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NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SC 01, SP 02, SS 20, SAH 03, AID 28, ACDA 16, AF 09,
RSR 01, SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CCO 00, /153 W

O R 221550Z MAR 68 WVF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5004
USMISSION USUN NYD799
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1375
AMEMBASSY LONDON 792
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1421
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 615
AMEMBASSY RABAT 156
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1547

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AMMAN 3966

SUBJECT: PROPOSED SC RESOLUTION ON MIDDLE EAST
REF: USUN 4251; 4252

1. WE HAVE READ FIVE-POWER DRAFT AND PROPOSED COUNTERDRAFT RESOLUTIONS ON MIDDLE EAST WITH INTEREST AND HAVE FOLLOWING COMMENTS.
2. WE BELIEVE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF ANY SC RESOLUTION ON ME AT THIS TIME OUGHT TO BE ACHIEVEMENT OF RENEWED SUPPORT FOR AND ENDORSEMENT OF NOV 22 '67 RESOLUTION.

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3. WE RECOGNIZE THAT ANY CONDEMNATION OF ISRAELI ACTION YESTERDAY (AND BY IMPLICATION, CONDEMNATION OF ISRAELI REPRISALS GENERALLY) MUST TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION CONTEXT IN WHICH ISRAELI LEADERS HAVE FELT CONSTRAINED TO VIOLATE THE CEASEFIRE

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RESOLUTION. THIS, HOWEVER, SHOULD NOT OBSCURE THE FACT THAT ISRAELI RETALIATIONS HAVE BEEN THE DELIBERATE AND CALCULATED ACTS OF THE GOI WHILE THE JORDANIAN GOVT ON THE OTHER HAND HAS PUBLICLY OPPOSED AND PRIVATELY TRIED TO STOP USE OF ITS TERRITORY BY TERRORISTS AND SABOTEURS. WE BELIEVE IT IS INCUMBENT UPON THE UN TO MAINTAIN A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE ADMITTED ACTS OF SOVEREIGN GOVTS AND THE ACTIVITIES OF IRRESPONSIBLE PERSONS, PARTICULARLY WHEN THOSE LATTER ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN OPPOSED AND EVEN OFFICIALLY CONDEMNED BY THE SECOND GOVT.

4. AT THE SAME TIME OTHER GOVTS THAT HAVE ENGAGED THEMSELVES TO RESPECT THE PRESENT CEASEFIRE HAVE EITHER ACTIVELY ENCOURAGED TERRORISM (AS IN CASE OF SYRIA) OR INDIRECTLY ENCOURAGED AND SUPPORTED IT. TO CONDEMN JORDAN FOR SYRIA'S POSITIVE SUPPORT OR THE UAR'S ACQUIESCENCE IN TERRORISM ASSUMES AT BEST AN ASPECT OF "GUILT BY ASSOCIATION." MOREOVER, SURELY THIS IS

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NOT THE TIME TO CONDEMN JORDAN FOR HAVING FAILED IN ITS EFFORTS TO CONTROL TERRORISM. RATHER IT IS TIME TO TRY TO STRENGTHEN ITS HAND AND TO ENCOURAGE IT TO TAKE MORE EFFECTIVE ACTION.

5. WITH FOREGOING GENERAL PROPOSITIONS IN MIND, IT SEEMS TO US THAT COUNTERDRAFT PROPOSED IN USUN 4252 FAILS IN SEVERAL WAYS TO ADVANCE OURPURPOSE IN PARA 2. AS WE SEE IT, TO ADVANCE THAT PURPOSE THE RESOLUTION OUGHT TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

A. CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL'S DELIBERATE AND ACKNOWLEDGED ACTION IN VIOLATION OF THE CEASEFIRE.

B. CONDEMNATION OF ALL VIOLATIONS AND, SPECIFICALLY, CONDEMNATION OF SABOTAGE AND INFILTRATION ACTIVITIES.

C. REALISTIC DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN GOVTS SUCH AS JORDAN THAT HAVE OFFICIALLY AVOIDED SUPPORT OF TERRORISM AND THOSE GOVTS THAT HAVE AT LEAST INDIRECTLY SUPPORTED IT TO THE EMBARRASSMENT OF JORDAN.

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6. WE BELIEVE A RESOLUTION WITH THESE ELEMENTS WOULD ULTIMATELY HELP THE JORDAN GOVT TO TAKE MORE EFFECTIVE ACTION. SUCH A RESOLUTION WOULD ALSO OBLIGATE OTHER PARTIES TO THE CEASEFIRE

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 3966A ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
AGREEMENT EITHER TO SUPPORT OR ACQUIESCE IN A TIGHTER CONTROL
OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

7. WE SUGGEST THAT CHANGES SUCH AS THE FOLLOWING BE MADE
IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN USUN 4252:

A. IN PARA 3. "LARGE SCALE ACTIONS OF" SHOULD BE
DELETED. SURELY WE CONDEMN "ALL" MILITARY REPRISALS BY
ISRAEL. IN THIS SAME PARA WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT "DE-
PLORES" BE CHANGED TO "CONDEMNS."

B. IN PARA 4. WE WOULD LIKE VERY MUCH TO SEE LANGUAGE
THAT WOULD AVOID ATTRIBUTING TO THE GOJ ANY SUPPORT OR CON-
DONING OF CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. AT
THE SAME TIME IT WOULD BE MOST IMPOLITIC TO CALL PUBLIC ATTEN-
TION TO THE POLICIES OF THE KING AND THE GOJ WITH RESPECT TO
ANTI-TERRORIST POLICIES AND ACTIONS. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE
SAFE TO SAY SOMETHING LIKE "RECOGNIZING THAT THE GOJ HAS SOUGHT
TO OBSERVE ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CEASEFIRE." AS A MIN-
IMUM, WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT THE FINAL "DEPLORES SUCH
ACTIVITIES" AT CLOSE OF PARA 4 BE PLACED IN A SEPARATE PARA.
PLACING IT IN THE SAME SENTENCE CAN ONLY BE READ AS INDICATING
THE GOJ IS LINKED TO AND CONSIDERED TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 3966A ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES THAT HAVE OCCURRED.

C. BESIDES PLACING THE "DEPLORING" OF SUCH ACTIVITIES
IN A SEPARATE PARA, WE WOULD ALSO RECOMMEND THAT THERE BE
ADDED AN ADDITIONAL CLAUSE: "CALLS UPON ALL STATES THAT ARE
PARTIES TO THE CEASEFIRE RESOLUTIONS TO TAKE IMMEDIATE
MEASURES TO CONTROL SUCH ACTIVITY WITHIN THEIR OWN TERRITORY

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AND REFRAIN FROM ENCOURAGING OR SUPPORTING THEM IN OTHER
STATES."

D. FINALLY, WITH RESPONSIBILITIES OF OTHER PARTIES TO
THE CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION IN MIND, WE RECOMMEND BROADENING
CONTACTS MENTIONED IN PARA 8 TO INCLUDE THE GOVTS OF THE
UAR, SYRIA, AND LEBANON AS WELL AS THE GOVTS OF ISRAEL AND
JORDAN.

GP-3. SYMMES



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ACTION SS 30

INFO SSD 00, /030 W

O R 211132Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4987
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EXDIS

SUBJECT: JORDAN ARMS

REF: AMMAN 3864

IN VIEW CURRENT SITUATION IT IS ESSENTIAL WE BE ABLE PROVIDE ALL POSSIBLE REASSURANCES OF OUR SUPPORT TO KING AND GOJ. ACCORDINGLY, HOPE WE CAN HAVE REPLY TODAY TO QUESTIONS RAISED IN REFTEL.

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GPM 03, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NIC 01, NSC 10, O 02, OC 06, OPR 02, P 04,
PER 02, RSC 01, SAH 03, SC 01, SCA 02, SCS 04, SP 02, SS 23, SY 03,
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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4977
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1401
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1526
USUN 0782
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1361
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COMSIXTHFLT
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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3919

REF: TEL AVIV 2982.

SUBJ: JORDAN-ISRAEL

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PAGE 2 RUQMG 3919A ~~SECRET~~

1. I CALLED DEPUTY PRIMIN TOUQAN 0615 ZULU TO INFORM HIM WE HAD BEEN INFORMED BY ISRAELIS GOVT IT INTENDED TODAY'S TO BE LOCALIZED ACTION AGAINST TERRORIST BASES. I NOTED THIS SEEMED TO BE CONFIRMED BY PUBLIC ISRAELI STATEMENT NOW BEING BROADCAST BY ISRAEL RADIO.

2. TOUQAN INFORMED ME THAT PAMPHLETS NOW BEING DROPPED

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03919 210733Z

BY ISRAELIS OVER KARAMA CAMP TELLING INHABITANTS TO BRING OUT THEIR ARMS, AND LEAVE THEM OUTSIDE DOORS. TOUQAN COMMENTED THIS ALSO SUGGESTED LOCALIZED NATURE OF CURRENT ATTACK, BUT HE NOTED RIVER CROSSINGS EXTENDED FROM DAMIYA TO POINTS SOUTH OF DEAD SEA. SYMMES //

GP-4

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~~SECRET~~ 251

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INFO SSO 00,CCO 00,NSCE 00,1030 W

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4969

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EXDIS

SUBJECT: CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR JORDAN

1. IN PRESENT HEIGHTENED STATE OF JORDAN-ISRAELI TENSIONS WE ASSUME DEPT LIKE US HAS WONDERED ABOUT POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTIONS ISRAEL MIGHT TAKE. TO US FOLLOWING APPEAR TO BE PRINCIPAL POSSIBILITIES: (A) SPOILING ACTION AGAINST SUSPECTED TERRORISTS LOCATED IN EAST BANK SECTOR OF VALLEY INVOLVING BATTLE WITH JAA UNITS AND DESTRUCTION OF PRINCIPAL ROAD NETWORK FROM PLATEAU TO RIVER; (B) RAID ON AQABA; (C) OCCUPATION OF AQABA; (D) RAID ON INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES IN ZERKA AREA INCLUDING REFINERY; (E) RAID ON AMMAN OR NORTHERN JORDANIAN CENTERS APPROACHING EITHER FROM VALLEY OR IN SWEEP EASTWARD ACROSS FROM PRESENT SYRIAN-ISRAELI CEASEFIRE LINE ENTERING JORDAN PERHAPS VIA DERA'A AND RAMTHA; (F) SEIZURE OF TERRITORY IN NORTHERN JORDAN; (G) SEIZURE OF EAST BANK AT LEAST AS FAR EASTWARD AS NORTH-

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3911A ~~SECRET~~
SOUTH LINE FROM RAMTHA TO AQABA.

2. ANY RETALIATORY MILITARY ACTION BY ISRAEL AT THIS TIME WILL POSE A SERIOUS THREAT TO FUTURE STABILITY HERE AND GRAVELY

DAMAGE OUR INTERESTS. WE SUGGEST THAT US CONTINGENCY PLANS BE PREPARED FOR ALL OF FOREGOING POSSIBILITIES. WE WILL NEED TO BE READY TO RESPOND QUICKLY IN EVENT ANY OF THESE SHOULD OCCUR. ANY ISRAELI SEIZURE OF TERRITORY ON EAST BANK WOULD HAVE PAR-

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TICULARLY GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR U.S. INTERESTS IN THE ENTIRE AREA AS WELL AS JORDAN. IN VIEW ANY ISRAELI MOVE INTO TERRITORY BEYOND PRESENT CEASEFIRE LINES WE RECOMMEND U.S. CONTINGENCY POSITION SHOULD INCLUDE IMMEDIATE CALL BY PRESIDENT TO ESHKOLI AFFIRMING WE WILL NOT COUNTENANCE OCCUPATION OF ANY FURTHER TERRITORY BY ISRAELI AND DEMANDING INSTANT WITHDRAWAL. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT OUR POSITION AGAINST ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF FURTHER TERRITORY MIGHT BE MOST USEFULLY CONVEYED TO ISRAELIS NOW RATHER THAN WAITING FOR SUCH A CONTINGENCY.

GP-1. SYMMES

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P R 201420Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4965
INFO USUN NY 774
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1391

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EXDIS:

UNCORRECTED COPY

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

REF: AMMAN 3897

DEPT PASS CAIRO

I SAW KING HUSSEIN SUBSEQUENT TO REFTEL AND REVIEWED CONVERSATION WITH RIFA'I, EXPLAINING I HAD SPOKEN UNDER INSTRUCTIONS. KING SAID HE EXPECTS TO SEE JARRING LATER TODAY AND WILL BE INTERESTED

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3903A ~~SECRET~~
IN WHAT HE HAS TO REPORT. HE CONCLUDED CONVERSATION BY SAYING HE INTENDS TO SEE NASSER NEXT WEEK AND WILL DO ALL HE CAN TO BRING ABOUT A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH BY UAR.

SYMMES

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.

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ACTION SS 30

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P 201012Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4958
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1389
USMISSION USUN NY 772

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EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

SUBJECT: ISRAEL-JORDAN

1. KING INFORMED E-BOFF IN CONVERSATION ON 19TH THAT HE PLANS TO VISIT RIYADH, CAIRO AND BAGHDAD (PROBABLY IN THAT ORDER) AT BEGINNING OF NEXT WEEK. PURPOSE OF VISITS IS TO OBTAIN RE-AFFIRMATION OF SUPPORT FOR JORDANIAN SEARCH FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. KING ALSO INTENDS OBTAIN AGREEMENT OF LEADERS IN THESE CAPITALS TO CEASE SUPPORT OF FEDAYEEN AND OTHER TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. KING CHARACTERIZED FORTHCOMING VISITS

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3894A ~~SECRET~~
AS "PEACE MISSION" AND SAID HE HOPED THAT ISRAEL WOULD DISCONTINUE ITS POLICY OF RETALIATION. HE SAID OBVIOUSLY ANY ISRAELI RETALIATIONS WOULD RENDER HIS EFFORTS FRUITLESS AND MAKE HIS POLICY LOOK RIDICULOUS IN THE EYES OF THE OTHER ARABS.

2. WE HOPE FOREGOING CAN BE APPROPRIATELY GOTTEN ACROSS TO EBAN AND OTHERS AS A FURTHER COMPELLING REASON FOR ISRAEL'S DESISTING FROM RETALIATORY ACTIONS AGAINST JORDAN. OBVIOUSLY IT WOULD BE MOST UNFORTUNATE IF GOI OFFICIALS WERE TO SURFACE THIS INFORMATION PUBLICLY.

3. SUGGEST DEPT PASS THIS TO CAIRO AND JIDDA.

GP-3. SYMMES

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P 201012Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4958
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1389
USMISSION USUN NY 772

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3894

EXDIS

SUBJECT: ISRAEL-JORDAN

1. KING INFORMED EMBOFF IN CONVERSATION ON 19TH THAT HE PLANS TO VISIT RIYADH, CAIRO AND BAGHDAD (PROBABLY IN THAT ORDER) AT

BEGINNING OF NEXT WEEK. PURPOSE OF VISITS IS TO OBTAIN RE-AFFIRMATION OF SUPPORT FOR JORDANIAN SEARCH FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. KING ALSO INTENDS OBTAIN AGREEMENT OF TJADERS IN THESE CAPITALS TO CEASE SUPPORT OF (#) TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. KING CHARACTERIZED FORTHCOMING VISITS

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3894A ~~SECRET~~

AS "PEACE MISSION" AND SAID HE HOPED THAT ISRAEL WOULD DISCONTINUE ITS POLICY OF RETALIATION. HE SAID OBVIOUSLY ANY ISRAELI RETALIATIONS WOULD RENDER HIS EFFORTS FRUITLESS AND MAKE HIS POLICY LOOK RIDICULOUS IN THE EYES OF THE OTHER ARABS.

2. WE HOPE FOREGOING CAN BE APPROPRIATELY GOTTEN ACROSS TO EBAN AND OTHERS AS A FURTHER COMPELLING REASON FOR ISRAEL'S DESISTION FROM RETALIATORY ACTIONS AGAINST JORDAN. OBVIOUSLY IT WOULD BE MOST UNFORTUNATE IF GOI OFFICIALS WERE (#)

INFORMATION PUBLICLY.

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3. SUGGEST DEPT PASS THIS TO CAIRO AND JIDDA.

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NOTE: (#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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SUBJECT: ISRAELI-ARAB
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ACTION SS 30

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4948
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1381
USMISSION USUN NY 769

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EXDIS

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION

I ASKED MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ABDUL MINYIM RIFAI TODAY WHAT LINE SOVIETS HAD BEEN TAKING WITH JORDAN RECENTLY WITH REGARD JARRING MISSION AND GENERAL ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION. RIFAI SAID THAT THE CURRENT SOVIET LINE SEEMED TO BE UNCERTAIN AND UNCLEAR. ONE DAY THEY APPEAR TO TAKE HARD LINE ASSERTING THEY ARE PUTTING PRESSURE ON SYRIA TO DEAL WITH JARRING AND TO TAKE STEPS TO CONTROL TERRORISM. THE NEXT DAY, HOWEVER, THEIR POSITION SEEMS AMBIGUOUS AND EQUIVOCAL WITH REGARD TO THE SAME TOPICS. HE SAID FOREGOING COMMENTS WERE BASED ON CONTACTS OF JORDANIAN OFFICIALS WITH SOVIETS AS WELL AS REPORTS JORDANIANS WERE RECEIVING FROM

PAGE 2 RUMKMG 3879A ~~SECRET~~
OTHER ARAB SOURCES.

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ACTION SS 30
INFO 1030 W

P R 191100Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4943
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1353
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1378
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1511

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 3873

EXDIS

SUBJ: TERRORISM

1. US JOURNALISTS GEORGE DE CARVALHO (REGIONAL EDITOR LIFE) AND JOE ALEX MORRIS (LOS ANGELES TIMES) RETURNED BEIRUT EVENING MARCH 17 AFTER THREE DAY VISIT TO AMMAN. WHILE HERE THEY MADE PARTICULAR INQUIRIES IN THEIR INTERVIEWS, INCLUDING WITH KIN, INTO QUESTION OF TERRORISM WHICH BOTH ARE WRITING UP AS SIGNIFICANT NEW POLITICAL FACTOR IN ARAB-ISRAELI CONFRONTATION. FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS DEVELOPED PRIMARILY BY DE CARVALHO WHO PLANS INCORPORATE IN APRIL LIFE ARTICLE ABOUT NEAR EAST SCENE. MORRIS, HOWEVER, SAID

PAGE 2 RUDMKG 3873/1A ~~SECRET~~
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SCOGE WILL DRAW ON THIS MATERIAL SHORTLY FOR LA TIMES ARTICLE ON TERRORISM.

2. DE CARVALHO TOURED JORDAN VALLEY EVENING MARCH 15 AND FOR SEVERAL HOURS FOLLOWING MORNING WITH TAXI DRIVER WHO DESCRIBED SELF AS AL-FATAH COURIER. ON BOTH OCCASIONS, DE CARVALHO SAID, TAXI WAS WAVED THROUGH SEVERAL GOJ ROAD BLOCKS ENROUTE VALLEY AFTER DRIVER

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IDENTIFIED SELF AS MEMBER FATAH MILITARY ARM AL-ASIFA.

3. ACCORDING DE CARVALHO, REPS OF FATAH, TERM WHICH HE USED TO COVER ALL TERRORISTS HE MET IN VALLEY, SEEMED TO BE MUCH MORE IN EVIDENCE THAN REPS JAA OR PUBLIC SECURITY. THEY WERE DRESSED IN CAMOUFLAGE UNIFORMS (SYRIAN ISSUE), IN MIXTURE OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY DRESS AND SOME SIMPLY IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES. ONE WORE FATIGUE CAP WITH SYRIAN ARMY INSIGNIA. WEAPONS CARRIED WERE SOVBLOC MANUFACTURED AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, INCLUDING THE KALASHNIKOV AND DRAKOV MODELS.

4. FATAH REPS STATED IN SEVERAL MEETINGS THAT SUPPLIES, MONEY AND AMMO WERE NO PROBLEM. THEY CLAIMED TO HAVE DIRECTED SEVERAL THOUSAND CIVILIANS TO REMAIN IN VALLEY

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3873/1A ~~SECRET~~

AFTER FEB 15 EXODUS TO PROVIDE SERVICES INCLUDING COOKING AND VEHICLE MAINTENANCE FOR FATAH. THEY STATED THEY HAD EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH JORDANIAN ARMY AND POLICE AND DE CARVALHO ON AT LEAST TWO OCCASIONS FOUND REPS OF BOTH SERVICES PARTICIPATING IN HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH ALLEGED TERRORISTS. ONE FATAH REP EXPRESSED ORGANIZATION'S GRATITUDE TO JAA FOR HAVING PROVIDED COVERING FIRE TO EXTRICATE HIS GROUP FROM IDF ENCIRCLEMENT.

5. DE CARVALHO WASTOLD MOVEMENT WAS APOLITICAL. FATAH DOES NOT CARE WHAT INDIVIDUALS' BACKGROUND MIGHT BE BUT MEMBER WAS TO DO NO POLITICKING WHILE IN MOVEMENT. MEMBERSHIP OVERWHELMINGLY PALESTINIAN BUT OTHER NATIONALITIES ALSO PRESENT. SECOND LARGEST GROUP WAS EAT BANKER FOLLOWED BY EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN. NO RPT NO LEBANESE HAD JOINED UP. DE CARVALHO REMARKED ON DEGREE OF ASCETICISM APPARENTLY REQUIRED WITH SMOKING, DRINKING AND WOMEN BEING FORBIDDEN TO FATAH MEMBERS.

6. ORGANIZATION ON EAST BANK REPORTEDLY CONSISTS OF TEN MAN SECTION UNDER ONE ONE LEADER. FIVE OF THESE SECTIONS ARE ORGANIZED INTO LARGER UNIT WITH ADDITIONAL

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LEADERSHIP. DE CARVALHO HAD IMPRESSION THERE WAS STILL LARGER FORMAL GROUPING ABOVE THAT OF FIVE SECTIONS BUT COULD NOT CONFIRM. ON WEST BANK FATAH OPERATES REPORTEDLY IN SECTIONS OF FIVE MEN FOR GREATER SECURITY; SECTION LEADER ON WEST BANK IS ALLOWED TO KNOW IDENTITY AND WHEREABOUTS OF ONLY ONE OTHER FATAH REP ON WEST BANK. TACTICS INVOLVED EXTENSIVE RECONNAISSANCE ACCORDING ONE FATAH REP WHO CLAIMED TEN CROSSING WERE MADE FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES FOR EVERY ONE WITH MISSION OF SABOTAGE OR ASSASSINATION. IT WAS ASSERTED FATAH CAN NOW PROVIDE TIMELY INFORMATION OF MOVEMENTS ON ALL ISRAELI AIR BASES.

7 RE WHEREABOUTS FATAH HEADQUARTERS, CARVALHO WAS TOLD THAT HEADQUARTERS IS WHEREVER LEADERSHIP HAPPENED TO BE. ONE DAY LEADERS MIGHT BE IN BEIRUT, NEXT IN KUWAIT OR DAMASCUS. BY COINCIDENCE LEADERS, ACCORDING TO SEVERAL FATAH REPS, WERE IN JORDAN VALLEY MARCH 16 BUT DE CARVALHO WAS UNABLE MAKE CONTACT.

8 RE WHAT FATAH EXPECTED TO ACCOMPLISH, DE CARVALHO WAS TOLD THAT ORGANIZATION BELIEVES IT IS ABLE CREATE

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 3873/1A ~~SECRET~~
SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE ON ISRAELIS. ORGANIZATION HAS NO ILLUSIONS IT CAN CRIPPLE IDF. INTENT IS HARRASSMENT AND ANY ISRAELI, CIVILIAN OR MILITARY, IS CONSIDERED FAIR TARGET. IT WAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE GOOD LIKELIHOOD IDF MAY ONE DAY RETALIATE BY OCCUPYING AMMAN, DAMASCUS AND EVEN CAIRO. THIS IS WELCOMED BY FATAH AS BEGINNING OF END FOR ISRAEL.

9 DE CARVALHO GOT IMPRESSION THAT KING HUSSEIN IS WELL REGARDED BY FATAH RANK AND FILE. REPS SHRUGGED OFF KING'S EFFORTS FOR POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AS ROLE WHICH HE MUST PLAY OUT BUT PREDICT HE WILL BE UNSEUCCESSFUL BECAUSE OF ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE. SEVERAL REPS COMMENTED THAT

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THEY HELD NO GRUDGE AGAINST HUSSEIN FOR HAVING ORDERED FATAH ARRESTS IN PAST AND ONE ALLEGED THAT GOJ AND KING "ON OUR SIDE SINCE FEB 15."

10. RE RELATIONS WITH WEST BANKERS, SEVERAL FATAH REPS STATED THAT WEST BANKERS HAD OFFERED MORE SUPPORT IN PAT MONTH THAN EVER BEFORE. FATAH IS CONFIDENT THIS SUPPORT WILL INCREASE. ONE BOASTED "WE ARE TWENTY TIMES STRONGER TODAY THAN PRE-WAR, AND TEN TIMES STRONGER THAN

PAGE 6 RUQMKG 3873/1A ~~SECRET~~
SIX MONTHS AGO".

1. IN LATE AFTERNOON JOINT INTERVIEW WITH KING MARCH 16 DE CARVALHO AND MORRIS ASKED HUSSEIN TO COMMENT ON SOME OF FOREGOING SPECIFICS. KING WENT OFF RECORD TO INFORM REPORTERS THAT HE IN CONTACT WITH LEADERS OF SEVERAL OF THE COMMANDO GROUPS, WHICH HE SAID NOW TOTALED THIRTEEN, AND FELT HE HAD HAD SOME SUCCESS IN COUNSELING THEM TO SUSPEND ACTIVITIES BECAUSE OF DANGERS THIS POSED TO PEACE EFFORTS. HE ALSO CONFIRMED OFF RECORD THAT HE HAD RECENTLY RELEASED FROM PRISON SOME FORTY TERRORISTS IN RETURN FOR COMMITMENT THAT EACH WOULD FORSWEAR FUTURE ACTIVITIES. ASKED IF HE SAW UTILITY IN TERRORIST ACTIONS AS WAY OF PUTTING PRESSURE ON ISRAEL, HUSSEIN REPLIED "PERHAPS THERE IS SOME, BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY THEIR ACTIVITIES GIVE ISRAEL THE PRETEXT TO STRIKE."

HE WARNED SOMBERLY THAT IF EVENTS DRIFTED ALONG PRESENT COURSE IT WOULD SOON NO LONGER BE A QUESTION OF HOW TO CONTROL THE CAMMANDOS. ASKED IF HE MEANT BY THIS HE WOULD BE BROUGHT TO GIVE COMMANDOS SUPPORT, KING REPLIED, "THAT IS QUITE A POSSIBILITY."

(#) APPARENT OMISSION.
CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P R 191100Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4944
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1354
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1379
RUQ
FJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1512

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SECTIONS AMMAN 3873

EXDIS

12. COMMENT: WE HAVE NO REASON QUESTION THAT DE CARVALHO HAS GIVEN AN ACCURATE REPORT TO US OF WHAT HE WAS TOLD IN VALLEY. HOWEVER, WOULD NOTE THAT IF ORGANIZATION IS AS WELL ORGANIZED AND WIDESPREAD AS WAS ASSERTED TO DE CARVALHO, THERE IS GREATDISPARITY BETWEEN ITS CLAIMED CAPABILITY AND THE NUMBER AND SERIOUSNESS OF INCIDENTS ATTRIBUTED TO IT TO DATE. WE SEE MORE THAN A LITTLE BRAGGADOCIO IN SOME OF THE FATAH STATEMENTS TO DE CARVALHO. CLEARLY, HOWEVER, THE EXODUS FROM THE VALLEY IN THE WAKE OF THE FEB 15 SHELLING AND BOMBING HAS BASICALLY CHANGED THE CHARACTER OF THE VALLEY. THIS, PLUS THE POPULAR RESENTMENT OF THE ATTACK AND INCREASEDSYMPATHY FOR THE TERRORISTS, HAS SERIOUSLY COMPLICATED THE REGIME'S ABILITY TO

PAGE 2 RUQMGK 3873/2A ~~SECRET~~
CONTROL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

13. WE DO NOT KNOW HOW MUCH OF THIS MATERIAL WILL EVENTUALLY BE PUBLISHED BY DE CARVALHO AND MORRIS. IN THE MEANTIME, GIVEN THE SENSITIVITY OF THE INFORMATION, WE CONSIDER IT DESIRABLE ITS DISSEMINATION BE STRICTLY CONTROLLED.

GP-3. SYMMES

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~~SECRET~~ 138

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P R 191100Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4943
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1353
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1378
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1511

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 3873

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

SUBJ: TERRORISM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 02-207 (+142)
By Jelco NARA, Date 5-29-05

1. US JOURNALISTS GEORGE DE CARVALHO (REGIONAL EDITOR LIFE) AND JOE ALEX MORRIS (LOS ANGELES TIMES), RETURNED BEIRUT EVENING MARCH 17 AFTER THREE DAY VISIT TO AMMAN. WHILE HERE THEY MADE PARTICULAR INQUIRIES IN THEIR INTERVIEWS, INCLUDING WITH KIN, INTO QUESTION OF TERRORISM WHICH BOTH ARE WRITING UP AS SIGNIFICANT NEW POLITICAL FACTOR IN ARAB-ISRAELI CONFRONTATION. FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS DEVELOPED PRIMARILY BY DE CARVALHO WHO PLANS INCORPORATE IN APRIL LIFE ARTICLE ABOUT NEAR EAST SCENE. MORRIS, HOWEVER, SAID

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3873/1A ~~SECRET~~
HE WILL DRAW ON THIS MATERIAL SHORTLY FOR LA TIMES ARTICLE ON TERRORISM.

2. DE CARVALHO TOURED JORDAN VALLEY EVENING MARCH 15 AND FOR SEVERAL HOURS FOLLOWING MORNING WITH TAXI DRIVER WHO DESCRIBED SELF AS AL-FATAH COURIER. ON BOTH OCCASIONS, DE CARVALHO SAID, TAXI WAS WAVED THROUGH SEVERAL GOJ ROAD BLOCKS ENROUTE VALLEY AFTER DRIVER IDENTIFIED SELF AS MEMBER FATAH MILITARY ARM AL-ASIFA.

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Department of State

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3. ACCORDING DE CARVALHO, REPS OF FATAH, TERM WHICH HE USED TO COVER ALL TERRORISTS HE MET IN VALLEY, SEEMED TO BE MUCH MORE IN EVIDENCE THAN REPS JAA OR PUBLIC SECURITY. THEY WERE DRESSED IN CAMOUFLAGE UNIFORMS (SYRIAN ISSUE), IN MIXTURE OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY DRESS AND SOME SIMPLY IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES. ONE WORE FATIGUE CAP WITH SYRIAN ARMY INSIGNIA. WEAPONS CARRIED WERE SOVBLOC MANUFACTURED AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, INCLUDING THE KALACHNIKOV AND DRAKOV MODELS.

4. FATAH REPS STATED IN SEVERAL MEETINGS THAT SUPPLIES OF MONEY AND AMMO WERE NO PROBLEM. THEY CLAIMED TO HAVE DIRECTED SEVERAL THOUSAND CIVILIANS TO REMAIN IN VALLEY

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3873/1A ~~SECRET~~

AFTER FEB 15 EXODUS TO PROVIDE SERVICES INCLUDING COOKING AND VEHICLE MAINTENANCE FOR FATAH. THEY STATED THEY HAD EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH JORDANIAN ARMY AND POLICE AND DE CARVALHO ON AT LEAST TWO OCCASIONS FOUND REPS OF BOTH SERVICES PARTICIPATING IN HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH ALLEGED TERRORISTS. ONE FATAH REP EXPRESSED ORGANIZATION'S GRATITUDE TO JAA FOR HAVING PROVIDED COVERING FIRE TO EXTRICATE HIS GROUP FROM IDF ENCIRCLEMENT.

5. DE CARVALHO WAS TOLD MOVEMENT WAS APOLITICAL. FATAH DOES NOT CARE WHAT INDIVIDUALS' BACKGROUND MIGHT BE BUT MEMBER WAS TO DO NO POLITICKING WHILE IN MOVEMENT. MEMBERSHIP OVERWHELMINGLY PALESTINAN BUT OTHER NATIONALITIES ALSO PRESENT. SECOND LARGEST GROUP WAS EAST BANKER FOLLOWED BY EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN. NO RPT NO LEBANESE HAD JOINED UP. DE CARVALHO REMARKED ON DEGREE OF ASCETICISM APPARENTLY REQUIRED WITH SMOKING, DRINKING AND WOMEN BEING FORBIDDEN TO FATAH MEMBERS.

6. ORGANIZATION ON EAST BANK REPORTEDLY CONSISTS OF TEN MAN SECTION UNDER ONE ONE LEADER. FIVE OF THESE SECTIONS ARE ORGANIZED INTO LARGER UNIT WITH ADDITIONAL

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LEADERSHIP. DE CARVALHO HAD IMPRESSION THERE WAS STILL LARGER FORMAL GROUPING ABOVE THAT OF FIVE SECTIONS BUT COULD NOT CONFIRM. ON WEST BANK FATAH OPERATES REPORTEDLY IN SECTIONS OF FIVE MEN FOR GREATER SECURITY; SECTION LEADER ON WEST BANK IS ALLOWED TO KNOW IDENTITY AND WHEREABOUTS OF ONLY ONE OTHER FATAH REP ON WEST BANK. TACTICS INVOLVED EXTENSIVE RECONNAISSANCE ACCORDING ONE FATAH REP WHO CLAIMED TEN CROSSING WERE MADE FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES FOR EVERY ONE WITH MISSION OF SABOTAGE OR ASSASSINATION. IT WAS ASSERTED FATAH CAN NOW PROVIDE TIMELY INFORMATION OF MOVEMENTS ON ALL ISRAELI AIR BASES.

7 RE WHEREABOUTS FATAH HEADQUARTERS, CARVALHO WAS TOLD THAT HEADQUARTERS IS WHEREVER LEADERSHIP HAPPENED TO BE. ONE DAY LEADERS MIGHT BE IN BEIRUT, NEXT IN KUWAIT OR DAMASCUS. BY COINCIDENCE LEADERS, ACCORDING TO SEVERAL FATAH REPS, WERE IN JORDAN VALLEY MARCH 16 BUT DE CARVALHO WAS UNABLE MAKE CONTACT.

8 RE WHAT FATAH EXPECTED TO ACCOMPLISH, DE CARVALHO WAS TOLD THAT ORGANIZATION BELIEVES IT IS ABLE CREATE

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 3873/1A ~~SECRET~~

SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE ON ISRAELIS. ORGANIZATION HAS NO ILLUSIONS IT CAN CRIPPLE IDF. INTENT IS HARRASSMENT AND ANY ISRAELI, CIVILIAN OR MILITARY, IS CONSIDERED FAIR TARGET. IT WAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE GOOD LIKELIHOOD IDF MAY ONE DAY RETALIATE BY OCCUPYING AMMAN, DAMASCUS AND EVEN CAIRO. THIS IS WELCOMED BY FATAH AS BEGINNING OF END FOR ISRAEL.

9 DE CARVALHO GOT IMPRESSION THAT KING HUSSEIN IS WELL REGARDED BY FATAH RANK ANDFILE. REPS SHRUGGED OFF KING'S EFFORTS FOR POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AS ROLE WHICH HE MUST PLAY OUT BUT PREDICT HE WILL BE UNSUCCESSFUL BECAUSE OF ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE. SEVERAL REPS COMMENTED THAT THEY HELD NO GRUDGE AGAINST HUSSEIN FOR HAVING ORDERED

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FATAH ARRESTS IN PAST AND ONE ALLEGED THAT GOJ AND KING
"ON OUR SIDE SINCE FEB 15."

10. RE RELATIONS WITH WEST BANKERS, SEVERAL FATAH REPS
STATED THAT WEST BANKERS HAD OFFERED MORE SUPPORT IN
PAST MONTH THAN EVER BEFORE. FATAH IS CONFIDENT THIS
SUPPORT WILL INCREASE. ONE BOASTED "WE ARE TWENTY TIMES
STRONGER TODAY THAN PRE-WAR, AND TEN TIMES STRONGER THAN

PAGE 6 RUQMKG 3873/1A ~~SECRET~~
SIX MONTHS AGO".

1. IN LATE AFTERNOON JOINT INTERVIEW WITH KING MARCH 16
DE CARVALHO AND MORRIS ASKED HUSSEIN TO COMMENT ON SOME
OF FOREGOING SPECIFICS. KING WENT OFF RECORD TO INFORM
REPORTERS THAT HE IN CONTACT WITH LEADERS OF SEVERAL OF
THE COMMANDO GROUPS, WHICH HE SAID NOW TOTALLED THIRTEEN,
AND FELT HE HAD HAD SOME SUCCESS IN COUNSELING THEM TO
SUSPEND ACTIVITIES BECAUSE OF DANGERS THIS POSED TO PEACE
EFFORTS. HE ALSO CONFIRMED OFF RECORD THAT HE HAD
RECENTLY RELEASED FROM PRISON SOME FORTY TERRORISTS IN
RETURN FOR COMMITMENT THAT EACH WOULD FORSWEAR FUTURE
ACTIVITIES. ASKED IF HE SAW UTILITY IN TERRORIST
ACTIONS AS WAY OF PUTTING PRESSURE ON ISRAEL, HUSSEIN
REPLIED "PERHAPS THERE IS SOME, BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY
THEIR ACTIVITIES GIVE ISRAEL THE PRETEXT TO STRIKE."

HE WARNED SOMBERLY THAT IF EVENTS DRIFTED ALONG PRESENT
COURSE IT WOULD SOON NO LONGER BE A QUESTION OF HOW TO
CONTROL THE COMMANDOS. ASKED IF HE MEANT BY THIS HE
WOULD BE BROUGHT TO GIVE COMMANDOS SUPPORT, KING REPLIED,
"THAT IS QUITE A POSSIBILITY."

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ACTION SS 30

INFO 1030 W

P R 191054Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4942
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1377
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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3872

EXDIS

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION

DEPT PASS CAIRO

1. ABDUL MUNIM RIFAI REQUESTED I CALL THIS MORNING. HE ASKED WHAT NEWS I HAD ON JARRING'S DISCUSSIONS IN JERUSALEM YESTERDAY. I HAD SEEN STATE 132392 BEFORE THIS MEETING BUT I TOLD RIFAI THAT I HAD ONLY INCOMPLETE INFORMATION. I SAID IT LOOKED AS IF THE ISRAELIS HAD NOT BOUGHT THE JORDANIAN SUGGESTION. IT WAS NOT CLEAR, ON THE OTHER HAND, WHETHER THE ISRAELIS HAD PROPOSED ANY COMPROMISE LANGUAGE TO JARRING. I GATHERED THAT JARRING WOULD VISIT AMMAN EITHER THE 20TH OR THE 21ST. I ADDED I WOULD LET RIFAI KNOW IF I RECEIVED ANY MORE DEFINITE INFORMATION. MEANWHILE, I WANTED TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF JORDAN'S MAIN-

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3872A ~~SECRET~~
TAINING A FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THIS WHOLE PROBLEM OF LANGUAGE. IT STILL SEEMED TO US, I SAID, THAT ISRAEL HAD ACCEPTED THE RESOLUTION AND THAT IT WAS A WASTE OF TIME TO CONTINUE THE SEMANTICS DEBATE. THE PASSAGE OF TIME IS AGAINST PEACE.

2. RIFAI RESPONDED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED JORDAN'S TACTICS WITH THE KING YESTERDAY. IT HAD BEEN TENTATIVELY DECIDED THAT W JTHAY ISRAEL'S REPLY TO THE JORDANIAN SUGGESTION WAS POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE, THE KING AND RIFAI WOULD PROCEED TO CAIRO TO DISCUSS

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NEXT STEPS WITH THE UAR. RIFAI SAID THAT IT IS EXPECTED THE RESHUFFLING OF THE UAR GOVT WILL TAKE PLACE TODAY. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION, HE SAID JORDAN EXPECTS THE RECONSTITUTED UAR GOVT WILL BE "HARD LINE." HE ALSO VOLUNTEERED THAT THE UAR POSITION ON THE JARRING MISSION "HAD CHANGED AND HAD HARDENED."

3. RIFAI SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE MOST IMPORTANT FOR THE KING AND HIM TO TALK TO ME BEFORE THEY LEAVE AND HE HOPED, THEREFORE, I WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE THEM WITH FULL DETAILS ON THE ISRAELI POSITION AS WELL AS OUR OWN VIEW OF THE SITUATION.

4. REQUEST URGENT GUIDANCE FROM THE DEPT ON WHAT I SHOULD SAY TO THE JORDANIANS BEFORE THEY VISIT CAIRO.

GP-3. SYMMES

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.

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ACTION SS 30

INFO SSD 00, /030 W

P 181630Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4935
INFO OSD/ISA
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EXDIS

SUBJECT: JORDAN ARMS MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING

REF: A-34, MAR 14, 1968

JOINT EMBASSY/DATT MESSAGE

1. REPAIR TRANSMITTING REVISED TEXT OF MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING WITH JORDAN RECEIVED. FROM REVIEW OF TEXT AND ON THE BASIS OF PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS OF DETAILS OF EQUIPMENT IN LAST FEW

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DAYS BETWEEN ASSISTANT ARMY ATTACHE MAP AND REPRESENTATIVE DESIGNATED BY GENERAL KHAMMASH, MAJOR SMARA, THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS HAVE EMERGED.

2. SAMARA SAID GENERAL KHAMMASH HAD INQUIRED AS TO DELIVERY SCHEDULES FOR THE 155MM GUNS. DEPT WILL RECALL PER PARA 6, STATE 113633, SECRETARY MCNAMARA PROMISED TO SEE WHAT WE COULD DO FOR JORDANIANS RE REPLACING 155 GUN LOSSES. DEPT OF ARMY (DCSLOG) MESSAGE 852839, FEB 26, INDICATED THAT TEN 155'S WERE AVAILABLE FOR POSSIBLE FMS CASE TO GOJ. THESE ARE NOT, HOWEVER, INCLUDED IN THE REVISED TEXT OF SALES AGREEMENT. WE REPORTED IN AMMAN 3418 KHAMMASH'S AFFIRMATION OF MR. MCNAMARA'S AGREEMENT TO TRY TO FIND THESE FOR JORDAN. THERE HAS NOT BEEN ANY DISCUSSION OF THE 155 GUNS SINCE THAT TIME, OTHER

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THAN THE COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT, FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF STATE 117988, THAT WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO CHANGE THE QUANTITIES (I.E. ACROSS THE BOARD) OF OUR INITIAL OFFER. FROM THE COMMENT BY MAJOR SAMARA WE ANTICIPATE THAT KHAMMASH WILL ARGUE THAT HE HAS ASSUMED THE 155'S WERE TO BE INCLUDED, UNLESS THEY COULD NOT BE FOUND. WE WOULD APPRECIATE AS EARLY AN ADVICE AS

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POSSIBLE AS TO WHETHER, IN THE LIGHT OF SEC MCNAMARA'S STATEMENT AND THE FACT THAT 155'S ARE APPARENTLY AVAILABLE, THEY MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE REVISED AGREEMENT.

3. WE NOTE THAT 50 CAL QUADS ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED IN THE MEMO TEXT. SHOULD NOT THESE BE SPECIFIED, SINCE THEY DO NOT FALL STRICTLY IN THE CATEGORY OF SMALL ARMS? IT IS RECALLED THAT THE ADD-ON LIST APPROVED PER STATE 128960 INCREASED THE NUMBER OF THESE FROM NINE TO ONE HUNDRED.

4. IN TRANSMITTING THE REQUEST FOR INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF QUAD 50'S (AMMAN 3614, FEB 28), WE STATED WE ASSUMED THE JAA WOULD BE WANTING ADDITIONAL M35A-2 (2 1 2 - TON TRUCKS) FOR MOUNTING THESE WEAPONS. MAJOR SAMARA INDICATED IN THE RECENT DISCUSSIONS A TOTAL REQUIREMENT FOR 120 SUCH TRUCKS, OR 80 MORE THAN THE 40 SPECIFIED IN THE SALES AGREEMENT TEXT. THESE WOULD BE USED TO MOUNT THE QUAD 50'S IN THE PACKAGE PLUS SOME THAT THEY ALREADY HAD ON HAND UNMOUNTED. WOULD IT BE AGREEABLE TO ADD THESE VEHICLES WITH FINANCING COVERED BY ADJUSTMENTS IN THE SPARE PARTS CATEGORY?

PAGE FOUR RUQMKG 3864A ~~SECRET~~

5. REQUEST EARLY REPLY SO THAT WE MAY MOVE RAPIDLY TO SIGNING OF MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING.
SYMMES

~~SECRET~~



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ACTION SS 30

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P R 171900Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4924
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 765
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1375

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3846

EXDIS

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION

REF AMMAN 3839

1. KING HAS PASSED MESSAGE EMPHASIZING IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHES TO JARRING'S VISITING AMMAN FOLLOWING HIS NEXT VISIT TO JERUSALEM, SCHEDULED FOR MONDAY MARCH 18, PRIOR TO PROCEEDING CAIRO.

PAGE TWO RUQMKG 3846A ~~SECRET~~

2. REGARDLESS OF WHAT ISRAELI ANSWER MAY BE TO NEW FORMULATION (REFTEL), KING BELIEVES THAT IT WILL IMPROVE CHANCES OF JARRING MISSION SUCCESS IF JORDANIANS ARE AT THIS STAGE ABLE PREPARE WAY WITH CAIRO.

GP-3
SYMMES

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ACTION SS 30

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4922
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1373

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EXDIS

SUBJECT TERRORISM

REF TEL AVIV 2913

1. I REVIEWED SUBSTANCE OF REFTEL WITH KING HUSSEIN THIS MORNING. I STRESSED THIS SEEMED TO ME AN OPPORTUNITY TO TRY TO REVERSE RECENT TREND OF EVENTS WHEREBY TERRORISTS BECOMING STRONGER AND THREATENING TO BRING DOWN ANOTHER ISRAELI PUNITIVE RAID ON JORDAN.

PAGE TWO RUGMKG 3844A ~~SECRET~~

I RECOGNIZED THAT CONTROL OF TERRORISTS HAD BECOME AN INCREASINGLY MORE SENSITIVE PROBLEM FOR GOJ. WE KNEW THERE TO BE NO ONE HUNDRED PERCENT EFFECTIVE WAY TO CONTROL TERRORISTS. YET MEASURE SUCH AS SUGGESTED BY EBAN, SUPPLEMENTED BY OTHERS SUCH AS BEGINNING WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI TROOPS, COULD HAVE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF REDUCING PRESSURES IN ISRAEL FOR RETALIATION. ISRAELI RESTRAINT IN TURN WOULD IMPROVE ATMOSPHERE FOR TIGHTER CONTROL OF TERRORISTS IN JORDAN.

2. KING SAID HE WOULD BE SEEING COLONEL DAOUD AS WELL AS GENERAL KHAMMASH LATER TODAY WITH INTENTION OF DECIDING WHETHER AND HOW TO HAVE SUCH MEETINGS WITH ISRAELIS. HE AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO TRY TO REVERSE CYCLE OF EVENTS BY WHICH ISRAELI RETALIATION ONLY INCREASED DIFFICULTIES OF CONTROLLING TERRORISTS.

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3. I TOLD KING THAT ISRAELIS HAVE IN PAST OBJECTED TO "HARD LINE" TAKEN BY DAUD. THIS MIGHT BE BECAUSE HE KNEW ARMISTICE LINE SITUATION SO WELL AND WASTHUS ABLE TO "OUTFOX" THE ISRAELIS AT TIMES. ON OTHER HAND, I HOPED HE WOULD GIVE DAUD A BROAD PORTFOLIO SO THAT HE COULD BE FLEXIBLE AND FORTHCOMING. I SAID I BELIVED ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE IN MIND AN EFFECTIVE DISCUSSION OF

PAGE THREE RUQMGK 3844A ~~SECRET~~
SENSITIVE INFORMATION. IF DAUD COULD BE GIVEN SOME FLEXIBILITY IN THIS REGARD WE WOULD IMPRESS UPON ISRAELIS ABSOLUTE NECESSITY OF PROTECTING THE LIAISON ARRANGEMENT AND AVOIDING ALL PUBLICITY NOW AND IN FUTURE. I ALSO SAID THAT I WAS QUITE FRANKLY AT SEA ABOUT WHERE TWO PARTIES STOOD ON MATTER OF MEETING UNDER UN UMBRELLA. IT MIGHT BE THAT ISRAELIS WOULD NOT WANT TO TALK THIS KIND OF BUSINESS IN FRONT OF UN OBSERVERS OR LIAISON OFFICERS. I HOPED THEREFORE THAT UN PRESENCE WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE MADE A STICKING POINT.

4. COMMENT: I THINK THE KING MAY INTEND TO MOVE QUICKLY ON GETTING DAUD DOWN TO THE BRIDGE. I BELIEVE GOJ WILL PROBABLY INSIST ON A UN PRESENCE AT LEAST FOR INITIAL CONTACT. WE SEE NO REASON, HOWEVER, WHY THIS NEED POSE OBSTACLE FOR ISRAELIS. WE BELIEVE JORDANIANS COULD BE TALKED INTO AGREEING TO UN OBSERVER STARTING MEETING AND THEN DRIFTING AWAY. WE HOPE THEREFORE THAT ISRAELIS WILL NOT MAKE AN ISSUE OF UN PRESENCE BUT WILL BE WILLING TO RELAX WHILE WE TRY TO WORK OUT AN ACCEPTABLE MODALITY.
SYMMES

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ACTION SS 30

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P 151630Z MAR 68
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4919
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1371
AMEMBASSY LONDON 780
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 762

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3839/1 SECTION ONE OF TWO

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION

1. SUMMARY: ABDUL MUNIM RIFAI GAVE ME A FULL SUMMARY OF YESTERDAY'S MEETING WITH JARRING, EMPHASIZING THAT WHAT JARRING TOLD JORDAN CONTRADICTED REPORTS OF NEGATIVE ATTITUDE OF RIAD. JARRING SAID HE HAD NOT REPORTED TO EBAN ANYTHING

PAGE TWO RUQMKG 3839/1A ~~SECRET~~

THAT WOULD HAVE JUSTIFIED EBAN'S STATEMENT TO THE PRESS ON THE TWELFTH. JARRING SAID DIFFICULTY LIES IN FACT THAT ISRAEL STRESSES NEGOTIATIONS WHILE CAIRO STRESSES IMPLEMENTATION. JARRING PLANS TO RETURN TO ISRAEL ON MONDAY AND AT THAT TIME WILL SEEK ISRAEL'S AGREEMENT TO REVISION OF FORMULA PROPOSED BY JORDANIANS IN EFFORT BREAK PRESENT IMPASSE WHICH WOULD SAY PARTIES HAVE DECLARED THEIR "ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION AND THEIR READINESS TO IMPLEMENT IT." IF HE IS UNABLE TO GET THIS AGREEMENT FROM ISRAEL, HE WILL HAVE TO REPORT TO THE SEC GEN.

2. RIFAIR GAVE ME VERBATIM REPORT OF HIS NOTES ON DISCUSSIONS YESTERDAY WITH JARRING. WITH REGARD TO REPORTED NEGATIVE ATTITUDE OF RIAD, JARRING HAD SAID DEFINETELY AND EMPHATICALLY

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HE HAD NOT DISCUSSED WITH EBAN A SO-CALLED NEGATIVE ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF RIAD OR CAIRO. WHEN RIFAI READ TO HIM EXCERPTS OF EBAN'S STATEMENT OF MARCH 12 TO THE PRESS, JARRING STRESSED THAT HE WAS NOT THE SOURCE OF SUCH INFORMATION. JARRING ADDED THAT THE NATURE OF HIS MISSION DID NOT PERMIT HIM IN ANY CASE TO PUT THE BLAME ON ONE PARTY IN DISCUSSIONS WITH A SECOND

PAGE THREE RUQMGK 3839/1A ~~SECRET~~

PARTY. ACCORDING TO JARRING, HE HAD TOLD EBAN THAT "CAIRO TAKES A STRONG STAND ON THE NECESSITY OF GETTING CLEAR ACCEPTANCE FROM ISRAEL ON IMPLEMENTING THE RESOLUTION AND PUTTING IT INTO ACTION." UARG CONSIDERS THIS AN ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT AND THE FIRST STEP TO BE TAKEN. JARRING EMPHASIZED TO RIFAI H SAID NOTHING MORE THAN THIS TO EBAN IN DISCUSSING HIS MEETING WITH RIAD.

3. IN EXPLAINING THE PRESENT DIFFICULTY AS HE SEES IT, JARRING TOLD RIFAI HE HAD SAID TO EBAN THAT THE DIFFICULTY CAN BE REDUCED TO TWO WORDS. ISAREL EMPHASIZES "NEGOTIATIONS" AND CAIRO STANDS STRONG ON "IMPLEMENTATION." THE DIFFICULTY IS HOW TO BRING THSE TWO VIEWS TOGETHER.

4. DURING THE TALKS YESTERDAY PRIMIN TALHOUNI COMMENTED TO JARRING THAT HE HAD NOTICED JARRING IS PESSIMISTIC. HE WONDERED IF THIS IS BECAUSE OF HIS LAST DISCUSSIONS IN CAIRO. JARRING HAD REPLIED HIS PESSISMISM WAS NOT BASED ON HIS LAST VISIT TO CAIRO BUT ON THE GENERAL ATMOSPHERE OF THE SITUATION IN ITS TOTALITY.

PAGE FOUR RUQMGK 3839/1A ~~SECRET~~

5. THE JORDAN MINISTERS YESTERDAY REITERATED TO JARRING THAT FROM THE BEGINNING JORDAN HAD ACCEPTED THE RESOLUTION. JORDANIANS HAD ALSO TOLD JARRING FROM THE BEGINNING THAT THEY DID NOT SEE HOW "ACCEPTANCE" COULD BE DETACHED FROM "IMPLEMENTATION." THEY ASKED JARRING'S COMMENTS ON THIS. JARRING HAD RESPONDED THAT THE DECISIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ARE MEANT TO BE "EXECUTIVE" AND NOT JUST "FRIENDLY ADVICE".

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 AMMAN 03839 151747Z

6. JARRING HAD GONE ON TO SAY HE HAS HAD DIFFICULTY IN GETTING A CLEAR STATEMENT FROM ISRAEL OF WILLINGNESS TO IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTION AND THAT HE DOUBTED HE COULD GET SUCH ACCEPTANCE FROM ISRAEL. JARRING ALSO SAID THAT WHEN HE HAD GIVEN HIS PROPOSAL TO RIAD ON THE SEVENTH RIAD HAD SAID THAT THE PROPOSAL WAS USELESS UNLESS ISRAEL WAS WILLING TO AGREE TO IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTION. EBAN ON THE TENTH HAD SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THE ISRAELI CABINET COULD BE PERSUADED TO ACCEPT THE FORMULA, BUT JARRING STILL HAD BEEN UNABLE TO GET FROM EBAN A STATEMENT THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE READY TO IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTION. RIFAI QUERIED JARRING AS TO WHETHER THIS DID NOT

PAGE FIVE RUQMKG 3839/IA ~~SECRET~~

JUSTIFY THE ARABS HAVING DOUBTS AND SUSPICIONS ABOUT ISRAEL'S POSITION. HOW COULD THE ARABS BE EXPECTED TO MEET SOMEWHERE UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES IF THEY WERE ONLY GOING TO FACE AN ARGUMENT AS TO WHETHER THE RESOLUTION IS TO BE IMPLEMENTED. JARRING REPLIED THAT HE COULD SEE THE POINT BUT HE SAID HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO GET A STATEMENT FROM EBAN WITH REGARD TO IMPLEMENTATION.

7. THE JORDANIANS THEN ASKED JARRING SPECIFICALLY WHAT WAS WRONG WITH CAIRO'S PRESENT POSITION. TO THIS JARRING HAD REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT CONSIDER CAIRO WAS "RIGHT" OR "WRONG" BUT RATHER "HARD." CAIRO IS STRESSING NOT ONLY IMPLEMENTATION BUT ALSO IS SAYING THAT ISRAEL MUST ACCEPT PUTTING THE RESOLUTION INTO ACTION. THE UAR WANTS WITHDRAWAL TO START BEFORE EVERYTHING ELSE. THE JORDANIANS WONDERED IF THIS COULD NOT BE A REACTION TO ISRAELI EXTREME STATEMENTS. IN RESPONSE TO THIS, JARRING DID NOT COME DOWN ON ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER BUT SAID IF HE WERE GOING TO CONTINUE FACING A DEADLOCK HE WOULD HAVE TO REPORT TO THE SYG. HE WOULD AVOID REPORTING ANYTHING THAT WOULD FINALLY SHUT THE DOOR BUT HE WOULD HAVE TO SAY

PAGE SIX RUQMKG 3839/IA ~~SECRET~~

SOMETHING ABOUT THE DIFFICULTY HE HAS BEEN FACING. JARRING NOTED THAT CAIRO WANTS TO GO TO THE SC TO GET CLARIFICATION.

~~SECRET~~



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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 AMMAN 03839 151747Z

IN JARRINGJ VIEW, THIS MIGHT BECOME NECESSARY BUT THE RESULT WOULD BE THAT THE SC WOULD ONLY SAY "IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTION," AND HE IMAGINED THERE WOULD BE GREAT DIVISION AND CONFUSION WITHIN THE COUNCIL ABOUT THIS.

2. TALHOUNI AND RIFAI EMPHASIZED TO JARRING THAT JORDAN'S VIEW AT THE PRESENT IS THAT THE MATTER SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN TO THE SC BUT THAT JARRING SHOULD CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS TO GET THE PARTIES TO AGREE TO ACCEPT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION. THEY STRESSED TO JARRING THAT JORDAN WOULD BE READY TO DO ALL IT WOULD TO HELP TOWARDS THIS END. JORDAN IS NOT PROPOSING ANY ORDER OF IMPLEMENTATION BUT STANDS BEHIND ITS PREVIOUS STATEMENTS THAT IT IS WILLING TO IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE AND IN ALL OF ITS PARTS. JORDAN ON THE OTHER HAND DOES NOT SEE HOW THIS CAN GO VERY FAR UNTIL ISRAEL DECLARES ITS READINESS TO PROCEED TO IMPLEMENTATION. IT WAS THEREFORE SUGGESTED TO JARRING THAT HE EXPAND FIRST ELEMENT OF HIS PRESENT PROPOSAL TO READ "THE UAR AND ISRAEL HAVE INDICATED SYMMES

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OCT.

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

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148 27

~~SECRET~~ 146

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03829 151718Z

40
ACTION SS 30
INFO /030 W

P R 151630Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4920
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1372
AMEMBASSY LONDON 781
USUN NEW YORK 763

~~SECRET~~ FINAL SECTION AMMAN 3829

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION

THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION AND THEIR READINESS TO IMPLEMENT IT." IF ISRAEL WOULD ACCEPT THIS, JORDAN CERTAINLY WOULD HAVE NO PROBLEMS. JORDAN ALSO COULD ASSURE JARRING OF ITS CONFIDENCE THAT THE UAR WOULD ACCEPT HIS PROPOSAL IF SO

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3839/2A ~~SECRET~~
MODIFIED.

9. JARRING, IN CONCLUDING, SAID HE HAD BECOME ALMOST DESPERATE BECAUSE OF THE UAR AND ISRAELI POSITIONS. NOW HE WOULD MAKE ONE MORE EFFORT WITH ISRAEL. HE WOULD PLAN TO GO TO ISRAEL ON MONDAY. SINCE RIAD MAY STILL BE TRAVELLING, HE MIGHT COME BACK TO JORDAN FIRST (BEFORE GOING TO CAIRO AGAIN) IF HE GETS POSITIVE REPLY FROM ISRAEL ON MONDAY.

10. OFF THE RECORD RIFAI TOLD ME THAT KING HUSSEIN AND PRIMIN TALHOUNI HAVE AGREED THAT IF JARRING IS ABLE TO GET A POSITIVE REPLY FROM ISRAEL TO THIS MODIFIED PROPOSAL, TALHOUNI AND RIFAI (AND PERHAPS THE KING) MAY PROCEED TO CAIRO TO INSURE THE UAR ACCEPTS THE NEW WORDING.

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 AMMAN 03829 151718Z

11. COMMENT: RIFAI WENT INTO GREAT DETAIL WITH ME AS TO HOW HE HAD PROBED JARRING ABOUT THE UAR AND ISRAELI POSITIONS. FROM RIFAI'S REPORTS OF WHAT JARRING SAID IT LOOKS AS IF THERE HAVE BEEN NEGATIVE ASPECTS IN BOTH THE ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN POSITIONS. I ALSO CANNOT AVOID THE IMPRESSION THAT JARRING

PAGE 3 RUQMGK 3839/2A ~~SECRET~~

SEEMS TO HAVE AN UNHELPFUL KNACK FOR BRINGING OUT AND EMPHASIZING THE NEGATIVE ASPECTS IN BOTH POSITIONS.) MEANWHILE, JORDAN IS CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE AND IT SEEMS TO US THE TIME HAS COME FOR US TO USE OUR INFLUENCE TO END THIS SEMANTIC DEBATE AND THEREBY AVOID ANOTHER SC ROUND. WE CONSIDER THE FIRST STEP IS TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS TO ACCEPT THE JORDANIAN SUGGESTION, WHICH WE BELIEVE IS NOT ONLY CONSTRUCTIVELY INTENDED BUT ALSO PROTECTS EVERYBODY'S SEMANTIC INTERESTS. THE JORDANIANS SINCERELY SEE IT AS A WAY OUT OF AN IMPASSE CAUSED BY BOTH ISRAEL AND THE UAR.

12. IN THE END, THE PERMANENT MEMBERS ARE GOING TO HAVE TO WEIGH INFROM TIME TO TIME TO KEEP THINGS GOING. THE PARTIES WILL HAVE TO DEPEND TO SOME EXTENT ON OUR GOOD FAITH TO SUPPORT REASONABLE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE RESOLUTION. I THINK ISRAEL HAS NOTHING TO LOSE AND MUCH TO GAIN BY GOING ALONG WITH THIS JORDANIAN SUGGESTION. MOREOVER, IF UAR SHOULD REFUSE TO ACCEPT NEW FORMULATION ONCE IT WAS UNEQUIVOCALLY ACCEPTED BY ISRAEL, ISRAEL WOULD HAVE A CLEARLY DEFENSIBLE RATIONALE FOR STANDING PAT (WITH OUR SUPPORT) UNTIL UAR COULD BE PERSUADED TO GO ALONG.

GP-3 SYMMES

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.

~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING NOTE

There is no document #149 in this file.

REGINA GREENWELL
Senior Archivist

September 25, 2001



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TELEGRAM

SECRET 323

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03827 151443Z

47
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 151420Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4907
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1367
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1504

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3827

SUBJ: POSSIBLE JORDANIAN CABINET CHANGES
ABDUL HUNIM RIFAI TOLD ME THAT IS NOW LOOKS AS IF THE PRO-
POSED RECONSTITUTION OF THE CABINET (AMMAN 3789) HAS NOW
BEEN PUT OFF, AT LEAST UNTIL THERE IS A MORE ENCOURAGING
POSSIBILITY OF ACTUAL TALKS ABOUT A SETTLEMENT.
GP-3 SYMMES

NOTE: HANDLED EXDIS PER S/S-O.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001

By 16118, NARA, Date 10/1/01

~~SECRET~~



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TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~ 254

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03826 151439Z

47
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 151415Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4906
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1366
USUN 0758

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3826

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION-LOCALE OF TALKS
RIFAI SAID THAT DURING TALKS YESTERDAY WITH JARRING, JORDAN-
IANS WERE ABLE TO LEAD GENTLY INTO QUESTION OF WHERE PARTIES
MIGHT MEET. JARRING HAD SAID HE DOES NOT INSIST ON ANY PARTI-
CULAR PLACE FOR MEETING. HE WOULD BE JUST AS WILLING TO HAVE
MEETINGS IN GENEVA. HE DID NOT DEMUR WHEN RIFAI SAID SOME-
THING ABOUT NEW YORK POSSIBLY ALSO BEING A GOOD MEETING PLACE.
SYMMES
GP-3

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OCT.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001

By ng/ll NARA, Date 10/4/01

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

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TELEGRAM
3

SECRET 939

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03819 151030Z

14
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P R 151009Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4899
INFO CINCSRIKE

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3819

EXDIS

SUBJECT: JORDAN ARMS

REF: STATE 128960

PLEASE ADVISE WHEN INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING SIGNING MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING MAY BE EXPECTED PER PARA 4 STATE 128960. WITH RESPECT LANGUAGE AND FORM MEMORANDUM ASSUME WE SHOULD BE PROCEEDING ON BASIS STATE 117988 AND PREVIOUS.

SYMMES

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001
By sp/ll, NARA, Date 10/4/01

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

29

~~SECRET~~ 669

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03810 141812Z

41
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

S

2

P 141700Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4897
INFO CINCPAC PRIORITY
DIA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 757
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1503
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1364

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3810

REF TEL AVIV DAO 0463 MARCH 68; AMMAN 3809

1. WE ARE CONSTRAINED TO COMMENT ON CERTAIN OF IDF CHIEF OF STAFF BAR-LEV STATEMENTS REF MESSAGE BOTH BECAUSE OF THE ASSUMPTIONS THEY REFLECT AND THE DANGERS OF THE POLICIES THAT HE MAKES EXPLICIT.

2. WITH RESPECT TO POINT D. WE ARE CONCERNED WITH THE LEGAL

PAGE TWO RUQMKG 3810A ~~SECRET~~
IMPLICATIONS OF ACTION BY THE ISRAELI ARMED FORCES IN LAYING MINES ON THE JORDANIAN CONTROLLED SIDE OF THE JORDAN RIVER. ALTHOUGH TERRORISTS HAVE BEEN LAYING MINES IN ISRAELI CONTROLLED TERRITORY ON THE WEST SIDE OF THE RIVER, THE GOJ DENOUNCES AND OPPOSES THE ACTIVITIES OF THESE TERRORISTS. WE RECALL THE SHARP DISTINCTION AND SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE ATTACHED BY THE GOI WHEN ISRAELI REPS ALLEGED (AND SUBSEQUENTLY RETRACTED THE CHARGE) THAT REGULAR UNITS OF THE JORDAN ARMY HAD PARTICIPATED IN MILITARY ACTION ACROSS THE CEASEFIRE LINE. IN NOTING THIS DISTINCTION, WE DO NOT WISH IN ANY WAY TO PLAY DOWN THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE TERRORIST PROBLEM BUT DO WISH TO EMPHASIZE THAT A DELIBERATE GOVERNMENT POLICY OF OPERATING ACROSS THE CEASEFIRE LINE UNDERMINES THE EXISTING, HOWEVER SHAKY, AUTHORITY OF THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT.

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NLJ 02-207

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By us, NARA, Date 11-20-02



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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03810 141812Z

3. IT IS WORRISOME THAT THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES APPEAR TO PERSIST IN THE CONVICTION THAT SUCH RETALIATORY MOVES EFFECTIVE. BY NOW THEY SHOULD HAVE BEGUN TO APPRECIATE THAT DESPITE THE SAMUA RAID IN NOV 1966, THE BLACK-EYES THEY GAVE THE SYRIANS IN APRIL 67, AND THE "MILITARY LESSON" THEY

PAGE THREE RUQMKG 3810A ~~SECRET~~

GAVE IN JUNE 67, PLUS SEVERAL SUBSEQUENT SHOOT-UPS OF REFUGEE CAMPS ON THE EAST BANK, ISRAEL NOW HAS MORE ORGANIZED BANDS OF TERRORISTS TO DEAL WITH THAN THEY HAD WHEN THE AFORENAMED SERIES OF EVENTS STARTED. SURELY TOO, IT MUST BE REALIZED THAT THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE IF ANY IMPROVEMENT IN ANTI-INFILTRATION TACTICAL CAPABILITY AS A RESULT OF THE ADDITIONAL TERRITORY WHICH ISRAEL NOW OCCUPIES.

4. WE FIND IT PARTICULARLY DISTURBING THAT ISRAELI CHIEF OF STAFF AND PRESUMABLY THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT CONTEMPLATE ADDITIONAL RETALIATIONS INCLUDING A POSSIBLE "MAJOR MILITARY OPERATION." (SEE TEL AVIV MEMCON FEB 27, STACKHOUSE-ZEMER, IN WHICH THE EDITOR OF "DAVAR" SEEMED TO AFFIRM ON GOOD AUTHORITY THAT ESHKOL AND EBAN, AS WELL AS DAYAN, HAD APPROVED THE FEB 15 SHOOT). UNFORTUNATELY, ACTIVITIES BY TERRORISTS WILL NOT AND CANNOT BE EFFECTIVELY INTERDICTED IN THE COMING WEEKS. HOPEFULLY, AND WE BELIEVE THIS WILL BE THE CASE, KING HUSSEIN WILL MAINTAIN A POLICY OF DOING THE MAXIMUM HE CAN IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO CONTROL TERRORISTS. NEVERTHELESS, THE

PAGE FOUR RUQMKG 3810A ~~SECRET~~

CAPACITY OF THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT TO OPERATE IN THIS AREA HAS, AS EARLIER POINTED OUT, BEEN UNDERMINED RATHER THAN STRENGTHENED BY RECENT ISRAELI ACTIONS. (THERE IS ALSO THE FACT THAT EVEN WITH A MAJOR EFFORT AND THE BEST POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT, SUCCESS IN INTERDICTING INFILTRATION WILL BE LIMITED.)

5. AS BAR-LEV POINTS OUT, ISRAEL IS DOING ABOUT AS WELL ON

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 AMMAN 03810 141812Z

ITS SIDE IN CONTROLLING INFILTRATION AS IT PROBABLY CAN EXPECT TO DO GIVEN THE HIGHLY ABNORMAL CONDITIONS OF THE CONTINUING CRISIS. HERE AGAIN THERE IS THE UNFORTUNATE FACT THAT THIS CONTROL WILL NOT BE PERFECT. THIS IS IN LARGE MEASURE A PRICE OF OCCUPATION OF ALIEN TERRITORY AND OF THE MAINTENANCE BY ISRAEL OF PRESSURES BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY AGAINST THE OTHER SIDE.

6. IN THIS OBVIOUSLY UNSATISFACTORY SITUATION, OUR INTEREST CONTINUES TO BE THE MAINTENANCE OR, PERHAPS MORE CORRECTLY, RESTORATION OF AN ATMOSPHERE THAT WILL PERMIT PROGRESS TO BE MADE ON A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. WE RECOMMEND THAT, AGAINST

PAGE FIVE RUQMKG 3810A ~~SECRET~~

THE BACKGROUND OF OUR COMMITMENT TO WORK FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, WE CONSIDER RAISING WITH THE ISRAELIS THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF A POLICY OF CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS ON ITS PART, INCLUDING MILITARY OPERATIONS ACROSS THE CEASEFIRE LINE AS A MEANS OF CONTROLLING TERRORISM. WE BELIEVE WE WOULD BE JUSTIFIED IN POINTING OUT THAT THE NATURE AND SEVERITY OF THE MEASURES TAKEN AND CONTEMPLATED BY ISRAEL AND THE DAMAGE TO INTERESTS OF ALL WITH RESPECT TO A SOLUTION OF THE CRISIS ARE TOTALLY DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE CURRENT LEVEL OF THREAT FROM TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND THAT, FURTHER, THE POLICY OF RETALIATION HAS GENERALLY SHOWN ITSELF TO BE BOTH BANKRUPT AND COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE.
SYMMES

NOTE: HANDLED EXDIS PER S/S-0.

~~SECRET~~



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TELEGRAM
21

~~SECRET~~ 5 2

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03809 141728Z

40
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, 030 W

O 141640Z MAR 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4896
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1363

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3809

EXDIS

SUBJECT: TERRORISM

REF AMMAN 3793; TEL AVIV 2893

1. I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO AMBASSADOR BARBOUR'S MAKING USE OF SUBSTANCE MY CONVERSATION WITH KING, BUT I CONSIDER IT MOST IMPORTANT THAT EBAN APPRECIATE THE SENSITIVITY OF HUSSEIN'S COMMENTS RE IRAQI TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND UNDERTAKE TO RESPECT THE CONFIDENCE. THERE IS ALSO NO OBJECTION FROM THIS EMBASSY [REDACTED] SHOULD AMB BARBOUR [REDACTED]

3.4
(b)(1,6)

PAGE TWO RUQMKG 3809A-~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] WISH TO DRAW ON [REDACTED] FURTHER RECENT INFORMATION ON FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES.

2. WITH RESPECT TO TERRORISM AND RECENT ISRAELI SUGGESTIONS OF FUTURE RETALIATION, I HOPE THEY CAN BE PERSUADED TO APPROACH THE PROBLEM IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY FOR IMPROVING THE PRESENT GLOOMY ENVIRONMENT FOR PEACE EFFORTS. I AM CONVINCED THERE ARE OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROGRESS, PROVIDED THE ISRAELIS ARE WILLING TO SHOW RESTRAINT (AMMAN 3784).

3. WE WOULD ALSO STRESS THAT KING HUSSEIN AND THE KEY PEOPLE IN HIS GOVERNMENT ARE GENUINELY OPPOSED TO THE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THEY REGARD THEM AS AGAINST JORDAN'S REAL INTEREST,

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Authority NY 15-41
By CS, NARA, Date 7/3/18

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03809 141728Z

AND THEY ARE QUITE PREPARED TO GO AS FAR AS THEY CAN AGAINST THEM WITHOUT BRINGING DOWN THE WHOLE HOUSE. IF ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE COMPLETED FOR DAUD TO MEET WITH ISRAELIS AT THE BRIDGE IN THE PRESENCE OF A UN REPRESENTATIVE, IF MORE TRAVEL BACK AND FORTH BY WEST BANK NOTABLES SUCH AS NUSEIBEH AND

PAGE THREE RUGMKG 3809A ~~SECRET~~

HIKMAT AL MASRI COULD BE PERMITTED AND STIMULATED; IF THE THREAT OF RETALIATIONS COULD BE LIFTED; IF THE KING WILL USE THE SUPPLY OF US ARMS TO EASE THE IRAQIS OUT; ETC., WE BELIEVE THERE COULD BE SUFFICIENT RELAXATION OF TENSIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS IN LOCAL ATTITUDES TO INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY THE KING'S ABILITY TO ACT AGAINST TERRORISTS. WE WOULD URGE EFFORTS ALONG THESE LINES. TO BE SUCCESSFUL THEY WILL REQUIRE ISRAELI RESTRAINT AND COOPERATION AND, MOST IMPORTANT, NO PUBLICITY.

4. IN ANY EVENT (AS EXPERIENCE HAS MADE CLEAR) RETALIATORY STRIKES AGAINST THE JORDANIANS ARE NOT GOING TO STOP TERRORIST MOVEMENT. ON THE CONTRARY THEY ONLY UNDERMINE FURTHER THE CAPACITY OF THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT TO ACT. A "MAJOR MILITARY OPERATION" SUCH AS SUGGESTED BY IDF CHIEF OF STAFF (TEL AVIV DAO 0463 MARCH 68) WOULD POSE OBVIOUS GRAVE DANGERS FOR FUTURE PEACE. WE ARE SUBMITTING COMMENTS RELATIVE TO BAR-LEVI'S STATEMENT BY SEPARATE MESSAGE. GP-3 SYMMES

~~SECRET~~



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TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 881

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03800 150935Z

14
ACTION SS 30

INFO 1030 W

R 141405Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4891
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1360
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1499

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3800

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

EXDIS
DEPT PASS CAIRO

SUBJ: FUTURE OF GAZA

1. WHEN I SAW ANWAR NUSEIBEH THE OTHER DAY (AMMAN 3756 NOTAL) CONVERSATION AT ONE POINT DRIFTED TO POSSIBLE ISRAELI OFFERS TO JORDAN OF PORT FACILITIES IN HIFA AND AEHKELON. NUSEIBEH INTERJECTED JORDAN WOULD BE MUCH MORE INTERESTED IN ACCESS TO GAZA WHICH " WOULD BECOME PART OF JORDAN" IN A SETTLEMENT.

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3800A ~~SECRET~~
AT THE TIME I LET THIS PASS.

2. ON FOURTEENTH GAZA AGAIN CAME UP IN CONVERSATION WITH ZAID AL-RIFAI WHO SAID NASSER HAD " FROM THE BEGINNING" TOLD HUSSEIN THAT UAR HAS NO INTEREST IN KEEPING GAZA AND WOULD BE HAPPY TO SEE IT PART OF JORDAN IN ANY SETTLEMENT.

3. DEPT WILL RECALL THAT EARLY LAST SUMMER HHUSSEIN EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN ABSORBING GAZA INTO JORDAN UNDER A PEACE SETTLEMENT. SYMMES
GP-3

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.

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NLJ-S 98001

By ag/ll, NARA, Date 10/1/01

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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31

SECRET 343

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03800 141507Z

41
ACTION SS 30

02

INFO /030 W

R 141405Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4891
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1360
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1499

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3800

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO(#)

SUBJ: FUTURE OF GAZA

1. WHEN I SAW ANWAR NUSEIBEH THE OTHER DAY (AMMAN 3756 NOTAL) CONVERSATION AT ONE POINT DRIFTED TO POSSIBLE ISRAELI OFFERS TO JORDAN OF PORT FACILITIES IN HIFA AND AEHKELON. NUSEIBEH INTERJECTED JORDAN WOULD BE MUCH MORE INTERESTED IN ACCESS TO GAZA WHICH " WOULD BECOME PART OF JORDAN" IN A SETTLEMENT.

PAGE 2 ROOMKG 3800A ~~SECRET~~
AT THE TIME I LET THIS PASS.

2. ON FOURTEENTH GAZA AGAIN CAME UP IN CONVERSATION WITH ZAID AL-RIFAI WHO SAID NASSER HAD " FROM THE BEGINNING" TOLD HUSSEIN THAT UAR HAS NO INTEREST IN KEEPING GAZA AND WOULD BE HAPPY TO SEE IT PART OF JORDAN IN ANY SETTLEMENT.

3. DEPT WILL RECALL THAT EARLY LAST#HUSSEIN EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN ABSORBING GAZA INTO JORDAN UNDER A PEACE SETTLEMENT. SYMMES
GP-3

(#) NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OCT
#AS RECEIVED. SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

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SECRET

By 12/12 NARA, Date 01/14/01



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TELEGRAM

3

~~SECRET~~ 979

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03794 140941Z

4
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 140825Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0000
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1357
AMEMBASSY LONDON 0778
USUN NEW YORK 0756

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3794

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION-TALK WITH HUSSEIN

REF: AMMAN 3782, STATE 129216

1. WHEN I SAW KING HUSSEIN LAST EVENING, I ALSO CARRIED OUT INSTRUCTIONS IN PARA TT OF STATE 129216 BE REVIEWING MY DE-

PAGE 2 RUMKMG 3794A ~~SECRET~~
TAILED DISCUSSION WITH ABD AL-MONEIM RIFAI EARLIER IN DAY (AMMAN 3782). I NOTED RIFAI CONSIDERED SITUATION MIGHT NOT BE SO BLEAK IN SOME WAYS AS IT APPEARED. NEVERTHELESS, WE WANTED KING TO KNOW HOW WE SEE SITUATION IN HOPE GOJ WOULD ALSO WISH TO SAVE JARRING MISSION AND HOPEFULLY BRING ALL PARTIES ALONG TO "NEXT STEPS". GIVEN HIS ROLE IN TALKS LEADING TO ADOPTION OF NOV 22 RESOLUTION, WE HOPED KING WOULD AGREE WE SHOULD NOT LET JARRING MISSION FOUNDER BECAUSE OF DEBATES ON MEANINGS OF WORDS.

2. HUSSEIN, WITH ZIAD AL-RIFAI OCCASIONALLY INTERJECTING COMMENTS, ASID FOLLOWING:
A. HE WOULD WAIT TO HEAR WHAT JARRING HAD TO SAY ABOUT ISRAELI POSITION ON ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION. IT SEEMED TO

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 AMMAN 03794 140941Z

HIM, HOWEVER, THAT ISRAEL MUST BEAR MOST OF THE BLAME IF JARRING FAILS. DESPITE THE UNDERSTANDINGS LEADING UP TO THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION, ISRAEL HAD BEEN INSISTING ON "DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS" AND "PEACE TREATIES". ISRAEL HAD REFUSED TO "ACCEPT" THE RESOLUTION ISRAEL MEANWHILE CONTINUED TO TAKE EXTREME AND REPEATED MEASURES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES INCON-

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3794A ~~SECRET~~

SISTENT WITH PRINCIPLES OF THE RESOLUTION. JORDAN HAD ACCEPTED THE RESOLUTION FROM THE BEGINNING JORDAN WANTS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT UNDER THE RESOLUTION. JORDAN SO FAR HAS NO REASON TO BELIEVE ISRAEL ALSO WANTS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. HE HOPED JARRING WOULD PROVE HIM WRONG.

B. BASED ON JORDAN'S INFORMATION, THE UAR POSITION DID NOT LOOK LIKE BACKTRACKING. (ZAID HAD WITH HIM AND READ FROM THE MINUTES OF RIYAD'S MARCH 7 MEETING WITH JARRING.) HE WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT JORDAN ALSO DOES NOT ENVISAGE "ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION" TO MEAN THAT ISRAEL IS THEN FREE TO INTRODUCE A DETAILED AGENDA FOR SOME FORM OF VEILED DIRECT TALKS LEADING TO A PEACE TREATY. JORDAN HAS ALWAYS BEEN WILLING TO TALK UNDER JARRING'S AEGIS ABOUT HOW THE PRINCIPLES OF THE RESOLUTION ARE TO BE IMPLEMENTED. IT IS THOSE PRINCIPLES, HOWEVER, AND NOT EBAN'S LIST AS PRESENTED IN THE EARLY MEETINGS WITH JARRING THAT ARE UP FOR DISCUSSION. FOR EXAMPLE, KING SAID, THERE WOULD BE NO NEED TO DISCUSS THE BOYCOTT. IF BELIIGERENCE WERE RENOUNCED AS THE RESOLUTION SPECIFIED, THEN THE ARAB SECONDARY BOYCOTT WOULD VANISH IMMEDIATELY. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF SOVEREIGN ARAB STATES (SOME OF WHOM DID

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 3794A ~~SECRET~~

NOT TRADE WITH EACH OTHER) DID NOT WISH TO TRADE WITH ISRAEL, THAT WAS ANOTHER MATTER. THE RESOLUTION DID NOT REQUIRE SUCH TRADE TO BE DISSUCSSED, LET ALONE FORCED ON ARABS. ISRAEL'S INSISTENCE ON SUCH AGENDA ITEMS WOULD ONLY STIMULATE ADVERSE ARAB REACTION.

C. HE FEARED THE ISRAELIS ARE NOW MORE INTERESTED IN BRINGING DOWN NASSER THAN IN PROCCEDING TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. (ZAID AL-RIFAI DREW PARRAELL BETWEEN CURRENT ISRAELI

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 03794 140941Z

TACTIS ON THE JARRING MISSION AND KING FAISAL'S ACTIONS IN DEALING WITH NASSER ABOUT THE YEMEN PROBLEM. THE ISRAELIS SEE NASSER IN A WEAKENED CONDITION AND IN THEIR EAGERNESS TO

EMBARRASS NASSER HAVE BEEN DISTRACTED FROM THE BUSINESS AT HAND.

THE U.S. COULD COUNT ON JORDAN TO DO ALL IT COULD IN THE HONOR TO HELP PRESERVE THE JARRING MISSION. JORDAN WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE OF RECENT U.S. EFFORTS IN THIS RESPECT. UNFORTUNATELY, JORDAN'S INFORMATION SO FAR DID NOT ENCOURAGE IT TO BELIEVE ISRAEL HAS EITHER ACCEPTED THE RESOLUTION OR IS WILLING TO DISCUSS IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS PRINCIPLES.

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 3794A-~~SECRET~~

3. COMMENT: WE ARE CONVINCED JORDAN WILL DO EVERYTHING IT CAN TO SAVE THE JARRING MISSION, NEVERTHELESS, FROM THIS VANTAGE POINT WE ARE FORCED TO CONCLUDE THAT, WHATEVER UAR BACKTRACKING THERE MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE BEEN, IT IS MOST IMPORTANT FOR US TO GET A CLEAR CUT ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION, AS WELL AS RECOGNITION OF THE NEED TO PROCEED AS ENVISAGED IN THE TALKS LEADING UP TO ADOPTION OF THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION. THOSE PRE-RESOLUTION TALKS DID NOT REQUIRE "DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS" NOR PROVIDE FOR A DETAILED AGENDA TO BE SUBMITTED IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THE JARRING MISSION. ISRAELI GAMBITS TO DATE HAVE KEPT ALIVE ARAB SUSPICIONS GENERALLY AND HAVE RAISED SERIOUS QUESTIONS IN JORDANIAN MIND ABOUT ISRAELI INTENTIONS.

4. SUGGEST DEPT ALSO PASS AMMAN 3782, 3783 AND 3784 TO CAIRO IF IT HAS NOT ALREADY DONE SO. SYMMES
GP-3

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.

~~SECRET~~



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PAGE 01 AMMAN 03793 140905Z

2

ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 140820Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4888
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1356
USMISSION USUN NY 755
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1496

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3793

EXDIS

SUBJECT: TERRORISM

1. WHEN I SAW KING HUSSEIN ON THIRTEENTH ON ANOTHER MATTER, I MENTIONED I WAS WORRIED ABOUT RECRUDESCENCE OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN PAST FEW DAYS. I SAID OUR INFORMATION INDICATED THAT TERRORISTS ARE STILL OPERATING IN STRENGTH IN JORDAN VALLEY AREA. GIVEN PAST PATTERNS I FEARED ANOTHER ISRAELI RETALIATION. RECOGNIZING HIS POLICY AGAINST TERRORISM, I

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3793A ~~SECRET~~
THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE OTHER HELPFUL STEP TO TAKE. FOR ONE THING HE HAD TOLD ME HE WANTED IRAQI TROOPS OUT. HE HAD SAID AS SOON AS HE KNEW US ARMS WERE FORTHCOMING HE WOULD BE IN STRONG POSITION TO GET IRAQIS OUT. I HOPED HE WOULD START WITH 421 PALESTINE BATTALION. SECONDLY, I HOPED NEWS THAT COL. DAUD IS BACK IN TOWN MEANT JORDAN WOULD AGREE TO DAUD'S MEETING WITH ISRAELIS. THIS MIGHT NOT PREVENT ALL INCIDENTS, BUT IT WOULD BE A HELPFUL FACTOR.

2. KING RESPONDED THAT FOR EVERYTHING HE DID TO CURTAIL TERRORISTS ISRAELIS SEEMED TO DO TWO THINGS THAT RESULTED IN STRENGTHENING THEM. ISRAELI UNILATERAL ACTIONS AND PARTICULARLY THEIR RETALIATORY ACTIONS GREATLY WEAKEN JORDAN ARGUMENT THAT THEY DO NOT NEED THE IRAQIS. THE IRAQI CHIEF

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03793 140905Z

OF STAFF IS EXPECTED IN JORDAN SOON, HOWEVER, AND KING WOULD DO WHAT HE COULD TO START IRAQI TROOPS ON THE WAY OUT. HE HOPED ISRAEL MEANWHILE WOULD NOT MAKE THIS IMPOSSIBLE.

3. ON DAUD, THE KING SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO THE MATTER AS SOON AS THE JORDAN CABINET HAS BEEN RECONSTITUTED.

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3793A ~~SECRET~~

LAUGHINGLY HE SAID HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO PUT DAUD IN GOVERNMENT HOUSE IF THE ISRAELIS WISHED.

4. HUSSEIN AGREED THAT THE TERRORISTS ARE HURTING THE ARAB CAUSE FAR MORE THAN THEY HELP IT. HE SAID HE COULD ARGUE THIS PROPOSITION WITH OTHER ARABS MUCH MORE CONVINCINGLY IF HE COULD POINT TO SOME PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT UNDER JARRING AUSPICES AND IF ISRAELIS WOULD DESIST FROM THEIR CONTINUOUS UNILATERAL ACTIONS TO DEPRIVE ARABS OF THEIR RIGHTS ON WEST BANK.

SYMMES

~~SECRET~~



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~~SECRET~~ 073

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03789 141056Z

4
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 130815Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4887
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1355
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1495

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3789

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (P A R A 1 L I N E T W O)

SUBJECT: RECONSTITUTION OF JORDAN CABINET

1. KING HUSSEIN SAID HE HOPES IN NEXT FEW DAYS TO SEE JORDAN CABINET RECONSTITUTED TO BRING IN NEW WEST BANK ELEMENTS. (HIKMAT AL-MASRI AND ANWAR NUSEIBEH CAME OVER SEVERAL DAYS AGO AT KING'S REQUEST UT AS OF MARCH 13 HAD SEEN NEITHER KING NOR PRIMIN TALHOUNI BECAUSE BOTH WERE OFF IN AQABA.) HIS PRIMARY IDEA IN RECONSTITUTING CABINET WOULD BE TO MAKE IT EASIER TO PURSUE "NEXT STEPS" WITH ISRAELIS IF AND WHEN JARRING IS SUCCESSFUL.

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3789A ~~SECRET~~

2. COMMENT: ABD AL-MONEIM RIFAI AND BRITISH AMBASSADOR HAVE CONFIRMED TO ME THAT NUSEIBEH AND MASRI WILL DECLINE PARTICIPATION IN CABINET AT THIS TIME ON GROUNDS THEIR PERSONAL PRESENCE AND THEIR CONTACTS WITH ISRAELIS ON WEST BANK ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN THIR SYMBOLIC PARTICIPATION IN CABINET. AS RIFAI PUT IT, ONCE A WEST BANKER IS IN CABINET HIS ORIENTATION IN EYES OF WEST BANKERS IS NO LONGER WEST, BUT EAST.
GP-3. SYMMES

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~~SECRET~~ 929

2

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03789 140855Z

2
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 130815Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4887
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1355
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1495

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3789

EXDIS

SUBJECT: RECONSTITUTION OF JORDAN CABINET

1. KING HUSSEIN SAID HE HOPES IN NEXT FEW DAYS TO SEE JORDAN CABINET RECONSTITUTED TO BRING IN NEW EAST BANK ELEMENTS. (HIKMAT AL-MASRI AND ANWAR NUSEIBEH CAME OVER SEVERAL DAYS AGO AT KING'S REQUEST BUT AS OF MARCH 13 HAD SEEN NEITHER KING NOR PRIMIN TALHOUNI BECAUSE BOTH WERE OFF IN AQABA.) HIS PRIMARY IDEA IN RECONSTITUTING CABINET WOULD BE TO MAKE IT EASIER TO PURSUE "NEXT STEPS" WITH ISRAELIS IF AND WHEN JARRING IS SUCCESSFUL.

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3789A ~~SECRET~~

2. COMMENT: ABD AL-MONEIM RIFAI AND BRITISH AMBASSADOR HAVE CONFIRMED TO ME THAT NUSEIBEH AND MASRI WILL DECLINE PARTICIPATION IN CABINET AT THIS TIME ON GROUNDS THEIR PERSONAL PRESENCE AND THEIR CONTACTS WITH ISRAELIS ON WEST BANK ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN THEIR SYMBOLIC PARTICIPATION IN CABINET. AS RIFAI PUT IT, ONCE A WEST BANKER IS IN CABINET HIS ORIENTATION IN EYES OF WEST BANKERS IS NO LONGER WEST, BUT EAST.

GP-3. SYMMES

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 03787 140856Z

3

3
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 140700Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0000
INFO CINCSTRIKE

~~S E C R E T~~ AMMAN 3787

EXDIS

SUBJ: JORDAN ARMS

REF: AMMAN 3781

1. KING HUSSEIN RECEIVED ME YESTERDAY EVENING IMMEDIATELY AFTER RETURNING FROM AQABA. ZAID AL-RIFAI WAS ALSO PRESENT. I REVIEWED WITH KING EARLIER CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL KHAMMASH (AMMAN 3781) AND SAID I HOPED HE COULD NOW AGREE TO MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING AS MODIFIED BY ADD-ONS. I ALSO SUGGESTED APPROPRIATE JAA OFFICERS BE AUTHORIZED GO INTO DETAILS WITH OUR DATT AND MAP.

PAGE 2 RUGMKG 3787A ~~S E C R E T~~

2. HUSSEIN EXPRESSED WARM THANKS AND THEN TELEPHONED TO KHAMMASH, SAID HE HAD ME WITH HIM, AND THAT HE WOULD DISCUSS MATTER WITH KHAMMASH IN MORNING. HE TURNED TO ME AND SAID HE WAS GLAD " THIS MATTER IS NOW BEHIND US" AND THAT HE HOPED DETAILS COULD BE QUICKLY SETTLED. HE EMPHASIZED THAT IMPORTANT THING FOR JORDAN WAS EARLY DELIVERIES AND THAT HE WOULD BE COUNTING ON INITIAL AIR SHIPMENT OF AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS.

3. DRAWING ON STATE 128960 I TOLD KING WE WOULD UTILIZE WEEKLY MAC FLIGHTS WHERE FEASIBLE. WHILE WE WOULD NOT RULE OUT ADDITIONAL AIRLIFTS, I MUST POINT OUT THAT COST AND TRANSPORT AVAILABILITY WOULD BE PROBLEMS. KING SAID HE

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03787 140856Z

UNDERSTOOD THESE FACTORS BUT WOULD STILL COUNT ON US TO AIR-LIFT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE INITIALLY, AS KHAMMASH HAD DISCUSSED WITH SECRETARY MACNAMARA.

4. COMMENT: KING SEEMED GREATLY RELIEVED AND WAS MOST GRACIOUS IN EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR ADD-ON. OBVIOUSLY WE PROBABLY HAVE SOME TOUGH NUTS AND BOLTS AHEAD, BUT IT IS GOOD TO BE OUT OF THE WOODS. SYMMES GP-3

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BY
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SECRETARY
OF STATE
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10/10/68

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~~SECRET~~ 785

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03784 131818Z

2

42
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P R 131750Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4885
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1354
US MISSION USUN NEW YORK 754
AMEMBASSY LONDON 777

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3784

EXDIS

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION--ENVIRONMENT FOR TALKS

1. JORDANIANS AND OTHERS ARE CITING ISRAELI UNILATERAL ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM AND ELSEWHERE ON WEST BANK AND CONTINUING ISRAELI RETALIATORY TACTICS TO EXPLAIN AND IN MANY CASES TO JUSTIFY POSSIBLE UAR BACKTRACKING. WHETHER SUCH ISRAELI ACTIONS ARE PRIMARY OR SECONDARY, HOWEVER, THEY HAVE HAD SERIOUSLY ADVERSE EFFECTS ON ARAB ATTITUDES TOWARD PRO-

PAGE 2 RUGMKG 3784 ~~SECRET~~

CEEDING TO "NEXT STEPS." WE BELIEVE THAT IF JARRING MISSION IS TO BE SAVED AND CONSTRUCTIVE TALKS ARE TO ENSUE, IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL FOR ISRAEL TO PRACTICE RESTRAINT IN SEVERAL AREAS IN THE FORTHCOMING PERIOD. IT WOULD ALSO BE IMPORTANT FOR THE ARABS TO HAVE TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF CESSATION OF CERTAIN ISRAELI UNILATERAL ACTIONS, AS WELL AS CLEAR ACCEPTANCE OF THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION BY THE ISRAELIS. EVEN THOSE MODERATE ARABS WHO WISH TO SAVE THE JARRING MISSION (AMMAN 3782) ARE BY NO MEANS CONVINCED THAT THEY WOULD BE IN A BAD TACTICAL POSITION IF THEY HAVE TO GO BACK TO THE SC.

2. WE THINK THAT THE FOLLOWING WILL BE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF AN ENVIRONMENT FOR SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS:

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03784 131818Z

- 1. CESSATION OF ISRAELI EXPROPRIATION AND CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES IN JERUSALEM.
- 2. CESSATION OF POLEMICAL ISRAELI PUBLIC STATEMENTS ABOUT JARRING MISSION AND ARAB POSITIONS TOWARD IT.
- 3. ISRAELI ACCOMMODATION TO US-UK REQUESTS RE RETURN OF NEW REFUGEES TO THE WEST BANK BY CONCRETE ACTIONS AS WELL AS STATEMENTS.

PAGE 3 RUGMKG 3784 ~~SECRET~~

- 4. NO RETALIATORY MILITARY ACTIONS IN THE JORDAN VALLEY.
 - 5. A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL ISRAELI STATEMENT OF ACCEPTANCE OF THE NOV 22 SC RESOLUTION (PARA 10, AMMAN 3756).
3. FOREGOING OF COUSE IS NOT INTENDED TO MEAN THAT THERE ARE NOT ALSO REQUIREMENTS FOR RESTRAINT ON THE ARAB SIDE.
GP-1

~~SECRET~~



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SECRET 789

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03783 131833Z

51
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, /030 W

P R 131800Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4884
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 753
AMEMBASSY LONDON 776
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1353

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3783

EXDIS

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION-- LOCALE OF TALKS

1. WHEN I SAW RIFAI TODAY TODAY (AMMAN 3782) HE SAID HE INTENDS TO SUGGEST TO JARRING THAT HE DROP THE IDEA OF CONVENING THE PARTIES ON CYPRUS. HE SAID FIRST OF ALL THERE HAS BEEN TOO MUCH PUBLICITY ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF MEETING ON CYPRUS. IT HAS BECOME A "DIRTY WORD" AS FAR AS THE ARABS ARE CONCERNED. EVEN IF ALL OTHER OBSTACLES HAD BEEN CLEARED

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3783 ~~SECRET~~

AWAY, PSYCHOLOGICAL OBSTACLES TO MEETING ON CYPRUS PROBABLY WOULD BE INSURMOUNTABLE. IT IS TOO SMALL A PLACE AND IT WOULD BE DELUGED WITH JOURNALISTS. COMMUNICATIONS WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE ARABS SO FAR AS CYPRUS IS CONCERNED. BEYOND THAT, RIFAI SAID, HE IS CONVINCED IT WILL BE MOST IMPORTANT TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE PRINCIPAL SC MEMBERS, WHICH MEANS BEING IN NEW YORK.

2. RIFAI IMPLIED, AS HE HAS DONE SEVERAL TIMES IN THE PAST, THAT HE DOUBTS JARRING PERSONALLY COULD BRING OFF A SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION AND THAT, THEREFORE, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO HAVE OTHER UN OFFICIALS CLOSE BY TO HELP. THUS, HE HAD CONCLUDED THAT NEW YORK, WHERE "EVERYONE CAN GET LOST," IS THE ONLY PRACTICAL PLACE TO HAVE TALKS BETWEEN THE

SECRET



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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03783 131833Z

PARTIES. HE SAID HE HOPED THAT IF WE WERE ASKED, WE WOULD SUPPORT THIS IDEA. I MADE NO COMMENT OTHER THAN TO SAY THAT I WOULD REPORT THE POINTS HE HAD MADE.

3. COMMENT: ACCORDING TO RIFAI, THE JORDANIANS HAVE AN EXTREMELY POOR OPINION OF JARRING'S INITIATIVE, FORCE-

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3783 ~~SECRET~~
FULLNESS AND NEGOTIATING ABILITY. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT CYPRUS AS A VENUE HAS ALREADY HAD THE "KISS OF DEATH" BECAUSE OF PUBLICITY. WE WOULD URGE DOING WHATEVER WE CAN DISCREETLY TO SUPPORT NEW YORK AS THE VENUE WHEN AND IF JARRING CAN GET THE PARTIES TOGETHER.
GP1

~~SECRET~~



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~~SECRET~~ 838

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03782 131912Z

42
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P R 131800Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4882
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 774
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 175
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 751
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1351

~~SECRET~~ SECTION ONE OF TWO AMMAN 3782

EXDIS

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION

REF STATE 129216; NJA 6861

1. ON RECEIPT REFTEL I SOUGHT IMMEDIATE APPOINTMENT WITH KING HUSSEIN, BUT HE IS STILL OUT OF TOWN. (I MAY SEE HIM LATER TODAY OR CERTAINLY SOME TIME TOMORROW BEFORE HE HAS SEEN

PAGE TWO RUGMKG 3782/1A ~~SECRET~~

JARRING.) I HAD ALSO MADE REQUEST TO SEE ABDUL MUN'IM RIFA'I WHO RECEIVED ME THIS MORNING. I MADE TO RIFA'I PRESENTATION OUTLINED IN PARA 5 OF REFTEL, DRAWING ALSO ON PERTINENT PORTIONS OF STATE 128497, USUN 4105, 4102, 4101 AND 4098. IN RESPONSE RIFA'I AGREED THAT PRESENT SITUATION IS "CRUCIAL AND DELICATE" BUT SAID HE BELIEVED NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF UAR POSITION HAD BEEN OVERDRAWN. ON OTHER HAND, HE BELIEVED POSITIVE ASPECTS ISRAELI POSITION HAD BEEN EXAGGERATED BY ISRAEL IN ORDER TO SCORE IMMEDIATE TACTICAL ADVANTAGE OVER UAR. RIFA'I SAID JORDAN WAS STILL PREPARED TO COOPERATE IN ANY REASONABLE WAY TO SALVAGE JARRING MISSION BUT HE THOUGHT CONSIDERABLE WORK YET REMAINED TO BE DONE WITH REGARD TO ISRAELI POSITION IF JARRING MISSION IS TO GET ANYWHERE.

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03782 131912Z

2. AFTER MY PRESENTATION RIFA'I SAID HE WOULD AGREE SITUATION WITH REGARD JARRING MISSION WAS WORSE THAN EVER. ON OTHER HAND, HIS EXPERIENCE WITH JARRING SO FAR LED HIM TO BELIEVE THAT NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF UAR POSITION AS SKETCHED IN OUR REPORTS AND POSITIVE ASPECTS OF ISRAELI POSITION IN SAME REPORTS WERE BOTH EXAGGERATED. HE HAD FOUND THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO HEAR

PAGE THREE RUQMKG 3782/1A ~~SECRET~~
DIRECTLY FROM JARRING WITH RESPECT TO THE POSITION OF THE VARIOUS PARTIES. WHAT ISRAEL IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID TO JARRING ON THE 10TH HAS NOT YET BEEN CONVEYED EITHER TO AMMAN OR TO CAIRO. HE DID NOT WISH TO QUESTION THE VALIDITY OF OUR REPORTS BUT EXPERIENCE HAD SHOWN WHAT WE AND OTHERS HEARD FROM THE INDIVIDUAL PARTIES COULD NOT ALWAYS BE TRUSTED AND, CERTAINLY, DID NOT ALWAYS JIBE WITH WHAT JARRING SAID.

3. RIFA'I DESCRIBED DETAILS OF RIAD'S DISCUSSION OF FEB 20 AND MARCH 7 WITH JARRING. IN THE MINUTES OF FEB 20 RIAD TOLD JARRING THAT THE UAR WAS A VICTIM OF A "LOT OF PROPAGANDA" TO THE EFFECT THAT IT WAS PULLING BACK FROM COMMITMENTS MADE TO JARRING. FOREIGN DIPLOMATS WERE TELLING UAR AMBASSADORS THAT IT WAS THE UAR THAT WAS NOT CLEAR ABOUT ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION AND THUS IT WAS THE UAR THAT WAS IMPEDING PROGRESS OF JARRING'S MISSION. RIAD WENT ON TO TELL JARRING THAT HE MUST KNOW THAT FROM THE VERY BEGINNING THE UAR HAD CLEARLY ACCEPTED THE RESOLUTION. JARRING AGREED WITH RIAD AND HE VOLUNTEERED IT WAS ONLY ISRAEL THAT HAD NOT ACCEPTED THE RESOLUTION. RIFA'I COMMENTED TO ME QUOTE AS YOU CAN SEE, JARRING HIMSELF HAD ALWAYS UNDERSTOOD

PAGE FOUR RUQMKG 3782/1A ~~SECRET~~
THE UAR TO HAVE ACCEPTED THE RESOLUTION UNQUOTE.

4. ACCORDING TO RIFA'I THE MARCH 7 MINUTES OF CONVERSATION INDICATED THAT WHEN JARRING PRESENTED THE DRAFT OF THE NEW FORMULA TO RIAD, THE LATTER HAD RESPONDED THAT THE UAR HAD ALWAYS INDICATED ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION IN PREVIOUS MEETINGS WITH JARRING. JARRING HAD UAR ACCEPTANCE, BUT THE UAR

~~SECRET~~



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PAGE 03 AMMAN 03782 131912Z

HAD NEVER BEEN TOLD BY JARRING THAT HE HAD ISRAEL'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION. AT THIS POINT JARRING HAD HAD NO ANSWER FOR RIAD. RIFA'I THEN WENT BACK TO HIS ORIGINAL POINT AND SAID THAT JORDAN THEREFORE IS WAITING TO SEE WHAT JARRING HIMSELF HAS TO SAY. JORDAN INTENDS TO ASK JARRING IF ISRAEL HAS ACCEPTED THE RESOLUTION. JORDAN HOPES HE WILL SAY "YES". THAT WOULD BE A GREAT HELP. IF JARRING DOES HAVE ISRAEL'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION, JORDAN HOPES JARRING WILL RETURN TO CAIRO TO INFORM THE UAR THAT ISRAEL HAS MADE A POSITIVE STATEMENT IN THAT RESPECT. ON MARCH 7, HOWEVER, JARRING WAS NOT ABLE TO TELL CAIRO THAT ISRAEL HAD ACCEPTED THE RESOLUTION. THUS WHAT RIAD HAD SAID ON MARCH 7 TO JARRING HAD BEEN SAID ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ISRAEL HAD NEVER TOLD JARRING THAT IT

PAGE FIVE RUQMKG 3782/1A ~~SECRET~~
ACCEPTED THE RESOLUTION.

5. RIFA'I THEN PULLED OUT A GOJ TRANSCRIPT OF YESTERDAY'S KOL ISRAEL BROADCASTS. HE READ AS FOLLOWS FROM WHAT EBAN WAS REPORTED BY KOL ISRAEL TO HAVE SAID ON MARCH 12 TO JOURNALISTS: QUOTE THE EGYPTIAN GOVT IS THE SOLE PARTY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FAILURE OF OUR MAKING PROGRESS IN THE JARRING MISSION. EGYPT HAS REFUSED STRONGLY AND CATEGORICALLY A PROPOSAL BY JARRING WHICH HE SUBMITTED RECENTLY TO THE UAR GOVERNEMENT. UNQUOTE. RIFA'I COMMENTED "THIS IS SIMPLY NOT TRUE." IT IS ONLY AN EFFORT BY EBAN TO SOW FURTHER CONFUSION. JARRING OBVIOUSLY COULD NOT INDICATE TO RIAD ON MARCH 7 THAT ISRAEL HAD ACCEPTED THE RESOLUTION. THUS, JORDAN ALSO INTENDS TO ASK JARRING TOMORROW TO COMMENT ON EBAN'S BROADCASTED DECLARATION WHICH, RIFA'I SAID, SEEMS TO THE GOJ TO BE FURTHER EVIDENCE OF ISRAEL'S CONTINUING EFFORTS TO DISTORT THE FACTS.

6. RIFA'I COMMENTED ON RIAD'S REACTION TO THE THIRD POINT IN JARRING'S DRAFT LETTER. HE SAID THAT RIAD'S COMMENTS

PAGE SIX RUQMKG 3782/1A ~~SECRET~~
WOULD APPEAR TO BE A "KIND OF REJECTION" OF NEGOTIATIONS.

~~SECRET~~



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PAGE 04 AMMAN 03782 131912Z

THE THIRD POINT HAD SAID THAT REPRESENTATIVES WOULD BE SENT TO NICOSIA "TO SPEED UP THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SETTLEMENT." IN RIFAI'S VIEW, THE NATURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IS THE REAL PROBLEM BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UAR. THE UAR WANTS IT UNDERSTOOD THAT "ACCEPTANCE" MEANS ACCEPTING "IMPLEMENTATION." IN THE UAR VIEW, THE RESOLUTION IN ITSELF IS "AN INSTRUMENT FOR SETTLING THE PROBLEM." ISRAEL, ON THE OTHER HAND, APPEARS TO WANT TO NEGOTIATE A SEPARATE AGENDA FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE RESOLUTION. CAIRO FEARS THIS MEANS THAT ISRAEL WANTS TO MAKE THE PRINCIPLES OF THE RESOLUTION ITSELF SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATION, ADDING DETAILS THAT WERE NEVER CONTEMPLATED. IT IS ISRAEL'S INSISTENCE ON PUTTING UP SUCH AGENDA ITEMS AND ADDITIONAL IDEAS (SUCH AS PEACE TREATIES AND DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS) THAT ARE THE REAL OBSTACLE TO FORWARD MOTION. RIFAI CONTINUED THAT JORDAN SEES NO WISDOM IN A SC MEETING AT THIS TIME, BUT UNLESS ISRAEL WILL RECOGNIZE THAT THE RESOLUTION ITSELF CONTAINS THE PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE DISCUSSION, IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY FOR THE SC TO ELUCIDATE THIS POINT. JORDAN SYMMES

ON THE POSSIBILITY THAT ISRAELI...
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ACTION SS 30

INFO 1030 W

P R 131800Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4883
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 775
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 176
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 752
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1352

~~SECRET~~ FINAL SECTION AMMAN 3782

EXDIS

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION

REF STATE 124205; NJA 6861

INTENDS TO ASK JARRING IF ISRAEL'S REPORTED ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION MEANS ISRAEL'S ACCEPTANCE OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION. HE DOUBTED THAT JARRING WOULD BE ABLE TO REPLY

PAGE TWO RUQMKG 3782/2A ~~SECRET~~
AFFIRMATIVELY.

7. AT THIS POINT I TOLD RIFAI THAT I THOUGHT HE HIMSELF MIGHT BE GETTING LOST IN WORDS. IT WAS OUR VIEW THAT IT SHOULD BE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TO EVERYONE BY THIS TIME THAT THE RESOLUTION IS A PACKAGE, THE PRINCIPLES OF WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED FOR IMPLEMENTATION IN DETAIL. ISRAEL WAS NO LONGER INSISTING ABSOLUTELY ON DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. OUR PEOPLE HAD MADE THE POINT THAT ALTHOUGH THE RESOLUTION DOES NOT SPECIFICALLY INCLUDE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS IT ALSO DOES NOT EXCLUDE THEM IF THE PARTIES SHOULD SUBSEQUENTLY AGREE TO THEM. IT SEEMED TO ME THEREFORE UNNECESSARY AND UNWISE FOR JORDAN TO INSIST UPON "ACCEPTANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION" WHEN IT WAS QUITE CLEAR TO ALL WHAT "ACCEPTANCE" MEANS.

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03782 131926Z

MOREOVER, I BELIEVED THE SC MEMBERS THAT HAD SECURED PASSAGE OF THE RESOLUTION COULD BE DEPENDED UPON TO SEE THAT IT WAS IMPLEMENTED AS A PACKAGE.

8. I ASKED RIFAI TO TELL ME CLEARLY WHETHER THE GOJ UNDERSTOOD THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATIONS OR WHETHER HE

PAGE THREE RUQMKG 3782/2A ~~SECRET~~

WAS HIDING BEHIND THE WORD "IMPLEMENTATION." RIFAI REPLIED THAT JORDAN QUITE CLEARLY UNDERSTANDS THERE MUST BE NEGOTIATIONS AND IS READY TO PROCEED WITH THEM. HE SAID IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT THE MECHANICS AND THE TIMING AND OTHER ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTATION WILL HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED. HE ADDED THAT JORDAN AND THE UAR WOULD NOT WANT TO BE CAUGHT IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL WHICH WOULD ALLOW ISRAEL TO USE WITHDRAWAL AS THE LAST COUNTER TO BE PLAYED IN THE GAME. IN OTHER WORDS, RIFAI SAID, ISRAEL COULD TAKE THE POSITION THAT THE RESOLUTION IS A PACKAGE AND THAT IT WILL NOT WITHDRAW A SINGLE SOLDIER UNTIL SHE HAS BEEN GIVEN ABSOLUTELY EVERYTHING SHE WANTS, INCLUDING EVERYTHING IN THAT DETAILED ISRAELI AGENDA THAT JARRING FIRST HANDED TO THE ARABS. RIFAI COMMENTED THE RESULT WOULD NOT BE A NEGOTIATION BUT A BLACKMAIL. I TOLD RIFAI THIS SEEMED TO ME AN EXTREME VIEW WITH REGARD TO ISRAELI TACTICS. CERTAINLY THIS WOULD BE AN AREA IN WHICH THESE MEMBERS COULD BE EXPECTED TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE. IF IT DID APPEAR THAT ISRAEL WAS INTRODUCING MINOR AGENDA ITEMS AS HE ENVISAGED, SC MEMBERS COULD BE EXPECTED TO WEIGH IN TO SUPPORT A FAIR AND REASONABLE APPROACH. IN CONCLUDING

PAGE FOUR RUQMKG 3782/2A ~~SECRET~~

I EMPHASIZED AGAIN THAT I HOPED JORDAN WOULD NOT INSIST UPON SOME NEW VARIATION OF WORDS.

9. COMMENT: IF ISRAEL HAS NOW CLEARLY ACCEPTED THE RESOLUTION, AND IF JARRING IS IN A POSITION TO AFFIRM THIS TO JORDAN, THEN I THINK WE CAN COUNT ON JORDAN'S CONTINUING TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE. IF ISRAEL, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS USING THE PRESUMED UAR BACKTRACKING IN ORDER TO TRY TO

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 03782 131926Z

SECURE A TACTICAL ADVANTAGE WITHOUT ACTUALLY HAVING MOVED TO "ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION. THEN WE ARE STILL IN TROUBLE. I WILL, OF COURSE, URGE THE KING WHEN I SEE HIM TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO TRY TO SAVE THE JARRING MISSION, INCLUDING PERHAPS SENDING RIFAI TO CAIRO. MY OWN IM-

PRESSION, HOWEVER, IS THAT THERE IS MUCH VALIDITY IN RIFAI'S COMMENT THAT THE UAR POSITION IS NOT AS NEGATIVE AS IT HAS BEEN PORTRAYED SECOND HAND AND THAT THERE IS STILL SOME QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE ISRAELIS HAVE ACCEPTED THE RESOLUTION OR ARE MERELY TRYING TO EXPLOIT A TEMPORARY TACTICAL SITUATION. GP-1 SYMMES

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001

By agill, NARA, Date 10/4/01

165 29

~~SECRET~~ 713

PAGE 01 AMMAN 00037 131702Z

02

47
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 131555Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4881
INFO CINSTRIKE

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3781

EXDIS

SUBJ: JORDAN ARMS

REF: STATE 128960

1. SINCE KING HUSSEIN WAS NOT EXPECTED RETURN TO AMMAN UNTIL TOMORROW AND SINCE WE THOUGHT IT BEST I ENDEAVOR LINE UP GENERAL KHAMMASH BEFORE PRESENTING PACKAGE TO KING, I ARRANGED FOR KHAMMASH TO CALL THIS MORNING SO I COULD ADVISE HIM OF RESPONSE CONTAINED STATE 128960.

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3781A ~~SECRET~~

2. INITIALLY I TOLD KHAMMASH THAT SO FAR AS 40 MMS WERE CONCERNED I COULD NOT BE ENCOURAGING BECAUSE OF AVAILABILITY DIFFICULTIES AND, AS INSTRUCTED, I ENDEAVORED TO PERSUADE HIM TO BE SATISFIED WITH 91 ADDITIONAL 50 CAL QUAD MOUNT AAs. I ADDED THAT IN ANY CASE HIGH COST OF 40 MMS WOULD ALSO SUGGEST JORDANIANS WOULD BE BETTER OFF WITHOUT THEM.

3. KHAMMASH TOOK A VERY DIM VIEW, TO SAY THE LEAST, OF WHAT I HAD TO SAY ABOUT AVAILABILITY OF 40 MMS. HE SAID THAT IN VIEW OF ISRAELI AIR ACTION IN THE VALLEY AND STRONG FEELINGS OF JAA ABOUT INADEQUACY OF PRESENT AAA IN JORDAN ARAB ARMY, HE WOULD NOT ASSOCIATE HIMSELF WITH ANY PACKAGE THAT FAILED TO PRODUCE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF JORDAN FOR 40 MMS. HE SAID HE KNOW THAT KING HUSSEIN FELT VERY STRONGLY ABOUT THIS, BUT NO MATTER HOW KING HUSSEIN FELT ABOUT IT, HE HIMSELF COULD

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 00037 131702Z

NOT RECOMMEND SUCH A PACKAGE. HE CONCLUDED THAT IF I HAD NOTHING FURTHER TO SAY ABOUT 40 MMS HE BELIEVED WE WERE IN BAD SHAPE.

4. I THEREUPON TOLD KHAMMASH THAT I HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED IF

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3781A ~~SECRET~~

JORDAN INSISTED ON 40 MMS TO SAY WE WOULD WITH GREAT DIFFICULTY BE ABLE TO PRODUCE AN ADDITIONAL 20 40 MMS, BRINGING TOTAL TO 24. KHAMMASH RESPONDED THAT 20 WERE NOT ENOUGH, BUT AFTER A LONG DISCUSSION HE FINALLY AGREED THAT HE WOULD SUPPORT THE PACKAGE WITH KING HUSSEIN. HE SAID THAT IN AGREEING TO DO SO HE ALSO WANTED TO INFORM ME NOW THAT JORDAN WOULD RAISE ITS REQUIREMENT FOR ADDITIONAL 40 MMS WITH US AT SOME LATER DATE.

5. KHAMMASH WAS PLEASED WITH OUR POSITION ON POSSIBLE SCALING DOWN OF HIS UNDELIVERED GROUND FORCE SPARE PARTS. HE SAID HE HOPED LTCOL THOMPSON (MAP) WOULD BE ABLE TO DISCUSS WITH MAJOR SAMARA POSSIBLE SUBSTITUTIONS AND AVAILABILITIES WITH "FLEXIBILITY".

6. KHAMMASH SUGGESTED THAT WHEN I SEE THE KING (PERHAPS LATER TODAY OR EARLY TOMMORROW) I SHOULD PRESENT PACKAGE IN GENERAL WAY, SUGGESTING THAT KHAMMASH GET DOWN TO DETAILED TALKS IMMEDIATELY WITH OUR MAP WORKING LEVEL. HE RECOMMENDED STRONGLY THAT COST OF 40 MMS NOT BE MENTIONED

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 3781A ~~SECRET~~

TO HUSSEIN AS A FACTOR IN OUR THINKING BUT THAT STRESS BE LAID ON AVAILABILITY FACTOR.

7. COMMENT: WE IN AMMAN ARE VERY GRATIFIED TO RECEIVE REFTEL. I HAVE REQUESTED APPOINTMENT WITH KING HUSSEIN ON URGENT BASIS AND AM ENCOURAGED TO BELIEVE THAT HE WILL APPROVE OUR PROCEEDING EXPEDITIOUSLY TO SIGNING OF MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING.

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 00037 131702Z

8. DEPT MAY WISH REPEAT TO JIDDA AND LONDON. SYMMES

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~~SECRET~~ 711

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03768 121547Z

51
ACTION SS 30

2

INFO SSO 00,1030 W

R 121520Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4874
INFO USUN NEW YORK 0749
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1348

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3768

EXDIS

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

1. BRITISH AMB ADAMS TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT WHEN HE SAW KING HUSSEIN LAST WEEK THE KING HAD SAID AT ONE POINT THAT JORDAN WOULD SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO CYPRUS EVEN IF THE UAR DID NOT. ADAMS SAID WHEN HE PROBED THE KING ON THIS STATEMENT HUSSEIN DREW BACK SOMEWHAT, BUT NOT COMPLETELY, INDICATING HE HAD BEEN DEFINITELY THING OF THIS POSSIBILITY.

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3768A ~~SECRET~~

2. IN DISCUSSING THIS, ADAMS AND I AGREED THAT KING WAS PROBABLY THINKING IN TERMS OF JORDAN'S ACCEPTING SUCH AN INVITATION FROM JARRING BASED ON A CHANGE IN ISRAEL'S "ACCEPTANCE" OF THE RESOLUTION. THE KING PROBABLY FELT THAT WITH LATTER HE WOULD HAVE SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION TO PROCEED TO CYRPUS NO MATTER WHAT UAR MIGHT DO. MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, OF COURSE, MAY WELL HAVE MADE SUCH A MOVE ON KING'S PART IMPOSSIBLE. IT DOES EMPHAISIZE, HOWEVER, THAT ISRAELI FAILURE TO ACCEPT THE RESOLUTION CLEARLY AND UNEQUIVIOCALLY CONTINUES TO BE MAJOR OBSTACLE TO OUR MAKING ANY PROGRESS ANYWHERE ALONG THE LINE. SYMMES

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By ica, NARA, Date 11-20-02



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SECRET 351

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03760 121147Z

4
ACTION SS 30

INFO 030 W

P 121031Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4867
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1346
INFO DIA
CINCSTRIKE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 1492

S E C R E T AMMAN 3760

EXDIS

JOINT EMBASSY/DATT MESSAGE

SUBJECT: ISRAEL-JORDAN

REF: TEL AVIV 2830; USDAO TEL AVIV 0461 MARCH 68

IN VIEW NUMBER RECENT INCIDENTS AND DANGERS INHERENT POSSIBLE ISRAELI RETALIATION, REQUEST PERMISSION PASS PARAPHRASE OF USDAO 0461 TO KEY GOJ OFFICIALS AS EXAMPLE OF WHAT GOI IS CURRENTLY THINKING. SUGGEST, HOWEVER, GOI OFFICIALS NOT RPT NOT BE TOLD WE ARE PASSING TO GOJ.

SYMMES

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 15-42

By UHT NARJ, Date 04-11-2016

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TELEGRAM

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SECRET 732

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03754 111038Z

2
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 110955Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4863

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3754

EXDIS:

SUBJ: JORDAN ARMS

REF: STATE 123779

KING IS OUT OF TOWN FOR ID AL-ADHA WHICH ENDS TOMORROW. WE MUST ANTICIPATE THAT BY THIRTEENTH JORDANIANS CONCERNED WITH ARMS PACKAGE WILL HAVE BECOME VERY ITCHY. IS THERE ANY CHANCE OF DECISION ON ON ADD-ONS BY THIRTEENTH? I SHALL IN ANY CASE BE SEEING KING THAT DAY (ACCOMPANYING JAMIESON OF ESSO AND NEED), AND T WILL BE VERY DESIRABLE TO BE ABLE TO GIVE HUSSEIN SOME IDEA OF WHEN WE CAN PROCEED TO

PAGE 2 RUGMKG 3754A ~~SECRET~~
SETTLE PACKAGE.

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 03750 091049Z

4
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P 091020Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4860
INFO CINCPAC/CINCPACAFSA PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3750

EXDIS

SUBJ: JORDAN ARMS: F-104 PORTION

REF: STATE 125943

1. WE HAVE CONTACTED BOTH KING AND KHAMMASH, THE LATTER FOLLOWING RECEIPT REFTEL, AND BOTH HAVE STATED CATEGORICALLY THAT JORDAN HAS MADE CLEAR-CUT DECISION TO ACCEPT EIGHTEEN F-104'S AS PART OF AIR GROUND PACKAGE. KHAMMASH AFFIRMED HE ACCEPTS PAYMENT SCHEDULES OUTLINED REF. HE STATED HE PREPARED TO SIGN ACCEPTANCE FORM FOR AIRCRAFT AND GROUND EQUIP.

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3750A ~~SECRET~~
MENT AS SOON AS JORDAN'S REQUEST FOR GROUND EQUIPMENT ADD-ONS APPROVED (AMMAN 3614). JORDANIANS HAVE NOT YET DECIDED ON EXACT DATE THEY WANT AIRCRAFT DELIVERED IN JORDAN SINCE THERE ARE SEVERAL FACTORS, BOTH PRACTICAL AND POLITICAL, WHICH REQUIRE FURTHER STUDY. KHAMMASH PROMISED TO GIVE US A MORE DEFINITE SCHEDULE IN A FEW WEEKS. HOWEVER, HE CONSIDERS THIS A DETAIL WHICH DOES NOT IN ANY WAY AFFECT JORDAN'S BASIC DECISION TO ACCEPT F-104'S AND ONE WHICH SHOULD NOT DELAY SIGNING OF CONTRACT.

2. ON BASIS KING'S AND KHAMMASH'S STATEMENTS WE CONSIDER THAT JORDAN'S DECISION IS NOW DEFINITIVE. WE THEREFORE REQUEST PROMPT PROCESSING NECESSARY PAPERS FOR THE AIRCRAFT AS PART OF THE OVERALL PACKAGE.

SYMME



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~~SECRET~~ 986

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03697 051631Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 051520Z MAR 68

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4835
INFO CINCSTRIKE

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3697

EXDIS

SUBJ: JORDAN ARMS

1. INFORMATION OF PLANS OF JORDAN ARMY REPS TO VISIT FORD COMPANY AT DEARBORN MAR 18 TO DISCUSS TECHNICAL SPECS FOR TRUCKS IN PROPOSED PACKAGE (USDAO AMMAN 0139 MAR 68) WAS GIVEN MAP CHIEF HERE BY MAJOR SAMARA, SECRETARY TO GEN KHAMMASH.

2. PROPOSED TRIP IS IN ANTICIPATION THAT AGREEMENT ON PACKAGE

PAGE 2 RUQMG 3697A ~~SECRET~~
WILL IN FACT BE REACHED AND REFLECTS JORDAN ARMY DESIRE MOVE AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE ONCE AGREEMENT SIGNED. THERE WERE SIMILAR CONTACTS DIRECTLY WITH COMPANY IN CONNECTION WITH PREVIOUS CONTRACTS.

3. WE GAVE KHAMMASH GIST OF STATE 123779 FOR WHICH HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND SAID HE WAS ENCOURAGED.

SYMMES

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~~SECRET~~ 353

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03685 050906Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 050826Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4826
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1325
AMEMBASSY LONDON 769
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1334
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1477
USMISSION USUN NY 739

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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3685

EXDIS

1. CANADIAN AMBASSADOR HARDY CALLED ON KING HUSSEIN MARCH 4 AND FOUND HIM "PREOCCUPIED BUT NOT DEPRESSED" HE SAID KING EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR US AND UK EFFORTS TO BE HELPFUL RE JARRING MISSION, JERUSALEM AND REFUGEES. KING TOLD HARDY HE DOES NOT PLAN TO REQUEST SC MEETING AT PRESENT, BUT COULD WAIT ONLY SO LONG FOR PROGRESS TOWARD A SETTLEMENT. MEANWHILE, HUSSEIN SAID, OTHER SIDE "WAS HAVING EVERYTHING ITS OWN WAY," AND JORDAN COULD NOT TOLERATE PRESENT SITUATION INDEFINITELY.

SYMMES

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-207
By js, NARA, Date 11-20-02

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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TR	XMB	AIR
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OSD	USIA	NSA

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AIR POUCH

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TO : Department of State

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Info: TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM

MAR 5 11 14 AM 1968

COPY NO. 02 SERIES B

RS/AN
ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy AMMAN

DATE: February 20, 1968

SUBJECT: Ambassador's February 15 Conversation with
Prime Minister Talhouni

REF :

We forward as an enclosure to this airgram memorandum of conversation between Prime Minister Talhouni and the Ambassador which took place the morning of February 15, prior to the major ceasefire violation of that day.

Portions of this conversation, the Prime Minister's comments on progress of the Jarring Mission and on terrorism, have been reported telegraphically.

Prime Minister also discussed his thinking about the desirability of bringing certain major West Bank personalities into the government, noting in particular the flattering attention given by the Israeli authorities to Anwar Nuseibeh and Hikmat al-Masri. Other topics discussed concerned arms for Jordan and U.S.-Jordan relations.

SYMMES

Enclosure:

Memorandum of Conversation

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NLJ 02-207
By iss, NARA, Date 11-20-02

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In Out

Drafted by:

POL: Murphy/clc

2/20/68

Comments and Classification Approved by:

DCM: ESDuncan

Clearances:

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: H.E. Bahjat Talhouni - Prime Minister
Ambassador Harrison M. Symmes
Richard W. Murphy

Handwritten initials

DATE: February 15, 1968 (Note: Conversation occurred before major ceasefire violation of that day.)

The Prime Minister opened conversation with complaint that recent Eshkol and Dayan speeches were a "threat to peace" in the area. GOJ's aim is to secure maximum stability to enable Jarring Mission proceed. For this reason Talhouni decided against responding directly to Eshkol attacks either by issuing statement in his own name or by calling for a Security Council meeting to protest. Matters could so easily escape from our control, Talhouni commented. If Jordan wanted to play this propaganda game, the Prime Minister observed, the GOJ could have brought photographers from Beirut and published atrocity pictures of the refugee camp shelling.

Jarring Mission. Jarring had brought with him yesterday the latest Israeli position. It represents a theoretical shift of the Israeli position but not a practical one. Jordan restated its position it would accept nothing which would weaken the SC resolution. Nonetheless, Talhouni acknowledged, the recent Israeli presentation represented "progress". Ambassador said he hoped Talhouni appreciated that the change of position on Israel's part, such as it was, represented the result of our exerting influence over them. He then asked what the UAR current attitude was toward the resolution and what the next step was. Talhouni said the UAR had not been as forthcoming with Jarring as had Jordan. If Israel would accept the resolution in the same terms as Jordan, Talhouni was convinced UAR would do the same. Cairo in one sense was taking its lead from Israel. If Israel will insert one qualifying word in its acceptance of the resolution Cairo will insert two. When pressed for what would be the next step if all parties agreed to accept the resolution as categorically as did Jordan, Talhouni did not give a clear answer but stated all parties would presumably have to defer to Jarring's initiative on the next stage. Ambassador urged need for speed and doubted that Jarring's continual flights around the area would meet this need. Talhouni then referred to Arab public opinion which he said was inhibiting Arab leaders other than Hussein from being frank and forthcoming about the SC resolution. Israel must try to ease the problems facing Arab leaders. Israel must realize its reliance on force will not solve problems. After acceptance by all parties was reported by Jarring to U Thant and registered

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with the Security Council, Talhouni said the Arab leaders would need "a short time" to propagandize their public before entering the next stage. The Ambassador observed that "in the Near East there is no public opinion, there are only public opinions."

Talhouni added that Jarring had now learned that Jordan would flatly reject any attempt by the Israelis to twist the resolution. Of course direct talks would come in the future but the ground must be prepared. Jordan does not want a temporary, false peace. Talk of establishing secure boundaries was nonsense. The hot line between Washington and Moscow represents better security in US-USSR relations than many of what were commonly accepted as their respective defenses. Confidence is basic to security. Neither the Maginot nor Siegfried lines gave security.

UAR had a particular problem with its public opinion. Mahmoud Riad on his return from New York had been accused in UAR Parliament of irresponsibility by Ahmad Sa'id.

Terrorism. Talhouni said businessman Ibrahim Mango and the Chief of the Amman Chamber of Commerce (Haj Muhammad Ali Bdair) had been to see him, just before the Ambassador arrived, to complain about the frequent visits to business establishments in downtown Amman by terrorists demanding contributions. The Prime Minister cited the visit by terrorists two weeks ago to Muri Sama'an's printing shop on Basman Street where they demanded that Sama'an print pamphlets supporting their cause. A week ago terrorists had come to Mango's shop demanding to see his books in order to assess the contribution he should make. Talhouni said he had met with Hussein yesterday and urged him to go to the Iraqis and frankly state that the Iraqi army was the source of most of Jordan's problems with the terrorists. The King should assert that Jordan could rely on itself for defense and demand withdrawal of Iraqi units. Talhouni commented, however, that Jordan cannot successfully deal with the terrorists unless Israel agrees to accept the SC resolution and there is demonstrable movement towards peace. The Ambassador said he thought Palestinians on the West Bank today hated the terrorists. Talhouni acknowledged this might be true, certainly the GOJ was opposed to them. One problem facing the GOJ was that the terrorist does not care where he dies, whether in Amman or on the West Bank. They had already impudently challenged Jordan's police authority and will probably do so even more in the future.

The Prime Minister stated he did not get involved in the details of terrorist incidents or control but had set out the broad policy of the King and Government which was one of firm opposition to terrorism. In his discussion

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with King, he had urged the necessity of clearing the Jordan Valley of terrorists. He rejected Dayan's charge, however, that there were terrorist bases and weapons and ammo depots in the Valley. UNRWA is well represented in Karameh Camp, for example, and has never noted any such depots. No Israeli shells falling in the camps had exploded ammunition dumps. It was probable, however, individual terrorists were transiting the refugee camps and using their facilities.

Ambassador then referred to the "leading Jordanian source" in yesterday's press appealing to the UN Secretary General and the Security Council and reminded Prime Minister that for sometime past we had urged Jordan to introduce UNTSO observers into Valley. The appeal to SYG and SC was in effect meaningless unless Jordan was willing to take such an action. Talhouni acknowledged this point and indicated that this statement had been primarily intended as a propaganda response to Eshkol. It had been couched in minimum terms which could satisfy Jordanian public opinion. He added he had no confidence that the presence of UNTSO observers would materially assure peace. He felt Jordan and Israel shared this attitude.

Ambassador deplored lack of communication between Jordan and Israel in order to discuss ceasefire violations. He reviewed the Israeli complaint that Daoud did not come to bridge as well as statements Dayan had made February 13 that Jordan was serving as a principal base for terrorists. He said we also knew that the terrorists were hiding among the civilian population. Recognizing that retaliation is inhuman and illegal against civilians, it could be argued that the presence of the terrorists in the refugee camps nonetheless left the Israelis little option but to reply by an attack on the camps. If one reason for the Eshkol-Dayan statements might have been a type of pressure on the USG, the Ambassador continued, the second was an expression of genuine concern on the GOI's part about the continuance of terrorist incidents.

Arms. Prime Minister expressed his appreciation for the US arms offer "even though the King is not happy". He said he had argued with King two days ago that he should maintain his ties with the US since both Washington and Amman wanted peace and had urged Hussein to conduct himself in the spirit of longstanding US-Jordanian friendship.

Ambassador emphasized he was ready to sign our proposed arms agreement today. He had asked Washington to see if it could improve the package but an answer could take some days. Recognizing how the King disliked the word "patience," he hoped Talhouni appreciated our willingness to be helpful on arms and hoped the Prime Minister would continue his most useful efforts with the King.

Change in Government. The Prime Minister said he has encouraged the Jerusalemites with whom he has met in recent days to continue their contacts with GOI representatives. He said that the next Prime Minister of Jordan

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could well be from the West Bank and mentioned Anwar Nuseibeh and Hikmat al-Masri as leading candidates. He noted that Dayan and Sasson had been "fattening up" Nuseibeh. He said he felt that West Bankers perhaps better appreciated the realities of Arab-Israeli coexistence and were therefore better fitted to lead the Jordanian Government which would carry on peace negotiations. (Talhouni strongly implied he would resign once all parties concerned had accepted the SC resolution and Jarring moved into "the next stage".)

Peace Settlement. Prime Minister argued that Jordan is seeking to deal wisely with the whole Arab-Israeli confrontation. "You cannot treat cancer with aspirin." He argued the problems on the ceasefire line are not the main issue, but only part of the problem. Concerning Colonel Daoud's continued absence from the Kingdom he said he had told Mohammad al-Farra on eve of his departure from New York to send Daoud back "even if he is dying." Talhouni deprecated Major Twal's ability to carry on talks with the Israelis. He did not trust Twal to keep confidences and would not himself receive Twal.

U.S.-Jordan Relations. Talhouni stated when he took over the Prime Ministership he found many doubts about US attitudes towards Jordan. The people felt the US had all possible influence over Israel and were disappointed in our stance on Jerusalem, West Bank and arms. Americans and Jordanians share the same values. The post-war American attitude had pained Talhouni. He saw how much the positions of Tito, Indira Gandhi, Kossygin and DeGaulle were being praised by Jordanians. Then the King went to the United States to speak in the name of all Arabs, except Syria. His reception in U.S. caused further pain, particularly when contrasted with the President's reception of Eshkol. Talhouni said he was propagandizing for U.S. in Parliament, arguing, for example, that all must recognize the limits of what help U.S. could give in arms because of its Vietnam demands. The Ambassador referred to recent PL-480 negotiations and said Najm ad-Din Dajani had told him he was sending a memo to the Prime Minister concerning problems in connection with the 3,000 ton portion of the package. The conditions in this part of the agreement were, however, largely based on official Jordanian statistics. We are now reviewing these conditions in Washington and Embassy is awaiting an answer. Talhouni said the agreement had been a good step in increased mutual confidence. As far as the arms went, the Ambassador perhaps had heard of the telegram from Jordan's Ambassador to Moscow. The King definitely wants more arms but Talhouni believes his recommendation that he "stay with old friends" has had its effect.

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EXDIS

REF: USUN 3980

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION == RHODES-TYPE TALKS.

REFTEL CONTAINS NUMBER OF REFERENCES BY TEKOAH AND AMB
GOLDBERG TO RHODES-TYPE TALKS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE
DEPARTMENT'S COMMENTS OF HOW RHODES FORMULA IS
INTERPRETED BY USG AND WHAT VARIOUS TECHNIQUES ARE
UNDERSTOOD TO BE COVERED BY IT.

GP-3. SYMMES

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8
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By 15/11 NARA, Date 10/14/05

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SUBJECT: JORDAN ARMS

REF: AMMAN 3570

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Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, #95
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-30-02

1. SUMMARY: GEN KHAMMASH HAS CONFIRMED THAT THEY WISH TO LEAVE F-104S IN THE PACKAGE AND ARE READY TO SIGN, ASSUMING THE ADJUSTMENTS REQUESTED IN THE GROUND PACKAGE WILL BE GRANTED. IT APPEARS THAT THE ARGUMENTS SUPPLIED BY THE DEPARTMENT AND WHICH WE HAVE BEEN USING IN FAVOR OF F-104S HAVE BORNE FRUIT. THESE HAVE BEEN REINFORCED BY THE APPARENT UNWILLINGNESS OF FAISAL TO HELP ON AIRCRAFT AND BY FAVORABLE REPORTS ON THE F-104 OBTAINED FROM THE PAKISTANIS. KHAMMASH NOW ASKS ONLY FOR REASSURANCE THAT THE \$2.8 MILLION GROUND

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3648A ~~SECRET~~
CONTROL SYSTEM INCLUDED IN OUR PACKAGE WILL BE ADEQUATE. (KHAMMASH STILL DOES NOT WISH TO HAVE THE F-104'S STATIONED IN JORDAN AND SUPERFICIALLY COMBAT READY AT TOO EARLY A DATE.) REQUEST THEREFORE THAT F-104 AIRCRAFT PORTION BE LEFT IN WHATEVER REWRITE OF MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING IS BEING DONE.

2. ELABORATION ON THE FOREGOING: KHAMMASH EXPLAINED THAT BASIC PROBLEM ON JORDAN'S ACCEPTANCE OF F-104 AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN NEGATIVE FEELING AMONG JORDANIAN PILOTS TOWARDS THIS MODEL. CRASH OF TWO 104S DURING COLLEGE RUN PROJECT LAST YEAR, AGAIN BY BACK-
GROUND OF GERMAN AIR FORCE LOSSES, CONFIRMED THEIR SUSPICIONS

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F-104 WAS UNSAFE AIRCRAFT.

3. KHAMMASH SAID HE HAD BEEN DOING SOME QUIET PROPAGANDA ON HIS OWN IN FAVOR OF F-104 OVER PAST SEVERAL WEEKS. HE SENT JORDANIAN AIR FORCE CHIEF COLONEL KURDI TO PAKISTAN LAST WEEKEND TO DISCUSS F-104S WITH PAKS. KURDI, WHO HAD BEEN DUBIOUS BOTH ABOUT SAFETY AND WHETHER IT WOULD SERVE JORDANIAN PURPOSES, RETURNED WITH CONSIDERABLY LESS NEGATIVE OUTLOOK. HE ALSO BROUGHT

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NEWS THAT PAKS HAD SAID THEY WOULD TRY TO BE HELPFUL SHOULD JORDANIANS NEED ANY EXTRA INDOCTRINATION AND ON THE JOB TRAINING OR MAINTENANCE.

4. KHAMMASH SAID HIS TRIP EARLIER THIS WEEK TO SAUDI ARABIA (AMMAN 3570) HAD MADE HIM VERY DUBIOUS THAT FAISAL WOULD BE WILLING TO UNDERWRITE PURCHASES OF MIRAGE AIRCRAFT OR TURN SAUDI LIGHTNINGS OVER TO JORDAN. FURTHER ARGUMENT KHAMMASH HAD ADDUCED FOR THE F-104S, THEREFORE, IN SESSION FEB 29 WITH KING AND KURDI WAS ECONOMY. LACKING ASSURANCE FROM FAISAL THAT SAUDI ARABIA WOULD ASSIST AND IN VIEW PROBABILITY JORDAN STOOD TO LOSE SEVERAL MILLION DOLLARS ALREADY PAID DOWN ON F-104 TRAINING AND REHABILITATION, HE ARGUED KINGDOM COULD NOT AFFORD TO CHOOSE ANY OTHER MODEL.

5. IN COURSE OF SEVERAL HOURS MEETING FEB 29 WITH KING AND KURDI, FOREGOING POINTS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AS WELL AS AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITIES AND COSTS. IT WAS DECIDED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL JORDAN SHOULD BE ABLE TO STATE IT WAS GETTING AIRCRAFT IN RELATIVELY NEAR FUTURE. FACT THAT DELIVERY LEME FOR MIRAGES AND LIGHTNINGS

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COULD BE AS MUCH AS THREE YEARS AWAY WOULD SERIOUSLY DIMINISH CREDIBILITY OF KING'S POSTURE THAT HE DOING UTMOST TO RE-EQUIP JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES. KHAMMASH, HOWEVER, MADE CLEAR TO EMBARK OFF THAT HE CONTINUED TO HAVE SOME DOUBTS AS TO ADVISABILITY HAVING F-104S STATIONED IN JORDAN AS EARLY AS THIS SUMMER BOTH BECAUSE HE MIGHT BE EXPECTED TO USE THEM AND BECAUSE THE

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AIRFIELDS AND GROUND CONTROL EQUIPMENT WOULD NOT BE READY AND PERSONNEL FULLY QUALIFIED.)

6. KURDI CONCEDED THAT GIVEN ALL THESE ARGUMENTS AND HIS TRIP TO PAKISTAN HE FELT WITH CAREFUL INDOCTRINATION OF JORDANIAN PILOTS, WHICH SHOULD INCLUDE ORIENTATION VISITS TO USA AND PAKISTAN, THE PILOTS COULD BE BROUGHT AROUND TO ACCEPT THIS AIRCRAFT. HE THEREFORE WOULD WITHDRAW HIS OBJECTION TO ACQUISITION OF F-104?J KING SAID THAT THIS CHANGE IN KURDI'S POSITION REMOVED HIS, HUSSEIN'S, ONLY SERIOUS OBJECTION TO THE F-104. HUSSEIN SAID HE WOULD NOT HAVE FORCED AN UNACCEPTABLE AIRCRAFT ON JORDAN'S AIRFORCE; TO DO SO WOULD ONLY CREATE FURTHER PROBLEMS. KHAMMASH, KURDI, AND HUSSEIN THEREUPON AGREED TO ACCEPT F-104S AND CARRY OUT FURTHER PILOT INDOCTRINATION TO INCREASE THE PILOTS CONFIDENCE IN THE

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AIRCRAFT. KHAMMASH SAID HE HOPED WE WOULD HELP OUT IN THIS INDOCTRINATION BECAUSE THERE COULD BE A LINGERING PROBLEM IF NOT RESOLVED.

7 KHAMMASH SAID HE HAD ONLY ONE OUTSTANDING QUESTION IN CONNECTION WITH AIRCRAFT SALE. IN REGARD TO DOLLARS 2.8 MILLION GROUND CONTROL RADAR SYSTEM FOR F-104 AND HAWKER HUNTER AIRCRAFT WHICH WE HAD UNDERTAKEN TO SUPPLY, HE SAID HE WOULD LIKE WNSURANCE THAT THIS SYSTEM WOULD BE ADEQUATE TO DO THE JOB AND NOT

JUST A SHOESTRING OPERATION TAILORED TO FIT JORDAN'S BUDGET. HE SAID IT WAS IN NEITHER JORDAN'S NOR US INTEREST TO ATTEMPT TO OPERATE F-104S WITH DEFICIENT GROUND CONTROL SYSTEM.

8. RECOMMENDATION: THAT AIRCRAFT NOT BE DELETED FROM WHATEVER REWRITE OF MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING MAY BE IN PROCESS

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#AS RECEIVED. WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

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SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

FOLLOWING IS UNCLEARED MEMCON, FYI, NOFORN, SUBJECT TO CHANGE ON REVIEW.

SUMMARY: IN CONVERSATION WHICH SECRETARY HAD PRIOR TO LUNCH WITH RIFAI, LATTER ASSURED HIM HE WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO INFLUENCE RIAD TO REMAIN IN NEW YORK UNTIL EBAN HAD RETURNED AND HAD PROVIDED JARRING WITH ISRAELI RESPONSE TO LATEST UAR DOCUMENT. RIFAI HAS BEEN STRESSING TO RIAD THAT HE CANNOT GO BACK TO AMMAN EMPTY-HANDED. HE IS APPARENTLY GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO POSSIBLE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING TO APPLY PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO TAKE BACK DISPLACED PERSONS PRESENTLY FACING BLEAK WINTER IN HIGHLANDS OF JORDAN. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT RIFAI CONSIDERING SUCH SECURITY COUNCIL ROUND AS SOMEWHAT OF A FARE-BAYER IN EVENT EBAN DOES NOT COME BACK WITH ANYTHING WHICH OFFERS PROSPECT FOR PROGRESS.

AS IN PAST, RIFAI LAID CONSIDERABLE STRESS ON NEED FOR ISRAELI COMMITMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO WITHDRAW. NUMBER OF POINTS SUMMARIZED BELOW WERE TOUCHED UPON AT TWO-HOUR LUNCHEON WITH SECRETARY, KATZENBACH, ROSTOW, HART, AND SISCO ON U.S. SIDE AND RIFAI, SWARAF AND EL-FARRA ON JORDANIAN SIDE. END SUMMARY.

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By 45/116, NARA, Date 10/14/01

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1. IN RESPONSE TO OUR INQUIRY, RIFAI WAS CAUTIOUS REGARDING DESIRABILITY OF JARRING MAKING PROPOSALS OF HIS OWN IN EVENT EBAN DOES NOT BRING BACK TO NEW YORK SOMETHING WORTHWHILE. RIFAI SAID IT IMPORTANT THAT JARRING DISCUSS SUCH PROPOSALS WITH PARTIES TO TRY TO ACHIEVE PRIOR UNDERSTANDING. HE SEEMED VERY AWARE THAT SUCH MOVE COULD RESULT IN END OF JARRING MISSION. AT ONE POINT HE SAID ISRAELIS MORE LIKELY THAN ARABS TO OBJECT TO JARRING MAKING PROPOSALS. HE AGREED THAT EACH SIDE HAD DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF S.C. RESOLUTION. HE DID NOT LIKE GOING BACK TO SECURITY COUNCIL IN ORDER TO GET NEW INTERPRETATION, SINCE THIS WOULD ONLY CONTINUE IMPASSE. HE STRESSED NEED FOR MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN PARTIES. HE IS WILLING TO STAY ON LONGER IN NEW YORK BUT THERE MUST BE PROGRESS, OTHERWISE IT WOULD BE HUMILIATING FOR HIM.

2. RIFAI SAID THERE WAS NEED FOR ISRAELIS TO COMMIT THEMSELVES IN PRINCIPLE TO WITHDRAWAL. ONCE ISRAELIS HAD DONE THIS, QUESTION OF RECOGNIZED AND SECURE BOUNDARIES COULD BE WORKED OUT BY PARTIES. HE DID NOT AGREE THAT COMMON GROUND MIGHT BE ACHIEVED BY STARTING OTHER WAY AROUND, NAMELY BY APPROACHING PROBLEM PRAGMATICALLY AND WORKING OUT IN FIRST INSTANCE AGREEMENT ON SPECIFICS OF BOUNDARY QUESTION AND OTHER ELEMENTS IN RESOLUTION. RIAD RECALLED THAT IN EARLIER DAYS ARABS HAD MADE WITHDRAWAL A PRECONDITION, BUT THAT THEY NOW INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO TALK ABOUT WHOLE RESOLUTION AS PACKAGE. HE HELD TO VIEW THERE MUST FIRST BE GOI COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW.

3. IN RESPONSE TO OUR QUESTIONING, RIFAI EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT RECENT INCIDENTS ALONG SUEZ WERE UNHELPFUL TO PEACE EFFORTS. HE FEARED PEACE EFFORTS TURNING TO FAILURE RATHER THAN SUCCESS. HE HINTED THAT PRESENT INCIDENTS WERE A REFLECTION OF A HARDER LINE, AND PREDICTED INCIDENTS IN AREA WOULD INCREASE IN INTENSITY. HE SAID WE ARE AT CRUCIAL JUNCTURE, AND HE HAS BEEN TELLING RAID HE CANNOT RETURN TO AMMAN AND TELL HIS PEOPLE THAT JARRING MISSION HAD FAILED. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT EBAN WILL COME BACK WITH A CLEAR POSITION WHICH IS USEFUL AND SPECIFIC, NOT GENERAL.

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4. IN RESPONSE TO SECRETARY'S INQUIRY WHETHER SOVIETS WANT PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, RIFAI SAID WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS WHAT U.S. WANTS, NOT USSR. IF U.S. WANTS PEACE, WE COULD GET IT. HIS ARAB COLLEAGUES IN CAIRO TELL HIM THAT USSR IS HAMMERING AT THEM ON NEED FOR PEACE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SC RESOLUTION. JORDAN HAS NO REAL DIRECT CONTACTS WITH SOVIETS, BUT GROMYKO TOLD RIFAI IN NEW YORK THAT USSR WANTS PEACE, HOWEVER, RIFAI DOES NOT FEEL USSR CAN BE HELPFUL IN PROMOTING PEACE. SECRETARY REFERRED TO REPORTS THAT USSR ARMING FEDAYEEN. RIFAI SAID FEDAYEEN GETS ALL SORTS OF ARMS THROUGH CONTRIBUTIONS AND PURCHASES. HE DOUBTED FEDAYEEN WERE GETTING ARMS DIRECTLY FROM SOVIETS, BUT SAID THEY WERE COMING FROM COUNTRIES WHERE SOVIET AND CHINESE ARMS WERE AVAILABLE. HE AGREED THAT U.S. WANTS PEACE IN THE AREA, BUT MAINTAINED ARABS WERE CONFUSED AS TO US DESIRES BECAUSE WE HAVE BEEN GIVING ISRAELIS DESTRUCTIVE ARMS THEY DO NOT NEED. HE MENTIONED SKYHAWKS AND PHANTOMS SPECIFICALLY.

5. RIFAI THEN TURNED TO QUESTION OF 355,000 DISPLACED PERSONS WHO FACE A BLEAK WINTER IN MONTHS AHEAD. HE SAID JORDAN IS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING BRINGING MATTER TO SECURITY COUNCIL IN ORDER TO APPLY PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO PERMIT RETURN OF DR'S TO WEST BANK WHERE THERE ARE EMPTY VILLAGES AND UNRWA CAMPS. IF ISRAEL REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH SUCH SC ACTION, JORDAN WOULD WANT MEASURES TAKEN ISRAEL. WE POINTED OUT THERE WOULD BE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER IN GA WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF UNRWA ITEM. WE CAUTIONED HIM ON ANY RECOURSE TO SC, LIMITED OR OTHERWISE, WHICH IN OUR JUDGMENT MIGHT AFFECT ADVERSELY THE WORK OF JARRING MISSION. RIFAI DID NOT SEE MUCH GOOD COMING FROM ANY GA DISCUSSION. IT WAS MADE CLEAR TO RIFAI THAT WE FAVORED RETURN OF DPS TO WEST BANK. SHARAF ASKED WHAT JORDAN WAS TO DO IF EBAN CAME BACK EMPTY-HANDED? IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, JORDAN WOULD HAVE TO GO TO SECURITY COUNCIL ON QUESTION OF DISPLACED PERSONS. RIFAI SAID HE COULD NOT RETURN TO AMMAN EMPTY-HANDED, AND SC ACTION ON THIS MATTER WOULD BE HELPFUL TO JORDAN.

6. SECRETARY TURNED TO QUESTION OF BELLIGERENCY AND HIS INABILITY TO GET READ TO SAY SPECIFICALLY THAT END OF STATE OF WAR EMBRACED FREEDOM OF PASSAGE OF ALL VESSELS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS. RIFAI FIRST REPEATED STANDARD UAR LINE

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REGARDING FREEDOM OF PASSAGE OF ISRAELI CARGOES, HE LATER SAID ONCE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES WERE GUARANTEED, THERE COULD BE FREEDOM OF PASSAGE FOR ALL SHIPS. HE REVERTED AT THIS POINT TO NEED FOR A "PACKAGE DEAL" WHICH WOULD INCLUDE AGREEMENT ON ALL ELEMENTS OF RESOLUTION. SECRETARY ASKED WHERE PROCESS OF PEACE COULD BEGIN; COULD NEGOTIATING PROCESS BEGIN ON REFUGEE PROBLEM? SHARAF SAID ALL MATTERS IN RESOLUTION OUGHT BE DISCUSSED AND A TIMETABLE WORKED OUT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SC RES. RIFAI SAID HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO GIVING PRIORITY TO DISCUSSION OF REFUGEE QUESTION; HE MAINTAINED UAR HAS ACCERTED PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF PASSAGE, BUT IMPORTANT QUESTION WAS WHETHER ISRAEL WAS WILLING TO HAVE REFUGEES EXERCISE THEIR LEGITIMATE RIGHTS. HE REPEATED THAT IF REFUGEE RIGHTS WERE GUARANTEED, THERE COULD BE FREEDOM OF PASSAGE FOR ALL VESSELS.

7. SECRETARY MADE SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS WHICH SEEMED TO MOVE RIFAI. SECRETARY STATED THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN UNDERLYING U.S. ATTITUDE AND DIFFICULTIES OF PRESENT SITUATION. HAD OUR ADVICE BEEN TAKEN BY PARTIES IN JUNE OF 1967, THERE WOULD NOW HAVE BEEN A WAR NOR A CHANGE OF ONE INCH OF TERRITORY. WE ARE IN TRAGIC POSITION OF NOT HAVING WANTED ANY OF THE EVENTS OF LAST EIGHTEEN MONTHS TO HAVE OCCURRED. FACT THAT OUR ADVICE WAS NOT TAKEN BY EITHER SIDE HAS AFFECTED US DEEPLY. WE WANT NOTHING OTHER THAN PEACE, WE HAVE NO OTHER NATIONAL PURPOSES IN THE AREA. OVER YEARS, WE HAVE ACTED IN SUPPORT OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF STATES IN AREA. NONE OF THE STATES IN THE AREA HAS SAID TO US: "TELL US WHAT TO DO". INVARIABLY STATES IN THE AREA HAVE TOLD US TO TELL THE OTHER FELLOW WHAT TO DO. NEVERTHELESS, U.S. IS GOING TO CONTINUE TO TRY TO PICK UP PIECES WHICH HAVE RESULTED FROM SIX-DAY WAR. PERHAPS THIS WILL MAKE EVERYBODY ANGRY, BUT DURING THAT PROCESS RIFAI SHOULD BE IN NO DOUBT REGARDING OUR DEEP CONCERN FOR JORDAN AND OUR DESIRE TO SEE JORDAN AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE, BOTH IN RELATIONSHIP TO ISRAEL AND TO OTHER ARAB STATES. RIFAI MUST APPRECIATE THERE ARE FORCES WHICH ARE ANTAGONISTIC TO U.S., TO JORDAN, AND TO JORDAN'S CLOSEST FRIENDS IN ARAB WORLD. OUR INTEREST IS TO SUPPORT JORDAN. WE WANT TO SEE JORDAN LIVE UNDER CONDITIONS OF DIGNITY, COMPATIBLE WITH ITS LEGITIMATE INTERESTS. SECRETARY SAID PARENTHETICALLY WE CANNOT AGREE THAT IT IS IN JORDAN'S LEGITIMATE INTEREST

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FOR ISRAEL TO DISAPPEAR. THERE IS NEED FOR LONG AND HARD THOUGHTS BY BOTH SIDES ON HOW THEY WILL LIVE IN PEACE WITH EACH OTHER. JORDAN'S MOST SERIOUS ENEMIES DO NOT LIVE IN ISRAEL. THE U.S. HAS A STAKE IN JORDAN AGAINST ANY AND ALL OF ITS ENEMIES. EVERYBODY IN AREA ASSUMES THAT U.S. CAN BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT AT NO TIME HAVE ANY OF PARTIES BEEN WILLING TO GIVE US THE DECISIVE INFLUENCE IN THEIR OWN CAPITALS WHICH WOULD BE NEEDED. IT IS NOT OUR PURPOSE TO GO TO WAR WITH ANY OF ALL SIDES, NOR TO IMPOSE PEACE. WE ARE READY TO WORK WITH JORDAN WITH RESPECT AND EVEN AFFECTION. WE WILL DO OUR BEST, BUT IF U.S. SHOULD FAIL, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT JORDAN NOT FEEL THAT IT IS BECAUSE OF LACK OF APPRECIATION BY UNITED STATES OF JORDAN'S PROBLEMS.

8. RIFAI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR SECRETARY'S STATEMENT AND SAID THAT NEITHER JORDAN NOR KING HUSSEIN DOUBTED IN ANY DEGREE US SINCERITY AND THAT OF SECRETARY PERSONALLY. JORDAN KNOWS OF SILENT EFFORTS OF US, AND GIVES US CREDIT FOR IT. HE BELIEVED THAT US ADVICE WAS WELL RECEIVED EVEN IN DANGEROUS MOMENTS PRIOR TO BREAKOUT OF HOSTILITIES. NASSER HAD HEEDED THIS ADVICE. AS TO JORDAN, IT ALSO TOOK US ADVICE THAT IT SHOULD BE MODERATE AT ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE. JORDAN WANTS US CONTINUING INTEREST AND INVOLVEMENT, AND HE MAINTAINED UAR ALSO WANTS TO SEE US PLAY ROLE. JORDAN IS ASSURED OF US DESIRE TO PROTECT ITS POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. RIFAI SAID JORDAN HAS BEEN IN JEOPARDY DURING LAST 17 MONTHS AS A RESULT OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF ITS LAND; US SHOULD NOT ALLOW THIS TO GO ON IN LIGHT OF PLEDGES IT HAS MADE. RIFAI SAID JORDAN HAD "PATIENCE AND CONFIDENCE IN THE US AND IN YOU PERSONALLY". BUT JORDAN IS APPREHENSIVE IN LIGHT OF 350,000 DP'S WHICH ISRAEL REFUSES TO TAKE BACK, RAZING OF PROPERTY AND VILLAGES, ESTABLISHMENT OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK, ACTIVITIES IN JERUSALEM, AND OTHER EVIDENCES OF ISRAELI INTENTION TO REMAIN IN JORDANIAN TERRITORY. RIFAI SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE TWO POINTS IN PARTICULAR:

(A) JORDAN IS PART OF ARAB HOMELAND AND THEREFORE HAS TO ACT WITH WISDOM AND CARE, OTHERWISE IT WILL BE PUT IN A VERY DIFFICULT POSITION IN ARAB WORLD. US MUST TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT.

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(B) IF US FAILS TO ACHIEVE RESULTS, JORDAN EXPECTS THAT AT LEAST US WILL NOT ADD TO STRENGTH OF ITS ADVERSARIES WHILE THEY ARE IN OCCUPATION OF JORDANIAN TERRITORY. JORDAN WANTS AND IS PLAYING A POSITIVE ROLE IN ARAB WORLD. IT INTENDS TO CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN ITS MODERATE POSITION WHICH, HOWEVER, MUST HAVE BROAD SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT IN ARAB WORLD.

SECRETARY DESCRIBED COMPLEXITY OF SITUATION DERIVING FROM THREE STRUGGLES IN AREA: ARAB-ISRAELI, ARAB-ARAB, AND DIFFERENCES AMONG THE MAJOR POWERS. HE CONCLUDED CONVERSATION BY REITERATING US INTENTION TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO HELP ACHIEVE PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST.

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EXDIS

SUBJECT: ARAB-ISRAEL

1. GHORBAL CALLED ON DAVIES AT FORMER'S REQUEST OCTOBER 24 TO DISCUSS THREE QUESTIONS: DEMILITARIZATION, LINKAGE OF REFUGEE AND CANAL ISSUES, AND STATUS UAR TALKS WITH JARRING. REGARDING DEMILITARIZATION, HE SAID ON INSTRUCTIONS FONMIN RIAD HE WISHED TO CLARIFY UAR POSITION WHICH HAD COME UP FOR DISCUSSION DURING ROSTOW-KHOULY LUNCH OCTOBER 16. UAR HAD AGREED TO DEMILITARIZATION ON UNDERSTANDING IT WOULD BE RECIPROCAL. UAR NOT RPT NOT PREPARED DEMILITARIZE "ALL OF SINAI" BUT WOULD BE PREPARED DEMILITARIZE AREA ALONG BORDER PROVIDING ISRAEL DEMILITARIZED SAME SIZE AREA ON ITS SIDE. DEPTH OF DZ MUST BE SAME ON EACH SIDE OF BORDER, UAR VIEW WAS THAT HISTORY SHOWED ITS SECURITY MORE IN DANGER THAN ISRAEL'S AND IT COULD NOT AFFORD ABANDON SINAI MILITARILY.

2. WITH REGARD LINKAGE OF REFUGEES, CAIRO HAD BEEN PERPLEXED BY DEMARCHE THIS SUBJECT MADE BY BERGUS TO SIDGI, WHICH RAISED QUESTION WHETHER USG ABANDONING ITS POSITION THAT NOV 22 RESOLUTION WAS PACKAGE. HE HANDED IN PIECE OF RAPER SETTING FORTH UAR POSITION THAT IT ACCEPTS RESOLUTION AS WHOLE AND ASKING WHETHER US ADHERES TO ITS FORMER POSITION AND STILL

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Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, # 291
By 5 NARA, Date 9-20-01

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CONSIDERS REFUGEE QUESTION AN INTEGRAL PART OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION.

3. FINALLY, HE POINTED OUT THAT IN HIS OCTOBER 19 MEMORANDUM TO JARRING, FONMIN RIAD HAD SAID ISRAELI DECLARATION OF READINESS TO IMPLEMENT RESOLUTION AND WITHDRAW ITS FORCES "WOULD LEAD TO ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST". HE SAID THIS WAS RESPONSE TO OUR URGINGS THAT UAR GIVE INDICATION IT READY FOR "PEACE" AND NOT JUST "POLITICAL SOLUTION". HE COULD ASSURE US RIAD MEANT WHAT HE SAID AND THAT UAR WAS SINCERELY ANXIOUS FOR PEACE. THERE HAD BEEN NO PROGRESS TO DATE, HOWEVER. UAR HAD SHOWN ITS HAND AND MADE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO JARRING, WHICH ISRAELIS HAD IGNORED. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER RIAD COULD REMAIN IN NEW YORK UNDER THESE CONDITIONS. HE HAD BEEN THERE A MONTH, LARGELY AS RESULT URGINGS AMBASSADOR BALL. THERE HAD BEEN NO PROGRESS, AND NOW EBAN HAD GONE OFF TO ISRAEL. WERE ARABS SUPPOSED TO SIT COOLING THEIR HEELS FOREVER? IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION HE SAID RIAD CONSIDERING LEAVING FOR HOME PERMANENTLY ON OCTOBER 29. HE INDICATED TIMING OF US-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS ON PHANTOMS WAS MAJOR FACTOR IN RIAD'S CURRENT UNHAPPINESS.

4. DAVIES NOTED CLARIFICATION REGARDING DEMILITARIZATION BUT DID NOT COMMENT BEYOND SAYING HOPED SETTLEMENT WOULD ENSURE SECURITY BOTH ISRAEL AND ARAB STATES. REGARDING LINKAGE OF CANAL AND REFUGEES, DAVIES SAID WE HOPED EGYPTIANS WOULD NOT REACT IN SUCH SERIOUS FASHION EACH TIME WE MADE SUGGESTION TO THEM. BERGUS HAD MERELY BEEN DRAWING TO THEIR ATTENTION LEGAL ASPECTS OF PROBLEM WHICH THEY SHOULD NOT OVERLOOK. WE HAD BEEN JUST AS FRANK IN CALLING TO ATTENTION OF ISRAELIS CERTAIN FLAWS IN THEIR LEGAL POSITION. IN SO DOING WE TRYING TO HELP PARTIES MOVE TOWARDS SETTLEMENT, WHICH ALL OF US WANTED. WE WERE NOT TRYING SEPARATE REFUGEE ISSUE FROM PACKAGE. IT WAS EGYPTIANS WHO SEEMED TO BE SEPARATING IT AND CANAL ISSUE FROM REST OF PACKAGE, PARTICULARLY IN FONMIN'S OCT 1 CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY. WE THOUGHT THAT WAS MISTAKE AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO SPECIAL LINKAGE OF THIS SORT BETWEEN ANY OF THE SEPARATE COMPONENTS OF RESOLUTION.

5. DAVIES SAID WE PLEASED TO NOTE RIAD HAD SPOKEN OF PEACE IN HIS MEMORANDUM TO JARRING. HE WOULD CALL THIS POSITIVE NOTE TO ATTENTION OF OTHERS. HE HOPED AT SAME TIME THAT

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EGYPTIANS WOULD CONCENTRATE ON POSITIVE ASPECTS OF ISRAELI POSITION, AND WOULD REALIZE THAT ISRAELIS HAD DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEM WHICH NECESSITATED EXTREME CAUTION ON EBAN'S PART. EBAN HAD GONE HOME FOR CONSULTATIONS. HOPEFULLY HE WOULD RETURN WITH MORE FLEXIBILITY. WE HOPED ISRAELIS WOULD RESPOND TO EGYPTIAN POSITION IN POSITIVE FASHION AND THAT EGYPTIANS WOULD RECIPROCATE. ALL OF US SHOULD PUT OUR SHOULDERS TO WHEEL AND PUSH.

6 REGARDING MAHMOUD RIAD'S TRAVEL PLANS, PARKER TOLD GOHORBAL IT WOULD BE SERIOUS TACTICAL ERROR FOR HIM TO LEAVE ON 29TH. HE SHOULD AT LEAST WAIT UNTIL EBAN RETURNED AND FIND OUT WHAT LATTER HAD TO SAY. RIAD HAD WAITED 18 MONTHS, IT WOULD BE MISTAKE NOT TO WAIT FEW DAYS LONGER. IF EGYPTIANS SO CONVINCED WE HAD MADE PLUNDER ON PHANTOMS, THEY SHOULD NOT COMPOUND IT WITH ONE OF THEIR OWN.

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INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:RP PAGANELLI
APPROVED BY: NEA:RODGER P DAVIES
NEA/ARN:MR BAAS
NEA/IAI:MR BAHTI
NEA/UAR:MR PARKER
IO/UNP:MISS JONES
S/S:MR WALSH

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TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

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1. JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR SHARAF AT HIS OWN REQUEST CALLED ON DAVIES OCTOBER 24. HE WELCOMED THE SECRETARY'S INVITATION TO RIFA'I TO COME TO WASHINGTON, STATING THAT THIS WAS A HELPFUL BOOST TO RIFA'I WHO WAS GENERALLY DEPRESSED ABOUT THE SITUATION IN NEW YORK. SHARAF HOPED THE SECRETARY HAD "SOMETHING NEW" TO TELL RIFA'I. SHARAF'S MAIN PURPOSE IN CALLING WAS TO EXPRESS HIS APPREHENSION THAT THE PEACE EFFORTS IN NEW YORK WERE IN DANGER OF IMMINENT BREAKDOWN. HE DESCRIBED RIFA'I AND RIAD AS DEPRESSED AND EXPECTED THEY WOULD LEAVE NEW YORK AFTER A WEEK OR 10 DAYS IF THERE WERE NO PROMISE OF A MOVEMENT IN THE SITUATION. HE STATED HIS BELIEF THAT JARRING MISSION WOULD FOLD THEREAFTER. SHARAF SAID THAT GOJ WAS UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE TO CALL FOR A REPORT BY JARRING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON HIS PROGRESS OR LACK OF SAME TO DATE.

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2. SHARAF CHARACTERIZED PRESS COVERAGE OF THE EVENTS IN NEW YORK AS UNHELPFUL AND INACCURATE AND DAMAGING TO THE ARAB POSITION, AND CLAIMED THAT THESE WERE ISRAELI INSPIRED. HE SAID THAT FALSE REPORTS OF DIRECT ISRAELI-JORDANIAN CONTACTS WERE INTENDED BY THE ISRAELIS TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN JORDAN AND THE UAR. HE ADDED THAT THESE REPORTS OF DIRECT CONTACTS CAUSED THE GOJ ACUTE PROBLEMS AT HOME, AND CITED LAST WEEK'S GOJ-FEDAYEEN CONFRONTATION AS PARTIALLY A RESULT OF SUCH REPORTS. HE SAID ALSO THAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY ARAB DIPLOMATS AT UN THAT USUN WAS PROPAGATING UNFOUNDED RUMORS OF PROGRESS IN NEW YORK.

3. DAVIES STATED THAT US TOO WAS DISAPPOINTED IN THE SLOW PACE OF EVENTS IN NEW YORK, BUT WAS HOPEFUL OF FURTHER FORWARD MOVEMENT AS A RESULT OF EBAN'S CURRENT CONSULTATIONS IN ISRAEL. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT PRESS REPORTING HERE AND IN ISRAEL HAD BEEN UNHELPFUL. HE DENIED CATEGORICALLY THAT USUN WAS SPREADING UNFOUNDED RUMORS OF PROGRESS IN NEW YORK, NOTED THAT THE GOI HAD PUBLICLY DENIED REPORTS OF DIRECT ISRAELI-JORDANIAN CONTACTS. HE SAID THAT HE DOUBTED OFFICIAL GOI INSPIRATION OF SUCH STORIES, AND DESCRIBED THE ISRAELI PRESS AS NOTORIOUSLY SPECULATIVE.

4. SHARAF URGED THE US TO TAKE THE LEAD IN WORKING OUT A MIDDLE EAST SOLUTION. DAVIES OUTLINED US EFFORTS WITH ALL CONCERNED PARTIES. SHARAF CONCLUDED BY REPEATING THAT THE US SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DEPRESSION OF RIAD AND RIFA'I AT THIS PRESENT JUNCTURE. HE REITERATED THAT BOTH MEN WOULD LEAVE NEW YORK IN DESPAIR UNLESS THERE WERE SOME SUBSTANTIVE MOVEMENT SOON. HE RECOMMENDED THAT, GIVEN RIAD'S DEEP SUSPICION OF US INTENTIONS TOWARD THE UAR, THE US ATTEMPT TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH RIAD AS A MEANS OF REASSURING HIM. SHARAF ASKED IF THE SECRETARY WOULD SEE RIAD AGAIN. DAVIES ANSWERED THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT THE SECRETARY WOULD BE RETURNING TO NEW YORK, BUT OTHER US OFFICIALS WOULD MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH RIAD.

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INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN TWSEELYE
APPROVED BY NEA PARKER T HART
S/S MR BROWN
NEA/IAI ALATHERTON
NEA RPDVAVIES
IO/UNP ARDAY

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EXDIS

SUBJECT JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR CALLS ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY HART AND DISCUSSES LATEST GOJ POSTURE RE SETTLEMENT.

1. IN COURTESY CALL OCTOBER 21 ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY HART, JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR SHARAF EMPHASIZED CRITICAL IMPORTANCE IN DAYS AHEAD OF ACHIEVING ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT. HE CITED NUMBER OF EXAMPLES OF MORE REALISTIC ARAB POSTURE TOWARD ISRAEL IN PAST YEAR IN CONTRAST TO WHAT HE CLAIMED IS ISRAEL'S REFUSAL TO "GIVE" AT ALL. HE ECHOED FAMILIAR THEME THAT USG PRESSURE ON ISRAEL AT THIS POINT ESSENTIAL TO PERMIT SETTLEMENT.

2. SHARAF REITERATED JORDANIAN POSITION THAT ESSENTIAL SINE QUA NON TO INITIATION OF TALKS IS CATEGORIC ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE NOVEMBER RESOLUTION. HE SAID THAT JORDANIANS PREPARED BE "IN CLOSER CONTACT WITH ISRAEL" IF ISRAEL ADHERES TO RESOLUTION AND AFFIRMS ITS WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW TO PRE-JUNE 5 BOUNDARIES.

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3. IN SUBSEQUENT CLARIFICATION DURING TALK WITH DEPARTMENT OFFICER, SHARAF MADE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WITHDRAWAL "IN PRINCIPLE" TO PRE-JUNE 5 BOUNDARIES AND AGREEMENT ON SECURE BUNDARIES. HE ACKNOWLEDGED BORDER RECTIFICATIONS TO SATISFY ISRAELI SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ARE ACCEPTABLE TO JORDAN PROVIDING THERE IS TERRITORIAL COMPENSATION. WHEN QUERIED WHETHER HIS REMARK "IN CLOSER CONTACT WITH ISRAEL" MEANT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS, HE DID NOT FORECLOSE THIS POSSIBILITY.

4. SHARAF SAID EGYPTIANS SUPPORT JORDAN'S POSITION. GP-3. RUSK

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DRAFTED BY: S/S-S: APARKER
APPROVED BY: S/S-S: MR GLEYSTEEN
S: MR SHLAUDEMAN

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REF: USUN 6830 (SECTO 22)

REFTEL IS APPROVED FINAL MEMORANDUM OF SUBJECT CONVERSATION.

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By ag/ll NARA, Date 6/14/01

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INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:TWSEELYE
APPROVED BY: NEA:RODGER P DAVIES
NEA:AMB SYMMES
NEA/IAI: ALATHERTON
NEA/URA:RBPARKER
S/S: WBRANDT

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R 100107Z OCT 68
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
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SUBJECT: CALL BY JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR

1. JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR SHARAF CALLED ON DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY DAVIES LATE AFTERNOON OCTOBER 8 FOR PURPOSE ASCERTAINING LATEST INFORMATION RE ARAB-ISRAELI DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE PROCEEDING TO LONDON AT SUMMONS OF KING. AMBASSADOR SYMMES ALSO PRESENT.

2. DAVIES BRIEFLY SUMMARIZED STATE OF PLAY AS FOLLOWS:

ON ONE HAND ARAB GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES REFUSE TO ENTER INTO MEETINGS WITH THE ISRAELIS UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES UNTIL ISRAEL CATEGORICALLY ENDORSES NOVEMBER 1967 UN RESOLUTION AND AGREES TO IMPLEMENT IT. ON OTHER HAND, ISRAELIS RELUCTANT TO ENTER INTO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS UNTIL ASSURED THAT PROCESS WILL RESULT ULTIMATELY IN TRUE PEACE. AFTER ALLUDING TO

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SECRETARY'S TALKS WITH GOJ FOREIGN MINISTER RIFAI AND OTHER ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS, DAVIES REPORTED THAT USG HAS STRONGLY URGED ISRAEL TO TAKE IMPORTANT STEP OF AGREEING TO ENTER INTO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS THROUGH JARRING AT THIS JUNCTURE. HE SAID WE HAVE STRESSED TO BOTH SIDES THE IMPORTANCE OF TAKING CERTAIN RISKS IN INTEREST OF ACHIEVING SETTLEMENT.

3. DAVIES AND SYMMES COMMENTED WE WERE DISAPPOINTED WITH POSITION UAR FOREIGN MINISTER RIAD HAD TAKEN IN HIS MEETING WITH SECRETARY. RIAD STANCE APPEARED TO BE MORE RIGID THAN THAT EARLIER ADOPTED BY UAR. SYMMES REPORTED HIS CONVERSATION WITH GOJ PRIME MINISTER TALHOUNI BEFORE HIS TRIP TO US IN WHICH PRIME MINISTER HAD STATED THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD OBTAINED NASSER'S APPROVAL FOR GOJ TO TAKE LEAD AT UNGA ON BEHALF OF ARAB STATES IN EFFORT ACHIEVE SETTLEMENT. PRIME MINISTER CLAIMED THAT NASSER HAD TAKEN CAREFUL LOOK AROUND HIM AND HAD CONCLUDED THAT KING HUSSEIN MOST POPULAR ARAB LEADER AT THIS JUNCTURE. ACCORDINGLY, HUSSEIN AUTHORIZED BY NASSER TO CONTINUE ROLE AS PRINCIPAL ARAB SPOKESMAN ON THIS PROBLEM. SYMMES NOTED HOW MUCH MORE FORTHCOMING THIS REPORTED POSITION WAS THAN THAT ADOPTED BY RIAD IN HIS TALK WITH SECRETARY.

4. AMBASSADOR SHARAF, ENDEAVORING TO EXPLAIN RIAD'S NEGATIVE STANCE, WONDERED WHETHER THIS MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR. HE SAID HE HAD RECENTLY TALKED WITH RIAD ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS AND KNEW THAT RIAD, AS WELL AS OTHER ARAB REPRESENTATIVES, EXPECTED IMPORTANT USG INITIATIVE. HIS DISAPPOINTMENT THAT USG CONTINUING TO PUT ALL ITS EGGS IN JARRING BASKET, AS REVEALED DURING HIS TALK WITH SECRETARY, MAY HAVE COLORED HIS STANCE. SHARAF COMMENTED THAT HE PERSONALLY UNDERSTOOD USG RATIONALE FOR CONTINUING TO SUPPORT JARRING AND REFRAINING FROM TALKING INITIATIVE ON ITS OWN. HOWEVER, OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES STILL BELIEVE ONLY HOPE FOR BREAKTHROUGH IS MAJOR USG INITIATIVE. ARAB HOPES IN THIS REGARD ARE EASILY CONVERTED INTO EXPECTATIONS. DAVIES SAID IT QUITE CLEAR FROM RIAD'S COMMENTS, AS WELL AS WITH FOLLOW-ON CONVERSATIONS WE HAD HAD WITH OTHER UAR OFFICIALS, THAT RIAD'S NEGATIVENESS WAS MORE THAN "PSYCHOLOGICAL".

5. DAVIES GAVE SHARAF, FOR HIS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, SYNOPSIS USG REPLY TO SOVIET NOTE IN WHICH INTER ALIA WE HAD STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF SUPPORTING JARRING MISSION. DAVIES INDI-

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CATED THAT SOVIETS HAD DESCRIBED NOT AS SOVIET INTERPRETATION OF ARAB POSITION. ALTHOUGH NOTE SUGGESTED CERTAIN SPECIFICS FOR POSSIBLE AGREEMENT, SOVIETS HAD AT SAME TIME ENDORSED JARRING MISSION.

6. DAVIES ALSO GAVE SHARAF HIGHLIGHTS EBAN'S STATEMENT BEFORE UN (WHICH WERE CONVEYED TO HIM TELERHONICALLY DURING MEETING WITH SHARAF.) SHARAF SHOWED INTEREST AND SAID HE WOULD GET HOLD OF TEXT SOONEST. SYMMES INFORMED SHARAF THAT DURING HIS CURRENT CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON HE IS HAVING OPPORTUNITY CLARIFY AT VARIOUS LEVELS USG LATEST JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT POSITIONS ON NUMBER OF MATTERS. THIS IS PROVING TO BE QUITE USEFUL.
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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN PRIORITY

Info

State : 249673

NODIS

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT King's Interest in US Hawk Missiles

REF Amman 6214

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-233
By ms, NARA, Date 6-6-03

Rostow

1. USG willingness in principle rpt in principle to consider rpt consider supplying Hawks to certain Arab states including Jordan, as stated at time of original sale of Hawks to Israel, is still valid. As Embassy aware, Hawks were supplied to Saudis and offered to Lebanese couple of years ago. At one point Hawks were discussed with the Jordanians although Khammash has in the past volunteered information to USG official that Jordan had no rpt no interest in Hawk missiles.
2. At same time question of whether at this juncture USG would in fact agree to sale of Hawk missiles to GOJ cannot repeat cannot be answered in abstract. Embassy has rightly noted relevant change in area situation since June 1967. Hypersensitivity in Congress to further sales of sophisticated weapons to Jordan, together with concern re possible

Drafted by: *RPP* NEA/ARN:RPPaganelli/TWSeelye
TW DOD/ISA:RMurray/Col. Wix/gvl

Tel. Ext. 3236

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

NEA - *RMD* Rodger P. Davies

Clearances:

OSD/ISA: Mr. Schwartz (J-5 Col. Bradburn)

UI - *WHL* Mr. Katzenbach

S/S - *WHL* Mr. Brown

G/PM - *WHL* Mr. Farley

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escalation of arms race in area and possible applicability of Conte-Long-Symington Amendments, are new factors in situation which must be weighed carefully in assessing any request for Hawks. For these reasons sale of major item like Hawks would require close scrutiny of all concerned elements of USG and eventual Presidential approval.

3. For the GOJ to pursue its current interest in procuring less sophisticated surface-to-air missiles from the UK/ (London 12816) as part of Saudi grant package would alleviate difficulties alluded to in para 2. We, of course, would expect in any case to be consulted by GOJ re acquisition of missiles in accordance with March Memorandum of Understanding. FYI: As you know, Memo of Understanding obliges Jordanians to obtain an advance approval, which cannot necessarily be assumed. END FYI

4. Following are other reasons why Jordanians should not rpt not be encouraged to acquire Hawk missiles:

(a) Hawk system is highly sophisticated and requires high order of technical competence. It cannot be used piecemeal or as a "gap filler" for the aircraft component as implied in para 1 reftel and as can the 40 mm guns in some instances. Question arises as to whether or not the GOJ would be capable of providing personnel highly trained enough to meet all the necessary prerequisites. (Saudis, who admittedly less technically proficient, are having continuous problems on this score after a couple of years of effort.) Even if GOJ had adequate personnel resources, we have no assurance that a contractor capability for training, maintenance

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and other support, e.g., as in Saudi Arabia, would be available. While some Jordanians could probably be trained in US, creation of an effective Hawk system would require great deal of "on-the-job" training.

(b) The Hawks are expensive. We have no rpt no firm figures on improved version, but older model costs approximately \$33 million per battalion of 4 batteries (older model probably not available). This figure does not include installation and annual O&M costs.

(c) We have no firm availability dates. It appears that earliest time orders could be accepted would be the end of FY 71 with delivery 18-20 months thereafter.

(d) Absence of credit. We anticipate that any government-to-government transaction would probably have to be for cash.

5. You may draw on foregoing four paras in responding to possible request by King for Hawks, stressing highly confidential nature of your response. Should you be pressed for additional 40 mm or other anti-aircraft equipment in lieu of Hawks, you may state that while we prepared consider such a request, we believe that once all twenty-four 40 mm self-propelled anti-aircraft equipment are delivered (under the Memo of Understanding) GOJ needs should be adequately met. JAA will then have a total of 96 such weapons in its inventory. We note that King's comments reported in para 1 Amman 6629 appear to reflect similar conclusion. You might mention that delivery time for 40 mm anti-aircraft guns is approximately 14 months.

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:RPPAGANELLI
APPROVED BY: NEA - RODGER P. DAVIES
NEA/ARN - MR. SEELYE
DOD/ISA - COL. WIX
DOD/PA - COL. STACER
P/PG - MR. TOBEY (INFORM)
S/S - MR. BROWN
NEA/P - MR. SMITH
H - MISS FOLGER (INFORM)
P/ON - MR. BARTCH (INFORM)

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TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

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EXDIS

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: PUBLICITY RE JORDANIAN PILOT TRAINING

REF: STATE 230649 AND AMMAN 6416

1. DEPT CONFIRMS THAT FIRST SENTENCE PARA 4 STATE REFTEL READS AS FOLLOWS: QTE YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO STATE IN RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC QUERY HOW MANY JORDANIANS ARE IN TRAINING AT ANY PARTICULAR TIME. UNQTE.
2. OUR EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN THAT AMONG FIRST QUESTIONS ASKED ABOUT MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR FOREIGNERS IN THE U.S. IS ONE CONCERNING NUMBER OF TRAINEES. REFUSAL TO PROVIDE THIS INFORMATION IN ANSWER TO DIRECT QUESTION WOULD LIKELY STIMULATE INACCURATE SPECULATION AND FURTHER INQUIRIES ON THE TRAINING PROGRAM FOR THE JORDANIANS. THIS WOULD NOT RPT NOT SERVE OUR OBJECTIVE OF AVOIDING PUBLICITY FOR THE

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PROGRAM. IN FACT, RELATIVELY FEW JORDANIANS WILL BE IN TRAINING AT ANY PARTICULAR TIME. GP-3. RUSK

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By ef/ll, NARA, Date 10/10/01

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: RPPAGANELLI
APPROVED BY: NEA: RPDAVIES
NEA/ARN: MR SEELYE
P/ON: MR BARTCH
P/PG: MR TOBEY
S/S: MR BROWN
NEA/P: MR SMITH
H: MISS FOLGER
DOD/ISA: COL WIX
DOD/PA: COL STACER

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SUBJ: PUBLICITY RE JORDANIAN PILOT TRAINING IN US

REF: STATE 224665

1. THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE ON PUBLICITY OF JORDANIAN PILOT TRAINING IN THE US HAS BEEN PROVIDED CONCERNED USAF COMMANDS IN CONUS. IN RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC QUERIES ONLY, EMB MAY DRAW UPON THIS GUIDANCE, COORDINATING IN ITS DISCRETION WITH GOJ.

2. QUOTE: 1. TRAINING FOR JORDANIAN AIR FORCE PERSONNEL IN CONNECTION WITH SALE OF F-104 IS SCHEDULED TO BEGIN AT HOMESTEAD AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA IN SEPT.

2. BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THE PROGRAM, STATE DEPT AND DOD HAVE DIRECTED THAT PUBLICITY BE KEPT AT AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM. THERE WILL BE NO REPEAT NO ADVANCE PRESS RELEASE OR OTHER PUBLICITY. GUIDANCE BELOW SHOULD BE USED ONLY IN RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC INQUIRY.

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3. IN RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC QUERY DOD, STATE AND CONCERNED COMMANDS AND UNITS WILL EMPHASIZE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. A VERY LIMITED NUMBER OF JORDANIAN PILOTS AND GROUNDCREWS ARE RECEIVING TRAINING IN FLORIDA IN CONNECTION WITH A MARCH 1966 AIRCRAFT SALES AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVT OF JORDAN, WHICH WAS REAFFIRMED IN MARCH OF THIS YEAR.

B. TRAINING OF SELECTED FOREIGN NATIONALS IN U.S. SERVICE SCHOOLS HAS BEEN A STANDARD PRACTICE IN CONNECTION WITH SALES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

C. THIS TRAINING IS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE GOVT OF JORDAN.

4. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO STATE IN RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC QUERY HOW MANY JORDANIANS ARE IN TRAINING AT ANY PARTICULAR TIME. COMMENTS ON STUDENTS' ATTITUDES, MORALE OR THEIR PERSONAL REACTIONS TO EVENTS WILL BE AVOIDED.

5. ANY QUERIES WHICH CANNOT BE ANSWERED BY THE ABOVE GUIDANCE WILL BE ACCEPTED AND RELAYED TO SAFOI WITH RECOMMENDED RESPONSE.

6. SAFOIPC WILL BE NOTIFIED WHEN INFO CONCERNING THE JORDANIANS IS USED IN RESPONSE TO QUERY.

7. UNDER THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE MARCH 1968 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, ANY PUBLICITY FOR THIS TRAINING PROGRAM GENERATED BY THE JORDANIANS IS TO BE FULLY COORDINATED WITH THE US GOVT. THEREFORE, INTERVIEWS CAN BE GRANTED ONLY WITH THE PERMISSION OF THE JORDANIANS AND COORDINATION WITH STATE DEPT AND DOD. SUCH REQUESTS SHOULD BE DISCOURAGED ON THE BASIS OF A STRINGENT TRAINING SCHEDULE. YOU SHOULD ALSO INSURE THAT ANY COVERAGE OF JORDANIAN ACTIVITIES BY JORDANIANS HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH THE STATE DEPT AND DOD. UNQUOTE GP-4 RUSK

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 349

PAGE 01 STATE 224665

83
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/P: JT WHEELOCK
APPROVED BY: NEA: LUCIUS D. BATTLE
NEA/ARN: MR. GAMON
DOD/ISA: COL. WIX
P/ON: MR. BARTCH (INFORM)
OSD/PA: COL. STACER
P/PG: JOHN TOBEY
NEA/P: MR. SMITH
H: MISS FOLGER
S/S: MR. SHEPARD

R 210100Z AUG 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

~~SECRET~~ STATE 224665

EXDIS

SUBJ: PUBLICITY OF TRAINING PROGRAM FOR JORDANIAN JET PILOTS IN US

1. AS EMBASSY IS AWARE, TRAINING FOR JORDANIAN AIR FORCE PERSONNEL IN CONNECTION WITH SALE OF F-104'S IS SCHEDULED TO BEGIN SOON. IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT GOJ MAY WISH TO GAIN MAXIMUM POLITICAL ADVANTAGE BY PUBLICIZING TRAINING PROGRAM. HOWEVER, YOU SHOULD ON SOME EARLY APPROPRIATE OCCASION REMIND GOJ OF ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER PARA 2C OF THE PROTOCOL ANNEXED TO THE MARCH 28, 1968 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING REQUIRING THAT ANY PUBLICITY FOR THIS TRAINING PROGRAM SHOULD BE FULLY AND PREVIOUSLY COORDINATED WITH THE USG.

GP-3. RUSK

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By 101-101 NARA, Date 101-101

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Department of State

185
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 070

PAGE 01 STATE 213373

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81
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY:EA/K:RCROWBERG
APPROVED BY:EA/WINTHROP G. BROWN
U: THE UNDER SECRETARY S/S: MR. BROWN NEA/ARN: MR. WILEY
#.....#.....

R 020030Z AUG 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
INFO AMEMBASSY SEOUL

~~SECRET~~ STATE 213373

EXDIS

SUBJECT: NORTH KOREAN DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE

REF: STATE 213742

WE UNDERSTAND THAT NORTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR TO SYRIA MAY BE MAKING GOOD-WILL VISIT TO AMMAN IN NEAR FUTURE AS PART OF NORTH KOREAN DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE. IF VISIT MATERIALIZES, YOU SHOULD, IN YOUR DISCRETION, EXPRESS TO GOJ OUR HOPE THAT KING HUSSEIN WILL RAISE QUESTION OF PUEBLO PRISONERS WITH AMBASSADOR ALONG LINES INDICATED PAR 3 REFTEL. RUSK

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLMS 08001
By ng/ll NARA, Date 10/4/01

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49

~~SECRET~~ 677

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PAGE 01 STATE 213436

82
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN MWWILEY
APPROVED BY NEA STUART W ROCKWELL
NEA/IAI MR ATHERTON
IO MR SISCO SUBS
S/S MR BROWN

R 012206Z AUG 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

~~SECRET~~ STATE 213436

EXDIS

REFERENCE AMMAN 5965

IN YOUR MEETING WITH KING ON AUGUST 3 YOU SHOULD TAKE SAME
LINE WITH HIM YOU HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO TAKE WITH RIFAI
IN STATE 212831. IF KING OR RIFAI RAISE QUESTION OF ISRAELI
POLICY ON GAZA REFUGEES YOU MAY PASS ON TO THEM SUBSTANCE ISRAELI
POSITION AS EXPRESSED IN TEL AVIV 4713 AND 4716. GP-3. RUSK

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
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By sc/ll NARA, Date 10/1/02

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NLJ-3 98001

By sp/ll, NARA, Date 10/14/01

SECRET 993

2

PAGE 01 STATE 212831

82
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: IO/JJSISCO
APPROVED BY: M: MR. ROSTOW
NEA: MR. BATTLE
USUN: AMB. BALL
S/S: MR. WALSH

R 010019Z AUG 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
INFO USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

~~SECRET~~ STATE 212831

EXDIS

1. WE READ WITH GREAT CARE AND INTEREST AMMAN'S 5934, AND WE FEEL THAT RIFAI, WITHOUT INTENDING TO DO SO, IS PERHAPS CREATING DIFFICULTIES FOR JORDANIANS WHICH DO NOT NECESSARILY EXIST. BOTH BALL AND SISCO MADE CLEAR THAT PROPOSALS CONVEYED TO GOJ ON BEHALF OF EBAN WERE IN OUR JUDGMENT A STARTING POINT. BALL STRESSED IN PARTICULAR THAT PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO BEGIN A PROCESS AND THAT IT WAS SIGNIFICANT THAT THESE SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSALS WERE BEING CONVEYED TO GOJ WITHOUT GOJ INSISTING ON DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AS A PRECONDITION. IMPORTANT THING FROM JORDANIAN POINT OF VIEW IS THAT THIS WAS BEGINNING OF AN INDIRECT PROCESS WHICH GOJ CAN INFLUENCE CONSTRUCTIVELY OR OTHERWISE DEPENDING ON HOW THEY REACT TO EBAN OVERTURES BY RESPONDING THROUGH JARRING. EBAN JULY 20 STATEMENT SHOULD BE RECALLED IN THIS CONNECTION. HE SAID ISRAEL'S ADHEREANCE TO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS DID NOT LESSEN ITS QTE WILLINGNESS TO USE GOOD OFFICES TO PASS ALONG QUESTIONS AND IDEAS TO ARAB STATES IN ORDER TO CLARIFY CERTAIN BASIC MATTERS. UNQTE.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 212831

2. QUICKEST WAY TO PUT HALT TO BEGINNING OF POSSIBLE CONSTRUCTIVE PROCESS IS FOR GOJ TO DECIDE NOT TO RESPOND TO SUBSTANTIVE IDEAS CONVEYED TO GOJ THROUGH BALL. NO ONE CAN SAY CLEARLY HOW LONG GOI WILL PERMIT INDIRECT PROCESS TO GO ON BEFORE INSISTING ON JOINT MEETINGS (BY WHICH WE MEAN MEETINGS OF GOI AND GOJ REPS WITH OR WITHOUT PRESENCE OF JARRING, DEPENDING ON WHAT PROVES FEASIBLE AT OUTSET).

3. YOU SHOULD SEE RIFAI AND URGE HIM STRONGLY KEEP BALL IN PLAY BY CONVEYING SUBSTANTIVE REACTION TO GOI. (WE ASSUME THEY WILL WISH TO DO SO THROUGH JARRING.) IT IS NOT ENOUGH FOR GOJ TO SAY THEY NEED NOT RESPOND TO EBAN'S OVERTURES BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENTLY FORTHCOMING IN THEIR PAST RESPONSES TO JARRING'S PROBES. THIS ATTITUDE COULD KILL OPENING WHICH EBAN OVERTURE PROVIDES.

4. ON QUESTION OF HOW FAR PARTIES CAN GET INTO SUBSTANCE WITHOUT DIRECT TALKS, YOU WILL RECALL THAT BALL SAID SEVERAL TIMES HE DID NOT SEE HOW QTE AGREEMENT UNQTE COULD BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT PARTIES SITTING DOWN TOGETHER AT SOME STAGE. HE LEFT COMPLETELY OPEN AS FAR AS WE WERE CONCERNED, HOWEVER, AT WHAT STAGE PARTIES WOULD GET TOGETHER DIRECTLY, AND AS INDICATED ABOVE WE ARE NOT CLEAR AT WHAT STAGE GOI WOULD INSIST ON SUCH DIRECT TALKS. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS THAT THE EBAN POINTS OFFER GOJ OPPORTUNITY TO PROBE SUBSTANCE INDIRECTLY AT OUTSET AND THAT GOI HAS DEMONSTRATED FLEXIBILITY BY THUS SEEKING TO EXPLORE MATTERS INDIRECTLY.

5. WE FEEL AS MUCH PROGRESS AS POSSIBLE SHOULD BE MADE BETWEEN NOW AND OPENING OF GA. WE RECOGNIZE THAT BEFORE GA OPENING JARRING WILL HAVE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH QUESTION OF POSSIBLE MEETINGS BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTERS, IN HIS PRESENCE INITIALLY OR OTHERWISE. WE FEEL THIS QUESTION SHOULD BE ADDRESSED AT SOMEWHAT LATER STAGE, HOWEVER, FOR EXAMPLE AFTER JARRING HAS HAD ANOTHER ROUND WITH PARTIES IN AREA. AT PRESENT TIME, KEY ISSUE IS DEVELOPMENT INDIRECT DIALOGUE. IN THIS RESPECT, BALL IS IN GOJ COURT, AND THEY SHOULD BE STRONGLY URGED RESPOND SUBSTANTIVELY TO GOI OVERTURES. WE FEEL IT IS INDISPENSABLE TO USE EVERY DEVICE TO HELP SPEED UP JARRING PROCESS. RUSK

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TELEGRAM
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17
ORIGIN NEA 15

INFO NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04,
RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, IO 13, AID 28, ACDA 16, MC 01, EUR 15,
AF 09, 164 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA: IAI: JHBAHTI
APPROVED BY: NEA: RODGER P. DAVIES
WH: MR. SAUNDERS
NEA: ARN: MR. WILEY
H: MISS FOLGER (INFO)

R 242216Z JUL 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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REF: AMMAN 5844

1. ROSTOW-SCOTT LETTER JULY 17 ROUTINE REPLY TO EXPRESSION
CONCERN RE SALE PHANTOM AIRCRAFT.

2. AFTER REFERENCE TO JANUARY 8 JOINT STATEMENT, LETTER
CONTINUED: QTE I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE INDEED MAIN-
TAINING A CONTINUOUS WATCH ON THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST AND THAT WE ARE MINDFUL OF THE CONCERNS YOU
HAVE EXPRESSED. I AM ENCLOSEING THE TEXT OF THE JOINT STATE-
MENT ISSUED BY THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL
AFTER THE PRIME MINISTER'S JANUARY VISIT SO THAT YOU MAY
REVEIW CONVENIENTLY THE FULL CONTEXT OF THEIR UNDERSTANDING
ON OUR ARMS POLICY.

QTE OUR OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST REMAINS,
AS YOU HAVE STATED, ACHIEVEMENT OF A DURABLE PEACE WHICH WILL
BENEFIT ALL THE PEOPLE OF THAT AREA, AND WE RECOGNIZE THE
IMPORTANCE OF RELATING OUR ARMS POLICY TO PURSUIT OF THAT

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OBJECTIVE • UNGTE

3 • POUCHING COPIES SCOTT LETTER AND ROSTOW REPLY • RUSK

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TELEGRAM

SECRET 286

PAGE 01 STATE 206835

2

85
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: IO:UNP:AR DAY
APPROVED BY: IO - DAVID H. POPPER
NEA/ARN - MR. WILEY
S/S - MR. PARKER
NEA/IAI - MR. BAHTI

R 222307Z JUL 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

~~SECRET~~ STATE 206835

EXDIS

SUBJ: DAYAN'S COMMENT RE CROSSING JORDAN

REF: TEL AVIV'S 4566

SUGGEST IN YOUR DISCRETION YOU INFORM KHAMMASH ALONG LINES
REFTEL. GP-3. RUSK

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By ng/lk, NARA, Date 10/14/01

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TELEGRAM

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ORIGIN NEA 15

INFO AF 09, EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, ACDA 16, SA 01, SAL 01,
MC 01, NSA 02, /138 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/IAI: JHBAHTI
APPROVED BY: NEA/LUCIUS D BATTLE
NEA-MR. DAVIES
NEA/0-MR. WHEELOCK
NEA/ARN-MR HOUGHTON
NEA/UAR-MR. PARKER
NEA/IAI-MR. BAHTI
NEA/ARP-MR BREWER
S/S-GLKELLY
WHITE HOUSE-WWROSTOW

R 131945Z JUL 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ADEN
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 7903
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL DHARRAN
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1. VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY JULY 11 ISSUED STATEMENT ON HIS VIEWS WITH RESPECT ARAB-ISRAEL QUESTION. STATEMENT CONTAINED FOLLOWING RE MIDDLE EAST ARMS SITUATION QTE UNTIL PERMANENT PEACE IS ACHIEVED AND THE ARMS RACE ENDED, I BELIEVE CONTINUED US MILITARY ASSISTANCE, INCLUDING JET PLANES, TO ISRAEL IS JUSTIFIED AND DESIRABLE. I FAVOR IT. BUT THE REAL ANSWER LIES IN AGREED DISARMAMENT UNQTE PRESS DESCRIBED STATEMENT AS DISAGREEMENT WITH ADMINISTRATION POLICY.

2. IN RESPONSE TO POSSIBLE QUERIES FROM GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, YOU SHOULD STATE THAT US POLICY ON NEAR EAST, INCLUDING ARMS PROBLEM, CONTINUES TO BE AS STATED IN PRESIDENT'S SPEECH OF JUNE 19, 1967, AND JOHNSON-ESKOK JOINT STATEMENT OF JANUARY 8, 1968. MATTER NOT RAISED AT NOON PRESS BRIEFING TODAY, BUT SPOKESMAN UNDER INSTRUCTIONS REFUSE COMMENT. DEPARTMENT OFFICERS WILL RESPOND TO ANY PRESS QUEIRIES ON BACKGROUND THAT THEY NOT AWARE ANY CHANGE US POLICY. ADDRESSES SHOULD RESPOND SIMILAR VEIN TO PRESS OR PUBLIC INQUIRIES.

3. FYI: PRESS HAS NOTED STATEMENT DELIBERATELY VAGUE ON QUESTION OF KIND AND NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT. AS YOU ARE AWARE, WE ARE DELIVERING A-4 SKYHAWK JET AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRE-WAR SALES AGREEMENT. IN RESPONSE TO PRESS QUEIRIES, VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE REPORTEDLY REFUSED TO COMMENT ON TYPE OR NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT HE HAD IN MIND. END FYI

4. COMPLETE TEXT VICE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT INCLUDED TODAY'S USIS WIRELESS FILE. RUSK

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

190a

7/13/68
notified S/S - Barbara
slw

July 12, 1968

Date

LW:
Cleared
Please inform
S/S

Mr. Walt W. Rostow
The White House

The enclosed is for White House
clearance prior to transmission.

Geo. H. Read
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Tel to ADEN, AMMAN, BEIRUT, et al.

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2/ In response to possible queries from Government officials, you should ~~xxxxx~~ state that US policy on Near East, including arms problem, continues to be as stated in President's speech of June 19, 1967, and Johnson-Eshkol joint statement of January 8, 1968. Matter not raised at noon press briefing today, but spokesman under instructions refuse comment. Department officers will respond to any press queries on background that they not aware any change US policy. Addressees should respond similar vein to press or public inquiries.

3. FYI: Press has noted statement deliberately vague on question of kind and number of aircraft. As you are aware, we are delivering A-4 Skyhawk jet aircraft to Israel in accordance with pre-war sales agreement. In response to press queries, Vice President's office reportedly refused to comment on type or number of aircraft he had in mind. END FYI

4. Complete text Vice President's statement included today's USIS wireless file.

END



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PAGE 02 STATE 200965

BE THE CASE BUT WHAT DISTURBS US IS THAT JORDAN'S PARTICIPATION COULD WORK TO THE SERIOUS DETRIMENT OF US-GOJ RELATIONS PARTICULARLY IN THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE FIELD. IT IS UNREALISTIC TO ASSUME THAT THIS DEVELOPMENT WILL NOT RPT NOT BE WIDELY PUBLICIZED SINCE BOTH THE ARABS AND THE ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE VERY GOOD REASONS TO INFLATE THIS DEVELOPMENT FAR OUT OF PROPORTION WITH ITS REAL MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE. IN THE U.S. PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL CONTEXT, JORDANIAN PARTICIPATION IN THIS PROPOSED COMMAND CAN ONLY PRODUCE A NEGATIVE REACTION. THE COMMAND COULD WELL CONJURE UP THE UNPLEASANT MEMORIES OF THE KING'S MAY 1967 TRIP TO CAIRO WHICH PRODUCED THE UAR-JORDANIAN MUTUAL DEFENSE AGREEMENT. PROPOSED IRAQI COMMAND OVER JORDANIAN FORCES IS AN ADDITIONAL DISTURBING FACTOR. THOUGH ALLEGEDLY DEFENSIVE IN CHARACTER, THE COMMAND RISKS THE IMPRESSION OF ANOTHER ARAB GANG UP ON ISRAEL. FURTHER, IT COULD TARNISH KING HUSSEIN'S IMAGE HERE AS A SENSIBLE AND MODERATE ARAB LEADER WHO IS SEEKING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS AND EXPOSE THE KING TO CHARGES THAT HE IS COLLUDING WITH THE RADICAL ARAB FANATICS AND WAR SEEKERS SUCH AS THE SYRIANS.

3. NET RESULT OF REACTION COULD WELL BE INCREASED PRESSURE TO SUPPLY MORE ARMS TO ISRAEL AND CONVERSELY GREATER DIFFICULTY IN CARRYING OUT EXISTING ARMS PROGRAM TO JORDAN. IN THE LIGHT OF ABOVE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE WOULD NOT BE HONEST IF WE DID NOT POINT OUT TO THE GOJ THE POTENTIAL PITFALLS FOR OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE JORDANIANS THAT WOULD BE CREATED BY JORDANIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE EASTERN COMMAND. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE SEEK AN EARLY APPOINTMENT WITH KING HUSSEIN TO MAKE CLEAR OUR CONCERN AS EXPRESSED ABOVE. YOU MAY ALSO WISH TO HAVE AN EMBASSY REPRESENTATIVE MAKE A PARALLEL AND PERHAPS PREVIOUS APPROACH TO MAJOR GENERAL KHAMMASH ON THE SAME SUBJECT. GP-3. RUSK

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TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 468

PAGE 01 STATE 196073

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83
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO SSO 00, CCD 00, FILE 02, /032 R

DRAFTED BY: 89: JJ SISCO
APPROVED BY: S/S: MR. J. WALSH
NEA: MR. BATTLE (SUBS)
EA: MR. FLECK (SUBS)
M: MR. ROSTOW (SUBS)
WHITE HOUSE: MR. ROSTOW
USUN: AMB BALL
THE SECRETARY (SUBS)

P R 032124Z JUL 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

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~~SECRET~~ STATE 196073

EXDIS TODEL 601

PARIS ONLY ZFF5

1. AMBASSADOR BALL, ACCOMPANIED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO, IS UNDERTAKING TRIP TO HOLD TALKS WITH VARIOUS UN MEMBERS OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE IS TO DISCUSS A NUMBER OF OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS ON UN AGENDA PREPARATORY TO OPENING OF NEXT REGULAR GA SESSION IN SEPTEMBER.

2. CONSULTATIONS WITH UK AND JAPANESE, PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF TRIP, ARE PART REGULAR SERIES OF TALKS ON UN MATTERS. TRIP WILL ALSO GIVE BALL OPPORTUNITY TO SANDWICH IN A FEW DAYS IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO FAMILIARIZE HIMSELF FIRST-HAND WITH CURRENT

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DEVELOPMENTS. BALL WILL ALSO AVAIL HIMSELF OF THE OPPORTUNITY AFFORDED BY HIS PRESENCE IN TOKYO TO SPEND A DAY IN SEOUL TO CONCERT OUR STRATEGY ON HANDLING THE KOREAN ITEM IN THE UNGA THIS FALL.

3. SCHEDULE IS AS FOLLOWS: LONDON-JULY 11-12 (UK EMBASSY HERE EXPECTS MOMENTARILY CONFIRMATION ACCEPTANCE THESE DATES); PARIS-JULY 13-14; TEL AVIV-JULY 15-16; AMMAN-JULY 17; BEIRUT-JULY 18; TOKYO-JULY 24-25; SEOUL-JULY 26.

4. WE WOULD EXPECT TO MAKE ANNOUNCEMENT HERE OF ENTIRE TRIP, MAKING CLEAR PURPOSE IS UN TALKS AND MIDDLE LEAST ONLY INCIDENTAL. WE WOULD NOT WANT TO GIVE ANY IMPRESSION THAT BALL UNDER-TAKING NEW PEACE INITIATIVE WITH RESPECT TO THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM, AND HIS STOP-OVER THERE IS FOR PURPOSE OF ENABLING BALL TO OBTAIN BACKGROUND INFORMATION. WE WOULD NOT WISH TO MAKE ANY ANNOUNCEMENT UNTIL HOST GOVTS HAVE BEEN INFORMED AND FIND ABOVE SCHEDULE ACCEPTABLE.

5. POSTS SHOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN OFFICES PROMPTLY.

6. FOR PARIS: BALL WOULD LIKE INFORMAL SESSION WITH APPROPRIATE QUAI OFFICIALS SATURDAY MORNING, JULY 13.

GP-3. RUSK.

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~~SECRET~~ 237

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81
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN; RBHOUGHTON/RPDAVIES
APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY
NEA/IAI: MR ATHERTON
IO/ MR POPPER
S/S: MR READ
NEA: WHANDLEY
WH: MR ROSTOW
U: MR KATZENBACH

O R 042027Z JUN 68 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USUN NY

~~SECRET~~ STATE 175876

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 5084: 5170

1. PLS PASS TO KING HUSSEIN FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT:

YOUR APPREHENSIONS CONCERNING FUTURE SANCTITY OF JORDANIAN TERRITORY HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO MY ATTENTION. I WISH AGAIN TO ASSURE YOU, AS I DID IN MY LETTER OF FEB 11, THAT IT IS OUR POLICY AND OUR INTEREST TO CONTINUE OUR CLOSE RELATIONSHIP AND OUR SUPPORT OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN. AS AMBASSADOR SYMMES HAS INDICATED TO YOU, WE HAVE MADE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL OUR POLICY TOWARD THE CONTINUED INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY OF YOUR COUNTRY. YOU SHOULD ALSO KNOW THAT WE WOULD STRONGLY OPPOSE ANY OCCUPATION OF TERRITORY BEYOND THE PRESENT CEASE-FIRE LINES. I RECOGNIZE THAT YOUR MAJESTY HAS SOUGHT TO PREVENT USE OF JORDANIAN TERRITORY TO MOUNT ACTS OF VIOLENCE ACROSS THE CEASE-FIRE LINE AND URGE THAT CONTINUED EFFORTS BE MADE TO PREVENT THESE ACTIONS WHICH PROMOTE INSTABILITY AND ARE AN IMPEDIMENT TO PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE.

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Authority ERUS, Vol. XX, #188
By *ly* NARA, Date 9-20-01

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PAGE 02 STATE 175876

2. I WANT ALSO TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE CONTINUING OUR EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A JUST SETTLEMENT IN THE NEAR EAST WHICH IS, AFTER ALL, THE ONLY SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM ABOUT WHICH WE ARE BOTH CONCERNED. RUSK

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TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 181

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82
ORIGIN SS 30

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INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA:IAI: GBLAMBRAKIS
APPROVED BY: NEA:IAI: ALFRED L. ATHERTON JR.
NEA:ARN: MR WILEY (DRAFT)
NEA:RA: COL FREDERICKS (SUBS)
S:S: MR SHEPARD

R 282257Z MAY 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

~~SECRET~~ STATE 172646

EXDIS

REF: STATE 150845

SUBJ: ANTI-INFILTRATION DEVICES

1. EMBASSY IS INVITED TO COMMENT ON CONSIDERATIONS DESCRIBED IN REFTEL, IF IT WISHES.

2. COMMENTS SHOULD BE RECEIVED IN DEPT PRIOR TO JUNE 4 IN ORDER TO BE AVAILABLE FOR IRG MEETING SCHEDULED THAT DAY.

GP-3. RUSK

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MEET JORDAN'S MOST PRESSING REQUIREMENTS, ALTHOUGH WE DID NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBLE ACQUISITION OF ADDITIONAL CENTURION TANKS FROM THE UK. WE FIND IT MORE DIFFICULT, HOWEVER, TO UNDERSTAND JORDANIAN DESIRE TO ACQUIRE SECOND SQUADRON OF 18-20 HAWKER HUNTERS OR A LARGE QUANTITY OF NATO STANDARD RIFLES. THE SITUATION CALLS FOR (A) A MORE THOROUGHGOING AND REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF JORDAN'S LEGITIMATE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS IN THE LIGHT OF ITS ECONOMIC RESOURCES, (B) BETTER PLANNING FOR AN ARMS ACQUISITION PROGRAM, AND (C) CLOSER COORDINATION WITH OURSELVES AND OTHER PRINCIPAL SUPPORTERS OF THE GOJ.

3. JORDAN'S APPARENTLY UNCOORDINATED EFFORTS AT ARMS ACQUISITION NO DOUBT REFLECT THE DIFFICULT MILITARY AND POLITICAL SITUATION WHICH THE REGIME IS NOW EXPERIENCING. NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE THERE ARE COMPELLING REASONS FOR JORDAN TO RATIONALIZE ITS ARMS ACQUISITIONS AND WOULD APPRECIATE EMBS COMMENTS ON HOW THIS COULD BEST BE ACCOMPLISHED. FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD IT BE ADVISABLE TO SET A DEFINITE DATE FOR THE FIRST ANNUAL REVIEW OF JORDANIAN MILITARY REQUIREMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AND ASK THE JORDANIANS TO POSTPONE ANY FURTHER MAJOR ARMS ACQUISITION DECISIONS UNTIL THIS REVIEW IS COMPLETED?

4. DEPT WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL INFO EMB MAY HAVE ON JORDAN'S EFFORTS TO OBTAIN SAUDI FUNDING FOR JORDANIAN ARMS PURCHASES. RUSK

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91
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INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN MWILEY
APPROVED BY NEA/IAI ALATHERTON
TO MR DAY
S/S MRS DAVIS
NEA/UAR MR JOHNSTONE

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EXDIS

DEPARTMENT ENDORSES CONSIDERATION CONTAINED AMMAN 4678 AND
RECOMMENDS ADDRESSEES TAKE LINE EXPRESSED IN BEIRUT 8930 ON
SUBJECT OF SEPARATE JORDANIAN-ISRAELI PEACE MOVES. RUSKI

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48

SECRET 519

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82
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M: MR ROSTOW
S/S: MR MEEHAN

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EXDIS

SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON JERUSALEM

1. WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THIS NEXT ROUND IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WE CONSIDERED WHETHER TO WEIGH IN WITH HUSSEIN AND CONCLUDED THAT IN LIGHT PRECARIOUS SECURITY SITUATION REPORTED IN AMM'S 4588 AND FACT THAT HUSSEIN WILL BE INCOMMUNICADO FOR NEXT SEVERAL DAYS IN LONDON, WE WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT MAKE DIRECT

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APPROACH TO HIM. HOWEVER, WE DO BELIEVE THAT JORDANIAN INTENTION TO GO AHEAD IN SECURITY COUNCIL IS MOST UNHELPFUL, THAT IT WILL SERVE SOVIET AND NOT JORDANIAN CAUSES, THAT IT WILL HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON JARRING MISSION, AND THAT NET RESULT WILL BE TO HARDEN ISRAELI POSTURE.

2. SINCE WE DO NOT BELIEVE JORDANIANS WOULD BE WILLING DEFER SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ALREADY SCHEDULED FOR WEDNESDAY,

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MAY 1, SUGGEST THAT YOU SEE PM AND RIF'AI URGING THAT THIS NEXT SECURITY COUNCIL ROUND BE LIMITED TO SERIES OF STATEMENTS WITHOUT SEEKING FORMAL RESOLUTION.

3. IN ADDITION TO DRAWING UPON THE ARGUMENTS CONTAINED IN USUN 4829, YOU SHOULD POINT OUT THAT APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS IN SECURITY COUNCIL COULD BE UTILIZED POSITIVELY BY JORDAN TO SATISFY ITS PUBLIC OPINION. MOREOVER, FACT THAT US AND JORDAN JOINED IN COMMON RESOLUTION LAST SATURDAY SHOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL TO JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT. AT SAME TIME YOU SHOULD INDICATE THAT IF THIS MATTER IS PURSUED TO FORMAL RESOLUTION STAGE IN SECURITY COUNCIL WE UNLIKELY BE ABLE TO JOIN IN A

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CENSURE OF ISRAEL ON JERUSALEM ISSUE.

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88
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APPROVED BY: NEA- LUCIUS D. BATTLE
NEA- MR DAVIES
S/S MR WALKER

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EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 4451; STATE 150600
CAIRO FOR BERGUS

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1. WE AGREE, OF COURSE, WITH YOUR OBSERVATIONS THAT OUR STRATEGIC GOAL IS TO ATTAIN A JUST AND LASTING PEACE BASED ON AGREEMENTS OF PARTIES IMPLEMENTING THE NOVEMBER 22 RESOLUTION. IN TERMS OF OUR LONG-TERM INTERESTS IN ARAB WORLD, IT IS IMPORTANT TO U.S. THAT SETTLEMENT DERIVE FROM NOVEMBER 22 RESOLUTION. LAST PARA IN DEPTTEL IN STATE 150600 MUST BE INTERPRETED WITHIN THIS BROADER CONTEXT. OUR PAST AND PRESENT EFFORTS ARE DIRECTED TO KEEPING ALL PARTIES FEET TO THE FIRE IN ORDER TO KEEP JARRING MISSION

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ALIVE IN HOPES DIALOGUE CAN BEGIN TOWARDS JUST SETTLEMENT. IF, HOWEVER, JARRING MISSION SHOULD MOVE FROM PRESENT STATE OF IMPASSE TO FAILURE, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT PRINCIPAL ONUS NOT REST WITH ISRAEL SINCE THIS WILL PROVIDE HOSTILE ELEMENTS IN UN AND IN WORLD COMMUNITY TO ISOLATE US AND TO PORTRAY US POLICY AS ONE OF EXCLUSIVE SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL. WE HAVE ACCORDINGLY USED OUR INFLUENCE TO GAIN GOI ACCEPTANCE OF MARCH 10 FORMULA, WHICH IN OUR VIEW IS IN FACT AN ACCEPTANCE OF QUOTE IMPLEMENTATION UNQUOTE THROUGH AGREEMENT AS REQUIRED BY PARA 3 OF NOVEMBER 22 RESOLUTION. IN LIGHT ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF MARCH 10 FORMULA, AND POSITIVE JORDANIAN RESPONSE TO THAT FORMULA, IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE

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THAT OUR PRESENT STRATEGY IS USE OUR LIMITED INFLUENCE TO KEEP UAR'S FEET TO FIRE SO THAT IF FAILURE OF JARRING MISSION OCCURS, PRINCIPAL ONUS WOULD REST ON UAR. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT BEST CHANCE OF GAINING UAR ACCEPTANCE IS TO PRESENT FORMULA ALREADY ACCEPTED BY GOI AND GOJ. GP-3. RUSK

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82
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

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APPROVED BY: NEA: AMBASSADOR BATTLE
IO: MR SISCO
S/S: MR MEEHAN

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EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 4333 (BEING REPEATED BEIRUT AND JIDDA)

1. ARAB ASSERTION THAT GOI VIEWS SC RESOLUTION AS QTE
MERE AGENDA UNQTE IS OF COURSE OTHER SIDE OFI QTE
IMPLEMENTATION UNQTE COIN.

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2. ARABS INTRODUCED CONCEPT OF IMPLEMENTATION SUBSEQUENT TO THEIR
DEMAND THAT ISRAEL QTE ACCEPT UNQTE RESOLUTION. ISRAELI HAS
REFUSED TO STATE THAT IT WILL QTE IMPLEMENT UNQTE RESOLUTION
SINCE IT BELIEVES THAT ARABS INTEND THIS TERM TO MEAN THAT
PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN RESOLUTION SHOULD BE PUT INTO EFFECT
AUTOMATICALLY AND WITHOUT NEGOTIATION. ARABS HAVE INTERPRETED
ISRAELI REFUSAL TO MEAN THAT WHOLE RESOLUTION INCLUDING
APPLICABILITY OF PRINCIPLES IS OPEN TO NEGOTIATION. THEY ARE

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CONCERNED PARTICULARLY THAT PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE TREATED IN THIS WAY.

3. IN USG VIEW TERM QTE IMPLEMENTING RESOLUTION UNQTE, TO EXTENT IT HAS ANY MEANING, MUST MEAN CARRYING OUT PROCESS WHICH THAT RESOLUTION ENVISAGES -- I.E., COOPERATION BY ALL PARTIES WITH JARRING IN HIS TASK OF PROMOTING AGREEMENT AND ASSISTING EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL AND ACCEPTED SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF RESOLUTION. RESOLUTION WAS NOT INTENDED TO BE READY-MADE SETTLEMENT WHICH SHOULD BE PUT INTO EFFECT AUTOMATICALLY, NOR WAS IT INTENDED

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TO BE A LIST OF ITEMS TO BE ACCEPTED OR DISCARDED AS RESULT OF NEGOTIATING PROCESS. WE BELIEVE RESOLUTION ITSELF, AS WELL AS PRACTICAL REALITIES OF SITUATION, REQUIRE SOME SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATION AMONG THE PARTIES. IN THIS NEGOTIATION ELEMENTS OF PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 OF RESOLUTION ARE TO CONSTITUTE INTERCONNECTED SET OF PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD FORM THE BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT.

4. IT APPEARS TO US THAT INTRODUCTION OF TERM QTE IMPLEMENTATION UNQTE HAS DIVERTED PARTIES INTO STERILE SEMANTIC ARGUMENT. MORE MEANINGFUL CONCEPT IS THAT OF QTE ACCEPTANCE UNQTE TO WHICH WE UNDERSTAND GOI AS WELL AS UARG AND GOJ HAVE AGREED. AS FORMULATED BY JARRING QTE ACCEPTANCE UNQTE IS UNQUALIFIED AND CAN ONLY MEAN THAT PARTIES ACCEPT EACH AND EVERY PART OF RESOLUTION. QTE PEACEFUL AND ACCEPTED SETTLEMENT UNQTE WHICH RESOLUTION ENVISAGES THROUGH JARRING'S EFFORTS MUST THEREFORE BY DEFINITION BE WORKED OUT WITHIN TOTAL FRAMEWORK OF RESOLUTION AND MUST RESPECT PRINCIPLES SET FORTH THEREIN.

5. SEEMS TO US THAT JARRING'S FORMULATION (PARA 2, STATE

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(31334) (A) PROTECTS ARABS AGAINST ANY POSSIBILITY ISRAEL WILL CLAIM RESOLUTION IS QTE AGENDA UNQTE IN SENSE THAT PRINCIPLES AND PROVISIONS IT SETS FORTH ARE SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATIONS,

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AND (B) PROTECTS ISRAEL AGAINST ANY POSSIBILITY ARABS WILL CLAIM RESOLUTION CAN BE IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT AGREEMENT REACHED BY NEGOTIATION. GIVEN SOME DESIRE ON BOTH SIDES TO MAKE PROGRESS, JARRING FORMULATION SHOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE SURMOUNT STERILE QTE AGENDA UNQTE VERSUS QTE IMPLEMENTATION UNQTE DEBATE.

6. ADDRESSEES MAY DRAW ON FOREGOING AS APPROPRIATE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH LOCAL CONTACTS.

GP-3. RUSK

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ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: IO:UNP:B-JJONES:IO:DHPOPPER
APPROVED BY: NEA - AMB. BATTLE
IO - MR. SISCO
S/S - MR. HOUDEK

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By ag/ll NARA, Date 10/14/01

P R 120105Z APR 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 1295
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3508
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1383
CAIRO 1816

~~SECRET~~ STATE 145661

EXDIS

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

REF: STATE 144444; AMMAN 4256, 4302, 4308

1. DEPT HAS DECIDED FOR ALL REASONS YLU HAVE ALREADY GIVEN JORDANIANS THAT USG CANNOT PROVIDE WRITTEN STATEMENT GOI HAS REQUESTED. JARRING HAS MADE WHAT WE CONSIDER WELL-BALANCED PROPSAL, WHICH ISRAEL HAS INFORMED HIM IN WRITING THAT IT ACCEPTS.

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IN OUR VIEW THERE SHOULD BE NO FURTHER STATEMENT REQUIRED FROM ISRAEL INTERPRETING WHAT ITS ACCEPTANCE MEANS, AND CERTAINLY NO SUCH STATEMENT SHOULD BE REQUIRED FROM THIRD GOVT. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE MOST INAPPROPRIATE FOR USG TO SEEK TO GIVE AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATION OF GOI ACTIONS OR STATEMENTS. ONLY GOVT THAT CAN DO THIS IS GOI ITSELF, AND, AS NOTED, IN THIS CASE WE DO NOT BELIEVE EVEN IT SHOULD BE REQUIRED DO SO.

2. SHOULD SUCH INTERPRETIVE STATEMENT BE PROVIDED, WHAT IS TO



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PREVENT REQUEST FOR FURTHER STATEMENT CLARIFYING THE INTERPRETATION? MOREOVER, WOULD NOT GOI BE JUSTIFIED IN SEEKING INTERPRETATION OF WHATEVER STATEMENT CONCERNING JARRING PROPOSAL GUAR OR GOJ MIGHT MAKE? IT IS JUST THIS SORT OF CONTINUOUS SEMANTICAL EXERCISE THAT HAS STALLED JARRING MISSION SO FAR.

3. IN INFORMING GOJ OF OUR DECISION, YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THIS DOES NOT IMPLY ANY LACK OF CONFIDENCE ON OUR PART IN WHAT ISRAEL'S INTENTIONS ARE. ON CONTRARY, WE BELIEVE THAT FOR US TO ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE REQUESTED STATEMENT WOULD IMPLY SUCH LACK OF CONFIDENCE, SINCE WE WOULD BE LENDING SUPPORT TO VIEW THAT

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ISRAEL'S ACCEPTANCE OF JARRING PROPOSAL INSUFFICIENT AS IT STANDS.

4. FYI: WE FRANKLY DISAPPOINTED AT REPORTS INDICATING JARRING HAS FAILED UTILIZE ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE HIS MARCH 10 FORMULA TO PRESS UAR AND JORDAN TO MOVE TOWARD COOPERATION WITH HIM IN SEARCH OF A SETTLEMENT. WE ESPECIALLY ASTONISHED THAT JARRING WOULD SUGGEST SYMMES GIVE WRITTEN GUARANTEE ON BEHALF OF USG AS TO INTERPRETATION OF ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE. WE WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT ACCEPTANCE OF A FORMULA WHICH JARRING HIMSELF HAD DEVISED WOULD BE CONSIDERED BY JARRING AS A STEP FORWARD, AND THAT IF QUESTIONS AROSE AS TO INTERPRETATION OF JARRING'S FORMULA, HE WOULD SEEK NAIL THESE DOWN BY FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH PARTIES BETWEEN WHOM HE IS MEDIATING. GP-1. RUSK

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~~SECRET~~ 649

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87
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 R

DRAFTED BY: IO: JJSISCO
APPROVED BY: IO: JOSEPH J SISCO
USUN: AMB GOLDBERG
NEA: MR BATTLE
S/S: MR WALSH
M: MR ROSTOW

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EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CAIRO OMITTED ON DISTRIBUTED COPIES)

NOFORN

FOLLOWING IS VERY SENSITIVE SINCE IT CONTAINS JARRING'S
CURRENT REPORTS TO THE UN, AS CONVEYED BY BUNCHE TO AMB.
GOLDBERG THIS MORNING ON A VERY CONFIDENTIAL BASIS. PLEASE
HANDLE WITH GREAT CARE.

BUNCHE REPORTS JARRING WAS TOLD BY RIAD THAT EGYPTIAN
POSITION REMAINS UNCHANGED. RIAD SAID ISRAEL MUST DECLARE
ITS READINESS TO ACCEPT AND TO "IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTION
AND EVACUATE ALL FORCES FROM ARAB SOIL, INCLUDING JERUSALEM."
JARRING REPORTS RIAD STRESSED JERUSALEM, AND THAT THIS HAD
NEVER BEEN MENTIONED BEFORE. IF ISRAEL DOES NOT CHANGE
ITS ATTITUDE BY STATING ITS WILLINGNESS TO IMPLEMENT THE
SC RESOLUTION, RIAD SAID, PRESENT DEADLOCK WOULD CONTINUE.
ARABS HAVE TIME AND MEANS TO WAIT, AND IN LONG RUN ISRAEL

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WOULD HAVE TO GIVE IN. JARRING REPORTS THAT SEVERAL TIMES RIAD SAID ARABS COULD WAIT FOR FIVE YEARS, IF NECESSARY.

JARRING REPORTS FURTHER THAT HE POINTED OUT TO RIAD THAT IF THERE IS NO GIVE BY PARTIES, HE HAS NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO REPORT COMPLETE DEADLOCK TO SECURITY COUNCIL WITH A STATEMENT THAT HE HAS FOUND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PROMOTE AGREEMENT. JARRING TOLD RIAD THIS WOULD MEAN SC WOULD HAVE TO TAKE UP MATTER AGAIN. JARRING REPORTS RIAD WAS NOT AT ALL KEEN ABOUT RENEWAL OF SC CONSIDERATION.

THEN RIAD DISCUSSED WITH JARRING POSSIBILITY OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS, ALL BASED UPON THE ASSUMPTION OF A PRIOR DECLARATION BY ISRAEL OF ITS WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT AND IMPLEMENT THE SC RESOLUTION. RIAD REFERRED TO KING HUSSEIN, SAYING HE WAS UNDER US PRESSURE TO CHANGE ARAB LINE. RIAD TOLD JARRING IF HUSSEIN DID THIS AND SIGNED SOME KIND OF PEACE TREATY WITH ISRAEL HE WOULD NOT DARE SHOW HIMSELF ON STREETS OF AMMAN. NOT ONLY WOULD FEDAYEEN BE AFTER HIM, BUT ALL ARABS AND MOSLEMS WOULD WANT TO KILL HIM BECAUSE HE WOULD HAVE BETRAYED ARAB CAUSE. RIAD SAID JORDAN IS CUSTODIAN OF HOLY PLACES IN JERUSALEM AND HAS AN OBLIGATION TO FULFILL. (BUNCHE NOTED TO GOLDBERG BLATANT NATURE OF UAR THREAT TO HUSSEIN.) FINALLY, RIAD GIVE UAR ASSURANCE THAT IT WAS READY TO ACCEPT AND IMPLEMENT SC RESOLUTION BASED ON ASSUMPTION OF RECIPROCAL ACCEPTANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION BY ISRAELIS. IF SUCH RECIPROCAL ASSURANCE WAS NOT FORTHCOMING, UAR WOULD FEEL FREE TO WITHDRAW ITS ACCEPTANCE OF NOVEMBER SC RESOLUTION AT ANYTIME.

JARRING REPORTS TO UN THAT HE THEN MET WITH RIFAI SHORTLY AFTER HIS MEETING WITH RIAD. RIFAI SAID TO JARRING THERE HAD BEEN A RATHER "ANIMATED DISCUSSION" BETWEEN JORDANIANS AND EGYPTIANS ON WHOLE MATTER. RIFAI INDICATED HE HAD BEEN UNDER STRONG PRESSURE FROM US AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN TO ACCEPT JARRING PROPOSAL OF MARCH 10 WITHOUT JORDANIAN AMENDMENT. RIFAI TOLD JARRING THAT HUSSEIN HAD BEEN INFORMED THROUGH BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO THAT ESHKOL HAD NOW FORMALLY ACCEPTED JARRING PROPOSAL IN ITS ORIGINAL WORDING. RIFAI ADDED THAT REACTION OF KING WAS THAT HE NEW THIS BEFOREHAND THROUGH JARRING A LONG TIME AGO. RIFAI SAID HE FELT, HOWEVER, THAT THIS FORMAL DECISION BY ISRAEL WAS "KIND OF A STEP

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FORWARD" AND THAT JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT HAD TOLD UAR THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO TRY OUT POSSIBILITIES OF HAVING TALKS IN NEW YORK UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES. RIFAI ALSO SAID EGYPTIANS, HOWEVER, HAD REPEATED INSISTENCE ON ISRAELI DECLARATION ON READINESS TO IMPLEMENT SC RESOLUTION BEFOREHAND. RIFAI, OBVIOUSLY ACTING ON KING'S ORDERS, WAS INCLINED TO ACCEPT JARRING MARCH 10 FORMULA PROVIDED WORDS "INTEND TO DEVISE ARRANGEMENTS...FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION" COULD BE UNDERSTOOD AS ISRAELI READINESS TO IMPLEMENT. RIFAI SAID THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE DECLARED IN SOME WAY BY THE ISRAELIS. RIFAI SUGGESTED THAT POSSIBLY A REWORDING BY JARRING OF HIS DRAFT PROPOSAL COULD SOLVE PROBLEM. RIFAI ASKED JARRING TO DISCUSS THIS WITH EBAN ON HIS VISIT TO JERUSALEM ON THURSDAY AND REQUESTED JARRING TO COME BACK TO AMMAN ON 16TH OF APRIL. JARRING TOLD RIFAI HE GREATLY DOUBTED THAT ISRAEL COULD BE BROUGHT AROUND TO GIVE INTERPRETATION WHICH RIFAI WAS SEEKING. JARRING ADDED THAT EVEN SO EGYPTIAN INSISTENCE ON A PRIOR ISRAELI DECLARATION OF READINESS TO IMPLEMENT REMAINED AN OBSTACLE. JARRING NOTED RIAD HAD BEEN VERY FIRM ON THIS POINT.

GOLDBERG FILLED IN BUNCHE VERY CONFIDENTIALLY ON REPORTS WE HAVE HAD WHICH ARE AT VARIANCE WITH ABOVE.

COMMENT: HUSSEIN'S REPORT TO SYMMES OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH NASSER DOES NOT SEEM INDICATE RIGID POSITION EXPRESSED BY RIAD TO JARRING AS REPORTED ABOVE IN WHICH UAR INSISTING ON PRIOR DECLARATION OF ACCEPTANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SC RESOLUTION AND WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ISRAELI FORCES FROM ARAB TERRITORIES INCLUDING JERUSALEM. IF ABOVE JARRING REPORT TO UN IS COMPLETE, THERE IS NO INDICATION OF RIAD ACCEPTANCE OF MARCH 10 PROPOSAL IF PROPOSAL ALTERED TO STATE THAT JARRING HAD "ARRANGED TO MEET WITH REPRESENTATIVES (OR DELEGATES) OF THE PARTIES IN NEW YORK" (AMMAN 4252). EITHER RIAD IS TAKING HARDER LINE THAN NASSER, AS REPORTED BY HUSSEIN, OR NASSER IS HAVING RIAD TAKE STIFF LINE WHILE GIVING HUSSEIN FULL REIN TO PRESS PROPOSAL TO MOVE TALKS TO NEW YORK WITH JARRING AND WITH US.

IN VIEW FACT JARRING MISSION NEAR COLLAPSE, WE BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL THAT LEVEL OF TALKS BE RAISED. SUGGEST SYMMES ENCOURAGE HUSSEIN HIMSELF TO SEE JARRING IN NEXT ROUND.

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WE WERE STRUCK WITH SYMMES REPORT THAT KING ONLY RECENTLY BECAME AWARE OF MARCH 10 PROPOSAL INDICATING ADVISERS NOT LEVELING COMPLETELY WITH KING. IN ADDITION WE ARE CALLING IN UK AMBASSADOR HERE TO SUGGEST THAT BEELEY FIND WAY TO GET ACROSS IDEA TO UAR THAT IN VIEW CRITICAL STAGE OF JARRING MISSION IT WOULD BE WELL FOR A MEETING TO BE HELD WITH JARRING AT NASSER LEVEL. WE ARE ENCOURAGING BUNCHE TO SUGGEST TO JARRING THAT MEETINGS AT HUSSEIN AND NASSER LEVEL WITH UN REP WOULD BE DESIRABLE BEFORE ANY FINAL CONCLUSIONS REACHED. SINCE JARRING HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO TAKE SUCH INITIATIVE FOR HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF SOME MOVEMENT CAN BE MADE IN AMMAN AND POSSIBLY CAIRO ON THIS. RUSK

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PROCESSING NOTE

The documents originally numbered as #203 (State 144841 to Tokyo) and #204 (State 144470 to Tokyo) in the National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. V, Cables, Box 147, were misfiled. They have been transferred to the National Security File, Country File, Japan, Vol. VII, Box 252 and renumbered in that file as #284 and #285 respectively.

REGINA GREENWELL
Senior Archivist

September 26, 2001



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APPROVED BY: M: MR ROSTOW
S/S: MR WALSH
NEA: MR BATTLE

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INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1364
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CAIRO 1805

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EXDIS

DEPARTMENT HAS VERY SERIOUS RESERVATIONS REGARDING ANY WRITTEN STATEMENT TO BE GIVEN TO JORDANIANS. YOU SHOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE DISCOURAGING LINE REPORTED IN AMMAN 4296. FURTHER INFO AND GUIDANCE WILL FOLLOW. CONTINUE TO AFFIRM ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF MARCH 10 JARRING TEXT AS YOU HAVE BEEN DOING. RUSK

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DRAFTED BY: IO:DHPOPPER;IO:UNP;ARDA
APPROVED BY: M - MR. ROSTOW
WHITE HOUSE - MR. ROSTOW (IN SUB.)
NEA/IAI - MR. ATHERTON
S/S - MR. WALSH
NEA - MR. BATTLE

R 100126Z APR 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 1276
INFO CAIRO 1794
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1357
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3472

~~SECRET~~ STATE 144268

EXDIS

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

1. IT WOULD APPEAR FROM TIMING OF ISRAELI COMMUNICATIONS WITH JARRING (DEPTEL 143638 AND PREVIOUS) THAT JORDANIANS WOULD NOT HAVE RECEIVED WORD FROM HIM OF FIRM ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO MARCH 10 JARRING FORMULA. IT IS OF COURSE POSSIBLE THAT JARRING HAS CONVEYED THIS INFORMATION IN HIS CAIRO TALKS IN WHICH RIFAI PARTICIPATED, BUT THIS NOT YET CLEAR.

PAGE 2 RUEHC 144268 ~~SECRET~~

2. WE RECOGNIZE THAT PLAY HAS MOVED ON BEYOND THIS POINT BY CHANGES PROPOSED BY NASSER. HOWEVER, IF YOU FIND JORDANIANS UNCLEAR ON ISRAELI POSITION AND YOU CONSIDER GAP OUTGHT TO BE FILLED PLEASE INFORM GOJ ACCORDINGLY. GP-3. RUSK

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By 15/11/01, NARA, Date 10/1/01

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM
45

~~SECRET~~ 586

PAGE 01 STATE 143077

87
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA RPD AVIES
APPROVED BY: U MR ROSTOW
IO MR POPPER
S/S JW DAVIS

.....
O R 070131Z APR 68 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1258
CAIRO 1771
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3444

~~SECRET~~ STATE 143077

EXDIS

1. CAIRO FOR BERGUS

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Authority FRUS, Vol. XX # 135
By *g* NARA, Date 9-20-01

WITH ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE FORMULA PRESENTED BY AMBASSADOR JARRING IN HIS DISCUSSION IN JERUSALEM MARCH 10, AND KING HUSSEIN'S APPARENT READINESS TO ACCEPT THIS APPROACH (AMMAN'S 4238), KING'S SUCCESS IN OBTAINING NASSER'S ACCEPTANCE NOW BECOMES OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE IN DETERMINING WHETHER JARRING MISSION IS TO SUCCEED OR FAIL. WE HAVE INFORMED LONDON OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS THROUGH BRITISH EMBASSY AND REQUESTED THAT BEELEY CONSULT WITH YOU SOONEST

PAGE 2 RUEHC 143077 ~~SECRET~~

ON WHAT ACTIONS CAN BE TAKEN WITH THE UARG IN SUPPORT OF HUSSEIN'S POSITION. YOU SHOULD APPRISE HIM OF LATEST DEVELOPMENTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IN ADDITION, SUGGEST THAT YOU OR BROMMELL SEE HUSSEIN OR, IF NOT POSSIBLE, PASS WORD TO HIM DISCREETLY ON RESULTS OF OUR INTERVENTION WITH ISRAELIS WITH VIEW TO HAVING HIM MAKE STRONGEST EFFORTS TO OBTAIN NASSER'S ACCEPTANCE. WE HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT TO GET OUT IN FRONT OF JARRING, BUT ISSUE IS AT SUCH CRITICAL JUNCTURE EVERY EFFORT MUST NOW BE MADE TO MOVE PARTIES TOWARD SOME FORM OF NEGOTIATION LEADING TO

WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION

~~SECRET~~ OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



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PAGE 02 STATE 143077

IMPLEMENTATION SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION THROUGH AGREEMENT AS
REQUIRED BY PARA 3, SC RESOLUTION. CLEARLY, IF NASSER NOW RENEGES,
RESPONSIBILITY FOR LACK OF PROGRESS WILL BE ON EGYPTIANS. IN
LIGHT YOUR 2055, YOU MAY WISH TO MAKE THIS POINT APPARENT IN
FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH MUHAMMAD RIAD.

2. AMMAN FOR AMBASSADOR SYMMES

IF IN ADDITION TO ACTION BEING TAKEN IN CAIRO YOU DEEM IT
IMPORTANT PASS ISRAELI REACTION TO SENIOR GOJ OFFICIALS, YOU
AUTHORIZED TO DO SO.

PAGE 3 RUEHC 143077 ~~SECRET~~

GP-3 KATZENBACH

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208 41

~~SECRET~~ 051 POSS DUPE

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47
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA - RPD AVIES
APPROVED BY: NEA - LUCIUS D. BATTLE
S/S - MR. WALSH

R 051801Z APR 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 1245

~~SECRET~~ STATE 142523

EXDIS

1. TURKISH EMBASSY OFFICER IN INFORMAL DISCUSSION APRIL 4 SAID TURKISH AMBASSADOR AMMAN REPORTS BEING INFORMED BY HIGH JORDANI OFFICIAL THAT GOJ HAS AGREED TO HAVE ISRAELIS INFORMED IT PREPARED FOR INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS ON SETTLEMENT IN GENEVA.

2. DEPTOFF (DAVIES) REPLIED IT OUR UNDERSTANDING GOJ PREPARED CONSIDER INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES ONCE ISRAEL AFFIRMED ACCEPTANCE UK RESOLUTION INCLUDING PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL.

PAGE 2 RUEHC 142523 ~~SECRET~~

3. TURKISH UNDERSTANDING APPARENTLY IS THAT SPECIFIC PROPOSAL BEING CONVEYED. WITHOUT DIVULGING SOURCE, YOU MAY WISH CHECK OUT REPORT.

GP-3.
KATZENBACH

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By 12/12 NARA, Date 10/4/01



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TELEGRAM
48

~~SECRET~~ 633

PAGE 01 STATE 142274

82
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN RBHOUGHTON
APPROVED BY: NEA RPDAVIS
DOD/ISA RMURRAY
S/S MGRIBBLE

R 050146Z APR 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 1241
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 4718

~~SECRET~~ STATE 142274

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 4192

WE HAVE KEPT BRITISH EMBASSY WASHINGTON FULLY INFORMED ON
ARMS PACKAGE AND SUGGEST YOU DO THE SAME WITH UK EMBASSY
AMMAN. KATZENBACH

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45

~~SECRET~~ 620

3

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85
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, 1030 R

DRAFTED >Y: NEA:IAI:ALATHERTON, JR
NEA:ARN:RBHOUGHTON:MWWILEY
APPROVED BY: NEA:LUCIUS D BATTLE
NEA: MR DAVIES
IO: MISS BROWN (SUBS)
S/S: MR GRIBBLE

.....
O R 050129Z APR 68 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1240
INFO USMISSION USUN NY 3416
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1316

~~SECRET~~ STATE 142173

EXDIS

DELIVER TO ACTION OFFICER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS APRIL 5

SUBJECT: KING TO CAIRO; JARRING MISSION

REF: AMMAN 4188

1. FOR THE MOMENT THERE ARE NO NEW DEVELOPMENTS FOR YOU TO REPORT TO KING PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE. WE CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL HOWEVER THAT EVERY EFFORT BE MADE TO KEEP DOOR OPEN FOR JARRING

PAGE 2 RUEHC 142173 ~~SECRET~~
MISSION AT THIS PARTICULARLY CRITICAL JUNCTURE AND OBTAIN IF POSSIBLE SUPPORT FOR CONTROL OF TERRORISTS.

WE THEREFORE LEAVE TO YOUR DISCRETION WHETHER IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO SEE KING IN ORDER REVIEW ONCE MORE OUR CONCERNS. OR ALTERNATIVELY YOU MAY WISH TO DISCUSS SUCH MATTERS WITH SOME OTHER JORDANIAN OFFICIALS WHO MAY ACCOMPANY KING TO CAIRO.

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2. FYI: THERE ARE SEVERAL FURTHER INITIATIVES UNDER CONSIDERATION AND WE MAY BE IN A POSITION TO INFORM YOU OF THEM PRIOR TO THE KING'S DEPARTURE. END FYI GPH-1. KATZENBACH

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211 29

~~SECRET~~ 527

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40
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: RBHOUGHTON
APPROVED BY: NEA: RODGER P. DAVIES
WHITE HOUSE: MR. SAUNDERS
P/ON: MR. MCCLOSKEY
NEA/P: MR. BROWN
S/S: MR. WALSH
DOD/ISA: MR. SCHWARTZ

0 281723Z MAR 68 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1184

~~SECRET~~ STATE 137774

EXDIS

REF: STATE 136987 AND AMMAN 4060

1. IN VIEW PERSISTENT PRESS INQUIRIES CONCERNING CONCLUSION OF ARMS AGREEMENT, WE CAN NO LONGER STAND ON GUIDANCE PARA 2 STATE'S 136987. ACCORDINGLY, IN RESPONSE QUERIES WE WILL TAKE FOLLOWING LINE:

2. IN REPLY TO QUESTION, "DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING NEW ON THE JORDAN ARMS PACKAGE?" WE WILL REPLY, "NEGOTIATIONS ON THE JORDAN ARMS PACKAGE HAVE BEEN GOING ON FOR SOME TIME AND THE LAST DETAILS HAVE NOW BEEN SETTLED."

PAGE 2 RUEHC 137774 ~~SECRET~~

3. IF ASKED WHEN, WE WILL REPLY, "THE DETAILS WERE SETTLED TODAY."

4. IF ASKED AS TO ELEMENTS OF THE PACKAGE, TIMING OF DELIVERIES, ETC., WE WILL REPLY, "I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO GO INTO DETAILS."

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5. WE REGRET WE WERE UNABLE TO COORDINATE WITH GOJ AND HOPE THEY WILL UNDERSTAND. YOU WILL BE INFORMED IMMEDIATELY IF WE ARE FORCED TO REPLY TO QUESTION. WOULD HOPE YOU COULD CONTINUE LINE PARA 3 AMMAN 4060 IN MEANTIME.

GP-3. RUSK

EXDISE

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TELEGRAM

20/25

~~SECRET~~ 612

02

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42

ORIGIN SS 30

INFO SSO 00 NSCE 00 7030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:RBHOUGHTON
APPROVED BY: THE UNDER SECRETARY
L/T-MRS. MCDOWELL
NEA-MR. HANDLEY
S/S-MR. WALSH
L/NEA-MR. WEHMEYER
H-AMBASSADOR TORBERT
G/PM-MR. JUNIOR
DOD-MR. MURRAY

O 271554Z MAR 68 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1175
INFO CINCSTRIKE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 136987

EXDIS

SUBJECT: JORDAN ARMS

DELIVER ACTION OFFICER OPENING BUSINESS MARCH 27

REF: AMMAN'S 4026

1. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO SIGN MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AS TRANSMITTED DEPARTMENT'S A-34, WITH ADDITION IN PARA 3-C OF MEMO OF 100 QUAD. 50 CALIBER ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS.

PAGE 2 RUEHC 136987 ~~SECRET~~

2. IN PRESENT SITUATION IN THE AREA, WE WOULD HOPE GOJ WOULD AGREE THAT THERE BE NO PUBLICITY ON CONCLUSION OF AGREEMENT FOR TIME BEING. GP-3. RUSK

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TELEGRAM

48

~~SECRET~~ 554

PAGE 01 STATE 136818

80
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: DOD/ISA:HSCHWARTZ
APPROVED BY: NEA:WILLIAM J. HANDLEY
S/S:MR. WALSH
NEA/ARN:MR. HOUGHTON

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RA CD2-233
By us, NARA, Date 6-6-83

P R 270013Z MAR 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 1171
INFO CINCSTRIKE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 136818

EXDIS

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE

REF: AMMAN 4004, STATE 136135

1. THE DESCRIPTION IN REFTEL OF THE KHAMMASH-MCNAMARA-SCHWARTZ CONVERSATIONS ON FEBRUARY 10 WITH RESPECT TO 155MM GUNS IS NOT REPEAT NOT CORRECT. THE MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND KHAMMASH AS IT PERTAINED TO 155MM GUNS CORRECTLY DESCRIBES THE EXCHANGE AND IS QUOTED AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE GENERAL KHAMMASH EXPRESSED A STRONG NEED FOR 7 TO 10

0-83 2 RUEHC 136818 ~~SECRET~~
155MM GUNS WHICH HE HAD LOST DURING THE WAR AND MR. MCNAMARA PROMISED TO SEE WHAT WE COULD DO FOR HIM IN THIS RESPECT. UNQUOTE.

2. WHAT SCHWARTZ TOLD GENERAL KHAMMASH LATER THAT AFTERNOON ON THE SAME SUBJECT IS CORRECTLY REPORTED IN A MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION OF FEBRUARY 10 AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE I TOLD GENERAL KHAMMASH THERE SEEMED TO BE NO SUCH ARTICLES (155MM GUNS) IN THE U.S. BUT THAT I THOUGHT WE MIGHT BE

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 136818

ABLE TO FIND SOME ELSEWHERE. WE WOULD DO IT IF POSSIBLE.
GENERAL KHAMMASH THANKED ME AND MR. MCNAMARA. UNQUOTE

3. AT NO TIME TO OUR KNOWLEDGE HAS ANY JORDANIAN OFFICIAL
BEEN TOLD THAT 155MM GUNS WERE AVAILABLE NOR HAS ANY OTHER
INFORMATION BEEN GIVEN TO JORDAN.

4. THE ABOVE IS FOR CLARIFICATION ONLY. THE POLICY REMAINS
AS SET FORTH IN STATE'S 135613 AND 136135. GP-3. RUSK

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~ 803

PAGE 01 STATE 136135

83

ORIGIN SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA:ARN: RBHOUGHTON
APPROVED BY: UNDER SECRETARY
NEA: HANDLEY
DOD: MURRAY
S/S: WALSH

O R 260107Z MAR 68 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1161
INFO CINCSTRIKE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 136135

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 4004 AND 4012

1. DEPARTMENT APPRECIATES FACTORS OUTLINED REFTEL. NONETHE-
LESS, IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES WE ARE UNABLE TO INCLUDE 155'S
IN PACKAGE, ALTHOUGH AS WE EXPLAINED IN STATE'S 135613 WE DO
NOT PRECLUDE INCLUDING 155'S AT A LATER DATE. WE HAVE TRIED
TO BE AS FORTHCOMING AS WE COULD IN MEETING KING'S
REQUIREMENTS AND WOULD HOPE THAT HE WOULD BE UNDERSTANDING
AND PATIENT IN THIS PARTICULAR INSTANCE.

PAGE 2 RUEHC 136135 ~~SECRET~~
GP-3. RUSK

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215 24

~~SECRET~~ 192

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47
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO SSO 00 NSCE 00 CCO 00 / 030 R

2

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:RBHOUGHTON
APPROVED BY: NEA - LUCIUS D. BATTLE
L - DONALD WEHMEYER (DRAFT)
DOD/ISA - MR. MURRAY (SUBSTANCE)
S/S - MR. WALSH

O 251700Z MAR 68 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1156
CINCSTRIKE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 135613

EXDIS

SUBJECT: JORDAN ARMS MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

REF: AMMAN 3864 AND 3931

1. FOLLOWING ARE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS RAISED REFTEL WITH RESPECT TO TEXT OF MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING:

A. WE ARE NOT YET IN A POSITION TO STATE WHETHER 155 MM. GUNS ARE AVAILABLE. WE ARE STILL INVESTIGATING AND CONSEQUENTLY DO NOT WISH TO INCLUDE THE 155'S IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING. (FYI: WE COULD NOT FOR REASONS OF WHICH EMBASSY IS

PAGE 2 RUEHC 135613 ~~SECRET~~

AWARE INCLUDE 155'S IN THE PACKAGE AT THE PRESENT TIME, ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT PRECLUDE PROVIDING THEM LATER. END FYI).

B. THE 100 QUAD 50'S MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE EQUIPMENT LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 3C OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING.

C. AS FOR M-35 A-2 (2 1/2 TON TRUCKS), THESE ARE IN CRITICALLY SHORT SUPPLY. WE ARE HAVING GREAT DIFFICULTY IN ESTABLISHING EARLY DELIVERIES FOR THE 40 ALREADY AGREED UPON. WE BELIEVE THERE ARE SUFFICIENT TRUCKS EITHER TO BE

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INVENTORY OR BEING CONSIDERED IN OUR ARMS PACKAGE (1240
COMMERCIAL TYPE) TO MEET GOJ REQUIREMENTS FOR TRANSPORTING
QUAD 50'S.

2. IF THERE ARE NO FURTHER CHANGES, YOU SHOULD REQUEST
AUTHORIZATION FROM DEPARTMENT TO SIGN MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING.
RUSK

EXD

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SECRET 593

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83
ORIGIN SS 30
INFO 1030 R

DRAFTED BY: UNP: ARDAY
APPROVED BY: IO: JOSEPH J. SISCO
NEA- MR. DAVIES
NEA/IAI: MR. ATHERTON
S/S- GLKELLY

P R 200139Z MAR 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 1100
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1176
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3106
CAIRO 1656

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By ag/ll NARA, Date 10/14/01

~~SECRET~~ STATE 133118

EXDIS

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

REF: STATE 1323292; USUN 4192; AMMAN 3872

1. DEPT CONSIDERS ISRAEL'S ATTITUDE AS EXPRESSED TO JARRING TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE AND FORTHCOMING NOW THAN AT ANY PREVIOUS TIME. WE SEE TWO IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS RESPECT:

PAGE 2 RUEHC 133118 ~~SECRET~~
(A) EBAN'S CATEGORIC STATEMENT TO JARRING MARCH 18 THAT GOI ACCEPTS HIS ORIGINAL PROPOSAL (USUN 4192, PARA 2 (D));
(B) ISRAEL'S WILLINGNESS, DESPITE PREFERENCE FOR JARRING'S ORIGINAL PROPOSAL, TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE (USUN 4192, PARA 2 (F) AND STATE 132292, PARA (B)). IN BOTH CASES WE BELIEVE ISRAEL HAS BEEN RESPONSIVE TO US SUGGESTIONS.

2. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, FIRST PART OF JARRING FORMULA AS

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PAGE 02 STATE 133118

MODIFIED BY ISRAELIS WOULD STATE THAT PARTIES HAVE DECLARED THEIR QTE ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION AND THEIR READINESS TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON ITS IMPLEMENTATION AND ACCORDINGLY TO COME TO A CONFERENCE. UNQTE WE BELIEVE THIS STRIKES BALANCE BETWEEN ARAB DESIRE FOR INCLUSION OF CONCEPT OF IMPLEMENTATION, AND ISRAELI DESIRE TO EMPHASIZE NECESSITY FOR NEGOTIATING AN AGREEMENT. AS JORDANIANS KNOW, WE HAVE CONSIDERED ALL ALONG THAT RESOLUTION REQUIRED DISCUSSIONS TAKE PLACE FOR PURPOSE OF ARRIVING AT AGREED SETTLEMENT, AND WE UNDERSTOOD THE JORDANIANS AGREED WITH THIS. IN OUR VIEW, NEED FOR SUCH DISCUSSIONS IS INHERENT IN LANGUAGE OF PARA 3 OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, WHICH PROVIDES THAT JARRING SHOULD QTE ESTABLISH

0-83 3 RUEHC 133118 ~~SECRET~~

AND MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE STATES CONCERNED IN ORDER TO PROMOTE AGREEMENT AND ASSIST EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL AND ACCEPTED SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES IN THIS RESOLUTION. UNQTE. THUS BY TERMS OF RESOLUTION ITSELF, QTE IMPLEMENTATION UNQTE IS A PROCESS INVOLVING SEARCH FOR AGREEMENT. THIS IS ESSENTIALLY THE MEANING OF PROPOSED ISRAELI MODIFICATION-- I.E., QTE SEEK AGREEMENT ON ITS IMPLEMENTATION. UNQTE

3. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE URGE JORDANIANS TO RESPOND AFFIRMATIVELY TO ORIGINAL JARRING FORMULA OR, IF THEY UNWILLING TO DO THAT, TO FORMULA AS MODIFIED BY ISRAELIS (PRESUMING JARRING PROPOSES IT MARCH 20 OR 21 WHEN HE IS IN AMMAN). IN EITHER CASE, WE WOULD HOPE JORDANIANS WOULD ENDEAVOR PERSUADE EGYPTIANS TO AGREE AS WELL.

4. FYI: IN LIGHT JARRING INDICATION TO EBAN THAT SYG MAY PRESS HIM TO SUBMIT REPORT, WHICH HE APPARENTLY PREFERS NOT DO AT THIS TIME, AMB GOLDBERG PLANS URGE SYG NOT RPT NOT TO REQUEST FORMAL REPORT FROM JARRING AS LONG AS LATTER BELIEVES THIS COULD MAKE CONTINUATION HIS EFFORTS MORE DIFFICULT. GOLDBERG WILL ADD

PAGE 4 RUEHC 133118 ~~SECRET~~

THAT IF SYG BELIEVES REPORT IS NECESSARY, IT SHOULD BE KEPT PRIVATE. END FYI. GP-3 RUSK

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~~SECRET~~ 310

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89
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO 1030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARM:RBHOUGHTON/NEA
IAI: ALATHERTON
APPROVED BY: NEA- RODGER P. DAVIES
IO-MR DAY(SUBS)
S/S MR O'DONOHUE

P 162135Z MAR 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 1075
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1150

~~SECRET~~ STATE 131724

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 3844; TEL AVIV 2913
1. AS AMBASSADOR SYMMES FEELS KING MAY MOVE QUICKLY ON DIRECT TALKS ON TERRORISM, DEPARTMENT HOPES THAT ISRAEL WILL NOT STOCK ON UN PRESENCE ISSUE. ALTHOUGH WE KNOW IMPORTANCE ISRAELIS ATTACH TO TALKS WITHOUT UN PRESENT, FACT REMAINS SUCH TALKS POSE GENUINE POLITICAL PROBLEM FOR GOJ. WE STRONGLY URGE THAT GOI ACCEPT UN PRESENCE, AT LEAST IN THE INITIAL STAGES OF THE TALKS. GOI HAS NOTHING TO LOSE BY SUCH POSITION AND POTENTIALLY HAS MUCH TO GAIN.

0-83 2 RUEHC 131724 ~~SECRET~~
2. GOI KNOWS OUR VIEWS ON SELF-DEFEATING NATURE OF MILITARY REPRISALS, AND WE ASSUME ISRAEL SEES MILITARY TALKS WITH JORDAN AS MEANS OF RELIEVING PRESSURE FOR FURTHER REPRISALS. IN CIRCUMSTANCES, WE CONSIDER IT INCONVEIVABLE THAT ISRAEL WOULD INSIST ON EXCLUDING UN PRESENCE IF THIS IS ONLY ISSUE PREVENTING TALKS FROM TAKING PLACE. GP3. RUSK

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By ng 1M NARA, Date 10/1/01



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2

81
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO 1030 R

DRAFTED BY: IO:UNP-ARDA
APPROVED BY: IO-JOSEPH J. SISCO
NEA- MR BATTLE (SUBS)
NEA- MR ATHERTON
S/S- DO'DONOHUE

Robert

R 160044Z MAR 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 1066
INFO CAIRO 1624
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1135
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3057

~~SECRET~~ STATE 131321

EXDIS

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION; LOCALE OF TALKS
REF: AMMAN 3783; CAIRO 1885; USUN 4141
1. WHILE WE APPRECIATE ARGUMENT THAT NY VENUE MIGHT HAVE
PSYCHOLOGICAL VALUE VIS-A-VIS ARABS, WE AGREE WITH USUN'S
OBSERVATIONS IN REFTEL REGARDING GENERAL UNSUITABILITY OF NY.

2. POSTS SHOULD NOT RPT NOT GIVE ANY ENCOURAGEMENT TO IDEA
OF MOVING TALKS TO NY, TAKING LINE THIS IS MATTER FOR JARRING

PAGE 2 RUEHC 131321 ~~SECRET~~
TO DEAL WITH AT THIS STAGE. GP3. RUSK

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