



Department of State

219
TELEGRAM

42

~~SECRET~~ 505

PAGE 01 STATE 131104

83
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: L/NEA:DAWEHMEYER
APPROVED BY: NEA-RODGER P. DVIES
NEA/ARN- MR HOUGHTON
S/S MR MEEHAN

P 152227Z MAR 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 1064

~~SECRET~~ STATE 131104

EXDIS

REF: STATE 117988 AND AMMAN 3819.

REVISED TEXT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AND NEGOTIATING INSTRUCTIONS
SENT POUCH C-36 SCHEDULED ARRIVE AMMAN MARCH 17. GP2. RUSK

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001

By ag/llh, NARA, Date 10/14/01



Department of State

TELEGRAM

220

42

SECRET 323

PAGE 01 STATE 129955

83
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:RBHOUGHTON
APPROVED BY: NEA: RODGER P. DAVIES
DOD/ISA: MR QUINN
S/S: MR SHEPARD

2

R 140120Z MAR 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 1043

~~SECRET~~ STATE 129955

EXDIS

REF: STATE 128960

STATEMENT IN PARA 3 REFTEL THAT WE WOULD AIRLIFT SOME OF THE
EQUIPMENT ON WEEKLY MAC FLIGHT NEEDS SOME CLARIFICATION.
AIRLIFT WOULD APPLY TO MAP GRANT EQUIPMENT ONLY, AS TRANSPORT
SALES EQUIPMENT WOULD BE AT COST GOJ. GP-3. RUSK

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NLJ-S 98001

By 16/100 NARA, Date 10/11/01

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ORIGIN/ACTION

4-0

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AIRGRAM

DEF 194 JORDAN-US

Original to be Filed in _____ Decentralized Files.

FILE DESIGNATION

~~SECRET~~-EXDIS

A-34

HANDLING INDICATOR

NO.

TO : Amembassy AMMAN

COPY NO. 02 SERIES B

MAR 14 6 22 PM '68

DATE:

FROM : Department of State

SUBJECT : Military Sales Agreement

REF :

There is attached a revised text of the Military Sales Agreement with Jordan.

As the Embassy will note, the provisions which are believed to be those which the King would consider most sensitive have been placed in a Protocol to the Memorandum. Since no reference is made to the Protocol in the Memorandum, it would be possible, if necessary, for the King to show the Memorandum without disclosing the extent of his commitment to the United States. It is hoped that this arrangement will prove satisfactory from the standpoint of the Jordanians.

Circular 175 approval has been obtained for negotiation of an Agreement and Protocol on the basis of the enclosed text. The Embassy is requested to report by cable any proposed changes at which time approval for signature of the final text will be given. As will be apparent, the blanks in the Protocol should be filled in with the date of signature of the Memorandum of Understanding.

RUSK

Enclosure:

Secret Text of Military Sales Agreement.

GROUP 2
Exempted from automatic downgrading by _____

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For Department Use Only

FORM 10-64 DS-323

In Out

Drafted by: L/NEA:DAWehmeyer:eg Drafting Date: 3/14/68 Phone No.: 5895 Contents and Classification Approval: NEA - Rodger P. Davies

Clearances: NEA/ARN - Mr. Houghton
I/T - Mrs. McDowell

1968 MAR 14 PM 9 05
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 NII-S 95001
 By 26110 JNAR, Date 10/1/01



Department of State

TELEGRAM

222

48

~~SECRET~~ 391

PAGE 01 STATE 128960

85
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO 550 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CIAE 00, /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA:ARN: MWWILEY: RBHOUGHTON
APPROVED BY: NEA: LDBATTLE
NEA: RPDAVIES
U: KATZENBACH (SUBS)
S/S: WALSH
DOD/ISA: SCHWARTZ (INFORMED)

O 120047Z MAR 68 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1025

~~SECRET~~ STATE 128960

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 3570, 3571, AND 3648

1. WE ARE PLEASED THAT THE KING NOW WISHES TO CONCLUDE NEGOTIATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IN ORDER TO CONCLUDE AGREEMENT, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED INFORM GOJ AS FOLLOWS:

(A) USG WILL INCREASE NUMBER OF M48A1 TANKS IN OUR PACKAGE FROM 48 TO 100.

(B) WE WILL INCREASE NUMBER OF 40 MM. SELF-PROPELLED ANTI-AIRCRAFT FROM 4 TO 24.

PAGE 2 RUEHC 128960 ~~SECRET~~

(C) WE WILL INCREASE NUMBER OF QUAD .50 CALIBER ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS FROM 9 TO 100.

2. WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO KHAMMASH'S PROPOSAL TO SCALE DOWN HIS UNDELIVERED GROUND FORCE SPARE PARTS TO A LEVEL OF \$2 MILLION. JAA AND DAO MUST DECIDE WHAT SPARES ACTUALLY NEEDED.

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Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, #107

By *ly* NARA, Date 9-20-01

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PAGE 02 STATE 128960

PERHAPS HIS PURPOSES WOULD BE BETTER SERVED BY CANCELLING OUT THE UNDELIVERED SPARE PARTS IN CASES UBN, UBO, UBS, UBU AND REPROGRAM THESE REQUIREMENTS WITHIN THE GROUND FORCE PACKAGE NOW OFFERED. ALTERNATIVELY, IF THE JAA IS IN A GOOD SPARE PARTS SUPPLY POSITION, SUCH REQUIREMENTS MIGHT BE FURTHER DELAYED. IN VIEW HEAVY LOAD OF SPARES PURCHASES (3 YEARS LEVEL) UNDER 1965 GROUND FORCE AGREEMENT, WE BELIEVE JAA MAY BE "SPARE PARTS POOR" AND IT WOULD MAKE GOOD SENSE MAKE NEW PURCHASES OF SPARES ON THE MOST MINIMUM BASIS. BY NOW JAA MAY HAVE DEVELOPED NEW USAGE FACTORS WHICH WOULD ENABLE JORDAN MAKE MORE ECONOMICAL USE OF FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR MILITARY PURCHASES.

3. IN OTHER RESPECTS PACKAGE REMAINS AS PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED.

PAGE 3 RUEHC 128960 ~~SECRET~~

WITH CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY WE HAVE INCREASED THE SIZE OF THE PACKAGE IN AN EFFORT TO REACH PROMPT AGREEMENT. WE CANNOT GO FURTHER. WE HAVE ALSO AGREED TO AIRLIFT SOME OF THE EQUIPMENT ON MAC WEEKLY FLIGHTS. WE HAVE NOT RULED OUT POSSIBILITIES OF ADDITIONAL AIRLIFTS BUT COST AND TRANSPORT WOULD BE A PROBLEM. WE WILL ALSO TRY TO ADVANCE THE DELIVERY DATES AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. IN THIS CONTEXT, OF COURSE, WE CANNOT EVEN BEGIN THE PROCESS OF PROCURING OR REHABILITATING THE EQUIPMENT UNTIL THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AND THE SALES AGREEMENT ARE SIGNED AND FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS MADE. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE LONGER THE DELAY IN CONCLUDING THE AGREEMENT THE GREATER RISK OF SLIPPAGES IN SOME OF THE ITEMS.

4. INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THE SIGNING OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING FOLLOW.

5. FYI ALTHOUGH APPROVAL GRANTED ON POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL GROUNDS FOR INCREASED ARMS PACKAGE ITEMIZED PARA 1, WE ARE DISTURBED OVER HIGH COST OF 40 MM. SP AA'S. BEFORE CONVEYING TO THE JORDANIANS OUR APPROVAL OF THE ADDITIONAL 40 MM. AA'S, YOU SHOULD MAKE

PAGE 4 RUEHC 128960 ~~SECRET~~

STRONG EFFORT PERSUADE THEM TO ACCEPT THE 91 ADDITIONAL 50 CAL.

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QUAD MOUNT AA'S AS ADEQUATE MEET THEIR AA REQUIREMENTS.
IF JORDANIANS REMAIN UNCONVINCED YOU MAY THEN, IN YOUR
DISCRETION, OFFER THE ADDITIONAL 20 40 MM. SP AA
END FYI: RUSK

EXD-1

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TELEGRAM

223

48

SECRET 802

PAGE 01 STATE 126252

80
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: IO/UNP: DODSON/JONES
APPROVED BY: IO: SISCO
UNP: DAY
NEA/IAI: LAMBRAKIS
NEA/UAR: PARKER SUB
S/S: WALSH

R 072136Z MAR 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0984
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2881
CAIRO 1552
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1053

~~SECRET~~ STATE 126252

EXDIS

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION - RHODES FORMULA

REF: AMMAN 3657

1. VIRTUALLY ONLY AUTHORITATIVE REPORTS ON PROCEDURES FOLLOWED AT RHODES ARE THOSE BUNCHE SUBMITTED TO UNSC. DEPT HAS ALSO REVIEWED DESCRIPTION INCLUDED IN BOOK BY CHIEF ISRAELI NEGOTIATOR WALTER EYTAN. BUCHE RECENTLY INDICATED SOME ISRAELI DESCRIPTIONS

PAGE 2 RUEHC 126252 S E C R E T
INACCURATE AND MISLEADING, BUT REFUSED EXPAND PUBLICLY ON HIS 1949 REPORTS.

2. EGYPT-ISRAEL MEETINGS APPARENTLY BEGAN WITHOUT ADVANCE AGREEMENT ON PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED. NOV 1948 SC RES CALLED ON PARTIES TO NEGOTIATE QTE EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH THE ACTING MEDIATOR UNQTE. AFTER ITS ADOPTION ISRAEL SAID IT

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PREFERRED DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS, BUT IF THIS NOT IMMEDIATELY PRACTICABLE IT WAS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE THROUGH UN INTERMEDIARIES; ARAB REPLIES DID NOT COMMENT ON PROCEDURES. BUNCHE REPORTED HE FIRST MET SEPARATELY WITH EACH DELEGATION, THEN ON SECOND DAY HELD FIRST JOINT MEETING WHERE, ON DELEGATES' REQUEST, HE ASSUMED ROLE OF CHAIRMAN. IN REPORT ON FIRST JOINT MEETING, BUCHE ALSO SAID MEETINGS WOULD BE ON THREE LEVELS: PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS SEPARATELY WITH EACH DELEGATION; INFORMAL MEETINGS BETWEEN HEADS OF DELEGATIONS AND UN; AND JOINT FORMAL MEETINGS OF THE TWO DELEGATIONS. FREQUENCY OF EACH TYPE MEETING AND DEGREE TO WHICH SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS TOOK PLACE IN EACH NOT EVIDENT FROM REPORTS.

PAGE 3 RUEHC 126252 ~~SECRET~~

3. EYTAN SAYS EGYPTIANS IN JOINT MEETINGS FIRST ADDRESSED ALL REMARKS TO BUNCHE, AS IF ISRAELIS NOT IN ROOM, BUT THAT THIS QTE ARTIFICIALITY UNQTE SOON GAVE WAY TO DELEGATIONS ARGUING DIRECTLY WITH ONE ANOTHER.

4. IN ANY EVENT IT CLEAR THAT QTE RHODES FORMULA UNQTE, AS GOLDBERG HAS STATED (USUN 4003), EMBRACED VARIETY OF METHODS, BOTH FORMAL AND INFORMAL, JOINT AND SEPARATE. DEPT AGREES WITH GOLDBERG'S STATEMENT THAT US SUPPORTS IDEA OF DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS EMBRACING ALL METHODS BUNCHE USED AND EXCLUDING NONE. THERE ARE OBVIOUS ADVANTAGES TO OUR BEING QTE CONSTRUCTIVELY AMBIGUOUS UNQTE ABOUT PRECISE NATURE OF FORMULA. USUN MAY WISH GET FURTHER CLARIFICATION FROM BUNCHE. FIELD POSTS ARE CAUTIONED NOT TO BE TOO PRECISE ABOUT FORMULA.
GP-3 RUSK

SECRET



Department of State

224
TELEGRAM

47

~~SECRET~~ 3 8

PAGE 01 STATE 125943

81
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: WILEY
DOD: MURRAY
APPROVED BY: NEA: DAVIES
DOD/ILN: DOLDT
DOD/I&L: COL HAZAM
DOD/AF: HILBERT
S/S: DAVIS
DOD/J-5: COL ALBA
DOD/ISA: WARNKE
NEA/ARN: HOUGHTON

R 070114Z MAR 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0972
INFO CINCPACAF/CINCPACFLT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 125943

EXDIS

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE

REF: AMMAN 3648

1. IN VIEW OF PAST RECORD OF JORDANIAN CONFUSION ON AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS WE BELIEVE IT IS NOW NECESSARY TO PIN DOWN DETAILS OF F-104 TRANSACTION WITH GOJ. WE WOULD LIKE YOUR ASSESSMENT FIRST AS TO WHETHER JORDAN IS PREPARED NOW TO DECIDE FINALLY AND AGREE TO PAYMENT OF APPROXIMATELY \$10 MILLION IN FY 68 IN ADDITION TO MONEY NOW ON DEPOSIT AND ABOUT \$10 MILLION MORE

PAGE 2 RUEHC 125943 ~~SECRET~~
IN FY 69. SECONDLY, IF KHAMMASH DOES NOT WANT SUCH PLANES IN JORDAN "AT TOO EARLY A DATE" WHEN AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD HE WANT THEM IN JORDAN?

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By etm, NARA, Date 9-11-02

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PAGE 02 STATE 125943

2. USAF NOW PREPARING FOR POUCHING AN APPROPRIATE OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE FORM (FORM 1513) TO AMEND EXISTING SALE AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE SIX ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT AND RELATED ENGINES, SPARES AND EQUIPMENT MAKING TOTAL 18 AIRCRAFT, WITH APPROPRIATE PAYMENTS SCHEDULE AND AVAILABILITY FOR DELIVERY AND COSTS OF STORAGE. WE INTEND SCHEDULE PAYMENTS SO THAT WE WILL HAVE FUNDS IN HAND BEFORE REHAB AND OTHER COSTS ARE INCURRED. WE WILL EXPECT JORDANIANS SIGN FORM 1513 AT ONCE, AS WE MUST MAKE DECISION WITHIN TWO WEEKS ON WHETHER WE KEEP OPEN THE REHABILITATION LINE. CLOSING DOWN AND REOPENING LINE WOULD GREATLY INCREASE COST. ALSO, WE HAVE ANOTHER POTENTIAL CUSTOMER (US AIR NATIONAL GUARD) FOR THESE AIRCRAFT IF JORDANIANS DO NOT WISH TO HAVE THEM.

3. RE GROUND ENVIRONMENT, BASIS OF \$2.8 MILLION IS RADAR SURVEY CONDUCTED BY US IN MAY 1967. WE CONSIDER THIS ADEQUATE, ALTHOUGH NOT ELABORATE, SYSTEM FOR JORDAN, AND WAS DESIGNED TO

PAGE 3 RUEHC 125943 ~~SECRET~~
SUPPLEMENT EXISTING RADAR FACILITY. IF EVENTS SINCE MAY 1967 HAVE ALTERED SITUATION, WE WILLING TO UPDATE SURVEY. FYI. WE REVIEWING SURVEY REPORT TO SEE IF RELEASABLE TO GOJ. IT MAY BE THAT GOJ CAN MAKE ITS OWN JUDGMENT, ON BASIS OF REPORT, AS TO ADEQUACY THE \$2.8 MILLION PROPOSAL. END FYI.

4. WE EXPECT TO HAVE RESPONSE ON GROUND PACKAGE SHORTLY.
GP-3 RUSK

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TELEGRAM

4

~~SECRET~~ 021

PAGE 01 STATE 124565

2

85
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO 1030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN/MWWILEY
APPROVED BY: NEA:ROGER P DAVIES
NEA/ARN:ROBERT B. HOUGHTON
DOD/ISA:CHARLES QUINN
S/S/MR HOUDEK

R 05011Z MAR 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0964
INFO CINCSTRIKE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 124565

EXDIS

JOINT STATE -DEFENSE

SUBJECT: LOW ALTITUDE CAPABILITY OF F-104

REF: AMMAN 3570

1. IN PREVIOUS CONVERSATION KHAMMASH SAID F-104 NOT SUFFICIENTLY MANEUVERABLE AT LOW ALTITUDE. YOU MAY DRAW ON FOLLOWING AS YOU DEEM APPROPRIATE IN FUTURE DISCUSSIONS WITH GOJ ON THIS SUBJECT.

PAGE 2 RUEHC 124565 ~~SECRET~~

2. IN ANY CONSIDERATION OF AIRCRAFT CAPABILITY AND COMBINATION OF PERFORMANCE, ARMAMENT, AND PILOT ABILITY MUST BE WEIGHED AS A TOTAL PACKAGE. THE F-104 IS AN EXCELLENT WEAPON IF EMPLOYED PROPERLY. IT HAS EXCESS ENERGY (PS) AT LOW ALTITUDE COMPARABLE WITH ANY OPERATIONAL FIGHTER AVAILABLE AND ARMED WITH AIM 9B'S AND A GUN (M-61) HAS BOTH A STAND OFF (LONG RANGE) AND A CLOSE IN KILL CAPABILITY. WHILE RANGE IS ONLY AVERAGE,

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PAGE 02 STATE 124565

IT CAN BE QUITE ACCEPTABLE IN MANY TACTICAL SITUATIONS. THE VISIBILITY AFFORDED IS OUTSTANDING. IN ANY LOW ALTITUDE ENGAGEMENT, THE PRINCIPAL LIMITATIONS ARE THE PILOT'S ABILITY AND HIS TOLERANCE OF PHYSICAL STRESS. THE AIRCRAFT IS CAPABLE OR MANEUVERABLE TO A POINT WHERE THE ONLY LIMITATION IS HOW MUCH STRESS ("G"FORCES) THE PILOT CAN WITHSTAND AND STILL SEE ENOUGH TO CONTINUE ANY AIR MASS MANEUVERING HE MAY BE CALLED ON TO PERFORM. THERE ARE NO MAJOR LIMITS TO MANEUVERABILITY IN AN F-104 AT LOW ALTITUDE AND IT IS COMPARABLE WITH ANY EXISTING OPERATIONAL FIGHTER WHERE RANGE IS NOT A MAJOR FACTOR.

3. WE CONCLUDE:

PAGE 3 RUEHC 124565 ~~SECRET~~

- 1) F-104 HAS GOOD MANEUVERABILITY AGAINST OTHER AIRCRAFT AT LOW ALTITUDE AND IS EQUIPPED WITH COMPATIBLE ARMAMENT.
- 2) ONLY SIGNIFICANT LIMIT ON MANEUVERABILITY AT LOW ALTITUDES ARE STRESS LIMITS THE PILOT CAN WITHSTAND.
- 3) TO BE MOST EFFECTIVE THE PILOT MUST BE KNOWLEDGEABLE IN THE OPTIMUM FLIGHT ENVELOPES OF THE F-104. RUSK

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TELEGRAM

226

49

SECRET 432

PAGE 01 STATE 123779

85
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:MWWILEY
APPROVED BY: NEA:RPDAVIS
NEA/ARN:MR. HOUGHTON, S/S:MR. BROWN, DOD/ISA:MR. MURRAY (SUBS)

R 020127Z MAR 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0951

~~SECRET~~ STATE 123779

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 3636

1. WE ARE URGENTLY ADDRESSING PROBLEM OF ADD-ONS TO ARMS
PACKAGE AND HOPE TO HAVE A REPLY FOR YOU WITHIN A FEW DAYS.
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By 14/11 NARA, Date 10/14/01

Lee

NODIS/Sandstorm



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WF 5
TELEGRAM

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228

RR RUEHC RUEHCR
DE RUQMKG 7258A 3041140
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 301130Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4630
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1948
RUEHCR/USINT CAIRO 164
STATE GRNC
BT

9 9 5 1 Q
Oct 30, 1968
7:13AM

F S

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 7258

NODIS

SANDSTORM

REF: CAIRO 3696

1. WEST BANK LEADER HIKMAT AL-MASRI TOLD EMBOFF, IN ONLY CONTACT WE HAVE HAD SO FAR WITH HIM, THAT HIS VISIT TO AMMAN HAD AS PRIMARY PURPOSE SEEING HIS FAMILY, PARTICULARLY RONE SON WHO ON VERGE OF MARRIAGE. SAID THAT HE HAD TALKED TO KING HUSSEIN AND INDICATED HE WILL SEE HIM AGAIN AT WHICH TIME, HE SAID, HE INTENDED TO ADVISE HIM NOT RPT NOT TO CRACK DOWN ON THE FEDAYEEN.

2. OTHER COMMENTS REPORTED IN AMMAN 7257. AL-MASRI INTENDS RETURN TO JERUSALEM ON FRIDAY, NOVEMBER ONE.

GP-1

SYMMES
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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-207
By ics NARA, Date 11-20-02

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Department of State

WM 7
TELEGRAM

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229

RR RUEHC RUEHCR
DE RUQMG 7226A 3021555
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 281545Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6613
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1945
STATE GRNC
BT

9 1 5 6 Q
Oct 28, 1968
11:44AM

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 7226

NODIS/SANDSTORM

REF: TEL AVIV 5842

1. IN GENERAL DISCUSSION OF JARRING MISSION WITH KING HUSSEIN TODAY, SUBJECT OF FONMIN EBAN'S RETURN TO NEW YORK CAME UP. I MENTIONED TO KING HUSSEIN THAT INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO ME FROM NEW YORK CONFIRMED PRESS REPORTS THAT RIAD APPARENTLY INTENDS TO RETURN TO CAIRO ON THIRTIETH. REFERRING TO OTHER NEWS REPORTS REGARDING ESHKOL'S ILLNESS, I TOLD HUSSEIN THAT INFORMATION I HAD RECEIVED FROM AMB BARBOUR INDICATED THAT UNFORTUNATELY PRIMIN ESHKOL IS QUITE ILL. IT HAD BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO HOLD A CABINET MEETING ON TWENTY-SEVENTH AND PROBABLY ISRAELI CABINET WOULD NOT MEET UNTIL THIRTIETH OR AFTERWARD. THUS, EBAN'S DELAY WAS FOR LEGITIMATE REASONS. I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE TOO BAD IF RIAD DEPARTED NEW YORK ON THIRTIETH AS PLANNED.
2. HUSSEIN SAID HE INTENDED TAKING STEPS TO INSURE THAT RIAD DOES NOT LEAVE NEW YORK UNTIL EBAN HAS GOTTEN BACK. HE WOULD SEND MESSAGES TO CAIRO AND NEW YORK TO TAKE CARE OF THIS.
3. SUBSEQUENTLY, I SAW PRIMIN TALHOUNI AND ZAID RIFAI IN LATTER'S OFFICE AND WE AGAIN DISCUSSED THIS MATTER. BOTH OF THEM SAID GOJ WOULD TAKE STEPS TO PERSUADE RIAD TO STAY IN NEW YORK. THEIR MAIN CONCERN WAS THAT FONMIN RIFAI SHOULD NOT BE LEFT IN NEW YORK ALONE. TALHOUNI, WHO WAS TO SEE THE KING SHORTLY AFTERWARD, SAID HE WOULD PROPOSE CALLING IN THE UAR AMB IN AMMAN TO GET A MESSAGE TO NASSER TO INSURE THAT RIAD REMAINS IN NEW YORK.
4. FOREGOING HAS BEEN PLACED IN NODIS SANDSTORM SERIES BECAUSE OF REFERENCE TO TEL AVIV 5842. DEPT MAY WISH TO MAKE FURTHER DISTRIBUTION, ESPECIALLY TO USUN, AND REMOVE FROM SANDSTORM SERIES.

SYMMES
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NJ 02-207
By ms, NARA, Date 11-20-02

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Department of State

Jordan
TELEGRAM

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230

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 6450 2480610
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 040609Z SEP 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6286
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1873
STATE GRNC
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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 6450

587Q

1968 SEP 4 AM 2 46

Postow

NODIS SANDSTORM

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

1. DURING MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN ON THIRD I BRIEFLY REFERRED TO JARRING MISSION IN CONTEXT OF ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL MEETING AND FEDWREEN PROBLEM. I ASKED HUSSEIN HOW HE FELT ABOUT THE GENERAL SITUATION AND WHETHER IN VIEW OF THE APPARENT LACK OF PROGRESS IN JARRING'S EFFORTS IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO PROCEED TO MEETINGS WITH THE FONMIN'S IN NEW YORK. THE KING COMMENTED HE WAS DISCOURAGED JARRING IS MAKING SO LITTLE PROGRESS BUT HE STILL BELIEVED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE TALKS IN NEW YORK. HE THEN SAID QTE I AM TRYING TO GET SOME IDEA OF WHAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE IN MIND BEFORE THE FONMINS MEET. THE ISRAELIS HAVE NOT BEEN VERY FORTHCOMING BUT I AM NOT GIVING UP HOPE. UNQTE.

2. I GATHERED FROM THE KING'S WHOLE Demeanor AND THE WAY HE TALKED THAT HE WAS REFERRING TO SOME KIND OF SEPARATE CONTACTS WITH THE ISRAELIS. ALTHOUGH WE TALKED ABOUT HIS PAKISTAN VISIT NEITHER OF US MENTIONED HIS STOP-OVER IN IRAN (TEHRAN 6274 REPEATED AS STATE 230380). FOR OBVIOUS REASONS I DID NOT ASK ANY QUESTIONS AND ALTHOUGH HE HAD OPPORUTNITY, HE VOUNTEERED NO FURTHER INFORMATION. SYMMES
BT

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By *ms* NARA, Date 11-20-02

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Jordan

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: [] COLLECT
[] CHARGE TO

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Classification

Origin
Info

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN . PRIORITY

35 SEP 68 20 30z

INFO.: Amembassy TEL AVIV
USUN

STATE 231616

NODIS

SANDSTORM

REF.: Amman's 6424

FS

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM BATTLE

1. Question possible secret talks between Israelis and Jordanians highly sensitive. Strongly urge you not repeat not probe with King or others except on specific instructions from here.

END

GP-1

RUSK

Drafted by
NEA:LDBattle:lab 9/3/68

Tel. Ext.
4263

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - Lucius D. Battle

S/S - Mr. Walsh

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Authority: RAC 001-147-2-314 State Guidelines

By *[Signature]* NARA, Date 9-13-01

~~SECRET~~
Classification

FORM 105-322
2-68



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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232

RR RUEHC RUEHCR
DE RUQMKG 6424A 2441310
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 311300Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6274
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1870
STATE GRNC
BT

1 0 3 7 2Q
1968 AUG 31 AM 9 43

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 6424



NODIS

SUBJECT: SANDSTORM

REF: TEHRAN 6274; AMMAN 6417

1. IT SEEMS CLEAR TO ME THAT WHEN JARRING TOLD RIFAI HE KNOWS WHY THE ISRAELIS ARE NOT GIVING HIM DETAILS ON THEIR SUBSTANTIVE POSITION ON BOUNDARIES (AMMAN 6417), HE WAS ACTUALLY REFERRING TO EBAN'S EXPLANATION REPORTED IN PARA THREE OF TEL AVIV 5041 BUT DID NOT WANT TO SAY THIS TO RIFAI.
2. RIFAI WAS EMPHATIC, AND TO ME CONVINCING, IN STATING ONCE AGAIN THAT HE IS NOT AWARE OF ANY "OTHER CHANNELS" PROVIDING SUBSTANTIVE CONTACTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN. AT ONE POINT IN OUR CONVERSATION, HOWEVER, RIFAI EMPHASIZED HE HOPED I WOULD SEE KING HUSSEIN EARLY NEXT WEEK FOR A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE SITUATION. HE GAVE NO SPECIFIC REASON FOR THIS SUGGESTION. SINCE I HAD SEEN TEHRAN 6274 I HAD A FUNNY FEELING RIFAI MIGHT BE SUGGESTING THE KING MIGHT HAVE SOMETHING TO TELL ME IF MY EAR WAS MADE AVAILABLE. THIS WAS ONLY AN IMPRESSION AND FOR OBVIOUS REASONS I DID NOT WANT TO DO ANY PROBING. SYMMES

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NJ 05-95
By isl, NARA, Date 1-31-06

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**Hold
Close 7
233*~~SECRET~~

Action

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 732A 2201119

1967 AUG 16 AM 5 34

Info

ZNY SSSSS
R 081109Z AUG 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 732

NODIS - SANDSTORM

REF: AMMAN 686, PARA 2

1. HUSSEIN TOLD EMBOFF YESTERDAY AFTERNOON THAT HE HAD HAD ONLY ONE CONTACT WITH THE ISRAELIS SINCE THE END OF HOSTILITIES, AND THAT WAS THROUGH A "CHANNEL" IN EUROPE WHEN THE KING WAS ON HIS WAY BACK TO JORDAN FROM HIS UN VISIT. THE KING SAID THAT VERY FEW PEOPLE IN THE ISRAELI GOVT KNEW OF THIS CHANNEL AND THEREFORE WE SHOULD HOLD THIS INFO VERY TIGHTLY. HUSSEIN WAS URGED BY ISRAELIS THROUGH THIS CHANNEL TO OPEN DIRECT SECRET DIALOGUE WITH ISRAELIS. HUSSEIN REPLIED HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DO SO IF AND WHEN SUCH ACTION APPEARED IT MIGHT LEAD TO AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT.

2. LATER IN THE AFTERNOON I SAW THE KING BRIEFLY AND AMONG OTHER THINGS WARNED HIM THAT A RUMOR WAS CIRCULATING IN

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 732A ~~SECRET~~

AMMAN THAT HE WAS HAVING FACE-TO-FACE DEALINGS WITH THE ISRAELIS AT AQABA. THE KING REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO TRUTH WHATSOEVER IN THIS RUMOR AND THAT HE HAD HAD NO FACE-TO-FACE CONTACT WITH THE ISRAELIS. IF HE EVER DID, HE WOULD LET US KNOW.

3. WHAT DID HAPPEN AT AQABA LAST WEEKEND IS BIZARRE TO THE EXTREME. THE KING TOOK A PARTY TO AQABA CONSISTING, AMONG OTHERS, OF HIS BROTHER CROWN PRINCE HASSA, HIS COUSIN PRINCE RAAD, LINDA CHRISTIAN, HER TWO TEEN-AGE DAUGHTERS, AND AN ITALIAN MOVIE SCRIPT WRITER WHO IS IN JORDAN WITH LINDA CHRISTIAN OSTENSIBLY TO TRY TO MAKE A MOVIE. (LINDA CHRISTIAN IS A FADED MINOR MOVIE ACTRESS WITH MEXICAN PASSPORT AND UNSAVORY REPUTATION IN HOLLYWOOD CIRCLES, WHO WAS AT ONE TIME MARRIED TO THE LATE TYRONE POWER.) THE KING WAS TAKEN VIOLENTLY ILL ON THE NIGHT

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/IRAC 15-36

NARA, Date 05-13-2015

By *Uct*

~~SECRET~~

-2- AMMAN 732, AUGUST 8

OF AUGUST 4-5 AND, ACCORDING TO WHAT HE TOLD EMBOFF, CAME NEAR TO EXPIRING. IT SEEMS THAT LINDA CHRISTIAN DOUSED HIS DRINK WITH A HEAVY DOSE OF LSD. SHE HAD DOUSED HIS FOOD WITH IT, TOO, BUT, FORTUNATELY FOR HUSSEIN, HE DID NOT EAT. LINDA CHRISTIAN IS NOW BEING HELD BY THE

PAGE 3 RUEMKG 732A ~~SECRET~~
JORDANIAN POLICE AND HAS ADMITTED TO HAVING PUT THE POTIONS IN THE KING'S FOOD AND DRINK. THE JORDANIANS SUSPECT THAT SHE WAS TRYING EITHER TO POISON THE KING OR, AT THE VERY LEAST, TO LOOSEN HIS TONGUE. [REDACTED]

2.
3.3(b)(1)

GP-1. BURNS

NOTE: MESSAGE DELAYED IN TRANSMISSION.

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

234
TELEGRAM

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 6029A 2181030
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 051015Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6081
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~

1 0 5 6 Q

1968 AUG 5 AM 7:30

#7
FS

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 6029

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NERUS, Vol. XX # 230
By J NARA, Date: 9-2001

NODIS SANDSTORM

REF STATE 214812

1. WHILE I WAS WAITING TO SEE KING HUSSEIN ON THE THIRD, HIS CONFIDANT, ZAID RIFAI, INVITED ME INTO HIS PRIVATE OFFICE FOR WHAT TURNED OUT TO BE A LONG CONVERSATION. AFTER MAKING HIS USUAL ARGUMENTS FOR THE NEED OF US PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO MOVE MORE CONSTRUCTIVELY TOWARD A PEACE SETTLEMENT, ZAID AT ONE POINT COMMENTED THE ISRAELIS SHOULD KNOW THAT JORDAN WOULD WELCOME SECRET AND SEPARATE TALKS IF ISRAEL HAD SOMETHING CONCRET TO OFFER. HE SAID THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE SURPRISED BY HOW RECEPTIVE JORDAN WOULD BE TO REALISTIC, CONCRETE PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO BRING ABOUT A PACKAGE MUTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL. HE THEN VOLUNTEERED THAT THERE ARE NOT NOW AND HAVE NOT BEEN IN THE PAST ANY CONTACTS WITH ISRAEL ABOUT SPECIFIC MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE. REFERRING TO MESSAGES THAT HAVE BEEN BROUGHT OVER BY PEOPLE LIKE HIKMAT AL-MASRI, ZAID SAID, "THE TROUBLE IS THE ISRAELIS NEVER GET DOWN TO EARTH WITH US."

2. COMMENT: VIEWED IN THE GLOOMY AFTERMATH OF ISRAEL'S AIR STRIKE ON AUGUST FOURTH, ZAID RFAI'S COMMENTS MIGHT NOT SEEM SO SIGNIFICANT AS THE DAY THEY WERE UTTERED. NEVERTHELESS, I WOULD JUDGE THEY MORE THAN LIKELY REFLECT THE THINKING OF THE KING, AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE TREATED SERIOUSLY. RIFAI'S REFERENCE TO THE NEED FOR CONCRETE PROPOSALS FROM ISRAEL UNDERLINES WHAT HAS BEEN SAID FREQUENTLY BY THE FONMIN AND HUSSEIN TO RECENT AMERICAN VISITORS SUCH AS BALL AND SISCO. IT REVEALS THAT IF CONCRETE, SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WERE ADVNACED BY ISRAEL, JORDAN OR, RATHER, THE KING WOULD ATTACH RELATIVELY LITTLE IMPORTANCE TO THE CHANNEL THROUGH WHICH THEY MIGHT BE TRANSMITTED, WHETHER FROM JARRING, OR THROUGH SOMETHING LIKE THE BALL/SISCO MEDIUM, OR THE "SECRET AND SEPARATE TALKS" WHICH RIFAI MENTIONED.

3. I UNDERSTAND WHY DEPT DOES NOT WISH TO PROBE EITHER ISRAELIS OR JORDANIANS WITH REGARD TO "DISAVOWABLE" OR OTHER TYPE CONTACTS THEY MAY HAVE. IF ANY CONTACTS, WHATEVER THEIR NATURE, ARE TO DO ANY GOOD SO FAR AS JORDANIANS ARE CONCERNED, THEY WILL HAVE TO GET CONCRETE. DEPT MAY WISH THEREFORE O CONSIDER PASSING ZAID'S COMMENTS TO AN APPROPRIATE ISRAELI OFFICIAL.

GP-1.
SYMMEs

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

WAH 7
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

235

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMGK 5985A 2150730
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 020710Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6059
STATE GRNC
BT

4 4 8 Q

1968 AUG 2 AM 9 11

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 5985

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-207
By jes NARA, Date 11-20-02

NODIS SANDSTORM

REF: STATE 212458

1. I AM MYSTIFIED BY REFTEL AND WOULD APPRECIATE CLARIFICATION AS TO WHETHER PARA 2 MEANS WE ARE CERTAIN THERE IS SOME SPECIAL AND MEANINGFUL DIRECT ISRAELI-JORDANIAN CONTACT BEYOND THE TYPES DESCRIBED IN AMMAN 5421.

2. IN PARA 2 OF TEL AVIV 4665, RAPHAEL APPEARED TO IMPLY THAT ISRAEL'S "EXPLORATIONS" WERE CONFINED TO THE JARRING CHANNEL. MOREOVER, SINCE THE JORDANIANS THEMSELVES PREVIOUSLY HAVE APPRISED US OF (AND AT THE SAME TIME DISPARAGED) THEIR HIKMAT AL-MASRI AND ANWAR NUSEIBEH TYPE CONTACTS WITH THE ISRAELIS, IT IS HARD TO BELIEVE THEY WOULD KEEP THEM FROM US NOW (OR THAT WE WOULD NOT HAVE INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE OF THEM IN THIS "OPEN SECRET" SOCIETY). NEVERTHELESS, TEKOAH'S COMMENTS TO PEDERSEN (PARA 5, USUN 6010) IMPLYING THAT DIRECT CONTACTS ARE BEING CONTROLLED BY KING HUSSEIN PERSONALLY, TOGETHER WITH FIRST PARA OF STATE 207551 WOULD INDICATE THERE COULD BE SOMETHING RATHER SPECIAL GOING ON. WITH REGARD TO STATE 207551, IF KING HUSSEIN IS ALREADY IN SECRET CONTACT WITH ISRAELIS, WHY WOULD HE BE INTERESTED IN ESTABLISHING ADDITIONAL CONTACT WITH DAYAN. MOREOVER, WOULD NOT THE SECRET ISRAELI CONTACT INFORM HUSSEIN OF WHO WAS WITTING ON THE ISRAELI SIDE? FINALLY, APPROACH TO HUSSEIN SUGGESTED IN STATE 207551 (WHCICH I HAVE NEVER MADE INCIDENTALLY) WOULD IMPLY USG DISCOURAGES ANY KIND OF DIRECT, SECRET JORDAN-ISRAEL CONTACT.

3. ON THIS GENERAL SUBJECT OF SECRET AND DIRECT JORDAN-ISRAEL CONTACTS, I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT TO BEAR THE FOLLOWING IN MIND:

A. NEITHER WE NOR THE ISRAELIS SHOULD DELUDE OURSELVES THAT KING HUSSEIN ALONE CAN OR WILL AGREE TO SUBSTANTIVE DETAILS OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT THAT ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE TO AT LEAST HIS CLOSE ADVISERS. AT THIS JUNCTURE, ABDUL MUNIM RIFAI AND PRIMIN TALHOUNI CERTAINLY MUST BE INCLUDED IN THAT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- AMMAN 5985, AUGUST 2, (NODIS/SANDSTORM)

GROUP OF ADVISERS. (IN THIS CONNECTION WE MUST KEEP IN MIND THAT ZAID RIFAI, PROBABLY THE KING'S CLOSEST CONFIDANT IN THE PALACE, IS THE NEPHEW OF ABDUL MUNIM AND THE SON-IN-LAW OF TALHOUNI.)

B. IT IS NOT IN OUR LONG-TERM INTEREST IN THIS REGIME NOR IN THE INTEREST OF A POTENTIAL PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT TO ENCOURAGE ANY KIND OF EXERCISE THAT WOULD RISK ISOLATING THE KING FROM HIS CHIEF SUPPORTERS. IT IS HIS NATURE, OF COURSE, TO BE REASONABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE ALSO TENDS TO BE SUPERFICIAL AND IMPATIENT. IN NEW SITUATIONS HE MAY MOVE POSITIVELY BUT ALSO QUICKLY AND WITHOUT CONSULTATION, AT TIMES WITH EMBARRASSING RESULTS FOR HIM PERSONALLY AS WELL AS FOR HIS POLICY. HE FEELS A DEEP SENSE OF GUILT ABOUT THE DEFEAT OF JUNE 1967 AND DESPERATELY WANTS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. HE PROBABLY DOES NOT SHARE (BUT, ON THE OTHER, MAY NOT FULLY APPRECIATE) THE MUCH DEEPER FEELINGS THAT MANY OF HIS ADVISERS AND SUPPORTERS FEEL ABOUT SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM.

C. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE ALERT TO THE "RED HERRING" POSSIBILITY TO AVOID BEING LED INTO RELAXING OUR EFFORTS TO PROMOTE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS (THE JARRING MISSION AND OUR OWN DIPLOMATIC INFLUENCE) BY GIVING UNDUE CREDENCE TO ISRAELI HINTS THAT THEY ARE DOING SOMETHING SIGNIFICANT IF AND WHEN THEY ARE ACTUALLY NOT.

D. WE SHOULD ALSO BE ALERT TO PREVENT OUR SEPARATE CONTACTS WITH THE PARTIES FROM BEING USED BY THE ISRAELIS AS A DEVICE FOR EXPLORING GAPS IN THE JORDANIAN NEGOTIATING POSITION AND THEREBY WORKING BOTH ENDS AGAINST THE MIDDLE.

GP-1. SYMMES
BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

#9
TELEGRAM
W D

~~SECRET~~

236

FM RUENH RUEHCR
DE RUQNK 4640A 1231455
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 021454Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5412
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2874
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0850
RUEHCR/USUN 0913
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4640

CONTROL: 353Q
Received: May 2, 1968
11:25 a.m.

DDIS/SANDSTORM

REF: STATE 156687

RE FINAL PARA STATE REFTEL WE CONSIDER ISRAELI
INTERPRETATION OF RECENT CABINET CHANGES IN JORDAN
TO BE SERIOUSLY OFF BASE. WE HAVE SEEN NO REASON
REVISE EMBASSY [REDACTED] ASSESSMENTS OF THESE CHANGES REPORTED
IN AMMAN 4547, PARAS 7, 8 AND [REDACTED]. SUGGEST THESE
ANALYSES MIGHT USEFULLY BE DRAWN ON IN REVIEW WITH

25X1A
25X1A

PAGE 2 RUQNK 4640A ~~SECRET~~
ISRAELI REPS. WE HAVE ASKED [REDACTED]

25X1A

SYMMES

GP-3
BT

NOTE: Not Relayed to any post per J. P. Walsh, S/S
5/2/68--12:10 p.m., frm

NNNN

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

W H

237

~~SECRET~~

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 4634A 1231325
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 021300Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASDC 5407
STATE GRNC
BT

CONTROL: 0328Q
RECD: May 2, 1968
10:21 a.m.

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4634

NODIS/SANDSTORM

SUBJ: GERMAN AMB SPECULATES ABOUT POSSIBLE DIRECT
JORDANIAN-ISRAELI TALKS

1. GERMAN AMB VON HILLE, IN CALL ON MAY SECOND, SAID HE SERIOUSLY WONDERED IF KING HUSSEIN'S PRESENT TRIP TO LONDON IS FOR PURPOSE MAKING DIRECT CONTACTS WITH ISRAELI OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS SEPARATE JORDANIAN-ISRAELI PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. VON HILLE SAID HE WAS ENCOURAGED IN THIS SPECULATION BY FOLLOWING FACTS:

1. SHARIF HUSSEIN BIN NASIR HAD MADE MYSTERIOUS AND STILL UNEXPLAINED TRIP TO LONDON ABOUT ONE MONTH AGO, AND HE, VON

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4634A ~~SECRET~~
HILLE, HAD PICKED UP HINTS THAT SHARIF HUSSEIN'S TRIP WAS FOR PURPOSE MAKING CONTACTS WITH ISRAELIS.

2. KING'S PRESENT TRIP SEEMS TO HAVE NO OTHER REAL EXPLANATION. (VON HILLE DISCOUNTED MEDICAL CHECKUP AS SUBSTANTIAL REASON AND OPINED THAT CANCELLED LIBYAN PORTION OF TRIP HAD NEVER BEEN SERIOUS ANYWAY.)

3. VON HILLE HAD BEEN TOLD BY "ARAB SOURCES" IN AMMAN THAT TALHOUNI'S VISITS TO CAIRO AND BAGHDAD ARE FOR PURPOSE INFORMING THOSE CAPITALS OF POSSIBLE SEPARATE DEAL AND TO GAIN THEIR ACQUIESCENCE IN SUCH DEAL.

4. CURRENT STATEMENTS BY EBAN AND OTHERS IN ISRAEL INDICATING THAT ISRAELIS ARE WORKING TOWARDS SEPARATE ARRANGEMENT WITH JORDAN.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 02-207

By isa NARA, Date 11-20-02

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-2- AMMAN 4634, MAY 2

2. VON HILLE ASKED HOW I SAW SITUATION. I TOLD VON HILLE I HAD NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT KING'S CURRENT TRIP WAS FOR ANY OTHER PURPOSE THAN THOSE GIVEN OFFICIALLY, I.E., HE HAD PLANNED TO GO TO LIBYA BUT HAD CANCELLED AT THE LAST MINUTE BECAUSE OF UNAVAILABILITY OF KING IDRIS. HE HAD ALWAYS INTENDED TO GO TO EUROPE TO HAVE A REST AND MEDICAL CHECKUP AFTER LIBYA. I COMMENTED THAT THE LACK OF PLANNING (AS TO WHEN AND WHETHER HE WOULD GO TO LONDON, PARIS AND BONN) SEEMED TO ME FAIRLY NORMAL "DISORGANIZATION" FOR JORDANIAN TRAVEL OF THIS NATURE. I SAID I HAD GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT TALHOUNI'S TRIP WAS DESIGNED TO GAIN SUPPORT FOR CONTINUATION OF JARRING MISSION AND POSSIBLE SOFTENING OF HAR (PARTICULARLY, FOMMIN RIAD) ATTITUDE ON POSSIBLE TALKS UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES. SO FAR AS ISRAELI OFFICIAL STATEMENT WERE CONCERNED, I SAID I THOUGHT THEY COULD BE EXPLAINED AS TYPICAL ISRAELI SPECULATIONS THAT HAD BEEN GOING ON FOR MONTHS.

3. VON HILLE THEN CALLED ATTENTION TO STORY IN YESTERDAY'S BEIRUT DAILY STAR WHICH REFERRED TO ESHKOL AND EBAN STATEMENTS AND POSSIBILITY OF SEPARATE JORDANIAN-ISRAELI ARRANGEMENTS. (IF HE HAD SEEN TEXT OF ALFRED FRIENDLY'S ARTICLE IN MAY 1 WASHINGTON POST, HE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN EVEN MORE SUSPICIOUS.)

4. COMMENT: WE HAVE NO INDICATIONS JORDANIANS HAVE ANYTHING IN PROGRESS BEYOND EFFORT AT CONTACTS THROUGH HIKMAT AL-MASRI

PAGE 4 RUOMKG 4634A ~~SECRET~~
(AMMAN 4266). RABIN MAY WELL HAVE BEEN REFERRING TO AL-MASRI OR EARLIER AL-NUSEIBEH CONTACTS (AMMAN 3373), NEITHER OF WHICH HAS YET PRODUCED ANYTHING SO FAR AS WE AWARE. I HAD NOT SEEN STATE 156687 OR ALFRED FRIENDLY'S ARTICLE BEFORE VON HILLE CALLED. I AM FRANKLY QUITE CONCERNED BY INDICATIONS IN EBAN AND OTHER RECENT ISRAELI OFFICIAL STATEMENTS OF APPARENT DISREGARD FOR OR LACK OF APPRECIATION OF EFFECT THEIR PUBLIC REFERENCES TO POSSIBLE SEPARATE ARRANGEMENTS MAY HAVE ON SECURITY OF JORDANIAN REGIME. APART FROM LATTER CONSIDERATION, THE SUCCESS OF A REVIVED SANDSTORM EXERCISE ITSELF REQUIRES COMPLETE SECURITY ON THE PART OF ALL. I HOPE ISRAELIS CAN BE APPROPRIATELY CAUTIONED ABOUT THIS.

GP-1. SYMMES

~~SECRET~~

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Department of State

#6
TELEGRAM

238

~~SECRET~~

6 9 7 3 Q
APRIL 27, 1968
7:29 A.M.

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 4555A 1181200
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 271130Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5364
STATE GRNC
BT
SECRET AMMAN 4555

Rollow

NODIS

SUBJ: SANDSTORM

REF: USUN 4785

1. REFTEL AND OTHER RECENT MESSAGES ON ISRAELI THINKING ABOUT JARRING MISSION GIVE MORE THAN HINT THAT GOI MAY NOW CONCENTRATE ON MAKING SEPARATE ARRANGEMENTS WITH JORDAN. I WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED TO FIND THEY WILL SEEK CONTACTS WITH HUSSEIN DURING HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO EUROPE. WE HAVE ALREADY REPORTED SIGNS THAT SOME MEMBERS OF THE JORDANIAN "ESTABLISHMENT" MAY BE CONSIDERING SEPARATE TALKS WITH ISRAEL.
2. FOR ALL OF REASONS SET FORTH IN AMMAN 3770 AND 4119, I THINK WE MUST BE EXTREMELY CAREFUL IN HOW WE USE (OR ACQUIESCE IN ISRAELIS USING) THIS LAST ASSET FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT BECAUSE IF A SEPARATE PEACE EFFORT SHOULD BLOW UP, HUSSEIN AND JORDAN WILL STAND TO LOSE EVERYTHING. ISRAEL WILL ONLY HAVE LOST ANOTHER MOVE IN ITS CHESS GAME WITH THE ARABS.
3. I THEREFORE THINK OUR OWN INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST REQUIRE:
(A) THAT WE OBTAIN A CLEAR AND ENFORCEABLE BILATERAL UNDERSTANDING WITH ISRAEL ON WHAT WE CONSIDER A MINIMUM FLOOR FOR ISRAEL TO OFFER JORDAN FOR NEGOTIATIONS, WITH UNDERSTANDING ISRAEL MIGHT HAVE TO GIVE MORE IN ACTUAL BARGAINING WITH JORDAN. THIS WILL BE ESSENTIAL IN CASE OF JERUSALEM ASPECT OF PROBLEM.

(BB) THAT WE GIVE CAREFUL AND DETAILED CONSIDERATION TO POLITICO-MILITARY CONTIGENCIES THAT MIGHT ARISE AND BE PREPARED TO MOVE

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, #153

By *h* NARA, Date 9-20-01

~~SECRET~~

-2- AMMAN 4555, APRIL 27

FIRMLY AND DEFINITELY (1) TO UNDERWRITE ANY MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ARRANGEMENT ISRAEL AND JORDAN MIGHT REACH, OR (2) TO ASSIST GOJ IN MAINTAINING PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY PARTICULARLY IF EFFORTS REACH SEPARATE AGREEMENT SHOULD FAIL, AND (3) TO PREVENT ANY OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE THAT MIGHT BE THREATENED OF UNDERTAKEN BY OTHER STATES IN THE AREA.

4. JORDAN AND ISRAEL MAY MOVE TO SEPARATE TALKS WITHOUT OUR KNOWLEDGE. SUCH TALKS COULD FAIL, AND IT WOULD THEN BE TOO LATE FOR US EITHER TO HELP INFLUENCE THE PARTIES TO FINAL AGREEMENT OR TO PROTECT JORDAN AND OUR MIDDLE EASTERN INTEREST FROM THE BLOWUP THAT MAY ENSUE.

5. FOREGOING IDEAS WERE DEVELOPED IN GREATER DETAIL IN AMMAN 3770 AND 4119 WHICH I HOPE WILL BE REREAD IN CONJUNCTION WITH THIS MESSAGE.

SYMMES
BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

239

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 4267A 0991930
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 081925Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT

2 0 7 6 Q

1968 APR 8 PM 2 58

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4267

NODIS

SANDSTORM

REF: AMMAN 4119, 4266

AS WE SEE IT, WEST BANKERS LIKE HIKMAT AL-MASRI AND ANWAR AL-NUSEIBEH WILL BE IMPORTANT DIRECT CHANNELS BETWEEN HUSSEIN AND ISRAELIS IF THERE IS TO BE ANY QUICK PROGRESS IN LATEST EFFORTS UNDER JARRING UMBRELLA. AT SAME TIME WE BELIEVE RECOMMENDATIONS WE HAVE MADE FOR PROBING OF ISRAELI INTENTIONS BY USG REMAIN RELEVANT AND PERHAPS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT IF AND WHEN WE ARE GOING TO GET MOVING. WE HOPE DEPARTMENT IS GIVING SOME CONSIDERATION TO IDEAS PROPOSED IN AMMAN 4119 AND 3770.

GP-1 SYMMES

BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-207
By us NARA, Date 11-20-02

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

#2

240

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 7939Q
RECD: MARCH 30, 1968
9:30 A.M.

RR RUENC
DE RUQMGK 4119A 0901300
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 301230Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5100
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4119

NODIS

SANDSTORM

RE: AMMAN 3770, 4081; STATE 137662, 136930; A-255, 3/29/68

1. EVEN IF THEY SUCCEED IN TEMPORARILY RESTRAINING EXTREMIST ACTIONS IN THE TWO SIDES, SUGGESTIONS IN STATE 137662 AND SUBSTANCE OF EVRON-ROSTOW CONVERSATION IN STATE 136930 UNFORTUNATELY ARE INSUFFICIENT TO ADVANCE US TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. WE OF COURSE HAVE USED AND WILL CONTINUE TO USE SUGGESTIONS IN STATE 137662 WITH JORDANIAN OFFICIALS AT ALL LEVELS, BUT THEY DO NOT GET AT THE ROOT PROBLEM, WHICH IS HOW TO BRING THE ISRAELIS ON THE ONE HAND AND THE UAR AND JORDAN ON THE OTHER TO MOVE TO IMPLEMENT THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION.

2. OUR EXPERIENCE IS THAT EXHORTATIONS TO JORDAN ARE NOT GOING TO STOP GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES IN ISRAEL OR ISRAELI-OCCUPIED TERRITORY. JORDAN HAS NEVER BEEN ABLE TO CONTROL THE FEDAYEEN COMPLETELY UNDER THE BEST OF CONDITIONS, NOW JORDAN IS IN THE IMPOSSIBLE POSITION OF HAVING THE FEDAYEEN THREATENING TO BECOME A STATE WITHIN THE STATE, THE REGIME LACKS NEITHER THE WILL NOR THE DESIRE TO CONTROL THE FEDAYEEN; IT LACKS THE CAPABILITY TO TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION BECAUSE OF CONDITIONS OVER WHICH IT HAS NO CONTROL. (SEE AMMAN 4330; NJA6878.) EVEN IF BY SOME MIRACLE JORDAN COULD COMPLETELY DENY USE OF ITS TERRITORY TO THE FEDAYEEN, THE LATTER WOULD IN ALL PROBABILITY, USE OTHER ARAB TERRITORY FOR CONTINUING TO INFILTRATE ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY. IN THAT EVENT WE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE THEM OPERATING AGAIN THROUGH LEBANON. THE RECORD SHOWS THAT ISRAELI REPRISAL RADIS HAVE ONLY EXACERBATED THE PROBLEM OF FEDAYEEN CONTROL WHILE ALSO REDUCING THE ALREADY FEW CHANCES WE HAVE OF HELPING MOVE THE PARTIES TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. PRESUMABLY ONLY ISRAELI REALIZATION THAT REPRISAL TACTICS ARE INEFFECTIVE WILL LEAD IT TO MODIFY THAT POLICY. AND ONLY SOME TANGIBLE PROGRESS TOWARDS

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-207
By us, NARA, Date 11-20-02

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-2- AMMAN 4119, MARCH 30 (NODIS/SANDSTORM)

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION WILL OFFER AN ALTERNATIVE TO THOSE ARABS WHO FAVOR "POPULAR RESISTANCE" MEASURES. THUS, WE ARE LEFT WITH A VICIOUS CIRCLE THAT LEADS AWAY FROM PEACE AND CAUSES INCREASING DAMAGE TO US INTERESTS IN THIS REGION.

3. WE IN AMMAN HAVE NO MAGIC ALTERNATIVE FORMULAE TO OFFER. WE ALSO CONCLUDE THAT THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION AND THE JARRING MISSION ARE CURRENTLY OUR ONLY HOPES. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT JARRING HAS LITTLE CHANCE OF SUCCESS UNLESS SOME WAY CAN BE FOUND TO BRING ISRAEL AND THE UAR TO ACCEPT THE RESOLUTION AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION AND TO DROP THEIR POSITIONS THAT HAVE SO FAR OBSTRUCTED JARRING'S MOVING TO THE NEXT STEP". WE SUBMIT THAT JARRING BY HIMSELF PROBABLY WILL NEVER BE ABLE TO PERSUADE THE UAR AND ISRAEL TO DO THIS. JARRING CAN PERHAPS PROVIDE AN UMBRELLA FOR SOMETHING MORE EFFECTIVE, BUT ALONE HE HAS NEITHER THE PERSONALITY NOR THE REQUIRED LEVERAGE AND TECHNIQUE TO BUDGE THE PARTIES. WHAT THEN COULD BE PUT UNDER THE JARRING UMBRELLA?

4. IN THE PAST THE IDEA OF A SETTLEMENT IMPOSED BY THE "FOUR" PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SC HAS BEEN CONSIDERED BUT NOT PURSUED FOR VARIOUS REASONS. YET, IN THE END IT IS CLEAR THAT AGREEMENT AMONG THE PERMANENT MEMBERS WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO REACHING AND ENFORCING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT UNDER THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION. WE HERE VERY MUCH HOPE, THEREFORE, THAT APPROPRIATE US OFFICIALS ARE ACTIVELY IN CONTACT WITH SOVIET AND FRENCH OPPOSITE NUMBERS TO DETERMINE WHAT PARIS AND MOSCOW ARE PREPARED TO DO. WE HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY SOME SIGNS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT READY TO DITCH JARRING COMPLETELY, BUT WE WONDER WHAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO DO UNDER HIS UMBRELLA. SIMILARLY WITH THE FRENCH.

5. OBVIOUSLY, THE REACHING OF A CONSENSUS AMONG THE PERMANENT SC MEMBERS IS SOME WAY OFF, AND THE SITUATION WILL NOT STAND STILL. WHAT ELSE CAN WE DO? WE GO BACK TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS MADE IN AMMAN 3770 (PARTICULARLY PARA SIX) . WE BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL IN PURSUING ANY ALTERNATIVES TO JARRING, OR ANY PRACTICAL EFFORTS IN HIS SUPPORT, TO FIND OUT SPECIFICALLY WHAT THE ISRAELIS ARE PREPARED TO GIVE TO REACH A SETTLEMENT. WE MUST KNOW THIS SO THAT WE CAN JUDGE WHEN AND HOW TO USE OUR INFLUENCE BEST, WHETHER IN SUPPORT OF SOME NEW LINE BY JARRING OR TO TRY TO PERSUADE THE SOVIETS OR THE FRENCH TO BRING ALONG ONE OR MORE OF THE ARAB PARTIES. THE MORE WE HAVE THOUGHT ABOUT THIS THE MORE IT HAS SEEMED TO US THAT WHILE THE USG MUST CONTINUE TO SUPPORT JARRING IT CAN BEST DO SO IF IT HAS PROBED ISRAELI INTENTIONS SEPARATELY AND SECRETLY IN AN ORGANIZED AND SYSTEMATIC FASHION. TO MOVE FORWARD WE

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RESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-3- AMMAN 4119, MARCH 30 (NODIS/SANDSTORM)

MUST HAVE A PRACTICAL APPRECIATION OF WHAT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WOULD LOOK LIKE.

6. AS WE SEE IT, WHAT WE NOW NEED IS A QUALIFIED AMERICAN, PREFERABLY A RETIRED DIPLOMAT WITH DEEP BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM, WHO COULD SERVE AS A SECRET SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT TO PROBE ISRAEL "GIVE" IN PARTICULAR BUT ALSO ARAB "GIVE" WHERE NECESSARY. ON FULL-TIME BASIS HE WOULD TRY TO STIMULATE AND CAJOLE THE PARTIES AND TO PROPOSE PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS UNDER THE JARRING UMBRELLA. WE WOULD ENVISAGE THAT ACTUAL ROLE OF THIS REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE DIVULGED ONLY TO THE HIGHEST LEVELS IN ISRAEL (OR IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES, IF PERTINENT). HIS COVER COULD BE A SPECIAL, BONA FIDE RESEARCH OR FOUNDATION PROJECT IN THE MIDDLE EAST (REFUGEES OR SOMETHING SIMILAR). WHATEVER HIS COVER, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE REAL INSTEAD OF PHONY AND ESTABLISHED SOMEWHERE IN THE AREA.

7. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS KIND OF MISSION COULD BE SUCCESSFULLY ACCOMPLISHED IN ANY PART-TIME, IN-AND-OUT-OF-THE-AREA BASIS BY A BUSINESS MAN OR AN ACADEMICIAN. WE FURTHER BELIEVE THAT FAMILIARITY AND EXPERIENCE WITH THE PROBLEM AND WITH THE UN AND USG DIPLOMATIC MACHINERY WOULD BE INDIS-

PENSABLE QUALIFICATIONS. ACCEPTABILITY TO THE PARTIES (PARTICULARLY ISRAEL), SOME EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH THEM, AND THE EVIDENT TRUST OF THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE USG WOULD ALSO BE ESSENTIAL.

8. WE CAN IMMEDIATELY THINK OF THREE AMERICANS WHO HAVE THE REQUIRED QUALIFICATIONS AS WE ENVISAGE THEM: CHARLES YOST, JOHN JERNEGAN, AND JULIUS HOLMES. THESE THREE ALSO APPEAR TO HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF BEING ABLE TO MOVE FROM THEIR CURRENT STATUS TO TAKE ON SUCH A MISSION. ALTHOUGH PHILLIPS TALBOT MAY LACK THAT LATTER ADVANTAGE, WE WOULD POINT TO HIM ALSO AS A PRIME EXAMPLE OF THE TYPE OF PERSON WHO COULD ACCOMPLISH THIS KIND OF MISSION.

9. SOMETHING LIKE FOREGOING SEEMS ESSENTIAL TO HELP MOVE JARRING MISSION FORWARD BUT IS ALSO PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IF WE ENVISAGE EARLY RESUMPTION OF SANDSTORM EFFECTS.

GP-1

SYMMES

BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

#6

241

~~SECRET~~

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 3666A 0611635
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 011630Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4813
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3666

CONTROL: 194Q
REC'D : MARCH 1, 1968
12:04PM

Rhetow

NODIS

SUBJ: SANSTORM

REF: STATE 122954 AND 122952

1. IN CONTACTS WITH HUSSEIN THROUGH WEST BANKERS THAT WE HAVE HEARD ABOUT (TEL AVIV 2590) AND ALSO IN PARA 1-D STATE 122952, IT IS NOT CLEAR JUST WHAT ASPECTS OF JERUSALEM PROBLEM ISRAELIS WOULD BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE. I NOTE, FOR EXAMPLE, WHAT ANWAR NUSEIBEH TOLD JERUSALEM CONGEN OFFICER ABOUT HIS CONVERSATION WITH PRIMIN ESHKOL (JERUSALEM 930) IS SOMWHAT AT VARIANCE WITH ROSIER VIEW IN STATE 122952.

2. I AM NOT SUGGESTING NECESSARILY THAT AT THIS STAGE WE

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3666A ~~SECRET~~
SHOULD PROBE ISRAELIS ON WHAT IS NEGOTIABLE ABOUT JERUSALEM ON OTHER HAND, THE WAY EBAN PUT IT TO HADOW MAKES IT SOUND AS IF ISRAEL IS PREPARED TO BE MORE GENEROUS EVEN ON JERUSALEM THAN WE HAD HERETOFORE EXPECTED. SYMMES

GP-3
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-207
By *llg*, NARA, Date *11-20-02*

~~SECRET~~

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ag list
Sander (5)
WH

251351

242

7 OCT 68 23 19z

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Origin
Info

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN
USUN NEW YORK
Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO

State 251351

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

NODIS/SANDSTORM

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION: CURRENT JORDANIAN ATTITUDES

1. On 6th Symmes discussed recent developments in Jarring mission with Zaid Rifai in London. Zaid, who is now hospitalized himself with heart condition, said that King Hussein had left Nuffield Nursing Home the previous day and was feeling fine. Hussein had asked Zaid to tell Symmes he had nothing to add to points made in their last conversation in Amman. King hoped USG realized that meetings in New York probably represent last chance to reach peaceful settlement. Alternative is increased Arab emphasis on resort to military measures. Hussein considers key element now needed is more active USG efforts to persuade Israelis to move toward an acceptable position.

2. In brief discussion of Secretary's meetings with FonMin Rifai and FonMin Riad, concerning which Zaid said he and the King had summary reports from Foreign Minister Rifai in New York, Zaid made the following points:

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-207
By *is*, NARA, Date 11-20-02

Drafted by: *hmd*
NEA/ARN:HMSymmes/gvl 10/7/68

Tel. Ext. 5617

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

NEA - Rodger P. Davies *RMD*

Clearances:

NEA/ARN - Mr. *Seelye*
S/S - Mr. Brown *KLW*
NEA/UAR:RBParker *RP*

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy AMMAN

~~SECRET~~

Classification

(a) UAR position as stated by Riad appears to Jordanians to be somewhat harder than position Nasser had taken with Jordanians in Cairo during King's latest visit. Nasser had still favored working toward a political settlement. ~~That position with regard to the relevance of the refusal of the Jordanian government to accept the Allon Plan and the possibility of a move in response to a Jordanian proposal to discuss any special arrangement in their talks with Jarring. Last year had had periodic discussions with the King and the resolution was back to progress in discussions with the King to a resolution.~~

(b) Jordan is "still ready to move alone if that becomes necessary".

(c) Foreign Minister Rifai has expressed optimism in his reports to the King in London. Hussein has requested the Foreign Minister to come to London on the 10th for discussions with him. Rifai would return to New York on Saturday.

(d) Zaid and the King are much less optimistic than Rifai because, as he put it, "the Israelis are still talking about the Allon Plan and have shown no give on Jerusalem".

(e) In their discussions with the King, Prime Minister Wilson and Foreign Minister Stewart had told Hussein they would try to persuade the United States to take a stronger line with Israel in an effort to try to move them off dead center in the coming days in New York.

GP-3.

KATZENBACH

ACTING

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
Classification

223184

A 243

17 Aug 68 20 56 Z

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV
Info: INFO: Amembassy AMMAN

SANDSTORM

STATE 223184

REF: STATE 223182

(90)

During conversation reported reftel Rabin referred to secret ~~private~~ talks with Jordanians. Rostow suggested these points that be deferred to meeting alone after conversation. In ~~private~~ talk, Rabin said that private contacts with Jordanians were continuing; that according to his information El Salt raid had not repeat not altered schedule of meetings; that a further meeting was scheduled for end of this month or early in September; that exchanges had revealed basis for possible agreement on most issues; but that two basic difficulties were Jerusalem and whether Hussein dared to move alone, assuming that meetings defined basis for agreement.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-207
By us, NARA, Date 11-20-02

END

RUSK

Drafted by: *ER* M:EVROS tow:jd 8/17/68 Tel. Ext. 5284 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: *ER* M - Eugene V. Rostow

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. O'Donohue *POD*

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Classification

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET-N DIS~~

Classification

223140

244

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

17 Aug 68 14 59z

GP

Origin
Info.

ACTION: AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

STATE 223140

NODIS

SANDSTORM

In Eban's discussions with Ball and Sisco, he said that GOI would give us clear-cut indication by end of July or early August as to what prospects were with respect to flirtation QTE Jordanian/~~EMERSON~~ UNQTE. You should see Eban and remind him of the above statement, and request a run-down on this matter ~~request a run-down on this matter~~ based on any direct disavowable contacts which may have occurred over the past weeks. (You will be receiving another telegram requesting you to approach Eban re GOI exchanges with Jordan through Jarring.)

END

GP-1

RUSK

NW/SR

Drafted by: IO:JJSisco/mtb Tel. Ext. 5241 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Under Secretary

Clearances: NEA Mr. Rockwell M - Mr. Rostow S/S Mr. Read

WAH 8
215

215397

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~ *mu*

Classification

5 Aug 68 22 45Z

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy TEL AVIV

Info:

INFO: Amembassy AMMAN

STATE 215397

NODIS SANDSTORM

REF: Amman 6029

1. We are requesting you in separate message to convey to GOI Jordanian comments contained Amman's 6014. Believe you should, (being repeated you) at same time, pass on Zaid Rifai's comments reported reftel/.

GP - 3

END

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8
NLJ-S 98301
By *af/ll*, NARA, Date *10/4/01*

Drafted by: IO:UNP:ARDay:cap 8/5/68

Tel. Ext. 5138

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: Under Secretary

Clearances:

IO - Mr. Sisco
S/S - Mr. *[Signature]* Walsh

NEA - Ambassador Battle
M - Mr. Rostow

[Signature]

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

SECRET-NODIS

Classification

W H 246
214812
5
3 AUG 68 16 49z
FOR CC/T USE ONLY

Origin
Info

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN

STATE 214812

NODIS-SANDSTORM

REF: AMMAN's 5985

We have for some time operated on assumption contacts of a disavowable character underway between Jordanians and Israelis. At periods we have been skeptical as to likely effectiveness these contacts and have at no time had complete knowledge their nature. Nevertheless, from our point of view we see no reason at present to probe Israelis further since they are obviously reluctant cut us in on specifics and possibly have good reason.

Moreover, Israelis have told us categorically they intend to give us a clearcut judgment in early August as to what the possibilities are for progress with the Jordanians as a result of any contacts they may have. You should not assume, though we do not have any specific knowledge, that GOI-GOJ contacts are necessarily limited to those which you have reported.]

Drafted by: NEA:LDBattle/ LB
IO:JJSisco: jmp

Tel. Ext. 5241

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

U - Mr. Katzenbach

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Walsh M - Mr. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.3
NLJ-S 98001

By MLL, NARA, Date 10/11/01

SECRET-NODIS

Classification

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Classification

We well aware dangers to King of any such contacts which may exist. We assume that both King (and perhaps his entourage) and certainly the Israelis equally aware dangers. Given Jarring efforts and current slight evidence movement under his mission, we see no reason for us at this juncture to probe, since it seems advantageous to our interest to let any such contacts proceed in their natural course. If they exist, they can only help Jarring Mission. You should indicate no repeat no knowledge or suspicion of such talks to other Ambassadors or to Jordanian officials including King Hussein. This message is for your guidance and information only. It is of the highest importance that our assumption on this subject not be known. If asked a question as you were by the Italian Ambassador you should continue to follow the line taken there, i.e., that we know nothing of such contacts and that we continue to ~~xxx~~ rely on Jarring Mission and our own diplomacy.

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

Classification

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247

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

6

1 MAY 68 83 59z

Origin ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN
 INFO: " TEL AVIV

Info: ~~AMMAN~~ Amembassy LONDON
 USUN

NODIS
 /SANDSTORM

Rostow

STATE 156687
FOR AMBASSADOR

In a private meeting, Ambassador Rabin told Under Secretary Rostow that he hoped to have something tangible to report about private talks with Hussein within a week. Thus far the contacts have been preliminary.

FYI. Rostow had suggested to Evron several weeks ago that we thought the time might be approaching for Israel to make secret contact with Hussein. In view of reports from Amman of Jordanian interest in such talks, and indications that there was motion on that front, we had been carefully studying your telegrams on the subject, and ~~preparing~~ considering various contingencies. ~~contingencies~~ We prefer to wait until asked before offering our good offices. END FYI

Drafted by: M:EVRostow:jd	5/1/68	Tel. Ext. 5284	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: M - Eugene V. Rostow
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Clearances:
S/S - Mr. Walsh

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

SANITIZED
Authority NLJ 15-41
By CTB, NARA, Date 7/31/18

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy AMMAN

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

3.4(b)(1) Rabin also gave Israeli evaluation of recent Cabinet changes in Jordan [REDACTED] In sum, Israelis believe King sought to dismiss Talhouni, who refused to resign. Cabinet changes stem from Hussein's backing down before Talhouni threat. ^{GOI} /MI reads changes as replacement of key officials loyal to King by men primarily connected with Talhouni.

END

RUCK

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

248

Nodis



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

249

RR RUEHCR
 DE RUQMKG 6242A 2321040
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 R 191039Z AUG 68
 FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6178
 STATE GRNC
 BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 6242

5 4 4 9 Q
 August 19, 1968
 8:09A

NODIS

REF: AMMAN 6066,

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

~~SUBJ: KING'S INTEREST IN US HAWK MISSILES~~

1. REPORTED KING HUSSEIN'S POTENTIAL INTEREST IN ACQUIRING HAWK MISSILES IN THE EVENT THE US DECIDES TO SUPPLY PHANTOM AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL. ALTHOUGH HIS STATEMENTS WERE MADE IN THE IMMEDIATE EMOTIONAL AFTERMATH OF THE SALT RAID, THERE ARE OTHER SIGNS THAT PRESSURES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE HAVE GROWN SINCE THE RAID OF AUGUST 4. FOR EXAMPLE, FATAH HAS UNDERTAKEN A CAMPAIGN TO RAISE MONEY FOR ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS, PRESUMABLY TO BE ABLE TO CLAIM THAT THEY, UNLIKE THE KING, ARE TAKING STEPS TO DEFEND THE CIVILIAN POPULATION AGAINST AIR RAIDS. IN ADDITION, FATAH HAS CIRCULATED RECOMMENDATIONS TO CIVILIANS IN AREAS WHERE FATAH FEDAYEEN ARE HEADQUARTERED TO DIG TRENCHES AND CONSTRUCT BOMB SHELTERS, PROBABLY WITH THE AID OF ACHIEVING GREATER IDENTIFICATION BETWEEN FATAH AND CIVILIANS. MOREOVER, WE HAVE HEARD RESPONSIBLE JORDANIANS SAYING THAT SINCE IT WILL BE SOME TIME BEFORE JORDAN COULD DEVELOP THE AIRCRAFT COMPONENT OF AIR DEFENSE, THEY SHOULD MEANWHILE IMPROVE ANTI-AIRCRAFT CAPABILITIES. AS THE DEPT WILL RECALL, THIS EMPHASIS ON ANTI-AIRCRAFT CAPABILITY ALSO EMERGED DURING THE TALKS LEADING UP TO THE MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING OF MARCH 28, 1968. 3.3(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ / RAC 15-36

By UCH NARA, Date 05-13-2015

~~SECRET~~

Page 2 Amman 6242

Control 54490

2. EMBASSY PERSONNEL IN AMMAN HAVE UNCLEAR RECOLLECTION THAT IN CONNECTION WITH THE ORIGINAL SALE OF HAWKS TO ISRAEL WE MADE STATEMENTS OF WILLINGNESS IN PRINCIPLE TO CONSIDER SUPPLYING HAWKS AS AN ENTIRELY DEFENSIVE WEAPON TO CERTAIN ARAB STATES AS WELL AS TO ISRAEL. DURING VARIOUS MILITARY SALES DISCUSSIONS WITH THE JORDANIANS OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS, WE RECALL THAT THEY WERE ENCOURAGED TO CONSIDER THE USE OF HAWKS RATHER THAN RELYING ON EXPANDED OR MODERNIZED AIR FORCE. MEANWHILE, WE HAVE AGREED TO SELL HAWKS TO SAUDI ARABIA.

3. WE RECOGNIZE THE AREA SITUATION HAS CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY, PARTICULARLY SINCE JUNE 1967. WE ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THE HAWK MISSILE IS A COMPLICATED AND EXPENSIVE WEAPON SYSTEM. NEVERTHELESS, IT WILL BE MOST IMPORTANT TO HAVE DEVELOPED ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS WHAT WE WILL SAY TO THE KING IF AND WHEN HE COMES TO US WITH A REQUEST FOR HAWKS. I THEREFORE REQUEST (A) WE SEARCH THE RECORD AS TO WHAT WE MAY HAVE SAID IN THE PAST TO THE KING AND OTHER JORDANIANS ABOUT US WILLINGNESS IN PRINCIPLE TO CONSIDER SUPPLYING HAWKS TO JORDAN, AND (B) WE URGENTLY EXAMINE THE FISCAL, LOGISTICAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS INVOLVED IN SUPPLYING HAWKS TO JORDAN, BOTH WITH OR IN THE ABSENCE OF A DECISION TO SUPPLY PHANTOMS TO ISRAEL.

4. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR US TO HAVE OUR DUCKS IN A ROW SO THAT WHEN AND IF THE KING FOLLOWS UP HIS REPORTED INTEREST, WE WILL BE ABLE TO RESPOND IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO APPEAR TO BE DISCRIMINATING AGAINST JORDAN AND THEREBY INVITING OUR OPPONENTS TO PRESS FOR SOVIET SAMS. WE WOULD ANTICIPATE THAT SHORT OF A REQUEST FOR HAWKS WE MAY BE PRESSED FOR ADDITIONAL 40 MM OR OTHER ANTI-AIRCRAFT IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WE THEREFORE REQUEST CONSIDERATION ALSO BE GIVEN AS TO HOW WE WILL RESPOND TO THIS POTENTIAL REQUEST. SYMMES

GP-1

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~~SECRET~~



Department of State

WS 5
TELEGRAM
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SECRET

4 6 3 1 Q
1968 JUL 17 PM 12 32

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMG 5775A 1991600
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 171550Z JUL 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5961
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 5775

Rdhow

NODIS

SUBJ: SYRIAN INTEREST IN U.S. ARMS

1. IN CONVERSATION WITH DCM REPORTED AMMAN 5739 AND 5764 KHAMMASH SAID SYRIAN CHIEF OF STAFF TALAS EXPRESSED INTEREST IN PURCHASING CERTAIN AMERICAN EQUIPMENT INCLUDING M-113 APC'S, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, 106 MM RECOILLESS RIFLES AND THE M-42 TWIN 40MM AAA SP GUN. RECOILLESS RIFLES WERE FIRST PRIORITY. THE IMMEDIATE INTEREST WAS STIMULATED BY WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENTS DISPLAY FOLLOWING JOINT EXERCISE REPORTED AMMAN 4764. TALAS ASKED IF KHAMMASH COULD ASSIST IN ARRANGING SALE.

2. KHAMMASH SAID HE WAS PASSING THIS ON TO HIS AMERICAN FRIENDS AND IT WAS UP TO THEM WHETHER THEY WANTED TO FOLLOW UP. HE THOUGHT THE DEVELOPMENT WAS INTERESTING TO SAY THE LEAST. THE DCM ACKNOWLEDGED IT WAS INTERESTING BUT OTHERWISE LIMITED COMMENT TO AN INDICATION HE WOULD REPORT THE DEVELOPMENT.

SYMMES
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Department of State TELEGRAM

WH 9

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4 5 5 9 Q

1968 JUL 17 AM 7 56

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 5757A 1990750
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 170737Z JUL 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5949
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 5757

Ref how

NODIS

SUBJECT: 155MM GUNS FOR JORDAN

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, # 216
By g NARA, Date 9-2001

1. SPEAKING "OFF-THE-RECORD" ON SIXTEENTH, ZAID RIFAI READ TO ME FROM A LETTER SENT TO KING HUSSEIN BY "A BRITISH PERSON." THE WRITER STATED THAT HIS FIRM HAD BEEN ABLE TO LOCATE SEVENTY 155 MM LONG TOM GUNS WHICH WERE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE. SHORTLY AFTER FINDING THESE 70 GUNS, HOWEVER, THE "SOURCE OF SUPPLY" HAD INFORMED THE WRITER OF THE LETTER THAT THE GUNS HAD ORIGINALLY COME FROM THE U.S. SOURCE ALLEGED THE AMERICAN AUTHORITIES HAD LEARNED OF JORDANIAN INTEREST IN THEM AND HAD TAKEN STEPS TO INSURE THAT THEY COULD NOT BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR SALE TO JORDAN. THE WRITER STATED THAT HE REGRETTED THAT PARTICULAR SOURCE WAS NO LONGER AVAILABLE BUT THAT HE WAS FOLLOWING UP CERTAIN OTHER SOURCES (ZAID IMPLIED THE OTHER SOURCE WAS TURKEY) AND THAT HE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO FIND 20 OR 25 GUNS FOR JORDAN.

2. ACCORDING TO ZAID, KING HUSSEIN IS FURIOUS ABOUT THE INDICATION THAT THE USG HAS TAKEN STEPS TO CUT OFF ALL POSSIBLE SOURCES OF 155 MM GUNS FOR JORDAN. THE KING HAS BEEN MAKING NOISES THAT HE WILL ACCEPT IRAQI OFFERS TO SUPPLY NEW 122 (POSSIBLY 130) MM GUNS FROM THE SOVIET UNION AS A "GIFT." ZAID SAID QUITE A "HEAD OF STEAM" HAS BUILT UP ON THIS MATTER AND THAT BOTH KING HUSSEIN AND GENERAL KHAMMASH ARE DETERMINED THAT THEY MUST AT LEAST MAKE UP THEIR LOSSES IN THIS CATEGORY OF WEAPONRY. HE SAID THE KING AND KHAMMASH ARE PARTICULARLY UPSET THAT USG OFFICIALS ON THE ONE HAND HAVE BEEN IMPLYING THAT 155 MM GUNS ARE NOT AVAILABLE BECAUSE THEY CANNOT BE LOCATED, WHEREAS, IN FACT, THE USG SEEMS TO HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO MAKE THEM "UNAVAILABLE."

3. ZAID INDICATED THE JAA CURRENTLY HAS EIGHT 155 MM GUNS OPERATIONAL. THIS AGREES WITH INDICATION GIVEN DATT JULY 16 BY COMMANDING GEN 2ND DIV.

SYMMES
BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

WA
252 7
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PP RUEHC
DE RUQMG 5449A 1741220
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 221219Z JUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN - CORRECTED COPY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5813
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 5449

5 8 4 4Q
1968 JUN 22 9:36 A.M.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-207
By us, NARA, Date 11-20-02

NODIS

1. FONMIN ABDUL NUMIM RIFAI ON 20 JUNE GAVE EMBOFF FOLLOWING RUNDOWN OF DEVELOPMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH JARRING MISSION. JORDAN PERMANENT REP TO UN, MOHAMMAD AL-FARRA, REPORTED SEVERAL DAYS AGO THAT SOVIET UN DELEGATE KUZNETSOV HAD INDICATED TO AL-FARCA THAT JARRING MISSION EFFORTS SHOULD PROBABLY BE REFERRED TO SECURITY COUNCIL AT END OF JULY ON GROUND NO PROGRESS BEING MADE. AL-FARRA SAID ARAB DELEGATIONS ALSO INCLINED SUPPORT REFERRAL TO SECURITY COUNCIL AT END OF JULY. RIFAI SAID HE HAD RECEIVED WORD FROM UAR FONMIN MAHMUD RIYAD THAT HE ALSO FAVORED THIS COURSE OF ACTION.

2. RIFAI SAID GOJ OPPOSED TO SC REFERRAL SINCE SCOPE AND DIMENSIONS OF THIS ACTION BEYOND ANYONE'S CAPABILITY TO PREDICT AND RESULTS FAR MORE LIKELY TO BE NEGATIVE THAN POSITIVE AND COULD IN FACT BE DIASTROUS. RIFAI HAS COMMUNICATED THESE VIEWS TO AL-FARRA AND TO RIYAD TOGETHER WITH SUGGESTION THAT PRESSURE ON JARRING BE INCREASED DURING COMING WEEKS TO SHOW SOME PROGRESS IN ORDER CARRY MISSION ON UNTIL FOREIGN MINISTERS CONVENE IN NEW YORK AT NEXT GA SESSION IN SEPTEMBER. RIFAI WOULD HOPE AT THAT TIME SOME SIGNIFICANT STEPS FORWARD COULD BE TAKEN. IF JARRING CONTINUES SHOW NO PROGRESS AND PRESSURE BUILDS FOR ALTERNATIVE ACTION, RIFAI URGES THAT BIG-FOUR POWER CONSULTATIONS AND JOINT PRESSURE BY THEM ON JARRING THROUGH U THANT FAR PREFERABLE TO RETURNING TO SC FOR UNPRODUCTIVE DEBATES. HE HAS PASSED THESE VIEWS WITH KING'S APPROVAL TO UAR, ARAB DELEGATIONS AT UN, AND TO SYRIANS WHO RECENTLY QUERIED GOJ ON STATUS JARRING MISSION. RIFAI BELIEVES THIS STRATEGY WILL CIRCUMVENT SC MEETING.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- AMMAN 5449, JUNE 22

3. TO FACILITATE THESE EFFORTS RIFAI WILL MEET JARRING AT HIS REQUEST IN LONDON DURING SECOND WEEK OF JULY. JARRING WILL ALSO MEET RIYAD IN STOCKHOLM PROBABLY DURING FIRST WEEK JULY. BOTH WILL PRESS JARRING VERY HARD TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO MAKE MUTUAL ACCEPTANCE OF SC RESOLUTION A MATTER OF PUBLIC RECORD AND TO GET TALKS STARTED ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. IF THIS CAN BE DONE, RIFAI SEES NO GREAT DIFFICULTY IN GETTING RHODES TYPE MEETINGS UNDERWAY WHEN FOREIGN MINISTERS MEET IN NEW YORK.

4. IN DISCUSSING JARRING MISSION KING HUSSEIN TOLD EMBOFF ON 21 JUNE THAT RIFAI WOULD STOP OFF IN CAIRO AFTER HIS MEETING WITH JARRING IN LONDON IN EFFORT TO PERSUADE NASSER TO AGREE TO MEET ISRAELIS WITH JARRING. HOWEVER, KING SAID, EVEN IF NASSER REFUSES, JORDAN IS PREPARED TO MEET ISRAELIS ALONE UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES IF THERE ANY REAL PROSPECT HIS WOULD FACILITATE ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT.

5. UNLESS DEPT BELIEVES NECESSARY, SUGGEST FOREGOING, PARTICULARLY PARA FOUR, NOT RPT NOT BE SIDELY DISSEMINATED AT THIS TIME. SYMMES
BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

253 (6)
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PP RUEHCR
DE RUQMKG 4855A 1361215
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 151205Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5524
STATE GRNC

3557Q

1968 MAY 15 AM 10:46

BT

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4855

NODIS

Sandstorm

REF: STATE 164162

Restow
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-207
By us NARA, Date 11-20-02

1. AS REPORTED AMMAN 4266 (NODIS), HIKMAT AL MASRI BROUGHT MESSAGE FROM EBAN TO KING IN EARLY APRIL. AL-MASRI WENT FROM AMMAN TO BEIRUT FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT AND DID NOT REACH CAIRO UNTIL LATE APRIL OR EARLY MAY, AT WHICH TIME HE MET WITH NASSER (AMMAN 4675, NODIS). AL-MASRI RETURNED TO WEST BANK VIA AMMAN FROM CAIRO ON OR ABOUT MAY 6: WE WERE UNABLE TO MAKE CONTACT WITH HIM BEFORE HIS RETURN. IN ANY EVENT, GENERAL NATURE OF HIS CONTACTS WITH ISRAELIS, UAR AND GOJ BECAME FAIRLY WIDELY KNOWN IN UPPER LEVELS GOJ DURING PAST FEW WEEKS. WE ALSO NOTE ISRAELI JERUSALEM POST OF EARLY LAST WEEK REPORTED AL MASRI'S MEETINGS IN CAIRO AND AMMAN WITH COMMENT ISRAELI AUTHORITIES WERE KEENLY AWAITING HIS RETURN.

2. BEYOND AL MASRI'S MISSION WE HAVE NOTHING TO UK TO WHAT WE REPORTED IN AMMAN 4634.

3. UNLESS THERE ARE MORE SUBSTANTIVE JORDANIAN REACTIONS OR EXCHANGES THAN ANY OF WHICH WE ARE AWARE, WE FRANKLY BELIEVE THE ISRAELIS ARE EXAGGERATING IMPORTANCE OF THESE EFFORTS (STATE 164162). THE GOJ IS CONVINCED, AND WE CONCUR, THAT IT NEEDS THE UMBRELLA OF THE UN RESOLUTION, THE JARRING MISSION AND SOME SORT OF AT LEAST TOKEN UAR PARTICIPATION IN ANY DEALINGS WITH ISRAEL AND IS LIKELY TO ABANDON THAT ROUTE ONLY IN EXTREMIS. AS STATED IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE TODAY (AMMAN 4840), WE BELIEVE THAT JORDANIANS HAVE RECENTLY BECOME MORE NERVOUS OVER ISSUE OF JOINT MEETINGS WITH ISRAELIS.

. DEPT MAY WISH CONVEY SUBSTANCE FOREGOING TO TEL AVIV AND AMB GOLDBERG.

GP-1. SYMMES
BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State TELEGRAM

#5

254

~~SECRET~~

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 4675A 1241330
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 041329Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5437
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4675

CONTROL: 914Q
REC'D : MAY 4, 1968
9:46AM

Rollow

NODIS/NOFORN

REF: AMMAN 4266

SUBJ: ARAB-ISRAEL: EBAN MESSAGE

IN MAY 4 MEETING WITH PRIMIN TALHOUNI, HE INFORMED ME THAT HIKMAT AL-MASRI WAS IN CAIRO AT SAME TIME AS TALHOUNI THIS WEEK AND HAD ALSO SEE MASSER (BUT NOT TOGETHER WITH TALHOUNI). ACCORDING PRIMIN, UAR OFFICIALS HAD TAKEN VERY DIM VIEW OF ISRAELI ATTITUDES AS CONVEYED BY AL-MASRI. SYMMES

GP-1
BT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 96001
By ag/ll, NARA, Date 01/10/01



Department of State

WH #7
255
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 3358Q
RECEIVED: April 12, 1968
2:39 p.m.

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 4354A 1031905
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 121855Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5246
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4354

NODIS

REF: STATE 145603

NEITHER KING NOR ZAYD AL-RIFAI HAS AGAIN RAISED SUBSTANCE REFTTEL WITH US. MASRI IS STILL IN AMMAN AND HAS TOLD US HE DOES NOT PLAN VISIT CAIRO FOR AT LEAST ANOTHER WEEK. IN VIEW ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS IN JARRING MISSION (SEE AMMAN 4352), I SUSPECT JORDANIANS WILL LET THIS ONE RIDE AT LEAST UNTIL THEY SEE HOW THE UAR REACTS TO LATEST JARRING DEVELOPMENTS.

GP-1 SYMMES

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001
By ag/ll, NARA, Date 10/10/01

~~SECRET~~

#7
W4
12/23
TELEGRAM

Department of State



~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 33280
RECEIVED: April 12, 1968
2:00 p.m.

RECEIVED
RUSTOW'S OFFICE

1968 APR 12 PM 6 30

BY STATE GRRC
TO LEGATE WASHDC 2546
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
R 181835Z APR 68
LNY 0808Z LTN
DE RUEKND 4324 102190Z
BT

0012

REF: STATE 142803

THEY SEE HOW THE UAR REACTS TO LATEST JARRING DEVELOPMENTS.
I SUSPECT JORDANIANS WILL LET THIS ONE RISE AT LEAST UNTIL
ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS IN JARRING MISSION (SEE AMMAN 4324)
DOES NOT PLAN VISIT CAIRO FOR AT LEAST ANOTHER WEEK. IN VIEW
HOTEL WITH SA. NABSI IS STILL IN AMMAN AND HAS TOLD US HE
NEITHER KING NOR SAUD AL-RIFAI HAS AGAIN RAISED SUBSTANCE

CF-1 - 5/1/68

~~SECRET~~

BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT
FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
APR 12 1968



Department of State

TELEGRAM ²⁵⁶~~SECRET~~

W/d

Rhetow

OO RUEHC
 DE RUQMKG 4321A 1021155 2927Q
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 O 111140Z APR 68 ZFF-4 1968 APR 11 AM 7 37
 FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5232
 STATE GRNC
 BT

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4321

NODIS

REF: STATE 144444, 144870, CAIRO 2085, EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

DELIVER ACTION OFFICER OPENING BUSINESS APRIL 11.

1. WE ANTICIPATED DEPT WOULD HAVE RESERVATIONS REGARDING ANY WRITTEN STATEMENT TO BE GIVEN TO JORDANIANS BUT ARE UNSURE WHETHER STATE 144444 WAS TRANSMITTED PRIOR TO RECEIPT AMMAN 4302 AND 4308. LATTER FORWARDED RIFAI'S SUGGESTED TEXT. WE CONSIDER WHICH FORWARDS THE VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT OF MEETINGS ON 6 AND 7 APRIL IN CAIRO BETWEEN HUSSEIN AND NASSER, HELPS PUT GENESIS OF JORDANIAN REQUEST FOR WRITTEN TEXT INTO BETTER PERSPECTIVE. IN OUR VIEW, READING OF THIS LENGTHY DOCUMENT WILL PROVIDE VERY REVEALING CLARIFICATION OF HUSSEIN'S AND NASSER'S RESPECTIVE POSITIONS.

3.3(b)(1)

2. FROM AMMAN IT APPEARS THAT AT THIS JUNCTURE IN JARRING MISSION THE ALTERNATIVES ARE BLACK AND WHITE. TO SAVE THE MISSION EITHER ISRAEL HAS GOT TO GIVE JARRING WHAT HE WILL NEED TO SECURE FORWARD MOVEMENT OR WE HAVE GOT TO GIVE THE JORDANIANS WHAT THEY SAY THEY NEED IN FORM OF A LETTER WHICH THEY MAY SHOW TO UAR. UNQUESTIONABLY, IT WOULD BE INFINEITELY PREFERABLE IF ISRAELIS CAN BE BROUGHT TO ACT AS URGED BY STATE 144983.

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 15-36

By Uud

NARA, Date 05-13-2015

~~SECRET~~

-2-, AMMAN 4321, APRIL 11

3. WE MUST RECOGNIZE POSSIBILITY, HOWEVER, THAT WHEN JARRING COMES TO AMMAN TOMORROW HE MAY NOT BRING WITH HIM AFFIRMATION FROM GOI WHICH WILL ALLAY JORDANIAN AND UAR DOUBTS SUFFICIENTLY TOWOIT THEM TO MOVE FORWARD TO TALKS.. IN THIS EVENT IF WE ARE UNABLE TO PRESENT STATEMENT AS OUTLINED AMMAN 4308 PARA 3 MESSAGE WILL COME THROUGH TO GOJ LOUND AND CLEAR THAT USG DOES NOT BELIEVE ISRAEL INTENDS IMPLEMENT SC RESOLUTION AND, PERHAPS EVEN WORSE, THAT WE DO NOT THINK ISRAEL SHOULD HAVE TO DO SO.

4. WE MUST ALSO KEEP IN MIND THAT UAR IS INDIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THIS PARTICULAR DIALOGUE AND IS BETTING, AS BERGUS HAS REPORTED, THE USG WILL NOT RPT NOT GIVE JORDANIANS WRITTEN INTERPRETATION ALONG LINES SUGGESTED BY JARRING (PARA 17 CAIRO 2085). CAIRO SAYS IT IS DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS THAT NEITHER ISRAEL NOR USG EXPECTS THERE WILL BE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION (PARA 6, CAIRO 2085).

5. WE BELIEVE USC MUST TAKE EXTRAORDINARY CARE AT THIS JUNCTURE. IF WE ARE UNABLE TO BRING THE ISRAELIS TO PRODUCE AND OURSELVES REFUSE TO GIVE AN UNAMBIGUOUS UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT, WE WILL GET THE WORST OF ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS. OUR CONTACTS WITH JORDANIANS CONFIRM WHAT JARRING IS QUOTED AS HAVING SAID TO RIAD THAT IN FUTURE HE WILL DOT THE I'S (PARA 3 CAIRO 2085). WE HAVE EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE JARRING WILL REPORT HIS FAILURE AS LARGELY DUE TO ISRAELI EQUIVOCATION. IF HE DOES NOT DO SO WHEN HIS REPORT IS PUBLISHED, WE SUSPECT ARABS WILL FORCE PUBLIC DEBATE ON HIS REPORT IN SC AND USE THAT TECHNIQUE TO ELICIT SUCH STATEMENT FROM HIM.



3.3(b)(1)

GP-1

SYMMES

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET-NODIS~~

April 9, 1968

257

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Comment on Amman 4266

It's hard to know exactly what to make of the attached secret message from Eban to Hussein and Nasser. We can't even be sure that this third-hand account is completely accurate. The substance of the Israeli position as reported contains nothing new. The interesting aspect is the fact that they seem to be putting on some pressure now.

Whatever else one reads into it, it's an ultimatum--direct negotiations now or we'll attack--softened somewhat by the line that the politicians may be losing control in Israel and this may be the Arabs' last chance for some time to get the kind of forthcoming deal Eban can offer.

Why should Eban apply the pressure now? From other Israelis we have the impression that they'd rather sit until the Arabs come to them. Possible explanations:

1. There is a serious debate going on over how to stop terrorism, and Eban and other moderates may have bought enough time from the hard-liners to give negotiations one final try. Eban probably does feel it would be disastrous for Israel's hard-liners to gain the upper hand, but if he can't stop terrorism the peaceful way he may not be able to hold out against those who urge the military solution. While it sounds quite uncharacteristic for Eban to admit that terrorism is having an unsettling effect in Israel, he is still speaking from a position of strength since the alternative he poses is further use of force.

2. The situation may not be so neat as that described above, and this may be just one of several simultaneous attempts to explore a new tack. We know they are considering such things as seizing part of the East Bank, working directly against Nasser and Hussein, an \$80 million fence on the Jordan, dealing directly with the Palestinians, and a wide variety of military answers to terrorism, three of which have been tried in the past month. It would not be surprising if they were to make diplomatic use of these to try to precipitate negotiations. They'd have nothing to lose, except that an ultimatum of this sort may do more harm than good if poorly presented.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET-NODIS~~

Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, # 139
By g NARA, Dsec 9-20-01

3. Or they may be afraid of us and this may be their way of pressing the Arabs to talk on their terms before we push them to change their terms. They're alert enough to know by now that a lot of people here are beginning to talk about "partial solutions" and "last chance for peace." They also know that American public opinion against our "pro-Israeli" policy is slowly coming to life.

Except for the insight it provides if other evidence fills out the picture, there's no immediate operational aspect to this message.


John Foster


Hal Saunders



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PP RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 4266A 0991900
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 081659Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4266

MODIS/NOFORN

SUBJ: ARAB-ISRAELI EBAN MESSAGE

1. ZAID RIFAI, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE KING, INFORMED ME AND EMOFF IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE APR 8 OF MESSAGE WHICH HIKMAT AL-MASRI HAD JUST BROUGHT FROM ABBA EBAN TO KING HUSSEIN AND GAMAL ABDUL NASSER.

2. SASSOON OF THE ISRAELI FONMIN APPROACHED AL-MASRI LAST WEEK TO ARRANGE PRIVATE MEETING WITH ABBA EBAN WHO, SASSOON SAID, HAD A MESSAGE FOR KING THSSEIN'S AND NASSER'S EARS ONLY. THE MEETING WAS HELD ON APR 4. THE FOLLOWING IS BASED ON THE NOTES AL-MASRI TOOK DURING EBAN'S ORAL PRESENTATION.

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4266A-~~SECRET~~

3. QUOTE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE FOR ISRAEL TO REACH A SETTLEMENT WITH THE ARABS OVER AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME BUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE FEDAYEEN NOW MAKE IT IMPERATIVE THAT A SETTLEMENT BE REACHED QUICKLY. IF A SETTLEMENT IS NOT REACHED DURING THE MONTH OF APRIL, ISRAEL WILL HAVE TO RESORT TO USE OF FORCE. THE POLITICIANS ARE LOSING CONTROL IN ISRAEL AND IF THERE IS NO PEACE BY THE END OF THIS MONTH, THE IDF WILL GAIN THE UPPER HAND. THE ONLY WAY TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT IS THROUGH DIRECT ARAB-ISRAEL CONTACT. ISRAEL DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THE NEGATIVE ARAB POSITION ON CONTACT. EVEN IN VIET-NAM THERE ARE NOW CONTACTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

4. QUOTE THE ARABS SEEM TO THINK THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT MAKE CONCESSIONS DURING NEGOTIATIONS. ISRAEL WANTS TO ASSURE THE KING (AND NASSER) THAT SHE IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS BORDER AND SECURITY MATTERS IN A POSITIVE MANNER IF CONTACTS TAKE PLACE, IN SPITE OF INTERNAL IDF PRESSURES. THE PROBLEMS WITH THE UAR ARE SECURITY AND NAVIGATION. THE PROBLEMS WITH JORDAN ARE MORE COMPLEX BECAUSE THEY CONCERN REGIONAL (TERRITORIAL) ISSUES. SHARM EL-SHEIKH CAN BE SOLVED WITHOUT GREAT DIFFICULTY BECAUSE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 02-207

By us NARA, Date 11-21-02

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-2- AMMAN 4266, April 8, 1968, (NODIS)

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 4266A ~~SECRET~~

THERE ARE ALREADY MANY WORLD PRECEDENTS FOR THIS PROBLEM. IF THERE IS TO BE PEACE, JORDAN MUST BE PREPARED TO AGREE ON INTERNATIONAL BORDERS, SECURITY, DEFENSE, SOVEREIGNTY, REGIONAL CONTACTS AND THE DEMILITARIZATION OF CERTAIN AREAS. IF THIS IS DONE, IT WILL BE A BEGINNING POINT WHICH WILL ALLOW ISRAEL TO RETURN CERTAIN AREAS TO JORDANIAN SOVEREIGNTY.

5. QUOTE EBAN SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO ASSURE THE KING THAT SINCE ISRAEL IS INTERESTED IN A PURELY ISRAELI SOCIETY SHE DOES NOT ENVISAGE ANY EXPANSION. THE ONLY WAY ANYONE'S INTENTIONS REGARDING PEACE AND MODERATION CAN BE DISCOVERED IS THROUGH NEGOTIATION. ISRAEL WILL DELIVER ARAB LANDS TO YOU BY HAND, NOT BY MAIL, AS NASSER WANTS. THE TIME ELEMENT IS DECISIVE. WE MUST PROGRESS DURING NEGOTIATIONS WITH JARRING DURING APRIL AND WE MUST DISCUSS PEACE NOT SEMANTICS. ISRAEL HAS ACCEPTED JARRING'S PROPOSAL BUT MAHMOUD RIAD HAS REFUSED IT. IF ISRAEL SAYS SHE IS WILLING TO AGREE TO IMPLEMENT THE UN RESOLUTION, WILL THE ARABS DO THE SAME? WILL THE ARABS AGREE TO MEET UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES TO IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTION, KEEPING IN

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 4266A ~~SECRET~~

MIND THE RESOLUTION CALLS FOR AGREEMENT, NOT IMPLEMENTATION?

6. QTE AS FOR JERUSALEM, IT IS NOT REASONABLE FOR US TO IGNORE THE INTEREST OF JORDAN IN THE MUSLIM HOLY PLACES. SO WE ARE PREPARED TO DEVISE A STATUS BY WHICH JORDAN CAN PRESERVE FOR ITSELF THE DOME OF THE ROCK AND POSSIBLY TO RAISE THE JORDANIAN FLAG IN THE MUSLIM HOLY PLACES. THE CHRISTIAN HOLY PLACES HAVE A STATUS WHICH DOES NOT CONCERN JORDAN BUT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL WE ALLOW THE CITY OF JERUSALEM TO BE DIVIDED AGAIN. UNQTE

7. AS AN ASIDE EBAN ASKED AL-MASRI TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE KING WAS STILL IN CONTROL IN JORDAN, ADDING THAT IF HE WAS NOT, " WE PLAN TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT."

8. EBAN WAS VERY ANXIOUS THAT AL-MASRI DELIVER THE MESSAGE TO HUSSEIN BEFORE THE LATTER'S DEPARTURE FOR CAIRO ON APRIL 6. ON APRIL 5 SASSOON CONTACTED ANWAR NUSEIBEH TO DETERMINE WHETHER AL-MASRI HAD LEFT FOR AMMAN AND TO URGE HIM TO DO SO IMMEDIATELY IF HE HAD NOT ALREADY LEFT. NUSEIBEH PASSED

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 4266A ~~SECRET~~

THIS MESSAGE TO AL-MASRI WHO TOLD NUSEIBEH TO TELL SASSOON

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PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-3- AMMAN 4266, April 8, 1968, (NODIS)

THAT HE COULD NOT LEAVE ON THE FIFTH AND THAT " HE DID NOT FEEL THERE WAS ANYTHING IMPORTANT ENOUGH IN EBAN'S MESSAGE FOR HIM TO HURRY TO DELIVER IT".

9. MASRI HAS NOW LEFT FOR CAIRO TO SEE NASSER AND IS TO RETURN TO JORDAN BEFORE RETURNING TO JERUSALEM TO SEE EBAN. KING HUSSEIN IS STILL CONSIDERING HOW HE WILL REPLY.

10. ZAID STRESSED THAT FOREGOING HAD BEEN PASSED ON FOR PURPOSE KEEPING US IN PICTURE AND THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD IT BE DISCUSSED BY ANY US OFFICIALS WITH ISRAELIS, OR ANYONE OUTSIDE SMALL CIRCLE HIGH US OFFICIALS ON NEED-TO KNOW-BASIS. ONLY KING, PRIMIN TALHOUNI, GNERAL KHAMMASH AND ZAID ON JORDAN SIDE ARE AWARE OF MASRI MESSAGE. SYMMES
GP-1
BT

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY



Department of State

258 4
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

Rastow

PP RUEHC
DE RUQMG 4266A 0991900
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 081859Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
STATE GRNC
BT

2 0 8 1 Q

1968 APR 8 PM 2 59

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4266

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-207
By us NARA, Date 11-20-02

NODIS/NOFORN

SUBJ: ARAB-ISRAELI EBAN MESSAGE

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PAGE 2 RUQMG 4266A ~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

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-2- AMMAN 4266, April 8, 1968, (NODIS)

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 4266A ~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 4 RUQMKG 4266A ~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 5 RUQMKG 4266A ~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- AMMAN 4266, April 8, 1968, (NODIS)

THAT HE COULD NOT LEAVE ON THE FIFTH AND THAT " HE DID NOT FEEL THERE WAS ANYTHING IMPORTANT ENOUGH IN EBAN'S MESSAGE FOR HIM TO HURRY TO DELIVER IT".

9. MASRI HAS NOW LEFT FOR CAIRO TO SEE NASSER AND IS TO RETURN TO JORDAN BEFORE RETURNING TO JERUSALEM TO SEE EBAN. KING HUSSEIN IS STILL CONSIDERING HOW HE WILL REPLY.

10. ZAID STRESSED THAT FOREGOING HAD BEEN PASSED ON FOR PURPOSE KEEPING US IN PICTURE AND THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD IT BE DISCUSSED BY ANY US OFFICIALS WITH ISRAELIS, OR ANYONE OUTSIDE SMALL CIRCLE HIGH US OFFICIALS ON NEED-TO KNOW-BASIS. ONLY KING, PRIMIN TALHOUNI, GNERAL KHAMMASH AND ZAID ON JORDAN SIDE ARE AWARE OF MASRI MESSAGE. SYMMES

GP-1
BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

7
TELEGRAM

259

~~SECRET~~

PP RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 4098A 0891600
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 291545Z MAR 63
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5088
STATE GRNC
BT

CN: 7688Q
MAR 29 AM 11:08

R. Stow

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4098

NODIS

SUBJ: CARBINES FOR PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM

REF: STATE 119313

1. SIGNATURE ON MAR 28 OF MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON JORDAN ARMS PACKAGE REMOVED OBSTACLE PER REFTTEL TO APPROVAL CARBINES, REVOLVERS, AND RELATED AMMUNITION AND SPARES FOR PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM. REJUSTIFICATIONS AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ONLY RECENTLY REQUESTED BY AID/W IN STATE 126458 WAS SUBMITTED IN AMMAN 3833 AND 3982. I EARNESTLY HOPE WE CAN BE ADVISED SOONEST OF APPROVAL OF THIS SUPPLY AND THAT URGENT ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE FOR AIRLIFT. PLEASE ADVISE.

SYMMES
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 02-235
By ms, NARA, Date 9-13-04

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

260
7

OO RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 4081A 0891050
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 291040Z MAR 68 ZEF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5077
STATE GRNC
BT

CONTROL : 7622Q
RECEIVED : March 29, 1968
6:13A.M.

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4081

NODIS

REF: AMMAN 4058, TEL AVIV 3092

SUBJ: POSSIBLE ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACK AGAINST JORDAN

• IN VIEW TEL AVIV 3092 WISH RENEW RECOMMENDATION PARA TWO AMMAN 4058.

GP-1

SYMMES

BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001

By 16/ll, NARA, Date 10/14/01

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

7
TELEGRAM

261

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 6709Q
RECD: MARCH 26, 1968
10:38 A.M.

PP RUENC
DE RUQMKG 4031A 0861445
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 261430Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5043
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4031

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001
By ag/m, NARA, Date 10/14/01

Raplow

NODIS

SUBJ: POSSIBLE FURTHER ISRAELI MILITARY ACTION
AGAINST JORDAN.

REF: AMMAN 3911

1. GENERAL KHAMMASH TOLD EMBOFF TODAY THAT ISRAELI CONCENTRATIONS IN BEIT SHEAN AREA HAVE NOT RPT NOT BEEN REDUCED SINCE MARCH 21 ACTION. HE SAID THAT IN VIEW ISRAELI CONTINUED THREATENING PUBLIC STATEMENTS, AS WELL AS REPORTS OF INCIDENTS IN THAT AREA, THE JORDANIANS FULLY EXPECT A FURTHER MAJOR MILITARY

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4031A ~~SECRET~~
ACTION BY THE ISRAELIS AT ANY TIME, PROBABLY IN BEIT SHEAN AREA ALTHOUGH OTHER MOVES WERE NOT RULED OUT. KHAMMASH ADDED THAT IN LIGHT PAST EXPERIENCE JORDAN BELIEVES NEXT ACTION WILL BE ON EVEN LARGER SCALE.

2. AS PRACTICAL MATTER WE MUST EXPECT THAT FEDAYEEN INCIDENTS ARE GOING TO CONTINUE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. AS ALREADY REPORTED, THE CAPACITY OF THE GOJ TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT THIS HAS BEEN FURTHER SET BACK RATHER THAN ENHANCED BY THE MARCH 21 ACTION. IT IS THUS INEVITABLE THAT THE INCIDENT COUNT IS LIKELY TO INCREASE FAIRLY RAPIDLY. HOPE OF ANY EFFECTIVE COUNTER-MEASURES DEPENDS ON (A) A PERIOD OF CALM IN WHICH THE KING CAN SEEK TO ACHIEVE BETTER CONTROL OF THE SITUATION, AND (B) PROGRESS ON THE POLITICAL FRONT. BOTH ARE ESSENTIAL.

3. MEANWHILE, THE PROBLEM IS TO PREVENT AN EARLY REPETITION OR WORSE OF THE MARCH 21 EXERCISE. WE SCRAPPED THROUGH THE MARCH 21 EXERCISE BECAUSE THE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- AMMAN 4031, MARCH 26

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 4031A ~~SECRET~~
JORDANIANS HAD ENOUGH SUPERFICIAL EVIDENCES OF A
"VICTORY" TO PREVENT MASS REACTION. DESPITE THIS,
GREAT DAMAGE WAS DONE.

4. US INTERESTS, WHICH ARE BASICALLY INTERRELATED
WITH A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, CANNOT TAKE MUCH MORE SHOCK, IF ANY,
FROM ISRAELI MILITARY RETALIATIONS AGAINST JORDAN. IN
THE CASE OF THE MARCH 21 INCIDENT, THE REPRESENTATIONS
FROM THE PRESIDENT ARRIVED AFTER THE ACTION WAS
INITIATED. THE CONTINGENCIES AND THE PROBLEMS OUTLINED
IN AMMAN 3911 ARE EVEN MORE PRESSING KH. WE ACCORDINGLY
BELIEVE WE SHOULD TAKE URGENT MEASURES TO CONVINCING THE
ISRAELIS THAT FURTHER RETALIATION OR MILITARY ACTION IS
UNACCEPTABLE TO US AND RAISES SPECTRE OF SECURITY COUNCIL HAVING
TO CONSIDER "EFFECTIVE STEPS" MENTIONED IN PARA 3 OF
MARCH 24 RESOLUTION. IT FROM THE TONE OF ISRAELI
STATEMENTS AND THE SITUATION DEVELOPING
ALONG THE CEASEFIRE LINE, WE MAY HAVE ONLY A VERY
SHORT TIME IN WHICH TO ACT.

GP-1 SYMMES
BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

262
TELEGRAM
4

~~SECRET~~

PP RIHNCR
DE RUONXG 3977A 0831015
ZNY SSSSS ZZK
P 231010Z MAR 68
FM ANEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5010
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3977

6114Q
March 23, 1968
7:32 A.M.

NODIS

SUBJECT: JORDAN ARMS

REF: AMMAN 3931 AND 3920:

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

1. KING HUSSEIN IS DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO REMOVE REMAINING OBSTACLES TO FINAL ACTION ON MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING (AMMAN 3864). OUR INABILITY TO RESPOND ON MATTER WITH WHICH WE HAVE BEEN SEIZED SINCE KHAMMASH SAW SECRETARY MCNAMARA IN EARLY FEBRUARY (SEE PARA 2, AMMAN 3864) ASSUMES MOST UNFORTUNATE IMPLICATIONS OF STALLING IN EYES OF JORDANIANS.

2. REPORTS ON ORDERS FOR DEPARTURE OF IRAQI FORCES FROM JORDAN. THIS WAS RESULT OF HARD PERSONAL DECISION BY KING AT LEAST PARTIALLY IN RESPONSE TO MY PRESSING HIM JZ SO ON BASIS OUR HAVING AGREED SUPPLY ARMS. IN FACE OF LATEST ISRAELI RETALIATION AND CURRENT RECRIMINATIONS IN NEW YORK, HUSSEIN HAS RIGHT TO EXPECT WE WILL JUSTIFY HIS ACTION BY MOVING PROMPTLY ON OUR SIDE.

3.3(b)(1)

3. I AM WELL AWARE THAT THE KING'S REQUEST FOR ADD-ONS CONTRIBUTED TO DELAYS. I FEEL I MUST POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT DELAYS OUVUR SIDE HAVE TENDED TO DETRACT CONSIDERABLY FROM THE GOOD EFFECTS OF OUR DECISION TO RESUME ARMS SUPPLY AND ALSO TO SAP THE KING'S CONFIDENCE IN OUR INTENTIONS.

4. WE NEED HIM ANSRALTEEDS US IN THESE PRESENT CRITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES. IT IS ONE THING FOR US TO BE UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO MEET HIS NEEDS, BUT IT IS ANOTHER TO ALLOW TIME ITSELF TO EMBARRASS OUR RELATIONSHIP.

5. I VERY MUCH HOPE WE CAN HAVE URGENT ACTION ON THIS MATTS.

GP-1. SYMMES

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 1122e 15-36

By Uud

NARA, Date 05-13-2016



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

263

5

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 3922A 0810830
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 210829Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4980
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3922

CONTROL : 5309Q
RECEIVED : March 21, 1968
3:49A.M.

NODIS

SUBJ: PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO KING HUSSEIN

REF: STATE 133887

REFTEL RECEIVED AT 8:45 LOCAL. WE DELIVERED PRESIDENT'S
LETTER TO KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY ZAID RIFAI AT 9:40 LOCAL.
SYMMES
BT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 90001
By ag/ll, NARA, Date 10/2/01

7

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

264

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, March 21, 1968
7:25 p.m.

Rec'd
7:34
P

Mr. President:

Herewith Hussein reacts negatively
to our balancing message.

W. W. Rostow
W. W. Rostow

Amman 3928

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001
By 16/10 NARA, Date 01/16/01

~~SECRET~~



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

#6

264a

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 5368Q
RECD: A MARCH 21, 1968
7:56 A.M.

OO RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 3928A 0811035
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 211030Z MAR 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4985
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3928

NODIS

REF: STATE 133587

1. WE HAVE JUST BEEN ASKED BY KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY TO SEND FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM KING HUSSEIN TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON:

2. QTE DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: IN RESPONSE TO YOUR LETTER WHICH I JUST RECEIVED, I WISH TO POINT OUT THE FOLLOWING: WE ARE NOW FIGHTING ONCE AGAIN, DEFENDING--IN THE FACE OF A BLATANT AND PREMEDITATED ISRAELI AGGRESSION--OUR LAND, OUR HOMES, THE SHABBY TENTS OF THE VICTIMS OF CIVILIZATION, AND OUR HONOR. WE ARE DOING SO WITH WHAT HAS REMAINED IN OUR HANDS IN THE WAY OF WEAPONS SINCE JUNE 1967, FACING OVERWHELMING ODDS, UNEQUIPPED AS WE ARE, NOT EVEN BY A FINALIZED AGREEMENT BETWEEN US FOR RESUPPLYING US WITH DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT BY THE FRIENDLY UNITED STATES.

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3928A ~~SECRET~~

3. "IF THE BATTLE SHOULD GO THE WAY IT WELL MIGHT DO, THEN JORDAN, ITS HEAD OF STATE: ITS LEADERS, ITS ARMED FORCES AND ITS PEOPLE WOULD ALL BECOME THE VICTIMS OF AMERICAN WEAPONS, AND THEIR OWN FAITH IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS PRESIDENT, AS WELL AS THE FRIENDSHIP WHICH THEY VALUED TO THE POINT OF REFUSING TO ACCEPT ANY OTHER OPTION TO BOLSTER THEIR DEFENCE IN THE FACE OF A HISTORY OF CONTINUED AGGRESSION.

4. "I AM NOT, AND SHALL NEVER HOLD MYSELF OR MY GOVERNMENT AND ARMED FORCE, RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF THE ISRAELI FORCES OF OCCUPATION IN THE WEST BANK OF JORDAN AND THE REST OF THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES. NOR DO I EXPECT TO BE HELD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS."

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, # 122
By ly NARA, Date 9-20-01

~~SECRET~~

-2- AMMAN 3928, MARCH 21

5. "AS FOR THE INCIDENT OF MARCH 18 TO WHICH YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, REFERRED, I WISH TO STATE, FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THAT AFTER A MOST THOROUGH INVESTIGATION, THIS INCIDENT COULD NOT BE TRACED INNSANIN OR CONSEQUENCE, TO JORDAN.

6. "WE HAVE TRIED OUR BEST, HONESTLY, FAITHFULLY AND SINCERELY TO LAY THE FOUNDATION FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THIS AREA. THE BLAME FOR FAILURE, IF IT OCCURS, MUST LIE SQUARELY ON THE ISRAELI SIDE AND ON THOSE WHO, KNOWINGLY OR UNDELIBERATELY,

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3928A ~~SECRET~~
ENCOURAGE ISRAEL IN HER PLAN FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF THE FIRST AND LAST CHANCE TO ACHIEVE PEACE.

7. "WITH MY REGARD. SINCERELY, AL-HUSSEIN. UNQTE.

8. COMMENT: AS WE HAVE REPORTED, PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE ARRIVED AFTER ISRAELI ATTACKS HAD BEGUN (AND HAD BEEN IN PROGRESS FOR THREE HOURS). IN DELIVERING LETTER IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT IT HAD ORIGINATED PRIOR TO THIS MORNING'S ATTACKS AND THAT A PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE HAD ALSO BEEN SENT TO ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER.

9. WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO HUSSEIN EVOKED A VERY NEGATIVE REACTION. KING WAS APPARENTLY PARTICULARLY UPSET BY WHAT HE CONSIDERED IMPUTATION WE WERE HOLDING JORDAN RESPONSIBLE FOR BUS INCIDENT AND THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN SINCERE IN HIS EFFORTS TO TRY TO CONTROL TERRORISTS.

GP-1. SYMMES
BT

~~SECRET~~

ZFF-6

264-b

133887

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

21 MAR 68 05 40Z

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~ ~~STATE~~

Classification

Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy AMMAN FLASH

Info

Info: AmEmbassy TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

USUN New York IMMEDIATE

NODIS

STATE 133887

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: FRUS, Vol. 44, #120
By: J. NARA, Date: 9-20-01

Deliver following message urgently from President to King Hussein. Quote: Dear King Hussein;

While I appreciate your problem in controlling terrorism incidents such as that which occurred on March 18th cannot but arouse passions most destructive for common hopes for peace in the Middle East.

I found your public statement of February 15th ~~very courageous~~ courageous; but despite this statement and subsequent efforts incidents have continued.

I appeal to you for a maximum effort to bring such incidents under firm control and to indicate by words and actions your determination to maintain an environment in which such violence cannot occur.

CT

Drafted by: As received from White House	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:	S/S-O: Eledbetter
--	-----------	--	-------------------

Clearances:

Page 2 of telegram to AmEmbassy AMMAN FLASH

~~SECRET~~

Classification

I am making a strong appeal at this time to Prime Minister
Eshkol to exercise restraint.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Unquote.

End



Department of State

TELEGRAM

#6
265

~~SECRET~~

OO RUEHC
DE RUQNKG 4058A 0871715
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 271700Z MAR 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5062
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4058

CONTROL: 7058Q
RECD: MARCH 27, 1968
12:48 P.M.

NODIS

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE ISRAELI MILITARY ACTION AGAINST JORDAN

1. JORDANIANS INCLUDING KING (AMMAN 4057) CLAIM THAT ALL THEIR OBSERVATIONS INDICATE MAJOR ISRAELI CONCENTRATION IN BEIT SHEAN (OR BEISAN) AREA. USDAO TEL AVIV MESSAGE 0563 MAR 68 CONFIRMS SIZEABLE FORCE CONTINUES IN PLACE IN BEISAN VALLEY. AS TO QUESTION OF EVIDENCE OR LACK THEREOF RE NEW MOBILIZATION IN SAME TEL AVIV MESSAGE, I RECALL THERE LITTLE HARD EVIDENCE OF THIS KIND REPORTED UNTIL FEW HOURS BEFORE ACTUAL ATTACK MARCH 21. WHEN BOTH OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL STATEMENTS REPORTED FROM ISRAELI ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, I AM INCLINED TO CREDIT PRESENT JORDANIAN CONCERNS FOR IMMINENT ATTACK AS REASONABLE.

2. AS BROUGHT OUT IN STATE 136930 THE DANGERS TO PEACE PROSPECTS AND TO OUR INTERESTS ARE CLEAR. EVROW'S REPONSES AND THE FUNDAMENTAL MISCONCEPTIONS REVEALED THEREIN, HOWEVER, BRING HOME TO US THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL BE DETERRED FROM FURTHER MILITARY ACTION ONLY BY THE STRONGEST REPRESENTATIONS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. OBVIOUSLY IF SUCH REPRESENTATIONS ARE TO DETER ISRAELIS AND PRECLUDE ACTION WE WISH TO AVOID, THEY MUST BE MADE BEFORE ISRAELIS HAVE MADE DECISION AND STARTED ACTUAL OPERATION. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES I URGE THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO PRESIDENTIAL APPROACH AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

GP-1

SYMMES
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-207
By us, NARA, Date 11-20-02

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

By Lavender

SECRET

**TELEGRAM
ACTION COPY**

266

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 3922A 0810830
ZNY SSSSS ZZK
R 210829Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4980
STATE GRNC
BT
SECRET AMMAN 3922

CONTROL : 5309Q
RECEIVED : March 21, 1968
3:49A.M.

NODIS

SUBJ: PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO KING HUSSEIN

REF: STATE 133887

REFTEL RECEIVED AT 8:45 LOCAL. WE DELIVERED PRESIDENT'S
LETTER TO KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY ZAID RIFAI AT 9:40 LOCAL.
SYMMES
BT

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 96001
By *ag/llh*, NARA, Date *10/14/01*



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

6

PP RUEHCR
DE RUQMKG 3912A 0801750
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 201745Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4971
STATE GRNC
BT

CN: 5102Q
1968 MAR 20 PM 21:18

267

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3912

NODIS

SUBJ: TERRORISM

REF: AMMAN 3887

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-207
By us, NARA, Date 11-20-02

1. IN COURSE DISCUSSING EFFORTS CONTROL TERRORISM WITH EMBOFF MARCH 19, KING HUSSEIN REVEALED THAT HE HAD ESTABLISHED SECRET PERSONAL CONTACT WITH FATAH AND PLF LEADERSHIP IN EFFORT TO INFLUENCE THEM TO COOPERATE WITH HIM IN SEEKING POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BY SUSPENDING THEIR PRESENT GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES. HUSSEIN SAID HE HAD SELECTED THESE TWO ORGANIZATIONS FOR PARTICULAR ATTENTION BECAUSE, OF THE 13 SEPARATE TERRORIST GROUPS NOW OPERATING, THEY ARE THE ONLY ONES SERIOUSLY INVOLVED IN SIGNIFICANT EFFORTS AT TERRORISM.

2. KING SAID NO ONE ELSE EVEN IN HIS OWN GOVERNMENT KNEW OF THESE PRIVATE CONTACTS AND HE WANTED THIS

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3912A ~~SECRET~~
INFORMATION STRICTLY HELD.

3. HUSSEIN FEELS HE HAS MADE SIGNIFI ANT PROGRESS THROUGH HIS PERSONAL INTERVENTION WITH THESE ORGANIZATIONS IN GETTING THEIR COOPERATION TO CURTAIL THEIR ACTIVITIES. HE HAS HOPES THAT GIVEN TIME HE CAN ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE CONTROL OVER THEM. AMONG OTHER THINGS HE HAS RECEIVED PROMISES, THUS FAR HONORED, THAT NO ACTIVITIES WOULD BE CONDUCTED SOUTH OF THE DEAD SEA AND IN SEVERAL AREAS NORTH OF THE DEAD SEA. BASIC PROBLEM, HUSSEIN OBSERVED, IS THAT THE LOCAL LEADERS DO NOT CONTROL OPERATIONS ALONG SYRIAN FRONTIER; THESE ARE DIRECTED FROM DAMASCUS. THE KING SAID HE HAS ALSO GOTTEN THE TWO LEADERSHIPS' AGREEMENT TO DISARM.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4. AFTER THE MARCH 18 BUS INCIDENT HUSSEIN GOT IN TOUCH WITH THE FATAH AND PLF LEADERSHIP. THEY INSISTED THAT THEY HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THIS INCIDENT AND OFFERED TO PROVE IT IN ANY WAY THEY COULD. THE KING SAID HE IS INCLINED TO BELIEVE THEM ON THE BASIS OF HIS CONTACTS WITH THEM SO FAR.

5. HUSSEIN SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT IF HE COULD

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3912A ~~SECRET~~

ACHIEVE CONTROL OVER THESE TWO ORGANIZATIONS IT WOULD BE RELATIVELY SIMPLE TO SORT OUT AND CONTROL THE OTHER GROUPS WHICH, HE MAINTAINS, ARE PREDOMINANTLY COMPOSED OF HIRED THUGS, OPPORTUNISTS AND LOCAL BULLIES. AS ONE EXAMPLE, HE SAID HE HAS DISCOVERED SOME TERRORISTS ARE RECEIVING AS MUCH AS 25 JDS A MONTH, I.E. FIVE TIME THE WAGES OF A JAA PRIVATE.

6. IN CONCLUSION, THE KING SAID THAT A POTENTIALLY SERIOUS COMPLICATING FACTOR TO HIS EFFORTS TO GAIN CONTROL OVER THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS IS THE PRESENCE IN THE VALLEY OF ISRAELI AGENTS POSING AS TERRORISTS. HE SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO THOSE FROM TWO ARABIC-SPEAKING DRUZE BATTALIONS OF IDF WHO HAVE INFILTRATED ONTO EAST BANK. HE ADDED THAT HE COULD NOT DISMISS POSSIBILITY ISRAELIS THEMSELVES MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN CREATING INCIDENTS.

GP-1. SYMMES
BT

~~SECRET~~



6 W.A.
Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

268

PP RUEHCR
DE RUQMKG 3905A 0801455
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 201445Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
STATE GRNC

5 1 9 6Q

1968 MAR 20 PM 6 07

BT

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3905

NODIS

SUBJ: ISRAEL-JORDAN

1. I TOLD KING HUSSEIN TODAY THAT WE ARE GRATIFIED BY ACTIONS HE HAS TAKEN WITH RESPECT TO REMOVAL IRAQI PALESTINIAN BATTALION AND COLONEL DAUD'S ASSIGNMENT TO MEET WITH ISRAELIS. WE HAD PASSED THE SUBSTANCE OF THESE ACTIONS TO THE OTHER SIDE WITH STRONG CAVEATS ABOUT PUBLICITY. I SAID WE HAD HEARD TODAY FROM KHAMMASH THAT AT LEAYO INITIALLY JORDAN WOULD INSIST ON PRESENCE UN OFFICER. I HOPED ON PRESENCE COULD QUICKLY WITHER AWAY. I ALSO RECALLED MY COMMENTS ON 16TH CONCERNING NEED FOR DAUD TO ADOPT AS FLEXIBLE AND FORTHCOMING WH POSTURE AS POSSIBLE. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR CONTACTS NOT TO TAKE FORM OF SOME OF IJMAC WRANGLES OF THE PAST.

PAGE 2 RUQNKG 3905A ~~SECRET~~

2. KING SAID HE PERSONALLY HAD DISCUSSED THE PURPOSE OF THE EXERCISE WITH DAUD. MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON HOW THE ISRAELIS PLAY THIS CONTACT. MEANWHILE, JORDAN WOULD HAVE TO INSIST ON UN PRESENCE AT LEAST INITIALLY.

3. EMBOFF TOUCHED BASE WITH UNTSO LIAISON OFFICER LTC STANAWAY (NEW ZEALAND) SHORTLY BEFORE MY MEETING WITH KING. IN DISCUSSION OF MEETING PROSPECTS STANAWAY VOLUNTEERED THAT HE FELT OVERRIDING NEED FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS WAS FLEXIBILITY. HE SAID, FOR EXAMPLE, IF HE WERE TO BE INVOLVED AND OTHER PARTICIPANTS WISHED TO TALK QUIETLY TOGETHER, HE WOULD BE HAPPY ABSENT HIMSELF FROM DISCUSSIONS.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-S 92001

By ag/ll NARA, Date 10/16/01

SECRET

PREPARED BY

~~SECRET~~

-2- 3905 FROM AMMAN, MARCH 20, 1968 (NODIS)

4. STANAWAY SAID HE THOUGHT IT MOST UNLIKELY JORDANIANS WOULD AGREE TO MEETING AT ALLENBY BRIDGE SINCE THIS WOULD COMPROMISE GOJ POLICY POSITION RE CEASEFIRE LINE. ASKED WHAT HE WOULD PERSONALLY SUGGEST AS ALTERNATIVE, STANAWAY PROPOSED EITHER GOVERNMENT HOUSE JERUSALEM, AQABA OR SHEIKH HUSSEIN BRIDGE. EMBOFF SAID HIS PERSONAL REACTION WAS GOVERNMENT HOUSE MEETING WOULD BE UNPALATABLE FOR ISRAELIS. STANAWAY POINTED OUT THAT

PAGE 3 RUQMGK 3905A ~~SECRET~~

ADVANTAGE OF AQABA OR SHEIKH HUSSEIN BRIDGE MEETING WAS THAT BOTH SITES ARE ON ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE. HE POINTED OUT SHEIKH HUSSEIN SITE HAS PARTICULAR ADVANTAGE OF BEING LESS PUBLIC THAN EITHER ALLENBY OR AQABA.

5. ASKED ABOUT SPIRIT IN WHICH HE FELT DAUD WOULD APPROACH PROSPECTIVE MEETING, STANAWAY SAID EVERYTHING DEPENDED ON MARCHING ORDERS DAUD GIVEN BY PALACE. HE SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE DAUD WOULD BE RIGID ON PROCEDURAL MATTERS.

6. AT END OF EMBOFF-STANAWAY CONVERSATION, COL DAUD CALLED AT STANAWAY'S OFFICE. (WE LATER LEARNED THIS VISIT WAS ON ORDERS FROM KHAMMASH.) STANAWAY SHORTLY THEREAFTER DEPARTED FOR JERUSALEM FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH UNISO STAFF. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS TRIP IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO PROSPECTIVE MEETING OR WHETHER IT IN RESPONSE TO UNRELATED REQUEST FROM ODD BULL.

7. WE ARE AWAITING WORD FROM JORDANIANS ON SPECIFIC DATE FOR INITIAL MEETING.

GP-3. SYMMES
BT

NOTE: PASSED TEL AVIV BY OC/T

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

269
TELEGRAM
6

~~SECRET~~

OO RUEHC RUEHCR
DE RUQMKG 3891A 0800900
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 200859Z MAR 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4956
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1387
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3891

CN-4953
March 20, 1967
4:34 a.m.

NODIS

SUBJ: ISRAEL-JORDAN

REF: STATE 133116; TEL AVIV 2965; AMMAN 3886; AMMAN 3887

1. ASSUME THAT BY NOW BOTH DEPT AND EMBASSY TEL AVIV HAVE RECEIVED AMMAN 3886 AND 3887 WHICH REPORT KING'S DECISION TO SEND DAUD TO MEET WITH ISRAELIS IN COMPANY LT. COL. STANAWAY. WE EXPECT RECEIVE WORD SHORTLY OF PROPOSE TIME AND PLACE ALONG LINES SUGGESTED TEL AVIV 2916.

2. I AM SEEING KING IN COURSE OF DAY TO REVIEW AGAIN

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3891A ~~SECRET~~
WITH HIM THE NEED FOR DAUD TO BE FLEXIBLE AND FORTHCOMING AS A CHANNEL.

3. ASSUMING MEETING WILL MATERIALIZE, WE HOPE THAT ISRAELIS WILL NOT MAKE STANAWAY'S PRESENCE ON ISSUE AND THAT THEIR DELEGATES SIMILARLY WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO BE FLEXIBLE ON BOTH MODALITIES AND POSTURE.

4. AS WE SEE IT, CRITICAL POINT IS TO ENGAGE THE TWO PARTIES. WE WILL CONTINUE EFFORTS ENCOURAGE JORDANIANS TO LET UN PRESENCE WITHER AWAY BUT MUST EMPHASIZE THEY ARE EXCEEDINGLY SUSPICIOUS AND FRIGHTENED AS TO USE ISRAELIS MAY TRY TO MAKE OF MEETING. SYMMES
BT

NOTE: PASSED TELAVIV BY OC/T 3/20/68

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001
By ag/ll, NARA, Date 10/1/01

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Department of State

270
TELEGRAM

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OO RUEHCR
DE RUQMKG 3887A 0791925
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 191915Z MAR 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4954
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1385
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3887

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, #116
By g NARA, Date 9-20-01

CN 4878Q
3/20/68

2:02 a.m.

NODIS

SUBJECT: TERRORISM

REF: AMMAN 3844; 3886

TEL AVIV FOR AMB BARBOUR FROM SYMMES

1. SUMMARY: KING HAS FOLLOWED UP ON SUGGESTIONS MADE TO HIM PER AMMAN 3844 AND PREVIOUS AND IN COURSE EXTENDED DISCUSSION WITH EMBOFF AFTERNOON MARCH 19 REVEALED DECISION MADE FOR STAGED WITHDRAWAL FROM JORDAN OF PALESTINIAN BATTALION OF IRAQI BRIGADE TO BEGIN WITHIN WEEK. DECISION HAS ALSO BEEN MADE SEND COL DAUD TO MEET WITH ISRAELI COUNTER PART UNDER UN AUSPICES IN NEXT FEW DAYS. HE REPORTED GOJ INTENSIVE EFFORTS APPREHEND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR BUS INCIDENT AND AGAIN REQUESTED ANY INFORMATION WHICH MIGHT AID THE INVESTIGATION. HE ALSO SPECULATED AT SOME LENGTH ON ISRAELI INTENTIONS TOWARD EAST BANK.

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3887A ~~SECRET~~

2. KING PREFACED DISCUSSION OF TERRORISM WITH STATEMENT THAT HIS REVIEW OF ARAB MILITARY CAPABILITIES WITH OWN ADVISORS, IRAQI CHIEF OF STAFF AND PAKISTANI MILITARY TEAM JUST ARRIVED FROM CAIRO HAVE FURTHER CONVINCED HIM OF ARAB'S TOTAL INCAPACITY TO WIN MILITARY SOLUTION OF ARAB-ISRAELI CONFRONTATION. IRAQI CHIEF OF STAFF ANSARI HAD JUST ADVISED HIM THAT IRAQ COULD DO NO MORE TO HELP JORDAN MILITARILY. ACCORDING PAKISTANIS, UAR WILL NEED ANOTHER TEN YEARS TO MODERNIZE ITS AIR FORCE AND BRING ITS TRAINING AND MAINTENANCE UP TO ISRAELI STANDARDS. SYRIAN, KING DESCRIBED AS COMPLETELY IMPOTENT MILITARILY AND SAID JORDAN'S LACK OF MILITARY POTENTIAL HARDLY BORE DISCUSSION.

3. SINCE ISRAELIS ARE FULLY AWARE OF THIS, KINGSUAID, HE HAD COME TO DOUBT SERIOUSLY THAT ISRAELIS HAD ANY DESIRE FOR PEACE

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-2- 3887 FROM AMMAN, MARCH 19, 1968 (NODIS)

AND HE SPECULATED THAT THE ISRAELI POSTURE ON TERRORISM OWED SOMETHING TO THIS UNDERLYING ATTITUDE. HE HAD CONCLUDED ISRAEL WISHES TO HOLD ON TO LAND IT NOW OCCUPIES FOR RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL REASONS AND NEEDS CERTAIN ADDITIONAL TERRITORY TO CONSOLIDATE ITS POSITION. EAST BANK HE FEELS IS OBVIOUS REMAINING TARGET. HE QUESTIONS WHETHER ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE ANY SERIOUS CONCERN

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3887A ~~SECRET~~
ABOUT ADVERSE WORLD OPINION SHOULD THEY FEEL TIME HAD COME TO LAUNCH MILITARY ATTACK. THEY WOULD CITE TERRORISM AS PRETEXT. WITH FALL OF EAST BANK, WEST BANK WOULD QUICKLY COME TO TERMS. IN PROCESSIONUAR AND SYRIAN REGIMES WOULD BE EXPOSED AS IMPOTENT AND LIKELIHOOD THEIR FALL WOULD SHARPLY INCREASE.

4. HUSSEIN SAID HE HAD "RAISED HELL" WITH EVERYBODY CONCERNING MARCH 18 BUS INCIDENT AND HAS DIRECTED THAT, IF PERPETRATORS ARE CAUGHT IN JORDAN, THEY ARE TO RECEIVE SAME PUNISHMENT AS IF THEY HAD CAUSED THIS ACCIDENT TO JORDANIANS. HE SAID HE HAD SENT HIS TOP INVESTIGATORS, INCLUDING TRACKERS, TO AQABA AREA AND STATED THEY HAVE DISCOVERED AS YET ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE OF ANYONE HAVING CROSSED OVER FROM JORDANIAN TERRITORY IN THAT AREA OR RETURNED. KING STATED JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS THROUGH PENETRATIONS AND OTHERWISE HAS THUS AR BEEN UNABLE DISCOVER INVOLVEMENT ON PART OF ANY KNOWN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS WITH BUS INCIDENT. INVESTIGATIONS CONTINUING UNDER KING'S PERSONAL DIRECTION. HE REITERATED HIS REQUEST FOR ANY INFORMATION THAT MIGHT ASSIST INVESTIGATION.

4. KING SUGGESTS POSSIBILITY, RECALLING INCIDENT OF OIL STORAGE TANK SABOTAGE AT EILAT TWO MONTHS AGO, THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 3887A ~~SECRET~~
OUTSIDE EGYPTIAN INVOLVEMENT IN YESTERDAY'S INCIDENT.

6. KING SAID HE WISHED TELL US IN CONFIDENCE THAT DECISION MADE TWO DAYS AGO (SUNDAY, MARCH 17) TO START PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF PALESTINE BATTALION OF IRAQI BRIGADE. BATTALION WOULD FIRST BE MOVED TO H-4 (OR H-5) AND ULTIMATELY TO IRAQ. (KHAMMASH SUBSEQUENTLY STATED THAT IRAQIS STRENUOUSLY RESISTED MOVE ON POLITICAL GROUNDS BUT THAT ORDERS WERE ISSUED TODAY, MARCH 19, FOR BATTALION TO BEGIN PACKING UP.)

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-3- 3887 FROM AMMAN, MARCH 19, 1968 (NODIS)

7. RE COL DAUD MEETING WITH ISRAELIS, KING SAID HE HAD DELEGATED RESPONSIBILITY FOR MEETING ARRANGEMENTS TO GEN KHAMMASH AND WE SHOULD FOLLOW UP SUBJECT WITH HIM. KING ANTICIPATED MEETING UNDER UN AUSPICES COULD TAKE PLACE IN NEXT FEW DAYS. (ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN CLEARED WITH PRIMIN ALSO AND FURTHER DETAILS ARE REPORTED IN AMMAN 3886.)

8. HUSSEIN SAID HE RECOGNIZED THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO INFORM ISRAELIS OF SOME OF FOREGOING RE TERRORISM AND BUS INCIDENT; THE PALESTINIAN BATTALION; AND DAUD. HE WARNED EMBOFF HOWEVER, "IF ISRAELIS PUBLICIZE EXIST OF PALESTINIAN BATTALION AND CLAIMS IT IS RESULT OF ISRAELI PRESSER, I WILL NOT BE ABLE TO LET IT LEAVE, AND MY EFFORTS IN THIS

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 3887A ~~SECRET~~
REGARD WILL BE SERIOUSLY COMPROMISED." SIMILAR STRICTURES APPLY TO THE DECISION TO SEND DAUD.

9. COMMENT: I BELIEVE IT IMPERATIVE THAT YOU GET UNDERTAKING FROM ISRAELIS THAT FOREGOING WILL BE KEPT IN ABSOLUTE CONFIDENCE BEFORE RELATING ANY OF IT. WE KNOW HOW WELL THE ISRAELIS CAN KEEP A SECRET IF THEY SO CHOOSE. I BELIEVE THAT IT IS IN FACT LEGITIMATE FOR US TO CLAIM CREDIT FOR SOME OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS. FOR EXAMPLE, AS REPORTED AMMAN 3844, THE PALESTINE BATTALION WAS DISCUSSED WITH KING PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE IRAQI CHIEF OF STAFF WITH WHOM AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW PALESTINIAN BATTALION FINALLY REACHED.

GP-1. SYMMES
BT

NOTE: PASSED TEL AVIV BY OC/T 3/20/68

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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271

OO RUEHCR
DE RUQMGK 3886A 0791730 CONTROL: 4730Q
ZNY SSSSS ZZH REC'D : MARCH 19, 1968
O 191721Z MAR 68 ZFF-6 12:36PM
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1384
INFO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4953
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3886

Rostow

NODIS

SUBJECT: ISRAEL-JORDAN

REF: TEL AVIV 2916

1. WE HAVE JUST BEEN INFORMED THAT COL DAUD WAS BEEN BRIEFED TO MEET WITH ISRAELI REPRESENTATIVE ACCOMPANIED BY LT. COL. STANAWAY (AT LEAST IN INITIAL CONTACT). TIME AND PLACE OF MEETING WILL BE DETERMINED TOMORROW.

2. RE THIRD PARA YOUR 2916 SUGGEST YOU MIGHT HOLD OFF TELLING ISRAELIS UNTIL WE HAVE FIRM PROPOSAL AS TO TIME AND PLACE UNLESS YOU FEEL THIS NEWS MIGHT BE CRITICAL IN HOLDING OFF IMMEDIATE RETALIATORY ACTION BY ISRAELIS.

SYMMES

BT

NOTE: PASSED TEL AVIV BY OC/T.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5

NLJ-3 88001

By 10/11/01, NARA, Date 10/11/01

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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W/d

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272

RR RUEHC RUEHCR
DE RUQMKG 3824A 0751130
ZNY SSSSS
R 151125Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4904
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1365
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3824

CN: 3858Q
1968 MAR 15, 7:13AM

Postow

NODIS

DEPT PASS USUN

REF: STATE 119451; TEL AVIV 2592, 2692: AMMAN 3793

SUBJ: ISRAEL- JORDAN

1. I REALIZE THAT SUGGESTION IN DEP TEL 119451 THAT I APPROACH HUSSEIN TO DETERMINE THIS WILLINGNESS TO APPOINT A BRIGADIER TO MEET WITH ISRAELIS IN PRESENCE UN OFFICER STILL REQUIRES AN ANSWER. WHILE I HAVE AS YET NOTHING DECINITIVE TO REPORT ON THIS QUESTION I DO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY STILL EXISTS OF SETTING UP A LIAISON ARRANGE-

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3824A ~~SECRET~~
MENT AT ALLENBY BRIDGE.

2. AS KING STATED TO ME MARCH 13, WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAIL, AS SOON AS HE HAS RECONSTITUTED CABINET HE WILL REVIEW QUESTION OF SENDING DAUD TO BRIDGE (AMMAN 3793). HUSSEIN SET NO CONDITIONS DURING OUR CONVERSATION ON DAUD'S MEETINGS BUT GENERAL KHAMMASH IN SEPARATE MEETING EARLIER THAT SAME DAY WAS EXPLICIT TO ME THAT PRESENCE OF UNSTO REP STANAWAY WOULD BE OBSOLUTE PREREQUISITE TO DAUD'S BEING AUTHORIZED TO ATTEND SUCH MEETINGS. (KHAMMASH, INCIDENTIALLY, CLARIFIED THAT DAUD IS STILL A COLONEL. KHAMMASH ADDED THAT HE TOLD KING WHEN HE TOOK OEVER C/S THAT THERE WOULD BE NO HIGH LEVEL PROMOTIONS, THAT THIS WAS NOT THE TIME. THIS CONTRADICTS ISRAELI UNDERSTANDING ON DAUD'S PROMOTION REPORTED TEL AVIV 2692.) WE CONSIDER IT PROBABLY THAT KHAMMASH'S POSITION ON STANAWAY'S PARTICIPATION REFLECTS HUSSEIN'S OWN VIEWS.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
NLJ-S 98001

By ag/ll, NARA, Date 10/14/01

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-2- AMMAN 3824 MAR 15

3. WE CONTINUE TO THINK LIAISON ARRANGEMENT AT BRIDGE WOULD BE USEFUL WAY TO HELP LIMIT ESCALATION OF FUTURE

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3824A ~~SECRET~~

CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS. HOWEVER, IT APPEARS THAT JORDAN AND ISRAEL ARE WAITING FOR EACH OTHER TO TAKE THE FIRST STEP. PRESENT POSITION AS WE RECONSTRUCT IT IS THAT ISRAELIS WANT TO KNOW IF MEETING BETWEEN OFFICERS OF GENERAL RANK IS ACCEPTABLE TO JORDAN UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES BEFORE THEY COMMIT THEMSELVES TO US AS ACCEPTING UN PRESENCE (TEL AVIV 2592). AS WE HAVE REPORTED EARLIER, UN PRESENCE IS SINE QUA NON FOR JORDANIANS AND THEY ARE UNWILLING CONTEMPLATE ANY MEETING IN ABSENCE UN REP. I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER SUBSTITUTION FOR DAUD WILL PROVE TO BE NEGOTIABLE BUT AM CONVINCED THAT PRESENCE UN REP IS ABSOLUTELY NON-NEGOTIABLE AT THIS TIME.

4. I SUGGEST THAT IN ORDER TO BREAK FREE OF THIS ALFONSE-GASTON CIRCLE WE NOW INFORM GOI THAT EARLY MEETING BETWEEN DAUD AND ISRAELI COUNTERPART APPEARS TO BE REAL POSSIBILITY ON CONDITION UN REP ALSO ATTENDS.

GP-2 SYMMES

NOTE: PASSED TO TEL AVIV BY OC/T MAR 15.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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W D 2

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 3770/1A 0721700
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 121615Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4376
STATE GRNC
BT

CONTROL : 31310
RECEIVED : March 13, 1968
2:33A.M.

273

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 3770

NODIS

SANDSTORM

1. IT IS NOW GETTING ON TO FOUR MONTHS SINCE THE ADOPTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF NOV 22. MOST RECENT REPORTS FROM CAIRO, TEL AVIV, AND USUN INDICATE THAT WE ARE FURTHER THAN EVER AWAY FROM IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT RESOLUTION AND MAY SOON BE BACK IN SC.

2. IN LATE SUMMER WE DECIDED AT LEAST TEMPORARILY TO CLOSE DOWN "SANDSTORM" AND BEGAN TO PURSUE PRESENT POLICY OF SEEKING A MULTILATERAL ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT. IN MAKING THIS SHIFT

PAGE TWO RUQMKG 3770/1A ~~SECRET~~
WE OF COURSE RECOGNIZED THE DIFFICULTY OF GETTING INDIVIDUAL ARAB STATES WHICH, AFTER ALL, HAVE QUITE DIFFERENT INTERESTS IN A FINAL SETTLEMENT, TO AGREE ON A CONCERTED APPROACH TO DEALING WITH ISRAEL. INDEED, THE DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING SUCH AN ARAB CONSENSUS HAS BEEN ONE OF THE PRICIPAL LESSIONS OF THE PAST TWENTY YEARS.

3. OVER THE YEARS WE HAVE ALSO BEEN VERY MUCH AWARE OF ANOTHER LESSON--THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR A LEADER OF ONE OF THE SMALLER ARAB STATES, SUCH AS LEBANON OR JORDAN. TO MAKE A SEPARATE PEACE WITH ISRAEL AND SURVIVE. PARTICULARLY IN JORDAN, THE FATE OF KING ABDULLAH ALWAYS COMES TO MIND. WE DOUBT THAT THE SITUATION HAS CHANGED TODAY. A SEPARATE PEACE WOULD STILL ENTAIL EXTREMELY GRAVE RISKS FOR THE ARAB LEADER WHO APPEARED TO CONTEMPLATE IT. THE MOST MODERATE AND REASONABLE JORDANIANS WE TALK TO SEE SEPARATE TALKS ONLY AS A LAST, DESPERATE RESORT.

4. WE KNOW QUITE WELL THAT KING HUSSEIN AND MANY JORDANIAN LEADERS WANT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. FROM THE VERY BEGINNING

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Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, #109
By ly NARA, Date 9-20-01

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-2-Page, AMMAN 3770, Section 1 of 2, March 13, 1968 NODIS/SANDSTORM

PAGE THREE RUQMKG 3770/1A ~~SECRET~~
OF THE JARRING MISSION (EVEN THOUGH THEY MAY HAVE PLAYED WITH WORDS DURING THE FIRST MEETING WITH JARRING IN ORDER TO SAVE THEIR HONOR AND THEIR REPUTATIONS WITH FELLOW ARABS) WE HAVE KNOWN THAT THE JORDANIANS ACCEPTED THE RESOLUTION AND WANTED TO MOVE TO PRACTICAL NEXT STEPS.

5. MEANWHILE, THE SITUATION IN PRESENTLY TRUNCATED JORDAN CAN ONLY WORSEN, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE ISRAEL CONTINUES TO FOLLOW POLICIES TENDING TO CONSOLIDATE, AT LEAST IN ARAB EYES, ITS OCCUPATION OF THE WEST BANK. UNFORTUNATELY, THE MANIPULATIVE STRATEGY FOLLOWED BY ISRAEL (THAT IS RETALIATORY RAIDS TO "TEACH JORDAN A LESSON," OFFICIAL AND SEMI-OFFICIAL THREATS LINKED WITH RETALIATION, AND PUBLIC SURFACING OF CONTACTS WITH ARABS OR EASING OF ARAB STANDS) TENDS TO COMPOUND CURRENT DIFFICULTIES FACED BY JORDAN'S LEADERS. IN OUR VIEW, ALTHOUGH TERRORISM IN FUTURE MAY NOT BECOME ANY MORE EFFECTIVE IN ISRAEL OR IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY, IT SEEMS BOUND TO INCREASE BECAUSE OF POLICIES ISRAEL ITSELF IS FOLLOWING. AND THE POST-FEB 15 DEVELOPMENTS HAVE SHOWN THAT IT IS GOING TO BECOME MORE AND MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE JORDAN REGIME TO SUPPRESS IT.

PAGE FOUR RUQMKG 3770/1A ~~SECRET~~
MOREOVER, THE TERRORISTS POSE A MAJOR THREAT TO THE JORDANIAN REGIME ITSELF. WE CAN ONLY CONCLUDE FROM HERE THAT IF PRESENT STALEMATE IN THE JARRING MISSION CONTINUES, WE WILL NOT ONLY HAVE FAILED TO ACHIEVE A MULTILATERAL SETTLEMENT UNDER JARRING'S AEGIS, BUT MORE IMPORTANT, WE WILL ALSO HAVE SUBSTANTIALLY DIMINISHED THE CHANCES FOR MOVING SUCCESSFULLY TOWARDS BILATERAL JORDAN-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT. THE OUTLOOK FOR A STABLE AND INDEPENDENT JORDAN WILL BECOME EVEN MORE BLEAK.

6. FOREGOING SUGGESTS THE TIME MAY HAVE COME TO CONSIDER AGAIN WHETHER TO ENCOURAGE ISRAEL AND JORDAN TO SEEK A BILATERAL SETTLEMENT. I RECOGNIZE OF COURSE THAT THIS IS NOT AN EITHER-OR MATTER. IT MIGHT WELL BE POSSIBLE AND DESIRABLE, FOR EXAMPLE, TO ENCOURAGE JORDAN-ISRAEL CONTACTS UNDER A MORIBUND JARRING EFFORT. IN OTHER WORDS, WE COULD PAY LIP SERVICE TO WHAT MIGHT BE AN OBVIOUSLY DEAD JARRING MISSION BUT STILL USE LATTER AS CLOAK FOR CONTACTS. THERE WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE OTHER POSSIBLE VARIATIONS. I AM CERTAIN WE WILL FIND CONSIDERABLE RESISTANCE TO ANY KIND OF SEPARATE BILATERAL SETTLEMENT FROM MANY PROMINENT JORDANIANS. AS TIME GOES ON I WOULD EXPECT SUCH OPPOSITION

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-3-Page, AMMAN 3770, Section 1 of 2, March 13, 1968 NODIS/SANDSTORM

PAGE FIVE RUQMKG 3770/1A ~~S E C R E T~~

TO INCREASE RATHER THAN TO DIMINISH, PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE ISRAEL'S POSITION WOULD HAVE HARDENED. RECOGNIZING THERE ARE POSSIBILITIES FOR TALKS SHORT OF OUTRIGHT, SECRET CONTACTS, I BELIEVE IF AS A LAST RESORT WE WERE PREPARED TO TELL THE KING WE SAW NO CHANCE OF FORWARD MOTION BY OTHER MEANS AND THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO PROTECT HIM IF HE MOVED TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL, HE MIGHT DECIDE TO TAKE THIS STEP. I WOULD BE OPPOSED TO OUR MAKING SUCH AN APPROACH, HOWEVER, UNLESS WE HAD FIRST OBTAINED FROM THE ISRAELIS A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT IN DETAILED TERMS OF WHAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED INITIALLY TO OFFER HUSSEIN. BY THIS I MEAN, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO GET FROM ISRAEL A CLEAR MINIMUM COMMITMENT AS TO WHAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO GIVE JORDAN WITH REGARD TO JERUSALEM. THIS MINIMUM COMMITMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE SPECIFIC IN TERMS OF ARE, LINES ON THE GROUND, ACCESS, ECONOMIC MODALITIES, AND ASPECTS OF SOVEREIGNTY. IT WOULD HAVE TO BE SUBJECT TO SOME DISCUSSION. IN OTHER WORDS, WE WOULD NEED TO BE ABLE TO SAY TO THE KING THAT ISRAEL WAS ATLEAST COMMITTED TO DO WHAT IT HAD SAID BUT THAT WE WOULD ALSO HOPE IN DISCUSSIONS ISRAEL MIGHT HAVE SOME ADD-ONS TO ITS MINIMUM POSITION. WE WOULD ALSO

PAGE SIX RUQMKG 3770/1A ~~S E C R E T~~

NEED SPECIFICS WITH REGARD TOWHERE THE ISRAELIS EXPECT TO REDRAW WEST BANK BORDERS, WHAT THEY ACTUALLY MEAN BY DEMILITARIZATION, AND WHETHER THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER SOMETHING LIKE THE JOSEPH JOHNSON PLAN FOR REFUGEES. UNLESS WE COULD OBTAIN SUCH SPECIFIC STATEMENTS FROM ISRAEL, I WOULD BE OPPOSED TO OUR APPROACHING THE KING ON BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. IN FACT, I WONDER IF WE SHOULD NOT NOW SEEK TO ELICIT WHAT ISRAEL IS PREPARED TO OFFER AGAINST CONTINGENCIES SHORT OF OUTRIGHT, SECRET CONTACTS.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 3770/2A 0721800
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 121515Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4877
STATE GRNC
BT

CONTROL : 3122Q
RECEIVED : March 13, 1968
1:56A.M.

~~SECRET~~ FINAL SECTION OF TWO AMMAN 3770

NODIS

SANDSTORM

7. I WISH TOMAKE CLEAR I AM NOT BY ANY MEANS SUGGESTING WE SHOULD ALIGN OURSELVES WITH JORDAN TO ACT AS JORDAN'S AGENT IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS ITSELF. I DO BELIEVE, HOWEVER; THAT THE KING AND THE OFFICIALS WHO MIGHT GO ALONG WITH HIM HAVE EVERYTHING TO LOSE BY MOVING TO ANYTHING SMACKING OF SEPARATE PEACE AND THAT THEY THEREFORE DESERVE TO HAVE FROM US AND FROM THE ISRAELIS THROUGH US A GUARANTEED FLOOR FOR COMMENCING THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE SUBSTANCE OF SUCH DIRECT CONTACTS THAT PREVIOUSLY HAVE TAKEN PLACE BETWEEN JORDAN AND ISRAEL (AT LEAST THOSE OF WHICH WE ARE AWARE) LARGELY HAVE BEEN DEVOID OF DETAIL. WE GATHER THAT THE KING HAS FOUND ISRAELI GENERALIZATIONS BROUGHT OVER BY EMISSARIES SUCH AS NUSEIBEH QUITE UNATTRACTIVE FOR THIS REASON.

8. IF WE WERE TO MOVE TOWARDS BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS, I THINK WE SHOULD BE PREPARED WITH CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR HELPING TO HANDLE CIVIL STRIFE AND EFFORTS BY OTHER ARAB STATES TO INTERFERE. I WOULD SUGGEST WE GIVE THOUGHT IMMEDIATELY TO THIS KING OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN ANY CASE BECAUSE KING HUSSEIN MIGHT WELL MOVE TOWARDS BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT OUR

PAGE TWO RUQMKG 3770/1B ~~SECRET~~
ENCOURAGEMENT.

9. FINALLY, WE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE IRONCLAD ASSURANCES FROM THE ISRAELIS WITH REGARD TO (1) PUBLICITY (BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER TALKS--PARTICULARLY IF THE TALKS SHOULD BE INCONCLUSIVE THE ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE TO AVOID SURFACING THE CONTACTS) AND (2) CESSATION OF MANIPULATIVE ACTIVITIES (SUCH AS RETALIATION AND THREATS) AT LEAST DURING THE COURSE OF THE TALKS.

GP-1.
SYMMES

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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6

274

PP RUEHC
DE RUOMKG 3756A 0711450
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 111425Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4864
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1344
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NY 746
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3756

CN: 2619Q

1968 MAR 11 11:23 AM

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-207
By ms, NARA, Date 11-20-02

NODIS

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION: JORDAN VIEWS

1. SUMMARY: ANWAR HUSEIBEH, WHO HAS BEEN CALLED FROM WEST BANK TO AMMAN TO DISCUSS HIS BEING FOREIGN MINISTER IN A RECONSTITUTED CABINET, TOLD AMBASSADOR HE PLANS TO DECLINE PARTICIPATION IN VIEW OF PGOSENT BLEAK PROSPECTS FOR JARRING MISSION. HE EXPRESSED REASONABLE AND MODERATE VIEWS ON DEALING WITH ISRAELIS BUT STRESSED THAT UNLESS GOI WILL MAKE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION HE IS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

2. AT REQUEST OF ABD-AL-MONEIM AL-RIFA'I AND ANWAR NUSEIBEH I CALLED ON LATTER THIS MORNING AT RIFA'I'S HOUSE, WHICH IS A SHORT WALK FROM EMBASSY. RIFA'I LEFT ALMOST UMEEDIATELY TO SEE HIKMAT AL-MASRI, WHO LIKE NUSEIBEH HAS COME TO AMMAN FROM WEST BANK AT KING'S REQUEST TO DISCUSS PARTICIPATING IN NEW CABINET. (SEE NJA-6856).

3. NUSEIBEH HAD BEEN BRIEFED THOROUGHLY BY RIFA'I ON CURRENT STATUS JARRING TALKS. HE SAID IT APPEARED OUTLOOK IS QUITE DIM. RIFA'I HAD JUST HAD A NEGATIVE REPORT FROM MAHMUD RIYAD ON HIS LATEST CONVERSATION WITH JARRING. APPARENTLY ISRAEL STILL HAD NOT ACCEPTED RESOLUTION. MOREOVER, NUSEIBEH SAID, HE PERSONALLY HAD SOME SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT UAR POSITION. RIFA'I HAD ASSURED HIM, HOWEVER, THAT IF ONLY ISRAEL WOULD STATE ITS UNEQUIVOCAL ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION AND "STOP THE MINUET", HE COULD ABSOLUTELY GUARANTEE THAT UAR WOULD PARTICIPATAMIN TALKS WITH JARRING IN CYPRUS.

4. NUSEIBEH DESCRIBED HIS UNDERSTANDING OF ISRAELI POSITION AS GAINED IN TALKS WITH VARIOUS ISRAELIS. HE HAD BEEN TOLD ISRAELIS SINCERELY DESIRE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, AN AIM THAT HE VERY MUCH SHARES. ON OTHER HAND, HE HIMSELF HAD NEVER BEEN ABLE TO FORM A CLEAR IDEA OF AN ISRAELI "MINIMUM POSITION", PARTICULARLY

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-2- AMMAN MRN 3756 MAR 11

ON JERUSALEM. HE WONDERED SOMETIMES WHY, IF THE ISRAELIS REALLY WANT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, THEY ARE SO UNWILLING TO STATE UNEQUIVOCALLY THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION. NUSEIBEH VOLUNTEERED THAT IT SEEMED TO HIM BOTH SIDES HAD BEEN PLAYING WITH WORDS. THERE HAD BEEN NO NEED FOR A SUMMIT CALL BACK IN NOVEMBER, AND JARRING AS A NEGOTIATOR SEEMED TO HAVE FALLEN INTO SEMANTIC TRAPS. WHATEVER THE BLAME, HOWEVER, FOR PRESENT STALEMATE, TIME HAD NOW COME FOR ISRAELIS TO MAKE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT OF ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION IN ORDER TO PREVENT BREAKDOWN OF JARRING MISSION AND RETURN TO SECURITY COUNCIL.

5. NUSEIBEH (SOMEWHAT NAIVELY I THOUGHT) ASKED IF USG COULD NOT PERSUADE SYRIANS TO GO ALONG WITH UAR AND JORDAN IN TAKING "NEXT STEPS" WITH JARRING. AFTER I EXPLAINED OUR PRESENT RELATIONS WITH SYRIA, HE THEN ASKED WHY USG COULD NOT GET SOVIETS TO BRING SYRIANS AROUND. NUSEIBEH SAID IT SEEMED TO HIM SOVIETS HAD MADE CLEAR TO ARABS THEY SUPPORT A FREE AND INDEPENDANT ISRAEL AT LEAST IN ITS PRE-JUNE 5 BOUNDARIES. WHAT HAD THEY TO LOSE BY NOW EXERCISING THEIR LEVERAGE ON THE SYRIANS? HE THOUGHT OUTLOOK GRIM INDEED UNLESS SOVIETS WANTED A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

6. AFTER WE HAD SURVEYED SITUATION ALONG FOREGOING LINES IN SOME DETAIL, NUSEIBEH THEN REFERRED TO REASON FOR HIS BEING IN AMMAN. HE PROBABLY WOULD BE SEEING KING HUSSEIN TOMORROW. HE PLANNED TO TELL KING THAT IN VIEW OF CURRENT BLEAK OUTLOOK FOR TALKS WITH ISRAEL HE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE BEST FOR HIM NOT TO PLAN TO PARTICIPATE IN THE RECONSTITUTED CABINET. HE COULD DO MORE GOOD BY REMAINING IN JERUSALEM AND HELPING TO MAINTAIN A SEMBLANCE OF AN ARAB PRESENCE THERE. REFERRING THEN TO US "INVOLVEMENT" IN THE SITUATION, NUSEIBEH SAID HE WOULD WELCOME MY VIEWS ON HIS THINKING

7. I PREFACED MY RESPONSE BY OBSERVING IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR ME TO SAY ANYTHING THAT COULD BE CONSTRUED AS ADVICE IN THIS MATTER. I THEN MADE GENERAL REMARKS ABOUT THE DESIREABILITY OF HAVING A WEST BANK CONSENSUS BEHIND THE KING AND THE GOJ WHEN AND IF ANY PRACTICAL TALKS WITH ISRAELIS WERE HELD. I SAID I CONSIDRED IT ESSENTIAL, IN FACT, FOR THE WEST BANK TO HAVE A SENSE OF PARTICIPATION WHETHER TALKS WITH ISRAEL WERE MULTILATERAL OR BILATERAL. QUESTION AS TO WHETHER PRESENT MOMENT WAS PROPITIOUS FOR NUSEIBEH TO PARTICIPATE IN CABINET WAS ONE WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE LEFT FOR KING HUSSEIN AND NUSEIBEH TO DECIDE.

8. NUSEIBEH COMMENTED THAT KEY TO FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS LIES IN ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION. JORDAN COULD NOT PROCEED TO MAKE SEPARATE PEACE (ALTHOUGH AT ONE POINT HE IMPLIED THIS MIGHT BE "LAST RESORT"). THUS, IF RIFA'I WAS RIGHT IN HIS CONTENTION THAT ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION WOULD BE ENOUGH TO GET UAR TO MOVE TO "NEXT STEPS", THEN IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO REMOVE THIS OBSTACLE. NUSEIBEH REFERRED TO RIFA'I'S DESCRIPTION OF RECENT US EFFORTS TO SUPPORT JARRING MISSION (AND EXPRESSED WARM THANKS) AND URGED THAT USG NOW USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH ISRAEL TO OBTAIN SUCH CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT.

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-3- AMMAN MRN 3756 MAR 11

9. AS I WAS LEAVING NUSEIBEH SAID HE EXPECTED HE WOULD RETURN TO JERUSALEM ON WEDNESDAY AND THAT HE WOULD HOPE TO MAINTAIN DISCREET CONTACT WITH CONSUL GENERAL CAMPBELL. HE INDICATED AGAIN THAT WHEN HE SEES THE KING TOMORROW HE WILL ASK TO BE EXCUSED FROM PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENT AT THIS TIME. HE WOULD EXPRESS HIS WILLINGNESS TO COME BACK, HOWEVER, WHEN THERE SEEMED TO BE SOME HOPE FOR FORWARD MOVEMENT.

10. COMMENT: IT WAS REFRESHING AND STIMULATING TO TALK TO NUSEIBEH, WHO WAS MODERATE AND REASONABLE THROUGHOUT OUR CONVERSATION. WE ALL KNOW HE IS NOT BY ANY MEANS FULLY REPRESENTATIVE OF WEST BANKERS BUT IT IS ALWAYS REASSURING TO KNOW THAT SOME WEST BANKERS LIKE HIM STILL EXIST. I WAS GRATIFIED BY EFFIDENCE THAT WEST BANKERS LIKE NUSEIBEH ARE PREPARED TO STAND BEHIND KING IF THERE IS SOME HOPE OF PROGRESS.

11. RIFA'I TOLD ME THAT JARRING IS DUE IN AMMAN ON THURSDAY. WE HAVE BEEN REMINDED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THAT IN TALKS LEADING UP TO ADOPTION OF NOV 22 RESOLUTION JORDAN WAS TOLD BY US OFFICIALS THAT ISRAEL HAD ACCEPTED THE FORMULATION. JORDANIANS NOW ASK WHY, IF THIS WAS TRUE, ISRAEL FINDS IT SO DIFFICULT TO STATE ITS ACCEPTANCE NOW. WHY CANNOT ISRAEL SAY SOMETHING LIKE THE FOLLOWING:

"THE GOI HAS ACCEPTED THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF NOVEMBER 22, 1967, AND HAS INDICATED TO AMBASSADOR JARRING THAT IT IS PREPARED TO PROCEED TO ITS IMPLEMENTATION THROUGH APPROPRIATE DISCUSSIONS UNDER HIS AUSPICES." WE HERE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO STATE WHETHER FOREGOING FORMULATION WOULD MEET UAR NEEDS, BUT IF JORDANIANS ARE CORRECT IN THEIR ESTIMATE OF UAR POSITION IT OUGHT TO BE SUFFICIENT.

12. WE VERY MUCH HOPE THAT IF GOI DID NOT "ACCEPT" RESOLUTION YESTERDAY USG WILL NOW USE ITS INFLUENCE TO TRY TO REMOVE THE SEMANTIC OBSTACLES FOWARD MOTION. END COMMENT.

13. IN VIEW NUSEIBEH'S COMMENTS ABOUT CAMPBELL DEPT MAY WISH TO REPEAT THIS MESSAGE TO JERUSALEM FOR CAMPBELL'S EYES ONLY. DEPT MAY ALSO WISH TO REPEAT TO CAIRO.

SYMMES
BT

NOTE: PASSED TO TEL AVIV BY OC/T MAR 11.
NOT PASSED TO USUN BY OC/T

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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1968 MAR 9 AM 6 11

DE RUQMAT 3749A 0690935

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 090925Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO ZEN/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 1338
INFO RUEHCR/DOD PRIORITY
RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 4859
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3749

NODIS

JOINT EMBASSY/DATT MESSAGE

SUBJECT: CONSULTATION RE ANTI-INFILTRATION DEVICES

REF: STATE 127184

1. MILES P. SEELEY, USAID PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION, AND LT. COL. HOWARD B. THOMPSON, ASST ARMY ATTACHE, SCHEDULED ARRIVE BEIRUT ME 311, MORNING MONDAY, MARCH 11, FOR CONSULTATION WITH DR. ZIRKIND PER REFTTEL.

2. RE PARA 1 SUGGESTION DATT ATTEND, PREFERABLE HE NOT LEAVE AMMAN AT THIS TIME DUE ABSENCE HIS ASSISTANT ON LEAVE. PLEASE INFORM CINCSRIKE THAT LT. COL. THOMPSON, MAP, WILL BE ABSENT FROM JORDAN MARCH 11-12.

SYMMES

BT

NOTE: NOT PASSED DOD

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-207
By us NARA, Date 11-20-02

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

296/6

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RR RUEHC
DE RUQMKG 3667A 0611700
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 011655Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4814
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3667

4 3 0Q
MARCH 2, 1968
3:03 A.M.

NODIS

JOINT EMBASSY/DATT MESSAGE

NODIS

SUBJECT: JORDANIAN REQUEST FOR ANTI-INFILTRATION EQUIPMENT

REF: STATE 1193114

1. WE ARE CONSIDERING SENDING EMBREP TO MEET WITH DR. ZIRKING IN BEIRT MARCH 11-12 TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE USG ASSISTANCE TO JORDANIANS IN DEVELOPMENT ANTI-INFILTRATION TECHNIQUES.
2. RE QUESTIONS RAISED REFTTEL, DEPT WILL RECALL THERE WAS SURVEY UNDERTAKEN IN JORDAN BY DOD ANTI-INFILTRATION EXPERT WHO ACCOMPANIED AMB MACOMBER ON HIS SPECIAL MISSION HERE IN DEC. 1966. WE DO NOT HAVE A COPY OF THIS REPORT IN COUNTRY AND ALL RECORDS PERTAINING TO THIS VISIT WERE DESTROYED DURING GENERAL DESTRUCTION OF EMB FILES LAST JUNE. STATE AND DOD WILL ALSO RECALL THAT ALTHOUGH FOLLOW-UP PRESENTATION ON THIS REPORT WAS TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY ARPA OFFICER FROM EMB BEIRUT LAST FEB OR MARCH, KHAMMASH FOR VARIETY OF REASONS WAS UNAVAILABLE AND IT WAS NEVER MADE.
3. BASIC PROBLEM FOR JORDANIANS IS THAT THEY NEITHER KNOW WHAT TYPE OF ANTI-INFILTRATIO SYSTEM THEY DESIRE NOR ARE THEY AWARE OF WHAT EQUIPMENT WE HAVE TO OFFER. USG ORIGINALLY TOOK INITIATIVE TO SUGGEST THAT SUCH SYSTEM MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR JORDAN IN DEC 1966 IN WAKE OF SAMUS ATTACK. GOJ IS NO MORE SOPHISTICATED ABOUT ANTI-INFILTRATION SYSTEMS TODAY THAN IT WAS AT THAT TIME. JORDANIAN REQUEST IN JANUARY 1968 WHILE SHARPLY FOCUSED ON CURRENT PROBLEMS IS ESSENTIALLY A FOLLOW-UP TO DEC 1966 SURVEY.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-234
By isa, NARA, Date 7-22-03

~~SECRET~~

-2- AMMAN 3667, MARCH 1. N O D I S

4. GOJ'S PRESENT REQUEST IS FOR EXPERT ADVICE ON TACTICS (SUCH AS PATROL AND AMBUSH TECHNIQUES) AS WELL AS FOR DEVICES WHICH MIGHT BE USEFUL AIDS IN ANTI-INFILTRATION PROGRAM. DEVICES WOULD HAVE TO BE USED SECRETLY WITH MINIMUM NUMBER OF PEOPLE AWARE OF REAL PURPOSE. BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS DICTATE GOJ INVESTMENT IN HARDWARE WOULD BE MINIMAL. ADDED FACTOR IS THAT PROGRAM SHOULD NOT GIVE SEMBLANCE OF PERMANENCE TO PRESENT CEASEFIRE LINE.

5. THEREFORE SUGGEST THAT PRIOR DR. ZIRKING'S ARRIVAL BEIRUT, WASHINGTON ADDRESSEES REVIEW INFORMATION AVAILABLE PERTAINING INFILTRATION THREAT IN JORDAN, ESPECIALLY FROM SYRIAN BORDER AND THROUGH JORDAN VALLEY, INCLUDING NATURE OF TOPOGRAPHY. IF WE WANT TO ENCOURAGE JORDANIAN INITIATIVE AGAINST GUERRILLA INFILTRATION AND EXFILTRATION VIA THIS COURSE, IT IS OUR EXPERTISE WHICH IS MOST LIKELY TO BE USEFUL. IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE, FOR EXAMPLE, AS FIRST STEP FOR MILITARY AND SECURITY OFFICIALS CONCERNED TO TALK ABOUT TACTICS WITH DOD OR OTHER USG OFFICIALS WHO HAVE DEALT WITH INFILTRATION PROBLEM IN VIET NAM, RATHER THAN DISCUSS WHAT WE UNDERSTAND TO BE EXPENSIVE ELECTRONIC OR OTHER DEVICES.

6. WE AGREE, AS DO JORDANIANS, THAT ANY US ROLE IS TO BE WORDED SECRET EVEN IF AS IN THE CASE OF ISRAEL, WE SHOULD JUDGE IT TO BE IN OUR INTEREST TO BEAR PART OF THE COST AS WELL AS TO FURNISH ADVICE AND EQUIPMENT. SYMMES

GP-2

BT

~~SECRET~~

145603

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

(7)

A 278

Origin ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN PRIORITY

11 Apr 68 23 50z

Info: NODIS

STATE: 145603

REF: Amman's 4266

(circled symbol)

F S

SUBJECT: Arab-Israeli Eban Message.

Should King Hussein seek our reaction to proposal carried by Hikmat Al-Masri, suggest you reply along following lines:

1. Notwithstanding strong U.S. desire seek progress toward settlement, because of considerable risk for Hussein we believe we must leave decision to him.
2. At the same time, we recognize pressures mounting within the status quo may prove a greater danger in the longer term.
3. While there are elements in Eban message we do not like, it does represent a significant Israeli initiative and a possible opening.
4. As made clear in November discussions with Hussein in the U.S., we cannot guarantee to deliver Israel on any

/specific

Drafted by:	4/11/68	Tel. Ext.	2107	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:	U - Mr. Katzenbach
Clearances:	S/S - Mr. Walsh			IO - Mr. Sisco	
	NEA - Mr. Battle				
	NEA/ARN - Mr. Houghton				

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, Vol. 44 # 143
By *h* NARA, Date 9-20-01

Page 2 of telegram to AMMAN PRIORITY

145003

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

specific issue but would use our influence to get the best deal possible for Jordan. We adhere to the views expressed then.

112:011 50z

5. FYI You will recall at that time we made clear we could not envisage a viable Jordan without return of the West Bank. We believe there must be withdrawal of Israeli forces to recognized and secure frontiers but not, necessarily, the old armistice lines. We believe there could be adjustments of these lines based on security and economic considerations but that there must be mutuality in adjustments. As Ambassador Goldberg noted, for example, "If Jordan makes an adjustment along the Latrun salient there ought to be some compensatory adjustment for it." Jerusalem, we recognize, is probably the most difficult issue involved in any settlement, but even here we are prepared to be helpful. We are willing to use our influence to see what arrangements can be worked out for an appropriate Jordanian role in Jerusalem. END FYI.

6. If King should not raise this matter with you in next few days, we may wish to reassess the situation to determine whether we should take initiative.

GP-1

END

RUSK

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

137662

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

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379

Origin ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN PRIORITY

28 Mar 68 01 30z

Info: INFO: Amembassy TEL AVIV
USUN NEW YORK

STATE 137662

Rostow
cc - Saunders

N O D I S

State

REF: ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ 136930.

1. In your discretion you may draw on report of Rostow-Evron conversation reported reftel to give GOJ flavor of present Israeli attitudes and indication of our efforts forestall further Israeli attacks. We shall continue those efforts, as we oppose retaliatory raids just as we do terrorism, but we are not sanguine that these efforts will prevail with GOI for long in the absence of a serious and successful effort on the part of the Arabs to reduce sharply the incidence of terrorist activity. Although we appreciate Hussein's problem in controlling terrorism in the absence of progress towards a settlement, we at the same time believe that no Israeli Government can resist internal political

Drafted by: NEA/ARN:RBHoughton/mc/dmg 3/27/68	NEA/IAI:ALatherton	Tel. Ext. 5617	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: Nicholas deB XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX NEA - Mr. BATTLE
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Clearances:
NEA - Rodger P. Davies
S/S - Mr. Parker

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~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, Vol. 44, # 126
By [Signature] NARA, Date 9-20-01

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

pressures for military action if terrorism continues in Israeli territory. Underlining this assessment is British report that Eban told Foreign Secretary Stewart in London on March 25 that he realized March 21 raid conflicted with Israel's long-term aim of negotiated settlement, but, given growing intensity of terrorism, security considerations were overriding for GOI.

2. Just settlement acceptable to both sides is obviously only real solution to terrorist problem and we are actively studying ways we can assist Jarring's efforts towards settlement. However, if terrorism retaliatory raids cycle continues, situation will quickly degenerate to point of no return. We have and will continue to work for more flexibility in Israeli position, but it is imperative that Jordanians demonstrate significant measure of control over terrorist activity. Unfortunately, we have no blueprint to offer the Jordanians for controlling terrorism, but would suggest renewed offer of early secret talks between senior military officers, if necessary under UN auspices, might be a means of expressing GOJ's desire to control terrorism as far as its capabilities permit. We urge Jordan consider advantages of UN presence on cease-fire line.

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

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~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ We most strongly hope if a Summit Conference is held that GOJ would make unmistakably clear need for curbing terrorism. In stressing the necessity of stopping terrorism, we are not unmindful of efforts GOJ has taken or of moderate and constructive course GOJ has followed. We have particularly in mind the King's press conference on March 23. We are concerned by present situation in which dangerous trend away from peace appears to be unfolding and are using what influence in concerned capitals we have to reverse trend. We hope conclusion arms negotiations will be considered an earnest of US interest in providing support for King in his effort chart course through these troubled waters to a just settlement so urgently needed by the peoples of the Near East.

GP-3

END

RUSK

~~SECRET-NODIS~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~-NODIS

MFG. 4-67

133116

(A)

W/D

280

20 MAR 68 01 22z

Origin ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE
Amembassy TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

Info: INFO: USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

STATE 133116

NODIS

SUBJECT: ISRAEL-JORDAN

Ref: TEL AVIV 2916

1. FOR AMMAN: Particularly in light recent bus incident on Eilat Road, Department believes there is considerable merit in suggestion contained last para reftel. Jordanian initiative suggested might well have dampening effect on any Israeli inclination for retaliation bus incident. We fully understand political problem such meeting involves for Hussein, but suggest Ambassador should consider making suggestion to him in light above context.
2. FOR TEL AVIV: Subject confirmation from Ambassador Symmes that he is making approach suggested above, you may inform Eban we are actively pursuing with GOJ his request to you for assistance in this matter. In doing so, suggest you draw on AMMAN 3880 to underline importance of Israeli restraint in response Eilat bus incident, which we of course regret and deplore just as we do much larger Jordanian loss of life in reprisals such as that of February 15.


GP-3

END

RUSK

Drafted by: NEA/ARN:RBHoughton/IAI:ALatherton/	Tel. Ext. 5617	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: NEA - Rodger P. Davies
Clearances: mc 3/19/68		

IO/UNP - Mr. Day

S/S - Mr. Kelly 

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
NLJ-S 98001

~~SECRET~~-NODIS

FORM 8-65 DS-322

By 76/14 NARA, Date 10/1/01

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~

127184

281

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Origin ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN PRIORITY
Info: Amembassy BEIRUT PRIORITY

8 MAR 68 23 07z

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-234
By us NARA, Date 7-22-03

STATE 127184

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Jordanian Request for Anti-infiltration Equipment

REF: AMMAN 3667 (NOTAL); BEIRUT 7254

N O D I SFOR AMMAN:

1. Dr. Zirkind, OSDA/ARPA, plans meet with Embassy Amman reps in Beirut on 11-12 March as suggested reftel. Assume from reftel that no repeat no JAA personnel will attend. Suggest DATT be included in party. Since Zirkind departing Washington March 9, request all cables this subject be repeated Beirut for Zirkind.
2. The December 1966 survey cited reftel was, in fact, a reconnaissance rather than a survey. An actual survey would take about 4-5 weeks. Principal conclusions of

Drafted by: DOD/ISA:Mr. Murray/
NEA/ARN:MWiley:dmg 3/7/68

Tel. Ext. 3236

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - Lucius D. Battle

Clearances: DOD/ARPA - Dr. Zirkind
DOD/ISA - Mr. Quinn
NEA/ARN - Mr. Houghton
NEA - Mr. Davies

S/S - Mr. Walsh

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Page 2 of telegram to Amembassies AMMAN and BEIRUT

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December reconnaissance, full details of which familiar to Zirkind, as follows:

a. Recon limited to West Bank and Syrian border areas, and movements of party highly constrained by weather.

b. Numerous crossing points make detection and control of infiltrators from Jordan into Israel particularly difficult.

c. Brigade commanders and lower level officers allegedly not concerned with infiltration into Israel from Jordan but rather anti regime activities. Terrorist operations against Israel were considered by these officers to be Israel's problem.

d. Intelligence from indigenous population decreases as disenchantment with Hussein or Hussein's policies increases. (i.e., local Arabs support anti-Israel guerrilla operations).

e. There is a range of technical devices which can resist in the detection of infiltrators; but

f. JAA personnel encountered were uniformly skeptical of usefulness of intrusion detection devices: "complicated, expensive, ineffective."

3. Zirkind fully aware of December 1966 reconnaissance, of range of detection devices that could be made available to Jordan and their

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Page 3 of telegram to Amembassies AMMAN and BEIRUT

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technical characteristics and approximate cost, and tactics. Believe Zirkind and Embassy reps will be able to put together next steps in this area.

4. We are concerned by the increasing unpopularity of GOJ's policy of interdicting terrorists, not only with the public but with some elements of Jordan's uniformed services. In assisting the GOJ in surpressing terrorism we would want to procede in a way which would not create any unnecessary antagonism towards the regime. Anti-infiltration devices would of course be useless if there is no rpt no desire or will to use them to best advantage. Embassy's views requested on how effective program can be established with minimum potential adverse reaction to regime and U.S. interests.

5. Re secrecy, it is possible that employment of detection devices themselves can be kept secret for some time. Nevertheless, the enforcement measures themselves obviously cannot be kept secret.

FOR BEIRUT:

6. Concur your recommendation that Zirkind meet with DAO and RDFO(ME) personnel who could later brief appropriate members of Lebanese military (Beirut 7254). Assume Amman Emboff and possibly DATT will be included in Zirkind presentation in Beirut. Please coordinate timing, etc. directly with Amman.

GP-3

END

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