

**DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
REFERRED TO IN RECORDINGS OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS**

During the course of the Dominican Crisis in April and May 1965, numerous telephone conversations between President Johnson and his advisors, and between the advisors themselves, were recorded by the White House. Many of these conversations took place between U.S. officials in the Dominican Republic and those in Washington, DC, over non-secure telephone lines. Because they were concerned about their conversations being intercepted, the conversants often made reference to information in documents that each side had in their possession to discuss sensitive topics or individuals.

Since these conversations are often cryptic unless the listener also has copies of the documents in hand, the Library staff has compiled this reference set of documents for use in listening to the conversations.

Please use the original file location to reference these documents.

<u>Citation #</u>	<u>Tape #</u>	<u>Document #</u>	<u>File Location</u> (see below)
7767	WH 6505.24	5, 5a, 5b	II
7773, 7774, 7775	WH 6505.25	5, 5a, 5b	II
7776	WH 6505.25	96	I
7784	WH 6505.26	89, 95	I
7792	WH 6505.27	84	I
7807	WH 6505.28	58	I
7809	WH 6505.28	54, 55	I
7810	WH 6505.28	54, 55	I
7814, 7815, 7816	WH 6505.29	54, 55	I
7817	WH 6505.30	54, 55	I
7818	WH 6505.30	54, 55	I
7820	WH 6505.30	54, 55	I
7821	WH 6505.30	54, 55	I
7824	WH 6505.30	49	I
7913, 7914, 7915	SR 6505.01	95	I
7917, 7918, 7919	SR 6505.02	95	I
7922	SR 6505.02	91	I
7924	SR 6505.02	103, 116	I
7942	SR 6505.03	84, 89, 90	I
7953	SR 6505.03	47	III
8005	SR 6505.05	80, 91	I
8011	SR 6505.05	79, 80, 84, 89, 90	I
8024	SR 6505.06	91	I

File Location:

- I. National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, "Davidson," Box 51, Document # (as listed).
- II. National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, "Dominican Republic Vol. IV," Box 39, Document # (as listed).
- III. National Security File, Files of Gordon Chase, "Bundy's Mission on the Dominican Problem," Box 2, Document # (as listed).

OUTGOING

Embassy, SANTO DOMINGO

84

AMB
BUNDY
DUMMY CHRON

Charge:

Classification

Control:

Date: MAY 20, 1965
1:15 AM

ACTION: SecState WASHINGTON 1830 FLASH

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-530

By lip, NARA, Date 8-22-95

EXDIS

FROM BUNDY

1. This has been a day of much movement, but conclusions are hard to find.
2. Most important event is capture of Radio Santo Domingo by Imbert. This evening he agreed again with Bennett that Station should be run by CAS. Moreover he agrees with us that CAS umbrella should shelter firm U. S. management. He has promised to announce this decision at ten Thursday morning. Effective use of RSD may be decisive in the coming week. We all believe that now is the time for Don Wilson to come. He should be here Thursday without fail and he should be ready to stay awhile. He is not needed tonight because station is still on the blink.
3. Next most important event is rapid Imbert advance in area north of LOC. This advance has no final strategic value to Imbert, because it does not touch real rebel stronghold. But it lifts morale far beyond its real meaning, and there is no Guzman solution in sight tonight that would not be rejected & out of hand by Imbert and loyalist military. This does not mean that Guzman solution is impossible. I continue to believe it makes more sense than any other. But I do not think it can be concluded at an acceptable cost until Imbert and Company

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find out that their small victories north of LCC have no lasting value. They must learn again that rebels will probably remain in control of heart of city which is heart of country. Imbert forces cannot dislodge them and our forces will not--if it can be avoided.

4. Further block to early settlement--but not to a later solution--is reported death of Rafael Fernandez Dominguez in attack on Imbert-held Palace. This will shock Bosch deeply, though Gusman has taken it calmly. Utterly cynical rebel assertion that U. S. shot him in the back is seen for what it is by Gusman, but Casanovic is on the air making as much emotional noise as possible. Unless Comins killed him in Spanish war style, Fernandez died soldier's death he partly sought, and three U. S. Marines were wounded resisting rebel action about the same time. For a hot fire fight front and back are silly words. But rebels will be stirred, and Gusman will be rightly reinforced in his growing conviction that the men downtown are in no mood for reason.

5. Meanwhile Solomon and Company are at work, and the country is not repeat not coming apart.

6. In this situation I think we probably need a carefully staged pause. No solution appears possible now, but we should soon have on the side of peace the following: (a) time (b) the end of the northern battle, and (c) Radio Santo Domingo. Both Imbert and rebels should learn in coming days that neither of them is going to win a war. RSD should be preaching peace; Solomon should be practicing good works, by continuing

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
firmness Palmer should be able to prove that the U. S. is the one real power on the scene.

7. This pause can be signaled by our return or by our ostentatious settling in. On either basis we strongly believe we should be authorized to ^{begin} bring judicious briefing of press and equally judicious contacts with other personages here. We can spread message of peace and reconciliation to all, if we are authorized to do so. It is time.

8. Meanwhile this evening we gave Gusman draft documents sent forward in our 1824, and we also discussed present shape of Cabinet. He kept documents for study and he apparently wants to send Bosch both of them. We will stall on this pending your advice because private document is pretty hot. On Cabinet Gusman showed usual tendency to backslide a little toward familiar FRD friends, and usual tendency to do better when pressed. Details follow in separate telegram. I floated notion of brief delay in reaching final solution, on ground that both sides were in a bad mood for compromise. He did not quarrel but he did ask that any return of Washington team be accompanied by noises which would ~~leave~~ leave him in business. I reassured him that Gusman solution remained our choice.

9. It remains to report Gusman - Amiana contact. First meeting was correct and there will be another Thursday morning at ten. We think the two men respect each other. We think they also have a long way to go before ~~their~~ their minds really meet. We

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that their conversations can only do good, and we will press them to keep on. But we will not use our biggest guns to seek immediate paper agreement between them unless you tell us to - if only because Amiana will not repeat repeat not agree to serve under Guzman at this stage. This agreement is still my strong hope, but all concerned must be softened by a little time before it will be possible. Specifically, Amiana will accept only if his comrades in arms agree, and tonight they see no need for what they still call a "surrender" to Bosch." Moreover Amiana will certainly have a view of his own on critical question of Army Chief of Staff and we strongly doubt that he could accept Lora Fernandez. Vance thinks de Leon or Valdes may still be key here.

- 10. So let us make haste slowly and let us explain why.
- 11. Vance generally concurs.

B
BENNETT

cc
MBundy:dft

