THE OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY DURING THE ADMINISTRATION OF PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON

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Part I

VOLUME ONE: ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

Chapter One
The Beginning

Introduction

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It is less than five years since President Lyndon Johnson called for a declaration of "unconditional War on Poverty in America." But in that time, the programs instituted by his Administration have changed the fabric of life for millions of our citizens, and have reshaped not only our institutions but our very thinking about poverty and the poor.

At the very center of this rapid and, at times, convulsive institutional change has been the agency President Johnson created to administer the anti-poverty program, and which, to strengthen and protect its independence, he placed in the Executive Office of the President.

The Office of Economic Opportunity has never, in the five years of its existence, been free from controversy or criticism. Nor has it limited itself to the safe channels of coordination, study, or consensus. It has, from the very outset, taken the role of advocate and activist on behalf of all the poor and all of their problems. Not content to leave education to the educators, medicine to the doctors, law to the lawyers, or the community to the politicians--it has sought to involve itself and great numbers of concerned citizens in better ways of adapting these fields to the needs of the poor. And so, it was OEO which developed Head Start and Upward Bound;

Neighborhood Health Centers and Legal Services, Community Action and a host of related programs. In the main, professional establishments were quick to give their support and assistance. But, without the trail-blazing efforts of OEO, the focus on the problems of the poor might have remained diffused.

The history of the War on Poverty, then, is one which compresses into a brief span, an entire social revolution. It is a "quiet revolution" which has been carried out in meeting halls and classrooms; town halls and neighborhood centers. When there has been violence in the streets, poverty workers have sought to calm tensions, bridge barriers and open channels of communications between those in power and those frustrated by their powerlessness. In a thousand communities, in every state, in almost every county, it has offered self-help as a substitute for welfare, and participation as a substitute for acceptance.

This record of the genesis, the events and the personalities of the War on Poverty, is an honest attempt to see the first five years of this infant effort with clarity and integrity. The warts and the blemishes are there; the conflicts and the frustrations--as well as the victories and the justifications. Never before had a major nation attempted such a feat. To put an end to the poverty of the minority, at a time when the majority were enjoying their greatest prosperity. To enlist the services of a million volunteers at a time when they had earned the right to untroubled leisure. To change the direction

and alter the scope of established institutions which were serving adequately the needs of the vast majority. And to bring into sight and into mind, a segment of our society which could well have remained hidden and ignored.

There will never again be an excuse for "The Other America" of wasted lives and blighted hopes. There will never again be a justification for suppressing the legitimate aspirations of black Americans, or Mexican Americans, or American Indians, or the poor white Americans of the rural backwash. In March of 1964, President Johnson said:

> The War on Poverty is not a struggle simply to support people, to make them dependent on the generosity of others. It is a struggle to give people a chance. It is an effort to allow them to develop and use their capacities, as we have been allowed to develop and use ours, so that they can share as others share in the promise of the nation.

This history of the Office of Economic Opportunity is a record of how well that promise has been kept, an analysis of how far there is still to go, and a challenge to those who will come after, to proceed with determination--building on the foundation of what has gone before--to get the job done for all time.

Foreward

The History of the Office of Economic Opportunity During the Administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson was completed under the supervision of Acting Deputy Director Robert Perrin. It was directed by Herbert Kramer. The general editor was Bennett Schiff. The work was written by Bennett Schiff and Stephen Goodell with the research assistance of James F. Donnelly and Mary Jo Kelly. Assisting secretaries were Pamela Hebson and Florence Johnston.

Chapter One

The Beginning

Poverty Discovered

In his 1964 State of the Union address, President Lyndon Baines Johnson officially launched the war on poverty: "This Administration today here and now declares unconditional war on poverty, and I urge this Congress and all Americans to join with me in that effort. It will not be a short or easy struggle--no single weapon or strategy will suffice--but we shall not rest until that war is won. The richest nation on earth can afford to win it. We cannot afford to lose it." For the first time in history a President had proposed a policy committing the country to the specific task of eliminating poverty. The result of a combination of factors in the early 1960's, the war against poverty brought to a "crescendo the theme of compassion and concern of man for his fellow man, and of big government for little people."[1]

The origins of the poverty war, some writers have suggested, begin with the era of the Depression. The economic collapse that began in 1929 acted as a powerful catalyst in the "modern American reaction against the idea of individualism and against the well-established institutions which gave that idea reality." The 1930's, a time of universal hardship, social dislocation and despair, provided an atmosphere conducive to drastic reforms, and the New Deal initiated a variety of precedent-breaking programs based on the premise that the

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1 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1964, p. 875; Thomas Gladwin, Poverty U.S.A. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company; 1967), p. 2.

national interest was best served by ensuring the well-being and security of all Americans.

It is important to note that the Depression unemployed were primarily skilled workers. The immediate need, therefore, was to provide jobs, not create skills. This task was temporarily resolved by the numerous relief and recovery programs, a strategy that assumed employment opportunity facilitated economic recovery. The effect was to bypass the hard-core poverty-stricken--those without job skills or the proper motivation--the bystanders, the "unworthy poor." Thus, during the Thirties and beyond, literally millions of impoverished Americans failed to benefit directly from the social and economic legislation of the Thirties--elderly citizens not covered by Social Security or whose public and private benefits did not support a decent life; the chronically unemployed; workers displaced by improved technology or working at poverty jobs; and a minority of farmers, Negroes and the young.[2]

With the urgency of the war came a drastic revision of priorities, and the rash of progressive programs came to a halt. By 1945, repudiation of much of the philosophy and programs of the New Deal was an accomplished fact. Post-war America viewed the persistence of poverty and unemployment as the aberrations of a malfunctioning economy, more related to unwise government policy than to inherent structural causes. The concerns of the mid-century focused around the problems engendered by the cold war, and successive administrations, "faced as they were with the great problems of adjustment

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2 Michael Harrington, "The War Against Poverty," (Draft Speech, August 1965), see Appendix; Paul Conkin, The New Deal (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company; 1967), pp. 23-52.

to the post-war world, both at home and abroad, and finding the nation generally prosperous," felt no great pressure to indulge in social and economic legislation. Thoughtful writers of the Fifties concentrated on social developments--the corporate society, middle-class anxieties, problems of leisure, conformity, status and the like. Conventional economic wisdom stressed fiscal problems of balanced budgets, spending versus tight money policies, taxation and pump-priming. Emphasis was given to economic growth and expansion, and political action was based upon the general problems of inflation and unemployment--not poverty per se.[3]

The "Haunted Fifties" was, by some accounts, an era of self-congratulation for the achievements of abundance. John Kenneth Galbraith, for one, looked upon the residue of poverty in affluent America as a "remarkable" phenomena, but no longer a "universal or massive affliction." It was, the Harvard economist noted, "more nearly an afterthought." Galbraith's message fell on ears "which seemed eager to hear that social problems didn't really exist;" and, as the University of Chicago economist Theodore Shultz observed, the Fifties was a time

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3 Richard H. Leach, "The Federal Role in the War on Poverty Program," Law and Contemporary Problems: Anti-poverty Programs, Vol. 31, No. 1, Winter, 1966, p. 18; Ben B. Seligman (ed.) Poverty as a Public Issue (New York: The Free Press; 1965), pp. 2-4; see also, C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd, William Whyte, The Organization Man, Philip Wylie, The Generation of Vipers; James Sundquist's Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson Years (Washington: Brookings Institute; 1968) provides a thorough review of the economic policies of each respective administration.

of "directionless and passive complacency toward domestic problems."[4]

Not until the Sixties did a group of writers, "whose awareness of the realities of income and poverty was keener than most," attempt a critical analysis of the American economy and the subculture of poverty. One such writer was Gabriel Kolko. In Wealth and Power in America, he showed that statistical evaluations of income failed to "tell all there was to say about poverty." Another was Michael Harrington, whose book, The Other America, graphically described the quality of life of the poor, revealing a subculture of poverty that was perpetual, cyclical, and beyond reach.[5]

Harrington sketched a "sympathetic portrait of the chronically poor," caught in the "vicious trap of circumstances, a way of life in which one learned not to care and often discovered that sacrifice and struggle just made things worse." Harrington helped redefine poverty in human, understandable terms, and he emphasized the systematic and structural causes of poverty--environment, not the individual, contri-

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4 John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (New York: The New American Library; 1958), pp. 250, 251, 258; Margaret S. Gordon, Poverty in America (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company; 1965), pp. xv-xvii; An exception was Edward R. Murrow's "Harvest of Shame" documentary dealing with conditions of migrant farmers. Daniel P. Moynihan notes that in 1956, Governor Harriman of New York called for an "Attack on Poverty" in his Annual Message to the State Legislature: "The data he cited were of almost exactly the same order and magnitude as those to which President Johnson called attention in his Message to the Congress eight years later. . . But the time had not come for an attack on poverty." See "Poverty and Progress," The American Scholar, Fall, 1964.

5 Seligman, Poverty as a Public Issue, p. 3; Michael Harrington, The Other America (New York: The Macmillan Company; 1963); Gabriel Kolko, Wealth and Power in America (New York: Frederick A. Praeger; 1962).

buted to one's status in society. The Other America viewed the individual as victim, not a causal agent of poverty. The poor, Harrington wrote, suffered more than mere material deprivation. They were subjected to a "persistent and degrading suppression of their living standards and whatever humanity they once possessed." They were both estranged and invisible: "they think and feel differently; they look upon a different America than the middle class looks upon."[6]

Galbraith's Affluent Society had employed a $1,000 poverty income criterion; but writers like Harrington, Gunnar Myrdal, and Leon Keyserling revised the figure to embrace a substantially larger portion of the population. What emerged was a new image of America, of more than 30 million citizens inhabiting a landscape of deprivation and misery. Theirs was a world of malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, unemployment, high infant and adult mortality rates, hopeless futures and general despair. The world of the poor in affluent America was an aberration, and had little in common with the world of the middle class. To be poor in America was to suffer a debilitating exclusiveness: as Walter Reuther put it, "poverty in America is more destructive of human values — because (it) not only robs people of economic opportunity but spiritually. They are invisible citizens of America. When they are set aside they are denied the sense of belonging and the sense of participating as useful members of our society. They are denied their measure of

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6 Gladwin, Poverty U.S.A., pp. 12-13; Harrington, The Other America, pp. 13, 17, 163, 166; Dwight MacDonald, "Our Invisible Poor," Poverty in America (Ferman et al, ed.) (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; 1965), p. 8, 13; Carl H. Madden, "The War Over Poverty," Anti-poverty Programs, Vol. 31, No. 1, Winter, 1966, pp. 45-63.

human dignity." The American Dream for the poor was a nightmare. Children of migrant workers, American Indians on government reservations, Appalachian miner's families, Americans of Spanish descent, Negroes in both North and South--all were testament to that fact.[7]

Myrdal, Kolko, Keyserling and Harrington were among the vanguard to expose the realities of impoverishment of one fifth of the nation's population. The revised image of the country shattered the complacency of Americans, who could no longer "conceal from themselves (the fact) that there is in the United States a large 'underclass' of poor and destitute people in the urban and rural slums who are largely cut off from the life and aspirations of the nation." In the Sixties, Americans had to face the disturbing paradox--poverty in the midst of plenty. This fact, inconsistent with the nation's espoused moral ideals of equality, was alien to the nation's self-image that denied the possibility of widespread poverty.[8]

While the task of identifying poverty was underway, new strategies for combatting it were being formed. "In case after case," wrote Harrington, "it has been documented that one cannot deal with the various components of poverty in isolation, changing this or that condition but leaving the basic structure intact." The primary need was a

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7 Harrington, The Other America; Leon Keyserling, Poverty and Deprivation in the United States (Conference on Economic Progress; 1962); Leon Keyserling, Progress of Poverty (Conference on Economic Progress; 1964); Gunnar Myrdal, Challenge to Affluence (New York: Pantheon Books; 1963); Statement of Walter Reuther before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor, April 8, 1964.

8 Gunnar Myrdal in Poverty as a Public Issue (Preface), Ben Seligman (ed.), p. 1; Elinor Graham, "The Politics of Poverty," Poverty as a Public Issue, p. 235.

displacement of the old by new communities, "substituting a human environment for the inhuman that now exists." Any strategy designed to break the cycle of poverty had to account for the interrelatedness of the social, economic, legal, educational and psychological problems that plagued the poor. All segments of society had to be involved in a "many-pronged attack on these problems."[9]

The cyclical view of poverty, the recognition of its massive proportions, and the acceptance of a comprehensive approach to strike at the fundamental causes of the problem came to be a shared consensus on the part of sociologists, social workers, economists and academics generally during the early part of the Sixties. What remained was for their insights to become a part of a national dialogue. The story of intellectual influence in the higher councils of government is a curious one indeed.[10]

Genesis of a Program

Early in 1960, John F. Kennedy declared himself a candidate for the Presidency of the United States. On August 14, 1960, he coined the phrase, "war on poverty," in a memorial speech at Hyde Park, New York, marking the fifteenth anniversary of the signing of the Social

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9 Harrington, The Other America, p. 168; Gladwin, Poverty U.S.A., p. 28; see also, Edgar S. and Jean C. Cahn, "The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective," The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 73, No. 8, July, 1964, p. 1317.

10 Moynihan, in "The Professors and the Poor," Commentary, August, 1968, p. 20, writes: ". . .more than most government programs, the war on poverty--rather like the war on Vietnam--was pre-eminently the work of intellectuals--specifically those liberal, policy-oriented intellectuals who gather in Washington, and in a significant sense came to power in the early 1960's under the Presidency of John F. Kennedy."

Security Act. The opening battle, Kennedy had remarked, against suffering and deprivation had been won in the 1930's; but the war against poverty and degradation was not yet over. In 1960 the Democratic platform singled out the problem, and in Kennedy's Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961, three references were made to poverty, capped by the ringing admonition: "If the free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich." Early in the Kennedy administration efforts to develop ideas to combat unemployment and related problems began.[11]

In 1961, Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz urged a national program to eliminate poverty and ignorance. In the summer of 1962 the Conference on Economic Progress published a detailed analysis of poverty in America. Using annual income guidelines to measure poverty, the Conference found that over one fifth of the nation's population lived in poverty. The 1960 Census showed that thirty-seven million Americans were impoverished, one third of them children. Statistics on income distribution betrayed the reality of national abundance, revealing that the poor were left virtually untouched by federal, state and local programs. Occupational differentials were widening in many areas, especially in the Negro communities.[12]

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11 Transcript of Interview conducted by Time Magazine with Eric Tolmach and Hyman Bookbinder, March 17, 1966; Daniel P. Moynihan, "Three Problems in Combatting Poverty," Poverty in America, Gordon (ed.), p. 42.

12 Moynihan, ibid.; Terry Sanford, "Poverty's Challenge to the States," Anti-poverty Programs, p. 78; Keyserling, Poverty and Deprivation.

President Kennedy directed studies to be made on poverty, authorizing the formation and funding of special study groups to investigate the related problems of the poor. One such group was the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime, an outgrowth of the 1961 Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act. It established a small program staff in the Justice Department under the direction of Attorney General Robert Kennedy and his Special Assistant David Hackett. By the terms of the 1961 act, fifteen million dollars was provided to finance live experiments in "community action projects."[13]

This concept of "community action" had its roots in unique theories of social action and social psychology that had been germinating in some universities for the past several decades. Community action was based partly on the view that the principle hope for the poor was for them to "develop sufficient strength and skill to maneuver themselves, largely by their own efforts, out of where they are and into something better. Corollary to this is the belief that if any reforms are feasible in the existing social system they will have to be accomplished through vesting poor people with the political and administrative power necessary to force the changes they consider important upon the power structure.[14]

In the early 1960's, the Ford Foundation's "gray areas" program--based on the theory that poverty was the product of related economic,

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13 See: Sundquist, "For the Poor, Opportunity," Politics and Policy; Christopher Weeks, The Job Corps: Dollars and Dropouts (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co.; 1967).

14 Gladwin, Poverty U.S.A., p. 28.

social, and psychological problems--had proved the worth of community action as a way to attack poverty at its source. The North Carolina Fund conducted a similar effort on a broader, statewide basis. These "demonstration" precedents were incorporated into the Attorney General's interdepartmental committee's experiments. Based on the Ford Foundation philosophy, the staff sponsored modestly funded projects of community action in a number of cities, one of which was the Mobilization for Youth on the lower East side of New York City. Through the various urban "pilot projects" operating in the early Sixties, a new vocabulary was developed. Words like "comprehensive," and "coordinated" came to be "enshrined as the inviolable precepts of the successful poverty program." Moreover, the output of volumes of materials and project proposals greatly increased, adding significantly to "the state of the art of social analysis."[15]

What had begun as efforts to deal with a behavioral problem broadened in scope. Analysts discovered beneath the symptoms of delinquency the deeper problems of teenage unemployment, slum schools, ghetto living, and broken families. Many believed that government had the capacity and the responsibility to alleviate or eliminate these problems. The concrete results of such studies were the 1961 Area Redevelopment Act, emphasizing the "elimination of poverty rather than amelioration of some of its effects." Economically depressed areas were to be revitalized by attacking structural unemployment through the extension of

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15 Robinson O. Everett, "Forward," Anti-poverty Programs, p. 1; Edgar and Jean Cahn, "Civilian Perspective," p. 1317; Weeks, Job Corps, pp.37-45.

loans, grants, and technical aid. The 1962 Manpower Development and Training Act stressed skills preparation, whereby the impact of technological displacement and related forces was met by job training and retraining. And the Vocational Education Act of 1963 provided vocational training for young people in a more sophisticated technology.[16]

In 1963 began a curious and apocalyptic story. The first two years of President Kennedy's administration had been characterized by a preoccupation with foreign affairs. Questions of military strength--foreign policy and aid, the missile gap--and key events--the Bay of Pigs, the Berlin situation, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Peace Corps, the Cuban missle crisis--had relegated domestic affairs to second priority attention. By 1963, for a variety of reasons--including the civil rights movement, the steel controversy, and the tax cut package which "raised issues of domestic policy"--the focus of the Administration's attention shifted.[17]

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16 Michael Harrington, "Introduction," Poverty in America, pp. xvii-xviii; Hubert H. Humphrey, "The War on Poverty," Antipoverty Programs, pp. 8-11.

17 Weeks, Job Corps, pp. 30-33; For a thorough analysis of the events leading to the President's Task Force on the War Against Poverty, and the evolution of the ideas and programs contained in the Economic Opportunity legislation, see the following: Adam Yarmolinsky, "The Beginnings of OEO," American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Seminar on Poverty (Appendix); James Sundquist, "For the Poor, Opportunity," Politics and Policy, 1968; Sanford Kravitz, "The Community Action Program: Past, Present and Its Future?" American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Seminar on Poverty, February, 1968 (Appendix); John G. Wofford, "Administering the Community Action Program: The Politics of Local Responsibility," American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Seminar on Poverty (Appendix); Draft of the Legislation, paper prepared by request by Harold Horowitz, November 28, 1966 (Appendix).

Harrington's Other America was published in 1962. Dwight MacDonald, in a New Yorker article entitled "Our Invisible Poor," reviewed the book among others of the same topic. "In the last year," he wrote, "we seem to have suddenly awakened, rubbing our eyes like Rip Van Winkle, to the fact that mass poverty exists, and that it is one of our two gravest social problems." Poverty denied real citizenship to a large segment of society: "If that right is denied, 'it impoverishes us all.'" Placing the blame squarely on the "doorstep of the White House," he charged that Federal programs were grossly inadequate. More serious was the lack of an aroused public opinion. The need, he concluded, was for greater federal programs to aid the poor.[18]

MacDonald later recalled that by request the New Yorker reprinted over 20,000 copies for sociologists, economists, social workers, trade unions, and private citizens. Inquiries emanated from Washington, one from Theodore Sorensen, Special Assistant to the President. According to Washington legend, and economist Ben S. Seligman, Sorensen was so moved, or astute, that he at once brought the article to Kennedy's attention. Thus, so the story runs, was born the war on poverty.

Within a month Kennedy proposed a national youth service program drawn from the experience of the Peace Corps. The National Service Program became the special project of a Cabinet-level study group under the Attorney General. Begun in November, 1962, under the Presidential instruction that "we shall be judged more by what we do at home than

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18 Dwight MacDonald, "Invisible Poor," Poverty in America; Weeks, Job Corps, p. 40.

what we preach abroad," the study group reported to the President in January, 1963.[19]

Kennedy's State of the Union address and a Special Message Relative to the Nation's Youth referred to the feasibility of establishing a national service corps to provide aid in mental hospitals, Indian reservations, centers for the aged, and for young delinquents, Appalachia, migratory labor communities and elsewhere. The President urged upon Congress the necessity for such a proposal, but the Administration bill failed to pass both Houses. The significance of the National Service Corps program was reflected in the Study Group's report to the President. Explicitly stated was a clear recognition of the poverty problem, accompanied by a description of the hardships faced by one-sixth of the nation. The report contained a brief bibliography of poverty, attempted to dramatize the plight of the needy, and by implication suggested the need for a program of broader scope and depth.[20]

Another version of the inspirational force behind the Kennedy poverty "program" was given by Richard Boone, a member of the 1964 task force on poverty. According to Boone, Kennedy had been greatly impressed by Homer Bigart's New York Times article on Appalachian problems. On April 9, 1963, Kennedy authorized the President's Appalachian Regional Commission, bringing national attention to the problems of

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19 Dwight MacDonald, "The Now Visible Poor," Poverty in Plenty. George H. Dunne (ed.) (New York: P.J. Kenedy & Sons; 1964), p. 61; Seligman, Poverty as a Public Issue, pp. 4-5.

20 109 Congressional Record A7217 (November 21, 1963); The President's Study Group on a National Service Program, Information on a Proposed National Service Program, January, 1963.

that region. In October, the President instructed Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., then Undersecretary of Commerce, to put together a comprehensive program for Eastern Kentucky. Roosevelt consulted with various Executive departments, and initiated a crash program on November 13, with allocations of $16 million for a number of projects including job training, food distribution, housing and special welfare, and a Christmas-vacation domestic peace corps utilizing college students. This provided an action model for future thinking about organization and implementation.[21]

Bigart's article may have been the "trigger" that led to the formation of a comprehensive attack on the poverty problem; however, there was no single catalyst. Eric Talmach and Hyman Bookbinder, two task force members in 1964, recall that the Harrington book got to Kennedy by way of MacDonald's article and a memo from Walter Heller, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors. Nevertheless, a combination of the articles and The Other America prompted Presidential interest, and within weeks Kennedy directed Heller to embark on a study of potential poverty programs. In early May, 1963, assisted by Robert Lampham, a University of Wisconsin economist who had studied income distribution of the poor, the Council of Economic Advisors began such a study. In June, 1963, Heller asked Lampham, "What lines of action might make up

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21 Richard Boone, "Community Action," Address Delivered at the Community Action Residential Conference, Lake Arrowhead, California, May, 1965; Weeks, Job Corps, pp. 56-58; William J. Page and Earl E. Huyck, "Appalachia: Realities of Deprivation," Poverty as a Public Issue, p. 152; Time Interview, Tolmach and Bookbinder, March 17, 1966.

a practical Kennedy anti-poverty program?" Lampham's guidelines formed the basis for what followed.[22]

At about the same time, the Bureau of the Budget became "dominant in the planning of the anti-poverty programs. . .because it believed that a community action program idea applied locally all over the country would offer new leverage power in coordinating resources primarily of the Federal Government." It was assumed that local structures in major urban areas could coordinate resources and function to provide leverage power "to bring federal agencies into line." It would force them to "do business with a single structure rather than doing business. . .all over the lot."[23]

In mid-summer, 1963, the Budget Bureau was engaged in preparing the 1964 budget message, which was to include a section on poverty. The Budget process, one observer has noted, forced the President and his chief advisors each year to examine the relationship of government programs and national issues. Kennedy and Sorensen exploited these opportunities to force decisions in major problem areas. In September, Sorensen asked Walter Heller to "pull together for the President's consideration a set of measures which might be woven into a basic attack on the problems of poverty and waste of human resources, as part of the 1964 legislative program." Heller gathered together an informal interagency task force, and for two months meetings were held between Cabinet members, Budget Bureau officials, and other interested parties,

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22 Time Interview; "War on Poverty," Newsweek Magazine, February 17, 1964, p. 36.

23 Boone, "Community Action."

to establish proposals for Presidential review.[24]

In other parts of the Executive branch "some of the young activists most concerned with programs related to poverty started to put their heads together," and William Capron, Staff Director of the Council of Economic Advisors, called together a small planning group to "sift through the various program possibilities."[25] The combined efforts of those concerned with anti-poverty planning produced little in the way of a constructive, formal program, and clear lines of division developed between the Departments of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare. Heller and Kermit Gordon, Director of the Budget Bureau, felt the need, therefore, to conduct the poverty program outside the old-line agencies, but there was no agreement as to the administrative form it should take. During the fall session, while no formal organization emerged, David Hackett, Richard Boone of the White House staff, and Paul Ylvisaker of the Ford Foundation, pushed hard for the community action program, convincing Heller and William Canon of the Budget Bureau. Agreement was reached on one other point. The program had been designated as "Widening Participation in Prosperity," primarily as a way to destigmatize the national effort from the negative connotations of the word "poverty." As a result, the war on poverty began

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24 Moynihan, "Professors and the Poor," p. 21; Weeks, Job Corps, pp.48-51.

25 Capron, who wrote to Wirtz, Celebreeze, Weaver, Freeman, Udall, and Robert Kennedy under Heller's name, recalled that the response was disappointing, resulting in the reincarnation of all the obsolete programs and stale ideas of the past. Interview with William Capron, Brookings Institution, July 9, 1968.

as a "prosperity" program.[26]

Throughout his last months, President Kennedy was kept informed of the discussions and planning behind the proposed poverty program. To some degree he gave to the planners an overview that could only come from his office. On October 21, 1963, Kennedy suggested to Heller the possibility that he would visit some poverty-stricken area in order to underscore the problem nationally. At his last Cabinet meeting, October 29, 1963, the President left a memo pad with the word "poverty" inscribed six times, and the word "coordination" underlined twice and enclosed in a penciled box.[27]

A number of factors brought the matter to a head. Throughout the spring and summer of 1963, while Congress stifled Kennedy's social legislation (the National Service Corps and the Youth Employment Act), "the library of Dickens-like descriptions of life in poor America grew." Night Comes to the Cumberlands, by Harry Caudill, vividly depicted the shortcomings of the welfare system in Eastern Kentucky. Edgar May, Pulitzer prizewinner, wrote in The Wasted Americans what it meant to be "enveloped and surrounded"in the ghetto. In April the Committee on Youth Employment reported that the youth unemployment problem had reached crisis conditions.[28]

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26 An early memo by Adam Yarmolinsky, for example, indicated that "pockets of poverty" would be called "targets of opportunity." Memorandum for Mr. Shriver, February 6, 1964; Interview with Eric Tolmach, June 28, 1968; Interview with David Hackett, July 30, 1968; Weeks, Job Corps, pp. 47-48; Time Interview.

27 Weeks, Job Corps, pp. 52-58.

28 Ibid., p. 43.

The Civil Rights movement, climaxing in the August March on Washington, highlighted the unrest of a disenchanted minority most affected by poverty. The Kennedy Administration, by one account, was interested in launching a national program to give the movement direction and purpose, and to translate its energies into a "virile program addressed to poverty."[29] Moreover, a domestic program attacking poverty offered the way for productive spending on the theory that indigents could be transformed from tax-eaters to tax-payers.

The literature of poverty, the revelations of various study groups, and the animating drive that underlay the spirit of the "New Frontier"--resurrecting the democratic ideals of equality and opportunity in a free society--all combined to provide an atmosphere of public concern. What had begun as an overt concern on the part of a few social analysts had evolved into preliminary and exploratory steps taken within the Executive branch of the government. These early steps represented a concerted effort centered on the problems of the poor. The first "reconnaissance" in the war on poverty had begun. It was the "newest initiative" in an old struggle, involving new ideas, new men, and new institutions. It embodied, in Nathan Glazer's words, the "professionalization of reform in modern society."[30]

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29 Gladwin writes, "the war on poverty as often as not operates in the shadow of the civil rights movement and it is therefore not always clear to which of these two sets of values a given set is in witness. . .It obscures the workings of the strategy. . ." Poverty U.S.A., pp. 18-19.

30 Moynihan, "Three Problems," Poverty in America, pp. 41-42; Boone, "Community Action;" S.M. Miller and Martin Rein, "The War on Poverty: Perspectives and Prospects," Poverty as a Public Issue, p. 276.

Three days before the tragic events of November 22, Walter Heller had his last conversation with the President. The mobilization of forces for a national poverty program had been underway for months, although no formal announcement had been made. A draft copy of Chapter Two of the 1964 Economic Advisor's Report lay on the President's desk.[31] The President, Heller recalled, "expressed his deep concern over the problem, and urged us to move ahead with our efforts to bring the relevant agencies of government into consensus on a program to combat poverty." Heller asked the President whether he wanted to "go forward on the assumption that the anti-poverty measure would be a part of his 1964 legislative program." His answer was an unhesitating "Yes." [32]

Three days later President Kennedy was dead. On the 23rd, Heller took up the matter of the poverty program with President Johnson: "His immediate response was 'That's my kind of program. . .I want to move full speed ahead.'" The new President said he intended to wage total war on poverty, making it the cornerstone of his administration. Said a Kennedy Administration holdover, "The President has a great feeling for this program. It's close to his roots. Where Kennedy may have had only an intellectual appreciation of the need to eradicate poverty, Johnson had a 'gut' reaction to the basic idea." Seymour Harris, member of the 1960 President's Task Force on the Economy, noted that it

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31 The 1964 Economic Advisor's Report has been called "the most important single document that has been created in the whole War on Poverty. It is a Bible." Time Interview

32 Dunne, Poverty in Plenty, p. 15; Newsweek, September 13, 1965.

was to President Johnson's credit that he "enthusiastically accepted the Kennedy-Heller program."[33]

The new President lost no time in carrying forward the steps initiated by his predecessor.[34] Between November 24, 1963 and February 1, 1964, interagency meetings were held on the subject of poverty programs. Johnson gave his stamp of approval to the Council of Economic Advisor's Report calling for a "new federally-led effort" to combat poverty. The report recommended that government should "marshall already developed resources, focus already expressed concerns," and coordinate the "diverse attacks" on poverty by the myriad agencies engaged in health, education, housing, welfare and agriculture programs. It concluded with the assertion that the war on poverty "must be based on a change in national attitude. . . It is time. . .to allow Government to assume its responsibility for action and leadership in promoting the general welfare."[35]

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33 Gunnar Myrdal, "A Summing Up," Poverty in America, p. 443; "Poverty U.S.A.," Newsweek, February 17, 1964, p. 36; Interview with William Capron; Time Interview; Seymour E. Harris, Economics of the Kennedy Years and a Look Ahead (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers; 1964), p.238.

34 Moynihan writes that, "The theme fitted perfectly into the New Deal, Populist style of Lyndon Johnson, who immediately upon taking office directed that plans for the poverty program proceed as a matter of administrative priority."; "Professors and the Poor," p. 21.

35 Council of Economic Advisors, Annual Report 78, 1964; Richard Leach, "The Federal Role," Antipoverty Programs, p. 19; Sorensen and Kermit Gordon attended meetings at the LBJ ranch. Capron Interview.

In the space of a few short months the tempo of events rapidly accelerated. At a December press conference the President told reporters that "high" on his "agenda of priority" would be "poverty legislation for the lowest income groups." And he added, " any kind of poverty will be a concern of this Administration." Johnson soon set into motion a movement within the Executive to find ways to reduce federal spending. He instructed Secretary of Defense McNamara to pare defense production costs, and called for a general federal job curb. The object was to enable a shift of federal funds from the defense budget to the poverty program. Johnson termed the reallocation of funds a form of wealth redistribution, from "those who have it to those who don't have it."[36] The advantage was obvious: the poverty war would not require additional spending beyond what already existed. When Sargent Shriver later testified before the House committee considering the poverty bill, he was able to say that the program would "not raise the national budget by a single dollar."[37]

The commencement of the war on poverty publically began on January 8, 1964, when President Johnson formally declared war in his State of the Union address. The President's appeal was verbalized in business-like terms. Simply stated, it was a question of sound investment:

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36 Some interpreted the President's remarks as meaning taking from the "haves" and giving to the "have nots." Shriver had to explain that this meant taking from "have government programs," and not people. Letter from Shriver to Mrs. J.T. Thayer, May 7, 1964.

37 Graham, "Poverty and the Legislative Process," Poverty as a Public Issue, pp. 253-256; Capron Interview; Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Hearings before the Subcommittee on the War on Poverty Program of the Committee on Education and Labor, House, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, on H.R. 10440, p. 22.

"$1,000 invested in salvaging an unemployable youth today can return $40,000 or more in his lifetime." Poverty, he continued, was a national problem that required the utilization of all resources available to the federal, state, and local governments--"from the court-house to the White House." The chief aim of the poverty war, he stressed, was to deal with the deep-set causes of poverty arising from the failure "to give our fellow citizens a fair chance to develop their own capacities." The chief weapons in the war would be:

> better schools, and better health, and better homes, and better training and better job opportunities to help more Americans--especially young Americans--escape from squalor and misery and unemployment rolls where other citizens help to carry them. Very often a lack of jobs and money is not the cause of poverty, but the symptoms. . .our joing federal-local effort must pursue poverty--pursue it wherever it exists--in city slums and small towns, in sharecropper shacks, or in migrant worker camps, on Indian reservations, among whites as well as Negroes, among the young as well as the aged, in the boom towns and in the depressed areas.

By the terms of the President's proposal, the nation was obliged to strike away "the barriers to full participation in our society." Finally, the program was to be accompanied by a half-billion budget cut.[38]

In his first Annual Economic Report, Johnson restated the aims of the 1964 Council of Economic Advisor's report, which he sent to Congress on January 20, 1964. The report, largely an amplification of Harrington's own findings two years before, systematized the latest data to portray the picture of American poverty.

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38 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1964, p. 875; Of the budget cut, James Reston noted the historical and ambivalent similarities: the address sounded the "Franklin Delano Hoover" theme, revisiting the New Deal "with emphasis on the forgotten man and flashes of Roosevelt in a three-inch Hoover collar." New York Times, January 9, 1964, p. 17.

The Report pointed out that "one-fifth of our fellow citizens," or about 35 million persons, live "without hope below minimum standards of decency," having only $590 per capita income in 1962 compared with the national average of $1,900.[39] Poverty was "no purely private or local concern." It was a "social and national problem," in which the poor "inhabit a world scarcely recognizable, scarcely recognized, by the majority of their fellow Americans."

The Report made the following points:

- one-fifth of our families and nearly one-fifth of our total population were poor;

- of the poor, 44% were non-white and nearly one-half of all non-whites lived in poverty;

- the heads of over 60 percent of all poor families had only grade school educations;

- even for those denied opportunity by discrimination, education significantly raised the chance to escape from poverty. Of all non-white families headed by a person with 8 years or less of schooling, 57 percent were poor. This percentage fell to 30 for high school graduates and to 18 percent for those with some college education;

- education did not remove the effects of discrimination;

- one-third of all poor families were headed by a person over 65, and almost one-half of the families headed by such a person were poor;

- when a family and its head had several characteristics frequently associated with poverty, the chances of impoverishment were particularly high; a family headed by a Negro young woman with less than an eighth grade education was poor in 94 out of 100 cases. Even if she was white, the chances were 85 out of 100 that she and her children would be poor.

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39 For other views see, Madden, "The War Over Poverty," Antipoverty Programs; Orshansky, "Counting the Poor: Another Look at the Poverty Profile," Social Security Bulletin, January, 1965; Rose D. Friedman, Poverty: Definition and Perspective (1965); Ben J. Wattenberg & Richard M. Scammon, This U.S.A. (1965).

The Government established a poverty yardstick at $3,000 per year for a family of four. This broke down to about $60.00 a week. The Council had estimated typical expenditures to be: $5 per week per person would be spent for food; about $800 per year would go for housing, leaving only $1,200--less than $25 per week--for clothing, transportation, school supplies, home furnishings and supplies, medical care, personal care, recreation, insurance and other basic needs. "Obviously," the Advisors declared, "it does not exaggerate the problem of poverty to regard $3,000 as the boundary."

In 1962, there were 9.3 million families in the country who had total incomes below $3,000. More than 1.1 million families were "now raising four or more children on such an income." There were more than 5.4 million families (totaling 17 million people) with total incomes below $2,000. More than a million children came from large families with incomes of less than $2,000. And there were people living alone, the "unrelated" individuals. In 1962, 45 percent of them--or five million--had incomes of less than $1,500; and 29 percent--or more than three million--had incomes below $1,000. Thus, 33 to 35 million Americans lived at or below the boundaries of poverty in 1962--nearly one-fifth of the Nation.

The Council's report concluded with a request to "focus and coordinate our older programs and some new ones into a comprehensive long-range attack on the poverty that remains."[40]

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40 Council of Economic Advisors, Annual Report 78, 1964.

On January 21, the President submitted a $97.9 billion budget request for fiscal year 1965. In it he proposed a network of federal, state and local programs for the poverty war to be backed by an initial federal authority of $500 million of new obligational funds. In all, more than $1 billion of federal money would be concentrated on the program.[41]

Task Force

On Saturday, the 1st of February, President Johnson telephoned Peace Corps Director Sargent Shriver, who had returned from a world trip on an Executive mission. The President asked Shriver to serve as his "personal chief of staff in the war against poverty." That afternoon, the two met, and Shriver accepted the task.[42]

As Chairman of the Peace Corps' Advisory Council, Johnson had had the opportunity to size up Shriver's abilities, and he liked what he saw. No one in the United States, he said later, was so ideally suited by "personality, by training, by head and heart and heels" to lead the attack on poverty. Shriver's duties would be to direct "the activities

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41 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1964, p. 6.

42 Capron recalls that he and Heller in December, 1963, pressed upon President Johnson the need to name somebody to head a special study group. Capron wrote a letter listing possible candidates, among whom were Terry Sanford and Dick Leibner. At the top of the list was Sargent Shriver, who had political charisma, ability on the Hill, and had demonstrated an effective style with the Peace Corps. Interview with Capron; On Shriver, see: Anthony Lewis, "Shriver Moves Into the Front Rank," New York Times Magazine, March 15, 1964; A.H. Raskin, "Generalissimo of the War on Poverty," New York Times Magazine, November 22, 1964; Murray Kempton, "The Essential Sargent Shriver," New Republic, March 28, 1964.

of all executive departments and agencies involved in the program against poverty."[43]

In a letter of February 11, appointing Shriver to be his Special Assistant in the anti-poverty effort, Johnson outlined some of his duties. "As my representative," he wrote, "you will direct the activities of all executive departments and agencies involved in the program against poverty. You will also be my representative in presenting to the Congress the Administration's views with respect to necessary legislation." Indicative of the importance the President gave the program, he empowered Shriver to attend Cabinet meetings. Further:

> You will also undertake the coordination and integration of the federal program with the activities of state and local governments and of private persons, including the Foundations, private business and industry, labor unions, and civic groups and organizations. I ask that you invite their close cooperation; that to the extent that they desire, you integrate their efforts with our work on the federal level; and that you encourage joint planning, joint programs and joint administration, wherever feasible.

If this were done, the nation could then solve the problem of poverty "with the greatest possible speed, efficiency, and economy." The task, Johnson said later, engendered "awesome and exacting responsibilities."[44]

For Shriver, the situation was reminiscent of the day, four years before, when President Kennedy had authorized him to organize the Peace

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43 John Kenneth Galbraith wrote to the President, "you have shown what I feel sure will one day be called the Johnson genius for getting the right man in the right job." Letter from John K. Galbraith to The President, February 27, 1964; Remarks of the President at Swearing-in Ceremony of Honorable Sargent Shriver as Director of OEO, White House, October 16, 1964.

44 Text of President's Letter Addressed to the Honorable Sargent Shriver, Director of the Peace Corps, February 11, 1964; See also, Robert A. Liston, Sargent Shriver: A Candid Portrait (New York: Farrar, Straus & Co.; 1964), pp. 205-206.

Corps, which became one of the most successful and admired governmental operations. At that time Shriver had called in the best talent available. Now, on February 1, he took the same course of action.

On Sunday, February 2, Shriver held a meeting at his Maryland home with Walter Heller, Kermit Gordon, and Adam Yarmolinsky, one of Defense Secretary McNamara's top advisors. Two days later Shriver organized an all-day conference devoted to preliminary planning. Present were: Heller and his aide William Capron; Yarmolinsky; John Kenneth Galbraith; Richard Boone; Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz; Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Assistant Secretary of Labor; the Undersecretary of HEW, Wilber Cohen; Michael Harrington; Paul Ylvisaker; writer Paul Jacobs; John Baker and James Sundquist, two Agriculture specialists on rural problems; Minneapolis mayor Arthur Naftalin; Frank Mankiewicz of the Peace Corps; Justice Department legal expert Norbert Schlei; Donald Petrie of Avis Rent-a-Car; Virgil Martin of Carson, Pirie & Scott; Lane Kirkland of the AFL-CIO; Richard Goodwin from the White House staff; and James Dixon, president of Antioch College.

The conference agreed on a three point attack: to emphasize the concept of individual economic independence; to build around the theory that poverty was cyclical; and to focus on the young. The conferees decided to delegate responsibilities according to areas. Thus, Labor was to handle jobs and training, HEW would deal with educational and health problems, and Agriculture would develop special rural programs.[45]

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45 "Poverty, U.S.A.," Newsweek, February 17, 1964.

Then began the task of forming the official Task Force to draft the President's special message on poverty, and put together the legislation.

"We propose," said one of the first memoranda among the storm of papers that descended upon Shriver during the early hectic days, "to take poverty seriously."[46] Such was the sentiment of the President's Task Force on Poverty (dubbed by Washington wags as the "Poor Corps"), although gravity was given comic relief at the Peace Corps building when "there were suddenly a lot of guys in funny shoes running around the corridors." It was a time of chaos and exhaustion when energies were fueled by excitement and exhilaration--itself, at times, the product of a kind of hysteria--"the beautiful hysteria of it all," as one participant put it."[47]

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46 Memorandum from Messrs. Harrington, Jacobs, Mankiewicz to R. Sargent Shriver, entitled, "The Long-Term View."

47 "Crossfire in the War on Poverty," Time Magazine, May 13, 1966; "Poverty, U.S.A.," Newsweek, February 17, 1964; The official Task Force members were the following: Andrew Brimmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce; William Capron, Staff Economist, Council of Economic Advisors; Ronald Goldfarb, Justice Department; Richard Goodwin, International Peace Corps Secretariat; David Hackett, Justice Department; Harold Horowitz, Associate General Counsel, HEW; Frank Mankiewicz; Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Assistant Secretary of Labor; Anne Oppenheimer, analyst, Bureau of the Budget; Norbert Shlei, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice; Milton Semer, General Counsel, CFA, HHFA; James L. Sundquist, Deputy Undersecretary of Agriculture; Christopher Weeks, analyst, Bureau of the Budget; Stephen Pollak, Office of the Solicitor General; Eric Tolmach, Labor Department; and Adam Yarmolinsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

Hyman Bookbinder, later Assistant Director of OEO, recalled the early days of the Task Force as "chaotic, hectic, unorganized, disorganized, but also historically productive." There was a "constant traffic of people. Government people were in and out of the fifth floor of the Peace Corps building. At one point traffic got so heavy that Shriver said we have to find some more rooms, and we found some on the 12th floor."[48]

The Task Force began its work at the Peace Corps building. Later, it was to move to the old Federal Court of Claims building; then to the basement of the unused Emergency Hospital; then to the New Colonial Hotel; and finally to the newly constructed Brown Building, its present headquarters. The move from the Court of Claims was forced: one afternoon, an engineer notified the planners that there was a crack in the structure (excavation was underway next door), and that everyone had to vacate within two hours. Eighty people, who had crammed into the building on an ad hoc basis, went streaming out, arms flowing with folders and papers. By Monday, the Task Force was implanted in the Emergency Hospital in what had been the basement morgue.

On the day he accepted the job to head the war on poverty, Shriver telephoned Michael Harrington, and asked him to come to Washington. At a luncheon meeting, Shriver put the following question to the author of The Other America: "Now you tell me how I abolish poverty?"

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48 Interview conducted by Bennett Schiff with Hyman Bookbinder, July 9, 1968.

"You've got to understand right away," Harrington said bluntly, "that you've been given nickels and dimes for this program. You'll have less than a billion dollars to work with."

"Well," said Shriver dryly and characteristically, "I don't know about you, Mr. Harrington, but this will be my first experience at spending a billion dollars, and I'm quite excited about it."[49]

"In a sense," recalled Bookbinder, "that was what everyone on the Task Force was asking themselves and everyone else, paraphrasing Shriver's famous question, 'How do you fight a war on poverty, what are you supposed to do, and what do you do?'"

In six weeks time, the Task Force had answered the question, completing both the Special Message on Poverty, and the specifics of the bill that created by law the Office of Economic Opportunity. Also completed was a Congressional presentation entitled "The War on Poverty," which provided the first systematic explanation of the programs, and contained the first budget estimate of $962.5 million. The hard nucleus of the Task Force had met around the clock with representatives of business, labor, education, and government to sort out and design the program.

"It was soon clear," an early participant said, "that even though there were different emphases on the poverty problem, the problem was not the kind that could be licked by one great gimmick or one great

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49 "The money figures that are being talked about are utterly unrealistic in view of the goals authorized," said Harrington. "New York could absorb that much just on the problem of the Negro." "Poverty, U.S.A.," Newsweek, February 17, 1964, p. 38; An administration official called it a "band-aid" program. Seligman, Poverty as a Public Issue, pp. 5-6; Raskin, "Generalissimo," pp. 84-91.

brilliant program. It was a multi-pronged problem leading to a multi-pronged program. That basic concept was eventually accepted and there were literally dozens of thoughtful ideas to discuss this, discuss that, and do this and that. Also, it was clear that we could not do everything."

Another participant recalled a memorable morning meeting chaired by Adam Yarmolinsky, who acted at the time the part of sargeant major. "It kind of pulled us together, and I think from that point on all of those involved looked at it more or less this way: Who is it in this country that needs the help? What is available? What is not available, and what priorities should we select among those who need help?"[50]

The New York Times reported later that "when Shriver presided over the task force some of the in-fighting over who would do what got so bitter that it appeared the whole project might be wrecked. 'Sometimes the walls dripped with blood as the empire-builders clashed with the empire-wreckers,' one official reports."[51]

The reference was to the working out of arrangements involving the established 21 government agencies dealing with the U.S. Welfare system in some 200 federal projects, many of which were already overlapped and interlocked. The Task Force had decided to set up a separate agency within the Executive Office to control major programs, while supervising others operating at federal, state and local levels. The

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50 Time Interview, Tolmach & Bookbinder.

51 Raskin, "Generalissimo," p. 88.

problem was not with the Secretaries of Departments involved, according to Hyman Bookbinder, but with the hundreds of key officials who attended the dozens of meetings day after day and who resisted what they considered to be the beginnings of a gradual dissolution of the prerogatives of their departments.

A letter from Budget Director Kermit Gordon to Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.), dated March 20, 1964, gives some idea of the number of programs and other federal agencies involved in existing poverty legislation at the time.[52] Gordon listed as examples the Departments of Agriculture; Health, Education and Welfare; Commerce; Interior; Labor; Housing and Home Finance Agency; and the Veterans Administration.

HEW alone, for example, had legislation covering aid to federally affected school areas, vocational education, maternal and child welfare, public assistance payments and services, including medical care; vocational rehabilitation, construction and operation of Indian Health facilities. There was also new legislation, Gordon pointed out, that authorized HEW to administer 14 other programs.

Dr. Joseph A. Kershaw, former provost of Williams College and economist for the Rand Corporation, came to OEO to set up a computerized cost analysis system and to help figure out how the War Against Poverty could get the best possible return for its dollars. He and Leon Gilgoff compiled a book three inches thick, listing for the first

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52 Letter from Kermit Gordon to Honorable Gaylord Nelson, March 20, 1964.

time in the government's history, the names of all Federal programs to aid the poor. There was an entire library of affecting legislation for the programs, a legal labyrinth which was remarkable even in that tortuous field.

Kershaw's recruitment typified the Shriver method of OEO Task Force induction. "I was sitting on a veranda last September (1964) at Martha's Vineyard," Kershaw recalled, "when the phone rang. 'My name is Sargent Shriver,' a voice said. 'We're going to spend a lot of money.'"[53]

In the early days most decisions leading up to the President's poverty message and submission of legislation went as consensus recommendations to the White House. Early compromises involved the dispensation of authority, and it was resolved that the new agency was to have central and executive authority over a number of independent programs. Where other programs fit logically into the framework of existing agencies, authority would then be delegated.[54]

The Program Proposed

By the time President Johnson delivered his message to Congress on March 16, most issues were resolved. On that day, the President

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53 "War on Poverty," Newsweek, September 13, 1965.

54 See: "Organization of the 'Poverty Program,'" Bureau of the Budget position paper, February 6, 1964; Memorandum from Charles L. Schultze, Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget, to Sargent Shriver, "Poverty Program--Control of Funds," February 3, 1964; "Work-Study Programs," undated Task Force position paper; Charles Schultze, "Examples of Programs in an Urban Slum Area," December 28, 1963; "Financial Aid for High School Students," Undated Task Force memorandum; Charles Schultze, "Rural Area Programs," December 28, 1963; Stephen Pollack Memorandum for the Attorney General, "Relationship between the National Service Corps and the proposed new legislation for an attack on poverty," February 27, 1964, in Appendix.

asked for a new agency, and declared his intention of appointing Sargent Shriver to be its Director. In the message, he outlined the specific objectives of the war. Assembled in a basic five point plan, the strategy was based on the theory that by broadening the base of abundance, new industry, higher production, and higher earnings and income would result. The proposed legislation, a multi-pronged comprehensive package, would provide educational opportunities for the millions of underprivileged young, give communities the chance to mobilize their own programs, enable the privileged youth of the nation to redirect the idealism of the Peace Corps type to domestic needs, assist in the destruction of barriers that reduce farmers and laborers to poverty, and combine the nation's talents and resources under one agency in a "concerted attack on poverty."

"The war on poverty," the President continued, "is not a struggle simply to support people, to make them dependent on the generosity of others. It is a struggle to give people a chance. It is an effort to allow them to develop and use their capacities, as we have been allowed to develop and use ours, so that they can share, as others share, in the promise of the nation."

The nation should embark on the program, the President concluded, because it was right that it should, and also because "helping some will increase the prosperity of all. Our fight against poverty will be an investment in the most valuable of our resources--the skills and strength of our people. And in the future, as in the past, this

investment will return its cost many fold to our entire economy."[55]

On the following day, the House Committee on Education and Labor began hearings on H.R. 10440, entitled the Economic Opportunity Act. In 1961 Shriver had gone to see every single Congressman and Senator to tell the Peace Corps story. Before the War Against Poverty bill became law, he was to duplicate that remarkable feat; but this time it was more difficult.

The draft legislation contained six titles embodying programs to be coordinated by the Office of Economic Opportunity. It authorized appropriations of $962.5 million for the fiscal year 1965. The thrust of the program against poverty was to be along a broad, ten-point front: income tax cuts, civil rights, regional development, urban and rural community rehabilitation, youth programs, teenage vocational training and basic educational programs, and hospital insurance for the aged.

The Office of Economic Opportunity, the headquarters for the new war, was to be the President's managerial arm which could cut across Departmental lines to facilitate coordination.[56] Shriver, testifying before the House Committee, stated that "it was an authority which the President wants because he wants to be at the focal

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55 Text of the President's Special Message to Congress, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1964, p. 875ff; Graham, "Politics of Poverty," Poverty as a Public Issue, p. 232.

56 An unsigned and undated memorandum entitled "ANEC(sic)DOTES," states: "Insiders agree that two persons, seldom mentioned, played a key role at important points in the initial days. They credited Abe Fortas with urging on the President the creation of a separate executive office to coordinate and operate War on Poverty programs, rather than permit them to be parts of traditional governmental bureaus." (p.5).

point with respect to this aspect of our domestic effort." A precedent existed for this unique position. By the terms of the Executive Reorganization Act of 1939, and the recommendations of the Committee on Administration Management, President Roosevelt had promoted the cause of scientific management and established tools for a national governing body in initiating bureaucratic changes. A 1937 report provided guidelines for future executive reorganization, one of which was the need to install coordinating "managerial arms" for the President in the area of personnel, fiscal policy, and national planning. These were to be at a level between the President and his Cabinet.[57]

The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 was a multi-faceted constellation of projects. Title I embodied three proposals: a Job Corps that would provide work experience and training for youths in conservation camps and residential training centers; work-training programs to provide employment to youths aged 16-21 in their immediate locale; and a work-study program designed for college youths from low-income families.

Title II established a federally financed community action program to assist state, local private and local public non-profit agencies to combat poverty locally. Title III would give grants to farmers for agricultural materials, loans to farmers to set up non-agricultural enterprises, and loans to cooperatives to assist low-income families.

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57 Graham, "Poverty and the Legislative Process," pp. 263-264; Time Interview, Tolmach and Bookbinder; House Committee on Education and Labor Hearings, p. 21.

It would also erect farm development corporations which would provide for a more economic transfer of land to low-income farmers. Title IV would establish incentive loans to individuals who would then hire the hard-core unemployed. It would also enable small businessmen exempted from Small Business Association loan terms to receive assistance.

Title V set up job training programs for the heads of households on public assistance, and Title VI created the Office of Economic Opportunity and its administration, as well as a volunteer national service organization entitled "Volunteers for America." The program, under the supervision and direction of the Office of Economic Opportunity, contained a three year projected authorization.[58]

While the program embodied programs resembling the CCC and the NYA, it was not meant to be simply a reincarnation of the New Deal. The New Deal had provided social services to relieve want and distress; the war on poverty, on the other hand, aimed at "expanding choices and enlarging human freedoms," and to open the doors "into the main edifice of our economy" to everyone, regardless of skills. Underlying the act was the assumption that success and achievement in American society should be available to those willing to work. The Council of Economic Advisors' report had noted that the proposed programs were designed "to equip and to permit the poor of the nation to produce and to earn. . .the American standard of living by their own efforts

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58 Text of H.R. 10440, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, in House Committee on Education and Labor Hearings, pp. 3-18.

and contributions."[59]

A second assumption was that success in the war on poverty rested largely upon a rapid and steady economic growth, increasing employment opportunity and raising the demand for labor. The quality of the labor supply, it was felt, could be raised to meet the changing labor demand through education, training and retraining. Title I of the act was specifically addressed to that precondition.[60]

The Legislation

During the hearings in Congress, critics noted that many of the programs either incorporated or extended "activities that had been operated in large scale or in prototype at some point in the past," or which had direct analogies in ongoing programs. Opponents gave notice that consideration of specific programs had been made before the respective bodies in the past. For example, VISTA resembled the National Service Corps and the Peace Corps; a work-study feature of the National Defense Education Act had failed due to opposition by educators; a job corps and work-training project of the 1963 Youth Employment Opportunity Act was killed in the House Rules Committee; the Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act of 1961 contained community action provisions; and so on.[61]

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59 S.M. Miller and Martin Rein, "Perspectives and Prospects," p. 278; Graham, "Politics of Poverty," p. 233.

60 Myrdal, Poverty as a Public Issue, p. vii.

61 See: Moynihan, "Three Problems," p. 43; Graham, "Poverty and the Legislative Process," pp. 261-262.

Precedents also existed in privately-sponsored projects such as the Ford Foundation urban community action planning and the North Carolina Fund state-wide programs. Ad hoc local groups had previously operated their own version of tutoring programs, while the Opportunity Industrial Corporation, headed by Leon Sullivan, an activist Negro minister, had conducted education, retraining, and job placement programs in poverty-stricken areas of Philadelphia. The NAACP had for years engaged in financing sharecroppers, the National Urban League had supervised retraining projects, and the Southern Regional Council since 1945 had overseen programs similar to those within the act.[62]

Daniel Moynihan, one of the original task force group, recalled that prior to and during the Task Force days, the initial impulse "within the second echelon of the government was simply to launch a greatly expanded community action program, following the models already in action." Other considerations, however, had led to more diverse programs. Another task force member stated that barring the community action section of the act, much of the rest was "made up of items which could not get through Congress separately." While President Kennedy had tried to get a job corps through Congress under the Department of Labor, and had failed, "it was felt by President Johnson that this was a good opportunity to put a number of things together in a package and get them through Congress, and he did just that."[63]

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62 John H. Wheeler, "Civil Rights Groups--Their Impact Upon the War on Poverty," Antipoverty Programs, p. 154.

63 Moynihan, "Three Problems," p. 43; Boone, "Community Action;" One Task Force participant explained the multi-program package as the result of what the members thought could get through Congress. Time Interview, Tolmach and Bookbinder.

During the hearings, spokesmen for the Administration took pains to distinguish between antecedent programs and legislation and the present act. Ample testimony explaining the advantages of coordination, unification, and interagency cooperation was given by Shriver, Celebrezze, Wirtz and others who urged the necessity of an omnibus approach. The major thrust of the program, Shriver told the House committee, was contained in Title II, the community action program. Its purpose was to "change institutions as well as people." It challenged "hostile or uncaring or exploitive institutions," attempting to make them responsive to the peculiar needs of the "whole community."[64] Title II departed from traditional federal welfare approaches by placing main responsibility on local communities, the reasons being that local leadership was more in touch with indigent problems, it would be more acceptable to the states, and that it enabled communities to unify through widespread local participation.[65]

While the bill was before Congress, the President waged a vigorous campaign to solicit public support. Diverse organizations enlisted in the cause, from the Daughters of the American Revolution to the Socialist Party. The President appealed to the people and their repre-

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64 See Hearings on H.R. 10440, pp. 16-17, 20-21; Boone said: "There were no specific designs thought of when the architects built the maximum feasible participation clause, only later in terms of its implementation did it tend to take two forms in local community action programs." Eric Tolmach recalls that no one for sure knew precisely what the phrase meant, or what would happen. The concept was speculative, undefined in the bill itself, and resulted from the "feeling" that some new element had to be infused into the program.Boone, "Community Action;" Interview with Eric Tolmach, June 28, 1968.

65 H.R. Report No. 1458, 88th Congress, 2nd Session 10 (1964).

sentatives, personally visiting poverty-stricken regions, highlighting conditions, and reminding Congressmen of their responsibilities to their constituents. In some cities and states he promised federal aid as soon as the bill passed. In May, Johnson called for the country to build a "Great Society," based on a "creative federalism between the national capital and the leaders of local communities." A month later, before the AFL-CIO Communications Workers convention, he announced the objectives of the Great Society: no one would be "the victim of fear or poverty or hatred. . .and no person, no group, no party is going to stand in the way of that forward march." In a very real sense, a writer has observed, the poverty program "would be the test case to see whether the battle standards of the Great Society could be raised up in place of the somewhat tattered flags of the New Frontier."[66]

During the summer of 1964 the nation was "deluged with vivid descriptions of the life of the poor, statistical accounts of their number and characteristics, and details of their geographic location." Poverty--the issue, not the reality--became "fashionable," according to Dwight MacDonald, who noted that even the Saturday Evening Post ran a lead article running to twelve pages entitled "The Invisible Americans." In April the House Committee on Education and Labor published a report on Poverty in the United States. Senator Clark (D-Pa.) held a sub-

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66 Graham, "Poverty and the Legislative Process," pp. 253-256; Weeks, in Job Corps, writes, ". . .the master chef who compiled the ingredients and supervised as they were blended into one chef d'oeuvre was Lyndon Baines Johnson. And the political gourmets knew this. In an election year, this was the bill which would show whether the new President's magic worked only because Congress felt charged with a responsibility to fulfill the Kennedy legacy, or whether Johnson had the persuasive power to realize his own legislative initiatives." p. 10.

committee investigation on unemployment, and Hubert Humphrey's name appeared on a book entitled War on Poverty, which quoted Scripture, Michael Harrington, and gave official recognition to the theory of the culture of poverty whereby generations bequeath poverty to their progeny "with almost genetic certainty." John Kenneth Galbraith, who less than a decade before had dismissed poverty in a short chapter of his Affluent Society, now wrote in Harpers magazine that the impoverished must be rescued from their plight, and in their rescue "a steady expansion in economic output (and) a broad and equitable distribution of services" would be required. By the time Adam Clayton Powell brought the bill to a vote in the House Committee, an emergent public interest generated by the media had developed.[67]

Eighty-five witnesses testified in the twenty-five days of hearings before the House Committee on Education and Labor. Nine opposed the bill--three represented the Chamber of Commerce, one was a state manufacturing association delegate, and another was from the Farm Bureau Federation--"lobbies whose opposition to any form of government spending on social welfare and education is a basic ritual" performed regularly. Two of the remaining four were Republican members of the Joint Economic Committee whose minority report had accused the Council of Economic Advisors' report of exaggerating the extent of poverty in the country. The remaining two were educators who felt the bill was misdirected and its programs unnecessary.

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67 Dwight MacDonald, "The Now Visible Poor," Poverty in Plenty, pp. 61-62; Graham, "Politics," pp. 243-244; Leach, "Federal Role," p. 19; Hubert H. Humphrey, War on Poverty (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company; 1964); John Kenneth Galbraith, "Let Us Begin: An Invitation to Action on Poverty," Harper's Magazine, March, 1964.

Of the remaining seventy-six witnesses, twelve were technical advisors representing government statistical services and whose testimony was unrelated to the merits of the bill. Twenty-nine were members of the administration or original members of the task force. The remainder represented social-welfare, civic and religious organizations, state and local governments, and businesses.[68]

Opposition to the bill came from expected quarters. From the first, Republican committee members served notice that the poverty bill would not get bipartisan support. Representative Peter Freylinghuysen (R-N.J.) labeled the bill a potpourri of stale ideas previously rejected by Congress. The new bill, he announced, would produce confusion of purpose, create a "poverty czar," and usurp the authority of Cabinet officers. On April 28, Frelinghuysen introduced his own anti-poverty bill, authorizing a program to be administered by the States under HEW, funded at $1.5 billion for three years. States were to assume one-third of the costs, and 50% of the funds were to be spent on educational programs.[69]

Richard Nixon, at an April press conference, called the war on poverty a "cruel hoax." Those who would make such criticisms, Johnson retorted, were the sort "who would turn the American dream into a nightmare." GOP House Committee members Dave Martin (R-Neb.) and M.G. Snyder (R-Ky.) also attacked the President's sincerity in the war. "The President's poverty campaign is nothing more than an election year gimmick," they asserted. Shriver, in his testimony before the Senate Committee on

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68 Graham, "Poverty and the Legislative Process," pp. 257-258.

69 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1964, p. 16.

Labor and Public Welfare, replied to the charge with the words: "I think that if the national administration had failed to propose this bill, just because it was afraid that someone would say it was an election year gimmick, as they have, then I would think the Federal Government would be derelict in its responsibility."[70]

New York's Governor Rockefeller, campaigning for the GOP Presidential nomination, branded the administration's poverty war as a "public relations effort to distract people's attention" from its failure to provide more jobs. It was an outdated program, he continued, more "keyed to the problems of the depressed thirties, not the challenge of the sixties. In an advanced, automated economy, a youngster cannot learn useful jobs out in the woods with an axe."

If the liberal wing of the GOP was critical of technique, the conservative element struck at the programs' substance. In arguments reminiscent of the late 19th century Social Darwinist view of the poor, conservatives maintained that poverty was the result of individual fault and not environment. "The fact is," said Barry Goldwater,"that most people who have no skill, have had no education for the same reason--low intelligence or low ambition." People must earn, and want to earn, any social and economic benefits they receive. In American society, he continued, a person receives rewards by "merit and not by fiat." To be sure, everyone was entitled to an opportunity for education and earnings ("in keeping with the value of their work"), but he

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70 Leach, "Federal Role," pp. 35-36; Graham, "Politics of Poverty," p. 240; Louise Lander (ed.), War on Poverty (New York: Facts on File; 1967), pp. 13-42; Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare Hearings on S. 2642, pp. 6-17, 54-93, 123, 137-173.

did not believe that "the mere fact of having little money entitles everybody, regardless of circumstances, to be permanently maintained by the taxpayers at an average or comfortable standard of living."[71]

Throughout the summer of 1964, the bill passed through the Congressional grist-mill, undergoing slight alteration under sometimes hostile scrutiny. Administration witnesses, testifying on behalf of the proposed legislation, presented a united front to committee members, citing the advantages of each respective provision. Executive officers testified that the whole Johnson Cabinet was behind the bill, while Secretary of Commerce Hodges said in reply to queries about potential departmental conflict, "I'm not scared of anyone taking anything away from me." HEW Secretary Anthony Celebrezze painted a rosy picture of interdepartmental cooperation, denying that Mr. Shriver would dominate other government agencies. If successful war was to be waged on poverty, he said, it was necessary to have a commanding general.[72]

Secretary of Labor Wirtz pacified committee fears about the exclusion of religious groups from the community action programs, and Hodges suggested that Title IV would be a useful experiment to test

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71 Landers, War, pp. 12, 17; Leach, "Federal Role," p. 36; New York Times, January 16, 1964.

72 Cited in Liston, Sargent Shriver, pp. 207-208; The sources for the 1964 legislative history of the Economic Opportunity Act include the following: H.R. 10440, Administration Draft bill; H.R. 11050, Frelinghausen's bill; H.R. 10443, Powell's bill; H.R. 11377, clean bill reported by House Committee; House Report # 1458; S. 2642, Administration draft; Senate Report # 1218; S. 2642 Subcommittee print; Ad Hoc Subcommittee on the Poverty War Program of the House Education and Labor Hearings; House Committee on Agriculture Hearings; House Rules Committee Hearings; Senate Select Subcommittee on Poverty of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee Hearings.

the merits of private enterprise's participation in the poverty war. Orville Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture, praised the Job Corps as a needed adjunct to the Forest Service, and said that urban pressures could be relieved through the grant and loan program to farmers. Speculative pressures from large-scale farming operations had caused undue inflation of farm land values, and the farm development corporations, envisaged by Title III, would make available to small farmers good farm land at lower prices and would act as an incentive to rural development.[73]

Criticisms and objections to specific portions of the bill generally followed partisan lines, as did the actual voting. In the House Committee, Representative Charles Goodell (R-N.Y.) questioned the absence of a prohibition against aid to religious groups. Robert Taft, Jr., (R-Ohio) felt that the community action programs ignored the proper federal-state relationships. Roman Pucinski (D-Ill.) compared the farm development corporations scheme with "the type of farming we most often criticize behind the Iron Curtain," while Peter Frelinghuysen said the bill charted "a new and unjustified course for governmental responsibility in general and for the Federal role in particular." He objected to a new federal bureaucracy whose influence would "permeate every nook and cranny of civic responsibility--public and private."

In the Senate, the senior Senator from New York, Jacob Javits, would have preferred to have the government declare a joint war with the states, instead of a federal war alone. Senators John Tower (R-Tex.) and Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) saw the bill as yet another example of federal intru-

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73 Hearings on H.R. 10440.

sion into state and local matters, "complete and untrammeled." Some complained that the bill had been hastily drawn together, and Shriver's testimony confirmed that the draft had, indeed, been compiled in six weeks. Carl Madden, a Chamber of Commerce researcher, reported that a task force consultant seeking his cooperation had confessed, "we haven't got time to study; we have to act."[74]

Major objections in both the House and Senate Committees' minority reports focused on the duplication of existing programs, the undermining of federal-state relations, and the confusions that would result from a new bureaucracy. In the House, the program was seen as a rehash of older, sometimes rejected ideas gathered together for political purposes. The farm development corporations would institute "agrarian land reform," and the programs bypassed the very old and very young. The Goldwater-Tower Senate minority report wielded a sharper axe. The Administration's technique in ram-rodding the bill through Congress recalled "Madison Avenue" and "The Wizard of Oz" practices. It was a "poverty grab-bag," based on obsolete programs, which treated the results and "not the causes of poverty." Some of its programs were totally "alien to the best traditions of our country."[75]

Shriver, in response to criticism of the political aspect of the OEO program, replied: "For six months we had our sign out like a

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74 H.R. Report No. 1458, 88th Congress, 2nd Session 10 (1964); S. Report No. 1218, 88th Congress, 2nd Session 7 (1964).

75 Ibid.

lawyer's shingle, begging for constructive ideas on how to wage this war. . . .Those who have challenged the substantive parts of our program have been asked by me to come up with something better. For a half-year I've been saying, 'If you've got a better mousetrap, show us,' and they proposed nothing. Our program has been almost unanimously endorsed by economists and by an extraordinary cross-section of business leaders--men who certainly would not lend themselves to any crass vote-getting scheme."[76]

To some extent outside pressures and events hastened the passage of the bill. During a delay in the House hearings, the President, capitalizing on a New York World's Fair speech, subtly reminded Harlem Representative and Committee Chairman Adam Clayton Powell of his obligations by announcing a one million dollar grant to HARYOU. The New York Times reported the grant was contingent upon passage of the bill. In the wake of the summer race riots and subsequent appeal by Mayor Wagner for more federal anti-poverty funds, the New York Times, describing the bill as an "anti-riot" measure, cautioned members of the committees to bear that in mind when it came time for a vote.[77]

During the summer both major political parties held nominating conventions. The Republican Party platform contained a plank condemning the poverty program as overlapping with and contradicting the "42 existing Federal poverty programs," and charged that the program "would dangerously centralize Federal controls." The Democrats, of course,

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76 Cited in Raskin, "Generalissimo," pp. 91-92.

77 Graham, "Poverty and the Legislative Process," p. 256.

gave unqualified endorsement, pledging to "carry the war on poverty as a total war against the causes of human want." Shriver had eloquently summarized for the delegates the meaning of poverty, and he described the Democrats as the party which historically "cared and acted" for the poor. The President's program was no hoax or gimmick, he assured the Convention, but a practical effort to enable the unfortunate to get back on their feet, turning "relief-receivers into taxpayers." The war on poverty was "the challenge to our generation--to build a world for our children in which relief is unknown and opportunities are unlimited."[78]

In August, the House vote on the bill depended on a bloc of undecided Congressmen who fell loosely into two affiliated groups. A dozen moderate to liberal Republicans, sympathetic to the aims of the program, and impressed by Shriver's Peace Corps record, faced the dilemma that it was a Democratic bill backed by a Democratic President. These same Republicans had been "flattened by the Goldwater steamroller" at the GOP Convention weeks earlier. Democrats in the other group, from marginal Southern states, "concentrated in the North Carolina delegation," recognized the need for an omnibus poverty program in their home districts. They had just been "badly torn by the bloody fight over the Civil Rights Act of 1964." They had to decide whether to support a bill which Southern critics complained was designed to force compliance with the Civil Rights act.[79]

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78 Leach, "Federal Role," pp. 35-36; Statement of Sargent Shriver Before the Democratic Platform Committee, August 18, 1964.

79 Weeks, Job Corps, pp. 11-17.

Two key events resolved the issue and won support from the undecided bloc. A bargain was struck between conservation lobby groups and top aides in the task force, whereby a percentage of Job Corps enrollees would be consigned to a Youth Conservation Corps in return for active support for the bill by the lobbies. The other event involved the jettisoning of Adam Yarmolinsky, the man "who had been even more instrumental than Shriver in designing the structure of the poverty bill." At a critical point in the voting, Representative William Ayres (R-Ohio) attacked Yarmolinsky, quoting an internal memo implying that Defense Department funds were being used to build and equip Job Corps centers before the bill had passed. Representative Phil Landrum (D-Ga.) then announced that Yarmolinsky would be excluded from the operations of the OEO, "on the highest authority."[80]

Christopher Weeks, a task force member, noted that "the Southern Democrats had asked for and gotten their pound of flesh--assurance that the abrasive, intellectual Jew of Russian extraction who had roughed up the military rank and file in the Defense Department, and who was reputed to have been responsible for orders forcing base commanders in the South to declare segregated facilities in nearby towns off-limits to servicemen, would thereafter be barred from any job in Johnson's poverty agency."[81]

The House passed the bill, after three days of debate, by a roll-call vote of 226-184 on August 8, 1964. Three days later the Senate

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80 Congressional Record, House, August 7, 1964, p. 17996.

81 Weeks, Job Corps, pp. 16-17.

followed suit, by a vote of 61-34. Changes in the original form of the bill were slight. Minority opposition had introduced a gubernatorial veto of the location of the Job Corps centers and the stationing of VISTA volunteers within the confines of a state. Citing the experience of the New York Mobilization for Youth, staffed by "left-wingers" and indulging in anti-establishment activity, a Dixiecrat/Northern Republican coalition inserted a loyalty oath requirement into the bill. The idea of a single "community action program" executed by a "community action organization" was deleted, as well as the requirement that the agency receiving funds be "broadly representative of the community." The clause was revised to allow grants to "components of a community action program" without reference to the concurrent planning of a single, carefully planned, community-wide program. By a single deletion, "pork-barrel legislation was produced that no longer made local grants contingent upon the creation of a community-wide administration and the formation of an overall development program." Also, direct grants to agricultural workers were eliminated, as were "land reform" measures. Farm cooperatives were forbidden aid if they engaged in agricultural production or for manufacturing purposes.[82]

President Johnson signed the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 on August 20, declaring:

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82 S.M. Miller and Martin Rein, "Perspectives and Prospects," p. 277; Graham, "Poverty and the Legislative Process," pp. 265-266; Raskin, "Generalissimo," pp. 90-91.

> Today for the first time in all the history of the human race, a great nation is able to make and is willing to make a commitment to eradicate poverty among its people.
>
> Whatever our situation in life, whatever our partisan affiliation, we can be grateful and proud that we are able to pledge ourselves this morning to this historic course. We can be especially proud of the nature of the commitments that we are making.
>
> This is not in any sense a cynical proposal to exploit the poor with a promise of a hand-out or a dole.
>
> We know--we learned long ago--that answer is no answer.
>
> The measure before me this morning for signature offers the answer that its title implies--the answer of opportunity. For the purpose of the Economic Act of 1964 is to offer opportunity, not an opiate.
>
> . . .We are not content to accept the endless growth of relief rolls or welfare rolls. We want to offer the forgotten fifth of our people opportunity and not doles.
>
> That is what this measure does for our times.[83]

The Act was the first major legislation proposed by the President to be passed by the Congress.

Funding the Program

A subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee began hearings on August 14.[84] Shriver asked for $947.5, the full amount auth-

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83 Remarks of the President Upon the Signing of S. 2642 - Poverty Bill, in the Rose Garden, August 20, 1964; The entire program, Robert Theobald complained, reflected a dire "lack of research. We don't know enough. . .we are flying blind." Theobald, "Johnson's War on Poverty," New Politics, Fall 1964; Time commented that the war reflected "the uniquely American belief. . .that evangelism, money and organization can lick just about anything, including conditions that the world has always considered inevitable." "The Poor Amidst Prosperity," October 1, 1965; and Paul Jacobs noted that the program was conceived in "an almost mystical belief in the infinite potentials of American society. Poverty, like polio, will be defeated when the right vaccine is found." Jacobs, "America's Schizophrenic View of the Poor," 201 Nation 191, 196 (1965).

84 The following is taken from Hearings before the Subcommittee on Departments of Labor, HEW, and Related Agencies, of the House Appropriations Committee, 1964.

orized by the Act. In his opening statement Shriver stressed three points: the efforts which had gone into the preparation of the request for funds; why the program needed the full amount; and the low overhead involved in the nature of the program.

To substantiate his points Shriver said the anti-poverty programs were developed by "the best men we could find in America, both in and out of Government, irrespective of party." Called in, he went on to explain, were representatives of business, labor, education; state, city and county officials; and experts from the voluntary agencies working in the field. All of these experts, Shriver said, working in conjunction with officials of the Departments of Labor, Interior, Agriculture, HEW, Justice and the Small Business Administration, had conferred on and approved the budget estimates which were before the committee. "Sums requested for programs to be delegated to one of the departments are the product of coordinated efforts of personnel of that agency and the task force. In each case the pertinent department strenuously supports the request for funds," he said.

"The funds requested," he said, "will be used to establish needed new programs such as the Job Corps, work-training and work-study programs, community action programs, adult basic education programs, and the VISTA volunteers program. In certain cases the funds will be used to broaden existing pilot programs which have proved their worth; for example, the loan programs of the Farmers Home Administration and the work-experience program of the Bureau of Family Services of the

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Each of these programs is sound; each is practical. Each will meet a proven need." From the moment when the President sent the bill to Congress, "we have planned for operations beginning September 1. We have continually reviewed these plans and are prepared to go ahead on that schedule. To meet our goals we need and will obligate every single dollar authorized and included in these budget estimates." Finally, Shriver emphasized that it was a low-overhead program designed to avoid a "giant Federal bureaucracy." Major development and administrative tasks were to be carried out at the local and state levels.

Shriver denied, as he had in previous hearings, that the program would duplicate existing efforts, emphasizing that it had the full support of all related government departments. It should be obvious, he said, they would not approve of programs which conflicted with their established and ongoing operations.

It was true, Shriver said, that there were three important national groups who were opposed to the program: the National Association of Manufacturers; the U.S. Chamber of Commerce; and the American Farm Bureau Federation. But he added, "they were conspicuous in their opposition because they were among the very few that did oppose."

During the series of extended hearings Shriver went on, point by point, to answer criticism and reply to detailed questioning. The program had the support of both a committee and the Council of Governors and the full U.S. Conference of Mayors. During the first day

of hearings, Shriver stressed the constructive nature of the program and its basic difference from the entrenched welfare system:

> I think the problem some people have when they look at this bill or hear about it, is that they think of it as a relief program, they think we are going to take money from the rich and give it to the poor or just hand out checks to people.
>
> That is not the intent of this bill and under its provisions it would not be possible to do that in any case.
>
> One of the reasons we call it the economic opportunity program (is) to emphasize the fact it is not a relief program. This is a program which opens up new opportunities and new changes for people who need a chance to get out of poverty and that is why it has such a heavy emphasis on job training, education, and local community action.

Supported by testimony from U.S. Commissioner of Education Francis Keppel, representatives of Federal departments and key members of his Task Force, Shriver went on to explain major points of the different sections of the Act. On the subject of the community action program, the core of the Administration's anti-poverty war, Shriver said:

> I can just say the objective of the community action program is to get action initiated against poverty at the point closest to where the poor people live by encouraging and inspiring local governmental units, and local private voluntary agencies to initiate programs at the local level.
>
> The philosophy behind this is that poverty can be analyzed and combatted best by those who are closest to it; so, rather than putting the individual communities of the United States in a planning straitjacket originated here, or in a state capitol, we are trying to take this responsibility as close to the local government level as we can.[85]

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85 This profound and innovative concept of basic social participation--one of the most controversial of OEO's programs--had been written into the 1964 Act, requiring Community Action Agencies to be "developed, conducted, and administered with the maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and members of the groups involved." A full discussion of the intent, derivation and application of the phrase follows in a subsequent chapter.

Issues examined during the hearings included poverty in rural areas, grants for program development, technical assistance grants, the migrant agricultural employees program, loans in the agricultural sector, the adult literacy program, VISTA, the administrative structure of OEO and its costs, the relation of the program to the Manpower Development and Training Act, Aid for Dependent Children, the possibility of funds being used to buy educational toys (it was explained that this might come under a community action program and would have to be reviewed as such), review procedure for community action grant applications, requirements for matching local contributions (10 percent would be required, either in cash or in equivalent staff-services or facilities), cost per Job Corps enrollee, aid for Indians, consultant fees, and others.

"I think," said subcommittee Chairman John E. Fogarty (D-R.I.) in concluding the day's hearings, "you have done a good job today in justifying this appropriation. I wish you a lot of luck. You will need it."

Retorted Shriver, "I think we will."

On September 17, the House Appropriations Committee reported H.R. 12633 which contained the FY 1965 appropriations for OEO. The Committee recommended an appropriation of $750 million (a reduction of $197.5 million from the request) because "it is obvious that when this program was planned it was expected that it would be implemented much earlier than is now going to be the fact," and that it would take a "considerable amount of time to recruit all the staff necessary." The

House passed the appropriations bill by a roll call vote of 209-103 on September 22. It defeated an amendment proposed by Representative Ben F. Jensen (R-Iowa), which would have reduced the appropriation to $650 million.

The Senate Appropriations Committee began hearing testimony on the budget on August 15, with Shriver making the point immediately that "we planned right from the beginning. . .on an operation which would start September 1, not July 1." Another Senate hearing was held on September 22, and again Shriver made an attempt to clarify the budget estimates by pointing out they were predicated on a September beginning and not on the customary fiscal year basis of July 1 to June 30. On September 29, the Senate Committee recommended an appropriation of $861.5 million, an increase of $111.5 million over the House figure and a reduction of $85.95 million from the Administration request. The Senate passed its bill on October 1. The House-Senate Conference Committee followed with a report appropriating $800 million for the program. The bill (H.R. 12633) was finally cleared on October 3, the last day of the session. The President signed the measure on October 7, and OEO began formal operations on October 8.

The Targets and the Design

In its first Congressional presentation of March 17, 1965,[86] OEO described the six groups from whom "the community of poverty" was largely drawn: the children of poverty; those by-passed by industrial

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86 See the first Congressional Presentation, War on Poverty (OEO publication), March 17, 1964.

change; rural families; minority group members; fatherless families; the aged.

While the list was not all inclusive, the report said, it was clear that most of the nation's poor shared one or more of the characteristics included in it and that "together, they constitute what must be recognized, even by the skeptical, as a stubborn core of poverty in the United States."

Toward these targets of opportunity, the report said, its programs would:

- stimulate our communities to initiate comprehensive action programs attacking the roots of poverty;
- expand the opportunities for your youth to gain the education, skills, and experience they must have to become full participants in our nation's life;
- help farmers to increase their income through a program of small capital loans and grants;
- provide new employment opportunities--for the long-term unemployed--by encouraging capital investment, and new opportunities for small entrepreneurs by making credit available;
- encourage more states to orient their programs of public assistance toward rehabilitation rather than support;
- recruit and train volunteers to work with agencies carrying out the various programs.

"In short," the introduction concluded, "it is a program which can open for the young the opportunity to learn; for the able bodied, the opportunity to work; and for all, the opportunity to live in decency and dignity."

Chapter Two
Starting Out

Chapter Two

Starting Out:

Grants, Troubles, Criticism, and Achievements

FIRST GRANTS

There were applicants long before there was any money for them. As far back as September, after the House Appropriations Committee had recommended a cut of $197.5 million, Shriver told the Senate Appropriations Committee[1] that, already, more than 10,000 teachers and counselors had inquired about working in Job Corps Centers; states and counties had already requested 1,500 VISTA Volunteers; there had been more than 100 spontaneous requests for Job Corps centers from governors,

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1 On September 22.

mayors, city councils; chambers of commerce, businessmen and citizen's organizations; more than 125 cities and towns had already submitted community action requests; and, 15 specific contract proposals for Job Corps centers had been received from states, universities and private businesses. Just these last applications alone, he said, would involve 15,000 enrollees in training by the end of the fiscal year, June 30.

Under the terms of the Act, roughly one-third of the total funds were to be available to the individual states for Community Action, Adult Education, and Work-Study programs according to a distribution formula contained in the Act. The balance was to be allotted to those states, communities and institutions which came forward with the best programs first. The total state share would depend on the state's willingness and readiness to engage in comprehensive community action programs, and on the substance and practicality of the projects proposed, as well as on the priority in which the requests were received.

The War on Poverty launched its first barrage, an OEO press release read, on six fronts involving 119 separate anti-poverty projects in two-thirds of the states in the nation. Six Federal agencies simultaneously announced, on November 25, projects involving $35 million and affecting impoverished Americans ranging from unemployed adults to school children. Details of the initial programming were announced by Shriver following a meeting with President Johnson. Highlights of the programs included:

-- The first Community Action grants to help communities plan, develop and operate Community Action programs were made to nine states, 12 cities, six rural areas, and an Indian reser-

vation.

-- The first Neighborhood Youth Corps programs to provide part or full-time jobs for young men and women 16 through 21. The initial 14 programs serving 10,500 youths were located in 13 states.

-- The first work-experience programs for unemployed parents who were to receive training in basic education, work habits and job skills. The initial four projects were located in Pittsburgh, Atlanta; Carven County, North Carolina; and Yell County, Arkansas. More than 1,200 unemployed parents with almost 5,000 children were involved in the four programs.

-- The first construction funds--approximately $15 million--allocated to build and refurbish Job Corps conservation centers. Construction funds were assigned to the Departments of Agriculture and the Interior to operate the centers. Fourteen governors waived the 30-day veto period for Job Corps Centers and gave their immediate approval for 32 centers.

In other developments covered by that first release, 31 colleges and universities in the Washington, D.C., Chicago and Detroit areas had agreed to conduct work-study programs to assist needy students by providing part-time jobs on and off campus. Meanwhile, VISTA reported that the first 150 Volunteers would begin training before the year's end. Requests for Volunteers had come in from 78 communities in 34 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and American Samoa.

On December 6, OEO announced approval by 21 Governors of the first

Job Corps Centers. Ten days later Shriver announced approval of 18 additional Job Corps centers in 15 states.

The following day, on December 17, President Johnson announced 162 separate War on Poverty projects, ranging from a near $4 million grant to Chicago for implementing an anti-poverty campaign, to a $6,000 small business loan to a former Pittsburgh steelworker to expand his 12-seat luncheonette. The package, totaling $82.6 million, included the first three urban Job Corps Centers, each of them to train between 1,250 and 2,500 enrollees per year when in full operation.

One month later President Johnson announced another giant cluster of projects in 33 states and Puerto Rico for a total cost of $101,960,782. Said the President:

> In the first 101 days of this unique national war effort we have brought nearly 400 transfusions of new opportunity to disadvantaged Americans in every part of this land. We have made a major and significant beginning to throttle want and elevate hope. We have changed what some have called the government's War on Poverty to truly every American's War on Poverty. From every state in the nation men and women have come forward to help in this effort.

The President announced the package on January 18. By that time there was already a good deal of backfire.

THE CRITICS

"The program was being roundly denounced," said David Gelman, an information officer on loan from the Peace Corps to write some of OEO's early presentations, "long before it got its first dime. The problem was that it was visible right from January as a task force."[2]

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2 Conversation, June 1968.

Criticism came in many forms and in a remarkably flexible use of the American language. "It has always been the Republican approach," said a pamphlet issue by the Republican National Committee, and sounding a minority theme which accompanied OEO from its very beginnings, "to assist the poor and disadvantaged in their climb up the economic and social ladder; not to drag them up forcibly by a green rope of dollar bills."[3] The pamphlet quoted a Minority opinion in the 1964 Annual Economic Report of the Joint Economic Committee of Congress:

"A war on poverty will not be won by slogans; nor by shopworn programs and proposals dressed up in the new packaging; nor by the defeatist relief concept of the 1930's; nor by the cynical use of poverty for partisan political ends; nor by overstating the problems and thereby inexcusably lowering America's prestige in the eyes of the world."

"I thought," said Republican Congressman Robert Taft Jr., "we had been working against poverty since the beginning of this country. I thought many of the programs, the Manpower Development and Training Act, vocational education, unemployment compensation, all kinds of measures of this sort were trying to keep our economy strong...Why, at this particular point, are we going ahead with a poverty program as such in an omnibus bill?"[4]

There was less temperate criticism from more radical quarters.

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3 "The Alleviation of Poverty," June 1966.

4 Hearings before the Subcommittee on the War on Poverty Program of the House Education and Labor Committee, 88th Congress, 2nd session, March 17, 1964. p.99.

"...the Poverty Program is turning into a prize piece of political pornography," said community organizer and social dissident Saul Alinsky, head of the Industrial Areas Foundation, well before the program was a year old. "It's a huge political pork barrel, and a feeding trough for the welfare industry, surrounded by sanctimonious, hypocritical, phony, moralistic crap...Across the country, City Halls have their Committees on Economic Opportunity to identify what they call positive and negative programs and leaders. Positive means you do what every City Hall tells you to do and negative means you are subversive, that you think for yourself."[5]

A magazine article at the time cited Alinsky's criticisms of OEO: Before a Washington audience of Congressmen and their aides, Alinsky asserted that the war on poverty is "the first war ever launched in history on a balanced budget." It might become, he said, "the worst political blunder and boomerang of the present Administration." He added, "Our slums are not foreign nations to be worked with in such a manner as never to constitute a challenge to the status quo. The Peace Corps mentality does not apply to America's dispossessed...This is not the program for a silky smooth Madison Avenue approach with a major talent for the avoidance of controversy...which fails to understand that dissonance is the music of democracy." Alinsky went on to charge that community umbrella organizations were "stacked at least two to one with payrollers or the party faithful;" that anti-poverty funds are being used to "suffocate militant independent leadership and

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5 Harpers Magazine, July 1965; Vol 231, No. 1382: Conversations with Saul Alinsky, Part II: A Professional Radical Moves in on Rochester."

action organizations which have been arising to arm the poor with their share of power;" that OEO had created "a vast network of sergeants drawing generals' pay;"[6] that the Economic Opportunity Act "may well be regarded as history's greatest relief program for the benefit of the welfare industry." An all out war on poverty would be fought only when the poor were "possessed of sufficient power to threaten the status quo with disturbing alternatives, so that it will induce the status quo to come through with a genuine, decent, meaningful poverty program."[7]

PROBLEMS

Two major, wide-ranging incidents that first difficult and path-finding Summer of 1965, both within the framework of the Community Action Program, illustrate the complexity of issues aroused by the introduction -- some called it intrusion -- of OEO programs into the local, daily life of the country. The first concerned a Head Start program for preschool children in the deep South; the second, in upstate New York, involved a pilot community action program which inspired the enmity of the established political and welfare structures. Both had powerful

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6 From the earliest days of Congressional consideration of the poverty legislation there had been many fears expressed concerning the creation of a poverty "czar." Shriver, according to Yarmolinsky, would insist he was only a sergeant and, disclaiming any ambitions for "czarhood" would direct people to consider "what happened to the czars."

7 Erwin Knoll, "Progress on Poverty," The Progressive, July 1965.

political ramifications which caught OEO between activist movements and "the establishment." Both were widely reported in the press, often with decided partisan flavor, and both were accompanied by bitter charges that OEO was either "playing ball" with the vested structure of local and federal government, or, was inspiring and funding disruptive political movements. And, both caused "protest" demonstrations in Washington.

CDGM

Probably the most complicated and long-lasting dispute in which OEO was embroiled was the issue involving the Child Development Group of Mississippi (CDGM). The community organization was formed in the Spring of 1965, specifically to bring the benefits of CAP's newly organized Head Start preschool program to 6,000 children through 85 centers in 24 counties. The board members of CDGM included Dr. A. D. Beittel, former president of Tougaloo College and an employee of the American Friends Service Committee, Marian Wright, a lawyer with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and the Rev. James McCree, a minister from Canton, Mississippi.

The first grant to CDGM was awarded on May 18, 1965, to Mary Holmes Junior College, West Point, Mississippi. Mary Holmes throughout the controversy would be the CAP grantee and would, in turn, sub-contract for the Head Start program to be operated by CDGM. Mary Holmes is operated by the Presbyterian National Board of Missions. From every point of view, the project promised to be an outstanding one. In terms

of size it was the largest Head Start program to be funded that first summer. In terms of need, the immediacy was evident. The poor children of Mississippi were remarkably good examples of the kinds of children for whom Head Start had been devised; they were very much in need of the social, medical, educational and emotional services the program contained. The May grant to CDGM through Mary Holmes was for $1,263,480. An additional $197,268 was granted later, bringing the total to $1,460,748. The termination date for the grant was the end of August, 1965.

About one month after the program had begun, on June 29, the Senate Appropriations Committee, at the insistence of Senator Stennis, of Mississippi, had sent an investigating team to inspect the project. Stennis had sent a telegram to Shriver on June 3, expressing concern about the program, and especially about the location of CDGM headquarters at Mount Beulah, a center for civil rights activities, notably including the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, an all Black grassroots activist group. Stennis subsequently charged that OEO funds had been used to provide bail for civil rights demonstrators and that the financial management of the entire program was haphazard. OEO had sent its own investigating team to Mississippi at about the same time as the Senate Committee. On the evening of August 1 and 2, the CDGM Board of Directors met with the CDGM staff and representatives of OEO. James Heller, of OEO, told the meetings that OEO was disturbed about various methods of fiscal control, policy procedures and management as well as the location of CDGM headquarters at Mount Beulah. The staff admitted the validity of the fiscal and management criticism but balked at transferring the project headquarters. The Board reversed

its decision on the headquarters move after re-reading a letter from Head Start Associate Director Jule Sugarman to Dr. D. I. Horn, President of Mary Holmes Junior College. The letter said, in part:

> To facilitate action by your office and maintain effective control thereafter consistent with your legal responsibilities...we must insist that you arrange for immediate transfer of CDGM's Head Start central administration activities from Mount Beulah...[8]

The Board then voted to move its headquarters to Mary Holmes. On August 3, the OEO Director of Audits recommended to Head Start Director Julius Richmond that Mary Holmes and CDGM be given one week to correct a number of weaknesses at the risk of grant curtailment or termination if they failed to comply.[9]

On August 4, an internal memorandum in the Office of Inspection reported that the CDGM staff had refused to move from Mount Beulah and had threatened to resign en masse rather than do so. The issue created a conflict within OEO itself with some officials of Head Start siding with the CDGM staff and others in the CAP and General Counsel's offices insisting on the move.[10] A compromise was proposed and eventually CDGM headquarters remained at Mount Beulah that summer, but moved to Jackson the following year.

Meanwhile, a re-organization order calling for the preparation of

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[8] Cited in Senate Appropriations Committee Hearings, 1965, (Supplemental Appropriations FY 1966), p.521.

[9] Memorandum, Nathan Cutler to Julius Richmond, August 3, 1965.

[10] Memorandum, Robert Clampett to William Haddad, August 4, 1965 (in the files of the Office of Inspection, OEO).

records for a final audit was given to CDGM. On August 13, Shriver wrote to Stennis:

> As a result of our continuing review of the project we concluded that certain modifications, areas of responsibility have been re-defined to the extent that we are satisfied the project can be continued with full assurance that management and fiscal practices are sound...With these additional controls funding has been resumed...The headquarters of the project will continue to operate out of the location near Edwards (Mount Beulah) because it has been determined that any relocation, at this time, would have a damaging effect upon the program and is just not feasible.[11]

In October, 1965, following a second visit to the area by Appropriations Committee investigators, Stennis repeated charges of irregularities and complained that Mount Beulah was a "center of civil rights activities...and a hot bed of racial zealots."[12]

Shriver appeared before the Appropriations Committee on October 24 and defended OEO's role in the project. He denied that there had been a lack of supervision of the program and insisted that even a partial listing of OEO's auditing and inspection "reveals that OEO was alert and decisive on all aspects of its operations."[13] As to charges that CDGM was simply a front for civil rights activities, Shriver said that while it was impossible to oversee the activities of the "many thousands of people who participated in Head Start in Mississippi, this office made clear that civil rights work - or poli-

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11 Letter from R. Sargent Shriver to Honorable John Stennis, USS. August 13, 1965.

12 Senate Appropriations Committee Hearings, 1965, p.515.

13 Prepared Statement of R. Sargent Shriver before the Senate Appropriations Committee, October 14, 1965.

tical activity of any kind - would not be tolerated during working hours."[14] He asked the Committee members to be mindful that "diligent and proper attention to administration and management, and rightful concern for frugal use of the taxpayers' money, should not becloud our vision so completely that we lose sight of the fact that nearly 6000 Mississippi children received pre-school training, physical examinations, and medical care, two warm meals a day and a Head Start for the future."[15]

There had been another difficulty involving CDGM in that, apparently by design, the provisions calling for full racial integration of all OEO projects were not being adhered to. The use of so-called "freedom of choice" sites had led to a virtually exclusive Negro project. OEO therefore, in the early fall of 1965, withheld payments for projects in two counties and withheld partial payments in six others where teaching staffs were found to have excluded white teachers. On October 1, Shriver released funds to the six communities involved, noting that future applications from them would go through a special grant review that would seek "concrete evidence" that facilities would be integrated. In December, Samuel F. Yette, Shriver's Special Assistant for Civil Rights, informed the Head Start centers that "freedom of choice" sites could be used only if it could be shown that they led to greater integration. Otherwise, centers would have to be admin-

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14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

istered according to a geographical plan wherein children would go to the nearest center. In effect, the situation was the reverse of the one which existed in schools throughout the country outside the deep South, particularly in the great cities.

Meanwhile, CDGM had submitted an application for a new program which was funded by OEO at $5.6 million on February 22, 1966, but not before a delegation of 48 Negro 5-year-olds from Mississippi, accompanied by 25 teachers, nurses and parents, invaded the hearing room of the U.S. House Education and Labor Committee February 11 to demand that the grant be expedited. The day after the grant was announced Senator Stennis again took the Senate floor and charged it would "undermine and destroy the accomplishments already made" in Mississippi and would "play into the hands of extremists and. . . give weight to the argument made by those who oppose the poverty program on the grounds that it has no regard for the poor but is, instead, devoting millions of taxpayers' dollars to special groups and individuals who use the money for their own selfish purposes."[16] Senator James O. Eastland and Representative John Bell Williams, both of Mississippi, joined Stennis in attacking the grant. In authorizing the grant, which was to include programs for 9,000 children, OEO stipulated that white persons be added to the CDGM Board, that a new auditing firm be retained, that some administrative personnel be hired. The termination date for the 1966 grant was August 31, 1966.

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16 Congressional Record, February 23, 1966, pp. 3687-89.

In May of that year OEO regional directors of the Southeast, Southwest and Mid-Atlantic regions indicated "concern" that some Head Start programs "have apparently been designed to exclude poor white children." Practices cited as being used to circumvent the intent of the Civil Rights Act were the use of Negro schools for Head Start programs, the selection of predominantly Negro staffs and the concentration of recruitment on Negro families. At the same time reports from Mississippi and Lousiana revealed difficulties experienced by integrated Head Start projects in the South. In Bruce, Miss., several Head Start teachers had resigned following phone threats from persons identifying themselves as "the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan." Bill Crook, OEO Director of the Southwest region, (later to be appointed Director of VISTA), said in Austin, Tex., July 13 that Klan members in Louisiana had "in numerous cases intimidated white teachers and white volunteer workers into resigning from integrated Head Start programs." Earlier, the April 16 issue of the New Republic had charged that Stennis tried to block the CDGM grant for 1966 and was responsible for its delay until February.

CDGM submitted an application for $41 million for a full-year program to cover 30,000 children on July 7, 1966. The application was returned on July 14 and on July 16 Sugarman and other OEO officials met with CDGM in Jackson to explain reasons for the rejection. Sugarman told the board CDGM could not be funded for a level of children above the previous program and the dollar amount could not exceed more than two percent above its previous $5.6 million grant. On July 22 OEO told Mary Holmes Junior College, that OEO had been receiving reports

of serious administrative problems in CDGM. A series of questions on civil rights, expenditures and program administration, to be answered within 14 days, was presented. The answers were received on August 8 and submitted to the OEO Office of Inspection for review. On August 19, OEO Regional Director Sloan wired CDGM, instructing it to cut off the program by September 15. On August 29 CDGM re-submitted an application for a new full-year program.

On September 27, 1966, OEO reached a decision that CDGM, in its present form, could not lawfully be refinanced. The decision was based on OEO audits, inspection reports, program analysis, and management reviews of CDGM's entire history. Unable to arrange a meeting with the CDGM Board on October 1, OEO mailed a compendious report to the Board on its decision not to refund the organization.

The report was 11 pages long and had attached a three-page legal opinion by OEO General Counsel Donald Baker. OEO's decision not to refund CDGM became a national issue through the interest of the Citizens Crusade Against Poverty, headed by former OEO CAP Deputy Director Richard Boone, and the National Council of Churches. It should be remembered that the CDGM sponsor, Mary Holmes Junior College, was owned and operated by the National Board of Missions of the Presbyterian Church. Opponents of the OEO decsion took the position, strongly, that OEO had capitulated to the desires of Senator Stennis.

The OEO-CDGM Situation Report listed serious deficiencies and irregularities in the CDGM program; determined that approximately $654,000 could not be approved as valid grant expenditures since they reflected lack of supporting documents, inadequate information, and

activities unrelated to the Head Start objectives. It said, in part:

> ...these situations would not have occurred it CDGM had effectively and responsibly managed the Head Start program delegated to its authority. The OEO has reached this conclusion despite continuing efforts during the past 18 months to provide all assistance possible to the CDGM program... Nonetheless, the record shows that CDGM failed to monitor its operation, and sometimes through disregard of guidelines, to discharge its responsibilities in areas of program, management and fiscal procedure.
>
> Despite these shortcomings, OEO wishes to emphasize that through the Mary Holmes-CDGM implementation, Head Start was launched over a wide region of Mississippi under difficult circumstances. CDGM, formed in the spring of 1965 by a group of Mississippians interested in the problems of the Negro in the state, was able to enlist indigenous participation from the beginning. Mary Holmes Junior College provided the organized base of an institution of higher learning through which the grant funds could be channeled. The Head Start program administered by CDGM reached approximately 13,900 childre, and involved thousands of parents at the grass roots level.
>
> OEO, which has provided as much, if not more, consultant and staff time to this particular community action program than any other, regrets that CDGM has been unable to provide the minimum management and program capabilities required of a grantee during the course of two separate grants.[17]

The report then listed, among other irregularities, deficient employee records showing duplicate payments, salaries to persons not present for work, certifications that employees were on the job when they were not and cashed payroll checks endorsed by persons other than than payees. It showed a number of conflict of interest instances involving leased property and transportation contracts. It showed excessive salary payments totaling $64,000 beyond permissable OEO policy regulations. It identified a number of cases of nepotism involving

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17 "CDGM Situation Report", OEO Document, September 27, 1966.

wives and family-members of Board members, an area administrator and center chairmen. It listed a number of violations of the use of official vehicles and questioned car rental costs of $25,000 for periods which could not be substantiated. It called into serious question a number of transportation, lease and consultant contracts. It questioned the basic policy of CDGM which, it said, "prefers a go-it-alone policy rather than a policy of cooperation with existing resources and other community groups"[18] and causing serious deficiencies in supervision and health programs. Of its program policy, the report said: "The concern is that without proper supervision by qualified personnel, there is little prospect of improving the situation. CDGM seems unable to improve that supervision."[19]

Of its delayed health programs, it said: "CDGM has not been able to recruit a full-time physician to direct the health program. There was considerable delay in getting examinations underway and there has been much difficulty in making arrangements for follow-through care. This can be attributed both to CDGM's own resistance to using existing resources, and to its inability to overcome community hostility."[20]

The Report concluded that "further funding of CDGM would not be in the best interest of a strong, well-managed Head Start program, of the type which OEO intends to see continued in Mississippi."[21]

The General Counsel's opinion to Shriver, included these findings:

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18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

...On the basis of experience with two prior grants...I see no basis on which you could anticipate substantial improvement in the conduct of the Head Start program or in their management capability.

The administrative and management deficiencies are so manifold as to require a complete reconstitution and reorganization if they are to be eliminated. There is no reason or basis for thinking this can or will be done.

...The program has been increasingly oriented toward the economic needs of adults rather than the educational and development needs of children. CDGM has been unable and unwilling to attract and to use persons most likely to provide intellectual and emotional uplift to the children.

CDGM is not disposed toward the development of bi-racial community action agencies which could mount the broader-based programs contemplated under title II of the EOA. Indeed, there is a great degree of evidence of antipathy to and active opposition to existing community action agencies.

On October 7 OEO announced a 12-month, $1.2 million Head Start grant to Rust College, Holly Springs, Miss., to administer a program for 600 pre-school children in two counties. In making the announcement Shriver repeated his decision that no single group "has a monopoly on running any of the War on Poverty programs in Mississippi."

The same day, OEO announced an 8-month Head Start grant for $713,000 to Southwest Mississippi Opportunity, Inc., Woodville, to provide programs for 935 children in three counties.

On October 8, about 3,000 Negroes held a mass meeting in Jackson, Miss. protesting OEO's "political deal." The Rev. James F. McCree, then CDGM chairman, pledged to fight against "political tricks and manipulations" until funds were restored. McCree, who had received telegrams of support from the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was joined by the Rev. Charles Leber Jr. of the United Presbyterian Church and Boone's Citizens Crusade Against Poverty, a private anti-poverty group supported by the United Auto Workers and a grant from the Ford

Foundation. Mrs. Fanie Lou Hamer of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party said: "We aren't ready to be sold out by a few middle-class bourgeoisie and some of them Uncle Toms who couldn't care less." The CCAP appointed a 10-member board of inquiry which concluded there was no evidence to support the OEO charges against CDGM.

That same day OEO released a telegram from John A. Morsell, Assistant Executive Director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, supporting the funding of new Head Start programs in Mississippi. Morsell's telegram regretted the decision to discontinue funding CDGM, but went on to say:

> As you know within past two weeks NAACP's Mississippi State Board, State President Aaron Henry, and Field Director Charles Evers jointly and severally urged approval of new grant to CDGM and offered to work closely with CDGM in such event to prevent recurrence of irregularities. But we join our leadership in that State in welcoming decision to continue vital work of providing educational opportunity to disadvantaged children through a new agency of which Aaron Henry is co-chairman. We hope and expect that new agency as well as local programs it conducts will be fully representative of all segments of the community having genuine concern for the needs which are to be met.

And, on that same day, Shriver replied to the CCAP's board of inquiry opinion, stating that its review added nothing new to the situation. He said:

> The information available to the government was collected over many months by professional auditors, inspectors and analysts.
>
> Therefore, OEO does not foresee any change in its position. We do intend to move as fast as possible away from de facto racially segregated programs, such as CDGM, to racially integrated programs, such as recently funded Rust College and Southwest Mississippi Opportunity, Inc. We see every reason in morality and public policy to encourage racially integrated groups in Mississippi, which, incidentally, we were told was an impossible goal when the War on Poverty began two years

ago. We intend to encourage such groups in Head Start and other programs.

Furthermore, we intend to encourage additional diversifications of Head Start in Mississippi and to move away from the Head Start monopoly which existed in the past.

Further procrastination, after weeks of discussion and review, could only deny vitally needed Head Start services to children in Mississippi.

Moving quickly, OEO the next day, on October 11, announced a grant of $3,020,906 to Mississippi Action for Progress, Inc. (MAP) to conduct a full-year program for 1500 children. Shriver said that $10 million had been reserved to finance MAP child development programs, which could ultimately reach about 5000 children. MAP was to be administered by an 18-member bi-racial board of directors including Aaron Henry, president of the Mississippi State Conference of NAACP Branches; Hodding Carter, III, editor of the Greenville Delta Democrat Times and a number of prominent labor leaders, businessmen and clergymen. It was to include six representatives of the poor, residents of the areas and groups to be served. Additionally, MAP had endorsed the concept of employing a maximum number of poor people to assist in the operation of the program.

Less than a week later UAW chief Walter Reuther announced that the CCAP would withdraw from the CDGM controversy in view of the new grant to MAP. But, he insisted that "OEO acted as it did in this situation in the face of political pressure by forces who are more interested in preserving the status quo in Mississippi than they are in helping disadvantaged children."

On October 15, 70 clergymen, urban specialists of the Episcopal

Church, the United Presbyterian Church and the United Church of Christ, picketed OEO headquarters in Washington charging OEO with "throwing road-blocks in the way of maximum feasible participation of the poor in anti-poverty programs." Shriver met with the church officials on October 17 and strongly denied charges of political pressure. He said, as he had right along, that he was ready to meet with CDGM's board of directors to discuss the possible continuation of its pregram. On October 24 Shriver did meet with CDGM officials in Atlanta. Following the meeting he said OEO funds to CDGM would not be resumed without "comprehensive reorganization."

The formation of the MAP had brought with it a number of accusations charging that it was a put-up organization. The New Republic had charged on October 13, 1966 that MAP had been developed by White House lawyer Harry C. McPherson, Jr. and Douglas Wynn, a lawyer from Greenville. It listed a number of other accusation as well. MAP board member Hodding Carter, in a letter to the editors of the New York Times, the Washington Evening Star and the Washington Post, hotly contested the accusation. Replying to the cluster of charges in the New Republic, Carter denied that MAP was going to strip the Head Start programs of their community action function; that its board would not be handpicked by its first board members but would be elected within the counties to be served; that it was "a lie" to assert that State NAACP members met secretly with Sen. Stennis prior to or after the organization of MAP; that it was "a lie" that the White House contacted Roy Wilkins, executive director of the NAACP to arrange to have Aaron Henry serve on the board; that it was "a lie" that any White House

assistant or Douglas Wynn had any part in forming MAP and that it was "a misstatement to say that this Board is intended as a political vehicle of any kind."

The NAACP sent a memorandum to all of its Mississippi Branch presidents on October 14, 1966, pointing out the significance of the fact that the composition of the MAP board marked "one of the few times that such men of prominence of both races have agreed to work together in behalf of Negro advancement."[22] It ended its message:

> Anyone who knows the record of Aaron Henry, Reverend R. L. T. Smith and others who have been victimized by bombings, arrests, harassment and yet have kept the faith and fought for the rights of their fellow men will pay no attention to the carping critics and those who yell 'sellout.' The NAACP leaders and others who have agreed to support MAP are carrying on in the tradition of those who believe in freedom, justice and equality.[23]

And, on October 15, the NAACP's John Morsell attacked the New Republic editorial which had accused Wilkins of giving in to White House pressure to intervene in the CDGM controversy. The authors of the charge, said Morsell, "knew it was a lie, and they have fabricated it in order to cast a slur on the NAACP. Mr. Wilkins had not discussed CDGM with Aaron Henry or anyone in the Administration."[24]

It was not, even then, the end of public charges and counter-charges,

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22 NAACP Memorandum from Gloster B. Current to Mississippi Branch Presidents, re: Mississippi Action for Progress, October 14, 1966.

23 Ibid.

24 NAACP News Release, October 15, 1966.

of controversy and misunderstanding. On October 19, 1966, the New York Times printed an advertisement paid for by the National Citizens Committee for the Child Development Program in Mississippi and signed by scores of prominent clergymen. "Say It Isn't So, Sargent Shriver," the ad read. The sub-head read:

> Awesome political pressures have made Poverty Chief Shriver abandon a Head Start program considered "the best in the country." 12,000 Mississippi children, and their parents, are praying he'll change his mind.
>
> Of all the battles Sargent Shriver has fought to keep politics out of the poverty program, none is more crucial than the campaign to save the Child Development Group of Mississippi.
>
> At the moment it looks as if Sargent Shriver has given up.
>
> ...CDGM was what Sargent Shriver had in mind when he spoke about the maximum feasible extent to which the poor may participate in the solution of their own problems. It is, in fact, what Sargent Shriver and his poverty warriors have been battling for all along.
>
> Unfortunately, the prospect of a self-emancipated Negro community isn't welcome everywhere in Mississippi. Some political leaders see it, with clarity, as a threat. So they want Sargent Shriver to drop CDGM and then channel the funds through a group of directors they'll approve.[25]

The ad cited the report of the CCAP review panel which had approved of CDGM's handling of its Head Start programs.

Shriver sent a letter to the Times:

> The Times prints a message entitled "Say It Isn't So, Sargent Shriver," dealing with the Head Start grants in Mississippi. For over two weeks I have been saying that it isn't so, that it hasn't been so, and that it will not be so. But some people are unwilling to listen. It is shocking to me that any Americans, and especially members of the clergy, should rush into public print impugning the motives of a public official before ascertaining the facts. Fortunately, and to their credit, a number of other individuals called for in-

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25 New York Times, October 19, 1966.

formation before agreeing to sign and then withheld their signature.

...In many respects, the Child Development Group of Mississippi project constitutes one of the more promising chapters of the history of the poverty program. For my associates and for myself, I take great pride in this exciting chapter. Last February, despite problems and loud protests, we refunded CDGM with one of the largest Head Start grants in the country, more than $5 million. More OEO staff time and energy went into this program than any other one in order to secure good management and good results. There is no group of individuals in the country which has sought and prayed for CDGM's success more than we have at OEO. And while many others have talked OEO has actually worked to try to make CDGM successful.

As the official charged by law to authorize expenditures under OEO programs, I was faced last August with reports about CDGM operations which I could not ignore. I received the unanimous recommendations of all the OEO officials involved--Community Action, Head Start, Auditing, Inspection, Civil Rights, Legal--that under the circumstances I could not again legally refund CDGM. The justification for this decision has been available and is available for anyone interested. Briefly, it adds up to substantial evidence of gross mismanagement and irresponsibility. We could not in clear conscience and under the law ignore findings of payroll padding, nepotism, conflict of interest, and misuse of property. I reject and resent charges that forces outside my agency made that decision--or that I knuckled under any pressures. I did not. Nor did any other of the many officials here at OEO.

It grieves me particularly that clergymen should give their names to a statement that refers to what unnamed people--referred to only as "they"--have said or charged or done. And I have heard from signatories who confess that they never read the statement before agreeing over the telephone to sign it. Now they regret they did so.

My principal associates have met with the CDGM Board of Directors. I will see the Board next week. The channels of communication with CDGM or any other group have always been open. But the plight of Mississippi children is more important to me than the status of any single organization. The children of Mississippi have my pledge that there will be Head Start classes for them and that these will be programs of which they and we can be proud, one in which the poor themselves, Negro and white, will have a major role.[26]

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26 Letter from R. Sargent Shriver, to the New York Times, October 19, 1966.

Shriver then met with the CDGM Board in Atlanta on October 24. The Board released a statement expressing "keen disappointment at the failure of today's negotiations with Mr. Shriver." It continued:

> We expressly regret OEO's misinformation, intransigence and lack of understanding of Mississippi's problems. We have, in good faith, been willing and remain willing to discuss with OEO appropriate steps to be taken by CDGM towards refunding on a continuing and substantial basis. Towards this end, additional meetings will be held in the very near future between OEO and CDGM officials. We will, however, continue to put before the public all of the facts surrounding OEO's actions regarding CDGM and to use every available means to insure refunding.[27]

Shriver replied immediately:

> I am astonished at the statement issued by the Board of CDGM following my meeting with them today--that this meeting ended in failure. When I left to return to Washington, I felt that it was being conducted on an amicable basis and that solid groundwork had been laid for future productive meetings.
>
> OEO had agreed to work closely with representatives of CDGM to attempt to overcome the serious deficiencies which we found in their program and which led to our decision that it could not be refunded as presently organized.
>
> I personally was impressed by the reasonable exchange of opinions that took place and expecially by the frank exchange of information, and the candid exploration of areas of misunderstanding.
>
> It came as an extraordinary surprise, therefore, that following this progress, CDGM saw fit to accuse OEO of "misinformation, intransigence, and lack of understanding of Mississippi's problems."
>
> CDGM has asked me to make a commitment to refinance their program on a continuing basis, something this Agency has not been asked to do by any other program of any kind... This would be completely beyond the authority which Congress has given to me to administer programs on a year-to-year

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27 OEO Statement (Press Release), October 24, 1966.

> authorization. In any case the application which CDGM had submitted to OEO exceeds by more than one-third the financial guidelines given to them.
>
> I authorized a statement to be made to the CDGM Board that OEO would continue to meet with CDGM to attempt to work out deficiencies of program, personnel, management capability and fiscal responsibility. If such matters could be resolved I said I was "very hopeful that OEO could refinance their program."
>
> In the light of this, I find it almost incredible that this indication of good faith and cooperation has been rebuffed and this meeting called a failure. Nevertheless, I affirm OEO's determination to work with CDGM to bring their program, which has accomplished so much for the poor children and adults of Mississippi, up to the standards where refunding by OEO will be feasible under the law.[28]

In November Mississippi Governor Paul B. Johnson, Jr., had vetoed the grant of $713,000 to the Southwest Mississippi Opportunity, Inc. Head Start program. Johnson claimed that the community action agency's program had been infiltrated by at least 20 former CDGM members. Shriver, as he was permitted to do under the law, vetoed the governor's veto.

During November, 1966, discussions between OEO officials and representatives of the National Board of Missions continued. On November 9th, Jule Sugarman wrote:

> At your request, I agreed when we met recently to set down in writing a statement of those preconditions which OEO believes must be met by the Board of Missions, Mary Holmes Juni or College and the Child Development Group of Mississippi before any future funding...the conditions listed below are designed to guarantee that any future grant will be administered by an organization which is capable of avoiding the financial difficulties which have been characteristic under previous grants...they are also directed at reinforcing the CDGM Board's announced intention to operate the program on

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28 Ibid.

a biracial basis.[29]

OEO and the supporters of CDGM moved closer to agreement on the basic point of financial controls and the newly emphasized question of bi-racialism. OEO staff submitted favorable reports on the findings of the Mississippi Task Force. "It would have been easy for CDGM--indeed, it must have been a great temptation--to use this fiercely loyal constituency to thwart the efforts of the Task Force--both before and after OEO's announced decision not to refund CDGM. At no time was this done."[30] Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey met with religious leaders at a Miami Beach conference and promised his good offices. On December 16, 1966, OEO announced that an "agreement in principle" had been reached between OEO officials and the CDGM Board and its supporters. The joint communique read in part:

> 1. The Board of Missions and Mary Holmes College agreed to assume full financial responsibility. . .
> 2. Mary Holmes College has agreed to assign its Vice President for Development. . .as administrator of the grant. . .
> 3. CDGM has completed the enlargement of its Board of Directors to a total of 19 of whom 6 will be white. . .
> 6. The Board of Directors of CDGM has taken action to make it clear to all employees that they are prohibited during working hours from participating in voter registration or partisan political activities, the organization of civil rights activity as defined. . .the organization of economic boycott or any other activity not essential to the approved purpose of the grant. . .[31]

The rest of December was taken up with working out the practical implementation of these agreements. On January 30, 1967, OEO announced that a grant had been made to CDGM for $4,927,100 to serve 5900 children in 14 counties. A set of special conditions, reflecting the agree-

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29 Letter from Jule Sugarman to Bryant George of the National Board of Missions, November 9, 1966.

30 Memo from Lynn Kirk to Jule Sugarman, November 30, 1966.

31 OEO Release, December 17, 1966.

ments of December, were attached to the grant.

Senator Stennis renewed his attacks during 1967 and Shriver responded during hearings before the Appropriations Committee:

> If there was anybody who got the militant SNCC-type people out of this program, it was us, not somebody else. We got them out before anybody raised a ruckus about it just as we attempted to get people out who were attempting to use our programs for purposes other than we intended.[32]

With these words, Shriver indicated that the CDGM crisis was over. Head Start in Mississippi would continue despite the difficulties inherent in the Mississippi social system.

A final disposition of CDGM 1966 financial irregularities was adjudicated by Acting Deputy Director C. Robert Perrin following a hearing in his office on June 12, 1968. Perrin had been directed by Harding to make a final decision on the appeal to an OEO disallowance of costs which had been entered by the Presbyterian Board of National Missions. At issue was an initial OEO determination to disallow $118,512.55. The Board of National Missions had appealed all but about $11,000 of the figure and CAP had reached a disallowance figure of $87,668.55.

Following the extensive hearing,* Perrin, on August 12, 1968, wrote to Kenneth Neigh of the Board of National Missions, stating that he had "sought to consider objectively all of the relative arguments regarding the appeal as provided by CDGM, the Board and the Community Action Program." Perrin's final determin-

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32 Senate Appropriations, FY-1968 Supplemental, p. 52.

* In attendance at the metting in Perrin's office were: Kenneth Neigh, Richard Powell and Robert Berry, of the Board of National Missions; A. N. Morgan, of the auditing firm of Ernst and Ernst; Tex Wilson, of Mary Holmes Junior College; Frances Scott, assistant to Perrin; Terry Tondro, of OEO's legal staff, and Gary Furlong, of the Southeast OEO Regional Office.

ation, to which there was no appeal, was for a disallowance of $81,891.55.

Perrin concluded his letter, and the issue by stating that "On behalf of OEO I want to express our sincere thanks for your understanding and cooperation in this matter and for the participation of the National Board of Missions in a very difficult, but extremely important program."

THE SYRACUSE SITUATION

Another explosive situation developed in Syracuse when, on November 30, 1965, OEO notified the Syracuse Community Development Association (SCDA) and Syracuse University that future requests for funds would have to be channeled through the city's official anti-poverty agency, the Syracuse Crusade for Opportunity. The SCDA had operated as the organizing arm of the Syracuse University Community Action Training Center, which was training community organizers. The joint project had received a 9-month grant of $315,000 from OEO. The training center had requested an additional %568,000 to finance training and research for another 15 months, and SCDA had asked for $211,000 for the actual organizing. The Association had organized sit-ins, marches and other demonstrations and claimed to have helped more than

2,000 of the poor to register to vote, in addition to effecting a number of community improvements. Shriver said, on December 1, that OEO would consider financing the training center but that the SCDA would have to work through the city's Crusade for Opportunity. OEO released a $110,000 grant for a 3-month extension of the university program while its 15-month extension request was being considered. An SCDA delegation met with Shriver in Washington on December 8. The group contended that the Crusade for Opportunity was closely linked with Syracuse Mayor William F. Walsh who had accused the Association of promoting class warfare. At the heart of the situation was the question in the minds of the antagonists as to how far, if at all, should the federal government go toward helping the poor fight City Hall? Compounding the problem in the minds of city government officials and the organized welfare services of the city was the fact that a consultant to the university program was the volatile Saul Alinsky. Under Alinsky's guidance, organizers from the university center were segmenting the low-income sections of the city and organizing groups within them for direct social action. Their demands included improved garbage disposal systems, relief from excessive rents and utility bills, more protection against unjustified evictions and a recreational system adequate for the needs of the poor. Of even greater irritation was the organization of an energetic vote-registration drive supported by a series of neighborhood one-sheet newspapers calling for power through registration. Democratic Party enrollments in the poor neighborhoods began to rise soon after the drive began, prompting the Republican Mayor, Walsh, who was up for re-election that year, to protest:

> These people go into a housing project and talk about setting a "democratic" organization--small "d"--but it sounds just the same as Democratic--big "d". In a close election it could be decisive.[33]

The situation boiled furiously and on April 12, Charles A. Walker, a commissioner of the Syracuse Housing Authority wrote to President Johnson protesting that the OEO grant was financing "activities which do no good and will ultimately cause serious trouble in our community if allowed to continue." Walker charged that the university organizers "are claiming that all kinds of benefits will accrue to the tenants of our housing projects if they will join these 'action committees.' One of these promised benefits is the 'improvement of conditions' in the housing project known as the Pioneer Homes. Conditions in Pioneer Homes are as good as the tenants will permit them to be."

Walker's letter enclosed a memorandum from William L. McGarry, executive director of the Syracuse Housing Authority, which said:

> I thoroughly distrust any program that identifies two distinct classes of society. In this case, the 'poor' and the 'affluent.' This soical-action program follows all of the old patterns of class distinction and hate, so easily identified with Marxism. The obvious cleavage away from the established resources of social welfare and charity in our community by the action group only makes the identity of the classes more distinct. If ever the circumstances that create hostility among these occur, we then have a situation that--by the grace of God--has never happened in our city.

The charges were immediately labled as false by Dean Clifford Winters of University College, one of the units involved in the Univer-

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33 Erwin Knoll and Jules Witcover, "Fighting Poverty--and City Hall," The Reporter, June 3, 1965. All quotations in this section are from this article.

sity project.

Another item which caused severe inflamation of feelings was a brochure issued by the University which said:

> This program differs from most in being solely concerned with the creation of powerful self-directed democratic organizations in areas of poverty.

It added that applicants should:

> Have a controlled but intense anger about continued injustice and should be committed to hard work for people who are grappling with apparently overwhelming problems.

Not only the Mayor and other city officials were concerned. They were joined by the city's established social-welfare agencies which banded together to form the Syracuse Crusade for Opportunity, officially designated by the city as its "umbrella" community action agency. OEO funded the Crusade, several weeks after the University received its grant, with $483,000 about a third of what it had requested.

The approach to the problems of poverty of the two conflicting agencies, the SCDA and the Crusade, were almost classically diametrically opposed. In the view of the SCDA, a program for true social action--based on Alinsky's principals of organized social dislocation--was one which organized poor people in sufficient strength to demand changes and to fight to obtain them. The Crusade approach was one of extending established services to individuals who, in its view, met the qualifications for such services. The executive director of the Crusade organization, Ben Zimmerman, warned that the University project invited civic strife. "If you talk about a mass program, you're saying 'How do you galvanize the poor to break down the walls of the city?' Anger and frustration can bring a program together. But you have to

keep fanning the flames if that's what keeps the program going. This is the kind of program that really demands an outside 'enemy.'"

An entirely different view was expressed by the director of the University project, Assistant Professor Warren C. Haggstrom of the School of Social Work. He said:

> Ours is a philosophy of self-help. We want to help the neighborhoods develop strong democratic organizations with as wide a base as possible that will achieve an additional level of power--enough power to enable those individuals excluded from the community to enter it. The poor are outsiders; the problem is, How can the enter the community? If you just give them services, it doesn't pull them in. The failure of past welfare programs proves that.

These, roughly, were the issues under discussion at the December 8 meeting between Shriver and the SCDA delegation. Shriver insisted that the SCDA group would have to work through the Crusade agency, adding that any refusal of funds by the Crusade could be appealed to OEO which would give any such situation the most careful scrutiny and objective consideration. The SCDA decided, on December 17, to refuse to work through the Crusade. On December 21 Syracuse University announced its decision not to renew Alinsky's contract. The decision, the University said, was routine and had no bearing on the controversy involving SCDA. Alinsky responded with the accusation that the government's anti-poverty program was the "greatest boondoggle and feeding trough that's come along for the welfare industry in years." Government sponsorship of community action programs, he said, was "like asking an employer to go ahead and hire a union organizer."

On January 16 and 17, 600 delegates representing neighborhood organizations in several cities met in Syracuse under the sponsorship

of the newly formed Syracuse People's War Council Against Poverty, (a successor to the SCDA). The convention adopted resolutions, among other actions, favoring "control" by the poor of anti-poverty programs effecting them and denouncing Shriver for failing to appear at the meeting.

The SCDA continued for some time with private funding. Several of the organizations comprising SCDA eventually split with the parent organization and sought shelter and funds under the Crusade umbrella. Syracuse University terminated its involvement with SCDA. SCDA was later reorganized as the Organization of Organizations, but, lacking sufficient funding, effective recruitment and organization became impossible. The Syracuse Crusade for Opportunity became the major vehicle for the anti-poverty program.

JOB CORPS - NYC DIFFICULTIES

In the first year of operations, the Job Corps had to confront press and Congressional criticism about administrative dificiencies in recruiting, screening, assignments, transportation, high costs, excessive salaries, disciplinary problems with corpsmen, legal and jurisdictional disputes caused by "riots" and outbreaks at the camps, a variable dropout rate, and the placement success of Job Corps graduates. In addition, the basic philosophy of the Corps -- the techniques and objectives of the residential center program -- became an issue exacerbated by sensitive and often difficult community/center relations. Compounding the problems from without was the constant scrutiny and

evaluation of the program from within, resulting in frequent critical reports about the "authoritarian" administration of the vocational and educational programs.

It is to the credit of responsible Job Corps officials that each major issue had, to some extent, already been anticipated. The Job Corps, an experimental project designed to accomplish the dual role of "human renewal" and job training, had to refashion its methods constantly without encroaching upon its real purpose. In the face of often hostile community attitudes and a sharp-eyed Congress, the Corps' pragmatic flexibility assured the continuation of the program, and came a long way toward success and workable organization. Philosophy and methodology were welded into working components of education, training, program administration and guidelines. By the middle of 1965, however, its future was very much in doubt.

The first major issue to beset the Job Corps planners originated in a national magazine's report of a high dropout rate. Newspapers, journals, periodicals and Congressional investigations perennially focused upon the dropout rate as "evidence" of the program's failure. Lost in the public furor was the simple fact that the Corps dealt with 100% dropouts, and that, lacking precedents, no clear meaning of the rates was assessible until after the program had become clearly established and ongoing. Without consideration of other variable criteria for measuring the program's success--including the renewal of human spirit and self-confidence, social adaptibility, learned skills and job placement, among others--the dropout issue alone too frequently became a false issue in the hands of those for whom the program held

little promise at the outset.

During the summer of 1965, incidents of misbahavior by Corpsmen helped shape in the public mind an image of the Job Corps as an unsavory, unworkable, badly administered program. The urban training centers at Atterbury, Camp Parks, and Camp Gary experienced difficulties involving fighting, drinking, assault, racial antagonism, drugs, sodomy, and riots.

An incident at Camp Breckinridge in August, was the most severe and got the widest publicity. The center was run by Southern Illinois University, located near Morganfield, Kentucky. Inadequate preparations, a loose administration and coordination system plus deficiencies in discipline had led to a tense situation. A major extortion racket terrorized enrollees, fights and hazing were not uncommon, and a high rate of classroom absenteeism was left unpunished. From within the center some staff members had formed a civil rights group which had produced a high degree of race consciousness. Compounding a bad situation was the "Demonstration for Jobs in Western Kentucky," organized by the NAACP, and virtually paralyzing the administration. The large influx of trainees produced frustration because of a lack of equipment. Complaints were voiced over the quality of food, raw life in the barracks, overcrowding, mistreatment, misinformation, and restrictions. A number of fistfights broke the situation open. When administrators called out a fire truck, the inflamed trainees engaged in a general riot in which thirteen people were injured. About half the camp took part, while others fled to nearby towns. FBI agents and U.S.

Marshalls were called in, as state troopers stood by.[34]

Moreover, it was charged that lack of facilities, the undue haste with which the program was begun, and inadequate administrative techniques had contributed to a general disillusionment about the programs and the dropout rate. To some extent, at two centers, administration was considered by the Job Corps headquarters to be deficient -- a decision which led to the phasing out of universities and the substitution by industry in the running of the centers. This, of course, offended liberal critics, who found private exploitation in the anti-poverty war repulsive.

The announcement of a Christmas vacation furlough in November, 1965, added fuel to the charges of high costs, unnecessary expenditures and overall waste. Disparate comparisons were made between the "salaries" received by Corpsmen and Servicemen; educational textbooks which attempted to involve trainees with realistic and relevant materials provoked public "outrage;" and contrived and false incidents helped to distort the general image of the Corps. Responses by the OEO Public Affairs office, attempting to refute the charges, resulted in charges of "oversell." The mandate to speedily implement the program brought criticism in Congress on the grounds that over-recruitment had led to deep disappointment on the part of applicants who had been rejected.

In sum the Corps experienced the frustrations and headaches of the painful build-up stage, by which innovative techniques and experimental programs came under fire both for their achievements and failures. The Corps could not have it both ways: To reach the "hard core,"

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34 Weeks, Job Corps, pp. 212-215; Lander, War, pp. 114-115; The Louisville Courier Journal, August 25, 1965.

the truly forgotten youth who had dropped out of school and society, whose prospects were welfare roles, prisons, or worse, meant dealing with an element that rejected conventional, middle-class values; thus, to experience problems was a certainty. To avoid these, to concentrate only on the motivated and the "safe"--those who had demonstrated an eagerness and willingness to repudiate their impoverishment, and a desire to join the "mainstream" of society, and those without criminal and delinquent records--meant excluding perhaps the largest segment of urban slum youths, and disobeying the original intention of the task force planners.

The first year produced an image of the Job Corps that was hardly credible or creditable. The obloquy it suffered yoked the Corps in terms of the extension of its programs. Subsequent efforts to "spin-off" the program to old line agencies, or to phase it out entirely, to a very considerable degree, originated in its burdened beginning.

If the Job Corps ran the gamut of scandals and unpopular publicity in 1965, its companion program in the two-pronged attack on job training could boast of a large measure of success. Conceived by the February Task Force, it borrowed from the local public service employment and training program of the Hometown Youth Employment section of the Youth Employment Opportunity Act. Entitled the "Work-Training Program" in the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, it came to be known as the Neighborhood Youth Corps. Administered by the Department of Labor, it would be set up for young people who would continue to live at home. Like the Job Corps, the NYC intended to increase the capacities of poor people to get and hold decent jobs, particularly at

the outset of their working careers. It would be a hometown counseling and job program for in-school and out-of-school teen-agers between 16 and 21. As Nathan Glazer put it, "the aim of these efforts is not so much the employment of young people as an end in itself, but rather their training for employment, by teaching them the required demeanor for holding any job."

Congress was informed in March, 1964, that "until recently," young people could gain work experience in unskilled jobs that "abounded" in the economy. Today, however, the number of unskilled jobs had declined due to "automation, mechanization and other scientific and technological advances." In the future, jobs would require "higher motivation, more maturity, greater judgement, and broader experience than are possessed by the thousands of actual and potential school dropouts aged 16-21 who need employment."

The Work-Training section of Title I was to provide full- or part-time work experience and training in state and community public service jobs for young people in need. It would encourage them to resume their education, and would be open to women. The stress was laid on "local initiative and control," in which state agencies, local government and private non-profit organizations could develop and conduct work projects, such as work in "hospitals, settlement houses, schools, libraries, courts, children's homes, parks, playgrounds, public and private welfare agencies, and so on."

The projects must increase the "employability" of youths, contribute to an undertaking "in the private interest," and must not displace employed workers or contracts. Its rate of pay must be "appropriate" to work performed, skill involved, and the general locality. It must coordinate with vocational training and educational services so

that the "special needs of the enrollees may be met by the state or local school authorities." It must include standards and procedures designed to encourage enrollees to continue or resume school.

The NYC program was to be flexible, involving full-time on-the-job training, work-study combination, part-time employment, and so forth. It aimed at 200,000 young men and women. 90% of the cost (or $219 million for the first year) was to be federally financed.

Labor Secretary Wirtz announced the inauguration of the NYC November 19, 1964 Shriver approved the first 14 NYC projects November 25. The projects were to enroll 10,500 youths in 15 states at a federal cost of $4½ million and a local cost of $616,000. On February 14, 1965, Wirtz presented to the President a report on the first NYC project because "its success has been so heartening and meaningful." Mr. Johnson commented that the project was "an early indication that we can succeed in this best of all efforts" to combat poverty.

Administrative problems in the first year of the NYC included the enrollment of ineligible young people whose families' income exceeded OEO guidelines. Time Magazine reported that: "The program had scarcely started when investigators claimed that fully one-forth of the youths drawing salaries came from families well above the poverty line. One indiscreet Youth Corps girl tooled to work in a 1965 Thunderbird, was asked to resign. In Macoupin, County, Ill., Democratic officials turned the program into a patronage pie for their children until OEO found out and ordered 83 youngsters dropped. Protested one $9,000 a year Democratic jobholder whose stepson was bounced: 'He comes from a broken home, don't he? Anyway, to the victors goes the spoils. You

know what I mean?'"'

An OEO fact sheet replied to the Macoupin County charge, admitting the scandal, but said: "What is more significant is that the program. . . is one of only two in the nation to have been closed while a thousand are operating successfully."

The National Observer quoted NYC Director Jack Howard on December 20, 1965, as estimating that as many as 25% of the participants in the 1965 summer program were ineligible. This inclusion of too-prosperous enrollees ("rich kids") was reported to be partly inadvertant, and partly a matter of local officials placing children of political supporters in the program. The Christian Science Monitor quoted Chicago poverty officials as protesting that the income requirements were so low as to exclude some young people whose parents were on welfare.

Officials in Detroit reported June 21, 1965, that they had problems of recruitment. Only 800 of 1,500 vacancies in the program had been filled because of young people's unwillingness to work for the $1.25-an-hour federal minimum wage. "You're crazy, man; I don't work for that kind of money," was said to be a typical comment. The reverse was true in the case of those critics who pointed out that by the minimum wage, NYC youth would receive higher rates of pay than their parents, if their parents trained under the Manpower Development and Training Act Programs.

In Boston, allegations of financial irregularities, including fraud and stealing as well as the enrollment of ineligibles, led the Labor Department to freeze Boston NYC funds on November 17, 1965, pending an investigation. Newsweek, in an article, "The 'Mess' in the 'Pov-

erty War,'" May 16, 1966, said that one-third of the 600 teen-agers employed by the NYC claimed they received income tax forms showing more income than they actually claimed they received, according to Congressman Charles Goodell (R-N.Y.). He said, "This is not the first scandal in Boston's poverty program. Falsified and padded payrolls, forged identity cards and checks, political favoritism, sloppy administration, controversy and bitterness--all have been a part of Boston's poverty politics." Mark Battle, NYC Deputy Director, conducted the investigation, giving final clearance for the continuation of the program and renewal of funding on November 30, 1965. He announced that improvements in the administration of funds by the NYC had been agreed on by federal and city officials. But the NYC was overruled by the OEO which cancelled the release of the NYC funds on December 2.

The Labor Department only had 325 employees to administer the program. "I think the OEO has more people in its Public Affairs office," the Washington Post quoted NYC Director Jack Howard as saying on February 11, 1966. As a consequence, there was an almost total lack of field supervision, which left NYC officials unable to interdict NYC projects that were inadequate, such as make-work programs, such as leaf-raking.

Despite these charges and incidents, which were relatively minor and were quickly cleared up, the NYC came to be one of the most popular of the anti-poverty programs. During the 1965 Congressional session, the Congress eliminated the Governor's veto power over the NYC.

The power had been used twice--once by Governor Connally over a grant to the Texas Farmer's Union amounting to $400,000; and once by

Governor Tim Babcock (R-Mont.) over a $550,000 work-training program for rural youths sponsored by the Montana Farmer's Union. Over 300 Governors protested the repeal of the veto power. Senator Ralph Yarborough accused Connally of deliberately delaying and in some cases vetoing Texas NYC projects where enrollees were to be paid $1.25 an hour, while rushing through projects that paid only $1.00 an hour; "This abuse of power must stop," he said. Connally replied, "No Governor in any state. . .has spent as much time as I have on the program trying to assure its success. I have no apologies to make." He justified his NYC veto on the grounds that the Farmer's Union was "quasi-political." The farm organization denied this. The House minority report said the Governor's veto was the only way of getting the poverty czars to consult with the states before going ahead with the programs. The Democratic-inspired removal of the veto power was "one more slash at the authority of state governments." * In 1965, the Administration request for FY 1966 was $255.0 million; obligated funds for NYC in 1965 were $132.1 million.

1965 provisions in the amendments: 1) authorized enrollment of Cuban refugees in the NYC; 2) extended for one year the 90% funding authority; 3) authorized the OEO Director to override governors' veto. Of the extension of the 90% funding authority, President Johnson said, "If we do not do this, then many communities, especially those in rural or isolated areas and which lack the resources to get underway quickly, will be unable to qualify before the cut-off date."

Many proposals had been submitted in the first few months of operation, demonstrating an "awareness of the problem." "At first, the

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* pp. 405-409.

flow of these proposals was slow, uneven, and of variable quality. But with the assistance of the NYC staff, there has been steady improvement in the quality of the proposals." During the first 6 months, the NYC received 600 proposal applications. A total of 167 NYC projects had been announced by March 31, 1965, and submitted to Governors for review. 124 of them provide work-training for youth in urban areas, while only 43 were in rural communities. Together they will accomodate more than 93,000 enrollees. By April, 1965, 40 projects with 20,000 enrollees were in operation. In fiscal 1966, the NYC intended to enroll 265,000 youths, including 50,000 summer enrollees, in 430 projects.

Enrollees in school were limited to 15 hours of work per week, to insure that the workload did not impair their school performances. School dropouts worked 32 hours per week, allowing time for supportive services such as remedial education, training, counseling or other class work.

Wherever CAP organizations existed, NYC sponsors were instructed to relate their projects with the community's program, and these projects were given priority in funding. Moreover, NYC projects were to be coordinated with existing work-training programs through the Youth Opportunity Centers run by the USES. Pre-selection counseling determined the capacities of applicants, and special referrals services are provided to match the enrollee with the basic remedial and training courses. Those who complete training would be assisted in job referral and placement by the sponsoring agency, the Youth Opportunity Centers, and the USES, as well as CAP, civic, voluntary, employer and

labor organizations.

The NYC found that cities, "not surprisingly," were able to construct programs faster than rural areas. "The NYC has now developed active laison and cooperation with the Department of Agriculture to stimulate rural programs." In 1965 the NYC contributed to the decline in juvenile crime rates during the summer in major urban areas where the projects were operating. Probation officers, police juvenile bureaus, and police officials attributed the drop to the Corps, which had conducted traffic surveys, preparation of educational materials for teachers, cross reference of historical and archival materials, and so on. Evidence of the NYC's popularity came in the 1966 Congressional session, whereby more than the requested funds were allocated to the program.

HARYOU - ACT

HARYOU - ACT was created in the "general conflict, the normative turmoil, and the persistent tensions which comprise the Harlem ghetto." The product of a merger of the Harlem Youth Opportunities Unlimited agency with the Associated Community Teams in the summer of 1964, the joint venture had emerged from the experience of the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and New York's Mobilization for Youth. C. Kenneth Clark, Columbia University psychologist, educators, administrators, and a host of scholars and concerned community social workers had formed a task force to counteract "the demoralizing realities of an oppressed community." The result was an organization designed to mobilize the commitment and resources of the ghetto community to guarantee to the youth of Harlem "the respect, the preparation, and the living conditions which are essential for creative lives." Dr. Clark became director.[35]

Within a month after the merger Clark resigned from HARYOU's directorship, charging that Adam Clayton Powell, Chairman of the House Committee on Education and Labor, had seized control of the organization to use for his own purposes. As New York Post columnist Murray Kempton wrote, Washington saw Harlem as "simply a geographical expression for Adam Powell's private property." To William Buckley, HARYOU - ACT was merely "another of Mr. Powell's expensive hobbies." In November of that year, Cyril Tyson, Acting Director, also resigned to head the United Community Corporation, the Newark anti-poverty organization. He was replaced by Livingston Leroy Wingate as effective head of HARYOU,

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35 Youth in the Ghetto: A Study of the Consequences of Powerlessness and a Blueprint for Change, by Harlem Youth Opportunities Unlimited, Inc., New York: Organs Press, Inc., 1964, pp. xi-xiv.

a man described by Kempton as "Powell's steward, a man of noticeable probity, implausible energy, and a talent for almost anything but administration." Coming to office, Wingate said, "HARYOU - ACT, by its very nature, must be scrupulously guarded from politicians and other interests who might seek to divert its program to their own interests." The only order he had ever received from Powell about HARYOU - ACT, he said, was to "keep it clean."[36]

In May, 1965, James G. Bellows, editor of the Herald Tribune, had written to Shriver requesting that HARYOU - ACT records be made public. The Tribune had asked HARYOU - ACT Director Wingate for a record of all employees of the agency who earned more than $8,000 a year, in order to "confirm or refute" charges of "political control, relatives on the payroll, members of the non-paying board of directors being paid as consultants, slipshod record keeping, questionable leases, and shortages in inventory." Wingate refused, saying he did not want the paper "harassing his employees." Shriver affirmed the right of the public to information regarding the expenditure of public funds, but pointed out that only NYC allocations were thus far a part of HARYOU's OEO funding.[37]

In September, 1964, before the establishment of the Office of Economic Opportunity, a grant of $1 million was made under the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency. Authorized for one year, and primarily intended for administrative staffing purposes, the refunding application came under the umbrella of the New York community action

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36 Louise Lander (ed.) War on Poverty (New York: Facts on File, Inc.; 1967) p. 72; Murray Kempton and William Buckley, "The Broker of Harlem," Washington Daily News, October 19, 1965

37 Letter from James G. Bellows, Editor New York Herald Tribune, to Sargent Shriver, May 4, 1965; Letter from Shriver to Bellows, May 10, 1965.

agency, the Economic Opportunity Corporation. OEO policy was to refund such Juvenile Delinquency funding, and in June, 1965, HARYOU - ACT received a $1.2 million grant for housing, education, employment, health and social services, as a part of the larger city CAP grant.[38]

At the end of the month, the initial grant was increased to $1.4 million, with an augmentation of $500,000 from the Neighborhood Youth Corps. The program, a summer offensive to carry the "battle against poverty into New York's steaming slums," would establish summer jobs for youths, plant "vest pocket" parks, provide training programs and "block" day camps, and initiate educational programs. Shriver said the demonstration program would test "whether a massive summer mobilization of a community's resources can strike a lasting blow at the poverty that devestates a hugh metropolitan slum." The latter grant was made outside the umbrella agency, and was to fund a special crash program for youth employment called Project Uplift. The program's goals were to "demonstrate community involvement, engender community pride and concern," and to refocus residents' horizons from an isolated "inner city" to that of the typical urban "sophisticate."[39]

In June, 1965, the New York press, particularly the Herald Tribune, raised concern about HARYOU - ACT's management. Barry Gotteher, Tribune reporter, claimed to have made a deal with William Haddad, OEO Director of Inspection, to "lay off" the allegations provided Haddad would give him the "full story" of its finances after Price, Waterhouse & Co.

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38 Memorandum from James Kelleher, Deputy Director of Public Affairs, to Bernard Boutin, OEO Deputy Director, entitled "Sequence of Events - HARYOU-ACT," October 31, 1965; letter from Shriver to Bellows, May 10,1965.

39 OEO release, June 23, 1965; Thelma Griffith Johnson, "Final Report of the Office of Executive Assistant to the Coordinator," HARYOU-ACT,Inc., Project Uplift: Special Summer Project for Harlem, October 1, 1965, p. 1.

(HARYOU - ACT's auditors) had "done its work."[40] Throughout the summer the accountant firm investigated HARYOU-ACT's records, and in July made a series of recommendations that were, however, "largely ignored."[41] By late August, the New York press carried stories of "hanky-panky" of the organization's funds, an issue that was inflamed by the internal inspection and "anonymous phone calls from OEO" with the tip that $300,000 in bad checks had been written by HARYOU-ACT.[42]

On September 23, 1965, OEO negotiated with HARYOU-ACT to carry out its own audit of their books in anticipation of a grant extension, fully aware of the discrepancies discovered by Price, Waterhouse, & Co. The next day Wingate telegrammed OEO requesting a countersigner on the extension grant. On the 28th, a $827,000 grant was made to HARYOU-ACT in order to extend Project Uplift through November 30, with the provision

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[40] Memorandum from Herbert Kramer and James Kelleher to Sargent Shriver, September 28, 1965.

[41] Memorandum from James Kelleher to Bernard Boutin, October 31, 1965, p. 3; Another internal memorandum outlined the official policy OEO was to take publicly. It stressed the fact that the HARYOU project overall was a "good one." Shriver drove the point home: It was "better than good. Would they have preferred a Watts?" OEO would point out that HARYOU had applied for an extension, and had obligated funds in anticipation of it, much in the manner federal agencies operate under continuing resolutions in anticipation of appropriations legislation being passed. Lastly, OEO would maintain that the Price, Waterhouse recommendations to put the operation on a more "business-like basis" had "been followed." See Memorandum to Sargent Shriver from Herbert Kramer and James Kelleher, with concurrence of Edgar May, September 28, 1965.

[42] Memorandum from James Kelleher to Bernard Boutin, October 31, 1965, p. 2. Edgar May wrote, "I learned that part of the greater newspaper interest in this situation has been caused by the fact that several creditors of HARYOU-ACT have informed the papers." Memo from May to Shriver, September 28, 1965.

that OEO countersign the deposition of funds. Approximately $400,000 of the grant was earmarked for "administration" but in fact covered the obligation HARYOU - ACT had incurred prior to the funding, and which was, as OEO recognized, "for all practical purposes, without authorization or authority."[43]

Justification for the extension was that HARYOU had recruited the more "alienated," "difficult and suspicious" youth of Harlem. To discontinue funding would place the agency in the position of reinforcing their distrust and alienation. An extension would serve also to involve the many additional applicants to the program, thus enabling the project to serve the entire Harlem community and to include many of the grassroot organizations. At the same time, OEO began auditing HARYOU - ACT's records.[44]

On October 1, the New York District Attorney, Frank Hogan, subpoenaed HARYOU - ACT, ordering it to produce its financial records. The investigation was touched off by a mother's complaint that her son had not received payment for five week's work for HARYOU - ACT. Wingate called the investigation a "fishing expedition," denying any "mismanagement or irregularities." When the New York Tribune printed the story, Negroes from Harlem promptly picketed the newspaper, condemned Hogan,

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43 Memorandum from Jim Kelleher to Bernie Boutin, October 31, 1965, pp 2-3; Samuel Proctor, OEO Northeastern Regional Director, explained to Wingate the reason for refunding the additional $800,000: "The audit was not complete and since there was not concrete information at that time, it was advisable to fund so that the $407,000 could be paid to the creditors and the remaining money would enable the program to continue through October 30." Memo from Joe Argrette to Ed May, October 4, 1965.

44 Memorandum from Sanford Kravitz to Theodore Berry, Undated #9160-I.

and threatened violence. "There has never been a grand-jury investigation in Harlem when black babies were cremated in tenement fires," exclaimed Wingate. "This investigation is a smear tactic by forces opposed to the War on Poverty." HARYOU officials appeared at the District Court, but did not produce the records.[45]

Since the 1964 merger of the organization, New York City had granted $6.8 million for its projects, and made commitments for $5 million more. The City Comptroller, Abraham Beame, on October 1, advanced $270,000 to cover bank drafts, a move that some felt had Powell's backing. The next day, OEO disclosed that its own audit was underway, and that the September 28 grant included the counter-signature proviso. The DA's investigation, it said, was "complementary," and should not detract from the program's "highly successful" accomplishments. Poor management by the organization would be corrected, but to withhold funds would be to punish the youth of Harlem for failures of the program administrators.[46]

During this time, Representative Powell formed his own investigating team.[47] After only two days in Harlem, its report said HARYOU's finances

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45 Lander, War, p. 73; The Harlem Council for Economic Development Bulletin Number 68, "Special HARYOU-ACT Issue," called the precipitators of the DA investigation "The lying son and his impetuous mother." Of Frank Hogan, it said, "We suspect he has a vendetta against BLACK PEOPLE;" New Republic, December 18, 1965, pp. 7-8; William Haddad, "Mr. Shriver and the Savage Politics of Poverty," Harpers Magazine, December, 1965, p. 50; "HARYOU-ACT Subpoenaed," New York Herald Tribune, October 3, 1965.

46 Lander, War, P. 73; Memorandum from Jim Kelleher to Bernie Boutin, October 31, 1965, pp. 1-4.

47 An internal memo stated: "Sam Proctor visited Adam Powell yesterday afternoon (September 27) and told him the bad news (financial shenanigans). According to Proctor, the Chairman 'hit the roof,' then called Wingate and chewed him out, saying Wingate had only until this morning to remove the 'leeches' from the program." Memorandum from Jack Williams to Edgar May, September 28, 1965.

were "in total disarray." Expenditures could not be correlated with reimbursements; personnel records were inaccurate; and funds from different grants had been intermingled. The size of the security force was unnecessarily large: "There is a policeman at every door, on every entrance and at every floor." Costs for the security force were unable to be determined. In December, four of Powell's investigators were fired.[48]

On October 4, Powell sent Shriver a list of recommendations compiled by his assistant Chuck Stone. They included suggestions to "Stabilize HARYOU - ACT's top administrative echelons and increase its efficiency," through changes in administration by the Comptroller's office, the Business Manager, the Personnel Director. A full-time General Counsel was "desperately" needed, along with a new executive committee representing a greater proportion of poor people. On October 3, Powell had demanded that Shriver oust HARYOU Comptroller Milledge Mosby, to which OEO replied that it did not have the authority over the organization's board duties. Newspapers interpreted Powell's demand as a "last-ditch power play" to save Wingate's job. Several days later,

Stone said that HARYOU's books "were in a mess," and that the agency had overexpended "roughly $400,000 spent on programs expanded beyond the initial financial commitments." On the next day, October 11, Powell said he knew of "no misuses or misappropriation of funds in HARYOU-ACT," but that he would demand that all parties concerned resign and be brought to trial if such malpractices were uncovered. He said that his investigation had found 10 "major shortcomings" of HARYOU - ACT's

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48 Editorial, "The Mystery of HARYOU," New Republic, December 18, 1965 pp. 7-8.

administration, but that it had made "absolutely no criticisms of HARYOU's programs and accomplishments."[49]

On the same day, New York City's Economic Opportunity Committee announced the withholding of a five million dollar grant because HARYOU could not meet financial management requirements. The Labor Department also revealed that it had audited HARYOU - ACT's apprenticeship program back in April, after the agency had drawn $141,781 for administrative expenses, but had employed only five youths.[50]

At a press conference, HARYOU Board Chairman, the Reverend Eugene Callender, announced that he backed Wingate without reservation. He said that OEO had the policy of making verbal commitments of funds in advance of grants, and did so in the case of HARYOU - ACT, putting them on the spot. Director Wingate said that HARYOU's auditors had found "no evidence of financial malfeasance." He admitted that some earmarked funds had, indeed, been comingled: "We had deadlines and we were under pressure" to launch the summer projects. "But we came through. For one thing, there was no 'long hot summer.'"[51]

On October 14, in a speech before the National Urban League, Wingate warned of an "ominous movement" in Harlem of militant Negroes who were "prepared to die" in racial warfare if HARYOU were scuttled. "I can see

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49 Memorandum from Chuck Stone to The Chairman (Powell), October 4, 1965; "Powell Investigators Bitterly Lash HARYOU," New York World Telegram, October 28, 1965; Lander, War, p. 74; Memorandum from Jim Kelleher to Bernie Boutin, October 31, 1965; "Powell Loses Poverty Fight," New York Herald Tribune, October 5, 1965.

50 Lander, War, p. 73

51 "HARYOU funds Commingled," New York Herald Tribune, October 7, 1965.

bloodshed in Harlem and then in Bedford-Stuyvesant and then Rochester and Syracuse will move." He claimed that HARYOU had "bought time with this movement, by employing its members during the summer," and that "5,000 kids threatened to break us asunder when the agency reached in and took the money." Wingate said he "didn't give a continental what account it came from" and he refused to name the movement for fear of reprisals. It was generally known to be the 5%'s (the name came from the group's theory that 85% of all Negroes were like cattle, 10% were 'Uncle Toms,' but the remaining 5% were properly militant.) Said Wingate regarding the 5%'s: "I've talked to police. They're scared, they know the facts. If I tell too much, I'll be the late Wingate." He warned of "holocaust if funds are curtailed," affirming that HARYOU-ACT was the only thing standing between "the black youths of Harlem and the guns of outer society." Remove HARYOU-ACT, he said, and you have "holocaust."[52] Kempton wrote that if funding HARYOU prevented a riot, "presumably then HARYOU was a bribe to the neighborhood to keep quiet." Ex-Director C. Kenneth Clark said that Wingate was practicing "Black McCarthyism" and playing "a dangerous game" that "could set things off in a volatile community." Wingate replied that the "establishment must give. Otherwise we face a French Revolution." He said, "there does exist a group that refused to accept grievous social injustices--and they are prepared to rebel. . . .I'm not just talking about the blacks. I'm talking about poor whites too." The United Council of Harlem Organizations

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52 Lander, War, pp. 74-75; Kelleher wrote that Wingate's shift in emphasis from holding OEO responsible for verbal commitments to blaming unidentified enemies indicated "Chairman Powell's efforts to shift his gears and avoid identification with HARYOU-ACT problems." Memo from James Kelleher to Bernard Boutin, October 31, 1965.

had called a press conference to denounce "statements which imply the existence of large hate groups within the community," on October 19. OEO mildly denied Wingate's statements, at the same time emphasizing the program's worth.[53]

On the 9th of October, OEO received the preliminary audit report. Recognizing the "seriousness" of the potential mismanagement, CAP Director, Theodore Berry set up a meeting with the HARYOU - ACT board and OEO Northeast Regional Director Samuel Proctor to make a series of recommendations including specific changes in personnel. OEO suggested that Whitney Young head a committee of three prominent persons to oversee the completion of Project Uplift, and to change the Project Director. The alternative was a cut-off of funds. Day-long meetings on the 9th and 10th were held between the Regional Director (Proctor) and HARYOU, with constant consultation with Washington. The result was a compromise. HARYOU announced "it is seeking specific individuals as Project Director and fiscal manager, and that Dr. James Dumpson, former New York Welfare Commissioner, would head a committee to evaluate the summer program."[54]

On the 10th, OEO froze the planning at current levels, and withheld the release of about $1 million in grants to HARYOU - ACT pending its adoption of new management controls and fiscal tightening. It revealed that its initial audit findings included the discovery of

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53 Murray Kempton, "The Broker of Harlem," Washington Daily News, October 19, 1965; Lander, War, p. 75; Memorandum from Jim Kelleher to Bernie Boutin, October 31, 1965, p. 4.

54 Memorandum from Jim Kelleher to Bernie Boutin, October 31, 1965, p. 4; Kelleher wrote: "All moves to this point have been informally O.K.'d by White House staff."

various "deficiencies in record-keeping and overall management." The completion of the audit was to be October 30, at which time recommendations for further grants would be made. Shriver stated that the summer program, despite its problems, was justified. Had the Federal Government not "focused their urgent attention on the problems in Harlem," he said, OEO would have been "liable to severe and justified criticism." Consequently, Harlem did have a program: 35,000 youngsters participated in jobs, education programs, camp experience, and work training projects. OEO had found no evidence of fraud "or other intentional wrongdoing." [55]

Subsequent personnel changes in HARYOU were made and an organizational restructuring occurred. The Director of Project Uplift, Frank Stanley, was suspended. Milledge Mosby, HARYOU comptroller, resigned, and two new posts were created. Stanley had received less than propitious treatment.[56] Originally he had taken Project Uplift to Washington as an Urban League program, but Shriver had recommended that he carry it out through HARYOU, prompting Murray Kempton's comment that "Washington does not permit encroachments on Adam Powell's franchise." The project had, in fact, exceeded expectations, with more than 65% of the adolescents served returning to schools, 20% more than expected. An internal Uplift report, moreover, stated that "the wonder is that the Comptroller's

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55 Undated HARYOU - ACT statement for Mr. Shriver; OEO release entitled "HARYOU- ACT Discusses Future of Project Uplift with OEO Officials," October 11, 1965; Telegram from Sargent Shriver to Mrs. Anne Roberts, Executive Director, Economic Opportunity Committee, October 10, 1965.

56 Murray Kempton, "Broker of Harlem," Washington Daily News, October 19, 1965; The Harlem Council for Economic Development Bulletin #68, dated October 9, 1965, said of Mr. Stanley, "This guy doesn't even live in Harlem - was infiltrated into HARYOU - ACT from the white-dominated Urban League."

office was able to function at all in the earlier days of the program," due to a small staff and inadequate procedures. The Comptroller's ability to function in payroll matters was further hampered by the pressures placed upon his office because of the 'panic psychology of the agency.' Instead of permitting the orderly rectification of payroll errors and omissions the Comptroller's staff was repeatedly summoned by the Executive Staff of the agency and told to 'Pay the kids.'"[57]

Dr. Samuel D. Proctor OEO Northeast Regional Director, said on November 8, 1965, that "Somewhere around the midpoint of the summer they found it necessary to expand the program ... Then HARYOU - ACT made what I consider a management misjudgment. They found themselves with their nose against the fiscal grindstone." Given the crisis situation, "I would call (the summer program) a victory."[58]

HARYOU's Board of Directors announced December 6, 1965, that Wingate would be relieved of his responsibilities until February 1, 1966, to "concentrate all of his time to clarifying HARYOU - ACT's fiscal matters from January 1, 1965 to October 31, 1965." At the same time the Board reaffirmed its vote of confidence in him. His departure was a move interpreted by the press as the result of OEO pressure, which Wingate confirmed later. He was replaced by G. Douglas Pugh. OEO Director Shriver stated that federal funding of the agency would be resumed "after we are formally notified" of the Board's action.[59]

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57 Thelma Griffith Johnson, "Final Report of the Office of Executive Assistant to the Coordinator," HARYOU-ACT Inc., Project Uplift: Special Summer Project for Harlem, October 1, 1965, p. 8.

58 Lander, War, p. 76.

59 OEO Release, December 6, 1965;"Wingate Vows He'll Keep Post," New York Times, December 10, 1965;"Study in Confusion," New York Times, December 9, 1965. The Harlem Council for Economic Development applauded Mr. Winegate's success in detering Harlem riots "regardless ofhow he approached this need. This goes for commingling of funds, borrowing from the banks or petitioning the OEO for more funds, or delaying payment of salaries until funds are available." Bulletin #68, October 9, 1965, p. 1.

Chairman Paul Screvane of the Antipoverty Operations Board said that HARYOU had agreed to a new fiscal and bookkeeping controls, and that city funds would be released in a "special sequestered account," as soon as the new procedures had been instituted. Shriver publicly commended the Board "for apparently initiating a responsive total reorganization of management and fiscal organization since the completion of the OEO interim audit on October 31." The step was "encouraging and most significant to the future of the Harlem antipoverty agency." On December 9, 1965, Powell called HARYOU "the best program in the country -- fiscally too," but said that he had designated a subcommittee of the House Education and Labor Committee under Representative Hugh Carey (D.- New York) to investigate the agency.[60]

On January 18, 1966, the New York Times published the conclusions of a three-man investigation's report, consisting of Dr. Inabel Lindsay, James R. Dumpson, and Dr. Roy Nichols. It praised Project Uplift for "involving large numbers of people in a self-help program," but criticized it for administrative inefficiency, "a total disregard for the principle of accountability," and "confused lines of authority and communication." It said, "We believe that ultimate goals were obscured by the pervading thought that something must be done to keep trouble from erupting in the ghetto during the summer." In May, the Executive Board of HARYOU voted to reinstate Wingate. An OEO spokesman said that the OEO was in a "position of wait and see" as to the effect of Wingate's reinstatement on future funding.[61]

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60 OEO release, December 6, 1965; Lander, War, pp. 76-77.

61 Lander, War, p. 77.

BLACK ARTS THEATRE

Adding to the financial and administrative problems of HARYOU-ACT were the events surrounding the Black Arts Theatre, a part of Project Uplift. The HARYOU-ACT imbroglio of the summer and fall of 1965 was, to some extent, symptomatic of the diffusion of responsibility and locally-oriented lines of authority inherent in OEO-sponsored community action projects. The politics of the locality, as well as the troubling concern with the impact of the program in the tinder-like atmosphere of the Negro ghetto, contributed to the methods by which OEO responded to an altogether bad situation. In the context of managerial disorder, the Black Arts Theatre under Le Roi Jones was able to gain a role in the program. By the time the press broke the story, OEO investigators had discovered that the Black Arts Theatre contract had been accomplished without the knowledge or consent of OEO.

Le Roi Jones, a widely recognized black playwright who taught at Columbia University, had incorporated the Black Arts Theatre in an effort to duplicate an earlier project in the San Francisco area. Its charter read: "To explore, develop, extend, propogate and preserve the dramatic arts and talents of the Afro-Americans, with particular emphasis on linking such expressions to the African past and present in order that the black community may realize and protect and nourish distinctive aspects of its own historical culture."[62] Jones, writer of three successful off-Broadway plays, a novel and two books on poetry and jazz, had formulated a militant philosophy of black nationalism. America, he

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62 Memorandum from Jack Williams to Edgar May, March 3, 1966.

once wrote, must be "stormed" by "20 million spooks (Negroes). . .with furious cries and unstoppable weapnns. We want actual explosions and actual brutality."[63]

In May, 1965, Jones set out to promote the re-education of "the nearly half a million Harlem Negroes to find a new pride in their color." Accordingly, Jones and his cohorts, claiming foundation support from Guggenheim, Rabinowitz and Magdelene, approached Frank Stanley of Project Uplift for a grant. Meeting with a negative response, they "crashed" into Livingston Wingate's office at HARYOU-ACT, at which point Wingate overruled Stanley in favor of Jones. Wingate, in a verbal commitment, agreed to finance the Black Arts Theatre project with funds from Project Uplift. Justification for the grant was on the grounds that all other Uplift programs ended at five o'clock, and that a twilight program would benefit the ghetto youths with hours of daylight ahead of them.[64]

By mid-July, the theatre project was enlarged to include, in addition to dramatic arts, a school of cultural history, the political philosophy of the black man in America, playwriting, painting, dancing, sculpture, remedial reading and mathematics. During the course of the summer, five plays were produced, on a seven-nights-a-week schedule, from a portable

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63 Cited in "U.S. Cash Aids Negro Spiel of White Hatred," Chicago Tribune, December 1, 1965.

64 Williams wrote, "the real reason for Wingate's decision was fear. This probably was less personal physical fear. . .than fear of the embroglio Jones and his adherents might create if they didn't get 'a piece of the action.'" There was an apparent connection between the 5%'s and the Black Arts group. Black Arts Theatre School, Inc. (BATS) FBI summary report (undated); Memorandum from Jack Williams to Edgar May, March 3, 1966.

stage in different parts of Harlem. These included: "The Super," "The Liberal," "Black Ice," "Jello," and "The Experimental Death Unit." Collectively, the plays denounced Martin Luther King's philosophy of nonviolence, advocated rebellion by black people, challenged the liberal rhetoric as hypocritical, exposed white capitalist exploitation of the ghetto, and invoked a quasi-Marxist form of political and social revolution.[65]

The Black Arts Theatre performed the street-corner plays for about six weeks, attracting thousands to the evening presentations. The plays, which were performed before audiences including women and children, got mixed, but generally enthusiastic responses. On the one hand, some Harlem community leaders protested to HARYOU-ACT officials about the use of "foul" and "vulgar" language, prompting Wingate to admonish Jones to "keep HARYOU out of trouble;" thereafter, the Project Uplift staff blue-penciled the plays. On the other hand, an OEO investigator later pointed out, the plays were very well received on the streets of Harlem, where the people enjoyed taunting the "whitey" being portrayed through black-face-in-reverse.[66] It was this portion of the theatre presentation that incited the wrath of the press, which described it as a "crude, racist" philosophy "preaching hatred of the white race." The use of the word "whitey" inclusively portrayed, as James Harris, a local critic observed,

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65 OEO Statement on HARYOU-ACT and the Black Arts Theatre, November, 1965; Memorandum from Edgar May to Sargent Shriver, December 13, 1965; Memorandum from Jack Williams to Edgar May, March 3, 1965.

66 Memorandum from Jack Williams to Edgar May, March 3, 1966; Statement on Black Arts Theatre (undated).

"bungling fools with a monopoly of the human defects of avarice, ignorance, cowardice and stupidity."[67]

Public reaction to the press coverage of the Black Arts Theatre required an official OEO response. "We'd rather see these kids fussing on the stage," said Jim Kelleher, Deputy Director of Public Affairs, "than on the streets." The overall program was a good one, he stressed, and "we have to figure that this (the Theatre-school)was a part of its success. HARYOU-ACT wanted Jones in the program. He is a legitimate playwright, whatever you may think about his views. We knew about it when we granted the money and we have no apologies."[68]

In September, Wingate had ordered the Black Arts Theatre's continuation under a new supplementary grant. In discussions between OEO staff and HARYOU officials, "HARYOU specifically asked that the entire supplementary budget be for the Black Arts Theatre." This was rejected by the OEO with the recommendation that at some point in the future a separate cultural arts demonstration proposal might be funded.[69] On September 17

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67 See, for example: "Aids Negro Hate Troupe," The Hammond Times, November 1, 1965; "Hatred is Theme of Negro Theatre," New York Tribune, November 30, 1965; "Fatal Confusion in Race Relations," Sunday Advocate, December 5, 1965; "Public Finance for 'Hate' School," Des Moines Register, December 2, 1965; Statement of Black Arts Theatre.

68 Cited in Chicago Tribune, December 1, 1965. This statement was at variance with a November release which said: "This was accomplished (Black Arts Theatre grant) without the knowledge or consent of OEO, and even without the knowledge of the HARYOU-ACT Board of Directors." OEO statement on HARYOU-ACT and the Black Arts Theatre, November, 1965. Interestingly, Kelleher's office was flooded with hate mail, of which the following was typical: To James Kelleher - Tax-paid political parasite. Poverty funds, to divide people. You disgraceful pharisee."

69 Memorandum from Sanford L. Kravitz to Edgar May, December 16, 1965; Memorandum from Jack Williams to Edgar May, March 3, 1966.

according to an OEO statement, "as a result of local indignation and the action of the program's director," the Black Arts Theatre project was cut off from the HARYOU-ACT program. Perhaps out of fear of reprisal (HARYOU controller Mosby had been threatened by a Black Arts member, an incident represented as "racial blackmail"), Wingate immediately telegrammed delegated HARYOU agencies blaming "whitey" (Washington) for HARYOU's financial plight.[70]

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70 Donald Washington, Black Arts member, reportedly had said to Mosby, "You said you'd pay me if I kept the Black Arts off your back." Mosby thereupon threatened to resign. Memorandum from Joe Argrett, Jim Brenner, Jack Williams to Edgar May, October 19, 1965; Memorandum from Jack Williams to Edgar May, March 3, 1966; OEO statement on HARYOU-ACT and the Black Arts Theatre, November 1965.

During this time, OEO was conducting its own investigation to discover exactly how the Black Arts Theatre had become involved in the first place. An F.B.I. tracer, "to separate the wheat from the chaff," was begun to check the names of the top members of the theatrical group.[71] The Office of Inspection determined that the "Black Arts originally crept into the HARYOU-ACT funding pattern through the back door" on a contract that was contingent upon approval of a supplementary application submitted in early August, which was never approved. Technically, then, the contract was null and void. The project had been "imbedded" in the summer day camp program of Project Uplift, which it was assumed by OEO at the time, "was the typical camp arts and crafts program." It was not until December 1965, that OEO first came into possession of the original Black Arts proposals to HARYOU-ACT. Wrote an investigator, "OEO was never told of this contract, nor was a copy ever furnished. The Office of Inspection came upon it in the ACT files during the September investigation and had it xeroxed." On September 28, the OEO supplemental grant to HARYOU-ACT specifically ruled out the Black Arts Theatre.[72]

Initial estimates of the cost of the Black Arts Theatre ran to about $18,000 in Federal funds. Later estimates raised the figure to $95,150; and still later, the HARYOU-ACT Internal Investigations Committee also submitted a report showing the Black Arts project costing $115,200. The funds had been used for a variety of purposes, but primarily to pay the

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71 Edgar May had said, "It is harder to get accurate information such as number of plays out of HARYOU-ACT than information from Peking." Memo from Jack Williams to Edgar May, October 5, 1965; Black Arts Theatre School, Inc. (BATS) FBI Summary Report (undated).

72 Memorandum from Edgar May to the Director, December 16, 1965; Memorandum from Jack Williams to Edgar May, March 3, 1966.

wages of the program's participants.[73]

OEO Director Shriver stated that he deplored the involvement of the theatre in the HARYOU component program. "It is unfortunate," he said, "that the Harlem antipoverty program was disgraced this way. It happened at a time when a crash effort was underway to get a massive program going. Frankly, it illustrates the lack of administrative control that was in effect." As an OEO official statement put it, "it obviously never should have been permitted to occur at all. It will not occur again in the war on poverty."[74]

To attempt a balanced view of the entire incident whereby OEO was charged by the press with funding a racist, obscene, and quasi-Marxist revolutionary movement it is important to bear in mind that OEO never sanctioned, directly or indirectly, the plays or the poetry readings. Equally important to observe is the fact that the Black Arts Theatre was credited with serving as an emotional catharsis, easing the threat of civil disorder in Harlem. Noting that the temperature "hovered near 100 in Harlem during the four days of Watts, yet there was no eruption," OEO inspector Jack Williams brought to the incident perhaps the wisdom and honesty that it deserved. He wrote:

> "Those plays aren't a popular subject for conversation in Harlem (as they aren't at OEO) and I've yet to find anyone sufficiently familiar with them who doesn't have a vested interest in a point

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73 Williams wrote: "Under some duress, Jim Kelleher put out a press statement on Black Arts which indicated that BATS share of the HARYOU summer funding (which, unaccountably, was listed at $1.8 million rather than $2.2 million) was 'less than 1%' or some $18,000. This is sheer malarky, and someone's going to find it out....In reality, I'd estimate the overall cost to OEO of the Black Arts program as being substantially above $100,000 including close to $90,000 in costs alone." Memorandum, Jack Williams to Edgar May, March 3, 1966; OEO Statement on HARYOU-ACT and the Black Arts Theatre, November, 1965.

74 Shriver statement re Black Arts Theatre School.

> of view. It's clear that the civil rights movement has focused the attention of this generation upon the indignities and injustices done to Negroes in America, currently and in the past. Their knowledge was never lacking for an individual Negro, of course, but in earlier days it was suppressed. Now its out in the open and for many Negroes it seems to be it is only expectable that the reaction will be -- and is -- rage, for both the present and the past. Because it has been long suppressed, this rage is particularly virulent, but it must come out if the Negro is to reach an accommodation with his own personality and his everyday world. It comes out, it seems to me, in Watts -- and it can also come out in "The Super." As Dr. Diggs points out, whatever the intrinsic artistic merit of the play, it was well received by the people of Harlem. The taunts and anger are part of this badly needed catharsis, and such white-baiting is going to continue, with or without OEO participation. The Black Nationalists and the Muslims have made it a way of life with their adherents, and I believe the teaching of an Elijah Muhammed or Malcolm X, strikes some chord of sympathy within any Negro."[75]

As Shriver succinctly had put it: "Would they have preferred a Watts?"

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75 Memorandum from Jack Williams to Edgar May, March 3, 1966.

THE CRITICS

There was continuingly a constant accompaniment of charges of high salaries and low intentions; of waste, opportunism, bungling, nepotism and malfeasance.

On August 23, 1965, when OEO was just eight months old, U.S. News and World Report published a denunciatory article called "Poverty War Out of Hand?" which presented its summation of charges against OEO to date. These included allegations of Presidential concern "about the swelling volume of criticism," complaints of "administrative chaos, bureaucratic bungling, waste, extravagance, costly duplication of existing services and internal squabbling," along with a number of other indictments. The OEO Public Affairs Office issued a mamorandum on the article, answering, point by point, the charges made. [76] Sample rebuttals: "Of course the White House is concerned--just as it is over attacks on any key Administration program. But only last week the President gave high praise to the entire program, and the OEO, before a meeting of Congressional leaders. There is no evidence whatsoever of his dissatisfaction." And: "The article conveniently omits the preponderance of favorable reaction, the consensus that recently led to such overwhelming victories for the new anti-poverty bills in Cong-

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[76] August 24, 1965.

ress. And it fails to question how, in the light of such 'bungling' the program managed to serve over three million poor people in 2,000 communities in its first nine months."

Along with rising statistics and expanding programs there continued to be the chorus of critics who became, in a way, an adverse adjunct of the War on Poverty. Undeterred by progress, and not deflected by quick rebuttal and explicit answers to charges, they continued their barrage of headlines-inspired invective. In those days, and all the subsequent ones, Shriver had good reason for reading, often, the maxim from Edmund Burke which he kept in his office:

"Those who would carry on the great public schemes must be proof against the most fatiguing delays, the most mortifying disappointments, the most shocking insults, and worst of all the presumptuous judgment of the ignorant upon their design."

There were charges of federal anti-poverty funds being used to rent tuxedos for high school boys, secret meetings at which Democratic Congressmen were given preferential treatment for projects in their districts, an allegation that OEO had flown Job Corps enrollees from Hawaii to California to pick asparagus; assertions that students were being sent to see "the Sound of Music" and being given ballet lessons; accusations that OEO was an advocate of violence in black ghettos and comment by Senator Dirksen which led to an editorial in the Wall Street Journal headed "Tent Shows and Snake Oil".

Such charges made very readable headlines. The OEO replies, many signed by Shriver personally, did not make for such sensational reading. But, in their explicit denials and exposition of facts, they consti-

tuted a new departure for federal agencies in responding to allegations.

By the Associated Press, May 26, 1966: "A 'glorious victory against poverty' was cited in the House floor today--high school youths at Fort Lauderdale,Fla., can get tuxedos at government expense.

"Rep. Robert M. Michel, R-Ill., quoted the Fort Lauderdale News of May 22 as reporting the government is footing the $250 bill to enable 16 boys in Dol Palos Union High School to attend a junior prom.

"'In addition,' Michel said, 'the bill for dinner afterwards and tips will be courtesy of the taxpayers.'

"'...I know that dancing and partying are very much in vogue in this administration but I am a little surprised to find that they are considered such vital areas in the War Against Poverty,' Michel told the House.

"'Perhaps it will be deemed equally important to furnish mink stoles for those who want to attend the opera but wouldn't feel they were properly attired without a furpiece.'"

By OEO, May 26, 1966: "Mr. Shriver branded Rep. Michel's assertion as complete nonsense.

"He emphasized that no money from any OEO anti-poverty program had been used or would be used for such a purpose, in Florida, as Rep. Michel alleged, in California where such an incident was previously reported, or anywhere else in the United States."

By United Press International, June 3, 1966: "A Republican Congressman from Ohio complained today that California Democratic Congressman had been promised at a 'secret meeting' that they would be given a 'preferential preview' of anti-poverty projects in their districts.

"Rep. William H. Ayres, ranking GOP member of the House Education and Labor Committee, asked in a letter to OEO Director Sargent Shriver that Republican lawmakers be given the same privilege.

"'I can well understand the concern of these members,' Ayres said, 'For many of them have stated they find themselves blamed for ill-advised OEO projects over which they have had no control.'"

By OEO, June 3, 1966: "Sargent Shriver...said today that he had not as of late Friday received the letter which Representative William H. Ayres...announced in the press he had sent ot Mr. Shriver.

"Mr. Shriver said he wanted to make it clearly understood that there are no secrets or 'secret meetings' at the OEO, as Representative Ayres charged. This is a typical misrepresentation issued for

political purposes," he said.

"Mr. Shriver said that the OEO has for months supplied governors and mayors with notification of all applications made to OEO as part of the routine practice of informing elected officials of OEO business at the earliest possible time..."

From the Chicago, Ill, Tribune, June 9, 1966: "RIPS 'JOYRIDE' FOR JOB CORPS PICKERS." Rep. Charles S. Bubser (R-Cal.) charged today that the Office of Economic Opportunity spent 'at least $8,000' to fly 40 workers from a Job Crops camp in Hawaii to pick asparagus in the San Francisco bay area.

"'It is almost inconceivable that the OEO would do this,' said Gubser in a speech in the House. 'It is stupid and ridiculous that the war on poverty uses money like this after the taxpayer has worked so hard to earn it. It almost seems like Sargent Shriver is trying to think up new ways of squandering it.'"

By OEO, June 9, 1966: "The statement by Rep. Charles S. Gubser of California...was completely in error.

"Dr. Franklyn A. Johnson, Director of Job Corps, said that no Job Corpsmen have been flown from the Hawaiian center, Koko Head. 'A group of 14 young men, who formed the cadre for the center, were the only ones at the center on May 15, when the trip allegedly was made,' Dr. Johnson said...

"Airline representatives reported that on May 7 a group of 50 farm workers flew from Honolulu to San Francisco, destination, Stockton, to help harvest crops. The trip was privately financed."

Letter from OEO Public Affairs Director to columnist Ruth S. Montgomery of the Hearst Newspapers, June 10, 1966: "...a letter has come in protesting the use of OEO funds to underwrite the cost of sending all students in a Hawaiian elementary school to view the motion picture, 'Sound of Music,' a charge which is absolutely ridiculous. Another story has it that OEO funds are paying for ballet lessons of poor youngsters in Omaha. The fact is that the local community action agency applied for a cultural component which did do this, but it was turned down...

"The point is, I think, that in this silly season of politics the superficiality and absurdity of such charges make good copy, but hurt the effort being made to help the poor help themselves and also degrades the good name of politics..."

Comment on the Senate floor by Senator Everett M. Dirksen, which stimulated the "Tent Shows and Snake Oil" editorial in the Wall Street

Journal brought letters from Shriver to each. To Dirksen, Shriver said, on November 8, 1966:

"You recently commented sharply on the unclear language of an application filed with the Office of Economic Opportunity by the Young Adult Project of Northwest Pasadena, California, and on the unworthiness of another application from Pasadena to set up a community theater.

"I have no quarrel with your evaluations of the proposals, but I assure you this office had no hand in their preparation. We are thus being criticized because citizens in the Pasadena community sent unsolicited proposals to OEO. These projects have not been funded. Even though they have not, your remarks indicated that OEO is somehow to blame for their existence...

"You also criticized two Legal Services projects, one in Karnak, Illinois, with a population of 667, and the other in Eldorado, Illinois, with a population of 3,573.

"Actually, the first project serves not only Karnak, but also Alexander, Pulaski, Union, Massac, and Johnson Counties with a population of 60,514. The second project serves the combined Counties of Saline, Hardin, Pope, and Gallatin with a population of 43,897, based on the 1960 census."

To Vermont Royster, Editor, Wall Street Journal, November 8, 1966: "The charges contained in you editorial...was grossly unfair and presented a distorted view of the War on Poverty.

"...What you failed to make clear is that these are simply proposals submitted by private citizens and have not been funded by OEO. There is, as you will undoubtedly agree, a vast difference between a suggestion and an implementation. However, your editorial was couched in such language that you in effect, held OEO responsible for the content of each and every proposal sent to this office, whether it has been accepted or rejected.

"Two of the Legal Services Programs of the OEO also came in for your editorial wrath. One you indicated was in Eldorado, Illinois, with a population of 3,573. The second, you identified as operating in Karnak, Illinois, with a population of 667.

"In both instances, your facts were at variance with reality. The first project does not serve Eldorado alone, but a four county area--Hardin, Salina, Pope and Gallatin--with a population of 43,887.

"Similarly, the second project does not serve Karnak alone, but the Counties of Alexander, Pulaski, Union, Massac and Johnson, with a population of 60,514.

"From these cases you draw the conclusion that a smaller appropriation to the OEO would require more careful spending, with the implication that care has not been exercised in the past. This is roughly

analagous to proposing that an editor's salary be reduced in order that he will be more careful in his work. Neither argument has real validity.

"OEO has continually exercised care in the evaluation of projects and in their funding. This will continue."

An editorial in the St. Louis, Mo. Globe-Democrat, June 27, 1966, headed "Poverty War Profiteers" brought together a number of charges common to OEO's most dedicated critics. "The conduct of the Vietnam war," it began, "might be considered a model of efficiency compared to the much-tooted 'war on poverty' and the way it's run. The public has been aware of a scandal here and a scandal there, but the full impact of its boondoggles is not realized until one tots up the score in the aggregate. The Office of Economic Opportunity, which administers the poverty war, is well-named indeed, so far as its employees are concerned."

The editorial went on to charge disproportionate salaries to OEO officials and other examples of bureaucratic irresponsibility" and quoted Senator Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.):

"Shorn of its garish and deceptive political trappings the war on poverty is revealed to the taxpayer as an irresponsible waste, and to the victim of poverty as a cruel hoax. For all the money spent, about all that has been produced is a series of program catch-words, such as 'VISTA' and 'Head Start.' Congress should take a cue and impose some catch-word programs of its own like 'Head Knocking' and 'New Start!'"

On June 30, 1966, Shriver wrote another letter to George A. Killenberg, managing editor of the Globe-Democrat:

"Your editorial of June 27, headed "Poverty War Profiteers," has come to my attention.

"While I am gratified by responsible coverage of the American press in reporting the anti-poverty campaign, I am less impressed with reports which tot up the score, as your editorial put it, with a disproportionate share of statements without basis of fact.

"Here is a point by point rundown of your 'aggregate:'

"It is not true that 70 percent of the OEO appropriations goes for salaries. In fact, a little more than 1 percent of the anti-poverty budget goes for salaries (in 1966 OEO was authorized by Congress to spend up to $18,006,000 for salaries, out of a total appropriation of $1.5 billion.)

"It is not true there is one "super-grade" employee for every 16 employees. The ratio is one super-grade to about 102 employees. (OEO has 2,870 on its payroll, of which 28 super-grade salaries of $19,619, or above, and six more are high-level positions created by the President or Congress.

"It is not true that 154 school teachers were pirated from schools, many at doubled salaries, for the Gary Job Corps Center. Teachers' former salaries were based on a nine-month school year, and 18 percent should be added because of a legislative-ordered pay raise.

"I don't think it can be factually stated that OEO employees "often" get higher salaries than they did at their last job. Some get higher pay and many others do not. In December of last year when I made a personal check on the salary of the top men at OEO, the top twenty officials at that time were receiving a total of $3,500 less than they had received before they came to OEO. In other words, in the aggregate, these top officials had accepted a similar loss in order to take on the top responsibilities in this agency.

"It is not true that 13 of the first 16 Neighborhood Youth Corps youths screened in Philadelphia had arrest records. This has been formally denied by George Brown, former Neighborhood Youth Corps Project Director there, and also by the Philadelphia municipal government.

"It is not true that only 10 out of 153 youths to be enrolled in the Neighborhood Youth Corps in Omaha, Nebraska, were eligible. Every Omaha applicant was eligible.

"It is not true that anti-poverty funds were used to rent tuxedos for high school boys in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, or anywhere else in the United States.

"It is true that an aircraft was chartered in August 1965 by the director of a project named the Child Development Group of Mississippi. The event was the Head Start graduation ceremony at the first of 83 projects administered by the program, and a number of local officials were attending. The project director and an aide arranged the 400 mile round trip. The cost was $109.

"If you wish to go beyond the remarks you cite by Senator Strom Thurmond on VISTA and Head Start, you will find that there are 3,500 VISTA Volunteers working for their country in a variety of urban and rural projects, and that Head Start has given educational and medical help to 1.3 million underprivileged children.

"The above, I think, presents a different picture than advertised in your headline. If there is any scandal, it is the extent of confusion and distortion carelessly put forward about the anti-poverty program.

"The Office of Economic Opportunity welcomes inspection and review of its programs. Our office is at your service if your newspaper wishes facts or figures or information on what the OEO is doing.

"I can't say that I thank you for presenting an editorial which I do not believe was balanced, but I am not unmindful of pro and con controversy about the program. I support such discussion, and only urge that it be done with objectivity, in the public interest."

In May 1966, the Republican minority[77] (with one exception) of the House Education and Labor Committee had issued a 100-page compendium of criticism in a minority report assailing OEO for abuses, scandals and mismanagement. The report urged the dismantling of OEO, and the substitution of an "Opportunity Crusade," in its place. Under the plan the Job Corps and Neighborhood Youth Corps would be placed in the Labor Department, Adult Educations programs would go to the Office of Education, leaving only the Community Action Program and VISTA in OEO.[78] Shriver's comment on the report as issued by OEO on June 2: "...I have read the so-called Minority Report. It is nothing other than a patchwork of old newspaper clippings and worn rumors, gossip and alleged scandals, the vast majority of which have been proven wrong over and over again, or where there was substance, the situation has long since been corrected. In the communication field, there is a well-known technique called 'the big lie' which says that if you repeat something over and over again people may believe it..."

Not all of the surveys condemned OEO, by any means. In October,

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77 The report was signed by Reps. William N. Ayres, Ohio; Albert H. Quie, Minn.; Charles E. Goodell, New York; John M. Ashbrook, Ohio; Dave Martin, Neb.; Alphonzo Bell, Calif.; Glenn Andrews, Fla.; and Edward J. Gurney, Fla.. Of the Republican committee members, only Rep. Ogden R. Reid, New York, did not join in the dissent.

78 On July 17, 1968, the Senate voted to transfer Head Start to the Office of Education effective July 1, 1969. And, on July 25, the House approved an amendment to transfer Upward Bound to the Office of Education, effective immediately. These actions will be discussed in the final chapter.

1966, the Christian Science Monitor asked its correspondents throughout the United States to assess the federal anti-poverty program's first 18 months. "They have found some 'tooling up,' some solid achievement, but much disorder and faltering," the italic precede to the series, written by William C. Selover, said. "This newspaper," said the first article, "found that the process alone of getting local communities to accept the challenges of cooperation--to sacrifice petty political and bureaucratic interests--has been so formidable that the initial expenditure of time and money was beyond anyone's expectation." In his fifth article, Selover said: "Nobody's amazed that problems and potential scandals have turned up. In the bright lights of vast publicity the war on poverty is being watched for every false move, by newspapers, by OEO itself, by the Administration, by local and State governments, and by the political opposition. What is remarkable is not that such instances have cropped up, but that there have been so few of them, and that in the sizable majority of local programs, there hasn't been a whisper of scandal."

That conclusion proceeded from a lead which said:

"The American 'war on poverty' may have established some kind of all-time record."

"Believe it or not, in the nearly two years of operation, there hasn't been even a whisper of scandal in the administration of the overwhelming majority of programs across the country...

That is not to say that the programs have been wholly efficient. They haven't in many cases.

But, in general, the local administrators have taken great care to maintain close watch on funds and to keep the programs free of patronage of graft..."

Real problems and difficulties did exist, the paper said, "but, unfortunately for the program such stories paint a completely distorted view of the program as a whole...

On the other hand, the findings of this Monitor survey are so unexpected as to be newsworthy and pertinent. It may also prove important simply because Congressmen and other opponents of the program have capitalized on the relatively few shortcomings of the program, without pointing out the remarkably clean record of the majority of the programs.

Still, the story is indisputable. In city after city, Monitor reporters found the same freedom from dishonesty and graft."

In February, 1966, Shriver told a Chicago Sun-Times reporter:

"I suppose maybe we shouldn't have started so many programs so fast and we wouldn't have got so many people excited... Maybe we should have limited the amount of programs we put out and waited six months longer to do some of the things we did. Things would have been much quieter and calmer but the poor wouldn't have been helped so much."

EARLY ACCOMPLISHMENTS

From the beginning, and afterward, up until the day he left OEO on May 6, 1968, to become the U.S. Ambassador to France, Shriver had maintained that struggle was part of the War Against Poverty. In September, 1965, he told Newsweek that "abrasiveness and conflict are part of being alive. I do not see waiting just because we don't have it all worked out. If you worried about the sixteenth hurdle before you started, you'd never get over the tenth hurdle." Before that, in the days of the first orders of business, Shriver had made his attitude toward unenlightened criticism clear when he said, "For six months we had our sign out like a lawyer's shingle begging for con-

structive ideas on how to wage this war. Those who have challenged the substantive parts of our program have been asked by me to come up with something better. For a half-year I've been saying: 'If you've got a better mousetrap, show us,'and they proposed nothing. Our program has been endorsed by economists and by an extraordinary cross-section of business leaders--men who certainly would not lend themselves to any crass vote-getting scheme. We are the first to admit we don't have all the answers. This is a war that is going to require social inventiveness, just as we needed military inventiveness when we were plunged into World War II.

"When I started serving in the Submarine Corps (He entered as an apprentice seaman and emerged as a Lieutenant Commander), I remember our torpedoes hitting an enemy ship and never exploding. We have the same job now of perfecting our weapons and developing new ones."

The War Against Poverty, said one reporter, started off like the cowboy who jumped on a horse and rode off in all directions at once looking for the Indians. Shriver himself said, in 1966 recalling the earlier times, "it's like we went down to Cape Kennedy and launched a half-dozen rockets at once." He had said too, even earlier than that, "The American People are just plain confused about what the poverty program is all about. It's just like giving an American sports page to an Englishman."

And yet, in its first Congressional Presentation of April, 1965, OEO could justifiably say:

"In its first six months the War on Poverty translated a Congressional mandate into a working program." It did not wait, stated the report,

"until perfection could be guaranteed, or criticism avoided," having determined at the outset that such an approach would condemn programs to committees or the drafting boards.

"In these first days," the report went on, "many of the myths about poverty, and what would happen when OEO was established, were effectively destroyed," including the charges:

--that no Southern official would voluntarily cooperate with Negro leaders in local anti-poverty programs;

--that the poor were apathetic, inarticulate, incapable of working for their own welfare in organized systems;

--that nobody would volunteer for VISTA without the exotic appeal of service in foreign countries;

--that Negroes would not live with whites in Job Corps Centers, or vice versa;

--that towns and cities wouldn't want Job Corps camps nearby.

The first signs, said Shriver in the presentation, were encouraging:

"We have a Job Corps.

We have a Neighborhood Youth Corps.

There are Community Action programs all across the country.

Work Study, Work Experience and Adult Basic Education are in operation as are the Small Business and Rural Loan programs.

VISTA Volunteers are at Work.

The beginning has not only shown the difficulty, but the possibility."

By the time OEO celebrated its first fiscal birthday--at the cal-

endar age of less than eight months--it had a number of facts and accomplishments to record. This it did in its First Annual Report, entitled, "A Nation Aroused." "In a short time," the introduction said, "the War on Poverty has produced--as it must--quantifiable results, numerical results. We know for example, that by December 1965, 440,071 young men and women had participated in Neighborhood Youth Corps projects, that 104,017 unemployed adults had benefited from Work Experience programs, that Office of Economic Opportunity programs had reached 178 of the Nation's 182 poorest counties, that a total of 4,896,873 poor persons had been helped--directly and indirectly--by our programs." The report contained charts and graphs to document the accomplishments listed.

"But the War on Poverty is not simply a series of numerical results," it continued. "it is also a means of arousing, of mobilizing, of harnessing the moral energies and the conscience of the American people...

"The 16,946 young men and women who, on December 3 were earning and learning in 76 Job Corps Centers is an important and an impressive figure. So is the fact that 561,359 children received valuable pre-school training during the summer of 1965 through Project Head Start. But just as impressive is the fact that within a very short time span, millions of Americans--the 'haves' and the 'have nots'--have looked inward at their country, their neighbors and themselves and admitted that there were problems that needed solving."

The report contained tables to show that in its first eight months OEO had: More than 10,000 enrollees in the Job Corps in 36 Conservation Centers, seven Men's Urban Centers and five Women's Centers; 278,426 enrollees involved in 639 projects in Neighborhood Youth Corps activities; 1,120 educational institutions conducting Work-Study pro-

grams for 38,015 students in the Spring program, 40,761 in the Summer program and 107,525 in the Fall program; 15 approved state plans for Adult Basic Education programs and 25 with conditional approval involving 37,991 participants; had granted 10,984 individual loans totaling $18,733,800 and 82 cooperative loans totaling $929,200 in the Rural Loan program; had extended 159 Small Business Loans totaling $1,766,350; had 88,700 trainees in 164 Work Experience projects; had placed 202 VISTA Volunteers in the field and had 851 more in Training; under the extensive CAP program had given 315 grants for program development, 313 grants for administration, eight for technical assistance, 84 for research, training and demonstration projects; 53 grants for work with Migrant workers; and, in the Head Start program had given 2,398 grants for work with 561,356 children in 13,344 centers attended by 46,182 non-professional employees hired from among the poor and 96,540 volunteer workers.

In its Second Annual Report, issued in 1966, OEO summed up some of the lessons it had learned:

> The poverty program was meant to be both a pivot for experiment and a focus for change. Gradually, this has begun to happen.
>
> ...Possibly the most heartening gain since last year has come from human resources. Because the War on Poverty is an experiment in people, any success we have had is accountable to something deeper than money, something nobler than the fad-value of idealism--it comes from the aspirations of people who are willing to use their own energies to fulfill their own needs. We have slowly evolved out of the New Deal philosophy of welfare into a new federalism whereby the work of a democratic government is not of finding things to do for the people, but to let the people do things for themselves...
>
> For countless Americans, the War on Poverty has pro-

duced personal results that will never be told in headlines and has brought private changes too deep for print. The ultimate outcome, assuredly, will not be known for some time- as was remarked, we do not fight on the winning side, but we fight to determine that poverty is being eliminated and the poor are being listened to. The nation has been alerted..."