THEIR LATEST MEETING RADI HAD APPARENTLY GIVEN JARRING REPHRASED VERSION OF HIS THINKING ON NY TALKS; HE HAD TOLD JARRING THAT HE SHOULD DRAW UP PROGRAM FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION.

PAGE 4 -UUKK: 4447 ~~SECRET~~
AND PRESENT IT TO PERMREPS.

5. RIFAI REVIEWED TACTICS HE HAD EARLIER SUGGESTED JARRING FOLLOW DURING HIS MEETINGS IN BOTH JERUSALEM AND CAIRO. (AMMAN 4352). JARRING, AFTER MEETING WITH EBAN, PASSED WORD TO RIFAI THAT ISRAEL "FOUND DIFFICULTY IN ACCEPTING JORDANIAN TEXT AND WAS WAITING TO SEE ATTITUDE OF CAIRO." FURTHERMORE, ISRAEL HAD TO DISCUSS JORDANIAN AMENDMENT IN 21 APR CABINET

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Department of State

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 04447 191806Z

MEETING. (AMMAN 4406). IN CAIRO, JARRING FOUND UAR STILL INSISTED ON A CLEAR ISRAELI STATEMENT RE IMPLEMENTATION, AND APPARENTLY SAID IN RESPONSE TO RIAD'S QUESTION ISRAEL WOULD NOT RPT NOT ACCEPT JORDANIAN REVISION. RIFAI SAID HE HAD BEEN CONVINCED A WEEK AGO THAT IF JARRING HAD CONFINED HIMSELF TO ASSURING RIAD THAT NY DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE DEVOTED TO STARTING IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION, RIAD WOULD POSE NO OBJECTION AND TALKS COULD HAVE BEEN INITIATED AFTER MEETING WITH EBAN.

5. RIFAI CRITICIZED RECENT EBAN STATEMENT AS BEING UNHELPFUL IN PRESENT ATMOSPHERE. HE SAID HE HAD RECEIVED TEXT EVENING APR 18 OF STATEMENT IN WHICH EBAN SAID MAJORITY OF ISRAELIS WOULD LIKE

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4447 ~~SECRET~~

TO GIVE UP SOME OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES PROVIDED PEACE CAN BE CONCLUDED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. SUCH STATEMENTS, RIFAI COMMENTED, MERELY ADD TO CAIRO'S SUSPICIONS AND ENCOURAGE CAIRO TO PRESS FOR A CLEAR ISRAELI STATEMENT ON IMPLEMENTATION.

6. RIFAI ADMITTED HE WAS EXTREMELY DEPRESSED; THE SLIGHT GLIMMER OF HOPE HE HAD SEEN LAST FRIDAY BEEN ELIMINATED. RIAD HAD TOLD HIM IT HOPELESS TO CONTINUE. IN THIS CASE, RIFAI COMMENTED, IT LIKELY JARRING WILL SUBMIT HIS REPORT TO SYG AND SC WILL HAVE TO RECONSIDER WHOLE PROBLEM. "PERHAPS THIS IS WHAT CERTAIN POWERS WANT", RIFAI SAID.

7. RIFAI SAID IT HAD BECOME QUITE CLEAR THAT ARABS HAD TO KNOW WHAT TERRITORIES ISRAELIS INTENDED TO KEEP AND WHAT THEY INTENDED TO RETURN. ANSWER TO THIS COULD BSCU
E#ARABS WHETHER TO CONTINUE SEARCH FOR POLITICAL SOLUTION. AS FAR AS RIFAI WAS CONCERNED, MEETING IN NY COULD BE THE WAY TO PROVIDE ARABS FOR THE FIRST TIME WITH TRUE ISRAELI POSITION.

PAGE 6 RUQMKG 4447 ~~SECRET~~

8. I OBSERVED THAT ISRAELIS HAD NOT GIVEN FINAL REFUSAL TO REVISED JARRING FORMULA. I ADDED I WAS SURPRISED BY EVIDENT

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Department of State

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PAGE 04 AMMAN 04447 191806Z

STALLING OF PROGRESS BECAUSE I HAD THOUGHT JORDANIANS HAD FINALLY GOTTEN JARRING TO REALIZE HE SHOULD NOT PUT HIMSELF IN POSITION OF MAKING CATEGORICAL STATEMENTS TO RIAD ABOUT ISRAELI POSITIONS. RIFAI GLOOMILY ANSWERED THAT LATEST JARRING-RIAD EXCHANGE WAS APPARENTLY REPLAY OF FORMER SESSIONS IN WHICH EACH GAVE OVERLY SHARP AND CATEGORICAL ANSWERS TO THE OTHER'S QUESTION.

9. ASKED WHY RIAD HAD GONE TO MOSCOW, RIFAI ACKNOWLEDGED THE TRIP HAD BEEN A SURPRISE TO HIM AND SAID HE ASSUMED EGYPTIANS WERE IN NEED OF FURTHER AID. HE APPEARED TO HAVE NO DETAILED INFORMATION.

10. RE POSSIBILITY OF GA ACTION ON ME, RIFAI COMMENTED THAT THERE WERE ALREADY TWO ITEMS ON GA AGENDA CONCERNING ME: GUSSING'S REPORT ON NEW REFUGEES AND JERUSALEM. HE SAID HE HAD TOLD AL-FARRA THAT HE EXPECTED NPT DEBATE TO LAST SOME FOUR WEEKS AND THAT WHILE NPT DEBATE IN PROGRESS JORDAN WOULD DECIDE ON WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE FURTHER GA ACTION ON ME.

NOTE: # AS RECEIVED.

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~~SECRET~~ 190

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04447 191816Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P R 191655Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5298
INFO USINT CAIRO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4447 FINAL SECTION OF TWO SECTIONS:

EXDIS

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION

REF: AMMAN 4352; CAIRO 2179

11. RIFAI ASKED FOR BERGUS' ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC OPINION IN CAIRO. BERGUS SAID THAT ALL OF HIS SOUNDINGS INDICATED THAT UAR PUBLIC OPINION WAS ABSOLUTELY OPPOSED TO ANOTHER WAR. HOW-

PAGE TWO RUQMG 4447A ~~SECRET~~

EVER, THERE IS DOMESTIC DISCONTENT IN UAR AND, BERGUS CONTINUED, NASSER APPARENTLY HAS PERSUADED HIMSELF HE CANNOT AFFORD TO INCUR CRITICISMS EITHER FROM EGYPTIANS OR FROM OTHER ARAB STATES. BERGUS COMMENTED BRIEFLY ON NASSER-MCCLOY MEETING AND SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY BELIEVED NUANCES IN NASSER'S PRESENTATION INDICATED PRESIDENT WAS MUCH MORE FLEXIBLE RE PROCEDURES FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION THAN WAS RIAD. RIFAI SAID SOME JORDANIANS HAD SIMILAR FEELING BUT ADDED NASSER SEEMS CONVINCED THAT EVEN FAISAL IS DETERMINED ON WAR AND READY TO CRITICIZE NASSER SHOULD HE ESPOUSE A PEACEFUL COURSE. (WE OF COURSE TRIED TO SET FAISAL'S ATTITUDE IN BETTER PERSPECTIVE.) RIFAI SUGGESTED THAT UAR LEADERSHIP IS DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT IT RISKS CUTOFF IN FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHER ARAB STATES IF IT CONTINUES TO SEEK PEACEFUL SOLUTION. I OBSERVED THAT KING HAD TOLD ME NASSER HAD MENTIONED TO HIM THAT UAR HAS BECOME HEAVILY

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Department of State

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04447 191816Z

DEPENDENT ON OTHER ARAB FUNDS (AMMAN 4264). RIFAI SAID HE HAD HEARD NASSER SAY HE NEEDED FOREIGN ARAB CONTRIBUTIONS FOR AT LEAST ANOTHER FULL YEAR.

12. DISCUSSING APPARENT RIGIDITY OF RIAD'S POSITION, I OBSERVED

PAGE THREE RUQMKG 4447/2A ~~SECRET~~

THAT ISRAELIS WERE CONVINCED RIAD IS STILL INSISTING ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AS PREREQUISITE TO IMPLEMENTATION REST OF NOV 22 RESOLUTION. BERGUS COMMENTED UAR SPOKESMAN SAY RIAD HAD NEVER SAID THIS. RIFAI OBSERVED THAT RIAD SEES SAME RIGIDITY IN ISRAELI POSITION AS THEY SEEM TO SEE IN RIAD'S. AS RIFAI SAID, "WHEN JARRING TELLS US ISRAELIS INTEND TO STAY IN GAZA AND JERUSALEM, WHAT ARE WE SUPPOSED TO RESPOND?" ONE ATTRACTION FOR RIAD IN SC ACTION, ACCORDING RIFAI, IS THAT RIAD THINKS IF HE GOES TO SC HE WILL BE PUBLICLY REASSURED THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION BY FORCE. RIAD WILL THEN BE ABLE TO CORNER ISRAEL WITH STATEMENT THAT HE IS WILLING TO APPLY EVERY PROVISION OF RESOLUTION KNOWING THAT ISRAEL, BEING INTENT ON SOME TERRITORIAL GAINS CANNOT EASILY MATCH THIS DECLARATION. I COMMENTED THAT RIAD SEEMED TO BE FORGETTING DIFFICULT TALKS THAT LED TO ADOPTION OF NOV 22 RESOLUTION.

13. RIFAI SAID BASIC PROBLEM BETWEEN JORDAN AND UAR IS THAT UAR IS CONVINCED IT CAN WAIT FOR BETTER TIMES; JORDAN CANNOT. RIFAI ADDED, HOWEVER, HE BELIEVES JORDAN MUST STILL TRY TO MOVE IN HARMONY WITH CAIRO. I SAID IT APPEARS TO ME ARABS

PAGE FOUR RUQKKG 4447/2A ~~SECRET~~

MUST GO TO NEW YORK CONVINCED THEY ARE GOING TO SECURE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION. RIFAI ANSWERED THAT ISRAELIS ALL TOO APT TO SAY THEY WILL NOT DISCLOSE THEIR INTENTIONS UNTIL PARTIES SIT DOWN TOGETHER AND, IN THAT EVENT, ARABS WILL BE ENTERING INTO NEGOTIATION ON UNKNOWN BASIS. JORDANIANS HAD NO OBJECTION TO FACE TO FACE MEETINGS PROVIDED THEY WERE DOING THIS IN ORDER TO DISCUSS IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION.

14. RIAD RETURNS CAIRO APRIL 25. JARRING RETURNS NICOSIA FROM

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 04447 191816Z

MEETING WITH U THANT IN TEHRAN APRIL 23. JARRING HAS TOLD JORDANIANS HE AT THEIR DISPOSAL AFTER APRIL 23, BUT RIFAI WILL DELAY RESPONSE TO JARRING PENDING KING'S RETURN TO AMMAN APRIL 22.

15. ONLY CONCLUSION RIFAI APPEARED TO REACH DURING THIS MEETING WAS THAT PERHAPS HIS NEXT MEETING WITH JARRING SHOULD BE IN COMPANY WITH RIAD AND THAT WHEN AND IF JARRING GOES TO NEW YORK, HE SHOULD CALL FOR JOINT MEETINGS WITH UAR AND JORDANIAN PERMREPS. RIFAI RUEFULLY AGREED WITH MY COMMENT THAT TO START JARRING TALKS IN NEW YORK WITH AL-KUNI AND AL-FARRA AS ARAB REPS WOULD TEND DOOM TALKS FROM START. HE INDICATED HE OR SOME-

PAGE FIVE RUQMKG 4447/2A ~~SECRET~~

ONE ELSE WOULD SOON ARRIVE TO HEAD JORDANIAN SIDE. BUT BASIC PROBLEM, AS RIFAI OBSERVED, IS HOW TO START MOVEMENT TO NEW YORK. HE FELT ISRAELIS WILL SURELY GIVE NEGATIVE ANSWER TO JARRING ON SUGGESTED REVISION HIS FORMULA IN LIGHT OF CAIRO'S RESPONSE.

16. RIFAI SEVERAL TIMES DROPPED HINTS HE HAD BEEN THINKING SERIOUSLY OF SUGGESTING SEPARATE TALKS WITH ISRAEL AS ONLY ALTERNATIVE FOR JORDAN BUT DID NOT KNOW HOW TO GO ABOUT IT OR WHETHER JORDAN'S INTERNAL SITUATION WOULD PERMIT. HE CLEARLY WISHED AWAIT RETURN OF KING BEFORE PURSUING THIS THOUGHT ANY FURTHER.

GP-1. SYMMES

~~SECRET~~



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~~SECRET~~ 361

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47
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P R 181615Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5287
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4425

EXDIS

REF AMMAN 4352; TATE 148776; USUN 4638, 4639

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION

DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING JARRING MISSION REPORTED STATE AND USUN REFTELS SUGGEST TO US THAT BEFORE JARRING'S NEXT CONTACT WITH GOI WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO URGE ISRAELIS AT LEAST ACCEPT THE FORMULATION WHICH JORDAN HAS ACCEPTED AND JARRING PRESENTED

PAGE TWO RUQMKG 4425A ~~SECRET~~
RGO ISRAEL APRIL 16. FROM LAST SENTENCE, PARA 2, STATE 148776, WE GATHER JARRING MAY BE DUE BACK IN ISRAEL PRIOR HIS TRIP TO TEHRAN TO MEET WITH SYG APRIL 22. JORDANIAN DESIRE FOR EARLY MOVEMENT TOWARDS ZBAKS UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES REMAINS UNCHANGED AND AS FAR AS WE ARE AWARE THEY HAVE NO NEW TACTIC TO SUGGEST BEYOND THAT REPORTED AMMAN 4352.
GP-3.
SYMMES

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 88001

By Ag/12, NARA, Date 10/2/01

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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3/

~~SECRET~~ 417

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04406 171833Z

02

44
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSD 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

O R 171810Z APR 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5279
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO 017

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4406

EXDIS

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION

REF AMMAN 4352

1. MINSTATE FO FONAFF ABDUL MUNIM RIFAI INFORMED ME EARLY EVENING APR 17 HE HAD RECEIVED UNOFFICIAL, BUT HE BELIEVED ACCURATE, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON JARRING TALKS IN ISRAEL APR 16 AND CAIRO APR 17.

PAGE TWO RUQMKG 4406A ~~SECRET~~

2. IN ISRAEL JARRING REPORTEDLY HAD DIFFICULTY IN CONVINCING EBAN TO AGREE TO REVISED FORMULATION PER PARA AMMAN 4352. RIFAI THOUGHT DIFFICULTY INVOLVED BOTH SITE AND POSSIBLY WORDING. HE UNDERSTOOD EBAN TOLD JARRING THAT ISRAEL WOULD LIKE TO RESERVE ITS POSITION UNTIL JARRING WOULD RETURN TO ISRAEL FOLLOWING VISIT CAIRO. THE ISRAELI CABINET WOULD HAVE TO DISCUSS QUESTION AND TAKE A DECISION IN ITS APR 21 MEETING WHICH IN TURN WOULD BE CONTINGENT ON POSITION TAKEN BY CAIRO.

3. IN CAIRO, RIFAI SAID, THERE HAD APPARENTLY BEEN ARGUMENT BETWEEN JARRING AND THE EGYPTIANS OVER THE OLD QUESTION OF CLARITY OR LACK OF CLARITY AS TO ISRAEL'S

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By NS/100, NAHA, Date 10/2/01

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04406 171833Z

POSITION ON QTE IMPLEMENTING THE RESOLUTION END QTE. RIFAI SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT HAD PRECIPITATED THE ARGUMENT OVER THIS QUESTION AND WHAT MIGHT BE THE SOURCE OF CAIRO'S DISSATISFACTION WITH JARRING'S STATEMENT OF THE SITUATION. RIFAI RECALLED THAT HE HAD URGED JARRING TO BE SURE TO TELL RIAD THE SAME THING HE HAD

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 4406 ~~SECRET~~

AGREED WITH RIFAI WAS THE MEANING OF THE JARRING MAR 10 FORMULATION AS REVISED AND ACCEPTED BY JORDAN.

4. RIFAI ADDED THAT HE EXPECTED TO RECEIVE AN OFFICIAL REPORT INCLUDING THE MINUTES OF THE CAIRO MEETINGS SHORTLY. THIS SHOULD GIVE HIM A CLEARER IDEA OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED IN BOTH ISRAEL AND THE UAR. MEANWHILE HE FEARED THAT THE PRELIMINARY REPORT WITH ITS NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS WAS ACCURATE. RIFAI COMMENTED HE HAD HOPED THAT THE VERY POSITIVE LINE TAKEN WITH JARRING BY JORDAN IN HIS APRIL 12 VISIT WOULD HAVE BROUGHT BETTER RESULTS FROM ISRAEL. HE ASKED FOR ANY INFORMATION WE MIGHT RECEIVE WHICH WOULD HELP CLARIFY JUST WHERE THINGS STOOD. I TOLD HIM WE HAD NOT RECEIVED ANYTHING IN AMMAN AS YET.

5. RIFAI SAID HE HAD TELEGRAPHED RIAD THAT HE WISHED COME TO CAIRO TO DISCUSS MATTERS. RIAD HAD REPLIED HE WAS WELCOME BUT SHOULD ALLOW FOR FACT RIAD WOULD BE

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 4406 ~~SECRET~~

AWAY ON TRIP TO MOSCOW AND OTHER POINTS FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE WEEK BEGINNING APRIL 18. RIFAI INDICATED HE WOULD DECISE ON POSSIBLE TRIP TO CAIRO FOLLOWING KING'S RETURN TO AMMAN AND OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS SITUATION WITH HUSSEIN
GP-1 DUNCAN

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

90/8

~~SECRET~~ 219

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04353 130845Z

16
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 121833Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5247
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY CAIRO

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4353

EXDIS

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION

REF: STATE 145661, AMMAN 4352

IN MY MEETING WITH ABDUL MUNIM RIFAI THIS AFTERNOON, I INFORMED HIM OF DEPT'S DECISION THAT WE WILL NOT MAKE WRITTEN STATEMENT AS HAD BEEN REQUESTED BY KING AND RIFAI LAST TUESDAY. RIFAI RESPONDED THAT IN LIGHT OF ENCOURAGING PROGRESS JARRING APPEARS

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4353A ~~SECRET~~

TO BE MAKING (AMMAN REFTEL), HE CONSIDERED JORDANIAN REQUEST FOR SUCH A STATEMENT FROM US TO BE OUTDATED. HE UNDERTOOK TO INFORM BOTH KING AND PRIMIN TALHOUNI OF HIS OPINION THAT STATEMENT FROM US NO LONGER NEEDED AND OF REASONS WHY WE CONSIDERED SUCH STATEMENT INAPPROPRIATE. RIFAI SAID HE HIMSELF HAD AGREED WITH ME IT WAS FAR MORE DESIRABLE FOR JARRING TO GET THE ISRAELIS THEMSELVES TO CLARIFY THEIR POSITION THAN FOR JORDAN TO SEEK SUCH CLARIFICATION FROM US.

GP-3.
SYMMES

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 08001

By af/100, NARA, Date 10/21/01

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TELEGRAM

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SECRET 520

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04352 122258Z

81
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

O P 121810Z APR 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5244
USMISSION USUN NY
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4352 SECTION 1 OF 2

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - N U M B E R E D P A R A G R A P H 6

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

REF: USUN 4566

SUMMARY: IN HIS APR 12 TALKS IN AMMAN JARRING WAS MORE ENCOURAGING RE ISRAELI ATTITUDES THAN IN ANY PREVIOUS MEETINGS WITH JORDANIANS. JARRING HAS AGREED SUBMIT REVISED WORDING HIS MARCH FORMULA TO CAIRO AND JERUSALEM. GOJ HAS TOLD JARRING IT UNDERSTANDS THAT

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4352/1A ~~SECRET~~

WHEN IT GOES TO NEW YORK IT WILL BE TO DEVISE ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SC RES. JARRING WAS URGED BY JORDANIANS TO ENCOURAGE CAIRO TO ACCEPT NY TALKS BY USING THIS SAME LINE. JARRING WILL VISIT JERUSALEM APR 16, CAIRO APR 17. GOJ IS STARTING TO CONDITION JORDANIAN NOTABLES ON IDEA OF NEW YORK MEETINGS.

I MET WITH ABDUL MUNIM RAFAI THIS AFTERNOON AFTER JARRING'S RETURN TO NICOSIA. RAFAI SAID THAT IN MEETING WITH PRIMIN AND HIMSELF TODAY. JARRING WAS MORE ENCOURAGING THAN IN ANY PREVIOUS SESSION ABOUT ISRAELI ATTITUDES AND INTENTIONS. QUOTE JARRING SOFTENED HIS APPROACH TO US, EITHER AS RESULT ISRAELI ATEMENTS OR BECAUSE HE WAS INFLUENCED BY OTHERS. UNQUOTE. JARRING

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001

By: [signature], NARA, Date 10/2/01

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04352 122258Z

AGREEDNSUBMIT REVISION PENULTIMATE SENTENCE IN HIS MARCH 10 FORMULA TO READ QUOTE I WILL MEET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF ISRAEL AND JORDAN (UAR), FOR CONFERENCES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SC RESOLUTION, IN NEW YORK. UNQUOTE. JARRING IS TO PRESENT THIS RE-FORMULATION TO ISRAELI AMBASSADOR IN NICOSIA SATURDAY MORNING APR 13 FOR TRANSMISSION TO EBAN. JARRING HAS UNDERTAKEN SEND RIFAI PRELIMINARY ISRAELI REACTION, PRIOR TO JARRING'S NEXT VISIT TO JERUSALEM

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 4352/1A ~~SECRET~~
TUESDAY, APR 16.

2. TODAY'S SESSION WAS NOT WITHOUT DIFFICULTIES. JORDANIANS REITERATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT HEY UNDERSTOOD JARRING'S STATEMENT THAT NY MEETING WAS INTENDED TO "DEVISE ARRANGMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION" MEANT JORDANIANS WERE GOING TO NY TO WORK OUT IMPLEMENTATION OF SC RESOLUTION. JARRING IN TURN REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES WHILE THAT MIGHT BE JORDANIAN UNDERSTANDING, IT PROBABLY WOULD NOT SATISFY CAIRO WHICH HAD ASKED HIM TO GET CLEARER LANGUAGE FROM ISRAELIS. RIFAI SAID AT ONE POINT HE CRITICIZED JARRING SHARPLY FOR HAVING TOLD CAIRO DURING HIS APR 9 VISIT THAT ISRAEL WAS NOT WILLING TO IMPLEMENT RESOLUTION. THIS PROMPTED CAIRO TO ASK IF THEIR ANY POINT CONTINUING JARRING MISSION AS LONG AS ISRAEL REFUSES TO SAY IT WOULD IMPLEMENT RESOLUTION. JARRING PROTESTED THAT HE HAD ONLY MEANT TO MAKE IT PLAIN TO CAIRO THAT ISRAEL HAD NOT GIVE HIM CLEAR LANGUAGE ON IMPLEMENTATION. IT WAS NOT, JARRING SAID, THAT ISRAEL HAD TOLD HIM IT WAS AGAINST IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION. AT ONE POINT TODAY, JARRING SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO REFER TO SYG U THAT JORDANIANS' VIEW THAT BY ACCEPTING

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 4352A ~~SECRET~~

HIS FORMULA PARTIES HAVE ACCEPTED IMPLEMENTATION. RIFAI TOLD HIM TO FORGET ANY SUCH IDEA AND CONVEY TO CAIRO AS HIS, RIFAI'S INTERPRETATION THAT JORDAN UNDERSTANDS BY JARRING'S LANGUAGE IT IS AGREEING TO GO TO NEW YORK FOR PURPOSE OF DEVISING ARRANGEMENTS TO WORK OUT IMPEMETATION OF RESOLUTION.

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3. AFTER CIRCLING AROUND TROUBLESOME QUESTION OF "IMPLEMENTATION" AT LEAST SIX TIMES, ACCORDING RIFAI, JARRING WAS FINALLY BROUGHT TO UNDERSTAND THAT MANY PROBLEMS OF RECENT WEEKS HAD BEEN CREATED BY JARRING'S CONTINUALLY REMINDING UAR FONMIN MAHMOUD RIAD OF ISRAELI NEGATIVISM. THIS HAD MADE THE ALREADY NERVOUS RIAD MUCH MORE NERVOUS AND SUSPICIOUS.

4. JARRING THEN SAID THAT FACT REMAINED CAIRO WANTED WHOLE PROCESS TO START WITH ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. RIFAI TOLD HIM "WE'RE NOT PUTTING PRIORITIES" AND BROUGHT JARRING TO AGREE THAT ALL PARTIES WERE GOING TO NEWYORK TO DISCUSS HOW, WHEN AND IN WHAT STAGES NOT ONLY WITHDRAWAL HOULD TAKE PLACE BUT HOW ALL OTHER PROVISIONS OF RESOLUTION SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED.

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 4352/1A ~~SECRET~~

5. RIFAI TOLD ME HE WAS SEEING UAR AMBASSADOR LATER THIS AFTERNOON TO GIVE HIM REVISED JARRING FORMULATION, TO SAY JORDAN ACCEPTS, AND TO URGE UAR TO DO THE SAME. HE WILL TELL UAR AMB IT IS JORDAN'S UNDERSTADING THAT ITS AGREEMENT TO GO TO NEW YORK IS FOR PURPOSE OF DISCUSSION OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION WITH JARRING. RIFAI TOLD ME HE HAD CAUTIONED JARRING TO BE SURE HE TOLD RIAD PRECISELY THAT SAME THING DURING THEIR NEXT MEETING ON APRIL 17.

6. WHEN JARRING ASKED WHAT JORDAN WILL SAY SHOULD ISRAEL START DISCUSSIONS IN NY BY SAYING IT DEMANDS A CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENT PROVIDING FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE. RIFAI SAID HE HAD ANSWERED "IN THAT CASE I WILL START WITH SAYING WITHDRAWAL IS WAY TO JUST AND LASTING PEACE." RIFAI SAID HE HAD ALSO TOLD JARRING THAT "IF ISRAELIS TELL ME CONTRACTUAL ARRANGMENTS AND DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS ARE VITAL, I WILL RESPND THEY ARE NOT SPECIFIED IN NOV 22 RESOLUTION. I ACCEPT DISCUSSION OF EVERYTHING IN THE RESOLUTION AND NOTHING OUTSIDE OF THAT FRAMEWORK." RIFAI SAID THAT PRIMIN TALHDUNI HAD URGED HIM IN JARRING'S

~~SECRET~~



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~~SECRET~~ 329

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ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

O P 121810Z APR 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5245
USMISSION USUN NY
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 AMMAN 4352

EXDIS

PRESENCE TO GO TO CAIRO AND PREPARE RIAD PRIOR TO RIAD'S NEXT MEETING WITH JARRING. RIFAI TURNED THIS IDEA DOWN SAYING IT WOULD BE A WASTE, AT LEAST UNTIL HE HAD HEARD REACTION OF ISRAEL TO TODAY'S DISCUSSIONS.

7. EXPRESSING SATISFACTION OVER COURSE OF TODAY'S MEETING, RIFAI SAID THERE WERE NOW THREE MORE STAGES: (1) JARRING TO GET ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF GOING TO NY AND REVISED PHRASING OF

PAGE 2 RUQMG 4352/2A ~~SECRET~~
FORMULA (2) JARRING TO GET CAIRO'S ACCEPTANCE OF SAME (3) JORDAN TO DECIDE HOW AND WHEN TO FORM JORDANIAN DELEGATION TO NY.

8. RIFAI SAID HE TOLD JARRING THAT HE EXPECTED HIM, AFTER SECURING ISRAELI AND UAR AGREEMENT TO NY VENUE, TO PROCEED TO NY IMMEDIATELY AND ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH PERMANENT UN REPRESENTATIVES ALL THREE COUNTRIES. ISRAELIS, RIFAI SAID, HAD PRESSED JARRING TO GET NAMES AND RANKS OF ARAB REPRESENTATIVES SO THEY COULD DESIGNATE COMPARABLE DELEGATION. RIFAI SAID GOU PLANS DISPATCH "ALMOST IMMEDIATELY" MINISTERIAL LEVEL DELEGATION. ACCORDING RIFAI, KING AND PRIMIN WANT HIM TO LEAD JORDANIAN DELEGATION AND HE INDICATED HE WOULD PROBABLY ACCEPT, BUT HAD COUNSELLED TALHOUNI AGAINST TELLING JARRING TODAY. RIFAI BELIEVES UAR WILL RETAIN ITS UN AMBASSADOR, AL-KONY, AS ITS REPRESENTATIVE.

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04352 02 OF 02 121920Z

SENTATIVE TO TALKS AT LEAST UNTIL IT CAN "TEST THE AIR."

9. COMMENT: FROM HIS ACCOUNT, IT WOULD SEEM RIFAI STILL HAD TO WORK RATHER HARD TO BRING OUT THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE SITUATION. NEVERTHELESS THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN CONSIDERABLE GAIN IF JARRING HAS REALLY BEEN MADE AWARE THAT THE WAY HE

PAGE 3 RUQMGK 4352/2A ~~SECRET~~
HANDLES HIS APPROACHES TO THE PARTIES CAN DETERMINE THEIR RESPONSES.

10. I THINK IT ESSENTIAL THAT JUST AS ARABS MAY NOW HAVE BEEN MOVED AWAY FROM THEIR FIXATION ON THE QUESTION OF IMPLEMENTATION JUST SO MUST ISRAELIS BE PERSUADED TO RELAX THEIR INSISTENCE (PARTICULARLY IN PUBLIC) ON DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AND PEACE TREATY. THEY MIGHT ULTIMATELY GET BOTH, BUT THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO GET EVEN AN ACCEPTABLE SUBSTITUTE IF THEY COME OUT WITH MORE STATEMENTS IN PUBLIC SUCH AS ESHKOL JUST MADE (PARA 3, TEL AVIV 3321) AND EBAN IN PRIVATE TO JARRING (PARA 12, USUN 4566). JERUSALEM POST'S "DIPLOMATIC REPORTER'S" REVELATIONS ARE ALSO LIKELY TO MAKE NERVOUS ARABS EVEN MORE SKITTISH THAN THEY ARE (TEL AVIV 3118).

GP-1 SYMMES

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

92

SECRET 514

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04333 120552Z

14
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 120530Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5237
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 822
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 009
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 858
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1505

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4333

EXDIS

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION

IN LIGHT OF REPEATED ASSERTIONS BY JORDANIANS
THAT ISRAEL CONSIDERS NOV 22 RESOLUTION TO BE MERE
AGENDA FOR DISCUSSIONS AND MOST RECENT MAHMOUD RIAD
STATEMENT TO THIS EFFECT (PARA 6 CAIRO 2085), WOULD APPRECIATE
UPDATED STATEMENT US POSITION ON THIS POINT FOR USE

PAGE TWO RUGMKG 4333A ~~SECRET~~
IN ONGOING LOCAL CONTACTS.
GP-3
SYMMES

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.3
NLJ-S 98001
By 15/10 NARA, Date 10/14/01

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

93

46

~~SECRET~~ 349

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04332 112033Z

2

41
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, 1030 W

P R 111625Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5236
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 821
USMISSION USUN NY 857
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 008
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1504

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4332

EXDIS

REF: STATE 145013

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

1. IN BRIEF MEETING WITH ABDUL MUNIM RIFAI AFTERNOON APR 11 I SOUGHT TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES IN REPORTS WE HAVE BEEN RECEIVING ABOUT THE RIAD-JARRING APR 8.

PAGE 2 RUMKGO 4332A ~~SECRET~~

CONVERSATION. (REFTEL PARA 2) I ASKED RIFAI WHETHER RIAD HAD DISCUSSED WITH JARRING AMENDMENT OF PENULTIMATE SENTENCE IN JARRING'S MARCH 10 PROPOSAL. RIFAI ASSURED ME THAT RIAD HAD DONE SO, SUGGESTING THAT SENTENCE BE AMENDED TO READ "TO MEET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTIES IN NEW YORK." JARRING WROTE DOWN THE SUGGESTED PHRASING AT HIS MEETING WITH RIAD AND READ IT OFF FROM HIS NOTES TO RIFAI IN THEIR MEETING TWO HOURS LATER THAT DAY. JARRING TOLD RIFAI HE WOULD PROPOSE THE SUGGESTION TO ISRAELIS AS COMING FROM BOTH RIAD AND RIFAI IN HIS NEXT MEETING IN JERUSALEM.

2. TO DEMONSTRATE FURTHER THERE ABSOLUTELY NO QUESTION THAT RIAD HAD HIMSELF LAUNCHED THIS IDEA WITH JARRING.

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04332 112033Z

RIFAI READ TO ME ARABIC TEXT OF MINUTES RIAD HAD JUST SENT HIM ON THE APRIL 8 RIAD-JARRING MEETING. ACCORDING TO MINUTES RIAD SUGGESTED REVISION READING "TO MEET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONCERNED PARTIES IN NEW YORK."

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 4332A ~~SECRET~~

3. RIFAI THEN SAID THAT IT WAS ONLY BECAUSE HE AND RIAD HAD GIVEN THIS AMENDMENT TO JARRING FOR ISRAELIS TO CONSIDER THAT HE HAD FELT IN EARLIER DISCUSSIONS WITH ME HE HAD ANY BASIS FOR HOPE JARRING MIGHT BE ABLE TO ELICIT SOME CLEARER STATEMENT FROM ISRAELIS ABOUT THEIR READINESS TO IMPLEMENT THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION IN JARRING'S APR 11 TALKS IN JERUSALEM.

4. I TOOK OCCASION TO TEL RIFAI THAT DEPT HAS "VERY SERIOUS RESERVATIONS" RE ANY WRITTEN STATEMENT TO BE GIVEN TO JORDANIANS (STATE 144444, NOTAL) AND I REHEARSED EARLIER ARGUMENTS AGAINST SUCH STATEMENT (AMMAN 4296). I ADDED THAT I HOPED OUR PRELIMINARY REACTIONS WOULD NOT BE COMMUNICATED TO JARRING AT THIS STAGE.

5. RIFAI SAID HE WAS VERY APPREHENSIVE THAT JARRING WOULD ARRIVE TOMORROW BRINGING NO SHIFT IN GOI POSITION. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN TRYING TO THINK, THUS

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 4332A ~~SECRET~~
FAR WITHOUT SUCCESS, ABOUT WHAT JORDAN'S NEXT STEPS SHOULD BE.

GP-3 SYMMES

~~SECRET~~



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94
TELEGRAM 5

~~SECRET~~ 973

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04319 111148Z

16
ACTION SS 30

2

INFO /030 W

P R 111052Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5230
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1502
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 007
AMEMBASSY LONDON 819
USMISSION USUN NY 855

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4319

EXDIS

REF: STATE 144870, 145013

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

1. WOULD NOTE THAT HUSSEIN HAS SEEN JARRING ALMOST EVERY TIME JARRING HAS VISITED AMMAN. IN ALL PROBABILITY HUSSEIN HAS BEEN PLANNING TO SEE JARRING TOMORROW. HOWEVER, WE ARE ASKING ABDUL MUNIM RIFAI TO INSURE THAT HE DOES.

2. WE INTERPRET RIFAI'S FAILURE TO BRING JARRING'S MARCH TO FORMULATION TO PERSONAL ATTENTION OF KING AS GOOF AND NOT RPT NOT INDICATIVE OF BASIC LACK OF

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4319A ~~SECRET~~
COMMUNICATIONS OR ANY POLICY DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN KING AND EITHER RIFAI OR PRIMIN TALHOUNI IN HANDLING JARRING MISSION.

GP-3. SYMMES

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By 18/10 NARA, Date 10/14/01

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95 22

~~SECRET~~ 030

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04309 111231Z

11
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P 101630Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO XSECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5222
USMISSION USUN NY 854
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1501
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 005

2

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4309

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN ,!\$2, 4259

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

BRITISH AMB ADAMS HAD AN AUDIENCE WITH KING HUSSEIN THIS AFTERNOON AND WAS INFORMED BY THE KING OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE REFTELS. I TOLD ADAMS THAT INOAD REPORTED THIS NEW DEVELOPMENT IN VERY RESTRICTED CHANNELS AND HOPED IN VIEW OF ITS EXTREME SENSITIVITY HE WOULD SEE IT WAS GIVEN SIMILAR TREATMENT IN HIS GOVT.

GP-1 SYMMES

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NLJ 05-95
By isl, NARA, Date 1-31-06

~~SECRET~~



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TELEGRAM

96 / 31

~~SECRET~~ 535

2

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04308 101715Z

53
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

0 P 101615Z APR 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5221
USMISSION USUN NY 853
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1500
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 004

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4308

EXDIS

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

REF: AMMAN 4302, 4296

1. MEETING WITH ABDUL MUNIM RIFAI THIS AFTERNOON PRODUCED LITTLE MORE ON DEVELOPMENTS REPORTED IN REFTELS. RIFAI SAID THAT IF JARRING IS ABLE, IN HIS MEETINGS WITH ISRAELIS TOMORROW, TO OBTAIN STATEMENT THAT WILL BE CONVINCING TO

PAGE 2 ROOMKG 4308A ~~SECRET~~
CAIRO, THERE WILL, OF COURSE, BE NO NEED FOR A USG WRITTEN STATEMENT TO THE GOI. I REITERATED MY VIEW THIS IS STILL JARRING'S JOB, NOT OURS.

2. RIFAI REQUESTED WE CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS IN CASE JARRING DOES NOT GET SATISFACTION FROM ISRAELIS. HE ENVISAGES THAT THIS STATEMENT WOULD BE ADDRESSED TO HIM FROM ME.

3. STATEMENT READS: QUOTE EXCELLENCY: IN A MEETING ON APRIL 9, YOUR GOVERNMENT INQUIRED CONCERNING MY GOVERNMENT'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE ATTITUDE OF THE GOI TOWARDS THE NOV 22, 1967 SC RESOLUTION AND THE FORMULA AMB JARRING GAVE THE GOI ON MARCH 10, 1968. I HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED TO INFORM

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04308 101715Z

YOU THAT THE USG UNDERSTANDS THAT BY ACCEPTING THE MARCH 10 FORMULA OF DR. JARRING THE GOI HAS AGREED TO IMPLEMENT THE NOV 22 SC RESOLUTION. IT IS ALSO UNDERSTOOD BY MY GOVT THAT THE DETAILS OF THIS IMPLEMENTATION BY THE PARTIES WILL BE WORKED OUT WITH DR. JARRING. UNQUOTE.

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 4308A ~~SECRET~~

4. RIFAI POINTED OUT THAT JARRING WOULD BE HERE ON FRIDAY AND THAT HE HOPED I WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO LET HIM KNOW OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PROPOSED STATEMENT BY THAT TIME.

SYMMES

~~SECRET~~



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TELEGRAM

97
25

~~SECRET~~ 390

2

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04302 101502Z

47
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

0 101335Z APR 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5216
INFO AMEMBASWY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1497
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 003
USMISSION USUN NY 853

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4302

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 4296

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

1. MEETING THIS MORNING WITH ABDUL MUNIM RIFAI DEVELOPED FURTHER BACKGROUND ON WHY GOJ IS SEEKING WRITTEN STATEMENT FROM USG. RIFAI IS DEEPLY WORRIED THAT FORCES WORKING FOR PEACE ARE LOSING GROUND.

2. RIFAI SAID THAT IN HIS OWN APRIL 8 MEETING WITH JARRING HE ASKED WHETHER JARRING IN MEETING WITH MAHMOUD RIAD EARLIER THAT DAY HAD INFORMED RIAD OF ISRAELI "ACCEPTANCE" OF JARRING'S MARCH 10 PROPOSAL. JARRING SAID NO AND, WHEN RIFAI PRESSED HIM TO DO SO, AGREED TO TELEPHONE RIAD FROM OFFICE WHERE JARRING AND RIFAI WERE MEETING. MAHMOUD WAS OUT OF HIS OFFICE AND JARRING SPOKE WITH MAHAMMAD RIAD.

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4302A ~~SECRET~~

TELLING OSQM

HEADBECAUSEILCAI#REQUESTED IT, HE WISHED MAHMOUD TO BE INFORMED OF ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE. MAHMOUD, JARRING ADDED, SHOULD ALSO BE TOLD THAT HE, JARRING, FELT ISRAELI "ACCEPTANCE" DID NOT REALLY CONSISTLFIF YTOGLXQPH#

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By 11/11 NARA Date 10/1/01



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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04302 101502Z

CTTO IMPLMHAHIRGOLUTIONGS N BQRIYEM#JARRING REITERATED TO RIFAI AND
RIAD IN THEIR SEPARATE
MEETINGS APRIL 8 HIS EARLIER OPINION THAT ISRAELIS DO NOT
CONSIDER THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION TO BE A DOCUMENT FOR
IMPLEMENTATION BUT RATHER AN AGENDA FOR DISCUSSIONS.
HE ADDED ISRAELIS MAY OR MAY NOT ACCEPT INDIVIDUAL
PRINCIPLES OF RESOLUTION. RIFAI THEREUPON COMMENTED
TO ME THAT THIS IS THE PRINCIPAL REASON DOUBT CONTINUES
TO NAG JORDANIAN AND UAR LEADERS. THEY SUSPECT STRONGLY
ISRAEL WANTS NOT ONLY TO AVOID IMPLEMENTING THE
UNPALATABLE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL BUT ALSO TO DISCUSS
"THINGS OTHER THAN THE PRINCIPLES OF THE RESOLUTION."
I OBSERVED IT WAS JARRING'S JOB TO KEEP BOTH SIDES
FROM THROWING IN THE KITCHEN SINK.

4. RIFAI REITERATED THAT SOLE REASON HE NEEDS WRITTEN
STATEMENT FROM US IS TO ENCOURAGE CAIRO TO JOIN JORDAN

PAGE 3 RUGMKG 4302 ~~SECRET~~
IN NEW YORK DISCUSSIONS. THIS DOCUMENT WOULD BE KEPT IN
CONFIDENCE BUT MIGHT BE PUBLISHED IF NEEDED TO RESOLVE ANY
SUBSEQUENT CONFLICT OF ARAB-ISRAELI VIEWS ON "IMPLEMENTATION
OF RESOLUTION." SUCH PUBLICATION COULD OCCUR IF CASE IS
RETURNED TO SC. AT SUCH TIME IT WOULD BE PUBLISHED
IN CONJUNCTION WITH JARRING'S MARCH 10 PROPOSAL.
(COMMENT: RIFAI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IF PARTIES AGREE
TO MEET IN NEW YORK JARRING'S PROPOSAL MIGHT WELL BE
PUBLISHED ON ITS OWN AS PART OF HIS REPORT TO U THANT.)

5. I SAID TO RIFAI THAT THE WAY HE HAD REPORTED TO ME
LAST NIGHT JARRING'S SUGGESTION THAT USG FURNISH A
WRITTEN ASSURANCE OF ISRAELI INTENTIONS SUGGESTED
THAT JARRING MIGHT BE PIQUED WITH USG FOR MEDDLING IN
JARRING'S MISSION. RIFAI SAID, ON THE CONTRARY, HE HAD
TOLD JARRING SOMETIME AGO THAT HE WAS FURNISHING ME
WITH FULL ACCOUNTS OF JORDAN'S CONTACTS WITH JARRING
BECAUSE IT WAS FELT VITAL THAT USG HAVE AS FULL PICTURE
AS POSSIBLE. HE SAID THAT JARRING HAD WELCOMED THIS
AS PROSPECT OF USG SUPPORT FOR HIS MISSION.

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 0430Z 101502Z

6. TASKED AGAIN IF USG AGREED TO PROVIDE WRITTEN

PAGE 4 RUMKMG 4302A ~~SECRET~~

STATEMENT SATISFACTORY TO JORDAN WHETHER JORDAN COULD GUARANTEE THAT CAIRO WILL GO TO NEW YORK. RIFAI ANSWERED CATEGORICALLY IN AFFIRMATIVE.

7. RIFAI STRESSED HE WAS NOT TRYING TO PUT A NEW STUMBLING BLOCK IN WAY OF GETTING DISCUSSIONS STARTED HE SAW OUR WRITTEN STATEMENT AS OFFERING THE ONLY CONCEIVABLE WAY TO CONVINCE THE UAR TO COME ALONG TO NEW YORK, ADDING THAT JORDAN HAD TO HAVE UAR IN ATTENDANCE TO ENABLE JORDAN TO START TALKS WITH ISRAELIS. HE THEN SAID THAT HIS MEETINGS IN CAIRO, SUBSEQUENT TO HUSSEIN'S DEPARTURE HAD BEEN DEEPLY DISTURBING. HE HAD SEEN NOT ONLY SEVERAL CABINET MINISTERS AND AMBASSADORS BUT HAD RECEIVED VISITS FROM WHAT HE DESCRIBED, WITH PURPOSES OF EMKMGUECSSMULU HWZBWJETXGUSP OVES#OF ARABHATONNAL FORCES."

LATTER REPS SAID THEY WERE AWARE OF INTEREST IN SOME CIRCLES IN SPONSORING ARAB-ISRAELI MEETINGS AND THEY HAD COME TO ARN HIM ABOUT GRAVE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH AN PEDH"VQSH RIFAI SAID HE FELT MORE KEENLY THAN EVER THAT "FORCES ARE AT WORK IN THE ARAB WORLD WHICH WILL DRIVE MATTERS TOWARDS ANOTHER CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL." HE MADE

PAGE 5 RUMKMG 4302A ~~SECRET~~

CLEAR HE WAS NOT REFERRING TO FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY AND COMMENTED THAT ISRAEL WAS EXAGGERATING SUCH ACTIVITY OUT OF ALL PROPORTION. ANY FURTHER DELAYS IN GETTING TALKS STARTED RIFAI SAID COULD MEAN THAT JORDAN'S PEACE MOVES WOULD BE OVERPOWERED BY THOSE ADVOCATING MILITARY RESISTANCE. HE SAID "I FEEL I AM RACING WITH TIME."

8. RIFAI SAID HE AND RIAD UNDERSTOOD FROM JARRING THAT, IN HIS APRIL 11 TALKS WITH ISRAELIS, JARRING WOULD TAKE LINE THAT HE HAD SECURED POSITIVE MOVEMENT FROM CAIRO

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PAGE 04 AMMAN 04302 101502Z

AND AMMAN IN TERMS THEIR WILLINGNESS PROCEED NEW YORK FOR DISCUSSIONS. JARRING SAID HE INTENDED TO ASK ISRAELIS TO GIVE HIM IN RETURN FURTHER STATEMENT ON ISRAELI READINESS TO IMPLEMENT THE NOVEMBER 22 RESOLUTION.

9. RIFAI DISPATCHED MESSAGE TO JARRING THIS MORNING ASKING THAT HE ADVANCE HIS SCHEDULED ARRIVAL IN AMMAN FROM TUESDAY, APRIL 16 TO FRIDAY APRIL 12.

10. RECOMMENDATION: UNLESS ISRAELIS HAVE SOMETHING TO OFFER IN CONTACTS WITH JARRING TOMORROW WHICH WILL BE CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO CAIRO OF THEIR "READINESS TO IMPLEMENT" THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION, I URGE THAT WE SUPPLY

PAGE 6 RUQMG 4302A ~~SECRET~~

JORDAN WITH BRIEF WRITTEN STATEMENT INDICATING IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF JARRING'S MARCH 10 PROPOSAL INVOLVES GOI AGREEMENT TO IMPLEMENT THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION. HOPES FOR CONTINUANCE OF THE JARRING MISSION HANG ON VERY SLENDER THREAD. IF OUR STATEMENT WILL BE ENOUGH TO COAX UAR TO MEET WITH JORDAN AND ISRAEL UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES THE COST WILL BE CHEAP. ALTERNATIVE AS I SEE IT IS IMMINENT COLLAPSE OF MISSION BECAUSE I AM NOT SANGUINE IN TALKS WITH ISRAELIS EVEN UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES.

11. RIFAI IS SEEING HUSSEIN AGAIN THIS AFTERNOON. I AM TO SEE HIM AFTER THIS MEETING AND EXPECT HE WILL COME UP WITH SOME FIRM PROPOSALS ON KING OF STATEMENT JORDAN WOULD LIKE US TO MAKE.

GP-1. SYMMES

NOTE: # AS RECEIVED.
CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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26

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 04302 101813Z

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ACTION SS 30

2

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

0101335Z APR 68 ZFF6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5216
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 149Z
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 003
USMISSION USUN NY 353

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4302

EXDIS

CORRECTED COPY

REF: AMMAN 4296

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

1. MEETING THIS MORNING WITH ABDUL MUNIM RIFAI DEVELOPED FURTHER BACKGROUND ON WHY GOJ IS SEEKING WRITTEN STATEMENT FROM USG. RIFAI IS DEEPLY WORRIED THAT FORCES WORKING FOR PEACE ARE LOSING GROUND.

2. RIFAI SAID THAT IN HIS OWN APRIL 8 MEETING WITH JARRING HE ASKED WHETHER JARRING IN MEETING WITH MAHMOUD RIAD EARLIER THAT DAY HAD INFORMED RIAD OF ISRAELI "ACCEPTANCE" OF JARRING'S MARCH 10 PROPOSAL. JARRING SAID NO AND, WHEN RIFAI PRESSED HIM TO DO SO, AGREED TO TELEPHONE RIAD FROM OFFICE WHERE JARRING AND RIFAI WERE MEETING. MAHMOUD WAS OUT OF HIS OFFICE AND JARRING SPOKE WITH MAHAMMAD RIAD,

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4302A ~~SECRET~~
TELLING HIM THAT BECAUSE RIFAI REQUESTED IT, HE WISHED MAHMOUD TO BE INFORMED OF ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE. MAHMOUD, JARRING ADDED, SHOULD ALSO BE TOLD THAT HE, JARRING, FELT ISRAELI "ACCEPTANCE" DID NOT REALLY CONSISTITUTE

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By 7/11/11 NARA, Date 10/11/11



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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04302 101813Z

AGREEMENT TO IMPLEMENT RESOLUTION.

3° JARRING REITERATED TO RIFAI AND RIAD IN THEIR SEPARATE MEETINGS APRIL 8 HIS EARLIER OPINION THAT ISRAELIS DO NOT CONSIDER THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION TO BE A DOCUMENT FOR IMPLEMENTATION BUT RATHER AN AGENDA FOR DISCUSSIONS. HE ADDED ISRAELIS MAY OR MAY NOT ACCEPT INDIVIDUAL PRINCIPLES OF RESOLUTION. RIFAI THEREUPON COMMENTED TO ME THAT THIS IS THE PRINCIPAL REASON DOUBT CONTINUES TO NAG JORDANIAN AND UAR LEADERS. THEY SUSPECT STRONGLY ISRAEL WANTS NOT ONLY TO AVOID IMPLEMENTING THE UNPALATABLE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL BUT ALSO TO DISCUSS "THINGS OTHER THAN THE PRINCIPLES OF THE RESOLUTION." I OBSERVED IT WAS JARRING'S JOB TO KEEP BOTH SIDES FROM THROWING IN THE KITCHEN SINK.

4° RIFAI REITERATED THAT SOLE REASON HE NEEDS WRITTEN STATEMENT FROM US IS TO ENCOURAGE CAIRO TO JOIN JORDAN

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 4302A ~~SECRET~~
N NEW YORK DISCUSSIONS. THIS DOCUMENT WOULD BE KEPT IN CONFIDENCE BUT MIGHT BE PUBLISHED IF NEEDED TO RESOLVE ANY SUBSEQUENT CONFLICT OF ARAB-ISRAELI VIEWS IN IMPLEMENTATION

OF RESOLUTION." SUCH PUBLICATION COULD OCCUR IF CASE IS RETURNED TO SC; AT SUCH TIME IT WOULD BE PUBLISHED IN CONJUNCTION WITH JARRING'S MARCH 10 PROPOSAL. (COMMENT: RIFAI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IF PARTIES AGREE TO MEET IN NEW YORK JARRING'S PROPOSAL MIGHT WELL BE PUBLISHED ON ITS OWN AS PART OF HIS REPORT TO U THANT.)

5° I SAID TO RIFAI THAT THE WAY HE HAD REPORTED TO ME LAST NIGHT JARRING'S SUGGESTION THAT USG FURNISH A WRITTEN ASSURANCE OF ISRAELI INTENTIONS SUGGESTED THAT JARRING MIGHT BE PIQUED WITH USG FOR MEDDLING IN JARRING'S MISSION. RIFAI SAID, ON THE CONTRARY, HE HAD TOLD JARRING SOMETIME AGO THAT HE WAS FURNISHING ME WITH FULL ACCOUNTS OF JORDAN'S CONTACTS WITH JARRING BECAUSE IT WAS FELT VITAL THAT USG HAVE AS FULL PICTURE AS POSSIBLE. HE SAID THAT JARRING HAD WELCOMED THIS

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 04302 101813Z

AS PROSPECT OF USG SUPPORT FOR HIS MISSION.

6. I ASKED AGAIN IF USG AGREED TO PROVIDE WRITTEN

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 4302A ~~SECRET~~

STATEMENT SATISFACTORY TO JORDAN WHETHER JORDAN COULD GUARANTEE THAT CAIRO WILL GO TO NEW YORK. RIFAI ANSWERED CATEGORICALLY IN AFFIRMATIVE.

7. RIFAI STRESSED HE WAS NOT TRYING TO PUT A NEW STUMBLING BLOCK IN WAY OF GETTING DISCUSSIONS STARTED HE SAW OUR WRITTEN STATEMENT AS OFFERING THE ONLY CONCEIVABLE WAY TO CONVINCING THE UAR TO COME ALONG TO NEW YORK, ADDING THAT JORDAN HAD TO HAVE UAR IN ATTENDANCE TO ENABLE JORDAN TO START TALKS WITH ISRAELIS. HE THEN SAID THAT HIS MEETINGS IN CAIRO, SUBSEQUENT TO HUSSEIN'S DEPARTURE HAD BEEN DEEPLY DISTURBING. HE HAD SEEN NOT ONLY SEVERAL CABINET MINISTERS AND AMBASSADORS BUT HAD RECEIVED VISITS FROM WHAT HE DESCRIBED, WITH PURPOSEFUL VAGUENESS, AS "REPRESENTATIVES OF ARAB NATIONAL FORCES." LATTER REPS SAID THEY WERE AWARE OF INTEREST IN SOME CIRCLES IN SPONSORING ARAB-ISRAELI MEETINGS AND THEY HAD COME TOWARD HIM ABOUT GRAVE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH AN IDEA. RIFAI SAID HE FELT MORE KEENLY THAN EVER THAT "FORCES ARE AT WORK IN THE ARAB WORLD WHICH WILL DRIVE MATTERS TOWARDS ANOTHER CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL." HE MADE

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 4302A ~~SECRET~~

CLEAR HE WAS NOT REFERRING TO FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY AND COMMENTED THAT ISRAEL WAS EXAGGERATING SUCH ACTIVITY OUT OF ALL PROPORTION. ANY FURTHER DELAYS IN GETTING TALKS STARTED RIFAI SAID COULD MEAN THAT JORDAN'S PEACE MOVES WOULD BE OVERPOWERED BY THOSE ADVOCATING MILITARY ASSISTANCE. HE SAID "I FEEL I AM RACING WITH TIME."

8. RIFAI SAID HE AND RIAD UNDERSTOOD FROM JARRING THAT, IN HIS APRIL 11 TALKS WITH ISRAELIS, JARRING WOULD TAKE LINE THAT HE HAD SECURED POSITIVE MOVEMENT FROM CAIRO

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PAGE 04 AMMAN 04302 101813Z

AND AMMAN IN TERMS THEIR WILLINGNESS PROCEED NEW YORK FOR DISCUSSIONS. JARRING SAID HE INTENDED TO ASK ISRAELIS TO GIVE HIM IN RETURN FURTHER STATEMENT ON ISRAELI READINESS TO IMPLEMENT THE NOVEMBER 22 RESOLUTION.

9. RIFAI DISPATCHED MESSAGE TO JARRING THIS MORNING ASKING THAT HE ADVANCE HIS SCHEDULED ARRIVAL IN AMMAN FROM TUESDAY, APRIL 16 TO FRIDAY APRIL 12.

10. RECOMMENDATION: UNLESS ISRAELIS HAVE SOMETHING TO OFFER IN CONTACTS WITH JARRING TOMORROW WHICH WILL BE CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO CAIRO OF THEIR "READINESS TO IMPLEMENT" THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION, I URGE THAT WE SUPPLY

PAGE 6 RUQMKG 4302A ~~SECRET~~

JORDAN WITH BRIEF WRITTEN STATEMENT INDICATING IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF JARRING'S MARCH 10 PROPOSAL INVOLVES GOI AGREEMENT TO IMPLEMENT THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION. HOPES FOR CONTINUANCE OF THE JARRING MISSION HANG ON VERY SLENDER THREAD. IF OUR STATEMENT WILL BE ENOUGH TO COAX UAR TO MEET WITH JORDAN AND ISRAEL UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES THE COST WILL BE CHEAP. ALTERNATIVE AS I SEE IT IS IMMINENT COLLAPSE OF MISSION BECAUSE I AM NOT SANGUINE THAT KING WILL FEEL HE CAN COME TO BILATERAL TALKS WITH ISRAELIS EVEN UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES.

11. RIFAI IS SEEING HUSSEIN AGAIN THIS AFTERNOON. I AM TO SEE HIM AFTER THIS MEETING AND EXPECT HE WILL COME UP WITH SOME FIRM PROPOSALS ON KIND OF STATEMENT JORDAN WOULD LIKE US TO MAKE.

GP-1. SYMMES

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~~SECRET~~ 019

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04300 101021Z

12
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

O R 100950Z APR 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5214
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 211
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA 633
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 262

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4300

EXDIS

REF: STATE 144267 NOTAL

SUBJECT: ARMS FOR JORDAN

1. WE UNDERSTAND BUT REGRET POSITION TAKEN IN REFTEL. WE BELIEVE THIS IS CERTAINLY A CASE IN WHICH OUR BEST TACTICS WOULD BE TO STALL. STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT IF AMB MEYER AND EDEPT HAVE NOT ALREADY TAKEN ACTION TO INFORM IRANIAN OFFICIALS OF THIS POSITION, WE WITHHOLD INFORMING IRANIANS INDEFINITELY WHILE WE ENDEAVOR COME UP WITH SOME WAY EITHER TO AGREE TO MEET JORDAN'S NEEDS AT A LATER DATE OR TO FIND SOME ACCEPTABLE WAY TO EXPLAIN OUR DECISION DIRECTLY TO THE JORDANIANS.

2. WITH REFERENCE TO AMMAN 4236, ALSO RECOMMEND DEPT WITHHOLD

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4300A ~~SECRET~~
COMMUNICATING ANY SIMILAR POSITION TO TURKS OR SAUDI ARABIANS.

3. MEANWHILE, REQUEST DEPT DETERMINE IF THERE ANY POSSIBILITY TURKS HAVE ANY EQUIPMENT NOT SUBJECT TO US CONTROLS OR TYPE MENTIONED IN STATE 144267.

SYMMES

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

NLJ-S 08001

By: cg/ll, NARA, Date: 10/14/01

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SECRET 048

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04296 101034Z

14
ACTION SS 30

2

INFO SSD 00 NSCE 00 CCO 00 /030 W

O 100810Z APR 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5210
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1495
USMISSION USUN 852
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4296
CORRECTED COPY
EXDIS

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION

1. KING HUSSEIN SUMMONED ME LAST NIGHT TO MEET WITH HIM URGENTLY IN THE PRIMIN'S OFFICE. HE HAD WITH HIM CROWN PRINCE HASSAN, PRIMIN TALHOUNI, ABD AL-MONEIM AL RIFAI AND ZAYD AL-RIFAI. ABD AL MONEIM HAD NOT LONG BEFORE RETURNED FROM CAIRO AND THEY HAD BEEN DISCUSSING HIS TALKS WITH MAHMOUD RIAD AND JARRING.

2. THE KING WITH INTERJECTIONS FROM ABD AL-MONEIM EXPLAINED A NEW SNAG THAT HAD DEVELOPED IN THE JARRING EXERCISE AS A RESULT OF THE TALKS IN CAIRO ON THE EIGHTH. AS A RESULT OF THE TALKS ABD AL-MONEIM HAD WITH RIAD AND JARRING, JORDAN

PAGE 2 RUGMKG 4296A ~~SECRET~~

WASNOWREQUESTING THE USG TO STATE TO THE GOJ IN WRITING THAT IT IS THE USG UNDERSTANDING THAT ISRAEL, IN SAYING THAT IT ACCEPTS THE NOV 22, 1967 AND JARRING'S MARCH 10 PROPSAL, MEANS THAT IT ALSO ACCEPTS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION. IF THIS COULD BE DONE, THEN JORDANIAN AND EGYPTIAN REPRESENTATIVES WOULD BE IN NEW YORK IN A MATTER OF FEW DAYS.

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Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, #142

By *h* NARA, Date 9-19-01



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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04296 101034Z

READY TO TALK UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES. AFTER THE TALKS STARTED, JORDAN WOULD BE READY "TO MOVE VERY FAR, VERY FAST" REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE UAR MIGHT DO. BUT JORDAN HAD TO HAVE THE UAR WITH IT IN ORDER TO GET STARTED IN TALKS. WITH THE REQUESTED WRITTEN ASSURANCE FROM THE US, JORDAN COULD GET THE UAR TO TALKS IN NEW YORK. THE US STATEMENT WOULD BE CONSIDERED AS AN ASSURANCE, NOT AS A COMMITMENT, THE KING SAID.

3. I RESPONDED THAT WE HAD ALREADY BEEN ASSURED JARRING HAD BEEN INFORMED OFFICIALLY BY ISRAEL THAT IT ACCEPTED HIS MARCH 10 PROPOSAL. WHY SHOULD ANYTHING ELSE BE NEEDED AND WHY, IN PARTICULAR, SHOULD IT BE REQUIRED OF US? I DID NOT SEE HOW JARRING'S PROPOSAL COULD BE MODIFIED WITHOUT RAISING FURTHER QUESTIONS AND SUSPICIONS IN EVERYONE'S MIND. TO US JARRING'S PROPOSAL, LIKE THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION, MEANT WHAT

PAGE 3 RUGMKG 4296A ~~SECRET~~

IT SAID, NOTHING MORE AND NOTHING LESS. ISRAEL HAD PROVIDED US WITH THE WORDING OF ITS WRITTEN TELEGRAM TO JARRING REITERATING ACCEPTANCE OF HIS PROPOSAL.

4. ABD AL-MONEIM THEN EXPLAINED THE GENESIS OF THE JORDANIAN REQUEST AS FOLLOWS: AFTER A LOT OF JOCKEYING AROUND ON THE EIGHTH ABOUT WHAT WOULD BE SAID TO JARRING AND WHETHER JORDAN AND THE UAR WOULD MEET HIM SEPARATELY OR TOGETHER, IT WAS DECIDED RIAD WOULD SEE HIM FIRST ALONE. RIAD WAS TO SAY THAT JORDAN HAD ACCEPTED HIS MARCH 10 PROPOSAL AND WAS READY TO MEET WITH HIM. JARRING HAD RESPONDED TO RIAD AND LATER TO RIFAI "THAT'S FINE, BUT ISRAEL HAS NOT ACCEPTED THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION."

5. I EXPRESSED INCREDULITY THAT JARRING HAD SAID THIS. IN THE COURSE OF FURTHER DISCUSSION, HOWEVER, IT CAME OUT THAT BOTH RIAD AND RIFAI HAD BEEN TOLD BY JARRING THAT HE DID NOT CONSIDER THAT ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF HIS MARCH 10 PROPOSAL OR THE ISRAELI TELEGRAM MEANT THAT THEY WILL IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTION.

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 04296 101034Z

6. I OF COURSE WENT OVER ALL OF THE OLD GROUND MAKING ESPECIALLY THE FOLLOWING POINTS: (1) THE RESOLUTION IS

PAGE 4 RUGMKG 4296A ~~SECRET~~

NOT SELF-IMPLEMENTING (2) TO ACCEPT THE RESOLUTION IS TO ACCEPT THE IDEA OF ITS FULFILLMENT (3) THE RESOLUTION IS A PACKAGE (4) TALKS BETWEEN THE PARTIES, BUT NOT NECESSARILY DIRECT TALKS, ARE UNDERSTOOD TO BE REQUIRED, (5) SOME KIND OF SECURE AND PERMANENT ARRANGEMENTS, BUT NOT NECESSARILY A FORMAL PEACE TREATY, ARE FORESEEN IN IMPLEMENTING THE RESOLUTION (6) THE ONLY TRUE TEST OF THE INTENTIONS OF THE OTHER SIDE IS TO SIT DOWN AND START TRYING "TO DEVISE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION." I SAID IT WAS JARRING'S JOB TO GET ACCEPTANCE OF DIFFERENT WORDS IF HE AND THE PARTIES FELT THAT OTHER WORDS WERE NECESSARY. I PERSONALLY THOUGHT A GREAT DEAL OF TIME HAD ALREADY BEEN WASTED IN DEBATING THE MEANING OF WORDS ABOUT "ACCEPTANCE." IF NOW WE TOLD ISRAEL WE WERE ASSUMING THE ARABS AND ISRAEL HAD AGREED TO IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTION, ISRAEL WOULD HAVE EVERY RIGHT TO ASK US WHAT THE ARABS MEANT BY MOVING AWAY FROM JARRING'S MARCH 10 PROPOSAL. WE HAD HEARD ENOUGH ABOUT THESE FORMS OF WORDS TO KNOW EACH SIDE SEEMED TO FIND SOME SPECIAL MAGIC IN THEM. IF THE JORDANIAN-UAR IDEA IS TO PLAY LEGAL OR SEMANTIC TRICKS ON ISRAEL I SAW NO HOPE FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. I DID NOT SEE

PAGE 5 RUGMKG 4296A ~~SECRET~~

IN ANY CASE WHY MY GOVT SHOULD HAVE TO SPEAK FOR ISRAEL IN THIS WAY. WE VERY MUCH WANTED A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT BUT WE COULD NOT LEND OURSELVES TO DECEIVING EITHER SIDE. IF WE SAID "ISRAEL AGREES TO IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTION" IT WOULD MEAN NO MORE AND NO LESS THAN WHAT THE JARRING MARCH 10 PROPOSAL SAYS.

7. WE WENT OVER AND OVER THIS GROUND. THE KING EMPHASIZED THERE WAS NO INTENTION OF MISLEADING ANY ONE. JORDANI SIMPLY HAS TO HAVE THE UAR WITH IT TO BEGIN TALKS. THE REQUESTED

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PAGE 04 AMMAN 04296 101034Z

ASSURANCE (NOT A COMMITMENT, HE STRESSED SEVERAL TIMES), FROM US WOULD ENABLE JORDAN TO ET THE UAR TO NEW YORK. FROM THEN ON THERE WOULD BE CLEAR SAILING. THERE WOULD BE NO NEED FOR A REPORT OR STATEMENT OR ANYTHING ELSE FROM JARRING.

8. I PRESSED ABD AL-MONEIM ON WHY JARRING'S PROPOSAL WA NOT SUFFICIENT. HE REITERATED THAT JARRING HAD SAID HE CANNOT GUARANTEE THAT ISRAEL WILL IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTION AND THAT HE, JARRING, DOES NOT BELIEVE THEY WILL. JARRING HAD SAID THIS TO RIAD. WHEN JARRING SAID THE SAME THING TO RIFAI, THE LATTER HAD SAID THE U.S. EMBASSY ASSURES US ISRAEL ACCEPTS YOUR PROPOSAL AND WILL PROCEED TO AGREE ON ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

PAGE 6 RUQMG 4296A ~~SECRET~~

JARRING HAD SAID IN EFFECT: " I DON'T BELIEVE IT. GET IT FROM THAT EMBASSY IN WRITING." IT WAS LARGELY FOR THIS REASON THAT JORDAN NOW NEEDED A STATEMENT FROM THE USG IN WRITING-- A STATEMENT IT COULD SHOW TO RIAD.

9. SEVERAL VARIATIONS OF A POSSIBLE USG WRITTEN STATEMENT WERE PUT FORWARD, BUT I DID NOT GET A CLEAR STATEMENT OF WHAT WOULD SATISFY THE JORDANIANS OR THE UAR.

10. HUSSEIN ASURED ME SEVERAL TIMES THAT JORDAN IS EAGER TO MEET IN NEW YORK AND TO REACH AGREEMENT. IF THIS UMBRELLA CAN BE PROVIDED TO GET UAR TO NYC, JORDAN WILL MOVE AHEAD RAPIDLY.

11. COMMENT: FOREGOING IS PRELIMINARY REPORT. I AM SEEING RIFAI AGAIN IN A FEW MINUTES AND MAY ASK TO SEE HUSSEIN LATER. WILL MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS FOLLOWING THESE MEETINGS.

12. ONLY EXPLANATION FOR THIS BIZARRE PERFORMANCE THAT OCCURS TO US IS THAT JARRING MUST HAVE BELIEVED THAT ISRAEL'S RETRACTION OF ITS ACCEPTANCE AS REPORTED IN STATE 143647 AND 143619 HAD AGAIN PULLED THE RUG FROM UNDER HIM.

GP-1. SYMMES

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~~SECRET~~ 969

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04290 091735Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P 091600Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5207
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1492
USMISSION USUN NY 849

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4290

EXDIS

REF: TEL AVIV 3242, AMMAN 4252

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

DEPT PASS CAIRO

1. ABDUL MUNIM RIFAI, WHO REMAINED BEHIND IN CAIRO FOLLOWING HUSSEIN'S DEPARTURE APRIL 7, WILL RETURN AMMAN THIS EVENING. I HAVE LEFT MESSAGE WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY THAT I WANT TO SEE RIFAI AS SOON AS CONVENIENT. I WILL THEN BE ABLE REPORT ON RIFAI'S SESSION WITH JARRING, WHICH ACCORDING LOCAL PRESS TOOK PLACE APR 8, AND RIFAI'S FURTHER MEETINGS WITH MAHMOUD RIAD.

2. WITH RESPECT TO TEL AVIV 3242, WOULD NOTE THAT OUR REFERRAL IN AMMAN 4252 TO TALKS IN NEW YORK BEING

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4290A ~~SECRET~~

"LOW KEY" WAS INTENDED TO DESCRIBE NASSER'S DESIRE FOR MINIMAL PUBLICITY AS TALKS GET UNDERWAY, NOT TO INDICATE SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS WOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED. NEW YORK IS NASSER'S PREFERRED VENUE FOR TALKS BECAUSE HE BELIEVES, AS DO JORDANIANS, THAT ARAB-ISRAELI NEGOTIATORS IN THAT CITY WILL BE MUCH LESS CONSPICUOUS THAN IN ANY OTHER SPOT.

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04290 091735Z

3. AS FAR AS WE ARE AWARE, NASSER DID NOT ATTACH ANY NEW RESTRICTIONS TO TALKS IN NEW YORK; SPECIFICALLY, NOTHING WAS SAID TO KING THAT TALKS MUST BE "SEPARATE" (TEL AVIV REFTEL PARA 1). MOREOVER, OUR UNDERSTANDING FROM KING IS THAT EVEN IF TALKS START IN NEW YORK THIS DOES NOT PRECLUDE JARRING'S SUBSEQUENTLY MOVING THEM TO ANY OTHER CENTER. WE SHARE SOME OF AMB BARBOUR'S DISCOURAGEMENT BUT ON OTHER HAND BELIEVE THAT FOR NASSER TO AGREE TO SEND REPS TO NEW YORK OR ANY OTHER CITY REPRESENTS REAL PROGRESS AND KEEPS THE MISSION ALIVE.

4. MORE IMPORTANTLY, IN MAKING CONCESSION TO MEET WITH ISRAELIS UNDER JARRING AUSPICES, JORDAN AND UAR SEE THEMSELVES AS TAKING LEAP INTO OUTER DARKNESS BECAUSE

PAGE 3 RUQMG 4290A ~~SECRET~~

THEY DO NOT YET KNOW WHAT THE ISRAELI DEMANDS ARE GOING TO BE. THEIR DESIRE THAT THE FIRST STAGE OF THOSE NEGOTIATIONS BE AS LOW KEY, I.E. INCONSPICUOUS, AS POSSIBLE IS OBVIOUSLY INTENDED TO PROTECT THEIR FLANKS FROM CRITICS IN CAIRO AND AMMAN WHO OPPOSE ANY FORM OF DISCUSSIONS AND WHO STAND TO BENEFIT FROM A COLLAPSE OF THE TALKS. THESE CRITICS, IN ASSERTING THAT ISRAEL IS DISINTERESTED IN PEACE WERE ABLE UNTIL LAST WEEK TO ARGUE CONVINCINGLY THAT JERUSALEM'S REFUSAL TO "ACCEPT" THE NOVEMBER 22 RESOLUTION PROVED THEIR CASE.

5. IT WAS OBVIOUS FROM START OF HUSSEIN-NASSER TALKS THAT UAR HAD SOME SERIOUS MISCONCEPTIONS RE ISRAELI AND US INTENTIONS REGARDING JARRING MISSION. ONE BENEFIT OF THESE TALKS WAS THE KING WAS APPARENTLY ABLE TO PRESENT NASSER WITH FAR CLEARER PICTURE OF US INTENTIONS IN THIS WHOLE MATTER THAN NASSER HAS BEEN GETTING FROM HIS IMMEDIATE ADVISORS. IF HUSSEIN DID NOT CONVERT NASSER, HE DID FROM HIS ACCOUNT TO US APPARENTLY SUCCEED IN PERSUADING HIM THAT US IS

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 04290 091735Z

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 4290A ~~SECRET~~
INTERESTED IN HELPING ARRANGE AN HONORABLE PEACE
AND THAT OUR EFFORTS TO BRING PARTIES TOGETHER AS SOON
AS POSSIBLE ARE A SINCERE ATTEMPT TO TAKE FIRST STEP
TOWARD ACHIEVING SUCH PEACE. HE ALSO APPEARS TO HAVE
BROUGHT HOME TO NASSER THAT THE ALTERNATIVE TO PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT NOW IS NOT WAR LATER BUT PERHAPS WAR NOW--AND
NASSER IS NOT READY.

6. WE THINK IT IN US INTEREST THAT EFFORTS BE
CONTINUED TO MANEUVER THE PARTIES INTO TALKS ON THE
ISSUES AND THE SOONER THE BETTER. BOTH ARABS AND
ISRAELIS COULD BE DEPICTED AS SEEKING TO STALL FOR
SINISTER PURPOSES. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT HUSSEIN'S
ONLY OPTION IN FACT IS TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS ON HIS
OWN ON BASIS JARRING MARCH 10 FORMULATION. IN ANY
EVENT IF HUSSEIN CAN BRING UAR ALONG WITH HIM TO
NEW YORK THIS WILL PROVIDE KING WITH UMBRELLA FOR
NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HE HAS BEEN SEARCHING FOR EVER
SINCE JUNE WAR. AS LONG AS HE HAS ANY GROUNDS TO
HOPE THAT UAR CAN BE EDGED INTO TALKS ALONG WITH HIM,
HE MUST PURSUE THAT COURSE. SO SHOULD WE. WE

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 4290A ~~SECRET~~
THEREFORE HOPE USG CAN BRING ISRAELIS ALONG ON THIS
ISSUE. THEY SHARE BLAME FOR PRESENT LOW STATE OF
JARRING MISSION BECAUSE OF THEIR FAILURE COME FORWARD
IN EARLY STAGES TO "ACCEPT" THE RESOLUTION. I THINK
THEY NOW OWE US ANOTHER STEP OR TWO TO MEET JORDAN
AND THE UAR.

GP-1. SYMMES

~~SECRET~~



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~~SECRET~~ 314

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04270 090718Z

14
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

2

R 090600Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5196
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1488
AMEMBASSY LONDON 0817
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1594

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4270

EXDIS

SUBJ: ISRAELI INDEPENDENCE DAY PARADE

1. DURING MEETING APR 5 WITH MINSTATE FOR FONAFFS RIFAI AND MIN NATL ECONOMY HATEM ZU'BI, ZU'BI STATED HE HAD BEEN HEARING VARIOUS NEWS REPORTS ON ISRAELI PLANNING FOR MAY 2 INDEPENDENCE DAY PARADE TO BE HELD IN JERUSALEM HE SAID IF THIS PARADE IS STAGED AS CURRENTLY PLANNED THROUGH THE OLD CITY IT WOULD HAVE EXTREMELY BAD REPERCUSSIONS IN ARAB

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4270A ~~SECRET~~
WORLD. RIFAI STRONGLY SECONDED ZU'BI'S VIEW.

2. COMMENT: IT SEEMS TO US BOTH INAPPROPRIATE AND UNWISE THAT THIS PARADE BE HELD ALONG PLANNED ROUTE WHICH INCLUDES OCCUPIED AREA OF JERUSALEM. PREDICTABLY THIS ROUTING WILL BE HIGHLY PROVOCATIVE TO THE ARABS GENERALLY. WE RECOGNIZE ISRAELI PLANNING IS ALREADY FAR DOWN THE ROAD AND THAT WHATEVER COUNSEL WE OR OTHER FRIENDS MAY OFFER ISRAELIS WILL MEET STRONG RESISTANCE AND MAY BE UNLIKELY TO ALTER THEIR ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS PARADE. NONETHELESS, WE CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL USG TAKE PUBLIC CRITICAL POSITION.

3. WE PROPOSE A TWO-STAGE APPROACH: FIRST, ENCOURAGE U THANT TO ISSUE A STATEMENT DEPLORING ISRAELI PLANNING AS LIKELY TO

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State Guidelines Authority FR 45 Vol 44, # 140 footnote 2

By *[Signature]* NARA, Date 4-26-01

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04270 090718Z

RAISE TENSIONS IN THE AREA AND COMPLICATE EFFORTS BEING MADE FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFRONTATION. SECOND, DEPT SHOULD ISSUE STATEMENT EXPRESSING A SIMILAR POSITION. WE MIGHT TELL THE ISRAELIS PRIVATELY WE MAY HAVE TO SAY SOMETHING MORE. OUR STATEMENT MIGHT WELL GO BEYOND CITING UNCHANGING US POSITION ON THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM TO

PAGE 3 RUQMGK 4270A ~~SECRET~~
CRITICIZE ROUTING IN OCCUPIED AREA.

4. PRESUMABLY DATT WOULD WISH COORDINATE WITH UK AND OTHER INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS. SYMMES
GP-3

~~SECRET~~



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TELEGRAM
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~~SECRET~~ 306

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04268 090712Z

14
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 090559Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5194
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1487
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1593
USUN 0848

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4268

EXDIS: NOFORN

SUBJ: ISRAEL-JORDAN: WEST BANK ATTITUDES

ZAID RIFAI ON APRIL 8 ADVISED ME THAT HIKMAT AL-MASRI HAD JUST ARRIVED FROM THE WEST BANK AND IN MEETING WITH THE KING HAD MADE CERTAIN POINTS AND GIVEN CERTAIN ADVICE REGARDING WEST BANK SITUATION AND JORDAN-ISRAEL RELATIONS. AL-MASRI URGED THE KING TO DO EVERYTHING HE COULD TO STOP THE FEDAYEEN RAIDS SINCE THEY WERE ACCOMPLISHING NOTHING EXCEPT TO PROVIDE

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4268A ~~SECRET~~

THE ISRAELIS AN EXCUSE TO RETALIATE AGAINST THE EAST BANK AND ENGAGE IN REPRISALS AGAINST WEST BANK INHABITANTS. AL-MASRI SAID THAT IF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WAS NOT ACHIEVED IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, THE ISRAELIS WOULD MOST CERTAINLY OPT FOR A MILITARY SOLUTION. WITH CONTINUANCE OF FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY, INCREASING MILITANCY OF ISRAELIS AND DIMINISHING CHANCE FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION, WEST BANKERS WERE IN DANGER OF LOSING ALL THEIR REMAINING HOPE. IN DESPERATION THEY WOULD PROBABLY BE INCREASINGLY INCLINED TO MAKE A SEPARATE DEAL WITH ISRAEL.
GP-3 SYMMES

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 05-95
By isl NARA, Date 1-31-06

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~~SECRET~~ 216

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47
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

O P 081214Z APR 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5180
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1482
USUN 0843

2

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 4252

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CIARO

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

REF: (453067#8.) 13214

1. SUMMARY: KING HUSSEIN CALLED ME AND EMBOFF
TO PALCE EVENING SEVENTH FOR BRIEFING ON JARRING
TALKS WITH
NASSER. ONLY AFTER SEVERAL HOURS OF DIFFICULT DISCUSSION
HAD BE OBTAINED NASSER'S AGREEMENT EVEN TO CONSIDER
ACCEPTING THE JARRING PROPOSAL. CATCH NOW IS THAT

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4252/1A ~~SECRET~~
NASSER INSISTS JARRING MUST COME UP WITH SOME ALTERNATE
PHRASEOLOGY TO SUBSTITUTE FOR " I HAVE INVITED THE TWO
GOVTS TO MEET WITH ME FOR CONFERENCES" ON MARCH 10
PROPOSAL. JORDAN AND UAR THEREFORE WILL TRY TO GET
JARRING TO DEVELOP HIS OWN PROPOSAL ALONG LINES " I PLAN
TO MEET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OR DELEGATES OF THE PARTIES
IN NEW YORK". NASSER IS ADAMANT THAT MEETINGS CAN BE
HELD ONLY IN NEW YORK AND MUST BE LOWEST KEY POSSIBLE.
ABDUL MUNIM RIFAI STAYED BEHIND IN CAIRO TO JOIN WITH
UAR FONMIN RIAD IN MEETING WITH JARRING ON EIGHTH.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, #136

By *[Signature]* NARA, Date 4-19-01

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2. KING SAID HIS APRIL 6-7 MEETINGS WITH NASSER HAD BEEN LONGEST AND MOST ARDUOUS HE HAD EVER HAD WITH ANY LEADER. JORDANIANS HAD EXPECTED SOME DIFFICULTIES IN THESE DISCUSSIONS BUT WERE STUNNED BY NASSER'S OPENING POSITION WHICH WAS TOTALLY NEGATIVE TO CONCEPT OF ANY PEACEFUL SOLUTION. AS FAR AS JORDANIANS COULD SEE THIS POSITION WAS SHARED BY ALL OF NASSER'S ADVISORS. NASSER HAD BEGUN BY SAYING FLATLY THAT JARRING MISSION COULD NOT SUCCEED, THAT ONLY MILITAR SOLUTION WAS FEASIBLE

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 4252/1A ~~SECRET~~

AND THAT UAR MILITARY WAS THEREFORE PREPARING FOR THAT SOLUTION. NASSER REPEATEDLY SAID EGYPTIAN PEOPLE WOULD NOT STAND FOR THE HUMILIATION OF DEALING WITH ISRAELIS THROUGH JARRING IN TERMS OF LATTER'S PRESENT PROPOSAL. NASSER IN FACT CONSIDERED JARRING'S PRESENT FORMULA AS " AN AMERICAN TRICK". HE INDICATED TO THE KING A GREATER MISTRUST OF US POLICY THAN EVER AND STRESSED HE IS UNWILLING TO RESUME DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE US. ACCORDING TO NASSER HE HAD JUST TURNED DOWN OPPORTUNITY TO RESTORE RELATIONS AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO.

3. NASSER TOLD HUSSEIN THAT SIX OTHER ARAB STATES HAVE STATED TO HIM THEY HAVE NOT ACCEPTED THE SC RESOLUTION AND OPPOSE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THE SIX ARE ALGERIA, SYRIA, SUDAN, KUWAIT, SOUTH YEMEN AND SAUDI ARABIA. NASSER SAID FAISAL THROUGH OMAR SAQQAFI HAD JUST URGED HIM TO AGREE TO ANNOUNCE FIALURE OF THE JARRING MISSION. HUSSEIN OBSERVED PARENTHETICALLY TO ME " YOUR FRIEND FAISAL IS MORE OPPOSED THAN ANYONE

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 4252/1A ~~SECRET~~
TO PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT".

4. KING PROBED NASSER FOR INDICATION TO WHEN UAR WOULD BE READY TO TAKE ISRAEL IN MILITARILY, IF NASSER SERIOUSLY MEANT THAT THE MILITARY ALTERNATIVE

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 04252 01 OF 02 081343Z

WAS THE ONLY ONE AVAILABLE TO THE ARABS. NASSER SAID HE WOULD BE READY " BEFORE EIGHTEEN MONTHS HAD LAPSED". KING THEN COUNTERED WITH QUESTION HOW UAR PROPOSED TO HELP JORDAN MILITARILY SINCE ISRAEL ATTACKS ON JORDAN ARE OCCURRING RIGHT NOW. NASSER REPLIED UNFORTUNATELY HE WAS IN NO POSITION TO GIVE ANY HELP. JORDANIANS THEREUPON REMINDED NASSER HE HAD TOLD THEM HE FELT PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR LOSS OF WEST BANK AND WAS PREPARED TO DO ANYTHING POSSIBLE TO HELP KING RECOVER HIS LOST TERRITORY. KING PRESSED THIS POINT HOME WITH COMMENT " NOW YOU SAY NO POLITICAL SOLUTION AND YET YOU CANNOT HELP US MILITARILY". KING SAID HE POINTED OUT TO NASSER THAT WHETHER UAR LIKE IT OR NOT JORDAN DID NOT INTEND TO CONTINUE TO BEAR ALONE THE BRUNT OF ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACKS AND WOULD CALL FOR ASSISTANCE OTHER

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 4252/1Z ~~SECRET~~

ARAB STATES, SPECIFICALLY UAR. THUS, KING CONTINUED, UAR WOULD BECOME INVOLVED MILITARILY AGAINST ISRAEL BUT ONCE AGAIN IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE ISRAELIS WOULD BE DICTATING THE TIME AND PLACE. THIS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY MEAN ANOTHER DISASTROUS DEFEAT FOR THE ARABS. KING OBSERVED HE THOUGHT THIS STAGE IN DISCUSSION HAD BEEN TURNING POINT IN HIS EFFORTS TO GET NASSER TO CONSIDER ACCEPTING JARRING PROPOSAL. THE TWO DELEGATIONS THEREUPON SETTLED DOWN TO REVIEW JARRING'S FORMULA.

5. TO JORDANIANS' SURPRISE NASSER PASSED OVER THE " TO DEVISE ARRANGEMENTS" PHRASE WITHOUT HESITATION. THIS WAS POINT ON WHICH GOJ HAD EXPECTED MOST TROUBLE. KING SAID HE HAD RESERVED AS HIS FALLBACK POSITION INSERTION OF PHRASEOLOGY " READINESS TO IMPELEMENT" BUT FOUND THIS WAS UNNECESSARY. NASSER BALKED ONLY AT THE PENULTIMATE SENTENCE OF JARRING'S FORMULA AND STATED THAT CALL FOR MEETINGS IN WAY JARRING PROPOSED WAS " IMPOSSIBLE".

6. JORDANIANS' FIRST THOUGHT WAS THAT THEY MUST THEN

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 AMMAN 04252 01 OF 02 081343Z

PAGE 6 RUQMGK 4252/1A ~~SECRET~~

BEGIN ALL OVER AGAIN WITH THEIR ARGUMENTATION. THEY POINTED OUT THAT THE MEETING WITH ISRAELIS UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES WAS WHOLE OBJECT OF EXERCISE. NASSER COUNTERED WITH STATEMENT IF HE ACCEPTED JARRING'S " I HAVE INVITED THE TWO GOVTS TO MEET WITH ME FOR CONFERENCES". THERE WOULD BE A " REVOLUTION IN EGYPT TOMMORROW". NASSER STATED THAT CYPRUS AS MEETING PLACE WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION. JORDANIANS THEN SUGGESTED POSSIBILITY OF NEW YORK AS MEETING PLACE. NASSER WAS INTRIGUED WITH THIS IDEA AND, OVERRIDING THE OBJECTIONS OF SOME OF HIS ADVISORS, AND HE COULD ACCEPT THIS AND ADDED NEW YORK WOULD BE THE ONLY PLACE WHERE UAR COULD MEET.

7. IT WAS CLEAR TO THE JORDANISN THAT THEY HAD PUSHED NASSER AS FAR AS WAS POSSIBLE. THEY FELT AT CONCLUSION OF DISCUSSIONS NASSER WOULD STICK TO HIS POSITION EVEN OPPOSITION TO SOME OF HIS ADVISORS INCLUDING THOUGH THIS PUT HIM IN MAHMOUD RIAD WHO THROUGHOUT THE MEETINGS WAS PARTICULARLY RIGID AND OUTSPONKENLY ANTI-AMERICAN. NASSER AND HUSSEIN GP-1 SYMMES

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Department of State

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25

~~SECRET~~ 115

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04252 02 OF 02 081414Z

02

44

ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

O P 081214Z APR 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5181
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1483
USUN 0844

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 AMMAN 4252

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO

SUBJ JARRING MISSION

REF TEL AVIV 3214
AGREED THAT ABDUL MINIM RIFAI WOULD REMAIN IN CAIRO
TO MEET WITH JARRING AND MAHMUD RIAD ON MONDAY
APRIL 8. THEY WOULD EXPLAIN DIFFICULTY OF " INVITING
THE TWO GOVTS" AND WOULD URGE JARRING TO DEVELOP A
SUBSTITUTE PHRASING OF HIS OWN. NASSER INDICATED FOR

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4252/2A ~~SECRET~~

EXAMPLE THAT HE WOULD NOT OBJECT TO JARRING SAYING HE HAD
" ARRANGED TO MEET WITH REPRESENTATIVES (OR DELGATES) OF THE
PARTIES IN NEW YORK". NASSER ALSO AGREED WITH HUSSEIN THAT SUCH
MEETINGS BY NO MEANS NEED TO BE CONFINED TO PERMANENT UN
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED. WHAT HE COULD NOT
ACCEPT WAS A REFERENCE TO " GOVTS" OR " CONFERENCES".

8. HUSSEIN SAID HE WAS CONVINCED NASSER BOTH FULLY INTENDS TO
PROCEED WITH " INDIRECT TALKS" WITH JARRING AND RECOGNIZES THAT
TALKS ARE NECESSARY " TO DEVISE ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTA-
TIONS". HUSSEIN SAID AS FAR AS HE IS CONCERNED HE WILL SEND ABDUL
MUNIM
RIFAI AND OR DEPT PRIMIN AHMAD TOUQAN, TOGETHER WITH OTHER

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

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AIDES, TO TALK IN NEW YORK AND WILL BE PREPARED TO MOVE AS FAST AS POSSIBLE. JORDAN'S AL-FARRA WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE GOJ REPRESENTATIVE.

9. AFTER REVIEWING THE FOREGOING, KING HUSSEIN SAID " THIS REALLY IS OUR LAST CHANCE. YOU MUST PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS TO KEEP QUIET AND TO GO ALONG WITH WHATEVER JARRING PROPOSES IN PLACE

PAGE 3 RUQMG 4252/2A ~~SECRET~~

OF THE PRESENT INVITATION TO THE GOVTS". THE KING KEP SAYING THAT " THERE WILL BE TALKS AND THEY CAN BE BROADENED LATER IF WE CAN ONLY GET THE MEETINGS STARTED" HE ALSO SAID THAT ALTHOUGH NASSER AND HE REMAIN ADAMANT AGAINST PROCEEDING TO A FORMAL PEACE TREATY, THEY HAD DISCUSSED VARIOUS FORMULAS THROUGH WHICH PERMANENT AND SECURE GUARANTEES OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT COULD BE ESTABLISHED. THE KING RECOGNIZED THE PROBLEM OF PROPOSING CHANGES IN THE PRESENT PROPOSAL. FOR THAT REASON, RIFAI AND RIAD WOULD NOT PROPOSE ANY SPECIFIC LANGUAGE TO JARRING BUT WOULD EXPLAIN THE PROBLEM AND TRY TO STIMULATE HIM TO COME UP WITH LANGUGUAGE OF HIS OWN THAT WOULD SOLVE THE PROBLEM FOR THE ARABS AND AT THE SAME TIME BE ACCEPTABLE TO ISRAEL AS JARRING'S OWN IDEAS.

10. COMMENT: WE CONSIDER RESULTS OF HUSSEIN'S TALKS TO BE ENCOURAGING. THEY WERE NOT CONCLUSIVE IN TERMS OF GETTING FINAL AGREEMENT FROM NASSER TO JARRING'S FORMULA BUT WE BELIEVE NONETHELESS WE ARE WITHIN REACH OF GETTING TALKS STARTED. WE LEAVE TO OTHER ADDRESSES WHETHER THERE WOULD BE BENEFIT IN GIVING GOI RUN DOWN ON HUSSEIN-NASSER TALKS UNTIL IT IS:

PAGE 4 RUQMG 4252/2A ~~SECRET~~

CLEAR WHAT JARRING INTENDS TO DO NEXT. HE MAY NEED PUSHING FROM U THANT OR BUNCHE IF WE ARE TO HAVE ANY QUICK ACTION. BECAUSE OF JARRING'S LESS THAN ACTIVIST APPROACH TO HIS MISSION WE RECOGNIZE THAT PROPOSED REVISING OF PENULTIMATE SENTENCE IN HIS FORMULA MAY RISK CONSIDERABLE DELAY AND EVEN ISRAELI REJECTION.

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Department of State

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 AMMAN 04252 02 OF 02 081414Z

11. AS FAR AS JORDANIANS ARE CONCERNED, IT IS CLEAR TO US THEY ARE READY TO ASSUME ALL RISK INVOLVED IN SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS AND WILL TAKE THE LEAD IN EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF THE TALKS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

12. WE HAVE INCREASINGLY DEEP RESERVATIONS ABOUT JARRING'S ABILITY TO CARRY THROUGH THE JOB SUCCESSFULLY AND BELIEVE HE WILL NEED CAREFUL MONITORING AND PRODDING. FOR THIS REASON WE SEE POSITIVE MERIT IN MEETINGS IN NEW YORK WHICH OUTWEIGH THE OBJECTIONS USG HAS HITHERTO MAINTAINED TO THIS VENUE. IN ANY CASE, FROM WHAT HUSSEIN SAYS THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO NEW YORK. SYMMES
GP-1

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY DC/T.

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

104
29

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS Vol. XX # 136
By fy NARA, Date 9-19-01

~~SECRET~~ 387

02

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44

ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

O P 081214Z APR 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5180
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1482
USUN 0843

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 4252

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (FOR PAGE 6 PGH 7. ONLY)

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CIARO

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

REF: (453067#&.1)3214 #

1. SUMMARY: KING HUSSEIN CALLED ME AND EMBOFF TO PALACE EVENINGSEVENTH FOR BRIEFING ON JARRING TALKS WITH NASSER. ONLY AFTER SEVERAL HOURS OF DIFFICULT DISCUSSION HAD BE OBTAINED NASSER'S AGREEMENT EVEN TO CONSIDER ACCEPTING THE JARRING PROPOSAL. CATCH NOW IS THAT

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4252/1A ~~SECRET~~
NASSER INSISTS JARRING MUST COME UP WITH SOME ALTERNATE PHRASEOLOGY TO SUBSTITUTE FOR " I HAVE INVITED THE TWO GOVTS TO MEET WITH ME FOR CONFERENCES" ON MARCH 10 PROPOSAL. JORDAN AND UAR THEREFORE WILL TRY TO GET JARRING TO DEVELOP HIS OWN PROPOSAL ALONG LINES " I PLAN TO MEET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OR DELEGATES OF THE PARTIES IN NEW YORK". NASSER IS ADAMANT THAT MEETINGS CAN BE HELD ONLY IN NEW YORK AND MUST BE LOWEST KEY POSSIBLE. ABDUL MUNIM RIFAI STAYED BEHIND IN CAIRO TO JOIN WITH

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04252 01 OF 02 081648Z

UAR FONMIN RIAD IN MEETING WITH JARRING ON EIGHTH.

2. KING SAID HIS APRIL 6-7 MEETINGS WITH NASSER HAD BEEN LONGEST AND MOST ARDUOUS HE HAD EVER HAD WITH ANY LEADER. JORDANIANS HAD EXPECTED SOME DIFFICULTIES IN THESE DISCUSSIONS BUT WERE STUNNED BY NASSER'S OPENING POSITION WHICH WAS TOTALLY NEGATIVE TO CONCEPT OF ANY PEACEFUL SOLUTION. AS FAR AS JORDANIANS COULD SEE THIS POSITION WAS SHARED BY ALL OF NASSER'S ADVISORS. NASSER HAD BEGUN BY SAYING FLATLY THAT JARRING MISSION COULD NOT SUCCEED, THAT ONLY MILITAR SOLUTION WAS FEASIBLE

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 4252/1A ~~SECRET~~

AND THAT UAR MILITARY WAS THEREFORE PREPARING FOR THAT SOLUTION. NASSER REPEATEDLY SAID EGYPTIAN PEOPLE WOULD NOT STAND FOR THE HUMILIATION OF DEALING WITH ISRAELIS THROUGH JARRING IN TERMS OF LATTER'S PRESENT PROPOSAL. NASSER IN FACT CONSIDERED JARRING'S PRESENT FORMULA AS " AN AMERICAN TRICK". HE INDICATED TO THE KING A GREATER MISTRUST OF US POLICY THAN EVER AND STRESSED HE IS UNWILLING TO RESUME DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE US. ACCORDING TO NASSER HE HAD JUST TURNED DOWN OPPORTUNITY TO RETORE RELATIONS AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO.

3. NASSER TOLD HUSSEIN THAT SIX OTHER ARAB STATES HAVE STATED TO HIM THEY HAVE NOT ACCEPTED THE SC RESOLUTION AND OPPOSE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THE SIX ARE ALGERIA, SYRIA, SUDAN, KUWAIT, SOUTH YEMEN AND SAUDI ARABIA. NASSER SAID FAISAL THROUGH QMAR SAQQAFI HAD JUST URGED HIM TO AGREE TO ANNOUNCE FIALURE OF THE JARRING MISSION. HUSSEIN OBSERVED PARENTHETICALLY TO ME " YOUR FRIEND FAISAL IS MORE OPPOSED THAN ANYONE

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 4252/1A ~~SECRET~~
TO PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT".

4. KING PROBED NASSER FOR INDICATION TO WHEN UAR WOULD

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Department of State

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 04252 01 OF 02 081648Z

BE READY TO TAKE ISRAEL IN MILITARILY, IF NASSER SERIOUSLY MEANT THAT THE MILITARY ALTERNATIVE WAS THE ONLY ONE AVAILABLE TO THE ARABS. NASSER SAID HE WOULD BE READY " BEFORE EIGHTEEN MONTHS HAD LAPSED". KING THEN COUNTERED WITH QUESTION HOW UAR PROPOSED TO HELP JORDAN MILITARILY SINCE ISRAEL ATTACKS ON JORDAN ARE OCCURRING RIGHT NOW. NASSER REPLIED UNFORTUNATELY HE WAS IN NO POSITION TO GIVE ANY HELP. JORDANIANS THEREUPON REMINDED NASSER HE HAD TOLD THEM HE FELT PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR LOSS OF WEST BANK AND WAS PREPARED TO DO ANYTHING POSSIBLE TO HELP KING RECOVER HIS LOST TERRITORY. KING PRESSED THIS POINT HOME WITH COMMENT " NOW YOU SAY NO POLITICAL SOLUTION AND YET YOU CANNOT HELP US MILITARILY". KING SAID HE POINTED OUT TO NASSER THAT WHETHER UAR LIKE IT OR NOT JORDAN DID NOT INTEND TO CONTINUE TO BEAR ALONE THE BRUNT OF ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACKS AND WOULD CALL FOR ASSISTANCE OTHER

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 4252/1Z ~~SECRET~~
ARAB STATES, SPECIFICALLY UAR. THUS, KING CONTINUED, UAR WOULD BECOME INVOLVED MILITARILY AGAINST ISRAEL BUT ONCE AGAIN IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE ISRAELIS WOULD BE DICTATING THE TIME AND PLACE. THIS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY MEAN ANOTHER DISASTROUS DEFEAT FOR THE ARABS. KING OBSERVED HE THOUGHT THIS STAGE IN DISCUSSION HAD BEEN TURNING POINT IN HIS EFFORTS TO GET NASSER TO CONSIDER ACCEPTING JARRING PROPOSAL. THE TWO DELEGATIONS THEREUPON SETTLED DOWN TO REVIEW JARRING'S FORMULA.

5. TO JORDANIANS' SURPRISE NASSER PASSED OVER THE " TO DEVISE ARRANGEMENTS" PHRASE WITHOUT HESITATION. THIS WAS POINT ON WHICH GOJ HAD EXPECTED MOST TROUBLE. KING SAID HE HAD RESERVED AS HIS FALLBACK POSITION INSERTION OF PHRASEOLOGY " READINESS TO IMPELEMENT" BUT FOUND THIS WAS UNNECESSARY. NASSER BALKED ONLY AT THE PENULTIMATE SENTENCE OF JARRING'S FORMULA AND STATED THAT CALL FOR MEETINGS IN WAY JARRING PROPOSED WAS " IMPOSSIBLE".

6. JORDANIANS' FIRST THOUGHT WAS THAT THEY MUST THEN

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 AMMAN 04252 01 OF 02 081648Z



PAGE 6 RUQMKG 4252/1A ~~SECRET~~

BEGIN ALL OVER AGAIN WITH THEIR ARGUMENTATION. THEY POINTED OUT THAT THE MEETING WITH ISRAELIS UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES WAS WHOLE OBJECT OF EXERCISE. NASSER COUNTERED WITH STATEMENT IF HE ACCEPTED JARRING'S " I HAVE INVITED THE TWO GOVTS TO MEET WITH ME FOR CONFERENCES". THERE WOULD BE A " REVOLUTION IN EGYPT TOMMORROW". NASSER STATED THAT CYPRUS AS MEETING PLACE WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION. JORDANIANS THEN SUGGESTED POSSIBILITY OF NEW YORK AS MEETING PLACE. NASSER WAS INTRIGUED WITH THIS IDEA AND, OVERRIDING THE OBJECTIONS OF SOME OF HIS ADVISORS, AND HE COULD ACCEPT THIS AND ADDED NEW YORK WOULD BE THE ONLY PLACE WHERE UAR COULD MEET.

7. IT WAS CLEAR TO THE JORDANISN THAT THEY HAD PUSHED NASSER AS FAR AS WAS POSSIBLE. THEY FELT AT CONCLUSION OF DISCUSSIONS NASSER WOULD STICK TO HIS POSITION EVEN THOUGH THIS PUT HIM IN OPPOSITION TO SOME OF HIS ADVISORS INCLUDING MAHMOUD KAD WHO THROUGHOUT THE MEETINGS WAS PARTICULARLY RIGID AND OUTSPOKENLY ANTI-AMERICAN. NASSER AND HUSSEIN

UNQUOTE. SYMMES.
GP-1.

NOTE: HAS RECEIVED.



~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

105
TELEGRAM
22

~~SECRET~~ 260

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04251 081553Z

47
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 081115Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5179
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1481
USUN 842

2

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4251

EXDIS

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

REF: TEL AVIV 3216

COMMENT: PARTIES MAKE THIS EXERCISE DIFFICULT ENOUGH,
BUT JARRING CONTINUES TO SOUND LESS THAN POSITIVE IN
HIS APPROACH.

SYMMES

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001
By 18/11/NARA, Date 10/19/01

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

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TELEGRAM
3

~~SECRET~~ 608

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04241 070423Z

83
ACTION SS 30

2

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

0 070409Z APR 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5174
CAIRO 01
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1480
USUN 0840

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4241

EXDIS

JARRING MISSION

REF STATE 143077, USUN 4492, TEL AVIV 3214

1. STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT WHEN CONTACT IS MADE IN CAIRO TODAY IT BE WITH EITHER KING DIRECTLY OR THROUGH HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY ZAID RIFAI. ALTHOUGH MINSTATE FOR FONAFFS ABDUL MUNEIM RIFAI AND PRIMIN TALHOUNI ARE ALSO IN CAIRO WITH KING, BELIEVE IT MOST IMPORTANT WE TAKE NO CHANCES ON HAVING MESSAGE DELAYED OR GARBLED BY HANDLING IT THROUGH EITHER OF THEM.

2. ONLY SENIOR GOJ OFFICIAL NOW IN AMMAN WHO HAS BEEN INVOLVED

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4241A ~~SECRET~~
WITH JARRING MISSION THROUGHOUT IS DEPUTY PRIMIN TOUQAN. WE ARE INCLINED AWAIT KING'S RETURN PRIOR TO MAKING CONTACT WITH GOJ SINCE WE ARE NOT SURE TOUQAN HAS BEEN READ INTO DEVELOPMENTS OF PAST THREE DAYS. SYMMES
GP-1

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO
BY OCT.

DECLASSIFIED
EO. 12958 Sec. 3.3
NLJ-S 96001
By Ag/ll NARA, Date 01-10-

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

3

~~SECRET~~ 966

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04238 060915Z

18
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, 1030 W

0 051922Z APR 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5172
INFO USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE 838
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1477

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-207
By ics, NARA, Date 11-20-02

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4238

CORRECTED COPY

EXDIS

REF AMMAN 4226

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION

SUMMARY: KING HUSSEIN TOLD ME TODAY HE WILL TRY TO OBTAIN NASSER'S ACCEPTANCE OF JARRING PROPOSAL AS PRESENTED IN EARLY MARCH. HE SAID HIS CHANCES OF DOING SO WOULD BE GREATLY STRENGTHENED BY ISRAEL'S AGREEMENT TO ADD FEW WORDS SUGGESTED BY JORDAN (0000 3839).

1. AFTER DISCOVERING JARRING HAD GIVEN JORDANIANS EXACTLY SAME TEXT GIVEN TO AMB GOLDBERG BY TEKOAH (AMMAN 4226), WE ARRANGED FOR ZAID AL-RIFA'I TO BRIEF KING HUSSEIN PRIOR TO MY SEEING KING AT 1830 LOCAL.

2. I TOLD KING WE HAD NOT KNOWN UNTIL TODAY PRECISELY WHAT JARRING HAD PRESENTED TO JORDAN AND ISRAEL IN EARLY MARCH.

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4238A ~~SECRET~~

I EXPLAINED IT WAS ONLY APRIL 1 THAT I SAW TEXT OF WHAT JARRING HAD PRESENTED TO ISRAEL. QUITE BY ACCIDENT AT NOON TODAY, I HAD LEARNED EXACTLY SAME TEXT HAD BEEN GIVEN TO JORDAN. PRESUMABLY JARRING HAD PRESENTD SAME TEXT TO CAIRO.

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 AMMAN 04238 060915Z

3. STRESSING I WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY, I SAID I BELIEVED USG WOULD HAVE BEEN PRESSING ALL PARTIES MUCH HARDER IF WE HAD KNOWN THIS EXACT TEXT PREVIOUSLY. TEXT HAD EVERYTHING JORDAN NEEDED, WHICH FURTHER MAGNIFIED SERIOUSNESS OF NOW ALLOWING JARRING TO FAIL. IT WOULD BE MOST UNFORTUNATE TO PERMIT SEMANTICS AND LEGALISMS TO OBSCURE FACT THIS PROPOSAL INCLUDED ACCEPTANCE BOTH OF THE RESOLUTION AND OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION. IT WAS JARRING'S PROPOSAL, NOT ISRAEL'S AND NOT JORDAN'S. HAVING IN MIND MY EARLIER TALK WITH ABD AL-MUNEIM RIFA'I, I STRESSED THAT "DEVISE ARRANGEMENTS" IN JARRING'S PROPOSAL DID NOT MEAN "SIGN A PEACE TREATY." MOREOVER, USG SPOKESMEN HAD MADE CLEAR WE DO NOT CONSIDER THAT "DIRECT TALKS" AND "A PEACE TREATY" ARE REQUIRED (OR EXCLUDED) UNDER THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION. WE BELIEVE SOME KIND OF TALKS AND SOE KIND OF SECURE ARRANGEMENTS ARE REQUIRED, HOWEVER, AND THIS JARRING PROPOSAL IN OUR VIEW WOULD MEET WHAT IS REQUIRED TO MOVE TO PRACTICAL NEXT STEPS. I URGED THAT KING ACCEPT THIS PROPOSAL AND THAT HE ALSO TRY TO PERSUADE NASSER TO GO ALONG WITH JORDAN IN ITS ACCEPTANCE.

4. HUSSEIN RESPONDED HE WAS SORRY TO SAY HE HIMSELF HAD ONLY TODAY SEEN THE FULL TEXT OF WHAT JARRING HAD PRESENTED TO JORDAN IN EARLY MARCH. WHAT WAS IMPORTANT TO HIM WAS THAT EBAN HAD TOLD JARRING ISRAEL WOULD ACCEPT THIS PROPOSAL. HE EMPHASIZED HE WOULD

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 4238A ~~SECRET~~

BE IN A MUCH BETTER POSITION TO BRING ALONG THE UAR IT ISRAEL WOULD ALSO AGREE TO THE INSERTION OF THE FEW WORDS PROPOSED BY JORDAN (AMMAN 3839). HE COULD GET ALONG WITHOUT THOSE WORDS, BUT WOULD GREATLY IMPROVE HIS POSITION WITH NASSER TO HAVE THEM INSERTED WITH ISRAEL'S AGREEMENT. HE INTENDS TO TRY TO PERSUADE NASSER TO ACCEPT THE TEXT AS IT STAND IF THERE IS NO TIME TO GET THEM INSERTED. HE STRESSED THAT IN DOING SO HE UNDERSTAND THAT ISRAEL HAD TOLD JARRING AND THE USG THAT IT ACCEPTED THIS TEXT.

5. I EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR KING'S STATESMANLIKE DECISION. I SAID USG IS WELL AWARE OF ITS COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION AND THE JARRING MISSION. NOTHING WOULD PLEASE US MORE THAN TO BE IN A POSITION TO HELP THE PARTIES MOVE FORWARD

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 04238 060915Z

TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

6. COMMENT: KING'S DECISION TO WEIGH IN WITH NASSER TO ACCEPT JARRING PROPOSAL (EXACTLY AS IN USUN 4389) GIVES ADDED URGENCY TO RECOMMENDATIONS IN AMMAN 4226. KING'S HAND IN PERSUADING NASSER TO COME ALONG WOULD BE GREATLY STRENGTHENED BY ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO INSERT FEW WORDS SUGGESTED BY JORDAN (AMMAN 3839). IT IS OBVIOUSLY IN OUR INTEREST TO PERSUADE ISRAELIS GO ALONG WITH THOSE ADDITIONS IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE PROSPECTS OF BRINGING NASSER ON BOARD.

7. BUT, IN ANY CASE, ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT AT THIS POINT IS FOR ISRAELIS TO INVITE JARRING BACK AND TO URGE HIM TO TRY TO OBTAIN ACCEPTANCE OF HIS PROPOSAL BY UAR. SUCH AN INVITATION OBVIOUSLY WOULD HAVE ADDED CREDIBILITY FOR JARRING IF ISRAELIS INDICATED THEY WERE WILLING TO ADD JORDANIAN WORDS.

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 4238A ~~SECRET~~

8. I THINK EXPERIENCE OF PAST FEW WEEKS DEMONSTRATES THAT WE HAVE GOT TO HELP IN THE ORCHESTRATION AND THE SCENARIO-WRITING IF JARRING AND THE PARTIES ARE TO GET OFF THE GROUND. NOW IS THE TIME FOR US TO DO SOME NEEDED PUSHING BEHIND THE SCENES, AND I HOPE WE CAN DELIVER. END COMMENT

9. DEPT MAY WISH PASS THIS TELEGRAM AND OUR 4226 TO CAIRO.

GP-1. SYMMES



Department of State

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108

S/D

48

~~SECRET~~ 065

2

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04236 052101Z

83
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P R 051901Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5170
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA 258
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 629
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 209
CINCSRIKE

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4236

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 4189

SUBJ: ARMS FOR JORDAN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-207
By isa NARA, Date 11-20-02

1. KING MENTIONED TO ME IN COURSE DISCUSSION OTHER TOPICS TODAY THAT JORDAN HAS ASKED TURKEY TO HELP OUT WITH JAA 155 GUN AND M-48 REQUIREMENTS. HE EXPLAINED THAT SINCE US HAD NOT YET LOCATED 155S FOR JORDAN, HE HAD BEEN FORCED TO LOOK ELSEWHERE. HE BELIEVED TURKEY WAS DISPOSED TO PROVIDE SOME. HUSSEIN DID NOT SPECIFY UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS TURKISH GUNS MIGHT BE SUPPLIED AND I DECIDED NOT TO GET INVOLVED IN DISCUSSING DETAILS AT THIS POINT. HE ALSO MENTIONED THAT JORDAN HAS ASKED TURKS

PAGE 2 RUGMKG 4236A ~~SECRET~~

TO MAKE UP THE M-48 LOSSES JORDAN HAD USFERRED IN RECENT ISRAELI ATTACKS. AGAIN, I DID NOT PRESS FOR DETAILS.

2. HUSSEIN INQUIRED EAGERLY HOW I CURRENTLY SAW AIRLIFT POSSIBILITIES. I TOLD HIM WE WERE WORKING WITH JAA TO FIND OUT WHAT WERE ITS HIGHEST PRIORITY NEEDS, THAT AIRLIFT OF EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION TO BE PROVIDED UNDER SALES CASES WOULD BE EXPENSIVE AND THAT AT THIS MOMENT I WAS UNABLE GIVE HIM ANY PRECISE DETAILS. HE COMMENTED JORDAN NEEDS

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 AMMAN 04236 052101Z

"AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, AS FAST AND AS VLEAPLY AS POSSIBLE."

GP-3. SYMMES

EXDIB

EXDIB

EXDIB

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ON 03-23-78
BY 1528/2678



Department of State

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Department of State

109
TELEGRAM

22

SAUNDERS/DAVIS

SECRET 874

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04234 051900Z

45
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P R 051530Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5168
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1474
USMISSION USUN NY 836

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4234

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION

IN CONNECTION WITH POSSIBLE REVITALIZATION OF JARRING MISSION AND MEETING OF PARTIES UNDER HIS AUSPICES, WE STRONGLY BELIEVE IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL JARRING SUGGEST NEW LOCALE FOR TALKS IN PLACE OF CYRUS. LATTER HAS COME INCREASINGLY TO TAKE ON SINISTER SIGNIFICANCE FOR ARABS. RIFAI AND OTHER SENIOR JORDANIANS CONTINUE EXPRESS PREFERENCE FOR NEW YORK OR,

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4234A ~~SECRET~~
FAILING THAT, GENEVA. AS INSTRUCTED STATE 131321, WE HAVE OURSELVES CAREFULLY AVOIDED GIVING ANY ENCOURAGEMENT TO IDEA OF MOVING TALKS TO NEW YORK.

GP-3. SYMMES

NOTE: NOT

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001

By ng/lb, NARA, Date 10/14/01

SECRET



Department of State

110
TELEGRAM

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001
By ag/ll NARA, Date 10/4/01

~~SECRET~~ 599

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04226 060440Z

17
ACTION SS 30

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, NSAE 00, NSCE 00, SSD 00, USIE 00, /030 W

O 051319Z APR 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5163
INFO USUN IMMEDIATE 0834
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1472

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4226

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

REF: STATE 141273, USUN 4391 AND 4389

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

1. WE HAVE BEEN IN EXTENSIVE CONTACT WITH JORDANIAN LEADERSHIP DURING PAST TWENTY-FOUR HOURS PROBING FOR ANY POSSIBLE WAY TO REVIVE THEIR FAITH IN JARRING MISSION, WHICH LEADERSHIP CLEARLY HAD COME TO CONSIDER DEAD. I BELIEVE ONE POSSIBILITY EXISTS BUT WILL NEED URGENT ACTION FROM DEPT TO EXPLOIT IT.

2. AFTER INTENSIVE DISCUSSION MINSTATE OF FONAFFAIRS RAFAI CONFIRMED TO ME THAT JARRING HAD READ SAME FORMULA TO JORDANIANS WHICH USUN 4389 REPORTED HE HAD READ TO EBAN. RIFAI IN FACT SHOWED ME WRITTEN TEXT IN ENGLISH

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4226A ~~SECRET~~
WHICH I WAS ABLE TO COMPARE WORD FOR WORD WITH TEXT IN USUN 4389.

3. RIFAI SAID PRINCIPAL PROBLEM HE HAD WITH JARRING FORMULA WAS PHRASEOLOGY "TO DEVISE ARRANGEMENTS" WHICH HE AND OTHER JORDANIANS INTERPRETED AS CALLING FOR

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04226 060440Z

PEACE TREATY. I REMINDED HIM USG REPS AND OTHER SC REPS HAVE PUBLICLY RECOGNIZED THAT NOV 22 RESOLUTION NEITHER CALLED FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS NOR PEACE TREATY. WHILE WE OURSELVES WOULD WELCOM BOTH DEVELOPMENTS, NEITHER WE NOR OTHER IN SC CONSIDERED RESOLUTION REQUIRED THEM. USG EFFORT, I STRESSED, HAS BEEN TO FIND PRACTICAL STEPS TO IMPLEMENT SC RESOLUTION. RIFAI ACKNOWLEDGED CORRECTNESS OF THIS.

4. NET EFFECT I BELIEVE IS THAT JORDANIANISM, IF PUSHED, MAY NOW BE READY TO ACCEPT JARRING'S FORMULA. PROBLEM IS THEY ARE UNSURE THEY CAN SELL NASSER ON IT. ACCORDING RIFAI, CONSENSUS OF JORDANIAN LEADERS IS THAT SINCE JARRING'S FORMULA CAME CLOSE TO JORDANISM FORMULA (AMMAN 3839) THEY WONDERED WHY ISRAEL WOULD NOT ACCEPT LATTER.. IF ISRAEL DID SO, GOJ FULLY CONFIDENT IT COULD

PAGE 3 RUQMGK 4226A ~~SECRET~~

GET UAR ON BOARD AND GET UAR TO MEETING OF THE PARTIES UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES.

5. I SENSE THAT JORDANISMS ARE NONETHELESS PREPARED TO RAISE JARRING'S FORMULA WITH NASSER AND FELT IF VITAL THEY DISCUSS THIS WITH NASSER DURING KING'S APRIL 6-7 VISIT TO CAIRO. FAILING THIS INITIATIVE THEY BELIEVE MISSION'S EARLY AND TOTAL COLLAPSE IS INEMITABLE.

6. FOREGOING I BELIEVE REQUIRES FOLLOWING IMMEDIATE ACTIONS: A) ISRAELIS SHOULD INVITE JARRING TO RETURN JERUSALEM IMMEDIATELY, B) WE SHOULD PREVAIL UPON ISRAELIS TO NOTIFY JARRING THEY HAVE RECONSIDERED AND WERE NOW PREPARED ACCEPT JORDANIAN FORMUAL AND HE SHOULD SO INFORM JORDAN AND UAR. I BELIEVE THIS WOULD HAVE TREMENDOUS ADVANTAGE OF ASSURING THAT THE JORDANISM ARE ON BAORD AND READY TO MEET UNDER JARRING. JORDANIANS ARE CONFIDENT UAR WILL JOIN THEM IN THESE MEETINGS IF THEIR FORMULA IS ACCEPTED BY ISRAEL. C) FAILING THIS, WE SHOULD GET ISRAELIS TO CONFIRM TO JARRING THEY ACCEPT HIS FORMULA EXACTLY AS THEY REPORTED IT TO US (USUN 4389) AND ASK HIM TO SO INFORM JORDAN

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 04226 060440Z

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 4226A ~~SECRET~~

AND UAR. WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO ISRAELIS WE CONSIDER THEY ARE SIGNED ON TO JARRING FORMULA AS RECORDED BY EBAN (USUN 4389) AND WE INTEND TO HOLD THEM TO THIS AS A MINIMUM RPT MINIMUM POSITION. D) FINALLY, WE SHOULD ASK ISRAELI LEADERSHIP TO AVOID ALL PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON JARRING MISSION (PARTICULARLY GLOSSES ON WHAT THEIR "INTERPRETATION" IS) WHILE JARRING TRIES TO GET ARAB ACCEPTANCE.

7. I SUGGEST THAT FOREGOING ACTIONS MAY OFFER BETTER CHANCE OF PRESERVING JARRING MISSION FROM COLLAPSE AND OF GETTING PARTIES TO MEET FOR DISCUSSIONS OF NOV 22 RESOLUTION THAN DOES NEW INITIATIVE ALONG LINES PROPOSED BY AMB GOLDBERG (USUN 4391), WHICH UNFORTUNATELY WOULD BE LIKELY FURTHER TO STIMULATE ARAB SUSPICIONS, ABOUT MEANINGS OF WORDS AND ISRAEL'S REAL INTENTIONS.

8. I CONSIDER IT IMPERATIVE THAT ISRAELI ANNOUNCEMENT JARRING HAS BEEN INVITED BACK TO JERUSALEM BE MADE WITHIN NEXT FORTY-EIGHT HOURS, I.E. WHILE KING IS STILL IN CAIRO. THIS WILL GIVE KING TREMENDOUS INFLUENCE ON NASSER TO KEEP DOOR TO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 4226A ~~SECRET~~
OPEN.

9. I HAVE REQUESTED APPOINTMENT TO SEE KING LATER TODAY. I WOULD APPRECIATE INDICATION FROM DEPARTMENT SOONEST THAT IT CONCURS WITH ACTIONS RECOMMENDED PARA 6.
GP-1 SYMMES

~~SECRET~~



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TELEGRAM

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NLI-S 98001

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46

~~SECRET~~ 197

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04226 060015Z

81
ACTION SS 30

INFO CCO 00, SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 W

0 051319Z APR 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 000
INFO USUN IMMEDIATE 0834
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1472

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4226

EXDIS

REF: STATE 141273, USUN 4391 AND 4389

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

1. WE HAVE BEEN IN EXTENSIVE CONTACT WITH JORDANIAN LEADERSHIP DURING PAST TWENTY-FOUR HOURS PROBING FOR ANY POSSIBLE WAY TO REVIVE THEIR FAITH IN JARRING MISSION, WHICH LEADERSHIP CLEARLY HAD COME TO CONSIDER DEAD. I BELIEVE ONE POSSIBILITY EXISTS BUT WILL NEED URGENT ACTION FROM DEPT TO EXPLOIT IT.

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PAGE 2 RUGMKG 4226A ~~SECRET~~
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04226 060015Z

3. CALLED FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS NOR PEACE TREATY. WHILE WE OURSELVES WOULD WELCOME BOTH DEVELOPMENTS, NEITHER WE NOR OTHER IN SC CONSIDERED RESOLUTION REQUIRED THEM. USG EFFORT, I STRESSED, HAS BEEN TO FIND PRACTICAL STEPS TO IMPLEMENT SC RESOLUTION. RIFAI ACKNOWLEDGED CORRECTNESS OF THIS.

4. NET EFFECT I BELIEVE IS THAT JORDANISN, IF PUSHED, MAY NOW BE READY TO ACCEPT JARRING'S FORMULA. PROBLEM IS THEY ARE UNSURE THEY CAN SELL NASSER ON IT. ACCORDING RIFAI, CONSENSUS OF JOR UMI AFT FEADERS IS THAT SINCE JARRING'S FORMULA CAME CLOSE TO JORDANIAN FORMULA (AXNRIN3839) THEY WONDERED WHY ISRAEL WOULD NOT ACCEPT LATTER. IF ISRAEL DID SO, GOJ FULLY CONFIDENT IT COULD

PAGE 3 RUGMKG 4226A S EGTC E T
GET UAR ON BOARD AND GET UAR TO MEETING OF THE PARTIES UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES.

5. I SENSE THAT JORDANISNS ARE NONETHELESS PREPARED TO RAISE JARRING'S FORMULA WITH NASSER AND FEEL IT VITAL THEY DISCUSS THIS WITH NASSER DURING KING'S APRIL 6-7 VISIT TO CAIRO. FAILING THIS INITIATIVE THEY BELIEVE MISSION'S EARLY AND TOTAL COLLAPSE IS INEVITABLE.

6. FOREGOING I BELIEVE REQUIRES FOLLOWING IMMEDIATE ACTIONS: A) ISRAELIS SHOULD INVITE JARRING TO RETURN JERUSALEM IMMEDIATELY, B) WE SHOULD PREVAIL UPON ISRAELIS TO NOTIFY JARRING THEY HAVE RECONSIDERED AND WERE NOW PREPARED ACCEPT JORDANIAN FORMULA AND HE SHOULD SO INFORM JORDAN AND UAR. I BELIEVE THIS WOULD HAVE TREMENDOUS ADVANTAGE OF ASSURING THAT THE JORDANISN ARE ON BOARD AND READY TO MEET UNDER JARRING. JORDANISNS ARE CONFIDENT UAR WILL JOIN THEM IN THESE MEETINGS IF THEIR FORMULA IS ACCEPTED BY ISRAEL. C) FAILING THIS, WE SHOULD GET ISRAELIS TO CONFIRM TO JARRING THEY ACCEPT HIS FORMULA EXACTLY AS THEY REPORTED IT TO US (USUN 4389) AND ASK HIM TO SO INFORM JORDAN

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 04226 060015Z

PAGE 4 RUQMKG

~~-4226- SECRET~~

AND UAR. WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO ISRAELIS WE CONSIDER THEY ARE SIGNED ON TO JARRING FORMULA AS RECORDED BY EBAN (USUN 4389) AND WE INTEND TO HOLD THEM TO THIS AS A MINIMUM RPT MINIMUM POSITION. D) FINALLY, WE SHOULD ASK ISRAELI LEADERSHIP TO AVOID ALL PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON JARRING MISSION (PARTICULARLY GLOSSES ON WHAT THEIR " INTERPRETATION" IS) WHILE JARRING TRIES TO GET ARAB ACCEPTANCE.

7. I SUGGEST THAT FOREGOING ACTIONS MAY OFFER BETTER CHANCE OF PRESERVING JARRING MISSION FROM COLLAPSE AND OF GETTING PARTIES TO MEET FOR DISCUSSION OF NOV 22 RESOLUTION THAN DOES NEW INITIATIVE ALONG LINES PROPOSED BY AMB GOLDBERG (USUN 4391), WHICH UNFORTUNATELY WOULD BE LIKELY FURTHER TO STIMULATE ARAB SUSPICIONS, ABOUT MEANINGS OF WORDS AND ISRAEL'S REAL INTENTIONS.

I. I CONSIDER IT IMPERATIVE THAT ISRAELI ANNOUNCEMENT JARRING HAS BEEN INVITED BACK TO JERUSALEM BE MADE WITHIN NEXT FORTY-EIGHT HOURS, I.E. WHILE KING IS STILL IN CAIRO. THIS WILL GIVE KING TREMENDOUS INFLUENCE ON NASSER TO KEEP DOOR TO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 4226A ~~SECRET~~
OPEN.

O. I HAVE REQUESTED APPOINTMENT TO SEE KING LATER TODAY. I WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE INDICATION FROM DEPARTMENT SOONEST THAT IT CONCURS WITH ACTIONS RECOMMENED PARA 6.
GP-1 SYMMES

#AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

112
TELEGRAM

SAUNDERS/DAVIS

26

~~SECRET~~ 682

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04225 051348Z

41
ACTION SS 30

2

INFO SSO 00 NSCE 00 CCO 00 /030 W

0 051309Z APR 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4225

EXDIS

REF: STATE 142173

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

FOR ASSISTANT SECTY BATTLE AND DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECTY DAVIES

IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM REPORTS POSSIBLE WAY TO PRE-
SERVE JARRING MISSION. I HOPE YOU WILL GIVE ACTIONS IT
RECOMMENDS YOUR URGENT CONSIDERATION. SYMMES
GP-1

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NLJ-S 98001
By sl/ll NARA, Date 10/14/01

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

113
TELEGRAM

26

~~SECRET~~ 803

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04212 041642Z

49
ACTION SS 30

2

INFO SSO 00, /030 W

P 041629Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5156

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4212

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 4199; USDAO TEL AVIV 0626 APR 68

FOR ASST SECTY BATTLE

TEL AVIV USDAO 0626 REINFORCES, IN OUR VIEW, NEED FOR REAFFIRMATION US POLICY TOWARDS SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE OF JORDANIAN REGIME. PARTICULARLY IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. WE WOULD HOPE DEPT COULD INSURE THAT POLICY LINE RECOMMENDED IN AMMAN 4199 IS USED BY ALL US PERSONNEL IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS OF JORDAN WITH ISRAELI CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICIALS. SYMMES
GP-3

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S 96001

By 15/11 NARA, Date 10/14/01

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Department of State

114
TELEGRAM

27

~~SECRET~~ 506

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04200 041229Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P 041159Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5147
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 0628

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4200

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 4168 NJA 6884

3.4
(b)(1)

INDICATES THERE IS NO OBJECTION IF AMBASSADOR EILTS SHOULD WISH TO DRAW ON INFORMATION IN IN TALKS WITH APPROPRIATE SAUDI OFFICIAL SHOULD THERE BE OPPORTUNITY HELP SMOOTH JORDAN-SAUDI RELATIONS DISTURBED BY EXCHANGES MFERSUMMIT. WE ARE INCLINED TO BELIEVE HOWEVER, THAT SOME DETAILS REPORTED REF NJA WOULD TEND FUEL THE CONTROVERSY AND SUGGEST THAT GENERAL "COMEDY OF ERRORS" LINE, WITHOUT USING NAMES, AS REPORTED AMMAN 4168 MIGHT BETTER SERVE OBJECTIVE REDUCING IRRITATION OVER THIS ISSUE IF OPPORTUNITY ARISES. SYMMES

NOTE: #1 AS RECEIVED.

SANITIZED
Authority NJ 15-41
By CTS, NARA, Date 7/31/18

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Department of State

115
TELEGRAM
4

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001
By SP/LL, NARA, Date 10/14/01

~~SECRET~~ 262

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04190 040951Z

22
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P R 040730Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5140
INFO CINCSTRIKE

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4190

CORRECTED COPY

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 4111, DAO AMMAN MAP 0194, JIDDA 3409, TEHRAN 3992

SUBJ: ARMS FOR JORDAN

1. AMMAN 4189 REPORTED HUSSEIN'S APPROACHES TO SHAH AND FEISAL FOR ARMS ASSISTANCE. THESE APPROACHES CONFIRM OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT REGIME IS UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE TO GET ARMS QUICKLY INTO THE COUNTRY.

PAGE 2 RUGMKG 4190A ~~SECRET~~

2. FORMER PRIMIN WASFI TELL COMMENTED TO EMBOFF APRIL 2 THAT HE HOPED QTE ALL US ARMS DELIVERIES COULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN COMING MONTH UNQTE. HE SAID HE WAS HAVING EXTENSIVE CONTACTS WITH JAA OFFICER CORPS WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS "NEAR MUTINOUS" BECAUSE OF SHORTAGES OF EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION. HE AFFIRMED THAT JAA AS ORGANIZATION REMAINS LOYAL TO KING BUT THAT KING AND CHIEF OF STAFF KHAMMASH WERE NONETHELESS TARGETS OF STRONG JAA CRITICISM FOR NOT HAVING ARRANGED EARLIER REPLACEMENT OF JAA'S JUNE LOSSES.

3. IT WILL BE GOOD IF EITHER SHAH OR FEISAL WILL HELP WITH AIRLIFT. THE USG HAS INDICATED IT WILL PROVIDE AIRLIFT FOR SOME GRANT AID ITEMS AND WE URGE THIS BE EXPEDITED.

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04190 040951Z

GIVEN PROBLEMS INHERENT IN POSSIBLE AID BY EITHER SAUDIS OR SHAH, WE RECOMMEND PRIORITY STUDY BE GIVEN TO THE PROSPECT OF THE USG PROVIDING AIRLIFT AT MOST FAVORABLE POSSIBLE RATES TO GOJ FOR THOSE ITEMS WHICH KHAMMASH HAS REQUESTED BE AIR SHIPPED (USDAO MAP 0194). WILL APPRECIATE EARLY ADVICE AS TO WHAT CAN BE DONE.

GP=3

SYMMES

EX012

U O B R E C L E

INFO CINCIBIKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 010811Z 0190
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
P 6 040951Z 0409 04

INFO

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INFO 01 0409 04130 040951Z

SECRET 595



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Department of State

116
TELEGRAM

7

~~SECRET~~ 167

2

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04189 040758Z

11
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P R 040715Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5139
INFO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 208
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 627
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 256
CINCSTRIKE

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4189

EXDIS

REF: TEHRAN 3992 (NOTAL)

SUBJECT: ARMS FOR JORDAN

1. WE HAD NOT ~~BEEN AWARE~~ OF HUSSEIN'S APPEAL TO SHAH FOR ARMS ASSISTANCE (REFTEL).

PAGE 2 RUOMKG 4189A ~~SECRET~~

3.4
(b)(1)

2. [REDACTED] HAS REPORTED THAT GOJ AMB TO SAUDI ARABIA, WHEN IN AMMAN LAST WEEK ON CONSULTATIONS, WAS INSTRUCTED TRANSMIT REQUEST FOR AMMUNITION TO FEISAL [REDACTED]. FEISAL HAS NOW REPORTEDLY ANSWERED HE UNABLE TO DO MORE THAN SEND JORDAN "TWO THOUSAND SHELLS" (TYPE UNIDENTIFIED) AND SOME 30 CALIBER AMMUNITION. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HUSSEIN HAS SENT SIMILAR APPEALS TO OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING IRAN AND PAKISTAN, BUT WE HAVE NOT YET CONFIRMED THIS. WE KNOW KING CALLED TURKISH AMBASSADOR TO ARMY HQS APRIL 3 FOR MEETING IN PRESENCE KHAMMASH AND SPECULATE IT WAS IN SAME CONNECTION. IN ANY EVENT, HIS APPEALS TO OTHER CHIEFS OF STATE ARE MEASURE OF KING'S MOOD THAT HE MUST QUICKLY PRODUCE EVIDENCE OF HIS ABILITY TO SUPPLY ARMS TO JAA.

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04189 040758Z

30 WE HOPE SHAH COULD BE ENCOURAGED RESPOND POSITIVELY TO HUSSEIN EITHER WITH SOME HARDWARE OR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. ALSO, IN LIGHT AMB EILT'S ASSESSMENT (JIDDA 3409 NOTAL) THAT SAUDI CAPABILITY TO ASSIST IN AIRLIFT OF OUR ARMS PACKAGE IS AT BEST DUBIOUS, WE WONDER WHETHER SHAH COULD

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 4189A ~~SECRET~~
ASSIST EITHER IN FERRYING ARMS TO JORDAN OR HELPING SUBSIDIZE COST OF AIRLIFT.

GP-1 SYMMES

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

117

32

~~SECRET~~ 727

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04188 031736Z

45
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

0 031629Z APR 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5138
INFO USUN IMMEDIATE 0832
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1468

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4188

#XDIS

SUBJ: KING TO CAIRO: JARRING MISSION

REF: 4174

1. THE KING'S VIST TO CAIRO ON THE SIXTH IS IN LIEU OF A SUMMIT CONFERENCE. HE HAS HAD IN MIND FOR SOME TIME THE NEED TO GET MORE FREEDOM OF ACTION FOR JORDAN IN DEALING WITH JARRING. HE HAS ALSO WANTED TO STIMULATE NASSER TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE AND FORTHCOMING IN REGARD TO "IMPLEMENTATION OF SC RESOLUTION" AND KINGS OF DISCUSSIONS THAT MIGHT BE

PAGE 2 RUQMKC 4188A ~~SECRET~~
HELD WITH JARRING. AS WE REPORTED EARLIER, IF ISRAEL HAD CLEARLY ACCEPTED THE ORIGINAL JARRING PROPOSAL (AND EVEN IF ISRAELIS HAD BEEN ADAMANT IN REFUSING THE JORDANIAN SUGGESTIONS REPORTED IN AMMAN 3839), THE KING HAD PLANNED TO GO TO CAIRO TO TRY TO PERSUADE NASSER TO GO ALONG WITH MEETINGS IN CYPRUS OR ELSEWHERE.

2. IN FORTHCOMING VISIT WE ALSO EXPECT HUSSEIN WILL TRY TO PERSUADE NASSER TO HELP HIM CONTROL FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY. AMONG OTHER THINGS, HE WILL PROBABLY TRY TO GET NASSER TO USE HIS INFLUENCE WITH VARIOUS GROUPS TO PROVIDE FOR A FROM OF COORDINATION THAT WOULD LEAD TO GREATER CONTROL OF THE FEDAYEEN BY JORDAN.

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04188 031736Z

3. YESTERDAY'S MEETING WITH JARRING AND VARIOUS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION HAVE PRODUCED AN UNFORTUNATE AND SOMEWHAT NEGATIVE ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF THOSE JORDANIANS WHO HAVE BEEN DEALING WITH JARRING. BRITISH AMB ADAMS AND I TODAY AGREED THAT THIS NEGATIVE AND RESIGNED FRAME OF MIND IS NOTICEABLE AMONG ALL OF THE "MODERATE"

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 4188A ~~SECRET~~

JORDANIAN LEADERSHIP FROM THE KING DOWN. GIVEN THEIR PRESENT PROBLEMS WITH CONTROL OF THE FEDAYEEN ON THE ONE HAND, AND LACK OF ANY GIVE AT ALL IN THE ISRAELI POSITION ON THE OTHER, THEY HAVE COME INCREASINGLY TO ADOPT AN ATTITUDE OF RESIGNATION AND SETTLING DOWN FOR THE LONG HAUL. IN A REAL SENSE THEY NOW MAY HAVE DECIDED THEY HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO DIG IN AND TO CONTINUE TO TRY TO STAND UP TO ISRAELI REPRISALS OF THE FEB 15, MARCH 21 AND MARCH 29 VARIETY. THEY PROBABLY ARE HOPING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CAN PREVENT ISRAEL FROM MAKING AN ALL-OUT MILITARY ONSLAUGHT ON JORDAN. THEY PROBABLY ALSO HOPE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION CAN PRECLUDE ISRAELI BOMBING OF POPULATION CENTERS DEEP IN JORDAN OR GROUND PENETRATIONS BEYOND THE VALLEY AREA.

4. WE BELIEVE MOST JORDANIANS HAVE NOT TAKEN THIS LINE OF THINKING TO ITS LOGICAL CONCLUSION, THAT IS, TO CONSCIOUS SUPPORT OF, AND OFFICIAL BLESSING FOR, WHAT MIGHT BECOME A STRATEGY OF "PASSIVE PARA-MILITARY RESISTANCE". JORDANIAN ACTIONS AND ATTITUDES CLEARLY IMPLY, HOWEVER, THAT THEY REGARD THE ISRAELI JUNE VICTORY AS A WASTING, IF NOT ALREADY WASTED,

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 4188 ~~SECRET~~

ASSET IN FORCING THEM TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. THEY ALSO RELIEVE THE ISRAELIS ARE GOING TO GET MOST OF THE BLAME FOR JARRING'S PRESUMPTIVE FAILURE.

5. THAT IS THE ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH HUSSEIN WILL BE GOING TO CAIRO AND WE THINK HIS VISIT TO NASSER IN SUCH AN ATMOSPHERE COULD BE SOMETHING OF A WATERSHED UNLESS WE OR JARRING CAN

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 AMMAN 04188 031736Z

SHOW THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE PREPARED TO GIVE SOMETHING IN ORDER TO KEEP THE JARRING MISSION ALIVE. WE HAVE ALREADY SUGGESTED WHAT MIGHT BE DONE WITH REGARD TO KEEPING ALIVE THE JARRING MISSION PER SE (AMMAN 41#)

6. WE HAVE ALSO FULLY REPORTED WHAT THE JORDANIANS EXPECT FROM THE ISRAELIS AND FROM THE USG IN RESPECT TO SUPPORT OF JARRING (AMMAN 3794, 3784, 3782). ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS WE HAVE ASSURED HUSSEIN AND OTHERS OF OUR GENERAL SUPPORT FOR THE JARRING MISSION AND THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION. I WOULD LIKE TO GO IN TO SEE THE KING BEFORE HE LEAVES TO TRY TO PRECLUDE JORDANIAN RESIGNATION FROM LEADING TO SOME DAMAGING RETROGRADE STEPS AND TO ENCOURAGE HIM TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE AND FLEXIBLE IN HIS TALKS WITH NASSER. I SEE NO

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 4188 ~~SECRET~~

REASON FOR ME TO ASK TO SEE HIM, HOWEVER, UNLESS WE HAVE SOMETHING NEW TO SAY. UNLESS WE HAVE EVIDENCE OF REAL GIVE IN THE ISRAELI POSITION OR UNLESS WE HAVE SOME NEW IDEAS, I WOULD ONLY BE ABLE TO TAKE OVER ALREADY WELL-HARROWED GROUND. THAT SOMETIMES CAN BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE WITH HUSSEIN. THE KING IS WELL AWARE OF OUR GOOD INTENTIONS AND OUR POLICY STATEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO JARRING. WHAT HE NEEDS AT THIS POINT IS SOMETHING TANGIBLE.

7. IF I AM TO SEE THE KING BEFORE HE LEAVES, I SHOULD TRY TO GET IN TOMMORROW, ALTHOUGH FRIDAY MAY BE POSSIBLE. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY SUGGESTIONS DEPT MAY HAVE ON WHERE WE GO NEXT AND INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW I SHOULD PUT OUR VIEWS TO HUSSEIN. SYMMES
GP-3

~~SECRET~~



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By NAARA, Date 01/10/01

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SECRET 478

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04174 031406Z

2

45
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSD 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

Q P 031249Z APR 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5133
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1467
USUN 0831

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4174

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO

DELIVER ACTION OFFICER OPENING OF BUSINESS APRIL 3
SUBJ JARRING VISIT TO JORDAN APR 2

I. ABDUL MUNIM RIFAI SAID JARRING'S VISIT YESTERDAY
WAS MOST DISAPPOINTING YET SO FAR AS JORDAN IS
CONCERNED. JARRING HAD BROUGHT NOTHING NEW AT ALL AND
SEEMED PERSONALY TO BE MORE DEPRESSED THAN EVER.

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4174A ~~SECRET~~

RIFAI ASSERTED JARRING IMPLIED STRONGLY TO THE JORDANIANS
THAT HE CONSIDERS ISRAEL TO BLAME FOR HIS LACK OF
SUCCESS. HE TOLD THE JORDANIANS HE HAD TRIED AND TRIED
TO MOVE THE ISRAELIS BUT HAD BEEN UNABLE TO GET ANY IMPROVEMENT
ON THEIR POSITION WITH REGARD TO ACCEPTANCE OF THE
RESOLUTION. JARRING INTENDS GOING TO CAIRO NEXT AND WILL
THEN VISIT JERUSALEM AND BEIRUT (ORDER OF LATTER TWO
VISITS NOT CLEAR). UNLESS HE SEES SOME LIGHT, HE WILL
THEN (IN A MATTER OF DAYS) SUBMIT FINAL REPORT ON HIS
"FAILURE" TO SYG. (IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH
UK COUNSELOR YESTERDAY, RIFAI WENT FURTHER THAN HE
DID WITH ME AND SAID JARRING HAD INDICATED IF HE UNABLE
GET ANY CHANGE IN ISRAELI POSITION HE PLANNED REPORT

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04174 031406Z

ISRAEL WAS PRINCIPAL OBSTACLE TO SUCCESS HIS MISSION.)

2. IN THE SESSIONS YESTERDAY, PART OF WHICH KING HUSSEIN ATTENDED, THE JORDANIANS REAFFIRMED TO JARRING THEIR PREVIOUS POSITION ON ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION AND INDICATED THEY ARE READY TO GO TO CYPRUS OR ANY OTHER PLACE FOR DISCUSSIONS. THEY REPEATED THEY

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 4174A ~~SECRET~~
WOULD HAVE GONE EVEN IF CAIRO HAD BEEN UNWILLING TO JOIN THEM. RIFAI SAID THAT JORDAN STILL WANTS THE INSERTION OF THE TWO WORDS THAT THEY HAD SUGGESTED TO JARRING DURING HIS MARCH 14 VISIT.

3. THE JORDANIANS INFORMED JARRING THAT THE KING PLANS TO VISIT NASSER ON APRIL 6. THEY HAD ASKED JARRING IF HE HAD ANY OTHER FORMULA OR IDEA TO SUGGEST FOR THE KING TO DISCUSS IN CAIRO. THEY PROBED JARRING

SEVERAL TIMES IN THIS WAY HOPING THIS MIGHT UNCOVER SOME CHANGE IN THE ISRAELI POSITION BUT JARRING ALWAYS RESPONDED HE HAD NOTHING NEW.

4. RIFAI CONCLUDED " THAT POOR MAN WAS JUST NOT THE MAN FOR THE JOB ". HE EXPRESSED REGRET THAT JARRING HAD DETERMINED TO GO TO CAIRO BEFORE MAKING FURTHER TRY IN JERUSALEM TO GET SOME CHANGE IN ISRAELI POSITION.

5. COMMENT: IF THE JARRING MISSION IS TO HAVE ANY CHANCE OF CONTINUING, I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 4174A ~~SECRET~~
FOR HIM TO GO TO JERUSALEM BEFORE CAIRO TO TRY ONCE MORE TO GET A SHIFT IN THE ISRAELI POSITION ON THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION. IF JARRING TURNS UP EMPTYHANDED IN CAIRO AS HE DID IN AMMAN, HE PROBABLY WILL HAVE SEALED FATE OF HIS MISSION. I DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT HE WOULD GO TO ISRAEL FIRST UNLESS INVITED BY THE GOI

SECRET



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PAGE 03 AMMAN 04174 031406Z

TO COME. THUS, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, IT IS UP TO ISRAEL TO DECIDE THE FATE OF THE JARRING MISSION. SYMMES GP-3

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.

EXD-1-2

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SECRET 973

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04154 021701Z

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41
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 021439Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1462
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 5121
USUN 828
AMEMBASSY LONDON 809

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4154

EXDIS

REF: TEL AVIV 3114

SUBJ: LOCUS OF FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY

RE COMMENT IN PARA 2 REFTEL THAT THERE HAS BEEN RELATIVELY LITTLE TERRORISM ON THE WEST BANK ITSELF, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOT DISMISS LIKELIHOOD THAT FEDAYEEN GROUPS HAVE CAPABILITY BASED ON WEST BANK. REPORTS BOTH FROM JORDANIAN SECURITY AND FROM JOURNALISTS WHO HAVE INTERVIEWED FEDAYEEN IN RECENT WEEKS SUGGEST THERE MAY WELL BE FEDAYEEN WHO DO NOT UTILIZE EAST BANK SANCTUARIES BUT REMAIN MORE OR LESS PERMANENTLY ON WEST BANK WHERE THEY HAVE SUFFICIENT COVER TO CARRY OUT THEIR MISSIONS.

PAGE 2 RUGMKG 4154A ~~SECRET~~
BAR LEV'S CLAIM GOI HAS 1500 FEDAYEEN UNDER ARREST IN OUR OPINION ONLY LENDS FURTHER CREDENCE TO THESIS THERE ARE WEST BANK BASES FOR FEDAYEEN TRAINING AND OPERATIONS; WE ARE NOT AWARE OF GOI ASSERTION THESE WERE ALL PICKED UP WHILE ON MISSION FROM EAST BANK. RECENT INCIDENTS IN RAMALLAH AND HEBRON AND EARLIER ONES DEEP INSIDE ISRAEL ALSO SUGGEST SOME ACTIONS MAY BE BEING LAUNCHED BY OTHER THAN RECENT CROSSERS FROM EAST BANK. SYMMES
GP-3

SECRET



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~~SECRET~~ 9:8

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04151 021626Z

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41

ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 021440Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5119
INFO OSD/ISA
CINCSTRIKE

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4151

EXDIS

SUBJECT: JORDAN ARMS

REF: AMMAN 4060

JOINT EMBASSY/DATT MESSAGE

1. AFTER PRIMIN TALHOUNI AND I SIGNED MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING ON MARCH 28, GENERAL KHAMMASH SAID THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD WANTED TO ADD TO THE MEMO EQUIPMENT ITEMS LOST BY JORDAN ARAB ARMY IN FEB 15 AND MARCH 21 CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS. KHAMMASH SAID AFTER MEETING REPORTED IN AMMAN 4052 (IN WHICH I TALKED THE KING OUT OF SEVERAL CHANGES HE WISHED MADE IN THE MEMO), THE KING HAD AGREED WITH KHAMMASH THAT JORDAN WOULD SEEK TO MAKE UP THE LOSSES IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS WITH US. KHAMMASH ADDED THAT HE WAS HOPEFUL SOME OF THESE LOSSES COULD BE ADDED

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4151A ~~SECRET~~
TO LETTERS OF OFFER NOW IN PREPARATION AND THAT HE WOULD FOLLOW THIS UP IN HIS FUTURE DISCUSSIONS WITH USDAO AND HIS STAFF. HE SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO 33 TANKS THAT WERE DAMAGED ON MARCH 21 AND IN RESPONSE TO DATT'S QUERY SAID HE DID NOT KNOW HOW MANY OF THE 33 MAY BE REPAIRABLE.

2. I HAVE BEEN INFORMED JORDANIAN LOSSES INCLUDE 33 DAMAGED TANKS, ONE 155MM GUN, ONE 105MM HOWITZER, AND AN UNKNOWN

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 15-42

By 448

NARA, Date 04-11-2016



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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04151 021626Z

NUMBER OF MISCELLANEOUS CARGO VEHICLES. [] REPORTS THREE
ADDITIONAL 155 GUNS WERE DESTROYED ON MARCH 29. DATT
PERSONALLY SAW SIXTEEN DESTROYED OR DAMAGED CARGO VEHICLES
AND FIVE LANDROVERS DURING RECONNAISSANCE ON MARCH 22.

3.3(b)(1)

SYMMES

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TELEGRAM
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~~SECRET~~ 187

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04121 301359Z

42
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 301240Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5102
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 806
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1456
USMISSION USUN NY 824
USMISSION NATO 01

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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4121

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO

REF: STATE 138988; USUN 4306, 4217

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST

1. WE HAVE NOTED STATEMENT IN PARA 2 REFTEL THAT EGYPTIANS WERE BLOCKING ANY POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS UNDER THE NOV 22

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4121A ~~SECRET~~
RESOLUTION.

2. JARRING IS TO BE IN AMMAN ON SECOND. MEANWHILE, JORDANIANS ARE EMPHASIZING TO US THAT ISRAELI ATTITUDE REPRESENTS REAL ROADBLOCK TO PROGRESS BY JARRING. THEY CITE TEKOAH'S STATEMENTS REPORTED IN USUN 4306. ON OTHER HAND, THEY POINT TO FACT THAT UAR HAS PUBLICLY DECLARED ITS READINESS TO IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTION (USUN 4217) AND THAT UAR SPOKESMAN ZAYYAT HAS PUBLICLY DECLARED UAR ACCEPTS THE RESOLUTION.

3. IN FURTHER CONTACTS WITH JORDANIAN OFFICIALS IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO US TO HAVE CLARIFICATION OF HOW WE SEE THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF ISRAEL AND THE UAR ON QUESTIONS OF "ACCEPT-

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04121 301359Z

ANCE" AND "IMPLEMENTATION" OF RESOLUTION. SYMMPS

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OCT.

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~~SECRET~~ 103

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04111 301141Z

14
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, /030 W

P R 301010Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5096
INFO AMEMBASSY JDDDA 622
DOD/ISA
CINCSTRIKE
DIA
DA
CSAF

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-234
By isa, NARA, Date 7-22-03

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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4111

EXDIS

SUBJ: AIRLIFT FOR JORDAN ARMS

JOINT/DATT MESSAGE

I. AFTER I SIGNED MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING MORNING MARCH 28 WITH PRIMIN TALHOUNI, GEN KHAMMASH SAID HE AGAIN WISHED EMPHASIZE IMPORTANCE TO JAA AND POPULAR MORALE OF BRINGING SOME EQUIPMENT IN BY AIRLIFT. I

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4111A ~~SECRET~~
TOLD KHAMMASH THAT AS HE WAS AWARE, USG PLANNED AIRLIFT SOME GRANT AID EQUIPMENT. ANY OTHER MATERIAL AIRLIFTED WOULD HAVE TO BE AT GOJ EXPENSE AND WOULD ALSO DEPEND UPON AIRCRAFT AVAILABLITES. KHAMMASH ARGUED THIS POINT USING LINE THAT BOTH ARMY AND POPULAR REACTIONS TO AIRLIFT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO US AS WELL AS GOJ. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE HOPED IF AIRLIFT INDEED HAD TO BE AT GOJ EXPENSE THAT WE WOULD ARRANGE MOST FAVORABLE POSSIBLE AIRLIFT RATES. LIST OF EQUIPMENT WHICH KHAMMASH WANTS AIRLIFTED IS BEING FORWARDED BY SEPTEL; WE ESTIMATE IT WOULD TAKE 16-20 C-133 TYPE AIRCRAFT LOADS.

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04111 301141Z

2. EMPHASIZING AGAIN THAT, IF AVAILABLE, AIRLIFTS WOULD BE VERY EXPENSIVE, I ASKED KHAMMASH IF IT HAD OCCURRED TO HIM THAT THE SAUDIS MIGHT HELP JORDAN OUT BY PROVIDING THEIR C-130 AIRCRAFT FOR AIRLIFTING URGENT ITEMS. THIS WOULD BE A DRAMATIC GESTURE OF SOLIDARITY FROM FAISAL TO HUSEEIN AND PERHAPS MORE PALATABLE TO SAG THAN WRITING OUT ANOTHER CHECK.

PAGE 3 RUQMGK 4111A ~~SECRET~~

KHAMMASH SAID HE WAS DUBIOUS SAUDIS WOULD BE ATTRACTED TO THIS PROPOSAL AND THAT SINCE TI WAS OUR IDEA HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD APPROACH SAG ON BEHALF OF JORDAN.

3. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IF SAUDIS WOULD AGREE TO PROVIDING AIRLIFT, THIS WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO US. APART FROM FACT SOME ITEMS ARE NEEDED URGENTLY, DRAMATIC IMPACT OF AN AIRLIFT UNQUESTIONABLY WOULD HELP THE REGIME GET NEEDED BENFIT FROM OUR ARMS AGREEMENT. ON SEVERAL COUNTS, THERE IS MERIT TO HAVING THE SAUDIS DO THE AIRLIFT THAN THE USAF, WHETHER OR NOT JORDAN IS PAYING THE BILL.

4. IF DEPT AND AMB EILTS PERCEIVE NO OBJECTIONS I WOULD HOPE AMBASSADOR EILTS COULD BE AUTHORIZED MAKE DISCREET SOUNDINGS WITH SAG.
GP-1

SYMMES

~~SECRET~~



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TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~ 017

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 04110 300932Z

14
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

0 300915Z MAR 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5095
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1452

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4110

EXDIS

SUBJ: MESSAGE FROM ESHKOL TO TALHOUNI

REF: TEL AVIV 3113

1. REFTEL JUST RECEIVED (0840 ZULU MAR 30)

2. I BELIEVE OUR DELIVERING IT WOULD HAVE MOST UNFORTUNATE EFFECT HERE. PARTICULARLY SINCE PERFECTLY GOOD UN CHANNEL (GOI TO GENL BULL IN JERUSALEM TO COL STANAWAY IN AMMAN) EXISTS, I SEE NO REASON WHY USG SHOULD RISK REPERCUSSIONS OF PASSING THIS MESSAGE. MESSAGE MERELY IS RESTATMENT GOI PUBLIC POSITION AND IS ARGUMENTATIVE AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE IN TONE. MOREOVER, IT OFFERS NO PRACTICAL STEPS TOWARD REVERSING CYCLE OF VIOLENCE. IT HAS PROPAGANDISTIC THRUST WHICH WOULD LEND ITSELF TO FURTHER ANTI-AMERICAN FEELINGS IF IT WERE SURFACED BY GOI.

3. WE SEE NO USEFUL PURPOSE IN OUR PASSING SUCH MESSAGE AND RECOMMEND STRONGLY GOI BE ADVISED TO USE UN FACILITIES FOR MESSAGES OF THIS KIND. WE OF COURSE REMAIN READY TO PASS MESSAGES AIMED AT PRACTICAL MEASURES AND WITHOUT POLEMICS.
GP-3

SYMMES

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NLJ-S 96001
By aj/ll, NARA, Date 10/14/01

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By ag/ll, NARA, Date 10/4/01

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SECRET 161

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04108 292310Z

81
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

O P 292130Z MAR 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5094
USUN 821
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1451
AMEMBASSY LONDON 803

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4108

EXDIS

SUBJ: U.S. AIMS IN SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON JORDAN
COMPLAINT

REF: AMMAN 4105, 4107

1. IT WAS QUITE CLEAR IN MEETING WITH PRIMIN TALHOUNI,
REPORTED IN AMMAN 4105 THAT JORDANIANS WILL NOW PRESS TO
HAVE SC APPLY SOME SORT OF SANCTIONS TO ISRAEL IN ACCORDANCE WITH
PARA THREE OF MAR 24 SC RESOLUTION. SOVIET AND FRENCH
AMBS MADE COMMENTS TO PRIME MINISTER DURING THIS MEETING INDIC-
ATING THEY AND THEIR GOVTS CONSIDERED MAR24 RESOLUTION FELL SHORT OF
WHAT WAS NECESSARY AND JUSTIFIED IN TERMS OF RESTRAINING
ISRAEL.

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4108A ~~SECRET~~

2. SEEN FROM AMMAN, THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION ARE
THAT, WITH BEST WILL IN THE WORLD, THE JORDAN GOVT IS
NOT GOING TO BE ABLE TO PREVENT FURTHER FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY
FROM ITS TERRITORY. NOR DO WE BELIEVE THAT ANY AMOUNT OF
EXHORTATIONS, WHETHER IN THE UN OF BY US PRIVATELY, ARE GOING
TO CHANGE THAT SITUATION. IF THE PRESENT CYCLE OF REPRISAL
RAIDS CONTINUES, WE FACE A WIDENED AND NASTY MILITARY-CUM-
PARA-MILITARY SITUATION THAT WILL END PROBABLY BY BRINGING

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04108 292310Z

DOWN THE JORDANIAN REGIME AS WELL AS DESTROYING ANY HOPE OF GETTING ANYWHERE WITH JARRING MISSION.

3. IF ISRAEL HAS DISREGARDED PARA FOUR, IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE SYG HIMSELF CAN BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE DISREGARDED PARA FIVE OF THE MAR 24 RESOLUTION. WE ARE LEFT WITH THE TROUBLING THOUGHT THAT THERE MAY BE NO EFFECTIVE MEASURES THE UN CAN TAKE. WE MAY BUY TIME WITH RESOLUTIONS THAT ARE SO EVEN-HANDED AND INEFFECTUAL THEY CAN OBTAIN A CONSENSUS. THE QUESTION IS WHAT CAN WE DO WITH THE TIME THUS BOUGHT.

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 4108A ~~SECRET~~

4. WE SHOULD JOIN THE REST OF THE SC MEMBERS IN SAYING ONCE AGAIN THAT THE PARTIES MUST MOVE TOWARDS ACCEPTANCE OF THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION AND COOPERATION WITH THE JARRING MISSION. WHILE THIS ESSENTIAL, IT IS CLEAR THAT IT WILL NOT BUY ENOUGH TIME TO STOP THE PRESENT CYLCE OF VIOLENCE. WE NEED SOMETHING MORE. SINCE WE AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE UN STILL CONSIDER THAT THE WEST BANK IS "OCCUPIED TERRITORY", THEN IT SEEMS TO US WE AND THE UN HAVE THE RIGHT TO INSIST UPON BEING ABLE TO PLACE UN OBSERVERS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, OR TO TAKE OTHER MEASURES TO HELP ISRAEL POLICE IT. SIMILARLY, WE HAVE THE RIGHT TO STATION UN OBSERVERS ALONG THE JORDAN SIDE OF THE CEASEFIRE LINE

5. AS WE SEE IT, THEREFORE, THE U.S. AIM IN A RENEWED SC REVIEW OF THIS MATTER SHOULD BE TO TRY TO OBTAIN A GREATLY STRENGTHENED UN PRESENCE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY AND ON THE JORDAN SIDE OF THE CEASEFIRE LINE WITH A CLEAR MANDATE TO STOP VIOLENCE. WE HERE HAVE ALWAYS VISUALIZED NEED FOR SOMETHING LIKE UNEF TO PROVIDE TRANSITIONAL SUPERVISION OF A DEMILITARIZED WEST BANK AS PART OF IMPLEMENTATION OF NOV 22 RESOLUTION. WE SUGGEST SUCH A FORCE IS NEEDED NOW, EVEN

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 4108A ~~SECRET~~

BEFORE THE PARTIES HAVE REACHED A SETTLEMENT. WE DO NOT THINK THAT THIS FORCE WOULD HAVE TO BE ESTABLISHED UNDER

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 04108 292310Z

TERMS OF THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS OR ANY OTHER CONTROVERSIAL UN MACHINERY BUT SHOULD BE INSTITUTED UNDER THE EARLIER CEASEFIRE RESOLUTIONS AND THE RESOLUTIONS OF NOV 22 AND MAR 24. JORDAN AND ISRAEL HAVE SHOWN THAT THEY BY THEMSELVES CANNOT PREVENT VIOLENCE BY FEDAYEEN. THE WORLD COMMUNITY NOW HAS A RIGHT, IF NOT AN OBLIGATION, TO DO IT FOR THEM BECAUSE THE THREAT IS TO MORE THAN THOSE IMMEDIATELY CONCERNED.

4. BOTH PARTIES WILL STRENUOUSLY OBJECT TO SUCH A PROPOSITION, BUT IT HAS THE MERIT OF BEING EMINENTLY REASONABLE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND THERE ARE NO APPARENT ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVES.
GP-3

SYMMES

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SECRET 536

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04104 291655Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 291605Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5090
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1447
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1571
USUN 817

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4104

EXDIS

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

REF: USUN 4328

THERE SEEMS TO BE SOME CONFUSION ON BUNCHE'S PART CONCERNING LATEST DATE OF JARRING'S VISIT TO AMMAN. JARRING PAID ONE-DAY VISIT HERE MAR 20, RETURNING NICOSIA THAT EVENING. FIGHTING DID NOT BREAK OUT UNTIL EARLY MORNING MAR 21.
GP-3

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~~SECRET~~ 104

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04060 281114Z

14
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00,CCO 00,NSCE 00,1030 W

0 R 281054Z MAR 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5064
INFO CINCSTRIKE

2

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4060

EXDIS

DELIVER ACTION OFFICER OPENING BUSINESS MAR 28

REF: STATE 136987

1. MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING AND PROTOCOL SIGNED BY AMBASSADOR AND PRIME MINISTER TALHOUNI AS SCHEDULED 0930 LOCAL TIME MARCH 28.

2. GOJ OFFICIALS (TALHOUNI AND GENL KHAMMASH) AGREED TO OUR REQUEST AVOID PUBLICITY PER PARA TWO REFTEL.

3. CORRESPONDENTS NOW IN AMMAN HAVE BEEN PRESSING FOR

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4060A ~~SECRET~~
INFORMATION ON THIS TOPIC. WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY FOLLOWED

"NO COMMENT" POSTURE BUT HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED DISCUSSIONS CONTINUING. WE SHALL NOW SIMPLY STATE THAT WE HAVE NO COMMENT AND THAT SUBJECT MUST REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL MATTER BETWEEN GOJ AND USG.

4. PLEASE ADVISE EMBASSY IMMEDIATELY IF ANYTHING SHOULD BREAK ON THIS IN WASHINGTON. SYMMES

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By 10/16/01 NARA, Date 10/16/01

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~~SECRET~~ 678

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04057 271804Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P 271650Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5061

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4057

EXDIS

SUBJ: KING HUSSEIN'S CONCERN OVER POSSIBILITY NEW ISRAELI ATTACK

1. KING HUSSEIN ASKED ME TODAY WHAT I KNEW ABOUT ISRAELI BUILDUP TAKING PLACE IN THE BEIT SHEAN AREA. I REPLIED THAT HIS MILITARY HAD INFORMED US OF SUCH BUILDUP BUT WITHOUT GIVING SPECIFICS. I SAID ALTHOUGH I HAD NO POSITIVE INFORMATION INDICATING SUCH AN ISRAELI BUILDUP, I HAD NO REASON TO BELIEVE ISRAELIS HAD REMOVED THE FORCES PLACED IN THAT AREA BEFORE MARCH 21 ATTACK. IN RESPONSE TO HIS QUESTION I ACKNOWLEDGED I WAS AWARE OF VARIOUS THREATS AGAINST JORDAN MADE IN PAST FEW DAYS BY ISRAELI LEADERSHIP.

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4057 ~~SECRET~~

KING SAID HE IS EXTREMELY CONCERNED THAT AN ISRAELI ATTACK IN THIS AREA WILL LEAD TO "SOMETHING MUCH LARGER." HE WILL HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO FIGHT TO THE LAST MAN IF THE ISRAELIS AGAIN VIOLATE THE CEASEFIRE LINE AS THEY DID ON MARCH 21. HE URGED THAT I DO WHATEVER I COULD TO PREVAIL UPON THE USG TO USE ALL POSSIBLE MEANS TO PREVENT ANY FURTHER ISRAELI REPRISALS AGAINST JORDAN.
GP-3. SYMMES

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By lis, NARA, Date 11-20-02

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~~SECRET~~ 505

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 04052 271414Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO SSD 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

0 271400Z MAR 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMZGIATE 5057

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4052

#XDIS

SUBJ: JORDAN ARMS-MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING

REF: AMMAN 4026

KING HUSSEIN JUST REQUESTED THAT I SIGN MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING WITH PRIMIN TALHOUNI TODAY. I OBTAINED AGREEMENT TO PUT IT OFF UNTIL TOMORROW MORNING AT 0730 ZULU, USING AS EXCUSE THAT WE WERE STILL TYPING IT. REQUEST IMMEDIATE AUTHORIZATION. GP-3.

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~~SECRET~~ 979

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ACTION SS 30

INFO USUE 00, /030 W

R 261430Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5042
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1435

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4030

EXDIS

REF: TEL AVIV 3029

SUBJ: JORDAN INTERNAL SITUATION AND FUTURE OF JARRING MISSION

1. WE WISH THE SILVER LINING POSSIBILITY MENTIONED IN REFTEL WERE APPARENT IN JORDAN. UNFORTUNATELY, THE JORDANIAN PROTESTATIONS OF VICTORY HAVE NOT PREVENTED THE GRAPEVINE FROM BEGINNING TO SPREAD THE ACTUAL FACTS OF A FURTHER HUMILIATION AT THE HANDS OF ISRAEL. ALTHOUGH MANY BELIEVE THE GOI INTENDED A DEEPER PENETRATION OF THE EAST BANK ON MARCH 21 AND WAS PUSHED BACK BY JAA, IT IS ALSO CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THE GOI COULD HAVE HIT OTHER CENTERS WITH AIR STRIKES HAD IT CHOSEN TO DO SO. SO JORDANIANS SPECULATE THAT "DEFEAT" OF MARCH 21 WILL TEMPT ISRAEL TO CHOOSE DIFFERENT TARGETS NEXT TIME. THUS FAR FROM GIVING THE KING GREATER FLEXIBILITY

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4030A ~~SECRET~~

VIS-A-VIS THE ARAB STATES AND HIS OWN PEOPLE, WHETHER IN HIS APPROACH TO THE JARRING MISSION OR ON ANY OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUE, THE MARCH 21 AFFAIR, IN OUR VIEW, HAS SERIOUSLY LIMITED THE KING'S FLEXIBILITY AND CAPABILITY TO TAKE INITIATIVES FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. UNLESS THERE SHOULD BE SOME SIGNIFICANT AND DRAMATIC SHIFT IN THE ISRAELI APPROACH TO THIS WHOLE PROBLEM OF ACHIEVING SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE WEATHER FORECAST IS GLOOMY INDEED.

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NLJ 02-207
By us, NARA, Date 11-20-02

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2. MOREOVER, REFTEL APPEARS TO OVERLOOK THAT THE KING HAD SHOWN CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY IN HIS APPROACH TO THE JARRING MISSION. HE HAS SOUGHT CONSISTENTLY IN THE FACE OF BOTH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN ARAB OPPOSITION, TO TAKE A MODERATE AND REALISTIC APPROACH AS COMPARED WITH OTHER PARTIES. THIS APPROACH STILL EMERGED EVEN IN HIS MARCH 23 PRESS CONFERENCE (AMMAN 4006). THUS, THE QUESTION ASKED IN TEL AVIV 3029 IS SOMEWHAT PUZZLING. IS EMBASSY SUGGESTING THERE SHOULD BE GREATER FLEXIBILITY-- IN THE FORM, PERHAPS, OF SEPARATE AND DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO A PEACE TREATY? WHAT WOULD "GREATER FLEXIBILITY" ENTAIL?

3. WE HERE CONCLUDE THAT UNFORTUNATELY ISRAEL'S MARCH 21 ACTION HAS DASHED HOPES WE HAD OF ANY EARLY REVERSING OF TREND

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 403A ~~SECRET~~
TOWARDS INCREASED GUERRILLA ACTIVITY. THE CYCLE OF ISRAELI REPRISAL RAIDS, UNILATERAL ACTIONS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AND REFUSAL TO RESPOND TO UR SUGGESTIONS AND REQUESTS (RE JERUSALEM AND REFUGEES) FOR IMPROVING THE CLIMATE OF JARRING'S MISSION HAVE HAD NET EFFECT OF DECREASING JORDAN FLEXIBILITY. WE ARE STILL TRYING TO ASSESS THE FULL DAMAGE.

4. THE FOLLOWING HOWEVER HAVE IMPRESSED US AS THE MORE SIGNIFICANT RESULTS OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION POLICIES AND THE MOST RECENT SERIES OF REPRISAL ACTIONS:

A. THE KING'S POPULARITY HAS HAD AN IMMEDIATE (BUT PROBABLY EPHEMERAL) UPLIFT. NEVERTHELESS, HIS POTENTIAL FOR CONTROLLING THE FEDAYEEN HAS BEEN DECIDELY REDUCED, AND IF THE FEDAYEEN WERE BETTER ORGANIZED AND THEIR POLITICAL PURPOSES WERE FOCUSED, THE REGIME WOULD HAVE A REALLY HOT POTATO TO HANDLE. WE RATE THE PROBABILITY AS HIGH THAT THE FEDAYEEN GROUPS INEVITABLY WILL DEVELOP A SHARPER POLITICAL FOCUS AGAINST THE REGIME ITSELF.

B. WE CANNOT BE CATEGORICAL AS TO WHETHER THE KING NOW WILL HAVE GREATER OR LESS FLEXIBILITY VIS-A-VIS THE OTHER ARAB STATES IN DEALING WITH THE JARRING MISSION. THAT, OF COURSE, DEPENDS TO A LARGE DEGREE ON THE STILL EMERGING

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ATTITUDES OF THE OTHER ARAB STATES. IT IS OUR PRESENT READING, HOWEVER, THAT THE KING WILL HAVE LESS RATHER THAN MORE FLEXIBILITY. FOR ONE THING, HIS FINANCIAL DEPENDENCE ON THE RICH ARAB STATES FOR SUPPORT HAS HEIGHTENED BECAUSE THERE IS EVERY REASON TO EXPECT THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE JORDAN VALLEY'S HAVING BEEN MADE INTO A VIRTUAL NO-MAN'S LAND WILL HAVE FURTHER SERIOUS ADVERSE EFFECTS ON THE JORDANIAN ECONOMY. WE HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT LIBYA, KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA AS DONORS OF FINANCIAL AID WOULD APPROVE THE KING'S BEING MORE FLEXIBLE THAN HE ALREADY IS-- CERTAINLY NOT IF "MORE FLEXIBLE" MEANS SEPARATE, DIRECT TALKS LEADING TO A SIGNED PEACE TREATY WITH ISRAEL. PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT, THE INCREASED POPULARITY OF THE FEDAYEEN IN JORDAN AND THROUGHOUT THE ARAB WORLD; THE CONTINUING EXTREMISM OF SYRIA; AND THE REPORTED INTERNAL STRAINS IN THE UAR--ALL OF THESE MILITATE AGAINST THE KING'S BEING MORE FORTHCOMING THAN HE HAS ALREADY BEEN.

C. COMBINING (A) AND (B) ABOVE, WE WOULD EXPECT, IF WE HAD TO MAKE A PREDICTION, THAT THE KING PROBABLY WILL BE ABLE TO HANG ON FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. TO DO SO, HOWEVER, HE WILL PROBABLY BE FORCED TO TAKE A HARDER "ARAB" LINE UNLESS THERE SHOULD BE SOME UNEXPECTED FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE UAR OR ELSEWHERE IN THE ARAB WORLD. WE DO NOT SEE SUCH

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 4030A ~~SECRET~~
DEVELOPMENTS AS PROBABLE OR EVEN POSSIBLE AT THIS TIME. WE WOULD EXPECT THAT A "PARA-MILITARY STATE" COULD HANG ON IN JORDAN UNDER THE KING'S AEGIS FOR SOME TIME TO COME. THIS COULD LEAD ULTIMATELY TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF CLOSE JORDANIAN RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH COULD IN TURN HAVE UNFORTUNATE REPERCUSSIONS IN SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT AND LEBANON SO FAR AS U.S. INTERESTS ARE CONCERNED.

D. WE ARE FORCED TO CONCLUDE THAT IT IS NOT SO MUCH WHETHER "GREATER FLEXIBILITY" IS OUT OF THE QUESTION AS IT IS WHETHER ISRAEL IS GOING TO ALLOW HUSSEIN AND THE OTHER ARAB STATES ANY ALTERNATIVE TO THE BLEAK PROSPECTS WE NOW SEE.

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ISRAEL HOLDS IN ITS HANDS THE CAPABILITY TO CREATE A CLIMATE FOR ARAB FLEXIBILITY AND MODERATIONS.

4. WE OUTLINED IN AMMAN 3784 WHAT WE CONSIDERED THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF AN ENVIRONMENT FOR SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES. THESE ACTIONS THAT CAN ONLY BE TAKEN BY ISRAEL. THE LIST LEAVES OUT ONE OTHER FACTOR, HOWEVER, WHICH IS THE NEED FOR A BASIC CHANGE OF ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE ARAB NEIGHBORS WITH WHOM ISRAEL MUST LIVE. AN EVALUATION OF REPRISAL RAIDS OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS DEMONSTRATES THAT THE ARABS CERTAINLY DO NOT "UNDERSTAND" FORCE AND THAT THE ISRAELIS APPARENTLY DO NOT UNDERSTAND ARABS. THE SPIRIT OF

PAGE 6 RUQMG 4030A ~~SECRET~~

PEACEFUL ACCOMMODATION ENUNCIATED BY A FEW GOI SPOESMEN LIKE EBAN IS CONTRADICTED BY THE PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS OF MANY OTHERS AND BY THE CYCLE OF ACTIONS DESCRIBED IN PARA 3 ABOVE. THE IMAGE THAT COMES THROUGH TO THE JORDANIANS IS OF AN ISRAEL THAT IS UNACCOMMODATING AND EXPANSIONIST WITHOUT A REAL DESIRE FOR PEACE.

5. THE FOREGOING IS VERY GLOOMY. IT IS MEANT TO BE. WE CERTAINLY DO NOT BELIEVE ALL OF THE "GIVE" MUST BE FROM THE ISRAELIS, BUT WE ARE BOUND TO SAY ISRAEL WILL HAVE TO CHANGE THE INGREDIENTS OF ITS APPROACH IF IT DESIRES TO REACH A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT (AND WE DO NOT MEAN A SIT-DOWN TYPE VERSAILLES TREATY) WITH ITS NEIGHBORS. AS THE KING HAS PUT IT, THIS MAY BE THE "FIRST" AND THE "LAST" CHANCE FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

6. OUR ANSWER, THEN, TO SEARCH FOR "SOME SILVER LINING TO CLOUD CAST BY ISRAELI MILITARY ACTION" MUST CAST THE INITIATIVE BACK ON ISRAEL'S OWN LEADERS. FURTHER JORDANIAN FLEXIBILITY APPEARS POSSIBLE ONLY IF ISRAELIS CAN BE PERSUADED CHANGE THEIR APPROACH.

GP-1

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6039

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4026

EXDIS

SUBJ: JORDAN ARMS

REF: STATE 135613

DELIVER ACTION OFFICER OPENING BUSINESS MARCH 26

1. ON BASIS MEETING WITH KHAMMASH THIS MORNING WE BELIEVE KING WILL PROBABLY AUTHORIZE SIGNING MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING AS TRANSMITTED BY A-34 WITH ADDITION IN PARA 3C OF MEMO ON ONE HUNDRED QUAD 50'S AS CONFIRMED REFTEL.

2. ON ASSUMPTION KING'S FINAL APPROVAL WILL BE FORTHCOMING, REQUEST DEPT AUTHORIZATION FOR ME TO SIGN MARCH 27.

SYMMES

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NLJS 98001
By ag/ll NARA, Date 10/14/01

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5032
INFO CINCPAC

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4012

SUBJECT: JORDAN ARMS

REFERENCE: STATE 135613; AMMAN 4004

AS WE HAVE REPORTED IN AMMAN 4004, UNFORTUNATELY KING AND
KHAMMASH CONSIDER OUR WORD AS A GOVERNMENT IS ENGAGED IN THIS
MATTER OF AVAILABILITY OF 155S. I BELIEVE THAT TO SAY "WE ARE
STILL INVESTIGATING" IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES JUST WILL NOT WASH
AND COULD HAVE CONSEQUENCES WE WANT TO AVOID.

BEFORE EMBASSY TAKES FURTHER ACTION ON THIS (HOPEFULLY TOMORROW)
I REQUEST URGENT RECONSIDERATION IN THE LIGHT OF FACTORS DISCUSSED
IN AMMAN 4004.

GP-1. SYMMES

NOTE: HANDLED EXDIS PER S/S-0.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
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By AK NARA Date 10/4/01

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ACTION SS 30

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5026
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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-233
By iss NARA, Date 8-7-03

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4004

EXDIS:

REF: CINCSTRIKE STRCC 2326 MAR 23 (SECRET NOFORN)

SUBJECT: JORDAN ARMS PACKAGE

JOINT EMBASSY-DATT MESSAGE

1. FULLER BACKGROUND THAN MAY BE AVAILABLE TO CINCSTRIKE RE
FEB 10 DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON CONCERNING JORDAN'S REQUEST

PAGE 2 RUQMG 4004A ~~SECRET~~
FOR 155 GUN WAS CONTAINED AMMAN TELS 3417 AND 3419, ORIGINALLY
SENT SECSTATE AS SOLE ADDRESSEE.

2. TO RECAP NATURE OF DISCUSSION BRIEFLY, WHEN KHAMMASH MET
WITH SECDEF MCNAMARA FEB 10 HE COMMENTED TO SECRETARY THAT
DESPITE STATEMENT USG WAS REPLACING BULK OF JORDAN'S JUNE
LOSSES NO PROVISION HAD BEEN MADE FOR 155 GUNS. MCNAMARA
THEREUPON TURNED TO DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHWARZ,
IN PRESENCE KHAMMASH, AND ASKED SCHWARZ TO CHECK ON AVAIL-
ABILITY THESE GUNS AND ADVISE KHAMMASH PRIOR TO LATTER'S
DEPARTURE AFTERNOON FEB 10 FOR LONDON. SCHWARZ TELEPHONED
KHAMMASH THAT AFTERNOON TO INFORM HIM IT APPEARED ABOUT
NINE OR TEN GUNS WERE AVAILABLE. THIS EXCHANGE WAS INTER-
PRETED BY KHAMMASH AS COMMITMENT TO INCLUDE THESE GUNS AS

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PART OF SALE CASE AND HE SO INFORMED KING.

3. WE DO NOT WISH CHALLENGE CINCPAC'S CONCLUSION (PARA 3 REFTEL) THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT OPERATION 155 GUNS WOULD BE PRIMARILY DEFENSIVE. IN THIS CONNECTION, HOWEVER, WOULD NOTE FOLLOWING FACTS GOVERNING CURRENT JAA DEPLOYMENT

PAGE PAGE 3 RUQMKG 4004A ~~SECRET~~
OF 155 GUNS:

A. WE BELIEVE JORDANIANS HAVE BEEN EMPLOYING THE TWO BATTERIES OF 155MM GUNS IN THE NORTHERN SECTOR TO SUPPORT THE 2ND DIVISION AND THE 155MM HOW BN IN CENTRAL SECTOR IN SUPPORT OF 1ST DIV.

B. GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE TERRAIN IT APPEARS PROBABLE THE 155MM GUNS ARE LOCATED ON THE PLATEAU SOME 14 KMS EAST OF THE JORDAN RIVER AT ALTITUDE CONTOUR 300 METERS. IN FACT RECENT ISRAELI AERIAL PHOTOS AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON (BUT NOT HERE) SUGGEST 4X155MM GUNS ARE LOCATED IN TAIYIBA (3233N-3543E), WHICH IS IN FACT IN GENERAL AREA OF SAMAA (3238N-3549E), KIFR ASSAD (3236N-3542E) AND DEIR ABU SA'ID (3230N-3541E). THESE AREAS WERE ATTACKED BY AIR ON FEB 15. WE HAVE LONG ESTIMATED ARTILLERY LOCATED THIS AREA.

C. RANGE ARCS DRAWN FROM TAIYIBA PLACE MINIMUM EFFECTIVE 14000 YD RANGE OF 155MM GUN ALONG JORDAN RIVER AND MAXIMUM 25000 YD LINE 3 KMS WEST OF BEIT SEAN. THIS DEPLOYMENT DEFINITELY SUGGESTS A DEFENSIVE POSTURE OF HEAVY 155MM GUNS TO COVER THE VALLEY AREA EXTENDING FROM BEIT SEAN NORTH TO EDGE OF LAKE TIBERIAS.

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 4004A

D. THE NATURE OF THE TERRAIN (A DROP IN ALTITUDE FROM PLUS 300 METERS TO MINUS 200 METERS IN 14 KILOMETERS) MAKES IT INFEASIBLE TO PLACE TOWED HEAVY ARTILLERY IN THE LOWER

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 04004 251623Z

VALLEY.

4. ADMITTEDLY THE PRESENT DEFENSIVE EMPLOYMENT OF GUNS WILL INTRODUCE LARGE DISPERSION ERRORS. IN THIS AND OTHER WAYS THE 155MM GUN IS NOT THE BEST WEAPON FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES. DEFENSE OF THE 100KM JORDAN RIVER LINE WOULD REQUIRE BY US STANDARDS A MINIMUM OF 5 BN OF MEDIUM ARTILLERY AND 2 BNS OF HEAVY ARTILLERY JORDAN AS STATED ABOVE HAS 1 BN OF MEDIUM (155 HOW) ARTY AND TWO BATTERIES OF HEAVY (155MM GUNS) ARTY. IT IS REASONABLE IN THE MILITARY SENSE THAT 10 ADDITIONAL 155MM GUNS CAN BE PROPERLY EMPLOYED TO COVER THE APPROACHES FROM THE WEST BANK HILLS AND GIVE SOME ADDED DEFLECTIONS ALONG LENGTH OF VALLEY. (IN THIS CONNECTION, WE RECALL THAT KHAMMASH'S STATED REQUIREMENT WAS FOR 1 BN OF 155MM HOW PLUS REPLACEMENT OF 10X155MM GUNS LOST IN WAR. THE HOWITZERS WERE NOT INCLUDED IN OUR MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING WHICH ESSENTIALLY LIMITED NEW SALES

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 4004A ~~SECRET~~
PACKAGE TO LOSS REPLACEMENT.)

5. WE SUGGEST IT IS UNPROFITABLE TO ARGUE OFFENSIVE-DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES OF VARIOUS WEAPONS IN HIS PACKAGE. THIS AT BEST IS MATTER DEGREE AND RELATED TO OVERALL CAPABILITIES JAA AND ITS CLEARLY DEFENSIVE POSTURE. RECOMMEND WE KEEP OUR ATTENTION FOCUSED ON OUR UNDERTAKING DO OUR BEST TO REPLACE THE BULK OF JORDAN'S JUNE LOSSES.

6. BASICALLY OUR APPREHENSION OVER OUR BACKING AWAY FROM SUPPLYING ABOUT TEN 155 GUNS IS EXTREMELY TENSE PSYCHOLOGICAL-POLITICAL SITUATION DOMINATING PALACE-JAA RELATIONS AND POTENTIAL EFFECT UPON PALACE DECISION RE US ARMS PACKAGE. OUR APPREHENSIONS ON THIS SCORE PROMPTED US TO SEND AMMAN 3864, 3931 AND 3977. FURTHER DELAY ON OUR PART COULD BE DISASTROUS TO OUR ARMS RELATIONSHIP. WE RISK NOT JUST INCREASED FRICTION IN JORDANIAN-US RELATIONS BUT REOPENING THE WHOLE QUESTION OF A SOVIET-JORDANIAN DEAL.

GP-i. SYMMES

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