

**DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
REFERRED TO IN RECORDINGS OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS**

During the course of the Dominican Crisis in April and May 1965, numerous telephone conversations between President Johnson and his advisors, and between the advisors themselves, were recorded by the White House. Many of these conversations took place between U.S. officials in the Dominican Republic and those in Washington, DC, over non-secure telephone lines. Because they were concerned about their conversations being intercepted, the conversants often made reference to information in documents that each side had in their possession to discuss sensitive topics or individuals.

Since these conversations are often cryptic unless the listener also has copies of the documents in hand, the Library staff has compiled this reference set of documents for use in listening to the conversations.

Please use the original file location to reference these documents.

<u>Citation #</u>	<u>Tape #</u>	<u>Document #</u>	<u>File Location (see below)</u>
7767	WH 6505.24	5, 5a, 5b	II
7773, 7774, 7775	WH 6505.25	5, 5a, 5b	II
7776	WH 6505.25	96	I
7784	WH 6505.26	89, 95	I
7792	WH 6505.27	84	I
7807	WH 6505.28	58	I
7809	WH 6505.28	54, 55	I
7810	WH 6505.28	54, 55	I
7814, 7815, 7816	WH 6505.29	54, 55	I
7817	WH 6505.30	54, 55	I
7818	WH 6505.30	54, 55	I
7820	WH 6505.30	54, 55	I
7821	WH 6505.30	54, 55	I
7824	WH 6505.30	49	I
7913, 7914, 7915	SR 6505.01	95	I
7917, 7918, 7919	SR 6505.02	95	I
7922	SR 6505.02	91	I
7924	SR 6505.02	103, 116	I
7942	SR 6505.03	84, 89, 90	I
7953	SR 6505.03	47	III
8005	SR 6505.05	80, 91	I
8011	SR 6505.05	79, 80, 84, 89, 90	I
8024	SR 6505.06	91	I

File Location:

- I. National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, "Davidson," Box 51, Document # (as listed).
- II. National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, "Dominican Republic Vol. IV," Box 39, Document # (as listed).
- III. National Security File, Files of Gordon Chase, "Bundy's Mission on the Dominican Problem," Box 2, Document # (as listed).

TELETYPE

OUTGOING

Foreign Service of the
United States of America

Ambassy SANTO DOMINGO

FILES Charge:
BUNDY ✓

Classification

Control:

Date: ⁹⁶
May 19, 1965
8:50 am

ACTION: SecState & WASHINGTON FLASH 1798
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNDY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-530
By , NARA, Date 8-22-95

EXDIS

1. Gusman is going now to Rebel Command. He has agreed to put forth agreed Secretary of Armed Forces and a place in Cabinet for loyalists on matters he himself supports. But he is unwilling to raise question of departure of Aristy, Tavares and Monte Aracha. He has now told Shlaudeman of unstated rebel condition of yesterday. It was that Casmaño should be member of some sort of joint military command.

2. In order to get Gusman on his way I have had Shlaudeman tell him that he should press first two conditions as his own and tell rebels there is one other matter which must be settled between Washington and President Bosch. This puts departure question where you can decide it, a course I prefer since phone calls suggest a difference of judgment there and here.

3. I now believe this question may be the last issue before settlement. It is also one of the most important. Seen from here, departure of three least popular rebels would have three major good effects.

a. It would increase chance of loyalist cooperation. Vance sees it as second only to Minister of Armed Forces for this purpose and notes wryly that we are sending all his side out already.

b. It would increase the chance that officers of new government will have real as well as nominal control over forces down here.

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-2-

Tavares

3. Since ~~Tavares~~ is considered a communist by all and Aristy by many, it would show right at the start that the communists have no inside track.

4. Just because it is so desirable, this result is hard to reach. My present proposal is that the agreement should provide that three agreed members of each side must leave the country simply to prevent vengeance for a period of six months. I believe that if this proposal for an honorable cooling-off period can be presented here as the joint position of President Johnson and President Bosch, we ~~xxxxxx~~ can put it over and I believe it would make a great difference.

5. If this is to be done, we must get Bosch to support it strongly as a simple matter of humanity and ~~magnanimity~~ ^{magnanimity.} It is full of honor and renunciation and paternal wisdom. But it also touches the nerve-center of power in this mess.

6. Vane and I join in hoping you will decide to press hard on this point. But we will of course accept and support an opposite decision.

GP 2.

B

BENNETT

66
MBundy:ep

~~SECRET~~

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Get that to Mr. Arnold right away
and tell him to talk to State about it.

LBJ/mf
5-18-65
6:05p

~~5~~
S

5a

*5-18-65, Tues
5:52p*

SENT
WHCA

1965 MAY 18 21 45

SD611

*****ZZ RUEPWW
DE RUEHCR 17421 18/2125Z
Z 182124Z ZEA
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY
Z 18055Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1778
STATE GRNC
BT

29779

~~SECRET~~ MAY 18 .

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

5/15

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1965 MAY 18 PM 5 23

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Action

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Info

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FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC **FLASH 1778**
STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ MAY 18

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNDY

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-530

By , NARA, Date 8-4-95

EXDIS

1. THOUGH I REMAIN LEAST PESSIMISTIC SENIOR OFFICER HERE, I AM DEEPLY SHAKEN BY THIS MORNING'S MONKEY-WRENCH. IT FORCES RECONSIDERATION OF QUESTION OF BASIC CONTROL OF A POSSIBLE GUZMAN GOVERNMENT. YOU CAN JUDGE BETTER THAN I THE ROLE OF BOSCH, BUT THE STOOGES' ROLE OF GUZMAN IN THIS EPISODE IS CLEAR AND UNLESS YOUR EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY IS CONCLUSIVE, MY OWN GUESS IS THAT MILITARY COMMAND INITIATED THIS PROPOSAL, WHOEVER CONCURRED IN IT.

PAGE 2 RUESSD 625S ~~SECRET~~

2. SINCE MILITARY COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS OF YESTERDAY PROPOSED TO PUT A RELATIVELY UNKNOWN COLONEL OVER A GROUP OF MEN WHOSE COLLECTIVE ENERGY AND DETERMINATION IS AMPLY DEMONSTRATED IN RECENT WEEKS, AND SINCE GUZMAN OBEDIENTLY TELEPHONED A CLEARLY ABSURD ULTIMATUM TO EMBASSY, NONE OF US CAN RESPONSIBLY RECOMMEND THAT AGREEMENT ALL BUT COMPLETED YESTERDAY IS NOW SAFE FOR THE UNITED STATES. EVIDENCE IS STRONG THAT IT WOULD PUT REAL CONTROL OF ALL DOMINICAN GROUND FORCES IN HANDS OF THOSE WHO NOW HAVE THIS CONTROL DOWNTOWN. AT THE VERY MINIMUM, AND ON OPTIMISTIC ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT INFLUENCE OF BOSCH AND IMPACT OF OFFICE ON GUZMAN, WE SHOULD HAVE A VERY HARD UP-HILL ROAD REQUIRING CONSTANT ENERGY AND SKILL IN DAILY INFIGHTING.

3. APPARENTLY ALL OF US IN WASHINGTON AND HERE AGREE THAT THERE ARE MEN IN REBEL COMMAND WHO PREFER CONTINUED STRUGGLE TO ANY AGREEMENT THEY DO NOT CONTROL. IN THE LIGHT OF THE LAST DAYS'S EVENTS, I DO NOT THINK GUZMAN'S GOVERNMENT ON PRESENTLY NEGOTIATED BASIS IS GOOD ENOUGH FOR US TO BET ON. NOR DO I THINK TIME IS RUNNING OUT DOWN HERE.

4. IN THIS SITUATION I BELIEVE THAT WHEN NEGOTIATIONS ARE REOPENED WE SHOULD ADVANCE NEW REQUIREMENTS WHICH COMBINE

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L2- 1778, MAY 18, FROM: SANTO DOMINGO

ADVANTAGE OF TESTING BASIS OF AUTHORITY AND LIMITING ROLE OF PRESENT MILITARY COMMAND IN NEW GOVERNMENT. I THINK OF TWO SUCH PROVISIONS.

PAGE 3 RUESSD 6255 ~~SECRET~~

5. THE FIRST IS ELIMINATION OF THREE LEAST DESIRABLE MEMBERS OF REBEL COMMAND BY APPOINTMENT ABROAD. THIS IS PARALLEL TO PLAN ALREADY ACCEPTED BY LOYALISTS AND I WOULD NOMINATE ARISTY, TAVARAS, AND MONTE ARACHE.

6. SECOND, I WOULD REOPEN QUESTION OF MINISTER OF ARMED FORCES AND INSIST ON RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF BOSCH AGREEMENT THAT A MAN ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES BE FOUND.

7. I PRESSED BOTH OF THESE IDEAS YESTERDAY BUT DID NOT INSIST IN FACE OF ABSOLUTE REFUSAL BECAUSE WE WANTED AGREEMENT AND HOPED IT WOULD WORK. NOW I BELIEVE THAT STRONG AND SUSTAINED PRESSURE FOR THESE PROVISIONS IS ESSENTIAL:

- A. TO TEST THE SOURCE OF POWER.
- B. TO STRENGTHEN OUR CONFIDENCE IN GUZMAN GOVERNMENT, AND
- C. TO ATTEMPT WEDGE-DRIVING IN A DANGEROUS CABAL.

8. UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED I SHALL TAKE THIS LINE IN MY FIRST TALK WITH GUZMAN. IF EVENTUALLY WE DECIDE TO TAKE LESS FOR AGREEMENT, I CAN ALWAYS FALL BACK.

GP-2. BENNETT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 5/18/65, 5:25 P.M.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, 5/18/65, 5:28 P.M.

PASSED DOD EXCLUSIVE FOR MCNAMARA , 5/18/65, 6:00 P.M.

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