

**DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
REFERRED TO IN RECORDINGS OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS**

During the course of the Dominican Crisis in April and May 1965, numerous telephone conversations between President Johnson and his advisors, and between the advisors themselves, were recorded by the White House. Many of these conversations took place between U.S. officials in the Dominican Republic and those in Washington, DC, over non-secure telephone lines. Because they were concerned about their conversations being intercepted, the conversants often made reference to information in documents that each side had in their possession to discuss sensitive topics or individuals.

Since these conversations are often cryptic unless the listener also has copies of the documents in hand, the Library staff has compiled this reference set of documents for use in listening to the conversations. **Please use the original file location to reference these documents.**

<u>Citation #</u>	<u>Tape #</u>	<u>Document #</u>	<u>File Location</u> (see below)
7767	WH 6505.24	5, 5a, 5b	II
7773, 7774, 7775	WH 6505.25	5, 5a, 5b	II
7776	WH 6505.25	96	I
7784	WH 6505.26	89, 95	I
7792	WH 6505.27	84	I
7807	WH 6505.28	58	I
7809	WH 6505.28	54, 55	I
7810	WH 6505.28	54, 55	I
7814, 7815, 7816	WH 6505.29	54, 55	I
7817	WH 6505.30	54, 55	I
7818	WH 6505.30	54, 55	I
7820	WH 6505.30	54, 55	I
7821	WH 6505.30	54, 55	I
7824	WH 6505.30	49	I
7913, 7914, 7915	SR 6505.01	95	I
7917, 7918, 7919	SR 6505.02	95	I
7922	SR 6505.02	91	I
7924	SR 6505.02	103, 116	I
7942	SR 6505.03	84, 89, 90	I
7953	SR 6505.03	47	III
8005	SR 6505.05	80, 91	I
8011	SR 6505.05	79, 80, 84, 89, 90	I
8024	SR 6505.06	91	I

File Location:

- I. National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, "Davidson," Box 51, Document # (as listed).
- II. National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, "Dominican Republic Vol. IV," Box 39, Document # (as listed).
- III. National Security File, Files of Gordon Chase, "Bundy's Mission on the Dominican Problem," Box 2, Document # (as listed).

TELEGRAM

INCOMING

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

~~TOP SECRET~~
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Control:

Recd:

-2-

- (2) TO INQUIRE WHETHER HE WOULD SERVE IN THE CABINET OR WOULD SUGGEST ONE OF HIS ASSOCIATES FOR THE CABINET.
3. J.B. WILL SUPPORT FOR THSV CABINET: JULIO POSTIGO
4. J.B. REVAGNIZES THAT THE CABINET MIGHT INCLUDE A PERSON, WHETHER OR NOT A MILITARY OFFICER, WHO WOULD HAVE SPECIAL APPEAL TO THE SAN ISIDRO FORCES -- AND HE WILL ENDEAVOR TO SUGGEST NAME OR NAMES.
5. J.B. IS OF THE OPINION THAT COL COROMINES (NOT HIS BROTHER LICOL ENRIQUE COROMINES) COULD BE A SATISFACTORY CHIEF OF THE ARMY. BOSCH THINKS THAT COL COROMINES IS NOW COMMANDER OF THE MAO FORTRESS.
6. COMMUNISTS - LAST NIGHT'S PAPER SETS FORTH THE UNDERSTANDING. THE DETAILED PROCEDURES WILL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT WITH THE NEW PRESIDENT WITH THE OBJECT OF ACCOMPLISHING AN EFFECTIVE JOB UTILIZING THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO ALL CONCERNED.
7. OAS - THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S. TO APPEAR JOINTLY AS FUNCTIONING TO BRING THIS ABOUT IN COOPERATION OF THE DOMINICAN PEOPLE. END QUOTE.

DOCUMQT NUMBER THREE.

(AGREED TO BY JUAN BOSCH AND SILVESTRE ANTONIO GUZMAN ON 15 MAY 1965 IN THE PRESENCE OF DAVIDSON, CYRUS VANCE, MCGEORGE BUNDY AND BENITEZ.)

QUOTE: 1. POSTIGO - NO LONGER AGREEABLE.

2. SAN ISIDRO - SOMEONE SHOULD BE PROPOSED FOR THE CABINET BY SAN ISIDRO FORCES - PREFERABLY A CIVILIAN.

3. MINISTER OF ARMED FORCES - SOMEONE SELECTED MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY TO SAN ISIDRO AND TO CAAMAANO FORCES. POSSIBLE -- IF THERE ISSGGREEMENT ON THIS, MAY NOT BE NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT PARA TWO, EXAMPLE, SOMEONE PROPOSED BY SAN ISIDRO FORCES FOR THE CABINET.

4. COL COROMINES FOR CHIEF OF ARMY BUT A BETTER MAN MIGHT BE

CHS

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-3-

COL DE LEON OR COL ADRIANO VALDES. (VALDES STRONGER AND PROBABLY PREFERRED BY DE LEON PEOPLE.)

5. COMMUNISTS AND TRUJILLISTAS.

INTERNMENT

INTERMENT OR DEPARTURE -- PERMISSIBLE BUT MAY BE PRACTICAL DISADVANTAGES.

IT IS SUGGESTED THAT BETTER METHOD WOULD BE FOR PERSON OR PERSONS OF OUR OWN CHOOSING AND THE MAN WHO IS GOING TO BE MINISTER OF POLICE TO GET TOGETHER AND COME TO AGREEMENT AS TO HOW BEST TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE AND THE ASSISTANCE OF OUR PERSONNEL WILL BE SOUGHT AND REOINED FOR SUCH TIME AS MAY BE NECESSARY. U.S. MAN OR MEN SHOULD BE OF SPANISH BACKGROUND AND SPANISH SPEAKING. END QUOTE.

DOCUMENT NUMBER FOUR.

(THIS IS THE STATEMENT TO BE MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S. AS AGREED TO ON, I THINK, 13 MAY 1965.)

QUOTE: I HOPE THAT THE OAS MISSION PRESENTLY IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC WILL RAPIDLY FIND A SOLUTION THAT WILL AT THE SAME TIME ASSURE FOR THE DOMINICAN PEOPLE THE PRINCIPLES OF A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION AND A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY ABLE TO MAINTAIN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STABILITY. IF THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE OAS SUCCEED IN ACHIEVING THIS SOLUTION THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL OFFER ALL NECESSARY ASSISTANCE TOWARDS RAPID ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. END QUOTE.

GP-1. RUSK

CHS

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TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

INCOMING

AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO

ACTION: AMB
INFO: BUNDY

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Control: (19) 80

Recd MAY 20, 1965
4:38 PM

FLASH

FROM: WHITE HOUSE

NO : 202054Z

CITE CAP65180. FROM MOYERS TO VANCE AND BUNDY
EMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO

URGENTLY REQUEST YOUR SEPARATE VIEWS ON FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

1. ASSUMING PLAN COMPLETED WITH REBELS, WHAT IS YOUR APPRAISAL OF POSSIBILITY OF SECURING NEEDED ACCEPTANCE OR ACQUIESCENT FROM IMBERT FORCES?

2. HOW WOULD YOU PROCEED AND WHAT MEANS WOULD YOU USE IN SEEKING THIS.

3. WHAT ARE YOUR VIEWS NOW AND PALMER'S AS TO MILITARY FEASIBILITY OF STOPPING LOYALISTS AT PRESENT POINTS ACHIEVED IN THE NORTH? SEE FLASH 1805.

4. WHAT ARE YOUR VIEWS AS TO RESPONSE AND EFFECTS OF NOTIFICATION TO IMBERT IMMEDIATELY TO STOP ANY ADVANCE IN NORTHERN SECTOR AND, AS A SEPARATE BUT RELATED MATTER, IF IMBERT DOES NOT COMPLY, EFFECTS OF U. RM TROOP INTERPOSITION AT PRESENT LINE OF LOYALIST ADVANCE IN NORTH?

I 5. WHAT ARE YOUR VIEWS AS TO POSSIBILITY OF PROMPT AGREEMENT ON ALL REMAINING POINTS WITH GUZMAN REGARDLESS OF WHETHER NOMINEES WHO ARE ACCEPTABLE TO GUZMAN AND US WILL AGREE TO SERVE?

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-530

By *[signature]*, NARA, Date 3/15/96

JHH

~~SECRET~~

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Embassy SANTI DOMINGO

84

AMB
BUNDY
DUMMY CHRON

Charge:

~~SECRET~~
Classification

Control:

Date: MAY 20, 1965
1:15 AM

ACTION: SecState WASHINGTON 1830

FLASH

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-530

By lig, NARA, Date 8-22-95

EXDIS

FROM BUNDY

1. This has been a day of much movement, but conclusions are hard to find.
2. Most important event is capture of Radio Sante Domingo by Imbert. This evening he agreed again with Bennett that Station should be run by OAS. Moreover he agrees with us that OAS umbrella should shelter firm U. S. management. He has promised to announce this decision at ten Thursday morning. Effective use of RSD may be decisive in the coming week. We all believe that now is the time for Don Wilson to come. He should be here Thursday without fail and he should be ready to stay awhile. He is not needed tonight because station is still on the blink.
3. Next most important event is rapid Imbert advance in area north of LCC. This advance has no final strategic value to Imbert, because it does not touch real rebel stronghold. But it lifts morale far beyond its real meaning, and there is no Guzman solution in sight tonight that would not be rejected & out of hand by Imbert and loyalist military. This does not mean that Guzman solution is impossible. I continue to believe it makes more sense than any other. But I do not think it can be concluded at an acceptable cost until Imbert and Company

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- 2 -

find out that their small victories north of LCC have no lasting value. They must learn again that rebels will probably remain in control of heart of city which is heart of country. Inbert forces cannot dislodge them and our forces will not--if it can be avoided.

4. Further block to early settlement--but not to a later solution-- is reported death of Rafael Fernandez Dominguez in attack on Inbert-held Palace. This will shock Bosch deeply, though Gusman has taken it calmly. Utterly cynical rebel assertion that U. S. shot him in the back is seen for what it is by Gusman, but Caamaño is on the air making as much emotional noise as possible. Unless Commies killed him in Spanish war style, Fernandez died soldier's death he partly sought, and three U. S. Marines were wounded resisting rebel action about the same time. For a hot fire fight front and back are silly words. But rebels will be stirred, and Gusman will be rightly reenforced in his growing conviction that the men downtown are in no mood for reason.

5. Meanwhile Solomon and Company are at work, and the country is not repeat not coming apart.

6. In this situation I think we probably need a carefully staged pause. No solution appears possible now, but we should soon have on the side of peace the following: (a) time (b) the end of the northern battle, and (c) Radio Santo Domingo. Both Inbert and rebels should learn in coming days that neither of them is going to win a war. RSD should be preaching peace; Solomon should be practicing good works by ~~continued~~

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- 3 -

firmness Palmer should be able to prove that the U. S. is the one real power on the scene.

7. This pause can be signaled by our return or by our ostentatious settling in. On either basis we strongly believe we should be authorized to ^{begin} ~~begin~~ judicious briefing of press and equally judicious contacts with other personages here. We can spread message of peace and reconciliation to all, if we are authorized to do so. It is time.

8. Meanwhile this evening we gave Gusman draft documents sent forward in our 1824, and we also discussed present shape of Cabinet. He kept documents for study and he apparently wants to send Bosch both of them. We will stall on this pending your advice because private document is pretty hot. On Cabinet Gusman showed usual tendency to backslide a little toward familiar FRD friends, and usual tendency to do better when pressed. Details follow in separate telegram. I floated notion of brief delay in reaching final solution, on ground that both sides were in a bad mood for compromise. He did not quarrel but he did ask that any return of Washington team be accompanied by noises which would ~~leave~~ leave him in business. I reassured him that Gusman solution remained our choice.

9. It remains to report Gusman - Amiana contact. First meeting was correct and there will be another Thursday morning at ten. We think the two men respect each other. We think they also have a long way to go before ~~their~~ their minds really meet. We ~~continue~~ ~~submit~~ ~~unclassified~~

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- 1 -

that their conversations can only do good, and we will press them to keep on. But we will not use our biggest guns to seek immediate paper agreement between them unless you tell us to - if only because Amiana will not ~~expect~~ repeat not agree to serve under Gorman at this stage. This agreement is still my strong hope, but all concerned must be softened by a little time before it will be possible. Specifically, Amiana will accept only if his comrades in arms agree, and tonight they see no need for what they still call a "surrender" to Bosch." Moreover Amiana will certainly have a view of his own on critical question of Army Chief of Staff and we strongly doubt that he could accept Lora Fernandez. Vance thinks de Leon or Valdes may still be key here.

- 10. So let us make haste slowly and let us explain why.
- 11. Vance generally concurs.

B
BENNETT

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 MBundy:dft

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FILE
AMB
BUNDY ✓

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Control:

Date: MAY 19, 1965
8:10 PM

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-530

By lig, NARA, Date 8-22-95

ACTION: SecState WASHINGTON FLASH 1824

FROM BUNDY

EXDIS

1. The following are uncleared draft texts of two understandings.
2. These documents are only drafts not yet reviewed in detail with Guzman because of one day without diplomatic relations. They nevertheless reflect faithfully what he and I have orally agreed. I hope to discuss them with him this evening.
3. First document is "public" and second is "private" as explained below. First purpose of "public" paper is for Guzman to get agreement of all on his side to this basis of government, but paper is also drawn with a view to possible publication.
4. "Private" document repeats sense of public paper, but it is more precise on:
 - a. Management of Communists,
 - b. disarmament of civilians,
 - c. departures of officers in uniform, and
 - d. possible immediate withdrawal of one U. S. battalion.

I have presented it as a private understanding "at the Presidential level" to cover Guzman from having to show it to the whole downtown crowd.

5. You may want more about OAS in public paper, and I can probably arrange it. But except for some good work by Mora, OAS presence ^{here} has been

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Date:

feeble and ineffective in the extreme.
of "public" paper

6. Text/follows:

QUOTE: Statement of the Position of Antonio Guzman Toward the Formation of a Constitutional Government in the Dominican Republic, May 19, 1965:

1. Sr. Antonio Guzman has expressed his readiness to assume the office of President of the Dominican Republic, if duly chosen, on the following terms and with the following convictions:

2. Sr. Guzman will assume office only when qualified on the basis of the Constitution of 1963. He will at once call for a duly authorized national referendum, to take place within 60 days. This referendum will permit the Dominican people to reaffirm--or to oppose--this constitution. Full observation by the Organization of American States will be requested.

3. Sr. Guzman will establish a government of National Concord. This government will be broadly based. Members of the cabinet will reflect a broad spectrum of political, economic and social views. In particular, appointment will be offered to one member of the group which has been serving under General Inbert. This government will be equally opposed to extremists of left and right.

4. The military control of the new government will be non-political, and its professional leadership will be entrusted to officers who merit the confidence of the Dominican people and of all their fellow professionals.

5. Concerning active communists and trujillistas, Sr. Guzman holds the firm position that they present a problem for democracy.

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-3-

in the Dominican Republic and that effective measures must be taken by the constitutional government to protect the Dominican people from their subversive activities. Plans will be developed for the development and execution of such measures within constitutional terms.

6. It is in the interest of the Government of National Concord that the Inter-American Force establish its presence in the Dominican Republic as soon as possible. The United States forces will form a part of the Inter-American Force. It is not possible at this time to predict how long the presence of the Inter-American Force will be required in the Dominican Republic but withdrawal of components will begin as soon as possible.

7. Sr. Gusman has assurances from the Government of the United States that just as soon as a Government of National Concord is established and a full cease fire is assured, the United States will withdraw a substantial part of the U. S. military forces now in the Dominican Republic. The United States Government has informed him that further withdrawals will be made just as rapidly as the restoration of peace permits.

8. Sr. Gusman has also received assurances that the United States Government will ^{offer} ~~offer~~ strong emergency assistance in the task of restoring active economic life in the Dominican Republic, as well as the assistance already publicly proposed by President Johnson for rapid economic development.

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-4-

9. On taking office, Sr. Gusman will present a public accounting of all his properties and assets. He will then turn over the management of all these private interests to a trustee, and this trustee will conduct no business with any part of the Dominican Government, except routine for necessary ~~xxxxxx~~ dealings with the Agricultural Bank.

10. Sr. Gusman will approach his new duties, if chosen, in the determination that there shall be a spirit of reconciliation among all Dominicans. He will insist on this same attitude among all members of his cabinet and in all branches of the Dominican Government, civil and military alike. In particular he will insist that there be no acts of personal vengeance from any quarter. END OF TEXT.

Text of "private" paper follows:

QUOTE: MEMORANDUM

Communism

1. The Constitutional Government of National Concord will be firmly anti-communist and President Gusman will state this position in his inaugural address. The Government of National Concord will oppose communism and will so conduct its activities as to make this opposition entirely clear. It will prevent any confusion in the public mind by distinguishing in all its dealings between the truly democratic political parties and those responding to or influenced by communist doctrine. It will make certain the public understands that its aims do not coincide with those of the Communists.

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-5-

2. Persons identified as Communists or communist sympathizers will be placed under close observation by the Government of National Concord and, when detected breaking any law, will immediately be detained. Such other measures as may be necessary to contain the threat of communist subversion will be taken after appropriate consultation with the Government of the United States.

3. The Government of National Concord will not permit Communists or communist sympathizers to occupy positions in the Dominican Government, the Armed Forces or the National Police.

4. The Government of the United States will make available professional personnel with full competence in the Spanish language to assist the Government of National Concord in identifying Communists and communist sympathizers, and in controlling their activities. The greatest care will be taken to insure that the information in this field provided by the competent Dominican authorities is precise and detailed, and that innocent persons are not victimized.

5. Measures necessary to contain the communist threat will be the subject of continuing consultations between our two Governments. The Government of the United States reserves the right to re-examine the terms of the agreement reflected in this memorandum if the measures taken under it prove to be inadequate.

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-6-

1. President Gusman and his Government will firmly oppose the ^{spirit}~~spirit~~ of hatred and vengeance wherever it may be found. President Gusman, by example and word, will demonstrate to the entire nation his desire that all Dominicans be treated with absolute impartiality and fairness.

2. The task of disarming the civilian population will be the responsibility of the competent Dominican authorities. United States forces will not take an active role in this process but officers of these forces will be available for professional consultation if their Dominican counterparts should find it desirable. Persons who might wish to deliver their arms to the United States forces will be permitted to do so under appropriate safeguards.

Organization of American States

1. The process of establishing the Constitutional Government of National Concord will, to the maximum extent possible, take place with the participation and approval of the Organization of American States. President Gusman, with the cooperation of the United States Government, will attempt to insure that his Government and its efforts to restore national harmony receive the full endorsement of the OAS through the Special Commission appointed by the Tenth Meeting of Foreign Ministers.

2. The ~~same~~ Government of National Concord will request the sending of OAS observers to witness the referendum on the 1963 Constitution

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-7-

that is scheduled to be held within 60 days after the inauguration of President Guzman.

Withdrawal of U. S. Forces

President Johnson wishes to begin the withdrawal of U. S. forces at the earliest possible date. It will be recommended to him that the time for the withdrawal of the first units be determined immediately so that President Guzman may make an appropriate announcement in his inaugural address.

Departure of Military Officers

Any officer of the Dominican Armed Forces who has been involved on either side in the present conflict and who wishes to leave the country will be permitted to do so. Those leading officers of either side who wish to depart in uniform will be given appropriate official assignments abroad. END OF TEXT.

GP 2.

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MBundy:cp

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13

Date: May 19, 1965
1:40 p.m.

ACTION: SecState WASHINGTON FLASH 1809

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM VANCE AND PALMER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-24
By ig, NARA, Date 11-27-88

KIDIS

With reference to telephone conversation between Mr. Arnold and Vance:

1. No RPT no helicopter support whatsoever has been given to loyalist forces operating in the Santo Domingo area. On two different occasions, ~~one to~~ two helicopters have provided transportation for loyalists to locations up-country remote from Santo Domingo. In addition, we have transported both loyal and rebel leaders by US helicopters to meeting places in the ISZ for the purpose of negotiations. 16/17 May
twelve
xxxxxxx
2. With one accidental exception, we have not RPT not allowed any movement of armed individuals, regardless of identification, through the LOC or across the LOC or across the eastern boundary of the ISZ. The one exception was the relief in place of the loyal garrison which has held the Palace inside rebel territory since the beginning of the revolution. On 14 May, an English-speaking civilian talked the U. S. Marine Guard at the checkpoint on Avenida Bolivar on the eastern edge of the ISZ into allowing the passage of about 200 troops. These troops accomplished the relief and approximately the same number returned through the same checkpoint before General Palmer and Ambassador Bennett

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learned of the error. The rebels discovered the return movement and
apparently fired upon the troops on the way back. In response to the
rebel complaint to the OAS Commission, the error was explained as
described above.

3. Following material support has been given to loyalists: About
10,000 rations of Donkey Brand rice and 200 magazines to loyalist navy
(these naval forces have not yet been involved in the fighting in
the city but are on essential support missions) two small generators have
been loaned to the loyalist Air Force for its hospital and mess at
San Isidro; about 1000 rations were given to the loyalist Army.

4. Since the attack on Radio Santo Domingo by the loyalist Air
Force on 13 May, we have physically restrained loyalist combat
aircraft from taking off from San Isidro Airfield. This has been
accomplished with US troops and vehicles positioned around the parked
aircraft. Transport aircraft carrying rice to up-country locations
have been permitted to fly. No troops have moved on these aircraft.
Unarmed recon aircraft have been permitted to fly an average of one
mission per day.

GP 2.

BENNETT

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Amembassy SANTO DOMINGO

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MAY 19, 1965
11:05 A:M

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 92-522

By *[Signature]* NARA, Date 3/15/94

ACTION: SecState WASHINGTON FLASH - 1805
FROM VANCE, PALMER, BUNDY AND BENNETT

EXDIS

In the event negotiations fail today, we recommend that following modification of plan proposed in 1776 be carried out ASAP, H-hour to be determined by General Palmer:

Loyalists have now moved beyond line proposed in 1776 and have taken Radio Santo Domingo. They are somewhat flushed with success. If they are permitted to take all of area north of LOC, Imbert will be increasingly difficult to deal with. Proposed plan would deny to him area east of Avenida Duarte, extending to Isabela and Osama River. Hard core of rebel forces north of LOC is located in area extending from Radio Santo Domingo Vila to Rika Consuela. Proposed plan would leave hard core between loyalist forces and ~~hard part~~ of LOC. Thus, rebels would be faced with choice of fighting in place or leaving their weapons and retiring to area south of LOC. We believe recommended plan would establish better conditions both for true cease-fire and for political settlement since it interposes US forces between loyalists and rebels, except in Vila Consuela. We also believe this action would give evidence of a ^{credible} ~~creditable~~ position of US impartiality. Disadvantages of plan are: (1) risk of further alienating Imbert and loyalist military leaders; (2) action might be interpreted by Caamafio forces as strengthening their position by protection

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(TO DEPT 1805 dtd 19 May 65,
11:05 Charge:

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-2-

forces from superior loyalist forces. But this is not all bad, given probable conflict among rebels on political proposals.

We believe plan could be carried out with minimum difficulty and that casualties, both military and civilian, would be light. Estimated time to carry out plan in daylight is four hours. If done at night and surprise is effected, it might be accomplished in less time.

We feel CAS should be notified shortly before execution, but not so far in advance as to tip off loyalist and rebel forces. We do not believe UN should be notified in advance.

We should not discuss this plan on open telephone as both sides are monitoring.

GP 2.

BENNETT

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CVance:cp

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