

State Cables



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 353

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ACTION NEA 15

INFO AF 18, EUR 20, GPM 03, SC 01, RSC 01, USIA 12, H 02, NSC 10, L 03, INR 07,
P 04, CIA 04, DOD 01, SP 02, SS 20, NSAE 00, TRSY 08, CPR 02, O 02, SY 03,
OPR 02, IO 15, AID 30, RSR 01, SAH 03, /189 W

R 021700Z NOV 67
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3651
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 1059
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 438
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 917
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 554
AMEMBASSY LONDON 520
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AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 321
AMEMBASSY TUNIS 228
USMISSION USUN 350

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-268
By , NARA Date 4-3-00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BEIRUT 3678

SUBJECT: KING HUSSEIN VISIT TO US

1. NOW THAT KING HUSSEIN WILL SOON BE IN WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK, EMBASSY BELIEVES IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO DESCRIBE

PAGE 2 RUQMBE 3678 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHAT APPEARS TO BE GENERAL LEBANESE, AND PERHAPS GENERAL ARAB ATTITUDE, TOWARD THIS "BRAVE YOUNG KING" AT THIS TIME. GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD HUSSEIN AND THIS IS SHARED BY BOTH CHRISTIANS AND MOSLEMS HERE, HAS UNDERGONE CONSIDERABLE CHANGE AS RESULT JUNE WAR AND

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WE BELIEVE IS WORTH NOTHING.

2. BEFORE JUNE WAR, HUSSEIN WAS SO COMPLETELY OVERSHADOWED BY STRENGTH AND POPULARITY OF EGYPT'S NASSER, THAT HE OCCUPIED PRACTICALLY NO PLACE AT ALL IN CONTEXT GENERAL ARAB PROBLEMS AS VIEWED FROM LEBANON. HE WAS, IN FACT, VIEWED (DESPITE SOME KINSHIP WITH LEB CHRSTIANS) AS SOMETHING LESS THAN WHOLLY ARAB. HE CERTAINLY WAS NO CHAMPION OF ARABS, NOR WAS HE CONSIDERED AS A LEADER OF ARAB NATIONALISM.

3. AFTER DISASTE OF JUNE WAR, NASSER'S IMAGE HAS DECLINED VASTLY HERE TO POINT NO ONE WILL BE SURPRISED WHEN HE RESIGNS (OR IS DEPOSED). ALL APPEAR TO EXPECT THIS TO HAPPEN SOONER OR LATER. SOME WITH

PAGE 3 RUGMBE 3678 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REGRET, SOME WITH RELIEF. WHILE NO ONE BELIEVES HUSSEIN CAN FILL THE GAP IN ARAB EMOTIONS THAT NASSER WILL LEAVE, HUSSEIN IS, AT THIS JUNCTURE, THE ONLY ARAB LEADER WHO HAS MANAGED TO CAPTURE THE IMAGINATION OF THE BULK OF MOSLEM AND CHRISTIAN LEBANESE.

4. GENERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD HUSSEIN CAN BE DESCRIBED MORE AS "KINDLY, SYMPATHETIC AND HIGHLY RESPECTFUL" RATHER THAN ONE OF "DEVOTION" WHICH NASSER MANAGED TO ACHIEVE. NEVERTHELESS, HE IS CURRENTLY REGARDED AS A KIND OF SYMBOL OF THE NEW ARAB MODERATION WHICH CHARACTERIZES THE ARAB FEELING AND THINKING NOW. HUSSEIN, IN LEBANESE EYES, IS NOT ONLY MODERATE, BUT HE IS PRO-WESTERN, ANTI-COMMUNIST, YET THROUGHWLY MOSLEMM. HE IS ALSO CONSIDERED BRAVE AND HENCE WORTHY OF SUPPORT. LEBANESE SOMEHOW BELIEVE HUSSEIN IS THE NATURAL LINK BETWEEN ARABS AND THE WEST AND IS WORTHY OF WESTERN AND PARTICULARLY US SUMPATHY AND SUPPORT.

5. AS ARAB INHERITOR OF WHAT IS LEFT OF ARAB PALESTINE,

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PAGE 03 BEIRUT 03678 022058Z

PAGE 4 RUQMBE 3678 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
HE IS CONSIDERED HEIR TO MAJOR PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM JUNE WAR AND HIS EFFORTS TO COPE WITH THESE PROBLEMS HAVE INSPIRED CONSIDERABLE APPLAUSE AND ADMIRATION FROM ALL LEBANESE.

6. LEBANESE NOT ONLY HOPE BUT EXPECT USG AND THE WEST TO RECOGNIZE HUSSEIN'S MODERATION, REASONABLENESS AND GOOD INTENTIONS IN TRYING TO SOLVE ARAB'S OVERWHELMING PROBLEMS. AS THE BRIDGE BETWEEN ARABS AND WEST, LEBANESE HOPE FERVENTLY THAT USG WILL TREAT HUSSEIN AS A FRIEND, IN FACT A FRIEND WHO DESPERATELY NEEDS SYMPATHY AND HELP FROM US. LEBANESE TEND TO VIEW THEIR OWN FATE AS ARAB MODERATES AS BEING CLOSELY LINKED TO THAT OF HUSSEIN. IF HUSSEIN FARES WELL IN US, SO WILL ARAB MODERATES, INCLUDING LEBANESE. IF US REJECTS HUSSEIN, THEY FEAR ALL ARAB MODERATES, INCLUDING THEMSELVES, WILL SUFFER SAME FATE. IN THEIR VIEW THERE WOULD THEN BE LITTLE POSSIBILITY FOR MODERATES AND MODERATE REGIMES TO CONTINUE AND PROSPER IN

PAGE 5 RUQMBE 3678 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
MIDDLE EAST.

7. LEBANESE ARE GENERALLY CONVINCED THAT ISRAELIS ARE OUT TO DESTROY HUSSEIN AND HIS REGIME. THEY BELIEVE THAT ISRAELIS ARE WORKING FOR HIS DISTRUCTION, NOT BECAUSE HE POSES ANY THREAT TO ISRAEL MILITARILY, BUT BECAUSE HE IS IN FACT A MODERATE WHO HAS CLOSE TIES WITH US AND THE WEST AND WHO IS CAPABLE OF OBTAINING SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT FROM US AND WEST. ISRAELIS, LEBANESE BELIEVE, WOULD MUCH PREFER THAT JORDAN AND THEIR OTHER NEIGHBORS, PERHAPS EVEN INCLUDING LEBANON, BE RULED BY RADICALS OR "PROGRESSIVES" WITH CLOSE TIES TO SOVIET UNION. IN THIS WAY, ISRAEL WOULD BE ASSURED OF US SUPPORT IN ANY FUTURE DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS ARAB NEIGHBORS. WHILE THIS REASONING MAY APPEAR CONVOLUTED TO US, LEBANESE BELIEVE IT EXPLAINS ISRAEL'S HARSH ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ONE ARB

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PAGE 04 BEIRUT 03678 022058Z

LEADER WHO, MOST OF ALL, HAS PROCLAIMED WILLINGNESS
AND NECESSITY FOR REACHING POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL.

PAGE 6 RUQMBE 3678 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8. FOR ABOVE REASONS AND BECAUSE OF UNEASY CONCERN HERE THAT
US LOSING INTEREST IN ARAB WORLD, THE LEBANESE WILL BE LOOKING
ANXIOUSLY FOR ANY RESULTS ACCRUING FROM HUSSEIN VISIT THAT WILL
DEMONSTRATE US CONCERN FOR HUSSEIN'S WELFARE AND FOR THE
WELFARE OF THE ARABS IN GENERAL.
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PAGE 01 AMMAN 02015 261030Z

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *JW*, NARA, Date 8-16-99

8
ACTION NEA 19

INFO SC 01, RSC 01, NSC 10, E 19, STR 08, SP 02, SS 20, AID 30, INR 07,
TRSY 08, COM 08, CIA 04, FRB 02, XMB 06, NSAE 00, L 03, H 02, IGA 02,
RSR 01, GPM 03, DOD 01, EUR 25, /182 W

R 260945Z OCT 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3866

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AMMAN 2015

REF: STATE 58598; AMMAN 1932

SUBJECT: AID BUDGET PROPOSALS

JOINT EMBASSY/USAID

1. ALTHOUGH THE CURRENT PERIOD OF RISING TENSION IS NOT A GOOD TIME TO BROACH SUBJECT OF CHANGE IN BUDGET SUPPORT PATTERN, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD GIVE GOJ OFFICIALS AT LEAST PRELIMINARY INDICATION OF OUR THINKING BEFORE KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON AT BEGINNING OF NOVEMBER. IF SUBJECT NOT RAISED UNTIL AFTER KING'S RETURN TO AMMAN, MOVE MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS FURTHER UNFAVORABLE POLICY DEPARTURE AND TEND UNDERMINE POSSIBLE HELPFUL

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 2015A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNDERSTANDINGS FROM WASHINGTON TALKS.

2. ANOTHER FACTOR IS THAT GOJ IS NOW PREPARING BUDGET FOR 1968. SOME MINISTRIES HAVE ALREADY COMPLETED PREPARATIONS FOR SUBMISSION TO MINISTRY OF FINANCE. IF WE KEEP QUIET DURING THIS PERIOD, GOJ

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 02015 261030Z

OFFICIALS MAY PROCEED WITH PLANNING FIGURE FOR OUR AID ON BASIS PREVIOUSLY WORKED OUT PLAN OF GRADUAL REDUCTION AND EVEN LEAVE US OPEN TO CHARGES OF BAD FAITH AFTER FIGURE HAS BEEN ENSHRINED IN BUDGET.

3. THUS, DESPITE UNSATISFACTORY POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT FOR DOING SO, RECOMMEND WE BE AUTHORIZED TO INITIATE DISCUSSIONS REGARDING POSSIBLE MODIFICATION IN LAST QUARTER CY 67 \$6.2 MILLION PAYMENT AND APPARENT LACK OF NEED OFOR BUDGET SUPPORT IN COMING JORDAN FISCAL YEAR, AS OUTLINES IN AMMAN 1932.

4. ALTERNATIVELY, IF IN FORTHCOMING DISCUSSION IN WASHINGTON WITH KING AND HIS PARTY, IT IS POSSIBLE TO BE CLEARLY HELPFUL ON SUCH THINGS AS POTASH PROJECT OR IF OUTLOOK FOR RELEASE MILITARY SHIPMENTS IMPROVES, INITIAL DISCUSSION OF BUDGET SUPPORT PROBLEM

PAGE 3:7271.1& 2015A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IN WASHINGTON MIGHT BE CONSIDERED. IF SIGNIFICANT FAVORABLE ACTIONS CAN BE TAKEN AT SAME TIME, PRESIDENT MIGHT CONSIDER INDICATING THAT SOME DISCUSSION OF STRICTLY ECONOMIC SIDE OF OUT BUDGET SUPPORT RELATIONSHIP SEEMS IN ORDER AND PROPOSE THAT THIS BE TAKEN UP BY APPROPRIATE STATE AND AID OFFICIALS WITH MINISTER OF ECONOMY ZU'BI.

GP-3 BURNS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 987

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ACTION SS 70

INFO 1070 W

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R 181000BM OCT 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3815

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *ju*, NARA, Date 8-16-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AMMAN 1918

LIMDIS

REF STATE 55227

airmail

1. AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, THE KING HAS SEVERAL TIMES STATED TO THE AMBASSADOR THAT HE HOPES TO SEE THE PRESIDENT IN EARLY NOVEMBER WHEN HUSSEIN EXPECTS TO VISIT THE UN IN NEW YORK.
2. HAD ASSUMED THAT HE WOULD TRANSMIT THROUGH HIS EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON A FORMAL REQUEST FOR AN APPOINTMENT WITH THE PRESIDENT. IT COULD WELL BE, HOWEVER, THAT HUSSEIN THINKS HE HAS MADE THE REQUISITE FORMAL REQUEST FOR AN APPOINTMENT THROUGH HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH AMBASSADOR BURNS.

PAGE TWO RUOMKG 1918A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. ALL THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US ON THE KING'S PLANS IS CONTAINED IN TWO LETTERS TO RODGER DAVIES DATED OCT 16 AND AMMAN 1917. KING EXPECTS TO ARRIVE IN NEW YORK SOME TIME BETWEEN OCT 30 AND NOV 2. ASSUME HUSSEIN WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO SEE THE PRESIDENT ANY TIME AT THE LATTERS CONVENIENCE DURING THE PERIOD NOV 3 THROUGH NOV 8.

3. IF THE PRESIDENT IS AGREEABLE TO RECEIVING HUSSEIN, WHICH WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT HE DO, SUGGEST YOU ASK JORDANIAN

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 AMMAN 01918 181040Z

AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON TO MAKE CONTACT WITH HUSSEIN ON HIS PRESENT TRAVELS TO SETTLE ON A DATE.

4. HUSSEIN HAS ALSO INFORMED US HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE SECRETARY RUSK DURING THE COURSE OF HIS STAY IN US. PERHAPS THIS COULD BE ARRANGED FOR THE DAY HUSSEIN COMES TO WASHINGTON TO SEE THE PRESIDENT, OR ALTERNATELY, ON A DAY THE SECRETARY MIGHT BE IN NEW YORK ON OTHER BUSINESS.

GP-3
BURNS

TO THE DIRECTOR, FBI, WASHINGTON, DC

[Handwritten signature]

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TELETYPE UNIT, WASHINGTON, DC

TO DIRECTOR, FBI, WASHINGTON, DC
BY AIRMAIL, 1/18/53

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Department of State

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 01917 180534Z

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ACTION SS 70

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-268
By is, NARA Date 4-3-00

R 171740Z OCT 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3814

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~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 1917

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: KING HUSSEIN'S PROPOSED CALL ON PRESIDENT JOHNSON

1. AS REPORTED EARLIER, KING HUSSEIN HOPES TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND SECRETARY RUSK DURING HIS PLANNED SEVEN-TO-TEN DAY STAY IN THE US BEGINNING ABOUT NOV 1. WE RECOMMEND THAT THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY BE REQUESTED TO RECEIVE THE KING. THIS MESSAGE SUMMARIZES POINTS WHICH THE KING MAY RAISE.

2. ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT: THE KING'S STRONG DESIRE FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WHICH WILL RESTORE JORDANIAN SOVEREIGNTY

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 1917A ~~SECRET~~

OVER AS MUCH OF JERUSALEM AND THE WEST BANK AS POSSIBLE IS THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE KING'S TRIP AND HIS REQUEST TO SEE THE PRESIDENT. IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS NOT ALREADY ACTED, THE KING WILL URGE THE NEED FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AS AN UMBRELLA UNDER WHICH DETAILS OF A SETTLEMENT CAN BE NEGOTIATED. HUSSEIN WILL PROBABLY EXPRESS DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE US HAS NOT BEEN MORE ACTIVE IN PROVIDING HIM AND THE ARABS WITH MORE DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT IN THE UN.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 01917 180534Z

3. REFUGEES: WITH RESPECT TO 1948 REFUGEES, THE KING WILL REFLECT HIS OWN CONVICTION THAT REALISTICALLY THE BULK OF THESE MUST BE RESETTLED AND THEIR REFUGEE RELIEF STATUS TERMINATED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WHILE FLEXIBLE, HE WILL SEEK SUPPORT, HOWEVER, FOR SOME NOD BY ISRAEL, IN THE CONTEXT OF SETTLEMENT, AT UN RESOLUTIONS ON REPATRIATION AND COMPENSATION, ESPECIALLY THE LATTER. THE "NEW" REFUGEES, HOWEVER, ARE A SPECIAL PROBLEM AND HUSSEIN MAY ASK HELP IN PERSUADING THE ISRAELIS TO PERMIT EARLY RETURN OF AS MANY AS POSSIBLE TO THE WEST BANK. THE EASTWARD FLOW CONTINUES AND THE ONSET OF

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 1917A ~~SECRET~~

WINTER COMPLICATES THE PROBLEM OF CARING FOR THEM.

4. ECONOMIC AID: THE KING WILL PROBABLY PROBE FOR ASSURANCE THAT US ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WILL CONTINUE IN PRINCIPLE. HE WILL AT THIS STAGE BE CONCERNED MORE FOR EVIDENCE OF POLITICAL SUPPORT THAN FOR THE IMMEDIATE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES. HE MAY STRESS A NEED FOR CONTINUED COMMITMENT IN PRINCIPLE FOR BUDGET SUPPORT ON THE GROUNDS THAT ARAB EMERGENCY AID IS TRANSITORY AND IN ANY EVENT RELATED TO THE GREATLY INCREASED DEFICITS AS AS RESULT OF THE JUNE WAR. IT WOULD BE VALUABLE IF THE PRESIDENT COULD AFFIRM THAT WE WILL KEEP OUR COMMITMENT FOR 27 MILLION DOLLARS FOR THE CURRENT JORDANIAN FISCAL YEAR, FOLLOWED BY THE COMMENTS (A) WE FEEL THAT EMERGENCY ARAB AID HAS OBIATED THE CURRENT NEED FOR OUR BUDGET SUPPORT BUT THAT WE ARE OF COURSE PREPARED TO RECONSIDER JORDAN'S NEED SHOULD ARAB SUPPORT FALTER, AND (B) WE ARE PREPARED TO FINANCE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF OUR FINANCIAL RESOURCES. (FYI: WE HAVE IN MIND STATE 52685 AND PLAN TO EXPLORE PROJECT ROUTE PER PARAGRAPH 2. END FYI).

5. POTASH PROJECT: THE KING MAY RAISE THE POTASH PROJECT IN

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 1917A ~~SECRET~~

SPECIFIC DETAIL (AMMAN 1852). ACTION ON THIS PROJECT,

~~SECRET~~



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PAGE 03 AMMAN 01917 180534Z

INCLUDING SPEAKING TO THE PRIVATE INVESTORS WOULD HELP TO REASSURE THE KING ON ECONOMIC AID GENERALLY.

6. MILITARY ASSISTANCE: WE HAVE PROMISED DELIVERY FIRST UNDER THE SUSPENDED MAP AND SUBSEQUENTLY UNDER THE EXISTING SALES PACKAGE AS SOON AS CONGRESSIONAL PROBLEMS WILL PERMIT. CHIEF OF STAFF KHAMMASH WAS TOLD IN AUGUST (LONDON 1017) THAT WE HOPED TO RESUME MAP SHIPMENTS BY SEPTEMBER WITH FIRST ARRIVALS IN AQABA IN EARLY OCTOBER. OUR DELAY IN RESUMING SHIPMENTS COMPLICATES THE REGIME'S RELATIONS WITH THE ARMY AND RAISES DOUBTS AS TO OUR INTENTIONS. EXCEPT FOR THE CONTINUING INTEREST IN RECEIPT OF THE MAP AND SALES PACKAGE ON AN URGENT BASIS, THE KING WILL PROBABLY TAKE THE POSITION THAT THE FUTURE SHAPE OF HIS MILITARY FORCES IS DEPENDENT ON A SETTLEMENT. THE KING MAY AFFIRM A PRESENT INTEREST IN EVENTUALLY OBTAINING A SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT ALTERNATIVE TO THE F-104 FOR WHICH THE CONTRACT IS ON ICE, PERHAPS THE FRENCH MIRAGE. EFFORTS TO OBTAIN HAWKER HUNTERS MAY ALSO BE MENTIONED.

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 1917A ~~SECRET~~

7. BROADCASTING FACILITIES: THE KING HAS RECENTLY EXPRESSED TO THE AMBASSADOR HIS CONTINUED INTEREST IN US ASSISTANCE FOR A 1-MILLION-WATT BROADCAST TRANSMITTER. NAHE AMMAN COUNTRY TEAM RECOMMENDED SHORTLY BEFORE THE ARAB-ISRAEL WAR THAT A STATION WITH US TIES GROWING OUT OF SUCH ASSISTANCE COULD BE USEFUL IN THE AREA. (DETAILS OF THIS PROJECT AND MISSION RECOMMENDATIONS ARE SON FILE IN WASHINGTON.) THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION WILL PROBABLY SEEK TO FOLLOW-UP AS WELL. THIS EMBASSY IS NOT AT THIS TIME PREPARED TO REAFFIRM ITS RECOMMENDATION FOR THE TRANSMITTER.

8. AREA OUTLOOK: THE KING WILL LIKELY CONTRAST THE BLEAK OUTLOOK FOR US INTERESTS AND MODERATION IN THE AREA IF A SETTLEMENT IS NOT REACHED WITH THE HOPES FOR LONG-TERM IMPROVEMENTS IF A SETTLEMENT IS FOUND. HE WILL VOICE HIS OWN SUSPICIONS THAT ISRAEL WANTS TO KEEP THE CONQUERED TERRITORIES AND WILL FOREGO REAL PEACE IN THE HOPE OF FUTURE EXPANSION.

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9. AMERICAN COMPANIES: UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS OF THE CROW

PAGE 6 RUQMKG 1917A ~~SECRET~~

CONSTRUCTION CO. AND SETTLEMENT OF THE MECOM PETROLEUM CON-
CESSION CANCELLATION CLAIMS MAY BE THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION
WITH THE MEMBERS OF THE KING'S PARTY, PARTICULARLY THE
MINISTER OF NATIONAL ECONOMY.

10. THE KING'S PARTY IN THE US, SOME OF WHOM WILL JOIN HIM
ENROUTE, IS NOW SCHEDULED TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

- MINISTER OF INFORMATION - SALAH ABU ZAID;
- MINISTER OF NATIONAL ECONOMY - HATEM ZU'BI;
- PRIVATE SECRETARY TO KING AND PROTOCOL CHIEF - ZAID RIFAI;
- KING'S PHYSICIAN - DR. SHAWKAT AS SATI;
- CHIEF MILITARY AIDE - MAJOR GENERAL SHARIF NASSER BIN JAMIL
(KING'S UNCLE);
- AND AIDES COL. SHARIF ZAID BIN SHAKIR AND COL. ANWAR MUHAMMED.

GP-3. BURNS

~~SECRET~~

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ACTION NEA 19

INFO AF 21, EUR 25, IO 21, GPM 03, SC 01, RSC 01, USIA 12, H 02, NSC 10, L 03,
INR 07, P 04, CIA 04, DOD 01, SP 02, SS 35, SAH 03, NSAE 00, CPR 02,
SY 03, RSR 01, /180 W

R 111603Z OCT 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3770
INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 109
AMEMBASSY MADRID 17
AMEMBASSY PARIS 205
AMEMBASSY BONN 18
AMEMBASSY LONDON 637
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 966
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1136
USMISSION USUN NY 506

DECLASSIFIED
Authority Group 4
By jw, NARA, Date 8-16-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AMMAN 1834

REF: AMMAN 1779

SUBJ: KING'S TRAVEL PLANS

1. PALACE INFORMS THAT KING HAS POSTPONED HIS DEPARTURE FROM AMMAN FOR ALGIERS UNTIL OCT 17. FROM ALGIERS, HUSSEIN WILL CONTINUE ON WITH VISITS TO MADRID, PARIS, BONN AND POSSIBLY LONDON AS REPORTED REFTEL.

2. IN VIEW OF THIS DELAY IN DEPARTURE FROM AMMAN, HUSSEIN HAS

PAGE 2 RUQMG 1834A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 01 STATE 55227

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FILE COPY

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Moose

DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: RBHOUGHTON
APPROVED BY: NEA/ARN: RBHOUGHTON
WHITE HOUSE: HSAUNDERS

- BOWDLER
- BUDGET
- DAVIS
- FRIC
- GINSBURGH
- HAMILTON
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- JORDEN
- KEENE
- LEONHART
- ROCHE
- SAUNDERS
- TAYLOR

R 172031Z OCT 67
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0009

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 55227

LIMDIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT HATIM ZUBI HAS ASKED THE JORDANIAN
AMBASSADOR TO MAKE TENTATIVE APPOINTMENTS EITHER IN NEW YORK
OR WASHINGTON FOR KING HUSSEIN WITH THE HEAD OF THE TRIB AND ALSO
AN APPOINTMENT WITH PETER GRACE. THE JORDANIANS HAVE NEVER
OFFICIALLY INFORMED US THAT THE KING WAS COMING TO WASHINGTON
OR THAT HE EXPECTED TO SEE THE PRESIDENT. WE WOULD, THEREFORE,
APPRECIATE ANY MORE PRECISE INFORMATION AS TO THE TIMING OF HIS
VISIT AND WHETHER HE, IN FACT, EXPECTS TO SEE THE PRESIDENT.

GP-3. RUSK

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 8-16-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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Moore
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ACTION NEA 15

By jw, NARA, Date 8-16-99

INFO EUR 20, IO 15, GPM 03, SC 01, RSC 01, USIA 12, H 02, NSC 10, L 03, INR 07,
P 04, CIA 04, DOD 01, SP 02, SS 20, NSAE 00, SAH 03, AID 30, RSR 01,
/154 W

R 271615Z NOV 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4075
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1256
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1085

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AMMAN 2401

SUBJ: THE KING RETURNS

1. ON HIS RETURN TO AMMAN AFTERNOON OF NOV 26, KING WAS GREETED BY AN UNUSUALLY LARGE CROWD AT AMMAN AIRPORT. AN EXTENSIVE PROTOCOL LIST OF THOSE WHO WOULD BE PRESENT HAD BEEN PUBLISHED EARLIER INSURING A LARGE OFFICIAL TURNOUT. KING RECEIVED WARM RECEPTION AND APPEARED TO BE IN EXCELLENT SPIRITS.

2. RE KING'S US VISIT, RUMOR HAS QUICKLY SPREAD IN AMMAN THAT HUSSEIN WAS PLEASED WITH HIS TALKS WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON.

PAGE 214471. (1 & 2401A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)
ACCORDING TO ONE MP WHO TALKED TO MEMBER OF OFFICIAL DELEGATION THE MORNING OF NOV 27, PRESIDENT GAVE HUSSEIN HIS FIRM ASSURANCES THAT THE US WOULD EITHER PRESSURE ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW TOTALLY FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OR, IN CASES LIKE LATROUN, AGREE TO AN EQUAL EXCHANGE OF TERRITORY. MP

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 02401 271815Z

COMMENTED THAT IF THIS POSITION HAD BEEN MADE KNOWN BEFORE,
THE QUOTE UNFORTUNATE UNQUOTE ANTI-US DEBATE IN PARLIMENT
NOV 22 COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED. (AMMAN 2391)

GP-4 SYMMES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Secret~~ / Eplis

KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT
November 6-9, 1967

I N D E X

Tab

Schedule of Appointments

GENERAL

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Jordan Potash Project	F
Crow Construction Company Claim	G
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BIOGRAPHIC DATA

King HUSSEIN	1
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Abdul Moneim RIFA'I, Minister for Foreign Affairs	3
Abdul Hamid SHARAF, Ambassador to the U.S.	4
Zayd RIFA'I, Chief of Royal Protocol	5

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C.

VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES OF HIS MAJESTY HUSSEIN I,
KING OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

November 2 - 10, 1967

November 2 to
November 5 - - - - At New York

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 6

- 12:30 p.m. Meeting with Secretary Rusk at the Department of State.
Luncheon with Secretary Rusk
- 7:30 p.m. Small reception by International Relations Club, Georgetown University
- 8:00 p.m. Address to the faculty and students, Georgetown University.

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 7

- 12:10 p.m. Luncheon at the National Press Club.
- 4:00 p.m. Meeting with the House Foreign Affairs Committee
- 7:30 p.m. Dinner with the Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs.

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 8

- 3:30 p.m. Meeting with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
- 5:30 p.m. Meeting with President Johnson
- 8:00 p.m. Private dinner at Jordan Embassy

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 9

2:15 p.m. EST

Depart Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, aboard a United States Air Force special flight.

3:00 p.m. CST

Arrival at O'Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois.

5:30 p.m.

Reception, dinner and address at Northwestern University.

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 10

a.m.

Departure from O'Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois.

p.m.

Arrival at John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York.

The date of departure from the United States will be announced later.

KING HUSSEIN'S ENTOURAGE*

His Majesty King Hussein I

Maj. Gen. Nasir bin Jamil, Chief Military Aide to His Majesty

Abdul Moneim Rifa'i, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

Abdul Hamid Sharaf, Jordanian Ambassador to the U.S.

Zayd Rifa'i, Chief of Royal Cabinet

Col. Zayd Shakir, aide-de-camp

Dr. Shawkat Sati, His Majesty's personal physician

Col. Anwar Muhammad, aide-de-camp

Capt. Mahmud Jamal, aide-de-camp

1st Lt. Fakhri Islam, aide

1st Lt. Muhammad Fu'ad, aide

1st Lt. Atallah Miqbil, aide

2nd Lt. Sulaiman Marzouq, aide

* In order of precedence.

9/26

I. GENERAL

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

TALKING POINTS

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-268
By ja, NARA Date 4-3-00

What Hussein Wants

Hussein comes here worried, and with a sense of grievance.

He is willing to negotiate with the Israeli, but not without the cover of a UN resolution. He believes he has helped prepare the way for such a resolution -- first by obtaining a moderate Arab position at the Khartoum summit, then by promoting a text drawn from the US five points and the US-Soviet agreement. Now, he feels, we are upping the ante in New York and backing off, as the Israeli position has become harder. This -- combined with our failure to reinstate the military aid program -- leads him to question whether the US is still interested in Jordan and in a political settlement. He has been to Moscow to get Soviet backing for a settlement, and received there offers of economic and military aid. Hussein is coming to Washington not only seeking reassurance, but to make a new calculation of how far he can depend on the United States. In specific, Hussein will want to know:

-- What kind of a resolution do we want in New York and what are we willing to do to get it?

-- What is our position on Jerusalem and the West Bank, and what are we willing to do to back it up?

-- How do we see the future of US/Jordan relations?

Do we still have an interest in a moderate Jordan, and if so, what are our intentions on military and economic aid?

What We Want

We have made a new calculation of what the Jordanian connection is worth. In essence Hussein is valuable to us because of the -- possibly indispensable -- role he can play in

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starting and sustaining negotiations for a general political settlement between Israel and its neighbors. Beyond that, Hussein has been known for ten years as a US protege. If he fails to survive, or turns away from us towards Moscow, our prestige in the area -- and the confidence of other moderate regimes in us -- will suffer. The balance of power in the Arab world would shift sharply away from moderation. Given the existing limits to our access in the area, the loss would be serious.

Our objective in these talks is to keep Hussein on course towards a UN resolution and direct or indirect negotiations with Israel. Because of attitudes in Congress on arms and the AID budget problem, we have nothing tangible to offer him now as evidence of support. (Indeed, we will have to tell him we are altering the nature of our economic support.) But we must convince him that we want a settlement equitable to both sides, and are willing to use our influence to get it. In order to do so, we must first make certain that he has no misconceptions of what we are up to in New York. We must also explain more definitely than so far what our position is regarding his territorial problems. And we must reaffirm that despite our difficulties we wish to continue our close and friendly relationship with Jordan.

Hussein will be skeptical. Since we have only assertions and not action to offer him, our success will depend on how convinced he is that we will act on those assertions to obtain a balanced settlement. If he is not convinced, the immediate danger is that Hussein will conclude that there is no future in negotiation. If Jordan gives up, no Arab country is likely to pursue negotiations. The delay -- given the Israelization of Jerusalem -- would be very damaging.

Consequences of Failure to Reach a Settlement

You should know that the Israeli evaluation of Hussein does not jibe with ours. Israeli representatives have gone out of their way to give us the impression Israel is writing

Hussein down, and maybe off. Their motive may be to make sure Hussein comes to the bargaining table alone; or their view may reflect a much diminished interest in negotiations. Manifestly they do not want continued close US/Jordan relations. We shall have to have this out with the Israelis.

Whatever the chances of settlement -- and as of now it is hard to be sanguine -- failure would be costly to us. Arab/Israeli tension would heighten, terrorism increase, the arms race accelerate, as both sides prepared for a new round. The United States could not stand aside, and probably could not avoid closer identification with Israel. The long-term risk of a confrontation with the Soviet Union would grow.

Talking Points

1. We both want to create conditions in which negotiations can start. Your efforts at Khartoum and afterwards have made an important contribution. For our part we have taken the lead in New York in working for a UN resolution. We have also tried to protect an environment favorable to negotiation by intervention on both sides in such questions as the movement of refugees, the terrorist problem, the opening of banks. We interceded strongly with Foreign Minister Eban of Israel on these problems two weeks ago.

2. Hope your talks with Arthur Goldberg have cleared up any misunderstanding on what our intentions are in New York.

3. We hope for quick action on a resolution. We agree with you that time is not on the side of a peaceful settlement. We understand your need for a Security Council resolution before undertaking negotiations.

When you are ready to negotiate either directly or indirectly, we are prepared to put our weight behind an equitable solution. We have no precise blueprint for a settlement.

But we do believe that it should involve the return of the West Bank to Jordan. In order to obtain this the West Bank would probably have to be demilitarized. Territorial adjustments would have to be made around boundary lines as they stood before the war. The boundaries must be permanent.

Jerusalem is tougher for a variety of reasons including our historical position with which you are familiar. As we have stated publicly, we do not accept Israel's unilateral action. We are prepared to use our influence to see what arrangements can be worked out. We believe Jerusalem should be a city with free access to all and that the interests of the three great religions and the interest of the inhabitants must be protected. It may be that these objectives could best be achieved through some form of international or other status involving participation of Jordan. But we do not exclude the possibility of an agreement between Israel and Jordan that would meet Jordan's political, economic and religious interests. In the context of peace, we can envision Jerusalem becoming the focus of a new and profitable relationship between the economies of Jordan and Israel. These might include bilateral trade, increased tourism across newly opened borders, duty-free access by Jordan to the Mediterranean, improved use of the Jordan waters.

4. You will appreciate that we cannot speak for the Israelis nor do we have unlimited influence over them. What we have said reflects our thinking alone.

5. We are seriously disturbed by the arms race in the Middle East. Congress is concerned about our general arms policy as well as that for the Middle East area. We have tried to find a formula for curbing the arms race and accordingly refrained from June until October from supplying arms to the area. Unfortunately our hands were forced by a heavy Soviet arms influx. As we are concerned with an arms balance in the area, we accordingly had to sell arms to Israel. We recognize Jordan's legitimate requirements for some arms and sincerely regret that strong feelings in Congress make it difficult for

us to carry out a military assistance program for Jordan in the absence of negotiations for a settlement. With a settlement we should be able to provide reasonable quantities of arms. However, given Congressional sentiment on this question and the serious trouble we are having in getting a foreign aid bill out of the Congress, we cannot resume any arms supply to Jordan at this particular time. We would hope that favorable developments looking towards a settlement might permit us to resume some shipments of military equipment other than major combat items in the fairly near future. In the interim we are prepared to support certain of Jordan's arms requests from Western European suppliers.

6. We do appreciate your situation and ask your patience a while longer. I think you know the temper of this country. There is much unhappiness about the events of June 5. I believe we can overcome these difficulties. I am sure I am telling you nothing you do not already know when I say that a decision of Jordan to obtain arms in the Soviet Union would make close US/Jordani cooperation of the sort we have enjoyed much more difficult.

7. Although we understand you do not wish to discuss economic matters, we do want to assure you of our continued active interest in Jordan's economic development and viability. We want to continue to participate in your development effort. I want you also to know that we are discussing ways of helping you get the Potash project under way as soon as possible. The nature of our assistance must, however, reflect your mounting reserves of foreign exchange, the sizeable contributions from other Arab states and our own stringent budgetary situation. We would like to discuss these matters with your Government.

8. I know you share our continuing concern at the possibility of an outbreak of fighting as a result of terroristic activity. We commend your wisdom in trying to convince other Arab states of the folly in using this tactic. We know you

will continue to do everything you can to control infiltration from Jordan. We on our side have been pressing restraint on the Israelis and emphasized the dangers of retaliation. We are nonetheless worried by the consequences, should the Syrians persist in using this weapon.

9. We agree that a solution to the refugee problem is essential to a permanent settlement. We have been actively studying the problem and are prepared to devote substantial resources to a settlement of the problem. A final solution would probably involve some repatriation, resettlement and compensation. We would be interested in hearing any ideas which the King might suggest for best dealing with the refugee problem, including interim measures which might be taken to provide dignity and a sense of self-sufficiency to the refugees even in advance of a settlement of the overall problem.

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II. BACKGROUND PAPERS

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KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, NOVEMBER 6-9, 1967

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-268

CONSULTATIONS ON A UN RESOLUTION

By ia, NARA Date 4-3-00

At the close of the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly in July, the US and USSR delegations agreed, ad referendum, on language for a draft resolution on the Middle East. The key element was a statement of principle that Israeli withdrawal should be linked to an end to belligerency by the Arabs, although the word "belligerency" was not specifically used. There was an additional paragraph which stressed the need for efforts to solve all aspects of the problem, in particular those of refugees and of guaranteeing freedom of transit through international waterways.

The resolution was not accepted by the Arabs and, as a result, the Soviet Union would not proceed with it in July.

In September we were consulted by others about the possibility of using this draft resolution with the addition of appointment of a UN intermediary, as a basis for Security Council action. The Arabs then seemed inclined to acquiesce in such an approach to the problem. We discovered, however, that the Soviets had not only distributed incorrect versions of the US-USSR language to the Arabs, but had also failed to explain in distributing the texts that understandings on interpretation were involved. (The US told the USSR at the outset of the July discussions, for example, that an end to belligerency meant the Suez Canal would be opened to Israeli shipping; therefore the final paragraph only referred to "guaranteeing" the freedom of transit.) The Arabs were thus given a false impression by the Soviets of what the July US-USSR understanding had been. As a result they gained the impression as consultations in New York proceeded that the US was going back on its earlier agreement, whereas it was the Soviets who were backing out.

In light of these indications of differing views regarding the US-USSR draft language, the United States considered it essential that if a resolution based on this language was to be adopted by the Security Council, all should agree in advance on what it meant. Otherwise we feared that the resolution would hinder rather than facilitate a settlement.

Efforts in September and early October to develop an agreed text and agreed interpretation based on the US-USSR language were unsuccessful. The non-permanent members of the Security Council then made a fresh start on the problem.

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The United States supported this effort by the non-permanent members. We understood that, rather than trying to develop a resolution which would in effect legislate a solution, they would draft a resolution containing 1) a statement of general principles which would be generally accepted, and 2) a request for appointment of a UN representative to serve as the intermediary to discuss specific issues with the parties in an effort to help them work out the details of a settlement. In our view, the important thing is that such a resolution provide a formula acceptable to the parties so that they will cooperate with the UN intermediary. We believe the draft suggested by Canada and Denmark to the other non-permanent Security Council members is better designed to gain this end than the draft suggested by India, but we have supported efforts to develop from the two texts something which will be acceptable to both sides. If the non-permanent Council members can arrive at no agreement, the permanent members, in particular the US and USSR, expect to be asked to resume their efforts to devise a formulation acceptable to the other Council members and the parties.

Positions of the Parties. All of the Arabs (with the possible exception of Syria and Algeria) now appear to be prepared to accept inclusion in a UN resolution of the concept of an end to the state of belligerency with Israel and acknowledgment of Israel's right to exist. They have generally insisted, however, that the resolution also contain a formulation on Israeli withdrawal that specifies return to the pre-June 5 lines. They also desire a linkage in the resolution between the questions of opening the Suez Canal to all ships (including Israeli) and of a solution of the refugee problem. The third main difficulty is the Arab desire that the role of the UN representative to be confined to implementing the principles set forth in the resolution, and that he not be given wide latitude to discuss all issues with the parties in an effort to assist them in working out the details of a settlement.

King Hussein is prepared to acquiesce in a resolution that does not refer to a date or to Israel in connection with withdrawal. He has indicated general Arab willingness to go along with this. He also does not insist on linkage of the Suez opening with a refugee settlement, though the UAR, supported by the Soviets, has continued to urge this in talks with us. Hussein's position on the role of the UN representative is not clear, but there is no doubt that the King would expect the UN emissary to seek Israeli withdrawal from Arab territory.

Israel would prefer to negotiate directly with the Arabs but is apparently willing to cooperate with a UN intermediary providing that the resolution under which he is appointed does not in any way prejudice the Israeli position.

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Best from its point of view would be a resolution doing nothing more than appointing the intermediary. It believes that principles, if stated, should be general and should not be presented as instructions to the intermediary. Israel has asserted privately that it will not cooperate with an intermediary appointed under a resolution, such as the Indian draft, which does not meet these requirements.

Israel specifically rejects any formulation which would appear to commit it in advance to withdrawal from all the occupied territory. It insists that withdrawal should only be to negotiated and mutually-recognized national borders, and has implied that in some areas it would expect such borders to diverge significantly from the pre-June 5 boundaries.

The Israeli position has been that the Suez Canal, when it is opened, must be opened to all ships, including Israeli. It rejects the idea that passage of Israeli ships through the canal should be linked to a solution of the refugee problem.

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KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, NOVEMBER 6-9, 1967

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-268

By is, NARA Date 4-3-00

JERUSALEM

Background. United States policy with regard to Jerusalem has been based on the corpus separatum provisions in the 1947 UN General Assembly partition resolution and a 1949 resolution reaffirming these provisions. Accordingly, while we have acknowledged de facto Israeli and Jordanian control in the respective sectors, we have not accepted their claims with respect to sovereignty over the city. These considerations remain the basis for our position concerning the future of Jerusalem.

On July 4 and 14, 1967, the UN General Assembly adopted two Pakistani-sponsored resolutions on Jerusalem. The first, inter alia, called upon Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem. (Adopted 99 to 0, with 20 abstentions.) The second resolution deplored the failure of Israel to implement the July 4 resolution and reiterated the earlier requests to Israel. (Adopted 99 to 0, with 18 abstentions.) The United States abstained on both resolutions. On July 14 Ambassador Goldberg explained that the United States had been unable to support the resolution because it believed that one aspect of the problem of Jerusalem should not be considered as an isolated issue, separate from the other elements of Jerusalem and of a peaceful settlement in the Near East. He also said that the administrative measures taken by the Government of Israel could not be considered other than interim and provisional and as not prejudging the final and permanent status of Jerusalem. Since July we have made no further public statements regarding Jerusalem.

Present situation. It is now clear that the Israelis consider themselves sovereign in the unified city and are proceeding to the full exercise of the rights that flow therefrom. Foreign Minister Eban's disclaimers that Israel had foreclosed a Jerusalem settlement which would recognize international interests must be interpreted in this context. Subsequent to the June decrees extending Israeli laws and municipal regulations, further steps have been quietly taken to assert Israeli control over municipal, postal and transportation services, currency, taxes, and customs duties, and to set up Israeli institutions and businesses in the Old City. Since the general strike in August there has been no serious demonstration of mass discontent, although there is considerable evidence of latent opposition to Israeli occupation.

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Prospects for agreement. The Israeli seizure and subsequent attitude have made plain that the pre-war status quo cannot be readily restored. We ourselves would not favor return to a physically divided city. It is equally certain that the Israelis would not accept internationalization of the entire city. On the other hand, the Arabs will never agree to peaceful settlement in the area which permits unqualified Israeli sovereignty over the entire city.

It seems probable that the Jordanians would rank their preferences for a Jerusalem solution in the following order:

1. Return to the pre-war status quo, probably conceding Israeli access to the Wailing Wall and other Jewish Holy Places.
2. An open city under GOI-GOJ condominium.
3. Internationalization of all Jerusalem.
4. Internationalization of the Old City.

The question of Jerusalem is probably the most difficult of the Arab-Israeli issues to resolve, and it is evident that no agreement among the parties on the future of the city is probable except in the context of an overall settlement.

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KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, NOVEMBER 6-9, 1967

REFUGEES

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-268
By is, NARA Date 4-3-00

Background. Jordan continues to be faced with an extremely serious refugee problem. Since hostilities some 200,000 persons have fled from the occupied West Bank to the East Bank, about half of whom are registered UNRWA refugees. About 55,000 refugees are now in temporary tent camps. Some 200-300 persons each day continue to cross into Jordan from the West Bank and Gaza.

While counselling GOJ restraint in their public statements on the problem, we have strongly urged the Israelis to allow the return of these new refugees. Thus far, Israel has not processed the great bulk of applications for return (and apparently does not intend to do so). Only some 14,000 people have actually moved back. The Israelis have a family reunification scheme which could lead to the return of several thousands more. We have felt, however, that Israeli has not been responsive enough on the overall problem, and we are continuing to press them on this issue. The Jordanian Government and UNRWA have expressed concern that, with winter coming on, many of the new refugees will suffer cold and disease because of a lack of proper shelter.

U.S. assistance to refugees. In June the U.S. agreed to furnish 10,000 tents plus the cost of air transportation in response to requests from the GOJ for shelter to meet the needs of the new refugees. We also provided small cooking stoves and offered to furnish blankets and household utensils for the refugees. On June 27 the President authorized a reserve of \$5 million to meet urgent relief needs of victims of the hostilities; \$2 million were immediately assigned to UNRWA for its emergency program. A total of \$340,000 has been contributed to the Red Cross for its work in the area.

In addition, NEED (Near East Emergency Donations) has undertaken a private campaign for funds to assist Arab refugees, particularly those displaced by the recent conflict. Thus far NEED has contributed \$2.5 million to UNRWA primarily for the emergency relief of the new displaced persons on the East Bank. King Hussein participated in the ceremony at which the first NEED check for \$1 million was presented to UNRWA.

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Prospects for settlement of refugee problem. President Johnson's 5 points of June 19 specifically included "justice for the refugees." We have resisted efforts by the UAR to link the refugee problem to the Suez Canal issue, believing that an association of these problems could only impede progress toward a general settlement. On the other hand, we envisage that a comprehensive peace settlement will contain provisions or guidelines for the implementation of a satisfactory solution to the problem posed by the refugees from the June 1967 conflict, as well as for the problem of the 1.3 million refugees from the 1948-49 conflict.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-268
By ia, NARA Date 4-3-00

KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, NOVEMBER 6-9, 1967

KING HUSSEIN'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS ISRAEL PRIOR TO
THE HOSTILITIES OF JUNE 5 AND HIS ACTIONS THEREAFTER
VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL

The Israeli attack at Samu in November 1966 caused King Hussein to change completely his estimate of Israeli intentions toward Jordan.

The Israeli attack at Samu, which was in retaliation for acts of infiltration which the Government of Jordan was making every effort to curb, led the King to conclude that Israel (a) no longer had an interest in the preservation of his regime and (b) harbored the desire to obtain control over the West Bank. Hussein could not believe that the internal upheaval which occurred in Jordan following the Samu attack had not been anticipated by the Israelis. Hussein also concluded that an Israeli objective was to try to line the United States up entirely on the side of Israel -- to remove, so to speak, the U.S. foot in both camps -- on the theory that from Israel's point of view maximum security for Israel would be obtained by the wholehearted commitment by the United States to Israel.

All efforts in the months following Samu to dislodge these ideas from the King's mind proved to no avail.

When Nasser occupied Sharm al-Shaykh Hussein concluded that a conflict was inevitable. He thought that if the conflict occurred quickly -- i.e., within a week of Nasser's occupation of Sharm al-Shaykh -- Jordan might be able to lie low and escape major involvement. By the second week of UAR occupation of Sharm al-Shaykh Hussein concluded that Jordan could not escape the coming conflict, no matter how much the Government of Jordan might wish to do so. Hussein also concluded in the coming conflict Israel would pursue what he considered to be her objectives of taking the West Bank. He was in fact fearful that Israel might not attack Nasser or Syria at all but would instead attack Jordan with the objective of taking over the West Bank. He cited to himself the examples of 1956 and 1966, when the Israelis were making noise against Jordan (1956) and Syria (1966), but instead attacked Egypt (1956) and Jordan (1966).

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Hussein called in the American Ambassador to ask him if the U.S. commitment to the territorial integrity of Jordan encompassed the dispatch of U.S. forces to Jordan within six hours of an Israeli attack against the West Bank. The American Ambassador replied that our guarantee of the territorial integrity of Jordan meant exactly what it said but that details of how it would be implemented would have to be decided at the time in the light of circumstances then existing. Hussein replied that unless there were American military intervention within hours of an Israeli attack, the Israelis would be able to exact what for Hussein would be an intolerable price for withdrawal.

Hussein's trip to Cairo was made in the context of obtaining military protection for the West Bank. Hussein believed that in signing the defense pact he would deter the Israelis from attacking the West Bank. He told the American Ambassador that he agreed to put Jordanian forces under Egyptian control in the event of hostilities so that, in the event of a military reverse, Nasser and not he would have to take the blame. Hussein had no idea that a military reverse would be of the proportions that actually occurred, nor did he envisage that the signing of the defense pact with Nasser would not have the result of deterring the Israelis, but rather the reverse.

Jordanian military strategy laid down by Glubb Pasha and followed by the Jordan Army ever since was essentially a defensive one. It was, given the size of the Jordan Army, well conceived, and General Khammash, Chief of Staff of the Jordan Army, told the Ambassador that he calculated Jordan might hold the West Bank for as long as one week against a major Israeli onslaught. (The strategy was that if the West Bank could be defended for one week, outside intervention would have the opportunity to materialize.)

On Monday, June 5, the first day of the war, when the Jordanian forces had been put under the command of General Abdul Monem Riadh, the Egyptian General who had been Chief of Staff of the United Arab Command and who had been sent to Amman for the purpose of taking command of the Jordan forces in the event of hostilities, Nasser sent an order to Amman ordering the Jordan Army to abandon its defensive positions and to launch a major offensive against Israel. Nasser told Amman (a) that his forces were already invading Israel and (b) his air force would furnish the necessary air cover. The truth was, of course, that Nasser's forces were being routed and his air force had been destroyed. Presumably Nasser gave the order for the Jordanian offensive in an effort to try to draw the Israelis off his back.

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Nasser's order was complied with by General Riadh and King Hussein. The defensive positions were torn apart and an offensive was launched. In the course of this, Jordanian forces were withdrawn from the Jenin area to take part in the offensive, the Israelis streamed through the Jenin opening, Jordanian forces hastily turned around to return to Jenin but ran out of gasoline before they could get there, and the Jordan military debacle on the West Bank was under way.

Hussein is today very bitter -- bitter against United States; bitter against the Soviet Union; bitter against Nasser; bitter against the other Arabs; and, above all, bitter against himself. He evidently had no military staff in Cairo -- at least he had no method of checking on Nasser's statement of Monday, June 5, that the UAR was invading Israel and that the UAR was in a position to provide air cover to the Jordan Army. When Hussein speaks, as he does in private, of the irresponsibility of Arab leaders, he includes himself, not for signing the pact with Nasser, which he still feels that in the circumstances he had no other choice but to do, but for his failure to ascertain Nasser's military position when Nasser ordered the Jordanian offensive.

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KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, NOVEMBER 6-9, 1967

MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND SALES TO JORDAN

Grant Aid. Following the termination of the United Kingdom subsidies to Jordan in March 1956, King Hussein turned to the U.S. as a major source of military equipment. During 1957 the U.S. provided Jordan with \$7 million in ground force equipment and in 1958 furnished \$3 million in air force equipment. Numerous additional requests for military assistance were subsequently received from the Government of Jordan. As a sequel to these requests, King Hussein specifically asked that the U.S. send a military survey mission to Jordan to conduct an on-the-spot survey of the requirements of the Jordan Arab Army. This took place on October 1958. As a result of the findings of this mission and U.S. policy decisions with respect to military assistance for Jordan, the United States programmed through FY 1967 \$53.2 million in grant military assistance for Jordan.

Included in the grant aid programs for Jordan have been 145 medium tanks, 100 armored personnel carriers, 130 artillery pieces (all types), and 295 vehicles. In addition, we have furnished 4 C-47 aircraft and 12 Hawker-Hunter aircraft.

The proposed program for FY 68 in the amount of \$1.9 million covers training, maintenance, spares and other services. Only the training portion of this program, \$.2 million, is being implemented. Currently 18 students are participating in MAP grant training courses. In addition, 23 students are training in connection with military sales contracts.

Sales (Ground Force Equipment). On 18 March 1965 the United States agreed to sell to Jordan ground force equipment amounting to \$44.5 million, with delivery during FY 1965, 1966 and 1967, with a provision for \$15 million in credit. Some of the major items in the package are: 100 M-48 tanks, 50 armored personnel carriers, 20 M-42 SP 40 mm AA guns and 1550 commercial-type vehicles. This sale was contingent on Jordan's agreement not to accept any Soviet type equipment into its inventory. The agreement provided for possible additional future sales of ground equipment.

Sales (F-104A/B aircraft). The US and Jordan agreed on 29 March 1966 to the sale of twelve F-104 A/B aircraft and supporting defense articles and services. The agreement allowed Jordan to exercise an option to purchase

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Authority: DOD Directive 5200.30
By jc, NARA, Date 3-11-02
State Guidelines

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an additional 24 F-104 A/B aircraft if it satisfied certain conditions. Total cost of the 36 aircraft, together with supporting defense articles and services, was \$54.6 million. This option was designed to meet a U.S. desire to limit the sale to 12 aircraft and yet to permit Jordan to demonstrate that it has met in substance a United Arab Command requirement of 36 aircraft. Because of financial restraints, Jordan was unable to exercise its option on 1 January 1967 to purchase 24 additional aircraft. As the result of a successful fund raising campaign by Hussein during the spring of 1967, the Jordanians orally agreed to purchase six of the 24 aircraft covered by the option and were granted a new option for the remaining 18. The first 12 aircraft were to have been delivered between July 1967 and January 1968.

Other Sales. During FY 62-1964 the US implemented miscellaneous sales to Jordan in the amount of \$2.4 million. These sales included spare parts, training, ammunition and communications equipment.

Pipeline: Grant Aid. Approximately \$3.7 million remains in the funded pipeline for Jordan. Most of this is in the nature of training ammunition, communications equipment, miscellaneous equipment, vehicles and spare parts.

Pipeline (Ground Force Equipment). The undelivered materiel portion in the ground force package is approximately \$7.0 million and includes spare parts for weapons, tanks, armored personnel carriers and other vehicles. Prior to the current crisis, it was forecast that most of this equipment would be delivered by the end of 1967. In view of recent battle losses in tanks and combat vehicles, Jordan has expressed a desire to substitute other equipment (small arms, ammunition, communications and engineering equipment, spares and miscellaneous equipment) for spare parts no longer required.

Pipeline: F-104 A/B Aircraft. Approximately \$4.1 million in equipment has been delivered to Jordan. This includes spare parts, ammunition, ground support equipment and other communications equipment. Except for the FAA type communications equipment, which was destroyed by the Israeli air strikes during 5-10 June, the F-104 A/B type equipment shipped is in good condition.

Status of Deliveries. Grant materiel aid and sales to Jordan were suspended as a result of the hostilities. Earlier this year King Hussein asked the U.S. for an agreement that in principle he could still look to the US for arms procurement. Hussein was informed that the US had made no decision in principle against supplying arms to Jordan.

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Given Congressional sentiment on this question, we cannot resume any arms supply to Jordan at this particular time. With a settlement of the Middle East crisis, however, we should be able to provide Jordan with reasonable quantities of arms. We would hope that favorable developments might permit us to resume some shipments of military equipment, other than major combat items, in the fairly near future. As a first step we should have to consult again with the Congress. In the interim we are prepared to support certain of Jordan's requests from Western European suppliers.

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KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, NOVEMBER 6-9, 1967

JORDAN POTASH PROJECT

Background. Over the past five years negotiations have been underway on a \$103 million Jordan Potash Project involving the construction of a potash extraction facility with a capacity of 1.2 million metric tons annually at the southern end of the Dead Sea. Financing plans involve the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Kuwait Government, private U.S. (W.R. Grace and Co. and Tenneco) and Jordanian firms, and AID Development Loan funds. Action on the project, for which AID had planned to authorize a \$15.5 million Development Loan in May 1967, has been delayed because of the political situation.

The Jordanian Government, the Arab Potash Company, the IBRD and IFC and, presumably, the Kuwait Fund are prepared to proceed with their respective commitments. However, in October AID was advised by IFC that due to the present political situation, W.R. Grace and Co. has withdrawn from the project. Grace still considers the project to be technically sound and would be prepared to review their position if political conditions improve. The GOJ is anxious to move ahead on the project and we expect the King to raise this subject during his visit.

Current Status. IFC and AID are exploring ways to proceed with the project. AID is prepared to participate with the GOJ in initiating the experimental construction phase if a well supervised construction program can be designed that can eventually be incorporated into the project.

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KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, NOVEMBER 6-9, 1967

CROW CONSTRUCTION COMPANY CLAIM
JERUSALEM AIRPORT LOAN

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By ju, NARA, Date 8-16-99

Background. The William Crow Construction Company of New York was working on the Jerusalem Airport in Jordan under an AID financed loan project when war broke out. Subsequently, about \$800,000 worth of their equipment was brought under Israeli control. \$700,000 worth of this equipment was later recovered and returned to Crow and has since been stored near Amman.

Under Crow's contract with Jordan, there is a very broad war damage clause and Crow has been attempting to recover from Jordan payment for work done through June 5, the value of the missing and damaged equipment, as well as losses sustained due to cessation of work under the force majeure provisions of the construction contract. Crow is required to pursue and preserve his administrative and legal remedies against Jordan before calling on his insurance contract with AID. We are advised Crow is submitting a claim along the following lines:

a) Work completed through June 5 and demobilization	466,900
b) Expenses of recovering equipment and moving to Amman	25,100
c) Overhead from June 5 (\$14,500 per month)	72,500
d) Downtime from June 5 (\$41,227 per month)	206,135
e) Loss of equipment due to war	133,912
f) War and depreciation from use by occupying forces	40,000
g) Repairs to recovered equipment	28,000
Estimated Total	<u>\$972,547</u>

Crow lists items e, f, and g as applicable against the specific risk guarantees, leaving \$770,635 to be covered by Jordan.

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William Crow has just returned from Jordan where he met with high level officials. He was unable to reach any kind of satisfactory settlement, not even the payment for work completed through June 5.

Current status. Crow is seeking Congressional intervention, in particular he has asked Congressman Ogden Reid to intercede with AID to stop budget support assistance to Jordan until some agreement is reached. To prevent adverse Congressional and public opinion at this particular time, it would be desirable if arrangements could be worked out whereby Jordan would pay for the work completed through June 5 and Crow and Jordan negotiate the remaining items of the claim.

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KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, NOVEMBER 6-9, 1967

Background Paper

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JORDAN'S ECONOMIC SITUATION

Area: 37,300 square miles (East and West Bank)
(approximately same as Indiana).

Population: 1.9 million (East and West Bank).

Recent Growth: Until the June war Jordan was second only to Israel among Near Eastern countries in the rapidity of its economic growth and had attained a level of per capita GNP equal to or slightly better than Turkey, Syria and Iraq. Economic conditions were depressed by the war and GNP growth has slowed if not halted since. Economic aid from the U.S. and others (including the wealthy Arab states) has played a key role in Jordan's economic expansion and has been more than ample both before and since the war, as is evidenced by Jordan's increasing foreign exchange reserves. Because of drastically reduced demands for imports, reserves have grown much more rapidly since the war.

Economic Structure: Agriculture is the heart of the economy, giving livelihood to two-thirds of the people. Dry farming predominates, with wheat and barley the chief crops, but the irrigated area under cultivation has more than doubled since 1955. Improvement in yields on irrigated lands, producing mainly vegetables and fruits, is striking. The most notable agricultural project is the expanding East Ghor irrigation scheme, made possible by U.S. aid, using Yarmouk River water on lands in the Jordan valley lying east of the Jordan River.

The only known exploitable mineral resources are phosphate and potash from the Dead Sea. Manufacturing has very limited potential for development.

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Future Prospects: With the remarkable advancement of the last decade, the prospects of Jordan's achieving economic independence were beginning to look brighter. The recent hostilities have left Jordan with grave economic problems. With the loss of West Bank markets for Jordan's small industrial establishment, business activity is depressed. Jordan's principal banks had branch offices and substantial lines of credit on the West Bank. Israeli occupation of the West Bank has left these financial institutions in uncertain condition. Tourism, Jordan's principal foreign exchange earner, is at a standstill and Jordan may lose as much as 75% of its tourist trade if the West Bank sites are lost. Jordan also faces the care and feeding of thousands of evacuees from the West Bank. Until the fate of the West Bank is determined, it is difficult to predict Jordan's economic future.

However, Jordan's difficulties have left it, at least temporarily, in better financial shape than before. Although loss of the West Bank deprived Jordan of about 50% of its potential foreign exchange earnings, it relieved Jordan of a like amount of import demand. The combination of reduced import demand on the East Bank (due to depressed conditions there) and increased aid from its wealthy Arab allies raised Jordan's already high foreign exchange reserves nearly \$60 million the first two months after the war and they are still rising.

As a consequence of the Khartoum meeting in August, Jordan received commitments for assistance from other Arab states which, if they are honored, will further enhance its financial situation. The principal challenge will be to reinvigorate the stagnating economy and restore confidence in the development potential of the country so that available resources will be put to good use.

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KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, NOVEMBER 6-9, 1967

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U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

U.S. Assistance, FY 1952-1967. U.S. economic assistance totalling \$517 million from 1952 through 1967 created a base for continued economic growth. The Jordanians increased domestic revenues, improved the management of their financial and institutional resources, and engaged in sound planning with heavy emphasis on income-producing activities.

The U.S. in FY 1967 provided \$32 million in grant budget support. We also gave \$3.9 million in technical assistance. This \$36 million constitutes almost one-third of the government budget. We also provided PL 480 wheat and flour. U.S. support of UNRWA for Jordan's Palestinian refugees constitutes a form of indirect aid.

U.S. Assistance in FY 1968. In FY 1968 the U.S. is providing technical assistance as feasible and has made one budget support payment of \$6.2 million.

Following the June war, contributions from other Arab states as well as rising foreign exchange reserves have enhanced Jordan's financial position. Further budget support from the U.S. at this time is not justifiable on economic grounds.

We are hopeful that the government will focus its attention on efficient utilization of its resources for economic development purposes. We are prepared to make a small amount of grant funds available which could be used for sector studies in agriculture or vocational education, or for other studies such as development of data for a comprehensive ground water development program. We are encouraging the Jordanians to plan ahead for activities in the post settlement period.

Should the need for supplemental U.S. funds develop and subject to availability of funds, we will be prepared to consider further assistance providing the Jordanians have committed their own resources including aid from the Arab states to development. We have contingency plans in the event Arab subsidies to Jordan stop.

We will consider Government of Jordan requests for PL 480 programs.

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III . BIOGRAPHIC DATA

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King HUSSEIN I

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Hussein I, born in Amman in 1935, ascended the throne at the age of 18. By 1956 he began to assume an increasingly active role in affairs of state, and his success in quelling sporadic civil disorder in Jordan won him considerable world acclaim for his courage and skill. His genius for survival -- especially after the Samu raid and the recent hostilities -- and the support of the Army and Bedouin tribes have enabled him to contain Jordan's dissident elements.

The 1964 rapprochement between Hussein and Nasser began to crumble in 1965, and by 1966 Hussein was virulently attacked by Cairo press and radio. The tensions of last May forced Hussein into a military pact with the UAR. Despite the defeat of Jordanian forces by Israel, his relations with Nasser are currently friendly, and he remains popular in his own country.

King Hussein is friendly, courteous and personable, but somewhat shy. Generally capable of resolute and determined action, he occasionally shows evidence of emotionalism. Our Embassy's relations with the King and his Cabinet have been close and highly satisfactory.

He is a qualified jet and helicopter pilot and is particularly attracted to daring sports, such as "go-kart" racing and water-skiing.

Hussein's grandfather, King Abdullah, was assassinated in 1951; his father abdicated because he was mentally disturbed. Divorced from his first wife, Hussein married Antoinette Gardiner, the daughter of a British military adviser, in 1961. He has two sons by his present wife -- now known as Princess Muna -- and a daughter by his first wife.

In 1965 the King by-passed his own sons to make his youngest brother, Hassan, Crown Prince.

Hussein made official visits to the U.S. in 1959 and 1964, and a working visit in June, 1967. He speaks fluent English.

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Sharif NASIR bin Jamil

Chief Military Aide to King Hussein

Major General Sharif Nasir bin Jamil, King Hussein's uncle, is one of the King's closest advisers, friends and supporters. One of the most hated and feared men in Jordan, Nasir's notorious illegal traffic of arms and drugs have placed a strain on his relationship with Hussein. An ultra-conservative monarchist who realizes that his own tenure is in direct relationship to the King's, he is also one of the regime's strongest bulwarks and is known to maintain an extensive intelligence network within the Jordan Arab Army (JAA). The recent move of the King to have Nasir "kicked upstairs" by appointing him Chief Military Aide and to have his former position (Deputy Commander in Chief of the JAA) abolished, has long been considered the most difficult step Hussein would face in reforming the Jordan Government.

A competent soldier and leader of men, Nasir is respected as a commander and for his ability to "play the game." Even those officers who hate Nasir and all he represents acknowledge respect for him as a soldier. Nevertheless, his image has been poor throughout Jordan, especially on the West Bank.

He first earned Hussein's complete trust in 1957 when he helped uncover the assassination plot against the King by former Chief of Staff 'Ali Abu Nuwar and his supporters. A short time later he was named chief of the Royal Guard Regiment, charged with palace security. He rose through the military ranks, was named commander of the East Front Command (the most important single Jordanian field command) in the September 1962 army reorganization and was selected as former Commander in Chief Habis Majali's deputy on 4 May 1965.

Nasir was born on 10 May 1926 in either Amman or Alexandria. He is descended from the Prophet in the Hashemite line; his great-grandfather was Sharif 'Ali, the Amir of Mecca. Nasir is also the younger brother of Queen Zayn, King Hussein's mother. General Nasir is pro-West, anti-Communist and anti-Nasir. He has never forgiven the Iraqis for overthrowing the Hashemites in 1958 and remains an adamant, implacable opponent of any "republican" regime in Baghdad.

Sharif Nasir studied in Alexandria and Jordan; he claims to have graduated from the Iraqi Royal Military Academy in 1948 with degrees in Arab, English and French. He served in the Iraqi Army for two years, reportedly with the Rammaha Division in North Africa. When his brother-in-law, Talal, became King of Jordan (1951), Sharif Nasir returned to Amman and joined the Arab Legion. During Talal's reign Nasir was royal military aide, technical member of the general staff of the 1st Armored Car Brigade and supervisor of

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the Armored Car Training Center. With Hussein's ascension, Nasir was named aide-de-camp and chief of the royal household.

Nasir has two children, Jamil and Zayn, by his first wife. In September 1966 he married Hind Ibrahim Mango, the attractive, well-educated 29-year-old daughter of a businessman. Nasir is a Sunni Muslim but he is not known for his regular attendance at religious services. He drinks and smokes and is congenial and hospitable. Nasir is an avid sportsman, likes hunting, horse racing and fast cars, in addition to women and gambling. He is always pleasant and affable with Americans. He speaks English and French in addition to his native Arabic.

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Abdul Moneim RIFA'I

Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

Abdul Moneim Rifa'i was appointed Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in the 18 October 1967 Cabinet. Highly regarded by US officials, Rifa'i has served in numerous diplomatic posts in the past. Immediately prior to his recent appointment he was Ambassador to the UAR and a delegate to the 1967 emergency session of the UN. He served as head of the Jordanian representation in the UN from 1959 to 1965. Rifa'i, who is pro-West, is easily one of Jordan's most sophisticated, cultured officials. In the UN, where he had a carte blanche degree of autonomy, Rifa'i became noted for his moderate and unemotional approach to the Palestine and Yemen issues. He is considered to be frank, friendly and approachable although vain and possessing a mind of his own.

Rifa'i was born in Tyre, Lebanon on 21 March 1915 to a prominent Sunni Muslim family originating in the Hejaz. In 1937 he graduated from the American University of Beirut with degrees in Arabic literature and political science. The following year Rifa'i entered the services of the royal court as private secretary to King 'Abdullah, assistant royal chamberlain and secretary general of Transjordan. Abdul Moneim was extremely close to the palace during this period and was able to establish his own reputation as a qualified official. Rifa'i's diplomatic experience began in 1945 when he was named consul in Cairo. In 1946 he was named consul general in Damascus and Beirut.

In 1949 Rifa'i was appointed counselor of legation in Washington and official observer at the UN General Assembly; the following year he became Minister to Iran and Pakistan. He returned to the US in September 1953 as a Minister; that December he became Ambassador to the US, serving concurrently as Jordan's first Permanent Representative to the UN. In April 1957, Rifa'i was named Ambassador to Egypt and, three months later, Ambassador to Lebanon. In 1958 Rifa'i served as Ambassador to the UK for a short time. He was then appointed director of national guidance.

In May 1959 Rifa'i became Permanent Representative to the UN. Two years later he was recalled but was returned to the position in February 1962. From that time until 1965 Rifa'i had almost complete authority in determining Jordan UN tactics. His recommendations regarding UN matters generally became Jordanian policy. Other Arab representatives at the UN also sought his advice on delicate questions. In early 1963 Rifa'i was given the additional assignment chief of the Jordan delegation to the Arab League. Rifa'i became Hussein's key man in the negotiations toward a rapprochement with the UAR. Rifa'i remained at the UN until August 1965 when he was transferred to the Foreign Ministry.

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In June 1967 Rifa'i returned to the UN as one of Jordan's delegates to the emergency session following the Arab-Israeli War. That month he was named Permanent Representative-delegate to the UN. In October he was one of the four delegates selected by the Arab members to negotiate in their behalf in the UN.

A pleasant man with a friendly and unaffected manner, Rifa'i enjoys social life and is an amusing conversationalist. A widely read Arab poet, Rifa'i published a poem in 1967. Rifa'i is divorced and has one son who was born in 1952. The Minister speaks Arabic, English, French and some Turkish and Persian.

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Abdul Hamid SHARAF

Ambassador to the US

By is, NARA Date 4-3-00

Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharaf served as Minister of Information from 1965 to June, 1967 when he was appointed Ambassador to the US, and has survived several cabinet changes. He is described as pro-West, but not hesitant to criticize Western policy. As a follower of former Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal, Sharaf himself has no political following; he relies chiefly on his own ability and experience to keep himself in office.

Sharaf was born in Baghdad, Iraq, in 1939 to an Iraqi branch of the Hashemite family. However, he is not particularly close to his cousin, King Hussein. Sharaf's father served briefly as Regent of Iraq before the British occupation of that country in 1941. Abdul Hamid attended the American University of Beirut (AUB), earning a BA in philosophy in 1959 and an MA in international relations in 1962. He was given the position of chief of the Arab and Palestine Affairs Section of the Foreign Ministry's Department of Political Affairs in 1962. In 1963 Sharaf was named to a committee investigating the effectiveness of the Hashemite Broadcasting Service (HBS); that April he was appointed its director general. Sharaf was transferred to the Prime Ministry in April 1964. A few weeks later he was named chief of the Royal Cabinet, the post he held until his August 1965 appointment as Minister of Information.

Despite his youth Sharaf has been a member of several official Jordanian delegations to other international conferences. He came to the US as a student in 1960 to do research and returned in 1962 as a delegate to the UN General Assembly.

A Sunni Muslim, Sharaf claims descent from the Prophet and has the title Sharif (the Honorable), which precedes his name. He is described as quiet, serious, courteous and an interesting conversationalist with a good sense of humor. Embassy officials who have dealt with Sharaf have found him frank, cooperative and friendly, his chief negative qualities being arrogance and condescension.

In 1965 Sharaf married Layla Najjar, a Lebanese Druze, who worked for the Lebanese television industry. Mrs. Sharaf is also a graduate of AUB. The Sharafs have a son, Nasir, born in 1966. Abdul Hamid Sharaf's hobbies include reading, painting, swimming and horseback riding. He is a Mason. Sharaf speaks good English in addition to his native Arabic. He smokes and drinks moderately.

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Zayd RIFA'I

Chief of Royal Protocol

Zayd Rifa'i, the eldest son of the late Prime Minister Samir al-Rifa'i, is the young US-educated Chief of Royal Protocol. The Rifa'i family position is undoubtedly responsible for Zayd's various governmental appointments and his future in the government will depend to a great extent upon the family's political fortunes. Rifa'i, in the Foreign Ministry, was extremely cooperative with US officials. He is believed to be pro-American.

Rifa'i was born in Amman in 1936. He attended Victoria College in Egypt for his secondary schooling (1949-1953) and graduated from Harvard University in 1956 with an AB degree. His first Foreign Ministry assignment (1957) was to the embassy in Beirut where he served under his uncle, Ambassador Abdul Moneim Rifa'i, currently Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. The following year he received the first of his many appointments as a member of the Jordanian delegations to the UN General Assembly. By 1960 Rifa'i was chief of the UN and International Affairs Section of the Ministry. He returned to New York in 1965 and 1967 as a member of the Jordanian delegation to the UN. Rifa'i was assigned to the embassy in London as first secretary in 1962. Rifa'i returned to Amman and the Foreign Ministry in January 1964, served as assistant chief of the Royal Diwan during the early summer and, in August, became Chief of Royal Protocol. In April 1965 he returned to the Foreign Ministry where he served as chief of the Economic Section and then Chief of the Foreign Department. Rifa'i returned to his former position, Chief of Royal Protocol, in 1966.

Rifa'i is a pleasant, well-mannered, good-looking young man. In November 1959 he married Carola Collier, a British subject he met in New York City. This marriage apparently did not last; in 1965 Rifa'i reportedly stated he intended to marry a Jordanian citizen living in Beirut. A son, Samir, was born to the Rifa'is in the summer of 1966. Rifa'i speaks English and some French in addition to his native Arabic.

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