

**DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
REFERRED TO IN RECORDINGS OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS**

During the course of the Dominican Crisis in April and May 1965, numerous telephone conversations between President Johnson and his advisors, and between the advisors themselves, were recorded by the White House. Many of these conversations took place between U.S. officials in the Dominican Republic and those in Washington, DC, over non-secure telephone lines. Because they were concerned about their conversations being intercepted, the conversants often made reference to information in documents that each side had in their possession to discuss sensitive topics or individuals.

Since these conversations are often cryptic unless the listener also has copies of the documents in hand, the Library staff has compiled this reference set of documents for use in listening to the conversations. **Please use the original file location to reference these documents.**

<u>Citation #</u>	<u>Tape #</u>	<u>Document #</u>	<u>File Location</u> (see below)
7767	WH 6505.24	5, 5a, 5b	II
7773, 7774, 7775	WH 6505.25	5, 5a, 5b	II
7776	WH 6505.25	96	I
7784	WH 6505.26	89, 95	I
7792	WH 6505.27	84	I
7807	WH 6505.28	58	I
7809	WH 6505.28	54, 55	I
7810	WH 6505.28	54, 55	I
7814, 7815, 7816	WH 6505.29	54, 55	I
7817	WH 6505.30	54, 55	I
7818	WH 6505.30	54, 55	I
7820	WH 6505.30	54, 55	I
7821	WH 6505.30	54, 55	I
7824	WH 6505.30	49	I
7913, 7914, 7915	SR 6505.01	95	I
7917, 7918, 7919	SR 6505.02	95	I
7922	SR 6505.02	91	I
7924	SR 6505.02	103, 116	I
7942	SR 6505.03	84, 89, 90	I
7953	SR 6505.03	47	III
8005	SR 6505.05	80, 91	I
8011	SR 6505.05	79, 80, 84, 89, 90	I
8024	SR 6505.06	91	I

File Location:

- I. National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, "Davidson," Box 51, Document # (as listed).
- II. National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, "Dominican Republic Vol. IV," Box 39, Document # (as listed).
- III. National Security File, Files of Gordon Chase, "Bundy's Mission on the Dominican Problem," Box 2, Document # (as listed).

OUTGOING

Amembassy SANTO DOMINGO

91

FILES
BUNDY

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Date:

MAY 19, 1965
11:05 A:M

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-522

By *[Signature]* NARA, Date 3/15/94ACTION: SecState WASHINGTON FLASH - 1805
FROM VANCE, PALMER, BUNDY AND BENNETT**EXDIS**

In the event negotiations fail today, we recommend that following modification of plan proposed in 1776 be carried out ASAP, H-hour to be determined by General Palmer:

Loyalists have now moved beyond line proposed in 1776 and have taken Radio Santo Domingo. They are somewhat flushed with success. If they are permitted to take all of area north of LOC, Imbert will be increasingly difficult to deal with. Proposed plan would deny to him area east of Avenida Duarte, extending to Isabela and Ozama River. Hard core of rebel forces north of LOC is located in area extending from Radio Santo Domingo Vila to Riza Consuela. Proposed plan would leave hard core between loyalist forces and ~~hard part~~ LOC. Thus, rebels would be faced with choice of fighting in place or leaving their weapons and retiring to area south of LOC. We believe recommended plan would establish better conditions both for true cease-fire and for political settlement since it interposes US forces between loyalists and rebels, except in Vila Consuela. We also believe this action would give evidence of a ^{credible} ~~credible~~ position of US impartiality. Disadvantages of plan are: (1) risk of further alienating Imbert and loyalist military leaders; (2) action might be interpreted by Caamaño forces as strengthening their position by protection.

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FORM FS-413P
10-64~~SECRET~~

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11:05 Change:

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Date:

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forces from superior loyalist forces. But this is not all bad, given probable conflict among rebels on political proposals.

We believe plan could be carried out with minimum difficulty and that casualties, both military and civilian, would be light. Estimated time to carry out plan in daylight is four hours. If done at night and surprise is effected, it might be accomplished in less time.

We feel OAS should be notified shortly before execution, but not so far in advance as to tip off loyalist and rebel forces. We do not believe UN should be notified in advance.

We should not discuss this plan on open telephone as both sides are monitoring.

GP 2.

BENNETT

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OUTGOING

Embassy SANTO DOMINGO

FILES
BUNDY ← Charge:

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Date:

May 19, 1965
10:45 am

ACTION: SecState WASHINGTON FLASH 1801
FROM BUNDY, VANCE, BENNETT AND PALMER

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-522
By plap. NARA, Date 3/15/96

EXDIS

Loyalists have taken Radio Santo Domingo. We believe all our interests would be greatly advanced by prompt repair of station and its return to air under OAS auspices. Bennett and Vance are pressing Imbert soonest for his agreement, playing high card that Radio will not ~~run~~ run unless we fix it. Then Bennett and Bundy will press Mora for interim OAS sponsorship. Ryan and Palmer are mobilizing all assets to repair transmitter soonest.

Can you press OAS Washington in most expeditious way to bolster Mora in this concern. Nothing could do more to move us forward here than a strong radio that tells truth and preaches peace and national concord. If we cannot ^{fit} fix this much under OAS mandate we and they deserve to suffer UN interference and all other woes.

This project highly sensitive because:

- a. Imbert has not agreed.
- b. rebels would raise hell if they knew about it
- c. Imbert needs time to clear area of snipers and we need time to clear booby traps when he agrees.

So telephone talk on this must be extremely careful.

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FORM 10-64

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MAY 17, 1965
3:30 P:M

BUNDY ✓

ACTION: SecState WASHINGTON FLASH - 1756

LIMDIS

Following is summary of situation at 11:00 a.m. today, Washington time as reported in telephone conversation to Washington:

Attitude of Imbert: Mann, Vaughn and Bennett saw Imbert on May 15 and informed him our plan to work for Government of National Concord built around Guzman. His reaction was immediate and strongly adverse. On May 16, Imbert called Mann, Bundy, Bennett and other Emboffs and took same strong line in opposition to our plan. Substance his position is that only a few days ago we had requested him and his four colleagues assume responsibility of government and that we are now pulling rug out from under him. He used the word "double cross". Said that since he took control armed forces have been revitalized and in 2-1/2 days, offensive north of line of communication, 600 rebel prisoners have been taken (we believe this may be reasonably accurate), killed 200 and has only 800 north of LOC and some 1000-1500 south of LOC to deal with. Claims that in four days rebellion will be crushed. While we believe these figures and estimates are overly optimistic there is no doubt that loyalist forces have made steady advances north of LOC in last two days. Imbert and Zeller both state that Guzman will be nothing but a puppet of Bosch and that another Bosch regime would again open doors to growth of communist influence and lead to another bloodbath. Claims he is under strong pressure

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NLJ 92-522 appeal

By WJW, NARA, Date 3/15/96

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of armed forces and all anti-communist elements in country to hold firm
threatens
in opposing return of Bosch to power. He alternatively ~~threatens~~ to resign
require
predicting that this would/occupation of entire country by US forces and
to publicly denounce US for opening the gates to the return of PRD
extremism and communism. We are countering these ~~obvious~~ ~~obvious~~
obvious
reactions with arguments and at same time pointing out to him that while
we will continue to work for establishment of a coalition government
this can be accomplished.
under Guzman, there can be no certainty at this time ~~that any success~~.

Attitude of San Isidro Forces: Loyalist forces only a few days ago
had low morale because of their failure to deal quickly and effectively
with rebellion. Today they think they are winning and are more difficult
than
to deal with ~~than~~ they were even two days ago. While professing to accept
in principle idea Guzman coalition regime and while apparently willing to
send de los Santos and Caminero to military jobs in Washington, they are
insisting on arrangements which will not destroy armed forces on the one
hand and on the other some face saving device for agreeing to 1963 Bosch con-
stitution. Latest suggestion is that acceptance of constitution be followed
by a referendum within 60 days on question of public support for 1963
constitution. Army, Air Force and Navy leaders say frequently that acceptance
of constitution without referendum will mean that their resistance to
revolt had ~~no~~ ^{no} basis and that they have sent men needlessly to die.
we authorized restraint of Dominican if necessary
Yesterday ~~it was necessary to restrain Air Force planes from taking off by~~

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parking vehicles on runway. Navy has threatened to bombard city but we doubt they will carry out this threat. We must be aware of possibility that if we push Imbert and San Isidro forces ^{too} far they could conceivably make foolish ~~follik~~ attack on US forces. We do not think this is ^{probable} ~~possibility~~ but we should not underestimate depth of hatreds in this country and strength of their feeling about Bosch. It was the personality of Bosch which unified majority of officer corps in Army, Navy and Air Force.

GUZMAN ASPECTS *fact*

We continue in close touch with Guzman attempting to complete arrangements outlined in Puerto Rico. Main stumbling block is command of military forces. Yesterday, after a first sobering encounter with rebel military leadership, Guzman backed away entirely from plan for agreed Secretary of ~~af~~ Armed Forces. When we offered possibility of a beginning without such a secretary he returned with proposal that rebels should designate Chief ^{de Leon} of Army and showed no enthusiasm for either ~~Aristiz~~ or Valdez. This morning he has amplified this position.

He maintains that fundamental requirement in Army first must be ability to command confidence of those who control armed civilians. Guzman asserts that disarming civilians is of ^{capital} ~~essential~~ importance in his judgment. He initially hoped we would accept proposal that he choose Army chief from list of three rebel nominees. Last night and again this morning we told him flatly that name of any Secretary of Armed Forces and name of Chief of Staff of Army must be agreed precisely between us before any final bargain is possible. He accepted this position and has gone off to see rebel

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leaders to test possibilities. His own belief is still that neither de Leon or Valdez will serve and he has now pressed, three times, with great insistence for us to accept Rafael Fernandez as Army Chief. He believes that Fernandez is the only man who has full rebel confidence without having liability of direct ^{part} ~~check~~ in outrages of war. We have not tested Fernandez with the other side but we have our own doubts about him.

We reopened ~~with~~ Bosch's early proposal of Gonzales ~~XXXXXX~~ ^{Pomaris} for Secretary of Armed Forces. We proposed ~~and~~ ^{to} tested this also with loyalist leaders. We will do ~~our~~ ^{our} best to see if this possibility/^{or} Sosa Estrada is workable.

When we tested Guzman on loyalist desire have face saving device under constitution, he too exploded. The constitution to him is the sacred objective of the revolution~~and~~ and any compromise of any sort is asserted to be an insult to the rebel dead. We ~~pressed~~ pressed upon him our own ignorant but firm belief that there was more than one way to reaffirm a constitution but if he heard us he did not admit it.

We ~~also~~ ^{He} also tried on Guzman three names suggested yesterday by loyalist forces for Minister of the Armed Forces. ~~He rejected~~ ^{He rejected} all three with equal firmness, if varied ^{acceptable but} passion. Benoit was obviously least ~~acceptable~~ ^{unpromising} ~~Amiana~~ ^{Amiana} made him ~~smile~~ ^{smile} and Pagan described as impossible. In this ~~promising~~ ^{promising} atmosphere we avoided discussion of loyalist cabinet nominations.

In spite of Guzman's reluctance to return to understanding of PR we have pressed him hard to consider again the possible value of de Leon and

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consider acceptable.
and Valdez as Army Chiefs since we ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ both men. We have also pressed him with particular strength to consider continuation of Jimenez as Chief of Navy, since Jimenez would have great appeal not only to professional services but to wider circles as able and honest officer. On this last point at least Guzman personally was sympathetic.

For obvious reasons we have agreed with Guzman that final agreement is not imminent. We continue to tell him that speed is of the essence and we shall meet him at least once more today, mainly on this critical question of military leadership. Conversation with Guzman this morning complicated by discovery that two of his most respected friends in ~~Sanct~~ Santiago had been jailed apparently on ^{GNR} orders ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ last night. We ^(in connection general strike effort Santiago) are trying to spring these hypothetical future statesmen.

In the last 24 hours there are for the first time indications that Caamaño may be willing to talk seriously in deal. The OAS Commission was invited to talk with Caamaño. Caamaño called Papal Nuncio to rebel zone yesterday afternoon ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ and Embassy USIS officer received an indirect feeler with a Caamaño suggestion for a complex negotiating setup which would involve the UN and OAS as well as Nuncio. Nuncio has just reported to Bennett that he told Caamaño and Aristy that he had been misled and reportedly accused Aristy to his face of being a communist. Nuncio reported Aristy left the room in high dudgeon but ^{Nuncio} had impression that rebel military leaders were in agreement with ^{his} ~~Nuncio's~~ position. Guzman's Spanish military aide,

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Colonel Herrera told Bundy yesterday after two explosive meetings with Guzman and rebel leaders that he assessed Aristy as communist seeking to prevent US-Guzman agreement. Disruptive efforts by Aristy have marked all Martin negotiations too. ^{OAS} OAS Committee is insisting again on returning to Washington. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ They infer we are preventing their departure by stalling on transportation. We are offering them ride to Washington on return flight of plane which brings Solomon and his group in at 5:30. Will however make another effort to get at least Panamanian and Colombian Reps to stay behind. They complain about lack of creature comforts and are ^{incensed} ~~incensed~~ about UN intervention. We suspect they also consider their dignity involved by lack of success in obtaining cease fire and probably feel that they will become too deeply involved in whole Dominican situation.

For some time OAS has been trying to bring Casamaño and Imbert together for talks. Until we are sure our efforts with Guzman will succeed, we believe it is in our interest to keep all lines open, though consider this one only a listening wire at this time.

GP 2.

BENNETT
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Dictated by Mr. Davidson 4:15 PM - 5/13/65

It is understood that Juan Bosch will support the following objectives:

- ✓ 1. For President, Silvestre Antonio Guzman
- ✓ 2. Juan Bosch proposes that he talk with Balaguer
 - A. To enlist his support for the plan and the new government, and
 - B. To inquire whether he would serve in the Cabinet or would suggest one of his associates for the Cabinet.

No 3. Juan Bosch will support for the Cabinet Julio Postigo.

Really better to get agreement on Minister of Defense

4. J. B. recognizes that the Cabinet might include a person -- whether or not a military officer -- who would have special appeal to the San Isidro forces, and he will endeavor to suggest name or names.

5. J. B. is of the opinion that Colonel Coromines -- not his brother, Lt. Col. Enrique Coromines -- could be a satisfactory Chief of the Army. Bosch thinks that Coromines is now commander of the Mao fortress.

6. Communists. Last night's paper sets forth the understanding. The detailed procedures will have to be worked out with the new President with the object of accomplishing an effective job utilizing the resources available to all concerned.

7. OAS and the President of the US would appear jointly as functioning to bring this about in cooperation with the Dominican people.

MANN NOW ?

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