

ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE

You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed a number of years ago. Since that time, many of the documents in the folder have been declassified. In order to make the withdrawal sheets easier to use, we have updated them, listing only the documents that are still closed. Use these updated sheets to request Mandatory Declassification Review of closed security classified documents.

The original withdrawal sheets are in a mylar sleeve in the front of the folder. We have retained them in the file so that you can see the status of the documents in the folder when it was first opened and the history of their declassification. Please replace these original sheets in the mylar folder when you have finished examining them.

July 14, 2010

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
06	memo	Special Memorandum; exempt, NLJ/RAC 02-179, 5/04 <i>exempt 5/5/15 per NLJ/RAC 15-39</i>	S	15	1/7/69	A
07	memo	Director to the President; exempt, NLJ 02-257 dup., #336b, NSF. Country File, "Jordan, Vol. V," Box148 and #94a, NSF, Files of Harold Saunders. "Jordan, 11/1/67-1/20/69," Box 23	S	3	4/15/68	A
07a	memo	Director to the President; sanitized, NLJ 02-257, 5/04 dup., #336c, NSF. Country File, "Jordan, Vol. V," Box148 and #94b, NSF, Files of Harold Saunders. "Jordan, 11/1/67-1/20/69," Box 23	S	2	1/25/68	A
11b	report	Ambassador's Audience with King Hussein; exempt, NLJ 02-213, 6/03 <i>open 12/14/18 per NLJ 15-46 NLJ 15-46</i>	TS	3	7/13/67	A
11c	report	Comments by Ambassador, Interview with King Hussein; exempt, NLJ 02-213, 6/03 <i>open 12/14/18 per NLJ 15-46</i>	TS	1	n.d.	A
12	cable	Intelligence Information Cable; exempt, 11/02 <i>sanitized 5/5/15 per NLJ/RAC 15-39</i>	S	3	7/13/67	A
13	cable	CAP82947, Rostow to the President; sanitized, NLJ 02-205, 2/04 <i>more info released 5/5/15 per NLJ 15-47</i>	S	1	12/29/68	A

Collection Title Natrional Security File, Country File
Folder Title "Jordan, Filed by LBJ Library"
Box Number 148

Restriction Codes

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 13292 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

FOIA exemptions

- b1) National security classified info
- b3) Exempted by statute
- b6) Personal info / Invasion of personal privacy
- b7c) Law enforcement records - personal privacy
- b7d) Law enforcement records - confidentiality

7/14/2010

Initials

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
14	cable	State 114805 to Amman	S	1	1/9/67	A

Collection Title National Security File, Country File

Folder Title "Jordan, Filed by LBJ Library"

Box Number 148

Restriction Codes

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 13292 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

FOIA exemptions

- b1) National security classified info
- b3) Exempted by statute
- b6) Personal info / Invasion of personal privacy
- b7c) Law enforcement records - personal privacy
- b7d) Law enforcement records - confidentiality

7/14/2010

Initials

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

178

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 cable	USUN New York 7882 S 1 p. <i>open 10.10.03 NW 03.32</i>	11/18/68	A
#2 cable	Amman 146 S 2 pp. <i>open 10.10.03 NW 03.32</i>	1/8/69	A
#3 cable	Amman 177 S 4 pp. <i>open 10.10.03 NW 03.32</i>	1/10/69	A
#4 cable	Amman 177, corrected copy S 4 pp. <i>open 10.10.03 NW 03.32</i>	1/10/69	A
#5 cable	deptel 5129 to Amman S 3 pp. <i>open 10.10.03 NW 03.32</i>	1/11/69	A
#6 report	Special Memorandum S 15 pp. <i>exempt 5.28.04 HW/PAL 02.177</i>	1/7/69	A
#7 memo	Director to the President S 5 pp. <i>[dups. #94a-b, NSF, Files of Saunders, Jordan, 4/15/68, 5-10-04 NW 02-257 11/16+1/24/04 Box 223]</i>	4/15/68	A
#8 cable	unnumbered deptel to Amman S 2 pp. <i>open 11/12/02</i>	12/29/67	A
#9a cable	unnumbered deptel to Amman S 1 p. <i>open 11/12/02</i>	12/26/67	A
#11a cable	131339z Amman S 7 pp. <i>open 6.24.03 NW 02.213</i>	7/13/67	A
#11b report	Ambassador Amman's Audience with King Hussein TS 3 pp. <i>exempt 6.24.03 NW 02.213</i>	7/13/67	A
#11c report	Comments by Ambassador, Amman re interview with Hussein TS 1 p. <i>exempt 6.24.03 NW 02.213</i>	undated	A
#12 cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 3 pp. <i>exempt 11.18.02 NW 001.148.2</i>	12/28/68	A
#13 cable	CAP82947, Rostow to the President S 1 p. <i>same sanitization [dup. #15, MTP, v. 112, bx 44] 2.26.04 NW 02.205</i>	12/29/68	A

FILE LOCATION
14 NSF, Country File, "Jordan, Filed by LBJ Library," Box 148

RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
14	cable	State 114805 to Amman	S	1	1/9/67	A

Collection Title National Security File, Country File

Folder Title Jordan, Filed by LBJ Library

Box Number 148

Restriction Codes

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 13292 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

3/7/2005

Initials _____



Department of State

1
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

RR RUEHCR
DE RUEHDI 7882 3232215
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 182150Z NOV 68
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4733
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ USUN 7882

(4)
5050Q

1968 NOV 18 PM 5 20

NODIS/SANDSTORM

SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST

EGERTON (UK) TOLD MISOFF TODAY THAT KING HUSSEIN DUE IN LONDON AGAIN NOV 23 FOR FURTHER MEDICAL TREATMENT. ACCORDING TO EGERTON, "MEDICAL" TO BE READ INSIDE QUOTATION MARKS: UK EXPECTS HUSSEING WILL HAVE FURTHER CONTACTS WITH ISRAEL. HUSSEIN IS EXPECTED TO STAY A NUMBER OF DAYS, AND EGERTON EXPRESSED HOPE THAT JARRING WOULD HANG ON THROUGH DEC SINCE RESULTS FROM JORDAN/ISRAEL CONTACTS WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE APPARENT BY NOV 30.

GP-1.

WIGGINS
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 03-32
By no, NARA, Date 7-9-03

~~SECRET~~

FILED BY LBJ LIBRARY

PRESERVATION COPY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 728

PAGE 01 AMMAN 00146 090600Z

14
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 081535Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7104
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY LONDON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 03-32
By *isa*, NARA, Date 9-9-03

050430

2

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 0146

EXDIS

SUBJ: JORDANIAN EFFORTS TO CONTROL FEDAYEEN IN AQABA AND
WADI ARABAH AREAS

REF: AMMAN 00AM, #STATE 2016 TEL AVIV 81

1. ON JAN 8, I INFORMED AN APPRECIATIVE VICEROY, PRINCE HASSAN, THAT UNDER SECRETARY ROSTOW AND AMBASSADOR BARBOUR HAD RELAYED TO THE ISRAELIS THE CONCERN HASSAN HAD COMMUNICATED TO ME AS A RESULT OF THE REPORTED REMARKS OF THE IDF SOUTHERN SECTOR COMMANDER (REFTELS). I SAID THAT IN BOTH CASES WE HAD STRESSED OUR BELIEF THAT JORDAN HAD MADE CONSCIENTIOUS AND INDEED EFFECTIVE EFFORTS TO PREVENT ANYTHING FROM HAPPENING IN THE AQABA AREA. WHEN HASSAN SAID HE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND HOW SUCH ISRAELI STATEMENTS COULD BE ALLOWED TO BE MADE, I COMMENTED ON THE CURRENT "SEIGE MENTALITY" IN ISRAEL, AND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF JORDANIAN CARE AND RESTRAINT IN THIS SITUATION.

2. HASSAN CLAIMED THAT FEDAYEEN WERE STILL BEING ROUNDED UP IN AQABA. MOST OF THEM, HE SAID, ORIGINALLY SEEMED TO HAVE BELONGED TO FATAH BUT HAD DRIFTED INTO OTHER GROUPS.

3. I ASKED THE PRINCE IF THE CONTINUING ISRAELIS RAIDS IN THE GHARANDAL AND GHOR SAFI AREA WERE IN PURSUIT OF FEDAYEEN OR IF THEY REFLECTED SOME OTHER ISRAELI ACTIVITY. HE RESPONDED THAT, UNFORTUNATELY, THIS IS A VERY WILD AND ROUGH AREA THAT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO POLICE PROPERLY. FEDAYEEN HAVE

FILED BY LBJ LIBRARY

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 AMMAN 00146 090600Z

BEEN OPERATING THERE AND IT IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR THE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES TO ROUND THEM UP. THE DIFFICULTY IS INCREASED BY THE FACT THAT THE FEDAYEEN, BECAUSE OF THE TERRAIN, ARE ABLE TO SEE THE JORDANIAN SECURITY AUTHORITIES FROM LONG DISTANCES.

4. THE IRANIAN AMON# WHO SAW HASSAN JUST AFTER ME, SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD ME THAT THE PRINCE HAD STRESSED TO HIM THAT JORDAN WANTS NO TROUBLE IN AQABA AREA, IS MAKING EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT TO PREVENT FEDAYEEN INTERFERENCE, BUT FEARS THE ISRAELIS MIGHT WELCOME AN EXCUSE TO BATTER AQABA AND THUS CLOSE JORDAN'S ACCESS TO US ARMS SUPPLIES.

SYMMES

NOTE: # AS RECEIVED.

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED
MAY 22 1968
STATE DEPT



~~SECRET~~

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

3
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 296

PAGE 01 AMMAN 00177 110734Z

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 03-32
By is NARA, Date 9-9-03

12
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, /030 W

..... 063660

R 101520Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7119
INFO USUN 1278
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO

2

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 0177

EXDIS

DEPT PASS LONDON, PARIS AND MOSCOW

SUBJ: JORDAN FONMIN'S COMMENTS ON SOVIET ME PROPOSAL

SUMMARY AND COMMENT: FONMIN RIFAI HAS RECOMMENDED TO HUSSEIN THAT JORDAN SHOULD NOT REACT OFFICIALLY TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL PENDING CLARIFICATION OF CERTAIN POINTS AND PREFERABLY NOT UNTIL IT IS PRESENTED FORMALLY THROUGH JARRING. YET, RIFAI IRONCALLY REVEALED PERSONAL IRRITATION THAT JORDAN HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED OR INFORMED IN ADVANCE BY EITHER THE UAR OR USSR THAT SUCH A PROPOSAL WAS ABOUT TO BE MADE. IN STRESSING TO ME THAT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE GREAT POWERS SHOULD BE CHANNELED THROUGH JARRING, RIFAI SEEMED TO COMPLEMENT THE THEME EMPLOYED THE PAST FEW DAYS BY OTHER GOU OFFICIALS SUCH AS PRIMIN TALHOUNI AND DEPUTY PRIMIN TOUGAN IN TALKS WITH U.S. AND OTHER OFFICIALS, I.E., THAT GREAT POWER INITIATIVES CONCEIVABLY COULD UNDERMINE THE INTERESTS OF JORDAN AND THE OTHER INVOLVED PARTIES IN A SETTLEMENT UNLESS CHANNELED THROUGH JARRING.

RIFAI'S COMMENTS SUGGEST TWO TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS. FIRST, IN ANYTHING THE U.S. MIGHT DO, WE SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF HIS VANITY, WHICH WAS WOUNDED NOT ONLY IN THIS RECENT AFFAIR BUT ALSO IN NEW YORK, WHEN THE IRAELIS FAILED TO TRANSMIT TO HIM THROUGH JARRING WHAT THEY HAD PROPOSED TO THE UAR. I THEREFORE WOULD LIKE TO CARRY OUT MORE FREQUENT AND DETAILED CONSULTATIONS WITH HIM, AND HOPE I CAN BE AUTHORIZED TO DISCUSS WITH

FILED BY LBJ LIBRARY

~~SECRET~~



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 AMMAN 00177 110734Z

HIM THE SUBSTANCE OF THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WHEN IT IS FINALLY DELIVERED. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO LET HIM HAVE OUR VERSION OF OUR OWN RESPONSE, RATHER THAN THE UAR VERSION, FOR EXAMPLE.

SECOND, RIFAI'S REACTIONS HAVE AGAIN SIGNALED THAT THE JORDANIAN LEADERSHIP IS NOT ATTRACTED TO AN IMPOSED SOLUTION, AND WOULD CERTAINLY BE UNEASY ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF ANY US-USSR DIALOGUE. RIFAI ALSO HAS TAKEN A SEEMINGLY CONTRADICTIONARY LINE BY WELCOMING OUTSIDE INITIATIVES CHANNLED THROUGH JARRING WHILE ALSO SAYING THAT JARRING, RATHER THAN A MAJOR POWER, SHOULD IDEALLY BE THE ONE TO DEVELOP DETAILED PROPOSALS. WHAT WE BELIEVE HE WOULD PREFER IS FOR JARRING TO PUT HIS OWN STAMP-HIS OWN NAME- ON ANY PROPOSAL, WHATEVER ITS REAL ORIGIN, US OR RUSSIAN, ISRAELI OR ARAB, THAT WOULD BE VENTPSED # UNDER HIS OFFICES. WE SUSPECT THAT THIS ECHOES HUSSEIN'S CURRENT THINKING AS WELL. IN ANY EVENT, RIFAI'S VIEWS, TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH HUSSEIN'S COMMENTS TO ME ON DECEMBER 28, INDICATE THAT JORDAN HAS DECIDED THAT THERE IS NO REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE JARRING MISSION. THEY MUST HAVE THIS UMBRELLA.
END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

1. I DID NOT SEE HUSSEIN ON FOURTH AS ORIGINALLY ANTICIPATED. BY THAT TIME, HOWEVER, IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT HUSSEIN WAS ABOUT TO BE INFORMED BY OTHERS OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL AND POSSIBLY OUR INTIIAL REACTIONS TO IT. WE THEREFORE CONVEYED TO HIM THROUGH ZIAD RIFAI, HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY, WHO HAS ACCOMPANIED HIM TO LONDON, OUR VIEWS AS OUTLINED STATE 1347 (NOTAL), PLUS A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE SOVIET STATEMENT. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH VICEROY PRINCE HASSAN AND PRIMIN TALHOUNI THIS WEEK, I HAVE DRAWN FURTHER ON THE GUIDANCE SUPPLIED IN STATE 1352.

2. JORDANIAN FONMIN RIFAI MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON THE SOVIET PROPOSAL OF DEC 30 WHEN I SAW HIM ON THE NINTH.

3. HE HAD PREPARED A STUDY OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS WHICH HAS BEEN SENT TO KING HUSSEIN IN LONDON AND ALSO CIRCULATED TO THE CABINET. THIS PAPER HAD EMPHASIZED THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL (WHICH HAD BEEN GIVEN TO JORDAN BY THE UAR SEVERAL DAYS AFTER GROMYKO HAD DISCUSSED IT IN CAIRO AND APPARENTLY AFTER DEC 30) REQUIRED CLARIFICATION ON SEVERAL SUBSTANTIVE POINTS. JORDAN SHOULD WITHHOLD ANY OFFICIAL REACTION TO IT UNTIL THOSE SUBSTANTIVE

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 AMMAN 00177 110734Z

CLARIFICATIONS HAD BEEN OBTAINED. (RIFAI DID NOT INDICATE SPECIFICALLY TO ME WHAT POINTS OF SUBSTANCE HE BELIEVED REQUIRED CLARIFICATION BUT HE DID COMMENT THAT THE ABSENCE OF ANY MENTION OF JERUSALEM DID NOT DISTURB HIM INASMUCH AS "WITHDRAWAL TO THE JUNE 5 LINES WOULD EFFECTIVELY TAKE CARE OF THAT PROBLEM".)

4. RIFAI'S PAPER HAD ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THERE WERE CERTAIN PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS THAT REQUIRED CAREFUL ATTENTION. SPECIFICALLY, HE CONSIDERED IT VERY MUCH IN JORDAN'S INTEREST THAT ANY FURTHER DISCUSSIONS OF THE PROPOSALS SHOULD PROCEED THROUGH JARRING. MOREOVER, JORDAN, AS A MAJOR PARTY IN THIS MATTER, SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSULTED BY THE UAR IF NOT BY THE SOVIET UNION BEFORE THE PROPOSALS WERE ADVANCED. IN ADDITION, WHATEVER, THE SUBSTANTIVE MERITS OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS, THE FACT THAT ONE OF THE INTERESTED GREAT POWERS HAD PRESENTED THEM GAVE THEM A CERTAIN "COLOR" WHICH MIGHT MILITATE AGAINST THEIR ACCEPTABILITY. IT WAS BOTH IN THE ARAB INTEREST AND IN THE INTEREST OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT GENERALLY THAT EXPLORATIONS OF THE POSITIONS OF THE VARIOUS PARTIES AND DEVELOPMENT OF DETAILED PROPOSALS FOR SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE MADE BY A DISINTERESTED PERSONAGE SUCH AS JARRING RATHER THAN BY ONE OF THE MAJOR POWERS. RIFAI THEREFORE HAD RECOMMENDED THAT JORDAN SHOULD NOT REACT OFFICIALLY TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL OR ANY OTHER PROPOSAL THAT WAS NOT PRESENTED TO IT THROUGH JARRING. RIFAI SAID PARENTHETICALLY THAT HE HAD TAKEN THE SAME GENERAL LINE WITH A NUMBER OF WEST BANK NOTABLES WHO HAD CALLED ON HIM EARLIER THIS WEEK TO ASK ABOUT THE SOVIET PROPOSALS.

5. THROUGHOUT THIS CONVERSATION RIFAI MANIFESTED CONSIDERABLE PERSONAL IRRITATION CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH JORDAN HAD BEEN MADE AWARE OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS. HE WAS PARTICULARLY IRRITATED THAT NEITHER GROMYKO NOR MAHMOUD RIAD HAD GIVEN ANY ADVANCED WORD OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS TO THE JORDANIAN AMB IN CAIRO WHO HAD CALLED ON THEM DURING GROMYKO'S VISIT TO FIND OUT WHAT WAS GOING ON. RIFAI SAID JORDAN OF COURSE WELCOMED ANY INITIATIVE THAT TENDED TO ADVANCE JARRING'S EFFORTS, BUT HOPED THAT ANY FURTHER ACTIVITY ALONG THESE LINES WOULD TAKE PLACE UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES.

6. I OUTLINED PRELIMINARY USG REACTION TO THE SOVIET PROPOSALS ALONG THE LINES OF STATE 1347, 1352. RIFAI SAID HE HOPED THAT THE U.S. WOULD TAKE A MORE POSITIVE AND ACTIVE ROLE

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 AMMAN 00177 110734Z

IN EFFORTS TO REACH A SETTLEMENT BUT AS HE HAD INDICATED HE WOULD ALSO HOPE OUR ACTIVITIES COULD BE CHANNLED THROUGH JARRING.

7. RIFAI WAS SOMEWHAT EVASIVE ABOUT WHEN JARRING WOULD BE COMING TO AMMAN. (I DID NOT TELL HIM THAT HASSAN HAD TOLD ME JARRING WOULD VISIT AMMAN ON THE 18TH.) RIFAI WOULD ONLY SAY THAT JARRING HAD MENTIONED DURING HIS LAST VISIT THAT HE EXPECTED TO BE BACK IN THE AREA ON THE 17TH OR 18TH.

SYMMES

NOTE: NOT PASSED LONDON, PARIS, MOSCOW BY OC/T.

NOTE: HAS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

~~SECRET~~



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

4

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

4

~~SECRET~~ 406

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 03.32
By js NARA, Date 9-9-03

PAGE 01 AMMAN 00177 111148Z

14
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, /030 W

064416

R 101520Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7119
INFO USUN 1278
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 0177

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

DEPT PASS LONDON, PARIS AND MOSCOW

SUBJ: JORDAN FONMIN'S COMMENTS ON SOVIET ME PROPOSAL

SUMMARY AND COMMENT: FONMIN RIFAI HAS RECOMMENDED TO HUSSEIN THAT JORDAN SHOULD NOT REACT OFFICIALLY TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL PENDING CLARIFICATION OF CERTAIN POINTS AND PREFERABLY NOT UNTIL IT IS PRESENTED FORMALLY THROUGH JARRING. YET, RIFAI IRONICALLY REVEALED PERSONAL IRRITATION THAT JORDAN HAD NOT BEEN CONSULTED OR INFORMED IN ADVANCE BY EITHER THE UAR OR USSR THAT SUCH A PROPOSAL WAS ABOUT TO BE MADE. IN STRESSING TO ME THAT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE GREAT POWERS SHOULD BE CHanneLED THROUGH JARRING, RIFAI SEEMED TO COMPLEMENT THE THEME EMPLOYED THE PAST FEW DAYS BY OTHER GOJ OFFICIALS SUCH AS PRIMIN TALHOUNI AND DEPUTY PRIMIN TOUGAN IN TALKS WITH U.S. AND OTHER OFFICIALS, I.E., THAT GREAT POWER INITIATIVES CONCEIVABLY COULD UNDERMINE THE INTERESTS OF JORDAN AND THE OTHER INVOLVED PARTIES IN A SETTLEMENT UNLESS CHanneLED THROUGH JARRING.

RIFAI'S COMMENTS SUGGEST TWO TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS. FIRST, IN ANYTHING THE U.S. MIGHT DO, WE SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF HIS VANITY, WHICH WAS WOUNDED NOT ONLY IN THIS RECENT AFFAIR BUT ALSO IN NEW YORK, WHEN THE IRAELIS FAILED TO TRANSMIT TO HIM THROUGH JARRING WHAT THEY HAD PROPOSED TO THE UAR. I THEREFORE

~~SECRET~~

7

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 AMMAN 00177 111148Z

WOULD LIKE TO CARRY OUT MORE FREQUENT AND DETAILED CONSULTATIONS WITH HIM, AND HOPE I CAN BE AUTHORIZED TO DISCUSS WITH HIM THE SUBSTANCE OF THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WHEN IT IS FINALLY DELIVERED. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO LET HIM HAVE OUR VERSION OF OUR OWN RESPONSE, RATHER THAN THE UAR VERSION, FOR EXAMPLE.

SECOND, RIFAI'S REACTIONS HAVE AGAIN SIGNALLED THAT THE JORDANIAN LEADERSHIP IS NOT ATTRACTED TO AN IMPOSED SOLUTION, AND WOULD CERTAINLY BE UNEASY ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF ANY US-USSR DIALOGUE. RIFAI ALSO HAS TAKEN A SEEMINGLY CONTRADICTIONARY LINE BY WELCOMING OUTSIDE INITIATIVES CHANNELED THROUGH JARRING WHILE ALSO SAYING THAT JARRING, RATHER THAN A MAJOR POWER, SHOULD IDEALLY BE THE ONE TO DEVELOP DETAILED PROPOSALS. WHAT WE BELIEVE HE WOULD PREFER IS FOR JARRING TO PUT HIS OWN STAMP-HIS OWN NAME- ON ANY PROPOSAL, WHATEVER ITS REAL ORIGIN, US OR RUSSIAN, ISRAELI OR ARAB, THAT WOULD BE VENTILATED UNDER HIS OFFICES. WE SUSPECT THAT THIS ECHOES HUSSEIN'S CURRENT THINKING AS WELL. IN ANY EVENT, RIFAI'S VIEWS, TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH HUSSEIN'S COMMENTS TO ME ON DECEMBER 28, INDICATE THAT JORDAN HAS DECIDED THAT THERE IS NO REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE JARRING MISSION. THEY MUST HAVE THIS UMBRELLA.
END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

1. I DID NOT SEE HUSSEIN ON FOURTH AS ORIGINALLY ANTICIPATED. BY THAT TIME, HOWEVER, IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT HUSSEIN WAS ABOUT TO BE INFORMED BY OTHERS OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL AND POSSIBLY OUR INITIAL REACTIONS TO IT. WE THEREFORE CONVEYED TO HIM THROUGH ZIAD RIFAI, HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY, WHO HAS ACCOMPANIED HIM TO LONDON, OUR VIEWS AS OUTLINED STATE 1347 (NOTAL), PLUS A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE SOVIET STATEMENT. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH VICEROY PRINCE HASSAN AND PRIMIN TALHOUNI THIS WEEK, I HAVE DRAWN FURTHER ON THE GUIDANCE SUPPLIED IN STATE 1352.

2. JORDANIAN FONMIN RIFAI MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON THE SOVIET PROPOSAL OF DEC 30 WHEN I SAW HIM ON THE NINTH.

3. HE HAD PREPARED A STUDY OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS WHICH HAS BEEN SENT TO KING HUSSEIN IN LONDON AND ALSO CIRCULATED TO THE CABINET. THIS PAPER HAD EMPHASIZED THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL (WHICH HAD BEEN GIVEN TO JORDAN BY THE UAR SEVERAL DAYS AFTER GROMYKO HAD DISCUSSED IT IN CAIRO AND APPARENTLY AFTER DEC 30) REQUIRED

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 AMMAN 00177 111148Z

CLARIFICATION ON SEVERAL SUBSTANTIVE POINTS. JORDAN SHOULD WITHHOLD ANY OFFICIAL REACTION TO IT UNTIL THOSE SUBSTANTIVE CLARIFICATIONS HAD BEEN OBTAINED. (RIFAI DID NOT INDICATE SPECIFICALLY TO ME WHAT POINTS OF SUBSTANCE HE BELIEVED REQUIRED CLARIFICATION BUT HE DID COMMENT THAT THE ABSENCE OF ANY MENTION OF JERUSALEM DID NOT DISTURB HIM INASMUCH AS "WITHDRAWAL TO THE JUNE 5 LINES WOULD EFFECTIVELY TAKE CARE OF THAT PROBLEM".)

4. RIFAI'S PAPER HAD ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THERE WERE CERTAIN PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS THAT REQUIRED CAREFUL ATTENTION. SPECIFICALLY, HE CONSIDERED IT VERY MUCH IN JORDAN'S INTEREST THAT ANY FURTHER DISCUSSIONS OF THE PROPOSALS SHOULD PROCEED THROUGH JARRING. MOREOVER, JORDAN, AS A MAJOR PARTY IN THIS MATTER, SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSULTED BY THE UAR IF NOT BY THE SOVIET UNION BEFORE THE PROPOSALS WERE ADVANCED. IN ADDITION, WHATEVER, THE SUBSTANTIVE MERITS OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS, THE FACT THAT ONE OF THE INTERESTED GREAT POWERS HAD PRESENTED THEM GAVE THEM A CERTAIN "COLOR" WHICH MIGHT MILITATE AGAINST THEIR ACCEPTABILITY. IT WAS BOTH IN THE ARAB INTEREST AND IN THE INTEREST OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT GENERALLY THAT EXPLORATIONS OF THE POSITIONS OF THE VARIOUS PARTIES AND DEVELOPMENT OF DETAILED PROPOSALS FOR SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE MADE BY A DISINTERESTED PERSONAGE SUCH AS JARRING RATHER THAN BY ONE OF THE MAJOR POWERS. RIFAI THEREFORE HAD RECOMMENDED THAT JORDAN SHOULD NOT REACT OFFICIALLY TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL OR ANY OTHER PROPOSAL THAT WAS NOT PRESENTED TO IT THROUGH JARRING. RIFAI SAID PARENTHETICALLY THAT HE HAD TAKEN THE SAME GENERAL LINE WITH A NUMBER OF WEST BANK NOTABLES WHO HAD CALLED ON HIM EARLIER THIS WEEK TO ASK ABOUT THE SOVIET PROPOSALS.

5. THROUGHOUT THIS CONVERSATION RIFAI MANIFESTED CONSIDERABLE PERSONAL IRRITATION CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH JORDAN HAD BEEN MADE AWARE OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS. HE WAS PARTICULARLY IRRITATED THAT NEITHER GROMYKO NOR MAHMOUD RIAD HAD GIVEN ANY ADVANCED WORD OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS TO THE JORDANIAN AMB IN CAIRO WHO HAD CALLED ON THEM DURING GROMYKO'S VISIT TO FIND OUT WHAT WAS GOING ON. RIFAI SAID JORDAN OF COURSE WELCOMED ANY INTIATIVE THAT TENDED TO ADVANCE JARRING'S EFFORTS, BUT HOPED THAT ANY FURTHER ACTIVITY ALONG THESE LINES WOULD TAKE PLACE UNDER JARRING'S AUSPICES.

6. I OUTLINED PRELIMINARY USG REACTION TO THE SOVIET PROPOSALS

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS
EXDIS



Department of State TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 AMMAN 00177 111148Z

ALONG THE LINES OF STATE 1347, 1352. RIFAI SAID HE HOPED THAT THE U.S. WOULD TAKE A MORE POSITIVE AND ACTIVE ROLE IN EFFORTS TO REACH A SETTLEMENT BUT AS HE HAD INDICATED HE WOULD ALSO HOPE OUR ACTIVITIES COULD BE CHANNLED THROUGH JARRING.

7. RIFAI WAS SOMEWHAT EVASIVE ABOUT WHEN JARRING WOULD BE COMING TO AMMAN. (I DID NOT TELL HIM THAT HASSAN HAD TOLD ME JARRING WOULD VISIT AMMAN ON THE 18TH.) RIFAI WOULD ONLY SAY THAT JARRING HAD MENTIONED DURING HIS LAST VISIT THAT HE EXPECTED TO BE BACK IN THE AREA ON THE 17TH OR 18TH.

SYMMES

NOTE: NOT PASSED LONDON, PARIS AND MOSCOW BY OC/T.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

005129

11 JAN 69 20 19

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE

Info:

INFO: Amconsul DHAHRAN
Amembassy JIDDA
Amembassy RAWALPINDI
CINCSTRIKE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 03-32
By in NARA, Date 7-9-03

STATE 005129

NODIS

SUBJECT: Delivery of F-104 Aircraft to Jordan

1. We are approaching the point where F-104 aircraft are scheduled for delivery to Jordan. The first six are due to arrive on or about Mar 1, 12 more to follow in April and early May. Also, present plans and understandings between the RJAF and USAF call for a mobile training team of about 11 men to arrive in Jordan approximately 10 weeks prior to the arrival of the first aircraft. This team would train the ground maintenance crews. A separate team would accompany the aircraft to assemble and test them. After about one month's assembly and testing for each increment, they will be ready for turnover to the RJAF.

2. The imminent arrival of the aircraft and USAF personnel has caused us to consider again the consequences of this action, and to put to you for consideration our concern and proposals. New factors in the situation since we last discussed this are: (a) routine Israeli use of aircraft

for retaliatory strikes against fedayeen and GOJ installations on East Bank;

Drafted by:

NEA/ARN:RPPagenelli:TWSeelye:DOD/ISA:Col.Wi. Classification approved by: NEA:PTHart

Clearances:

NEA - Mr. Davies

NEA/RA - Mr. Sober
S/S - Mr. Walker

DOD/ISA - Mr. Murray

G/PM - Mr. Junior

~~SECRET~~

Classification

~~SECRET~~

Classification

(b) deterioration of area situation in recent weeks; and (c) US agreement to supply Phantoms to Israel.

3. We recognize that delivery of aircraft will be a psychological and military boost for the GOJ and help justify Hussein's policy of continuing to procure arms requirements from Western sources, particularly the US. In addition, presence of aircraft might diminish increasing Jordanian clamor for more arms and blunt continuing pressures from some elements in Jordan to seek weapons from the Soviets.

4. At the same time we cannot ignore liabilities inherent in providing arms to potential combatants. With constant Israeli overflights (with US aircraft) which will undoubtedly continue, the GOJ will be forced either to do nothing or to scramble and engage Israelis. The first alternative seems untenable, and would presumably cost more in morale and "face" than present situation of no aircraft, no engagements. The second probably means shooting down Israeli aircraft and risking major retaliation and perhaps destruction of F-104 squadron. Furthermore, military engagement between American aircraft belonging to two powers in friendly relationship with US would be acutely embarrassing to USG.

5. We think that King and Khammash may appreciate these points and, although they could not say so formally, may "in their heart of hearts" not want 18 F-104s ready to fly and fight from Jordanian territory in the present circumstances. We suggest to you, for your consideration, that you have appropriate Embassy official call on Khammash for a quiet and informal exploration of this subject. Care should be taken not rpt not to create impression USG seeks to welsh on commitment.

~~SECRET~~

Classification

C O P Y

7a

25 January 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

1.

called on me late afternoon 23 January 1968. I was impressed by his detailed discourse on the mood in Jordan, the vulnerability of King Hussein, the conversations with the Soviet leaders in Moscow and Amman and Hussein's desire to achieve peace with Israel -- even at great risk to himself and the future of his dynasty.

2. This conversation re-enforces my impression that the situation in Jordan is fragile, that Jordan remains an essential element of any favorable solution in the Middle East and that time is running out for Hussein's moderate regime.

3. Hussein is caught in the middle between the radical Arab forces centered in Syria which support an escalation of terrorism and resistance and an insistent Israeli position that Jordan can and must assume the responsibility for these hostile acts. Each incident -- particularly those which lead to an Israeli punitive retaliatory move involving Israeli aircraft against a Jordan that has no air defense -- further undermines

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 02-257
By is, NARA, Date 8-20-03

~~SECRET~~
C O P Y

- 2 -

Hussein's position. Hussein becomes more vulnerable to the charges that he has been unable to demonstrate any capacity for recovery from the June war.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

4. [] emphasized that he regards a public commitment to provide Jordan arms as primarily a political action that is essential in the short-term to Jordan's survival. If peace with Israel can be achieved, the delivery of the arms will not be necessary. If some sort of settlement with Israel is not achieved, the question of Jordan's survival will probably become acute before any significant arms deliveries are possible.

5. After questioning [] on the details of Jordanian exchanges with the Soviet political and military leaders, we have concluded that the King and [] in a mood of desperation, have for the first time engaged in a serious consideration of Soviet arms as an alternative to their destruction. Considerable skill has been demonstrated by the Soviets in the handling of both Hussein and []

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

/s/ Richard Helms
Director

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

cc: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~
Classification

4869
Called S/S
1840 29 Dec 67
Ord by *Paulanders*
8
FOR OFFICE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN

PRIORITY

Idon

STATE

NODIS

1. You should ensure that King Hussein knows that message sent in DEPTTEL 89454 was a personal one directly from President Johnson. The President would like assurance that if we move to meet some of Jordan's military needs we will not subsequently be faced with Jordan's acceptance of Soviet offers. We leave to your judgment how best to elicit such assurances.

2. FYI You will recall that both ground and air sales packages negotiated with Jordan had condition that Jordan would not acquire ^{military} equipment from US and other Free World sources other than ~~US and other Free World sources~~. This condition still obtains and part of recommended package would come under existing sales agreement. The King may consider our response minimal particularly in face of termination of budget support by decision taken in light of possible adverse domestic and Congressional reaction and represents an effort to manifest continuing US support of Hussein's regime. END FYI.

GP-3

END

Drafted by
NEA:REDavies:av *RED*

Vol. Ser.
2107

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - William J. Handley *WJH*

Clearances

S/S
White House
Mr Rostow

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
Classification

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date 10-18-02

FORM 8-65 DS-322

FILED BY LBJ LIBRARY

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~
Classification

By To Sanders 4869

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

Origin
Info

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN PRIORITY
STATE
NODIS

1. You should ensure that King Hussein knows that message sent in DEPTTEL 89454 was a personal one directly from President Johnson. The President would like assurance that if we move to meet some of Jordan's military needs we will not subsequently be faced with Jordan's acceptance of Soviet offers. We leave to your judgment how best to elicit such assurances.
2. FYI You will recall that both ground and air sales packages negotiated with Jordan had condition that Jordan would not acquire/military equipment from other than US and other Free World sources. ~~US and other Free World sources.~~ This condition still obtains and part of recommended package would come under existing sales agreement. The King may consider our response minimal particularly in face of termination of budget support by decision taken in light of possible adverse domestic and Congressional reaction and represents an effort to manifest continuing US support of Hussein's regime. END FYI.

GP-3

END

Drafted by:
NEA:RPDavies:av

RPD

Tel. Ext.
2107

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - William J. Handley

Clearance:

S/S
White House

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
Classification

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc* NARA, Date 10-18-02

~~SECRET~~
~~CLASSIFICATION~~
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

9

For Clearance


- 1- Papandus
- 2- fit

file

December 26, 1967
Date

Mr. Walt W. Rostow
The White House

The enclosed is for White House
clearance prior to transmission.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:
Tel to Amman re Jordan arms recommendations

~~SECRET~~
~~CLASSIFICATION~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)
BY ju ON 11-18-91

SECRET

SECRET

RECEIVED
RUSTOW'S OFFICE

1967 DEC 26 PM 1 51

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, RUSTOW'S OFFICE

ON 11-15-67
SEC 1 (b)
INFORMATION OF 1332P
NOT FULLY SECURE
ADMINISTRATIVE WORKING
DETERMINED TO BE UN

RECEIVED
RUSTOW'S OFFICE

[Handwritten signature]

RE: [Illegible]

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, RUSTOW'S OFFICE

SECRET
December 26, 1967

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
SECRET

[Handwritten notes and signatures]

9a

~~SECRET~~

Embassy AMMAN PRIORITY

STATE

MODIS

1. The President has indicated that he will make decision on Jordan arms recommendations by New Year's. ^{He is inclined} ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ to be sympathetic to Jordan's needs.

2. You may pass this to King Hussein.

GP-1

End

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 10-18-02

NEA:RPDavles:fah:12/26/67 2107

NEA - William J. Handley

NEA - Ambassador Battle (subs)

S/S -

White House -

FILED BY LBJ LIBRARY

~~SECRET~~

SEP 5 1965

10
1- Home, 9/6
2- Ret
Encls held in
Mr. Smith's file

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Dead Sea Scrolls Exhibit - Presentation of Bound Catalog to the President, and Request that He Inscribe Another Copy to the King of Jordan

Under an agreement between the Smithsonian Institution and the Government of Jordan, an exhibit of the Dead Sea Scrolls, on loan from the Palestine Archaeological Museum, has been touring the United States, including showings in Washington, Philadelphia, Berkeley, Claremont, and Omaha. The tour concludes in Baltimore in September.

The exhibit, containing objects of extraordinary and unique historical value, is described in a catalog published by the University of California. A few specially bound copies have been prepared, including the enclosed copy for presentation to the President with the compliments of the Manuscript Fund of the American Schools of Oriental Research.

A second copy for presentation to His Majesty, King Hussein, and so marked, is also enclosed. It has been requested that the President inscribe a suitable sentiment and autograph it on the title page. The Department will then forward it to the Embassy in Amman for presentation to the King.

The Department suggests that the President inscribe on the title page of the copy for King Hussein a phrase such as "a token of the gratitude of the American people to the people of Jordan for the opportunity to see this fine exhibit" and autograph it.

Alexander Rattray
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Copy of bound catalog for presentation to the President
2. Copy of bound catalog for King Hussein

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

3701
11

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

BY mw ON 11-18-91

July 13, 1967

FOR: Mr. Bromley Smith
The White House

Enclosed are the three
documents I mentioned to you
on the telephone.

John P. Walsh
John P. Walsh

Enclosures:

Documents

~~TOP SECRET NODIS ENCLOSURES~~

~~SECRET~~

2701

11a

40

C O P Y

13 July 1967

131339Z Amman 4941

Please make appropriate distribution in consultation with Assistant Secretary of State Lucius D. Battle.

1. I saw Hussein yesterday afternoon at 3 P.M. He seemed on razor's edge and told me that he had not averaged more than two hours' sleep out of every 24 hours during the past five weeks, despite use of sleeping pills and other sedatives.

2. He said that when he was in Washington Mr. McGeorge Bundy and Mr. Nicholas Katzenbach had told him that if ever he wanted to see one of them he could. Hussein said he hoped either Mr. Bundy or Mr. Katzenbach would come to Amman as soon as possible.

3. Hussein said he was now prepared to make a unilateral settlement with Israel.

4. He said that he had hoped to have an Arab Summit in order to convince all the Arabs to follow the road of settlement. However, Nasser had told him he (Nasser) had only agreed to go to a Summit because Hussein had asked for it and he (Nasser), along with all the Arabs, owe much to Hussein. But, Nasser told Hussein, the Summit would be a debacle and all the world would see how fractious the Arabs really are. Nasser convinced Hussein that a Summit would be counter-productive at this time.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 02-213

By ms, NARA, Date 6-19-03

~~SECRET~~

FILED BY LBJ LIBRARY

~~SECRET~~

2

5. Hussein said Nasser told him that he, Nasser, could not make a settlement but that in the circumstances in which Hussein now found himself, the greatest loser in the war, Nasser would raise no objections if Hussein went to the Americans to see what they could do for him with Israel.

6. I asked Hussein what assurance he had that Nasser would not doublecross him. Hussein indicated that somehow he did not think so, but, of course, no one could ever be sure.

7. Hussein said that Nasser is still very much in control of Egypt but has sold himself to the Russians. Hussein said Nasser is a man in a cell with no egress.

8. Hussein said that he would like to know first what the Israelis might be likely to do vis-a-vis Jordan if he were prepared for a settlement. Hussein said Jordan would have to get back substantially all she lost in the war, or a settlement could not possibly be brought off. In the event of a settlement, because of the anticipated animosity toward Jordan, at least of Syria, Israel would have to agree to give Jordan air corridors to the West and access to an Israeli Mediterranean Port.

9. I asked Hussein if, from his point of view, there could be border rectification. He indicated yes, provided it was minor. I asked what if the Israelis wanted to retain the so-called West Bank Heights. He shook his head.

~~SECRET~~

10. Re demilitarization, Hussein said Jordan could live with a demilitarized zone paralleling the border.

11. I asked what would he do about Jerusalem. He replied that is the greatest problem of all. He said he must have the return of the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem. Jordan would, of course, guarantee free access to all those of Jewish Faith. I said that I had the impression from a newspaper article that Hussein had said he might agree to the internationalization of Jerusalem if the internationalization affected both the Israeli and Jordanian sectors. He replied that he must have been misquoted. What he had meant to say was that the one thing the Jordanians and Israelis are agreed upon is no internationalization of Jerusalem.

12. I asked him if he thought, in the event a Jordanian-Israeli settlement could be worked out and brought off, whether other Arab states would follow suit. He said that he did not know.

13. I asked him what assurance he had that he would not be overthrown if he made a settlement. Could he count on the Army's loyalty? Hussein replied he did not know, and that he was going to start that very afternoon to try to find out. I asked him what about the 15,000 Iraqi troops in Jordan. He replied that a message was going forward to President Aref of Iraq this afternoon requesting Aref to withdraw the Iraqi forces.

14. Hussein indicated that he went to Cairo precipitously as he did last Monday because he had concluded during his two days back in Amman from his US/Europe trip that time was running out fast--for everybody. He recognized that if he were to seek a settlement with Israel the longer he delayed doing so the more difficult Israel might be about the terms. He said that Israel must recognize that his regime could not possibly survive to make the agreement stick unless Israel's terms were generous. The Israelis, said Hussein, really had as much stake in a settlement with him as he with them. He hoped they would recognize this.

15. Although Hussein did not state specifically that he would be prepared to meet face to face with the Israelis, he said that when the time came, he would be prepared to go anywhere in the world if conclusion of a settlement so required.

16. Hussein said he had been responsible for bringing Jordan to its present state and he had a solemn obligation to Jordan to do his utmost to repair the damage that had been done. A settlement was the only sensible course, the only possible course, for Jordan. "All I want for Jordan," he said, "is to be able to live in peace and to develop Jordan along economic, educational and other lines of peace and reason."

17. If a settlement could not be brought off, then Jordan had only one other way to turn, to join the other Arabs who seem bent at present on readying themselves for another war.

Hussein added that if that is the course Jordan finds herself forced to pursue, he will feel he will have done his best to avert it and would abdicate.

18. He said that it was essential Jordan have some arms immediately. The Syrians, for example, lost relatively little equipment. Jordan was dangerously exposed militarily. There could be trouble from outside at any time, and more likely so in the event a settlement comes into the making. He said that he hoped we could agree to have General Khammash go to Washington as soon as possible in this regard.

19. Hussein noted that his Air Force now consisted of one Hawker-Hunter, aside from a few transport planes. He is owed four Hawker-Hunters from Britain: two new ones, and two Jordanian ones which were in Britain for overhaul when the hostilities broke out. He thought it might be some months before he would get these four Hawker-Hunters.

20. Hussein said I might be interested to know he had ascertained through a number of sources in Cairo that the Soviets have agreed to rearm Nasser only to the extent of Nasser's losses in the recent hostilities but not beyond this.

21. The conversation was concluded by my reverting to his request that either Mr. Bundy or Mr. Katzenbach come immediately to Amman. I said I thought this posed disadvantages, political

and practical. As an alternative, I would be prepared to go to Washington to discuss with them the matters he had raised. He agreed. I said that when I get to Washington I would discuss General Khammash's visit and let him know.

22. I had other reasons for wishing to go to Washington which obviously I did not tell the King. The King has been in Amman only three days in the past three weeks. There are undercurrents here of which I am not at all sure he is aware. These, plus nuances of my conversation with the King, and of conversations the same afternoon with General Khammash and Zaid Rifai (Chief of Royal Protocol), both of whom went to Cairo with Hussein, need to be taken into consideration. (The conversations with Khammash and Rifai are being reported by separate telegram.)

23. I have also seen the British Ambassador, who advises me that Hussein told him the same thing he told me. It seems the British Ambassador asked just about the same questions, too.

24. I told the British Ambassador that I was leaving Amman this afternoon and would be in Washington by 9 A.M. Saturday morning. I asked him to tell his people we would coordinate with them in Washington but please to take no action that was not coordinated. (Hussein had also asked the British to ascertain what the Israelis might be willing to settle for.) The British Ambassador knows as well as I do how tricky this is going to be on

~~SECRET~~

7

the Arab side, to say nothing of the Israeli side, and that a move that is not carefully thought out and coordinated could kill everything. I also told the British Ambassador I had asked Emboff Jack O'Connell, who had returned to Amman last night, to get in touch with the King to persuade him to pursue a course of the utmost discretion and caution at this time.

25. I also told the British Ambassador that General Khammash had asked us to support his request with the British that the Rjaf get right away a total of 18 Hawker-Hunters. Khammash had explained he had 15 pilots qualified to fly them in combat and that this would allow three planes to be out of commission for maintenance.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

H.M. Ambassador Amman's Audience with King Hussein
on 12 July

King Hussein saw Mr. Adams on 12 July in order to let him know his intentions following his meetings with President Nasser and Premier Boumedienne.

He began by saying that the divergencies of opinion between the Arab leaders were now so wide as to make a profitable summit meeting out of the question. He had the impression from his discussions with Nasser that Egyptian morale was low and that although Nasser was still very much in control his relations with the Soviets had worsened. Disillusioned by the performance of the Egyptian army the Russians were now concentrating their support on Syria and Algiera. They would not re-equip Egypt to the point where she could risk taking on Israel again.

In these circumstances and with the probability that nothing useful would emerge from the General Assembly, no overall settlement of the Arab/Israel dispute seemed to be in sight. Jordan could not wait indefinitely since she had sustained heavy losses and was not viable without the West Bank. The King saw himself faced with the alternatives of allowing Jordan to collapse (and presumably be overrun by her Arab neighbours) or seeking very discreetly a separate settlement with Israel. He was coming to the conclusion that

/ he

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
By CTS NLJ 15-410
NARA, Date 9/12/18

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

he should "go it alone." But before taking any action he would like to know Her Majesty's Government's assessment of the minimum terms the Israelis were likely to accept, and to what extent we should be prepared to help him to reach a settlement.

Mr. Adams undertook to put these questions urgently to the Foreign Secretary. Meanwhile, speaking personally, he said he thought King Hussein might find the Israelis fairly flexible on the West Bank in general, but doubted very much whether they could be persuaded to surrender Jerusalem: he asked if King Hussein had faced up to that possibility? King Hussein said he attached the highest importance to the recovery of Jerusalem and was prepared to give any assurances about access to the Holy Places; he did not think the Israelis would ignore world Moslem opinion. When Mr. Adams enquired if King Hussein did not think that the Israelis might insist (as they had over the cease fire) on dealing with the Arabs as a whole and perhaps holding out for guarantees and passage through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran and also for satisfaction on the Syrian frontier, the King dismissed these as subjects with which Jordan need not concern herself. He added that his relations with Syria were very bad and that he did not exclude the possibility of "a collision" with Syria sooner or later.

/ Mr. Adams

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 3 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

Mr. Adams then enquired whether the King considered his position in the country and in the Arab world sufficiently strong to embark on negotiations for a separate peace. The King replied that Nasser had given him to understand that he was prepared not to stand in his way and the King thought the moderate Arab leaders would come to his support. He said Iraq was now being asked to remove her troops from Jordanian soil; on the whole relations with Iraq were satisfactory and he did not expect difficulty in that quarter.

On Jordan's internal situation, King Hussein said morale in the army was unsatisfactory and steps were being taken to review the situation unit by unit; as a result there would be some transfers and dismissals. He went on to ask for British help in re-equipping the Jordanian armed forces and particularly the Jordanian air force.

In conclusion, the King said that the Jordanian army needed to be revitalized and he expected to make some changes within the next day or two.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
13 JULY, 1967.

~~TOP SECRET~~

2701
11c

~~TOP SECRET~~

COMMENTS BY H. M. AMBASSADOR, AMMAN ON HIS INTERVIEW
WITH KING HUSSEIN ON 12 JULY

King Hussein seemed clear that no settlement under the leadership of the revolutionary Arab States is possible at present. Unlike the revolutionary leaders, he is prepared to work on the assumption that Israel exists. While it may seem to us that he underestimates the dangers of "going it alone", (and in particular the chances that Nasser will withdraw his tacit approval when it suits him to do so, probably with devastating results), the King ^{may} in fact fully appreciated all this but felt that he had no alternative.

2. He said he thought it his duty to Jordan and the Arab nation to try to re-build his country and he could see no other way of doing it. But everything would depend upon how much support "his friends" (the United States and ourselves) could give him. He said that if he did not achieve some measure of success through separate negotiations, he would be driven to "extreme measures" by which he seemed to mean abdication. He was to see my United States colleague after me.

3. I could not draw the King very far on the nature of the help he wanted, apart from assistance for his armed forces. But first of all he needs an assessment of the limits within which we think the Israelis might negotiate.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 15-46
By CTS NARA, Date 9/12/18

~~TOP SECRET~~

EXEMPTIONS IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE BASED ON EO 13526

12



DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

Intelligence Information Cable

IN 61957

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS CCR FBIS DCI
IR3 AID USIA

EXO DDI 22

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

~~SECRET~~

281609Z

3.3(b)(1)

28 DECEMBER 1968

*Further P
From WJL*

COUNTRY: JORDAN/USSR/ISRAEL/ARAB STATES

DOI : 23 DECEMBER 1968

SUBJECT:

MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO.

*Sent from attached
via wire
@ AP 82947
3.3(b)(1)*

[Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

1.

[Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREY

GROMYKO. THE PRINCIPAL POINTS MADE BY GROMYKO WERE AS FOLLOWS:

- A. A STRONG COMPLAINT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES FOR FAILING TO EXERT THE INFLUENCE ON ISRAEL NECESSARY FOR ESSENTIAL PROGRESS TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WAS FULLY COMMITTED.

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

DOC #12

FILED BY LBJ LIBRARY

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 15-39

By *ch* NARA, Date 3-10-15

IN 61957

3.3(b)(1)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

~~SECRET~~~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

B. PRAISE OF JORDAN FOR HER MODERATION AND PERSEVERANCE UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES AND APPRECIATION FOR THE GOOD RELATIONS WHICH JORDAN HAS MAINTAINED WITH THE UAR AND WHICH GROMYKO URGED JORDAN TO CONTINUE.

C. ASSERTION THAT THE SOVIETS WERE NOW EXERTING PRESSURE ON SYRIA TO LINE UP MORE CLOSELY WITH THE UAR AND JORDAN, AND TO ADOPT A MORE REASONABLE AND FLEXIBLE POSITION ON A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

D. EXPRESSION OF SUSPICION OF IRAQ'S INTENTIONS TOWARD JORDAN AND THE UAR AND A WARNING THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT TRUST THE IRAQIS, THAT THE JORDANIANS SHOULD NOT, AND THAT CURRENT IRAQI GESTURES AND MANEUVERS ARE TACTICS TO COVER DEVIUS DESIGNS.

2. [REDACTED] THE GENERAL STATEMENTS [REDACTED]

3.3(b)(1)

[REDACTED] IMPLIED, BUT DID NOT SPECIFY IN SO MANY WORDS, THAT THE SOVIETS WERE CONCERNED THAT AS A RESULT OF GOVERNOR SCRANTON'S VISIT TO THE AREA AND OTHER INITIATIVES THAT THE UNITES STATES WAS ABOUT TO "STEAL THE SHOW" IN THE AREA AND THAT THE SOVIETS WANTED TO "GET IN ON THE ACT".) [REDACTED]

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~~~SECRET~~

IN 61957

[Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

[Redacted] UAR FOREIGN MINISTER MAHMUD RIYAD HAD CONFIRMED

3.3(b)(1)

THAT GROMYKO MADE THE SAME POINTS TO THE UAR [Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

[Redacted] IT IS ENTIRELY PROBABLE

THAT GROMYKO AND UAR OFFICIALS DISCUSSED OTHER SUBJECTS

WHICH NEITHER DISCLOSED TO [Redacted] ONE SUCH SUBJECT MAY

3.3(b)(1)

HAVE BEEN SOVIET DISAPPROVAL OF EARLY RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS

BETWEEN THE UAR AND THE UNITED STATES. [Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

[Redacted]

3. THERE WAS NO MENTION [Redacted] THAT GROMYKO

3.3(b)(1)

HAD OFFERED MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID TO JORDAN. ~~FIELD~~

~~COMMENT:~~ THE AREA PRESS HAD HEADLINED THE FACT THAT GROMYKO

HAD MADE SUCH AN OFFER DURING HIS MEETING [Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

4. [Redacted] DISSEM: STATE ARMY CINCPACAFSA CINCUSNAVEUR

3.3(b)(1)

CINCSOUTH COMSIXTHFLT. (ALSO SENT [Redacted])

3.3(b)(1)

[Redacted] (USUN.)

~~REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET~~

Received Washington CommGen
8:36 AM EST Sunday 29 Dec 1968

Received LBJ Ranch CommGen
8:23 AM CST Sunday 29 Dec 1968

~~SECRET~~

¹³
EO 13526
3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EEA891
OO WTE10
DE WTE 4710

FROM: WALT ROWTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP82947

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT:
MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO.

3.3(b)(1)

1.
 SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREY
GROMYKO. THE PRINCIPAL POINTS MADE BY GROMYKO WERE AS
FOLLOWS:

3.3(b)(1)

A. A STRONG COMPLAINT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
FOR FAILING TO EXERT THE INFLUENCE ON ISRAEL NECESSARY
FOR ESSENTIAL PROGRESS TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WAS FULLY COMMITTED.

B. PRAISE OF JORDAN FOR HER MODERATION AND
PERSEVERANCE UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES AND
APPRECIATION FOR THE GOOD RELATIONS WHICH JORDAN
HAS MAINTAINED WITH THE UAR AND WHICH GROMYKO URGED
JORDAN TO CONTINUE.

C. ASSERTION THAT THE SOVIETS WERE NOW EXERTING
PRESSURE ON SYRIA TO LINE UP MORE CLOSELY WITH THE UAR
AND JORDAN, AND TO ADOPT A MORE REASONABLE AND FLEXIBLE
POSITION ON A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

D. EXPRESSION OF SUSPICION OF IRAQ'S INTENTIONS
TOWARD JORDAN AND THE UAR AND A WARNING THAT THE SOVIETS
DO NOT TRUST THE IRAQIS, THAT THE JORDANIANS SHOULD NOT,
AND THAT CURRENT IRAQI GESTURES AND MANEUVERS ARE TACTICS
TO COVER DEVIIOUS DESIGNS.

3.3(b)(1)

2. COMMENT: THE GENERAL STATEMENTS
 IMPLIED, BUT DID NOT SPECIFY IN SO MANY WORDS, THAT
THE SOVIETS WERE CONCERNED THAT AS A RESULT OF GOVERNOR
SCRANTON'S VISIT TO THE AREA AND OTHER INITIATIVES THAT THE
UNITED STATES WAS ABOUT TO "STEAL THE SHOW" IN THE AREA AND
THAT THE SOVIETS WANTED TO "GET IN ON THE ACT".)

3.3(b)(1)

UAR FOREIGN MINISTER MAHMUD RIYAD HAD CONFIRMED
THAT GROMYKO MADE THE SAME POINTS TO THE UAR

3.3(b)(1)

COMMENT: IT IS ENTIRELY PROBABLE
THAT GROMYKO AND UAR OFFICIALS DISCUSSED OTHER SUBJECTS
WHICH NEITHER DISCLOSED TO ONE SUCH SUBJECT MAY
HAVE BEEN SOVIET DISAPPROVAL OF EARLY RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS
BETWEEN THE UAR AND THE UNITED STATES.

3.3(b)(1)

3. THERE WAS NO MENTION THAT GROMYKO
HAD OFFERED MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID TO JORDAN.
THE AREA PRESS HAD HEADLINED THE FACT THAT GROMYKO
HAD MADE SUCH AN OFFER DURING HIS MEETING

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)

DTG: 291336Z DEC 1968

~~SECRET~~

FILED BY LBJ LIBRARY

SANITIZED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 15-47

By UCB NARA, Date 03-10-2015

PROCESSING NOTE

Document #14 (State 114805 to Amman) was originally misfiled in the National Security File, Country File, "Italy, Volume IV." It was transferred to the National Security File, Country File, "Jordan, Filed by LBJ Library," Box 148 on this date.

Regina Greenwell
Senior Archivist

March 7, 2005