

PROCESSING NOTE

The Archives staff numbered the documents contained in the National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Volume V as one file. However, the documents filed in the Cables portion of Volume V are contained in Box 147, and the documents contained in the Memos of Volume V are contained in Box 148. The withdrawal sheets for the documents in the Cables portion are in Box 147, and the withdrawal sheets for the Memos portion are in Box 148.

REGINA GREENWELL
Senior Archivist

September 25, 2001

volume 5, cables: documents 1-281
volume 5, memos: documents 282-347

283 cable Intelligence Information Cable S 7p 6/11/68 A
 Exempt 12/5/03 NSJ 02-247 exempt 7/21/15 per NSJ/RAC 15-36

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
286	notes	Speaking Notes OPEN 6.12.03 NW 02-261	S	2	11/4/68	A
287	memo	Harold Saunders to Walt Rostow OPEN 10-10-03 NW 02-206	S	1	10/11/68	A
290	cable	Amman 7588 Sanitized per RAC 09/11/2000 same sanitization 7/21/15 per NSJ/RAC 15-37 same sanitization 8-25-03 NW 02-255	S	1	11/23/68	A
297	cable	Amman 7623 Corrected Copy OPEN 6.12.03 NW 02-261	S	1	11/27/68	A
298	cable	Amman 7623 OPEN 6/6/03 NSJ 02-261	S	1	11/27/68	A
302	cable	Amman 7768 OPEN 6.12.03 NW 02-261	S	1	12/5/68	A
303	cable	Amman 7678 OPEN 6.12.03 NW 02-261	S	1	12/2/68	A
304	cable	Amman 7774 OPEN 6.12.03 NW 02-261	S	3	12/6/68	A
305	cable	Amman 7831 OPEN 6.12.03 NW 02-261	S	3	12/10/68	A
307	cable	Amman 7822 OPEN 6.12.03 NW 02-261	S	2	12/9/68	A
309	memo	Walt Rostow to LBJ Sanitized per RAC, 09/11/2000 (dup., #32, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol., 53, Box 26) OPEN NLJ 019-026-206	S	1	12/6/67	A
309b	report	Intelligence report re Jordan Arms Sanitized per RAC, 09/11/2000 (dup., #32a, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 53, Box 26) same sanitization 5-10-04 NSJ 02-259 OPEN 11/19/14	S	6	12/5/67	A

Collection Title National Security File, Country File

Folder Title Jordan, Vol. V, Memos

Box Number 148

Restriction Codes

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LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
313	cable	Amman 7312 <i>OPEN 6.12.03 NLJ 02-261</i>	S	2	11/1/68	A
314	cable	Amman 7317 <i>OPEN 6.12.03 NLJ 02-261</i>	S	1	11/2/68	A
316	cable	Amman 7409 <i>OPEN 6.12.03 NLJ 02-261</i>	S	2	11/11/68	A
319	cable	Amman 7348 <i>OPEN 6.12.03 NLJ 02-261</i>	S	2	11/6/68	A
322	report	Intelligence Report <i>exempt 10-10-03 NLJ 02-245</i> <i>exempt 9/30/14 per NLJ/RAC 13-109</i>	S	18	10/7/68	A
323	memo	John Foster to Walt Rostow <i>sanitized 10-10-03 NLJ 02-206</i> <i>same sanitization 5/23/19 per NLJ 15-43</i> <i>Exempt #8, NSF, Files of Saunders, "Jordan, 11/1/67-1/20/69" Box 22}</i>	C	1	8/28/68	A
328a	memo	Intelligence memo Exempt per RAC, 09/11/2000 (dup., #24a, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 85, Box 37) <i>exempt 9/30/14 per NLJ/RAC 13-109</i> <i>exempt 5-10-04 NLJ 02-257</i>	S	3	6/29/68	A
329	memo	Walt Rostow to LBJ (dup., #15, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 84, Box 36) <i>sanitized 6-17-02 NLJ/RAC 0189 in duplicate 10-21</i> <i>more info released 1/13/10 per NLJ 15-44</i>	S	1	6/27/68	A
329a	memo	Intelligence memo Exempt per RAC, 09/11/2000 (dup., #15a, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 84, Box 36) <i>exempt 9/30/14 per NLJ/RAC 13-109</i> <i>sanitized 9/30/02 - exempt NLJ 02-257</i> <i>exempt 5-10-04 NLJ 02-257</i>	S	3	6/26/68	A
331	memo	Intelligence memo Exempt per RAC, 09/11/2000 <i>exempt 5-10-04 NLJ 02-257</i> <i>exempt 9/30/14 per NLJ/RAC 13-109</i>	S	1	5/24/68	A
331a	memo	Intelligence memo Exempt per RAC, 09/11/2000 <i>exempt 5-10-04 NLJ 02-257</i> <i>exempt 9/30/14 per NLJ/RAC 13-109</i>	S	3	5/22/68	A
336	memo	Harold Saunders to Walt Rostow <i>sanitized 6-25-03 NLJ 02-256</i> <i>same sanitization 1/13/10 per NLJ 15-44</i> <i>Exempt per RAC, 09/11/2000</i> <i>Exempt Aug. #22, NSF, Files of Saunders, "Jordan, 11/1/67-1/20/69" Box 22}</i>	S	1	4/17/68	A

Collection Title National Security File, Country File

Folder Title Jordan, Vol. V, Memos

Box Number 148

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LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
336a	cable	State 147492 to Amman	S	2	4/16/68	A
<i>Open 6-27-03 NW/RAC 02-246</i>						
336b	memo	Intelligence memo [Exempt per RAC, 09/11/2000] Exempt 5-10-04 NLS 02-257	S	3	4/15/68	A
<i>[dup #7 Jordan "Filed by LBJ Library" Box 48] Exempt 9/30/14 per NLS/RAC 13-169</i>						
336c	memo	Intelligence memo [Sanitized per RAC, 09/11/2000] more info released 5-10-04 NLS 02-257	S	2	1/25/68	A
<i>[dup #7 Jordan "Filed by LBJ Library" Box 48] [dup #94b, NSF, Files of Saunders "Jordan", 11/16/7 - 1/26/69] Box 22]</i>						
337	memo	Walt Rostow to LBJ [Exempt per NLJ 97-273, 3/2000] (dup., #36, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 71, Box 32)	S	1	4/10/68	A
<i>[dup #7 Jordan "Filed by LBJ Library" Box 48] Exempt 1/24/14 per NLS/RAC B110</i>						
337a	cable	Amman 4264	C	2	4/8/68	A
<i>Open 6-12-03 NW 02-261</i>						
337b	report	Intelligence report [Exempt per NLJ 97-271, 11/1999] (dup, #36b, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 71, Box 32)	S	2	4/9/68	A
<i>Exempt 9/30/14 per NLS/RAC 13-169</i>						
338	airgram	A-266 from Amman	S	1	4/5/68	A
<i>Open 6-12-03 NW 02-261</i>						
340a	memo	Intelligence memo	S	4	3/25/68	A
<i>Exempt 9-14-05 NLS 05-916 Exempt 9/30/14 per NLS/RAC 13-169</i>						
343	memo	Harold Saunders to Walt Rostow	S	2	3/14/68	A
<i>Open 10-10-03 NW 02-206</i>						
344	memo	John Foster to Walt Rostow	S	2	3/13/68	A
<i>Open 10-10-03 NW 02-206</i>						

Collection Title National Security File, Country File

Folder Title Jordan, Vol. V, Memos

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<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
284	cable	Intelligence Information Cable - Sanitized per RAC, 9/11/2000	S	3	3/15/68	A
<i>same sanitization 12-5-03 NW 02-21-07</i>						
<i>same sanitization 7/21/15 per NLS/RAC 15-36</i>						
300	cable	Intelligence cable	TS-	1	12/4/68	A
<i>EXEMPT 9.14.05 NW 05.97</i>						
310	cable	Intelligence cable	TS-	6	8/14/68	A
<i>EXEMPT 9.14.05 NW 05.97</i>						
310a	cable	Intelligence cable	TS-	2	8/14/68	A
<i>EXEMPT 9.14.05 NW 05.97</i>						

Collection Title National Security File, Country File

Folder Title Jordan, Vol. V, Cables

Box Number 147

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282

CIA

7 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE
IN 71423 284

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS
DDI EXO OER FBIS DCS IRS AID USIA

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

152018Z

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

DIST 15 MARCH 1968

COUNTRY: JORDAN/UAR/USSR

DOI:

3.3(b)(1)

SUBJECT: TASS REPRESENTATIVE BORIS URONOV'S VIEWS REGARDING
THE UAR AND THE PROSPECTS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

ACQ:

SOURCE:

3.3(b)(1)

1. WHEN ASKED BY ONE OF HIS PROFESSIONAL JORDANIAN
COLLEAGUES ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST,
BORIS URONOV, TASS REPRESENTATIVE AND KNOWN GRU OFFICER IN
AMMAN, STATED CATEGORICALLY THAT THERE MUST BE AND WOULD BE
A POLITICAL, RATHER THAN MILITARY, SOLUTION. URONOV SAID

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/IRAC 15-316

NARA, Date 05-13-2015

By 443

~~S E C R E T NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

(classification) (dissem. controls)

HE BELIEVED UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE DR. GUNNAR JARRING'S CURRENT EFFORTS WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL.

2. WHEN ASKED TO DEFINE THE APPARENTLY CONFLICTING STATEMENTS FROM THE UAR REGARDING PROSPECTS FOR WAR OR PEACE, URONOV SAID THAT UAR PRESIDENT JAMAL ABD-AL-NASIR "TALKS TOO MUCH. ONE DAY HE SAYS ONE THING, THE NEXT DAY HE SAYS ANOTHER. ANYWAY, NASIR HAS SEVERE INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND HIS HOLD OVER THE COUNTRY IS NOT SETTLED." REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP IN THE UAR, WHICH THE JORDANIAN DISCOUNTED, URONOV SAID, "THERE WAS ALREADY ONE COUP ATTEMPT THERE AFTER 5 JUNE." [REDACTED] COMMENT: THIS REFERS TO THE ATTEMPT BY MARSHAL ABD-AL-HAKIM AMIR.) URONOV STATED, "AFTER ALL, THERE IS NO WAY TO TELL WHETHER A COUP GROUP IS GOOD OR BAD UNTIL IT SUCCEEDS. IF IT IS PROPERLY REVOLUTIONARY, IT IS GOOD; IF IT IS AGAINST THE PEOPLE, IT IS BAD." URONOV DECLINED TO NAME THE GOOD AND PROPERLY REVOLUTIONARY ARAB LEADERS, BUT HE SAID, "KING FAYSAL OF SAUDI ARABIA IS THE MOST REACTIONARY LEADER, AND NASIR TALKS TOO MUCH."

3. [REDACTED] COMMENT: URONOV HAS SPOKEN IN THE PAST ABOUT THE NECESSITY FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB/ISRAELI

~~S E C R E T NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

[Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

~~S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

CONFLICT, BUT NEVER BEFORE HAS HE SPOKEN AGAINST NASIR. ON THE CONTRARY, HE HAS VOCALLY SUPPORTED NASIR AND DEFENDED EXTENSIVE SOVIET AID TO THE UAR. THIS MAY SIGNAL SOME SOVIET DISENCHANTMENT WITH NASIR, AS WELL AS SOME DOUBTS WHETHER NASIR CAN REMAIN IN POWER.)

4. [Redacted] DISSEM: STATE ARMY CINCMEAFSA CINCUSNAVEUR CINC SOUTH (PERSONAL). [Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)

[Redacted] USUN.)

3.3(b)(1)

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

BT

~~SECRET~~

285

Defense

NODIS

Amb. J. Egan left this paper with the Secretary

*286
JFK - Jordan JPC
WH 6*

~~TOP SECRET~~

NODIS / SANDSTORM

Read at White House 11/6/68 AM

SPEAKING NOTES FOR USE WITH MR. RUSK ON 4 NOVEMBER 1968.

(Handwritten initials)

MIDDLE EAST

The news from Amman is very worrying and I wonder if King Hussein will be able to keep control of the situation. I understand that King Hussein has appealed to you, as he has to us, to make one more effort to convince the Israelis of the need for Mr. Eban to say something sufficiently constructive to enable negotiations through Jarring to go forward. No doubt King Hussein calculates that, if his Foreign Minister is unable to pursue the negotiations in New York and is obliged to return empty-handed, the pressures on his regime from the terrorists and others who wish to pursue the war against Israel à l'outrance will become intolerable. Do you have any idea of what Mr. Eban has brought back with him? Do you think further pressure from you or us on the Israelis could be effective?

2. King Hussein has given our Ambassador in Amman in the strictest confidence some further information on his bilateral negotiations with the Israelis, without revealing the channel being used. He said that the Israelis had sent a message outlining their proposals for dealing with the various aspects of a settlement; while ready to cede almost all of the West Bank, they wanted the area demilitarized and a small Israeli force stationed on a line running southwards from the point at which the old armistice line leaves the Jordan River to just north of Jericho. On Jerusalem the Israelis were prepared to give Jordan a corridor under Jordanian sovereignty leading to the Moslem Holy Places which (as far as our Ambassador was able to understand) would be under "Moslem administration". The Israelis also proposed free movement of people and goods in the Jerusalem area and probably all along the proposed new border. On refugees the Israelis had proposed as a first step a meeting between officials of the two governments to consider what could be done.

3. King Hussein in his reply had said that security would depend not on the presence of troops but on mutual trust and he for his part was prepared to work for that. A corridor to Jerusalem was not enough; Jordan insisted that something like the former Arab part of the city should return to Arab sovereignty and he would like to hear some specific Israeli proposals on this. On the refugees he had said that the problem was one the Israel and Jordan governments alone could not solve and he would prefer the question to be discussed in a larger forum. King Hussein also asked for specific Israeli proposals on Gaza, commenting that the strip should be dealt with in the same way as the rest of the territory of Palestine. In conclusion the King had said to the Israelis that he was prepared to continue the dialogue through the secret channel, but that all proposals relating to a settlement should be made within the framework of Resolution 240 and in accordance with the principles contained in that Resolution. He would await the next Israeli move.

~~TOP SECRET~~

NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NJL 02-261
By *iss*, NARA, Date *6-6-03*

~~TOP SECRET~~

4. The King commented to our Ambassador that whether or not discussion through the secret channel achieved positive results it was essential for Jordan that contacts through Jarring should also take place. As he saw it, the Jarring channel was the basic one and the other would be used mainly to clear up differences which might arise in it. But before anything else could happen it was essential for the Israelis to come out clearly on the point of implementation of the Resolution.

5. All this points to the crucial importance of Mr. Eban's instructions. King Hussein's dilemma is an acute one: he desperately needs a satisfactory Israeli statement to be able to sell the idea of negotiations to his own people and the rest of the Arab world. But if he does not go forward with negotiations through Jarring, the bankruptcy of his previous policy of seeking a negotiated peace will be exposed and the pressures on him to adopt a more extreme course will become still more acute. He also needs the negotiations badly to justify the measures he is taking against terrorist groups in Jordan and the further measures which may be necessary to retain control of the internal situation. Everything now depends on the Israelis; I wish I were more sure that the Israeli Cabinet as a whole (as distinct from Mr. Eban) had a full realisation of longer-term danger of allowing the Hashemite regime to founder.

~~TOP SECRET~~

287

~~SECRET~~

October 11, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Will Jordan Sign a Peace Treaty?

You asked me whether Harry Symmes believes that the Jordanians will sign a peace treaty. I asked him the question myself yesterday at lunch. His answer is two-fold:

1. He himself has not discussed this directly with the Jordanians in specific terms, because he has had to be careful to avoid the appearance of becoming a broker between Israel and Jordan.

2. He does not rule out the possibility. As he put it, "Hussein wants peace so badly, he can taste it." He feels that we have underestimated Hussein's willingness to make a settlement with Israel by himself. If he can get terms that he feels he can sell to his people and to other Arabs--or even in good conscience defend--then he will settle separately. Whether or not that concludes a classic peace treaty Harry cannot say, but the process of settlement he envisions would be all but.

Symmes just last week delivered to Foreign Minister Rifai almost exactly the same kind of lecture you would give on this subject. In fact, what Harry says he told Rifai sounds almost word for word what you reported to me from Arthur Krim--that the Jordanians have a very important card in their hands in their ability to offer real peace to Israel and they should not underestimate the importance of such an offer.

Harold H. Saunders

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-206
By js, NARA, Date 8-25-03

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

288 WJ
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

201645Z NOV 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6785
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 7548

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, # 328
By g NARA, Date 9-20-01
57 17 Q

Robtow

1968 NOV 20 PM 12 26

NODIS SANDSTORM

REF TEL AVIV 6152, AMMAN 7409

1. SINCE I HAD ASSUMED OUR POSITION ON TERRITORIAL ASSURANCES FOR HUSSEIN WAS ALREADY WELL KNOWN TO ISRAEL (I UNDERSTOOD WE HAD IMMEDIATELY INFORMED ISRAEL WHAT WE TOLD HUSSEIN IN NOVEMBER 1967) AND PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF STATE 270935 AND 272847, EBAN'S STATEMENTS ON "UNPOPULATED AREAS" REPORTED IN TEL AVIV 6152 ARE SOMEWHAT DISCONCERTING. WHEN I SAW KING HUSSEIN ON NOVEMBER 9 (AMMAN 7409), I READ TO HIM THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES FROM THE MEMORANDUM ON THE "U.S. POSITION AS PRESENTED TO HUSSEIN ON NOVEMBER 6, 1967.) QTE THE UNITED STATES, AS A MATTER OF POLICY, DOES NOT ENVISAGE A JORDAN WHICH CONSISTS ONLY OF THE EAST BANK. THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO SUPPORT A RETURN OF THE WEST BANK TO JORDAN WITH MINOR BOUNDARY RECTIFICATIONS. HOWEVER, THE UNITED STATES WOULD USE ITS INFLUENCE TO OBTAIN COMPENSATION TO JORDAN FOR ANY TERRITORY IT IS REQUIRED TO GIVE UP. FOR EXAMPLE, IF JORDAN IS REQUIRED TO GIVE UP THE LATROUN SALIENT, THE USG WILL USE ITS INFLUENCE TO OBTAIN IN COMPENSATION ACCESS FOR JORDAN TO A MEDITERRANEAN PORT IN ISRAEL. FINALLY, ALTHOUGH AS A MATTER OF POLICY WE DO NOT AGREE WITH JORDAN'S POSITION ON JERUSALEM, NOR DO WE AGREE WITH THE ISRAELI POSITION ON JERUSALEM, WE ARE PREPARED TO USE OUR INFLUENCE TO OBTAIN FOR JORDAN A ROLE IN JERUSALEM. IN SHORT, WE ARE PREPARED TO MAKE A MAXIMUM EFFORT TO OBTAIN FOR JORDAN THE BEST POSSIBLE DEAL IN TERMS OF SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL. UNQTE.

2. THE TERRITORIAL ASSURANCES THAT WE HAVE GIVEN HUSSEIN ARE MANIFESTLY INCONSISTENT WITH ANY PROPOSAL THAT WOULD PLACE "CERTAIN UNPOPULATED AREAS OF WEST BANK" UNDER ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY OR JURISDICTION. THE RELEVANCE OF "UNPOPULATED AREAS" TO "MINOR BORDER RECTIFICATIONS" IS, OF COURSE, ANOTHER MOOT POINT. (INCIDENTALLY, THE JORDAN GOVT'S 1961 MAPS ON THE "DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION" AND "POPULATION DENSITY" SHOW VERY GRAPHICALLY THAT THE ONLY "UNPOPULATED AREAS" ON THE WEST BANK LIE ALONG THE PRESENT CEASEFIRE LINE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN. THESE MAPS ARE IN VOL. FOUR OF THE GOJ DEPT OF STATISTICS "FIRST CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING" PUBLISHED IN APRIL 1965. A SIMILAR GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF THE

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PRESERVATION COPY

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-2- AMMAN 7548, 201645Z NOV, (NODIS/SANDSTORM)

POPULATION COMPEXION OF THE WEST BANK IS SHOWN ON "THE POPULATION OF THE WEST BANK BY SETTLEMENTS, NOVEMBER 1967", PUBLISHED BY THE ISRAELI CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS IN 1967.) AS I READ PARA 1 OF TEL AVIV 6152, EBAN SEEMS TO BE SAYING THAT ISRAEL HAS SUGGESTED TO HUSSEIN SOME KIND OF VARIATION OF THE ALLON PLAN, WHICH WE HAVE ALREADY INDICATED IS UN-ACCEPTABLE IN PRINCIPLE BOTH TO US AND TO JORDAN. WHAT EBAN APPEARS TO BE ASKING OF JORDAN IS CERTAINLY " SIGNIFICANTLY" DIFFERENT EVEN IF NOT " VIOLENTLY" DIFFERENT FROM THE TERRITORIAL ASSURANCES WE HAVE GIVEN JORDAN.

3. I, DO NOT KNOW WHAT THE ISRAELIS MAY HAVE PROPOSED TO JORDAN BEYOND THE GENERALITIES OCCASIONALLY PASSED ON TO US BY EBAN AND OTHERS, NOR DO WE KNOW HUSSEIN' S REACTION TO ANY SPECIFIC TERRITORIAL PROPOSALS ISRAEL MAY HAVE MADE. THE KING AND SENIOR GOJ OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO TAKE THE LINE WITH ME THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE NEVER BEEN SPECIFIC WITH THEM ABOUT TERRITORY AND I, OF COURSE, HAVE NOT PROBED THEM REGARDING THIS MATTER. NEVERTHELESS, BECAUSE OF THE TERRITORIAL ASSURANCES WE HAVE RECENTLY REITERATED TO HUSSEIN, I WOULD STRONGLY DOUBT THAT HE WOULD FEEL HE SHOULD ENTERTAIN SERIOUSLY ANY ISRAELI PROPOSAL THAT EITHER SPECIFICALLY OR IN PRINCIPLE PROVIDED " CERTAIN UNPOPULATED AREAS OF WEST BANK TO REMAIN AS ISRAELI TERRITORY." I AM CONVINCED THAT ANYTHING LIKE THAT IS A NON-STARTER WITH THE KING. EVEN IF HE ACCEPTED IT, I DO NOT BELIEVE HE COULD BRING ALONG OTHER JORDANIANS WITH HIM.

4. I AM CERTAIN THAT THE DEPT IS WELL AWARE OF THE FOREGOING. I REVIEW THE MATTER PRIMARILY TO UNDERLINE MY HOPE THAT WE WILL BE VERY FIRM IN LETTING THE ISRAELIS KNOW (1) WE INTEND TO STAND BY THE TERRITORIAL ASSURANCES WE HAE GIVEN TO JORDAN AND (2) OUR EXPECTATION THAT THEY WILL PROCEED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO GIVE THE JORDANIANS ACCEPTABLE TERRITORIAL SPECIFICS AS PART OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. SYMMES
BT

~~SECRET~~

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Department of State

289
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 438

02

PAGE 01 AMMAN 07573 221056Z

19
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

070475

R 221040Z NOV 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6799

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 7573
EXDIS
REF: STATE 275224

WOULD APPRECIATE CLARIFICATION OF UNDERSECRETARY'S
REMARKS RE JUNE 4 LINES IN PARA 7 REFTEL, "SOVIETS
HAD TOLD US THAT MINOR BORDER RECTIFICATIONS OF TEN
OR TWELVE KILOMETERS PRESENTED NO PROBLEM." ARE THEY REFERRING TO
SINAI, OR WEST BANK, OR GOLAN, OR ALL THREE?

SYMMES

NOTE: EXDIS ADDED PER S/S-O - MR. STEMPER, 11/22/68.

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001
By 15/lll, NARA, Date 10/4/01

~~SECRET~~
5



Department of State

TELEGRAM

290

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

~~SECRET~~ 475

PAGE 01 AMMAN 07588 231527Z

50
ACTION SS 30

2

INFO SSO 00, /030 W

P 231400Z NOV 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6807
INFO USINT CAIRO PRIORITY

078775

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 7588

EXDIS

NOFORN

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

SUBJECT: VISIT OF UAR CHIEF OF STAFF

1. [redacted] UAR CHIEF OF STAFF ABD AL-MUN'IM RIYAD ARRIVED IN AMMAN 21ST WITH PRIMIN TALHOUNI AND FORMIN RIFA'I. FACT HE PRESENT HERE BEING KEPT QUIET. PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN AT AIRPORT WHEN TALHOUNI-RIFA'I ARRIVED WERE CAREFULLY SCREENED.

2. WE HAVE NO IMMEDIATE INFORMATION ON REASONS FOR HIS PRESENCE AMMAN, BUT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO DEVELOP SUCH INFORMATION ON AN URGENT BASIS.

GP-3
SYMMES

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/INAC 15-37

By llud NARA, Date 05-13-2015



Department of State

291
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 084

PAGE 01 AMMAN 07643 281141Z

12
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

----- 103799

O 281119Z NOV 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE IMMEDIATE 6836
INFO RUQMBEW
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 1833

2

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 7643

EXDIS

SUBJ: GOVERNOR SCRANTON'S VISIT

REF: STATE 279192

BEIRUT PASS AMBASSADOR SYMMES

1. ZUD RIFAI, SECRETARY GENERAL OF ROYAL DIWAN, HAS INFORMED US THAT KING HUSSEIN WILL RECEIVE GOVERNOR SCRANTON ON DECEMBER 8, AS PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT-ELECT.

2. RIFAI ALSO ASSURED US THAT THERE WOULD BE NO RPT NO PROBLEM RE POSSIBLE OTHER COMMITMENTS KING MIGHT HAVE ARRANGED FOR THAT DAY, NOTING IN THIS CONNECTION THAT AMBASSADOR JARRING WAS SCHEDULED VISIT AMMAN ON WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 4.

3. MORRIS DRAPER IS CONTROL OFFICER. DUNCAN
GP-3

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001

By 4/16/01, NARA, Date 10/14/01

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Department of State

292
TELEGRAM

SECRET 317

PAGE 01 STATE 279207

85
ORIGIN SS 30

2

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: IO/UNP:BJ JONES
APPROVED BY: JJ SISCO
NEA/IAI:MR. ATHERTON
NEA/ARN:MR. SEELYE
S/S:MR. BROWN
NEA:MR. DAVIES

----- 101433

R 280118Z NOV 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

~~SECRET~~ STATE 279207

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 7573

STATEMENT IN PARA 7 OF STATE 275224 HAD REFERENCE TO SEMENOV COMMENT TO AMB BUFFUM REPORTED IN PARA 9 OF USUN 7763, WHICH MADE IN CONTEXT OF DISCUSSION SETTLEMENT WITH JORDAN AND PRESUMABLY APPLIED ONLY TO WEST BANK.

GP-3. RUSK

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
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By ag/ll, NARA, Date 10/4/01

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PROCESSING NOTE

On this date Archives staff noticed that the ink on page two of document #293 was significantly faded. A preservation copy of the document was made and the ink on page 2 was darkened as much as possible. The original document #293 is also included behind the preservation copy in a mylar sleeve.

Alexis Percle

March 31, 2015

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

293

~~SECRET~~ 311

PAGE 01 STATE 279189

02

82
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA; UAR; RBPARKER
APPROVED BY: NEA - MR. WILLIAM HANDLEY
S/NL - AMB. LEONHART
S/S - MR. BROWN
S/NL - MR. MURPHY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLI-S 98001
By 26/LL NARA, Date 10/4/01

101407

P 280045Z NOV 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

~~SECRET~~ STATE 279189

EXDIS:

1. FOLLOWING IS ITINERARY OF GOVERNOR SCRANTON AND SPECIAL ASSISTANT U.G. SASALL:

MONDAY, DECEMBER 2 - DEPART JFK NEW YORK 8:30 P.M., PAA #114
DIRECT TO TEHRAN

ARRIVE TEHRAN ON TUESDAY, DEC. 3 AT 10:30 P.M.

STAY AT EMBASSY RESIDENCE

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 4 - IN TEHRAN

MEET WITH SHAH AND FOREIGN MINISTER ZAHEDI

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 5 - DEPART TEHRAN 8:30 A.M., PAA #119
ARRIVE BEIRUT 9:50 A.M.



Department of State

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PAGE 02 STATE 279189

MEET WITH PRESIDENT HELOU, PRIME MINISTER YAFI

FOREIGN MINISTER CHEIKH

DEPART BEIRUT 11:50 P.M. MS 5709

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 6 - ARRIVE CAIRO 1:00 A.M.

STOP AT NEGUS RESIDENCE

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 6 - IN CAIRO

MEET WITH PRESIDENT NASSER AND FOREIGN MINISTER ROAD

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 7 - DEPART CAIRO 11:00 A.M. SAR 5744

ARRIVE AMMAN 1:00 P.M.

MEET WITH KING FEISAL AND MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFF. OF JORDAN

OVERNIGHT AT RESIDENCE

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 8 - DEPART AMMAN 8:30 A.M. ROYAL JORDANIAN AIR

ARRIVE TEL AVIV 9:30 A.M.

MEET WITH KING HUSSEIN

PRIME MINISTER TALHOUNI AND

FOREIGN MINISTER RIFAI

DEPART AMMAN BY CAR (PRIVATE)

DRIVE DIRECTLY TO TEL AVIV

OVERNIGHT WITH FRIENDS IN TEL AVIV

MONDAY, DECEMBER 9 - MOTOR CAR TO TEL AVIV TO JERUSALEM

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 STATE 279189

MEET WITH PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL AND
FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN

OVERNIGHT AT CONGEN RESIDENCE IN JERUSALEM

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 10 - MOTOR FROM JERUSALEM TO TEL AVIV (PM)

OVERNIGHT AT RESIDENCE IN TEL AVIV

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 11 - DEPART TEL AVIV 9:00 A.M. TWA #841

ARRIVE NEW YORK 4:35 P.M.

2. GOVERNOR WOULD LIKE TO STAY AT RESIDENCE THROUGHOUT AND SUGGESTS THAT WHERE CONVENIENT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE WORKING DINNER OR LUNCH WITH AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE AND TOP STAFF. HE DOES NOT RPT NOT WISH ANY SIGHTSEEING OR FORMAL ENTERTAINMENT BY EMBASSY OR HOST GOVERNMENT.

3. AMMAN AND JERUSALEM SHOULD MAKE APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CROSSING ALLENBY BRIDGE LATE AFTERNOON DECEMBER 8. GOVERNOR DOES NOT PLAN TO STOP IN JERUSALEM ON 8TH BUT WISHES DRIVE DIRECTLY TO TEL AVIV.

4. ADDRESSEE POSTS SHOULD TAKE EVERY PRECAUTION, INTERNALLY AND WITH HOST GOVERNMENT, TO LIMIT CIRCLE OF KNOWLEDGEABLE AND TO ASSURE THAT NO LEAKS OCCUR PRIOR TO SCHEDULED PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT ON DECEMBER 1. SINCE SCHEDULE MAY HAVE TO BE REVISED PRIOR TO PUBLICATION, POSTS SHOULD ALSO TAKE CARE NOT TO INDICATE SCHEDULE WITH FINALITY TO HOST GOVERNMENT UNTIL THEY RECEIVE CONFIRMATION CABLE FROM DEPARTMENT. IF PRESS INQUIRIES ARE RECEIVED PRIOR TO THAT TIME THEY SHOULD BE NO COMMENTED.

GP-1. RUSK

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Department of State

293
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 311

PAGE 01 STATE 279189

02

82
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA:UAR:RBPARKER
APPROVED BY: NEA - MR. WILLIAM HANDLEY
S/NL - AMB. LEONHART
S/S - MR. BROWN
S/NL - MR. MURPHY

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLI-S 88001
By gll NARA, Date 10/4/01

..... 101407

P 280045Z NOV 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

~~SECRET~~ STATE 279189

EXDIS

1. FOLLOWING IS ITINERARY OF GOVERNOR SCRANTON AND SPECIAL ASSISTANT J.G. SASALL:

MONDAY, DECEMBER 2 - DEPART JFK NEW YORK 8:30 P.M., PAA #114
DIRECT TO TEHRAN

ARRIVE TEHRAN ON TUESDAY, DEC. 3 AT 10:30 P.M.

STAY AT EMBASSY RESIDENCE

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 4 - IN TEHRAN

MEET WITH SHAH AND FOREIGN MINISTER ZAHEDI

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 5 - DEPART TEHRAN 8:30 A.M., PAA #119
ARRIVE BEIRUT 9:50 A.M.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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STATE DEPARTMENT

PAGE 02 STATE 279189

ARRIVE TEL AVIV ON DECEMBER 6 1958

MEET WITH PRESIDENT WEIZMAN, PRIME MINISTER

WEIZMAN

FOREIGN MINISTER (GOLDA MEIR) AND DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER

DEPART TEL AVIV 11:00 P.M. MS 4725

ARRIVE CAIRO 11:00 P.M. DEPART CAIRO 1:00 P.M.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 5 - ARRIVE CAIRO 1:00 P.M.

EXDIS

STAY AT NASSR RESIDENCE

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 5 - IN CAIRO

MEET WITH PRESIDENT NASSR

AND FOREIGN MINISTER RIAD

AL-SAYED

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 6 - DEPART CAIRO 11:00 A.M. SAR 1744

ARRIVE TEL AVIV

DEPART TEL AVIV 11:00 P.M.

ARRIVE JERUSALEM 11:00 P.M.

MEET WITH KING HUSSEIN AND MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SADEK AL-KHAYAT

DEPART JERUSALEM 11:00 P.M.

ARRIVE TEL AVIV 11:00 P.M.

OVERNIGHT AT RESIDENCE

TEL AVIV

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 7 - DEPART TEL AVIV 8:00 A.M. ROYAL JORDANIAN

ATTACHED TO THE ROYAL JORDANIAN AIR FORCE

ARRIVE AMMAN 8:00 A.M.

ARRIVE AMMAN 8:00 A.M.

ARRIVE AMMAN 8:00 A.M.

MEET WITH KING HUSSEIN

ARRIVE AMMAN 8:00 A.M.

PRIME MINISTER TALHUNE AND

ARRIVE AMMAN 8:00 A.M.

ARRIVE AMMAN 8:00 A.M.

ARRIVE AMMAN 8:00 A.M.

DEPART AMMAN BY BUS 11:00 P.M.

ARRIVE TEL AVIV 11:00 P.M.

ARRIVE TEL AVIV 11:00 P.M.

ARRIVE TEL AVIV 11:00 P.M.

OVERNIGHT WITH FRIENDS IN TEL AVIV

ARRIVE TEL AVIV 11:00 P.M.

MONDAY, DECEMBER 8 - DEPART TEL AVIV TO JERUSALEM

ARRIVE JERUSALEM 11:00 P.M.

Department of State

TELEGRAM



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 STATE 279189

MEET WITH PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL AND
FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN

OVERNIGHT AT CONGEN RESIDENCE IN JERUSALEM

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 10 - MOTOR FROM JERUSALEM TO TEL AVIV (PM)

OVERNIGHT AT RESIDENCE IN TEL AVIV

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ARRIVE NEW YORK 4:35 P.M.

2. GOVERNOR WOULD LIKE TO STAY AT RESIDENCE THROUGHOUT AND SUGGESTS THAT WHERE CONVENIENT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE WORKING DINNER OR LUNCH WITH AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE AND TOP STAFF. HE DOES NOT RPT NOT WISH ANY SIGHTSEEING OR FORMAL ENTERTAINMENT BY EMBASSY OR HOST GOVERNMENT.

3. AMMAN AND JERUSALEM SHOULD MAKE APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CROSSING ALLENBY BRIDGE LATE AFTERNOON DECEMBER 8. GOVERNOR DOES NOT PLAN TO STOP IN JERUSALEM ON 8TH BUT WISHES DRIVE DIRECTLY TO TEL AVIV.

4. ADDRESSEE POSTS SHOULD TAKE EVERY PRECAUTION, INTERNALLY AND WITH HOST GOVERNMENT, TO LIMIT CIRCLE OF KNOWLEDGEABLE AND TO ASSURE THAT NO LEAKS OCCUR PRIOR TO SCHEDULED PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT ON DECEMBER 1. SINCE SCHEDULE MAY HAVE TO BE REVISED PRIOR TO PUBLICATION, POSTS SHOULD ALSO TAKE CARE NOT TO INDICATE SCHEDULE WITH FINALITY TO HOST GOVERNMENT UNTIL THEY RECEIVE CONFIRMATION CABLE FROM DEPARTMENT. IF PRESS INQUIRIES ARE RECEIVED PRIOR TO THAT TIME THEY SHOULD BE NO COMMENTED.

GP-1. RUSK

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 07645 281737Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO CCO 00,SSO 00,NSCE 00,/030 W

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O P 281609Z NOV 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6837
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 7645

EXDIS

REF: STATE 279192, AMMAN 7643

BEIRUT PASS AMBASSADOR SYMMES

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF NOVEMBER 28 MESSAGE FROM KING HUSSEIN WHICH PALACE REQUIRED WE FORWARD TO PRESIDENT-ELECT:

QUOTE MR. PRESIDENT-ELECT, I AM GRATEFUL FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF TODAY IN WHICH YOU INFORM ME THAT FORMER GOVERNOR WILLIAM W. SCRANTON INTENDS TO VISIT JORDAN ON A FACT-FINDING TOUR UPON YOUR REQUEST.

IT WILL GIVE ME AND MY GOVERNMENT GREAT PLEASURE TO WELCOME GOVERNOR SCRANTON TO JORDAN AT ANY DATE CONVENIENT TO HIM.

WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR KINDNESS IN AFFORDING US WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONVEY TO YOU OUR VIEWS ON THE SITUATION IN JORDAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

I WILL LOOK FORWARD TO THE DAY WHEN I CAN HAVE THE PLEASURE OF PERSONALLY DISCUSSING WITH YOU ALL THE AFFAIRS WHICH ARE OF MUTUAL INTEREST TO BOTH OUR COUNTRIES. WITH MY VERY BEST WISHES, SINCERELY, HUSEEIN UNQUOTE.

GP-3. DUNCAN

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8
NLJ-S 96001

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

By ag/lll, NARA, Date 10/4/01
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PAGE 01 AMMAN 07643 281141Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

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0 281119Z NOV 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE IMMEDIATE 6836
INFO RUQMBEW
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 1833

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 7643

EXDIS

S

SUBJ: GOVERNOR SCRANTON'S VISIT

REF: STATE 279192

BEIRUT PASS AMBASSADOR SYMMES

1. ZUD RIFAI, SECRETARY GENERAL OF ROYAL DIWAN, HAS INFORMED US THAT KING HUSSEIN WILL RECEIVE GOVERNOR SCRANTON ON DECEMBER 8, AS PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT-ELECT.

2. RIFAI ALSO ASSURED US THAT THERE WOULD BE NO RPT NO PROBLEM RE POSSIBLE OTHER COMMITMENTS KING MIGHT HAVE ARRANGED FOR THAT DAY, NOTING IN THIS CONNECTION THAT AMBASSADOR JARRING WAS SCHEDULED VISIT AMMAN ON WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 4.

3. MORRIS DRAPER IS CONTROL OFFICER. DUNCAN
GP-3

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.3
NLJ-S 96001

By 18/0 NARA, Date 10/4/01



Department of State

296
TELEGRAM

SECRET 740

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 07618 261600Z

43
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

----- 090549

R 261505Z NOV 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6822
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USUN NY 1231
USINT CAIRO

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 7618

EXDIS

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION: SECRETARY'S SEVEN POINTS

WHEN AMB COTTON AND I SAW FONMIN RIFAI ON NOVEMBER 26 HE MENTIONED THAT FONMIN RIAD WAS COMMENTING IN WRITING ON THE SECRETARY'S SEVEN POINTS. RIAD AND NASSER HAD DISCUSSED THE SEVEN POINTS WITH RIFAI WHEN HE WAS IN CAIRO LAST WEEK. RIAD INDICATED HE HAD NOT BEEN AWARE HE WAS EXPECTED TO COMMENT BUT WAS NOT AVERSE TO DOING SO. NEVERTHELESS, ACCORDING TO RIFAI, RIAD INTENDED TO "PUT EVERYTHING IN WRITING FROM NOW ON" SO THE UAR POSITION WOULD NOT BE MISINTERPRETED.

SYMMES

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
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By ng/ll NARA, Date 10/16/01

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

297

32

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02

PAGE 01 AMMAN 07623 271348Z

43
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

097492

R 270915Z NOV 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6827

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 7623

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

EXDIS

SUBJECT: U.S. ASSURANCES TO GOJ

REF AMMAN 7409

1. DEPT MAY BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING THAT FONMIN RIFAI COMMENTED TO ME ON NOV 26 THAT HUSSEIN HAS NEVER MENTIONED TO HIM THE ASSURANCES I REITERATED TO THE KING ON NOVEMBER NINTH (AMMAN 7409). RIFAI COMPLAINED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM WITH HUSSEIN AT LEAST THREE TIMES BETWEEN THE NINTH AND HIS VISIT TO CAIRO. YET, HE HAD LEARNED ABOUT THE REAFFIRMATION OF OUR ASSURANCES ONLY FROM THE SAUDIS AND EGYPTIANS. THOSE LATTER REPORTS HAD BEEN VAGUE AS TO WHAT REASSURANCES HAD BEEN GIVEN TO HUSSEIN OR FOR WHAT PURPOSE. FONMIN RIAD HAD QUERIED RIFAI IN CAIRO AND LATTER HAD HAD TO EXPRESS HIS IGNORANCE.

2. I RESPONDED BY SAYING I REGRETTED THE FONMIN HAD NOT BEEN INFORMED. I HAD ALSO TOLD ZAID AL-RIFAI ON NINTH WHAT I HAD SAID TO HUSSEIN. I THEN EXPLAINED TO ABDUL MONEIM THAT I HAD REAFFIRMED THE ASURANCES MADE TO HUSSEIN IN NEW YORK IN NOVEMBER 1067 JUST PRIOR TO ADOPTION OF THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION. ABDUL MONEIM ACKNOWLEDGED HE WAS AWARE OF THOSE ASSURANCES AND COMMENTED HE WAS HAPPY TO KNOW THEY HAD BEEN REAFFIRMED.

GP-1.
SYMMS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-261
By *is* NARA, Date 6-6-03

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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INFO /030 W

096184

R 270915Z NOV 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6827

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 7623

EXDIS:

SUBJECT: U.S. ASSURANCES TO GOJ

REF AMMAN 7409

2
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-261
By is, NARA, Date 6-6-03

1. DEPT MAY BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING THAT FONMIN RIFAI COMMENTED TO ME ON NOV 26 THAT HUSSEIN HAS NEVER MENTIONED TO HIM THE ASSURANCES I REITERATED TO THE KING ON NOVEMBER NINTH (AMMAN 7409). RIFAIR COMPLAINED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM WITH HUSSEIN AT LEAST THREE TIMES BETWEEN THE NINTH AND (#) YET,

HE HAD (#) ABOUT THE REAFFIRMATION OF OUR ASSURANCES ONLY FROM THE SAUDIS AND EGYPTIANS. THOSE LATTER REPORTS HAD BEEN VAGUE AS TO WHAT REASSURANCES HAD BEEN GIVEN TO HUSSEIN OR FOR WHAT PURPOSE. FONMIN RIAD HAD QUERIED RIFAI IN CAIRO AND LATTER HAD HAD TO EXPRESS HIS IGNORANCE.

2. I RESPONDED BY SAYING I REGRETTED THE FONMIN HAD NOT BEEN INFORMED. I HAD ALSO TOLD ZAID AL-RIFAI ON NINTH WHAT I HAD SAID TO HUSSEIN. I THEN EXPLAINED TO ABDUL MONEIM THAT I HAD REAFFIRMED THE ASURANCES MADE TO HUSSEIN IN NEW YORK IN NOVEMBER 1967 JUST PRIOR TO ADOPTION OF THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION. ABDUL MONEIM ACKNOWLEDGED HE WAS AWARE OF THOSE ASSURANCES AND COMMENTED HE WAS HAPPY TO KNOW THEY HAD BEEN REAFFIRMED.

GP-1.

SYMMES

NOTE: (#) OMISSIONS. CORRECTIONS TO FOLLOW.

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Department of State

299
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 205

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PAGE 01 STATE 281961

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ORIGIN SS 30

INFO /030 R

DRAFTED BY:NEA/RP DAVIES
APPROVED BY:NEA:PT HART
NEA/ARN:MR. SEELYE
S/S:MR. WALSH
S/NL:AMB LEONHART
WHITE HOUSE:MR. SAUNDERS

005492

R 042247Z DEC 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

~~SECRET~~ STATE 281961

EXDIS

SUBJ: KING'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT

REF: AMMAN'S 7684

- 1. GOVERNOR SCRANTON WAS BRIEFED ON GENERAL SECURITY SITUATION, STATUS OF THE JARRING MISSION, AND ON US ASSURANCES TO JORDAN.
- 2. INASMUCH AS NECESSARY BACKGROUND NOT AVAILABLE TO CHIEFS OF MISSIONS VISITED BY THE GOVERNOR PRIOR TO ARRIVAL AT AMMAN, YOU SHOULD BRIEF HIM ON KING HUSSEIN'S VIEWS AS EXPRESSED IN LETTER. YOU SHOULD GIVE HIM ALSO RATIONALE ADVANCED FOR DELAYING GENERAL KHAMMASH'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON.
- 3. WE ARE NOT RECOMMENDING A REPLY TO KING HUSSEIN'S LETTER. IF QUESTION IS RAISED, YOU SHOULD NOTE THAT LETTER HAS BEEN DELIVERED TO PRESIDENT AND THE KING'S VIEWS MADE KNOWN TO OTHER APPROPRIATE USG OFFICIALS. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT GENERAL KHAMMASH'S VISIT AT THIS JUNCTURE IS NOT NECESSARY.

GP-1. RUSK

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.3
NLJ-3 96001

By ag/ll NARA, OMO 1014121

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19

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
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~~SECRET~~
Classification

① 280634
W/D A 301
3 DEC 68 00 22Z
FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN
Info INFO: " TEL AVIV

STATE 280634

NODIS

AMMAN'S 7690

1. Governor Scranton was not briefed on SANDSTORM developments beyond fact that Israel hoping for breakthrough with Jordan outside purview Jarring talks.
2. Suggest you inform Scranton in general terms of SANDSTORM exercise with due emphasis on sensitivity of information. Governor should not raise subject with either Jordanian or Israeli Governments but should have some background should foreign officials allude to direct exchanges in the course of his discussions.
3. You may wish to note that Israelis more likely to raise subject than is King Hussein and that from lack of enthusiasm detectable on Jordanian side we surmise that whatever proposals may have been passed fall short of Jordan's minimum requirements.

GP-1

END

RUSK

Scranton

Drafted by: *RMD* NEA:RPD Davies:bw 12/2/68 Tel. Ext. 2107 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: *PH* NEA - Parker T. Hart

Clearances: *NS* IO - Mr. Sisco *JS* S/S - Mr. Walsh
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
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Classification



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 07768 051655Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

010347

R 051530Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6903

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 7768

EXDIS

IN VIEW OSMAN COMMENTS REPORTED PARA 5 CARIO 4051, SUGGEST DEPT MAY WISH PASS AMMAN 7623 TO MINISTER BERGUS FOR HIS BACKGROUND INFORMATION. I BELIEVE, HOWEVER, WE SHOULD NOT LET OTHEJ#KNOW OF RIFAI'S IMPLIED COMPLAINTS ABOUT KING'S FAILURE TO CONFIDE IN HIM.

SYMMES

NOTE: HAS RECEIVED. WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-261
By us, NARA, Date 6-6-03

~~SECRET~~
28

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Department of State

W18 7
TELEGRAM

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105Q

1968 DEC 2 AM 8:56 A.M.

R 021129Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8656
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2015
STATE GRNC
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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 7678

NODIS/SANDSTORM

SUBJ: ISRAELI " FINGER PROJECTIONS" INTO WEST BANK

1. IN CONVERSATION WITH EMBASSY OFFICER NOV 23, ZAID RIFA'I, SECRETARY GENERAL OF ROYAL DIWAN, VOLUNTEERED CRITICISM OF WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS AN IMPOSSIBLE ISRAELI POSITION ON TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS. RIFA'I SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT GIVE UP JERUSALEM AND AT BEST MIGHT ALLOW JORDAN ACCESS TO THE HARAM AL-SHARIF. HE THEN ADDED: " NOW THEY ARE TALKING ABOUT RUNNING PROJECTIONS INTO THE WEST BANK." PUTTING ON HIS MOST PUZZLED LOOK, EMBOFF ASKED WHETHER CONCEPT OF QUOTE PROJECTIONS UNQUOTE HAD BEEN CTSMUNICATED AS AN OFFICIAL ISRAELI POSITION. AFTER A LENGHTY PAUSE, RIFA'I EXPLAINED THAT THE QUOTE PROJECTION UNQUOTE CONCEPT HAD BEEN PART OF PUBLIC DEBATE IN ISRAEL OVER VARIATIONS ON THE ALLOW PLAN. EMBOFF DID NOT PURSUE SUBJECT. SUBSEQUENTLY, RIFA'I USED THE TERM QUOTE CORRIDORS UNQUOTE IN TALK ON SAME SUBJECT WITH ANOTHER EMBASSY OFFICER.

2. COMMENT: WE MAY BE READING MORE INTO THIS EXCHANGE THAN IS WARRANTED, BUT EMBOFF HAD CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT RIFA'I HAD REVEALED MORE THAN HE HAD INTENDED IN FIRST CONVRRSATION MENTIONED ABOVE AND WAS SOMEWHAT FLUQUERED AS A RESULT. WE CANNOT RECALL THAT ANY IDEA OF THIS SORT HAS BEEN VENTILATED IN PUBLIC MEDIA.

3. DEPT PASS USINT CAIRO AND USUN. SYMMES
BT

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO AND USUN BY OC/T 12/2/68

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-261
By is NARA, Date 6-6-03

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-261
By ~~is~~ NARA, Date 6-6-03
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Dec 6, 1968
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SUBJ: KING HUSSEIN'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT

REF: AMMAN 7685

1. AS DEPT WILL RECALL, KING HUSSEIN HAD INDICATED (BOTH IN LONDON AT TIMES DELIVERY AND ALSO SUBSEQUENTLY IN CONVERSATION WITH ME) THAT HE INTENDED TO RESPOND TO PRESIDENT'S PHANTOM MESSAGE LATER DATE WHEN HE HAD FULLY CONSIDERED ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR JORDAN.

2. THE SUBSTANCE OF KING'S LETTER FOR THE MOST PART SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. WHETHER OR NOT THE JORDANIANS CONSIDER THEMSELVES MORE THREATENED MILITARILY BY A PHANTOM SUPPLY TO ISRAEL, THEY REGARD IT AS A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN US-JORDANIAN RELATIONS. THE KING (AND GENL KHAMMASH) ARE ALWAYS CONCERNED FOR THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF THE REGIME AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S., PARTICULARLY IN THE MATTER OF ARMS SUPPLY. IN THEIR VIEW, A PHANTOM DEAL FOR A SUPERIOR AND INCREASINGLY AGGRESSIVE ENEMY REQUIRES EVIDENCE OF CONCRETE USG SUPPORT TO JORDAN AS AN "OFFSET". IF JORDAN IS HELD TO ITS PRE-JUNE STATUS, THEN THE REGIME WILL APPEAR TO THE ARAB PUBLIC AT LARGE AND PARTICULARLY TO THE JORDANIAN ARMY RANK AND FILE TO HAVE BETRAYED JORDANIAN INTERESTS. AS TO WHY HUSSEIN CHOSE THIS PARTICULAR TIME TO RESPOND TO THE PRESIDENT IN THE PARTICULAR TERMS OF THIS LETTER, WE CAN ONLY SPECULATE, BUT I THINK THE FOLLOWING FACTORS BEAR ON THE KING'S DECISION:

A. CLIMATE OF OPINION: JORDANIAN RESENTMENT OVER THE PHANTOM PROBLEM HAS BECOME MORE CORROSIVE RATHER THAN LESS WHILE THE WEEKS HAVE PASSED AND THE ISRAELIS HAVE CONCRETELY DEMONSTRATED THEIR MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER THEIR ARAB NEIGHBORS. AT THE SAME TIME HUSSEIN, LIKE SOME OF HIS CLOSE ADVISERS, MAY HAVE BEGUN TO THINK IN TERMS OF HAVING TO WRITE OFF THE JARRING MISSION. PARTICULARLY SINCE THE CAIRO FOREIGN MINSTERS' CONFERENCE IN AUGUST WE HAVE NOTICED (1) A CASTING ABOUT FOR ALTERNATIVES TO THE JARRING MISSION AND (2) DEFINITE TALK OF IMPROVING THE ARAB DEFENSIVE MILITARY POSTURE IN ORDER TO BE IN A BETTER NEGOTIATING POSITION. THE JORDANIANS SHARE ARAB FEELING THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE SUCH TREMENDOUS MILITARY SUPERIORITY THAT THEY CAN CARRY OUT THEIR INTENTION TO CALL

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THE TUNE SO FAR AS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IS CONCERNED. THIS LEADS THE JORDANIANS TO CONCLUDE THAT UNLESS THE ARABS IMPROVE THEIR OWN MILITARY POSITION, THE ISRAELIS WILL NEVER MAKE COMPROMISES IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE PEACE. THE FORMATION OF THE EASTERN ARAB COMMAND, RECENTLY INCREASED DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS WITH OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES, AND THE TONE OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS WITH REGARD TO THE NEED FOR AN IMPROVED MILITARY POSTURE ALL REFLECT THIS NEW ATTITUDE.

B. ISRAELI RAIDS: THE RECENT ISRAELI RAIDS (DEC 1 THROUGH 4) STRONGLY SUGGEST THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE DECIDED ON A NEW TYPE OF REPRISAL ACTIVITY AGAINST THE JORDANIANS. ALTHOUGH THE NEW RAIDS OCCURRED AFTER THE DRAFTING OF THE KING'S LETTER, THE JORDANIANS FOR SOME TIME HAVE ANTICIPATED SUCH TACTICS AND FOR MANY MONTHS IN FACT HAVE ASSERTED TO US THAT THEY NEED BETTER AIR DEFENSE GENERALLY, BOTH IN TERMS OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS AND IN TERMS OF INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT. THE CONTINUAL ISRAELI AERIAL INTRUSIONS OVER JORDAN, BOTH OF RECONNAISSANCE AND FOR ACTUAL BOMBING AND STRAFING, HAVE CAUSED A BUILD-UP OF JORDANIAN FEAR AND RESENTMENT, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE OF THE ISRAELI HITS ON CIVILIAN TARGETS IN THE QRBID WODSALT* AREA. THE KING'S REFERENCE TO "LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS" REFLECTS HIS MOUNTING CONCERN WITH HOW TO DEAL WITH CONTINUED ISRAELI RAIDS AND FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS DEEP WITHIN JORDAN TERRITORY.

C. JORDAN-ISRAEL CONTACTS: ONE CAN ONLY SURMISE WHAT THE ISRAELIS MAY HAVE TOLD THE JORDANIANS IN ANY BILATERAL CONTACTS THEY MAY HAVE HAD. WHAT WE HAVE HEARD ABOUT SUCH CONTACTS, INCLUDING KAN'AN'S APPROACH OF LAST WEEK (AMMAN 7758), DOES NOT INDICATE THE ISRAELIS HAVE MOVED ANY CLOSER TO MEETING THE MINIMUM JORDANIAN POSITION ON TERRITORIAL ASPECTS OF A SETTLEMENT, BUT RATHER THAT THEY ARE MOVING MORE TOWARD THE ALLON PLAN CONCEPT. FRUSTRATION WITH WHAT JORDANIANS REGARD AS ISRAELI LACK OF COOPERATION WITH THE JARRING MISSION CERTAINLY IS REFLECTED IN THE KING'S LETTER AND MAY BE A PRIMARY FACTOR IN ITS TIMING. THE KING'S EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO THE FAILURE OF THE US TO PRESS ISRAEL HARD ENOUGH TO COME TO AN ACCOMMODATION WOULD TEND TO SUPPORT MY ASSUMPTION THAT THE ISRAELIS STILL HAVE NOT PROVIDED HIM WITH ANY SATISFACTION (BUT RATHER THE OPPOSITE) ON TERRITORIAL ASPECTS OF A SETTLEMENT.

D. OTHER ARAB PRESSURES: THE PRESSURE OF OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES, MOST SIGNIFICANTLY IN TERMS OF RECENT COMMENTS BY THE OTHER ARAB CHIEFS OF STAFF ON JORDAN ARMY INADEQUACIES, HAVE STRONGLY INFLUENCED THE KING AND GENERAL KHAMMASH. THEY ARE MOST SENSITIVE TO SUCH CRITICISMS, AND THEY THEMSELVES FEEL THAT OUR DELIVERY DATES, AS WELL AS OUR UNWILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE CERTAIN KINDS OF EQUIPMENT JUSTIFY SUCH ARAB CRITICISMS. FACED WITH A SYNDROME OF PROBLEMS SUCH AS HE NOW HAS, THE KING'S NATURAL TENDENCY IS TO THINK IN TERMS OF HOW HIS ARMY AND ITS ARMS SUPPLY ENTER INTO THE SITUATION. MORE SIGNIFICANTLY, WE MUST NOT FORGET HIS THREAT TO GO SOVIET WHICH WE FACED APPROXIMATELY A YEAR AGO. IT IS OBVIOUS FROM HIS LETTER THAT HE REGARDS OUR TERRITORIAL AND OTHER ASSURANCES AS BEING SOMEWHAT HOLLOW AND THAT HE CONSIDERS THE FULFILLMENT OF OUR ASSURANCES IN TERMS OF MILITARY SUPPLIES AS BOTH GRUDGING AND INCOMPLETE. WE SHOULD NOT WRITE OFF THE POSSIBILITY

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THAT THE KING MIGHT DECIDE THAT JORDAN'S OVERALL SITUATION WOULD BE AGROVED IF JORDAN NOW SHIFTED TO THE SOVIETS FOR ITS ARMY SUPPLY.

E. CHANGE OF ADMINISTRATION: BY COMPLAINING ABOUT THE POLICIES OF THE OUTGOING ADMINISTRATION THE KING PROBABLY AIMS TO GET SOME THINGS OFF HIS CHEST BEFORE THE NEW ADMINISTRATION TAKES OVER. ALTHOUGH HE MAY WELL HOPE THE OUTGOING ADMINISTRATION MIGHT BE PERSUADED TO COMPLY WITH SOME OF HIS REQUESTS, HE PROBABLY HAS IN MIND THAT THE UNPLEASANT THINGS HE SAYS NOW WILL BECOME KNOWN TO THE NEW ADMINISTRATION AFTER IT TAKES OFFICE BUT WILL NOT HAVE TO BE SAID DIRECTLY TO IT. THE KING, HIS CLOSE ADVISERS, AND MANY OTHER ARABS, SEEM CONVINCED THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION IS BOUND TO TAKE MORE FORTHCOMING ATITUDES TOWARD ARAB PROBLEMS.

2. ALTHOUGH THE KING'S LETTER DOES NOT EXPLICITLY REQUEST A RESPONSE FROM THE PRESIDENT, I THINK HE WOULD CONSIDER OUR FAILURE TO RESPOND IN SOME WAY AS A PERSONAL AFFRONT. HE WOULD CERTAINLY THINK HIS SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS RAISED IN THE LETTER WERE BEING DISREGARDED BY US. HE PROBABLY READ THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE AS THE INITIATION OF A SPECIAL DIALOGUE IN WHICH HE WAS EXPECTED TO EXPRESS HIS VIEWS (AND RECEIVE AN ANSWER). I TOLD THE KING ON DEC 3 WHEN HE UNEXPECTEDLY SHOWED UP DURING DISCUSSION IN GENL KHAMMASH' OFFICE THAT KHAMMASH WOULD BE WELCOME TO GO TO WASHINGTON, AS HE HAD BEEN TOLD IN LONDON (LONDON 13640). WE STILL BELIEVED, HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE WELL TO CONSIDER ANY JORDANIAN MILITARY REQUIREMENTS INITIALLY IN AMMAN. AT THE KING'S REQUEST THESE INITIAL CONTACTS TOOK PLACE ON THE FIFTH AND ARE BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY.

3. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES I HOPE DEPT WILL NOT FORECLOSE RESPONDING TO THE KING AT LEAST UNTIL WE HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO ASSESS AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE SUBSTANTIVE IMPLICATIONS.
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* As received.

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EXDIS

SUBJ: GOVERNOR SCRANTON'S DECEMBER 8 TALK WITH TALHOUNI,
RIFAI, AND TOUGAN

1. FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY-PREPARED SUMMARY OF POINTS MADE BY
PRIME MINISTER TALHOUNI DURING TWO HOUR AND FORTY MINUTE
CONVERSATION WITH GOVERNOR SCRANTON ON DECEMBER 8. FOREIGN
MINISTER RAIFAI, DEPPRIMIN TOUGAN, AND MR. J.G. SASALL ALSO
PRESENT. GOVERNOR SCRANTON HAS CLEARED THIS SUMMARY REPORT.

A) U.S. SUPPORT OF NOV RESOLUTION-TALHOUNI CLAIMED THAT ALTHOUGH
U.S. HAD PROMISED PUT FULL WEIGHT BEHIND RESOLUTION THERE
WAS INSTEAD COMPLETE INACTION. ARABS MIGHT HAVE GOTTEN BETTER
RESOLUTION WERE IT NOT FOR U.S. REALITIES OF U.S. POSITION OF
OPEN SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL REVEALED IN STAND ON JERUSALEM
RESOLUTION OF MAY 25, 1968, COOLER RECEPTION GIVEN HUSSEIN IN
U.S. IN COMPARISON TO ESHKOL, ETC. ISRAELI DISDAIN FOR THE SC
RESOLUTION GREATLY REDUCES THE PRESTIGE AND AUTHORITY OF UN.
"ONE WOULD THINK THAT ISRAELI ACTIONS WOULD CONCERN THE U.S.",
AS PERMANENT SC MEMBER. FELT THAT U.S. FAILED TO SUPPORT JARRING
AS STRONGLY AS DID UK, FRANCE AND USSR.

B) UAR ARMS BUILD-UP - TALHOUNI ASSERTED THAT USSR HELPED UAR
ONLY WITH DEFENSIVE WEAPONS. NOTED THAT NASSER IS STILL UNABLE

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TO OCCUPY THE OTHER BANK OF THE CANAL. IF HE HAD HAD ADEQUATE ARMS HE WOULD NOT HAVE GONE TO SC. TALHOUNI SAID THAT ONLY WHEN USSR OFFERED ARMS TO JORDAN DID THE U.S. AGREE TO SUPPLY ARMS.

C) REFUGEES-TALHOUNI SAID THAT A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF THE 250,000 DISPLACED PERSONS (VICTIMS OF 1967 WAR) WOULD OPEN THE WAY TO PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS. AS FOR THE 1948 VINTAGE REFUGEES, EXPLAINED THAT THE U.S.-SPONSORED SC RESOLUTION (SIC) WAS A GOOD OPENING FOR SOLUTION. REFUGEES MUST OBTAIN COMPENSATION. REITERATED THAT WITH AN UNDERSTANDING ON REFUGEES, WE COULD THEN CONSULT ON OTHER PROBLEMS. TALHOUNI REFUSED TO COMMIT HIMSELF TO ESTIMATE SUPPLIED BY UAR AND LEBANESE LEADERS TO SCRANTON THAT PERHAPS ONLY TEN PERCENT OR LESS OF 1948 REFUGEES WOULD ACTUALLY WANT TO GO BACK. SAID THIS WOULD DEPEND ON POLITICAL CURRENTS AND ATTITUDES, NOTING POSSIBILITY THAT THE 160,000-ODD REFUGEES IN SYRIA MIGHT DECIDE TO ACT AS ONE UNIT (TALHOUNI PRESUMABLY MEANT THAT THIS GROUP MIGHT OPT TO GO EN MASSE TO ISRAEL). TALHOUNI SAID THAT THE 60,000-ODD GAZAN REFUGEES IN JORDAN WOULD CERTAINLY WANT TO RETURN TO GAZA.

D) FEDAYEEN-TALHOUNI DESCRIBED FEDAYEEN AS AUTONOMOUS MOVEMENT COMPOSED OF SEVERAL GROUPS WHICH COLLECTIVELY WERE GROWING STRONGER AS THE CHANCES OF PEACE DIMMED. SAID THERE WAS NO REAL UNITY AMONG VARIOUS GROUPS. SAID THAT ISRAELI INTERPRETATION OF GOJ-FEDAYEEN AGREEMENT WAS UNTRUE. CLAIMED THERE WAS NO SUCH AGREEMENT. (COMMENT: GOV SCRANTON OBTAINED IMPRESSION IN THIS TALK AND ALSO WITH KING THAT GOVERNMENT HAD SIMPLY TOLD FEDAYEEN OF THE RESTRICTIONS ON THEIR ACTIVITIES, AND FEDAYEEN AGREED TO COMPLY. THERE WERE NO NEGOTIATIONS AS SUCH.) NOTED THAT GOJ SUPPORTS SC RESOLUTION AND JARRING; FEDAYEEN OBJECT TO BOTH. FEDAYEEN, HE ARGUED, CAN BE CONTROLLED ONLY IF GOJ IS SUCCESSFUL IN ITS SEARCH FOR PEACE. TALHOUNI AGREED THAT AT PRESENT GOJ WAS NOT OVERLY CONCERNED ABOUT THREAT FROM FEDAYEEN BUT THOUGHT THAT AS TIME PASSED WITH NO PROGRESS TOWARD A SETTLEMENT, THE "FEDAYEEN COULD BE THE FORCE THAT CAN TAKE OVER". NOTED THAT NOVEMBER GOJ CONFRONTATION WITH FEDAYEEN HAD BEEN SMALL-SCALE. ON A LARGER SCALE, A CONFRONTATION WOULD BECOME A VIET-NAM.

E) IRAQI FORCES-TALHOUNI SAID THAT THERE WERE NO

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PROBLEMS FOR GOJ WITH IRAQI FORCES. FULL HARMONY EXISTED. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT AMONG IRAQI FORCES IS A UNIT (SO-CALLED 421ST COMMANDO BATTALION) OF PALESTINIAN REGULARS, NOT FEDAYEEN. CLAIMED THIS GROUP WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR INCIDENTS FOR WHICH THEY BLAMED.

F) U.S. V. USSR ARMS-AFTER U.S. HAD INITIALLY REFUSED TO PROVIDE ARMS AFTER THE JUNE WAR, TALHOUNI AND HUSSEIN HAD CONFERRED WITH NASSER. LATTER ADVISED GOJ TO SEEK ARMS FROM U.S. RATHER THAN USSR. GOJ TRIED AGAIN UNSUCCESSFULLY, THEN TOLD KING FAYSAL IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO GET SOVIET ARMS. USSR MILITARY DELEGATION WAS IN FACT ALMOST ON SCENE. FAYSAL PROMISED TO URGE RESPONSIVENESS ON U.S. AND SO, IN TIME, U.S. ARMS CAME, BUT NOT IN THE QUANTITY OR QUALITY DESIRED. PRESSURE TO GO SOVIET CONTINUES. MADE SEVERAL CRITICAL REMARKS ABOUT SUPPLY OF SKYHAWKS TO ISRAEL.

G) INTERNAL SITUATION-TALHOUNI SAID EXTREMISTS WERE GROWING STRONGER AT EXPENSE OF MODERATES. COMPARED SITUATION TODAY TO TIME HE CAME TO POWER 14 MONTHS AGO. IN PARLIAMENT, THOSE DEPUTIES WHO USED TO GO ALONG WITH SC RESOLUTION NOW CHALLENGE GOVERNMENT SUPPORT OF IT. NOTED PARLIAMENTARY MOTION INTRODUCED DAY PREVIOUSLY TO CRITICIZE SUPPORTERS OF RESOLUTION.

H) JERUSALEM-IF SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM IS INTERNATIONALIZATION, IT MUST BE ON BASIS OF 1948 RESOLUTIONS. DEVICE OF INTERNATIONALIZATION APPLIED TO PRESENT SITUATION WOULD BE INVALID. GOJ IS WILLING, HOWEVER, TO DISCUSS AGAIN PAKISTANI RESOLUTION ON WHICH U.S. HAD ABSTAINED EARLIER THIS YEAR. BUT, BASICALLY, GOJ CANNOT GIVE IN (TO ISRAELI POSITION).
GP-1

SYMMES

NOTE: EXDIS ADDED PER SSO - MR. THEROS, 12/10/68

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol. XX, # 344
By g NARA, Date 9-20-01

EXDIS

SUBJ: DECEMBER 8 HUSSEIN-SCRANTON TALK

PASS OTHER POSTS AT DEPT'S DISCRETION

1. FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY-PREPARED SUMMARY OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN KING HUSSEIN AND GOVERNOR SCRANTON EVENING OF DECEMBER 8. ZAID RIFAI, SECRETARY GENERAL OF ROYAL DIWAN, WAS ONLY OTHER PERSON PRESENT. SUMMARY REPORT APPROVED BY GOVERNOR SCRANTON.
2. GOVERNOR SCRANTON SAID THAT KING PRESENTED HIS POINTS CALMLY AND DISPASSIONATELY THROUGHOUT TALK. WHILE REVEALING DISAPPOINTMENT WITH US ACTIONS, OR LACK OF ACTIONS, DID NOT PUNCTUATE HIS CRITICISM WITH SHARP OR BITTER COMMENTS. HE WAS QUOTE VERY PLEASANT UNQUOTE. (ZAID RIFAI LATER AT KING'S DINNER TOLD ME THAT HE THOUGHT THE TALK HAD GONE VERY WELL AND THAT THE KING HAD BEEN IMPRESSED AND PLEASED WITH THE GOVERNOR.)
3. MUCH OF CONVERSATION DEALT WITH TERMS OF POSSIBLE SETTLEMENT (AMMAN 7822). HUSSEIN AGREED WITH SCRANTON'S INTERPRETATION OF NASSER'S POSITION AS REVEALED IN RECENT CAIRO CONVERSATION; I.E., (A) NASSER WANTED SINAI BACK; (B) WAS WILLING TO BE ACCOMODATING RE CANAL, TIRAN STRAITS; (C) COULD PARTICIPATE IN CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENT TO SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER SC RESOLUTION; (D) COULD ACCEPT UN PRESENCE BUT NOT DEMILITARIZATION; (E) WOULD FIND NO PROBLEM WITH UN OR OTHER KIND OF INTERNATIONAL

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PRESENCE AT SHARM AL-SHAYKH; (F) DID NOT BELIEVE SYRIA WOULD PRESENT A MAJOR PROBLEM IN SETTLEMENT; AND (G) DID NOT NECESSARILY WANT TO KEEP GAZA, BUT DID NOT WANT IT TO BE GIVEN TO ISRAEL.

4. HUSSEIN REVEALED A FAVORABLE ESTIMATE OF NASSER NOW, ADMITTED HAVING DIFFICULTIES WITH HIM IN PAST, BUT ASSERTED HE WAS UTTERLY CONVINCED THAT NASSER WANTED A SETTLEMENT. SAID HE AND NASSER WERE WORKING CLOSELY TOGETHER. ZAID RIFAI MENTIONED TO SCRANTON THAT HUSSEIN HAD OCCASIONALLY QUOTE LAID DOWN THE LAW TO NASSER UNQUOTE AND NASSER HAD COMPLIED.

5. HUSSEIN SEEMED QUITE CONFIDENT ABOUT HIS ABILITIES TO KEEP THE COUNTRY UNDER CONTROL. ADMITTED HE HAD PROBLEM WITH IRAQI FORCES BUT FELT HE HAD THIS SITUATION UNDER CONTROL AS WELL. ADMITTED THAT KING FAYSAL WAS GIVING MONEY TO FEDAYEEN, AND THAT LATTER HAD CHICOM AND RUSSIAN EQUIPMENT.

6. HUSSEIN DID NOT RAISE PHANTOM ISSUE AS SUCH, OR HIS INTEREST IN SENDING GENERAL KHAMMASH TO WASHINGTON. ONLY RIFAI REFERRED TO HUSSEIN'S DEC 2 MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON. HUSSEIN SAID HE COULD NOT DEFEND JORDAN IF ISRAEL ATTACKED. MENTIONED THAT PRESSURES TO BUY RUSSIAN ARMS WERE GROWING, BUT DID NOT CRITICIZE US POSITION ON ARMS SUPPLIES.

7. HUSSEIN SAID HE WAS CONVINCED THAT SOVIETS GENUINELY WANTED PEACE.

8. HUSSEIN ALSO INDICATED HIS INTEREST IN AN EARLY VISIT TO THE US TO SEE PRESIDENT-ELECT.

9. SCRANTON WENT INTO SOME DEPTH WITH HUSSEIN RE JORDAN'S ECONOMIC FUTURE, NOTING HOW WELL COUNTRY HAD BEEN DOING PRIOR TO JUNE WAR. HE ALSO PURSUED SUBJECT DURING SUBSEQUENT DINNER WITH KING, DISCUSSING WATER RESOURCES, DESALINATION SCHEMES, ETC.).

10. SCRANTON ALSO DISCUSSED REFUGEE PROBLEM AT LENGTH. KING WANTED SOME SCHEME WHICH WOULD BRING REFUGEES AS A GROUP UNDER ONE AUTHORITY.

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By us, NARA, Date 6-6-03

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SANDSTORM

SUBJ: DECEMBER 8 HUSSEIN-SCRANTON TALK

FOR SPECIAL ATTENTION S/S READ OR WALSH IN MAKING DISTRIBUTION.

GOVERNOR SCRANTON HAS APPROVED FOLLOWING REPORT:

1. GOVERNOR SCRANTON HAD 90 MINUTE CONVERSATION WITH HUSSEIN EVENING OF DECEMBER 8. ONLY OTHER PARTICIPANT WAS ZAID RIFA'I, SECRETARY GENERAL OF ROYAL DIVAN.
2. WHEN SUBJECT OF SPECIAL EXCHANGES BETWEEN JORDAN AND ISRAEL CAME UP, HUSSEIN HANDED GOVERNOR SCRANTON PAPER WHOSE TEXT IS AS FOLLOWS:
QUOTE: 1. WE HAVE HAD SOME INFORMAL AND UNOFFICIAL EXCHANGES FOR SOMETIME NOW.
2. AS A RESULT OF THESE EXCHANGES, I AM CONVINCED OF THE FOLLOWING: . FOR WHATEVER REASON, ISRAEL IS NOT TRULY SERIOUS IN NEGOTIATING SETTLEMENT WITH JORDAN, E.G. ABSOLUTE ABSENCE OF ANY CHANGE IN RIGID ISRAELI POSITION ONE YEAR AFTER RESOLUTION. B. ISRAEL IS DETERMINED TO ANNEX SIGNIFICANT PORTIONS OF THE WEST BANK TO INNER QUOTE IMPROVE HER SECURITY POSITION END INNER QUOTE. WHILE THIS DEMAND MIGHT BE WHITTLED DOWN SOMEWHAT, IT IS PROBABLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR ISRAEL TO ACCEPT TO LEAVE EAST JERUSALEM.
C. NEITHER I NOR ANY OTHER ARAB LEADER CAN ACCEPT A SETTLEMENT ON SUCH TERMS.
D. THERE IS NOTHING MORE I CAN DO TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT. IT IS CLEAR THAT JORDAN IS INCAPABLE OF INFLUENCING OR PRESSURING ISRAEL TO ALTER HER POSITION.
E. ONLY BY MASSIVE OUTSIDE PRESSURE ON ISRAEL IS THERE ANY CHANCE THAT SHE WILL AGREE TO REASONABLE TERMS THE ARABS CAN ACCEPT.
F. THE ONLY COUNTRY CAPABLE OF EXERTING THE DEGREE OF PRESSURE REQUIRED IS UNITED STATES. BUT TO DO SO WOULD ENTAIL SUCH A DRAMATIC CHANGE IN UNITED STATES' POLICY AND APPROACH THAT (IT) SEEMS - AT THE PRESENT - UNLIKELY.

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-2- AMMAN 7822, 091500Z DEC, (NODIS/SANDSTORM)

G. THE OUTCOME WILL PROBABLY BE AN INCREASE IN INCIDENTS, TENSIONS, RIGIDITY AND EXTREMISM ON BOTH SIDES, CULMINATING AT SOME POINT IN ANOTHER WAR.

H. IT IS QUITE CLEAR TO ME THAT ISRAEL HAS ADOPTED A TRANSPARENT AND CYNICAL POLICY OF USING THE EXCUSE OF ALLEGED NEGOTIATIONS IN AN ATTEMPT TO PREVENT OR DELAY ANY POSSIBLE PRESURE FROM OUTSIDE, AND THUS- BECAUSE OF INTERNAL DIFFERENCES - TO AVOID HAVING TO MAKE ANY DECISIONS ON THE TERMS OF THE FINAL SETTLEMENT. END QUOTE

3. IN ELABORATING ON HIS REACTION TO THE ISRAELI PROPOSALS, KING SAID HE HAD CONCLUDED HE HAD GOTTEN NOWHERE IN THESE CONTRACTS. HE DESCRIBED FOR GOVERNOR SCRANTON THE ISRAELI CONCEPT OF QUOTE CORRIDORS UNQUOTE INTO THE WEST BANK, FOR EXAMPLE, TO JERICHO, WITH QUOTE ATTACHMENTS UNQUOTE GOING EITHER WAY. ISRAEL INTENDED TO CREATE ISRAELI CIVILIAN SETTLEMENTS IN THESE WEST BANK CORRIDORS. (GOVERNOR SCRANTON INDICATED TO US HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH THESE CONCEPTS AS RESULT OF UNDER SECRETARY'S BRIEFING.) ISRAELIS, HUSSEIN EXPLAINED, ALSO HAD INDICATED THAT JORDAN MIGHT HAVE A QUOTE FREEWAY TO GAZA AND/OR A PORT UNQUOTE. THERE HAD BEEN NO ISRAELI MOVEMENT ON THE JERUSALEM PROBLEM, HUSSEIN SAID. THE ISRAELI INTENDED TO KEEP IT A UNIFIED CITY, BUT THEY WOULD ALLOW ACCESS TO THE MUSLIN HOLY PLACES.

4. HUSSEIN DID NOT MENTION ANY ISRAELI OFFER OF ANNUAL FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR JORDANIAN LOSS OF TOURIST REVENUES.

5. HUSSEIN TOLD SCRANTON HE WAS WILLING TO ENTERTAIN NUMBER OF IDEAS FOR JERUSALEM ISSUE, AND WOULD EVEN GO SO FAR AS TO ALLOW AN OUTSIDE ORGANIZATION TO HAVE SOME FORM OF JURISDICTION OVER THE CITY, (PROBABLY MEANING INTERNATIONALIZATION). HE COULD NOT, HOWEVER, GIVE UP TO ISRAEL JORDANIAN JURISDICTION OVER THE JORDANIAN INHABITANTS OF EAST JERUSALEM. SCRANTON NOTED THAT FAYSAL'S FEELINGS ON JERUSALEM WERE INTENSE.

6. HUSSEIN DID NOT INDICATE THAT PAPER HANDED SCRANTON WAS FOR PRESIDENT-ELECT ALONE.

7. OTHER SUBJECTS IN DISCUSSION REPORTED SEPTEL. I WILL SHORTLY BE FORWARDED MY OWN COMMENTS ON THIS DEVELOPMENT. SYMMES.

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PREPARED BY



Department of State

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN:PJGRIFFIN
APPROVED BY: NEA - PARKER T. HART
NEA/UAR - MR. PARKER
NEA/ARN - MR. SEELYE
S/S - MR. KELLY

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By 10/11/01 NARA, Date 10/19/01

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R 160102Z NOV 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USINT CAIRO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

~~SECRET~~ STATE 272844

EXDIS

SUBJ: ARAB-ISRAEL: CALL BY JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR SHARAF

1. JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR SHARAF CALLED ON ASSISTANT SECRETARY HART NOV. 14 APPARENTLY ON OWN INITIATIVE FOR EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS. SHARAF SAID HE PARTICULARLY WISHED TO CLARIFY GOJ POSITION FOR USG IN AFTERMATH RECENT EXCHANGES THROUGH JARRING AND FONMIN RIFA'I'S TALK WITH SECRETARY.

2. MAIN THRUST OF SHARAF'S PRESENTATION WAS EXPRESSION DEEP DISAPPOINTMENT OF GOJ AT CONTINUED FAILURE ISRAEL TO COMMIT ITSELF DEFINITELY TO PRINCIPLES OF IMPLEMENTATION OF UN RESOLUTION AND WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORY. SAID ARABS HAD HIGH HOPES OF FORWARD MOVEMENT IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WHEN EBAN RETURNED TO NEW YORK BUT CLEVERLY DRAFTED ISRAELI DOCUMENT GIVEN TO UAR FONMIN MAHMUD AND SIMILAR ORAL MESSAGE PASSED TO RIFA'I THROUGH JARRING PROVED VERY DISAPPOINTING AS BOTH CONTAINED SAME OLD ISRAELI SEMANTICS. ACCORDING SHARAF, BEST EBAN COULD DO IN ADDRESSING KEY SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE OF WITHDRAWAL

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 272844

WAS VAGUE AND SOMEWHAT ALARMING REFERENCE TO "DISPOSITION OF FORCES" AND "SECURE BOUNDARIES". THESE TERMS WERE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO JORDAN. SHARAF ALSO CRITICIZED ISRAELIS FOR AVOIDANCE ANY MENTION OF TIMING OF WITHDRAWAL.

3. ACCORDING SHARAF, ISRAELI POSITION MOST DISHEARTENING AS NEW YORK VENUE HAD BEEN GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO WORK OUT SOME FORM OF ACCOMMODATION TO WHICH ARABS COULD ADJUST AND WHICH WOULD ALSO GUARANTEE ISRAELI SECURITY. FOR UNEXPLAINED REASON, HOWEVER, GOI UNABLE OR UNWILLING DECLARE ITSELF ON SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS. SHARAF SAID APPARENT HARDENING OF ISRAELI ATTITUDE IN RECENT MONTHS CAME AS GREAT BLOW TO LIMITED NUMBER MODERATE ARABS FAVORING PEACEFUL APPROACH. UNLESS ISRAELIS DEMONSTRATE MORE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE ON KEY ISSUES SHARAF GLOOMILY PREDICTED THIS MIGHT MEAN END OF PEACEFUL EFFORTS ON PART ARABS. LACK OF PROGRESS, ACCORDING SHARAF, LIKELY INTENSIFY JORDANIAN INTERNAL PRESSURES AND STIMULATE GUERRILLA ACTIVITY. GOJ SIMPLY CANNOT RISK OPEN CONFRONTATION WITH "NATIONALISTS" ON PEACE ISSUE IF ALL IT CAN OFFER IN RETURN IS UNCOMPROMISING ISRAELI ATTITUDE.

4. IN REPLY SECRETARY HART EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR GOJ POSITION WHICH HE TERMED MOST FORTHCOMING OF ALL PARTIES. WHILE ADMITTING PEACE EFFORTS ARE IN DIFFICULT PHASE, HART STRESSED WE ARE HOPEFUL UAR WILL BE MORE CONCRETE ON QUESTION OF "STATE OF PEACE" FOLLOWING PRODUCTIVE TALK SECRETARY HAD RECENTLY WITH MAHMUD RIAD (USUN 7455). HART READ SUMMATION SECRETARY-RIAD DISCUSSION TO SHARAF WHO APPRECIATED HEARING RESTATEMENT OF USG POSITION. SHARAF SOUGHT CLARIFICATION OUR POSITION ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM GAZA. WAS INFORMED GAZA ALWAYS CONSIDERED SPECIAL PROBLEM, BUT COVERED BY BASIC PRINCIPLE OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORY.

5. SHARAF REITERATED CRITICISM US PRESS AS VERY UNHELPFUL TO ARAB POINT OF VIEW AND ALSO BITTERLY CASTIGATED ISRAELIS FOR PROCLIVITY TO EMBARRASS ARAB LEADERS PUBLICLY BY STATEMENTS AND PRESS LEAKS. HART EMPHASIZED USG HAS EXPRESSED DISPLEASURE TO GOI MANY TIMES ABOUT UNHELPFUL LEAKS AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS BUT ESSENCE OF PROBLEM IS LACK OF CLEAR MANDATE IN GOI RESULTING IN HESITATION AND LACK OF POLICY PRECISION. HART SAID IN US VIEW THERE IS NOW FRUSTRATING SORTING OUT TAKING PLACE IN GOI AND, THEREFORE, IT ESSENTIAL WE CONTINUE SUPPORT MODERATES

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 STATE 272844

LIKE EBAN.

6. TO SHARAF SUGGESTION THAT TRANSITION PERIOD LIKELY CURTAIL US EFFORTS SEEK PEACE SETTLEMENT, SECRETARY HART EMPHASIZED IN STRONGEST TERMS THAT USG DECISION-MAKING PROCESS WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY CHANGE IN ADMINISTRATION. SHARAF EXPRESSED PLEASURE AT HART'S ASSURANCE THAT TOP LEVEL ATTENTION IN DEPT NOW BEING DEVOTED TO ASSISTING JARRING IN HIS CONTINUING EFFORTS TO BREAK DEADLOCK OVER IMPLEMENTATION SC RESOLUTION.

GP-3. KATZENBACH

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

309

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65

Wednesday, December 6, 1967
6:00 p.m.

Rec'd
6:20p

Mr. President:

Herewith Dick Helms files a strong case for U.S. arms aid to Jordan -- from an intelligence perspective.

W. W. Rostow

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Authority 115 019-026-2-6
By SP, NARA, Date 1/19/02

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4805

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

309a

In light of a pending decision with regard to arms for Jordan, I pass to you a paper on this subject for whatever help it may be. It was prepared for me by the Office of National Estimates and represents this Agency's views.

Dick

Richard Helms

Attachment - 1

Implications of Jordan Receiving Arms from the US, the USSR, France, or Other Western Powers.

5 Dec. 1967

(DATE)

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Authority RAC 001-148-1-3

By NS NARA, Date 9-20-01

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

5 December 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Implications of Jordan Receiving Arms from the US,
the USSR, France, or Other Western Powers

I. INTRODUCTION

1. King Hussain feels a strong need to re-equip his armed forces after their heavy losses in the June war. This need springs more from political and psychological reasons than from military ones. Failure to get arms would give rise to severe domestic dissidence -- particularly from the officer corps on whose support Hussain depends. It would also weaken him politically in the rest of the Arab world -- inviting invidious comparison between the holdup in US resumption of arms sales to Jordan -- but not to Israel -- and the promptness with which Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi losses have been made good by the Soviets. Moscow has offered arms to Jordan on liberal terms. The \$100 million annual subsidy to Jordan from conservative oil-rich states will enable

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Excluded from automatic
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Authority NLS. 019.026.002/7
By je, NARA, Date 10-29-14

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Hussain to pay Western prices, and he would still prefer to rely chiefly on the US or, failing this, on French, British, and other Western European sources for his needs. He does so partly because his forces already use Western arms, partly because he fears Soviet influence, and perhaps most of all, because he feels a strong need for evidence that the US and the West, to which he has always looked for support, have not deserted him. If he does not meet with reasonable satisfaction from the US and the West he would take Soviet arms.

2. If the US refuses to supply any equipment at all and thus appears to be abandoning Jordan, other countries in the area would reassess their own relations with the US. Some, pro-US in orientation, would feel obliged to reinsure their positions by seeking closer relations with other states -- for example, Saudi Arabia might improve relations with Egypt, or even open diplomatic relations with the USSR. Any apparent abandonment of Jordan would in time also be observed with concern in Lebanon, Libya, Ethiopia, and other area states. Radical forces in the Arab world would be heartened.

- 2 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

II. ARMS FROM THE USSR

3. For Hussain to accept Soviet arms would mean that the USSR had established a position in another country heretofore largely closed to it. It would mean that all major Arab forces were standardized on Soviet equipment. The Israelis would raise an alarm about this and would urgently request additional US arms to offset those the Soviets supplied to Jordan. Such a development would serve to identify the US more closely with Israel and the Soviets with the Arabs. Prospects for movement toward an accommodation between the Arabs and Israel would probably be further dimmed.

4. In Jordan itself acceptance of Soviet arms would make preservation of Western influence increasingly difficult. In time, Jordan would be likely to come to share the antipathy of the radical Arabs toward the US and the West, and at best would adopt a neutralist stance. The acceptance of Soviet arms would probably improve Hussain's popularity in the short term, but would encourage the revolutionary forces that constitute the underlying threat to continuation of the monarchy.

5. We believe that Soviet aims in offering arms to Jordan are political, not military. By this move the Soviets do not have

it in mind to facilitate eventual military operations of their own in the area. Soviet policy almost certainly does not contemplate direct military intervention in intra-regional quarrels there. Moreover, Jordan, like those Arab states already equipped with Soviet weapons, would probably be unwilling to permit Soviet forces to use its territory except in the highly unlikely event that they were offered for use against Israel.

III. ARMS FROM WESTERN EUROPEAN SOURCES

6. Damage to US-Jordanian relations by US refusal to sell arms might be mitigated somewhat if the US facilitated acquisition of arms from other Western sources. Britain and France appear to be the most likely sources of the arms Jordan wants, but others, such as Belgium and Sweden, manufacture limited types of armaments.

France

7. De Gaulle's recent sharp condemnation of Israel and his suspension of military supplies to Israel on the eve of the war have already enhanced France's image in the Arab world. Sales of French arms, even through a third country intermediary, would

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further boost French prestige in both Jordan and in other Arab countries; it is not likely to benefit the US position in Jordan. While France could supply virtually all the categories of arms that Jordan wants, Jordan is particularly interested in French supersonic aircraft. Direct sales of French equipment to Jordan, especially of such significant items as Mirage aircraft, would bring a further deterioration of French-Israeli relations.

The UK

8. The UK has long been a major source of military supply for Jordan and has already provided a few aircraft since the war, though the British appear to be encountering difficulties in finding enough Hawker-Hunters to replace the two squadrons Jordan lost in the war. (The specific model Jordan wants is no longer in production.) Britain would be eager to earn hard currency from arms sales to Jordan and would not be much concerned at Israel's reaction. While the Jordanians have not so far pressed for ground equipment, they are familiar with British weapons and would probably prefer them as a first alternative to US equipment.

- 5 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

IV. ARMS FROM THE US

9. US agreement to provide a substantial proportion of the \$15-20 million in arms that Jordan has requested would help to slow the decline in US influence in the Arab world evident since the Arab-Israeli war. It would be interpreted both in Jordan and by other Arab regimes friendly to the US as tangible evidence that the US is not abandoning them. While provision of US arms would by no means fully restore US prestige in Jordan or in the area, particularly as long as Israel continues to occupy important Arab territories, it would encourage the moderate Arabs, for whom Hussain is at present the foremost spokesman, to maintain their relations with the US. It would also help Hussain maintain his moderate course in seeking an arrangement with Israel.

10. No matter what the source of Hussain's arms, there is not likely to be any significant effect on the military balance between the Arab states and Israel. Nonetheless, the latter would protest vigorously if the US resumed arms supply to Jordan. Tel Aviv would be certain to use shipments of arms to Jordan from any source as an argument for additional US aid.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

Sherman Kent

SHERMAN KENT
Chairman

- 6 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

27

~~SECRET~~ 334

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PAGE 01 CAIRO 03759 301554Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 301212Z OCT 68
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5314
INFO AMEMBASTY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
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EXDIS

DEPT WILL HAVE NOTED FROM MY UNCLASSIFIED 3751 GOHAR STATEMENT TO EFFECT ISRAEL PRESENCE ON EAST BANK SUEZ CANAL "INCONTRADICTION" TO SC NOV 22 RESOLUTION. ERIC PACE, WHO HAS JUST COME FROM WEEKLY GUAR PRESS CONFERENCE TELLS ME THIS LINE WAS PUSHED VERY HARD BY EGYPTIAN SPOKESMAN. ALL THIS LEADS ONE TO SPECULATE THAT LINE TAKEN IN NEW YORK BY FONMIN RIAD WITDC (USUN 7435) PARA 3) REFLECTS HIGH LEVEL GUAR DECISION. TROUBLING BUT IMPORTANT QUESTION WHICH ARISES IS WHETHER USSR IS PREPARED SUPPORT SUCH A DECISION AND POSSIBLE EXTENT OF SOVIET SUPPORT.

BERGUS

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001

By ag/ll, NARA, Date 10/1/01

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

311a

~~SECRET~~

March 21, 1968, 7:45 a. m.

Mr. President:

As you know from the press, the Israelis last night mounted a major raid on Arab terrorist bases on the east bank of the Jordan River.

Your message got to Eshkol after the attack had been launched (8:45 p. m. EST last evening), and he responded by assuring you that this would be a limited raid and that Israeli forces would withdraw as soon as they had accomplished their mission of "preventing additional sabotage activities and disarming the terrorists." Eshkol has just (5:50 a. m. EST) phoned Barbour to say that Israeli troops are now in the process of withdrawing. Eshkol says he will respond more fully to your message.

Three action items face us today:

1. State will probably postpone signing the new Israeli PL480 agreement, scheduled for 10:30 a. m. today. We lay ourselves open to Israeli resentment for "applying pressure," but I don't see how we could sign this today. State would say everybody is "too busy" today and avoid any implication our delay is punitive.
2. State is considering issuing early a statement built around the theme that "further violence cannot bring peace to the Middle East" and expressing our "concern and dismay" at Israeli military action. We can hardly remain silent, and we would be as careful as possible about domestic Jewish opinion. The British have already publicly urged withdrawal behind the June cease-fire lines.
3. We have no indication yet that there will be a UN Security Council meeting, but this is a clear possibility.

Hal
Harold H. Saunders

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, Vol. 44, # 121
By 47 NARA, Date 9-20-01

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3116

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, March 21, 1968 -- 9:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the statement which State Department proposes to issue this morning, if you approve.

It is responsive to some suggestions made by Mac Bundy, among others.

I have bracketed the two words I believe are questionable: we can make a judgment that the attacks are damaging to hopes for peace; but whether they are "unjustified" or not involves a calculus that only a higher authority, even, than the U.S. ought to make. We do not believe it realistic just to remain wholly silent, since this would be read in the Arab world as U.S. support for the Israeli exercise.

RETURN TO ROSTOW
PRES. TALKED TO ROSTOW

W. W. Rostow

Atatement approved as is _____

Approved without "unjustified" _____

No statement _____

Call me _____

311c

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

March 21, 1968

Further violence cannot bring a durable and stable peace to the Middle East.

The Israeli military actions today against the territory of Jordan are [unjustified and] damaging to hopes for a settlement of the real issues involved. Furthermore, all of the parties know that peaceful channels are available.

We recognize the problems created by terrorism, but our main objective is to achieve a lasting peace. Israel and the Arab States should be adhering scrupulously to the cease-fire resolution of the Security Council and working with the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General in accord with the Security Council's resolution of last November. Any action that delays his work is most regrettable.

We have made our position known repeatedly and as recently as one day ago: Arab-Israeli differences should be settled through the efforts of the U.N. Representative and not through the use of force.

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32

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 03903 201506Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00,7030 W

P R 201420Z MAR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4965
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1391

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EXDIS

SUBJ: JARRING MISSION

REF: AMMAN 3897

DEPT PASS CAIRO

I SAW KING HUSSEIN SUBSEQUENT TO REFTEL AND REVIEWED CONVERSATION WITH RIFA'I, EXPLAINING AND#I HAD SPOKEN UNDER INSTRUCTIONS. KING SAID HE EXPECTS TO SEE JARRING LATER TODAY AND WILL BE INTERESTED

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3903A ~~SECRET~~

IN WHAT HE HAS TO REPORT. HE CONCLUDED CONVERSATION BY SAYING HE INTENDS TO SEE NASSER NEXT WEEK AND WILL DO ALL HE CAN TO BRING ABOUT A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH BY UAR.

SYMMES

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OCT.

AS RECEIVED. WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001
By ag/ll NARA, Date 10/10/01

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Saunders

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 07318 022347Z

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39
ACTION SS 30

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6661
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE



~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 7318

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 7317

1. WE HAVE BEEN IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH EMBASSY TEL AVIV, WHICH PASSED PALACE MESSAGE TO BITAN OF ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY. BITAN SAID HE HAD NOT HEARD OF INCIDENT AND THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY ANYTHING SERIOUS HAPPENING.
2. TEL AVIV DATT REPORTED HE ALSO HAD NO FURTHER REPORT OF SHOOTING AFTER 2100 ZULU TIME.
3. AS OF 2300 ZULU TIME PALACE STATED ALL QUIET SINCE 2100 ZULU AND THEY EXPECT NO DETAILED REPORTS BEFORE MORNING. SYMMES

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By 12/11 NARA, Date 10/14/01

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Department of State

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INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1955
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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-261
By is NARA, Date 6-6-03

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 7312

Robertow

NODIS/SANDSTORM

DEPT PASS USUN AND CAIRO

1. WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT NATURE OF REPLY EBAN MAY BE BRINGING TO NEW YORK IS CRITICAL IN TERMS OF ENCOURAGING UAR TO CONTINUE, I TRUST WE ARE NOT OVERLOOKING ANY OPPORTUNITY THE EBAN PAPER MAY ALSO OFFER TO KEEP UP THE MOMENTUM ON THE JORDANIAN SIDE. HUSSEIN HAS AGAIN SPELLED OUT THE FUNDAMENTAL JORDANIAN POSITION, THIS TIME IN PUBLIC, IN HIS TELEVISION INTERVIEW OF OCT 31 (AMMAN 7298), I.E., THAT JORDAN COULD ENTER DIRECT OR INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS ONLY IF ISRAEL ACCEPTED THE NOV RESOLUTION AND INDICATED IT WAS PREPARED TO IMPLEMENT IT. IT IS NOTEWORTHY, TOO, THAT HE HINTED AT A POSSIBLE ISRAELI **BREAKTHROUGH** IN THIS DIRECTION. THE ONLY OMISSION IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENT IS THAT JORDAN NEEDS A CLEARER IDEA OF THE BORDER ADJUSTMENTS ISRAEL FORESEES.

2. JORDAN'S EAGERNESS FOR THE NEXT STAGE TO BEGIN IS CURRENTLY SO INTENSE THAT IT MIGHT INFLUENCE IN A POSITIVE DIRECTION THE UAR REACTION, AN EXAMPLE OF WHICH WAS JORDAN'S ENCOURAGING RIAD TO REMAIN IN NEW YORK. WE THEREFORE STRONGLY DISAGREE WITH RABIN'S ARGUMENT (STATE 264766) THAT UAR MOVES ALONG CANAL MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR JORDAN TO MAKE PEACE.

3. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE ARE CONFIDENT JORDAN WOULD ACCEPT GOI FORMULA OUTLINED TEL AVIV 5580, I.E., " IF JORDAN READY STATE ITS AIM IS REACH PEACE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL BY TERMS OF WHICH NEW BOUNDARIES WILL BE DEFINED, ISRAEL WILLING DECLARE IT WILL IMPLEMENT SC RESOLUTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS PEACE AGREEMENT." I STRONGLY URGE THAT EBAN AND JARRING BE ENCOURAGED TO PRESENT SIMULTANEOUSLY TO RIFAI AND RIAD THE

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-2- AMMAN 7312, NOVEMBER 1

NEW GOI POSITION ASSUMING, OF COURSE, THAT IT IS AS FORTHCOMING VIS-A-VIS JORDAN AS THAT FORMULA CITED ABOVE.

4. ONE FURTHER POINT TO BEAR IN MIND IS FACT THAT RIFAI, ALTHOUGH HE MAY NOT HAVE BEEN CUT INTO " INFORMAL CONTACTS", IS NEVERTHELESS THE JORDAN MAN ON THE SCENE. HE HAS ON OCCASION IN THE PAST ACTED WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS (ALTHOUGH NOT IN THE JARRING CONTEXT) AND IS CAPABLE OF A HASTY LEGALISTIC REACTION THAT MIGHT TUMBLE THE WHOLE SHAKY EDIFICE WE HAVE BEEN ERECTING. SYMMES

GP-1

BT

NOTE: NOT PASSED USUN AND CAIRO BY OC/T 11/1/68

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TELEGRAM
43

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 07317 022231Z

85
ACTION SS 30

INFO CCO 00,SSO 00,NSCE 00, /030 W

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0000

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EXDIS

PALACE INFORMED EMBASSY AT 2045Z THAT EXPLOSIONS AND SHOOTING HAD JUST OCCURED AT EILAT AND THAT EILAT HAD BEEN BLACKED OUT. ISRAELIS MOVING TANKS IN AREA. PALACE NOT CERTAIN WHAT HAPPENING BUT INVESTIGATING. AT 2100Z PALACE INFORMED US THAT REPORTS FROM AQABA INDICATED FEDAYEEN FROM JORDANIAN SIDE RESPONSIBLE AND THAT KING HUSSEIN HAD ORDERED JORDANIAN ARMY UNITS TO MOVE IMMEDIATELY AGAINST FEDAYEEN. KING HUSSEIN REQUESTED EMBASSY INFORM ISRAELI GOVERNMENT ON HIS BEHALF THAT HIS UNITS CLOSING AGAINST FEDAYEEN, THAT HE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION ISRAELIS HAVE THAT WOULD ASSIST HIM, AND THAT HE HOPES THAT ISRAELIS WILL ON THEIR SIDE NOT TAKE ANY ACTION TO ESCALATE SITUATION. REQUEST EMBASSY INFORM GOI AUTHORITIES IMMEDIATELY AND LET US HAVE REACTION.

SYMMES

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-261
By *is*, NARA, Date 6-6-03

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 07318 022347Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO SSD 00, CCO 00, NSCE 00, /030 W

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0 022339Z NOV 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6661
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 7318

EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 7317

1. WE HAVE BEEN IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH EMBASSY TEL AVIV, WHICH PASSED PALACE MESSAGE TO BITAN OF ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY. BITAN SAID HE HAD NOT HEARD OF INCIDENT AND THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY ANYTHING SERIOUS HAPPENING.
2. TEL AVIV DATT REPORTED HE ALSO HAD NO FURTHER REPORT OF SHOOTING AFTER 2100 ZULU TIME.
3. AS OF 2300 ZULU TIME PALACE STATED ALL QUIET SINCE 2100 ZULU AND THEY EXPECT NO DETAILED REPORTS BEFORE MORNING. SYMMES

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NLJ-S 98001

By ng/ll NARA, Date 10/1/01

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Department of State

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 07409 111406Z

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By us, NARA, Date 6-6-03

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

006723

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6725

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 7409

2

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

EXDIS

SUBJ: HUSSEIN ON NEXT STEPS WITH JARRING

1. ON NINTH I DISCUSSED WITH KING HUSSEIN LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE JARRING MISSION, PARTICULARLY THE RETURN OF THE TWO ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS TO AMMAN AND CAIRO AND JARRING'S APPARENT DETERMINATION TO KEEP THE MISSION ALIVE. I NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH WE ARE DISAPPOINTED THAT THE INDIRECT CONTACTS IN NEW YORK HAD NOT MADE GREATER PROGRESS WE STILL BELIEVED THEY HAD BEEN OF VALUE. WE HOPED THAT ALL PARTIES WOULD BE RESPONSIVE TO ANY SUGGESTIONS FROM JARRING IN THE COMING WEEKS. ALTHOUGH THE USG WILL BE GOING THROUGH A CHANGE OF ADMINISTRATION IN THE COMING WEEKS, THIS WOULD NOT SLACKEN OUR INTEREST IN DOING ANYTHING WE COULD TO HELP THINGS MOVE. I SAID I WAS CERTAIN PRESIDENT-ELECT NIXON WAS BEING KEPT FULLY INFORMED ON THE JARRING MISSION. I SAID IN ANTICIPATION OF MY AUDIENCE I HAD ASKED THE DEPARTMENT IF THEY HAD ANY SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR ME. IN RESPONSE I HAD BEEN TOLD I COULD REPEAT TO HIM THE ASSURANCES GIVEN HIM IN NEW YORK A YEAR AGO. I READ TO HIM VERBATIM THE PERTINENT TERRITORIAL ASSURANCES CONTAINED IN THE MEMORANDUM DATED NOVEMBER 6, 1967.

2. HUSSEIN SAID HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR THESE REASSURANCES OF OUR POSITION. HE HAD NOT PLANNED FOR JORDAN TO LIE BACK AND DO NOTHING ABOUT JARRING IN THE COMING WEEKS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE WAS NOT MUCH JORDAN COULD DO UNLESS ISRAEL CAME FORWARD AND GAVE HIM WHAT HE NEEDED IN ORDER TO PROCEED TO THE NEXT STEPS. ESSENTIALLY, THIS WAS A STATEMENT ABOUT ACCEPTANCE OF

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 07409 111406Z

THE RESOLUTION AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION AND SOME DETAILS ABOUT BOUNDARIES.

3. EMPHASIZING I WAS SPEAKING INFORMALLY, I ASKED HUSSEIN IF HE HAD GIVEN ANY THOUGHT TO THE PROBLEM OF HOW TO SATISFY ISRAELI SECURITY CONCERNS ON THE WEST BANK. WE COULD UNDERSTAND THAT THE ALLON PLAN CONCEPTS WERE UNACCEPTABLE TO HIM. NEVERTHELESS, ISRAELI SECURITY CONCERNS REGARDING THE WEST BANK ARE REAL. I RECALLED THAT IN SOME OF OUR PREVIOUS CONVERSATIONS HE HAD TOLD ME THAT HE ACCEPTED THE IDEA OF DEMILITARIZATION OF THE WEST BANK AND RECOGNIZED THAT HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PUT JORDAN MILITARY FORCES ON THE WEST BANK. HAD HE THOUGHT OF ANY SPECIFIC WAYS AS TO HOW JORDAN AND ISRAELI SECURITY REQUIREMENTS MIGHT BE MET? FOR EXAMPLE, WHAT ABOUT SOME IDEA OF JOINT POLICE SECURITY PATROLS?

4. HUSSEIN REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT GIVEN THIS PROBLEM MUCH THOUGHT. DEMILITARIZATION OF COURSE WOULD HAVE TO APPLY TO BOTH PARTIES, HOWEVER, AND OBVIOUSLY THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE SOME KIND OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES. HE HAD NOT THOUGHT ABOUT DETAILS.

5. IN DISCUSSING THE DEPARTURE OF THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS FROM NEW YORK, I MENTIONED CASUALLY THAT SOME QUARTERS SEEMED TO BE INTERPRETING FONMIN RIFAI'S DEPARTING COMMENTS AS REFLECTING AN ATTITUDE THAT THE JARRING MISSION WAS FINISHED. I HOPED THIS WAS NOT THE KING'S VIEW. HUSSEIN INDICATED JARRING IS STILL IN BUSINESS AS FAR AS HE IS CONCERNED.

6. DEPT MAY WISH TO PASS TO USUN, CAIRO AND TEL AVIV.

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ORIGIN SS 30

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IO/UNP BJJONES
APPROVED BY: THE UNDER SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE: HSAUNDERS
IO/JJSISCO
NEA/IAI: ALATHERTON
S/S: MR WALSH
NEA/RPDAVIES

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS. Vol. XX, # 312
By *g* NARA, Date 9-20-01

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 269779

EXDIS

SUBJECT: YOUR AUDIENCE WITH KING HUSSEIN

REF: AMMAN 7393

FOLLOWING MAY BE USED BY AMBASSADOR IN AUDIENCE WITH KING HUSSEIN:

1. NEXT STEPS IN JARRING MISSION. RE JARRING MISSION,
YOU MAY DRAW AS APPROPRIATE ON TELEGRAMS REPORTING DEVELOPMENTS IN
NEW YORK. SUGGEST YOU STATE THAT, WHILE THERE HAS NOT BEEN AS
MUCH PROGRESS AS WE HAD HOPED FOR, WE THINK INDIRECT EXCHANGES
BETWEEN PARTIES AND VARIOUS BILATERAL CONVERSATIONS HAVE BEEN
VERY USEFUL. MOST IMPORTANT THING AT THIS STAGE IS TO MAINTAIN
AND ACCELERATE WHAT MOMENTUM HAS DEVELOPED AND KEEP JARRING
EXERCISE GOING. IN THIS CONNECTION WE PLEASED THAT,
ALTHOUGH RIFAI AND RIAD LEAVING NEW YORK BOTH HAVE INDICATED THEY
AND GOVTS INTEND CONTINUE COOPERATE WITH JARRING. JARRING SEEMS
DETERMINED MAKE NO MOVE THAT WOULD JEOPARDIZE CONTINUATION
HIS MISSION. WE PLAN CONTINUE MAINTAIN CLOSEST CONTACT WITH
JARRING AND PARTIES. YOU MAY ALSO REPEAT ASSURANCES GIVEN
KING IN NEW YORK NOV. 1967 CONCERNING TERRITORIAL ASPECTS OF

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SETTLEMENT, INCLUDING POINT THAT U.S. PREPARED SUPPORT RETURN OF WEST BANK TO JORDAN WITH MINOR BOUNDARY RECTIFICATIONS. IN DISCUSSING FOREGOING, YOU REQUESTED ASCERTAIN FROM KING HIS VIEWS RE WAYS IN WHICH JORDAN MIGHT JUSTIFY ISRAEL'S SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ON WEST BANK. WHAT FORMULA WOULD GOJ BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT? FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD GOJ ACCEPT PROPOSITION OF JOINT GOJ-GOI PATROLS PERHAPS MADE UP OF SECURITY POLICE RATHER THAN MILITARY? ASSURE KING THAT YOU ARE ONLY MAKING INFORMAL PROBES ON THIS SUBJECT AND THAT YOU ARE ONLY SEEKING HIS PRELIMINARY VIEWS.

2. INTERNAL DEFENSE. YOU MAY REASSURE KING OF OUR DESIRE BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE RE STRENGTHENING GOJ'S INTERNAL DEFENSE CAPABILITY. IN THIS CONNECTION YOU MAY WISH MENTION INTER ALIA OUR INTENTION DISPATCH ON TDY SPECIALIST IN RIOT CONTROL, OUR CONTINUED WILLINGNESS ASSIST IN TRAINING, AND OUR READINESS SELL AND EXPEDITE SHIPMENT OF EQUIPMENT WHICH GOJ MAY WISH PURCHASE FROM U.S. KING MIGHT BE ADVISED TO ORDER NEEDED EQUIPMENT PROMPTLY VIEW LAPSE OF SHIPPING TIME.

FYI. APPEARS TO US THAT THE BALL IS NOW IN GOJ'S COURT. AMC'S MESSAGE NO. 38135 AND DA MESSAGE NO. 884553 GAVE EMBASSY INFORMATION ON PRICE AND AVAILABILITY OF VARIOUS ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT FOR USE BY SECURITY FORCES. WE AWAIT GOJ RESPONSE IN WAKE YOUR FURTHER CONSULTATIONS. WE NOTE PARENTHETICALLY THAT THE GOJ HAS NOT RPT NOT YET RESPONDED TO PRICE AND AVAILABILITY QUOTATIONS WHICH UK PROVIDED EXPEDITIOUSLY IN AUGUST (LONDON 13887). END FYI.

3. POSSIBLE INTEREST OF HUSSEIN IN VISITING U.S. FOR TALKS WITH PRESIDENT-ELECT. YOU SHOULD NOT RAISE SUBJECT BUT IF HUSSEIN EXPRESSES INTEREST IN VISITING U.S., YOU SHOULD INDICATE THAT YOU WILL SEEK ADVICE FROM DEPARTMENT ON QUESTION OF VISITS TO PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT-ELECT IN PERIOD PRIOR TO INAUGURATION. FYI. MR NIXON'S WISHES ON RECEIVING FOREIGN DIGNITARIES PRIOR TO INAUGURATION NOT YET KNOWN. END FYI.

4. POSSIBLE ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN NOVEMBER. IF KING SEEKS YOUR ADVICE RE CONVENING OF ARAB SUMMIT, SUGGEST YOU SEEK DISCOURAGE SUCH A MOVE AT THIS TIME. YOU MIGHT NOTE TENDENCY OF MOST PAST ARAB SUMMITS TO ADOPT EXTREME ARAB POSITIONS AND POINT TO RISK THAT SUMMIT DECISION

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 STATE 269779

IN CONTEXT ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM LIKELY REDUCE ARAB
NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY IN CONNECTION JARRING EFFORT.
FYI. WE PROPOSE YOU NOT RPT NOT MAKE TOO STRONG A CASE
AGAINST CONVENING ARAB SUMMIT SINCE THIS, AFTER
ALL, IS KING'S BUSINESS, NOT OURS. HE MAY HAVE HIS OWN
STRONG VIEWS AND, IF SO, WE WOULD NOT WISH MAKE AN ISSUE OUT
OF THIS. WE RECALL HUSSEIN'S DESIRE OVER PAST SEVERAL
MONTHS TO CONVENE ANOTHER ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE FOR PURPOSE OF
RENEWING MANDATE FOR ARABS TO SEEK POLITICAL SOLUTION TO MIDDLE
EAST CRISIS. WE ALSO RECOLLECT THAT HUSSEIN HOPED
TO USE SUCH A CONFERENCE TO ACHIEVE ARAB INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL COORDINATION ON BRINGING FEDAYEEN UNDER CONTROL.
WE SERIOUSLY DOUBT THAT AN ARAB SUMMIT WOULD ACHIEVE THESE
LAUDABLE GOALS. WE FEAR THAT ANOTHER SUMMIT AT THIS TIME
IS MORE LIKELY TO HARDEN ARAB PUBLIC POSITIONS ON AN
APPROACH TO A SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL,
THEREBY FURTHER REDUCING HUSSEIN'S AND PERHAPS NASSER'S
NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY AT THIS PARTICULARLY CRITICAL JUNCTURE
IN JARRING MISSION. HUSSEIN, OF COURSE, MUST MAKE HIS OWN
DECISION ON PROS AND CONS OF CALLING FOR THE CONVENING
ANOTHER ARAB SUMMIT. WE NOTE THAT ARAB LEADERS, PARTICULARLY
KING FAYSAL, HAVE CONSISTENTLY OPPOSED CONVENING OF
ANOTHER ARAB SUMMIT. END FYI. GP-3. RUSK

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ACTION SS: 30

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INFO /030 W

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6683
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-261
By us, NARA, Date 6-6-03

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 7348

EXDIS:

SUBJECT: ISRAEL-JORDAN

REF: TEL AVIV 5966, 5972

1. I PASSED GOI MESSAGE CONTAINED TEL AVIV 5966 TO ZAID RIFAI, SEC GEN OF ROYAL DIWAN ON FIFTH WITH REQUEST IT BE RELAYED TO KING. I PHRASED IT IN GENERAL TERMS. I ALSO STRESSED US CONCERN WITH SUCH INCIDENTS AS THOSE AT EILAT AND BEIT SHEAN. THESE INCIDENTS, I EMPHASIZED, PLAYED INTO THE HANDS OF THE REGIME'S ENEMIES.
2. ZAID RIFAI SAID THAT SOME FEDAYEEN UNITS WERE UNDISCIPLINED. HE ADMITTED THAT SOME WERE INDEED EQUIPPED WITH ROCKETS; HOWEVER, THEY ARE SINGLE-TUBE UNITS CARRIED BY A SINGLE MAN. IT IS NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE, HE SAID, FOR THE JAA TO DETECT THEM THROUGH THE USE OF ROAD-BLOCKS IN THE VALLEY. THE FEDAYEEN UNITS TAKE THEM INTO THE WOODED AREAS AND RAVINES RUNNING UP FROM THE JORDAN VALLEY, WHERE THEY ARE EASILY HIDDEN. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE JAA WAS AWARE THAT THESE ROCKETS HAD BEEN POSITIONED SOMETIMES ON THE WEST SIDE OF THE RIVER, FOR FIRING INTO THE BEISAN AREA.
3. RIFAI SAID THAT DAYAN'S NOVEMBER 4 PRESS STATEMENTS HAD HAD A DEPLORABLE EFFECT IN JORDAN; HE CITED AS EXAMPLE DAYAN'S REMARKS THAT JORDAN WAS CAPABLE OF MAKING A SEPARATE PEACE

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Department of State

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SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL.

4. I EMPHASIZED TO ZAID THAT REGARDLESS OF EXPLANATIONS, SUCH AS THOSE MENTIONED PARA 2 ABOVE, OR ABRASATIONS, SUCH AS IN PARA 3, THE FACT IS THAT INCIDENTS ACROSS THE CEASEFIRE LINES AND ADL ARE CONSIDERED UNACCEPTABLE BY ISRAEL AND HAVE MADE THE GOI GENERALLY MORE HARDNOSED. I THEREFORE HOPED FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES IN THE VALLEY WOULD BE BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL THROUGH APPLICATION OF GOJ'S "FOURTEEN POINTS".

SYMMES

TO THE SECRETARY

FROM THE AMMAN OFFICE

SEE AMMAN 07348

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COMMISSION FROM THE GOI
TO THE AMMAN OFFICE
ON 07/28/68

DATE 07-28-68
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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Memos & Misc.

321

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 9, 1968

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WWR:

If announcing Phantoms is still an active possibility, please note:

1. Rifai is flying to London with Jordanian ambassador here to see the King. This could be important, in connection with October 15. Let's not rock the boat.
2. If Symington needs more coaxing, why not tell him quietly that we'll sell the planes eventually but then show him the NODIS telegram from Jarring asking us not to right now.
3. Eban's speech gets good marks for tone but little for advancing negotiations substantively.

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HHS

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001
By ag/llh NARA, Date 10/16/01



Department of State

Jordan
TELEGRAM

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ACTION IO 15

INFO EUR 15, NEA 13, NSA 02, CIA 04, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, RSR 01, /120 W
----- 073702

R P72050Z OCT 68
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3615
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY LONDON

- BOWDLER
- BUDGET
- DAVIS
- FRIED
- GINSBURGH
- HAMILTON
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- JORDEN
- KEENY
- LEONHART
- SAUNDERS
- TAYLOR

~~SECRET~~ USUN 6905

(CORRECTED COPY FOR ACTION ADDEE: ADD LONDON)

CHAMMAS, LEBANESE ACTING PERM REP, TOLD MISOFF OCTOBER 7

JORDAN FONMIN RIFAI WILL FLY TO LONDON WITHIN NEXT 48 HOURS
TO REPORT AND CONSULT WITH KING. *Jordanian am bassador*
GP-3 *in Washington going with him.*
WIGGINS

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001
By *rf/ld*, NARA, Date *10/4/01*

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RELEASE IN PART, 50X1X6
(August 28, 2043)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 28, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWR:

At the risk of bothering you with bad information, I'm sending you a report that the Jordanians think an Israeli invasion is imminent. Crown Prince Hassan is getting married in Karachi, so Hussein has left the second team and his [redacted] brother Mohammed in charge. They may be excited about nothing.

50X6

We have no evidence of an Israeli buildup, but they can, of course, stage a good sized raid without preparations.

JW Foster
John W. Foster

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SANITIZED
Authority NU 15-43
By CS, NARA, Date 10/25/18

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Kathleen Allegrone, Senior Reviewer



Department of State

Jordan
TELEGRAM

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 978

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ACTION NEA 15

INFO EUR 15, ID 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SAH 02, ACDA 16, SR 01,
ORM 03, AF 09, SAL 01, SA 01, RSR 01, /147 W

P R 280900Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6246
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USUN 1122

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AMMAN 6365

SUBJ: JORDANIAN FEARS OF ISRAELI ATTACK

1. FONMIN RIFAI SUMMONED REPRESENTATIVES US, UK, FRANCE AND SOVIET UNION EVENING AUG 27 TO MEETING OVER WHICH VICEROY PRINCE MOHAMMED PRESIDED WITH ACTING PRIMIN TOUGAN AND ACTING MIN INTERIOR AKIF AL FAIZ ATTENDING. MOHAMMED MENTIONED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO US AMBASSADOR IN GENERAL TERMS EARLIER IN THE DAY (SEPTEL). HE WISHED ON THIS OCCASION TO PASS ON TO THE FOUR POWERS RESULTS OF FURTHER STUDY OF THE SITUATION.
2. MOHAMMED STATED CONCENTRATION OF TANKS VARIOUSLY ESTIMATED AT 100 TO 135 OBSERVED IN GOLAN HEIGHTS REGION OPPOSITE JORDAN REPORTEDLY MOVED LAST FEW DAYS FROM BEISAF VALLEY AREA. VISITORS FROM WEST BANK REPORTED EXTENSIVE MILITARY MOVEMENTS. HE HAD CONSULTED WITH JORDAN ARAB ARMY STAFF AND THEY FEARED ATTACK ON JORDAN HEIGHTS WAS IMMINENT. MOHAMMED SAID GOJ COULD NOT CONSIDER ANOTHER ATTACK INTO ITS TERRITORY AS SIMPLY A RAID AND HAD ORDERED MILITARY TO ASK FOR ASSITANCE FROM OTHER ARAB FORCES. THIS MIGHT INCLUDE IRAQI TROOPS AND AIR SUPPORT FROM OTHER ARAB STATES. HE RECALLED THE KARAMEH RAID AND SAID JORDAN HAD CONSIDERED THIS A LOCAL OPERATION AND

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By rs/ll, NARA, Date 10/10/01

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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REFUSED OFFERS OF ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER ARABS. AN ATTACK ON THE HEIGHTS, HOWEVER, COULD NOT BE DESCRIBED AS LOCAL. THE ARMY CONSIDERED IT COULD HOLD AGAINST ATTACK ON THE HEIGHTS FOR ONLY A FEW HOURS. THE REPORTS OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND ISRAELI THREATS WERE SUCH THEY FELT THEY COULD EXPECT AN ATTACK ANY TIME FROM FIRST LIGHT ON WEDNESDAY.

3. RIFAI RECALLED THAT JORDAN HAD REPORTED SIMILAR SIGNS OF IMPENDING ACTION ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, NOTABLY KARAMEH AND SALT, IN WHICH CASES THEIR REPORTS HAD UNFORTUNATELY BEEN CONFIRMED. RIFAI READ THE GOJ MONITORINGS OF ISRAELI PRESS AND RADIO. HE QUOTED FROM HAARETZ AUG 26 STATING THAT JORDAN SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF ISRAEL MADE A RESPONSE FITTING TO THE ACTIONS WITH WHICH ISRAEL CHARGED JORDAN. HE ALSO QUOTED FROM LEBANESE PAPER AN NAHAR CITING "BRITISH RELIABLE SOURCES" THAT ATTACK WAS EXPECTED AGAINST JORDAN SHORTLY.

4. RIFAI SAID HE HAD INSTRUCTED JORDAN'S PERMREP AUG 26 AND THE LATTER HAD SENT A STRONG NOTE TO MEMBERS OF THE SC DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE COUNCIL'S RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE FACE OF THESE THREATS IN THE LIGHT OF THE LATEST SC DECISION ON SALT. HE SAID JORDAN WAS DISCOURAGED BY THE OUTCOME OF THE PREVIOUS SC DECISIONS WHICH SEEMED INEFFECTIVE AND HOPED THAT THROUGH THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE FOUR POWERS AND THEIR CONTACTS WITH THE ISRAELIS THAT ISRAEL COULD BE DISSUADED FROM A FURTHER MASSIVE ATTACK. HE ADDED THAT JORDAN WOULD NOT HESITATE TO BRING THE CASE TO THE SC AND ASK FOR COERCIVE MEASURES IF AN ATTACK OCCURRED.

5. PRINCE MOHAMMED REFERRED TO ISRAELI CHARGES THAT COMMANDOS HAD ATTACKED SETTLEMENTS IN THE BEISAN AREA IN PARTICULAR AS JUSTIFICATION FOR CURRENT SPATE OF THREATS. HE SAID HE BELIEVED THAT COMMANDO OPERATIONS IN THE BEISAN AREA HAD BEEN FEW OR NON-EXISTENT FOR ABOUT TEN DAYS. HE SAID SOME COMMANDOS HAD BEEN FORCED TO LEAVE THE AREA OPPOSITE BEISAN BY THE JORDAN FORCES IN THAT AREA. ALSO A NUMBER OF COMMANDOS HAD BEEN JAILED THAT VERY DAY. RIFAI REINFORCED MOHAMMED'S STATEMENTS SAYING THAT THE ARMED FORCES WERE TAKING ACTION TO RESTRAIN THE COMMANDOS. TOUQAN SAID THAT THE ARMY HAD TAKEN CARE NOT TO SHELL ANY CIVILIAN ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE EXCHANGE OF FIRE ON SUNDAY AUG 25 AND HAD ANNOUNCED THIS FACT WHILE THE EXCHANGE WAS IN PROGRESS.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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6. THE US, UK, FRENCH AND RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVES PROMISED
TO REPORT THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS.

SYMMES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HO
WASHINGTON

8/15/68

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WWR -

For your
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Jordan
324a

August 14, 1968

SECRET-NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY
THE UNDER SECRETARY

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: IO - Joseph J. Sisco

SUBJECT: Attached Security Council Draft on
Middle East: Israeli Air Raid on Fatah
Bases in Salt, Jordan

It is my understanding that you intend to discuss with the President the US vote on the attached draft resolution. We assume the President will have read George Ball's telegram of last Friday. There is a time squeeze on this matter since it is expected that the resolution will be voted upon Thursday a.m. While there may still be some minor modifications, the resolution to be voted upon is likely to be along the lines of the attached.

*WWR -
This is
the one
I described
to you.*

George Ball, Luke Battle and myself believe an affirmative vote is imperative if we are to retain any influence with the Arabs on behalf of a peaceful settlement. I hope you will emphasize this point with the President. In addition, we suggest the following talking points:

1. The attached resolution is substantially the same as that adopted by the Security Council in March following the Israeli raid on Karamah. This is the case despite the fact that whereas there were general and well-documented prior incidents which provoked the Karamah raid, the same cannot be said for the present situation. The incidents that preceded the Israeli air raid on Salt were of a relatively minor character which could be expected in a situation where there is military occupation

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Authority State Rebuilding Files, Vol. XX #236

By lj NARA, Date 9-26-01

of territory. Tekoah (Israel) has made no real case in the Security Council concerning the prior provocations to this latest raid, and we nevertheless have succeeded in injecting balance in the resolution even though the Israelis have made a weak case. The fact of the matter is that this latest Israeli raid was a preventive raid rather than one that was sparked by any prior serious incident. Moreover, it is all the more embarrassing to us that evidence indicates that the Skyhawks we gave to Israel were involved.

2. We have worked very hard behind the scenes in order to make the text more balanced than in any of its earlier form. We have succeeded in two principal ways: (a) The sponsors, pursuant to our pressure, have eliminated any language which might form the basis for future sanctions against Israel; and (b) While the text condemns the Israeli counter raid, it also makes explicit reference to the prior acts of terrorism.

3. Friendly members of the Security Council, after concerted and extensive efforts on our part, (UK, Canada, Denmark, Brazil and Paraguay) have helped us achieve this result. They have concluded, as we have, that this is as well as we can do on any text. They are prepared to support the text, and we would be isolated if we were to stand out by abstaining. This would have adverse effects on our overall position in the area and give the Soviets an opportunity to exploit the situation to their advantage.

4. A U.S. abstention would encourage the Israelis to feel that there were no restraints regarding similar future raids and that it could disregard entirely the views of the Security Council.

5. Last March Israel put the best face on the Security Council resolution by stressing that both the prior terrorist raids and the Israeli counter action were criticized by the Security Council. They discounted its importance in Israeli public opinion, and we can expect the Israelis to play it essentially the same way this time. Our informal discussions

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- 3 -

with the Israelis indicate they expect condemnation and a resolution similar to the one adopted last March, and that this result they would not find greatly disturbing.

6. We do not expect the adoption of this resolution to have any appreciable effect here at home. We have had no expressions of concern from the Jewish Community, and there has been little interest in our press in the SC proceedings. The editorials on the latest incident in our papers have been balanced and have linked the provocations with the counter action, so that I do not anticipate any major press problem.

7. Our affirmative vote would be coupled with a statement by George Ball in the Council which would stress that the SC resolution applies both to the prior terrorist raids as well as to Israeli counteraction. George has already made such a speech in the Security Council, but it would be worth repeating.

IO:JJS:mtb

SECRET-NODIS

The Security Council,

Having heard the statements of the Representatives of Jordan and Israel,

Having noted the contents of the letters of the Representatives of Jordan and Israel in Documents S/8616, S/8617, S/8721, S/8724,

Recalling its previous Resolution 248 (1968) condemning the military action launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the ceasefire resolutions and deploring all violent incidents in violation of the ceasefire,

Observing that all the massive air attacks by Israel on Jordanian territory were of a large scale and carefully planned nature in violation of Resolution 248 (1968),

Considering that premeditated military attacks of this kind seriously prejudice the achievement of peace in the Middle East, and that all violent incidents and other violations of the ceasefire should be prevented,

Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation resulting therefrom,

1. Reaffirms its Resolution 248 (1968), in particular its paragraph 2 which condemns the military action launched

by Israel in flagrant violation of the UN Charter and the ceasefire resolutions, and paragraph 3 which deplores all violent incidents in violation of the ceasefire and declares that such actions of military reprisal and other grave violations of the ceasefire cannot be tolerated and that the Security Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts;

2. Deplores the loss of life and heavy damage to property;

3. Condemns the further military attacks launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and Resolution 248 (1968);

4. Warns that if such actions were to be repeated the Council would duly take account of the failure to comply with the present resolution;

5. Calls for full cooperation with the Secretary General's special representative.