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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS and SPACE COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

Space

21

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

December 3, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed Launch of SNAP Device in
Navigation Satellite

The second in a series of three radio-isotope powered navigation satellites is scheduled for launching on December 5. The first launching on September 28 was entirely successful. This launch will be a repeat performance using the same health and safety criteria.

✓ The Executive Secretary of the Space Council coordinated the arrangements and President Kennedy approved the series of launches prior to the first shot. Unless there is an objection, this launch will proceed on schedule.

All publicity covering this launch will be handled in a routine manner by the Department of Defense and Atomic Energy Commission.

E. C. Welsh

cc: Mr. Bundy ✓
Mr. Salinger

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
December 2, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Mac --

Here is the Monday morning edition of the speech that Ambassador Stevenson will make this afternoon at approximately 3:00 o'clock. There have been a number of changes made in the first part of the speech that are largely stylistic or corrections of fact. The few changes in the section dealing with manned flight to the moon occurring on pages 17 and 18 are inconsequential, largely editorial in nature. Eisendrath in State, the Drafting Officer, has informed me that Ambassador Stevenson will undoubtedly make some additional changes in the text before he delivers it.

As soon as the speech has been given, I will inform Miss Boyce. This should be at about 4:00 o'clock this afternoon.


Charles E. Johnson

DRAFT SPEECH ON OUTER SPACE AT

18TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

22a

Mr. Chairman,

In a world kept taut by constant danger -- in an organization often kept busy by dispute -- it is heartening at any time to be able to speak of progress -- any progress -- toward freedom, or peace, or law or international cooperation in any field of human endeavor.

I take multiple satisfaction, therefore, in coming before you today to consent upon our progress toward freedom, peace, law and cooperation in the field of outer space.

Common sense and harsh experience combine to teach us not to predict tomorrow by extrapolating from today -- especially if today is one of those days on which some progress has been made toward a safer and a saner world. We have seen enough of disappointment to half-suspect that today's zig automatically will be offset by tomorrow's zag. But I cannot suppress altogether the tempting notion that perhaps the habit of international cooperation will catch on first in outer space and then spread contagiously back to earth.

In any event, we can draw some comfort from the historical analogy between this great age of discovery, symbolized by Gagarin and Glenn, and that earlier great age of discovery, symbolized by Eriksen and Columbus. In those days, the rulers of Europe failed to match the

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geographic vision of Columbus with a corresponding vision of law and statecraft. Within two short years after the New World had been discovered, the two leading naval powers of the time agreed to divide the spoils. On June 7, 1494, ambassadors from Spain and Portugal met in the small town of Tordesillas in Spain and signed an agreement carving up the New World between them. What followed is well known: Nationalist competition and imperial wars.

A few centuries ago, then, a voyage of discovery was all but synonymous with a voyage of conquest.

This is only Year 7 of the age of space and we have only one foot over the threshold of this new age of discovery. Yet already the members of this organization -- not by secret agreement reached behind closed doors but by public debate on a flood-lit stage -- have agreed that the two leading space powers of today's world will never carve up the moon between them -- nor will they or any nation make any sovereign claim in outer space or on any celestial body. Discovery is no longer the prelude to conquest.

Mr. Chairman, we often warn -- and with good reason -- that the pace of scientific invention may so outstrip social invention that the world's affairs will race out of control and leave us floundering in chaos. But it may be worth noting that it took man tens of ^{thousands} ~~(millions)~~ of years to figure out how to escape his earthly environment; and in the half dozen years following there has been enough social invention to sustain the hope that outer space will not be chaotic at all.

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That hope is based on the progress that has been made so far toward freedom, peace, law, and cooperation in outer space which, if pursued, could make this the first age of exploration not in the name of national vainglory but in the name of man himself. I therefore propose, Mr. Chairman, to review briefly this march of social invention which suggests to me that we may not, after all, be lagging disastrously behind the pace of technological advance, at least in outer space.

II

The essential freedoms of outer space are set forth in General Assembly Resolution 1721 approved nearly two years ago. It asserts that outer space and celestial bodies are free from national appropriation. It asserts that all nations are free to explore and to use outer space. And it asserts that all states, "irrespective of the stage of their economic or scientific development", are free to share in the benefits which flow from the exploration and use of outer space. This is the doctrine of freedom in outer space promulgated unanimously by the members of this Assembly.

As for steps toward insuring peace in outer space, ^{in addition to the} ~~Resolution 1721~~ freedoms embodied in General Assembly resolution 1721, ~~also establishes the principle that "the exploration and use of outer~~ two important ~~steps~~ ^{steps} have recently been ~~space should be only for the betterment of mankind.."~~ taken to limit the arms race in outer space. Certainly the testing of nuclear weapons in outer space, and the ~~consequent contamination of the atmosphere with radioactive waste, held~~ ^{One was} little promise for the "betterment of mankind". ~~So~~ the treaty now signed by over a hundred nations, prohibiting the testing of nuclear

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weapons in outer space, in the atmosphere and under water, ~~was a~~
~~significant step toward a regime of peace in outer space.~~ ^{other step} The next
step was taken by this Assembly on October 17 when the members by
acclamation welcomed the expressions by the Soviet Union and the
United States of their intention not to station in outer space any
objects carrying nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons of mass
destruction and solemnly called upon all states to refrain from doing
so.

^{this resolution and of the partial test ban}
Observance of ~~(these arrangements)~~ by all nations will do more than
limit the arms race in outer space. It will help create the confidence
on earth needed for greater progress in disarmament and cooperation in
all areas, including space.

III

The structure for this cooperation, and for the activities of all
nations in space, must be an international legal order. This need
becomes more imperative as the number of nations in space increases and
as the range of their activities grow.

This growth of custom and usage must be present to form the basis
of sound law. Resolution 1721 made a beginning when it declared that
freedom to explore and use outer space means freedom to do so "in
conformity with international law." And more specifically: "International
law, including the Charter of the United Nations, applies to outer space
and celestial bodies" in the words of the resolution we adopted without
dissent.

This general proposition was not enough. In the same resolution the General Assembly asked the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to study legal problems arising out of the exploration of space. So the Committee established a Legal Subcommittee to begin to put flesh on the bones of outer space law.

From an early stage, members of the Committee realized that any attempts at a comprehensive codification of legal rules for outer space would be premature. The world's experience in the exploration of outer space has been entirely too brief. In conformity with this experience, the Committee finally agreed to try simultaneously to elaborate basic legal principles and to draw up rules for handling two specific legal problems which already pressed for solution: liability for outer space vehicle accidents, and assistance to, and return of, astronauts and their vehicles which might come down on the territory of another state.

After almost two years, this work has now borne fruit. We have before us a draft Declaration of General Principles which ^{the Outer Space Committee has} ~~is endorsed~~ ^{unanimously decided to submit to the General Assembly} ~~by the members of the Outer Space Committee~~. It is the outcome of a long process of international debate and international consultations, of numerous drafts, of clarifications, compromises and modifications. This fall, at the request of the Outer Space Committee, these consultations were intensified in order to produce a text which could be generally agreed and supported.

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I should like to say a few words about the character and status which the United States considers the principles contained in this Declaration will have once the draft resolution has been adopted by the General Assembly, as we hope, without any dissent. In the view of the United States, the operative paragraphs of the resolution contain legal principles which the General Assembly, in adopting the resolution, would declare should guide States in the exploration and use of outer space. We believe these legal principles reflect international law as it is accepted by the Members of the United Nations. The United States, for its part, intends to respect these principles. We hope that the conduct which the resolution commends to nations in the exploration of outer space will become the practice of all nations.

In adopting the resolution now before us the General Assembly will ~~not~~ be ~~completing, but~~ only beginning, its work in the development of law for outer space. The Declaration ~~[of Legal Principles]~~ is not the last word; it is one of the first. In the future, the United Nations ^{as experience accumulates} may ~~wish~~ ^{want} to formulate additional principles, ~~[as experience accumulates]~~. We believe also that work should be undertaken in the immediate future to enlarge upon some of the individual principles so that they may be given practical application and effect in the form of drafting detailed international agreements.]

^{addition} In particular -- and we ^{believe} think there is wide agreement on this -- the Outer Space Committee should now ^{give} ~~take up as a matter of~~ first priority ^{to} the task of preparing international agreements on the subjects

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of (1) liability for space vehicle accidents, and (2) assistance to and return of astronauts and space vehicles. We believe that the General Assembly should ask the Outer Space Committee to arrange its work program ^{accordingly} ~~[in accordance with this priority]~~

Moreover, the General Assembly will want to provide for a continuing study of the whole field of outer space law as the activities of States develop in this new environment. We believe the Outer Space Committee and its Legal Subcommittee should continue to survey the whole field of outer space exploration from the legal point of view, so that the United Nations may make its informed and effective contribution in building an international legal order for outer space.

IV

Freedom, peace and law -- these are the goals of the Assembly in space. But the Assembly and the United Nations have yet a fourth significant goal - international cooperation.

Such cooperation begins with direct cooperation among nations. It has been the consistent policy of my government, from the beginning of the age of space, to extend our hand in cooperation -- to share knowledge with other nations -- and to obtain, in return, the benefits of common enterprise -- much needed help and the good will of involvement in common tasks. As President Johnson stated as early as January 7, 1958, when he was a Senator of the United States: "The goals now within ~~the~~ reach of the human race are too great to be divided as spoils, too great for the world to waste its efforts in a blind race between competitive nations."

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Cooperative arrangements--both bilateral and multilateral--with other nations now cover virtually the entire range of U. S. research and application for peaceful development of outer space.

Our Weather Bureau and Space Agency ^{have} participated in the coordinated acquisition of satellite and ground-based weather data with forty weather services.

Through our International Ground Station Committee, 11 nations are cooperating in experimental space communications and gaining experience in reading out signals from communication satellites.

We have sounding rocket agreements with 12 nations, and cooperative arrangements with 26 nations in ionospheric research.

International cooperation has established 27 overseas facilities in 19 different jurisdictions, including tracking stations, Deep Space Instrumentation Facilities, and a Manned Space Flight Network.

We have also gained valuable experience in cooperative space launchings. The "ALOUETTE" satellite is the tangible fruit of our continuing cooperation with Canada. The "ARIEL" ^{satellite} is the first step in a continuing joint venture with Great Britain. In the near future, we plan to join Italy and France in the placing of other scientific satellites into orbit.

All in all, more than 60 countries ^{have worked} ~~are now working~~ cooperatively with the United States in actual flight experiments, in ground-based activities in direct support of orbiting experiments, or in cooperative training programs.

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Based upon this wide and mutually fruitful experience in bilateral cooperation, the United States entered into a cooperative agreement with the Soviet Union. On August 16, the U. S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the USSR Academy of Sciences announced the approval of a First Memorandum of Understanding to carry out this agreement. Cooperation in three fields is envisaged.

First, the United States and the Soviet Union will exchange data gathered by national experimental weather satellites and will coordinate launchings of their respective weather vehicles in space. The data coming in from these satellites will be open to all nations and will reinforce the projected World Weather Watch.

Second, we will exchange data ^{from} ~~[and coordinate launchings of]~~ satellites equipped with magnetometers, as part of the World Magnetic Survey.

Third, we will perform joint experiments in space communications with passive U. S. satellites.

This is at least a start and we hope it is a prophetic one. My government is ready to get on with this program at any time, and we hope that we may soon begin its operation.

V.

Mr. Chairman, bilateral cooperation in outer space and cooperation at the United Nations level and multilaterally through organizations of the world's scientific community are mutually reinforcing; and one tends to lead to the other. Experience gained in cooperating on a narrow base tends to lead to cooperation on a broader base.

Through the International Committee on Space Research -- COSPAR, of the International Council of Scientific Unions, 24 nations share scientific research on space. COSPAR has sought with a large measure of success to extend in the space science field the remarkable cooperation that characterized the International Geophysical Year, which, among its other accomplishments, ushered in the age of space.

COSPAR's World Data Centres for Rockets and Satellites, maintained at Washington, Moscow and Slough, England, are the world's major repositories for analyzed data on outer space.

COSPAR has pioneered in maintaining a registry of satellite launchings, and has sponsored SPACEWARN, a system in which launching nations communicate around the world essential information within a few hours after the successful firing of a scientific satellite or space probe.

The United States scientific community takes a fully active part in these and other important functions of COSPAR.

We also intend to take an active role in the International Year of the Quiet Sun, an important successor to the IGY, under the auspices of the International Council of Scientific Unions - an effort in which some 60 nations will take part.

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These cooperative arrangements within the world scientific community are a healthy phenomenon. They are indicative of a community of interest which transcends national boundaries, and binds men and nations together.

In the world as a whole, this community of interests is perhaps epitomized by the United Nations. Already, the United Nations and its family of agencies are deeply involved in the exciting potentials of outer space to focus cooperation, and centralized vital information.

INSINT [The Secretary General has now built up an effective staff in outer space to assist in this important work, a development warmly welcomed by the United States.

The Secretary General now maintains a registry of information on space launchings in which the United States, for its part, has registered all its launchings from mid-February 1962.

The Secretary General has now built up an expert staff in outer space to assist him in this important field, a development warmly welcomed by the United States. We hope, in implementing the work of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, that this staff might draw up constructive proposals to define further the scope of the Committee's recommendations and its future program.

The Committee, working with the Secretariat, is already collecting and will soon be publishing...

and the United States, in such, is also considering endorsement of specific activities and facilities which offer unusual opportunities for broad international participation -- this year the rocket launching station at Thumba, India.

These and other activities are being carried on directly by the United Nations Space Committee in cooperation with the Secretariat -- and I am proud to note, in passing, that my Government was one of the original

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His staff maintains a registry of information on space launchings in which the United States, for its part, has registered all its launchings from Mid-February 1962.

The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, working with the Secretariat, collects and publishes] information on national and cooperative programs, and on the resources of the United Nations, specialized agencies, and other international bodies related to the peaceful uses of outer space;

It is preparing reviews of training and educational opportunities;

It is preparing a list of available bibliographic and abstracting services covering the scientific and technical results and publications in space and space-related areas;

And the United Nations, as such, is also considering endorsement of specific activities and facilities which offer unusual opportunities for broad international participation -- this year the rocket launching station at Thumba, India.

These and other activities are being carried on directly by the United Nations Space Committee in cooperation with the Secretariat -- and I am proud to note, in passing, that my Government was one of the original

founders of this committee and has worked actively to help establish its program on a sound basis.

Indeed, it was President Johnson himself who, as a Member of the Senate, came before Committee One of the General Assembly on November 17, 1958, to speak in support of the resolution creating the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. At that time President Johnson stated:

"To keep space as man has found it and to harvest the yield of peace which it promises, we of the United States see one course--and only one--which the nations of earth may intelligently pursue. That is the course of full and complete and immediate cooperation to make the exploration of outer space a joint adventure."

Beyond the activities of the UN Space Committee, some of the technical agencies are becoming deeply involved in the space venture, and it is here that we see why, in some instances, international organization and international cooperation are not only desirable but a plain necessity. The most obvious instance of necessity is the problem of allocating radio frequencies to meet the needs for communication, weather, and navigational satellites; for space research; for radio astronomy; and other uses. The only alternative to international agreement is chaos in outer space communication. We therefore applaud the recently-completed work of the Space Radio Conference of the International Telecommunications Union which provided sufficient allocation of frequency bands for space communication for the next ten or fifteen years, and which adopted procedures relating to the use of these allocations. This, as I say, was a plain necessity.

There also is compelling reason for international organization and cooperation in weather reporting and forecasting. The atmosphere envelops

the globe -- not just a single state; so no nation can achieve weather forecasting adequate to its needs from observations made solely within its territory. As matters still stand, inadequate or inaccurate prediction of storms, rainfall, floods and drought cost the people of the world the loss of human life and billions of dollars annually. Our new-found capacity to orbit meteorological satellites, coupled with other exciting developments in meteorological science and computer technology, holds the promise of a drastic reduction in such losses which have plagued men of all nations through all history. To illustrate the point, our satellite TIROS VI,

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in the course of a record thirteen months of continuous operation, transmitted nearly 60,000 cloud cover photographs which enabled us to issue 360 warnings of severe storms and over 2,000 analyses of global cloud cover. This work is being carried on by TIROS VII, now in orbit above us.

And to stress the point that all this can be of direct benefit to all nations in the here and now, let me state that the next TIROS satellite, to be launched shortly, will carry aloft an experimental development -- the Automatic Picture Transmission System. This will transmit automatically to ground receiver stations, without command from the ground, cloud photographic coverage of an area about 1600 kilometers in radius surrounding the ground station. The receiving equipment can be procured for less than \$50,000, bringing this service within the reach of nations with the most modest economic resources.

This is what science and technology are bringing to the field of meteorology. And the international community is hard on the heels of scientific progress with a matching rate of progress in institutional ^{development} (innovation.) At its Fourth Congress, the WMO initiated the financial and organisational basis for a World Weather System to make the most of both conventional and satellite weather data. The resolution before us rightly applauds this move and urges the members to play their cooperative parts in the World Weather System and to take the necessary steps to be in a position to get the greatest benefits from it. My Government is only too pleased to support this program, and the WMO in general, as it has from the beginning.

In the field of space communications, too, the technology does not lie in the distant future, but has been coming rapidly into use this very year. The first RELAY satellite, placed into orbit December 13, 1962, provided successful transmission of voice between North and South America, and of black and white and color television between the United States

and Europe. The second STARSAT satellite, launched on May 23 of this year, has in addition, transmitted telephone calls, teletype messages

and data and Honolulu transmission. The first public demonstration of a

1. The first trans-Pacific demonstration of television took place by means of RELAY which transmitted news of President Kennedy's death and funeral. This demonstration occurred on the occasion of the inauguration of a Japanese ground terminal.

Here, too--in space communications as in weather--technology,

2. Moreover, the opening of this General Assembly was transmitted by both medium altitude and synchronous satellites in television and voice.

Fourth is the resolution now before us which urges that all Member States have an opportunity to participate in the ownership, management, and use of global satellite communication facilities as soon as practicable and in addition that participating States have an opportunity to compete for design and supply of equipment and "recommends that use by the United Nations of communications satellites be facilitated so that people everywhere will some day have the opportunity to hear and see United Nations proceedings as they take place."

My government endorses both these proposals.] As we have said, before, our purpose is to help develop a single, global commercial system of communication via satellites--a system in which all countries will have an opportunity to participate in its ownership, management and use. The United States Communications Satellite Corporation is now well underway

In the field of space communications, too, the technology does not lie in the distant future, but has been coming rapidly into use this very year. The first RELAY satellite, placed into orbit December 13, 1962, provided successful transmission of voice between North and South America, and of black and white and color television between the United States and Europe. ⁽¹⁾ The second TELSTAR satellite, launched on May 7th of this year, has in addition, transmitted telephone calls, teletype messages and data and facsimile transmission. The first public demonstration of a synchronous satellite--SYNCOM II--was conducted on August 4, 1963, between the United States and Nigeria. We were fortunate in having as a participant in that program the distinguished Secretary-General of the United Nations. ⁽²⁾

Here, too--in space communications as in weather--technology, economics, and common sense all impel us toward the establishment of a single universal system. [And once again, the guiding principle is set forth in the resolution now before us which "urges that all Member States have an opportunity to participate in the ownership, management, and use of global satellite communication facilities as soon as practicable and in addition that participating states have an opportunity to compete for design and supply of equipment" and "recommends that use by the United Nations of communications satellites be facilitated so that people everywhere will some day have the opportunity to hear and see United Nations proceedings as they take place."

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①

As President Kennedy said on November 20, "This Government and the United States Communications Satellite Corporation can now take practical steps, in cooperation with other governments and foreign business entities, to develop a single global commercial space communications system."

②

Communication by satellite is in process of imminent realization. The voice, message and picture will leap the barriers of distance. We will come ever closer together in time and space. But use of this new means of communication for international understanding will depend, as always, on our deeds. And in the creation of the global communication system itself, international cooperation is without alternative.

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with its planning.^① The United States Government and the Communications Satellite Corporation look forward to exchanging views in the months ahead with other governments and communications entities on next steps toward such a global system.^② ~~[Any alternative to international cooperation toward this end would fly in the face of all reason.]~~

VI

Mr. Chairman, what does all this add up to?

In the name of the world community, we have promulgated the doctrine of freedom in outer space--declared that it shall be for human betterment and taken first steps toward assuring it--decided that space shall be ruled by international law, and begun to spell out what we mean by that.

In the name of technology, efficiency, maximum benefit, and plain good sense, we are engaged in an elaborate network of international cooperation at bilateral, multilateral, and United Nations levels, which taken together can well be described as an international program to extend dramatically man's knowledge and mastery of the outer environment which wraps all nations and all peoples in a common embrace.

In short, we have rejected the political philosophy which made the last age of discovery an age of national conquest -- and projected a political philosophy which promises to make this new age of discovery one of conquest for none but mankind. In outer space, if you please, our sense of social responsibility and our capacity for social invention are not doing too badly in response to the challenge laid down by the inventions of our scientists.

I have left to the last any reference to a manned flight to the moon.

Let me make it clear that exploration of the moon is not a stunt, distinct from the outer space program as a whole; nor is it the exclusive concern of only two nations.

This project, spectacular though it may be, is understood best as a single step in Man's mastery of space. It is a stage in a sequence which has a background and foreground.

In the background of manned flight to the moon is the vast program of research and the varied series of experiments which will make it possible--which will be thoroughly justified in and of themselves. Indeed, not more than about ten percent of our total expenditures on outer space can be attributed directly to manned lunar flight. This program is being carried forward with significant international cooperation. Many nations, not one, are contributing to the moon project. The tracking and data stations in Mexico, Bermuda, the Canary Islands of Spain, Nigeria, Zanzibar and Australia have been central to the success of the orbital flights in our Mercury program. These stations, along with additional facilities, are vital to the program for the manned lunar landing. This applies as well to the scientific investigations to be carried out through cooperative satellite and sounding rocket programs. We are proud of these associations in a common task, Mr. Chairman. We hope that they will grow.

Beyond the manned landing on the moon lies the whole uncharted and unpredictable stage of inter-planetary exploration. So exploration of the moon is seen properly as the culmination of

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one stage of a process and the opening of another--as both an end and a beginning.

I repeat that the preponderant part of the U. S. space program is made up of projects which we want to carry out even if we did not plan at this stage to land men on the moon. The plans for a manned landing and return from the moon are thus one part of a space program whose larger purpose is to carry into outer space man's unending adventure of discovery.

As I have been saying here today, we have welcomed--and in fact fostered--the highest possible degree of international cooperation.

As you also know, President Kennedy proposed before the General Assembly last September to explore with the Soviet Union opportunities for working together in the conquest of space, including the sending of men to the moon as representatives of all of our countries. President Johnson has instructed me to reaffirm that offer today.

If giant strides cannot be taken at once, we hope that shorter steps can. We believe there are areas of work--short of integrating the two national programs--from which all could benefit. We should explore the opportunities for practical cooperation, beginning with small steps and hopefully leading to larger ^{of} ~~matters~~ matters.]

In any event, our policy ^{of} engaging in mutually beneficial and mutually supporting cooperation in outer space--with the Soviet Union as with all nations--does not begin or end with a manned moon landing. There is plenty of work yet to come before that--and there will be even more afterward.

Mr. Chairman, one of the legal principles in the resolution before us states that "In the exploration of outer space States shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance...." My government is so guided--by preference and by deed.

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Another principle in the same resolution declares that "States shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer space ". We are prepared to so regard our astronauts and all astronauts.

Finally, we ^{wish} ~~are prepared, if others are~~ to consider our own national effort to realize man's dream of a voyage to the moon as part of a larger design to add to the store of man's knowledge. We hope that all nations will take part in this great venture in the same spirit.

Mr. Chairman, we are well started, in this seventh year of the age of space, in the direction of freedom, peace, law, and cooperation in outer space. Every relevant pressure here on earth impels us to stay on that track. If we can acquire the habit of cooperation in outer space, we shall not only learn more about man's relation to his environment but about man's relation to man. And thus world statesmanship ^{can} ~~matches~~ achievement with ^{world} ~~science~~.

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File

President has decided Space
Just to remain in the
speech

Welsh-Informed

November 29, 1963

Gardner

C. Johnson-Informed

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

Mac --

to be informed by BKS
Craig Eisenhower

Dec 1, 1963
Gov. Stevenson's Secretary informed

(1) Ed Welsh has reported his conversation with you at lunch. I concur in the view that the two quotations -- marked on pages 7 and 12 of the attached draft speech -- should not appear in the speech.

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(2) The problem is simply one of Presidential intent. The State Department included the two quotations on instructions of Ambassador Stevenson, who had obtained the quotations from the President with the understanding (in which he may be mistaken) that the President wished them included in the speech. I have no doubt that Ambassador Stevenson would like to dust off the November 17, 1958 speech before the United Nations and would be disappointed if he is told that the quotation therefrom cannot be used. However, aside from the substance of the quotation and Ambassador Stevenson's feelings, the State Department would like to be informed authoritatively of the President's wishes in this matter. In addition, in view of your comment at the staff meeting this morning about "tears in New York," it is probably important that the right person inform the Ambassador that the President had given him these quotations to illustrate the President's long-standing familiarity with the problem and not for the purpose of insertion in the draft speech, for obviously the President must look hard at his old public statements in light of changed circumstances to determine the degree to which they are still reliable expressions of his views.

(3) I have given a copy of the draft speech to Ed Welsh and will convey to him the outcome of your consideration and action on this matter. If by any chance it is decided that the inserts should remain in the speech, Ed will have to mention this to certain people on the Hill with whom he has been in touch at Walter Jenkins' request.

(4) I also attach the full text of the 1958 speech for your reference. You can see that this speech has much in it that could be troublesome if we had to explain it today.

Ch

Charles E. Johnson

Mr. Chairman,

In a world kept taut by constant danger -- in an organization often kept busy by dispute -- it is heartening at any time to be able to speak of progress -- any progress -- toward freedom, or peace, or law or international cooperation in any field of human endeavor.

I take multiple satisfaction, therefore, in coming before you today to consent upon our progress toward freedom, peace, law and cooperation in the field of outer space.

Common sense and harsh experience combine to teach us not to predict tomorrow by extrapolating from today -- especially if today is one of those days on which some progress has been made toward a safer and a saner world. We have seen enough of disappointment to half-suspect that today's zig automatically will be offset by tomorrow's zag. But I cannot suppress altogether the tempting notion that perhaps the habit of international cooperation will catch on first in outer space and then spread contagiously back to earth.

In any event, we can draw some comfort from the historical analogy between this great age of discovery, symbolized by Gagarin and Glenn, and that earlier great age of discovery, symbolized by Erikson and Columbus. In those days, the rulers of Europe failed to match the

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geographic vision of Columbus with a corresponding vision of law and statecraft. Within two short years after the New World had been discovered, the two leading naval powers of the time agreed to divide the spoils. On June 7, 1494, ambassadors from Spain and Portugal met in the small town of Tordesillas in Spain and signed an agreement carving up the New World between them. That follows is well known: Nationalist competition and imperial wars.

A few centuries ago, then, a voyage of discovery was all but synonymous with a voyage of conquest.

This is only Year 7 of the age of space and we have only one foot over the threshold of this new age of discovery. Yet already the members of this organization -- not by secret agreement reached behind closed doors but by public debate on a flood-lit stage -- have agreed that the two leading space powers of today's world will never carve up the moon between them -- nor will they or any nation make any sovereign claim in outer space or on any celestial body. Discovery is no longer the prelude to conquest.

Mr. Chairman, we often warn -- and with good reason -- that the pace of scientific invention may so outstrip social invention that the world's affairs will race out of control and leave us floundering in chaos. But it may be worth noting that it took man tens of millions of years to figure out how to escape his earthly environment; and in the half dozen years following there has been enough social invention to sustain the hope that outer space will not be chaotic at all.

That hope is based on the progress that has been made so far toward freedom, peace, law, and cooperation in outer space which, if pursued, could make this the first age of exploration not in the name of national vainglory but in the name of man himself. I therefore propose, Mr. Chairman, to review briefly this march of social invention which suggests to me that we may not, after all, be lagging disastrously behind the pace of technological advance, at least in outer space.

II

The essential freedoms of outer space are set forth in General Assembly Resolution 1721 approved nearly two years ago. It asserts that outer space and celestial bodies are free from national appropriation. It asserts that all nations are free to explore and to use outer space. And it asserts that all states, "irrespective of the stage of their economic or scientific development", are free to share in the benefits which flow from the exploration and use of outer space. This is the doctrine of freedom in outer space promulgated unanimously by the members of this Assembly.

As for steps toward insuring peace in outer space, Resolution 1721 also establishes the principle that "the exploration and use of outer space should be only for the betterment of mankind..."

Certainly the testing of nuclear weapons in outer space, and the consequent contamination of the atmosphere with radioactive waste, held little promise for the "betterment of mankind". So the treaty now signed by over a hundred nations, prohibiting the testing of nuclear

weapons in outer space, in the atmosphere and under water, was a significant step toward a regime of peace in outer space. The next step was taken by this Assembly on October 17 when the members by acclamation welcomed the expressions by the Soviet Union and the United States of their intention not to station in outer space any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction and solemnly called upon all states to refrain from doing so.

Observance of these arrangements by all nations will do more than limit the arms race in outer space. It will help create the confidence on earth needed for greater progress in disarmament and cooperation in all areas, including space.

III

The structure for this cooperation, and for the activities of all nations in space, must be an international legal order. This need becomes more imperative as the number of nations in space increases and as the range of their activities grow.

This growth of custom and usage must be present to form the basis of sound law. Resolution 1721 made a beginning when it declared that freedom to explore and use outer space means freedom to do so "in conformity with international law." And more specifically: "International law, including the Charter of the United Nations, applies to outer space and celestial bodies" in the words of the resolution we adopted without dissent.

This general proposition was not enough. In the same resolution the General Assembly asked the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to study legal problems arising out of the exploration of space. So the Committee established a Legal Subcommittee to begin to put flesh on the bones of outer space law.

From an early stage, members of the Committee realized that any attempts at a comprehensive codification of legal rules for outer space would be premature. The world's experience in the exploration of outer space has been entirely too brief. In conformity with this experience, the Committee finally agreed to try simultaneously to elaborate basic legal principles and to draw up rules for handling two specific legal problems which already pressed for solution: liability for outer space vehicle accidents, and assistance to, and return of, astronauts and their vehicles which might come down on the territory of another state.

After almost two years, this work has now borne fruit. We have before us a draft Declaration of General Principles which is endorsed by the members of the Outer Space Committee. It is the outcome of a long process of international debate and international consultations, of numerous drafts, of clarifications, compromises and modifications. This fall, at the request of the Outer Space Committee, these consultations were intensified in order to produce a text which could be generally agreed and supported.

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I should like to say a few words about the character and status which the United States considers the principles contained in this Declaration will have once the draft resolution has been adopted by the General Assembly, as we hope, without any dissent. In the view of the United States, the operative paragraphs of the resolution contain legal principles which the General Assembly, in adopting the resolution, would declare should guide States in the exploration and use of outer space. We believe these legal principles reflect international law as it is accepted by the Members of the United Nations. The United States, for its part, intends to respect these principles. We hope that the conduct which the resolution commends to nations in the exploration of outer space will become the practice of all nations.

In adopting the resolution now before us the General Assembly will not be completing, but only beginning, its work in the development of law for outer space. The Declaration of Legal Principles is not the last word; it is one of the first. In the future, the United Nations may wish to formulate additional principles, as experience accumulates. We believe also that work should be undertaken in the immediate future to enlarge upon some of the individual principles so that they may be given practical application and effect in the form of drafting detailed international agreements.

In particular -- and we think there is wide agreement on this -- the Outer Space Committee should now take up as a matter of first priority the task of preparing international agreements on the subjects

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of (1) liability for space vehicle accidents, and (2) assistance to and return of astronauts and space vehicles. We believe that the General Assembly should ask the Outer Space Committee to arrange its work program in accordance with this priority.

Moreover, the General Assembly will want to provide for a continuing study of the whole field of outer space law as the activities of States develop in this new environment. We believe the Outer Space Committee and its Legal Subcommittee should continue to survey the whole field of outer space exploration from the legal point of view, so that the United Nations may make its informed and effective contribution in building an international legal order for outer space.

IV

Freedom, peace and law -- these are the goals of the Assembly in space. But the Assembly and the United Nations have yet a fourth significant goal - international cooperation.

Such cooperation begins with direct cooperation among nations. It has been the consistent policy of my government, from the beginning of the age of space, to extend our hand in cooperation -- to share knowledge with other nations -- and to obtain, in return, the benefits of common enterprise -- much needed help and the good will of involvement in common tasks. As President Johnson stated as early as January 7, 1958, when he was a Senator of the United States: "The goals now within the reach of the human race are too great to be divided as spoils, too great for the world to waste its efforts in a blind race between competitive nations."

put old sentence back?

Cooperative arrangements--both bilateral and multilateral--with other nations now cover virtually the entire range of U. S. research and application for peaceful development of outer space.

Our Weather Bureau and Space Agency participate in the coordinated acquisition of satellite and ground-based weather data with forty weather services.

Through our International Ground Station Committee, 11 nations are cooperating in experimental space communications and gaining experience in reading out signals from communication satellites.

We have sounding rocket agreements with 12 nations, and cooperative arrangements with 26 nations in ionospheric research.

International cooperation has established 27 overseas facilities in 19 different jurisdictions, including tracking stations, Deep Space Instrumentation Facilities, and a Manned Space Flight Network.

We have also gained valuable experience in cooperative space launchings. The "ALOUETTE" satellite is the tangible fruit of our continuing cooperation with Canada. The "ARIEL" is the first step in a continuing joint venture with Great Britain. In the near future, we plan to join Italy and France in the placing of other scientific satellites into orbit.

All in all, more than 60 countries are now working cooperatively with the United States in actual flight experiments, in ground-based activities in direct support of orbiting experiments, or in cooperative training programs.

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Bases upon this wide and mutually fruitful experience in bilateral cooperation, the United States entered into a cooperative agreement with the Soviet Union. On August 16, the U. S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the USSR Academy of Sciences announced the approval of a First Memorandum of Understanding to carry out this agreement. Cooperation in three fields is envisaged.

First, the United States and the Soviet Union will exchange data gathered by national experimental weather satellites and will coordinate launchings of their respective weather vehicles in space. The data coming in from these satellites will be open to all nations and will reinforce the projected World Weather Watch.

Second, we will exchange data and coordinate launchings of satellites equipped with magnetometers, as part of the World Magnetic Survey.

Third, we will perform joint experiments in space communications with passive U. S. satellites.

This is at least a start and we hope it is a prophetic one. My government is ready to get on with this program at any time, and we hope that we may soon begin its operation.

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V.

Mr. Chairman, bilateral cooperation in outer space and cooperation at the United Nations level and multilaterally through organizations of the world's scientific community are mutually reinforcing; and one tends to lead to the other. Experience gained in cooperating on a narrow base tends to lead to cooperation on a broader base.

Through the International Committee on Space Research -- COSPAR, of the International Council of Scientific Unions, 24 nations share scientific research on space. COSPAR has sought with a large measure of success to extend in the space science field the remarkable cooperation that characterized the International Geophysical Year, which, among its other accomplishments, ushered in the age of space.

COSPAR's World Data Centres for Rockets and Satellites, maintained at Washington, Moscow and Slough, England, are the world's major repositories for analyzed data on outer space.

COSPAR has pioneered in maintaining a registry of satellite launchings, and has sponsored SPACWARN, a system in which launching nations communicate around the world essential information within a few hours after the successful firing of a scientific satellite or space probe.

The United States scientific community takes a fully active part in these and other important functions of COSPAR.

We also intend to take an active role in the International Year of the Quiet Sun, an important successor to the IGY, under the auspices of the International Council of Scientific Unions - an effort in which some 60 nations will take part.

These cooperative arrangements within the world scientific community are a healthy phenomenon. They are indicative of a community of interest which transcends national boundaries, and binds men and nations together.

In the world as a whole, this community of interests is perhaps epitomized by the United Nations. Already, the United Nations and its family of agencies are deeply involved in the exciting potentials of outer space to focus cooperation, and centralized vital information.

The Secretary General has now built up an effective staff in outer space to assist in this important work, a development warmly welcomed by the United States.

His staff maintains a registry of information on space launchings in which the United States, for its part, has registered all its launchings from Mid-February 1962.

The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, working with the Secretariat, collects and publishes information on national and cooperative programs, and on the resources of the United Nations, specialized agencies, and other international bodies related to the peaceful uses of outer space;

It is preparing reviews of training and educational opportunities;

It is preparing a list of available bibliographic and abstracting services covering the scientific and technical results and publications in space and space-related areas;

And the United Nations, as such, is also considering endorsement of specific activities and facilities which offer unusual opportunities for broad international participation -- this year the rocket launching station at Thumba, India.

These and other activities are being carried on directly by the United Nations Space Committee in cooperation with the Secretariat -- and I am proud to note, in passing, that my Government was one of the original

founders of this committee and has worked actively to help establish its program on a sound basis.

Indeed, it was President Johnson himself who, as a Member of the Senate, came before Committee One of the General Assembly on November 17, 1958, to speak in support of the resolution creating the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. At that time President Johnson stated:

"To keep space as man has found it and to harvest the yield of peace which it promises, we of the United States see one course--and only one--which the nations of earth may intelligently pursue. That is the course of full and complete and immediate cooperation to make the exploration of outer space a joint adventure."

Beyond the activities of the UN Space Committee, some of the technical agencies are becoming deeply involved in the space venture, and it is here that we see why, in some instances, international organization and international cooperation are not only desirable but a plain necessity. The most obvious instance of necessity is the problem of allocating radio frequencies to meet the needs for communication, weather, and navigational satellites; for space research; for radio astronomy; and other uses. The only alternative to international agreement is chaos in outer space communication. We therefore applaud the recently-completed work of the Space Radio Conference of the International Telecommunications Union which provided sufficient allocation of frequency bands for space communication for the next ten or fifteen years, and which adopted procedures relating to the use of these allocations. This, as I say, was a plain necessity.

There also is compelling reason for international organization and cooperation in weather reporting and forecasting. The atmosphere envelops

the globe -- not just a single state; so no nation can achieve weather forecasting adequate to its needs from observations made solely within its territory. As matters still stand, inadequate or inaccurate prediction of storms, rainfall, floods and drought cost the people of the world the loss of human life and billions of dollars annually. Our new-found capacity to orbit meteorological satellites, coupled with other exciting developments in meteorological science and computer technology, holds the promise of a drastic reduction in such losses which have plagued men of all nations through all history. To illustrate the point, our satellite TIROS VI,

in the course of a record thirteen months of continuous operation, transmitted nearly 60,000 cloud cover photographs which enabled us to issue 360 warnings of severe storms and over 2,000 analyses of global cloud cover. This work is being carried on by TIROS VII, now in orbit above us.

And to stress the point that all this can be of direct benefit to all nations in the here and now, let me state that the next TIROS satellite, to be launched shortly, will carry aloft an experimental development -- the Automatic Picture Transmission System. This will transmit automatically to ground receiver stations, without command from the ground, cloud photographic coverage of an area about 1600 kilometers in radius surrounding the ground station. The receiving equipment can be procured for less than \$50,000, bringing this service within the reach of nations with the most modest economic resources.

This is what science and technology are bringing to the field of meteorology. And the international community is hard on the heels of scientific progress with a matching rate of progress in institutional innovation. At its Fourth Congress, the WMO initiated the financial and organizational basis for a World Weather System to make the most of both conventional and satellite weather data. The resolution before us rightly applauds this move and urges the members to play their cooperative parts in the World Weather System and to take the necessary steps to be in a position to get the greatest benefits from it. My Government is only too pleased to support this program, and the WMO in general, as it has from the beginning.

In the field of space communications, too, the technology does not lie in the distant future, but has been coming rapidly into use this very year. The first RELAY satellite, placed into orbit December 13, 1962, provided successful transmission of voice between North and South America, and of black and white and color television between the United States and Europe. The second TELSTAR satellite, launched on May 7th of this year, has in addition, transmitted telephone calls, teletype messages and data and facsimile transmission. The first public demonstration of a synchronous satellite--SYNCOM II--was conducted on August 4, 1963, between the United States and Nigeria. We were fortunate in having as a participant in that program the distinguished Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Here, too--in space communications as in weather--technology, economics, and common sense all impel us toward the establishment of a single universal system. And once again, the guiding principle is set forth in the resolution now before us which "urges that all Member States have an opportunity to participate in the ownership, management, and use of global satellite communication facilities as soon as practicable and in addition that participating states have an opportunity to compete for design and supply of equipment" and "recommends that use by the United Nations of communications satellites be facilitated so that people everywhere will some day have the opportunity to hear and see United Nations proceedings as they take place."

My government endorses both these proposals. As we have said, before, our purpose is to help develop a single, global commercial system of communication via satellites--a system in which all countries will have an opportunity to participate in its ownership, management and use. The United States Communications Satellite Corporation is now well underway

with its planning. The United States Government and the Communications Satellite Corporation look forward to exchanging views in the months ahead with other governments and communications entities on next steps toward such a global system. Any alternative to international cooperation toward this end would fly in the face of all reason.

VI

Mr. Chairman, what does all this add up to?

In the name of the world community, we have promulgated the doctrine of freedom in outer space--declared that it shall be for human betterment and taken first steps toward assuring it--decided that space shall be ruled by international law, and begun to spell out what we mean by that.

In the name of technology, efficiency, maximum benefit, and plain good sense, we are engaged in an elaborate network of international cooperation at bilateral, multilateral, and United Nations levels, which taken together can well be described as an international program to extend dramatically man's knowledge and mastery of the outer environment which wraps all nations and all peoples in a common embrace.

In short, we have rejected the political philosophy which made the last age of discovery an age of national conquest -- and projected a political philosophy which promises to make this new age of discovery one of conquest for none but mankind. In outer space, if you please, our sense of social responsibility and our capacity for social invention are not doing too badly in response to the challenge laid down by the inventions of our scientists.

I have left to the last any reference to a manned flight to the moon.

Let me make it clear that exploration of the moon is not a stunt, distinct from the outer space program as a whole; nor is it the exclusive concern of only two nations.

This project, spectacular though it may be, is understood best as a single step in Man's mastery of space. It is a stage in a sequence which has a background and foreground.

In the background of manned flight to the moon is the vast program of research and the varied series of experiments which will make it possible--which will be thoroughly justified in and of themselves. Indeed, not more than about ten percent of our total expenditures on outer space can be attributed directly to manned lunar flight. This program is being carried forward with significant international cooperation. Many nations, not one, are contributing to the moon project. The tracking and data stations in Mexico, Bermuda, the Canary Islands of Spain, Nigeria, Zanzibar and Australia have been central to the success of the orbital flights in our Mercury program. These stations, along with additional facilities, are vital to the program for the manned lunar landing. This applies as well to the scientific investigations to be carried out through cooperative satellite and sounding rocket programs. We are proud of these associations in a common task, Mr. Chairman. We hope that they will grow.

Beyond the manned landing on the moon lies the whole uncharted and unpredictable stage of inter-planetary exploration. So exploration of the moon is seen properly as the culmination of

one stage of a process and the opening of another--as both an end and a beginning.

I repeat that the preponderant part of the U. S. space program is made up of projects which we want to carry out even if we did not plan at this stage to land men on the moon. The plans for a manned landing and return from the moon are thus one part of a space program whose larger purpose is to carry into outer space man's unending adventure of discovery.

As I have been saying here today, we have welcomed--and in fact fostered--the highest possible degree of international cooperation.

As you also know, President Kennedy proposed before the General Assembly last September to explore with the Soviet Union opportunities for working together in the conquest of space, including the sending of men to the moon as representatives of all of our countries. President Johnson has instructed me to reaffirm that offer today.

If giant strides cannot be taken at once, we hope that shorter steps can. We believe there are areas of work--short of integrating the two national programs--from which all could benefit. We should explore the opportunities for practical cooperation, beginning with small steps and hopefully leading to larger matters.

In any event, our policy engaging in mutually beneficial and mutually supporting cooperation in outer space--with the Soviet Union as with all nations--does not begin or end with a manned moon landing. There is plenty of work yet to come before that--and there will be even more afterward.

Mr. Chairman, one of the legal principles in the resolution before us states that "In the exploration of outer space States shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance...." My government is so guided--by preference and by deed.

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Another principle in the same resolution declares that "States shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer space ". We are prepared to so regard our astronauts and all astronauts.

Finally, we are prepared, if others are, to consider our own national effort to realize man's dream of a voyage to the moon as part of a larger design to add to the store of man's knowledge. We hope that all nations will take part in this great venture in the same spirit.

Mr. Chairman, we are well started, in this seventh year of the age of space, in the direction of freedom, peace, law, and cooperation in outer space. Every relevant pressure here on earth impels us to stay on that track. If we can acquire the habit of cooperation in outer space, we shall not only learn more about man's relation to his environment but about man's relation to man. And thus world statesmanship matches achievement with science.

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arrangements to facilitate international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space; and

(d) the nature of legal problems which may arise in the carrying out of programs to explore outer space.

The committee should, we think, consist of representatives of governments who would have available to their delegations the services of scientific and other advisers. For maximum efficiency we believe this committee should be composed of about nine members. Its composition should reflect two criteria: first, that its members should be chosen from states who have already demonstrated capabilities or an active interest in the peaceful uses of outer space; second, that its composition should also be representative of the General Assembly. The committee would consult with the appropriate specialized agencies and give careful attention to the programs already under way in this field, particularly that of the Committee on Space Research of the International Council of Scientific Unions. Thus the committee would be able to survey all existing activities in the field based upon the fullest knowledge available.

Legal Aspects of Outer Space

The committee would also study the legal aspects of outer space. Suggestions have been advanced during the past year for determining, in one way or other, the law of outer space. There have been proposals for international conferences, for studies by bodies of legal experts, for resolutions by the United Nations. Concern that available and applicable legal rules should not lag behind the new scientific progress in space technology is indeed natural.

Nations have had so far only the most limited and tentative experience with space exploration, and there is very little knowledge of it. We need the information which comes from experience in order to learn the nature of outer space and to get some idea of the practical problems man's entry into space will create. Such knowledge is a prerequisite to definitive legal rules for outer space. As this knowledge is acquired, the law of outer space will develop gradually and as actual situations and concrete problems call for legal answers.

But some useful work can be started now in regard to the law of outer space. There has, ac-

cordingly, been included in the mandate of the proposed United Nations *ad hoc* committee the study of "the nature of legal problems which may arise in the carrying out of programmes to explore outer space." The *ad hoc* committee could perform valuable service in ascertaining probable legal questions. As knowledge of outer space is expanded by progress in space exploration, we will have a better idea of the actual legal problems and their possible solution.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me say that we firmly believe that the work of the *ad hoc* committee on the peaceful uses of outer space can help to promote more significant cooperation—cooperation which will enable scientists to move forward into outer space with greater speed and which will inspire statesmen to take new steps toward the settlement of pressing political problems. Thus the hopes of all men that the use of outer space will lead to a better life can come true.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHNSON, NOVEMBER 17¹¹

Press release 695 dated November 17

I come today with one purpose. I am here to express to you the essential unity of the American people in their support of the goals of the resolution offered now in their name.

This resolution is presented, as our system requires, by the representative of the executive branch of our Government. I speak here today at its request.

The executive position in the United States is held by the Republican Party through the mandate of the people. I am here as a member of one house of the legislative branch, in which the majority position is held, also at the mandate of the people, by the Democratic Party, of which I am a member.

These are distinctions. They are not, on this resolution, differences. On the goal of dedicating outer space to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind there are no differences within our Government, between our parties, or among our people. The executive and the legislative branches of our Government are together. United we stand.

¹¹ For a statement by Secretary Dulles concerning the invitation to Senator Johnson to speak in the General Assembly, see BULLETIN of Dec. 1, 1958, p. 868.

There need be no differences among us here.

The very opportunity of the issue before this Assembly is to erase the accumulated differences of our earth's long and troubled history and to write across the vastness of space a proud new chapter of unity and peace.

Men have not faced such a moment of opportunity before. Until now our strivings toward peace have been heavily burdened by legacies of distrust and fear and ignorance and injury.

Those legacies do not exist in space. They will not appear there unless we send them on ahead.

To keep space as man has found it and to harvest the yield of peace which it promises, we of the United States see one course—and only one—which the nations of earth may intelligently pursue. That is the course of full and complete and immediate cooperation to make the exploration of outer space a joint adventure.

There is, I emphasize, no other course.

In saying this I express no personal belief alone, but rather I convey to you the conviction of my countrymen and the force of the American decision which has already been established.

Record of Bipartisan Congressional Support

The American people, through their elected representatives in the Congress, have spoken their aims and their purposes. The will of the people is now fixed in our laws and our policies.

The end is peace. The means to that end is international cooperation. This is—and this will remain—the American decision.

Eleven months ago the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee submitted to the full Senate a report on an exhaustive inquiry into the satellite and missile program of the United States. In that report the bipartisan membership of the subcommittee made this unanimous declaration:

The immediate objective is to defend ourselves, but the equally important objective is to reach the hearts and minds of men everywhere so that the day will come when the ballistic missile will be merely a dusty relic in the museums of mankind and men everywhere will work together in understanding.

On July 29 of this year the Congress in an act signed by the President established in the executive branch an agency under civilian control to guide and direct our national efforts in the exploration of space. By the act creating this

agency, Congress embedded in the permanent law of the United States the following declaration of policy:

The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of the United States that activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind.

Further, in the same section of that act, Congress stated as a firm objective of the national efforts the following:

Cooperation by the United States with other nations and groups of nations in work done pursuant to this act and in the peaceful application of the results thereof.

Subsequent to that, the majority leader of the House of Representatives, the Honorable John McCormack, introduced before that body a resolution expressly requesting the President of the United States to submit to the United Nations the question of international cooperation in dedicating outer space to peaceful purposes only. That resolution received the earnest support of the full membership of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House, and it was adopted unanimously by the full membership of the House of Representatives.

In the Senate the Foreign Relations Committee, under the chairmanship of the Honorable Theodore Green, likewise accorded to the resolution the most serious study and recommended without dissent that it be adopted. The Senate of the United States, like the House of Representatives, gave to the resolution the unanimous support of the Senators of both parties. Thus it is a matter of record that the sense of the full membership of the Congress of the United States is that this question should be here on the agenda of the nations of the world. It is also the congressional view that this organization should assume the responsibility of leadership in promoting international cooperation in the exploration of outer space.

This is the American decision, expressed firmly in the resolutions of policy by the elected representatives of the people and established solidly by them in the cornerstone law of our nation's space effort.

Adoption of U.S. Resolution Urged

The resolution before this Assembly now embodies fully the will of the Congress and the will of the people whom the Members of the Congress serve. Thus I can—and I do—commend it to you

for adoption. The record already made assures you the continuing support of the Congress for the cooperative endeavors toward peaceful uses of outer space which the resolution contemplates.

The full dimensions of the promise of space are now beyond the scope of our knowledge and our imagination. To presume that we have more now than merely a glimpse of those dimensions would be both a vain and perhaps ultimately a fatally limiting error.

At this moment the nations of the earth are explorers in space, not colonizers. Hence it is proper that this Assembly should provide—first—the means for the United Nations to encourage and inspire that exploration. That is contemplated in the form of this resolution, which would create an exploratory *ad hoc* committee of representatives of member nations to carry out the following tasks:

First, to inventory the activities and resources of the United Nations, its specialized agencies, and other international bodies relating to peaceful uses of outer space;

Second, to determine areas of international cooperation and programs which could be undertaken under auspices of this organization by member nations without regard to their present stage of economic or scientific advancement;

Third, to consider the future form of internal organization in the United Nations which would best facilitate full international cooperation in this field; and

Fourth, to survey the nature of the legal problems which may arise in implementation of this joint adventure among the nations of the earth.

These are essential first steps. Until these explorations are conducted, orderly procedure to the broader horizons beyond will not be possible. Thus to impede this first step is to impede all progress toward the goals of peace which men of faith believe exist in the realms of space.

While these are first steps, they are decisive steps, and we cannot be unmindful of the precedents which, if established now, may influence or even control the longer steps ahead.

The Case Against Unilateral Action

We of the United States have recognized and do recognize, as must all men, that the penetration

into outer space is the concern of all mankind. All nations and all men, without regard to their roles on earth, are affected alike by what is accomplished over their heads in outer space.

If nations proceed unilaterally, then their penetrations into space become only extensions of their national policies on earth. What their policies on earth inspire—whether trust or fear—so their accomplishments in outer space will inspire also. For nations given to aggression and war and tyranny on earth, unilateral success in space technology would only multiply many times over their threat to peace. Thus it is the interest of nations dedicated to peace and freedom that the opportunity of space not be perverted to the end of aggression and control over earth by the aggressors.

Recognizing this as true, men of peace will recognize fully the necessity to proceed without delay on the first step which is here proposed.

Today outer space is free. It is unscarred by conflict. No nation holds a concession there. It must remain this way.

We of the United States do not acknowledge that there are landlords of outer space who can presume to bargain with the nations of the earth on the price of access to this new domain. We must not—and need not—corrupt this great opportunity by bringing to it the very antagonisms which we may, by courage, overcome and leave behind forever through a joint adventure into this new realm.

What man has done thus far has been the result directly of international cooperation on an informal basis by men of science through the years. The success, further, of the formal cooperation undertaken in observance of the International Geophysical Year foretells the high promise offered by enlargement of our goals and intensification of our support and efforts.

We know the gains of cooperation. We know the losses of failure to cooperate. If we fail now to apply the lessons we have learned or even if we delay their application, we know that the advances into space may only mean adding a new dimension to warfare. If, however, we proceed along the orderly course of full cooperation, we shall by the very fact of cooperation make the most substantial contribution yet made toward perfecting peace. Men who have worked together

*All out 2
2 x 2 units*

to reach the stars are r... likely to descend together into the depths of war and desolation.

It is the American vision, I believe, that, out of this fresh start for humankind which space affords, man may at last free himself of the waste of guarding himself against his ignorance of his neighbors.

Barriers between us will fall as our sights rise to space. Secrecy will cease to be. Man will come to understand his fellow man—and himself—as never he has been able to do. In the infinity of the space adventure, man can find growing richness of mind, of spirit, and of liberty.

The promise of this moment of opportunity is great. We of the United States believe that this Assembly will honor the moment and fulfill the opportunity—and all mankind will be the beneficiary of your courage.

STATEMENT BY MR. LODGE, NOVEMBER 18

U.S. delegation press release 3084

I will not take much of the committee's time, but Mr. Zorin has seen fit to make some statements to which I, of course, must reply. I might say that his speech seemed to consist of two entirely different halves—so much so that they might not have been written by the same person. The first half contains the ritualistic attack on the United States, which has become a hardy perennial feature of Soviet oratory in the United Nations. It has been so for the 6 years I have been here. Why they persist in this attack on the United States, I really don't know. How the United States, with its peaceful traditions and democratic methods, could possibly be a threat to anybody, I don't know, but it is written down in some book which they follow that they must be opposed to a country which is not Communist. Although not capitalist, we are assuredly not Communist, and so for that reason he thinks it is worth while to misrepresent us, and I must once again bother you by setting the record straight.

Mr. Zorin's first assertion is that the United States is not interested in reaching agreement to ~~insure~~ **insure that outer space will be used for peaceful purposes only.** Let me repeat what I have said here several times before. The United States is eager to reach such an agreement. All we need is Soviet agreement to sit down to begin negotia-

tions. Such an agreement, we think, must be the conclusive step in a sober and realistic process of negotiation and mutual understanding on the nature of the problem and the specific measures required to solve it. Proposals to make this the subject of a mere rhetorical declaration can only divert our attention from the real issues and the real problems involved if we are to assure that outer space is to be used for peaceful and scientific purposes only.

Recent events in the field of nuclear weapons tests make clear the absolute worthlessness of promises with no firmer foundation than a small quantity of black ink on white paper. These events can only reinforce the conviction of all of us who are interested in achieving genuine and lasting disarmament that the only possible way to achieve this goal is through agreement on specific steps under appropriate international control and inspection. Any agreement on disarmament without the necessary controls would be a sham and a delusion that would result in increasing mutual fears and enlarge the danger of war.

U.S. Prepared To Negotiate Agreement on Inspection

This matter, Mr. Chairman, is far too serious for us to engage in propaganda that evades the real issues. What is needed is action—action based upon a sincere desire to solve the problem instead of evasion behind a screen of empty and misleading catch phrases. The United States continues to be prepared to enter into the kind of negotiations that will enable us to make the quickest possible progress. All that is needed is the consent of the Soviet Union to begin the necessary technical talks to create an international inspection system, which is the only kind of approach that will assure the objective we all desire, to wit: a dedication of all man's efforts in outer space to peaceful purposes.

Mr. Chairman, we agree with the representative of the Soviet Union in this respect: The disarmament aspects of this question are important, and they do require urgent and serious attention. Indeed, the United States was the first to point this out. On January 14, 1957, within this Assembly and on behalf of the United States Government, I called for an early study of this matter. Some months later, at the 1957 London disarmament conference, the United Kingdom, France,

EXECUTIVE ORDER

- - - - -


DESIGNATING CERTAIN FACILITIES OF THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION AND OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AS THE
JOHN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER

WHEREAS President John F. Kennedy lighted the imagination
of our people when he set the moon as our target and man as the means
to reach it; and

WHEREAS the installations now to be renamed are a center and
symbol of our country's peaceful assault on space; and

WHEREAS it is in the nature of this assault that it should test
the limits of our youth and grace, our strength and wit, our vigor and
perseverance -- qualities fitting to the memory of John F. Kennedy:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as
President of the United States, I hereby designate the facilities of the
Launch Operations Center of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration and the facilities of Station No. 1 of the Atlantic Missile
Range, in the State of Florida, as the John F. Kennedy Space Center;
and such facilities shall be hereafter known and referred to by that name.



THE WHITE HOUSE

November 29, 1963

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

24a
The White House
Washington

1963 NOV 27 PM 7 11

November 27, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
Special Assistant to the President

In accordance with your request of this afternoon, there is attached a proposed Executive order designating certain facilities of the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration at Cape Canaveral and Merritt Island as the John F. Kennedy Space Center.

The proposed order has the approval of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and of appropriate representatives of the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, and NASA.

Arthur B. Focke

General Counsel

Attachment

91
J. B. Brundage
Space
11/29
November 27, 1963
S 24-b

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Changing Name of Cape Canaveral to Cape Kennedy

Pursuant to your suggestion earlier today, with the help of the Domestic Names Committee of the Board on Geographic Names I have evaluated the proposal that Cape Canaveral, Florida, be renamed Cape Kennedy.

The name Cape Canaveral is derived from Cabo de Canareal (Cape of Royal Cane) which first appeared on a Spanish map in 1565. This name appears in different spellings on later maps. It is apparent that the original Spanish name was corrupted over the years into the name Cape Canaveral which later became the official designation for this geographic area. It is also interesting to note that it was not until 1963 that the name of the post office was changed from Port Canaveral to Cape Canaveral.

Of course, in recent years Cape Canaveral, due to its central importance as a center of space research, has come to be associated in the minds of people of the United States with our effort to explore outer space. The major American achievements in space to date are unquestionably largely the result of inspired leadership of the late President, John F. Kennedy. Consequently, the experts in my Department consider that the historical values associated with the renaming of this geographic area in honor of the late President Kennedy far outweigh the claim of the other historical values associated with the existing name. I should also advise you that there is ample precedent under the circumstances for making a name change of this kind. You are also advised that the Board of Geographic Names unanimously favors the renaming of this geographic feature as Cape Kennedy.

Secretary of the Interior

✓

Space

11/27/63 7:00 p.m.

DRAFT WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

24-c

President Johnson has today determined that ~~the~~
~~installations~~ at Station No. 1 of the Atlantic Missile Range
and the NASA Launch Operations Center in Florida shall
hereafter bear the name The John F. Kennedy Space Center.
The President also announces that hereafter Cape Canaveral
Florida will bear the geographical name Cape Kennedy.

✓ DRAFT WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

President Johnson has today determined that the installations at the Air Force Missile Test Center and the NASA Launch Operations Center in Florida shall hereafter bear the name The John F. Kennedy Space Center. The President also announces that hereafter Cape Canaveral Florida will bear the geographical name Cape Kennedy.

not being used

INSERT

Because of his farsighted leadership in the field of space --an arena in which President Kennedy revealed so clearly his special confidence that this nation would become the world's leading space faring nation-- I am acting today to re-name Cape Canaveral as Cape Kennedy. It is most fitting that the name of one of history's greatest stars be so engraved where man-made planets begin their orbits into outer space. As such, it will encourage us all to greater heights on earth as well as in space.

ECW



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

November 27, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR McGEORGE BUNDY:

As far as the Board of Geographic Names is concerned, there is no problem concerning the changing of the name of Cape Canaveral. From a procedural standpoint I would suggest that a very brief order ^{or} ~~and~~ proclamation be prepared which might read as follows:

I hereby declare that hereafter Cape Canaveral, Florida, shall bear the official geographic name "Cape Kennedy".

Signature
Date

This will get the job done very nicely.

Stewart L. Udall
Secretary of the Interior

Space 105
only has cy

63-M-15B-S/14 c. **D**

File

25

~~SECRET~~

SPECIAL SPACE REVIEW

DRAFT REPORT

Bureau of the Budget
November 29, 1963

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
NLJ-S 98001
By com, NARA, Date 2-27-02

~~SECRET~~

SPECIAL SPACE REVIEW - 1965 BUDGET

INTRODUCTION

This report summarizes the principal results of the special review of the goals, nature, and pace of the space programs in the light of 1964 and 1965 budget pressures, which has been undertaken by the Bureau of the Budget in conjunction with the 1965 budget review and in response to the decisions at the October 8, 1963, meeting of the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

The purposes of the review have been to consider the goals of the space programs and the minimum requirements of a national program to achieve them, and to identify the policy questions, alternatives, and other major issues to be dealt with in the 1965 budget decisions.

The draft report has been prepared by Bureau of the Budget staff in consultation with senior representatives of NASA and the Department of Defense, and others, on the basis of information submitted by the agencies and discussions with agency officials in 1965 budget reviews now in process. The views expressed in the draft are necessarily those of the Bureau of the Budget staff. It is expected that the recommendations of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the concurrences ^{or} ~~on~~ differing views of the Secretary of Defense; the Administrator, NASA; the Director of OST; and the Executive Secretary of the NASC will be inserted as appropriate after discussion.

Section I covering the Manned Lunar Landing Program and Section II covering Military Space Objectives (including the proposed manned earth orbit experiments) are attached. Problems relating to communications satellites, meteorology, geodesy, space sciences, and technological development are being handled separately.

~~SECRET~~

11/29/63

~~SECRET~~

SPACE ACTIVITIES OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

63-M-15B-42 c.28

Preliminary Estimates Based on Agency 1965 Budget Proposals
(NOA/Program basis in millions)~~SECRET~~

	<u>FY 1962</u>	<u>FY 1963</u>	<u>FY 1964</u>	<u>FY 1965</u>	<u>FY 1966</u>	<u>FY 1967</u>	<u>FY 1968</u>
<u>NASA</u>							
Manned Lunar Landing	1194.1	2639.3	4129.7	4197.5	3673.2	3209.6	2561.2
Other NASA <u>1/</u>	627.5	1051.7	1215.0	1379.9	1483.6	1442.1	1416.7
Adjustments & provision for new programs ..	+3.3	-17.7	+5.3	-2.4	843.2	1348.3	2022.1
Total NASA <u>1/</u>	1824.9	3673.3	5350.0	5575.0	6000.0	6000.0	6000.0
<u>Defense</u>							
Dynasoar (X-20)	101.3	130.5	125.4	146.1	135.5	53.0	53.0
Gemini	-	-	13.6	6.0	-	-	-
Orbiting Space Station	-	-	-	5.0	40.0	100.0	100.
Titan III	35.2	261.1	329.6	213.3	29.1	-	-
DOD Communication Satellite System	104.6	59.6	76.5	90.6	114.0	104.0	55.0
All Other	1050.7	1182.7	1131.4	1153.1	1153.1 <u>2/</u>	1153.1 <u>2/</u>	1153.1 <u>2/</u>
Total Defense	1291.8	1633.9	1676.5	1614.1	1471.7 <u>3/</u>	1410.1 <u>3/</u>	1361.1 <u>3/</u>
<u>AEC</u>							
ROVER	62.9	94.4	112.9	144.9	222.8	210.0	177.0
SNAP	62.0	83.6	93.4	110.0	138.0	129.0	137.5
All Other	3.4	35.9	51.9	60.5	53.0	55.0	55.0
Total AEC	128.3	213.9	258.2	315.4	413.8	394.0	369.5
<u>Commerce</u> - Weather Bureau	50.0	40.0	18.0	20.0	45.0	45.0	45.0
<u>National Science Foundation</u>	1.3	1.5	2.4	2.9	4.7	5.2	7.1
TOTAL SPACE	3296.3	5562.6	7305.1	7527.4	7935.2	7854.3	7782.

1/ Include Aeronautics.2/ Assumed same as 1965.3/ Does not include additional amounts for possible new programs out of DOD development planning increment.~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

I. MANNED LUNAR LANDING PROGRAM

A. STATEMENT OF PRESENT GOAL:

To attempt to achieve a manned lunar landing and return by the end of this decade, on a high priority but not "crash" basis, with prudent regard for the safety of the astronauts, for the principal purposes of (a) demonstrating an important space achievement ahead of the USSR, (b) serving as a focus for technological developments necessary for other space objectives and having potential significance for national defense, and (c) acquiring useful scientific and other data to the extent feasible.

B. QUESTIONS, DISCUSSION, ALTERNATIVES, AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Should consideration be given at this time to backing off from the manned lunar landing goal?

Discussion: The review has pointed to the conclusion that in the absence of clear changes in the present technical or international situations, the only basis for backing off from the MLL objective at this time would be an overriding fiscal decision either (a) that the budgetary totals in 1965 or succeeding years are unacceptable and should be reduced by adjusting the space program, or (b) that within present budgetary totals an adjustment should be made shifting funds from space to other programs.

Alternatives

a. Adhere to the present goal as stated above. The arguments supporting this alternative include:

(1) That the reasons for adopting the manned lunar landing goal are still valid;

(2) That in the absence of clear and compelling external circumstances a change in present policies and commitments would involve an unacceptable "loss of face" both domestically and internationally; and

(3) That it is doubtful if budgetary reductions in the manned lunar program would in fact reduce criticism of the total magnitude of the budget or increase support for other meritorious programs to which the funds might be applied.

b. Decide now to abandon current work directly related to the manned lunar landing objective but to continue development of the large launch vehicle (Saturn V) so that it will be available for future space programs. It is estimated that cancellation in January 1964 of Apollo and other programs supporting the manned lunar landing only would result in NOA and expenditure savings in FY 1965 of about \$1 billion, less amounts required for any new objectives that might be substituted. The arguments supporting this alternative could include:

(1) The overriding need for economy in the 1965 budget;

(2) The doubts that Congress will provide adequate support for the manned lunar landing program in 1965 and succeeding years, regardless of the administration's recommendations; and

(3) The apparent absence of a competitive USSR manned lunar landing program at this time.

c. Decide now to abandon both current work toward the manned lunar landing objective and the development of the Saturn V large launch vehicle. If the programs involved are cancelled or adjusted in January 1964, savings approaching \$2.5 billion in 1965 NOA and expenditures could be anticipated. The arguments supporting this alternative could include,

in addition to those for alternative "b" above:

(1) That proceeding with development of the Saturn V launch vehicle is not justified in the absence of approved goals requiring its use; and

(2) That an adequate continuing space program can be built around the use of the Saturn IB (and perhaps the Titan III) launch vehicle.

Recommendations

[Recommendation of Director, Bureau of the Budget, and concurrences or differing recommendations of Secretary of Defense; Administrator, NASA; Director, OST; and Executive Secretary, NASC, to be inserted after discussions]

* * * * *

2. Does the present program represent the minimum necessary for achieving the MLL goal?

Discussion: The review has pointed to the conclusions:

a. That the elements comprising the present program (with Saturn I manned flights eliminated) are required for achieving the goal (recognizing the somewhat indirect contribution of the Gemini program), except for certain construction and other relatively minor items in which adjustments are under consideration in the regular budget review; and

b. That the current NASA 1964 and 1965 estimates represent the minimum funding level required to continue the program on the schedule now planned, except for the possible adjustments being considered in the regular budget review.

Alternatives

a. Approve the program and cost estimates as submitted by NASA, subject to separate resolution of the adjustments under consideration in the budget review. (The question of a 1964 supplemental estimate is considered in Item 3 below.)

b. Decide now that the program should be geared to a schedule slipping the first manned lunar landing attempts one or two years later than now planned to the very end of the decade (i.e., end of CY 1969 or 1970, depending on the definition of "decade"). This alternative might permit reductions in the range of \$100 to 200 million in the 1965 budget. Other things being equal, the total cost of the MLLP to the achievement of the first manned lunar landing would probably be greater by at least \$200 million because of the need to maintain the same engineering and other overhead costs over a longer period. However, this would probably not mean a corresponding increase in total annual budgets over what they would be under the present schedule, since expected successor programs would then consume the funds that would otherwise go for completing the stretched out MLLP.

In support of this alternative it could be argued that it would recognize the need for minimizing outlays in the 1965 budget without necessitating a decision at this time to abandon the goal of attempting to achieve manned lunar landing in this decade.

Opposing it, the point can be made that some degree of slippage in present schedules is recognized to be inevitable, so that eliminating the present margin between the current scheduled first manned lunar landing

attempts (late CY 1968) and the end of the decade would be tantamount to and generally recognized as an admission that achievement of the goal has been deferred beyond the end of the decade.

Recommendations

[Recommendation of Director, Bureau of the Budget, and concurrences or differing recommendations of Secretary of Defense; Administrator, NASA; Director, OST; and Executive Secretary, NASC, to be inserted after discussions]

* * * * *

3. Should a 1964 supplemental estimate be submitted to Congress in January for restoration in part or in full of the \$250 million congressional reductions below the total legislative authorizations for NASA in 1964?

Alternatives

a. Decide to submit a 1964 supplemental in the amount required to keep the MLLP on the current schedules. Arguments that can be made for this course include:

(1) That restoration of 1964 funds is necessary to avoid forced slippage in the program; and

(2) That submission of a supplemental estimate would once again place the question of maintaining the pace in the MLLP squarely before Congress.

b. Decide not to submit a 1964 supplemental estimate to Congress, and accept as the will of Congress whatever slippage in the MLLP is caused by insufficient funds in 1964. Arguments for this course include:

(1) It would avoid placing the administration in the untenable

budgetary posture of seeking restoration of the NASA reduction so soon after congressional action without making similar requests for other important programs reduced by Congress;

(2) There is no reason to believe that the Congress will look with more favor on a supplemental estimate than it did on the regular 1964 request;

(3) The outcome of a supplemental request is likely to be uncertain for several months, and the uncertainty will create operating difficulties which will tend to offset the advantages even if the supplemental is ultimately approved; and

(4) Congress has taken the responsibility for slippage in the MLL program because of insufficient funds in 1964.

c. Decide not to submit a 1964 supplemental estimate but to seek to make up in the 1965 budget the amounts required to adhere to the current MLLP schedules insofar as practicable. The arguments for this alternative are:

(1) It avoids the problems of a 1964 supplemental estimate referred to above [Items (1), (2), and (3) under "b" above];

(2) It offers a possibility of minimizing the impact of congressional 1964 reductions on the MLLP through adjustments in the timing of obligations between 1964 and 1965; and

(3) It may be feasible without increasing previously expected 1965 budget totals for NASA because of possible offsetting 1965 reductions that have been identified in the regular budget review, as follows:

		(NOA in millions)		
		<u>MLLP</u>	<u>All Other</u>	<u>Total NASA</u>
<u>NASA estimates:</u>				
	1964	4,129.7	1,220.3	5,350.0
	1965	<u>4,197.5</u>	<u>1,377.5</u>	<u>5,575.0</u>
	Total	8,327.2	2,597.8	10,925.0
<u>Adjustments:</u>				
Possible 1965 adjustments in				
	budget review	-88.4*	-313.8*	-402.2*
	Congressional 1964 reductions	-190.0*	-60.0*	-250.0
	Restoration in 1965 for MLLP	+190.0*	-	+190.0*
<u>Revised totals:</u>				
	1964	3,939.7*	1,160.3*	5,100.0
	1965	<u>4,299.1*</u>	<u>1,063.7*</u>	<u>5,362.8*</u>
	Total	8,238.8*	2,224.0*	10,462.8*

*Tentative numbers; subject to change in final budget recommendations.

Recommendations

[Recommendation of Director, Bureau of the Budget, and concurrences or differing recommendations of Secretary of Defense; Administrator, NASA; Director, OST; and Executive Secretary, NASC, to be inserted after discussions]

* * * * *

4. Should our posture on the manned lunar landing program attribute a greater degree of military significance to the program?

Discussion: The review points to the conclusions that:

a. The facts of the situation justify the position that the launch vehicle, spacecraft, facilities, and general technology being developed by NASA in the MLLP do have important potential future military significance;

b. That overplaying this point unduly could have the effects of undercutting the general peaceful image of the program, jeopardizing possibilities for international cooperation, or calling into question the need for a large-scale NASA non-military space program; and

c. That the question of public posture on potential military significance is separable from, but must be considered in relation to the questions of the composition of the NASA and Defense programs and of possible transfers of projects from NASA to Defense or vice versa.

Alternatives

a. Decide (1) to place greater stress on the potential military significance of the capabilities being developed in the MLLP in domestic public statements, exercising due restraint to avoid undesirable international effects; (2) to emphasize that NASA programs are being relied on by Defense for general technological capabilities and developments; and (3) to point to Defense use of Gemini (on whatever basis is decided separately below) as a tangible example of how NASA technological advances contribute to potential Defense needs. The principal advantage of this alternative is that if properly handled it would permit greater use of potential military applications in securing and maintaining congressional and public support for the administrations's manned lunar landing program without creating demands for an unwarranted expansion in military space programs in addition to or in lieu of the approved NASA programs.

b. Decide (1) to play down the potential military significance of the capabilities being developed in the MLLP; (2) to emphasize that all clearly established military requirements are being met by Department of

Defense programs coordinated with NASA and drawing on NASA's experience;
and (3) to point to the DOD use of Gemini (on whatever basis is decided
separately below) as indicating that prompt attention is being given to
the exploitation of possible military uses of space. The advantage of this
alternative is that it would avoid possible international complications and
unwarranted demands for a larger military space program that might result
from too much stress on the potential military significance of the MLLP.

Recommendations

[Recommendation of Director, Bureau of the Budget, and concurrences
or differing recommendations of Secretary of Defense; Administrator, NASA;
Director, OST; and Executive Secretary, NASC, to be inserted after
discussions]

* * * * *

5. What should be the posture with respect to a joint effort with the
USSR?

Discussion: The review points to the conclusion that in the present
situation we must necessarily take the posture that we are prepared to enter
into any constructive arrangement which will not jeopardize vital national
security interests and which will not delay or jeopardize the success of our
MLL program. We will necessarily have to wait to see what proposals, if
any, the USSR may make, and then expect an extended series of negotiations.

Recommendation: That the posture be as indicated above.

SUMMARY OF NASA PROGRAMS AS PROJECTED IN NASA 1965 BUDGET REQUEST
 Estimates do not reflect final congressional action in 1964 or budget adjustments in 1965
 New Obligational Authority - in millions

	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1962 thru 1968 total
<u>MANNED LUNAR LANDING PROGRAMS</u>	1,194.1	2,657.0	4,129.8	4,197.5	3,673.2	3,209.6	2,561.2	21,622.3
<u>For manned lunar landing only</u>	149.8	480.2	983.0	1,025.0	921.0	1,102.3	1,019.7	5,681.0
Apollo spacecraft	75.7	398.1	889.1	948.5	870.8	1,042.2	949.1	5,173.5
Control, operations, and construction ...	74.1	82.1	93.9	76.5	50.2	60.1	70.6	507.5
<u>For Saturn V only</u>	235.9	877.7	1,237.0	1,292.7	1,284.9	1,006.0	761.7	6,695.9
Saturn V development	56.0	340.9	672.1	901.1	999.2	789.0	550.0	4,309.0
Engines, operations, and construction ...	179.9	536.8	564.9	391.6	285.7	216.5	211.5	2,386.9
<u>For Saturn IB only</u>	19.9	48.8	206.7	190.3	170.1	92.5	35.1	763.4
Saturn IB development	-	18.4	167.9	155.0	138.7	64.1	8.7	552.8
Engines, construction, other	19.9	30.4	38.8	35.3	31.4	28.4	26.4	210.6
<u>Auxiliary programs</u>	544.8	828.0	938.0	804.9	449.0	218.4	62.0	3,845.1
Mercury and Gemini operations	89.3	308.9	404.7	328.6	158.8	58.9	-	1,349.2
Saturn I and engines	211.7	233.6	221.6	122.1	36.7	28.6	22.4	876.7
Unmanned Lunar and OSO	108.2	165.6	189.7	269.7	231.8	130.9	39.6	1,135.5
Centaur	73.8	90.1	109.5	82.0	21.7	-	-	377.1
Construction	61.8	29.8	12.5	2.5	-	-	-	106.6
<u>Supporting programs</u>	243.7	422.3	765.1	884.7	848.2	790.4	682.7	4,637.1
Systems, c.o. and other OMSF	24.8	74.6	207.3	322.9	290.4	267.5	246.6	1,434.1
Tracking and data acquisition	37.1	74.6	221.0	171.8	107.8	103.9	96.1	812.3
Operations	181.8	273.1	336.8	390.0	450.0	419.0	340.0	2,390.7
<u>OTHER PROGRAMS</u>	627.5	1,033.9	1,215.0	1,379.9	1,483.6	1,442.1	1,416.7	8,598.7
Application and technical utilization	77.8	98.2	103.5	90.0	129.9	95.9	57.2	652.5
Space sciences	199.4	260.3	358.5	371.9	418.1	320.6	261.3	2,190.1
Research and advance MSF	53.2	285.0	370.1	423.0	580.1	654.5	682.8	3,048.7
Tracking and data acquisition	60.8	62.0	100.0	109.6	115.5	112.1	111.4	671.4
NASA operations	130.2	157.7	181.2	210.0	240.0	259.0	304.0	1,482.1
Other construction	106.1	170.7	101.7	175.4	-	-	-	553.9
<u>PROVISION FOR NEW STARTS (and adjustments)</u> ..	+3.3	-17.7	+5.3	-2.4	843.2	1,348.3	2,022.1	4,202.1
<u>TOTAL NASA</u>	1,824.9	3,673.3	5,350.0	5,575.0	6,000.0	6,000.0	6,000.0	34,423.2

II. MILITARY SPACE OBJECTIVES

A. STATEMENT OF PRESENT GOALS:

1. To develop and exploit, as appropriate, space systems and capabilities which meet clearly defined high priority national defense requirements which cannot be better met, from a cost-effectiveness standpoint, by other means; and

2. To develop, through a national program, advanced space technology on a broad basis to permit timely development and exploitation of space systems and capabilities for military objectives which may become clearly established at some time in the future.

B. QUESTIONS, DISCUSSION, ALTERNATIVES, AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Does the present national program represent the minimum necessary for achieving the military space objectives stated above?

Discussion: The review points to the following conclusion that the need for two major elements of the present program is questionable:

a. Dynasoar - There is general agreement that continuation of the Dynasoar (X-20) program is not essential and that the engineering data of interest on lifting body reentry vehicles can be obtained much more economically through unmanned short range test firings tying together the results of the ASSET program and NASA wind tunnel and related work now underway. Termination of Dynasoar in January 1964 would save over \$400 million of the total of over \$800 million now estimated to complete the presently approved program. About \$35 million of 1964 NOA might be recovered and the present 1965 NOA estimates could be reduced by eliminating the \$146 million now included for Dynasoar development and special facilities.

b. Titan III - There are still no clearly essential program requirements for this launch vehicle. On the military side, the most specific potential uses now identified by Defense consist of Dynasoar launchings (see above), possible special purpose missions, future communications satellite system launchings, and manned orbiting space station experiments (see below). While Titan III (in either the A or C versions), if developed, might be used for launching larger special purpose or communications satellite payloads, there do not appear to be any clear prospective military requirements in either field that could not be oriented around smaller payloads which could be handled with Atlas or Titan II class launch vehicles. Similarly, the Titan III, if developed, might find useful applications in future NASA space exploration or other programs, but the Saturn I and IB are available for payloads in the Titan III class. For the "Gemini X" manned orbiting flight experiments discussed below, use of the Saturn IB in lieu of Titan III could be considered.

While the Titan III launch vehicle would have many attractive features (short reaction time, versatility, probable lower long-run costs), and development is now well underway, termination at this time would save from \$300 to 350 million of the estimated \$850 million total development costs (up to \$100 million in 1964 NOA, \$198 million in 1965 NOA, and \$29 million in 1966 NOA).

2. Should the present national program for achieving the military space objectives stated above be augmented or reoriented at this time?

Discussion: The review has pointed to the following conclusions:

a. Specific military requirements - There are no clearly essential military space requirements identified at this time which are not included in the currently approved or planned programs. Questions of how essential high priority military requirements can be met in the field of communications satellites are under active consideration in current discussions involving the Department of Defense, the Communications Satellite Corporation, and the interagency working group under the Deputy Attorney General. Questions of military requirements relating to meteorological and geodetic satellites are being dealt with separately in the special review and the 1965 budget discussions.

b. Technology of potential military significance - The current NASA, Defense, and AEC programs, taken together, appear to be generally adequate for providing the technological capabilities and base for possible future military space applications and objectives, except possibly in the field of experiments on the military or other utility of manned orbital flight discussed at length below. Questions relating to the possible transfer from Defense to NASA of development work on the 260" large solid rockets, the possible development of a new upper stage for Saturn IB or Titan III, the need and nature of a NASA-DOD program on lifting-reentry bodies to replace Dynasoar, the nuclear rocket (ROVER) program, and the space nuclear power programs are being considered separately in the review and the 1965 budget discussions.

c. Experiments on military or other utility of manned flight in earth orbit - The Department of Defense has proposed for consideration a reorientation of the current program under which a new program for testing experimentally the military or other utility of manned flight in earth orbit would be undertaken in lieu of the Dynasoar program discussed above, within or below the same total budget levels for space programs reflected in current agency estimates for 1964 and 1965. The principal considerations, differences, and problems related to this suggestion are outlined below, after which the main alternatives are summarized for consideration.

(1) There appears to be fairly wide agreement at this time on the following points:

(a) It is premature at this time to decide to proceed with an actual space station project involving long duration stay in orbit, ferrying of crews, and resupply of the space station. No clear high priority military or scientific requirements have yet been identified which would support the institution of such a project at this time. Studies now underway under the recent Defense/NASA agreement should be completed and evaluated before an actual space station project is initiated.

(b) The budgetary situation permitting, it would be desirable to undertake in the near future manned experiments in earth orbit with military surveillance or other equipment in a vehicle (named "Gemini X" in this report) affording some degree of increased space and mobility for the crew over that provided by the present 2-man Gemini capsule. The purpose would be an experimental test of what military or other advantages, if any, might be gained by the use of manned rather than unmanned satellites, so that the proper decisions may be made with respect to possible future costly manned space flight proposals.

(c) The experiments referred to in (b) above do not require a space station involving long stay-time in orbit, ferrying of astronauts, rendezvous, or resupply, but could probably be accomplished with a modified 2-man Gemini capsule launched with a module in which the experiments would be performed and which would be expended when the crew returns to earth in the Gemini capsule. However, the module should probably be designed so as to permit future modifications to provide for rendezvous and resupply. (Dr. Wiesner has suggested that a 1-man version of the Gemini capsule, without a new module, might be adequate.)

(d) The experiments contemplated with "Gemini X" would clearly be of greater value in the military space program than continuation of the Dynasoar project.

(e) If a project along the lines of "Gemini X" is approved, initiation of an actual space station project could be deferred beyond FY 1966.

(f) If a "Gemini X" project is initiated, it should and would be based on maximum utilization of the existing Gemini program and facilities, including specifically the NASA mission control facilities, existing and planned NASA and DOD tracking facilities, NASA checkout and other facilities at Cape Kennedy, and other available test facilities.

(g) If a "Gemini X" project is undertaken, the maximum provision feasible will be made for including experiments of scientific or non-military interest in the test program in addition to the experiments of special military interest.

(2) The points on which there may be disagreement or which may raise other problems include:

(a) In view of the 1965 budget problem, is the importance of the proposed "Gemini X" really so great as to justify starting it at this time as a "substitute" project using virtually in full the amounts now programmed for "Dynasoar"? Would it not be possible either (i) to defer starting a "Gemini X" program until after further study and realize in 1964 and 1965 the maximum potential savings from the cancellation of Dynasoar, or (ii) to initiate the "Gemini X" program at a lower rate that would still result in a substantial net budgetary saving in 1965?

(b) Is it desirable in the broad national interest to have the Air Force initiate, with the Gemini X, a program which could easily grow into a major costly manned space flight effort without a clearly defined mission and without more clearly defined limits on the scope, objectives, and duration of the project that it is possible to lay down at the present time? On the one hand, it can be argued that a military Gemini X type project would be a proper recognition of potential future military applications. On the other hand, it could be argued that initiation of such a project might in fact "preempt" for unclear military purposes the future development of manned flight in earth orbit which might be regarded as more properly the province of NASA, and serve to undercut support for non-military space objectives such as the manned lunar program to which great special importance is attached. The latter considerations raise the question of whether it might be preferable for the Gemini X type experiments to be conducted under NASA management under joint NASA-Defense arrangements similar to those now in force on the present Gemini program.

(c) If a Gemini X type program is to proceed under Defense auspices, is it essential, desirable, or feasible to decide ^{now} ~~not~~ to transfer management of the present Gemini program from NASA to Defense? The three most feasible possibilities appear to be:

(i) A decision now, as a part of a decision to proceed with Gemini X and cancel Dynasoar, that the present Gemini program will be transferred to Defense at a specified future time (either a specific date, e.g., in early FY 1966, or after a specified number of NASA Gemini flights, e.g., 6 or 9) and become at that time an integral part of the Gemini X program, with provision for meeting any future NASA Gemini requirements (under arrangements similar to those under which Air Force requirements are now being met in the current Gemini program). This course would avoid disruption of the Gemini development program, would keep NASA in direct control of the early Gemini manned and rendezvous flights which NASA regards as essential preparations for the Apollo program, would permit further non-military use of Gemini, and would establish now the principle that the Gemini X program is not to result in a separate and additional project in the national space program.

(ii) A decision now, as a part of decisions to undertake Gemini X and cancel Dynasoar, that management of the Gemini program will be transferred to Defense at some time in the future to be determined later on the basis of developments in the NASA Gemini and Apollo programs. This would have most of the advantages of (i) above, but might result in parallel NASA and Defense managed programs for a longer period.

(iii) A decision now to regard Gemini and Gemini X as separately managed but parallel programs. This would probably be the cleanest approach from a management standpoint, but would require close policing by both NASA and Defense top management to ensure that there is maximum utilization of the same developments, facilities, etc.

One of the key points requiring discussion in connection with the alternatives indicated above is the degree to which NASA Gemini flights are regarded as essential preparations for the Apollo program or for other NASA objectives.

(d) If it is decided to proceed with "Gemini X", is it essential to gear the program to the use of Titan III? The alternative of using Saturn IB would permit the Gemini X experiments to proceed without preempting the possible termination of Titan III discussed above.

(e) If it is decided to proceed with Gemini X, should the project be announced or referred to as a "space station"? Calling it a "space station" would tend to glamorize it and upgrade its importance. On the other hand, this would create the impression of a new, separate project and would be widely regarded as preempting for Defense the manned space station missions prior to completion of the studies NASA and Defense have underway under the recently announced agreement. Perhaps a name like "Gemini experimental orbiting vehicle" would be acceptable from all standpoints.

Alternatives

The nature and range of choices with respect to the programs affected by the above considerations are summarized below in terms of five alternatives. Illustrative 1964 and 1965 dollar estimates are shown on the attached table.

Alternative a. Current Program. Continuation of programs as currently approved and planned by the agencies in their 1965 budget requests would limit military manned space flight experimentation to Dynasoar and the currently planned Air Force participation in the NASA Gemini program. NASA and Defense studies of manned space stations would continue as would the NASA Gemini, Saturn IB, and lifting body R&D programs and the Defense Dynasoar, Titan III, and ASSET programs. This alternative has the merit of raising no new issues at this time and of permitting further study and consideration before initiating a Gemini X or space station program. It has the disadvantages of continuing the Dynasoar program of doubtful worth and of not effecting any substantial savings in the 1965 budget.

Alternative b. Possible Reorientation with "Gemini X". This alternative would consist of a "package" of decisions as follows:

(1) A decision that experimental tests of the military or other utility of manned flight in earth orbit are of sufficient potential military significance to justify initiation of an augmented program at this time;

(2) A decision that such a program is to be based on maximum utilization of the Gemini program, hardware, and facilities;

(3) A decision that the augmented program is to be managed by the Department of Defense, with the existing NASA Gemini program to be transferred to Defense and merged with the new program at a future date not specified at this time;

(4) A decision that approval of the augmented program will be limited to providing for essential military and other experiments not involving ferrying and resupply (although the design would keep these features in mind as future possibilities), and that separate specific approval will be required before a space station project involving ferrying and resupply is undertaken by either Defense or NASA;

(5) Final configuration of the Gemini X system would not be decided until after a program definition phase giving consideration, among other things, to the possible use of Saturn IB in lieu of Titan III;

(6) The experimental program for Gemini X flights will make maximum provision for incorporating scientific and other non-military experiments, with suitable arrangements for NASA participation;

(7) A decision to terminate Dynasoar at the earliest possible date, with consideration given to planning of extensions to the existing ASSET and NASA research and development programs to provide engineering data on lifting-body reentry vehicles;

(8) An understanding that 1964 and 1965 provision for the Gemini X program will be accommodated within or below the present totals including Dynasoar.

Alternative c. Restrictive Reorientation with Gemini X. Same as Alternative b except that 1965 funding for Gemini X would be held at a lower level, permitting a net 1965 saving as a result of the Dynasoar cancellation.

Alternative d. Study only reorientation. Dynasoar would be cancelled in favor of some expansion in other lifting-body reentry test programs and

with a decision to proceed with studies only of a Gemini X type program. This alternative, if feasible from a practical point of view, has the advantages (1) of avoiding a possibly premature commitment to a Gemini X type program in advance of completion of studies now underway and (2) of allowing time for better definition of the need for and nature of the experiments to be conducted and of the degree to which they can be accomplished in the present Gemini and Apollo programs.

Alternative e. Minimum Program. Defer any decision on Gemini X; cancel Dynasoar; and cancel Titan III. This alternative would be justifiable on the basis of overriding requirements to minimize the impact of the programs on the 1965 budget.

Recommendations

[Recommendation of Director, Bureau of the Budget, and concurrences or differing recommendations of Secretary of Defense; Administrator, NASA; Director, OST; and Executive Secretary, NASC, to be inserted after discussions]

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POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES RELATED TO EARTH ORBITAL MANNED SPACE FLIGHT
Illustrative 1964/1965 Estimates - (TOA/NOA in millions)

	<u>Alt. a</u> <u>Current</u> <u>Program</u> 64/65	<u>Alt. b</u> <u>Possible</u> <u>Reorientation</u> 1/2/ 64/65	<u>Alt. c</u> <u>Restrictive</u> <u>Reorientation</u> 64/65	<u>Alt. d</u> <u>Study-only</u> <u>Reorientation</u> 64/65	<u>Alt. e</u> <u>Minimum</u> <u>Program</u> 64/65
Gemini					
NASA program	367/295	367/295	367/295	367/295	367/295
Air Force experiments	14/6	14/-	14/-	14/6	14/6
"Gemini X"	-/-	33/125 2/	20/100 2/	2/4 3/	-/-
Manned Orbiting Space Station					
NASA	9/29	5/5 3/	5/5 3/	5/5 3/	5/5 3/
DOD	1/5	1/1 3/	1/1 3/	1/1 3/	1/5 3/
Dynasoar	125/146 4/	90/-	75/-	75/-	75/-
Asset	9/6	9/6	9/6	9/6	9/6
NASA lifting body R&D	*/*	*/*	*/*	*/*	*/*
New lifting body test program	-/-	-/15	-/15	-/15	-/-
Titan III	330/198 5/	330/198 1/	330/198 1/	330/198 1/	200/-
Saturn I-B	169/162	168/162	168/162	168/162	168/162
Total, above items	1024/847	1017/807	989/782	971/692	839/479

1/ Options include: Use Saturn I-B in lieu of Titan III.

2/ Options include: "Gemini X" program conducted by NASA in lieu of DOD.

3/ Studies only.

4/ Includes \$11 million for special range equipment, etc.

5/ Excludes \$15 million dollars originally proposed for Titan III facilities at PMR which have now been deferred.

* Principally in-house wind tunnel and other R&D.

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SPECIAL SPACE REVIEW

DRAFT REPORT

Bureau of the Budget
November 29, 1963

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SPECIAL SPACE REVIEW - 1965 BUDGET

INTRODUCTION

This report summarizes the principal results of the special review of the goals, nature, and pace of the space programs in the light of 1964 and 1965 budget pressures, which has been undertaken by the Bureau of the Budget in conjunction with the 1965 budget review and in response to the decisions at the October 8, 1963, meeting of the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

The purposes of the review have been to consider the goals of the space programs and the minimum requirements of a national program to achieve them, and to identify the policy questions, alternatives, and other major issues to be dealt with in the 1965 budget decisions.

The draft report has been prepared by Bureau of the Budget staff in consultation with senior representatives of NASA and the Department of Defense, and others, on the basis of information submitted by the agencies and discussions with agency officials in 1965 budget reviews now in process. The views expressed in the draft are necessarily those of the Bureau of the Budget staff. It is expected that the recommendations of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the concurrences ^{or} ~~on~~ differing views of the Secretary of Defense; the Administrator, NASA; the Director of OST; and the Executive Secretary of the NASC will be inserted as appropriate after discussion.

Section I covering the Manned Lunar Landing Program and Section II covering Military Space Objectives (including the proposed manned earth orbit experiments) are attached. Problems relating to communications satellites, meteorology, geodesy, space sciences, and technological development are being handled separately.

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SPACE ACTIVITIES OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
Preliminary Estimates Based on Agency 1965 Budget Proposals
(NOA/Program basis in millions)

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	<u>FY 1962</u>	<u>FY 1963</u>	<u>FY 1964</u>	<u>FY 1965</u>	<u>FY 1966</u>	<u>FY 1967</u>	<u>FY 1968</u>
<u>NASA</u>							
Manned Lunar Landing	1194.1	2639.3	4129.7	4197.5	3673.2	3209.6	2561.2
Other NASA 1/	627.5	1051.7	1215.0	1379.9	1483.6	1442.1	1416.7
Adjustments & provision for new programs ..	+3.3	-17.7	+5.3	-2.4	843.2	1348.3	2022.1
Total NASA 1/	1824.9	3673.3	5350.0	5575.0	6000.0	6000.0	6000.0
<u>Defense</u>							
Dynasoar (X-20)	101.3	130.5	125.4	146.1	135.5	53.0	53.0
Gemini	-	-	13.6	6.0	-	-	-
Orbiting Space Station	-	-	-	5.0	40.0	100.0	100.
Titan III	35.2	261.1	329.6	213.3	29.1	-	-
DOD Communication Satellite System	104.6	59.6	76.5	90.6	114.0	104.0	55.0
All Other	1050.7	1182.7	1131.4	1153.1	1153.1 2/	1153.1 2/	1153.1 2/
Total Defense	1291.8	1633.9	1676.5	1614.1	1471.7 3/	1410.1 3/	1361.1 3/
<u>AEC</u>							
ROVER	62.9	94.4	112.9	144.9	222.8	210.0	177.0
SNAP	62.0	83.6	93.4	110.0	138.0	129.0	137.5
All Other	3.4	35.9	51.9	60.5	53.0	55.0	55.0
Total AEC	128.3	213.9	258.2	315.4	413.8	394.0	369.5
<u>Commerce - Weather Bureau</u>	50.0	40.0	18.0	20.0	45.0	45.0	45.0
<u>National Science Foundation</u>	1.3	1.5	2.4	2.9	4.7	5.2	7.1
TOTAL SPACE	3296.3	5562.6	7305.1	7527.4	7935.2	7854.3	7782.

1/ Include Aeronautics.

2/ Assumed same as 1965.

3/ Does not include additional amounts for possible new programs out of DOD development planning increment.

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I. MANNED LUNAR LANDING PROGRAM

A. STATEMENT OF PRESENT GOAL:

To attempt to achieve a manned lunar landing and return by the end of this decade, on a high priority but not "crash" basis, with prudent regard for the safety of the astronauts, for the principal purposes of (a) demonstrating an important space achievement ahead of the USSR, (b) serving as a focus for technological developments necessary for other space objectives and having potential significance for national defense, and (c) acquiring useful scientific and other data to the extent feasible.

B. QUESTIONS, DISCUSSION, ALTERNATIVES, AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Should consideration be given at this time to backing off from the manned lunar landing goal?

Discussion: The review has pointed to the conclusion that in the absence of clear changes in the present technical or international situations, the only basis for backing off from the MLL objective at this time would be an overriding fiscal decision either (a) that the budgetary totals in 1965 or succeeding years are unacceptable and should be reduced by adjusting the space program, or (b) that within present budgetary totals an adjustment should be made shifting funds from space to other programs.

Alternatives

a. Adhere to the present goal as stated above. The arguments supporting this alternative include:

(1) That the reasons for adopting the manned lunar landing goal are still valid;

(2) That in the absence of clear and compelling external circumstances a change in present policies and commitments would involve an unacceptable "loss of face" both domestically and internationally; and

(3) That it is doubtful if budgetary reductions in the manned lunar program would in fact reduce criticism of the total magnitude of the budget or increase support for other meritorious programs to which the funds might be applied.

b. Decide now to abandon current work directly related to the manned lunar landing objective but to continue development of the large launch vehicle (Saturn V) so that it will be available for future space programs. It is estimated that cancellation in January 1964 of Apollo and other programs supporting the manned lunar landing only would result in NOA and expenditure savings in FY 1965 of about \$1 billion, less amounts required for any new objectives that might be substituted. The arguments supporting this alternative could include:

(1) The overriding need for economy in the 1965 budget;

(2) The doubts that Congress will provide adequate support for the manned lunar landing program in 1965 and succeeding years, regardless of the administration's recommendations; and

(3) The apparent absence of a competitive USSR manned lunar landing program at this time.

c. Decide now to abandon both current work toward the manned lunar landing objective and the development of the Saturn V large launch vehicle. If the programs involved are cancelled or adjusted in January 1964, savings approaching \$2.5 billion in 1965 NOA and expenditures could be anticipated. The arguments supporting this alternative could include,

in addition to those for alternative "b" above:

(1) That proceeding with development of the Saturn V launch vehicle is not justified in the absence of approved goals requiring its use; and

(2) That an adequate continuing space program can be built around the use of the Saturn IB (and perhaps the Titan III) launch vehicle.

Recommendations

[Recommendation of Director, Bureau of the Budget, and concurrences or differing recommendations of Secretary of Defense; Administrator, NASA; Director, OST; and Executive Secretary, NASC, to be inserted after discussions]

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2. Does the present program represent the minimum necessary for achieving the MLL goal?

Discussion: The review has pointed to the conclusions:

a. That the elements comprising the present program (with Saturn I manned flights eliminated) are required for achieving the goal (recognizing the somewhat indirect contribution of the Gemini program), except for certain construction and other relatively minor items in which adjustments are under consideration in the regular budget review; and

b. That the current NASA 1964 and 1965 estimates represent the minimum funding level required to continue the program on the schedule now planned, except for the possible adjustments being considered in the regular budget review.

Alternatives

a. Approve the program and cost estimates as submitted by NASA, subject to separate resolution of the adjustments under consideration in the budget review. (The question of a 1964 supplemental estimate is considered in Item 3 below.)

b. Decide now that the program should be geared to a schedule slipping the first manned lunar landing attempts one or two years later than now planned to the very end of the decade (i.e., end of CY 1969 or 1970, depending on the definition of "decade"). This alternative might permit reductions in the range of \$100 to 200 million in the 1965 budget. Other things being equal, the total cost of the MLLP to the achievement of the first manned lunar landing would probably be greater by at least \$200 million because of the need to maintain the same engineering and other overhead costs over a longer period. However, this would probably not mean a corresponding increase in total annual budgets over what they would be under the present schedule, since expected successor programs would then consume the funds that would otherwise go for completing the stretched out MLLP.

In support of this alternative it could be argued that it would recognize the need for minimizing outlays in the 1965 budget without necessitating a decision at this time to abandon the goal of attempting to achieve manned lunar landing in this decade.

Opposing it, the point can be made that some degree of slippage in present schedules is recognized to be inevitable, so that eliminating the present margin between the current scheduled first manned lunar landing

attempts (late CY 1968) and the end of the decade would be tantamount to and generally recognized as an admission that achievement of the goal has been deferred beyond the end of the decade.

Recommendations

[Recommendation of Director, Bureau of the Budget, and concurrences or differing recommendations of Secretary of Defense; Administrator, NASA; Director, OST; and Executive Secretary, NASC, to be inserted after discussions]

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3. Should a 1964 supplemental estimate be submitted to Congress in January for restoration in part or in full of the \$250 million congressional reductions below the total legislative authorizations for NASA in 1964?

Alternatives

a. Decide to submit a 1964 supplemental in the amount required to keep the MLLP on the current schedules. Arguments that can be made for this course include:

(1) That restoration of 1964 funds is necessary to avoid forced slippage in the program; and

(2) That submission of a supplemental estimate would once again place the question of maintaining the pace in the MLLP squarely before Congress.

b. Decide not to submit a 1964 supplemental estimate to Congress, and accept as the will of Congress whatever slippage in the MLLP is caused by insufficient funds in 1964. Arguments for this course include:

(1) It would avoid placing the administration in the untenable

budgetary posture of seeking restoration of the NASA reduction so soon after congressional action without making similar requests for other important programs reduced by Congress;

(2) There is no reason to believe that the Congress will look with more favor on a supplemental estimate than it did on the regular 1964 request;

(3) The outcome of a supplemental request is likely to be uncertain for several months, and the uncertainty will create operating difficulties which will tend to offset the advantages even if the supplemental is ultimately approved; and

(4) Congress has taken the responsibility for slippage in the MLL program because of insufficient funds in 1964.

c. Decide not to submit a 1964 supplemental estimate but to seek to make up in the 1965 budget the amounts required to adhere to the current MLLP schedules insofar as practicable. The arguments for this alternative are:

(1) It avoids the problems of a 1964 supplemental estimate referred to above [Items (1), (2), and (3) under "b" above];

(2) It offers a possibility of minimizing the impact of congressional 1964 reductions on the MLLP through adjustments in the timing of obligations between 1964 and 1965; and

(3) It may be feasible without increasing previously expected 1965 budget totals for NASA because of possible offsetting 1965 reductions that have been identified in the regular budget review, as follows:

		(NOA in millions)		
		MLLP	All Other	Total NASA
<u>NASA estimates:</u>				
	1964	4,129.7	1,220.3	5,350.0
	1965	<u>4,197.5</u>	<u>1,377.5</u>	<u>5,575.0</u>
	Total	8,327.2	2,597.8	10,925.0
<u>Adjustments:</u>				
Possible 1965 adjustments in				
	budget review	-88.4*	-313.8*	-402.2*
	Congressional 1964 reductions	-190.0*	-60.0*	-250.0
	Restoration in 1965 for MLLP	+190.0*	-	+190.0*
<u>Revised totals:</u>				
	1964	3,939.7*	1,160.3*	5,100.0
	1965	<u>4,299.1*</u>	<u>1,063.7*</u>	<u>5,362.8*</u>
	Total	8,238.8*	2,224.0*	10,462.8*

*Tentative numbers; subject to change in final budget recommendations.

Recommendations

[Recommendation of Director, Bureau of the Budget, and concurrences or differing recommendations of Secretary of Defense; Administrator, NASA; Director, OST; and Executive Secretary, NASC, to be inserted after discussions]

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4. Should our posture on the manned lunar landing program attribute a greater degree of military significance to the program?

Discussion: The review points to the conclusions that:

a. The facts of the situation justify the position that the launch vehicle, spacecraft, facilities, and general technology being developed by NASA in the MLLP do have important potential future military significance;

b. That overplaying this point unduly could have the effects of undercutting the general peaceful image of the program, jeopardizing possibilities for international cooperation, or calling into question the need for a large-scale NASA non-military space program; and

c. That the question of public posture on potential military significance is separable from, but must be considered in relation to the questions of the composition of the NASA and Defense programs and of possible transfers of projects from NASA to Defense or vice versa.

Alternatives

a. Decide (1) to place greater stress on the potential military significance of the capabilities being developed in the MLLP in domestic public statements, exercising due restraint to avoid undesirable international effects; (2) to emphasize that NASA programs are being relied on by Defense for general technological capabilities and developments; and (3) to point to Defense use of Gemini (on whatever basis is decided separately below) as a tangible example of how NASA technological advances contribute to potential Defense needs. The principal advantage of this alternative is that if properly handled it would permit greater use of potential military applications in securing and maintaining congressional and public support for the administrations's manned lunar landing program without creating demands for an unwarranted expansion in military space programs in addition to or in lieu of the approved NASA programs.

b. Decide (1) to play down the potential military significance of the capabilities being developed in the MLLP; (2) to emphasize that all clearly established military requirements are being met by Department of

Defense programs coordinated with NASA and drawing on NASA's experience;
and (3) to point to the DOD use of Gemini (on whatever basis is decided
separately below) as indicating that prompt attention is being given to
the exploitation of possible military uses of space. The advantage of this
alternative is that it would avoid possible international complications and
unwarranted demands for a larger military space program that might result
from too much stress on the potential military significance of the MLLP.

Recommendations

[Recommendation of Director, Bureau of the Budget, and concurrences
or differing recommendations of Secretary of Defense; Administrator, NASA;
Director, OST; and Executive Secretary, NASC, to be inserted after
discussions]

* * * * *

5. What should be the posture with respect to a joint effort with the
USSR?

Discussion: The review points to the conclusion that in the present
situation we must necessarily take the posture that we are prepared to enter
into any constructive arrangement which will not jeopardize vital national
security interests and which will not delay or jeopardize the success of our
MLL program. We will necessarily have to wait to see what proposals, if
any, the USSR may make, and then expect an extended series of negotiations.

Recommendation: That the posture be as indicated above.

SUMMARY OF NASA PROGRAMS AS PROJECTED IN NASA 1965 BUDGET REQUEST
 Estimates do not reflect final congressional action in 1964 or budget adjustments in 1965
 New Obligational Authority - in millions

	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1962 thru 1968 total
MANNED LUNAR LANDING PROGRAMS	1,194.1	2,657.0	4,129.8	4,197.5	3,673.2	3,209.6	2,561.2	21,622.3
For manned lunar landing only	149.8	480.2	983.0	1,025.0	921.0	1,102.3	1,019.7	5,681.0
Apollo spacecraft	75.7	398.1	889.1	948.5	870.8	1,042.2	949.1	5,173.5
Control, operations, and construction ...	74.1	82.1	93.9	76.5	50.2	60.1	70.6	507.5
For Saturn V only	235.9	877.7	1,237.0	1,292.7	1,284.9	1,006.0	761.7	6,695.9
Saturn V development	56.0	340.9	672.1	901.1	999.2	789.0	550.0	4,309.0
Engines, operations, and construction ...	179.9	536.8	564.9	391.6	285.7	216.0	211.7	2,386.9
For Saturn IB only	19.9	48.8	206.7	190.3	170.1	92.5	35.1	763.4
Saturn IB development	-	18.4	167.9	155.0	138.7	64.1	8.7	552.8
Engines, construction, other	19.9	30.4	38.8	35.3	31.4	28.4	26.4	210.6
Auxiliary programs	544.8	828.0	938.0	804.9	449.0	218.4	62.0	3,845.1
Mercury and Gemini operations	89.3	308.9	404.7	328.6	158.8	58.9	-	1,349.2
Saturn I and engines	211.7	233.6	221.6	122.1	36.7	28.6	22.4	876.7
Unmanned Lunar and OSO	108.2	165.6	189.7	269.7	231.8	130.9	39.6	1,135.5
Centaur	73.8	90.1	109.5	82.0	21.7	-	-	377.1
Construction	61.8	29.8	12.5	2.5	-	-	-	106.6
Supporting programs	243.7	422.3	765.1	884.7	848.2	790.4	682.7	4,637.1
Systems, c.o. and other OMSF	24.8	74.6	207.3	322.9	290.4	267.5	246.6	1,434.1
Tracking and data acquisition	37.1	74.6	221.0	171.8	107.8	103.9	96.1	812.3
Operations	181.8	273.1	336.8	390.0	450.0	419.0	340.0	2,390.7
OTHER PROGRAMS	627.5	1,033.9	1,215.0	1,379.9	1,483.6	1,442.1	1,416.7	8,598.7
Application and technical utilization	77.8	98.2	103.5	90.0	129.9	95.9	57.2	652.5
Space sciences	199.4	260.3	358.5	371.9	418.1	320.6	261.3	2,190.1
Research and advance MSF	53.2	285.0	370.1	423.0	580.1	654.5	682.8	3,048.7
Tracking and data acquisition	60.8	62.0	100.0	109.6	115.5	112.1	111.4	671.4
NASA operations	130.2	157.7	181.2	210.0	240.0	259.0	304.0	1,482.1
Other construction	106.1	170.7	101.7	175.4	-	-	-	553.9
PROVISION FOR NEW STARTS (and adjustments) ..	+3.3	-17.7	+5.3	-2.4	843.2	1,348.3	2,022.1	4,202.1
TOTAL NASA	1,824.9	3,673.3	5,350.0	5,575.0	6,000.0	6,000.0	6,000.0	34,423.2

II. MILITARY SPACE OBJECTIVES

A. STATEMENT OF PRESENT GOALS:

1. To develop and exploit, as appropriate, space systems and capabilities which meet clearly defined high priority national defense requirements which cannot be better met, from a cost-effectiveness standpoint, by other means; and

2. To develop, through a national program, advanced space technology on a broad basis to permit timely development and exploitation of space systems and capabilities for military objectives which may become clearly established at some time in the future.

B. QUESTIONS, DISCUSSION, ALTERNATIVES, AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Does the present national program represent the minimum necessary for achieving the military space objectives stated above?

Discussion: The review points to the following conclusion that the need for two major elements of the present program is questionable:

a. Dynasoar - There is general agreement that continuation of the Dynasoar (X-20) program is not essential and that the engineering data of interest on lifting body reentry vehicles can be obtained much more economically through unmanned short range test firings tying together the results of the ASSET program and NASA wind tunnel and related work now underway. Termination of Dynasoar in January 1964 would save over \$400 million of the total of over \$800 million now estimated to complete the presently approved program. About \$35 million of 1964 NOA might be recovered and the present 1965 NOA estimates could be reduced by eliminating the \$146 million now included for Dynasoar development and special facilities.

b. Titan III - There are still no clearly essential program requirements for this launch vehicle. On the military side, the most specific potential uses now identified by Defense consist of Dynasoar launchings (see above), possible special purpose missions, future communications satellite system launchings, and manned orbiting space station experiments (see below). While Titan III (in either the A or C versions), if developed, might be used for launching larger special purpose or communications satellite payloads, there do not appear to be any clear prospective military requirements in either field that could not be oriented around smaller payloads which could be handled with Atlas or Titan II class launch vehicles. Similarly, the Titan III, if developed, might find useful applications in future NASA space exploration or other programs, but the Saturn I and IB are available for payloads in the Titan III class. For the "Gemini X" manned orbiting flight experiments discussed below, use of the Saturn IB in lieu of Titan III could be considered.

While the Titan III launch vehicle would have many attractive features (short reaction time, versatility, probable lower long-run costs), and development is now well underway, termination at this time would save from \$300 to 350 million of the estimated \$850 million total development costs (up to \$100 million in 1964 NOA, \$198 million in 1965 NOA, and \$29 million in 1966 NOA).

2. Should the present national program for achieving the military space objectives stated above be augmented or reoriented at this time?

Discussion: The review has pointed to the following conclusions:

a. Specific military requirements - There are no clearly essential military space requirements identified at this time which are not included in the currently approved or planned programs. Questions of how essential high priority military requirements can be met in the field of communications satellites are under active consideration in current discussions involving the Department of Defense, the Communications Satellite Corporation, and the interagency working group under the Deputy Attorney General. Questions of military requirements relating to meteorological and geodetic satellites are being dealt with separately in the special review and the 1965 budget discussions.

b. Technology of potential military significance - The current NASA, Defense, and AEC programs, taken together, appear to be generally adequate for providing the technological capabilities and base for possible future military space applications and objectives, except possibly in the field of experiments on the military or other utility of manned orbital flight discussed at length below. Questions relating to the possible transfer from Defense to NASA of development work on the 260" large solid rockets, the possible development of a new upper stage for Saturn IB or Titan III, the need and nature of a NASA-DOD program on lifting-reentry bodies to replace Dynasoar, the nuclear rocket (ROVER) program, and the space nuclear power programs are being considered separately in the review and the 1965 budget discussions.

c. Experiments on military or other utility of manned flight in earth orbit - The Department of Defense has proposed for consideration a reorientation of the current program under which a new program for testing experimentally the military or other utility of manned flight in earth orbit would be undertaken in lieu of the Dynasoar program discussed above, within or below the same total budget levels for space programs reflected in current agency estimates for 1964 and 1965. The principal considerations, differences, and problems related to this suggestion are outlined below, after which the main alternatives are summarized for consideration.

(1) There appears to be fairly wide agreement at this time on the following points:

(a) It is premature at this time to decide to proceed with an actual space station project involving long duration stay in orbit, ferrying of crews, and resupply of the space station. No clear high priority military or scientific requirements have yet been identified which would support the institution of such a project at this time. Studies now underway under the recent Defense/NASA agreement should be completed and evaluated before an actual space station project is initiated.

(b) The budgetary situation permitting, it would be desirable to undertake in the near future manned experiments in earth orbit with military surveillance or other equipment in a vehicle (named "Gemini X" in this report) affording some degree of increased space and mobility for the crew over that provided by the present 2-man Gemini capsule. The purpose would be an experimental test of what military or other advantages, if any, might be gained by the use of manned rather than unmanned satellites, so that the proper decisions may be made with respect to possible future costly manned space flight proposals.

(c) The experiments referred to in (b) above do not require a space station involving long stay-time in orbit, ferrying of astronauts, rendezvous, or resupply, but could probably be accomplished with a modified 2-man Gemini capsule launched with a module in which the experiments would be performed and which would be expended when the crew returns to earth in the Gemini capsule. However, the module should probably be designed so as to permit future modifications to provide for rendezvous and resupply. (Dr. Wiesner has suggested that a 1-man version of the Gemini capsule, without a new module, might be adequate.)

(d) The experiments contemplated with "Gemini X" would clearly be of greater value in the military space program than continuation of the Dynasoar project.

(e) If a project along the lines of "Gemini X" is approved, initiation of an actual space station project could be deferred beyond FY 1966.

(f) If a "Gemini X" project is initiated, it should and would be based on maximum utilization of the existing Gemini program and facilities, including specifically the NASA mission control facilities, existing and planned NASA and DOD tracking facilities, NASA checkout and other facilities at Cape Kennedy, and other available test facilities.

(g) If a "Gemini X" project is undertaken, the maximum provision feasible will be made for including experiments of scientific or non-military interest in the test program in addition to the experiments of special military interest.

(2) The points on which there may be disagreement or which may raise other problems include:

(a) In view of the 1965 budget problem, is the importance of the proposed "Gemini X" really so great as to justify starting it at this time as a "substitute" project using virtually in full the amounts now programmed for "Dynasoar"? Would it not be possible either (i) to defer starting a "Gemini X" program until after further study and realize in 1964 and 1965 the maximum potential savings from the cancellation of Dynasoar, or (ii) to initiate the "Gemini X" program at a lower rate that would still result in a substantial net budgetary saving in 1965?

(b) Is it desirable in the broad national interest to have the Air Force initiate, with the Gemini X, a program which could easily grow into a major costly manned space flight effort without a clearly defined mission and without more clearly defined limits on the scope, objectives, and duration of the project that it is possible to lay down at the present time? On the one hand, it can be argued that a military Gemini X type project would be a proper recognition of potential future military applications. On the other hand, it could be argued that initiation of such a project might in fact "preempt" for unclear military purposes the future development of manned flight in earth orbit which might be regarded as more properly the province of NASA, and serve to undercut support for non-military space objectives such as the manned lunar program to which great special importance is attached. The latter considerations raise the question of whether it might be preferable for the Gemini X type experiments to be conducted under NASA management under joint NASA-Defense arrangements similar to those now in force on the present Gemini program.

(c) If a Gemini X type program is to proceed under Defense auspices, is it essential, desirable, or feasible to decide ^{Now} ~~not~~ to transfer management of the present Gemini program from NASA to Defense? The three most feasible possibilities appear to be:

(i) A decision now, as a part of a decision to proceed with Gemini X and cancel Dynasoar, that the present Gemini program will be transferred to Defense at a specified future time (either a specific date, e.g., in early FY 1966, or after a specified number of NASA Gemini flights, e.g., 6 or 9) and become at that time an integral part of the Gemini X program, with provision for meeting any future NASA Gemini requirements (under arrangements similar to those under which Air Force requirements are now being met in the current Gemini program). This course would avoid disruption of the Gemini development program, would keep NASA in direct control of the early Gemini manned and rendezvous flights which NASA regards as essential preparations for the Apollo program, would permit further non-military use of Gemini, and would establish now the principle that the Gemini X program is not to result in a separate and additional project in the national space program.

(ii) A decision now, as a part of decisions to undertake Gemini X and cancel Dynasoar, that management of the Gemini program will be transferred to Defense at some time in the future to be determined later on the basis of developments in the NASA Gemini and Apollo programs. This would have most of the advantages of (i) above, but might result in parallel NASA and Defense managed programs for a longer period.

(iii) A decision now to regard Gemini and Gemini X as separately managed but parallel programs. This would probably be the cleanest approach from a management standpoint, but would require close policing by both NASA and Defense top management to ensure that there is maximum utilization of the same developments, facilities, etc.

One of the key points requiring discussion in connection with the alternatives indicated above is the degree to which NASA Gemini flights are regarded as essential preparations for the Apollo program or for other NASA objectives.

(d) If it is decided to proceed with "Gemini X", is it essential to gear the program to the use of Titan III? The alternative of using Saturn IB would permit the Gemini X experiments to proceed without preempting the possible termination of Titan III discussed above.

(e) If it is decided to proceed with Gemini X, should the project be announced or referred to as a "space station"? Calling it a "space station" would tend to glamorize it and upgrade its importance. On the other hand, this would create the impression of a new, separate project and would be widely regarded as preempting for Defense the manned space station missions prior to completion of the studies NASA and Defense have underway under the recently announced agreement. Perhaps a name like "Gemini experimental orbiting vehicle" would be acceptable from all standpoints.

Alternatives

The nature and range of choices with respect to the programs affected by the above considerations are summarized below in terms of five alternatives. Illustrative 1964 and 1965 dollar estimates are shown on the attached table.

Alternative a. Current Program. Continuation of programs as currently approved and planned by the agencies in their 1965 budget requests would limit military manned space flight experimentation to Dynasoar and the currently planned Air Force participation in the NASA Gemini program. NASA and Defense studies of manned space stations would continue as would the NASA Gemini, Saturn IB, and lifting body R&D programs and the Defense Dynasoar, Titan III, and ASSET programs. This alternative has the merit of raising no new issues at this time and of permitting further study and consideration before initiating a Gemini X or space station program. It has the disadvantages of continuing the Dynasoar program of doubtful worth and of not effecting any substantial savings in the 1965 budget.

Alternative b. Possible Reorientation with "Gemini X". This alternative would consist of a "package" of decisions as follows:

(1) A decision that experimental tests of the military or other utility of manned flight in earth orbit are of sufficient potential military significance to justify initiation of an augmented program at this time;

(2) A decision that such a program is to be based on maximum utilization of the Gemini program, hardware, and facilities;

(3) A decision that the augmented program is to be managed by the Department of Defense, with the existing NASA Gemini program to be transferred to Defense and merged with the new program at a future date not specified at this time;

(4) A decision that approval of the augmented program will be limited to providing for essential military and other experiments not involving ferrying and resupply (although the design would keep these features in mind as future possibilities), and that separate specific approval will be required before a space station project involving ferrying and resupply is undertaken by either Defense or NASA;

(5) Final configuration of the Gemini X system would not be decided until after a program definition phase giving consideration, among other things, to the possible use of Saturn IB in lieu of Titan III;

(6) The experimental program for Gemini X flights will make maximum provision for incorporating scientific and other non-military experiments, with suitable arrangements for NASA participation;

(7) A decision to terminate Dynasoar at the earliest possible date, with consideration given to planning of extensions to the existing ASSET and NASA research and development programs to provide engineering data on lifting-body reentry vehicles;

(8) An understanding that 1964 and 1965 provision for the Gemini X program will be accommodated within or below the present totals including Dynasoar.

Alternative c. Restrictive Reorientation with Gemini X. Same as Alternative b except that 1965 funding for Gemini X would be held at a lower level, permitting a net 1965 saving as a result of the Dynasoar cancellation.

Alternative d. Study only reorientation. Dynasoar would be cancelled in favor of some expansion in other lifting-body reentry test programs and

with a decision to proceed with studies only of a Gemini X type program. This alternative, if feasible from a practical point of view, has the advantages (1) of avoiding a possibly premature commitment to a Gemini X type program in advance of completion of studies now underway and (2) of allowing time for better definition of the need for and nature of the experiments to be conducted and of the degree to which they can be accomplished in the present Gemini and Apollo programs.

Alternative e. Minimum Program. Defer any decision on Gemini X; cancel Dynasoar; and cancel Titan III. This alternative would be justifiable on the basis of overriding requirements to minimize the impact of the programs on the 1965 budget.

Recommendations

[Recommendation of Director, Bureau of the Budget, and concurrences or differing recommendations of Secretary of Defense; Administrator, NASA; Director, OST; and Executive Secretary, NASC, to be inserted after discussions]

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POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES RELATED TO EARTH ORBITAL MANNED SPACE FLIGHT
Illustrative 1964/1965 Estimates - (TOA/NOA in millions)

	<u>Alt. a</u> <u>Current</u> <u>Program</u> 64/65	<u>Alt. b</u> <u>Possible</u> <u>Reorientation 1/2/</u> 64/65	<u>Alt. c</u> <u>Restrictive</u> <u>Reorientation</u> 64/65	<u>Alt. d</u> <u>Study-only</u> <u>Reorientation</u> 64/65	<u>Alt. e</u> <u>Minimum</u> <u>Program</u> 64/65
Gemini					
NASA program	367/295	367/295	367/295	367/295	367/295
Air Force experiments	14/6	14/-	14/-	14/6	14/6
"Gemini X"	-/-	33/125 2/	20/100 2/	2/4 3/	-/-
Manned Orbiting Space Station					
NASA	9/29	5/5 3/	5/5 3/	5/5 3/	5/5 3/
DOD	1/5	1/1 3/	1/1 3/	1/1 3/	1/5 3/
Dynasoar	125/146 4/	90/-	75/-	75/-	75/-
Asset	9/6	9/6	9/6	9/6	9/6
NASA lifting body R&D	*/*	*/*	*/*	*/*	*/*
New lifting body test program	-/-	-/15	-/15	-/15	-/-
Titan III	330/198 5/	330/198 1/	330/198 1/	330/198 1/	200/-
Saturn I-B	169/162	168/162	168/162	168/162	168/162
Total, above items	1024/847	1017/807	989/782	971/692	839/479

1/ Options include: Use Saturn I-B in lieu of Titan III.

2/ Options include: "Gemini X" program conducted by NASA in lieu of DOD.

3/ Studies only.

4/ Includes \$11 million for special range equipment, etc.

5/ Excludes \$15 million dollars originally proposed for Titan III facilities at PMR which have now been deferred.

* Principally in-house wind tunnel and other R&D.

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FM HQ AFMTC PATRICK AFB FLA

TO MRS JOHN F KENNEDY

C/O THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON D C

BT

UNCLAS FROM MTNP 29-11-10. THE PEOPLE OF THE AIR FORCE MISSILE TEST CENTER ELT PARTICULARLY PROUD THIS MORNING AS THEY REPORTED FOR WORK AT CAPE KENNEDY. PARA. WE WILL REMEMBER THE VISITS OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO CAPE CANAVERAL AND HIS DEEP PERSONAL INTEREST IN OUR NATION'S EFFORTS IN SPACE. NO GREATER TRIBUTE TO OUR EFFORTS COULD HAVE BEEN PAID THAN NAMING CAPE CANAVERAL AND THE MERRITT ISLAND LAUNCH AREA THE JOHN F. KENNEDY SPACE CENTER. PARA. CAPE KENNEDY, AS LAUNCH SITE FOR THE ATLANTIC MISSILE RANGE, WILL PROVIDE A CONSTANT REMINDER OF OUR LATE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S DEDICATION TO AND SUPPORT OF THE MISSILE AND SPACE PROGRAMS SO VITAL TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY AND NATIONAL GOALS.

SIGNED: COMMANDER AND STAFF, AIR FORCE MISSILE TEST CENTER

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Mrn Tuckerman

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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November 25, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Ambassador Stevenson's Speech
on Outer Space to the United
Nations General Assembly

The President has approved the attached text, as revised, of the section of Ambassador Stevenson's speech which you sent over for clearance by your November 24 Memorandum for the President.

McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

28a

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I have left to the last any reference to a manned flight to the moon.

Let me make it clear that exploration of the moon is not a stunt, distinct from the outer space program as a whole; nor is it the exclusive concern of only two nations.

This project, spectacular though it may be, is understood best as a single step in man's mastery of space. It is a stage in a sequence which has a background and foreground.

In the background of manned flight to the moon is the vast program of research and the varied series of experiments which will make it possible -- which will be thoroughly justified in and of themselves. Indeed, not more than about ten percent of our total expenditures on outer space can be attributed directly to manned lunar flight. This program is being carried forward with significant international cooperation. Many nations, not one, are contributing to the moon project. The tracking and data stations in Mexico, Bermuda, the Canary Islands of Spain, Nigeria, Zanzibar and Australia have been central to the success of the orbital flights in our Mercury program. These stations, along with additional facilities, are vital to the program for the manned lunar landing. This applies as well to the scientific investigations to be carried out through cooperative satellite and sounding rocket programs. We are proud of these associations in a common task, Mr. Chairman. We hope that they will grow.

Beyond the manned landing on the moon lies the whole uncharted and unpredictable stage of inter-planetary exploration. So exploration of the moon is seen properly as the culmination of one stage of a process and the opening of another -- as both an end and a beginning.

I repeat that the preponderant part of the U. S. space program is made up of projects which we want to carry out even if we did not plan at this stage to land men on the moon. The plans for a manned landing and return from the moon are thus one part of a space

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program whose larger purpose is to carry into outer space man's unending adventure of discovery.

As I have been saying here today, we have welcomed -- and in fact fostered -- the highest possible degree of international cooperation.

As you also know, President Kennedy proposed before the General Assembly last September to explore with the Soviet Union opportunities for working together in the conquest of space, including the sending of men to the moon as representatives of all of our countries. President Johnson has instructed me to reaffirm that offer today.

If giant strides cannot be taken at once, we hope that shorter steps can. We believe there are areas of work -- short of integrating the two national programs -- from which all could benefit. We should explore the opportunities for practical cooperation, beginning with small steps and hopefully leading to larger matters.

In any event, our policy engaging in mutually beneficial and mutually supporting cooperation in outer space -- with the Soviet Union as with all nations -- does not begin or end with a manned moon landing. There is plenty of work yet to come before that -- and there will be even more afterward.

Mr. Chairman, one of the legal principles in the resolution before us states that "In the exploration of outer space States shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance" My government is so guided -- by preference and by deed.

Another principle in the same resolution declares that "States shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer space". We are prepared to so regard our astronauts and all astronauts.

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Finally, we are prepared, if others are, to consider our own national effort to realize man's dream of a voyage to the moon as part of a larger design to add to the store of man's knowledge. We hope that all nations will take part in this great venture in the same spirit.

Mr. Chairman, we are well started, in this seventh year of the age of space, in the direction of freedom, peace, law, and cooperation in outer space. Every relevant pressure here on earth impels us to stay on that track. If we can acquire the habit of cooperation in outer space, we shall not only learn more about man's relation to his environment but about man's relation to man. And thus world statesmanship matches achievement with science.

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28-6

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 24, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Ambassador Stevenson's Speech

1. NASA, per Webb's representative Arnold Frutkin, has been appraised of the changes as made and is very pleased at the outcome.
2. Webb, I believe, would still prefer that no speech on outer space be made but is now resigned thereto and will not raise the same with the President.
3. I have given Dick Gardner an advance draft of the revised text and will confirm clearance thereof after I hear from you.
4. Frutkin will urge Webb to background the speech along the line that it should surprise no one that one of the first formal statements of the Johnson Administration deals with outer space. The President has long familiarity with the subject and has quickly seized this opportunity to affirm the continuity of US policy on outer space with which he has been identified and to which he personally contributed in its formulation and evolution.
5. I don't know how you want to handle this with the Secretary but I attach a memo for your signature.

Charles E. Johnson

28-c

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 24, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Ambassador Stevenson's Speech
on Outer Space to the United
Nations General Assembly

I understand that Ambassador Stevenson spoke to you after the Cabinet Meeting on Saturday about the speech he is scheduled to make on Outer Space on November 27 before the United Nations General Assembly and that you expressed your desire to stand by the offer of cooperation in the manned exploration of the moon made in President Kennedy's speech to the General Assembly on September 20.

Attached for your approval is the relevant section of the speech we have drafted for Ambassador Stevenson.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Draft Speech.

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a).

BY Delt ON 1-23-89

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I have left to the last any reference to a manned flight to the moon. ~~Exciting as this is, I believe that our image of that project may be rather badly out of focus.~~

Let me make it clear that

exploration of the moon
~~In the first place, the moon landing project is not a~~
~~some separate~~ stunt, distinct from the outer space program as a whole; nor is it the exclusive concern of only two nations. ~~Not more than about ten percent of our total expenditures on outer space can be attributed directly to manned lunar flight.~~

This project, spectacular though it may be, is understood best as a ~~dramatic waystation~~ *single step* -- perhaps only one of a series of waystations ~~in~~ *man's* conquest of space. It is ~~an integral~~ *an* stage in a sequence which has a background and foreground. ~~In the background of manned flight to the moon is the vast program of research and the varied series of experiments which will make it possible -- which will be thoroughly justified in and of themselves.~~ *Included,*

~~This~~ This program is being carried forward with intensive international cooperation, ~~with the result that~~ *many* nations, not one, are contributing to the moon project. The tracking
/and data

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and data stations in Mexico, Bermuda, the Canary Islands of Spain, Nigeria, Zanzibar and Australia have been central to the success of the orbital flights in our Mercury program. These stations, along with additional facilities, ~~continue~~ *are* ~~to be~~ vital to the program for the manned lunar landing. This applies as well to the scientific investigations to be carried out through cooperative satellite and sounding rocket programs. We are proud of these associations in a common task, Mr. Chairman, ~~and~~ *we* hope that they will grow.

~~In the foreground of a~~ *Beyond the* manned landing on the moon lies the whole uncharted and unpredictable stage of inter-stellar exploration. So ~~a moon landing~~ *exploration of the moon* is seen properly as the culmination of one stage of a process and the opening of another -- as both an end and a beginning.

I repeat that the preponderant part of the U. S. space program is made up of projects which we ~~would~~ want to carry out even if we did not plan at this stage to land men on the moon, ~~within an estimated time schedule.~~ *The* *for* ~~As you know, we do~~ ~~include within present~~ plans a manned landing and return from the moon ~~as an integral part of a space program whose purpose~~ *and thus the* *longer* is to carry into outer space man's unending ~~search for truth~~ *adventure) discovery* about his world and the universe around it.

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-3-

As I have been saying here today, we have welcomed -- and in fact fostered -- the ^{highest possible} ~~maximum~~ degree of international cooperation. ~~that has been forthcoming from others.~~

As you also know, President Kennedy proposed before the General Assembly last September to cooperate with the Soviet Union in placing men on the moon. ^{President Johnson has instructed me to accept} ~~that offer stands.~~ ^{Today,}

~~We would hope that~~ ^{T. A. T.} if giant strides cannot be taken at once, ^{we hope that} ~~perhaps~~ shorter steps can. We believe there are areas of work -- short of integrating the two national programs -- from which all could benefit. ^{We should explore the opportunities for} ~~We have in mind such useful~~

^{practical cooperation in areas such as} ~~steps as~~ exchange of research, experience, and materials gathered in outer space; mutual support in tracking of astronauts, cooperative observation and sampling of the lunar surface; joint research on the biological behavior of men in space, and things of that nature. ^{We hope that} ~~Perhaps~~ one thing would lead to another.

In any event, our policy of engaging in mutually beneficial, ~~mutually agreeable~~ and mutually supporting cooperation in outer space -- with the Soviet Union as with all nations -- does not begin or end with a manned moon landing. There is plenty of work yet to come before that -- and there will be even more afterward.

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Mr. Chairman, one of the legal principles in the resolution before us states that "In the exploration of outer space States shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance...." My government is so guided -- by preference and by deed.

Another principle in the same resolution declares that "States shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer space". We are prepared to so regard our astronauts and all astronauts.

Finally, we are prepared, if others are, to consider our own ~~very great~~ national effort to realize ^{man's} the dream of ^{avoyage to} ~~reaching~~ the moon as part of a larger ~~universal~~ design to add to the store of man's knowledge. We ~~earnestly~~ hope that all nations will take part in this great venture in the same spirit.

Mr. Chairman, we are well started, in this seventh year of the age of space, in the direction of freedom, peace, law, and cooperation in outer space. Every relevant pressure here on earth impels us to stay on that track. If we can acquire the habit of cooperation in outer space, we shall not only learn more about man's relation to his environment but about

/man's

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man's relation to man. And thus world statesmanship matches achievement with science.

* * * *

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Agree 28d

November 26, 1963

Mr. Smith:

Message from Mr. Johnson --

He has heard that when the President looked at the text of Ambassador Stevenson's speech for next Monday, he called Mr. Webb to ask if he were satisfied with the speech. Mr. Webb said not entirely but indicated his points were of minor importance and he would not make an issue of it. Mr. Webb considered the speech cleared from his standpoint and the President approved it.

Mr. Johnson thought Mr. Bundy might like to know this if he doesn't already.

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

29 Space
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OUTER SPACE LEGAL PRINCIPLES - CONSULTATIONS WITH USSR

1. WE MET WITH USSR AT 3 PM TODAY AT US MISSION. SOVS REPRESENTED BY MOROZOV, VORONTSOV AND ALDOSHIN.
2. FORM. MOROZOV SAID SOVS READY TO AGREE ON GA RES, TO BE FOLLOWED BY US AND USSR STATEMENTS ON STATUS OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN RES, ON CONDITION THAT WE AGREE TO ADD FINAL PREAMBULAR PARA: "BELIEVING THAT IN THE FUTURE STATES SHOULD CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT ON THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES OF THEIR ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE",. MOROZOV SAID THIS IDEA WAS PUT FORWARD IN JULY 26 PAPER STEVENSON GAVE FEDORENKO (SEE LAST PARA). WE SUGGESTED SOMETHING ALONG THESE LINES COULD BE PUT IN OMNIBUS SPACE RES, WHICH WOULD DEAL WITH WMO AND ITU REPORTS, PRIORITY FOR LIABILITY AND RESCUE AGREEMENTS, ETC. MOROZOV SAID HE WOULD CONSIDER. HE THEN SUGGESTED SUCH STATEMENT COULD BE PUT IN REPORT (PRESUMABLY OF FIRST COMITE TO PLENARY) BUT WITHDREW THIS SUGGESTION AFTER WHISPERED CONVERSATION WITH VORONTSOV..
3. LIABILITY. MOROZOV URGED THAT WORDS "OR IN OUTER SPACE" SHOULD BE ADDED AT END PARA 8 TO AVOID NEGATIVE IMPLICATION THAT STATES DO NOT BEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR DAMAGE OCCURRING IN OUTER SPACE. WE EXPLAINED THAT THIS ADDITION MIGHT IMPLY THAT RULE OF ABSOLUTE LIABILITY WOULD OBTAIN RE OUTER SPACE COLLISIONS, WHICH MADE NO SENSE. MOROZOV AGREED THAT DAMAGE OCCURRING IN OUTER SPACE MIGHT BE GOVERNED BY DIFFERENT RULE FROM THAT APPLICABLE TO DAMAGE ON EARCH OR IN AIR SPACE; BUT HE MAINTAINED THAT PARA 8 DID NOT SPECIFY A RULE OF ABSOLUTE LIABILITY AND THAT ITS PURPOSE WAS MERELY TO ESTABLISH BROAD PRINCIPLE OF LIABILITY, LEAVING DETAILS

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

By cbu/jc, NARA, Date 9-15-08

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TO BE WORKED OUT IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT THIS SUBJECT. WE SUGGESTED POSSIBILITY DELETING ALL REFERENCE TO ENVIRONMENTS. END OF PARA 8 WOULD THUS READ "...IS INTERNATIONALLY LIABLE FOR DAMAGE DONE TO A FOREIGN STATE OR TO ITS NATURAL OR JURIDICAL PERSONS BY SUCH OBJECT OR ITS COMPONENT PARTS."

4. INTERFERENCE. MOROZOV ASKED FOR DELETION OF WORD "SIGNIFICANTLY" IN TWO PLACES IN WHICH IT USED IN PARA 6 ("MAY INTERFERE SIGNIFICANTLY WITH ACTIVITIES OF OTHER STATES," AND "MAY INTERFERE SIGNIFICANTLY WITH ACTIVITIES IN THE PEACEFUL EXPLORATION OF OUTER SPACE"). HE SAID "SIGNIFICANTLY" IS A WORD WHICH WAS OPEN TO UNILATERAL INTERPRETATION BY A STATE WISHING TO AVOID THE CONSULTATION PROCESS; MOREOVER, IT IS A WORD WHICH WOULD CREATE DISPUTES.

5. SPONSORSHIP. MOROZOV SAID THAT, IF US CAN AGREE TO ABOVE THREE CHANGES IN TEXT GENERAL PRINCIPLES RES, USSR WAS READY WITH US AND OTHER MEMBERS SPACE COMITE TO SPONSOR TEXT IN FIRST COMITE. MOROZOV CONFIRMED HIS HOPE THAT ALL 28 COMITE MEMBERS WOULD SPONSOR. HE SAID THIS WOULD BE A GUARANTY THAT TEXT AGREED BETWEEN US AND USSR WOULD NOT BE AMENDED. HE WAS READY TO UNDERTAKE "A MORAL OBLIGATION" TO CONVINCE HIS ALLIES THAT NO AMENDMENTS SHOULD BE MADE. MEEKER RESPONDED THAT WE WOULD UNDERTAKE TO PERSUADE OTHERS OF MERIT TEXT AGREED BETWEEN US, BUT THERE MIGHT BE SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGES; IF US AND USSR COULD ACCEPT A GIVEN AMENDMENT OR AMENDMENTS, THERE SHOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY. MOROZOV REPLIED THAT IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IF NON-SPACE POWERS PROPOSED AMENDMENTS; THESE MIGHT UPSET OUR LABORS, AND OPENING THIS DOOR MIGHT BE DANGEROUS.

6. POSSIBILITY OF A SPACE COMITE MTG. MEEKER NOTED THAT SOME SPACE COMITE MEMBERS HAD INTIMATED A DESIRE FOR A BRIEF MTG OF SPACE COMITE BEFORE FIRST COMITE TAKES UP OUTER SPACE ITEM. WE WERE NOT PARTICULARLY IN FAVOR OF THIS, SINCE WE THOUGHT WE COULD ACCOMPLISH SAME PURPOSE BY BROAD INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS IN THE PROCESS OF SEEKING SPONSORS. MOROZOV REMARKED THAT HE TOO, HAD HEARD RUMORS TO THIS EFFECT, AND THAT HE REGARDED THEM AS COMING FROM MATSCH (CHAIRMAN, SPACE COMITE). HE SAID THERE WAS NO NEED FOR SUCH A MTG; THE SPACE COMITE HAD APPEALED FOR CONSULTATIONS, AND THE USSR

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AND US HAD COMPLIED AND THUS PRODUCED LEGAL PRINCIPLES TEXT. VORONTSOV POINTED OUT THAT NO MTG OF ENDC HAD PRECEDED GA RESES ON ADHERENCE TO TEST BAN TREATY AND PROHIBITION ORBITING WEAPONS MASS DESTRUCTION. WE SAID THAT WE COULD SEE NO PARTICULAR HARM IN SPACE COMITE MTG IF MAJORITY ITS MEMBERS WANTED SAME. OOROZOV REPEATED HIS OPPOSITION AND HIS FEAR THAT PRESTIGE-SEEKING PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SPACE COMITE MIGHT "SPOIL OUR JOB."

7. NEXT MTG SET FOR 12 NOON NOV 5 AT SOV MISSION SINCE MOROZOV OCCUPIED PM NOV 5 AND AM NOV 6.

8. SEPTTEL (ALSO SENT PRIORITY) CONTAINS RECOMMENDATIONS USDEL.

9. AT NO TIME DID SOVS RAISE QUESTIONS OF OBSERVATION, PLACEMENT REFERENCE TO GA RES 110 ON WAR PROPAGANDA, OR "SOVEREIGN RIGHTS" RE JURISDICTION AND CONTROL BY LAUNCHING STATE OVER VEHICLES WHICH IT HAS LAUNCHED.

GP-3. STEVENSON
BT

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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FOL IS TEXT SPACE OMNIBUS RES NOW INTENDED FOR SUBMISSION
EARLY 4 DEC TO SECRETARIAT FOR TRANSLATION IN PREPARATION
TO CIRCULATION IN COMITE I AFTER COMPLETE LIST OF COSPONSORS
IS ADDED LATER SAME DAY. PRESENT COSPONSORS ARE AUSTRIA,
AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, CANADA, FRANCE, ITALY, JAPAN, MEXICO,
USSR, UK, USA..

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

RECALLING ITS RES 1721 (XVI) OF 20 DEC 1961 AND 1802 (XVII)
OF 14 DEC 1962, ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE PEACEFUL
USES OF OUTER SPACE,

HAVING ADOPTED RES (XVIII) CONTAINING A DECLARATION OF
BASIC LEGAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING ACTIVITIES OF STATES
IN EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE,

HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT (A/5549 AND A/5549 ADD. 1)
SUBMITTED BY THE COMITE ON PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE,
MINDFUL OF BENEFITS WHICH ALL MEMBER STATES WOULD ENJOY
BY PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS OF COOPERATION
IN THIS FIELD,

I

1. RECOMMENDS THAT CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO
INCORPORATING IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT FORM, IN THE FUTURE
AS APPROPRIATE, LEGAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING ACTIVITIES
OF STATES IN EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE;

2. REQUESTS COMITE ON PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE TO
CONTINUE TO STUDY AND REPORT ON LEGAL PROBLEMS WHICH MAY
ARISE IN EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE, AND IN

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-2- 2334, December 3, from New York

PARTICULAR TO ARRANGE FOR PROMPT PREPARATION OF DRAFT INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY OBJECTS LAUNCHED INTO OUTER SPACE AND ON ASSISTANCE TO AND RETURN OF ASTRONAUTS AND SPACE VEHICLES;

3. FURTHER REQUESTS THE COMITE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE TO REPORT TO GA AT ITS NINETEENTH SESSION ON RESULTS ACHIEVED IN PREPARING THESE TWO AGREEMENTS;

II

1. ENDORSES THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF REPORT OF COMITE ON PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE CONCERNING EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, ENCOURAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS, INTERNATIONAL SOUNDING ROCKET FACILITIES, EDUCATION AND TRAINING AND POTENTIALLY HARMFUL EFFECTS OF SPACE EXPERIMENTS;

2. WELCOMES DECISION OF COMITE, IN COOPERATION WITH SYG AND MAKING FULL USE OF FUNCTIONS AND RESOURCES OF SECRETARIAT, TO UNDERTAKE FOLLOWING:

A. PREPARATION OF WORKING PAPER ON ACTIVITIES AND RESOURCES OF UN, OF ITS SPECIALIZED AGENCIES, AND OF OTHER COMPETENT INTERNATIONAL BODIES RELATING TO PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE;

B. PREPARATION OF A SUMMARY OF NATIONAL AND OF COOPERATIVE INTERNATIONAL SPACE ACTIVITIES;

C. PREPARATION OF A LIST OF AVAILABLE BIBLIOGRAPHIC AND ABSTRACTING SERVICES COVERING THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL RESULTS AND PUBLICATIONS IN SPACE AND SPACE-RELATED AREAS;

D. COMPILATION IN COOPERATION WITH UNESCO OF REVIEWS OF INFORMATION ON FACILITIES FOR EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN BASIC SUBJECTS RELATED TO PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE IN UNIVERSITIES AND OTHER PLACES OF LEARNING;

E. ESTABLISHMENT, AT THE REQUEST OF GOVT OF INDIA, OF A GROUP OF FIVE SCIENTISTS TO VISIT SOUNDING ROCKET LAUNCHING FACILITY AT THUMBA AND TO ADVISE COMITE ON ITS ELIGIBILITY FOR UN SPONSORSHIP IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BASIC PRINCIPLES ENDORSED BY GA IN RES 1802 (XVII);

3. NOTES WITH APPRECIATION THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH GA RES 1721 (XVI), THE SYG IS MAINTAINING A PUBLIC REGISTRY OF OBJECTS

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LAUNCHED INTO ORBIT OR BEYOND ON BASIS INFORMATION BEING
FURNISHED BY STATES MEMBERS OF UN;

4. NOTES WITH APPRECIATION THAT CERTAIN MEMBER STATES HAVE, ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS, PROVIDED INFO ON THEIR NATIONAL SPACE PROGRAMS, AND INVITES OTHER MEMBER STATES TO DO SO;
5. INVITES MEMBER STATES TO GIVE FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION TO REQUESTS OF COUNTRIES DESIROUS OF PARTICIPATING IN THE PEACEFUL EXPLORATION OF OUTER SPACE FOR APPROPRIATE TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ON A BILATERAL BASIS OR ON ANY OTHER BASIS THEY SEE FIT;
6. NOTES THE CONSIDERABLE MEASURE OF COOPERATION IN THE PEACEFUL EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE UNDERWAY AMONG MEMBER STATES;
7. NOTES THAT US AND THE USSR HAVE REACHED AN AGREEMENT LOOKING TOWARD COOPERATION IN FIELDS OF SATELLITE METEOROLOGY, COMMUNICATIONS AND MAGNETIC FIELD MAPPING;
8. ENCOURAGES MEMBER STATES TO CONTINUE AND EXTEND COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS SO THAT ALL MEMBERS CAN BENEFIT FROM PEACEFUL EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE;
9. BELIEVES THAT INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION CAN BE BENEFICIAL IN FURTHERING THE EXPLORATION OF THE SOLAR SYSTEM;

III

1. NOTES WITH APPRECIATION (A) THE SECOND REPORT OF WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION ON THE ADVANCEMENT OF ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCES AND THEIR APPLICATION IN LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN OUTER SPACE AND (B) THE ORGANIZATIONAL AND FINANCIAL STEPS TAKEN BY THE FOURTH CONGRESS OF WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION IN RESPONSE TO RES 1721 C (XVI) AND 1802 III (XVII);
2. ENDORSES EFFORTS TOWARD ESTABLISHMENT OF A WORLD WEATHER WATCH UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION TO INCLUDE USE OF SATELLITE AS WELL AS CONVENTIONAL DATA CENTERS TO FACILITATE EFFECTIVENESS OF SYSTEM;
3. URGES THAT MEMBER STATES (A) EXTEND THEIR NATIONAL AND REGIONAL METEOROLOGICAL EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT THE EXPANDED PROGRAM OF WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION, (B) COOPERATE IN ESTABLISHMENT OF WORLD WEATHER WATCH, AND (C) INCREASE RESEARCH AND TRAINING IN ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCES;

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4. INVITES WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION TO MAKE PROGRESS REPORT TO COMITE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE IN 1964 RELATING TO ITS ACTIVITIES IN THIS FIELD;

IV

1. NOTES WITH APPRECIATION SECOND REPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION ON TELECOMMUNICATION AND THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE;

2. WELCOMES DECISIONS OF THE OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1963 EXTRAORDINARY ADMINISTRATIVE RADIO CONFERENCE CONVENED BY INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION ON ALLOCATION OF FREQUENCY BANDS FOR SPACE COMMUNICATION AND PROCEDURES FOR THEIR USE AS A STEP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPACE RADIO COMMUNICATIONS;

3. INVITES INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION TO MAKE A PROGRESS REPORT TO COMITE ON PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE IN 1964 RELATING TO ITS ACTIVITIES IN THIS FIELD;

4. RECOGNIZES THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES IN THE EXPANSION OF GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES AND POSSIBILITIES THIS OFFERS FOR INCREASING FLOW OF INFO AND FOR FURTHERING THE OBJECTIVES OF UN AND ITS AGENCIES;

V

REQUESTS THE COMITE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE TO CONTINUE ITS WORK AS SET FORTH IN GA RES 1472 (XIV), 1721 (XVI), 1802 (XVII), AND IN THIS RESOLUTION, AND TO REPORT TO GA AT ITS NINETEENTH SESSION ON ACTIVITIES OF THE COMITE. STEVENSON

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--Governor Stevenson

President Johnson has directed me to affirm to you that there will be no Johnson policy to the United Nations -- any more than there was a Kennedy policy. There was and is only a United States policy. That too, outlasts violence and outlives men.*

As long ago as 1948, President Johnson told American audiences that "our long term and sustained foreign policy must receive the full support of the United Nations." And now, on his behalf, I repeat to you that my government will -- as it has over the years -- support every practical move to add to the acceptance of the United Nations, to keep peace and aid new nations to reach the stage of self-sustaining growth.

The foreign policy of this government will continue to be, as to the troubling issues of today and tomorrow, to work for agreement where agreement is possible and to negotiate with patience and perseverance until agreement is possible. President Johnson is determined that the better feeling of the past few months shall not be lost; rather that it must increase. In that spirit, we shall not falter on the stony path to peace.

*Refers to previous use of this phrase.