

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

173

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 memo	Saunders to Rostow <i>open 11-25-91</i> S 1 p.	11/8/67	A
#2a memcon	American-Jordan Talks on Middle East Situation S 8 pp. <i>open 4-13-00 NLS 99-268</i>	11/6/67	A
#3 memo	Rostow to the President <i>open 9-14-99</i> S 1 p.	11/8/67	A
#4 memo	Saunders to Rostow <i>Sanitized 7/10/01 NSF File 95-168</i> S 2 pp. <i>Sanitized S. 2604 NW 03-203</i>	11/8/67	A
#5a memo	Rusk to the President <i>open 4-13-00 NLS 99-268</i> S 2 pp.	11/7/67	A
#5b	duplicate of #5a <i>open 4-13-00 NLS 99-268</i>		
#6 memo	Rusk to the President <i>open 9-14-99</i> S 2 pp.	11/8/67	A
#7a memo <i>Same Sanitization 1-5-04 NW 03-203</i>	John P. Walsh Memo for the Record S 2 pp. <i>Sanitized 4-13-00 NLS 99-268</i> <i>Edy. #39, NSF Files of Saunders, "Visit of King Hussein" Box 3}</i>	11/6/67	A
#8 memo	Saunders to Rostow <i>open 9-14-99</i> S 1 p.	11/6/67	A
#8a memo	Battle to Sec. State <i>open 9-14-99</i> S 1 p.	11/5/67	A
#8b report	Talking Points <i>open 4-13-00 NLS 99-268</i> S 6 pp.	11/5/67	A
#9	duplicate of #8a <i>open 9-14-99</i>		
#9a	duplicate of #8b <i>open 4-13-00 NLS 99-268</i>		
#10 memo	Rostow to the President <i>open 9-14-99</i> C 1 p.	10/31/67	A
#12 memo	Saunders to Rostow <i>open 9-14-99</i> C 1 p.	10/31/67	A
#13 memo	Rostow to the President <i>open 9-14-99</i> C 1 p.	10/26/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Country File, "Jordan, Informal Working Visit of Hussein, 11/6-9/67," Box 148

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

2073

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#14 memo	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>exempt 1-8-04 NLJ 03204</i></p> <p>to Katzenbach, Battle, Hughes and Rostow S 3 pp. Exempt 6-17-01 NLJ/NLJ 99-199</p>	undated	A
#15 memo	<p>Katzenbach to the President <i>open 9-14-99</i> C 1 p.</p>	10/25/67	A
#15a	<p>duplicate of #15 <i>open 9-14-99</i></p>		
#17 cable	<p>Beirut 3678 <i>open 4-13-00 NLJ 99-268</i> C 4 pp.</p>	11/2/67	A
#18 cable	<p>Amman 2015 <i>open 9-14-99</i> C 2 pp.</p>	10/26/67	A
#19 cable	<p>Amman 1918 <i>open 9-14-99</i> C 2 pp.</p>	10/18/67	A
#20 cable	<p>Amman 1917 <i>open 4-13-00 NLJ 99-268</i> S 4 pp.</p>	10/17/67	A
#21 cable	<p>Amman 1834 <i>open 9-14-99</i> C 2 pp.</p>	10/11/67	A
#22 cable	<p>Deptel 55227 to Amman <i>open 9-14-99</i> C 1 p.</p>	10/17/67	A
#23 cable	<p>Amman 2401 <i>open 9-14-99</i> C 2 pp.</p>	11/27/67	A
#27	<p>duplicate of #8b <i>open 4-13-00 NLJ 99-268</i></p>		
#30 report	<p>Consultations on a UN Resolution S 3 pp. <i>open 4-13-00 NLJ 99-268</i></p>	undated	A
#32 report	<p>Jerusalem <i>open 4-13-00 NLJ 99-268</i> C 2 pp.</p>	undated	A
#34 report	<p>Refugees <i>open 4-13-00 NLJ 99-268</i> C 2 pp.</p>	undated	A
#36 report	<p>King Hussein's Attitude <i>open 4-13-00 NLJ 99-268</i> S 3 pp.</p>	undated	A

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NSF, Country File, "Jordan, Informal Working Visit of Hussein, 11/6-9/67," Box 148

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

383

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#38 report	Military Assistance and Sales <i>open 4/9/02 NLJ/RAC 99-200</i> S 3 pp.	undated	A
#40 report	Jordan Potash Project <i>open 9-14-99</i> C 1 p.	undated	A
#42 report	re Jerusalem Airport <i>open 9-14-99</i> C 2 pp.	undated	A
#44 report	Jordan's Economic Situation <i>open 9-14-99</i> C 2 pp.	undated	A
#46 report	US Economic Assistance <i>open 9-14-99</i> C 1 p.	undated	A
#49 report	Biographic Sketch <i>open 4-13-00 NLJ 99-268</i> C 1 p.	undated	A
#51 report	Biographic Sketch <i>open 4-13-00 NLJ 99-268</i> S 2 pp.	undated	A
#53 report	Biographic Sketch <i>open 4-13-00 NLJ 99-268</i> S 2 pp.	undated	A
#55 report	Biographic Sketch <i>open 4-13-00 NLJ 99-268</i> S 1 p.	undated	A
#57 report	Biographic Sketch <i>open 9-14-99</i> S 1 p.	undated	A

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NSF, Country File, "Jordan, Informal Working Visit of Hussein, 11/6-9/67," Box 148

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1

Memos & Misc.

DECLASSIFIED

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

November 8, 1967

WWR:

The attached record of the Rusk-Hussein conversation Monday arrived after you had gone up to lunch.

I don't think it's essential that it go to the President. It is general luncheon conversation and does not cover the real issue of our support, which the Secretary covered in his half hour alone with the King. We've already told the President about that in our memo, and the Secretary will have covered the necessary points at lunch.

However, you will want the flavor of this yourself.

Hal Saunders

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 26, 1982

By *Dut* NARA, Date 11-25-91

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

8

Parsons
*2a*Approved in S
11/7/67Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 6, 1967

SUBJECT: American-Jordan Talks on Middle East Situation

19153

PARTICIPANTS: His Majesty King Hussein of Jordan
His Excellency Abdul Hamid Sharaf, Ambassador of Jordan
His Excellency Zayd Rifa'i, Chief of Royal CabinetThe Secretary
The Under Secretary
NEA - Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary
IO - Mr. Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary
NEA/ARN - Harrison M. Symmes, Ambassador to JordanCOPIES TO: S/S NEA
G S
WH U
USUN M
IO**DECLASSIFIED**
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-268
By , NARA Date 4-3-00

1. Refugees. The Secretary asked the King about the "new refugees" -- who they are and what is needed for them. The Secretary wondered if the matter needed more attention than it had been given. The King replied in a general way, stating that there were about 200,000 refugees altogether on the East Bank, some living in the cities with members of their families and others in camps. Only a few had been able to return to Israel. UNRWA, of course, was the main institution dealing with them, but others are helping. Mr. Rifa'i provided more detailed figures, stating that 120,000 of these refugees had filled out forms in the hope of returning to the West Bank. Only about 14,000 had been allowed to return. Others who had wanted to go and whose return had been approved did not in fact return because it would have meant splitting up their families. Rifa'i explained that the Government of Israel had approved return on the basis of individual rather than family applications. Thus 9,000 others whose return had been approved were unwilling to go back because it would have meant leaving their families. Rifa'i asserted also that the Israelis had approved the return of villagers but had not approved the return of refugees who formerly had been in camps, apparently because they wished to keep the camps for refugees from Gaza. Ambassador Sharaf commented that the Israelis also have not approved the return of anyone from Jerusalem.

NEA/ARN:HMSymmes/pw/mlc
(Drafting Office and Officer)FORM DS-1254
2-65~~SECRET~~EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION
GROUP 3Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

The Secretary asked the King if additional assistance needed for these refugees would be looked upon as implying approval of their status as new refugees and thus misinterpreted. The King and Rifa'i both stated that help would be needed. Rifa'i went on to say that any relief assistance would be welcomed, but what is really needed is to get them home. Meanwhile they must be kept alive. In response to the Secretary's question, Mr. Battle and others stated that UNICEF is not active in assisting the refugees at this time but that CARE and NEED, Inc., and certain other groups have been very active recently.

The Secretary asked if the GOJ has a central office to deal with refugee problems. The King indicated there is such an office, and Mr. Rifa'i commented that there is in addition to Government ministries dealing with refugee problems a Ministerial Committee for Refugees.

In further discussion, Mr. Battle commented that the US Government has been reluctant to take steps that might be misinterpreted as attempts to liquidate the refugee problem. NEED, Inc. has shared our concern about this. Mr. Battle wondered if the USG had been too sensitive in this regard or whether it would be feasible to try to proceed to long-term development activities instead of merely dealing with relief. The Secretary also asked whether outside attempts to deal with this problem on a long-term humanitarian basis might be misinterpreted. Again the King did not respond specifically but mentioned that the problem has its immediate aspects which must be dealt with and that the longer-term aspects could be dealt with as part of an overall solution. In any case, the King said, the problem must be dealt with. Mr. Rifa'i noted that much would depend upon the nature of assistance given.

The Secretary turned to Mr. Battle and said that he thought the problem of the new refugees should be looked at on an urgent basis and that he wanted the results of this new look at the problem to be available within the next couple of days. The Secretary then raised the question of "old refugees" and asked whether the King thought it would be possible for the UNRWA Commissioner General to seek authority from the UN to ask the refugees privately about their choice as to compensation or repatriation. The King said that he thought this might be all right in terms of a general solution. Mr. Rifa'i said that in both cases it is important to recognize that the Government of Israel would be involved; that is, both as to compensation or repatriation. The Secretary emphasized that he was speaking about private choice on the part of the refugees and not about a general political determination. He explained that he thought we could begin by asking ten refugees and then 100 and then 1,000 about their own private choices. As he saw it, the important thing was to keep Shuqayri

and others out of the matter so that a mass emotional political decision could be avoided. Ambassador Sharaf noted that if the occupied territory of the West Bank was returned to Jordan the new refugees would not be a big problem, since they could then return to their previous abodes. Then after withdrawal of the Israelis and, hopefully, a settlement on Near East problems, the matter of a longer-term solution of the old refugee problem could be faced.

The Secretary commented that we do not know the Israeli Government's attitude toward repatriation. One reason was because the refugees had never been asked to indicate whether they would wish repatriation. The Secretary said he believed that if given a chance to express themselves privately most refugees would not wish to be repatriated to Israel. The King endorsed the Secretary's view and said he thought most refugees would wish resettlement, but that the matter was becoming more and more complicated as the refugees produced sons and grandsons. The King also volunteered that transit of the Suez Canal is not tied to a complete solution of the refugee problem, but that a beginning of a solution to the refugee problem would be required.

2. Hussein's Talks With de Gaulle. The Secretary remarked to the King that we receive very little information from President de Gaulle or from his ministers.

He wondered how the King had found his visit to President de Gaulle. King Hussein responded that he had found President de Gaulle sympathetic and understanding, that President de Gaulle had commented that he hoped the United States would come around to more reasonable views about some of the world problems.

3. U. S. Arms Policy in the Area. The Secretary said that a major problem on which we had made little progress with the Soviet Union was the problem of arms restraint in the area. It is a three-cornered problem. The Soviets had supplied arms to certain Arab countries. This supply of Soviet arms had caused problems for certain other Arab countries which had then turned to the West, and this had caused a chain reaction that induced Israel to seek additional arms. The Secretary said we had tried to make clear to the Soviets we were not trying to freeze the June 10 situation, but rather to find ways to prevent a resumption of the arms rivalry. We had found no Soviet interest in finding ways to restrain this rivalry, which was very disappointing to us. Restraint in arms build-ups was one of the President's five points, and we were sorry there has been no progress in this field.

In responding, King Hussein said that the difficulty as far as the Arabs were concerned was the understanding of the word "balance". What is balance? There had not been a balance before June 5 and when the June war came there was no balance. In 14 months (from last June) there might have been a balance. (It was not clear what the King meant to imply by his statements at this point.) The King went on to say that Jordan is not worried only about the conventional arms situation, but also about reports that in one year Israel will have atomic weapons. There are a lot of problems in regard to arms. Some of the equipment Jordan had been receiving had been supplied with conditions as to how it would be employed. Jordan also had had binding arrangements with the Arab League. It was easy to ask why Jordan had fought in June, but the situation leading up to June had placed great pressure on Jordan and the Samu¹ raid had forced Jordan to reconsider its whole policy. (The Secretary interjected that Jordan surely knew the United States attitude with regard to the Samu¹ raid.) King Hussein said it was clear Jordan needed to participate in a collective response to Israeli threats. He went on to say that small countries also had the problem of having to rely on definite and continuous sources of supply. Jordan was now faced with a problem of arms requirements that it had not been able to satisfy. Meanwhile, it was forced to keep the Iraqi Army in Jordan to help defend itself. Jordan must have arms from somewhere and must have a source of supply that would have the quality of continuity. The Secretary responded that he hoped the King could understand our position in regard to arms supply. Our aim has been to avoid an all-inclusive legislative prohibition to supply arms. The Secretary said he could not exaggerate the effect of the India-Pakistan war in this respect. Many of our legislators had been upset that American arms were being used by both sides. These Congressional attitudes persisted, and therefore we had to move carefully. The Secretary emphasized, however, that he could be categorical with regard to the subject of nuclear weapons. "On this subject we are as old as Methuselah. We do not play games. It would be disastrous for nuclear weapons to be introduced into the Middle East." The King could leave it to us because we are very serious on this matter which we regard as fundamental.

Mr. Rifa¹i said Jordan could understand the difficulties about arms supply as explained by the Secretary. What Jordan could not understand is why the United States felt it now had to give Israel arms and refuse them to Jordan, which is an old ally. The people in the Near East are particularly sensitive with regard to the supply of aircraft to Israel. Under Secretary Katzenbach noted that our failure to have done something for the Government

of Israel and other Arab countries would have made the situation even more difficult. In this part of the discussion King Hussein said he is not against arms control in the context of an overall solution to Middle Eastern problems. Ambassador Sharaf commented that Jordan also has its public opinion. The decision to supply arms to Israel had been made in the context of the public hardening of Israel's position toward the results of the June war. This had been a shock to the Arab world, and it was this as much as anything that led the Arabs to insist at the UN upon unconditional withdrawal by the Israelis. In the context of the whole situation at the UN and the Israeli public position, the supply of arms to Israel by the US could only be regarded as shocking. The Secretary said he understood Arab feeling about this, but there are many other elements to be considered. The possibilities for settlement in the Middle East are much greater if the big powers are not involved militarily. Yet we cannot take non-involvement of the big powers for granted. We do not know what is in the mind of Moscow, yet we believe it is not in the interests of the United States or the Arabs for the big powers to become involved militarily. Meanwhile, the Soviets have made a massive resupply of arms to certain Arab countries. We cannot be sure that they have changed their position that Israeli withdrawal to pre-June 5 conditions must take place before all else is discussed. We are not certain about the Soviet attitude on military intervention.

4. US/UAR Relations. The Secretary remarked that the United States has never had any problems with the UAR so long as the UAR was looking after its own national interests. What had complicated our relations was UAR foreign adventures at the expense of its neighbors. We had never asked for or expected praise or thanks for our assistance, but had only wanted it used for the national interests of the country to which it was given. The Secretary commented that leaders who neglect their own people seem to get into trouble. He called the names of Ben Bella, Nkrumah, Sukarno and said maybe there are others. As far as the United States is concerned, the Secretary said that we have two requirements for good relations with the UAR. The first is that the UAR have good relations with its neighbors, and the second is that the UAR be silent about us if it could not be friendly toward us. The Secretary commented that President Johnson had never responded to attacks by foreign leaders and had not initiated any attacks on other leaders. There was further discussion of how private statements of Arab leaders could be reconciled with their public actions. Ambassador Sharaf stressed that there is also a difference between Arab words and Israeli actions, which is unfair to the Arabs. Mr. Battle

commented that fair or not, Arab words give the Israelis a superb propaganda justification. The Secretary commented on the change in Arab attitudes since the Khartoum Conference. Before the Khartoum Conference it had seemed that the Arabs felt obliged always to agree with the most extreme Arab voice such as voices from Syria or Algeria or Mr. Shuqayri. Since Khartoum it seemed there was a new air of moderation. King Hussein agreed with this assessment, but emphasized that there are still Arabs who do not agree with this approach. Thus time is of the essence. Palestine is still at the root of our troubles and we must solve that problem.

5. Jordan's Economic Situation. The Secretary referred to the encouraging way Jordan had dealt with its economic development in the past few years and asked how the King now sees the economic situation. The King said that the economy had been paralyzed as a result of the war and that there were serious economic dislocations because of the occupation of the West Bank. The King and Mr. Rifa'i noted that most Jordanian exports are from the West Bank, about 45 per cent of the agriculture and 80 per cent of the industry of the country are on the West Bank. Jordan has not only lost the positive benefits of its income from these sources, but the Government at the same time must continue paying Government salaries to Jordanians remaining on the West Bank. Ambassador Sharaf noted that under Jordan's development plan tourism was an important element and would become increasingly important. In the development of tourism the Government relied heavily on Jerusalem. Thus Jerusalem has a political, cultural, emotional and very important economic importance for Jordan.

6. Situation in Syria. The Secretary said that the situation in Syria seemed to be very fragile and the King agreed, saying that when he was in Moscow he had found the Soviets quite disenchanted with Syria.

7. Arab Attitude Towards Jews. In a discussion of Arab attitudes towards Jews, Mr. Rifa'i explained that it is important to remember there are Arab Jews and that the word "Arab" applied to an ethnic distinction while "Jew" was a religious distinction. There had been Arab Jews and all Arabs had lived together peacefully until Zionism had intruded in the area. Ambassador Sharaf stressed that it was the migration of Eastern European Jews to Palestine that had accentuated the problem. One had to bear in mind the piecemeal invasion of the Zionists over the past forty years to understand the desperation of the Jordanians in the circumstances leading up to the June war.

8. UN Resolution on Arab-Israel Crisis. The Secretary, in commenting on the

broader problem of a UN resolution, said he is not pessimistic. He hoped that we could get started along present lines. Mr. Sisco told the King that Ambassador Goldberg and the US Delegation had been very impressed by their talks with His Majesty over the weekend. The longer we waited to adopt a Security Council resolution, the more difficult the problem would be. It is important to get a UN representative into the area promptly. Once this was done, as Ambassador Goldberg had noted, the US could play a strong supporting role in trying to achieve a reasonable, peaceful settlement. The Secretary remarked that President Kennedy had once said, "if you have a fight, do not fight about nothing, fight about something." We are now making some headway. We see the shape of a possible solution and we are prepared to use our muscle in supporting a permanent solution that corresponded to the sober, reflective judgment of responsible leaders in the area.

Mr. Sisco commented on the freedom of action the Khartoum Conference appeared to have given King Hussein and President Nasser. He said, speaking candidly we see limitations on this freedom of action as it manifests itself at the UN in New York. In recent days we have wondered if the Arab group en masse has not been making decisions in New York rather than the individual countries. We believe it important that Jordan play a decisive role, that Jordan and the UAR make individual decisions rather than a mass Arab decision which gives extreme elements a veto. King Hussein responded that at Khartoum he and President Nasser had been given a chance to try for a political solution. Mr. Rifa'i explained that at Khartoum no definition of a political solution had been decided. It had been left to King Hussein and President Nasser to decide. The other Arabs were to go along with what King Hussein and President Nasser could work out. Mr. Sisco said that this is a crucial point. An earlier draft resolution in July which seemed to be acceptable to Jordan and the UAR had been killed by certain other Arabs. It was therefore important that the countries primarily concerned should make up their minds, make the decisions, and not worry about a group psychology. We therefore hoped Jordan could have a dominant voice. Mr. Rifa'i said the King had always appreciated this fact. He had called for a summit conference as early as June 9. Hopefully, agreement could now be reached on an acceptable resolution. Mr. Sisco said he wanted to stress again that he thought the resolution discussed with the King over the weekend was crucial. If King Hussein and President Nasser are on board with this resolution, everything would be all right. The King responded that the only

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difficulty had been the matter of withdrawal and how it should be defined. The question of withdrawal requires clarification. Jordan could accept statements with regard to withdrawal, but what was important was the meaning of those statements. Jordan needed a commitment as to their meaning. It was important to understand beforehand what was meant by withdrawal. Ambassador Sharaf commented further that Jordan would need to know in its bilateral negotiations with the United States how the United States stood with regard to matters such as withdrawal. Moreover, there is Arab public opinion to be kept in mind. "We Arabs are verbally minded people." The Secretary remarked that the key question of reciprocity does not involve the United States. The United States had not closed Tiran and if Tiran had not been closed there would have been no June war. The United States would certainly work to support any settlement that had prospects of success, but the United States is not in complete control and our answers alone cannot settle the problem. Neither the Arabs nor the Israelis will take our answer as final. His Majesty knows where we stand and what we would like to bring about.

Mr. Sisco summarized the situation at the UN by saying that the US delegation had been much impressed with what had been discussed with His Majesty over the weekend, consultations are continuing, Ambassador Goldberg is discussing the draft that had been discussed with the King with other key delegations and in the next day or two we should know whether there is a reasonable chance of success. While Israel was not yet signed on, the draft, if adopted, could be a good starting point for discussion among the parties with UN help. The positive views of Jordan and the UAR would of course be crucial.

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Wednesday, Nov. 8, 1967
4:15 p. m.

3

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Talking Points for King Hussein, 5:30 p. m.

Here is the file of background material for your talk with Hussein, including (Tab A) the cable from Arthur Goldberg that Secretary Rusk mentioned at lunch.

In brief, we recommend you make these points:

1. Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Goldberg have told you in detail of their conversations with His Majesty.
2. You wish to reaffirm what they have told him: We are prepared to make a maximum diplomatic and political effort to obtain for Jordan the best possible deal in a settlement with Israel. (The exact language Secretary Rusk used is at Tab B)
3. Our ability to make good on this reassurance will depend on what kind of arrangement comes out of the UN. We need a resolution that both sides will work with. Anything else would be no more than a hollow tactical victory.
4. We hope His Majesty can persuade his Arab colleagues to accept a workable resolution. (We do not think the Indian draft is workable. We think ours is.)
5. Time is not on the side of peace. What we can do today we may not be able to do 2 or 3 months from now.

If he asks about military aid, you might explain your tough problem in bringing Congress along. You have to say honestly that we can't resume military shipments now, but you hope the situation will improve if there's some movement toward a settlement. Meanwhile, you hope he'll be able to buy what he needs in Western Europe. His turning to Moscow at this stage of the game would just kill chances of progress toward a settlement and make it very hard for us to help.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 8-16-99

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

November 8, 1967

SUBJECT: Latest from King Hussein--Noon



3.3
(b)(1)

King Hussein's party here did not know in advance about the UAR's call for a UN Security Council meeting and was not consulted.

From subsequent calls to New York, the King explains what happened there this way:

1. The Jordanian representative tried to dissuade UAR Foreign Minister Riad from going ahead. He argued that the Indian resolution does not have US support and that any resolution without US support won't advance a solution. Hussein had told the US he would stand back and let the US try to pass its resolution. He urged Riad to do the same.

2. Riad's answer covered these points:

a. Riad has been negotiating in New York "for 50 days" and just doesn't feel the Arabs should give any more. He feels the US has been negative.

b. After a lot of work with friendly countries, they now have a resolution which they think will pass. Now that the Arabs' friends have invested so much, he can't tell them at the eleventh hour to stand down.

c. He doesn't see how the US can avoid accepting the Indian resolution if it passes--and he thinks it will. The Indian draft consists mainly of language that the US has supported in previous drafts.

The Jordanians don't know how to answer Riad and haven't been able to persuade him that the US won't accept the Indian resolution. King Hussein wants a resolution that will work and accepts the US draft. Hussein has told his representative in New York that he and Riad are responsible for getting a resolution that will work. He says

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 03-203
By ms, NARA, Date 5.20.04

his representative will work on Riad but asks that, if we have any way to get to Riad or even to Nasser, we do so. He also asks that, if we could make any changes in the wording of our resolution to help the Arabs buy it, we do so.

3.3
(b)(1)

[REDACTED] does not see the UAR move in New York as a spoiler to undercut Hussein. He sees it as a move made out of Riad's honest conviction that going into the Security Council now offers the best chance of Arab success. Hussein has not been completely cut off by the UAR's move because his delegation has carefully protected him by making clear that the King had not agreed to support the US resolution but simply to stand back and let it go.

3.3
(b)(1)

[REDACTED] the report does make apparent that Hussein himself, though surprised, does not openly regard yesterday's UAR move as treacherous.

Luke Battle is aware of this report and is talking to Joe Sisco in New York about our next move.

Harold H. Saunders

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

4278

November 8, 1967

19259

5

TO: Mr. Bromley Smith
The White House

Attached herewith is a copy of a memorandum, concerning King Hussein's visit, presented today to the President by the Secretary.

John P. Walsh

John P. Walsh
Deputy Executive Secretary

NOV 8 1967
RECEIVED

4378

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

10259

November 8, 1967

2
1

TO: Mr. Bromley Smith
The White House

Attached herewith is a copy of
a memorandum, concerning King Hussein's
visit, presented today to the President
by the Secretary.

John F. Walsh

John F. Walsh
Deputy Executive Secretary

RECEIVED
BOSTON'S OFFICE

NOV 8 PM 6 33

4278
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19259

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-268
By is, NARA Date 4-3-00

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Present Status of King
Hussein's Visit

You will have seen a detailed memorandum of my conversation with King Hussein at lunch yesterday. I met privately with him for a half hour preceding that luncheon and, among other things, referred to his conversations with Ambassador Goldberg in New York. I intended to incorporate the statements made by Ambassador Goldberg to him and by reference to indicate my approval of Ambassador Goldberg's statements.

Following the luncheon, a member of the King's party inquired as to whether I had specifically meant to include a reference to the statements made by Ambassador Goldberg with respect to territorial integrity. I authorized a U.S. official to confirm to the King that I had by reference incorporated Ambassador Goldberg's assurances in my comments.

The net effect of this incorporation is to state that the United States as a matter of policy does not envisage a Jordan which consists only of the East Bank. The United States is prepared to support the return of a substantial part of the West Bank to Jordan with boundary adjustments. However, the United States would use its influence to obtain compensation to Jordan for any territory it is required to give up.

For example, if Jordan is required to give up the Latrun salient, the United States will use its diplomatic and political influence to obtain in compensation access for Jordan to a Mediterranean port in Israel. Finally, although as a matter of policy we do not agree with either Jordan's

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading
and declassification.

or Israel's position on Jerusalem, we are prepared to use our diplomatic and political influence to obtain for Jordan a role in Jerusalem. In short, we are prepared to make a maximum diplomatic and political effort to obtain for Jordan the best possible deal in terms of settlement with Israel.

The foregoing was conveyed to the King with a clear statement that we cannot guarantee that everything will be returned to Jordan since, of course, we cannot speak for Israel.

King Hussein's visit has so far gone quite well. During his visit, King Hussein will have made a number of public appearances in addition to meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House. He appeared on the TV program "Face the Nation" on November 5. He also has delivered an address at Georgetown University and at the National Press Club.

The major theme of the King's public statements is the need for a permanent understanding between Israel and its Arab neighbors. In what he described as the "new and positive approach of the Arabs towards a lasting peace in the Middle East", he has stressed the willingness of the Arab world to consider a political approach to the Arab-Israel question.

Specifically, he has called on Israel to state what it proposes to do with respect to Arab lands it has occupied, Arab refugees it has displaced, and the future of the Old City of Jerusalem. He has stressed the Arab desire for peace and has pointed out that Israel has a choice of either living with the Arabs peacefully or of remaining an isolated outpost in the Arab world.

A separate memorandum is being submitted with respect to the current situation at the United Nations.

Dean Rusk

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

B 4278

file
(signature)

5-b

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-268

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

By *id*, NARA Date 4-3-00

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Present Status of King
Hussein's Visit

You will have seen a detailed memorandum of my conversation with King Hussein at lunch yesterday. I met privately with him for a half hour preceding that luncheon and, among other things, referred to his conversations with Ambassador Goldberg in New York. I intended to incorporate the statements made by Ambassador Goldberg to him and by reference to indicate my approval of Ambassador Goldberg's statements.

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~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

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and declassification.

PRESERVATION COPY

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Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By JW; NARA, Date 8-16-99

Rec'd 11/8/67
(cy sent Saunders)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Discussion with King Hussein

The following supplementary talking points for possible use with King Hussein have been prepared in light of developments today at the United Nations.

1. We were pleased that His Majesty had encouraged us in taking an initiative in the Security Council.

2. As His Majesty knows, time is not on the side of peace and we are very anxious for a United Nations representative to be appointed promptly so that the United States can give full support politically and diplomatically to his efforts in working out a reasonable settlement in the area.

3. We wish to assure His Majesty that the United States will help to work out a possible peace settlement.

4. It would be most helpful if His Majesty could take steps to assure full support of Jordan and do what he can with Egypt to assure acceptance of the United States resolution. This resolution goes as far as we can go with reasonable prospects of Israel's willingness to cooperate with the United Nations representative.

5. We must not lose this opportunity by inconsequential word exercises at the United Nations that are causing unfortunate delays in getting the United Nations representative out to the area.

6. The longer the occupation continues the more difficult it will be to achieve the kind of a settlement that will protect the territorial integrity and political independence of a Jordan in secure and agreed boundaries.

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not automatically declassified.

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I know the Secretary and Ambassador Goldberg have had detailed discussions with His Majesty and have indicated our views more precisely how we see things shaping up. We have no blueprint, we cannot guarantee the result: Israel is not our puppet. His Majesty can be assured, however, that we will do everything possible politically and diplomatically to be helpful. But in order for us to be helpful we must have the United States text adopted promptly. The United States text gives His Majesty what he needs and wants -- a United Nations umbrella under which to pursue discussions.

What is available today may not be available a month or two or three months from now and it is very important therefore that this opportunity not be lost.

We hope, therefore, His Majesty will do everything he can to win prompt acceptance among the Arab delegations and particularly the United Arab Republic to accept or acquiesce in the United States text.

Dean Rusk

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CLASSIFICATION
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

11/7/67
Date

Rostow

FOR: Mr. Walt W. Rostow
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

For your information and files.

Cy sent Rostow

Enclosures:

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CLASSIFICATION

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY ju ON 11-18-91

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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November 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

4

Subject: Hussein Visit and Security Council
Situation

Messrs. Katzenbach, Battle, Sisco and Walsh met with the Secretary at 4:15 p.m. to discuss the Hussein visit and the situation in New York. It was reported to the Secretary that the USSR, Indians and the UAR were continuing to lobby for the Indian resolution. While we believe we can block this effort, we will have to move aggressively to do so. We will have messages ready this evening to go from the Secretary to the Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Argentina and Ethiopia in an effort to persuade them from supporting the Indian resolution. In addition, the Secretary was informed that Ambassador Goldberg and the group believe we should [redacted] [redacted] urge King Hussein that, if he wants our resolution to pass, he should help head off the Indian resolution. If the King does not enter the fray, the snows will have fallen heavily before any resolution passes. In so doing, [redacted] should be authorized to reaffirm the assurances given the King on November 3 and by the Secretary in his private meeting with the King at 12:30 today (see attachment). The Secretary then authorized [redacted] to reaffirm to the King that the Secretary had in fact incorporated into his remarks what Arthur Goldberg had told him on November 4.

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The Secretary then summarized his private talk with the King along the following lines. The King, who was in a good mood, did most of the talking, touching on the basic problems in the area, such as refugees. The King's reactions to the US draft resolution were favorable. The Secretary responded in general terms about the situation in the Middle East and in New York, incorporating Goldberg's assurances on November 4 within the framework of his own comments. No details were discussed.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 03-205

By iw, NARA, Date 12-12-03

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- 2 -

The Secretary was informed that Goldberg was leaning toward the tabling in the Security Council of the draft US resolution and the group could see advantages in such a course of action. This step might be taken as a preemptive move if it became likely that the Indian resolution would be tabled. It would be designed to show the Arabs what we stand for instead of merely what we oppose. It was pointed out that, since Goldberg may have to move fast, it would be desirable to obtain the President's prior approval of such action. Joe Sisco assured the Secretary that the resolution, which is an amalgam of the Indian, Danish and other drafts, had been carefully reviewed with the Israelis and that he and Arthur Goldberg were confident that they would go along with it. The Secretary then authorized the transmission of a memorandum on this subject to Walt Rostow for discussion with the President.

John P. Walsh
John P. Walsh

Deputy Executive Secretary

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MEMORANDUM FOR WWR

November 6, 1967

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Hussein

Attached is the final version going to Secretary Rusk for his 12:30 p. m. and lunch meetings with Hussein today. We hope to have the President's briefing memo here by noon tomorrow. Then the Secretary could give the President a final up-dating at the Wednesday lunch.

The overriding issue is how hard we'll press Israel for a satisfactory settlement. He says he needs a UN umbrella to negotiate under and yesterday's talk with Goldberg was his way of saying he could work with our resolution. What he really wants to know is whether we'll press the Israelis in a negotiation.

The answer proposed (para. 3) is about what Arthur Goldberg has already told him and what the Secretary has told others: When you're ready to negotiate, we'll put our weight behind an equitable settlement. We don't have a blueprint and we know there will have to be territorial adjustments, but we believe the West Bank should go back to Jordan. Jerusalem is tougher, but we'll do what we can.

The two subsidiary issues are military and economic aid. These are important mainly as symbols of our continued interest, though military aid also plays a role in preserving the King's political base.

Nick Katzenbach Saturday was reluctant to see us promise too much on military aid. Clearly, we can't do anything until we see movement toward a settlement. Even then, it's questionable whether pro-Israeli sentiments here would permit us to send enough (i. e. more than radios and trucks) to make it worth our taking the heat for sending anything. So we propose saying frankly: Not now, but we hope later if there's movement toward a settlement.

There's a big hassle between State and AID on economic aid. AID can't justify paying the final \$6.2 million installment of CY 1967 budget support, given Arab contributions. AID proposes saying we'll help get ready for post-settlement economic development by a series of studies now--probably about \$3 million--without mentioning a price tag. State argues vehemently for saying this aid would equal the budget support we're dropping. I think State has closed its eyes to the imaginative way we could dress this up. But we'll see how the Secretary handles it.

Hal
Hal Saunders

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

November 5, 1967

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TO: THE SECRETARY

FROM: NEA - Assistant Secretary Battle *EDB*

Subject: Talking Points for Hussein Visit

Attached herewith is a Talking Points paper for the visit of King Hussein of Jordan. In view of the fluidity of the situation in New York, it will be necessary to supplement it with last-minute information from Ambassador Goldberg.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *ju*, NARA, Date *8-16-99*

JPW S/S:JPWalsh

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Executive Secretariat
Washington, D.C.

November 5, 1967

TO: THE SECRETARY

FROM: WEA - Assistant Secretary

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Hussein Visit

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BOSTON'S OFFICE

11-5-67

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TALKING POINTS

8-25
DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-268

By is, NARA Date 4-3-00

What Hussein Wants

Hussein comes here worried, and with a sense of grievance.

He is willing to negotiate with the Israeli, but not without the cover of a UN resolution. He believes he has helped prepare the way for such a resolution -- first by obtaining a moderate Arab position at the Khartoum summit, then by promoting a text drawn from the US five points and the US-Soviet agreement. Now, he feels, we are upping the ante in New York and backing off, as the Israeli position has become harder. This -- combined with our failure to reinstate the military aid program -- leads him to question whether the US is still interested in Jordan and in a political settlement. He has been to Moscow to get Soviet backing for a settlement, and received there offers of economic and military aid. Hussein is coming to Washington not only seeking reassurance, but to make a new calculation of how far he can depend on the United States. In specific, Hussein will want to know:

-- What kind of a resolution do we want in New York and what are we willing to do to get it?

-- What is our position on Jerusalem and the West Bank, and what are we willing to do to back it up?

-- How do we see the future of US/Jordan relations?

Do we still have an interest in a moderate Jordan, and if so, what are our intentions on military and economic aid?

What We Want

We have made a new calculation of what the Jordanian connection is worth. In essence Hussein is valuable to us because of the -- possibly indispensable -- role he can play in

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

starting and sustaining negotiations for a general political settlement between Israel and its neighbors. Beyond that, Hussein has been known for ten years as a US protege. If he fails to survive, or turns away from us towards Moscow, our prestige in the area -- and the confidence of other moderate regimes in us -- will suffer. The balance of power in the Arab world would shift sharply away from moderation. Given the existing limits to our access in the area, the loss would be serious.

Our objective in these talks is to keep Hussein on course towards a UN resolution and direct or indirect negotiations with Israel. Because of attitudes in Congress on arms and the AID budget problem, we have nothing tangible to offer him now as evidence of support. (Indeed, we will have to tell him we are altering the nature of our economic support.) But we must convince him that we want a settlement equitable to both sides, and are willing to use our influence to get it. In order to do so, we must first make certain that he has no misconceptions of what we are up to in New York. We must also explain more definitely than so far what our position is regarding his territorial problems. And we must reaffirm that despite our difficulties we wish to continue our close and friendly relationship with Jordan.

Hussein will be skeptical. Since we have only assertions and not action to offer him, our success will depend on how convinced he is that we will act on those assertions to obtain a balanced settlement. If he is not convinced, the immediate danger is that Hussein will conclude that there is no future in negotiation. If Jordan gives up, no Arab country is likely to pursue negotiations. The delay -- given the Israelization of Jerusalem -- would be very damaging.

Consequences of Failure to Reach a Settlement

You should know that the Israeli evaluation of Hussein does not jibe with ours. Israeli representatives have gone out of their way to give us the impression Israel is writing

Hussein down, and maybe off. Their motive may be to make sure Hussein comes to the bargaining table alone; or their view may reflect a much diminished interest in negotiations. Manifestly they do not want continued close US/Jordan relations. We shall have to have this out with the Israelis.

Whatever the chances of settlement -- and as of now it is hard to be sanguine -- failure would be costly to us. Arab/Israeli tension would heighten, terrorism increase, the arms race accelerate, as both sides prepared for a new round. The United States could not stand aside, and probably could not avoid closer identification with Israel. The long-term risk of a confrontation with the Soviet Union would grow.

Talking Points

1. We both want to create conditions in which negotiations can start. Your efforts at Khartoum and afterwards have made an important contribution. For our part we have taken the lead in New York in working for a UN resolution. We have also tried to protect an environment favorable to negotiation by intervention on both sides in such questions as the movement of refugees, the terrorist problem, the opening of banks. We interceded strongly with Foreign Minister Eban of Israel on these problems two weeks ago.

2. Hope your talks with Arthur Goldberg have cleared up any misunderstanding on what our intentions are in New York.

3. We hope for quick action on a resolution. We agree with you that time is not on the side of a peaceful settlement. We understand your need for a Security Council resolution before undertaking negotiations.

When you are ready to negotiate either directly or indirectly, we are prepared to put our weight behind an equitable solution. We have no precise blueprint for a settlement.

But we do believe that it should involve the return of the West Bank to Jordan. In order to obtain this the West Bank would probably have to be demilitarized. Territorial adjustments would have to be made around boundary lines as they stood before the war. The boundaries must be permanent.

Jerusalem is tougher for a variety of reasons including our historical position with which you are familiar. As we have stated publicly, we do not accept Israel's unilateral action. We are prepared to use our influence to see what arrangements can be worked out. We believe Jerusalem should be a city with free access to all and that the interests of the three great religions and the interest of the inhabitants must be protected. It may be that these objectives could best be achieved through some form of international or other status involving participation of Jordan. But we do not exclude the possibility of an agreement between Israel and Jordan that would meet Jordan's political, economic and religious interests. In the context of peace, we can envision Jerusalem becoming the focus of a new and profitable relationship between the economies of Jordan and Israel. These might include bilateral trade, increased tourism across newly opened borders, duty-free access by Jordan to the Mediterranean, improved use of the Jordan waters.

4. You will appreciate that we cannot speak for the Israelis nor do we have unlimited influence over them. What we have said reflects our thinking alone.

5. We are seriously disturbed by the arms race in the Middle East. Congress is concerned about our general arms policy as well as that for the Middle East area. We have tried to find a formula for curbing the arms race and accordingly refrained from June until October from supplying arms to the area. Unfortunately our hands were forced by a heavy Soviet arms influx. As we are concerned with an arms balance in the area, we accordingly had to sell arms to Israel. We recognize Jordan's legitimate requirements for some arms and sincerely regret that strong feelings in Congress make it difficult for

us to carry out a military assistance program for Jordan in the absence of negotiations for a settlement. With a settlement we should be able to provide reasonable quantities of arms. However, given Congressional sentiment on this question and the serious trouble we are having in getting a foreign aid bill out of the Congress, we cannot resume any arms supply to Jordan at this particular time. We would hope that favorable developments looking towards a settlement might permit us to resume some shipments of military equipment other than major combat items in the fairly near future. In the interim we are prepared to support certain of Jordan's arms requests from Western European suppliers.

6. We do appreciate your situation and ask your patience a while longer. I think you know the temper of this country. There is much unhappiness about the events of June 5. I believe we can overcome these difficulties. I am sure I am telling you nothing you do not already know when I say that a decision of Jordan to obtain arms in the Soviet Union would make close US/Jordani cooperation of the sort we have enjoyed much more difficult.

7. Although we understand you do not wish to discuss economic matters, we do want to assure you of our continued active interest in Jordan's economic development and viability. We want to continue to participate in your development effort. I want you also to know that we are discussing ways of helping you get the Potash project under way as soon as possible. The nature of our assistance must, however, reflect your mounting reserves of foreign exchange, the sizeable contributions from other Arab states and our own stringent budgetary situation. We would like to discuss these matters with your Government.

8. I know you share our continuing concern at the possibility of an outbreak of fighting as a result of terroristic activity. We commend your wisdom in trying to convince other Arab states of the folly in using this tactic. We know you

will continue to do everything you can to control infiltration from Jordan. We on our side have been pressing restraint on the Israelis and emphasized the dangers of retaliation. We are nonetheless worried by the consequences, should the Syrians persist in using this weapon.

9. We agree that a solution to the refugee problem is essential to a permanent settlement. We have been actively studying the problem and are prepared to devote substantial resources to a settlement of the problem. A final solution would probably involve some repatriation, resettlement and compensation. We would be interested in hearing any ideas which the King might suggest for best dealing with the refugee problem, including interim measures which might be taken to provide dignity and a sense of self-sufficiency to the refugees even in advance of a settlement of the overall problem.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

November 5, 1967

Cy sent President

(Handwritten initials)

TO: THE SECRETARY

EDB

FROM: NEA - Assistant Secretary Battle

Subject: Talking Points for Hussein Visit

S

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *pw*, NARA, Date *8-16-99*

JPW S/S:JPWalsh

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Executive Secretariat
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

November 5, 1967

TO: THE SECRETARY
FROM: NSA - Assistant Secretary Pacific
Subject: Talking Points for Hussein Visit

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BOSTON'S OFFICE

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TALKING POINTS

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-268
By is, NARA Date 4-3-00

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6. We do appreciate your situation and ask your patience a while longer. I think you know the temper of this country. There is much unhappiness about the events of June 5. I believe we can overcome these difficulties. I am sure I am telling you nothing you do not already know when I say that a decision of Jordan to obtain arms in the Soviet Union would make close US/Jordani cooperation of the sort we have enjoyed much more difficult.

7. Although we understand you do not wish to discuss economic matters, we do want to assure you of our continued active interest in Jordan's economic development and viability. We want to continue to participate in your development effort. I want you also to know that we are discussing ways of helping you get the Potash project under way as soon as possible. The nature of our assistance must, however, reflect your mounting reserves of foreign exchange, the sizeable contributions from other Arab states and our own stringent budgetary situation. We would like to discuss these matters with your Government.

8. I know you share our continuing concern at the possibility of an outbreak of fighting as a result of terroristic activity. We commend your wisdom in trying to convince other Arab states of the folly in using this tactic. We know you

will continue to do everything you can to control infiltration from Jordan. We on our side have been pressing restraint on the Israelis and emphasized the dangers of retaliation. We are nonetheless worried by the consequences, should the Syrians persist in using this weapon.

9. We agree that a solution to the refugee problem is essential to a permanent settlement. We have been actively studying the problem and are prepared to devote substantial resources to a settlement of the problem. A final solution would probably involve some repatriation, resettlement and compensation. We would be interested in hearing any ideas which the King might suggest for best dealing with the refugee problem, including interim measures which might be taken to provide dignity and a sense of self-sufficiency to the refugees even in advance of a settlement of the overall problem.

M:TOEnders/NEA:ARN:RHoughton
11/5/67

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

W B B

10
Mrs Saunders
& Sp (Kathy)
not filed
11/1/67
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, October 31, 1967

Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk has asked me to let you know his personal feelings about your seeing King Hussein. He had hoped to mention this at lunch today, but there wasn't time.

He appreciates your desire to keep these visitors to a minimum and concurs in your not trying to have Hussein to lunch if you feel that makes too heavy a load. However, he does feel it's important for you to see Hussein while he is here. Therefore, he would like your permission to extend an invitation for an office meeting.

Hussein will land in New York November 2 and will come to Washington November 6. He will see Arthur Goldberg in New York, and Secretary Rusk would talk to him here before he saw you. Hussein is set to speak to the Press Club and to meet with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

I would like to add my own endorsement. Hussein is uncertain about our position, and a talk with you would significantly reassure him. We'll have precious little to maintain our ties with him, since Congress will make military and economic aid difficult. Yet he is the Jordanian most likely to negotiate peace with Israel. A peace settlement would be such a great achievement that I think he warrants this investment of your time.

I gather Jim Jones is tentatively holding 5:30 p. m. on November 8 open pending your decision.

W. W. Rostow

I'll see him at 5:30 p. m. on the 8th _____

See me _____

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 8-16-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UPI-54

(HUSSEIN)

WASHINGTON--KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN WILL APPEAR ON THREE NATIONWIDE TELEVISION NETWORKS AND MAKE AT LEAST THREE MAJOR SPEECHES, THE JORDANIAN EMBASSY SAID TODAY IN OUTLINING THE "UNOFFICIAL" PORTION OF HIS EARLY NOVEMBER U.S. VISIT.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS EXPECTED SOON TO ANNOUNCE THE OFFICIAL PORTION OF THE VISIT, INCLUDING A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON.

HUSSEIN IS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN NEW YORK NOV. 2 AND REMAIN THERE UNTIL NOVEMBER 6 WHEN HE PLANS TO COME TO WASHINGTON.

DEPENDING ON WHEN HUSSEIN MEETS WITH JOHNSON, THE TENTATIVE SCHEDULE MAY BE ALTERED TO PROVIDE FOR A TRIP TO WASHINGTON BEFORE NOV. 6.

THE EMBASSY SAID HUSSEIN WILL BE INTERVIEWED ON THE CBS-TV "FACE THE NATION" PROGRAM ON NOV. 5, THE NBC-TV "TODAY" PROGRAM ON NOV. 6, AND THE ABC-TV "ISSUES AND ANSWERS" PROGRAM NOV. 12.

HUSSEIN IS SCHEDULED TO SPEAK AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY NOV. 6 IN WASHINGTON, THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB NOV. 7 IN WASHINGTON, AND NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY NEAR CHICAGO NOV. 9. HE WILL MEET WITH THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE NOV. 8.

AN EMBASSY SPOKESMAN SAID HUSSEIN, IN ADDITION TO DISCUSSING ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID AS WELL AS OTHER ASPECTS OF BILATERAL RELATIONS, IS COMING TO THE UNITED STATES TO OUTLINE "THE ARAB POINT OF VIEW" IN THE MIDEAST CRISIS.

10/31--TD/GE1106A

UPI-55

(MIDEAST)

LOS ANGELES--AHARON S. KIDAN, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL, CLAIMED YESTERDAY THE CHANCES FOR ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE ARE GREATER NOW THAN AT ANY TIME IN THE PAST 19 YEARS.

KIDAN TOLD STUDENTS AT CALIFORNIA STATE COLLEGE AT LOS ANGELES THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME THE ARAB COUNTRIES ARE REALIZING THAT THE BENEFITS OF PEACE ARE MUCH GREATER THAN THE FRUITS OF WAR.

10/31--GE1107A

UPI-56

(MALAYSIA)

KUALA LUMPUR--POLICE USED TEAR GAS TO DISPERSE ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATORS IN THE NORTHERN PORT CITY OF PENANG TONIGHT ON THE EVE OF VICE PRESIDENT HUBERT H. HUMPHREY'S VISIT TO MALAYSIA.

APPROXIMATELY 700 DEMONSTRATORS MARCHED IN PENANG'S CHINATOWN REGION CHANTING "GO HOME, HUMPHREY" BEFORE POLICE CLEARED THE STREETS WITH TEAR GAS SHELLS.

10/31--GE1107A

UPI-57

FUTURE RELEASES AVAILABLE:

POST OFFICE--APPOINTMENT OF EDMUND F. OVEREND AS DIRECTOR OF NEW POSTAL SERVICE INSTITUTE--WEDNESDAY MORNING.

INTERIOR--REPORT ON OIL AND GAS LEASE COLLECTIONS ON PUBLIC LANDS--THURSDAY MORNING.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

file 12
October 31, 1967

MEMO FOR WWR

SUBJECT: Hussein Visit at Lunch Today

I understand from John Walsh that Secretary Rusk is primed to raise the question of Hussein's seeing the President at lunch today. In view of your crowded agenda, I imagine there is danger that this subject would be overlooked. I hope you will be able to keep that from happening.

Hussein arrives in New York on Thursday. Already the press is carrying unfortunate stories that "it is expected" that the King will see the President. This can only get messier as the week goes on.

We all expect that the lunch for the King is unlikely, given the President's current desire to keep visitors to a minimum. However, I have laid the groundwork for the Jordanians to expect the least by telling the Jordanian ambassador when he calls on Friday that we were having a very difficult time with the President's crowded schedule. Therefore, we have an ideal base for going back and saying we are sorry that we can't do more but the Jordanian request just came too late in the game. However, with Eban having just been in and with the King having seen DeGaulle and other top people in Europe, I don't see how we can avoid him here.

Another subject. You will also note from the attached that the Israeli press is on to the idea of an Eshkol visit. I notice from the AP that the Israeli embassy had denied that they had any official knowledge of an Eshkol visit. However, when the Jewish press here gets hold of this, I can see the heat rising on this subject too. But this is not a subject for your lunch today.

Hal

Hal Saunders

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *ju*, NARA, Date 8-16-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

12a
TELEGRAM

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UNCLASSIFIED 156

PAGE 01 TEL AV 01355 301209Z

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ACTION NEA 15

INFO USIE 00, SS 20, GPM 03, H 02, P 04, CIA 04, RSC 01, INR 07, NSA 02, O 02,
OPR 02, CPR 02, NSC 10, SY 03, SCI 05, RSR 01, /083 W

R 301030Z OCT 67
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2645

UNCLAS TEL AVIV 1355

JOINT EMBASSY/USIS

SUBJECT: ESHKOL VISIT TO WASHINGTON
(Israeli domestic radio)

1. LOCAL PRESS AND KOL ISRAEL OCTOBER 29-30 REPORT WITHOUT OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION THAT PM ESHKOL EXPECTED TRAVEL WASHINGTON LATTER PART DECEMBER FOR WEEK-LONG TALKS PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND OTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. FEELERS FOR VISIT PUT OUT BY ISRAEL EMBASSY ALLEGEDLY FAVORABLY RECEIVED BY WHITE HOUSE.

2. DAVAR (SEMI-OFFICIAL) SPECULATES THAT THE PRESIDENT AND ESHKOL WILL DISCUSS ME SITUATION ESPECIALLY FUTURE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND PROPOSED DESALTING PROJECT.

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 1355 UNCLAS

3. TWO WIRE SERVICES QUERIED USIS WHEN FIRST NEWSPAPER STORY APPEARED OCTOBER 29. SPOKESMAN REPLIED THAT THE EMBASSY WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY VISIT PLANS. BARBOUR

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, October 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment for King Hussein

*Mr Saunders notified 10/27/67
Mr Rostow notified
Ben Read
WN*

King Hussein arrives in New York on November 2nd and will stay at least until the 10th. Since his trip to Moscow, he has been to see Nasser again and is stopping in Algiers, Madrid, Paris, Bonn, and London on the way here. He is coming largely in hopes of seeing you. Attached is Nick Katzenbach's recommendation that you invite him for a small working lunch on November 7 or 8 as you did in June.

I hate to involve you so deeply. However, I believe your role is crucial for these reasons:

- Your relationship with him will be our main, if not our only important tie with him in the weeks ahead. We have just announced releasing military shipments to all the friendly Arabs except Jordan, and we'll have trouble completing our budget support commitment for this year because the sizable Arab donations have put Jordan in pretty good financial shape.
- Despite the Israelis' bitter feelings about him, he's still the best bet to work out a settlement with Israel. He may not settle alone, but for the moment he seems to be carrying Nasser's proxy.
- He feels we've let him down, and the Soviets have made him attractive aid offers. He has worked hard to get the Arabs behind a position he thinks meets our objectives. Secretary Rusk and Arthur Goldberg may be able to persuade him we haven't changed our tune, but there's really no substitute to his hearing it from you.

Therefore I recommend you have him for a working meal, but offer these options:

- Working lunch if we can find a date. (You are booked for lunch on November 7 and 8.) _____
- Working dinner on 7 or 8 November _____
- Office meeting only _____
- Prefer not to see him _____

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By ju, NARA, Date 8-16-99

W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 8-16-99

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 25, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment with King Hussein
of Jordan.

King Hussein is scheduled to arrive in New York on November 2, where he will have consultations at the UN. He will be in Washington from November 6 to November 9 (while here, he will speak at Georgetown University and see IBRD officials).

Hussein's real purpose for coming is his hope that he can meet with you to discuss a political settlement of the Arab-Israel crisis.

Recommendation:

That you see King Hussein at a time convenient to you on November 7 or 8.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That you give a small working lunch for him.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Acting Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 1.2
Date of Declassification

By MARLA DICKERSON

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment with King Hussein
of Jordan.

King Hussein is scheduled to arrive in New York on November 2, where he will have conversations with the UN. He will be in Washington from November 6 to November 9 (while here, he will speak at Georgetown University and see IERD officials).

Hussein's real purpose for coming is his hope that he can meet with you to discuss a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli crisis.

Recommendation:

That you see King Hussein at a time convenient to you on November 7 or 8.

Approve _____
Disapprove _____

That you give a small working lunch for him.

Approve _____
Disapprove _____

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Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Acting Secretary

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By ju, NARA, Date 8-16-99

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 25, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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Hussein's real purpose for coming is his hope that he can meet with you to discuss a political settlement of the Arab-Israel crisis.

Recommendation:

That you see King Hussein at a time convenient to you on November 7 or 8.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

*State info
if done to*

That you give a small working lunch for him.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Acting Secretary

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18121

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 22, 1967

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520
OCT 22 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment with King Hussein
of Jordan.

King Hussein is scheduled to arrive in New York
on November 1, where he will have consultations at
the UN. He will be in Washington from November 5 to
November 8 (while here, he will speak at Georgetown
University and see IABD officials).

Hussein's main purpose for coming is his hope
that he can ease with you to discuss a political set-
tlement of the Arab-Israeli crisis.

Recommendation:

That you see King Hussein at a time convenient
to you on November 7 or 8.

Approve Disapprove

That you give a small working lunch for him.

Approve Disapprove

1967 OCT 26 AM 10 17
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Acting Secretary

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