

**DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
REFERRED TO IN RECORDINGS OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS**

During the course of the Dominican Crisis in April and May 1965, numerous telephone conversations between President Johnson and his advisors, and between the advisors themselves, were recorded by the White House. Many of these conversations took place between U.S. officials in the Dominican Republic and those in Washington, DC, over non-secure telephone lines. Because they were concerned about their conversations being intercepted, the conversants often made reference to information in documents that each side had in their possession to discuss sensitive topics or individuals.

Since these conversations are often cryptic unless the listener also has copies of the documents in hand, the Library staff has compiled this reference set of documents for use in listening to the conversations.

Please use the original file location to reference these documents.

<u>Citation #</u>	<u>Tape #</u>	<u>Document #</u>	<u>File Location</u> (see below)
7767	WH 6505.24	5, 5a, 5b	II
7773, 7774, 7775	WH 6505.25	5, 5a, 5b	II
7776	WH 6505.25	96	I
7784	WH 6505.26	89, 95	I
7792	WH 6505.27	84	I
7807	WH 6505.28	58	I
7809	WH 6505.28	54, 55	I
7810	WH 6505.28	54, 55	I
7814, 7815, 7816	WH 6505.29	54, 55	I
7817	WH 6505.30	54, 55	I
7818	WH 6505.30	54, 55	I
7820	WH 6505.30	54, 55	I
7821	WH 6505.30	54, 55	I
7824	WH 6505.30	49	I
7913, 7914, 7915	SR 6505.01	95	I
7917, 7918, 7919	SR 6505.02	95	I
7922	SR 6505.02	91	I
7924	SR 6505.02	103, 116	I
7942	SR 6505.03	84, 89, 90	I
7953	SR 6505.03	47	III
8005	SR 6505.05	80, 91	I
8011	SR 6505.05	79, 80, 84, 89, 90	I
8024	SR 6505.06	91	I

File Location:

- I. National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, "Davidson," Box 51, Document # (as listed).
- II. National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, "Dominican Republic Vol. IV," Box 39, Document # (as listed).
- III. National Security File, Files of Gordon Chase, "Bundy's Mission on the Dominican Problem," Box 2, Document # (as listed).

OUTGOING

Amembassy SANTO DOMINGO

91

FILES
BUNDY

Charge:

Classification

Control:

Date:

MAY 19, 1965
11:05 AM

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-522

By *[Signature]* NARA, Date 3/15/94

ACTION: SecState WASHINGTON FLASH - 1805
FROM VANCE, PALMER, BUNDY AND BENNETT

EXDIS

In the event negotiations fail today, we recommend that following modification of plan proposed in 1776 be carried out ASAP, H-hour to be determined by General Palmer:

Loyalists have now moved beyond line proposed in 1776 and have taken Radio Santo Domingo. They are somewhat flushed with success. If they are permitted to take all of area north of LOC, Imbert will be increasingly difficult to deal with. Proposed plan would deny to him area east of Avenida Duarte, extending to Isabela and Ozama River. Hard core of rebel forces north of LOC is located in area extending from Radio Santo Domingo Vila to ~~Rix~~ Consuela. Proposed plan would leave hard core between loyalist forces and ~~hard pan~~ of LOC. Thus, rebels would be faced with choice of fighting in place or leaving their weapons and retiring to area south of LOC. We believe recommended plan would establish better conditions both for true cease-fire and for political settlement since it interposes US forces between loyalists and rebels, except in Vila Consuela. We also believe this action would give evidence of a ^{credible} ~~creditable~~ position of US impartiality. Disadvantages of plan are: (1) risk of further alienating Imbert and loyalist military leaders; (2) action might be interpreted by Caamafio forces as strengthening their position by protection

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

hzk

FORM FS-413P
10-64

~~SECRET~~

COPY LBJ LIBRARY

OUTGOING

EMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO D R

(TO DEPT 1805 dtd 19 May 65,
11:05 Change:

Classification

Control:

Date:

-2-

forces from superior loyalist forces. But this is not all bad, given probable conflict among rebels on political proposals.

We believe plan could be carried out with minimum difficulty and that casualties, both military and civilian, would be light. Estimated time to carry out plan in daylight is four hours. If done at night and surprise is effected, it might be accomplished in less time.

We feel OAS should be notified shortly before execution, but not so far in advance as to tip off loyalist and rebel forces. We do not believe UN should be notified in advance.

We should not discuss this plan on open telephone as both sides are monitoring.

GP 2.

BENNETT

hak

CVance:ep

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"