

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

103

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 memo	M. Bundy to the President <i>open 9-14-99</i> C 1 p.	6/28/67	A
#2a draft	Suggested Press Guidance PCI 2 pp. <i>open 8-16-99</i>	6/28/67	A
#5 memo	M. Bundy to the President <i>open 10-22-99</i> S 2 pp. <i>NLJ 98-554</i>	6/27/67	A
#5a memo	Control Group to the Special Committee <i>open 10-19-99</i> S 4 pp. <i>NLJ 98-555</i>	6/21/67	A
#6 memo	M. Bundy to the President <i>OPEN 9.18.98</i> S 1 p.	6/27/67	A
#7 memo	Rostow to the President <i>OPEN 9.18.98</i> S 1 p.	6/27/67	A
#9b draft	memo from the Control Group to the Special Committee S 6 pp. <i>open 10-19-99 NLJ 98-555</i>	6/26/67	A
#9c draft	Talking Points for Use with King Hussein C 8 pp. <i>open 10-19-99 NLJ 98-555</i>	undated	A
#9e report	Study Paper S 10 pp. <i>open 10-19-99 NLJ 98-555</i>	6/26/67	A
#9g memo	Battle and Meeker to Rostow <i>open 9-14-99</i> C 4 pp.	6/26/67	A
#9i memo	Saunders to Eugene Rostow <i>open 1-21-00 NLJ 99-269</i> S 2 pp.	6/26/67	A
#9k memo	Memorandum <i>open 10-19-99 NLJ 98-555</i> S 7 pp.	undated	A
#9m report	Background Paper <i>open 12-14-99 NLJ 99-271</i> C 3 pp.	6/26/67	A
#10 memo	Rostow to the President <i>OPEN 9.18.98</i> C 1 p.	6/26/67	A
#11 memo	Rostow to the President <i>open 9-14-99</i> C 1 p.	6/26/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Country File, "Jordan, Visit of King Hussein, 6/28/67," Box 148

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
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203

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#11a report	Biographic Sketch <i>Exempt 2-2-01 NLS 99-270</i> C 1 p.	undated	A
#15 cable	Amman 4579 <i>open 9-14-99</i> C 1 p.	6/23/67	A
#17 cable	Amman 4560 <i>open 9-14-99</i> S 2 pp.	6/22/67	A
#18 cable	Deptel 215074 to Amman <i>open 9-14-99</i> S 1 p.	6/23/67	A
#18a	duplicate of #18 <i>open 9-14-99</i>		
#22 memo	Katzenbach to the President <i>open 12-15-99 NLS 99-271</i> S 5 pp.	6/27/67	A
#23 report	Talking Points for Use with King Hussein <i>open 12-15-99 NLS 99-271</i> C 9 pp.	undated	A
#26 report	King Hussein's Position <i>open 12-15-99 NLS 99-271</i> C 2 pp.	6/24/67	A
#28 report	re Jordanian aid <i>open 9-14-99</i> C 2 pp.	6/26/67	A
#30 report	re military assistance to Jordan <i>open 2-4-02 NLS/RAC 99-202</i> S 3 pp.	undated	A
#32 report	Jordan's Economic Situation <i>open 9-14-99</i> C 3 pp.	6/25/67	A
#34 report	Jordan's West Bank <i>open 12-14-99 NLS 99-271</i> C 3 pp.	6/25/67	A
#36 report	re refugees <i>open 12-14-99 NLS 99-271</i> C 2 pp.	6/26/67	A
#38 report	re Jerusalem <i>open 12-14-99 NLS 99-271</i> C 3 pp.	6/26/67	A
#40 report	re Israel <i>open 4-13-00 NLS 99-268</i> S 4 pp.	6/25/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#42	duplicate of #9e open 10-19-99 NLJ 98-555		
#44	duplicate of #9g open 9-14-99		
#50 photo	King sanitized 1-29-01 NLJ/RAC 99-203 C 1 p.	1967	A
#51 report	Biographic Sketch open 4-13-00 NLJ 99-268 C 1 p.	undated	A
#53 photo	Minister of Education sanitized 1-29-01 NLJ/RAC 99-203 C 1 p.	1953	A
#54 report	Biographic Sketch open 9-14-99 C 1 p.	undated	A
#56 photo	Director of Plans and Organization sanitized 1-29-01 NLJ/RAC 99-203 C 1 p.	1964	A
#57 report	Biographic Sketch open 9-14-99 C 1 p.	undated	A

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1

Memos & Misc.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: Walt Rostow *OKW*

SUBJECT: Press Guidance for Hussein Visit

The attached is not intended for release. We provide it simply as a working base for you and King Hussein to use in laying out the guidelines for George Christian and others in backgrounding the press afterward.

The Jordanians did not want to agree to anything like the attached until the King saw you. However, I suspect they just don't understand the problem George has. We think we've written something that the King can live with, but you can give him a crack at it.

MB
McGeorge Bundy

cc: George Christian

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
B: *ju* NARA, Date *8-16-99*

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 8-16-99

2a
June 28, 1967

SUGGESTED PRESS GUIDANCE FOR THE MEETING
BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
ON JUNE 28, 1967

The President and His Majesty King Hussein I exchanged views on the problems arising out of the recent hostilities in the Near East.

King Hussein expressed deep concern at the plight of the refugees, thanked the United States for assistance contributed to the refugees and hoped the United States would do its utmost to relieve the suffering. The President noted that the United States had been a major contributor to the support and rehabilitation of the Palestine refugees. He emphasized our acute concern with the welfare of the refugees, both those displaced by the fighting of 1948 and those who have left their homes as a result of the recent hostilities. While noting that the USG had established a \$5 million reserve fund for emergency relief for the refugees, he emphasized the need for a permanent solution to the refugee problem.

Both King Hussein and the President agreed that any resolution of the present crisis must be based on justice and the interest of all parties concerned. King Hussein insisted that a first step must be the withdrawal of Israeli forces back to the boundaries pertaining before June 4. The President referred to the five points which he made in his speech of June 19. He expressed the hope that measures could now be taken to implement these points and arrive at a just

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settlement including the withdrawal of the Israeli forces. He described our basic objective as the achievement of a more durable and more stable situation than that existing prior to June 5. He reaffirmed our views on the territorial integrity and political independence of all states.

Both agreed that Jerusalem as a Holy Place for three great religions deserved special attention. Both agreed that there must be appropriate consultation with religious leaders and others who are deeply concerned before any unilateral action is taken on the status of Jerusalem.

The President reaffirmed the deep interest of the United States Government in Jordan and its people. He expressed the hope that the friendly relations between the two countries would be strengthened and informed the King that the United States Government intended to continue its economic assistance to Jordan.

Although there was not an identity of views on all issues, the exchange was of real value.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 28, 1967

3

Mr. President:

If you decide to go to the Islamic Center with Hussein this afternoon, the attached brief remarks would be useful.

HS
for McGB

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SUGGESTED REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OPENING OF THE
ISLAMIC CENTER, WASHINGTON, D. C. ON
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 1967

work - just in
case. Mac
sent it up.
Hal

3a

Ten years ago President Eisenhower took part in the dedication ceremonies of this Center. I am glad to have a chance to mark this anniversary with His Majesty, King Hussein.

We in the West recognize a great debt to the Islamic world. Its discoveries in medicine and astronomy and its contributions in art, science and commerce have enriched our own civilization.

Today at this place of religious devotion and compassion, our minds turn to the human beings who are the main victims of tragic wars in the Middle East. I believe the place and the time are appropriate to rededicate ourselves to bringing justice and hope to those people.

Yesterday, on behalf of the United States Government, I announced a program of emergency relief for the refugees, and I understand that this Center is a collecting point for private contributions to that cause. I know that my fellow Americans will support all efforts to help those in need.

But emergency relief is not enough. It is time that all peoples of the Middle East--with the world's help--transform these refugees of nearly twenty years into men, women and children with a future.

- 2 -

New homelessness must not be created; old homelessness must be ended. There will be no peace unless this problem is attacked with new energy by all, and, certainly, primarily by those who are immediately concerned.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D. C.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL

VISIT TO WASHINGTON, D.C. OF HIS MAJESTY HUSSEIN I, KING OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
Wednesday, June 28, 1967

Departure from Andrews Air Force Base

Note: The American party traveling aboard the Jet Star should be at Andrews Air Force Base no later than 9:50 a.m. (See Enclosure No. 1 - Passengers aboard the aircraft)

10:00 a.m. EDT Departure of the Jet Star from Andrews Air Force Base.

Aircraft Commander: Major Francis Long
Stewart: Sergeant Travous
Aircraft Number: 612491

10:50 a.m. EDT Arrival at the Marine Air Terminal, LaGuardia Airport, New York.

Departure from New York

(See Enclosure No. 2 - Passengers Aboard the aircraft)

12:00 noon EDT Departure from the Marine Air Terminal, LaGuardia Airport, New York.

1:00 p.m. EDT Arrival at the Military Airlift Command Terminal, Washington National Airport, Washington, D.C.

Upon arrival at the airport, Ambassador Burns and Mr. Whitehead will descend the stairway. His Majesty and party will follow.

Welcoming Committee

His Excellency Farhan Shubeilat
Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

The Arab Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions at Washington

(continued)

Welcoming Committee (continued)

Mr. Chester C. Carter
Deputy Chief of Protocol of the United States

Mr. Rodger P. Davies
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

1:10 p.m.

His Majesty and party will depart from National Airport. Suggested car seating is as follows:

Car No. 1 - His Majesty
Foreign Minister Ahmed Tuqan
General Amir Khammash
Ambassador Shubeilat
Mr. Carter

State Depart- Ambassador Burns
ment Car

1:25 p.m.

Arrival at the Southwest Gate of the White House and proceed to the Diplomatic Entrance.

1:30 p.m.

President Johnson will give a luncheon for His Majesty at the White House.

p.m.

Departure from the White House and proceed to the Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2319 Wyoming Avenue Northwest.

His Majesty will return to New York later in the day.

Welcoming Committee

ENCLOSURE NO. 1

Passengers Aboard the Aircraft from Andrews Air Force Base

The Honorable Findley Burns, Jr.
American Ambassador to the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan

Mr. Ben Whitehead
Protocol Officer
Department of State

ENCLOSURE NO. 2

Passengers Aboard the Aircraft from New York City and Return

His Majesty Hussein I
King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

His Excellency Anmed Tuqan
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan

Major General Amir Khammash
Chief of Staff
Jordanian Air Force

The Honorable Findley Burns, Jr.
American Ambassador to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Mr. Ben Whitehead
Protocol Officer
Department of State

Mr. William DeFossett
Security Officer
Department of State

Mr. Ralph Laurello
Security Officer
Department of State

Wm Rostow

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

5~~SECRET~~

June 27, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: Walt Rostow

SUBJECT: Military Aid Policy in the Middle East

After fighting broke out, we stopped all aid shipments to countries that broke relations with us. For those that did not break, we let the pipeline flow beyond the depot but blocked new approvals. Now in order to get back into business with the moderates, State and Defense recommend a number of selective exceptions to that "no-new-approvals" policy.

The attached paper describes the specific shipments they would like to turn loose. They include no heavy combat equipment and no lethal items, except for a few important for defense or internal security. In cost, they add up to about \$170 million from past programs, but would involve no financing not already authorized or contemplated before the fighting.

That sounds like a lot, but \$145 million is for two sales programs in Saudi Arabia for improving mobility (vehicles, no tanks or arms, training, construction of maintenance facilities), weapons maintenance and repair and for purchase of one C-130. The next largest is the sale to Israel of \$16 million in spare parts for tanks and defensive Hawk missiles. The rest are dribs and drabs of spares and support equipment to Morocco, Libya, Lebanon and Jordan. (see page 2 bottom).

The one new program to be negotiated would be the \$14 million in credit you approved for Morocco's King Hassan in February. Though this might include APC's and transport aircraft, the lead time on those items ranges from 18 to 36 months.

The most controversial item on the list is the sale of 100 APC's to Israel, but you've been over that many times.

In Libya, we are still hoping to spin out our talks on Wheelus and would go ahead with one C-47 aircraft and a variety of spares, commo and automotive equipment. We would hold the 10 F-5 aircraft

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-554By is, NARA Date 10-7-99~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

we've agreed to sell until we see how the base talks go. Bob McNamara wonders whether we might leave our domestic flank open to go ahead with anything when the Libyans have just asked us to leave Wheelus, but he does not feel strongly. Nick Katzenbach thinks going ahead would improve our negotiating position.

McNamara also wants to flag the problem of domestic reaction to any relaxation of our ban now such as Senator Church's speech. I don't feel these programs are visible enough or military enough to cause a big ruckus--except for the Israeli APC's if they leak. He doesn't feel strongly about Morocco and Tunisia and recognizes that Saudi Arabia is a case by itself. My own view is that the list is pretty carefully drawn to exclude troublesome items and we have to go ahead with the Arabs if we're going to let Israel buy.

M. G. B.

McGeorge Bundy

Approve exceptions as described _____

See me _____

a million or so - not fully priced in its new form

The Jordan program would not include any of the ammo originally programmed, any aircraft or any equipment relating to the F-104 sale (first 4 planes were scheduled for delivery in September). It would include such things as automotive, commo and small arms repair parts, clothing, optical equipment and general spares.

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~~SECRET~~

June 21, 1967

5a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

FROM THE CONTROL GROUP

SUBJECT: Exceptions to Interim Arms Policy for the Middle East

Discussion

With the establishment of an effective cease-fire and with attention now focused on the political arena, we must consider whether our current arms policy for the Middle East continues to meet our requirements. The current policy (as stated in our memorandum of June 15) provides guidelines for generally evenhanded action within each of two categories of countries, i.e., those that maintain relations with us and those that do not. We need now to examine more selectively how to deal with individual countries.

Some of the Arab states -- Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia -- not only continue to maintain relations with us but would clearly like to continue to "do business" with us in a variety of ways. These countries had no meaningful involvement in the recent hostilities (except for Jordan); they did not propagate the "big lie"; by and large, they have resisted great pressure to take actions against US interests; and they continue to have considerable concern over the longer-term threat they see from the more radical Arab states such as Algeria and the UAR. King Hussein of Jordan found himself, for his very survival, drawn into a vortex in his relations with Nasser, but has now had the exceptional courage to come out publicly questioning the "big lie." In addition to broad political interests, we have special assets to preserve in some of these countries -- such as our naval communications and VOA facilities in Morocco, oil investments and Wheelus in Libya, oil in Saudi Arabia, and general business interests in Lebanon. What we have recognized in the past needs to be recognized still: the Arab countries are not identical in behavior and policy, and our own policy must differentiate among them.

It is imperative that we now take steps to support and to strengthen our position with the moderate Arabs.

One way we can evidence our own desire to maintain good relations is to relax, in a limited and selective way, the current restrictions on arms shipments. The steps already taken by the USSR to resupply some of the Arab countries, particularly Algeria and the UAR, and the reported Soviet offer of arms to our friends among the Arabs, impart some urgency to the issue.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-555

By is, NARA Date 10-8-99

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We believe we can take care of some of our most immediate political problems without opening up large new programs and without supplying -- at least for the immediate future -- major items of heavy combat equipment. The specific recommendations which follow all relate to programs or supply actions we had already authorized before hostilities began or which were then pending. None involves US Government financing beyond what was already authorized or contemplated before hostilities began.

If we relax our arms policy for some of the Arab states, it would seem that we should do the same for Israel, under the same conditions and limitations.

Recommendations

1. Morocco.

a. Authorize shipment of commodities under the existing MAP grant program which are now ready, or will be ready to move in the next 60 days: spares for F-5 and C-119 aircraft, rocket motors for F-5, photographic equipment, radio equipment, language trainer, and trucks (total value approximately \$250,000).

b. Authorize our Embassy in Rabat to conclude negotiations on the Memorandum of Understanding relating to the \$14 million credit for arms sales agreed to by the President in February 1967, during King Hassan's visit to Washington. Take under sympathetic consideration the Moroccan pleas for a speed-up of deliveries under this \$14 million credit, recognizing that certain items they desire (APC's and C-119G aircraft) have lead times ranging from 18-36 months which could not be changed without diverting from US forces.

2. Tunisia.

No action decisions are required at this time, but we plan to resume discussions with the GOT on the grant program for \$5.2 million (agreed on April 1, 1967), with a view to defining the conditions under which we would operate. We should also tell Tunis we are prepared to explore release of used MAP equipment the Tunisians are interested in buying from Turkey.

3. Libya

a. Authorize shipment of commodities (except for recoilless rifles, mortars and ammunition) under the existing MAP grant and sales programs which are now ready, or will be ready to move in the next 60 days. Items to be shipped include one C-47 aircraft and a variety of spare parts and communications and automotive equipment, as well as some anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, practice mines and fuses, detonating cord, demolition charges and blasting caps.

b. You should know that we have suspended implementation with Libya on the agreement for the sale of ten F-5 aircraft, already signed. We must be prepared to be forthcoming with that commitment in the impending Wheelus negotiations.

~~SECRET~~

-3-

4. Lebanon.

a. Revalidate existing Munitions Control licenses for commercial shipments to Lebanon. All outstanding licenses were suspended as of June 9. They cover a variety of minor supplies, with a total value of \$238,000.

b. Authorize shipment, under previously approved government-to-government sales (cash), of communications equipment valued at approximately \$3.6 million. Lebanon has already paid for the bulk of this transaction.

c. Continue suspension for the time being on conclusion of a credit sale of 20 M-48 tanks previously offered to the GOL.

5. Jordan.

a. Resume implementation of the FY 67 MAP grant materiel program, except for ammunition.

b. We would resume the shipment of sales items except for ammunition and all equipment relating to the sale of F-104 aircraft. Under the F-104 contract of March 1966, the first four aircraft are scheduled for delivery by September 1967 with the entire 12 delivered by January 1968.

6. Saudi Arabia.

a. Resume implementation of the \$120 million Saudi Arabia Mobility Program (SAMP) under the sales agreement signed in September 1966. The SAMP calls for supply of military vehicles (no tanks or other arms involved), construction of maintenance facilities, and training in vehicle maintenance. The first shipment of trucks went forward before hostilities.

b. Approve the completion of negotiations on a \$9.9 million weapons repair and maintenance program (RAMP). This has been under negotiation for the past 10 months and the SAG is now anxious to conclude. This would be a government-to-government credit sale, for which FY 67 funds have already been earmarked by DOD. The program includes spare parts for weapons, the construction of facilities, and training.

c. Authorize the issuance of a Munitions Control export license for the commercial sale of 10,000 pistols, holsters and ammunition, intended for the Saudi police.

d. Approve the sale of four new C-130 aircraft by Lockheed to the SAG. This \$15 million transaction, which has been under negotiation since late last year and which King Faisal now desires to conclude, would require a MAP loan guarantee of \$2.6 million. Although approval is needed so that production may go forward, the first plane would not be delivered for at least one year.

e. We would continue to hold up on the Saudi request for Sidewinders (for its F-86 planes), and on remaining deliveries of mortars, ammunition and spare parts we have agreed to supply for the Saudi National Guard.

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- 4 -

7. Israel.

a. Approve further negotiation and early shipment of materiel (basically spares and parts for Hawk missiles and tanks) under a \$ 14 million credit sale approved by the President on May 23, 1967, at 5 percent interest for 10 years. We believe the GOI should be permitted to use part of this credit for other small items (e.g., gas masks) if it desires. We believe the terms should be maintained as already approved, although the GOI has asked that the interest be lowered to 3-1/2 percent.

b. Approve shipment of \$2 million in tank spares for cash, as also approved by the President on May 23. The GOI has also asked for credit on this sale.

c. Approve requests, subject to a case-by-case review, for government-to-government sales (cash) and for Munitions Control export licenses for commercial sales, all for military spares and parts, communications and radio equipment and miscellaneous minor items. These requests were pending as of June 5.

d. Do not approve the sale and delivery of 143 half-track personnel carriers of World War II vintage which have been returned to us by the French. These are the remainder of 200 half-tracks requested for cannibalization which we earlier authorized for sale to Israel. However, the half-tracks may be used "as is" and would therefore not fall within the limitation on major combat equipment for which exceptions are being sought at this time. Also, since the vehicles would move from depots in France, there would be the danger of adverse publicity.

e. Approve negotiation of the offer to sell 100 U.S.-origin armored personnel carriers, on the condition that the transaction must be kept secret and on the understanding that delivery cannot be made for a minimum of 18 months. This is a cash sale for \$3.7 million. The approval on 23 May indicated that Israel should first approach the Italian firm which manufactures a similar APC under a U. S. license. It is now known to us that Italy is unwilling to make this sale.

f. Israel has also requested (June 1) purchase of another Hawk battery plus 100 missiles, and the immediate loan of 48 A-4 aircraft and 140 M60 tanks. Under a contract of March 1966, we agreed to sell 48 A-4 aircraft to Israel, with initial deliveries in December 1967. There is no commitment to sell the additional Hawk battery and missiles. We recommend that no action be taken on these items at this time.

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MEMORANDUM

31
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6

Tuesday, June 27, 1967
7:00 PM

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Handling Hussein

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 9-18-95

I hold to the view that our main purpose must be to let him down as gently as we can from his present conviction that you must pull his chestnuts out of the fire for him. I very much like Walt's suggestion of a way to make this point and I attach my copy of his memorandum.

Two other things you can do for the King are to listen to his story and show him your own personal sympathy and kindness. I strongly endorse the Department's notion that you should have your main talk with him alone, and I also agree with the notion of a quick unscheduled visit to the Islamic Center on its tenth anniversary.

In addition, you can assure the King that economic assistance -- at levels still to be settled -- will continue (except where we have had to suspend particular projects on the West Bank). The level of budget support for this year was \$32 million and the level for FY 68 is \$24 million, but in fact, the King's needs cannot yet be predicted because of the West Bank occupation.

On military assistance, I think Hussein will accept the notion that there can be no immediate question of combat airplanes (he had a bargain for twelve F-104's) or of early new arms shipments. But renewal of existing MAP commitments is up for your approval in tonight's reading along with similar small packages for other moderate Arabs.

In sum, I would stay within the State talking points and not press the King toward bargaining with the Israelis (along the lines of the State covering memo) -- unless he gives you an opening. We do not want him telling other Arabs that the U. S. is impossible. The fact is that if he will take us at our word, our five principles have quite a lot for him -- especially territorial integrity and justice for the refugees. He wants straight withdrawal, and you are quite right to insist on withdrawal from danger. A formula that is good enough for Kosygin is good enough for Hussein.

McG. B.
McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

Authority PLJ 91-140

By Jullian NARA. Date 9-18-98

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, June 27, 1967 -- 3:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

Here is one way to introduce your position to Hussein, if you can get him off by himself:

I was unable to prevent Nasser from pushing UNEF aside and closing the Gulf of Aqaba.

I was unable to prevent the Russians from giving the Syrians and the Egyptians inaccurate information in mid-May on Israeli mobilization.

I was unable to prevent you from signing a 5-year pact with Nasser; accepting an Egyptian commander; accepting Iraqi troops in your country; accepting Egyptian commando units to attack Israeli airfields.

I thought I had a promise from Eban and the Israelis that we had at least another week to work out a way of settling the Aqaba question; but I assure you I had not one moment's warning that the war would break out on June 5.

I could not prevent Nasser from telling you that he had achieved great victories on June 5 and that you would have UAR air support; I could not prevent you from attacking Israel.

I could help bring about a cease-fire. There are ways in which I can help bring about peace in the Middle East if there is a will for peace in the Middle East. But I cannot get the Israelis out of the West Bank unless there are serious things that you are prepared to do in return. What those are you probably know better than I.

If I have any advice for you, it is this: Do not rely on any outside force to solve this problem for you; neither the United Nations General Assembly, nor the UAR, nor the Russians, nor the Americans.

But, if you are willing to seek a solution, then there are ways others can help, as intermediaries, with economic resources, with persuasion of the other party, etc.

Walt Rostow

I am, of course, sending along this note to Mac Bundy so that you can have his comment on this approach.

~~SECRET~~

1:30 PM
28th

MEMORANDUM FOR MARVIN WATSON

June 27, 1967

8

SUBJECT: Luncheon for King Hussein

The President has agreed to a small working luncheon for King Hussein on Wednesday, 28 June.

My recommendation for the guest list would be as follows, but I would appreciate your checking with the President:

Under Secretary Katzenbach (Secretary Rusk will be hosting a lunch for the Thai King and Queen.)

Secretary McNamara

McGeorge Bundy

Walt Rostow

Findley Burns, the President's Ambassador to Hussein

Mac Bundy's notion and mine is to keep it as small as possible since, at present count, there will only be four Jordanians--King Hussein, Foreign Minister Ahmad Tuqan, Major General Amir Khammash (chief of staff) and Jordanian Ambassador in Washington, Farhan Shubeilat.

However, other possibilities would include George Christian, Gene Rostow and Bill Macomber (former US Ambassador in Jordan who knows the King intimately and has performed two special missions to him since November).

Since this is strictly a working session, I anticipate no formal arrival statement and no formal toast at lunch. However, we will provide a paper on press guidance for the President and Hussein to approve for George Christian.

The King has asked--and we strongly recommend--that he have an opportunity for a private talk alone with the President. There are things he will want to say that he can't say in front of any other Jordanian.

W. W. Rostow

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

6/26/67

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Mr. Walt Rostow - W. H.

This package of papers
was given to Special Committee
last night.

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DRAFT D **DECLASSIFIED**
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-555
By is, NARA Date 10-8-99

June 26, 1967

TO THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
FROM THE CONTROL GROUP

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We attach suggested talking points for your visit with King Hussein, now scheduled for Wednesday. After Bill Macomber's talk with the King, we recommend that you see him alone, at least for a brief period. It will be easier for the King to talk about reality without any witnesses but yourself, and especially without Arab witnesses.

The talks with King Hussein could be crucial to the process of achieving a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The King is approaching a fork in the road. It should not be impossible for him to choose the right course. If he does so, that fact would be a real beginning, breaking up the hitherto rigid Arab line against peace. If he is convinced that such a peaceful solution is impossible, the tide could run in the wrong direction from our point of view.

The Soviets are already consolidating Nasser in Egypt. Nasser is in touch with us, but we doubt that he will have an acceptable deal to offer. Therefore the Jordanian problem remains the most hopeful opening for us.

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There is a difference of view between those who counsel moving ahead with Jordan now, and those who advise waiting for the dust to settle. We recommend taking advantage of the King's presence to open the possibility of prompt action on his part with Israel, directly or through an intermediary -- perhaps the Shah. A delay, which the Israelis favor, could result in freezing the situation on the West Bank into a pattern of Israeli control which it would be nearly impossible to change later.

The problems between Israel and Jordan -- the West Bank and Jerusalem -- are more difficult than any of the other issues between Israel and her neighbors, except for the overriding and fundamental problem of obtaining Arab recognition for Israel's right to exist. But there are also greater opportunities, because a Jordan-Israel solution would hold out the hope of transforming the refugee problem, and that of Jerusalem, which are at the heart of the conflict.

Our talks with Israeli representatives in New York and here persuade us that the Israelis are willing to make a pretty favorable deal with King Hussein, provided he accepts the idea of peace. You should not, we think, sponsor or propose any particular bargain, or be drawn into the details of any possible plan. But we do recommend that you be prepared to advise and

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encourage King Hussein to explore the possibility of negotiations with the Israelis, directly or through an intermediary. (You should know that the King has negotiated secretly with the Israelis in the past, e.g., meeting Eban on the Riviera. This information is of the greatest sensitivity).

The basic territorial problem dividing Israel and Jordan is the West Bank area. The West Bank was part of the Palestine Mandate given up by the British in 1947. It came under Jordanian control as a result of the hostilities in 1948, ^{and} the subsequent declaration of Palestinian notables of their wish to adhere to Trans-Jordan. We have never recognized Jordanian Sovereignty over the West Bank; instead we have recognized the area as being under Jordanian control pursuant to the General Armistice Agreement. We have taken an even more reserved position about Jordanian control in the Old City of Jerusalem. Our Ambassador to Jordan, for example, does not show the flag while driving in the Old City. A memorandum on the history and legal position of the area is attached at Tab A.

The Israelis tell us they have not yet finally made up their minds on the position they will take with regard to the West Bank generally, and Jerusalem in particular. So far, we have advised them not to take unilateral actions, nor to present the world with a fait accompli.

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The Israelis point out that they have a national security interest in keeping the West Bank out of unfriendly or aggressive hands; that they tried to prevent King Hussein from entering the war and sought a cease fire even after he had taken offensive action; and that their occupation of the West Bank was unanticipated and is unwanted. They were particularly aggrieved by his attack in Jerusalem, where they took heavy casualties because they refrained from the use of air power. On the other hand, they say, these events occurred, a new situation has emerged, and they are still not clear what policy King Hussein represents today. They stress that the City of Jerusalem cannot be divided again, and that the Holy Places must be accessible to all.

There is a good deal of talk in Israel and among Palestinian Arabs about the possibility of an autonomous Arab state on the West Bank, federated with Israel, and of comparable status for the Gaza Strip. Both Dayan and Ben Gurion have suggested such an approach. Some Palestinians are reported to be interested in the possibility. There are rumors of possible meetings of Arab notables. There is always a possibility that such meetings could be stage-managed by the Israelis to come up with a statement or even a declaration calling for a separation of the West Bank from Jordan. Such a procedure would follow that of Jordan in annexing the West Bank in the first place.

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There would be political danger if Israel tried to set up a semi-autonomous Arab State on the West Bank by unilateral action. Such a step would make general Arab-Israeli peace more difficult to imagine, and would create a new Arab grievance.

We do not see any possibility that King Hussein could negotiate with Israel, and then accept a state of peace with Israel, unless he retained political control over the West Bank area, subject at most to minor boundary rectifications, and an international solution for Jerusalem.

But it is possible that over time an economic link could develop between Israel and Jordan as a whole. This would leave the two states of Israel and Jordan politically independent but with open cooperative economic relationships. A development of this kind should make it easier to solve the issue of Jerusalem, which could become a focus of economic exchange, rather than a salient on a nervous frontier. It could transform the refugee problem into a problem of regional economic development. And by providing an economic opportunity for the refugees, it would begin to relieve the other Middle Eastern states of the burden of the idea that somehow, some day, Arab loyalty requires them to help liberate Palestine and restore the refugees to their rightful property.

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We therefore conclude that at this stage the optimum plan should include these elements: (1) economic links between Israel and the whole of Jordan; (2) the West Bank under the sovereignty of Jordan, subject, however, (3) to boundary adjustments and (4) a special agreement about Jerusalem, and (5) an end to the state of war, demilitarization of the West Bank, and normal relations. We gather from a conversation between Evron and Walt Rostow that Israel is thinking along similar lines.

We should have no illusion: the odds are against Hussein accepting this sort of package at an early date. But it is worthwhile encouraging him to explore the possibilities.

The Israelis would probably accept some such approach in the near future. They might even accept a less ambitious solution that left the West Bank in Jordanian hands, except for an agreement on Jerusalem.

If the present situation continues very long, however, King Hussein should understand that his risks with regard to the West Bank probably increase. At the moment, he could probably get political control of most of the West Bank, in exchange for a favorable long-term economic arrangement, and a new status, perhaps condominium, in Jerusalem. Later on, such a deal might well become more difficult.

TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH KING HUSSEINKing's State of Mind

The King is still emotionally disturbed by recent events, although more composed than he was, and perhaps undecided as well between his traditional moderation and the mood of Arab nationalism and unity of early June. He is bitter towards the West, USSR, Nasser, other Arab leaders and toward himself above all because of the debacle. At bottom, he probably wants to be moderate and realistic in his approach to problem, but he is afraid to risk positions drastically at variance with present extremist Arab opinion. He has been proposing an Arab Summit Conference, which Nasser and some others have been avoiding. His object has been to challenge Nasser at such a meeting, and more Arab opinion towards moderation. Hussein will visit Nasser on his way home. He has made a number of inconsistent statements in recent days, but he handled himself yesterday on television with care and skill. He is enjoying the praise he has received in Arab circles for fighting bravely, and is probably unaware of the depth of the bitterness he created by making a deal with Nasser, and by attacking Jerusalem.

The message he takes away will inevitably be one for Nasser and other Middle Eastern leaders.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ By is, NARA Date 10-8-99

His Objectives

To determine U.S., Soviet, and Israeli position towards Jordan and himself, especially with regard to our economic and military assistance program and our position on boundary problems for Jordan. He has publicly committed himself to the return of the West Bank and of Jerusalem; but he appears not to have the slightest notion of how to do so.

Our Objectives

1. To affirm our continued interest in him and in his country. It is basic that he be encouraged to stand up now for himself and for Jordan, not for the loose and divided Arab community as a whole.

2. To make it clear again that we did not know of the onset of hostilities, that we tried to prevent them, using the same words with the UAR and with Israel, and that we were not involved, directly or indirectly.

3. To inform him we intend to continue our economic and some of our military assistance programs for him, and for other moderate states in the Middle East, and to make sure he understands the extent of our present assistance to such states.

4. To discuss with him our basic objective of achieving a more durable and more stable situation than that existing prior to June 5, and make clear that our commitments on territorial integrity will be fulfilled in that context.

5. To assure him of our support for a just and permanent solution for the refugees.

6. To ask for his views on possible solutions for the West Bank and Jerusalem problems, and on the future relationship between Israel and Jordan more generally, as well as his opinion on broader issues involved in the conflict.

Talking Points

His Majesty may be assured of continued United States support both for Jordan and for himself, and for other Arab nations which adopt constructive policies. We regret the tragic events of early June, the mistakes made, the death and destruction that ensued; it is imperative that we work together to see if a better and more durable settlement can be reached. Reiterate again that we strongly advised Israel and UAR not to start hostilities, that we did not know of the outbreak of hostilities in advance, and that our posture has been and remains even-handed.

His Majesty may be assured that we intend to continue our economic assistance programs. We are also prepared to resume some military assistance but we are not yet clear on either the scale nor the type of equipment. We wish to avoid an arms race and are consequently urgently reviewing the supply of lethal equipment such as aircraft and tanks to all Middle Eastern states.

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The states of the Middle East, with the help of the world community, must find an answer to the refugee problem. We should be most interested in the King's views on this subject, from the point of view of Jordan's national interest. Our objective, difficult as it may be of achievement, is a durable peace permitting all states to develop the full extent of their potentialities.

If he asks which kind of refugee plan we support, we suggest that you answer that it is too soon to choose. If Jordan and Israel could establish an economic link between their two countries, and perhaps others as well, the refugee problem would have a completely new appearance. If, however, progress of this kind proves impossible, we shall have to fall back on one or another of the older plans for resettlement.

As for Jerusalem, again, we have advised Israel against unilateral action to settle the status of Jerusalem. We recognize and share the interest of the three great religions in the Holy Places. As the King knows, we have never agreed either with Israel or with Jordan about the status of Jerusalem. And during the period of Jordanian control there were legitimate grievances on the part of all three religions. An arrangement should be worked out now

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which takes fully into account all interests in the problem. We stand ready to play our full part in such a negotiation.

The United States commitment to the territorial integrity of all states of the area is valid. We have acted in the past in support of this principle in behalf of many Middle Eastern states, including the UAR, Lebanon, and others. We shall do so in the future.

However, there must be a realistic approach to the problems of the area, taking fully into account the political consequences of Nasser's folly, the hostilities themselves, and the strong Soviet pressures.

We have been assured by Israel that its ultimate purposes are moderate, and that territorial claims will be subordinated to the goal of achieving peace. As the King realizes, the most difficult territorial problems are those between Jordan and Israel, in view of the past history of the West Bank, and the controversies over its legal status, which have never been finally resolved. Israel has not reached a conclusion on these questions. This is the moment to influence that conclusion.

Against this background, Israel's reluctance to yield territory unless it has some tangible assurances as to its own integrity is understandable from its point of view. There are many ways in which

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this condition can be satisfied. We have strongly advised the Israelis that we are unwilling to accept fait accompli solutions, and urged them not to take unilateral action either about the West Bank or about Jerusalem. We have intervened energetically to persuade Israel to encourage residents of the West Bank to remain in their homes, and to allow West Bank residents on the East Bank to return.

On the other hand, it is not practical after all that has happened to ask the Israelis to withdraw until the main terms of a political settlement are clearly agreed, at least in private. We have been thinking, for example, that at some point in the settlement process the Security Council or the General Assembly could declare that the state of war between Israel and other Middle Eastern states is ended, and that no one can legitimately claim rights of belligerency any longer. Such a declaration could be acknowledged by each government, thus starting a movement in the right direction.

While, as you have said, the continuance of hostilities and near hostilities in the Middle East has become a world problem not a regional one, we do not feel that the United States Government is in a position itself to initiate moves for a settlement of this problem. In this situation the

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attitudes of Jordan and Israelis are paramount. There is little the international community can do until both sides approach the problem of settlement on realistic terms. We are willing to help the parties reach agreement. But nothing can be done until they accept their own responsibilities.

In this setting, it would be helpful and important to hear King Hussein's views on the main outstanding issues between Israel and Jordan, and on the five principles you announced on June 19. How does he see the future of Jordan's relationship with Israel?

In the light of his answer, you may wish to draw on the covering memorandum, encouraging the King to explore the possibilities of agreement with Israel. We are ready to help in private. You should let him understand the risks for him and for Jordan of allowing the situation to drag on indefinitely in its present pattern.

You might ask the King for his ideas on a possible private intermediary. We are inclined to think that the Shah would be a candidate to consider. The Turkish Foreign Minister would also be a possibility.

In the meantime, we hope both Israel and Jordan will cooperate to deal with the present situation on the West Bank humanely. The people should be helped in their present plight.

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We hope that Jordan and Israel will both follow a two-pronged policy in the period ahead: trying as hard as they can for a basic settlement, and making arrangements which ensure the welfare of the local population in the meantime, and do not prejudice a constructive outcome.

The King will undoubtedly want to know -- as Nasser will -- your views on a wider range of topics.

I recommend that you stress these additional points:

(1) a condition of peace can be approached in stages, and does not necessarily require a treaty of peace in the first instance. There is no treaty of peace as yet between Germany and the Soviet Union, regrettable as that fact is.

(2) an end of all claims of belligerent rights should open the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal forthwith. The world community would expect the UAR to meet its clear responsibilities under international law.

(3) we deeply regret the decision of certain countries to break diplomatic relations with us. We should be glad to resume normal and friendly relations with them when conditions are appropriate on both sides.

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By is, NARA Date 10-8-99

ANNEX 2

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June 26, 1967

KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, JUNE 28, 1967

Study Paper - Jordan's West Bank

I ALTERNATIVES FOR WEST BANK

A. Return to Jordan with appropriate arrangements for demilitarization, access to Holy Places and minor border adjustments. These arrangements to be supervised by an increased UN presence.

B. Create a semi-independent Palestinian state with responsibility for defense and foreign affairs reserved to the Government of Israel.

C. Return to Jordanian sovereignty but with arrangements for economic unity with Israel.

D. Outright annexation to Israel.

II DISCUSSION: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ALTERNATIVES

A. Return to Jordan with appropriate arrangements.

1. Advantages:

a. The USG commitment concerning territorial integrity would be honored.

b. Israel's chances for ultimate acceptability in the Middle East would be increased.

c. Arab hostility towards the West would be reduced, provided the Soviets could not claim responsibility for the withdrawal.

d. The threat to other U.S. interests in the area, e.g. oil, transportation rights, would be reduced.

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e. Jordan would have a better chance of developing into an economically viable independent state.

f. The relatively stable leadership of King Hussein would probably be preserved in the sensitive area along Israel's eastern border.

g. Continued existence of Jordan as a moderate independent state would serve to prevent effective encirclement of Israel by a ring of USSR supported Arab states espousing the militant Arab nationalist line.

2. Disadvantages:

a. Israel's expectations have been aroused by the successes achieved in the recent hostilities. Even with United Nations supervised assurances of West Bank demilitarization and free access to the Holy Places, the Government of Israel may now be reluctant to give back the territory acquired.

b. Without considerable territorial alterations, the existing separation of the West Bank from its natural markets and ports on the Mediterranean coastal plain would be perpetuated.

c. The undesirable status quo on the refugee problem would be continued.

d. It may be difficult to obtain adequate UN surveillance forces.

Comment: In weighing the advantages and disadvantages of returning the West Bank to Jordan it is important to keep in mind the fundamental attitudes which characterize the parties to the conflict. It would be dangerous to assume that the recent round of hostilities has changed these basic attitudes which have been the root cause of the Arab-Israel conflict for the last 19 years. The Arabs have suffered a substantial military defeat including the loss of large quantities of military equipment but their basic strengths vis-a-vis Israel, e.g., sheer numbers, territory in depth, and overwhelming unanimity of opinion, have remained substantially intact. The humiliation suffered in the recent hostilities will have the effect of reinforcing the previous unfortunate states-of-mind of the Arab public and will probably only deepen their thirst for revenge. The Israelis do not have sufficient manpower or financial resources to control effectively any

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substantial portion of the hostile Arab populations of the Eastern Arab world nor can they change the Arab attitudes merely by destroying the aircraft and tanks of the Arab armies. Since neither side has the force to alter the existing deadlock, the only long-term solution lies in a change in attitudes by one or both parties to the dispute.

The long-range goal of Israel is acceptance in the Eastern Arab World. Absorption of the West Bank by Israel would reduce Israeli chances of attaining this goal as such action would confirm the Arab's worst fears concerning Israeli territorial ambitions. On the other hand, a return of the West Bank to Jordan could constitute a modest first step in the direction of Israel's ultimate acceptance by discrediting the widely held Arab belief that Israel is a dangerous, expansionist state.

The USG also has an important interest in maintaining stability in the Middle East and thus avoiding a confrontation with the USSR. Israeli territorial expansion by right of conquest, regardless of the provocations suffered by Israel prior to the outbreak of hostilities, would confirm existing Arab attitudes and probably hasten the date of the next outbreak of violence.

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B. Create a Palestinian state with defense and foreign affairs responsibilities reserved to the Government of Israel.

1. Advantages:

a. The West Bank would regain its natural economic ties with the Mediterranean coastal plain of Palestine.

b. Israel would acquire a more defensible perimeter and its consequent improved sense of security would reduce the risk of Israeli pre-emptive military action.

c. No agreement from the Arab states would be required. Israel could deal directly with the Arab leaders of the population who are already under Israeli military control.

d. This arrangement would restore contact between the Israeli-Arabs and their Palestinian brethren in the new state.

e. It would remove the adverse economic and military consequences of the irrationalities of the previous Israeli-West Bank armistice line.

f. It would provide a new framework to approach the refugee problem and give the Palestinians a sense of national identity, albeit in a state under Israeli influence and ultimate control.

2. Disadvantages:

a. The Arab world, and probably most of the international community, would consider that the U.S. had failed to honor its commitment for the maintenance of territorial integrity in the Middle East.

b. Since it appears unlikely that the other Arab states would consent to such an arrangement, it would be generally interpreted within the Arab world as Israeli expansion and further absorption of the Arab population into Israel. The residents of the new Palestinian state would suffer from the same psychological problems of divided loyalties as those which have plagued the Israeli-Arabs. In Arab eyes, the new state would be linked with Israel and would probably be cut off from access to any surrounding Arab country.

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c. There is no apparent responsible Palestinian leadership. Local Arab leaders who acquiesce in such an arrangement would be branded as Quislings and traitors in the other Arab countries.

d. Since Jordan would no doubt feel obliged to boycott the new Palestinian state, Jordan's economic future would become very problematical. The tourist attractions on the West Bank and Palestinian remittances are Jordan's two most important foreign exchange earning assets. The loss of these assets would be approximately offset by the termination of imports now consumed on the West Bank. As a result, the new political entity on the East Bank would require economic assistance at about the same level as that previously given to the entire state of Jordan even though the new state would contain only 53% of Jordan's population. In addition, the West Bank would require a considerable input of capital from either the U.S. or Israel. The \$200 million in foreign exchange reserves now backing the Government of Jordan would not be available to buttress the new political structure established on the West Bank. Unless Israel is willing to devote considerable resources to underwriting the economy of the new West Bank state, the total economic assistance required from the United States for both the East and West Banks would probably be substantially in excess of the present level of aid to Jordan. If the U.S. does not continue to support the East Bank at the level which it now supports all of Jordan, the economy would deteriorate with a probable increase in internal instability.

e. The general level of hostility toward Israel and the West would increase in the Arab world with consequent jeopardy to other U.S. interests in the area, such as oil and transportation rights.

f. Arab bitterness toward Israel would increase with a consequent reduction in Israel's ultimate chances for acceptance as part of the Middle East.

g. The permanent loss of the West Bank would create grave risks for Hussein's survival. The educated elites of the East Bank who dominate the civil service and the powerful merchant community contain many Palestinians. The continued loyalty of these elites to Hussein would be seriously shaken if he loses the rest of their Palestinian homeland.

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The officer corps of the Army is composed primarily of East Bank residents who traditionally look down on the Palestinians, but the loss of the West Bank would nevertheless be considered humiliating by the armed forces. The officer corps would question the wisdom of the King's policy of relying on the USG as his primary source of support. The possibility of a coup d'etat would increase. The result would probably be an Arab nationalist-type military regime patterned after those in the UAR, Iraq, or Syria. If such a regime assumes power, Israel would be ringed with Arab nationalist regimes probably supported by the USSR. Polarization would increase between the Israel-U.S. camp and the Arab-USSR camp with a consequent increased risk of a U.S. - USSR confrontation. Absorption of the East Bank into a neighboring state is another possibility. This would be resisted by the various groups who have an interest in Jordan's existing national entity, i.e., elements of the Army, the civil service, the merchant community and, of course, the regime. Annexation might be attempted in conjunction with an overthrow of Hussein's regime. The dislocations created by such an attempt would result in an unstable situation with Israel and the rival Arab claimants all moving to protect their interests. If Saudi Arabia absorbed the East Bank, the Saudi regime would be under great pressure to assume a more aggressive stance towards Israel. This inhibition on Feisal's moderation would not be in U.S. interests in view of our major oil holdings in Saudi Arabia.

h. U.S. prestige, now heavily committed to King Hussein, would suffer and our opponents throughout the world would use Hussein as an example of how we treat our friends.

i. Although the creation of a Palestinian state would provide an opportunity for a new approach to the refugee problem, in fact nothing significant would change unless Israel also opened its borders to the Palestinian refugees. Under the Jordan regime, the West Bank refugees already had access to the West Bank area and were given full citizenship rights. The USG provided economic assistance to the West Bank to the maximum extent consistent with the upper limit of the capital absorption rate. The re-establishment of economic ties between Israel and the West Bank might boost the economy but this would be off-set to a considerable extent by the cutting of economic ties between the West Bank and the rest of the Arab world as it appears very likely that the West Bank area would become subject to the Arab boycott.

Comment: The proposal to establish the West Bank as an independent state with an economic link to Israel and with defense and security responsibilities reserved to the Government of Israel would have obvious short-term advantages for the Israelis but would have serious disadvantages for U.S. interests in the area. It would give Israel strategic control of the West Bank area while simultaneously placing the cost of providing relief for the displaced Palestinian Arabs on the U.S. In the longer range this arrangement would reduce Israeli chances for acceptance as it would increase the bitterness and hostility of the Arab populations. It would thus further postpone the day of a permanent solution to the problem of the Middle East. It would reduce our ability to exert influence in the Arab capitals at a time when this influence is most needed to deal with the problems created by the Arab-Israeli conflict.

C. Return to Jordanian sovereignty but with arrangements for economic unity with Israel.

1. Advantages:

- a. The West Bank would regain its natural markets and trade links with the Mediterranean coastal plain.
- b. The East Bank of Jordan might also be drawn into commercial relations with Israel through West Bank middlemen.
- c. The economies of all three areas would benefit and the Arab boycott of Israel would be breached.
- d. The expanding economies would provide opportunities for de facto absorption of the refugee population into economically productive employment.
- e. The first step, i.e. the establishment of trade relations between the West Bank and Israel, could be accomplished unilaterally by Israel during the interim period of de facto Israeli military occupation of the West Bank.
- f. The return of the West Bank to Jordan would honor the U.S. commitment on territorial integrity.

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2. Disadvantages:

a. For the Government of Jordan to accept such an arrangement, i.e. trade between Israel and any area under Jordanian sovereignty, would quite likely result in its overthrow. Although the de facto Israeli occupation would provide an opportunity to establish these economic links without the acquiescence of Hussein, the principle of an economic boycott of Israel is well established in the Arab consensus. If Hussein resumes sovereignty over the West Bank at some later date, he could ignore this consensus only at great risk.

b. A successor regime would probably be even less inclined to establish trade relations with Israel.

c. If force or the threat of force were used by the Israelis to establish and maintain a regime in Amman willing to accept trade relations with Israel, such a regime would probably be considered by the other Arab countries as an Israeli puppet government and Jordan would be boycotted. Such a regime would also evoke strong internal opposition and would probably have considerable difficulty maintaining internal security.

d. Although the outcome of the hostilities has left Jordan in a position where Israel and the USG could apply considerable pressure to force the acceptance of such an arrangement, it would not be in US interests to risk the future of Hussein's regime. He has recently reiterated his statements calling for a unified Arab policy. If he accepts an arrangement with Israel which diverges sharply from the Arab consensus he would lose the support of his people and would probably be overthrown by his army.

e. If Hussein is overthrown a USSR supported Arab-nationalist type regime would be the likely successor. U.S. influence in Jordan would be reduced or abolished and Israel would risk a more effective USSR supported Arab "encirclement". This, in turn, would increase the possibility of a US-USSR confrontation in the Middle East.

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Comment: This proposal, although it has some attractive features, is not realistic in light of existing Arab attitudes towards Israel. An attempt to force its acceptance could mean the end of the Hashemite regime. The successor regime would probably be a radical Arab nationalist type military dictatorship or an Israeli sponsored puppet regime. In the latter case Israel would have considerable difficulty maintaining such a regime in the face of overwhelming popular opposition and Jordan would probably be cut off from all contact with the other Arab countries.

D. Outright annexation to Israel.

1. Advantages:

a. Outright annexation would bring Israeli efficiency to the West Bank in dealing with the administration of refugee relief and economic development.

b. Annexation would also provide the same advantages as those which would be attained by alternative (b).

2. Disadvantages:

a. The hostile Arab reaction against both Israel and the U S. would be even greater than that which would be evoked by the creation of an independent state linked to Israel with defense arrangements.

b. Annexation would create a difficult problem for the Israeli Government in maintaining internal security among the West Bank Arab population.

c. It would be an even more obvious violation of the U.S. commitment on territorial integrity than would the adoption of alternative (b).

Comment: Although there may be elements within Israel who are now advocating total annexation of the West Bank, it seems more likely that the Government of Israel would find it more in its interests to advocate some arrangement along the lines of alternatives (a), (b) or (c). Complete

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annexation and a bi-national state would be feasible only if the Israelis were willing to change the nature of the state of Israel from a Jewish state to a secular state. It seems unlikely that the Israelis would accept such a proposal.

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6/25/67

Clearances: Task Force- Amb. Porter
NEA/ARN- Robert B Houghton

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By ju, NARA, Date 8-16-99

June 26, 1967

TO : M - Mr. Rostow

FROM : NEA - Lucius D. Battle *LD*
L - Leonard C. Meeker *LC*

SUBJECT: Political and Legal History of the West Bank
and Jerusalem - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

Your memorandum of June 26, 1967, requested a short memorandum summarizing the political and legal history of the West Bank, including Jerusalem, and the position our Government has taken on it.

Historical Background

Prior to 1948, the area comprising the West Bank, Jerusalem and Israel, were included in the territory of the British mandate of Palestine. Following announcement by the British of their intention to terminate the mandate, the future of the area was debated at length in the United Nations. On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly adopted a partition plan which:

- (1) called for termination of the mandate as soon as possible but in any case no later than 1 August 1948;
- (2) provided for the creation of an independent Arab state with specified boundaries including the West Bank territories;
- (3) provided for creation of an independent Jewish state with specified boundaries;

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- (4) provided for a Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem.

The mandate terminated on May 14, 1948, at which time hostilities between Arab and Jewish forces occurred. These hostilities were eventually terminated by the General Armistice Agreement (GAA) of April 3, 1949 (insofar as Israel and Jordan were concerned).

The GAA of April 3, 1949, provided for Armistice Demarcation Lines, the basic purpose of which was "to delineate the lines beyond which the Armed Forces of the respective Parties shall not move."

West Bank

Articles V and VI of the GAA delineated the ADL's and provided that the West Bank area would be within the area of control of Jordan.

Jerusalem

Article V(b) provided that the ADL in the Jerusalem sector should correspond to lines established in a November 30, 1948 cease-fire agreement which conformed generally to military positions held by the respective sides on that date, the Jordanians holding the old city and adjacent territory.

Duration of Territorial Delineations

Article V(2) of this same GAA states:

"The Armistice Demarcation Line is not to be construed in any sense as a political or territorial boundary, and is delineated

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without prejudice to rights, claims and positions of either Party to the Armistice as regards ultimate settlement of the Palestine question."

Action of Parties

Subsequent to the GAA, both Israel and Jordan asserted positions with respect to the areas under their respective control which the United States considered inconsistent with the GAA/s and did not recognize.

West Bank

In 1950, Jordan purported to annex the portion of Palestine under its de facto control and notified the United States through the Legation at Amman. The United States merely acknowledged receipt of the notification. The other Arab states took action in the Arab League critical of Jordanian annexation. The British Government announced de jure recognition. On April 26, 1950, the Secretary was questioned concerning the matter at a press conference and stated: ". . . it has a bearing on efforts we have made through the U.N. to solve the Palestine matter. We are studying it from that standpoint and I think that is all I can say about it at the present time."

The United States has, accordingly, considered the West Bank legally under the control of Jordan pursuant to the GAA and having the full sanction of the United Nations. We have not extended de jure recognition to Jordanian claims to sovereignty.

Jerusalem

United States policy with regard to Jerusalem has been geared to the corpus separatum proposal of the

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1947 U.N. resolution and a reaffirming resolution in 1949. Accordingly, while we have acknowledged de facto Israel and Jordanian control in the respective sectors, we have not accepted their claims with respect to sovereignty.

Israel Sector of Jerusalem

In 1952 the Israelis announced their intention to move their Foreign Ministry from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. On July 9, 1952, we gave them an Aide Memoire stating that we would "not view favorably the transfer" since the United States adhered to the view that there should be a special international regime for Jerusalem acceptable to Israel and Jordan. The Aide Memoire also reasoned that "the U.S. Government believes that the United Nations should have an opportunity to reconsider the matter with a view to devising a status for Jerusalem which will satisfactorily preserve the interests of the world community and the states directly concerned." This statement was released publicly soon afterwards. It was reiterated in 1953 in a press conference by the Secretary. In a speech in 1955 the Secretary stated that "the U.S. would give its support to a UN review of the Status of Jerusalem problem." There have been no major U.S. public policy pronouncements since then.

Jordan Sector of Jerusalem

As noted above the U.S. has refused to acknowledge the Jordanian claim with respect to the Arab Sector.

Jerusalem has been treated as a separate consular district distinct from Israel or Jordan and we have succeeded by and large in maintaining the above position.

L/NEA:DAWehmeyer:dmg 6/26/67

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-269
By id, NARA Date 1-21-00

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June 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. E. V. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Middle East Priorities--Refugees or Withdrawal?

I didn't want to prolong your Control Group meeting Saturday by pursuing the importance of an Israeli offer on refugees. However, I hope you don't mind this informal note to complete my point that the refugee issue is so central that other issues might somehow fall into place around it.

I agree with you that the Arabs' main demand today is Israeli withdrawal. But the Arabs' main demand for 19 years has been "recognize the rights of the refugees." It's possible that the moderate Arabs might see greater advantage in making progress on a demand of 19 years, even at the temporary expense of a demand of 19 days.

I'm afraid that allowing ourselves to get overly engrossed in withdrawal will forfeit whatever chance we have to settle basic issues. Forcing Israel to withdraw and give up control of the main refugee centers leaves us right back where we were--the Arabs with an honest grievance and the Israelis having dumped the problem back on us.

What I tried to suggest Saturday was that an Israeli offer on refugees could have within it elements to meet--at least for debater's purposes--some of the immediate Arab demands:

1. Withdrawal. Israel recognizes Jordan's "residual sovereignty" over the West Bank and promises to withdraw the IDF as soon as it can assure justice for the refugees. (This leaves ultimate political arrangement open.)
2. Compliance with UN. To implement UN Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 ("... refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so . . ."), Israel asks PCC (or UN survey team) to plan implementation of the main elements of something like the Johnson Plan.
3. Compensation. If Israel actually repatriated a few Palestinians and offered a systematic plan for repatriation or productive resettlement with compensation, it might undercut zest--among moderates, at least--for the "liberation war."

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4. Recognition. By inviting the cooperation of host governments--even through the UN--a way might be paved leading to de facto recognition.

I admit this won't satisfy the radical Arabs. But if we're trying to give the moderates something to tie to without forcing them to commit suicide by signing a peace treaty with Israel, it seems to me a refugee program could be our area for de facto cooperation with great political appeal.



Harold H. Saunders

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MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-555
By is, NARA Date 10-8-99

1. Introduction. This memo tries to put some flesh on the general concept outlined in S/P's memo of June 17 regarding the west bank of Jordan.

It assumes that (i) there will be no rapid and major change in Soviet policy toward the area; (ii) Israel will insist on occupying the west bank, pending a wider Israeli-Jordanian settlement; (iii) US policy will vigorously support the effort to achieve such a settlement.

It considers how - if a settlement does not come quickly - the resulting period of Israeli occupation can be used to deal with the refugee problem on the west bank and to try to develop a new pattern of de facto Arab-Israeli economic cooperation or tissue-knitting in this area. It discusses what role the US will have to play, if this is to happen.

This memo is based, in part, on discussions with experts from NEA, AID, IO, and INR, and on an exceedingly interesting and original contribution from Ambassador G. Lewis Jones.

I. Political Framework

2. Status of the West Bank. We should urge Israel to follow a twofold policy toward the west bank:

(a) to indicate that it considers residual sovereignty to reside in Jordan (on the grounds that the local inhabitants transferred it to Jordan in 1948) and that Israel is willing to end occupation of the west bank as part of a wider settlement, when one can be negotiated with Jordan;

(b) to make de facto interim economic arrangements regarding the west bank (spelled out in Part II of this paper) which will advance the general goal of tissue-knitting in the meantime.

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Success of these de facto arrangements will hinge on Jordanian non-obstruction.

Jordan will only desist from obstruction if it hopes to get the west bank back. We should urge Israel to take no action now which would foreclose this hope - i.e., not to proceed with any plan which would seem to foreshadow a new political status for the west bank.

Instead, Israel should be urged to restore the Arab administrative districts which existed on the west bank before the recent conflict. Above them would be the Israeli military governor of the west bank; below them self-governing towns and local governments. Israeli taxes would not be applied to the west bank; previous Jordanian taxes would continue and the proceeds would be available to local administrative districts.

We should urge Israel, at the same time, to replace Israeli Defence Forces on the west bank by gendarmerie or police forces. If the IDF withdrew (presumably after dismantling west bank fortifications) the police could handle west bank security; having police rather than the army might be easier for the local population, and help to underline constructive long-term Israeli intent.

3. Jerusalem. We should also urge Israel not to try to settle the political future of Old Jerusalem now. De jure, its status should be the same as that of the rest of the west bank.

De facto, city-wide administration of Jerusalem will almost certainly be put into effect by Israel. We should encourage Israeli authorities, however, to maintain Arab participation in local government services in the Old City. We should also urge that an international authority be created - either by the UN or by agreement among religious groups - which would be empowered to override local administrative decisions, as necessary to ensure free access to the holy places.

II. Economic

Within the political framework outlined above, we should urge Israel to proceed to the de facto economic arrangements outlined below.

4. Trade.

(a) With the East Bank. We should urge Israel to allow free trade between the west and east banks. Such trade is important to both banks' welfare and to the wider program outlined below.

(b) With Israel. It may be easier for Jordan to allow trading with the west bank if there is, at least initially, a nominal customs barrier between Israel and the west bank, so that Jordan is not blatantly violating the Arab boycott of Israel. Over the longer run, however, this barrier should be gradually relaxed. Access to the dynamic Israeli market would spur economic development on the west bank and thus create new employment opportunities for refugees there. And it could lead to a promising pattern of indirect Jordan-Israel trade, with merchants on the west bank serving as middle men.

(c) Trans-Shipment. We should also urge Israel to give the west bank rights of trans-shipment via an Israeli port (Haifa) and airfield (Lydda), so that it can trade with overseas areas, duty-free.

5. Currency.

(a) West Bank. Negotiations with Israel and Jordan are underway, looking to use of both the Jordanian dinar and the Israeli pound as legal currency of the west bank. This would be a good thing, in providing a basis for the pattern of trade relationships outlined above.

(b) Jerusalem. We should continue to urge Israel to treat Jerusalem as part of the west bank for currency purposes.

(c) Foreign Exchange. We should urge Israel to develop some means of sharing any net foreign exchange earnings on the west bank and in Jerusalem with Jordan.

6. Refugees and Development. We should encourage Israel to use occupation of the west bank to mount a stepped up attack on the refugee problem. This will require:

(a) Increased funds for refugee education and re-training. Retrained refugees can usually find jobs elsewhere in the Arab world, even if they can't settle on the west bank. Israel to date has not been willing to contribute to refugee help, except as part of a final refugee settlement. Now is the time for Israel to make a handsome contribution, in an attempt to make a real dent on the west bank refugee problem. The US should be prepared to match such a contribution.

Israel may prefer to make its contribution via some channel other than UNRWA, which Israel feels has a stake in perpetuating the refugee problem. While UNRWA will clearly be needed on the east bank and in Gaza, its phasing down on the west bank might be a good thing.

(b) Extra capital to finance new small scale manufacturing plants, hotels, etc., to exploit the opportunities which may be created on the west bank by access to the Israeli market and expanding tourism.

The US should indicate that it would be willing to match Israeli aid to a temporary west bank Arab development corporation, set up by the local Arab authorities there, to secure and allocate needed external development financing, and manage public development projects, and make arrangements for use of the Israeli free port referred to earlier. We should urge Israel to make a generous contribution.

In the meantime, we should continue US aid to existing development projects on the west bank, if legal complications can be ironed out in ways which do not seem to imply that in giving aid, we are accepting permanent Israeli rule on the west bank.

Retraining and development will have only long-term effect. The immediate need is relief aid. We should urge Israel to help meet this need. To the extent that US relief is not given via UNRWA we should avoid channeling it through GOI agencies to the extent possible. Ad hoc local Arab Relief Committees would be better.

The Israeli should, at some stage, open an office to examine and meet (in cash or Israeli lands) valid individual compensation claims from Arabs who fled Israel in 1948 or the west bank in 1967.

The Israeli should also be urged, within limits imposed by the absorptive capacity of the west bank, to allow Arabs who fled the west bank after the fighting to return. There is no point in simply transferring the refugee problem to the east bank.

In line with this, the Israeli should limit the influx of their own business people (tourist guides, hotel owners, etc.) into the west bank and Old Jerusalem. Business opportunities there should be reserved for the local inhabitants.

III. US Role

7. Need. If the US simply stands aside and lets nature take its course, there is grave danger that a combination of Israel actions and Jordanian reactions will make the west bank a focus for growing conflict, cut off its ties to the east bank, and foreclose the opportunities described above. Trying to influence how the problems and opportunities posed by Israeli occupation of the west bank are met is thus a key requirement for US policy. An effective approach to these problems is necessary to the continued viability of Jordan, and it will have a direct bearing on prospects for achieving a more permanent settlement.

On the other hand, we do not want to appear as the key moving force in working out de facto west bank arrangements. An appearance of US-Israeli collaboration in developing these arrangements could be damaging in the Arab world, especially if the Israeli handled matters in a way which suggested that what they were, in fact, seeking was permanent occupation of the west bank. Utmost care will

be needed to avoid this appearance of collaboration, in both our public posture and our private talks with the parties concerned.

8. Public Posture. The US should take the public position that it considers the disposition of the west bank and Old Jerusalem as matters to be decided in the framework of an eventual Israel-Jordan settlement based on the principle of territorial integrity - with the clear implication that we favor eventual return of the west bank to Jordan, if Jordan will agree to an end of belligerency.

9. Private Discussion with Israel. In early, private, and candid US-Israeli discussion of the future of the west bank, we should urge the Israeli to the program outlined under I and II, above.

10. Private Discussions with Jordan. Similarly, we should indicate to the King:

(a) that we favor return of the west bank to Jordan, within the context of a wider settlement;

(b) that we hope he will not obstruct, in the absence of such a settlement, de facto economic arrangements that may be needed to maintain the viability of the west bank, keep up its ties with the east bank, and help the refugees.

NOTE: It may be easier for Jordan not to obstruct these arrangements if it appears that Israel undertook them reluctantly, under pressure from the international community. Positive Jordanian cooperation is not needed - only that Jordan refrain from active obstruction and from urging west bank inhabitants to active obstruction. Jordan could well continue to denounce Israeli occupation of the west bank, but indicate that, since Jordan could do nothing about this, it was concentrating on keeping up its ties with the east bank, in order to keep open the door for eventual return of the west bank.

11. Conclusion. As the euphoria engendered in the US by rapid Israeli victories dissipates, the public and the Congress will become increasingly disenchanted with

continuing and intensifying bickering in the Middle East. The oncoming election won't help matters.

In this circumstance, it would be helpful if there is progress, in at least one region, toward normalizing Arab-Israeli relations and improving the lot of the refugees. The course outlined above may hold some hope of achieving such progress on the west bank, even before a basic Israeli-Jordan settlement becomes feasible.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-271
By is, NARA Date 12-10-99

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9-M

June 26, 1967

KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, JUNE 28, 1967

Background Paper

The International Status of Jerusalem

Background: In 1949 the UN General Assembly, led by the traditional Catholic countries, adopted a resolution which provided that Jerusalem should be placed under a "permanent international regime... administered by the UN". We and the British voted against the 1949 resolution on the grounds that it was impractical; and we would evidently have been glad to settle for some kind of "functional" as opposed to "territorial" internationalization, i.e., an international arrangement merely to insure protection of and access to the Holy Places. However, since then we have considered ourselves bound by this resolution, and have refused to recognize de jure Israeli or Jordanian sovereignty over the parts of the city that they respectively occupied.

Past Precedents: The emphasis on administration of matters concerning the Holy Places up till now has been on the "status quo". The Turkish and later British administrators of the city found that any change in the status quo could produce such a violent international storm (such as the Crimean War) that they made every effort to enforce rigorous adherence to the letter of the status quo (which has often been quite difficult to document).

Recent Status : The truce line of 1949 left the great bulk of the Holy Places on the Jordanian side (the "Old City"). Since then there have been few major controversies concerning them except for the denial of access to Israelis and most Jewish tourists. The Jordanian governors have in general adhered scrupulously to the status quo with this important and regrettable exception.

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Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

The Present Problem: Regardless of who administers the Old City, he will have to face the problem of inextricable locations of the Holy Places of three faiths. For example, the Muslim Haraam al-Sharif is placed almost vertically on top of the Jewish Wailing Wall. The rights claimed by various nations and faiths, particularly Jewish and Muslim, continue to arouse intense passion. (King Hussein's grandfather Abdullah considered Jerusalem the pearl of his kingdom, and the Muslims in general consider Jerusalem one of the three holiest cities in the Muslim world).

Prospects for the Immediate Future: The confrontation of the international community with Israel over its holding of the Old City of Jerusalem in particular will be one of the most bitterly contested in the forthcoming attempt at a settlement. The Vatican has already publicly reasserted its position that all of Jerusalem should be placed under an international regime as a separate territory. Privately the Vatican has informed us that such a "corpus separatum" should be established "at least in the Old City". This position is bound to have an effect on the position taken in the UN by the traditionally Catholic powers, in particular France which has maintained an historic vital interest in the status of Christendom in Jerusalem. The British have already demanded that the Israelis give up the Old City. King Hussein received a very sympathetic hearing on this question when he addressed the General Assembly on June 26.

The feasibility of various plans now being proposed for the status of the Old City of Jerusalem will depend upon the degree to which the Israelis evacuate the West Bank. Obviously it would be next to impossible to attempt to maintain an "international" enclave in the midst of Israeli-held territory against the wishes of a powerful and victorious Israeli Army. (Furthermore, we cannot give serious consideration to proposals to continue to attempt to persuade the Israelis to submit their "New City" portion of Jerusalem, which they have held since 1948, to internationalization.) If, however, the Israelis evacuate the West Bank they will still be determined to hold on to all of Jerusalem, particularly because of the Wailing Wall.

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We have indications that King Hussein, if he got the Old City back, would be willing to permit access to the Old City to all faiths, including Jewish. Although the return of the Old City to Jordan under these circumstances would be the most desirable from the US point of view, the Israelis are unlikely to settle for this. In that event, one of the most feasible compromises might still be territorial internationalization of the Old City and its immediate environs such as the Mount of Olives, with equal access by all faiths administered by a UN High Commissioner and an equitable distribution of the all-important tourist revenues. However, the problems of any such administration will be so great that its constitution should be worked out with the greatest possible degree of consent by both Israel and Jordan.

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NEA/ARN/LLKinsolving:sdj
6/26/67

Clearance:

NEA/ARN - R.B. Houghton ^{new}
NEA/IAI - A.L. Atherton ^{new}
IO/UNP - S.C. Campbell ^{new}
NEA - R.P. Davies ^{new}

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON10~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Appointment with King Hassan's Emissary

You agreed last week to receive Moroccan King Hassan's personal emissary, Foreign Minister Ahmed Laraki. Secretary Katzenbach recommends you see him between Friday and Monday, 30 June to 3 July.

There is no need to schedule more than a 30-45 minute office visit. He brings a message from Hassan and may want to describe the threat to Morocco from the continuing buildup of Soviet arms in Algeria.

You last saw Laraki in mid-March when he left his post as Ambassador here to become Foreign Minister.

W. Rostow
W. Rostow

Friday, 30 June _____

Monday, 3 July _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *gw*, NARA, Date *9-18-98*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Rec'd
6-26-67
1245P

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Announcing King Hussein's Visit

With King Hussein coming here Wednesday for lunch, we have to decide when to announce his visit. The main issue is how you want your announcement to relate to his UN speech, probably at 3:30 p. m. today. He may have to say some things that we won't necessarily like. Mac Bundy thinks that, for that reason, it might be better for us to announce tomorrow so both speech and announcement won't end up in the same papers. But you may want to squelch press speculation by announcing sooner. I see three choices:

1. Get it out by special White House announcement early this afternoon, so the invitation will be on the record before Hussein speaks.
2. Announce at George's 4:00 p. m. press briefing this afternoon.
3. Wait until George's 11:00 a. m. session tomorrow.
4. You could do it yourself if you have a press conference.

I would suggest a very simple announcement here with advance notice to Hussein on timing: "King Hussein of Jordan will visit Washington for an exchange of views with the President on Wednesday, June 28. Details are being arranged."

W. W. Rostow

Announce immediately _____
 At 4:00 p. m. today _____
 I'll do it _____
 At 11:00 a. m. tomorrow _____

Text OK _____
 See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
 NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
 By *ju*, NARA, Date *8-16-99*

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George Christian notified 6/27
George Saunders 6/26
copy sent 6/26

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SMITH

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DE WTE 1243

SENT
WHCA

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO JIM JONES FOR THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAPS7577

1967 JUN 24 15 45

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUNE 24, 1967

THE PRESIDENT AGREED LAST WEEK TO SEE JORDAN'S KING
HUSSEIN AFTER HUSSEIN SPEAKS AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
26 JUNE.

SECRETARY KATZENBACH RECOMMENDS THAT THE PRESIDENT
SEE HIM EITHER WEDNESDAY OR THURSDAY, 28 OR 29 JUNE, AND
THAT THE PRESIDENT CONSIDER HAVING A VERY SMALL--SAY JUST
THE TUESDAY LUNCH MEMBERS--WORKING LUNCHEON FOR HIM.

IF WE COULD SET A TIME TODAY, WE WOULD SETTLE THE DETAILS
WITH HUSSEIN IN NEW YORK TOMORROW. HE ARRIVES THERE
TONIGHT AND WILL SPEND SUNDAY WITH HIS STAFF.

DTG 241508Z JUN 67

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DW NARA, Date 11-25-9