

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
002	memo	Walt Rostow to LBJ; sanitized, 01/04 dup. #17, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 35, Box 19	S	1	7/23/67	A
002a	cable	Intelligence Information Cable; exempt per RAC, 10/99 dup. #17a, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 35, Box 19	S	4	7/22/67	A
002b	cable	Intelligence Information Cable; exempt per RAC, 10/99 dup. #17b, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 35, Box 19	S	5	7/22/67	A
002c	cable	Intelligence Information Cable; exempt per RAC, 10/99 dup. #17c, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 35, Box 19	S	2	7/22/67	A
003	memo	Walt Rostow to LBJ; sanitized 6/01 dup. #28, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 35, Box 19	S	1	7/22/67	A
003a	cable	Intelligence Information Cable; exempt per RAC, 10/99 dup. #28a, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 35, Box 19	S	7	7/21/67	A
006	draft	Draft memo from McGeorge Bundy to LBJ through Walt Rostow	S	3	7/18/67	A

Collection Title National Security File, Files of the Special Committee of the NSC

Folder Title "Jordan"

Box Number 5

Restriction Codes

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 13292 governing access to national security information.
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7/12/2007

rls
Initials

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011	memo	McGeorge Bundy to LBJ dup. #36 this file	S	2	6/27/67	A
022	memo	Harold Saunders to Ruth Booth	S	1	6/11/68	A
023	memo	Walt Rostow to LBJ; sanitized 3/01 dup. #83, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 37, Box 20	S	1	8/3/67	A
023a	memo	for Mr. J. P. Walsh; sanitized, 5/01 dup. #83a, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol, 37, Box 20	S	3	8/3/67	A
025	report	re King Hussein	S	3	7/6/67	A
028	cable	text of Amman 4592; exempt per RAC, 10/99	S	8	7/17/67	A
030	note	from Roger dup. #31 this file	PCI	1	6/30/67	A
030a	cable	State 215869 to Beirut	S	3	6/24/67	A
030b	cable	Amman 4658 dup. #43 this file	S	6	6/26/67	A
030c	cable	Beirut 11813	S	2	6/27/67	A

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030d	cable	Jidda 5575	S	4	6/27/67	A
031	note	dup. #30	PCI	1	6/30/67	A
036	memo	dup. #11	S	2	6/27/67	A
043	cable	dup. #30b	S	6	6/26/67	A
045	report	Study Paper	S	2	6/23/67	A
046	report	Study Paper	S	14	6/23/67	A
047	draft	Draft Foreign Office Paper	C	7	[6/67]	A
047a	report	Annex re The Economic Consequences...	PCI	4	6/16/67	A
050	memo	for McGeorge Bundy; exempt per RAC, 10/99	S	1	6/21/67	A
050a	report	Intelligence report; exempt per RAC, 10/99	S	4	6/21/67	A
052	draft	Draft memo from McGeorge Bundy to LBJ	C	2	6/14/67	A

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057	cable	Amman 895	C	2	8/16/67	A
058	cable	Amman 889	C	2	8/16/67	A
059	cable	Amman 912	S	1	8/16/67	A
062	cable	London 1017	S	4	8/13/67	A
063	cable	Amman 840	C	1	8/13/67	A
065	cable	Amman 841	C	2	8/13/67	A
066	cable	Amman 833	C	2	8/12/67	A
070	cable	State 19548 to Amman	C	2	8/11/67	A
071	cable	State 19492 to Amman	C	1	8/11/67	A
073	cable	Amman 800	C	5	8/10/67	A
074	cable	Amman 801	C	3	8/10/67	A

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075	cable	Amman 796	C	1	8/10/67	A
076	cable	Amman 781	C	2	8/10/67	A
077	cable	Amman 777, corrected copy	C	2	8/10/67	A
078	cable	Amman 778 dup. #79 this file	S	1	8/10/67	A
079	cable	dup. #78	S	1	8/10/67	A
080	cable	Amman 736	S	4	8/9/67	A
081	cable	State 17813 to London	S	2	8/8/67	A
083	cable	Amman 752	C	1	8/8/67	A
083a	cable	Amman 753	C	3	8/8/67	A
084	cable	Amman 740	C	6	8/8/67	A
086	cable	Amman 734	C	2	8/8/67	A

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087	cable	Amman 727, corrected copy dup. #62, NSF, Country File, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 9," Box 111	S	2	8/7/67	A
088	cable	Amman 726	C	2	8/7/67	A
089	cable	Amman 713	C	2	8/7/67	A
090	cable	Amman 699	C	3	8/6/67	A
091	cable	Amman 697	C	2	8/6/67	A
094	cable	Amman 684	S	2	8/5/67	A
095	cable	Amman 681	C	2	8/5/67	A
096	cable	Amman 670	C	2	8/5/67	A
099	cable	Amman 661 dup. #100 this file	C	2	8/3/67	A
100	cable	dup. #99	C	2	8/3/67	A

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101	cable	Amman 649 dup. #105 this file	S	1	8/3/67	A
103	cable	Amman 654, corrected copy	S	2	8/3/67	A
104	cable	Amman 652	C	2	8/3/67	A
105	cable	dup. #101	S	1	8/3/67	A
106	cable	Amman 628	S	2	8/2/67	A
108	cable	Amman 586 dup. #110 this file	C	2	7/31/67	A
110	cable	near dup. #108	C	2	7/31/67	A
111	cable	Amman 581	C	1	7/30/67	A
113	cable	Amman 577	C	3	7/29/67	A
116	cable	Amman 553	C	2	7/28/67	A
118	cable	Amman 545	C	2	7/27/67	A

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119	cable	Amman 544	C	2	7/27/67	A
124	cable	Amman 525	C	2	7/26/67	A
125	cable	Amman 488	C	6	7/25/67	A
127	cable	Amman 501 dup. #128 this file	C	2	7/25/67	A
128	cable	dup. #127	C	2	7/25/67	A
132	cable	Amman 413	C	1	7/20/67	A
133	cable	Amman 414	C	2	7/20/67	A
151	cable	State 4969 to Tel Aviv	S	2	7/11/67	A
159	cable	Amman 128	S	3	7/7/67	A
161	cable	Amman 118	S	1	7/7/67	A
164	cable	Amman 88	C	1	7/5/67	A

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167	cable	Amman 58	S	1	7/4/67	A
168	cable	Amman 42	C	2	7/3/67	A
171	cable	Amman 37	C	3	7/2/67	A
174	cable	Amman 31 dup. #175	S	2	7/1/67	A
175	cable	dup. #174	S	2	7/1/67	A
181	cable	Amman 24 dup. #182	C	2	7/1/67	A
182	cable	Dup. #181	C	2	7/1/67	A
183	cable	Amman 15	C	1	7/1/67	A
187	cable	Ankara 6463	S	5	6/30/67	A
190	cable	Amman 4458 dup. #43, NSF, Country File, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 6, Box 108, Exempt 10/03	S	2	6/19/67	A

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7/12/2007

Initials

1

Memoranda

✓ Jordan 2

Mr Bundy

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, July 23, 1967 -- 11:15 am

Mr. President:


These three intelligence reports, bearing on Hussein, show:

-- He is more confident and feels under less time pressure in pursuing a moderate policy;

-- There are noises in Syria, including a reported suggestion from the Soviet ambassador that Hussein should be assassinated.

Given the role of the Soviets in Syria in triggering the mobilization in Sinai, we may want to consider telling Dobrynin that we have such a report and do not like it.

W. W. Rostow



~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

SANITIZED
Authority NWJ 03-218 (#17)
By rls/ly, NARA, Date 6-28-07

✓ Jordan
3
Mr Bundy

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, July 22, 1967 -- 1:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

This highly rational discussion between the Soviet Ambassador in Jordan and Hussein is of a piece with Soviet behavior in New York, where they openly pressed a resolution at least as good from our point of view as the Latin American resolution.

It is much too soon to judge, but it may be that post-Hollybush they have emerged with a Middle East policy that is tolerably moderate.

See also attached report [redacted] indicating that they yesterday urged Morocco to "recognize the existence" of Israel.

W. W. Rostow

[redacted]

WWRostow:rln

SANITIZED
Authority NLT/RAL 00-208
By clm/s NARA, Date 6-28-07

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

67 JUL RECEIVED 12 76
WACA

JUL 22 12 36

36

Rawlson

EHX239
OO RUEHEX
DE RUEHC 19741 2031225
ZNY SSSSS ZFH2
O R 221046Z JUL 67
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2452
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 362
RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 76
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 189
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 83
RUQTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 48
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 63
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 62
RUDKMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 171
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 338
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TELAVIV 48
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 129
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 323
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN 126
RUFPBK/USCINCEUR FOR POLAD
ZEN AMCONSUL CASABLANCA UNN
ZEN/AMCONSUL TANGIER UNN
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ RABAT 301

PRIME MINISTER BENHIMA TOLD ME EVENING JULY 21 GOM
HAD BEEN APPROACHED (APPARENTLY THAT MORNING)
BY SOVIET AMB URGING GOM "RECOGNIZE EXISTENCE" ISRAEL.
TASCA
BT

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *pk/s*, NARA, Date 6-28-07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Jordan
✓
4
Chern

Friday, July 21, 1967 -- 7:45 a. m.

Mr. President:

At 2:00 a. m. last night the attached cable (Tab A) was telephoned to me. It had taken about 5 hours to get this flash to Amman, down to the Consulate at the Port of Aqaba and back.

Given the fact the ship was leaving Aqaba at noon today our time, and required time for unloading, I decided a response shouldn't wait until morning.

Since the shipment turned out to be small and essentially non-lethal, I took the responsibility of telling them to okay it. With the question answered and Bob McNamara's and Nick's recommendation and my previous discussion with you, I did not think it appropriate to awaken you on this matter.

If my judgment was wrong and you wish to reverse this decision, I believe we could still barely do it.

(Tab B)

As you will see from the outgoing, we stressed to the Jordanian government that there should be no publicity concerning this shipment.

The background cable, with its assessment of the cost to Hussein and our relations if the ship was not unloaded, is at Tab C.

W. W. Rostow

Flash to Sec State MAP-0710 Jul 67
State 10625, July 21, 1967

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By sp/ls, NARA, Date 6/20/07

WWRostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4a

NNNN
ZCZCSCAT542 IN CONTROL 18384 7-21-67 140AM GER
*****ZZ RUEHC
DE RUQMG 41GB 2020539
ZNY CCCCC
Z 210525Z JUL 67
FM USDAO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE FLASH
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MAP-0710 JUL 67
REF: STATE 10447, DTG: 210005Z JUL 67
SHIPMENT CONSISTS OF 177 BOXES, WEIGHING 47,000, COMPOSED
PRIMARILY OF SPARE PARTS FOR VEHICLE, RADIO TUBE AND PARTS,
MACHINE PARTS, AIRCRAFT PARTS AND TIRES, TOOLS, TRACK VEHICLE
TREADS AND BATTERIES. DOLLAR VALUE ESTIMATED LESS THAN
\$50,000. GP-4
BT

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By pc/sf, NARA, Date 6-28-07

FLASH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXDIS

46

RECEIVED
WHCA

21 JUL 21 06 53

ZCZCEHA019
*****ZZ RUEHEX
DE RUEHC 10625 2020648
ZNY CCCCC
Z 210628Z JUL 67
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO WHITE HOUSE
Z 210628Z JUL 67 ZFF-6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 2444
RUEDPSA/CINCSRIKE
STATE GRNC
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 10625

EXDIS

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

REFERENCE: AMMAN 415

1. WE ARE ENDEAVORING REACH OWNER TO INSTRUCT MASTER HELLENIC DOLPHIN UNLOAD AQABA 174 BOXES SPARE PARTS. AS WE MAY NOT REPEAT NOT REACH OWNER FOR SEVERL HOURS, DEFENSE ATTACHE SHOULD SO INSTRUCT MASTER OFFLOAD BOXES.

2. YOU MAY INFORM KING OUR ACTION.

3. YOU SHOULD STRESS WITH GOJ IMPORTANCE THERE BEING NO REPEAT NO PUBLICITY THIS SHIPMENT.

GP-3. RUSK
BT

EXDIS

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By je/rs, NARA, Date 6-28-07

JUL 20 23 39

EMX179
OO RUEHEX
DE RUEHC 18215 2012335
ZNY CCCCC ZFH2
O 202145Z JUL 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2962
INFO RUEKDA/DOD
RUEDPSA/CINCSRIKE
STATE GRNC
BT

4c

By Burns

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AMMAN 415

DOD FOR OSD/ISA, DA/DCSLOG, MSTs

JOINT EMBASSY/DATT

1. GREEK REGISTRY HELLENIC DOLPHIN ARRIVED AQABA 1500 ZULU JULY 20 WITH 174 BOXES SPARE PARTS UNDER FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS) CASES UBM AND UBN. SHIP'S AGENT SHOWED JORDAN ARMY PORT COMMANDER LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS FROM STEAMSHIP COMPANY DATED JUNE 23 STATING THAT MILITARY CARGO WAS NOT RPT NOT TO BE OFF-LOADED AT AQABA BUT TO BE DIVERTED TO NEW ORLEANS OR NEW YORK. HELLENIC DOLPHIN SCHEDULED TO DEPART AQABA 1700 ZULU JULY 21. SHIP CARRIED COMMERCIAL CARGO WHICH NOW BEING OFFLOADED.

2. PRIME MINISTER CALLED EMBOFF AT 2000 ZULU UNDER INSTRUCTIONS

PAGE 2 RUQMKT 415A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
FROM KING ASKING EXPLANATION AND REQUESTING THAT ARRANGEMENTS BE MADE AUTHMRTIZE SHIP UNLOAD CARGO IN QUESTION. CASE ALREADY THREATENING BECOME CAUSE CELEBRE WITH MANY PEOPLE IN AND OUT OF ARMY AWARE OF PROBLEM. HE INDICATED THIS WOULD BE VERY SERIOUS FOR KING IF NOT STRAIGHTENED OUT. DEPUTY OF GENERAL KHAMMASH ALSO CALLED DAO/MAP OFFICER AND ASKED IF INSTRUCTIONS TO THE SHIP PERHAPS RELATED PERIOD HOSTILITIES ARE NOT OUTDATED.

3. WE HAD NO ADVANCE NOTICE THIS SHIP'S SCHEDULED ARRIVAL R CARGO. MATERIAL IN QUESTIMN LIMITED TO SPARE PARTS AND IS CLEARLY NON-LETHAL. REPERCUSSIONS THIS INCIDENT FOR BOTH KING AND US INTERESTS CAN OBVIOUSLY BE FAR RANGING. URGE IMMEDIATE ACTION AUTHORIZE UNLOADING THIS CARGO. RECOMMEND INSTRUCTIONS TO MASTER THROUGH SHIPPING COMPANY WITH SIMULTANEOUS ADVICE TO EMBASSY IN EVENT THOSE INSTRUCTIONS DELAYED. MEANWHILE WILL APPRECIATE INFORMATION ACTION BEING TAKEN TO PASS TO KING. PLEASE ALSO BRING FOREGOING TO ATTENTION AMBASSADOR BURNS CARE NEA/ARN.

GP-4. DUNCAN
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *yc/rs*, NARA, Date 6-28-07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNNN

Jordan ⁵

~~TOP SECRET~~

July 18, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR McGB

SUBJECT: McNamara's Answer on Jordan

Tim Hoopes called me in your absence to say that Secretary McNamara is agreeable to the following formulation:

1. Burns would be authorized to tell Hussein when he goes back that we hope to resume FY 67 MAP deliveries very soon but that we face a delicate Congressional situation which precludes our going ahead for another few days. As soon as we turn the Congressional corner, we intend to reopen MAP flow.

2. We recognize that what's in that MAP pipeline may not be very interesting to Hussein under current conditions so if the Jordanians desire to discuss in Amman a shift in the mix of materiel now in that pipeline, we'd be happy to have our Defense Attache do so--recognizing that any such shifts may cause some delay in deliveries.

3. We hope this move would provide sufficient hope now for the Jordanian military that their source of supply would be reopened.

McNamara would prefer to say nothing about the ground package or aircraft at this stage. *Any changes in the ground package (a sale) would require negotiating a new contract.*

Hoopes will be spelling this out with greater precision in a memo designed to reach us for the evening meeting with the President but wanted you to have this preliminary glimpse on McNamara's view.

Hal

Harold H. Saunders

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Authority NLJ017-005-1-7

By ly NARA, Date 6-27-07

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

July 5, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

On 5 July I notified John Walsh, Executive Secretary of the Control Group, that the President had approved releasing \$2 million in budget support for Jordan. I agreed to notify AID.

Harold Saunders

Harold H. Saunders

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *ly*, NARA, Date 7/207

Morris

7a

File SC

~~SECRET~~

July 5, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

On 5 July I notified John Walsh, Executive Secretary of the Control Group, that the President had approved releasing \$2 million in budget support for Jordan. I agreed to notify AID.

Jordan

Harold H. Saunders

~~SECRET~~

Att: Memo to HHS from McGB, 7/4/67, with cy message from McGB to President, 7/4/67.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *plg*, NARA, Date 6-28-07

76

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

→ McGB

July 4, 1967

MEMO TO MR. SAUNDERS

✓ Hal --

The attached telegram shows what I sent the President today. He sent back word that he agrees with all of it, and specifically paragraph 3, so we are now in position to get that \$2 million on its way. Will you do that Wednesday?

McG. B.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

70/

Hal -

Make sure WWR
Knows about this -

Roger

Informed

~~SECRET~~

7d
July 4, 1967

For the President from McGeorge Bundy

We have had a relatively quiet holiday weekend so far and I see nothing that requires your decision in the next few days. Here is where things stand right now:

1. The General Assembly will probably vote today on the Yugoslav and Latin American resolutions, unless there is a successful compromise effort. We seem to have the votes to prevent a really bad result, and I think both the Department and the New York people are doing a fine job.
2. There is a tricky specific problem of a separate Pakistani resolution condemning Israel for actions in Jerusalem. We cannot vote for it in its present form, because it assumes that the Israeli measures do affect the international status of Jerusalem whereas our position is that they are merely administrative actions which do not have this effect. Ours is a much more practical way of keeping heat on the Israelis, and it has already produced a considerable withdrawal by Eban. Our record would be badly tangled from a legal point of view if we were to vote for the current Pakistani draft. Yet we would like to have a record of approving some such protest if possible. In this situation we are trying to get the Paks to accept a modification which would be consistent with our own position. Then we could vote for the resolution and make a little money with

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ERUS, Vol. 14 #341
By ng NARA, Date 6-27-07

PRESERVATION COPY

moderate Arabs. The situation is highly tactical and the decision to vote for the resolution or to abstain will have to be made on the basis of the fine print as the hours roll along. I think the Department is in good control of this one, and there is no difference on the objective.

3. We continue to look for little things that can give some encouragement to the more reasonable Arabs. In this connection I plan to approve a \$2 million budget support grant to Jordan tomorrow. This action is consistent with the language we all used with Hussein and represents a commitment initially made some months ago after the November raid by Israel. It already has your approval as of that time and I believe its release now is consistent with your general directives to us. Nevertheless I inform you of it so that it can be held up if you wish.

4. We are also reviewing tourist policy, and there will probably be a recommendation for renewal of permission for the Lebanon as soon as we have a chance to check reactions to the General Assembly voting and as soon as the Embassy in Beirut is prepared to share responsibility for making such a recommendation. Newspapers today indicate that Lebanese authorities are admitting our tourists even though their passports are not valid for that country. They want the money. We still do not plan tourist permission for the countries which broke relations.

5. The most interesting contest on the scene at the moment is not the well-publicized skirmishing near Suez, but the battle for Libyan oil. The

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- 3 -

Libyan government has decided to renew shipments to the European continent, and the labor organization has called a general strike aimed particularly at shipments to West Germany. The result of this tug-of-war will have a great deal to do with the severity of any oil crisis this summer. It is a situation in which we have almost no influence, and in which the quieter we are the less likely we are to rock the boat. As I review the general problem in this holiday period, I am inclined to think this rule applies to the crisis as a whole and underlies your own success in dealing with it.

6. Finally, I should report that I have had a very good talk with Dean Rusk yesterday about my own future relation to this problem. We are in strong agreement on the right steps and we expect to have a recommendation for you in another couple of days. Our central purpose is to handle this so that you have the necessary machinery on hand at all times -- but not so much of it that it gets in its own way.

PRESERVATION COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

8

June 28, 1967

Mr. President:

If you decide to go to the Islamic Center with Hussein this afternoon, the attached brief remarks would be useful.

HS
for McGB

80
Jordan

SUGGESTED REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OPENING OF THE
ISLAMIC CENTER, WASHINGTON, D. C. ON
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 1967

Ten years ago President Eisenhower took part in the dedication ceremonies of this Center. I am glad to have a chance to mark this anniversary with His Majesty, King Hussein.

We in the West recognize a great debt to the Islamic world. Its discoveries in medicine and astronomy and its contributions in art, science and commerce have enriched our own civilization.

Today at this place of religious devotion and compassion, our minds turn to the human beings who are the main victims of tragic wars in the Middle East. I believe the place and the time are appropriate to rededicate ourselves to bringing justice and hope to those people.

Yesterday, on behalf of the United States Government, I announced a program of emergency relief for the refugees, and I understand that this Center is a collecting point for private contributions to that cause. I know that my fellow Americans will support all efforts to help those in need.

But emergency relief is not enough. It is time that all peoples of the Middle East--with the world's help--transform these refugees of nearly twenty years into men, women and children with a future.

- 2 -

New homelessness must not be created; old homelessness must be ended. There will be no peace unless this problem is attacked with new energy by all, and, certainly, primarily by those who are immediately concerned.

Mr. Bundy

Jordan 9

CONFIDENTIAL

June 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: Walt Rostow

SUBJECT: Press Guidance for Hussein Visit

The attached is not intended for release. We provide it simply as a working base for you and King Hussein to use in laying out the guidelines for George Christian and others in backgrounding the press afterward.

The Jordanians did not want to agree to anything like the attached until the King saw you. However, I suspect they just don't understand the problem George has. We think we've written something that the King can live with, but you can give him a crack at it.

McGeorge Bundy

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By PLA, NARA, Date 6-28-07

90

June 28, 1967

SUGGESTED PRESS GUIDANCE FOR THE MEETING
BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
ON JUNE 28, 1967

The President and His Majesty King Hussein I exchanged views on the problems arising out of the recent hostilities in the Near East.

King Hussein expressed deep concern at the plight of the refugees, thanked the United States for assistance contributed to the refugees and hoped the United States would do its utmost to relieve the suffering. The President noted that the United States had been a major contributor to the support and rehabilitation of the Palestine refugees. He emphasized our acute concern with the welfare of the refugees, both those displaced by the fighting of 1948 and those who have left their homes as a result of the recent hostilities. While noting that the USG had established a \$5 million reserve fund for emergency relief for the refugees, he emphasized the need for a permanent solution to the refugee problem.

Both King Hussein and the President agreed that any resolution of the present crisis must be based on justice and the interest of all parties concerned. King Hussein insisted that a first step must be the withdrawal of Israeli forces back to the boundaries pertaining before June 4. The President referred to the five points which he made in his speech of June 19. He expressed the hope that measures could now be taken to implement these points and arrive at a just

settlement including the withdrawal of the Israeli forces. He described our basic objective as the achievement of a more durable and more stable situation than that existing prior to June 5. He reaffirmed our views on the territorial integrity and political independence of all states.

Both agreed that Jerusalem as a Holy Place for three great religions deserved special attention. Both agreed that there must be appropriate consultation with religious leaders and others who are deeply concerned before any unilateral action is taken on the status of Jerusalem.

The President reaffirmed the deep interest of the United States Government in Jordan and its people. He expressed the hope that the friendly relations between the two countries would be strengthened and informed the King that the United States Government intended to continue its economic assistance to Jordan.

Although there was not an identity of views on all issues, the exchange was of real value.

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Tuesday, June 27, 1967
7:00 PM

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Handling Hussein

I hold to the view that our main purpose must be to let him down as gently as we can from his present conviction that you must pull his chestnuts out of the fire for him. I very much like Walt's suggestion of a way to make this point and I attach my copy of his memorandum.

Two other things you can do for the King are to listen to his story and show him your own personal sympathy and kindness. I strongly endorse the Department's notion that you should have your main talk with him alone, and I also agree with the notion of a quick unscheduled visit to the Islamic Center on its tenth anniversary.

In addition, you can assure the King that economic assistance -- at levels still to be settled -- will continue (except where we have had to suspend particular projects on the West Bank). The level of budget support for this year was \$32 million and the level for FY 68 is \$24 million, but in fact, the King's needs cannot yet be predicted because of the West Bank occupation.

On military assistance, I think Hussein will accept the notion that there can be no immediate question of combat airplanes (he had a bargain for twelve F-104's) or of early new arms shipments. But renewal of existing MAP commitments is up for your approval in tonight's reading along with similar small packages for other moderate Arabs.

In sum, I would stay within the State talking points and not press the King toward bargaining with the Israelis (along the lines of the State covering memo) -- unless he gives you an opening. We do not want him telling other Arabs that the U. S. is impossible. The fact is that if he will take us at our word, our five principles have quite a lot for him -- especially territorial integrity and justice for the refugees. He wants straight withdrawal, and you are quite right to insist on withdrawal from danger. A formula that is good enough for Kosygin is good enough for Hussein.

McG. B.

bc: Mr. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec 3.4 (#6)
By *js/r* NARA Date 6-27-07

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Mr Bundy

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Tuesday, June 27, 1967 -- 3:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Here is one way to introduce your position to Hussein, if you can get him off by himself:

I was unable to prevent Nasser from pushing UNEF aside and closing the Gulf of Aqaba.

I was unable to prevent the Russians from giving the Syrians and the Egyptians inaccurate information in mid-May on Israeli mobilization.

I was unable to prevent you from signing a 3-year pact with Nasser; accepting an Egyptian commander; accepting Iraqi troops in your country; accepting Egyptian commando units to attack Israeli airfields.

I thought I had a promise from Eban and the Israelis that we had at least another week to work out a way of settling the Aqaba question; but I assure you I had not one moment's warning that the war would break out on June 5.

I could not prevent Nasser from telling you that he had achieved great victories on June 5 and that you would have UAR air support; I could not prevent you from attacking Israel.

I could help bring about a cease-fire. There were ways in which I can help bring about peace in the Middle East if there is a will for peace in the Middle East. But I cannot get the Israelis out of the West Bank unless there are serious things that you are prepared to do in return. What those are you probably know better than I.

If I have any advice for you, it is this: Do not rely on any outside force to solve this problem for you; neither the United Nations General Assembly, nor the UAR, nor the Russians, nor the Americans.

But, if you are willing to seek a solution, then there are ways others can help, as intermediaries, with economic resources, with persuasion of the other party, etc.

W. W. Rostow

I am, of course, sending along this note to Mac Bundy so that you can have his comment on this approach.

WWRostow:rlm

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Authority NLS 91-140
By isp/ly NARA, Date 6-28-07

Cy sent to Mr George Bundy

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DRAFT D

June 26, 1967

TO THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
FROM THE CONTROL GROUP

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We attach suggested talking points for your visit with King Hussein, now scheduled for Wednesday. After Bill Macomber's talk with the King, we recommend that you see him alone, at least for a brief period. It will be easier for the King to talk about reality without any witnesses but yourself, and especially without Arab witnesses.

The talks with King Hussein could be crucial to the process of achieving a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The King is approaching a fork in the road. It should not be impossible for him to choose the right course. If he does so, that fact would be a real beginning, breaking up the hitherto rigid Arab line against peace. If he is convinced that such a peaceful solution is impossible, the tide could run in the wrong direction from our point of view.

The Soviets are already consolidating Nasser in Egypt. Nasser is in touch with us, but we doubt that he will have an acceptable deal to offer. Therefore the Jordanian problem remains the most hopeful opening for us.

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Authority NLS 98.555 (#96)
By is/8 NARA, Date 6-27-07

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There is a difference of view between those who counsel moving ahead with Jordan now, and those who advise waiting for the dust to settle. We recommend taking advantage of the King's presence to open the possibility of prompt action on his part with Israel, directly or through an intermediary -- perhaps the Shah. A delay, which the Israelis favor, could result in freezing the situation on the West Bank into a pattern of Israeli control which it would be nearly impossible to change later.

The problems between Israel and Jordan -- the West Bank and Jerusalem -- are more difficult than any of the other issues between Israel and her neighbors, except for the overriding and fundamental problem of obtaining Arab recognition for Israel's right to exist. But there are also greater opportunities, because a Jordan-Israel solution would hold out the hope of transforming the refugee problem, and that of Jerusalem, which are at the heart of the conflict.

Our talks with Israeli representatives in New York and here persuade us that the Israelis are willing to make a pretty favorable deal with King Hussein, provided he accepts the idea of peace. You should not, we think, sponsor or propose any particular bargain, or be drawn into the details of any possible plan. But we do recommend that you be prepared to advise and

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encourage King Hussein to explore the possibility of negotiations with the Israelis, directly or through an intermediary. (You should know that the King has negotiated secretly with the Israelis in the past, e.g., meeting Eban on the Riviera. This information is of the greatest sensitivity).

The basic territorial problem dividing Israel and Jordan is the West Bank area. The West Bank was part of the Palestine Mandate given up by the British in 1947. It came under Jordanian control as a result of the hostilities in 1948,^{and} the subsequent declaration of Palestinian notables of their wish to adhere to Trans-Jordan. We have never recognized Jordanian Sovereignty over the West Bank; instead we have recognized the area as being under Jordanian control pursuant to the General Armistice Agreement. We have taken an even more reserved position about Jordanian control in the Old City of Jerusalem. Our Ambassador to Jordan, for example, does not show the flag while driving in the Old City. A memorandum on the history and legal position of the area is attached at Tab A.

The Israelis tell us they have not yet finally made up their minds on the position they will take with regard to the West Bank generally, and Jerusalem in particular. So far, we have advised them not to take unilateral actions, nor to present the world with a fait accompli.

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The Israelis point out that they have a national security interest in keeping the West Bank out of unfriendly or aggressive hands; that they tried to prevent King Hussein from entering the war and sought a cease fire even after he had taken offensive action; and that their occupation of the West Bank was unanticipated and is unwanted. They were particularly aggrieved by his attack in Jerusalem, where they took heavy casualties because they refrained from the use of air power. On the other hand, they say, these events occurred, a new situation has emerged, and they are still not clear what policy King Hussein represents today. They stress that the City of Jerusalem cannot be divided again, and that the Holy Places must be accessible to all.

There is a good deal of talk in Israel and among Palestinian Arabs about the possibility of an autonomous Arab state on the West Bank, federated with Israel, and of comparable status for the Gaza Strip. Both Dayan and Ben Gurion have suggested such an approach. Some Palestinians are reported to be interested in the possibility. There are rumors of possible meetings of Arab notables. There is always a possibility that such meetings could be stage-managed by the Israelis to come up with a statement or even a declaration calling for a separation of the West Bank from Jordan. Such a procedure would follow that of Jordan in annexing the West Bank in the first place.

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There would be political danger if Israel tried to set up a semi-autonomous Arab State on the West Bank by unilateral action. Such a step would make general Arab-Israeli peace more difficult to imagine, and would create a new Arab grievance.

We do not see any possibility that King Hussein could negotiate with Israel, and then accept a state of peace with Israel, unless he retained political control over the West Bank area, subject at most to minor boundary rectifications, and an international solution for Jerusalem.

But it is possible that over time an economic link could develop between Israel and Jordan as a whole. This would leave the two states of Israel and Jordan politically independent but with open cooperative economic relationships. A development of this kind should make it easier to solve the issue of Jerusalem, which could become a focus of economic exchange, rather than a salient on a nervous frontier. It could transform the refugee problem into a problem of regional economic development. And by providing an economic opportunity for the refugees, it would begin to relieve the other Middle Eastern states of the burden of the idea that somehow, some day, Arab loyalty requires them to help liberate Palestine and restore the refugees to their rightful property.

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We therefore conclude that at this stage the optimum plan should include these elements: (1) economic links between Israel and the whole of Jordan; (2) the West Bank under the sovereignty of Jordan, subject, however, (3) to boundary adjustments and (4) a special agreement about Jerusalem, and (5) an end to the state of war, demilitarization of the West Bank, and normal relations. We gather from a conversation between Evron and Walt Rostow that Israel is thinking along similar lines.

We should have no illusion: the odds are against Hussein accepting this sort of package at an early date. But it is worthwhile encouraging him to explore the possibilities.

The Israelis would probably accept some such approach in the near future. They might even accept a less ambitious solution that left the West Bank in Jordanian hands, except for an agreement on Jerusalem.

If the present situation continues very long, however, King Hussein should understand that his risks with regard to the West Bank probably increase. At the moment, he could probably get political control of most of the West Bank, in exchange for a favorable long-term economic arrangement, and a new status, perhaps condominium, in Jerusalem. Later on, such a deal might well become more difficult.

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June 27, 1967

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TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH KING HUSSEIN

King's State of Mind

The King is still emotionally disturbed by recent events, although more composed than he was, and perhaps undecided as well between his traditional moderation and the mood of Arab nationalism and unity of early June. He is bitter towards the West, USSR, Nasser, other Arab leaders and toward himself above all because of the debacle. At bottom, he probably wants to be moderate and realistic in his approach to problem, but he is afraid to risk positions drastically at variance with present extremist Arab opinion. He has been proposing an Arab Summit Conference, which Nasser and some others have been avoiding. His object has been to challenge Nasser at such a meeting, and more Arab opinion towards moderation. Hussein will visit Nasser on his way home. He has made a number of inconsistent statements in recent days, but he handled himself yesterday on television with care and skill. He is enjoying the praise he has received in Arab circles for fighting bravely, and is probably unaware of the depth of the bitterness he created by making a deal with Nasser, and by attacking Jerusalem.

The message he takes away will inevitably be one for Nasser and other Middle Eastern leaders.

His Objectives

To determine U.S., Soviet, and Israeli position towards Jordan and himself, especially with regard to our economic and military assistance program and our position on boundary problems for Jordan. He has publicly committed himself to the return of the West Bank and of Jerusalem; but he appears not to have the slightest notion of how to do so.

Our Objectives

1. To affirm our continued interest in him and in his country. It is basic that he be encouraged to stand up now for himself and for Jordan, not for the loose and divided Arab community as a whole.
2. To make it clear again that we did not know of the onset of hostilities, that we tried to prevent them, using the same words with the UAR and with Israel, and that we were not involved, directly or indirectly.

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Authority: NLS 98-955 (#9c)

By: *ij/ky* NARA, Date: 6-27-07

3. To inform him we intend to continue our economic and some of our military assistance programs for him, and for other moderate states in the Middle East, and to make sure he understands the extent of our present assistance to such states.

4. To discuss with him our basic objective of achieving a more durable and more stable situation than that existing prior to June 5, and make clear that our commitments on territorial integrity will be fulfilled in that context.

5. To assure him of our support for a just and permanent solution for the refugees.

6. To ask for his views on possible solutions for the West Bank and Jerusalem problems, and on the future relationship between Israel and Jordan more generally, as well as his opinion on broader issues involved in the conflict.

Talking Points

His Majesty may be assured of continued United States support both for Jordan and for himself, and for other Arab nations which adopt constructive policies. We regret the tragic events of early June, the mistakes made, the death and destruction that ensued; it is imperative that we work together to see if a better and more durable settlement can be reached. Reiterate again that we strongly advised Israel and UAR not to start hostilities, that we did not know of the outbreak of hostilities in advance, and that our posture has been and remains even-handed.

His Majesty may be assured that we intend to continue our economic assistance programs. We are also prepared to resume some military assistance but we are not yet clear on either the scale nor the type of equipment. We wish to avoid an arms race and are consequently urgently reviewing the supply of lethal equipment such as aircraft and tanks to all Middle Eastern states.

The states of the Middle East, with the help of the world community, must find an answer to the refugee problem. We should be most interested in the King's views on this subject, from the point of view of Jordan's national interest. Our objective, difficult as it may be of achievement, is a durable peace permitting all states to develop the full extent of their potentialities.

If he asks which kind of refugee plan we support, we suggest that you answer that it is too soon to choose. If Jordan and Israel could establish an economic link between their two countries, and perhaps others as well, the refugee problem would have a completely new appearance. If, however, progress of this kind proves impossible, we shall have to fall back on one or another of the older plans for resettlement.

As for Jerusalem, again, we have advised Israel against unilateral action to settle the status of Jerusalem. We recognize and share the interest of the three great religions in the Holy Places. As the King knows, we have never agreed either with Israel or with Jordan about the status of Jerusalem. And during the period of Jordanian control there were legitimate grievances on the part of all three religions. An arrangement should be worked out now which takes fully into account all interests in the problem. We stand ready to play our full part in such a negotiation.

The United States commitment to the territorial integrity of all states of the area is valid. We have acted in the past in support of this principle in behalf of many Middle Eastern states, including the UAR, Lebanon, and others. We shall do so in the future.

However, there must be a realistic approach to the problems of the area, taking fully into account the political consequences of Nasser's folly, the hostilities themselves, and the strong Soviet pressures.

We have been assured by Israel that its ultimate purposes are moderate, and that territorial claims will be subordinated to the goal of achieving peace. As the King realizes, the most difficult territorial problems are those between Jordan and Israel, in view of the past history of the West Bank, and the controversies over its legal status, which have never been finally resolved. Israel has not reached a conclusion on these questions. This is the moment to influence that conclusion.

Against this background, Israel's reluctance to yield territory unless it has some tangible assurances as to its own integrity is understandable from its point of view. There are many ways in which this condition can be satisfied. We have strongly advised the Israelis that we are unwilling to accept fait accompli solutions, and urged them not to take unilateral action either about the West Bank or about Jerusalem. We have intervened energetically to persuade Israel to encourage residents of the West Bank to remain in their homes, and to allow West Bank residents on the East Bank to return.

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On the other hand, it is not practical after all that has happened to ask the Israelis to withdraw until the main terms of a political settlement are clearly agreed, at least in private. We have been thinking, for example, that at some point in the settlement process the Security Council or the General Assembly could declare that the state of war between Israel and other Middle Eastern states is ended, and that no one can legitimately claim rights of belligerency any longer. Such a declaration could be acknowledged by each government, thus starting a movement in the right direction.

While, as you have said, the continuance of hostilities and near hostilities in the Middle East has become a world problem not a regional one, we do not feel that the United States Government is in a position itself to initiate moves for a settlement of this problem. In this situation the attitudes of Jordan and Israelis are paramount. There is little the international community can do until both sides approach the problem of settlement on realistic terms. We are willing to help the parties reach agreement. But nothing can be done until they accept their own responsibilities.

In this setting, it would be helpful and important to hear King Hussein's views on the main outstanding issues between Israel and Jordan, and on the five principles you announced on June 19. How does he see the future of Jordan's relationship with Israel?

In the light of his answer, you may wish to draw on the covering memorandum, encouraging the King to explore the possibilities of agreement with Israel. We are ready to help in private. You should let him understand the risks for him and for Jordan of allowing the situation to drag on indefinitely in its present pattern.

You might ask the King for his ideas on a possible private intermediary. We are inclined to think that the Shah would be a candidate to consider. The Turkish Foreign Minister would also be a possibility.

In the meantime, we hope both Israel and Jordan will cooperate to deal with the present situation on the West Bank humanely. The people should be helped in their present plight.

We hope that Jordan and Israel will both follow a two-pronged policy in the period ahead: trying as hard as they can for a basic settlement, and making arrangements which ensure the welfare of the

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- 5 -

local population in the meantime, and do not prejudice a constructive outcome.

The King will undoubtedly want to know--as Nasser will--your views on a wider range of topics.

I recommend that you stress these additional points:

(1) a condition of peace can be approached in stages, and does not necessarily require a treaty of peace in the first instance. There is no treaty of peace as yet between Germany and the Soviet Union, regrettable as that fact is.

(2) an end of all claims of belligerent rights should open the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal forthwith. The world community would expect the UAR to meet its clear responsibilities under international law.

(3) we deeply regret the decision of certain countries to break diplomatic relations with us. We should be glad to resume normal and friendly relations with them when conditions are appropriate on both sides.

CONFIDENTIAL

Jordan

12

Mac Bundy

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Tuesday, June 27, 1967 -- 3:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the briefing book on Hussein,
with Nick Katzenbach's talking paper.

Mac Bundy will be sending along his
own comments.

W. W. Rostow

By sent Mac Bundy

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *pc/ky* NARA, Date 6-28-07

Jordan

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13

MEMORANDUM FOR McGEORGE BUNDY

June 27, 1967

SUBJECT: Hussein Lunch Guest List

The President has approved the following guest list for tomorrow's lunch:

1:30 p.m.

The President
Under Secretary Katzenbach
Secretary McNamara
McGeorge Bundy
Walt Rostow
Findley Burns, the President's Ambassador to Hussein
George Christian
William Macomber

King Hussein
Foreign Minister Ahmad Tuqan
Major General Amir Khammash, Chief of Staff
Jordanian Ambassador to Washington, Farhan Shubeilat

71.

Harold H. Saunders

Jordan ✓

14

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

June 27, 1967

SUBJECT: Possibility of Visiting Washington Mosque with Hussein

Tomorrow is the Tenth Anniversary of President Eisenhower's opening of the Washington Islamic Center. He made a general speech about our hopes for a future of "peace under one God."

It has occurred to us that you and King Hussein might make a quick swing by the Mosque after your talk tomorrow. This would be a dramatic pro-Arab gesture. Since the Mosque is the receiving point for private American contributions for refugee relief, you might in your remarks recall the USG emergency relief program being announced this afternoon and urge private Americans to show their usual generosity to people in distress.

If you like this idea, we would lay it on informally and tentatively. We might want to sound out Hussein or alert the Arab ambassadors to be there. We would want USIA and press coverage. But we would like to know tonight in order to turn the necessary wheels.

Mac Bundy thinks this is a good idea.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____
Disapprove _____

Approve tentatively; I'll decide with Hussein _____

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Jordan

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DRAFT D

June 26, 1967

TO THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
FROM THE CONTROL GROUP

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We attach suggested talking points for your visit with King Hussein, now scheduled for Wednesday. After Bill Macomber's talk with the King, we recommend that you see him alone, at least for a brief period. It will be easier for the King to talk about reality without any witnesses but yourself, and especially without Arab witnesses.

The talks with King Hussein could be crucial to the process of achieving a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The King is approaching a fork in the road. It should not be impossible for him to choose the right course. If he does so, that fact would be a real beginning, breaking up the hitherto rigid Arab line against peace. If he is convinced that such a peaceful solution is impossible, the tide could run in the wrong direction from our point of view.

The Soviets are already consolidating Nasser in Egypt. Nasser is in touch with us, but we doubt that he will have an acceptable deal to offer. Therefore the Jordanian problem remains the most hopeful opening for us.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NTJ 98-555 (#96)
By 10/17 NARA, Date 6-27-02

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There is a difference of view between those who counsel moving ahead with Jordan now, and those who advise waiting for the dust to settle. We recommend taking advantage of the King's presence to open the possibility of prompt action on his part with Israel, directly or through an intermediary -- perhaps the Shah. A delay, which the Israelis favor, could result in freezing the situation on the West Bank into a pattern of Israeli control which it would be nearly impossible to change later.

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encourage King Hussein to explore the possibility of negotiations with the Israelis, directly or through an intermediary. (You should know that the King has negotiated secretly with the Israelis in the past, e.g., meeting Eban on the Riviera. This information is of the greatest sensitivity).

The basic territorial problem dividing Israel and Jordan is the West Bank area. The West Bank was part of the Palestine Mandate given up by the British in 1947. It came under Jordanian control as a result of the hostilities in 1948, ^{and} the subsequent declaration of Palestinian notables of their wish to adhere to Trans-Jordan. We have never recognized Jordanian Sovereignty over the West Bank; instead we have recognized the area as being under Jordanian control pursuant to the General Armistice Agreement. We have taken an even more reserved position about Jordanian control in the Old City of Jerusalem. Our Ambassador to Jordan, for example, does not show the flag while driving in the Old City. A memorandum on the history and legal position of the area is attached at Tab A.

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The Israelis point out that they have a national security interest in keeping the West Bank out of unfriendly or aggressive hands; that they tried to prevent King Hussein from entering the war and sought a cease fire even after he had taken offensive action; and that their occupation of the West Bank was unanticipated and is unwanted. They were particularly aggrieved by his attack in Jerusalem, where they took heavy casualties because they refrained from the use of air power. On the other hand, they say, these events occurred, a new situation has emerged, and they are still not clear what policy King Hussein represents today. They stress that the City of Jerusalem cannot be divided again, and that the Holy Places must be accessible to all.

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There would be political danger if Israel tried to set up a semi-autonomous Arab State on the West Bank by unilateral action. Such a step would make general Arab-Israeli peace more difficult to imagine, and would create a new Arab grievance.

We do not see any possibility that King Hussein could negotiate with Israel, and then accept a state of peace with Israel, unless he retained political control over the West Bank area, subject at most to minor boundary rectifications, and an international solution for Jerusalem.

But it is possible that over time an economic link could develop between Israel and Jordan as a whole. This would leave the two states of Israel and Jordan politically independent but with open cooperative economic relationships. A development of this kind should make it easier to solve the issue of Jerusalem, which could become a focus of economic exchange, rather than a salient on a nervous frontier. It could transform the refugee problem into a problem of regional economic development. And by providing an economic opportunity for the refugees, it would begin to relieve the other Middle Eastern states of the burden of the idea that somehow, some day, Arab loyalty requires them to help liberate Palestine and restore the refugees to their rightful property.

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-6-

We therefore conclude that at this stage the optimum plan should include these elements: (1) economic links between Israel and the whole of Jordan; (2) the West Bank under the sovereignty of Jordan, subject, however, (3) to boundary adjustments and (4) a special agreement about Jerusalem, and (5) an end to the state of war, demilitarization of the West Bank, and normal relations. We gather from a conversation between Evron and Walt Rostow that Israel is thinking along similar lines.

We should have no illusion: the odds are against Hussein accepting this sort of package at an early date. But it is worthwhile encouraging him to explore the possibilities.

The Israelis would probably accept some such approach in the near future. They might even accept a less ambitious solution that left the West Bank in Jordanian hands, except for an agreement on Jerusalem.

If the present situation continues very long, however, King Hussein should understand that his risks with regard to the West Bank probably increase. At the moment, he could probably get political control of most of the West Bank, in exchange for a favorable long-term economic arrangement, and a new status, perhaps condominium, in Jerusalem. Later on, such a deal might well become more difficult.

Jordan

16

~~SECRET~~

June 26, 1967

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 98-555 (#96)
By is/ly NARA, Date 6-27-07

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We attach suggested talking points for your visit with King Hussein, now scheduled for Wednesday. After Bill Macomber's talk with the King, we recommend that you see him alone, at least for a brief period. It will be easier for the King to talk about reality without any witnesses but yourself, and especially without Arab witnesses.

The talks with King Hussein could be crucial to the process of achieving a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The King is approaching a fork in the road. It should not be impossible for him to choose the right course. If he does so, that fact would be a real beginning, breaking up the hitherto rigid Arab line against peace. If he is convinced that such a peaceful solution is impossible, the tide could run in the wrong direction from our point of view.

The Soviets are already consolidating Nasser in Egypt. Nasser is in touch with us, but we doubt that he will have an acceptable deal to offer. Therefore the Jordanian problem remains the most hopeful opening for us.

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-2-

There is a difference of view between those who counsel moving ahead with Jordan now, and those who advise waiting for the dust to settle. We recommend taking advantage of the King's presence to open the possibility of prompt action on his part with Israel, directly or through an intermediary -- perhaps the Shah. A delay, which the Israelis favor, could result in freezing the situation on the West Bank into a pattern of Israeli control which it would be nearly impossible to change later.

The problems between Israel and Jordan -- the West Bank and Jerusalem -- are more difficult than any of the other issues between Israel and her neighbors, except for the overriding and fundamental problem of obtaining Arab recognition for Israel's right to exist. But there are also greater opportunities, because a Jordan-Israel solution would hold out the hope of transforming the refugee problem, and that of Jerusalem, which are at the heart of the conflict.

Our talks with Israeli representatives in New York and here persuade us that the Israelis are willing to make a pretty favorable deal with King Hussein, provided he accepts the idea of peace. You should not, we think, sponsor or propose any particular bargain, or be drawn into the details of any possible plan. But we do recommend that you be prepared to advise and

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-3-

encourage King Hussein to explore the possibility of negotiations with the Israelis, directly or through an intermediary. (You should know that the King has negotiated secretly with the Israelis in the past, e.g., meeting Eban on the Riviera. This information is of the greatest sensitivity).

The basic territorial problem dividing Israel and Jordan is the West Bank area. The West Bank was part of the Palestine Mandate given up by the British in 1947. It came under Jordanian control as a result of the hostilities in 1948, ^{and} the subsequent declaration of Palestinian notables of their wish to adhere to Trans-Jordan. We have never recognized Jordanian Sovereignty over the West Bank; instead we have recognized the area as being under Jordanian control pursuant to the General Armistice Agreement. We have taken an even more reserved position about Jordanian control in the Old City of Jerusalem. Our Ambassador to Jordan, for example, does not show the flag while driving in the Old City. A memorandum on the history and legal position of the area is attached at Tab A.

The Israelis tell us they have not yet finally made up their minds on the position they will take with regard to the West Bank generally, and Jerusalem in particular. So far, we have advised them not to take unilateral actions, nor to present the world with a fait accompli.

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-4-

The Israelis point out that they have a national security interest in keeping the West Bank out of unfriendly or aggressive hands; that they tried to prevent King Hussein from entering the war and sought a cease fire even after he had taken offensive action; and that their occupation of the West Bank was unanticipated and is unwanted. They were particularly aggrieved by his attack in Jerusalem, where they took heavy casualties because they refrained from the use of air power. On the other hand, they say, these events occurred, a new situation has emerged, and they are still not clear what policy King Hussein represents today. They stress that the City of Jerusalem cannot be divided again, and that the Holy Places must be accessible to all.

There is a good deal of talk in Israel and among Palestinian Arabs about the possibility of an autonomous Arab state on the West Bank, federated with Israel, and of comparable status for the Gaza Strip. Both Dayan and Ben Gurion have suggested such an approach. Some Palestinians are reported to be interested in the possibility. There are rumors of possible meetings of Arab notables. There is always a possibility that such meetings could be stage-managed by the Israelis to come up with a statement or even a declaration calling for a separation of the West Bank from Jordan. Such a procedure would follow that of Jordan in annexing the West Bank in the first place.

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-5-

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-6-

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Jordan

16a

CONFIDENTIAL

June 27, 1967

TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH KING HUSSEIN

King's State of Mind

The King is still emotionally disturbed by recent events, although more composed than he was, and perhaps undecided as well between his traditional moderation and the mood of Arab nationalism and unity of early June. He is bitter towards the West, USSR, Nasser, other Arab leaders and toward himself above all because of the debacle. At bottom, he probably wants to be moderate and realistic in his approach to problem, but he is afraid to risk positions drastically at variance with present extremist Arab opinion. He has been proposing an Arab Summit Conference, which Nasser and some others have been avoiding. His object has been to challenge Nasser at such a meeting, and more Arab opinion towards moderation. Hussein will visit Nasser on his way home. He has made a number of inconsistent statements in recent days, but he handled himself yesterday on television with care and skill. He is enjoying the praise he has received in Arab circles for fighting bravely, and is probably unaware of the depth of the bitterness he created by making a deal with Nasser, and by attacking Jerusalem.

The message he takes away will inevitably be one for Nasser and other Middle Eastern leaders.

His Objectives

To determine U.S., Soviet, and Israeli position towards Jordan and himself, especially with regard to our economic and military assistance program and our position on boundary problems for Jordan. He has publicly committed himself to the return of the West Bank and of Jerusalem; but he appears not to have the slightest notion of how to do so.

Our Objectives

1. To affirm our continued interest in him and in his country. It is basic that he be encouraged to stand up now for himself and for Jordan, not for the loose and divided Arab community as a whole.
2. To make it clear again that we did not know of the onset of hostilities, that we tried to prevent them, using the same words with the UAR and with Israel, and that we were not involved, directly or indirectly.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NKJ 98-555 (#9c)
By [signature] NARA, Date 6-27-07

3. To inform him we intend to continue our economic and some of our military assistance programs for him, and for other moderate states in the Middle East, and to make sure he understands the extent of our present assistance to such states.

4. To discuss with him our basic objective of achieving a more durable and more stable situation than that existing prior to June 5, and make clear that our commitments on territorial integrity will be fulfilled in that context.

5. To assure him of our support for a just and permanent solution for the refugees.

6. To ask for his views on possible solutions for the West Bank and Jerusalem problems, and on the future relationship between Israel and Jordan more generally, as well as his opinion on broader issues involved in the conflict.

Talking Points

His Majesty may be assured of continued United States support both for Jordan and for himself, and for other Arab nations which adopt constructive policies. We regret the tragic events of early June, the mistakes made, the death and destruction that ensued; it is imperative that we work together to see if a better and more durable settlement can be reached. Reiterate again that we strongly advised Israel and UAR not to start hostilities, that we did not know of the outbreak of hostilities in advance, and that our posture has been and remains even-handed.

His Majesty may be assured that we intend to continue our economic assistance programs. We are also prepared to resume some military assistance but we are not yet clear on either the scale nor the type of equipment. We wish to avoid an arms race and are consequently urgently reviewing the supply of lethal equipment such as aircraft and tanks to all Middle Eastern states.

The states of the Middle East, with the help of the world community, must find an answer to the refugee problem. We should be most interested in the King's views on this subject, from the point of view of Jordan's national interest. Our objective, difficult as it may be of achievement, is a durable peace permitting all states to develop the full extent of their potentialities.

If he asks which kind of refugee plan we support, we suggest that you answer that it is too soon to choose. If Jordan and Israel could establish an economic link between their two countries, and perhaps others as well, the refugee problem would have a completely new appearance. If, however, progress of this kind proves impossible, we shall have to fall back on one or another of the older plans for resettlement.

As for Jerusalem, again, we have advised Israel against unilateral action to settle the status of Jerusalem. We recognize and share the interest of the three great religions in the Holy Places. As the King knows, we have never agreed either with Israel or with Jordan about the status of Jerusalem. And during the period of Jordanian control there were legitimate grievances on the part of all three religions. An arrangement should be worked out now which takes fully into account all interests in the problem. We stand ready to play our full part in such a negotiation.

The United States commitment to the territorial integrity of all states of the area is valid. We have acted in the past in support of this principle in behalf of many Middle Eastern states, including the UAR, Lebanon, and others. We shall do so in the future.

However, there must be a realistic approach to the problems of the area, taking fully into account the political consequences of Nasser's folly, the hostilities themselves, and the strong Soviet pressures.

We have been assured by Israel that its ultimate purposes are moderate, and that territorial claims will be subordinated to the goal of achieving peace. As the King realizes, the most difficult territorial problems are those between Jordan and Israel, in view of the past history of the West Bank, and the controversies over its legal status, which have never been finally resolved. Israel has not reached a conclusion on these questions. This is the moment to influence that conclusion.

Against this background, Israel's reluctance to yield territory unless it has some tangible assurances as to its own integrity is understandable from its point of view. There are many ways in which this condition can be satisfied. We have strongly advised the Israelis that we are unwilling to accept fait accompli solutions, and urged them not to take unilateral action either about the West Bank or about Jerusalem. We have intervened energetically to persuade Israel to encourage residents of the West Bank to remain in their homes, and to allow West Bank residents on the East Bank to return.

On the other hand, it is not practical after all that has happened to ask the Israelis to withdraw until the main terms of a political settlement are clearly agreed, at least in private. We have been thinking, for example, that at some point in the settlement process the Security Council or the General Assembly could declare that the state of war between Israel and other Middle Eastern states is ended, and that no one can legitimately claim rights of belligerency any longer. Such a declaration could be acknowledged by each government, thus starting a movement in the right direction.

While, as you have said, the continuance of hostilities and near hostilities in the Middle East has become a world problem not a regional one, we do not feel that the United States Government is in a position itself to initiate moves for a settlement of this problem. In this situation the attitudes of Jordan and Israelis are paramount. There is little the international community can do until both sides approach the problem of settlement on realistic terms. We are willing to help the parties reach agreement. But nothing can be done until they accept their own responsibilities.

In this setting, it would be helpful and important to hear King Hussein's views on the main outstanding issues between Israel and Jordan, and on the five principles you announced on June 19. How does he see the future of Jordan's relationship with Israel?

In the light of his answer, you may wish to draw on the covering memorandum, encouraging the King to explore the possibilities of agreement with Israel. We are ready to help in private. You should let him understand the risks for him and for Jordan of allowing the situation to drag on indefinitely in its present pattern.

You might ask the King for his ideas on a possible private intermediary. We are inclined to think that the Shah would be a candidate to consider. The Turkish Foreign Minister would also be a possibility.

In the meantime, we hope both Israel and Jordan will cooperate to deal with the present situation on the West Bank humanely. The people should be helped in their present plight.

We hope that Jordan and Israel will both follow a two-pronged policy in the period ahead: trying as hard as they can for a basic settlement, and making arrangements which ensure the welfare of the

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- 5 -

local population in the meantime, and do not prejudice a constructive outcome.

The King will undoubtedly want to know--as Nasser will--your views on a wider range of topics.

I recommend that you stress these additional points:

(1) a condition of peace can be approached in stages, and does not necessarily require a treaty of peace in the first instance. There is no treaty of peace as yet between Germany and the Soviet Union, regrettable as that fact is.

(2) an end of all claims of belligerent rights should open the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal forthwith. The world community would expect the UAR to meet its clear responsibilities under international law.

(3) we deeply regret the decision of certain countries to break diplomatic relations with us. We should be glad to resume normal and friendly relations with them when conditions are appropriate on both sides.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Alice Boyce

17

June 23, 1967

Jordan

Mc GB:

Later today, we will be getting a Katzenbach memo recommending that the President see Hussein next Wednesday or Thursday.

If you approve, I'll just run this through normal channels when it comes.

H. H. S.

Yes _____

No _____

Jordan
18

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 23, 1967

Mc GB:

Later today, we will be getting a Katzenbach memo recommending that the President see Hussein next Wednesday or Thursday.

If you approve, I'll just run this through normal channels when it comes.



H. H. S.

Yes _____

No _____

Jordan
Ken Rosen

19

June 23, 1967

Mc GB:

Later today, we will be getting a Katzenbach memo recommending that the President see Hussein next Wednesday or Thursday.

If you approve, I'll just run this through normal channels when it comes.

H. H. S.

Yes _____

No _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Jordan
20

SECRET-EXDIS June 16, 1967

McGB:

State feels it can answer Burns satisfactorily in the framework of our current policy. I suggested they add your point about doing what they can to prevent another arms race.

OK
DM

Hal

HHS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *jc/ls*, NARA, Date 6-28-07

SECRET-EXDIS

~~SECRET~~
EXDIS

File Bundy
Jordan memos 20a

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EXDIS

DELIVER TO ACTION OFFICERS OPENING OF BUSINESS JUNE 16

ARMS FOR JORDAN

REFERENCE: STATE 211613

1. I PLAN SEEK MEETING WITH HUSSEIN TO CONVEY CONTENTS REFTEL ON JUNE 17.
2. I PREDICT HUSSEIN WILL PRESS ME FOR ASSURANCES ON ONLY ONE POINT, NAMELY TMMT WE ARE MAKING ABSOLUTELY NO RPT NO DISTINCTION IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE MATTERS BETWEEN JORDAN AND ISRAEL. MAY I GIVE HIM CATEGORICAL ASSURANCE ON THIS POINT IN THE LIGHT OF SECDEF 7852 OF JUNE 15 WHICH APPEARS TO PLACE ISRAEL IN A SLIGHTLY MORE FAVORED CATEGORY?
3. IF MY INTERPRETATION OF SECDEF MESSAGE IS CORRECT, I STRONGLY URGE THAT WE REVIEW THE DECISION IT REFLECTS AND THAT ISRAEL BE PLACED, HOWEVER TEMPORARILY, IN PRECISELY THE SAME CATEGORY AS THE ARAB COMBATTANTS. PAST EXPERIENCE LEAVES NO GROUND FOR US

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4355A ~~SECRET~~
TO ASSUME THAT NEWS LEAKS ON OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE POLICY TO CRISIS AREAS CAN BE AVOIDED. WHEN SUCH A LEAK DOES OCCUR, I AM APPREHENSIVE THAT THE RATHER FINE DISTINCTION WE SEEM TO BE MAKING WILL BE MAGNIFIED BY THE PRESS TO THE SERIOUS EMBARRASSMENT BOTH OF JORDAN AND OURSELVES. IT WILL BE TRUMPETED ABROAD BY OUR CRITICS AS A STANCE TOTALLY INCONSISTENT WITH OUR STATED POLICY OF EVEN-HANDEDNESS AND NEUTRALITY.

GP-3. BURNS
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.A (#52)
By , NARA, Date 6-27-07

~~SECRET~~
EXDIS

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

4. Subject to foregoing, we wish Hussein to know we have made
supplying
no rpt no decision in principle against ~~supplying~~ arms to Jordan.

RUSK

File Jordan
memos to McGB 21

June 13, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

McGB:

SUBJECT: Tents for Jordan

I know the emergency relief question is in abeyance, but it may be useful for you to have the facts on the Jordanian tent problem when the subject arises again:

1. The GOJ has made a direct request to us for 5-10,000 tents.
2. AID would like to agree to send 5,500 tents immediately, with more later if necessary.
3. AID has located suitable tents they could buy, worked out means of transportation, and ready contingency funds for immediate use. (All this has been done very quietly.)
4. Fifty-five hundred tents would cost about \$600,000, plus about \$200,000 for transportation.
5. Thus, the tents can move within hours after the President approves -- if he approves.

Ed Hamilton

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *p/s*, NARA, Date 6-28-07

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, August 3, 1967 -- 7:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

The attached report, [redacted] paints
a much gloomier picture of the mood in Jordan than we have had from the
[redacted] in the past few days. Nevertheless, we take it seriously [redacted]

[redacted] I pass this on to you because I
think the flavor is worth your having.

and important

My impression is that this report is an accurate picture of emotions
at work in Jordan; but not necessarily all the emotions. Nor is it a final
indication of where policy will end up.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

SANITIZED
Authority NSA/RAC 00-217 (#23)
By Clem/sg NARA, Date 6-28-07

SECRET

Copy of Memorandum For: Mr. J. P. Walsh
Executive Secretariat
Department of State

[REDACTED]

1. Situation in Jordan: People are in hopeless frame of mind, as they have been since war. Because no one has held out hope for them, they are creating, in desperation, the false hope that by continuing the fight they will see Israel defeated in the end. Logic plays no part in this process, but the man on the street is a creature of emotions always. Growing resistance on West Bank is seen as proof that the battle will go on. The United States Government is totally discredited as a firm ally of Israel. The Soviets enjoy some popularity, but there is growing recognition that Soviet words are much braver than their deeds.

2. Peace in the Area: There are few prospects for peace, and the passage of time makes them even less. The Jordanian people are absolutely unwilling to "face reality" in the western sense, i. e., that they, as losers of the war, must pay some price and make the best deal they can with the victors. The people are not turning against Hussein yet, but they will unless Hussein can change present situation by getting back the West Bank and Jerusalem without signing a peace treaty with Israel. If Hussein were to try to negotiate with Israel for Jordan alone, he would be "absolutely alone, nobody would support him and he would be killed as his grandfather was killed." If Hussein lined up support from other moderates like Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, etc., it would do him no good at all; his people would still turn on him. Even were he somehow miraculously to conclude a successful peace with Israel and survive, Nasser and the Syrians would turn on him, topple him, and swallow Jordan. The key to peace is and has been Nasser; if he takes the lead in seeking peace, Jordan could and would go along, and the more radical Arabs would be helpless.

[REDACTED]

3. USG Position: The time has passed when it would have been easy for the U. S. Government to recoup its prestige with the Arabs by uttering a few proper phrases. The U. S. Government has lost all credibility in the Arab mind, as careful, tightly reasoned statements on technical points, such as why the U. S. Government did not vote for the UN resolution on Jerusalem, are worse than wasted effort -- they are positively harmful because they make the U. S. Government look hypocritical and deceitful. The U. S. Government should make no mistake, it is hated in the Arab world; innate courtesy, apathy from the shock of defeat, and the memory of kindnesses by individual American

SANITIZED

Authority NW 00-134
By Pj/y, NARA, Date 6-28-07

friends lead most educated Jordanians to conceal this hate, but it is there.

4. Possible Solutions:

[REDACTED] There is a power vacuum in the Near East now, with the big powers discredited and Nasser's stature diminished. The U. S. Government, if it wanted, could fill the vacuum and reverse the train of events, but the price would be high. The U. S. Government would have to make the Israelis leave the conquered territory, using whatever pressures are necessary, from arm-twisting to economic pressure to threat of armed intervention. Israeli arrogance in victory probably will not respond to any but the strongest measures. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] If the U. S. Government coldly calculated the value to its self-interest of tiny Israel against 13 Arab nations, then it would make the right decision. Working quietly through the United Nations would not achieve the same effect. The Arab people must see clearly that the U. S. Government forced Israel to withdraw, while the Soviets, the UN, and everybody else were unable to do so. Then the U. S. Government could have its way with the Arabs: radical governments would fall or could be pushed, negotiations leading to a real peace with Israel would be not only possible, but entirely likely, and a new era could begin. The alternative to a major initiative by the U. S. Government or Nasser is a long period of struggle and suffering. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Arab people will endure as it always has, while Israel, an unnatural creation, cannot endure. Great powers come and go, [REDACTED] Twenty years ago Britain was great, now she is fading rapidly. So if America and the USSR are against us now, we find consolation in the knowledge that they will go, too. If there is a long period of relative stalemate, of course the Soviets will supplant the U. S. Government as the great power with any influence at all. That is 100% certain, and there is nothing the U. S. Government could do about it short of risking a confrontation, which is not in her self-interest.

5. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

6. Ambassador Burns has requested that the above views [REDACTED] be transmitted to Mr. John Walsh in the Secretariat for appropriate distribution.

###

File Jordan

24

July 31, 1967

~~SECRET/SANDSTORM/NODIS ENCLOSURE~~

FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

Enclosed here with is a draft amendment of Ambassador Barbour's instructions. We hope to review this proposal later today.

John P. Walsh
Executive Secretary
Control Group

Enclosure:

Draft Amendment

~~SECRET/SANDSTORM/NODIS ENCLOSURE~~

Jordan ²⁶

ACTION: Amembassy AMMAN

SUBJ : ARMS FOR JORDAN

REF : AMMAN's 4312

1. You should assure Hussein that we are and shall continue to be deeply concerned with Jordan's security. We believe the survival and reconstruction of Jordan to be essential to stability and peace in the Middle East.

2. Our hope is to avoid a new arms race in the area. It seems to us to be in the interest both of the countries of the Middle East and of the rest of the world to ^{restrain} ~~contain~~ arms sales.

3. Pending efforts to arrive at such an understanding -- and in order not to prejudice them -- we believe it best not rpt

not to approve any new export licenses, or any further shipments

under the Military Assistance Program, to any of the ^{participants} ~~belligerents~~

^{in the conflict} ~~gerents~~ at this time rpt at this time.

4. Subject to foregoing, we wish Hussein to know we have made no rpt no decision in principle against supplying arms to Jordan.

Clearances

NEA
G/PM
M
000/15A

~~SECRET~~

Jordan
✓
27

July 18, 1967

THE U. S. AND A JORDAN-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT

King Hussein has told us that he wants to negotiate a settlement with Israel. His opening terms are a return to June 4 with Jewish access to the Wailing Wall and Jordanian access to the Mediterranean. This is obviously an opening position.

The Israelis have told us that their response is positive and that they are ready to meet with Hussein at a convenient time and place.

We are consulting Ambassador Burns (now in Washington) and Ambassador Barbour (who arrives this evening). In the next day or so we must give Burns instructions on what to say to Hussein when he goes back to Amman. This situation confronts us with both short-run tactical and long-run strategic questions. On the tactics, there is considerable agreement that we need to proceed cautiously and that we should not urge an immediate top-level direct negotiation between Hussein and the Israelis. Both sides need ways and means to communicate back and forth from their opening positions, which are very far apart. Hussein needs an adviser or advisers he can trust. Whatever our eventual position, we should not now be the obvious middleman in the first discussions.

The tactical decisions should await our discussions with Barbour and perhaps should go no further than the initial guidance to Burns on his reply to Hussein. Under Secretary Katzenbach has been on top of this problem and will be presenting matured recommendations to the Secretary and the President over the next day or so.

But he joins me in feeling that the really urgent question before the President and Secretary at the moment is not technical but strategic. It is whether and to what extent the United States is prepared to use its own influence with Israel and Jordan to increase the prospect of a serious settlement between them. Nobody can be certain that such a settlement is possible even if we use all our influence. But it is reasonably certain that it will not come about if we do not. We are the people with the carrot in the form of economic support for an Israel-Jordan partnership. We are also the people with the stick, in that we are the one really big friend of both of these countries, and our weapons, for example, are at present essential to both.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, Vol. 14, #374

By g NARA, Date 6-27-07

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- 2 -

There are many issues between Jordan and Israel -- the termination of hostilities, the degree of mutual recognition, the level of economic interconnection, the division of tourist revenues, the degree of common concern for Palestinian Arabs. But the two crucial political issues are those of control of the Old City of Jerusalem and sovereignty over the West Bank of the Jordan. The more King Hussein can get on these two issues, the more likely he can be an enduring force for peace as Israel's eastern neighbor. The less he gets on these two questions, the more risky his future and the less the likelihood of an agreement which can survive.

I think there is substantial agreement within the Executive Branch that Israel's own long-run interests would be served by a truly generous settlement with Hussein. I think there is also agreement that if we use our full influence, we can greatly affect the readiness of the government of Israel to move in this direction. But what is not clear is whether we are ready to apply our full influence in this direction, in the light of the depth and strength of the feelings of the people of Israel and of their supporters in the United States. With the best will in the world, our relations to both Hussein and ^{Israel} ~~Jordan~~ will tend to involve us more and more in their negotiations. If we mean to use our influence at the clutch, this involvement is desirable simply because it keeps us in touch with the state of play. But if we mean to stand aside on the substantive issues -- if we are unwilling to press either side to make concessions it does not now contemplate, then it is of critical importance that our people be restrained and careful.

This memorandum betrays my own beliefs in favor of a strong U. S. role -- not now but later. But it is not designed to produce an answer so much as to start a discussion from which top-level guidance can emerge.

M. G. B.

McGeorge Bundy

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

Approved in S 7/20/67

DATE: July 14, 1967

SUBJECT: Jordan

PARTICIPANTS: Secretary Rusk
Foreign Minister Ahmed Touqan of Jordan
Ambassador Shubeilat of Jordan
Ambassador-designate Sharif Sharaf of Jordan
Deputy Assistant Secretary Davies -NEA
Marshall W. Wiley, NEA/ARN

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Foreign Minister Touqan referred to the traditional ties between the US and Jordan and to the ideals which were shared by the two countries. He said that Jordan had been criticized at various times for its pro-Western attitudes, and now other people are asking the Jordanians why their traditional friends were not helping them. The Arabs came to the UN with the attitude of "give and take" but there was a limit to how far they could go. Jordan had lost much of its territory but the Jordanians did not feel that they, the Arabs, had been totally defeated. They admitted they had lost a battle but they did not admit they had lost the war. The Jordanians were not able to forget they were Arabs and they hoped the US had not adopted the theory that Jordan should now be isolated from the rest of the Arabs and pushed into accepting a settlement.

The Secretary said that there were three basic issues now operating in the Middle East. 1) Israel versus the Arab states. During his experience at the UN in 1948 he had tried to negotiate a stand-still agreement between the Arabs and Israelis at the end of the British mandate. He was aware of the deep roots of the Palestinian problem and the deep feelings which it engendered. He understood these feelings even though he did not fully share them. The US and the Arabs did have some differences in their attitudes towards Palestine and he hoped that both sides could put these differences to one side and get on with the business of living. 2) The struggle between the radical and moderate Arab states. The Secretary said that as he looked back over the history of US actions

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in the Middle East he was impressed by the extent to which we had supported the principle of territorial integrity and political independence for all nations in that area. We supported the UAR during the Suez crisis and acted to insure Lebanon's independence at a somewhat later date. President Kennedy had sent a squadron of aircraft to support the independence of Saudi Arabia and we had, on several occasions, supported Libya against possible interference from the UAR. We had protested strongly against Arab subversion by infiltration into Israel and had also protested strongly to Israel after the unfortunate raid on Samu last November. 3) Soviet efforts to penetrate the area. The Secretary said that the Soviets were attempting to increase their influence in the area by shipping arms to certain Arab states. We had tried on many occasions to encourage the Soviets to tone down the arms race. He had personally talked about this with Gromyko but the Soviets were interested only in discussing nuclear weapons as a subject for limitation. He realized that Jordan was not responsible for the recent situation getting out of control. There were two things that had contributed directly to the development of the hostilities. First, the speed of the removal of the UNEF forces and second, Nasser's closing of the Strait of Tiran. The closing of the Strait of Tiran had been more important than most people in the Arab world realized. It was not only a casus belli for Israel, but it also ran directly counter to commitments we had made in 1957 in order to get Israel out of Sinai. The UAR had not signed these commitments but had been aware of them. Nasser had based his action on the right of belligerency against Israel, but this cuts both ways. The Arabs are not consistent if they complain of Israeli aggression while simultaneously asserting belligerent rights against Israel. By his action in closing the Strait of Tiran Nasser had undercut our position with Israel. If we now ask the Israelis to withdraw they would say that they did so in 1956 on assurances from the US which had not been carried out in 1967.

The Secretary said that we attached great importance to the ending of the state of belligerency. We had no fixed formula but one useful precedent might be the formula used by the Soviets and Japanese to end the state of belligerence after WW II. They were able to do this without a formal peace treaty. He regretted that Jordan had been caught up in the hostilities since the major participants in the actions leading up to the fighting had been Syria, the UAR and Israel. He said he was not trying to lecture on this but he did wish that Jordan could have avoided the fighting. He had the feeling that apart from Jerusalem, which we all knew would be a "wrestle" the territorial problems involved in the settlement were not too serious. The basic and fundamental problem was the ending of the state of belligerency.

Foreign Minister Touqan said that the arms build up was not limited to the Arab side. On Jerusalem, he said that the US position should be the

same as that of Jordan, i.e. unilateral actions by Israel were not acceptable. Jerusalem had a very special status with the Arabs as with all Moslems. It was false to say that Jordan had prohibited the Jews from reaching their Holy Places. The demarcation line which had ended the fighting in 1948 prohibited travel by both Israelis and Jordanians to the territory of the other. The Jordanians had had no desire to prevent adherents of the Jewish religion from reaching their Holy Places and, in fact, had allowed many Jewish tourists to enter Jordan.

The Secretary said we had our reasons for abstaining on the Pakistani resolution. The false UAR charges of complicity with Israel had made us very sensitive. Big powers had their sensitivities as well as little powers. These false charges had made several countries break relations with us. We would also have liked to have had an opportunity to negotiate the language of the Pakistani resolution prior to the vote, but we had not been given the opportunity. The Pakistanis had apparently felt that they had enough votes to carry the resolution so there was no need to negotiate with us. We also had not been happy with the Jordan vote on the Cuban amendment to the draft resolution, although our vote on the Pakistani resolution had not been directly linked to Jordan's vote on the Cuban amendment.

Ambassador-designate Sharaf said that the Cuban amendment condemned Israel and Jordan automatically voted for any resolution condemning Israel. He also said that Jordan unfortunately had to vote first on the Cuban amendment before they had realized that some of the other Arab delegations would not vote for it.

Foreign Minister Touqan said that he had become very angry at the way Ambassador Goldberg had acted during the UNGA session. Ambassador Goldberg had tried to undermine every measure taken by the Jordanian delegation and had obviously used considerable pressure to reduce the number of votes for the non-aligned resolution. Secretary Rusk pointed out that the US could not tell other countries how to vote. The primary US interest was to find some way to bring about an Israeli withdrawal to a state of peace and not to a continuing state of war.

The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister what it was that the Jordanians had objected to in the Latin American resolution. The Foreign Minister replied that the resolution made Israeli withdrawal subordinate to too many other things. Secretary Rusk said it might still be possible to work out a compromise between the Latin American and the non-alignment resolution which would be acceptable to all.

Ambassador-designate Sharaf said that he wished to make two specific points
1) The often reiterated US assurances on territorial integrity and

political independence had been made without conditions. The Jordanians had been shocked to find that so many conditions were now attached to our commitments. 2) Jordan expected more from the US as a result of our past friendly relationship.

The Secretary said that there was one important difference between today and 1956. Nasser had completely undermined our position vis-a-vis Israel by closing the Strait of Tiran. If we were to ask Israel to withdraw now they would say that they had heard this before and our assurances on free navigation in the Strait had not held up. The Secretary then said that as far as Jordan was concerned if they were looking around the world for a friend in terms of Jordan's independence, safety and well being, they could find such a friend in the US

Ambassador Shubeilat said it would be impossible for Jordan to negotiate directly with Israel. Secretary Rusk said there was some flexibility on this. Working out the procedures of negotiation may be as difficult as agreeing on the substance. One possibility was the use of a UN representative as an intermediary. There were always other possibilities for unpublicized contacts. Ambassador-designate Sharaf said it was not feasible for Jordan to engage in open unilateral dialogue with Israel as Jordan cannot risk being completely isolated from the Arab world.

The Secretary said it was not necessarily true that Jordan should take the lead in the negotiations. It might be better if President Nasser or one of the other Arab states made the first move. It was difficult for us to talk to the Arabs because the Arabs themselves cannot seem to get together except on their opposition to Israel. It was always the extremist voices that were the loudest and which came to the front when we tried to talk to the Arabs. Secretary Rusk then asked if there would be some advantage for Jordan if the situation on the Syrian-Israeli border could be clarified before Jordan made any diplomatic move. Ambassador-designate Sharaf then said that a formal peace treaty was not possible and he hoped the US could understand this. It would be difficult for both Jordan and the US if Jordan were pushed in this direction since Jordan was well known in the area as a friend of the US. He said that in the Arab world form was very important as opposed to the US where people adopted a more pragmatic approach. The Secretary agreed that there were many ways to renounce belligerency. A Security Council resolution, for example, might be one possibility. The important thing was that the state of belligerency somehow be renounced.

Ambassador-designate Sharaf pointed out that the General Armistice agreement had neutralized the state of war and that the Israelis had undertaken aggression by violating the Armistice Agreement whether or not a state of non-belligerence had been agreed to by the concerned parties. The Secretary conceded that the accusation of aggression applied more

to the UAR than to Jordan. The Secretary asked the Jordanians not to discount US support for the principle of territorial integrity. Although the question of Jerusalem was a difficult one the Jordanians can be assured that we intended to stick to this principle. We were interested, however, in seeing that Israel withdrew to international boundaries and not to armistice lines. We must find a way to end the exercise of the rights of war in the Middle East and to stop the recurrent outbreak of hostilities.

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REF: STATE 211231

FROM AMBASSADOR

1. PROSPECTS FOR PEACEFUL AND DURABLE SETTLEMENT OF ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE APPEAR ALMOST ENTIRELY NEGATIVE IN SHORT RANGE. WE SEE BASIC FACTORS LIMITING OPPORTUNITY FOR SETTLEMENT AS FOLLOWS:

2. ISRAELIS HAVE LITTLE REASON TO BELIEVE THEY WOULD WIN FAVORABLE ARAB RESPONSE BY BEING "MAGNANIMOUS IN VICTORY", AND BARGAINING POSITION IS STRONGLY IN THEIR FAVOR. IF ARABS REFUSE

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TO NEGOTIATE ISRAEL CAN STAY WHERE SHE IS. NO AMOUNT OF UN RESOLUTIONS NEED DETER THEM FROM THEIR BASIC DEMANDS AND ASSERTION OF WHAT THEY VIEW AS THEIR RIGHTS. IF THEY DID NOT FEAR SOVIET INTERVENTION DURING HOSTILITIES, THEY ARE MUCH LESS LIKELY TO WORRY ABOUT SOVIET INTERVENTION DURING CURRENT PERIOD. RE-ARMING OF ARAB STATES BY SOVIET UNION IS NOT LIKELY TO HAVE APPRECIABLE EFFECT ON THEIR POSITION IN FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

3. GENERAL ARAB SITUATION ON OTHER HAND OFFERS LITTLE PROSPECT OF FLEXIBILITY OR OF NEGOTIATION. ARABS WILL BE EQUALLY INTRANSIGENT ABOUT ACCEPTING RESULTS OF MILITARY DEFEAT EVEN IF THEY HAVE FEW EFFECTIVE WEAPONS LEFT. DEEP HUMILIATION AND WEAKNESS OF ARAB REGIMES DEFEATED BY ISRAEL WILL CONTINUE TO PREVENT THEM FROM ACCEPTING RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO EXIST, MUCH LESS ANY LOSS OF TERRITORY TO HER OR RECOGNITION OF NAVIGATION RIGHTS. THEY MAY NOT YET

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REALIZE THAT CONTROL OF PRODUCTION OF CONSIDERABLE SHARE OF EUROPE'S OIL AND BLOCKAGE OF SUEZ CANAL IS NOT INCONTROVERTIBLE STRENGTH OR THAT EUROPE AND U.S. CAN SURELY FIND OTHER, ALBEIT MORE EXPENSIVE, ALTERNATIVES TO WHAT THEY MUST SELL IN ORDER TO LIVE. THEIR HOPE MUST BE TO PERSUADE USSR TO RE-ARM THEM FOR EARLY NEXT ROUND OF HOSTILITIES AND TO PAY FOR THIS BY CLOSER BLOC ALIGNMENT

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AND CONTINUED ANTI-WESTERN ACTIONS. WE SHOULD NOT COUNT ON PROSPECT THAT ECONOMIC FACTS OF LIFE, I.E., LOSS OF REVENUES FROM CANAL OR OIL SHIPMENTS, ARE LIKELY TO AFFECT THEIR POLITICAL POSITION IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE UNLESS GOVT OF EGYPT UNDERGOES CHANGE IN WITHIN.

4. SOVIET UNION HAS LOST PRESTIGE IN ARAB WORLD AND HAS LITTLE ALTERNATIVE BUT TO TRY TO REGAIN IT. IT COULD PARTIALLY ACCOMPLISH THIS BY PEACEFUL MEANS IF IT COULD COMPEL ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FROM ARAB SOIL, BUT ISRAEL CAN IGNORE UN RESOLUTIONS AND SOVIET PRESSURE. USSR CAN RE-ARM ARAB WORLD BUT THIS WILL TAKE TIME AND WEAKNESS OF ARABS IN ANY CASE WAS NOT DUE TO LACK OF ARMAMENT BUT TO FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS NOT CHANGEABLE IN SHORT RUN. USSR THUS FACES DILEMMA OF ARMING TOO MUCH OR TOO LITTLE. IF IT GIVES TOO MANY ARMS, HOSTILITIES ARE LIKELY TO ERUPT AGAIN WITH DANGER OF ANOTHER ARAB DEBACLE AND POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT BY OTHER POWERS. IF IT GIVES TOO FEW ARMS, ARABS WILL BE DISSATISFIED AND CRITICAL. IN FACT, ARABS MAY WELL BE DISSATISFIED WITH SOVIETS REGARDLESS OF WHAT SOVIETS DO. NEVERTHELESS, THE SOVIETS MUST SEE SOME ADVANTAGE IN DEPARTURE OF US-UK PRESENCE FROM SEVERAL ARAB CAPITALS AND WILL TRY TO EXPLOIT THIS. HOWEVER MUCH THE ARABS THINK THEY ARE

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USING SOVIETS AGAINST ISRAEL AND WEST, IN FACT SOVIETS ARE USING ARABS AGAINST WEST AND WILL CONTINUE DO SO.

5. ISRAEL'S CONTROL OVER GHAZA AND WEST BANK OF JORDAN IS NOT PER SE AGAINST LONG-TERM U.S. INTERESTS IF ISRAEL ABSORBS THESE ARAB POPULATIONS AND TREATS THEM WELL. OLD ARMISTICE LINES OFTEN REFERRED TO IN OUR NEA PLANNING SESSIONS OF 1950'S AS "THE THIRD AGGRESSOR." IT IS UNDESIRABLE TO RETURN TO THAT EXPLOSIVE SITUATION REGARDLESS OF ARAB EXHORTATIONS AND THREATS. KING HUSAYN'S WEST BANK ROLE SEEMS FINISHED. ITS LOSS IS ECONOMIC AND COULD BE MADE UP BY SOME FORM OF UNION WITH SAUDI ARABIA. POLITICALLY HUSAYN COULD BE BETTER OFF WITHOUT WEST BANK.

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6. EMBASSY SEES SOME PROSPECT FOR LONG-TERM BENEFIT WHICH MIGHT EVENTUALLY LEAD TO ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT IN FOLLOWING:

7. DIALOGUE WITH USSR ON TOTAL MIDDLE EAST PICTURE. BESIDES GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, IT SHOULD BE AIMED SPECIFICALLY AT REDUCING OR LIMITING ARMS SHIPMENTS INTO AREA. LIMITATIONS SHOULD AT FIRST AFFECT USSR ON ONE HAND AND US, UK, FRANCE AND FRG ON OTHER HAND. COULD BE

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EXPANDED LATER TO INCLUDE OTHER NATO COUNTRIES AND OTHER WARSAW PACT MEMBERS. PRIOR CONSULTATION IN NATO ON THIS APPROACH WOULD BE NECESSARY. IF CONSULTATION WITH USSR FAILS, US-UK AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES MAY WISH TO CONSIDER JOINT DECLARATION OF EMBARGO ON ARMS SHIPMENT TO MIDDLE EAST, DURATION OF WHICH WOULD DEPEND ON RECIPROCAL GESTURE BY USSR. THIS STEP MIGHT PLACE SOVIETS IN DELICATE WORLD POSITION AS TO SIZE OF ARAB REARMAMENT PROGRAM WHICH THEY ARE SUPPORTING. IN CONSIDERING DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIETS, WE SHOULD OF COURSE BE ALERT TO ANY INDICATION OF ENHANCED CHICOM ACTIVITY IN AREA WHICH MIGHT HELP PERSUADE USSR THAT OUR INTERESTS ARE JOINTLY SERVED THROUGH CONSULTATION.

8. FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH SUEZ CANAL AND GULF OF AQABA COULD BE STRENGTHENED AND CLARIFIED BY OFFERING TO PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATION OF NEW MULTILATERAL TREATY OR TREATIES. CONFERENCE OF LEADING INTERNATIONAL JURISTS, DIVORCED FROM POLITICAL PRESSURES MIGHT BE SUGGESTED AS VEHICLE TO PREPARE DRAFT TEXT, AFTER WHICH INTERNATIONAL

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CONFERENCE UNDER UN SPONSORSHIP MIGHT SIT DOWN TO NEGOTIATE. WHILE IT SEEMS MOST UNLIKELY THAT PRESENT GOVT. OF UAR COULD EVEN CONSIDER ACCEPTANCE OF A TREATY WHICH WOULD HAMPER ITS RIGHT TO BLOCK OR TO RESTRICT PASSAGE AT ITS OWN WHIM, THE PROPOSAL MIGHT NEVERTHELESS PUT PRESSURE ON UAR AND USSR IN SPOTLIGHT OF WORLD OPINION AND BE USED AS BASIS FOR LONG-TERM EFFORT TO RESOLVE THESE WATERWAYS.

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FROM AMBASSADOR

9. STATIONING OF UN PERSONNEL ALONG ARAB-ISRAEL FRONTIERS SEEMS ESSENTIAL TO PREVENT RENEWED CHAIN OF INCIDENTS AND REPRISAL ACTIONS. TO ACHIEVE THIS, WE BELIEVE UNSC RESOLUTION IS NECESSARY CALLING FOR INCREASE IN UNTSO AND SPECIFYING IT SHOULD OPERATE ON BOTH SIDES OF ENTIRE CEASE FIRE LINE. UN ROLE IN TRYING TO BRING ARABS AND ISRAELIS TOGETHER TO DISCUSS PEACE SETTLEMENT IS OBVIOUSLY DESIRABLE, EVEN IF PRESENT ARAB GOVTS FLATLY REFUSE. THEIR CONTINUED REFUSAL TO ACKNOWLEDGE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST OR TO NEGOTIATE WITH HER ON MATTERS AFFECTING PEACE OF AREA AND OF WORLD CAN ONLY ISOLATE THEM IN LONG RUN AND LEAD TO DE FACTO WORLD ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL'S NEW FRONTIERS. NASSER AND BA'ATH REGIMES SHOULD BE MADE TO BEAR ONUS OF ILLUSORY NATURE OF THEIR LATEST CHALLENGE TO ISRAEL AND ITS RESULTANT GREAT LOSS OF ARAB-CONTROLLED REAL ESTATE. FOR U.S. ARAB CHALLENGE BY ARMS AND RUPTURE OF RELATIONS WITH US ON WHOLLY FALSE

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PRETEXT CREATED NEW SITUATION IN WHICH US GOVT HAS NO FURTHER MORAL OBLIGATION TO RESTORE STATUS QUO ANTE BUT CAN BE "NEUTRAL" FROM ENTIRELY NEW BASE AND PUSH FOR MORE AGGRESSIVE UN ROLE IN SEEKING NEW FOUNDATIONS FOR MORE LASTING MODUS VIVENDI AND ULTIMATE SETTLEMENT.

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10. IF PEACE SETTLEMENT ULTIMATELY PROVES NEGOTIABLE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND NEIGHBORS IT SHOULD OCCUR IN ABSENCE OF BIG POWERS BUT UNDER UN SPONSORSHIP OR WITH UN PRESENCE AND HELP. US SHOULD STAY IN BACKGROUND FOR SAKE OF ITS TIES WITH THOSE ARAB STATES WITH WHICH IT RETAINS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

(IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE, OF COURSE, THAT THERE BE SOME TYPE OF PRIOR MAJOR POWER UNDERSTANDING OR TACIT AGREEMENT OUTSIDE THE UN WHICH COULD BE ENDORSED BY BROADER UN MEMBERSHIP. HOWEVER, IT SEEMS FAR-FETCHED TO BELIEVE USSR WOULD PARTICIPATE IN SUCH AGREEMENT AT EXPENSE OF ITS PRO-ARAB POSITION.) PEACE SETTLEMENT SHOULD PROBABLY PROVIDE FOR TEMPORARY CONTINUATION UNITSO ROLE. IT WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE PROVISION RECOGNIZING ISRAEL AS SOVEREIGN STATE WITH FULL ACCESS TO SUEZ CANAL

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AND AQABA AND SHOULD INCORPORATE BAN OF PARA-MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS BY BOTH SIDES.

11. POTENTIAL REFUGEE PROBLEM CAN BE OF MASSIVE PROPORTIONS AND MAY WELL DEFY FINAL SOLUTION EXCEPT BY ISRAEL ABSORBING GAZA AND WEST BANK ALONG WITH THEIR ARAB POPULATIONS. THIS OBVIOUSLY CHANGES DEMOGRAPHY OF ISRAEL IN MANNER WHICH WILL GIVE ISRAEL MUCH PAUSE, FOR IT RENDERS IT BI-ETHNIC, BI-RELIGIOUS, AND BI-LINGUAL STATE.

ISRAEL FACES BIG DILEMMA IN SUCH PROSPECT, BUT PALESTINE ARABS SHOULD BE MUCH MORE CONTROLLABLE WITHIN A HIGHLY EFFICIENT ISRAEL THAN IN CONCENTRATIONS JUST BEYOND HER BORDERS. BACK OF REFUGEE PROBLEM, WHICH HAS PLAGUED ALL EFFORTS TO RESOLVE ARAB-ISRAEL ISSUE, COULD THUS BE BROKEN, ESPECIALLY IF THERE IS GRADUAL EXTENSION TO PALESTINE ARABS WITHIN ISRAEL'S BORDERS OF ISRAELI CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES (ANALOGOUS TO NAZARETH ARABS). IT WOULD BE AN ACT OF GREAT STATECRAFT BY ISRAEL INVOLVING MANY RISKS, BUT IN LONG RUN MORE LIKELY TO ACHIEVE STABILITY IN PALESTINE THAN PROSPECT OF VAST NEW EXODUS OF ARABS TO

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NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AND CONTINUED CONFRONTATION OF PRE-DOMINANTLY JEWISH STATE BY DEEPLY SHAKEN ARAB STATES HOSTS TO REFUGEE PROBLEM BEYOND THEIR CAPACITIES TO SOLVE, AND THREATENING ALL REMAINING FORCES OF MODERATION IN THEIR SOCIETIES. ISRAEL WOULD HAVE SOMETHING IN COMMON WITH LEBANON IN TRYING TO ACHIEVE "CONFESSIONAL BALANCE", AND JEWISH POPULATION

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MIGHT FEAR MORE RAPID MUSLIM BIRTH RATE. HOWEVER, ARABS MIGHT BE LESS INCLINED TO LAUNCH SOME FUTURE MASSIVE SURPRISE ATTACK ON A JEWISH-ARAB ISRAEL (WITH NEARLY EQUAL JEWISH AND ARAB POPULATIONS) THAN ON A PURELY JEWISH STATE. IN THEIR USUAL COMPULSION TO DREAM THEY WOULD BE LIKELY TO SAY "WE'LL SOME DAY TAKE IT OVER FROM WITHIN." I THINK WE IN THE US COULD LOOK ON THAT PREDICTION WITHOUT LOSS OF SLEEP.

12. IN INTERIM, AID SHOULD BE CHanneled VIA RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT TO NATIONAL GOVTS, WHICH SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR DISTRIBUTING AID TO REFUGEES WHO HAVE JUST FLED TO ARAB STATES SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO RETURN TO THEIR HOME UNDER ISRAELI ADMINISTRATION AND THAT ISRAEL SHOULD GIVE COMMIT-

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MENT THAT REFUGEES WHO DO SO MAY STAY THERE WITH FREEDOM OF LIVELIHOOD AND WITH OFFERS OF CITIZENSHIP IN ISRAEL COMPARABLE TO ARABS OF NAZARETH. IF GHAZA IS ABSORBED BY ISRAEL OUTRIGHT, AS I THINK IS IN LONG-TERM US INTEREST, CROWDED REFUGEE SETTLEMENTS SHOULD BE RELIEVED BY PROGRAM OF INTEGRATION INTO ISRAEL ECONOMY AND PERMISSION TO GRADUALLY RESETTLE INDIVIDUALLY, ELSEWHERE IN ISRAEL. REFUGEES OUTSIDE TERRITORIES PRESENTLY CONTROLLED BY ISRAEL SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO PROGRAM OF PHASE-OUT BY UNRWA FOR ABSORPTION BY ARAB HOST STATES.

13. IN LONG RUN QUESTION US PRESTIGE WITH ARABS DEPENDS ON OTHER FACTORS THAN ISRAEL, SINCE WE CAN NEVER ACCEPT EXTREME ARAB POSITIONS WHICH TEND TO PREVAIL ON THIS ISSUE. ARABS NEED US AROUND AS POWER-OFFSET TO USSR AND WILL RECOGNIZE THIS NEED AGAIN AS TIME GOES ON. WE SHOULD FOCUS ON HELPING INTEGRATION OF EAST BANK JORDAN INTO ECONOMIC (AND ULTIMATELY PERHAPS POLITICAL) UNION WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND PROGRESSIVE ASSUMPTION BY LATTER OF BURDEN OF ITS SUPPORT. WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT THAT OFFERS OF ECONOMIC AID IN THEMSELVES WILL ELICIT EARLY POLITICAL BENEFITS TO US ANYWHERE IN ARAB WORLD, BUT WHAT IS LEFT OF JORDAN WILL NEED A LOT OF QUICK HELP, PREFERABLY BY A CONSORTIUM LIKE THAT ASSISTING TURKEY, UNTIL ECONOMIC UNION WITH SAUDI ARABIA ASSUMES THE LOAD.

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REF: STATE 211231

FROM AMBASSADOR

14. BECAUSE OF HIGH EMOTIONALISM ON BOTH SIDES, WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO TRY TO WORK OUT SOME OF FOREGOING PROBLEMS WITHOUT OUR APPEARING TO CONFRONT THE TERRITORIAL ISSUES AT ALL. TERRITORIAL CHANGES SHOULD PROBABLY BE LAST ISSUE FOR NEGOTIATION RATHER THAN FIRST, BE RESOLVED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HER NEIGHBORS. MEANWHILE PRESENT TERRITORIAL SITUATION IS NOT INTRINSICALLY BAD, AS WAS THAT OF 1949 TO JUNE 5, 1967, ALTHOUGH IT IS ANATHEMA TO ALL ARABS.

15. AS FAR AS TURKEY IS CONCERNED BELIEVE BEST WAY TO PREVENT MISUNDERSTANDING IS TO BRIEF FONMIN CAGLAYANGIL VERY CONFIDENTIALLY, AND IN ADVANCE, ALONG GENERAL LINES OF OUR THINKING. ALTERNATIVE, LESS SATISFACTORY TO TURKS, WOULD BE ADVANCE CONSULTATION IN NAC. WE SHOULD NOT FORGET THAT AMONG NATO MEMBERS TURKEY IS ONLY ONE WHICH CAN CLAIM TO BE MIDDLE EAST AS WELL AS EUROPEAN POWER. AS CAGLAYANGIL TOLD NATO MINISTERS, TURKEY BELIEVES IT HAS RETAINED CONFIDENCE OF ARABS THROUGH ISI RECENT SLIGHTLY

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-2-ANKARA 6227 SECTION 3 OF 3 JUNE 17, 1967

PAGE 2 RUQMGU 6227/3 ~~SECRET~~
PRO-ARAB STANCE AND HOPES TO BUILD ON THIS TURK-ARAB
RELATIONSHIP TO IMPROVE LATTER'S RELATIONS WITH WEST.
ALTHOUGH NOT SPELLED OUT BY FOREIGN MINISTER, GOT' BOW
IN DIRECTION OF ARABS IS ALSO DESIGNED PROTECT ITS RECENT
EFFORTS TO IMPROVE BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH ARAB STATES,
TO ENHANCE TURK POSITION VIS-A-VIS GREECE RE CYPRUS, AND
TO INCREASE ITS OVER-ALL REGIONAL PRESTIGE. CAN COUNT
ON TURKISH BRIDGE INTO MIDDLE EAST TO BE OF ASSISTANCE IN
SEEKING A SETTLEMENT BUT WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT, OR ASK,
TURKS TO PLAY ROLE IN MIDDLE EAST WHICH WOULD OPEN THEM
TO CHARGES THAT THEY WERE AGENTS OF US OR NATO AND HAVE
EFFECT OF DAMAGING THEIR IMPROVED POSITION IN ARAB WORLD. THUS,
WHILE CONSULTING FRANKLY AND SECRETLY WITH THE TURKS,
MUST EXPECT AND EVEN COUNT UPON THEIR TAKING DIFFERENT
POSTURE FROM OURS IN PUBLIC ARENA. IF THE CONSULTATION IS
WELL-CONDUCTED THIS DIFFERENT POSTURE CAN BE USEFUL TO US,
FOR ALL WE WANT IN FINAL RESULT IS WHAT TURKEY WANTS:
PEACE IN THE AREA AND DIRECTION OF ARAB ENERGIES TOWARD
DEVELOPMENT.

GP-3. HART
BT

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Bundy

30f

~~SECRET~~

Action
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Info

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Control: 18210
June 22, 1967, 3:27 A.M.

3

SECTO 13

EXDIS

FOLLOWING UNCLEARED MEMCON FYI NOFORN AND SUBJECT TO REVISION.

SECRETARY AND AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG RECEIVED ISRAELI FONMIN EBAN ALON WITH RAFAEL AND HARMAN 7:15 P.M. JUNE 21. HOUR'S CONVERSATION REVOLVED AROUND TWO MAIN TOPICS: (A) SITUATION IN NEAR EAST AND ISRAELI VIEW RE SETTLEMENT AND (B) PRESENT PARLIAMETARY SITUATION IN UNGA. THIS TELEGRAM COVERS TOPIC (A).

SECRETARY REFERRED TO SENTIMENT IN UNGA RE NEED FOR REAFFIRMATION PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL BEFORE MEANINGFUL DISCUSSIONS ON BASES FOR SETTLEMENT COULD TAKE PLACE. HE BELIEVED THERE WERE TWO SEPARABLE QUESTIONS AS REGARDS FORM AND SUBSTANCE. IF WE COULD BE CLEAR ON SUBSTANCE WE COULD THEN BE MORE FLEXIBLE ON MODALITIES.

EBAN STATED ISRAELI INTER-MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE HAD COME TO SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS WHICH HE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH SECRETARY BUT NOT OTHERS.

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EGYPT-ISRAEL. ISRAELIS WANTED PEACE TREAT. ON BASIS PRESENT INTERNATIONAL FRONTIERS. THIS WOULD INVOLVE ISRAELI MARITIME PASSAGE THROUGH STRAITS TIRAN AND SUEZ CANAL AND AIR PASSAGE OVER STRAITS. IN CONTEXT NON-BELLIGERENCY THIS WOULD MEAN ISRAEL WOULD BE TREATED LIKE EVERYONE ELSE. IN SAME CONTEXT ISRAELI ENVISAGED DEMILITARIZATION OF SINAI, WHICH WAS NATURAL BARRIER BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES. FROM EGYPT, ISRAEL WANTED ONLY SECURITY, NO TERRITORY. ISRAELIS FELT EGYPT MIGHT BE ATTRACTED TO THIS CONCEPT.

IMPORTANT THING THAT THERE MUST BE TREATY WHICH COMMITTED EGYPTIANS. ISRAELI UNWILLING ACCEPT ANOTHER UNDERSTANDING ON BASIS OF ASSUMPTIONS. THIS HAD BEEN MAJOR FAULT OF 1957 ARRANGEMENTS WHICH HAD COMMITTED MUCH OF WORLD BUT NOT EGYPT.

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ISRAEL-SYRIA. ISRAELIS WOULD LIKE PEACE TREATY ON THE BASIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL FRONTIERS WITH SOME UNDERSTANDING THAT SYRIAN HILL'S OVERLOOKING ISRAELI TERRITORY WOULD BE DEMILITARIZED. ISRAELI WOULD ALSO LIKE ASSURANCES THAT SYRIA WOULD NOT USE RETURNED TERRITORY FOR PURPOSE OF DIVERSION OF JORDAN WATERS AWAY FROM ISRAEL. EBAN NOTED THAT SYRIANS UNABLE DIVERT THESE WATERS NOW BECAUSE ISRAELI HELD ESSENTIAL TERRITORY. EBAN CONCLUDED THAT ISRAEL WAS OFFERING BOTH EGYPT AND SYRIA COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL TO INTERNATIONAL FRONTIERS. THESE TERMS NOT UNGENEROUS.

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GAZA. EBAN NOTED THAT EGYPT HAD NEVER CLAIMED GAZA, HAD NOT ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR OCCUPYING IT, OR FOR THE REFUGEES. THE NATURAL THING WAS FOR GAZA TO BE IN ISRAEL. ISRAELIS WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT ON BEHALF OF GAZA POPULATION WHICH TOTALED OVER 350,000 PEOPLE. THIS PLUS ISRAEL'S PRESENT ARAB POPULATION WOULD BRING TOTAL ARABS IN ISRAEL TO ABOUT 700,000. ISRAELIS WONDERED WHETHER SOME COULD NOT BE SETTLED ELSEWHERE, E.G. NORTHERN PART OF SINAI, "CENTRAL PALESTINE" OR WEST BANK OF JORDAN. ISRAELIS WOULD LIKE TO MAINTAIN STATUS OF UNRWA AS SOURCE OF ASSISTANCE TO THESE PEOPLE.

WEST BANK OF JORDAN. EBAN SAID ISRAELI THINKING "LESS CRYSTALIZED" RE WEST BANK. THEY WERE STILL WORKING ON BASIS TWO TENDENCIES, TWO CONCEPTIONS IN GOI. ONE TENDENCY ASSUMED THAT THE HASHIMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN WOULD CONTINUE AND THAT AN AGREED SETTLEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE DEMARCATION LINE SHOULD BE WORKED OUT. ANOTHER IDEA WAS THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME KIND OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE WEST BANK AND ISRAEL ON THE BASIS OF AUTONOMY AND ECONOMIC UNION. THE DIFFICULTY WITH THIS LATTER APPROACH, SAID EBAN, WAS THAT IT WOULD PUSH HUSSEIN BACK ACROSS THE JORDAN RIVER. MOREOVER, THERE WERE NO INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENTS FOR SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT.

THE SECRETARY INTERPOSED BY WONDERING WHETHER THERE WERE NOT PRECEDENTS ON THE BASIS OF LETTING THE PEOPLE CONCERNED DECIDE. EBAN REPLIED THAT GOI WAS TRYING TO TAKE SOUNDINGS ON THE

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INTELLIGENCE LEVEL. THERE WERE SOME "SERIOUS" ARAB LEADERS ON WEST BANK WHO FELT THAT THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH EAST JORDAN HAD

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BEEN ARTIFICIAL AND HAD PROVIDED THEM NO SECURITY. OTHERS HAD HASHEMITE LOYALTIES.

SECRETARY INQUIRED IF THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT EGYPTIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN SINAI WHAT WOULD BE SITUATION IN THE NEGEV? EBAN POINTED OUT THAT UNTIL UNEF REMOVED THERE HAD BEEN THE SLENDEREST MILITARY PRESENCE POSSIBLE IN THE SOUTH OF ISRAEL.

SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT IT WAS HELPFUL TO HAVE THESE PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS. HE WAS NOT CLEAR AS TO WHETHER DOCTRINE OF INNOCENT MARITIME PASSAGE THROUGH STRAITS OF TIRAN ALSO APPLIED TO AIR PASSAGE. EBAN FELT THAT DOCTRINE WOULD APPLY, IN LIGHT OF RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS RE AIR TRANSIT, EXCEPT IN TIMES OF WAR. SECRETARY ASKED WHETHER ECONOMIC ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND WEST BANK MIGHT NOT BE CONDUIT TO BRING TRANS-JORDAN INTO SIMILAR ARRANGEMENT. HE REALIZED ISRAELIS WERE ANGRY AT HUSSEIN BUT ADVISED THAT THEY SHOULD NOT SELL HIM SHORT. EBAN ADMITTED THAT ISRAELI'S FIRST REACTION HAD BEEN TO WRITE HUSSEIN OFF BUT THEY NOW HEARD THAT HUSSEIN WAS BEING PROPERLY CONTRITE.

SECRETARY SAID HE WANTED TO RAISE TWO POINTS:

1. REFUGEES. WE CONTINUED TO GET BAD INFORMATION ON THE REFUGEE

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SITUATION. APPARENTLY SEVERAL THOUSAND ARABS PER DAY CONTINUE TO LEAVE ISRAEL. IT WOULD BE A GREAT TRAGEDY IF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM WAS RE-CREATED. OUR INFORMATION DOES NOT AGREE WITH ISRAELI'S STATEMENTS ON THIS MATTER. EBAN SAID HE HAD SPOKEN WITH THE MILITARY GOVERNOR OF JERUSALEM (WHO HAPPENED TO BE HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW) ON THIS POINT. THE SECRETARY SUGGESTED THAT ISRAEL BE LESS RIGOROUS IN ITS PROCESS OF SCREENING OF PEOPLE WHO LEFT THE WEST BANK DURING THE HOSTILITIES AND NOW WISH TO RETURN. HE FELT THAT ISRAEL COULD TAKE SOME CHANCES IN THIS RESPECT AND THAT WORLD OPINION WOULD PRESS ISRAEL VERY HARD ON THE REFUGEE QUESTION.

2. JERUSALEM. SECRETARY HOPED THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE VERY CAREFUL WITH REGARD TO JERUSALEM AS IT INVOLVED ACTUAL OR LATENT PASSIONS OF AN ENORMOUS NUMBER OF PEOPLE. THE MATTER WAS VERY DELICATE AND COULD BE A SOURCE OF STRONG ANTI-ISRAEL FEELING IN THE UNITED STATES. EBAN REPLIED THAT ISRAEL WAS TRYING TO PUT THE CHRISTIAN HOLY PLACES UNDER CHRISTIAN CONTROL AND THE MOSLEM HOLY PLACES UNDER MOSLEM CONTROL. EBAN ADMITTED THAT ISRAEL HAD A JOB TO DO IN PROJECTING PUBLICLY ITS INTENTIONS REGARDING ACCESS TO HOLY PLACES.

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EBAN REFERRED TO REPORTS OF SOVIET REPLACEMENT OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO EGYPT. HE AGREED THAT FULL REPLACEMENT MIGHT TAKE A YEAR. AT THE SAME TIME ISRAEL'S OWN AIRCRAFT INVENTORIES WERE LOW. ISRAEL HAD LOST 42 PLANES IN HOSTILITIES. THIS HAD LED TO GOI REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED IMPLEMENTATION OF PRESENT CONTRACT TO SUPPLY SKYHAWKS TO ISRAEL. SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THIS WAS BEING CONSIDERED IN WASHINGTON AT THE PRESENT TIME. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER SOVIETS INTENDED TO REPLENISH FULLY ARAB INVENTORIES OR TO MAKE A MORE MODEST GESTURE. SECRETARY SAID THAT HE WOULD TRY TO FIND OUT FROM GROMYKO IF THERE WAS ANY SOVIET INTEREST IN SOME ARMS LIMITATION. SECRETARY NOTED THAT THIS WAS ISSUE AFFECTING WHOLE AREA AND THAT WE WERE UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE FOR ARMS FROM FRIENDLY ARAB COUNTRIES.

RUSK
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 3:44 A.M., JUNE 22.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 3:44 A.M.

~~SECRET~~

Jordan
Mr. Morris

32

June 28, 1967

Mr. President:

If you decide to go to the Islamic Center with Hussein this afternoon, the attached brief remarks would be useful.

McGB

32a

SUGGESTED REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OPENING OF THE
ISLAMIC CENTER, WASHINGTON, D. C. ON
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 1967

Ten years ago President Eisenhower took part in the dedication ceremonies of this Center. I am glad to have a chance to mark this anniversary with His Majesty, King Hussein.

We in the West recognize a great debt to the Islamic world. Its discoveries in medicine and astronomy and its contributions in art, science and commerce have enriched our own civilization.

Today at this place of religious devotion and compassion, our minds turn to the human beings who are the main victims of tragic wars in the Middle East. I believe the place and the time are appropriate to rededicate ourselves to bringing justice and hope to those people.

Yesterday, on behalf of the United States Government, I announced a program of emergency relief for the refugees, and I understand that this Center is a collecting point for private contributions to that cause. I know that my fellow Americans will support all efforts to help those in need.

But emergency relief is not enough. It is time that all peoples of the Middle East--with the world's help--transform these refugees of nearly twenty years into men, women and children with a future.

New homelessness must not be created; old homelessness must be ended. There will be no peace unless this problem is attacked with new energy by all, and, certainly, primarily by those who are immediately concerned.

Jordan

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SUGGESTED JOINT COMMUNIQUE FOR THE MEETING BETWEEN
THE PRESIDENT AND KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN ON JUNE 28, 1967

The President and His Majesty King Hussein I exchanged views on the problems arising out of the recent hostilities in the Near East.

King Hussein expressed deep concern at the plight of the refugees, thanked the United States for assistance contributed to the refugees and hoped the United States would do its utmost to relieve the suffering. The President noted that the United States had been a major contributor to the support and rehabilitation of the Palestine refugees. He emphasized our acute concern with the welfare of the refugees, both those displaced by the fighting of 1948 and those who have left their homes as a result of the recent hostilities. He noted that the USG was contributing a total of \$5 million for emergency relief for the refugees through UNRWA and other means.

Both King Hussein and the President agreed that any resolution of the present crisis must be based on justice and the interest of all parties concerned. King Hussein insisted that a first step must be the withdrawal of Israeli forces back to the boundaries pertaining before June 4. The President referred to the five points which he made in his speech of June 19. He expressed the hope that measures could now be taken to implement these points and arrive at a just settlement including the withdrawal of the Israeli forces. He described our basic objective as the achievement of a more durable and more stable situation than that existing prior to June 5. Our commitments on territorial integrity would be fulfilled in that context.

Both agreed that Jerusalem as the repository of shrines of three great religions deserved special attention. Both agreed that the future legal status of Jerusalem must be decided on the basis of international consultation and agreement.

The President reaffirmed the deep interest of the United States Government in Jordan and its people. He expressed the hope that the friendly relations between the two countries would be strengthened and informed the King that the United States Government intended to continue its economic assistance to Jordan.

Although there was not an identity of views on all issues, the exchange was most beneficial, clarifying the positions of the two countries.

Drafted by: NEA - Mr. Houghton Cleared by: NEA - Mr. Davies

File Jordan

Mr. Morris

34

MEMORANDUM FOR McGEORGE BUNDY

June 27, 1967

SUBJECT: Hussein Lunch Guest List

The President has approved the following guest list for tomorrow's lunch:

The President
Under Secretary Katzenbach
Secretary McNamara
McGeorge Bundy
Walt Rostow
Findley Burns, the President's Ambassador to Hussein
George Christian
William Macomber

King Hussein
Foreign Minister Ahmad Tuqan
Major General Amir Khammash, Chief of Staff
Jordanian Ambassador to Washington, Farhan Shubeilat

Harold H. Saunders

CONFIDENTIAL

June 27, 1967

TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH KING HUSSEIN

King's State of Mind

The King is still emotionally disturbed by recent events, although more composed than he was, and perhaps undecided as well between his traditional moderation and the mood of Arab nationalism and unity of early June. He is bitter towards the West, USSR, Nasser, other Arab leaders and toward himself above all because of the debacle. At bottom, he probably wants to be moderate and realistic in his approach to problem, but he is afraid to risk positions drastically at variance with present extremist Arab opinion. He has been proposing an Arab Summit Conference, which Nasser and some others have been avoiding. His object has been to challenge Nasser at such a meeting, and more Arab opinion towards moderation. Hussein will visit Nasser on his way home. He has made a number of inconsistent statements in recent days, but he handled himself yesterday on television with care and skill. He is enjoying the praise he has received in Arab circles for fighting bravely, and is probably unaware of the depth of the bitterness he created by making a deal with Nasser, and by attacking Jerusalem.

The message he takes away will inevitably be one for Nasser and other Middle Eastern leaders.

His Objectives

To determine U. S., Soviet, and Israeli position towards Jordan and himself, especially with regard to our economic and military assistance program and our position on boundary problems for Jordan. He has publicly committed himself to the return of the West Bank and of Jerusalem; but he appears not to have the slightest notion of how to do so.

Our Objectives

1. To affirm our continued interest in him and in his country. It is basic that he be encouraged to stand up now for himself and for Jordan, not for the loose and divided Arab community as a whole.

2. To make it clear again that we did not know of the onset of hostilities, that we tried to prevent them, using the same words with the UAR and with Israel, and that we were not involved, directly or indirectly.

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By SP/ly NARA, Date 6-27-07

3. To inform him we intend to continue our economic and some of our military assistance programs for him, and for other moderate states in the Middle East, and to make sure he understands the extent of our present assistance to such states.

4. To discuss with him our basic objective of achieving a more durable and more stable situation than that existing prior to June 5, and make clear that our commitments on territorial integrity will be fulfilled in that context.

5. To assure him of our support for a just and permanent solution for the refugees.

6. To ask for his views on possible solutions for the West Bank and Jerusalem problems, and on the future relationship between Israel and Jordan more generally, as well as his opinion on broader issues involved in the conflict.

Talking Points

His Majesty may be assured of continued United States support both for Jordan and for himself, and for other Arab nations which adopt constructive policies. We regret the tragic events of early June, the mistakes made, the death and destruction that ensued; it is imperative that we work together to see if a better and more durable settlement can be reached. Reiterate again that we strongly advised Israel and UAR not to start hostilities, that we did not know of the outbreak of hostilities in advance, and that our posture has been and remains even-handed.

His Majesty may be assured that we intend to continue our economic assistance programs. We are also prepared to resume some military assistance but we are not yet clear on either the scale nor the type of equipment. We wish to avoid an arms race and are consequently urgently reviewing the supply of lethal equipment such as aircraft and tanks to all Middle Eastern states.

The states of the Middle East, with the help of the world community, must find an answer to the refugee problem. We should be most interested in the King's views on this subject, from the point of view of Jordan's national interest. Our objective, difficult as it may be of achievement, is a durable peace permitting all states to develop the full extent of their potentialities.

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On the other hand, it is not practical after all that has happened to ask the Israelis to withdraw until the main terms of a political settlement are clearly agreed, at least in private. We have been thinking, for example, that at some point in the settlement process the Security Council or the General Assembly could declare that the state of war between Israel and other Middle Eastern states is ended, and that no one can legitimately claim rights of belligerency any longer. Such a declaration could be acknowledged by each government, thus starting a movement in the right direction.

While, as you have said, the continuance of hostilities and near hostilities in the Middle East has become a world problem not a regional one, we do not feel that the United States Government is in a position itself to initiate moves for a settlement of this problem. In this situation the attitudes of Jordan and Israelis are paramount. There is little the international community can do until both sides approach the problem of settlement on realistic terms. We are willing to help the parties reach agreement. But nothing can be done until they accept their own responsibilities.

In this setting, it would be helpful and important to hear King Hussein's views on the main outstanding issues between Israel and Jordan, and on the five principles you announced on June 19. How does he see the future of Jordan's relationship with Israel?

In the light of his answer, you may wish to draw on the covering memorandum, encouraging the King to explore the possibilities of agreement with Israel. We are ready to help in private. You should let him understand the risks for him and for Jordan of allowing the situation to drag on indefinitely in its present pattern.

You might ask the King for his ideas on a possible private intermediary. We are inclined to think that the Shah would be a candidate to consider. The Turkish Foreign Minister would also be a possibility.

In the meantime, we hope both Israel and Jordan will cooperate to deal with the present situation on the West Bank humanely. The people should be helped in their present plight.

We hope that Jordan and Israel will both follow a two-pronged policy in the period ahead: trying as hard as they can for a basic settlement, and making arrangements which ensure the welfare of the

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local population in the meantime, and do not prejudice a constructive outcome.

The King will undoubtedly want to know--as Nasser will--your views on a wider range of topics.

I recommend that you stress these additional points:

(1) a condition of peace can be approached in stages, and does not necessarily require a treaty of peace in the first instance. There is no treaty of peace as yet between Germany and the Soviet Union, regrettable as that fact is.

(2) an end of all claims of belligerent rights should open the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal forthwith. The world community would expect the UAR to meet its clear responsibilities under international law.

(3) we deeply regret the decision of certain countries to break diplomatic relations with us. We should be glad to resume normal and friendly relations with them when conditions are appropriate on both sides.

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KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN

June 26, 1967

INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, JUNE 28, 1967

Background Paper

Status of our Jordanian Aid Programs

Economic Assistance

We assume that for the present it is not possible to carry out economic assistance activities on the West Bank. The continuation of aid to Jordan might involve budget support, East Bank Development Loan and technical assistance projects, and PL-480 activities, if the political situation permits.

Budget Support

Thirty million dollars has been provided for budget support for FY 1967. An additional \$2 million was agreed to for political reasons related to the Samu raid in November, 1966. An agreement was signed on May 4, 1967 for the \$2 million but the transfer has been administratively delayed since the onset of hostilities. Consideration of further budget support is postponed pending review of the total situation. Total planned budget support for FY 1968 as presented to Congress is \$24.5 million.

Development Loans

Of the existing loan projects, with one exception, all are located wholly or in part on the West Bank. The Bethlehem/Jerusalem Road (\$1.6 million) and the Jerusalem airport (\$1.8 million) are both in occupied territory and we are delaying further implementation. The telecommunications project (\$6.3 million) involves both banks. With some modification part of it might be carried out on the East Bank. The bid period for the equipment is being extended to provide time for review.

The only existing loan project located entirely on the East Bank is the North Shouna Road project in the Jordan Valley. This involves primarily local currency and work can be resumed.

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Group 3

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There are two proposed new loans which have been under study. An electric power loan (\$16 million) involves both banks and will need to be modified if restricted to the East Bank. The Potash Loan (\$15,450,000) is part of a package involving IBRD/IDA, Kuwaiti Fund, W. R. Grace Company and Tenneco. The Project is on the East Bank but its implementation will depend on the reestablishment of conditions satisfactory to the participants.

Technical Assistance

Much of the Technical Cooperation program remains valid. As the situation permits, work may continue on projects including: East Ghor irrigated agriculture development, a feasibility study of a dam on the Zerka River to develop irrigation, studies of other East Bank water resources, public administration projects in Amman and tourism.

We are reviewing the Public Safety Program, in particular a request for equipment to strengthen the public security force.

PL-480

Problems of disaster relief are the subject of a separate paper. A \$9.8 million UNRWA program for Palestine refugees for FY 1968 is before the Interagency Staff Committee. The Voluntary Agencies have an advance equal to one quarter of last year's program pending approvals for FY 1968. There do not appear to be any immediate shortages of food although there are no doubt serious distribution problems.

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KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN

INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, JUNE 28, 1967

Background Paper

MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND SALES TO JORDAN

GRANT AID : Following the termination of the United Kingdom subsidies to Jordan in March 1956, King Hussein turned to the U.S. as a major source of military equipment. During 1957 the U.S. provided Jordan with \$7 million in ground force equipment and in 1958 furnished \$3 million in air force equipment. Numerous additional requests for military assistance were subsequently instituted by the Government of Jordan. As a sequel to these requests, King Hussein specifically asked that the U.S. send a military survey mission to Jordan to conduct an on-the-spot survey of the requirements of the Jordan Arab Army, which took place in October 1958.

As a result of the findings of this mission and U.S. policy decisions with respect to military assistance for Jordan, the United States has programmed through FY 1967 \$53.2 million in grant military assistance for Jordan. This includes an augmentation to the FY 67 program which the U.S. delivered on an expedited basis as a result of King Hussein's plea for assistance following the Israeli raid on Samu in November 1966.

Included in the grant aid programs for Jordan have been 145 medium tanks, 100 armored personnel carriers, 130 artillery pieces (all types), 127 2-1/2 ton and over vehicles, and 168 vehicles under 2-1/2 tons. In addition, we have furnished 4 C-47 aircraft and 12 Hawker-Hunter aircraft.

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The proposed program for FY 1968 in the amount of \$1.9 million covers training, maintenance, spares and other services. Approximately \$5 million remains in the grant aid pipe line for Jordan. Most of this is in the nature of spares and automotive supplies; however, there are 35 vehicles of various sizes.

SALES (Ground Force Equipment) : On 18 March 1965 the United States agreed to sell to Jordan ground force equipment amounting to \$44.5 million, with delivery during CY 1965, 1966 and 1967, and a provision for \$15 million in credit. Some of the major items in the package are : 100 M-48 tanks, 50 armored personnel carriers, 20 M-42 SP 40 mm AA guns, 1550 commercial type vehicles, ammunition, small arms, signal and engineer equipment. This sale was contingent on Jordan's agreement not to accept any Soviet type equipment into its inventory. The agreement provides for possible additional future sales of ground equipment.

SALES (F-104A/B Aircraft) : The U S. and Jordan agreed on 29 March 1966 to the sale of twelve F-104 A/B aircraft and supporting defense articles and services. The agreement allowed Jordan to exercise an option to purchase an additional 24 F-104 A/B aircraft if it satisfied certain conditions. Total cost of the 36 aircraft, together with supporting defense articles and services, is \$54.6 million. This option was designed to meet a U.S. desire to limit the sale to 12 aircraft and yet to permit Jordan to demonstrate that it had met in substance a United Arab Command requirement of 36 aircraft. Because of financial restraints, Jordan was unable to exercise its option on 1 January 1967 to purchase 24 additional aircraft. Jordan has agreed to purchase an additional six aircraft and has been granted an option, to be exercised by 31 March 1968, for 18 additional aircraft. The delivery schedule for the first 12 aircraft is:

2 F 104B's in July 1967
2 F-104A's in September 1967
2 F-104A's in October 1967
2 F-104A's in November 1967
2 F-104A's in December 1967
2 F-104A's in January 1968

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OTHER SALES : During FY 1962-1964 the U.S. implemented miscellaneous sales to Jordan in the amount of \$2.4 million. These sales included spare parts, training, ammunition and communications equipment.

PIPELINE: Ground Force Equipment : The undelivered portion in the ground force package is approximately \$9 million and includes spare parts for weapons, tanks, armored personnel carriers and other vehicles. Prior to the current crisis, it was forecast that most of this equipment would be delivered by the end of CY 1967.

PIPELINE: F-104 A/B Aircraft : Approximately \$3 million in equipment has been delivered to Jordan. This includes spare parts; ammunition, ground support equipment and other communications equipment. None of the aircraft has been delivered. However, 47 Jordanians are undergoing training in the U.S. in connection with the F-104 program .

STATUS OF DELIVERIES : Grant aid and sales to Jordan were suspended as a result of the hostilities. We are now resuming shipments of both grant and sales programs for Jordan, except for ammunition, F 104 aircraft and all equipment relating to F-104 aircraft. A decision on the F-104 aircraft has been deferred subject to a high policy review.

King Hussein has asked the U.S. for an agreement in principle that he can still look to the U.S. for arms procurement. Hussein has been informed that the U.S. has made no decision in principle against supplying arms to Jordan.

DOD/ISA/CQuinn:jh

Cleared by: NEA - Mr. Davies
NEA/ARN-Mr. Houghton

S/S-S:Lannon Walker, Room 7237, Ext. 4155

File Jordan
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June 26, 1967

KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, JUNE 28, 1967

Background Paper

The International Status of Jerusalem

Background: In 1949 the UN General Assembly, led by the traditional Catholic countries, adopted a resolution which provided that Jerusalem should be placed under a "permanent international regime... administered by the UN". We and the British voted against the 1949 resolution on the grounds that it was impractical; and we would evidently have been glad to settle for some kind of "functional" as opposed to "territorial" internationalization, i.e., an international arrangement merely to insure protection of and access to the Holy Places. However, since then we have considered ourselves bound by this resolution, and have refused to recognize de jure Israeli or Jordanian sovereignty over the parts of the city that they respectively occupied.

Past Precedents: The emphasis on administration of matters concerning the Holy Places up till now has been on the "status quo". The Turkish and later British administrators of the city found that any change in the status quo could produce such a violent international storm (such as the Crimean War) that they made every effort to enforce rigorous adherence to the letter of the status quo (which has often been quite difficult to document).

Recent Status : The truce line of 1949 left the great bulk of the Holy Places on the Jordanian side (the "Old City"). Since then there have been few major controversies concerning them except for the denial of access to Israelis and most Jewish tourists. The Jordanian governors have in general adhered scrupulously to the status quo with this important and regrettable exception.

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The Present Problem: Regardless of who administers the Old City, he will have to face the problem of inextricable locations of the Holy Places of three faiths. For example, the Muslim Haraam al-Sharif is placed almost vertically on top of the Jewish Wailing Wall. The rights claimed by various nations and faiths, particularly Jewish and Muslim, continue to arouse intense passion. (King Hussein's grandfather Abdullah considered Jerusalem the pearl of his kingdom, and the Muslims in general consider Jerusalem one of the three holiest cities in the Muslim world).

Prospects for the Immediate Future: The confrontation of the international community with Israel over its holding of the Old City of Jerusalem in particular will be one of the most bitterly contested in the forthcoming attempt at a settlement. The Vatican has already publicly reasserted its position that all of Jerusalem should be placed under an international regime as a separate territory. Privately the Vatican has informed us that such a "corpus separatum" should be established "at least in the Old City". This position is bound to have an effect on the position taken in the UN by the traditionally Catholic powers, in particular France which has maintained an historic vital interest in the status of Christendom in Jerusalem. The British have already demanded that the Israelis give up the Old City. King Hussein received a very sympathetic hearing on this question when he addressed the General Assembly on June, 26.

The feasibility of various plans now being proposed for the status of the Old City of Jerusalem will depend upon the degree to which the Israelis evacuate the West Bank. Obviously it would be next to impossible to attempt to maintain an "international" enclave in the midst of Israeli-held territory against the wishes of a powerful and victorious Israeli Army. (Furthermore, we cannot give serious consideration to proposals to continue to attempt to persuade the Israelis to submit their "New City" portion of Jerusalem, which they have held since 1948, to internationalization.) If, however, the Israelis evacuate the West Bank they will still be determined to hold on to all of Jerusalem, particularly because of the Wailing Wall.

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We have indications that King Hussein, if he got the Old City back, would be willing to permit access to the Old City to all faiths, including Jewish. Although the return of the Old City to Jordan under these circumstances would be the most desirable from the US point of view, the Israelis are unlikely to settle for this. In that event, one of the most feasible compromises might still be territorial internationalization of the Old City and its immediate environs such as the Mount of Olives, with equal access by all faiths administered by a UN High Commissioner and an equitable distribution of the all-important tourist revenues. However, the problems of any such administration will be so great that its constitution should be worked out with the greatest possible degree of consent by both Israel and Jordan.

^{now}
NEA/ARN/LLKinsolving:sdj
6/26/67

Clearance:

NEA/ARN - R.B. Houghton ^{now}
NEA/IAI - A.L. Atherton ^{now}
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June 26, 1967

KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
INFORMAL WORKING VISIT, JUNE 28, 1967

Study Paper - Jordan's West Bank

I ALTERNATIVES FOR WEST BANK

A. Return to Jordan with appropriate arrangements for demilitarization, access to Holy Places and minor border adjustments. These arrangements to be supervised by an increased UN presence.

B. Create a semi-independent Palestinian state with responsibility for defense and foreign affairs reserved to the Government of Israel.

C. Return to Jordanian sovereignty but with arrangements for economic unity with Israel.

D. Outright annexation to Israel.

II DISCUSSION: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ALTERNATIVES

A. Return to Jordan with appropriate arrangements.

1. Advantages:

a. The USG commitment concerning territorial integrity would be honored.

b. Israel's chances for ultimate acceptability in the Middle East would be increased.

c. Arab hostility towards the West would be reduced, provided the Soviets could not claim responsibility for the withdrawal.

d. The threat to other U.S. interests in the area, e.g. oil, transportation rights, would be reduced.

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e. Jordan would have a better chance of developing into an economically viable independent state.

f. The relatively stable leadership of King Hussein would probably be preserved in the sensitive area along Israel's eastern border.

g. Continued existence of Jordan as a moderate independent state would serve to prevent effective encirclement of Israel by a ring of USSR supported Arab states espousing the militant Arab nationalist line.

2. Disadvantages:

a. Israel's expectations have been aroused by the successes achieved in the recent hostilities. Even with United Nations supervised assurances of West Bank demilitarization and free access to the Holy Places, the Government of Israel may now be reluctant to give back the territory acquired.

b. Without considerable territorial alterations, the existing separation of the West Bank from its natural markets and ports on the Mediterranean coastal plain would be perpetuated.

c. The undesirable status quo on the refugee problem would be continued.

d. It may be difficult to obtain adequate UN surveillance forces.

Comment: In weighing the advantages and disadvantages of returning the West Bank to Jordan it is important to keep in mind the fundamental attitudes which characterize the parties to the conflict. It would be dangerous to assume that the recent round of hostilities has changed these basic attitudes which have been the root cause of the Arab-Israel conflict for the last 19 years. The Arabs have suffered a substantial military defeat including the loss of large quantities of military equipment but their basic strengths vis-a-vis Israel, e.g., sheer numbers, territory in depth, and overwhelming unanimity of opinion, have remained substantially intact. The humiliation suffered in the recent hostilities will have the effect of reinforcing the previous unfortunate states-of-mind of the Arab public and will probably only deepen their thirst for revenge. The Israelis do not have sufficient manpower or financial resources to control effectively any

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substantial portion of the hostile Arab populations of the Eastern Arab world nor can they change the Arab attitudes merely by destroying the aircraft and tanks of the Arab armies. Since neither side has the force to alter the existing deadlock, the only long-term solution lies in a change in attitudes by one or both parties to the dispute.

The long-range goal of Israel is acceptance in the Eastern Arab World. Absorption of the West Bank by Israel would reduce Israeli chances of attaining this goal as such action would confirm the Arab's worst fears concerning Israeli territorial ambitions. On the other hand, a return of the West Bank to Jordan could constitute a modest first step in the direction of Israel's ultimate acceptance by discrediting the widely held Arab belief that Israel is a dangerous, expansionist state.

The USG also has an important interest in maintaining stability in the Middle East and thus avoiding a confrontation with the USSR. Israeli territorial expansion by right of conquest, regardless of the provocations suffered by Israel prior to the outbreak of hostilities, would confirm existing Arab attitudes and probably hasten the date of the next outbreak of violence.

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B. Create a Palestinian state with defense and foreign affairs responsibilities reserved to the Government of Israel.

1. Advantages:

- a. The West Bank would regain its natural economic ties with the Mediterranean coastal plain of Palestine.
- b. Israel would acquire a more defensible perimeter and its consequent improved sense of security would reduce the risk of Israeli pre-emptive military action.
- c. No agreement from the Arab states would be required. Israel could deal directly with the Arab leaders of the population who are already under Israeli military control.
- d. This arrangement would restore contact between the Israeli-Arabs and their Palestinian brethren in the new state.
- e. It would remove the adverse economic and military consequences of the irrationalities of the previous Israeli-West Bank armistice line.
- f. It would provide a new framework to approach the refugee problem and give the Palestinians a sense of national identity, albeit in a state under Israeli influence and ultimate control.

2. Disadvantages:

- a. The Arab world, and probably most of the international community, would consider that the U.S. had failed to honor its commitment for the maintenance of territorial integrity in the Middle East.
- b. Since it appears unlikely that the other Arab states would consent to such an arrangement, it would be generally interpreted within the Arab world as Israeli expansion and further absorption of the Arab population into Israel. The residents of the new Palestinian state would suffer from the same psychological problems of divided loyalties as those which have plagued the Israeli-Arabs. In Arab eyes, the new state would be linked with Israel and would probably be cut off from access to any surrounding Arab country.

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c. There is no apparent responsible Palestinian leadership. Local Arab leaders who acquiesce in such an arrangement would be branded as Quislings and traitors in the other Arab countries.

d. Since Jordan would no doubt feel obliged to boycott the new Palestinian state, Jordan's economic future would become very problematical. The tourist attractions on the West Bank and Palestinian remittances are Jordan's two most important foreign exchange earning assets. The loss of these assets would be approximately offset by the termination of imports now consumed on the West Bank. As a result, the new political entity on the East Bank would require economic assistance at about the same level as that previously given to the entire state of Jordan even though the new state would contain only 53% of Jordan's population. In addition, the West Bank would require a considerable input of capital from either the U.S. or Israel. The \$200 million in foreign exchange reserves now backing the Government of Jordan would not be available to buttress the new political structure established on the West Bank. Unless Israel is willing to devote considerable resources to underwriting the economy of the new West Bank state, the total economic assistance required from the United States for both the East and West Banks would probably be substantially in excess of the present level of aid to Jordan. If the U.S. does not continue to support the East Bank at the level which it now supports all of Jordan, the economy would deteriorate with a probable increase in internal instability.

e. The general level of hostility toward Israel and the West would increase in the Arab world with consequent jeopardy to other U.S. interests in the area, such as oil and transportation rights.

f. Arab bitterness toward Israel would increase with a consequent reduction in Israel's ultimate chances for acceptance as part of the Middle East.

g. The permanent loss of the West Bank would create grave risks for Hussein's survival. The educated elites of the East Bank who dominate the civil service and the powerful merchant community contain many Palestinians. The continued loyalty of these elites to Hussein would be seriously shaken if he loses the rest of their Palestinian homeland.

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The officer corps of the Army is composed primarily of East Bank residents who traditionally look down on the Palestinians, but the loss of the West Bank would nevertheless be considered humiliating by the armed forces. The officer corps would question the wisdom of the King's policy of relying on the USG as his primary source of support. The possibility of a coup d'etat would increase. The result would probably be an Arab nationalist-type military regime patterned after those in the UAR, Iraq, or Syria. If such a regime assumes power, Israel would be ringed with Arab nationalist regimes probably supported by the USSR. Polarization would increase between the Israel-U.S. camp and the Arab-USSR camp with a consequent increased risk of a U.S. - USSR confrontation. Absorption of the East Bank into a neighboring state is another possibility. This would be resisted by the various groups who have an interest in Jordan's existing national entity, i.e., elements of the Army, the civil service, the merchant community and, of course, the regime. Annexation might be attempted in conjunction with an overthrow of Hussein's regime. The dislocations created by such an attempt would result in an unstable situation with Israel and the rival Arab claimants all moving to protect their interests. If Saudi Arabia absorbed the East Bank, the Saudi regime would be under great pressure to assume a more aggressive stance towards Israel. This inhibition on Feisal's moderation would not be in U.S. interests in view of our major oil holdings in Saudi Arabia.

h. U.S. prestige, now heavily committed to King Hussein, would suffer and our opponents throughout the world would use Hussein as an example of how we treat our friends.

i. Although the creation of a Palestinian state would provide an opportunity for a new approach to the refugee problem, in fact nothing significant would change unless Israel also opened its borders to the Palestinian refugees. Under the Jordan regime, the West Bank refugees already had access to the West Bank area and were given full citizenship rights. The USG provided economic assistance to the West Bank to the maximum extent consistent with the upper limit of the capital absorption rate. The re-establishment of economic ties between Israel and the West Bank might boost the economy but this would be off-set to a considerable extent by the cutting of economic ties between the West Bank and the rest of the Arab world as it appears very likely that the West Bank area would become subject to the Arab boycott.

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Comment: The proposal to establish the West Bank as an independent state with an economic link to Israel and with defense and security responsibilities reserved to the Government of Israel would have obvious short-term advantages for the Israelis but would have serious disadvantages for U.S. interests in the area. It would give Israel strategic control of the West Bank area while simultaneously placing the cost of providing relief for the displaced Palestinian Arabs on the U.S. In the longer range this arrangement would reduce Israeli chances for acceptance as it would increase the bitterness and hostility of the Arab populations. It would thus further postpone the day of a permanent solution to the problem of the Middle East. It would reduce our ability to exert influence in the Arab capitals at a time when this influence is most needed to deal with the problems created by the Arab-Israeli conflict.

C. Return to Jordanian sovereignty but with arrangements for economic unity with Israel.

1. Advantages:

- a. The West Bank would regain its natural markets and trade links with the Mediterranean coastal plain.
- b. The East Bank of Jordan might also be drawn into commercial relations with Israel through West Bank middlemen.
- c. The economies of all three areas would benefit and the Arab boycott of Israel would be breached.
- d. The expanding economies would provide opportunities for de facto absorption of the refugee population into economically productive employment.
- e. The first step, i.e. the establishment of trade relations between the West Bank and Israel, could be accomplished unilaterally by Israel during the interim period of de facto Israeli military occupation of the West Bank.
- f. The return of the West Bank to Jordan would honor the U.S. commitment on territorial integrity.

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2. Disadvantages:

a. For the Government of Jordan to accept such an arrangement, i.e. trade between Israel and any area under Jordanian sovereignty, would quite likely result in its overthrow. Although the de facto Israeli occupation would provide an opportunity to establish these economic links without the acquiescence of Hussein, the principle of an economic boycott of Israel is well established in the Arab consensus. If Hussein resumes sovereignty over the West Bank at some later date, he could ignore this consensus only at great risk.

b. A successor regime would probably be even less inclined to establish trade relations with Israel.

c. If force or the threat of force were used by the Israelis to establish and maintain a regime in Amman willing to accept trade relations with Israel, such a regime would probably be considered by the other Arab countries as an Israeli puppet government and Jordan would be boycotted. Such a regime would also evoke strong internal opposition and would probably have considerable difficulty maintaining internal security.

d. Although the outcome of the hostilities has left Jordan in a position where Israel and the USG could apply considerable pressure to force the acceptance of such an arrangement, it would not be in US interests to risk the future of Hussein's regime. He has recently reiterated his statements calling for a unified Arab policy. If he accepts an arrangement with Israel which diverges sharply from the Arab consensus he would lose the support of his people and would probably be overthrown by his army.

e. If Hussein is overthrown a USSR supported Arab-nationalist type regime would be the likely successor. U.S. influence in Jordan would be reduced or abolished and Israel would risk a more effective USSR supported Arab "encirclement". This, in turn, would increase the possibility of a US-USSR confrontation in the Middle East.

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Comment: This proposal, although it has some attractive features, is not realistic in light of existing Arab attitudes towards Israel. An attempt to force its acceptance could mean the end of the Hashemite regime. The successor regime would probably be a radical Arab nationalist type military dictatorship or an Israeli sponsored puppet regime. In the latter case Israel would have considerable difficulty maintaining such a regime in the face of overwhelming popular opposition and Jordan would probably be cut off from all contact with the other Arab countries.

D. Outright annexation to Israel.

1. Advantages:

a. Outright annexation would bring Israeli efficiency to the West Bank in dealing with the administration of refugee relief and economic development.

b. Annexation would also provide the same advantages as those which would be attained by alternative (b).

2. Disadvantages:

a. The hostile Arab reaction against both Israel and the U S. would be even greater than that which would be evoked by the creation of an independent state linked to Israel with defense arrangements.

b. Annexation would create a difficult problem for the Israeli Government in maintaining internal security among the West Bank Arab population.

c. It would be an even more obvious violation of the U.S. commitment on territorial integrity than would the adoption of alternative (b).

Comment: Although there may be elements within Israel who are now advocating total annexation of the West Bank, it seems more likely that the Government of Israel would find it more in its interests to advocate some arrangement along the lines of alternatives (a), (b) or (c). Complete

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annexation and a bi-national state would be feasible only if the Israelis were willing to change the nature of the state of Israel from a Jewish state to a secular state. It seems unlikely that the Israelis would accept such a proposal.

MW
NEA/ARN/MWwiley:jh
6/25/67

Clearances: Task Force- Amb. Porter
NEA/ARN- Robert B Houghton

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

41
June 26, 1967

TO : M - Mr. Rostow

FROM : NEA - Lucius D. Battle *LD*
L - Leonard C. Meeker *LC*

SUBJECT: Political and Legal History of the West Bank
and Jerusalem - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

Your memorandum of June 26, 1967, requested a short memorandum summarizing the political and legal history of the West Bank, including Jerusalem, and the position our Government has taken on it.

Historical Background

Prior to 1948, the area comprising the West Bank, Jerusalem and Israel, were included in the territory of the British mandate of Palestine. Following announcement by the British of their intention to terminate the mandate, the future of the area was debated at length in the United Nations. On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly adopted a partition plan which:

- (1) called for termination of the mandate as soon as possible but in any case no later than 1 August 1948;
- (2) provided for the creation of an independent Arab state with specified boundaries including the West Bank territories;
- (3) provided for creation of an independent Jewish state with specified boundaries;

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By *fw/mj*, NARA, Date 6-27-07

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- (4) provided for a Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem.

The mandate terminated on May 14, 1948, at which time hostilities between Arab and Jewish forces occurred. These hostilities were eventually terminated by the General Armistice Agreement (GAA) of April 3, 1949 (insofar as Israel and Jordan were concerned).

The GAA of April 3, 1949, provided for Armistice Demarcation Lines, the basic purpose of which was "to delineate the lines beyond which the Armed Forces of the respective Parties shall not move."

West Bank

Articles V and VI of the GAA delineated the ADL's and provided that the West Bank area would be within the area of control of Jordan.

Jerusalem

Article V(b) provided that the ADL in the Jerusalem sector should correspond to lines established in a November 30, 1948 cease-fire agreement which conformed generally to military positions held by the respective sides on that date, the Jordanians holding the old city and adjacent territory.

Duration of Territorial Delineations

Article V(2) of this same GAA states:

"The Armistice Demarcation Line is not to be construed in any sense as a political or territorial boundary, and is delineated

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without prejudice to rights, claims and positions of either Party to the Armistice as regards ultimate settlement of the Palestine question."

Action of Parties

Subsequent to the GAA, both Israel and Jordan asserted positions with respect to the areas under their respective control which the United States considered inconsistent with the GAA/s and did not recognize.

West Bank

In 1950, Jordan purported to annex the portion of Palestine under its de facto control and notified the United States through the Legation at Amman. The United States merely acknowledged receipt of the notification. The other Arab states took action in the Arab League critical of Jordanian annexation. The British Government announced de jure recognition. On April 26, 1950, the Secretary was questioned concerning the matter at a press conference and stated: ". . . it has a bearing on efforts we have made through the U.N. to solve the Palestine matter. We are studying it from that standpoint and I think that is all I can say about it at the present time."

The United States has, accordingly, considered the West Bank legally under the control of Jordan pursuant to the GAA and having the full sanction of the United Nations. We have not extended de jure recognition to Jordanian claims to sovereignty.

Jerusalem

United States policy with regard to Jerusalem has been geared to the corpus separatum proposal of the

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1947 U.N. resolution and a reaffirming resolution in 1949. Accordingly, while we have acknowledged de facto Israel and Jordanian control in the respective sectors, we have not accepted their claims with respect to sovereignty.

Israel Sector of Jerusalem

In 1952 the Israelis announced their intention to move their Foreign Ministry from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. On July 9, 1952, we gave them an Aide Memoire stating that we would "not view favorably the transfer" since the United States adhered to the view that there should be a special international regime for Jerusalem acceptable to Israel and Jordan. The Aide Memoire also reasoned that "the U.S. Government believes that the United Nations should have an opportunity to reconsider the matter with a view to devising a status for Jerusalem which will satisfactorily preserve the interests of the world community and the states directly concerned." This statement was released publicly soon afterwards. It was reiterated in 1953 in a press conference by the Secretary. In a speech in 1955 the Secretary stated that "the U.S. would give its support to a UN review of the Status of Jerusalem problem." There have been no major U.S. public policy pronouncements since then.

Jordan Sector of Jerusalem

As noted above the U.S. has refused to acknowledge the Jordanian claim with respect to the Arab Sector.

Jerusalem has been treated as a separate consular district distinct from Israel or Jordan and we have succeeded by and large in maintaining the above position.

L/NEA:DAWehmeyer:dmg 6/26/67

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June 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. E. V. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Middle East Priorities--Refugees or Withdrawal?

I didn't want to prolong your Control Group meeting Saturday by pursuing the importance of an Israeli offer on refugees. However, I hope you don't mind this informal note to complete my point that the refugee issue is so central that other issues might somehow fall into place around it.

I agree with you that the Arabs' main demand today is Israeli withdrawal. But the Arabs' main demand for 19 years has been "recognize the rights of the refugees." It's possible that the moderate Arabs might see greater advantage in making progress on a demand of 19 years, even at the temporary expense of a demand of 19 days.

I'm afraid that allowing ourselves to get overly engrossed in withdrawal will forfeit whatever chance we have to settle basic issues. Forcing Israel to withdraw and give up control of the main refugee centers leaves us right back where we were--the Arabs with an honest grievance and the Israelis having dumped the problem back on us.

What I tried to suggest Saturday was that an Israeli offer on refugees could have within it elements to meet--at least for debater's purposes--some of the immediate Arab demands:

1. Withdrawal. Israel recognizes Jordan's "residual sovereignty" over the West Bank and promises to withdraw the IDF as soon as it can assure justice for the refugees. (This leaves ultimate political arrangement open.)
2. Compliance with UN. To implement UN Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 ("... refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so . . ."), Israel asks PCC (or UN survey team) to plan implementation of the main elements of something like the Johnson Plan.
3. Compensation. If Israel actually repatriated a few Palestinians and offered a systematic plan for repatriation or productive resettlement with compensation, it might undercut zest--among moderates, at least--for the "liberation war."

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By ip/ny NARA, Date 6-27-07

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4. Recognition. By inviting the cooperation of host governments--even through the UN--a way might be paved leading to de facto recognition.

I admit this won't satisfy the radical Arabs. But if we're trying to give the moderates something to tie to without forcing them to commit suicide by signing a peace treaty with Israel, it seems to me a refugee program could be our area for de facto cooperation with great political appeal.



Harold H. Saunders

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70 Jordan

Mr. Bundy 44

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You may want to read this before your 6:00 p.m. meeting.

Hal

MEMORANDUM

1. Introduction. This memo tries to put some flesh on the general concept outlined in S/P's memo of June 17 regarding the west bank of Jordan.

It assumes that (i) there will be no rapid and major change in Soviet policy toward the area; (ii) Israel will insist on occupying the west bank, pending a wider Israeli-Jordanian settlement; (iii) US policy will vigorously support the effort to achieve such a settlement.

It considers how - if a settlement does not come quickly - the resulting period of Israeli occupation can be used to deal with the refugee problem on the west bank and to try to develop a new pattern of de facto Arab-Israeli economic cooperation or tissue-knitting in this area. It discusses what role the US will have to play, if this is to happen.

This memo is based, in part, on discussions with experts from NEA, AID, IO, and INR, and on an exceedingly interesting and original contribution from Ambassador G. Lewis Jones.

I. Political Framework

2. Status of the West Bank. We should urge Israel to follow a twofold policy toward the west bank:

(a) to indicate that it considers residual sovereignty to reside in Jordan (on the grounds that the local inhabitants transferred it to Jordan in 1948) and that Israel is willing to end occupation of the west bank as part of a wider settlement, when one can be negotiated with Jordan;

(b) to make de facto interim economic arrangements regarding the west bank (spelled out in Part II of this paper) which will advance the general goal of tissue-knitting in the meantime.

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Authority NLS 98-555 (H9K)

By 10/17 NARA, Date 6-29-07

Success of these de facto arrangements will hinge on Jordanian non-obstruction.

Jordan will only desist from obstruction if it hopes to get the west bank back. We should urge Israel to take no action now which would foreclose this hope - i.e., not to proceed with any plan which would seem to foreshadow a new political status for the west bank.

Instead, Israel should be urged to restore the Arab administrative districts which existed on the west bank before the recent conflict. Above them would be the Israeli military governor of the west bank; below them self-governing towns and local governments. Israeli taxes would not be applied to the west bank; previous Jordanian taxes would continue and the proceeds would be available to local administrative districts.

We should urge Israel, at the same time, to replace Israeli Defence Forces on the west bank by gendarmerie or police forces. If the IDF withdrew (presumably after dismantling west bank fortifications) the police could handle west bank security; having police rather than the army might be easier for the local population, and help to underline constructive long-term Israeli intent.

3. Jerusalem. We should also urge Israel not to try to settle the political future of Old Jerusalem now. De jure, its status should be the same as that of the rest of the west bank.

De facto, city-wide administration of Jerusalem will almost certainly be put into effect by Israel. We should encourage Israeli authorities, however, to maintain Arab participation in local government services in the Old City. We should also urge that an international authority be created - either by the UN or by agreement among religious groups - which would be empowered to override local administrative decisions, as necessary to ensure free access to the holy places.

II. Economic

Within the political framework outlined above, we should urge Israel to proceed to the de facto economic arrangements outlined below.

4. Trade.

(a) With the East Bank. We should urge Israel to allow free trade between the west and east banks. Such trade is important to both banks' welfare and to the wider program outlined below.

(b) With Israel. It may be easier for Jordan to allow trading with the west bank if there is, at least initially, a nominal customs barrier between Israel and the west bank, so that Jordan is not blatantly violating the Arab boycott of Israel. Over the longer run, however, this barrier should be gradually relaxed. Access to the dynamic Israeli market would spur economic development on the west bank and thus create new employment opportunities for refugees there. And it could lead to a promising pattern of indirect Jordan-Israel trade, with merchants on the west bank serving as middle men.

(c) Trans-shipment. We should also urge Israel to give the west bank rights of trans-shipment via an Israeli port (Haifa) and airfield (Lydda), so that it can trade with overseas areas, duty-free.

5. Currency.

(a) West Bank. Negotiations with Israel and Jordan are underway, looking to use of both the Jordanian dinar and the Israeli pound as legal currency of the west bank. This would be a good thing, in providing a basis for the pattern of trade relationships outlined above.

(b) Jerusalem. We should continue to urge Israel to treat Jerusalem as part of the west bank for currency purposes.

(c) Foreign Exchange. We should urge Israel to develop some means of sharing any net foreign exchange earnings on the west bank and in Jerusalem with Jordan.

6. Refugees and Development. We should encourage Israel to use occupation of the west bank to mount a stepped up attack on the refugee problem. This will require:

(a) Increased funds for refugee education and re-training. Retrained refugees can usually find jobs elsewhere in the Arab world, even if they can't settle on the west bank. Israel to date has not been willing to contribute to refugee help, except as part of a final refugee settlement. Now is the time for Israel to make a handsome contribution, in an attempt to make a real dent on the west bank refugee problem. The US should be prepared to match such a contribution.

Israel may prefer to make its contribution via some channel other than UNRWA, which Israel feels has a stake in perpetuating the refugee problem. While UNRWA will clearly be needed on the east bank and in Gaza, its phasing down on the west bank might be a good thing.

(b) Extra capital to finance new small scale manufacturing plants, hotels, etc., to exploit the opportunities which may be created on the west bank by access to the Israeli market and expanding tourism.

The US should indicate that it would be willing to match Israeli aid to a temporary west bank Arab development corporation, set up by the local Arab authorities there to secure and allocate needed external development financing, and manage public development projects, and make arrangements for use of the Israeli free port referred to earlier. We should urge Israel to make a generous contribution.

In the meantime, we should continue US aid to existing development projects on the west bank, if legal complications can be ironed out in ways which do not seem to imply that in giving aid, we are accepting permanent Israeli rule on the west bank.

Retraining and development will have only long-term effect. The immediate need is relief aid. We should urge Israel to help meet this need. To the extent that US relief is not given via UNRWA we should avoid channeling it through COI agencies to the extent possible. Ad hoc local Arab Relief Committees would be better.

The Israeli should, at some stage, open an office to examine and meet (in cash or Israeli lands) valid individual compensation claims from Arabs who fled Israel in 1948 or the west bank in 1967.

The Israeli should also be urged, within limits imposed by the absorptive capacity of the west bank, to allow Arabs who fled the west bank after the fighting to return. There is no point in simply transferring the refugee problem to the east bank.

In line with this, the Israeli should limit the influx of their own business people (tourist guides, hotel owners, etc.) into the west bank and Old Jerusalem. Business opportunities there should be reserved for the local inhabitants.

III. US Role

7. Need. If the US simply stands aside and lets nature take its course, there is grave danger that a combination of Israel actions and Jordanian reactions will make the west bank a focus for growing conflict, cut off its ties to the east bank, and foreclose the opportunities described above. Trying to influence how the problems and opportunities posed by Israeli occupation of the west bank are met is thus a key requirement for US policy. An effective approach to these problems is necessary to the continued viability of Jordan, and it will have a direct bearing on prospects for achieving a more permanent settlement.

On the other hand, we do not want to appear as the key moving force in working out de facto west bank arrangements. An appearance of US-Israeli collaboration in developing these arrangements could be damaging in the Arab world, especially if the Israeli handled matters in a way which suggested that what they were, in fact, seeking was permanent occupation of the west bank. Utmost care will

be needed to avoid this appearance of collaboration, in both our public posture and our private talks with the parties concerned.

8. Public Posture. The US should take the public position that it considers the disposition of the west bank and Old Jerusalem as matters to be decided in the framework of an eventual Israel-Jordan settlement based on the principle of territorial integrity - with the clear implication that we favor eventual return of the west bank to Jordan, if Jordan will agree to an end of belligerency.

9. Private Discussion with Israel. In early, private, and candid US-Israeli discussion of the future of the west bank, we should urge the Israeli to the program outlined under I and II, above.

10. Private Discussions with Jordan. Similarly, we should indicate to the King:

(a) that we favor return of the west bank to Jordan, within the context of a wider settlement;

(b) that we hope he will not obstruct, in the absence of such a settlement, de facto economic arrangements that may be needed to maintain the viability of the west bank, keep up its ties with the east bank, and help the refugees.

NOTE: It may be easier for Jordan not to obstruct these arrangements if it appears that Israel undertook them reluctantly, under pressure from the international community. Positive Jordanian cooperation is not needed - only that Jordan refrain from active obstruction and from urging west bank inhabitants to active obstruction. Jordan could well continue to denounce Israeli occupation of the west bank, but indicate that, since Jordan could do nothing about this, it was concentrating on keeping up its ties with the east bank, in order to keep open the door for eventual return of the west bank.

11. Conclusion. As the euphoria engendered in the US by rapid Israeli victories dissipates, the public and the Congress will become increasingly disenchanted with

continuing and intensifying bickering in the Middle East. The oncoming election won't help matters.

In this circumstance, it would be helpful if there is progress, in at least one region, toward normalizing Arab-Israeli relations and improving the lot of the refugees. The course outlined above may hold some hope of achieving such progress on the west bank, even before a basic Israeli-Jordan settlement becomes feasible.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 23 1967

Sir:

STATE Action on the Hussein Visit:

The Control Group meets tomorrow on the visit. The briefing for the President will probably yield --among the expected aid topics-- a definite (NEA) proposal on refugees and the West Bank.

STATE is sending over tonight a recommendation that the President see Hussein Wednesday (28th) or Thursday (29th). We cleared a noon cable saying the President would be glad to see him,, --the time to be arranged after Hussein arrives in New York.

Roger

Joan

File Jordan

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✓

File Jordan
Roger Morris

49

June 23, 1967

Mc GB:

Later today, we will be getting a Katzenbach memo recommending that the President see Hussein next Wednesday or Thursday.

If you approve, I'll just run this through normal channels when it comes.

H. H. S.

Yes _____

No _____

File Jordan 51

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 14, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

SUBJECT: Middle East Relief -- What Others Are Doing

As of noon today, the following have been confirmed:

1) Sweden has announced -

-- a special \$2 million contribution to UNRWA;

-- a \$200 thousand grant to Swedish Red Cross for use in Middle East;

-- another \$200 thousand to the Red Cross will follow;

-- the first shipment of what will total 20 tons of medical supplies will leave for the Middle East within a few days.

2) Italy has given authority to its ambassadors in Israel and the Arab countries to use up to \$320 thousand for emergency relief. They have also told us they are willing to participate in longer range development programs.


3) Canada has told us they are willing to join in relief programs, but they have no requests.

4) Iran has received requests from Hussein and may have sent a plane-load of medical supplies.

5) The wealthy Arab countries have pledged a total of \$23.8 million in relief, broken down as follows:

Saudi Arabia	--	\$8.4 million
Kuwait	--	14 million
Libya	--	1.4 million

6) In addition, Lebanon is conducting a house-to-house campaign for clothing and blankets. Several truckloads have been sent in the last few days.



Edward Hamilton

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 13, 1967

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McGB:

SUBJECT: Tents for Jordan

I know the emergency relief question is in abeyance, but it may be useful for you to have the facts on the Jordanian tent problem when the subject arises again:

1. The GOJ has made a direct request to us for 5-10,000 tents.
2. AID would like to agree to send 5,500 tents immediately, with more later if necessary.
3. AID has located suitable tents they could buy, worked out means of transportation, and ready contingency funds for immediate use. (All this has been done very quietly.)
4. Fifty-five hundred tents would cost about \$600,000, plus about \$200,000 for transportation.
5. Thus, the tents can move within hours after the President approves -- if he approves.

Ed Hamilton

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *pi/ly*, NARA, Date *6-28-07*

NEA:NE:RPDavies:av:es:4/15/64

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: April 14, 1964
12 o'clock noon

SUBJECT: The United States and Jordan

PARTICIPANTS: His Majesty King Hussein of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
 His Excellency Dr. Hazem Nuseibeh, Minister of Court of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
 His Excellency Anton Atallah, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
 His Excellency Saad Juma, Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
 The President
 Mr. George Ball, Acting Secretary of State
 Mr. Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State
 Robert G. Barnes, Ambassador to Jordan
 Mr. William Macomber, Assistant Administrator for Near East and South Asian Affairs, AID
 Mr. Robert Komer, The White House
 Mr. Rodger Davies, Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs

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The President and King Hussein had a [short] private conversation before joining the larger group.

The President said that he and King Hussein had discussed a variety of topics including foreign aid, military aid, problems with the Congress, the \$3 billion odd dollars spent since 1946 by the U.S. in assistance to the Arabs, and the Jordan Waters problem. He had asked His Majesty to outline his views and his feelings on these subjects. He had also touched on his speech at the Friends of the Weizmann Institute banquet. He told the King that nothing he said in any way implied discrimination. The U.S. proposal on desalinization discriminated against none and favored none. The U.S. offer stood for any country:

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King Hussein said it was extremely important that we all speak frankly on the problems which face the Near East. Realizing the great responsibilities the U.S. Government carries in the Free World, he believed that there are very few differences between the U.S. and the Arabs and indeed few differences in what we believe in. One great difference was Palestine. He had been asked by the Arab League to bring the sincerest hopes of all Arab leaders that Palestine will not be permitted to become a major problem between us and that relations between the U.S. and the Arab world will continue to improve.

The King said the President had been kind enough to refer to his surprise at Arab reaction to the President's speech. In frankness, the general reaction among the Arabs was one of annoyance. This can be understood only when viewed against the background of the Palestine problem. There is Arab annoyance that so many sorely needed resources have to be utilized to counter what the Arabs consider the major threat of Israel, a hostile state which splits the Arab worlds of Asia and Africa, and complicates Arab problems of development. The Palestine problem has given Jordan a large refugee population, some two-thirds of its total people. Since the 1947 UN resolution, Israel has acquired a greater area than allotted. There have been many crises such as the 1956 push against the Egyptians. In the case of Jordan, Israel is encroaching on Jordanian territory in the south in developing its potash works. In the demilitarized zones, the Israelis continue to encroach. Perhaps most important at this juncture is the water problem, which boils down simply to a diversion of water required in the area to another area. Against this background the President's remarks had been interpreted as a validation of Israel's right to divert water and offer to provide means for even greater water resources. Those would permit increased immigration and enhance Israel's threat to the Arabs.

The King said that Arab policy now was one of containment of Israel. Stability in the area depended on establishment of a balance between Israel and the Arab states. Israel must be brought to realize that she cannot continue to maintain a position in the area based on force. At the present, there is no balance between the Arabs and Israel. This is what has caused the Arabs to look to the Soviets for military equipment.

Israel's diversion project raised two problems: The first and most immediate was the increased salinity of the lower Jordan river; the second, the question of increased immigration and the threat to the Arabs of Israeli expansionism. In the face of this acutely felt threat and in light of the fact that Arabs cannot get their requirements for arms from the West, Soviet offers are found acceptable. Arabs do not doubt the desire of the Soviet Union to acquire a foothold in the Near East through provision of arms. However, the Soviets have suffered serious setbacks in the area over the past years and

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Arab solidarity will be a further guarantee against Soviet penetration. Basically the Arabs seek good relations with all states, but feel that Israel is "the spoiled child at Arab expense and at the expense of the U.S.". What Arabs ask of the U.S. is that it look into the future and see both sides of this issue.

The President said that the U.S. sees both sides quite clearly and, reverting to his speech at the Friends of the Weizmann Institute banquet, said that the offer on desalination was an example of U.S. evenhandedness: "We take salt out of his waters and yours; we give to you both."

Foreign Minister Atallah said that he thought the President's reference had been misconstrued in the Arab world. The particular sentence which caused the difficulty was that saying "Water should not be a cause of war but of peace". The Arabs interpreted this as U.S. official support of Israel's right to divert water from the Jordan. Since the dawn of history water has flowed through the Jordan to Galilee and on to the Dead Sea. If Israel unilaterally states that it has the right to stop this historic flow and divert it to alien areas when there is need in the Jordan valley for water, in self defense the Arabs must take steps to secure their rights in this water. If Jordan's needs for water from the Jordan were satisfied, there could be no objection to Israel's diversion project. However, domestic and international law both give the riparians in a basin the primary right to water until their needs are satisfied. Israel's project will result in stopping the flow of sweet water on which some 30,000 Arab farmers depend. It also prevents Jordan from developing lands on which refugees could be settled.

The President said that nothing he had said by implication or connotation reflected anything but the U.S. desire to deal equally with all: for the Arabs, for Israel, for any other country. The U.S. position on Israel's project rests on the plan worked out in 1955. As for the speech, he could not help what interpretations had been given to it, but he did not imply that he would do for one what he would not do for others. This he wished to make clear before other things were touched on. The Arabs complain about what the U.S. does for Israel. The Israelis protest about what the U.S. does for the Arabs and insist that more be done for them. The U.S. tries to do equally for both. The President said the only language he knows is that of candor. In extending \$3 billion worth of assistance to the Arabs since 1946, the U.S. showed its interest in their development and their future. The U.S. did not spend money on people it hates. The U.S. did not extend more than \$40 million to Jordan last year for any reason except to strengthen the country and speed its progress.

The King responded that the Jordanians were grateful, but when aid to the two million Israelis was weighed against this, the equation was not balanced. However, the Arabs and the U.S. had many joint interests.

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Mr. Ball said that problems of this kind were laden with history. The U.S. is aware of the controversial nature of most issues in the area and its relations with the area. Certain principles, however, guide U.S. policies. U.S. policy starts from the point that Israel is a fact. In connection with water, the U.S. made considerable effort to seek a solution and the U.S. regrets that full agreement with the riparian states was not obtained. There must be guiding principles to formulate foreign policy: U.S. actions, we think, are consistent with these principles. The U.S. would regard use of water from the Jordan system as fair if within the standards set by the unified plan. The U.S. had hoped that Jordan would take actions to insure its full share of water under the allocations, as this was the key to full flowering of Jordan's resources.

Mr. Talbot said that His Majesty knows the U.S. too is concerned over the question of salinity of the waters of the Jordan and hoped that a solution to this problem could be found. Jordan's East Ghor problem has contributed in large measure to this problem. He believed the recent visit by our water engineer was useful. His suggestion for pumping water from the power company reservoir into the canal offers a short-term solution for the problem of those farmers who face the problem of salinity in waters from the Jordan itself. In the longer range, there is hope for progress on the Maqarin Dam. Storage there would go a long way to preserve resources which are presently not usable. The Jordan valley plan was premised on meeting equitable Arab needs before any allocations to Israel were made; 6-8 years of effort had been devoted to work out a reasonable solution. The continuous concern of the U.S. is that the waters of the Jordan system be available to the appropriate users. We hope U.S. technicians and the Arab technicians can stay in touch with each other on actual and potential uses of the water. This will be of benefit to all and is far more desirable than measures which would serve to increase tensions.

Ambassador Juma said that the basic flaw in the U.S. approach is equating of the Arab states and Israel. This flies in the face of the fact that the inhabitants of Palestine are refugees, their property was destroyed, and they are living in misery. In 1947 no Arab delegate would talk with the Soviet representatives at the UN. The strong ties were with the U.S. In one single decade the basic transformation in the entire alignment of the Near East took place because of the U.S. policy toward Israel. Arabs fear that a crisis situation can arise in their relations with the U.S. unless this basic problem is faced squarely. The Ambassador pointed out that the Arabs were not previously interested in large armies or acquisition of modern arms except for parade purposes. He fears that the trend is toward reactivation of the Palestine problem rather than settlement. The Arabs are not opposed to Jews as members of a great religion or as a people. However, the Zionist movement is behaving in a manner which faces the Arabs with dangers. The Zionists are seeking to

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acquire atomic weapons to further intimidate the Arabs. As a result the Arab world is squandering precious resources in maintaining a balance of armaments. He said he thought it was high time for a new look and a reappraisal of the 1948 policy of "might vs. right". U.S. policy now is that Israel exists and must be accepted. The Ambassador believed that the U.S. with its principles of justice and morality must take another look at the Palestine problem.

Foreign Minister Atallah said that tension was rising because of the arms problem and the expected diversion of the Jordan. Arabs know U.S. policy: Israel has been created to remain there. Arabs know the U.S. anxiety for Arab peace. For this latter, thanks are due. However, U.S. policy overlooks the price asked; the price is tantamount to Israel's retaining Arab lands illegally and no enforcement of the UN resolutions and the right of Palestinians to return to their homes. Arabs do not expect the U.S. to pick up their chestnuts but do expect support on any additional forms of aggression. Zionism is aggressive -- it has designs on the Arab world. Initially seeking only a national home, this proved not enough and a Jewish state was necessary. The Jewish state quickly overran borders allotted and lines emerging from the Armistice are now becoming sanctified as the status quo. The Zionists took lands, settled aliens thereon and now are bringing more. Although all persecuted Jews have long been settled, Zionists seek other Jews for Israel. They seek them from the U.S., the USSR and Britain.

(The President was called out at this juncture for an urgent telephone call). Clearly their aim is expansionism from the Zionist heartland. Arab refugees have no right to their home but Jews from abroad do. Israel wants more land, more water and more people. If Israel has its way with Jordan waters, Jordan will become a desert while the Negev blooms. Some people say that Palestine provides a military base for the West, the Foreign Minister said. However, he would not go that far. He noted that the President had said that water should be a cause of peace. Arabs interpreted this as saying "Let Israel take your water". There are those that say that the Arabs for four generations let water waste in the Dead Sea. However, resources have not been available to fully utilize this water. This, said the Foreign Minister, is the mood of the Arab world. This is its spirit. Arabs respect you for your efforts to achieve peace, but feel you have different standards for Israelis. Mr. Atallah said that there is nothing sacrosanct in the Jordan Plan. Arabs have refused it since it gives Israel control of Arab waters. Israel is an expansionist state and a threat to the Arabs.

Mr. Talbot said that the foregoing reflected differences in our assessments of the Palestine problem. His Majesty's visit enables us to explore areas in which to seek cooperation on a practical basis. It is impossible now to turn the clock back. The King here interjected his agreement. We are

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^ faced with a given situation. We should see how within this framework we can cooperate. Our differing estimates of Israel's expansionism and capabilities must not prevent us from exploring those areas where we seek cooperation.

The King said that a review of the background of current problems was useful. Now we could get on with discussions of mutual interests.

Mr. Ball noted that we understood and regretted that both sides objected to the basic elements of the Eric Johnston Plan. The U.S. in its approach to the problem needed some standard and the Plan provided this standard. Notwithstanding the position of others we used the Plan as a yardstick on which to base our judgment of what was equitable and reasonable.

The President rejoined the group and apologized for his absence. He reiterated the evenhanded nature of proposals made in his February 6 speech. The discussion ended and His Majesty departed for luncheon in the State Department.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Memorandum of Conversation

SUBJECT: The United States and Jordan

Date: Wednesday, April 15, 1964
4:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Acting Secretary of State Ball
Assistant Secretary of State Talbot
Ambassador Duke
Ambassador Barnes
Mr. Robert Komer

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By g NARA, Date 6-27-07

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H.M. King Hussein of Jordan
H.E. The Minister of Court Hazem Nuseibeh
H.E. The Foreign Minister Anton Atalla
Ambassador Juma

PLACE : The President's Office

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The President opened the conversation by presenting the King a volume of colored photographs taken during the King's visit, commenting with a laugh that on the basis of the hospitality and good will reflected in the pictures it was going to be hard for the King to demonstrate to his Arab colleagues the diminishing interest of the U.S. in the Arab world, which he was quoted in the press as having mentioned in his address that noon. The King quickly denied that he had said any such thing and added that he was very upset that such a story could appear in the press. It was completely contrary to everything he felt. Exchanges such as those he had had in Washington could do much to erase doubts and establish a level of good will that would extend through future relations.

The President said the truth of the matter was that the USG is interested in and concerned with the future of the Arab people and would continue to be in the future. Of course there would always be some people who would seek to misinterpret our position but he could assure His Majesty that there had been absolutely no change in policy by the present administration. We had no intention of being friends of one country at the expense of another but would always strive to deal with each one equally. The King said he was very pleased with the exchange of views which had taken place and if at any time in the future some misunderstanding should arise he would be glad to exchange personal messages in order to avoid having a serious problem develop.

The President then said that it was important for the King to bear in mind that the amount of help which Jordan received from sources other than the U.S.

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would affect what we were able to do. Within the limit of the resources which Congress makes available he stood ready to help Jordan. The Secretary of Defense had already discussed military assistance. We were also ready to help with economic assistance. He hoped the King would assure the Arab world that this was our attitude. At the same time he should realize that Soviet aid to the Arabs did influence the Congress and could have a bearing on the level of resources made available to the Executive Branch and therefore on our ability to render assistance.

The King said he was very grateful for this statement and he knew that President Nasser would be too. Nasser had asked the King to convey his greetings to the President and he personally wanted to express the hope that U.S.-Arab relations could in the future be close. The President said that he wanted to be able to do more than at present but the Congress wanted to do less. It was true that we had very heavy taxes and a very large national debt. The answer to our level of aid would be some agreement between the Executive and the Legislature, but the conduct and actions of foreign governments could do much to influence the range of this agreement.

The King said that Jordan remained deeply grateful for everything which had been done and continued to do the best it could with the resources which it had. For instance, various reforms had been instituted in the budget and fiscal side of the government. A new 7-year development program was being initiated with the object of reducing Jordan's need for external assistance. The rate of taxation in Jordan was the highest in the Arab world but even so they had just proposed a bill providing for reform of the income tax. Domestic expenses had been frozen for the past two years while government revenues had been pushed up about 10% per year. This was Jordan's response to American aid.

As for the Communist problem the King said he did not today consider this a threat to the area. It had been a problem in the past but there was now a relaxation of tension which had reduced the threat. Jordan had accordingly established relations with the USSR. There had been times in the past, he said, when he did not know whether Jordan could survive. Now he felt in a more secure position. He wanted to thank the President again for his kindness in inviting him on this visit. From time to time he welcomed the opportunity to tell the Arab side of the story and he believed this kind of frank exchange could assure friendly relations between their two states in the future.

The President said he appreciated this comment and wanted the King to assure all the Arabs that Johnson is just as much their friend as Kennedy was. Our desire was for peace and good will. He referred again to his Weizmann Institute speech and said he had never meant to take sides. This had apparently been misunderstood but the real truth is that we want to help all. He would like to be able to see all the Arab leaders to make this clear but since that was impossible he was glad it had worked out so that the King could come and speak as a representative of all the Arabs.

The President

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- 3 -

The President then referred to the constant Israeli pressure for more arms because of the increase in Arab arms. The King said no such increase applied in the case of Jordan which was still far behind in armaments. This was very worrisome to him and he hoped that some day a balance could be achieved. Secretary Ball spoke up to say that we had always sought to avoid an arms race. New weapons produced a demand for more new weapons which led to a spiral of ever increasing armaments. Ideally we should have complete disarmament but this was not possible. By the same token you could probably never achieve a perfect balance for one side or the other would forever be seeking more.

Dr. Nuseibeh said he wanted to make it clear that Jordan was the victim of this increase in armaments. They were not increasing their armaments but they remained the most vulnerable country. Foreign Minister Atalla added that he had no doubt as to the sincerity of the U.S. position toward the Arabs. He knew we had tried to avoid an arms race in the area. We had sought to solve the refugee problem. But Jordan nevertheless remained the country in the exposed position and therefore the one which needed outside assistance.

Mr. Talbot pointed out that it was this very situation which had given rise to the statement made by President Kennedy on last May 8. President Johnson added that the May 8 statement remained the policy of the U.S. Government.

The King said the fundamental element in this picture had to be the long Jordan frontier with Israel. Presumably the arms which Saudi Arabia or Iraq possessed were considered part of the so-called balance but these arms would do Jordan little good. Israel had the capability of hitting hard and effectively and therefore Jordan felt very exposed. Secretary Ball said the presence of the U.S. Sixth Fleet should provide a measure of security in the area. Our power was Jordan's assurance of protection. Therefore we found it very hard to understand Nasser's attack on the Libyan bases. These were useful to us and therefore were a part of the stability of this area of the world.

The King said that if there could be a continual exchange of views in the future we could avoid this kind of misunderstanding. He had seen the statement that these bases were designed to help Israel. This is part of the Arab concern. He was glad to have this explanation and he would certainly report these views to the other Arab leaders. The President added that the matter of the bases was a real problem. If we were in effect to bring the bases home why should we send military assistance out the following week to help maintain stability in the area? Dr. Nuseibeh said the Arabs had a genuine fear that these bases were designed to assist Israel. They had not simply adopted a pro-Soviet position on the bases but were concerned about them as a threat to the Arabs. The President said the bases were definitely not a threat to the Arabs but were a part of the stability of the area. He hoped the King would convey this message to all the Arab leaders.

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