

EXECUTIVE

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LAG/Airlines

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1966 JUL 8 20 00N019/00312

EEA145
CO WTE10
DE WTE 1153

FROM: BILL MOYERS
TO : THE PRESIDENT
INFO: BOB FLEMING
CITE: WH66317

UNCLASSIFIED

- (1) RICHARD WILSON COLUMN IN WASHINGTON STAR HEADLINED: "ROMNEY-REAGAN CONFLICT COULD SPLIT GOP ANEW" STORY DATED LOS ANGELES READS: "EVENTS IN REPUBLICAN POLITICS HAVE CAST GOV. GEORGE ROMNEY OF MICHIGAN AND RONALD REAGAN OF CALIFORNIA IN OPPOSING ROLES. ASSUMING THAT BOTH ARE ELECTED OR RE-ELECTED GOVERNOR OF THEIR RESPECTIVE STATES THIS FALL, THESE TWO REPUBLICANS WILL FIND THEMSELVES IN AN UNAVOIDABLE COLLISION FOR THE TOP LEADERSHIP OF THEIR PARTY." WILSON SAYS ROMNEY WILL BE THE PROGRESSIVE AND REAGAN THE CONSERVATIVE WITH A RESULTING POLARIZATION OF PARTY VIEWS. THIS, HE CONCLUDES, MAY PREVENT ANY GOP RECOVERY FROM THE DISASTER OF 1964.
- (2) RALPH MCGILL WRITES IN THE STAR THAT MARTIN LUTHER KING IS APPEALING TO NEGRO LEADERS FOR AN END OF TALK OF "BLACK POWER." DR. KING REPORTEDLY HAS TOLD CARMICHAEL: "WE MUST NEVER SEEK POWER EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE NEGRO, BUT THE SHARING OF POWER WITH WHITE PEOPLE."
- (3) DAVID LAWRENCE'S COLUMN SAYS "CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES HAVE STOOD ALOOF OF THE AIRLINE STRIKE ISSUE." HE ADDS: "MEMBERS OF CONGRESS FAMILIAR WITH LABOR DEVELOPMENTS HAVE KNOWN FOR A LONG TIME THAT THE AIRLINES WERE CONFRONTED WITH A CRISIS." HE INDICATES THE STRIKE ISSUE MAY HAVE IMPACT ON NOVEMBER ELECTIONS SINCE IT IS THE DEMOCRATS WHO HAVE RENDERED SUPPORT TO THE CAUSE OF UNIONS."
- (4) BOTH AFTERNOON WASHINGTON NEWSPAPERS GIVE PARAMOUNT ATTENTION TO THE STRIKE. THE STAR HAS PICTURE OF COMPLETELY EMPTY NATIONAL AIRPORT, WHILE THE NEWS SHOWS IN LARGE PHOTOGRAPH A SCENE OF AIRCRAFT SITTING IDLE NEAR THE TERMINAL. YOUR ACTION WHICH SEEKS TO REDUCE THE IMPACT OF THE STRIKE CONTINUES TO GET STRONG ATTENTION.
- (5) AFTERNOON PAPERS CONTINUE TO GIVE ATTENTION TO FACT THAT THE NATION'S GOVERNORS, WITH EXCEPTION OF HATFIELD, ALL STAND BEHIND THE PRESIDENT'S HANDLING OF VIETNAM WAR.
- (6) DAILY NEWS SUPPORTS ROY WILKINS IN LEAD EDITORIAL FOR HIS "RACIAL STATESMANSHIP" IN OPPOSING BLACK POWER ADVOCATES. EDITORIAL PRAISES HIM FOR NEVER LOSING SIGHT OF THE "GREAT GOAL---A SOCIETY IN WHICH EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND PERSONAL DIGNITY TRANSCENDED THE LABELS OF "BLACK" OR "WHITE."

DTG : 081915Z JULY 1966

1

UNCLASSIFIED

~~FOR: THE PRESIDENT~~

~~FROM: BILL MOYERS~~

~~Info: BOB FLEMING~~

(1) Richard Wilson column in Washington Star headlined:

"Romney-Reagan Conflict Could Split GOP Anew " Story
datelined Los Angeles reads: "Events in Republican politics have
cast Gov. George Romney of Michigan and Ronald Reagan
of California in opposing roles. Assuming that both
are elected or re-elected governor of their respective states
this fall, these two Republicans will find themselves in
an unavoidable collision for the top leadership of their party."
Wilson says Romney will be the progressive and Reagan the
conservative with a resulting polarization of party views.
This, he concludes, may prevent any GOP recovery from
the disaster of 1964.

(2) Ralph McGill writes in The Star that Martin Luther King
is appealing to Negro leaders for an end of talk of "black power."
Dr. King reportedly has told Carmichael: "We must
never seek power exclusively for the Negro, but the sharing
of power with White people."

(3) David Lawrence's column says "Congressional committees have stood aloof of the airline strike issue." He adds: "Members of Congress familiar with labor developments have known for a long time that the airlines were confronted with a crisis." He indicates the strike issue may have impact on November elections since it is the Democrats "who have rendered support to the cause of unions."

(4) Both afternoon Washington newspapers give paramount attention to the strike. The Star has picture of completely empty National Airport, while The News shows in large photograph a scene of aircraft sitting idle near the terminal. Your action which seeks to reduce the impact of the strike continues to get strong attention.

(5) Afternoon papers continue to give attention to fact that the nation's governors, with exception of Hatfield, all stand behind the President's handling of Vietnam war.

(6) Daily News supports Roy Wilkins in lead editorial for his "racial statesmanship" in opposing black power advocates. Editorial praises him for never losing sight of the "great goal---a society in which equal opportunity and personal dignity transcended the labels of "black" or "white."

Your action which seeks to reduce the impact of
continues to get strong attention.

cc: Bill Moyers

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 8, 1966

C. F.

LAG/Airlines

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM Joe Califano

At the time the strike of the I.A.M. began today, their minimum demands were:

1. A three year contract retroactive to January 1, 1966;
2. Wage increases of 5%-5%-4% in each of the three years;
3. Premium of 2-1/2 times pay for all work performed on eight holidays;
4. Cost-of-living escalation effective July 1, 1966 to provide 1¢ per hour additional increase for each rise of 3/10 of a point in the consumer price index;
5. Vacations of three weeks for all employees with eight years of service;
6. Companies to pay the entire cost of dependency Health and Welfare coverage or in lieu thereof a straight 6¢ per hour payment for this purpose;
7. Companies to pay the entire cost of Pensions which is presently on a joint contributory basis;
8. A 10¢ per hour extra premium for all mechanics required to hold and using F.A.A. licenses to "check out" planes or engines or electrical systems.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING

BY Th ON 3-16-82

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

These demands are in addition to those three items recommended by the Emergency Board which the Union found acceptable. The three items were:

1. One additional holiday (making a total of eight).
2. Elimination of two wage progression steps.
3. Four weeks vacation for employees with 15 years of service.

At the break-off of negotiations, the carriers had accepted all recommendations of the Emergency Board (estimated by them to cost \$76 million for the five carriers). In addition, they had offered the following benefits (which the carriers estimate as costing an additional \$2 million):

1. 2-1/2 times wages for 3 of the 8 holidays.
2. An additional 2¢ per hour on the mechanic rate.

The negotiations were made particularly difficult by reason of a well-founded conviction on the part of the carriers that the five Union General Chairmen (one in charge of union affairs on each carrier) were determined to have a strike unless the carriers capitulated on all items.

This attitude of the Union Chairmen is attributable in part to discontent by union members over very generous settlements being attained in Building Trades negotiations in urban areas -- for example, in San Francisco, the new common laborers rate is \$3.95 per hour, compared to the airline journeyman machinist rate of \$3.52 per hour.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

This militant attitude is also a reflection of the public statements of the I. A. M. President.

Jim Reynolds believes that when the Union General Chairmen return, particularly as time wears on, they will become more and more interested in a settlement. Reynolds believes the final settlement figure will be more like 5 or 6%, than the 3.4% package recommended by the Emergency Board. For example, to get the union^{to} settle, he believes that beyond the Emergency Board recommendation, there will have to be higher wages, premium pay for all holidays worked, some sort of cost of living escalator clause, 3 or 4¢ per hour additional payments for health and welfare and 5¢ premium for mechanics. Reynolds' best hopes are that there will be a settlement about the middle of next week. He does not see a settlement in the works before that, even though he plans to work the parties 15 to 20 hours per day beginning tomorrow.

Unknown to Reynolds, I have taken steps to put some spine in the carriers. Charlie Murphy has indicated that there will be no lessening of his drive for lower fares on the basis of any high settlement. Murphy has made this clear to the airline presidents. Murphy reported to me that the airline presidents were in no mood to capitulate to what they consider to be outrageous union demands.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4

In addition, John McCone stopped by to see me today on the Draft Commission. During our conversation, I told John that we would certainly have no objection if he indicated to the airline presidents that as he took the temperature in Washington, the government would certainly not be unhappy if the carriers hold out for a reasonable settlement, even though the strike lasted for an additional period of time. McCone said he would certainly do this and would not indicate that he had talked to anyone in the White House.

Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the assessment of our experts is that the carriers could accept almost all the union demands and still make very substantial profits during the next few years.

Secretary Wirtz will not return to Washington until late tomorrow night. At that time he will join in the negotiations with Reynolds.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

42 hmk

184 hmk + 154 + 154 (J61, 66, 67, 68)

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DE WTE 1164

known unit

SENT
WHCA

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4.00 - 3.52 in rev

1966 JUL 9 02 07

C. F.

LAG Airlines

FROM: JOE CALIFANO
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP66493

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM JOE CALIFANO

AT THE TIME THE STRIKE OF THE I.A.M. BEGAN TODAY,
THEIR MINIMUM DEMANDS WERE:

1. A THREE YEAR CONTRACT RETROACTIVE TO JANUARY 1, 1966;
2. WAGE INCREASES OF 5PERCENT-5PERCENT-4PERCENT IN EACH OF THE THREE YEARS;
3. PREMIUM OF 2-1/2 TIMES PAY FOR ALL WORK PERFORMED ON EIGHT HOLIDAYS;
4. COST-OF-LIVING ESCALATION EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1966 TO PROVIDE 1 CENT PER HOUR ADDITIONAL INCREASE FOR EACH RISE OF 3/10 OF A POINT IN THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX;
5. VACATIONS OF THREE WEEKS FOR ALL EMPLOYEES WITH EIGHT YEARS OF SERVICE;
6. COMPANIES TO PAY THE ENTIRE COST OF DEPENDENCY HEALTH AND WELFARE COVERAGE OR IN LIEU THEREOF A STRAIGHT 6 CENTS PER HOUR PAYMENT FOR THIS PURPOSE;
7. COMPANIES TO PAY THE ENTIRE COST OF PENSIONS WHICH IS PRESENTLY ON A JOINT CONTRIBUTORY BASIS;
8. A 10 CENT PER HOUR EXTRA PREMIUM FOR ALL MECHANICS REQUIRED TO HOLD AND USING F.A.A. LICENSES TO "CHECK OUT" PLANES OR ENGINES OR ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS.

THESE DEMANDS ARE IN ADDITION TO THOSE THREE ITEMS RECOMMENDED BY THE EMERGENCY BOARD WHICH THE UNION FOUND ACCEPTABLE. THE THREE ITEMS WERE:

1. ON ADDITIONAL HOLIDAY (MAKING A TOTAL OF EIGHT).
2. ELIMINATION OF TWO WAGE PROGRESSION STEPS.
3. FOUR WEEKS VACATION FOR EMPLOYEES WITH 15 YEARS OF SERVICE.

AT THE BREAK-OFF OF NEGOTIATIONS, THE CARRIERS HAD ACCEPTED ALL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EMERGENCY BOARD (ESTIMATED BY THEM TO COST \$76 MILLION FOR THE FIVE CARRIERS). IN ADDITION, THEY HAD OFFERED THE FOLLOWING BENEFITS (WHICH

THE CARRIERS ESTIMATE AS COSTING AN ADDITIONAL \$2 MILLION):

1. 2-1/2 TIMES WAGES FOR 3 OF THE 8 HOLIDAYS.
2. AN ADDITIONAL 2 CENT PER HOUR ON THE MECHANIC RATE.

THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE MADE PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT BY REASON OF A WELL-FOUNDED CONVICTION ON THE PART OF THE CARRIERS THAT THE FIVE UNION GENERAL CHAIRMEN (ONE IN CHARGE OF UNION AFFAIRS ON EACH CARRIER) WERE DETERMINED TO HAVE A STRIKE UNLESS THE CARRIERS CAPITULATED ON ALL ITEMS.

THIS ATTITUDE OF THE UNION CHAIRMEN IS ATTRIBUTABLE IN PART TO DISCONTENT BY UNION MEMBERS OVER VERY GENEROUS SETTLEMENTS BEING ATTAINED IN BUILDING TRADES NEGOTIATIONS IN URBAN AREAS--FOR EXAMPLE, IN SAN FRANCISCO, THE NEW COMMON LABORERS RATE IS \$3.95 PER HOUR, COMPARED TO THE AIRLINE JOURNEYMAN MACHINIST RATE OF \$3.52 PER HOUR.

THIS MILITANT ATTITUDE IS ALSO A REFLECTION OF THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF THE I.A.M. PRESIDENT.

JIM REYNOLDS BELIEVES THAT WHEN THE UNION GENERAL CHAIRMEN RETURN, PARTICULARLY AS TIME WEARS ON, THEY WILL BECOME MORE AND MORE INTERESTED IN A SETTLEMENT. REYNOLDS BELIEVES THE FINAL SETTLEMENT FIGURE WILL BE MORE LIKE 5 OR 6 PERCENT, THAN THE 3.4 PERCENT PACKAGE RECOMMENDED BY THE EMERGENCY BOARD. FOR EXAMPLE, TO GET THE UNION TO SETTLE, HE BELIEVES THAT BEYOND THE EMERGENCY BOARD RECOMMENDATION, THERE WILL HAVE TO BE HIGHER WAGES, PREMIUM PAY FOR ALL HOLIDAYS WORKED, SOME SORT OF COST OF LIVING ESCALATOR CLAUSE, 3 OR 4 CENTS PER HOUR ADDITIONAL PAYMENTS FOR HEALTH AND WELFARE AND 5 CENT PREMIUM FOR MECHANICS.

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING:

BY Th ON 3/6/82

CENTRAL FILES

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IS PRESENTLY ON A JOINT CONTRIBUTORY BASIS;
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CLAUSE, 3 OR 4 CENTS PER HOUR ADDITIONAL PAYMENTS FOR
HEALTH AND WELFARE AND 5 CENT PREMIUM FOR MECHANICS.
REYNOLDS' BEST HOPES ARE THAT THERE WILL BE A SETTLEMENT
ABOUT THE MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK. HE DOES NOT SEE A SETTLEMENT
IN THE WORKS BEFORE THAT, EVEN THOUGH HE PLANS TO WORK THE
PARTIES 15 TO 20 HOURS PER DAY BEGINNING TOMORROW.

UNKNOWN TO REYNOLDS, I HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO PUT SOME SPINE
IN THE CARRIERS. CHARLIE MURPHY HAS INDICATED THAT THERE WILL
BE NO LESSENING OF HIS DRIVE FOR LOWER FARES ON THE BASIS OF
ANY HIGH SETTLEMENT. MURPHY HAS MADE THIS CLEAR TO THE
AIRLINE PRESIDENTS. MURPHY REPORTED TO ME THAT THE AIRLINE
PRESIDENTS WERE IN NO MOOD TO CAPITULATE TO WHAT THEY CONSIDER
TO BE OUTRAGEOUS UNION DEMANDS.

IN ADDITION, ONH MCCONE STOPPED BY TO SEE ME TODAY
ON THE DRAFT COMMISSION. DURING OUR CONVERSATIONS, I TOLD
JOHN THAT WE WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE NO OBJECTION IF HE INDICATED
TO THE AIRLINE PRESIDENTS THAT AS HE TOOK THE TEMPERATURE
IN WASHINGTON, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE UNHAPPY
IF THE CARRIERS HOLD OUT FOR A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT,
EVEN THOUGH THE STRIKE LASTED FOR AN ADDITIONAL PERIOD
OF TIME. MCCONE SAID HE WOULD CERTAINLY DO THIS AND WOULD
NOT INDICATE THAT HE HAD TALKED TO ANYONE IN THE WHITE
HOUSE.

NEVERTHELESS, IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT THE ASSESSMENT
OF OUR EXPERTS IS THAT THE CARRIERS COULD ACCEPT ALMOST
ALL THE UNION DEMANDS AND STILL MAKE VERY SUBSTANTIAL
PROFITS DURING THE NEXT FEW YEARS.

SECRETARY WIRTZ WILL NOT RETURN TO WASHINGTON UNTIL
LATE TOMORROW NIGHT. AT THAT TIME HE WILL JOIN IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS WITH REYNOLDS.

RECEIVED
JUL 27 1966
CENTRAL FILES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 8, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM Joe Califano

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE WARNING.

BY TL ON 3-16-82

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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This attitude of the Union Chairmen is attributable in part to discontent by union members over very generous settlements being attained in Building Trades negotiations in urban areas -- for example, in San Francisco, the new common laborers rate is \$3.95 per hour, compared to the airline journeyman machinist rate of \$3.52 per hour.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Secretary Wirtz will not return to Washington until late tomorrow night. At that time he will join in the negotiations with Reynolds.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SENT
WHCA

ZEB163
CO WTE13
DE WTE 1157

1966 JUL 8 23 30

FROM: JOE CALIFANO
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP66492

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

JULY 8, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM JOE CALIFANO

THERE FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF A PRESS RELEASE PUT OUT BY LARRY O'BRIEN THIS AFTERNOON IN RESPONSE TO YOUR DIRECTIVE TO USE EVERY AVAILABLE MODE OF TRANSPORTATION TO MOVE THE MAILS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE, PARTICULARLY TO OUR SERVICEMEN IN VIETNAM, AND REDUCE TO A MINIMUM ANY DELAYS IN MAIL DELIVERY.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE FRIDAY, JULY 8, 1966

"POSTMASTER GENERAL LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN SAID TODAY THAT AT THE DIRECTION OF THE PRESIDENT, HE HAS TAKEN STEPS TO USE EVERY AVAILABLE MODE OF TRANSPORTATION TO MOVE THE MAILS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE, PARTICULARLY TO OUR SERVICEMEN IN VIETNAM, AND REDUCE TO A MINIMUM ANY DELAYS IN MAIL DELIVERY.

"THERE WILL BE SERIOUS DELAYS IN THE MOVEMENT OF MAIL, BUT EVERY STEP WILL BE TAKEN TO ALLEVIATE THE PROBLEM," THE POSTMASTER GENERAL INFORMED PRESIDENT JOHNSON.

MR. O'BRIEN SAID THAT AT THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST HE HAD SENT EMERGENCY ORDERS TO ALL 15 REGIONAL OFFICES INSTRUCTING THEM TO:

1. TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO ASSURE THAT ALL APO AND FPO MILITARY LETTER MAIL GOING TO OUR SERVICEMEN IN THE PACIFIC IS MOVED TO PORTS OF EMBARKATION VIA FASTEST MEANS AVAILABLE.
2. CONTRACT TO THE FULLEST EXTENT WITH OTHER NON-STRIKING CERTIFICATED PASSENGER AND CARGO AIRLINES.
3. CONTRACT WITH NON-CERTIFICATED CHARTERED PASSENGER AND ALL CARGO AIRLINES SUCH AS AIR TAXIS, ETC.
4. UTILIZE TO THE FULLEST EXTENT THE FASTEST MODE OF SURFACE TRANSPORTATION IN THOSE AREAS WHERE CONTRACTS CANNOT BE MADE WITH ALTERNATE AIRLINES.

THE FIVE AIRLINES AFFECTED--EASTERN, NATIONAL, NORTHWEST, TRANS WORLD AND UNITED--MOVE ABOUT 75 PERCENT OF THE NATION'S AIRMAIL OR MORE THAN 10.5 MILLION PIECES DAILY."

DIG: 932360Z JULY 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GPS 360

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING.

BY TR ON 3-16-82

EXECUTIVE

LA6/airlines

NDI

SENT

CA/ND9

Sent
4:12

EEB159
FP WTE10
DE WTE 1155

1966 JUL 8 20 12

FROM: JOE CALIFANO
TO : THE PRESIDENT
INFO: BOB FLEMING
CITE: WH60319

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

JULY 8, 1966
FRIDAY, 3:30 P.M.

THERE FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF A MEMORANDUM I SENT AT YOUR DIRECTION TO THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES CONCERNING REDUCTION OF TRAVEL. THE MEMORANDUM SHOULD BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS EITHER FROM THE RANCH OR FROM THE WHITE HOUSE HERE. BILL AND I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE MORE ROUTINE TO HAVE FLEMING RELEASE IT FROM THE RANCH THAN TO PUT IT OUT HERE.

*MEMORANDUM FOR
THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

THE PRESIDENT YESTERDAY DIRECTED A SERIES OF ACTIONS DESIGNED TO MINIMIZE THE IMPACT OF THE CURRENT AIRLINE STRIKE. THESE ACTIONS ARE INTENDED TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT OUR MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR AIR TRANSPORTATION ARE MET, TO CONTINUE OPERATIONS AT CAPE KENNEDY WITH THE LEAST POSSIBLE INTERFERENCE, TO MINIMIZE THE INCONVENIENCE TO THE PUBLIC, AND TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT THE MAIL CONTINUES TO BE DELIVERED WITH MINIMUM DELAY.

IN KEEPING WITH HIS OBJECTIVE OF REDUCING THE IMPACT OF THE STRIKE, THE PRESIDENT DESIRES THAT ALL CABINET AND AGENCY HEADS REDUCE TRAVEL BY EMPLOYEES OF THEIR DEPARTMENTS FOR THE DURATION OF THE STRIKE, TO THE MINIMUM NECESSARY TO CARRY ON THE PUBLIC BUSINESS.

I SHOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU WOULD TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO SEE THAT THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN YOUR AGENCY.

JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

DTG: 081950Z JULY 1966

GPS 320

July 8, 1966

11

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

The President yesterday directed a series of actions designed to minimize the impact of the current airline strike. These actions are intended to make certain that our military requirements for air transportation are met, to continue operations at Cape Kennedy with the least possible interference, to minimize the inconvenience to the public, and to make certain that the mail continues to be delivered with minimum delay.

In keeping with his objective of reducing the impact of the strike, the President desires that all Cabinet and Agency Heads reduce travel by employees of their Departments for the duration of the strike, to the minimum necessary to carry on the public business.

I should appreciate it if you would take the necessary steps to see that this is accomplished within your Agency.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President "

McF

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

EXECUTIVE

LAG Airlines
FG

July 8, 1966
Friday, 3:30 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM Joe Califano

COPY TO: Bob Fleming

there follows the text

~~Attached is a text~~ of a memorandum I sent at your direction to the heads of Departments and Agencies concerning reduction of travel. The memorandum should be released to the press either from the Ranch or from the White House here. Bill and I believe it would be more routine to have Fleming release it from the Ranch than to put it out here.

"

Attachment

"

RECEIVED
JUL 11 1966
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

July 8, 1966

July 8, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM Joe Califano

There follows the text of a press release put out by Larry O'Brien this afternoon in response to your directive to use every available mode of transportation to move the mails as rapidly as possible, particularly to our servicemen in Vietnam, and reduce to a minimum any delays in mail delivery. Agency Heads reduce travel by employees of their Departments for the duration of the strike, to the minimum necessary to carry on the public business.

I should appreciate it if you could take the necessary steps to see that this is accomplished within your Agency.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 8, 1966


MEMORANDUM FOR

THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

The President yesterday directed a series of actions designed to minimize the impact of the current airline strike. These actions are intended to make certain that our military requirements for air transportation are met, to continue operations at Cape Kennedy with the least possible interference, to minimize the inconvenience to the public, and to make certain that the mail continues to be delivered with minimum delay.

In keeping with his objective of reducing the impact of the strike, the President desires that all Cabinet and Agency Heads reduce travel by employees of their Departments, for the duration of the strike, to the minimum necessary to carry on the public business.

I should appreciate it if you would take the necessary steps to see that this is accomplished within your Agency.


Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President

July 8, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR

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Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President

MESSAGE BY THE PRESIDENT

Airlines Dispute

The airlines dispute has become a triple threat to the economy.

Its direct costs are substantial.

It is weakening the vital institution of collective bargaining.

It is threatening the whole stabilization policy.

This has to stop.

There is a law -- the Railway Labor Act -- covering the handling of controversies in the airlines industry. The procedures established in this law have been exhausted.

There is an idea around that there are unwritten powers in the Presidency that could be exercised to resolve this dispute.

There are not such powers.

It has been possible in the past to find means of resolving such cases as the railroad case of 1964 and the steel case of 1965. In those cases there was the disposition on both sides to reach an agreement consistent with the national interest. The union in this case states flatly that its own interests must take precedence. It asserts the "militancy" of its members as a sufficient reason for the refusal to consider proposals dictated by the public interest.

One company after another and one union after another has agreed in the past to forego price or wage increases which it considered reasonable -- accepting instead the importance of the public interest in keeping the cost of living down.

This union rejects this balance of interests.

The plain fact is that this union's demands would, if met, lead to the certain spiralling of wages and prices in this country.

I believe too deeply in collective bargaining and in the importance of stabilization to see them sacrificed on this altar.

There have been proposals to meet this situation by the adoption of legislation providing for Government seizure of the airlines or for compulsory arbitration.

I propose to the Congress a course of action which will guarantee immediate resumption of operations on these airlines, but without provision for either seizure or compulsory arbitration.

This proposal calls for an immediate return to work while this dispute is worked out by further bargaining and mediation.

This proposal contemplates that the mediators will, with the authority and responsibility conferred on them, be able to resolve this dispute. This authority and responsibility includes the obligation to report, if their efforts fail, whose fault such failure is.

If either party proves unwilling in these negotiations to accommodate its position to the broader interests -- including its own -- which are involved, it will then be fairly viewed as inviting "compulsory" settlement in one form or another. The proposed Resolution contemplates this possibility, and provides for final determination -- but I am confident this will not be necessary.

It would be easier and simpler to prescribe a final and binding settlement procedure in this case now. The circumstances of the particular case warrant this. But the broader interests of the public and of labor and of management warrant giving voluntary settlement processes another chance. 3:50 p.m.

In the meantime, however, the public is entitled to its air transport continued.

FROM

I urge immediate adoption of this Joint Resolution.

COPY TO: Bob Fleming

there Affairs the day
Attachments of a memorandum I sent at your direction to the heads of Departments and Agencies concerning reduction of travel. The memorandum should be released to the press either from the Ranch or from the White House here. But I believe it would be more routine to have Fleming release it from the Ranch than to put it out here.

W. Willard Wirtz
Secretary of Labor

...to use every ... as ...
Vietnam, and reduce

Attachment

1911.

LA 6/Airlines
FG 115
N 51
N 59

WASHINGTON

1:45 p.m., Friday
July 8, 1966

FROM Joe Califano *[Signature]*

Since it is my understanding that you do not want to put this information out down at the Ranch, Bill and I will have Defense put it out as soon as possible.



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

July 8, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following data provide information concerning the impact of the strike called by the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers against five U.S. airlines on the Department of Defense.

- Defense requirements for essential official duty travel normally provided by the five affected carriers within the United States for the balance of the month of July total approximately 100,000 passengers.


- The Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service Agency has initiated the Defense Emergency Transportation Plan which provides for continuation and expansion of Defense chartered flights to meet essential requirements. The unions and the carriers have assured the Department of Defense that essential Defense traffic will be handled.

- If requested, the Department of Defense can make space available on contract aircraft for the movement of military mail, including personal letters to and from Vietnam, from inland points to coastal air terminals for overseas delivery.

- The Military Airlift Command, responsible for overseas air transportation, advises that all its contract agreements include no work stoppage clauses and that no problems are anticipated in the movement of essential Defense traffic to overseas locations.

- The arrangements with the airlines and the unions will not include movement of military personnel on leave. I have directed today that military aircraft be made available on a priority basis for the movement of military personnel on leave prior to or just returned from Southeast Asia duty. I expect that we can meet this requirement.

The Defense Emergency Plan now in effect is expected to provide for the movement of essential Defense traffic. I will keep you advised of developments and immediately inform you of any problems which arise.


Cyrus R. Vance

ZCZCEEA944
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1152

FROM: JOE CALIFANO
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP66490

RECEIVED
JUL 8 10 40
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ✓

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM JOE CALIFANO

THERE FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF A MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM CY VANCE ON THE ACTIONS OF THE DEFENCE DEPARTMENT TO ALLEVIATE THE SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO MILITARY PERSONNEL AND MAKE CERTAIN THAT OUR MILITARY NEEDS FOR AIR TRANSPORTATION ARE SATISFIED.

SINCE IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT YOU DO NOT WANT TO PUT THIS INFORMATION OUT DOWN AT THE RANCH, BILL AND I WILL HAVE DEFENSE PUT IT OUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

QUOTE

THE FOLLOWING DATA PROVIDE INFORMATION CONCERNING THE IMPACT OF THE STRIKE CALLED BY THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS AGAINST FIVE U.S. AIRLINES ON THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

- DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS FOR ESSENTIAL OFFICIAL DUTY TRAVEL NORMALLY PROVIDED BY THE FIVE AFFECTED CARRIERS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES FOR THE BALANCE OF THE MONTH OF JULY TOTAL APPROXIMATELY 100,000 PASSENGERS.

- THE MILITARY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND TERMINAL SERVICE AGENCY HAS INITIATED THE DEFENSE EMERGENCY TRANSPORTATION PLAN WHICH PROVIDES FOR CONTINUATION AND EXPANSION OF DEFENSE CHARTERED FLIGHTS TO MEET ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS. THE UNIONS AND THE CARRIERS HAVE ASSURED THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE THAT ESSENTIAL DEFENSE TRAFFIC WILL BE HANDLED.

- IF REQUESTED, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CAN MAKE SPACE AVAILABLE ON CONTRACT AIRCRAFT FOR THE MOVEMENT OF MILITARY MAIL, INCLUDING PERSONAL LETTERS TO AND FROM VIETNAM, FROM INLAND POINTS TO COASTAL AIR TERMINALS FOR OVERSEAS DELIVERY.

- THE MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND, RESPONSIBLE FOR OVERSEAS AIR TRANSPORTATION, ADVISES THAT ALL ITS CONTRACT AGREEMENTS INCLUDE NO WORK STOPPAGE CLAUSES AND THAT NO PROBLEMS ARE ANTICIPATED IN THE MOVEMENT OF ESSENTIAL DEFENSE TRAFFIC TO OVERSEAS LOCATIONS.

- THE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE AIRLINES AND THE UNIONS WILL NOT INCLUDE MILITARY PERSONNEL ON LEAVE. I HAVE DIRECTED TODAY THAT MILITARY AIRCRAFT BE MADE AVAILABLE ON A PRIORITY BASIS FOR THE MOVEMENT OF MILITARY PERSONNEL ON LEAVE PRIOR TO OR JUST RETURNED FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA DUTY. I EXPECT THAT WE CAN MEET THIS REQUIREMENT. THE DEFENSE EMERGENCY PLAN NOW IN EFFECT IS EXPECTED TO PROVIDE FOR THE MOVEMENT OF ESSENTIAL DEFENSE TRAFFIC. I WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS AND IMMEDIATELY INFORM YOU OF ANY PROBLEMS WHICH ARISE.

CYRUS R. VANCE

UNQUOTE

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING.

BY Th ON 3-16-82

- THE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE AIRLINES AND THE UNIONS WILL NOT INCLUDE MILITARY PERSONNEL ON LEAVE. I HAVE DIRECTED TODAY THAT MILITARY AIRCRAFT BE MADE AVAILABLE ON A PRIORITY BASIS FOR THE MOVEMENT OF MILITARY PERSONNEL ON LEAVE PRIOR TO OR JUST RETURNED FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA DUTY. I EXPECT THAT WE CAN MEET THIS REQUIREMENT. THE DEFENSE EMERGENCY PLAN NOW IN EFFECT IS EXPECTED TO PROVIDE FOR THE MOVEMENT OF ESSENTIAL DEFENSE TRAFFIC. I WILL KEEP YOU ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS AND IMMEDIATELY INFORM YOU OF ANY PROBLEMS WHICH ARISE.

CYRUS R. VANCE

UNQUOTE

DTG: 081906Z JULY 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EEB168
OO WTE16
DE WTE 1165

FROM: JOE CALIFANO
TO: THE PRESIDENT
CITE: WH60351

UNCLASSIFIED

SENT
WHCA

EXECUTIVE

LAG/airlines
TN

1966 JUL 9 01 39

7:50 P.M., FRIDAY
JULY 8, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM JOE CALIFANO

THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION ISSUED THE ATTACHED PRESS
RELEASE IN CONNECTION WITH THE AIRLINE STRIKE AND YOUR DIRECTIVE
TODAY:

QUOTE

PROGRAM ACTIVATED TO AID SHIPPERS AND PUBLIC SEEKING
ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF TRANSPORT DURING
AIRLINE STRIKE

IN PREPARATION FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF CESSATION OF AIR LINE
OPERATIONS DUE TO A STRIKE, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
YESTERDAY LAID PLANS FOR ACTIVATING ITS EMERGENCY PROGRAMS TO ASSIST
THE SHIPPING AND TRAVELING PUBLIC. TO COPE WITH THE REQUIRE-
MENTS FOR EMERGENCY MOVEMENTS AND FOR THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
WHEN SEVERE WEATHER, NATURAL DISASTERS, OR LABOR DISPUTES
DISRUPT TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES, A SELF-ACTIVATING SYSTEM
HAS BEEN DEVELOPED IN WHICH THE ICC'S NATIONWIDE SYSTEM OF
FIELD OFFICES IN PRINCIPAL CITIES AUTOMATICALLY ASSIST THE
PUBLIC IN OBTAINING ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF TRANSPORT.

WHEN AIRLINE-EMPLOYEE NEGOTIATIONS BROKE DOWN, THE
PRESIDENT REQUESTED CHAIRMAN JOHN BUSH AND THE INTERSTATE
COMMERCE COMMISSION TO TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE ACTION TO PROVIDE
THE MAXIMUM AVAILABLE RAIL AND BUS TRANSPORTATION TO MINIMIZE
THE INCONVENIENCE TO THE TRAVELING PUBLIC.

FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTIONS CHAIRMAN BUSH
REQUESTED THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS REPRESENTING THE RAILROAD,
BUS, AND TRUCKING INDUSTRIES TO UTILIZE THE FULL CAPABILITIES
OF THEIR MEDIA TO MEET THE SPECIAL NEEDS OF PASSENGERS AND
SHIPPERS AFFECTED BY THE CURTAILMENT OF AIR LINE OPERATIONS.

CHAIRMAN BUSH STATED THAT THE FULL RESOURCES OF THE
COMMISSION AND ITS FIELD OFFICES WILL BE DIRECTED TO THE ALLEVIATION
OF THE DISTRESS WHICH ARISES WHEN NORMAL TRANSPORTATION IS
UNAVAILABLE. "TO CARRY OUT THIS PROGRAM," THE CHAIRMAN STATED,
"THE COMMISSION IS AUTHORIZING THE DISTRICT SUPERVISORS AND
REGIONAL DIRECTORS OF THE COMMISSION'S BUREAU OF OPERATIONS AND
COMPLIANCE TO CERTIFY THE NEED FOR ON-THE-SPOT GRANTS FOR
MOTOR CARRIERS FOR EMERGENCY TEMPORARY AUTHORITY TO TRANSPORT
PASSENGERS OR PROPERTY. IN ADDITION, THE COMMISSION WILL
COOPERATE WITH STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES IN COORDINATING EFFORTS
TO ASSURE THE CONTINUANCE OF TRANSPORTATION FOR PRIORITY MOVEMENTS."

100

UNQUOTE

DTG: 090035Z JULY 1966

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

7:50 p.m., Friday
July 8, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM Joe Califano

The Interstate Commerce Commission issued the attached
Press Release in connection with the airline strike and your
directive today:

In preparation for the possibility of cessation of air line operations due to a strike, the Interstate Commerce Commission yesterday laid plans for activating its emergency programs to assist the traveling public. To cope with the requirements for emergency transportation for the national defense which severe weather, natural disasters, or labor disputes disrupt transportation facilities, a self-activating system has been developed in which the ICC's nationwide system of field offices in principal cities automatically assist the public in obtaining alternative means of transport.

When airline-employer relations become strained, the ICC's emergency programs are activated. One of the first steps is to inform the public of the situation and to provide the necessary information to the public to enable them to make alternative travel arrangements.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20423

737-9765 Ext. 350

FOR RELEASE:

78-66

Immediate

July 8, 1966

Quote

PROGRAM ACTIVATED TO AID SHIPPERS AND PUBLIC SEEKING ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF TRANSPORT DURING AIR LINE STRIKE

In preparation for the possibility of cessation of air line operations due to a strike, the Interstate Commerce Commission yesterday laid plans for activating its emergency programs to assist the shipping and traveling public. To cope with the requirements for emergency movements and for the national defense when severe weather, natural disasters, or labor disputes disrupt transportation facilities, a self-activating system has been developed in which the ICC's nationwide system of field offices in principal cities automatically assist the public in obtaining alternative means of transport.

When airline-employee negotiations broke down, the President requested Chairman John Bush and the Interstate Commerce Commission to take all appropriate action to provide the maximum available rail and bus transportation to minimize the inconvenience to the traveling public.

~~UNQUOTE~~

OVER

Following the President's instructions Chairman Bush requested the national associations representing the railroad, bus, and trucking industries to utilize the full capabilities of their media to meet the special needs of passengers and shippers affected by the curtailment of air line operations.

Chairman Bush stated that the full resources of the Commission and its field offices will be directed to the alleviation of the distress which arises when normal transportation is unavailable. "To carry out this program," the Chairman stated, "the Commission is authorizing the District Supervisors and Regional Directors of the Commission's Bureau of Operations and Compliance to certify the need for on-the-spot grants for motor carriers for emergency temporary authority to transport passengers or property. In addition, the Commission will cooperate with State and local agencies in coordinating efforts to assure the continuance of transportation for priority movements."

- ICC -

UNQUOTE

EF
in
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 8, 1966

EXECUTIVE

NDI
FG 211
FG 400
LA 6/airline
Morse, Wayne
(4)

FOR Bill Moyers

FROM

Joe Califano *Jack*

The President told me yesterday that he did not want any military aircraft used for Congressional trips back to town. I believe he was concerned that he would have to fly the whole Congress back and was also concerned about the use of military aircraft for such a purpose, where it is important for him to be completely assured that he has taken care of all the military requirements for air transportation.

In lieu of this, Charlie Murphy (through a Colonel John Deggi) at the CAB is making arrangements for Congressmen to get commercial flights back wherever that is possible.

I believe Congressional pressure is building up on this and it will be necessary to make some exceptions, at least on a space-available basis. As of now, Vance is operating under our instructions (which I relayed to him) not to fly any Congressmen back to town on military aircraft. So are Wilson and Manatos.

This is the one item I think you should check on tomorrow with Wilson, Manatos, Vance and Murphy because pressure may build to a point where we should make some exceptions for Congressmen who literally have no way of getting back to town and at least allow them to use military aircraft on a space-available basis.

You already have a copy of the wire I sent to the President last night advising him of the status of the airline situation as of that time. I am attaching others which also may be of use to you.

Attachment

RECEIVED
JUL 11 1966
CENTRAL FILES



OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20428

EXECUTIVE

LA6/Airline
FG 211

July 9, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Honorable Bill D. Moyers
Special Assistant to the President

FROM: Charles S. Murphy
Chairman

C 9M

As agreed with Joe Califano last night, we are issuing at 10:00 a.m. today the enclosed orders granting blanket type exemptions for additional air service during the strike emergency and authorizing discussions between the non-struck air carriers as to the service to be provided.

The purpose and effect of these orders is indicated in the enclosed press release.

Joe suggested that during his absence over the weekend you would be following the airline problem, and I thought that the President would be interested in this rather major action on our part.

We will probably put out some additional exemption orders covering specific situations during the day.

Attachments

2/ Although the military contract operations have not been disturbed, substantial volumes of military traffic are carried on the normal commercial services of the carriers.

new services by the nonstruck carriers in substitution for the services of the struck carriers would constitute an improper intervention by the Board in the controversy. In addition, the objecting carriers argue that the Board is without legal power to grant additional authority by way of exemption to relieve the emergency transportation.

Clearly the Board has no intention of intervening in the labor controversy, either directly or indirectly. Our sole concern here is to take action to alleviate the great public inconvenience and burden that will be inevitably suffered from a strike of this wide scope. We are not acting here to authorize air carriers to operate extensively outside the area of their route systems. Nor do we expect that the emergency authorizations we are granting will be successful in overcoming the great bulk of the public inconvenience that will flow from the strike. Therefore, our action herein can have only a negligible effect, if any, upon the basic economic forces which will be operative upon management and labor during the course of the strike. In essence, therefore, we must reject the claim that our action herein constitutes intervention into the labor controversy or that it operates in favor of one side against the other. 3/

We recognize that the emergency here involved has prevented us from following the normal procedures employed in exemption matters. However, we have, through direct communication with the carriers involved and through informal conference procedures afforded the struck carriers an opportunity to express their views. In recognition, however, of the fact that the carriers have not heretofore had specific notice of the precise authorizations under consideration, we believe it would be appropriate to provide in our order that within five days after its issuance, interested parties will be afforded the opportunity to present their views orally before the Board.

Little need be said to establish that the authorizations granted herein conform to the undue burden and public interest provisions of section 416(b) of the Act. Obviously it is impossible to hold a certificate proceeding in these circumstances. It is clear that the tremendous service burdens being placed upon the nonstruck carriers will create untold operational and managerial problems that will require the greatest of flexibility to maintain suitable services to the public. It would be incongruous for us to construe our authority under 416(b) so narrowly as to preclude the Board from taking any effective action to help relieve the serious public inconvenience occasioned by a strike of this magnitude.

3/ See Order E-16419, dated February 22, 1961, in which the Board said: "Moreover, the limited nature of the service to be provided in relation to the extent of the schedules canceled avoids any raising of the shibboleth of whether this action constitutes an intervention by the Board on the side of either party to a labor-management dispute. In short, the Board does not believe that this limited action will disturb the play of normal economic forces in the labor dispute."

In assessing the action we might take, the Board has held informal meetings with representatives of the non-struck carriers, the local service carriers, the trunklines, the cargo carriers, and the supplemental carriers. From these discussions, it appears that virtually every carrier is so heavily committed to its commercial and military business as to leave relatively little in the way of equipment or crews for service outside of their normal service pattern. The local service carriers have indicated that with a relaxation in their route restrictions, they will be able to improve their services, particularly in terminal to terminal markets where struck carriers have provided the major capacity. The trunk carriers have indicated only a limited ability to provide additional services, but are willing to augment their services with equipment and/or crews leased from other sources. The supplemental carriers, while having some equipment and crew time, were unable to suggest how they could directly employ them in individually ticketed services; they did note their ability to provide additional capacity for charters to other carriers, and for the carriage on military and commercial charters of pick-up cargo and mail. The cargo carriers are apparently fully committed in their resources. 4/

In the light of this situation, we deem it necessary to grant wide latitude to the non-struck carriers to engage in discussions, 5/ operations, and arrangements which will permit the best utilization possible of the limited facilities and personnel available for meeting the means of the travelling public in this emergency.

First, we shall exempt all of the non-struck certificated combination air carriers from sections 401 and 403 of the Act as well as from the terms, limitations and conditions of their certificates to the extent necessary to permit them to provide without regard to their linear route description or any other operating restrictions, unrestricted service between any pair of points on their respective systems between which a struck carrier or carriers, either individually or collectively, provided 25 percent or more of the scheduled flights as of July 1, 1966. 6/ We shall exempt local service carriers to permit them to reduce services in all of their markets without regard to certificate restrictions in order to free equipment for operation on the struck routes.

4/ So far as we are aware, there is little need for us to take action necessary to permit an enlarged contribution on the part of air taxi operators.

5/ See Order E-23929 issued contemporaneously herewith.

6/ The authority granted herein is intended to consider the broad transportation needs of the country during the strike emergency. Undoubtedly, special circumstances will arise which are not covered by this authority. The Board will treat in an expeditious manner applications for specific authority to provide such service which it considers in the public interest.

We realize that it might be necessary for the exempted carriers to cut back service in some markets in order to insure that a minimum amount of service is provided in other markets previously served by the struck carriers. 7/ However, such short-term inconvenience is clearly warranted in order to offer some measure of relief to the many passengers who might otherwise be left without any air service.

It appears that the ability of the certificated combination carriers to implement the exemptions herein granted may be limited by lack of standby crewtime and equipment. Therefore, during the interim emergency period we shall also permit the supplemental carriers to utilize available space on charter flights for individually waybilled cargo air service. In addition, we will permit the supplemental air carriers to wet-lease aircraft to certificated combination air carriers during the emergency period. 8/ We shall also permit the supplemental carriers to provide service for the certificated carriers' overflow by carrying individually ticketed passengers holding tickets issued by certificated combination carriers under specific arrangements with such carriers.

Because the emergency nature of this situation does not allow time for the preparation and filing of tariffs, nor any new service being authorized herein, the exemption for the supplementals extends to section 403 of the Act, provided that the rates charged are equal to those currently in effect for the struck carriers or competing carriers for the same classes of services.

In addition to the scheduled passenger, property and mail service, the five struck carriers have undoubtedly contracted to perform many charter flights. The sudden abandonment of such contracts could work substantial hardship on significant numbers of passengers many of whom cannot otherwise afford to use air transportation for their trips. Accordingly, we find it is in the public interest to exempt all certificated combination air carriers and all supplemental air carriers from the provisions of Title IV of the Act and the applicable Board regulations to the extent that they would otherwise prevent the carriers from contracting to perform the existing charter contracts of the struck carriers at the price of the existing contract or the operating carrier's established tariff. Within the terms of this exemption, carriers will be permitted to perform such passenger charters without regard to the limitations of Part 207 of the Board's Regulations.

7/ In addition such tailoring of services will require cooperation and discussions between the operating carriers to achieve the most effective pattern of service possible. In a concurrent order (Order E-23929) we are authorizing the carriers to conduct such discussions.

8/ We have not been authorizing additional authority for cargo carriers in view of the fact that they have not as yet advised us of any capability to provide such additional service during this emergency.

Due to the short-term nature of the exemption herein granted, and limitations imposed by employee and equipment availability, any service performed by subsidy-eligible carriers will entail only out-of-pocket or added costs, and hence we are limiting the exemption authority by the condition that operations pursuant to these exemptions shall be conducted on a non-subsidy basis.

On the basis of the facts and circumstances set forth above, the Board finds that enforcement of Title IV of the Act, the applicable Board regulations thereunder and terms, limitations and conditions of the carriers' certificates insofar as they would prevent provision of the services described herein would be an undue burden upon the classes of air carriers named herein by reason of the limited extent of and the unusual circumstances affecting their operations and is not in the public interest.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. All certificated combination route air carriers be and they hereby are exempted from Title IV of the Federal Aviation Act, the applicable Board regulations, and the terms, conditions, and limitations of their certificates to the extent necessary to permit them to provide unrestricted services between any pair of points on their respective systems as to which United, Eastern, TWA, National and Northwest, either individually or collectively, provided 25 percent or more of the total scheduled flights as of July 1, 1966, provided that the rates or fares to be charged are equal to those currently in effect for the aforementioned struck carriers or competing carrier for the same type of service;

2. All local service carriers be and they hereby are exempted from Title IV of the Federal Aviation Act, the applicable Board Regulations and the terms, conditions, and limitations of their certificates, to the extent necessary to permit them to reduce but not suspend scheduled services without regard to restrictions contained in their certificates, or the linear route descriptions contained therein;

3. All supplemental carriers be and they hereby are exempted from Title IV of the Act, the applicable provisions of the Board's Regulations, and the terms, conditions, and limitations of their certificates to the extent necessary to permit them to:

(a) Provide individually-ticketed passenger services, provided that the passengers involved hold tickets issued by a certificated combination route air carrier for authorized transportation over its route, at the fares currently in effect pursuant to the tariff of such route air carrier or competing carriers for the same type of service and under specific arrangements with such carriers;

(b) Utilize available space on commercial charters and flights for the Military Establishment for individually-waybilled cargo services at the rates presently in effect under any tariff of any certificated route air carrier; and

(c) Wet-lease aircraft to certificated air carriers;

4. All certificated combination route air carriers and supplemental air carriers be and they hereby are exempted from the provisions of Title IV of the Act and the applicable Board regulations to the extent necessary to permit any such carriers to fulfill existing charter contracts of any one of the five struck carriers at the contract price or the operating carrier's established tariff;

5. This order shall be effective immediately and shall continue in effect until further order of the Board;

6. Services performed pursuant to exemptions granted by this order by any air carrier otherwise eligible for subsidy payments under section 406 of the Act are subject to the condition that such services shall not be subsidized and mail payments therefor--if any--shall be limited to the service mail rate to be paid entirely by the Postmaster General under section 406(c) of the Act; 9/

7. Authority is hereby delegated to the Director of the Board's Bureau of Operating Rights to act for the Board on requests by any carrier for temporary suspensions of service during the pendency of the strike emergency; petitions for review of any such actions shall not stay the effective date thereof;

8. All air carriers providing services pursuant to the authority granted by this order shall within 30 days after cessation of operations hereunder file with the Board's Bureau of Accounts and Statistics an original and five copies of a report showing the number of flights and aircraft miles performed, by each aircraft type, pursuant to this order and the volume of traffic enplaned, by stations, passenger miles, revenue ton-miles and revenues related to each class of traffic carried by each aircraft type;

9/ With respect to services performed by local service carriers, the upward ad hoc provision of Order E-23850 (section I, page 7) shall obviously be inoperative as regards services performed by such carriers pursuant to the exemptions granted by this order.

9. Any interested persons objecting to any provisions of this order will be afforded an opportunity to present their objections orally to the Board, five days from the date of this order; and as a result of such objections, if any, the Board will make such modifications or amendments to this order as are deemed appropriate;

10. This order may be amended or revoked at any time in the discretion of the Board without notice or hearing; and

11. This order shall be served on all air carriers, the Post Office Department and Federal Aviation Agency.

This order will be published in the Federal Register.

By the Civil Aeronautics Board:

HAROLD R. SANDERSON

Secretary

(SEAL)

Order No. E-23929

In the matter of

Docket 17497

concerning emergency operations during :
the strike of the International Association :.
of Machinists against certain trunkline air :
carriers :

The operations of five trunkline air carriers 1/ terminated on July 8, 1966 after negotiations between such carriers and the International Association of Machinists collapsed. The effect of the strike is the cancellation of some 60 percent of the existing domestic and international airline commercial flights with a serious impact on the traveling and shipping public and the Postal Service.

The Board is of the view that extraordinary measures are essential to meet the existing emergency through permitting the non-struck direct air carriers to enter into arrangements, within the confines of their existing service areas, which are designed to contend to the fullest extent possible with the crisis. The Board has met with the carriers and they have indicated that they believe it might be desirable for carriers having aircraft surplus to their immediate needs to make them available to other carriers in short supply either on a wet or dry lease basis; for the trunk carriers to divert aircraft and crews normally utilized in short-haul markets to long-haul markets where the short haul might be served by local service carriers having a duplicate or parallel route; for all carriers having crew availability to consider assistance to carriers having less availability; and for all operating carriers to consider the elimination of duplicating services, and the reduction of stops and schedules, which under the circumstances would be considered wasteful. Such arrangements would be helpful in meeting the emergency, and in this posture discussions which might otherwise be unlawful and agreements arising therefrom should be permitted, subject to appropriate conditions.

To facilitate the development of any of the above arrangements, as well as others which to the carriers might seem desirable, the Board has decided to permit the non-struck direct air carriers to engage in bi-lateral or multi-lateral discussions, wherever and whenever feasible, with a view toward establishing arrangements designed to meet the emergency. In addition, with respect to

1/ Eastern Air Lines, Inc., National Airlines, Inc., Northwest Airlines, Inc., Trans World Airlines, Inc., and United Air Lines, Inc.

aircraft leases, because of the unusual circumstances which exist within the meaning of section 416(b) of the Act, the Board has decided to grant all such carriers a general exemption from section 408 of the Act with respect to aircraft transactions which might otherwise be subject to that section. In view of the extreme emergency we have concluded that the discussions and exemption are in the public interest.

Our action herein, of course, is to be effective for the duration of the present strike emergency. As a condition to the authorization, we shall require that copies of any agreement or memorandum of oral agreement reached pursuant to this order be filed with the Board within 5 days after the agreement is entered into. 2/

Accordingly, pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, particularly sections 102, 204(a), 408, 412, 414 and 416 thereof,

IT IS ORDERED:

1. That all non-struck direct air carriers may engage in discussions for the purposes and objectives of meeting the crisis described in this order;
2. That such carriers be and they hereby are exempt from the provisions of section 408 of the Act to the extent necessary to permit them to engage in aircraft transactions essential to meet the strike emergency;
3. That copies of all agreements and/or memoranda of oral agreements reached pursuant to the authorizations granted herein shall be filed with the Board within 5 days after the agreement is entered into;
4. That implementation of any agreement reached as a result of the discussions authorized herein be and it hereby is approved pursuant to section 412 of the Act; provided that such agreement upon Board consideration thereof may be subject to disapproval prospectively, and
5. That the authorizations granted hereby shall be effective as of the date of this order and until further order of the Board.

By the Civil Aeronautics Board:

HAROLD R. SANDERSON

Secretary

(SEAL)

2/ In the light of the exigencies of the situation we will not, as is our usual practice, provide for the presence of a Board representative at any discussions held pursuant to this order, or require the filing of minutes of any discussions.

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20428

FOR RELEASE:

CAB 66-91
382-6031

IMMEDIATE
JULY 9, 1966

In response to the President's request, the Civil Aeronautics Board has taken several actions to assist air carriers not subject to the strike to provide needed transportation services during the emergency.

The Board said the carriers should be given authority to tailor their services to meet the greatest needs of air travelers during the emergency.

The CAB orders will:

(1) Grant exemption authority to the certificated route operators to provide unrestricted service between points on their own route systems where 25 percent of flight frequencies were provided by the struck carriers as of July 1, 1966.

Notwithstanding existing certificate restrictions, all route carriers not in a strike situation will have the authority to provide service between any two points on their systems where a struck carrier had provided 25 percent of the flight frequencies on July 1. This gives authority to trunkline and local service carriers not on strike to provide service in markets where they were previously restricted and where a struck carrier was a significant participant.

(2) Grant exemption authority to the 13 supplemental air carriers to charter their equipment to the certificated route carriers, both trunkline and local service, for the carriage of traffic which these carriers are otherwise unable to handle.

The supplemental carriers will be permitted to enter into wet-lease arrangements in order to make crews and aircraft available for operations over the routes.

(3) Grant authority to supplemental air carriers to utilize available capacity for individually ticketed services provided the passengers involved hold tickets issued by a certificated route air carrier, the authority to be exercised under arrangements between the supplementals and the certificated carriers.

MORE

The supplemental carriers which do not under normal circumstances have authority to sell individually ticketed services will be allowed to carry overflow traffic which has been ticketed by a route carrier.

(4) Authorize the supplemental air carriers to carry individually waybilled cargo on their military and commercial charter flights.

This will enable the supplemental air carriers which have passenger authority only to use available space on their military and commercial charter flights to transport cargo.

(5) Authorize the carriers to hold bilateral and multilateral discussions, looking toward the leasing of equipment and the rationing of route services in order to provide transportation in markets with the greatest need.

The Board is authorizing these discussions on the theory that the carriers may be able to reach agreements as to the tailoring of schedules to meet the emergency needs of the public.

#

Order E-23926
E-23927
E-23928
E-23929

EXECUTIVE

FG 115

FG 105

LA 6/Airline

FG 211

⑨

Mr. President:

Re: Telephone message -- Califano to Christian

1. Califano talked to Vance and to Ball about Whitney Young, and they have cleared the way. He talked to Young, who was delighted at the speed with which his request was satisfied. He will probably go next week.

2. Airline Developments

*United, *TWA, and *Eastern have advised John McCone and Stanley *Osborne, that they are not going to cave to the Union demands. McCone believes that this will mean a strike of a week to ten days. Charlie Murphy agrees with this estimate.

Califano says these 3 airlines are annoyed at Murphy's order given scheduled airlines blanket authority to fly any of the routes of the struck airlines. Their position is that this will reduce the public furor, thereby delaying a settlement.

It is being explained to them that Murphy order is permissive rather than mandatory, and does not allow the non-scheduled carriers to fly the routes of scheduled airlines. Califano thinks this should reduce some of the fears of the three big airlines.

G Christian/vm

9:35 a

7/9/66

I want this on my desk.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'LBJ', is written over the typed text.

LBJ/mf

7-10-66

9:00p

115
0 11-2-67
EXECUTIVE
LAC/Airline
WASHINGTON--ADD AIRLINES (37)

RAMSEY MEANWHILE CRITICIZED A STATEMENT ISSUED YESTERDAY BY TWO MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PANEL WHICH ORIGINALLY INVESTIGATED THE AIRLINES DISPUTE AND MADE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT.

THE TWO, DAVID ^XGINSBURG AND RICHARD E. ^XNEUSTADT, SAID THE STRIKE WAS "UNNECESSARY AND UNJUSTIFIED" AND THAT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UNION AND THE AIRLINES "ARE NOT SO GREAT AS TO IMPEDE A SETTLEMENT WHERE THERE IS A WILL TO SETTLE."

"THERE IS NO REASON," THE TWO ALSO SAID, "WHY THE TRAVELING PUBLIC SHOULD BE FURTHER INCONVENIENCED OR THAT THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN AIR TRANSPORTATION SHOULD BE FURTHER DISREGARDED."

^XRAMSEY SAID THE TWO MEN WERE "GIVING SUPPORT AND COMFORT TO THE CARRIERS AND POSSIBLY INDICATING BIAS" IN FAVOR OF THE AIRLINES. HE SAID THE PAIR "HAVE IN FACT DONE A PROFOUND DISSERVICE TO THE NATION AND TO TAKE PRESIDENT."

XX

PE926PED 7/10

July 9, 1966

**Statement on the Airlines Strike
By David Ginsburg and Richard E. Neustadt, Members
President's Emergency Board No. 166**

The strike against the airlines is unnecessary and unjustified.

The report of the President's Emergency Board, on which we served under the chairmanship of Senator Wayne Morse, was based on information supplied, without limitation, by the Union and the five major carriers. That report was a serious effort to meet a serious problem. We did our utmost to inform ourselves fully, as the President directed and the law required.

The information we gathered led us to the clear conclusion that a basis exists for a prompt settlement of this dispute which will fully protect the public interest yet be fair and satisfactory to the parties involved. Our report set forth the outlines of such a settlement. Whatever the precise form of the final settlement, it is inconceivable to us that the parties cannot reach agreement without delay. The differences between the parties simply do not justify delay. Those differences are not so great as to impede a

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MAR 27 1967
CENTRAL FILES

settlement where there is the will to settle. The national interest requires nothing less.

Free collective bargaining is undermined when there is over-reaching, for whatever reason, or intransigence on either side.

The President has asked that the parties resume their negotiations without delay and both sides have agreed. The disputed issues have been clearly defined. The parties have in hand the Board's independent report and unbiased recommendations.

The Union should call off the strike during these negotiations. There is no reason why the traveling public should be further inconvenienced or that the public interest in air transport should be further disregarded.

B13
gh
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

EXECUTIVE

LAG/Airlines
FG-160

July 12, 1966
Tuesday, 11:15 a.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM Joe Califano *WJ*

Attached is the Wirtz assessment of the airline strike situation which is in general agreement with our own assessment. I am not so sure that it would be as disadvantageous as Bill apparently believes to have some Congressmen start publicly speaking about legislation to block strikes of this kind.

For example, ^x Wayne Morse *Wayne* says that his best judgment is that a settlement at or near the union's demands would make it necessary for you to request wage and price controls either in this Session or in the next Session of Congress if Vietnam continues and the economy stays at its current rate of growth. I will give you a report this evening at the end of the day's bargaining.

Attachment

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

WASHINGTON

July 12, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Airlines Case. Situation as of Tuesday a. m., July 12.

Negotiation sessions continue today, but with only an outside chance of any significant development. This is the probable pattern for the next two or three days.

Both sides are holding to their July 7 positions. They are expecting and in fact waiting for an outside development:

- * The Companies' privately stated position is that "either the President or George Meany will eventually have to persuade Roy Siemiller (IAM President) to make these fellows change their position." They feel this will happen when the public protest and the Congressional demand for legislation increase.
- * The Union bargainors are a little less certain about outside pressures, but are probably not expecting to reach a final settlement (including ratification) until after further White House participation.
- * Repeated Reynolds-Wirtz urging to both parties not to count on White House action -- that this strike is likely to go on a very long time -- are given polite but slight attention.

Present course of action (and expectations):

1. Continue the bargaining sessions on a daily basis -- looking for an opening.

- 2 -

2. Stay away from any pressuring for a settlement significantly above the Emergency Board recommendation.
3. See what two or three more days' time does.
4. Late this week or probably early next week, consider whether some combination of special approach to the union will break things open. (We will be talking with George Meany about this when he returns tomorrow.)

The disadvantages of this course are (i) that it leaves the Government negotiators looking fairly ineffective, and (ii) that it will mean increasing criticism about not being as tough on unions as on Companies. But the alternative course, blocking the union in one form or another, would almost certainly reduce the settlement possibilities, and increase the likelihood of legislation.

Recommendation: Continue present course; review situation Thursday, July 14; lay basis for properly timed special move.

W. Willard Wirtz
W. Willard Wirtz
Secretary of Labor

EXECUTIVE

LA 6/Airlines

July 12.

July 12, 1966

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Attachment

The Union bargainers are a little less certain about outside pressures, but are probably not expecting to reach a final settlement (not a day or two) until after further White House participation.

- * Repeated Reynolds-Wirtz urging to both parties not to count on White House action -- that this strike is likely to go on a very long time -- are given polite but slight attention.

Present course of action (and expectations):

1. Continue the bargaining sessions on a daily basis -- looking for an opening.

Nothing else sent to
Central Files as of

5/17/67

July 12, 1966

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Recommendation: Continue present course; review situation Thursday, July 14; lay basis for properly timed special move.

W. Willard Wirtz
Secretary of Labor

5/17/47

July 14, 1966

9:30 p.m. Thursday

EXECUTIVE (4)

LA 6/Airlines
PR 18

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I talked with Bill McAndrew of NBC News re Senator Morse's appearance re airlines strike. NBC will make a determined attempt to get Morse on the Huntley-Brinkley show tomorrow night or one of the news shows over the weekend. I have told Califano to alert Morse.

wayne

Robert E. Kintner

REK:ny

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JUL 15 1966
CENTRAL FILES

Nothing else sent to
Central Files as of 8/1/66

WV/EP
July 15, 1966
Friday - 7:00 p.m.

EXECUTIVE (2)
LAQ
McLennan

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FYI, while I did not see the program, *Wayne*
xNBC News reports that Senator Morse
on the aviation strike was on the Huntley-
Brinkley Report tonight.

Robert E. Kintner

cc Bill Moyers
Joe Califano

UNINDICATED COPIES: Watson, Jacobsen

Nothing else sent to
Central Files as of *8/10/66*
WV

RECEIVED
JUL 16 1966
CENTRAL FILES

EXECUTIVE

LA 6/Airlines
LA1-1/Airlines/Inre Carriers
Negotiating Comm.

July 15, 1966

FOR Cliff Alexander
FROM Larry Levinson
RE: The Airlines Strike

Attached are some materials which your Congressman friend might find useful.

1. A short statement about the strike.
2. Senator Morse's first statement on the eve of the strike. *Wayne*
3. The President's statement on the first day of the strike.
4. Senator Morse's statement applauding the President's statement.
5. A joint statement by David Ginsburg and Richard Neustadt, members of the President's Emergency Board.
6. Remarks of the President upon receipt of the Emergency Board's recommendations on June 5.

Attachments

Aug
Nothing else sent to
Central Files as of _____

STATEMENT CONCERNING AIRLINE STRIKE

We are now entering the eighth day of the airline strike.

The consequences are becoming more serious by the minute.

Two-thirds of the Nation's domestic air carrier capacity has been affected. Service to over 200 American cities has been disrupted. Hundreds of thousands of travelers have been inconvenienced and delayed. Businesses are feeling the pinch. Even the mail has slowed down.

Yet, the strike goes on. And, as of this moment, prospects for settlement look dim.

This is a most unusual strike. The Machinists Union is not striking because it could not get its case heard. It is not striking to correct violations of the rights of labor. It is not striking in a struggle to secure decent wages and working conditions.

Quite the contrary, airline employees have been better paid, better treated, and made more secure than most workers.

It is now time for the Union to shoulder its responsibilities to the Nation and to our men in Viet Nam. The settlement recommended by President Johnson's Emergency Disputes Board is fair

Exec. Branch Line

A

- 1) Post Office {
- 2) Ashley { economic = local
 { budget.
- 3) Connor { Balance of Payments - \$500,000
- 4) Hyman { 20 problems, but patchwork -
- * 5) Safety ← {
- 6) Maynard & Hunsman {
- 7) Economic Stability - ? {
 5.1 - 7.6% settlement + {

B] Mac, Mevey statement, Skelton's statement

C] Amer Airlines - out to strike -
Hart will not settle for what Macdonald settle for

RECEIVED
MAR 27 1967
CENTRAL FILES

3 Altman - { all against compl. }
{ arbitr. and membership }

Do you support Morse?

1) No -

2) Yes ←

3) Give us 72 hrs. to work it out }

→ Who testifies?

→ Pro Union - Aircraft accident

D Carnegie - all for emergency bd apt. - \$76 million
Now at \$80 million

✓ 5% - 5% - 4% + 1¢
Premium pay for holidays
42 mo. contract

Union - 42 mo. K only if \$20 million
premium in

5% - 5% - 4%

Premium pay - Jan 1, 1967

1¢ extra x briefs - 5¢ per hr.

10¢ premium for mechanic & boiler line
[would accept 5¢ for 1/4 of people]

Cost of living escalator - eff Jan 1, 1967

↳ 1¢ for every increase of .4 in CPI
and every 6 mos.

5.1% per yr w/o cost of living escalator
7% per yr. w/ cost of living escalator

E Review north Sec Hq at 10:00 a.m., Thursday
for airline strikes -

For [unclear]

July 18, 1966

④
EXECUTIVE

ST/mc

PR14

LA6/Airlines

FO

PL 2

TO: Governor Farris Bryant

FROM: Clifford L. Alexander, Jr.

The attached letter to the President, dated July 15, 1966 from Brevard C^xrihfield, Secretary-Treasurer of the National Governors' Conference, encloses copies of all resolutions adopted by the Conference at its meeting in Los Angeles last week.

Attachment

emc - 2

RECEIVED
JUL 18 1966
JUL 18 1966

14
11
11

National Governors' Conference

1313 EAST SIXTIETH STREET

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60637

July 15, 1966

CA
The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

I am pleased to transmit to you on behalf of the National Governors' Conference copies of all resolutions adopted by the Conference at its meeting in Los Angeles last week.

You may recall that the full text of Resolution II, entitled "Airlines Strike" was sent to you from Los Angeles by telegraph on Thursday, July 7, immediately upon passage.

Although I am sure you will be interested in a number of the resolutions, your attention is drawn particularly to Resolution V. on "Foreign Policy" and Resolution XI. on "National Elections."

Respectfully,

Brevard Carihfield

Brevard Carihfield
Secretary-Treasurer

BC:LM

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED
by the
NATIONAL GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE

58th Annual Meeting
Los Angeles, California
July 4-7, 1966

- I. AGRICULTURE**
- II. AIRLINES STRIKE**
- III. CLEAN WATER**
- IV. COORDINATION OF FEDERAL AID PROGRAMS**
- V. FOREIGN POLICY**
- VI. GRADE CROSSING SAFETY**
- VII. INDEPENDENCE DAY**
- VIII. INLAND NAVIGATION PROJECTS**
- IX. INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION ACT**
- X. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY**
- XI. NATIONAL ELECTIONS**
- XII. STANDARDIZATION OF STATISTICS**
- XIII. STATE COMMISSIONS ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY**
- XIV. VETERANS' ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING BENEFITS**
- XV. GUESTS**
- XVI. APPRECIATION**

BPY 66
July, 1966

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20428

JUL 15 1966

EXECUTIVE

LA 6/airline

CA

FY211

MEMORANDUM TO: The President
The White House

FROM: Charles S. Murphy
Chairman

SUBJECT: Air Transportation During the Strike Emergency

Following a series of informal discussions with all the air carriers, including the struck lines, the Board on Saturday, July 9, issued a series of orders designed to permit the non-struck lines to provide needed additional air services.

The Board, of course, was fully aware that the scope of the problem was such that, even with maximum carrier efforts, there was bound to be dislocation and serious inconvenience. Thus, the five struck carriers provided the bulk of the service in more than 260 markets in which at least 25 passengers a day were moving; and in almost 70 cities the struck carriers provided the only trunkline service. In the total domestic air transportation system, the struck carriers accounted for 60 percent of the traffic and capacity.

In any event, even in the first weekend of the strike, the non-struck carriers made a real service contribution. Thirteen of the nineteen non-struck carriers provided 195 extra flights on Saturday and Sunday over their regular routes, and 129 new flights made possible by the terms of the Board order. In addition, the carriers provided a substantial volume of additional emergency service for the Post Office and CAM's for the Defense Department.

By Thursday, the number of extra flights had grown to 987, of which 529 were provided pursuant to the terms of Board emergency orders. During this period, a staff task force, established by the Board, acted as a clearing house to facilitate the provision of needed services by willing carriers. The policy established was to encourage carriers to maximize their efforts within their own service areas. Thus, the struck and the competitive non-struck carriers would not be constrained by competitive considerations to oppose or impede constructive service proposals. Nor would there be a serious risk of sympathetic labor difficulties spreading to the non-struck lines.

To aid the carriers in meeting critical service needs, our staff have compiled lists of the major markets in which service has been strike-curtailed and have given the data to the carriers. We are also using the lists, copies of which are attached, to pinpoint the most critical service needs so that we can work with the carriers in arranging for needed service. Under the circumstances, this is, in our judgment, the most effective way for the Board at this time to obtain added air service.

There has been relatively little inter-carrier or union friction, and considerable cooperation. The non-struck carriers have canceled employee vacations, increased duty hours, added telephone facilities, adjusted service and schedules and made a very substantial effort to meet the emergency situation. But from the beginning, we realize that the single greatest difficulty in increasing air services was the limitations placed by various union contracts on pilot flight time. On Monday, when it became clear that an early settlement was not in sight, the Board sought the cooperation of the various pilot unions to permit their members to fly the 85 hours per month authorized by law. Information received from the carriers indicates some union groups are responding favorably, although the major pilot union is not cooperating. This remains the most significant problem in increasing air services.

Finally, we have been advised by some of the non-struck carriers making a major service contribution that they do not believe that they could maintain their current pace of operations for any extended period of time. We intend to keep a careful watch on this situation.

Charles S. Murphy

Attachment

RECEIVED
JOE CALIFANO, JR.

1966 JUL 15 PM 6 39

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

CARRIER STRIKE REPORT
PREPARED - JULY 15, 1966

GROUP 1 STRIKING CARRIERS FLY 100 PERCENT OF FLIGHTS

CITY - PAIR		PERCENT OF MARKET	AVERAGE DAILY PASSENGERS	AUTHORIZED CARRIERS			REGULAR AUTHORITY	CARRIERS ON STRIKE	EXEMPTIONS - E23928
				DN	NO	OZ		EA NW UA	
Chicago	Minneapolis	100	1751	AA	LC	NO		EA NW TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	CLEVELAND, OHIO	100	1271	AA	LC	NO		EA NW TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	PHILADELPHIA, PA	100	1014	AA	DL			EA NW TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	1004	AA	LC			EA NW TW UA	
MINNEAPLIS, MINN	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	682	BN				EA NW TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	SEATTLE, WASH.	100	629					EA NW TW UA	
DENVER, COLORADO	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	594	BN				EA NW TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	COLUMBUS, OHIO	100	507	AA	DL	LC		EA NW TW UA	
DETROIT, MICH.	LOS ANGELES, CAL	100	492	AA	DL			EA NW TW UA	
BALTIMORE, MD.	CHICAGO, ILL.	100	475	AA	DL	LC		EA NW TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	DAYTON, OHIO	100	466	AA	DL	LC		EA NW TW UA	
DETROIT, MICH.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	461	AA	AL	DL	LC	EA NW TW UA	
INDIANAPLIS, IND	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	458	AA	DL			EA NW TW UA	
SAN FRANCISCO	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	447	AA	DL			EA NW TW UA	
PITTSBURGH, PA.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	444	AA	AL	LC		EA NW TW UA	
DETROIT, MICH.	PHILADELPHIA, PA	100	434	AA	AL	DL		EA NW TW UA	
KANSAS CITY, MO.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	433	BN	DL			EA NW TW UA	
MILWAUKEE, WIS.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	433					EA NW TW UA	
DAYTON, OHIO	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	414	AA	DL			EA NW TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	OMAHA, NEBRASKA	100	413	BN	NO	OZ		EA NW TW UA	
NEW YORK, N.Y.	TAMPA, FLORIDA	100	403	DL				EA NW TW UA	
NEW YORK, N.Y.	SEATTLE, WASH.	100	385					EA NW TW UA	
CHARLOTTE, N.C.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	378	DL				EA NW TW UA	
MIAMI, FLORIDA	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	377	DL	NE			EA NW TW UA	
CLEVELAND, OHIO	PHILADELPHIA, PA	100	371	AA	AL			EA NW TW UA	
BOSTON, MASS.	SAN FRANCISCO	100	351	AA				EA NW TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	DES MOINES, IOWA	100	349	BN	OZ			EA NW TW UA	
NEW YORK, N.Y.	NORFOLK, VA.	100	349					EA NW TW UA	
CLEVELAND, OHIO	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	320	AA	AL	LC		EA NW TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	LAS VEGAS, NEV.	100	309	DL				EA NW TW UA	
MIAMI, FLORIDA	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	303					EA NW TW UA	
DETROIT, MICH.	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	296	AA	AL	LC	MO	EA NW TW UA	
LOS ANGELES, CAL	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	295	AA				EA NW TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	PORTLAND, OREGON	100	294					EA NW TW UA	
JACKSONVILLE	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	285	DL				EA NW TW UA	
PHILADELPHIA, PA	SAN FRANCISCO	100	285	AA	DL			EA NW TW UA	
HARTFORD, CONN.	CHICAGO, ILL.	100	283	AA				EA NW TW UA	
DENVER, COLORADO	SEATTLE, WASH.	100	283	WA				EA NW TW UA	
GREENSBORO, N.C.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	263					EA NW TW UA	
DETROIT, MICH.	MILWAUKEE, WIS.	100	262	NO				EA NW TW UA	
NEW YORK, N.Y.	RALEIGH, N.C.	100	254					EA NW TW UA	
MINNEAPLIS, MINN	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	247	BN				EA NW TW UA	
DETROIT, MICH.	SAN FRANCISCO	100	243	AA	DL			EA NW TW UA	
CLEVELAND, OHIO	MIAMI, FLORIDA	100	237					EA NW TW UA	
MILWAUKEE, WIS.	MINNEAPLIS, MINN	100	237	NO	OZ			EA NW TW UA	
CLEVELAND, OHIO	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	235	AA	AL	LC	MO	EA NW TW UA	
ST. LOUIS, MO.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	235	AA	BN	DL		EA NW TW UA	
NEW YORK, N.Y.	RICHMOND, VA.	100	228					EA NW TW UA	
SAN FRANCISCO	ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	226	AA	DL			EA NW TW UA	
NEW YORK, N.Y.	ORLANDO, FLORIDA	100	225	DL				EA NW TW UA	
FRESNO, CALIF.	LOS ANGELES, CAL	100	224	PC				EA NW TW UA	

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

CARRIER STRIKE REPORT
PREPARED - JULY 12, 1966

PERC GROUP 1 STRIKING CARRIERS FLY 100 PERCENT OF FLIGHTS

CITY - PAIR		PERCENT OF MARKET	AVERAGE DAILY PASSENGERS	AUTHORIZED CARRIERS			REGULAR AUTHORITY	CARRIERS ON STRIKE			EXEMPTIONS - E23928
LOS ANGELES, CAL	MIAMI, FLORIDA	100	222	DL				NA	TW	UA	
DETROIT, MICH.	MINNEAPLIS, MINN.	100	220	NO				EA	NW	UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	ROCHESTER, MINN.	100	219	BN	OZ			NH			
BOSTON, MASS.	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	216	AA	AL	MO		EA	TW	UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	TOLEDO, OHIO	100	215	DL	LC			EA	UA		
CHICAGO, ILL.	SALT LAKE CITY	100	210					UA			
HARTFORD, CONN.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	209	AA	AL	NE		EA	TW	UA	
COLUMBUS, OHIO	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	207	AA	DL	LC	PI	EA	TH	UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	NASHVILLE, TENN.	100	207	SO				EA	TH		
DETROIT, MICH.	ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	204	AA	DL			EA	TH		
ALBUQUERQUE, N.M.	LOS ANGELES, CAL	100	201	CO				EA	TH		
CHICAGO, ILL.	SAGINAW, MICH.	100	199	NO				UA			
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	198					EA	NH	TH	UA
DAYTON, OHIO	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	184	AA	DL	LC		TH	UA		
BUFFALO, N.Y.	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	181	AA	AL	LC	MO	UA			
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	CLEVELAND, OHIO	100	181					EA	NW	TH	UA
MIAMI, FLORIDA	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	100	178	DL				EA	NA	UA	
DENVER, COLORADO	OMAHA, NEBRASKA	100	176	BN	FL			UA			
RALEIGH, N.C.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	175	PI				EA	UA		
SPOKANE, WASH.	PORTLAND, OREGON	100	173	WC				NH	UA		
BUFFALO, N.Y.	PHILADELPHIA, PA.	100	171	AA	AL			UA			
LAS VEGAS, NEV.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	170	DL				UA	TH	UA	
LOUISVILLE, KY.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	170	AA	DL	PI		EA	TH		
BUFFALO, N.Y.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	169	AA	AL	LC		UA			
CHICAGO, ILL.	CEDAR RAPIDS, IA	100	168	OZ				UA			
CHICAGO, ILL.	RALEIGH, N.C.	100	166					EA	UA		
DENVER, COLORADO	PORTLAND, OREGON	100	166	HA				EA			
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	165	DL				EA	TH		
NASHVILLE, TENN.	CHICAGO, ILL.	100	163	AA	BN	OZ		EA	TH		
LOS ANGELES, CAL	OMAHA, NEBRASKA	100	160					UA			
NEW YORK, N.Y.	TOLEDO, OHIO	100	158	DL				EA	UA		
CHICAGO, ILL.	CHARLOTTE, N.C.	100	157	DL				EA	UA		
CHICAGO, ILL.	FORT WAYNE, IND.	100	155	DL				UA			
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	GREENSBORO, N.C.	100	149	PI				EA	UA		
CHICAGO, ILL.	JACKSONVILLE	100	149	DL				EA	UA		
NEW YORK, N.Y.	W. PALM BEACH	100	147	DL				EA	NA	UA	
FARGO, N.D.	MINNEAPLIS, MINN.	100	146	NO				NH			
NEW YORK, N.Y.	OMAHA, NEBRASKA	100	145	BN				UA			
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	RALEIGH, N.C.	100	144	PI				EA	UA		
INDIANAPOLIS, IND	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	142	AA	DL	LC		EA	TH		
BALTIMORE, MD.	DENVER, COLORADO	100	142					TH	UA		
CHICAGO, ILL.	WICHITA, KANSAS	100	141	BN	CO			TH			
ALBUQUERQUE, N.M.	CHICAGO, ILL.	100	141	CO				TH			
HOUSTON, TEXAS	SAN FRANCISCO	100	139	AA	DL			NA	UA		
DAYTON, OHIO	LOS ANGELES, CAL	100	138	AA	DL			TH			
INDIANAPOLIS, IND	ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	137	AA	DL	OZ		EA	TH		
BALTIMORE, MD.	KANSAS CITY, MO.	100	134	DL				EA	TH		
CLEVELAND, OHIO	INDIANAPOLIS, IND	100	133	AA	LC			EA	TH		
BALTIMORE, MD.	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	131	AA	AL	LC		EA	TH	UA	
BALTIMORE, MD.	ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	131	AA	DL			EA	TH		

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CITY - PAIR	PERCENT OF MARKET	AVERAGE DAILY PASSENGERS	AUTHORIZED CARRIERS	REGULAR AUTHORITY	CARRIERS ON STRIKE	EXEMPTIONS - E23928
COLUMBUS, OHIO - PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	131	AA LC		EA TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL. - LANSING, MICH.	100	131	NO		UA	
HARTFORD, CONN. - CLEVELAND, OHIO	100	129	AA AL MO		EA TW UA	
PHILADELPHIA, PA. - ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	126	AA DL		EA TW	
PITTSBURGH, PA. - ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	124	AA		EA TW	
CHICAGO, ILL. - MUSKEGON, MICH.	100	124	NO		UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA - MOBILE, ALABAMA	100	124	SO		EA UA	
AKRON, OHIO - CHICAGO, ILL.	100	123	LC		EA UA	
NEW YORK, N.Y. - YOUNGSTOWN, OHIO	100	123			UA	
CLEVELAND, OHIO - MILWAUKEE, WIS.	100	123	NO		EA NW UA	UA
CLEVELAND, OHIO - TAMPA, FLORIDA	100	122			EA TW	UA
DENVER, COLORADO - LAS VEGAS, NEV.	100	119	WA		TW UA	UA
BALTIMORE, MD. - MIAMI, FLORIDA	100	116	DL		EA NA TW UA	
HUNTSVILLE, ALA. - WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	116			EA UA	
LOUISVILLE, KY. - ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	113	AA DL OZ		EA TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL. - SPOKANE, WASH.	100	113			EA NW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL. - GREENSBORO, N.C.	100	110			EA UA	
CHARLESTON, W.VA. - NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	110	AA		EA UA	
GREENVILLE, S.C. - NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	108			EA UA	
PITTSBURGH, PA. - TAMPA, FLORIDA	100	108			EA NW TH UA	
MILWAUKEE, WIS. - WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	105			EA NW UA	
AKRON, OHIO - NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	104			EA UA	
ROCHESTER, N.Y. - WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	103	AA		EA UA	
PHILADELPHIA, PA. - ROCHESTER, N.Y.	100	103	AA		UA	
DAYTON, OHIO - PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	101	AA LC		TW UA	
CHARLESTON, W.VA. - PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	99	AA LC		EA UA	
BALTIMORE, MD. - DETROIT, MICH.	100	99	AA AL DL LC		EA TH UA	
JACKSONVILLE - TAMPA, FLORIDA	100	99	DL MK		EA NA UA	
BOISE, IDAHO - SALT LAKE CITY	100	98	WC		EA	
TAMPA, FLORIDA - WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	98	DL		EA NA NW TW UA	
HOUSTON, TEXAS - WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	98	AA BN DL		EA NA	
CHARLESTON, S.C. - WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	98	DL		EA NA	
MOBILE, ALABAMA - NEW ORLEANS, LA.	100	97	SO		EA NA UA	
NEW YORK, N.Y. - KNOXVILLE, TENN.	100	97	AA DL		EA UA	
BALTIMORE, MD. - CLEVELAND, OHIO	100	95	AA AL LC		EA TH UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA - NORFOLK, VA.	100	95	PI		UA	
PHILADELPHIA, PA. - SYRACUSE, N.Y.	100	94	AA		EA	
ALBUQUERQUE, N.M. - LAS VEGAS, NEV.	100	92			EA	
NEW ORLEANS, LA. - TAMPA, FLORIDA	100	92	DL		EA NA UA	
JACKSONVILLE - WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	92	DL		EA NA UA	
BIRMINGHAM, ALA. - CHICAGO, ILL.	100	88	DL		EA	
LOS ANGELES, CAL. - TAMPA, FLORIDA	100	86	DL		EA TH UA	
BALTIMORE, MD. - NORFOLK, VA.	100	85	PI		UA	
DES MOINES, IOWA - OMAHA, NEBRASKA	100	84	BN OZ		UA	
ALBUQUERQUE, N.M. - PHOENIX, ARIZONA	100	83	CO FL		UA	
NEW YORK, N.Y. - NEWPORT NEWS, VA	100	82			UA	
ALLENTOWN, PA. - PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	82			EA TH UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA - CHARLESTON, W.VA.	100	81	PI		EA UA	
BOSTON, MASS. - TAMPA, FLORIDA	100	81			EA NA TW UA	
MIAMI, FLORIDA - ORLANDO, FLORIDA	100	81	DL		EA NA	

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FORT WAYNE, IND.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	77	DL			UA	
PITTSBURGH, PA.	LOUISVILLE, KY.	100	76	AA			EA TW	
ORLANDO, FLORIDA	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	75	DL			EA NA	
BOISE, IDAHO	PORTLAND, OREGON	100	73	WC			UA	
INDIANAPOLIS, IND.	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	71	AA	LC		EA TW	
EVANSVILLE, IND.	ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	71	DL			EA	
MADISON, WIS.	MINNEAPOLIS, MINN	100	71	NO	OZ		NW	UA
MILWAUKEE, WIS.	PHILADELPHIA, PA	100	70				EA	UA
HARTFORD, CONN.	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	69	AA	AL MO		EA TW	UA
NORFOLK, VA.	PHILADELPHIA, PA	100	68				EA NA	UA
CHICAGO, ILL.	HUNTSVILLE, ALA.	100	67				EA	UA
INDIANAPOLIS, IND	PHILADELPHIA, PA	100	67	AA	DL		EA TW	
ST. LOUIS, MO.	TAMPA, FLORIDA	100	66	DL			EA TW	
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN	PORTLAND, OREGON	100	66	WA			EA NA	
NEW ORLEANS, LA.	PENSACOLA, FLA.	100	63				NW	UA
CLEVELAND, OHIO	FORT WAYNE, IND.	100	63				EA	
BIRMINGHAM, ALA.	MOBILE, ALABAMA	100	63	SO			EA	UA
KANSAS CITY, MO.	PHOENIX, ARIZONA	100	62	CO	FL		TW	
NEW ORLEANS, LA.	SAN ANTONIO, TEX	100	62	BN	TT		EA	
NASHVILLE, TENN.	ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	61	AA	BN OZ		EA TW	UA
JACKSONVILLE	PHILADELPHIA, PA	100	58	DL			EA NA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	INDIANAPOLIS, IND	100	57	DL			EA TW	
CHARLOTTE, N.C.	MIAMI, FLORIDA	100	57	DL			EA	
PORTLAND, OREGON	SALT LAKE CITY	100	57	WA	WC		EA	
CLEVELAND, OHIO	GRAND RAPIDS	100	57	LC	NO		UA	
DETROIT, MICH.	GRAND RAPIDS	100	55	LC	NO		UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	W. PALM BEACH	100	54	DL			EA	UA
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	TALLAHASSEE, FLA	100	53				EA	
HUNTSVILLE, ALA.	ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	53				EA	
CLEVELAND, OHIO	DENVER, COLORADO	100	53				TW	UA
COLUMBUS, OHIO	INDIANAPOLIS, IND	100	52	AA	DL LC		EA	TW
HUNTSVILLE, ALA.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	51				EA	UA

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GROUP 2 STRIKING CARRIERS FLY BETWEEN 51 AND 99 PERCENT OF FLIGHTS

CITY - PAIR		PERCENT OF MARKET	AVERAGE DAILY PASSENGERS	AUTHORIZED CARRIERS				REGULAR AUTHORITY	CARRIERS ON STRIKE				EXEMPTIONS - E23928	
BOSTON, MASS.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	68	5476	AA*	AL	MO	NE*		EA	NA	TW	UA		
LOS ANGELES, CAL	SAN FRANCISCO	65	5083	AA*	DL	PC	WA*		NA	TW	UA			
CHICAGO, ILL.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	64	4578	AA*	BN	DL			EA	NW	TW	UA		
NEW YORK, N.Y.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	78	4463	AA*	AL	DL	NE		EA	NA	NW	TW	UA	
MIAMI, FLORIDA	NEW YORK, N.Y.	90	3208	DL	NE*				EA	NA	NW	TW	UA	
LOS ANGELES, CAL	NEW YORK, N.Y.	60	2416	AA*	DL				EA	NA	TW	UA		
DETROIT, MICH.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	54	2125	AA*	AL	DL	MO		EA	NW	TW	UA		
CHICAGO, ILL.	LOS ANGELES, CAL	51	2106	AA*	CO*	DL			TW	UA				
NEW YORK, N.Y.	SAN FRANCISCO	67	1784	AA*	DL				NA	TW	UA			
CLEVELAND, OHIO	NEW YORK, N.Y.	77	1635	AA*	AL	MO			EA	NW	TW	UA		
NEW YORK, N.Y.	PITTSBURGH, PA.	91	1603	AA*	AL	MO			EA	NW	TW	UA		
CHICAGO, ILL.	SAN FRANCISCO	65	1476	AA*	DL				EA	NW	TW	UA		
SEATTLE, WASH.	SAN FRANCISCO	71	1253	WA*	WC				TW	UA				
BOSTON, MASS.	CHICAGO, ILL.	55	1031	AA*					EA	TW	UA			
LOS ANGELES, CAL	SEATTLE, WASH.	60	1025	WA*					EA					
CHICAGO, ILL.	DENVER, COLORADO	68	971	BN	CO*				EA	UA				
CHICAGO, ILL.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	56	953	AA*	BN	DL	LC		EA	NW	TW	UA		
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	NEW YORK, N.Y.	64	921	DL*					EA	NW	TW	UA		
NEW YORK, N.Y.	ST. LOUIS, MO.	76	840	AA*	BN	DL			EA	TW				
CHICAGO, ILL.	MIAMI, FLORIDA	65	796	DL*					EA	NW	TW	UA		
PORTLAND, OREGON	SAN FRANCISCO	68	757	PC	WA*	WC			EA					
LOS ANGELES, CAL	SACRAMENTO, CAL.	56	695	PC	WA*				EA					
PHILADELPHIA, PA	WASHINGTON, D.C.	62	648	AA*	AL*	DL	NE*		EA	NA	NW	TW	UA	
KANSAS CITY, MO.	ST. LOUIS, MO.	82	641	BN*	CN	DL	OZ		EA					
LOS ANGELES, CAL	WASHINGTON, D.C.	60	609	AA*	DL				EA	NA	TW	UA		
NORFOLK, VA.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	76	601	PI*					EA	NA	TW	UA		
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	CHICAGO, ILL.	54	586	DL*					EA	NA	TW	UA		
RENO, NEVADA	SAN FRANCISCO	89	580	PC	WA*				EA	NA	TW	UA		
DENVER, COLORADO	SAN FRANCISCO	78	572	WA*					EA	NA	TW	UA		
HOUSTON, TEXAS	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	73	564	BN	DL*	TT			EA	NA				
BALTIMORE, MD.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	83	552	AA*	AL	DL*			EA	NA				
PORTLAND, OREGON	SEATTLE, WASH.	70	535	WA*	WC*				EA	NA	TW	UA		
HOUSTON, TEXAS	NEW YORK, N.Y.	60	522	AA	BN	DL*			EA	NA				
COLUMBUS, OHIO	NEW YORK, N.Y.	60	487	AA*	DL				EA	NA	TW	UA		
MIAMI, FLORIDA	PHILADELPHIA, PA	83	474	DL	NE*				EA	NA	NW	TW	UA	
LOS ANGELES, CAL	KANSAS CITY, MO.	60	470	CO*	DL				EA	NA	UA			
LAS VEGAS, NEV.	SAN FRANCISCO	60	469	DL*	PC	WA*			EA	NA	TW	UA		
NEW YORK, N.Y.	PHILADELPHIA, PA	58	467	AA*	AL*	DL*	NE		EA	NA	NW	TW	UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	LOUISVILLE, KY.	83	464	AA	DL*	OZ			EA	NA	TW			
LOS ANGELES, CAL	PORTLAND, OREGON	75	461	PC	WA*				EA	NA				
HOUSTON, TEXAS	LOS ANGELES, CAL	56	446	AA	CO*	DL			EA	NA				
MIAMI, FLORIDA	TAMPA, FLORIDA	87	445	DL*	MK				EA	NA	NW	TW	UA	
NEW ORLEANS, LA.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	53	439	BN	DL*				EA	NA	UA			
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	MIAMI, FLORIDA	61	436	DL*					EA	NA	TW	UA		
LOS ANGELES, CAL	ST. LOUIS, MO.	83	426	AA*	DL				EA	NA				
SAN FRANCISCO	SALT LAKE CITY	70	410	WA*	WC				EA	NA				
DENVER, COLORADO	SALT LAKE CITY	81	367	FL	WA*				EA	NA				
SPOKANE, WASH.	SEATTLE, WASH.	73	363	WC*					EA	NA				
BOSTON, MASS.	MIAMI, FLORIDA	75	318	NE*					EA	NA	TW	UA		
NEW YORK, N.Y.	LOUISVILLE, KY.	67	303	AA*	DL				EA	NA	TW			

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CITY - PAIR		PERCENT OF MARKET	AVERAGE DAILY PASSENGERS	AUTHORIZED CARRIERS	REGULAR AUTHORITY	CARRIERS ON STRIKE	EXEMPTIONS - E23928
CHICAGO, ILL.	TAMPA, FLORIDA	71	297	DL*		EA	NW TW UA
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	JACKSONVILLE	57	295	DL* SO		EA	UA TW UA
CLEVELAND, OHIO	DETROIT, MICH.	74	290	AA AL	LC* MO NO*	EA	NW TW UA
CHICAGO, ILL.	GRAND RAPIDS	81	279	LC NO*		UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	MOLINE, ILLINOIS	88	273	OZ*		UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	TAMPA, FLORIDA	67	265	DL*		EA	NW TW UA
CHICAGO, ILL.	SOUTH BEND, IND.	55	252	LC NO*		UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	CHARLOTTE, N.C.	74	248	DL* PI	SO	EA	UA TW UA
BALTIMORE, MD.	LOS ANGELES, CAL	67	240	AA* DL		EA	NA TW UA
JACKSONVILLE	MIAMI, FLORIDA	75	233	DL* MK		EA	NA TW UA
NEWPORT NEWS, VA	WASHINGTON, D.C.	94	231	PI*		EA	NA TW UA
BALTIMORE, MD.	BOSTON, MASS.	83	230	AA* AL		EA	NA TW UA
FRESNO, CALIF.	SAN FRANCISCO	67	216	PC*		UA	
RICHMOND, VA.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	79	210	PI*		EA	NA TW UA
LOS ANGELES, CAL	TUCSON, ARIZONA	67	182	AA* CO		EA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	HOUSTON, TEXAS	64	171	DL*		EA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	ORLANDO, FLORIDA	57	161	DL*		EA	
GREENSBORO, N.C.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	93	158	PI*		EA	UA TW UA
BALTIMORE, MD.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	56	146	AA AL* DL* LC* PI*		EA	NA TW UA
MIAMI, FLORIDA	W. PALM BEACH	63	141	DL* MK*		EA	NA TW UA
CINCINNATI, OHIO	ST. LOUIS, MO.	67	136	AA* DL		EA	NA TW UA
CINCINNATI, OHIO	PITTSBURGH, PA.	75	129	AA* LC		EA	NA TW UA
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	GREENVILLE, S.C.	85	127	SO*		EA	NA TW UA
CHARLESTON, W. VA	WASHINGTON, D.C.	60	115	AA* LC	PI	EA	NA TW UA
CHARLOTTE, N.C.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	60	111	DL* PI		EA	NA TW UA
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	BALTIMORE, MD.	57	109	DL* PI		EA	NA TW UA
BAKERSFIELD, CAL	LOS ANGELES, CAL	63	104	PC*		UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	MONTGOMERY, ALA.	55	98	DL* SO		EA	
KNOXVILLE, TENN.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	56	97	AA* DL	PI	UA	
OKLAHOMA, OKLA.	ST. LOUIS, MO.	67	92	AA* BN	CN	UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	LOUISVILLE, KY.	55	86	DL* PI		EA	TW
RENO, NEVADA	SACRAMENTO, CAL.	89	83	PC WA*		UA	
BIRMINGHAM, ALA.	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	67	64	DL* SO		EA	UA
CLEVELAND, OHIO	TOLEDO, OHIO	85	58	LC*		EA	UA
BIRMINGHAM, ALA.	MEMPHIS, TENN.	67	57	DL* SO		EA	UA
STOCKTON, CALIF.	SAN FRANCISCO	70	50	PC*		UA	

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GROUP 3 STRIKING CARRIERS FLY BETWEEN 25 AND 50 PERCENT OF FLIGHTS

CITY - PAIR		PERCENT OF MARKET	AVERAGE DAILY PASSENGERS	AUTHORIZED CARRIERS				REGULAR AUTHORITY	CARRIERS ON STRIKE				EXEMPTIONS - E23928
LAS VEGAS, NEV.	LOS ANGELES, CAL	25	2023	BL*	DL	PC	WA*		NA	TW	UA		
CHICAGO, ILL.	DETROIT, MICH.	31	1535	AA*	DL	LC	NO		EA	NW	TW	UA	
BOSTON, MASS.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	29	1162	AA*	AL	NE*			EA	NA	TW	UA	
LOS ANGELES, CAL	SAN DIEGO, CALIF	44	1085	AA*	BL	DL*	PC* WA*		NA	UA			
CHICAGO, ILL.	KANSAS CITY, MO.	48	1011	BN*	CO*	DL	OZ		TW	UA			
CHICAGO, ILL.	MILWAUKEE, WIS.	34	827	NO*	OZ				EA	NW	UA		
LOS ANGELES, CAL	PHOENIX, ARIZONA	25	797	AA*	BL	CO*	WA*		TW				
NEW YORK, N.Y.	ROCHESTER, N.Y.	29	791	AA*	MO				UA				
DENVER, COLORADO	LOS ANGELES, CAL	44	769	CO*	WA				TW	UA			
HARTFORD, CONN.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	46	765	AA*	AL*	MO	NE*		EA	TW	UA		
NEW YORK, N.Y.	PROVIDENCE, R.I.	26	720	AA*	AL*	MO			EA	NA	UA		
CHICAGO, ILL.	INDIANAPOLIS, IND	42	686	AA*	DL*	LC	OZ		EA	TW			
BOSTON, MASS.	PHILADELPHIA, PA	50	682	AA	AL	NE*			EA	NA	TW	UA	
PHILADELPHIA, PA	PITTSBURGH, PA.	34	605	AA	AL*				EA	NW	TW	UA	
BOSTON, MASS.	LOS ANGELES, CAL	50	503	AA*					NA	TW	UA		
LOS ANGELES, CAL	PHILADELPHIA, PA	50	444	AA*	DL				NA	TW	UA		
BUFFALO, N.Y.	CHICAGO, ILL.	50	417	AA*	LC				UA				
DALLAS, TEXAS	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	27	408	BN	DL*	TT			EA				
CHICAGO, ILL.	PHOENIX, ARIZONA	50	374	AA*	CO				TW				
CHICAGO, ILL.	MADISON, WIS.	43	371	NO*	OZ				NW				
HOUSTON, TEXAS	SAN ANTONIO, TEX	33	357	AA*	BN	CO*	TT*		EA				
CLEVELAND, OHIO	LOS ANGELES, CAL	38	355	AA*					TW	UA			
SACRAMENTO, CAL.	SAN FRANCISCO	47	334	PC*	WA	WC*			UA				
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	WASHINGTON, D.C.	47	302	DL*	PI				EA	NW	TW	UA	
BOSTON, MASS.	CLEVELAND, OHIO	44	286	AA*	AL	MO			EA	TW	UA		
BOSTON, MASS.	DETROIT, MICH.	25	272	AA*	AL	MO			EA	TW	UA		
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	45	263	DL*	SO				EA	UA			
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	BIRMINGHAM, ALA.	47	259	DL*	SO*				EA	UA			
PHOENIX, ARIZONA	SAN FRANCISCO	33	257	AA*	WA				TW				
DETROIT, MICH.	MIAMI, FLORIDA	50	249	DL*					EA	NW	TW	UA	
HARRISBURG, PA.	PITTSBURGH, PA.	35	217	AL*					TW	UA			
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	PHILADELPHIA, PA	50	213	DL*					EA	NW	TW	UA	
SALINAS, CALIF.	SAN FRANCISCO	48	211	PC*					UA				
LOS ANGELES, CAL	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	40	209	DL*					NA	UA			
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	COLUMBUS, GA.	33	204	DL*	SO*				EA				
CORPUS CHRISTI	HOUSTON, TEXAS	37	198	BN*	TT*				EA				
LOS ANGELES, CAL	OKLAHOMA, OKLA.	50	195	AA*	CO				TW				
CLEVELAND, OHIO	CINCINNATI, OHIO	29	188	AA*	LC				EA	TW			
NEW YORK, N.Y.	PHOENIX, ARIZONA	50	176	AA*					TW				
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	ASHEVILLE, N.C.	44	175	DL	PI*				UA				
WICHITA, KANSAS	KANSAS CITY, MO.	40	170	BN*	CN	CO			TW				
LOS ANGELES, CAL	SANTA BARBARA, CAL	44	152	PC*					UA				
BIRMINGHAM, ALA.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	50	146	DL*					EA	UA			
CINCINNATI, OHIO	WASHINGTON, D.C.	33	144	AA*	DL	LC	PI		EA	TW			
HARRISBURG, PA.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	33	137	AL*					TW	UA			
ST. LOUIS, MO.	TULSA, OKLAHOMA	40	119	AA*	BN	CN	OZ		TW				
ALBANY, NEW YORK	BOSTON, MASS.	25	109	AA*	MO				TW				
DENVER, COLORADO	GRAND JUNCTION	33	107	FL*					UA				
BALTIMORE, MD.	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	25	99	DL*					EA	NA	UA		
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	CHATTANOOGA, TENN	36	97	DL*	SO				EA	UA			

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

CARRIER STRIKE REPORT
PREPARED - JULY 12, 1966

GROUP 3 STRIKING CARRIERS FLY BETWEEN 25 AND 50 PERCENT OF FLIGHTS

CITY - PAIR	PERCENT OF MARKET	AVERAGE DAILY PASSENGERS	AUTHORIZED CARRIERS	REGULAR AUTHORITY	CARRIERS ON STRIKE	EXEMPTIONS - E23928
CINCINNATI, OHIO LOUISVILLE, KY.	27	92	AA* DL* PI		EA TW	
ALBANY, GEORGIA ATLANTA, GEORGIA	33	91	SO*		EA	
HUNTSVILLE, ALA. MEMPHIS, TENN.	44	89	SO*		EA UA	
CHARLOTTE, N.C. PHILADELPHIA, PA	33	84	DL*		EA UA	
CINCINNATI, OHIO TAMPA, FLORIDA	50	80	DL*		EA TW	
BEAUMONT, TEXAS HOUSTON, TEXAS	47	60	DL* TT*		EA	
MEDFORD, OREGON SAN FRANCISCO	50	79	PC* WC		UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA MACON, GEORGIA	31	78	DL*		EA	
NASHVILLE, TENN. LOUISVILLE, KY.	36	74	AA* OZ		EA TW	
MINNEAPLIS, MINN. ROCHESTER, MINN.	47	73	BN* OZ*		NW	
HARTFORD, CONN. BOSTON, MASS.	29	70	AA* AL* MO* NE		EA TW UA	
BATON ROUGE, LA. NEW ORLEANS, LA.	32	69	DL* SO*		EA	
HARRISBURG, PA. WASHINGTON, D.C.	29	58	AL*		TW UA	
BALTIMORE, MD. PHILADELPHIA, PA	26	57	AA* AL* DL*		EA NA TW UA	

- NOTES:
- (1) Schedule data is as of May, 1965.
 - (2) "Authorized carriers" are those carriers with certificate authority to provide service in the listed market, as well as those carriers who could provide service as a result of the Board's grant of emergency authority under E-23928.
 - (3) Asterisked carriers are the non-struck carriers providing service as of May 1965.
 - (4) The number of passengers are as shown in the "Competition Study" for the 3rd quarter of 1965 recomputed to an average number per day.
 - (5) The city pairs include all markets, in terms of passenger density, from the largest and ranging down to 50 passengers per day, in each category shown.

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

CARRIER STRIKE REPORT
PREPARED - JULY 13, 1966

GROUP 1 STRIKING CARRIERS FLY 100 PERCENT OF FLIGHTS

CITY - PAIR		PERCENT OF MARKET	AVERAGE DAILY PASSENGERS	AUTHORIZED CARRIERS			REGULAR AUTHORITY	CARRIERS ON STRIKE	EXEMPTIONS - E23928			
				BN	NO	OZ		EA	NW	UT		
CHICAGO	Memphis	100	1751									
CHICAGO, ILL.	CLEVELAND, OHIO	100	1271	AA	LC	NO		EA	NW	TW	UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	PHILADELPHIA, PA	100	1014	AA	DL			EA	NW	TW	UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	1004	AA	LC			EA	NW	TW	UA	
MINNEAPLIS, MINN	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	682	BN				EA	NW	UA		
CHICAGO, ILL.	SEATTLE, WASH.	100	629					NW	UA			
DENVER, COLORADO	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	594	BN				TW	UA			
CHICAGO, ILL.	COLUMBUS, OHIO	100	507	AA	DL	LC		EA	TW	UA		
DETROIT, MICH.	LOS ANGELES, CAL	100	492	AA	DL			TW	UA			
BALTIMORE, MD.	CHICAGO, ILL.	100	475	AA	DL	LC		EA	TW	UA		
CHICAGO, ILL.	DAYTON, OHIO	100	466	AA	DL	LC		TW	UA			
DETROIT, MICH.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	461	AA	AL	DL	LC	EA	NW	TW	UA	
INDIANAPLIS, IND	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	458	AA	DL			EA	TW			
SAN FRANCISCO	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	447	AA	DL			NA	TW	UA		
PITTSBURGH, PA.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	444	AA	AL	LC		EA	NW	TW	UA	
DETROIT, MICH.	PHILADELPHIA, PA	100	434	AA	AL	DL		EA	NW	TW	UA	
KANSAS CITY, MO.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	433	BN	DL			TW	UA			
MILWAUKEE, WIS.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	433					EA	NW	UA		
DAYTON, OHIO	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	414	AA	DL			TW	UA			
CHICAGO, ILL.	OMAHA, NEBRASKA	100	413	BN	NO	OZ		UA				
NEW YORK, N.Y.	TAMPA, FLORIDA	100	403	DL				EA	NA	NW	TW	UA
NEW YORK, N.Y.	SEATTLE, WASH.	100	385					NW	UA			
CHARLOTTE, N.C.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	378	DL				EA	UA			
MIAMI, FLORIDA	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	377	DL	NE			EA	NA	NW	TW	UA
CLEVELAND, OHIO	PHILADELPHIA, PA	100	371	AA	AL			EA	NW	TW	UA	
BOSTON, MASS.	SAN FRANCISCO	100	351	AA				EA	NW	UA		
CHICAGO, ILL.	DES MOINES, IOWA	100	349	BN	OZ			NA	TW			
NEW YORK, N.Y.	NORFOLK, VA.	100	349					UA				
CLEVELAND, OHIO	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	320	AA	AL	LC		NA	UA			
CHICAGO, ILL.	LAS VEGAS, NEV.	100	309	DL				EA	NW	TW	UA	
MIAMI, FLORIDA	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	303					TW	UA			
DETROIT, MICH.	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	296	AA	AL	LC	MO	EA	NW	TW	UA	
LOS ANGELES, CAL	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	295	AA				EA	NW	UA		
CHICAGO, ILL.	PORTLAND, OREGON	100	294					TW	UA			
JACKSONVILLE	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	285	DL				NW	UA			
PHILADELPHIA, PA	SAN FRANCISCO	100	285	AA	DL			EA	NA	UA		
HARTFORD, CONN.	CHICAGO, ILL.	100	283	AA				EA	TW	UA		
DENVER, COLORADO	SEATTLE, WASH.	100	283	WA				EA				
GREENSBORO, N.C.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	263					UA				
DETROIT, MICH.	MILWAUKEE, WIS.	100	262	NO				EA	UA			
NEW YORK, N.Y.	RALEIGH, N.C.	100	254					EA	NW	UA		
MINNEAPLIS, MINN	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	247	BN				EA	UA			
DETROIT, MICH.	SAN FRANCISCO	100	243	AA	DL			EA	NW	UA		
CLEVELAND, OHIO	MIAMI, FLORIDA	100	237					EA	NW	TW	UA	
MILWAUKEE, WIS.	MINNEAPLIS, MINN	100	237	NO	OZ			EA	NW	UA		
CLEVELAND, OHIO	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	235	AA	AL	LC	MO	EA	NW	TW	UA	
ST. LOUIS, MO.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	235	AA	BN	DL		EA	NW	TW		
NEW YORK, N.Y.	RICHMOND, VA.	100	228					EA	NA	UA		
SAN FRANCISCO	ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	226	AA	DL			EA				
NEW YORK, N.Y.	ORLANDO, FLORIDA	100	225	DL				TW				
FRESNO, CALIF.	LOS ANGELES, CAL	100	224	PC				EA	NA			

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CARRIER STRIKE REPORT
PREPARED - JULY 12, 1966

PERC GROUP 1 STRIKING CARRIERS FLY 100 PERCENT OF FLIGHTS

CITY - PAIR	PERCENT OF MARKET	AVERAGE DAILY PASSENGERS	AUTHORIZED CARRIERS	REGULAR AUTHORITY	CARRIERS ON STRIKE	EXEMPTIONS - E23928
LOS ANGELES, CAL	100	222	DL		NA TW UA	
DETROIT, MICH.	100	220	NO		EA NW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	100	219	BN OZ		EA TW UA	
BOSTON, MASS.	100	216	AA AL MO		EA TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	100	215	DL LC		EA TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	100	210	DL		EA TW UA	
HARTFORD, CONN.	100	209	AA AL NE PI		EA TW UA	
COLUMBUS, OHIO	100	207	AA DL LC		EA TW UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	100	207	SO		EA TW UA	
DETROIT, MICH.	100	204	AA DL		EA TW UA	
ALBUQUERQUE, N.M.	100	201	CO		EA TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	100	199	NO		EA TW UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	100	198	AA DL LC MO		EA TW UA	
DAYTON, OHIO	100	184	AA AL LC		EA TW UA	
BUFFALO, N.Y.	100	181	AA		EA TW UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	100	181	DL		EA TW UA	
MIAMI, FLORIDA	100	178	BN FL		EA TW UA	
DENVER, COLORADO	100	176	PI		EA TW UA	
RALEIGH, N.C.	100	175	WC		EA TW UA	
SPOKANE, WASH.	100	173	AA AL		EA TW UA	
BUFFALO, N.Y.	100	171	DL		EA TW UA	
LAS VEGAS, NEV.	100	170	AA DL PI		EA TW UA	
LOUISVILLE, KY.	100	170	AA AL LC		EA TW UA	
BUFFALO, N.Y.	100	169	OZ		EA TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	100	168			EA TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	100	166	AA BN OZ		EA TW UA	
DENVER, COLORADO	100	166	DL		EA TW UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	100	165	AA		EA TW UA	
NASHVILLE, TENN.	100	163	DL		EA TW UA	
LOS ANGELES, CAL	100	160	DL		EA TW UA	
NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	158	BN		EA TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	100	157	DL		EA TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	100	155	DL		EA TW UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	100	149	PI		EA TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	100	149	DL		EA TW UA	
NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	147	DL		EA TW UA	
FARGO, N.D.	100	146	MO		EA TW UA	
NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	145	BN		EA TW UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	100	144	PI		EA TW UA	
INDIANAPOLIS, IND	100	142	AA DL LC		EA TW UA	
BALTIMORE, MD.	100	142	BN CO		EA TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	100	141	AA DL OZ		EA TW UA	
ALBUQUERQUE, N.M.	100	141	DL		EA TW UA	
HOUSTON, TEXAS	100	139	AA AL LC		EA TW UA	
DAYTON, OHIO	100	138	AA		EA TW UA	
INDIANAPOLIS, IND	100	137	DL		EA TW UA	
BALTIMORE, MD.	100	134	AA		EA TW UA	
CLEVELAND, OHIO	100	133	AA		EA TW UA	
BALTIMORE, MD.	100	131	AA		EA TW UA	
BALTIMORE, MD.	100	131	AA		EA TW UA	

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GROUP 1 STRIKING CARRIERS FLY 100 PERCENT OF FLIGHTS

CITY - PAIR		PERCENT OF MARKET	AVERAGE DAILY PASSENGERS	AUTHORIZED CARRIERS		REGULAR AUTHORITY	CARRIERS ON STRIKE			EXEMPTIONS - E23928
COLUMBUS, OHIO	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	131	AA	LC		EA	TW	UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	LANSING, MICH.	100	131	NO			UA			
HARTFORD, CONN.	CLEVELAND, OHIO	100	129	AA	AL MO		EA	TW	UA	
PHILADELPHIA, PA.	ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	126	AA	DL		EA	TW		
PITTSBURGH, PA.	ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	124	AA			EA	TW		
CHICAGO, ILL.	MUSKEGON, MICH.	100	124	NO			UA			
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	MOBILE, ALABAMA	100	124	SO			EA	UA		
AKRON, OHIO	CHICAGO, ILL.	100	123	LC			EA	UA		
NEW YORK, N.Y.	YOUNGSTOWN, OHIO	100	123				UA			
CLEVELAND, OHIO	MILWAUKEE, WIS.	100	123	NO			EA	NW	UA	
CLEVELAND, OHIO	TAMPA, FLORIDA	100	122				EA	NW	TW	UA
DENVER, COLORADO	LAS VEGAS, NEV.	100	119	WA			EA	NA	TW	UA
BALTIMORE, MD.	MIAMI, FLORIDA	100	116	DL			EA	UA		
HUNTSVILLE, ALA.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	116				EA	UA		
LOUISVILLE, KY.	ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	113	AA	DL OZ		EA	TW		
CHICAGO, ILL.	SPOKANE, WASH.	100	113				EA	NW	UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	GREENSBORO, N.C.	100	110				EA	UA		
CHARLESTON, W.VA.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	110	AA			EA	UA		
GREENVILLE, S.C.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	108				EA	UA		
PITTSBURGH, PA.	TAMPA, FLORIDA	100	108				EA	NW	TW	UA
MILWAUKEE, WIS.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	105				EA	NW	UA	
AKRON, OHIO	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	104				EA	UA		
ROCHESTER, N.Y.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	103	AA			UA			
PHILADELPHIA, PA.	ROCHESTER, N.Y.	100	103	AA			UA			
DAYTON, OHIO	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	101	AA	LC		UA			
CHARLESTON, W.VA.	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	99	AA	LC		EA	UA		
BALTIMORE, MD.	DETROIT, MICH.	100	99	AA	AL DL LC		EA	TW	UA	
JACKSONVILLE	TAMPA, FLORIDA	100	99	DL	MK		EA	NA	UA	
BOISE, IDAHO	SALT LAKE CITY	100	98	WC			UA			
TAMPA, FLORIDA	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	98	DL			EA	NA	NW	TW UA
HOUSTON, TEXAS	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	98	AA	BN DL		EA	NA		
CHARLESTON, S.C.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	98	DL			EA	NA		
MOBILE, ALABAMA	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	100	97	SO			EA	NA	UA	
NEW YORK, N.Y.	KNOXVILLE, TENN.	100	97	AA	DL		UA			
BALTIMORE, MD.	CLEVELAND, OHIO	100	95	AA	AL LC		EA	TW	UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	NORFOLK, VA.	100	95	PI			UA			
PHILADELPHIA, PA.	SYRACUSE, N.Y.	100	94	AA			EA			
ALBUQUERQUE, N.M.	LAS VEGAS, NEV.	100	92				EA			
NEW ORLEANS, LA.	TAMPA, FLORIDA	100	92	DL			EA	NA	UA	
JACKSONVILLE	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	92	DL			EA	NA	UA	
BIRMINGHAM, ALA.	CHICAGO, ILL.	100	88	DL			EA	NA	UA	
LOS ANGELES, CAL.	TAMPA, FLORIDA	100	86	DL			EA	TW	UA	
BALTIMORE, MD.	NORFOLK, VA.	100	85	PI			EA	UA		
DES MOINES, IOWA	OMAHA, NEBRASKA	100	84	BN	OZ		UA			
ALBUQUERQUE, N.M.	PHOENIX, ARIZONA	100	83	CO	FL		UA			
NEW YORK, N.Y.	NEWPORT NEWS, VA	100	82				EA	TW	UA	
ALBANY, N.Y.	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	82				EA	UA		
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	CHARLESTON, W.VA.	100	81	PI			EA	UA	TW	UA
BOSTON, MASS.	TAMPA, FLORIDA	100	81				EA	UA		
MIAMI, FLORIDA	ORLANDO, FLORIDA	100	81	DL			EA	UA		

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GROUP 1 STRIKING CARRIERS FLY 100 PERCENT OF FLIGHTS

CITY - PAIR		PERCENT OF MARKET	AVERAGE DAILY PASSENGERS	AUTHORIZED CARRIERS			REGULAR AUTHORITY	CARRIERS ON STRIKE		EXEMPTIONS - E23928
FORT WAYNE, IND.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	77	DL				UA		
PITTSBURGH, PA.	LOUISVILLE, KY.	100	76	AA				EA	TW	
ORLANDO, FLORIDA	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	75	DL				EA	NA	
BOISE, IDAHO	PORTLAND, OREGON	100	73	WC				UA		
INDIANAPOLIS, IND	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	71	AA	LC			EA	TW	
EVANSVILLE, IND.	ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	71	DL				EA		
MADISON, WIS.	MINNEAPOLIS, MINN	100	71	NO	OZ			NW		
MILWAUKEE, WIS.	PHILADELPHIA, PA	100	70					EA	NW	UA
HARTFORD, CONN.	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	69	AA	AL	MO		EA	TW	UA
NORFOLK, VA.	PHILADELPHIA, PA	100	68					NA	UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	HUNTSVILLE, ALA.	100	67					EA	UA	
INDIANAPOLIS, IND	PHILADELPHIA, PA	100	67	AA	DL			EA	TW	
ST. LOUIS, MO.	TAMPA, FLORIDA	100	66	DL				EA	TW	
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN	PORTLAND, OREGON	100	66	WA				NW	UA	
NEW ORLEANS, LA.	PENSACOLA, FLA.	100	63					EA	NA	
CLEVELAND, OHIO	FORT WAYNE, IND.	100	63					UA		
BIRMINGHAM, ALA.	MOBILE, ALABAMA	100	63	SO				EA	UA	
KANSAS CITY, MO.	PHOENIX, ARIZONA	100	62	CO	FL			TW		
NEW ORLEANS, LA.	SAN ANTONIO, TEX	100	62	BN	TT			EA		
NASHVILLE, TENN.	ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	61	AA	BN	OZ		EA	TW	
JACKSONVILLE	PHILADELPHIA, PA	100	58	DL				EA	NA	UA
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	INDIANAPOLIS, IND	100	57	DL				EA	TW	
CHARLOTTE, N.C.	MIAMI, FLORIDA	100	57	DL				EA	UA	
PORTLAND, OREGON	SALT LAKE CITY	100	57	WA	WC			UA		
CLEVELAND, OHIO	GRAND RAPIDS	100	57	LC	NO			UA		
DETROIT, MICH.	GRAND RAPIDS	100	55	LC	NO			UA		
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	W. PALM BEACH	100	54	DL				EA	UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	TALLAHASSEE, FLA	100	53					EA		
HUNTSVILLE, ALA.	ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	53					EA		
CLEVELAND, OHIO	DENVER, COLORADO	100	53					TW	UA	
COLUMBUS, OHIO	INDIANAPOLIS, IND	100	52	AA	DL	LC		EA	TW	
HUNTSVILLE, ALA.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	51					EA	UA	

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PREPARED - JULY 12, 1966

GROUP 2 STRIKING CARRIERS FLY BETWEEN 51 AND 99 PERCENT OF FLIGHTS

CITY - PAIR		PERCENT OF MARKET	AVERAGE DAILY PASSENGERS	AUTHORIZED CARRIERS				REGULAR AUTHORITY	CARRIERS ON STRIKE				EXEMPTIONS - E23928
BOSTON, MASS.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	68	5476	AA*	AL	MO	NE*		EA	NA	TW	UA	
LOS ANGELES, CAL	SAN FRANCISCO	65	5083	AA*	DL	PC	WA*		NA	TW	UA		
CHICAGO, ILL.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	64	4578	AA*	BN	DL			EA	NW	TW	UA	
NEW YORK, N.Y.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	78	4463	AA*	AL	BN*	DL	NE	EA	NA	NW	TW	UA
MIAMI, FLORIDA	NEW YORK, N.Y.	90	3208	DL	NE*				EA	NA	NW	TW	UA
LOS ANGELES, CAL	NEW YORK, N.Y.	60	2416	AA*	DL				NA	TW	UA		
DETROIT, MICH.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	54	2125	AA*	AL	DL	MO		EA	NW	TW	UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	LOS ANGELES, CAL	51	2106	AA*	CO*	DL			TW	UA			
NEW YORK, N.Y.	SAN FRANCISCO	67	1784	AA*	DL				NA	TW	UA		
CLEVELAND, OHIO	NEW YORK, N.Y.	77	1635	AA*	AL	MO			EA	NW	TW	UA	
NEW YORK, N.Y.	PITTSBURGH, PA.	91	1603	AA*	AL	MO			EA	NW	TW	UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	SAN FRANCISCO	65	1476	AA*	DL				TW	UA			
SEATTLE, WASH.	SAN FRANCISCO	71	1253	WA*	WC				UA				
BOSTON, MASS.	CHICAGO, ILL.	55	1031	AA*					EA	TW	UA		
LOS ANGELES, CAL	SEATTLE, WASH.	60	1025	WA*					UA				
CHICAGO, ILL.	DENVER, COLORADO	68	971	BN	CO*				TW	UA			
CHICAGO, ILL.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	56	953	AA*	BN	DL	LC		EA	NW	TW	UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	NEW YORK, N.Y.	64	921	DL*					EA	NW	TW	UA	
NEW YORK, N.Y.	ST. LOUIS, MO.	76	840	AA*	BN	DL			EA	TW			
CHICAGO, ILL.	MIAMI, FLORIDA	65	796	DL*					EA	NW	TW	UA	
PORTLAND, OREGON	SAN FRANCISCO	68	757	PC	WA*	WC			UA				
LOS ANGELES, CAL	SACRAMENTO, CAL.	56	695	PC	WA*				UA				
PHILADELPHIA, PA	WASHINGTON, D.C.	62	648	AA*	AL*	DL	NE*		EA	NA	NW	TW	UA
KANSAS CITY, MO.	ST. LOUIS, MO.	82	641	BN*	CN	DL	OZ		TW				
LOS ANGELES, CAL	WASHINGTON, D.C.	60	609	AA*	DL				NA	TW	UA		
NORFOLK, VA.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	76	601	PI*					NA	UA			
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	CHICAGO, ILL.	54	586	DL*					EA	NW	TW	UA	
RENO, NEVADA	SAN FRANCISCO	89	580	PC	WA*				UA				
DENVER, COLORADO	SAN FRANCISCO	78	572	WA*					TW	UA			
HOUSTON, TEXAS	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	73	564	BN	DL*	TT			EA	NA			
BALTIMORE, MD.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	83	552	AA*	AL	DL*			EA	NA	TW	UA	
PORTLAND, OREGON	SEATTLE, WASH.	70	535	WA*	WC*				EA	NW	UA		
HOUSTON, TEXAS	NEW YORK, N.Y.	60	522	AA	BN	DL*			EA	NA			
COLUMBUS, OHIO	NEW YORK, N.Y.	60	487	AA*	DL				EA	TW	UA		
MIAMI, FLORIDA	PHILADELPHIA, PA	83	474	DL	NE*				EA	NA	NW	TW	UA
LOS ANGELES, CAL	KANSAS CITY, MO.	60	470	CO*	DL				EA	NA			
LAS VEGAS, NEV.	SAN FRANCISCO	60	469	DL*	PC	WA*			TW	UA			
NEW YORK, N.Y.	PHILADELPHIA, PA	58	467	AA*	AL*	DL*	NE		EA	NA	NW	TW	UA
CHICAGO, ILL.	LOUISVILLE, KY.	83	464	AA	DL*	OZ			EA	TW			
LOS ANGELES, CAL	PORTLAND, OREGON	75	461	PC	WA*				UA				
HOUSTON, TEXAS	LOS ANGELES, CAL	56	446	AA	CO*	DL			NA				
MIAMI, FLORIDA	TAMPA, FLORIDA	87	445	DL*	MK				EA	NA	NW	TW	UA
NEW ORLEANS, LA.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	53	439	BN	DL*				EA	NA	UA		
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	MIAMI, FLORIDA	61	436	DL*					EA	NW	TW	UA	
LOS ANGELES, CAL	ST. LOUIS, MO.	83	426	AA*	DL				EA				
SAN FRANCISCO	SALT LAKE CITY	70	410	WA*	WC				UA				
DENVER, COLORADO	SALT LAKE CITY	81	367	FL	WA*				UA				
SPOKANE, WASH.	SEATTLE, WASH.	73	363	HC*					UA				
BOSTON, MASS.	MIAMI, FLORIDA	75	318	NE*					NW	UA			
NEW YORK, N.Y.	LOUISVILLE, KY.	67	303	AA*	DL				EA	TW			

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

CARRIER STRIKE REPORT
PREPARED - JULY 12, 1966

GROUP 2 STRIKING CARRIERS FLY BETWEEN 51 AND 99 PERCENT OF FLIGHTS

CITY - PAIR		PERCENT OF MARKET	AVERAGE DAILY PASSENGERS	AUTHORIZED CARRIERS	REGULAR AUTHORITY	CARRIERS ON STRIKE	EXEMPTIONS - E23928
CHICAGO, ILL.	TAMPA, FLORIDA	71	297	DL*		EA	NW TW UA
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	JACKSONVILLE	57	295	DL* SO		EA	UA TW UA
CLEVELAND, OHIO	DETROIT, MICH.	74	290	AA AL	LC* MO NO*	EA	NW TW UA
CHICAGO, ILL.	GRAND RAPIDS	81	279	LC NO*		UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	MOBILE, ALABAMA	88	273	OZ*		UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	TAMPA, FLORIDA	67	265	DL*		EA	NW TW UA
CHICAGO, ILL.	SOUTH BEND, IND.	55	252	LC NO*		UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	CHARLOTTE, N.C.	74	248	DL* PI	SO	EA	UA TW UA
BALTIMORE, MD.	LOS ANGELES, CAL.	67	240	AA* DL		EA	NA UA
JACKSONVILLE	MIAMI, FLORIDA	75	233	DL* MK		EA	NA UA
NEWPORT NEWS, VA	WASHINGTON, D.C.	94	231	PI*		EA	NA TW UA
BALTIMORE, MD.	BOSTON, MASS.	83	230	AA* AL		EA	NA TW UA
FRESNO, CALIF.	SAN FRANCISCO	67	216	PC*		EA	NA UA
RICHMOND, VA.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	79	210	PI*		EA	NA UA
LOS ANGELES, CAL.	TUCSON, ARIZONA	67	182	AA* CO		EA	NA UA
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	HOUSTON, TEXAS	64	171	DL*		EA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	ORLANDO, FLORIDA	57	161	DL*		EA	
GREENSBORO, N.C.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	93	158	PI*		EA	UA TW UA
BALTIMORE, MD.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	56	146	AA AL*	DL* LC* PI*	EA	NA TW UA
MIAMI, FLORIDA	W. PALM BEACH	63	141	DL* MK*		EA	NA TW UA
CINCINNATI, OHIO	ST. LOUIS, MO.	67	136	AA* DL		EA	NA TW UA
CINCINNATI, OHIO	PITTSBURGH, PA.	75	129	AA* LC		EA	NA TW UA
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	GREENVILLE, S.C.	85	127	SO*		EA	NA TW UA
CHARLESTON, W. VA.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	60	115	AA* LC	PI	EA	UA TW UA
CHARLOTTE, N.C.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	60	111	DL* PI		EA	UA TW UA
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	BALTIMORE, MD.	57	109	DL* PI		EA	UA TW UA
BAKERSFIELD, CAL.	LOS ANGELES, CAL.	63	104	PC*		EA	UA TW UA
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	MONTGOMERY, ALA.	55	98	DL* SO		EA	UA TW UA
KNOXVILLE, TENN.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	56	97	AA* DL	PI	EA	UA TW UA
OKLAHOMA, OKLA.	ST. LOUIS, MO.	67	92	AA* BN	CN	EA	UA TW UA
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	LOUISVILLE, KY.	55	86	DL* PI		EA	UA TW UA
RENO, NEVADA	SACRAMENTO, CAL.	89	83	PC WA*		EA	UA TW UA
BIRMINGHAM, ALA.	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	67	64	DL* SO		EA	UA TW UA
CLEVELAND, OHIO	TOLEDO, OHIO	85	58	LC*		EA	UA TW UA
BIRMINGHAM, ALA.	MEMPHIS, TENN.	67	57	DL* SO		EA	UA TW UA
STOCKTON, CALIF.	SAN FRANCISCO	70	50	PC*		EA	UA TW UA

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

CARRIER STRIKE REPORT

PREPARED - JULY 12, 1966

GROUP 3 STRIKING CARRIERS FLY BETWEEN 25 AND 50 PERCENT OF FLIGHTS

CITY - PAIR	PERCENT OF MARKET	AVERAGE DAILY PASSENGERS	AUTHORIZED CARRIERS	REGULAR AUTHORITY	CARRIERS ON STRIKE	EXEMPTIONS - E23928
LAS VEGAS, NEV. - LOS ANGELES, CAL	25	2023	BL* DL PC WA*		NA TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL. - DETROIT, MICH.	31	1535	AA* DL LC NO		EA NW TW UA	
BOSTON, MASS. - WASHINGTON, D.C.	29	1162	AA* AL NE*		EA NA TW UA	
LOS ANGELES, CAL - SAN DIEGO, CALIF	44	1085	AA* BL DL* PC* WA*		NA UA	
CHICAGO, ILL. - KANSAS CITY, MO.	48	1011	BN* CO* DL OZ		TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL. - MILWAUKEE, WIS.	34	827	NO* OZ		EA NW UA	
LOS ANGELES, CAL - PHOENIX, ARIZONA	25	797	AA* BL CO* WA*		TW	
NEW YORK, N.Y. - ROCHESTER, N.Y.	29	791	AA* MO		UA	
DENVER, COLORADO - LOS ANGELES, CAL	44	769	CO* WA		TW UA	
HARTFORD, CONN. - NEW YORK, N.Y.	46	765	AA* AL* MO NE*		EA TW UA	
NEW YORK, N.Y. - PROVIDENCE, R.I.	26	720	AA* AL* MO		EA NA UA	
CHICAGO, ILL. - INDIANAPOLIS, IND	42	686	AA* DL* LC OZ		EA TW UA	
BOSTON, MASS. - PHILADELPHIA, PA	50	682	AA AL NE*		EA NA TW UA	
PHILADELPHIA, PA - PITTSBURGH, PA.	34	605	AA AL*		EA NW TW UA	
BOSTON, MASS. - LOS ANGELES, CAL	50	503	AA*		NA TW UA	
LOS ANGELES, CAL - PHILADELPHIA, PA	50	444	AA* DL		NA TW UA	
BUFFALO, N.Y. - CHICAGO, ILL.	50	417	AA* LC		UA	
DALLAS, TEXAS - NEW ORLEANS, LA.	27	408	BN DL* TT		EA TW	
CHICAGO, ILL. - PHOENIX, ARIZONA	50	374	AA* CO		TW	
CHICAGO, ILL. - MADISON, WIS.	43	371	NO* OZ		NW	
HOUSTON, TEXAS - SAN ANTONIO, TEX	33	357	AA* BN CO* TT*		EA	
CLEVELAND, OHIO - LOS ANGELES, CAL	38	355	AA*		TW UA	
SACRAMENTO, CAL. - SAN FRANCISCO	47	334	PC* WA WC*		UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA - WASHINGTON, D.C.	47	302	DL* PI		EA NW TW UA	
BOSTON, MASS. - CLEVELAND, OHIO	44	286	AA* AL MO		EA TW UA	
BOSTON, MASS. - DETROIT, MICH.	25	272	AA* AL MO		EA TW UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA - NEW ORLEANS, LA.	45	263	DL* SO		EA UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA - BIRMINGHAM, ALA.	47	259	DL* SO*		EA UA	
PHOENIX, ARIZONA - SAN FRANCISCO	33	257	AA* WA		TW	
DETROIT, MICH. - MIAMI, FLORIDA	50	249	DL*		EA NW TW UA	
HARRISBURG, PA. - PITTSBURGH, PA.	35	217	AL*		TW UA TW UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA - PHILADELPHIA, PA	50	213	DL*		EA NW TW UA	
SALINAS, CALIF. - SAN FRANCISCO	48	211	PC*		UA	
LOS ANGELES, CAL - NEW ORLEANS, LA.	40	209	DL*		NA UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA - COLUMBUS, GA.	33	204	DL* SO*		EA	
CORPUS CHRISTI - HOUSTON, TEXAS	37	198	BN* TT*		EA	
LOS ANGELES, CAL - OKLAHOMA, OKLA.	50	195	AA* CO		TW	
CLEVELAND, OHIO - CINCINNATI, OHIO	29	188	AA* LC		EA TW	
NEW YORK, N.Y. - PHOENIX, ARIZONA	50	176	AA*		TW	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA - ASHEVILLE, N.C.	44	175	DL PI*		UA	
WICHITA, KANSAS - KANSAS CITY, MO.	40	170	BN* CN CO		TW	
LOS ANGELES, CAL - SANTA BARBARA, CAL	44	152	PC*		UA	
BIRMINGHAM, ALA. - NEW YORK, N.Y.	50	146	DL*		EA UA	
CINCINNATI, OHIO - WASHINGTON, D.C.	33	144	AA* DL LC PI		EA TW UA	
HARRISBURG, PA. - NEW YORK, N.Y.	33	137	AL*		TW	
ST. LOUIS, MO. - TULSA, OKLAHOMA	40	119	AA* BN CN OZ		TW	
ALBANY, NEW YORK - BOSTON, MASS.	25	109	AA* MO		UA	
DENVER, COLORADO - GRAND JUNCTION	33	107	FL*		EA	
BALTIMORE, MD. - NEW ORLEANS, LA.	25	99	DL*		EA NA UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA - CHATTANOOGA, TENN	36	97	DL* SO		EA	

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

CARRIER STRIKE REPORT
PREPARED - JULY 12, 1966

GROUP 3 STRIKING CARRIERS FLY BETWEEN 25 AND 50 PERCENT OF FLIGHTS

CITY - PAIR	PERCENT OF MARKET	AVERAGE DAILY PASSENGERS	AUTHORIZED CARRIERS	REGULAR AUTHORITY	CARRIERS ON STRIKE	EXEMPTIONS - E23928
CINCINNATI, OHIO LOUISVILLE, KY.	27	92	AA* DL* PI		EA TW	
ALBANY, GEORGIA ATLANTA, GEORGIA	33	91	SO*		EA	
HUNTSVILLE, ALA. MEMPHIS, TENN.	44	89	SO*		EA UA	
CHARLOTTE, N.C. PHILADELPHIA, PA	33	84	DL*		EA UA	
CINCINNATI, OHIO TAMPA, FLORIDA	50	80	DL*		EA TW	
BEAUMONT, TEXAS HOUSTON, TEXAS	47	60	DL* TT*		EA	
MEDFORD, OREGON SAN FRANCISCO	50	79	PC* WC		UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA MACON, GEORGIA	31	78	DL*		EA	
NASHVILLE, TENN. LOUISVILLE, KY.	36	74	AA* DZ		EA TW	
MINNEAPLIS, MINN. ROCHESTER, MINN.	47	73	BN* OZ*		NW	
HARTFORD, CONN. BOSTON, MASS.	29	70	AA* AL* MO* NE		EA TW UA	
BATON ROUGE, LA. NEW ORLEANS, LA.	32	69	DL* SO*		EA	
HARRISBURG, PA. WASHINGTON, D.C.	29	58	AL*		TW UA	
BALTIMORE, MD. PHILADELPHIA, PA	26	57	AA* AL* DL*		EA NA TW UA	

- NOTES:
- (1) Schedule data is as of May, 1965.
 - (2) "Authorized carriers" are those carriers with certificate authority to provide service in the listed market, as well as those carriers who could provide service as a result of the Board's grant of emergency authority under E-83928.
 - (3) Asterisked carriers are the non-struck carriers providing service as of May 1965.
 - (4) The number of passengers are as shown in the "Competition Study" for the 3rd quarter of 1965 recomputed to an average number per day.
 - (5) The city pairs include all markets, in terms of passenger density, from the largest and ranging down to 50 passengers per day, in each category shown.

MEMORANDUM

EXECUTIVE

La6/Airlines (16) (2)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 16, 1966
1:00 p.m. Saturday
(Dictated from N. Y.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Waynex
For your information, the interview with Senator Morse by XNBC News, which was a critical comment by Senator Morse of the Union's refusal to accept the terms of the Mediation Board, was distributed by NBC News to both of its network news shows and also used locally by NBC -owned stations.

K

Robert E. Kintner

CC: Bill Moyers
Joe Califano

EXECUTIVE
LAC/airline gmc
FG 251 (1)

Interstate Commerce Commission

Washington 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

July 18, 1966

Mr. Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Califano:

This report up-dates the information contained in my letter to you of July 8, 1966 with reference to the Interstate Commerce Commission's actions to minimize the inconvenience caused to the travelling public by the airline strike.

Extensive efforts were made by our regional and other field offices to publicize, through local news media, assistance available from the Commission during the period of emergency. During the weekend of July 9 and 10, our field staff was alerted to be on a standby basis and instructed to offer all possible assistance to carriers, shippers and passengers for the securing of alternate means of transport during the emergency.

My letter of July 8 mentioned several suggestions the Commission made to rail, bus and trucking national transportation associations that would aid in minimizing the impact of the strike. Passenger service complaints have not been above normal. It appears that railroads and bus lines have been diligent in adding additional equipment to schedules to the extent possible and as the passenger transportation demands indicated a need. We also understand that some industries owning private airplanes are cooperating in the joint movement of their own executives and those of neighboring industries, and that charter airlines which normally provide service for vacationers, are concentrating their efforts on providing passenger service.


We have received only a limited number of calls for assistance and as of this date have not received any applications for emergency on-the-spot

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MAR 27 1967
CENTRAL FILES

grants of temporary authority to motor carriers to transport passengers or property.

We will continue to use all available means to help the public. If there is anything further we can do, please let me know.

Sincerely,


John W. Bush
Chairman

Interstate Commerce Commission
Washington, D. C.

7:50 p.m., Friday
July 8, 1966

July 8, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM Joe Califano

**The Interstate Commerce Commission issued the attached
Press Release in connection with the airline strike and your
directive today:**

We, directed as soon as possible, the Commission to take all appropriate steps to provide the maximum available rail and bus transportation to minimize the inconvenience caused to the travelling public by the airline strike. We immediately put into motion our existing procedures for assisting the shipping and travelling public in times of emergencies.

I am enclosing a copy of our press release. As you will note in the press release, we have been in touch with the national associations representing the railroad, bus and trucking industries to arrange with them to do everything possible to meet the special needs of passengers and shippers. For example, we have suggested the curtailment, if possible, of charter trips by buses and we are urging expedited turn-around time for buses so that more equipment will be available for the transportation of passengers needing such service. We are also urging the provision of extra passenger railroad equipment and maximum motor freight equipment, wherever possible, to provide for increased loads. We also fully implemented our procedures for providing emergency on-the-spot grants of temporary authority to motor carriers to transport passengers or property. And, as you will note, we will cooperate through our Washington and field offices with State and local agencies.

We will continue to do everything within our power to help the public. If there is anything further you can suggest, I hope you will let me know.

Very truly,
John W. Blanton

John W. Blanton
Chairman

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MAR 27 1967
CENTRAL FILES

Interstate Commerce Commission

Washington 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

July 8, 1966

Mr. Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Califano:

We acted as soon as you called asking the Commission to take all appropriate steps to provide the maximum available rail and bus transportation to minimize the inconvenience caused to the travelling public by the airline strike. We immediately put into motion our standby procedures for assisting the shipping and travelling public in these types of emergencies.

I am enclosing a copy of our press release. As you will note in the press release, we have been in touch with the national associations representing the railroad, bus and trucking industries to arrange with them to do everything possible to meet the special needs of passengers and shippers. For example, we have suggested the curtailment, if possible, of charter trips by buses and we are urging expedited turn-around time for buses so that more equipment will be available for the transportation of passengers needing such service. We are also urging the provision of extra passenger railroad equipment and maximum motor freight equipment, wherever possible, to provide for increased loads. We also fully implemented our procedures for providing emergency on-the-spot grants of temporary authority to motor carriers to transport passengers or property. And, as you will note, we will cooperate through our Washington and field offices with State and local agencies.

We will continue to do everything within our power to help the public. If there is anything further you can suggest, I hope you will let me know.

Sincerely,

John W. Bush
John W. Bush
Chairman

Enclosure

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20423

737-9765 Ext. 350

FOR RELEASE:

78-66

Immediate

July 8, 1966

PROGRAM ACTIVATED TO AID SHIPPERS AND PUBLIC SEEKING ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF TRANSPORT DURING AIR LINE STRIKE

In preparation for the possibility of cessation of air line operations due to a strike, the Interstate Commerce Commission yesterday laid plans for activating its emergency programs to assist the shipping and traveling public. To cope with the requirements for emergency movements and for the national defense when severe weather, natural disasters, or labor disputes disrupt transportation facilities, a self-activating system has been developed in which the ICC's nationwide system of field offices in principal cities automatically assist the public in obtaining alternative means of transport.

When airline-employee negotiations broke down, the President requested Chairman John Bush and the Interstate Commerce Commission to take all appropriate action to provide the maximum available rail and bus transportation to minimize the inconvenience to the traveling public.

Following the President's instructions Chairman Bush requested the national associations representing the railroad, bus, and trucking industries to utilize the full capabilities of their media to meet the special needs of passengers and shippers affected by the curtailment of air line operations.

Chairman Bush stated that the full resources of the Commission and its field offices will be directed to the alleviation of the distress which arises when normal transportation is unavailable. "To carry out this program," the Chairman stated, "the Commission is authorizing the District Supervisors and Regional Directors of the Commission's Bureau of Operations and Compliance to certify the need for on-the-spot grants for motor carriers for emergency temporary authority to transport passengers or property. In addition, the Commission will cooperate with State and local agencies in coordinating efforts to assure the continuance of transportation for priority movements."

WASHINGTON--LAST NIGHT PLAYERS SHOWED LITTLE PROMISE TODAY OF FINDING THE AIRLINE STRIKE.

IN DALLAS, IT WAS REPORTED SOME AIRLINES STILL FLYING WERE BEGINNING TO CANCEL FLIGHTS BECAUSE BOOSTED FAREPAYERS WERE TAKING A HEAVY TOLL OF EQUIPMENT. ALMOST ALL FLIGHTS TO NEW YORK AND CHICAGO WERE LATE LEAVING.

AIRCRAFT WERE BEING PULLED OUT OF SERVICE FOR REPAIRS WHICH IN SOME CASES WERE TAKING A LONG TIME. MECHANICS WERE JUST TOO OVERLOADED TO GET THEM FIXED.

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND THE FIVE STRUCK AIRLINES SCHEDULED TALKS AGAIN TODAY AT 10:30 A.M.

IN ADDITION TO WHAT A LABOR DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN CALLED "EXTREMELY SLOW" MOVEMENT TOWARD SETTILING THEIR DIFFERENCES, THE NEGOTIATORS WERE MEETING UNDER THE THREAT THAT THE UNION WOULD WALK AWAY FROM THE BARGAINING TABLE.

IN A SIDE ISSUE, THE IAM'S CHIEF SPOKESMAN, JOSEPH W. HANNEY, ALLEGED ONE OF THE AIRLINES INVOLVED WAS SOLICITING PAYING PASSENGERS UNDER THE GUISE OF MILITARY CHARTERS.

HE SAID THE ACTIONS BY NORTHWEST AIRLINES WERE A VIOLATION OF A STRIKE AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE SERVICE ONLY FOR "AUTHORIZED MILITARY MOVEMENTS." THE AIRLINE HAS NOT COMMENTED ON THE ISSUE.

7/18--GE925A

[Handwritten signature]

UPI-17

(ECONOMY)

WASHINGTON--SEN. JACOB K. JAVITS, R-N.Y., TODAY URGED PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO ASK CONGRESS FOR A RAISE IN INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAXES.

IN A SPEECH PREPARED FOR SENATE DELIVERY, JAVITS PROPOSED A 1.5 TO 2 PER CENT INCREASE IN INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES AND A 2.5 TO 3 PER CENT RAISE IN CORPORATE INCOME TAXES.

HE SAID THIS WOULD YIELD \$5.5 BILLION TO \$7 BILLION IN GOVERNMENT REVENUES "AND WOULD AFFECT THE ECONOMY ACROSS-THE-BOARD MORE EQUITABLY THAN A TIGHT MONEY POLICY."

JAVITS SAID INCREASED INCOME TAXES SHOULD BE BALANCED BY AN EASING OF CREDIT AND A LOWERING OF INTEREST RATES. HE PREDICTED THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD WOULD ADJUST MONETARY POLICY IF THE ADMINISTRATION TAKES THE LEAD.

THE NEW YORK REPUBLICAN WARNED THE ADMINISTRATION IT CANNOT WAIT UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTIONS "TO TAKE THE NECESSARY DIFFICULT AND POLITICALLY SENSITIVE FISCAL ACTIONS" AND CRITICIZED JOHNSON FOR RELYING ALMOST SOLELY ON A TIGHT MONEY POLICY TO STABILIZE THE ECONOMY.

THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SAID YESTERDAY THE NATION'S BOOMING ECONOMY SHOWED A "SUBSTANTIAL SLOWDOWN" DURING THE APRIL-MAY-JUNE QUARTER OF THE YEAR, MOSTLY BECAUSE AMERICANS FINALLY WERE ENDING A MONTHS-LONG SPENDING SPREE.

THE DEPARTMENT SAID YESTERDAY THE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT INCREASED DURING 1966'S SECOND QUARTER BY ONLY \$13.8 BILLION. THIS WAS THE SMALLEST GAIN SINCE THE FALL OF 1964, AND PUT THE GNP AT A SEASONALLY ADJUSTED ANNUAL RATE OF \$732 BILLION.

WHILE THE ECONOMY WAS SLOWING, PRICES WERE RISING AS FAST AS THE PREVIOUS THREE MONTHS. IN FACT, INFLATION ATE UP \$6.3 BILLION OF THE \$13.8 BILLION SECOND-QUARTER GAIN, LEAVING ONLY \$7.5 BILLION AS A "REAL" INCREASE.

7/18--GE925A

UPI-18

(CENTRAL)

LONDON--GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES TODAY WOULD FLAUNTISHLY TO REVEAL AN EMERGENCY PLAN AIMED AT RESTORING CONFIDENCE IN BRITAIN'S WEAKENED POUND.

THE EMERGENCY PLAN, PROMISED BY PRIME MINISTER WILSON LAST WEEK AFTER THE STOCK MARKET PLUNGED AND THE VALUE OF THE POUND CONTINUED TO DECREASE, WILL BE PRESENTED IN A CABINET MEETING TOMORROW FOR FINAL APPROVAL.

WILSON, PRESENTLY IN MOSCOW, IS EXPECTED TO FLY BACK TO LONDON OVERSEAS TO CHAIRMAN THE MEETING AND MAKE THE FINAL DECISION.

THE PLAN IS EXPECTED TO BE ANNOUNCED IN COMMONS ON WEDNESDAY.

7/18--GE925A

RECEIVED
JUL 18 1966
CENTRAL FILES

LA 6/Airline

ST. 9

PR 8-2/F

PR 8-2/R

FG 160

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONJuly 19, 1966
1:31 p. m.

Mr. President:

Congressman Dante Fascell of Florida said that he is very concerned about the Airline strike and how it is affecting the economic and political situation in Florida. He said he was just at a loss as to what to do and wanted to come in and talk to you about it. I explained to the Congressman that you were doing everything legally and morally that could be done by this Administration. The Congressman said he understood this, but didn't know what to do.

Also, Congressman Ed Reinecke called and asked to come and see you regarding the Airline strike.

I suggest that you let me refer both of these to Secretary Wirtz. Do you agree?

Yes ☒ No ☐

If No, do you want to see these two Congressmen?

Yes ☐ No ☐

Marvin

Told Frank Brown
J.

EXECUTIVE

LA 6/Airlines (3)

FG 11-3

Dale, Ed

July 19, 1966

The Honorable Gardner Ackley, Chairman
Council of Economic Advisers
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D.C.

Dear Gardner:

Here is the revised version of the airlines strike statement from which I read large portions to the Associated Press man out there. He took down about three-fourths of the statement. Obviously, I don't know how much they will use.

Ed Dale also called, but was only interested in two or three brief comments and then switched to the perils of the pound.

I hope all this works out to be helpful to the White House and the public.

As always,

Walter W. Heller

WWH:dg

Enclosure

cc: The Honorable Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President

Joe*-I am enclosing a couple of extra copies. You may want to how one to the President and to Bill Moyers.

In London I can be reached through the Carlton Tower or the embassy. Francis Bator is posted on my movements.

As you can imagine, I have been getting plenty of heat from my ex-labor friends.

Walter W. Heller
W.W.H.

RECEIVED

MAR 27 1967

CENT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 18, 1966

Mr. Califano:

Walter Heller's office called. Ed Dale (NY Times) called them and got a statement about the Airline Strike. He is the only one who has called and the only one who has gotten a statement.

joe

RECEIVED
MAR 27 1967
CENTRAL FILES

July 18, 1966

STATEMENT BY WALTER W. HELLER ON THE AIRLINES STRIKE

As one who played a part in the development of our current national economic policies, I am deeply concerned about wage and price actions which threaten to disrupt our balanced economic progress. The current airlines strike is particularly disturbing.

Both labor and management must realize that if the strike is settled on terms above the generous proposals of the President's Emergency Board, it will be inflationary in its impact and therefore injurious to the national interest.

Early in the development of the new policies for prosperity, the Council of Economic Advisers emphasized that healthy economic progress has to rest on a stable structure of prices and labor costs. Earlier experience here, as well as the experience of other nations, demonstrates that periods of high employment tend to generate attempts by both labor and business to raise their respective shares of the national income.

Both labor and business can draw rich benefits from the steady and

rapid growth of total production. But both labor and business cannot, simultaneously, increase their shares in the division of that production. If they attempt to do so, the results can only be an inflation that benefits neither, but instead penalizes the public and jeopardizes the economic progress on which the interests of both depend. This was the basis for the Council's wage-price guideposts. Although a guidepost policy is meant to be a handmaiden, not a substitute, for suitable fiscal and monetary policies, responsible private wage and price decisions are an essential element in preserving price stability.

The issues in the current airlines wage dispute were exhaustively reviewed by an independent and judicious Emergency Board appointed by the President. The Board's recommendations were fair and generous. But the union, unlike management, was unwilling to accept its proposals. It is now imposing a heavy cost on the public in order to force a substantially more costly settlement.

My record will show that I am a friend of labor. I have firmly supported its objectives, and have frequently fought alongside labor's

representatives in support of our common legislative goals. I am speaking out now in the genuine conviction that the airlines union is hurting not only the cause of the public, but the cause of labor.

The union apparently thinks that excessive wage costs will be borne by the airlines out of their rapidly rising profits. But it should remember that today's high profits follow seven years of slim rewards. I am sure that the regulatory authorities will ask for rate cuts as needed to hold average returns on capital to reasonable levels--indeed, they would be remiss if they are not constantly on the watch for excessive profits.

The very fact, then, that the airlines are a regulated industry--that their earnings are to be limited to a fair and equitable return on their investments--means that higher airline labor costs will in the course of time be passed on to the traveling public.

But I am even more concerned about the impact that an excessive wage settlement in this highly visible case would have on other wage settlements and therefore on the whole cost structure of the economy. If the guideposts

are not only dented but smashed, we are heading for a destructive cost-price spiral. As President Kennedy said in 1962, what labor gains in one turn of the spiral, it will lose in the next.

I don't mean to say that labor bears responsibility for the price increases of the past year. While there have been a few excessive settlements, the great majority of union agreements over the past several years have stayed within the productivity trend. As I have publicly noted on several occasions, I have been more disturbed by the tendency for some prices to be pushed up in the face of stable labor costs.

But that is a reason for demanding better price performance by business, not a valid reason for a single union--which can threaten the public's convenience--to refuse already generous terms and demand more for its members.

I urge the union to join with management in settling this strike along the lines of the proposal of the President's Emergency Board.

#

*revised after discussion
with WW41 on July 17*

DRAFT STATEMENT BY
WALTER W. HELLER ON
THE AIRLINES STRIKE

I have had numerous inquiries from the press regarding the current airline strike. Consequently, I am releasing this statement of my views.

As one who played some part in the development of our current national economic policies, I feel compelled to speak out against any irresponsible action which threatens to disrupt our balanced economic progress. The current strike by the employees of 5 major airlines to sustain what appear to be unreasonable wage demands is just such an action.

Early in the development of the new policies for prosperity, the Council of Economic Advisers emphasized that a healthy economic progress can only rest on a stable structure of prices and labor costs. Earlier experience here, as well as the experience of other nations,

demonstrates that periods of high employment tend to generate attempts by both labor and business to raise their respective shares of the national income.

Both labor and business can draw rich benefit from the steady and rapid growth of total production. But both labor and business cannot, simultaneously, increase their shares in the division of that production. If they attempt to do so, the result can only be an inflation that benefits neither, but instead jeopardizes the progress on which the interests of both depend. This was the basis for the Council's wage-price guideposts. Although a guidepost policy can only work effectively in the context of suitable fiscal and monetary policies, the principle of responsible private wage and price decisions is an essential element in preserving price stability.

The issues in the current airlines wage dispute were exhaustively reviewed by an independent and judicious Emergency Board appointed by the President. The Board's recommendations were fair and generous. But the union was unwilling to accept its proposals, and it is now imposing a heavy cost on the public in order to force a substantially more costly settlement.

The union thinks this cost will be borne by the airlines -- newly prosperous after 7 years of slim rewards. But a victory of the union in this case would not be a victory over the airlines. The cost of a union victory would be paid by every family in America.

In the narrower sense, this is because the airlines are a regulated industry. Their earnings over the longer run will, I am sure, be limited to a fair and equitable return on the investment in airline equipment. Excessive airline labor costs imposed by a union victory would thus in the longer run be borne by the traveling public.

But the public will pay a much stiffer and more immediate price for a union victory in this dispute. If this group of workers is able to achieve an excessive settlement by the irresponsible use of its power, what other group of workers will be willing to accept a moderate and responsible settlement of its demands? And, seeing no moderation in the claims of labor, what business will feel an obligation to hold the line on prices and thereby pass up opportunities to swell its earnings?

I believe my record shows that I am a friend of labor. I have firmly supported its objectives, and have frequently fought alongside labor's representatives in support of our common legislative goals.

Nor will I claim that labor bears responsibility for the price increases of the past year. While there have been a few excessive settlements, the great majority of union agreements over the past

several years have stayed within the productivity trend. I have been more disturbed by the tendency for some prices to be pushed up in the face of stable labor costs.

But that is a reason for demanding better price performance by business, not a valid reason for a single union -- which can threaten the public convenience -- to refuse already generous terms and demand more for its members.

I urge the union to withdraw its excessive claims and to find a basis for settlement of this strike along the lines of the proposal of the President's Emergency Board.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

EXECUTIVE

LA6/Airlines

12:55 p.m., Wednesday
July 20, 1966

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM Joe Califano

Meany told Wirtz this morning that he was opposed to any legislation to deal with the airlines strike and that he would support any agreement the parties reached, as well as try to get the union leaders and membership to support it.

Subsequently, Siemiller told Meany (through Lane Kirkland) that he would settle for nothing less than a \$117 million package. The Morse board recommended a \$76 million package. Siemiller also said he wanted to take any offer the airlines put on the table today back to his union membership for a vote. Siemiller said the union membership would reject any such offer and he would urge them to do so. This would delay the bargaining for 7 days.

In view of this, Wirtz recommends:

1. Wirtz should get the airlines not to put any new proposal on the table this afternoon and get the union leaders ~~not~~ to withdraw their decision to go back to the membership for a vote and delay further bargaining for several days.

2. Wirtz should issue a statement that he and the parties will work around the clock to reach an agreement. In the statement, Wirtz would hit the union very hard and indicate that the agreement would have to be within the framework of the Morse board report.

3. We would all use the next day or two to bargain and to build public opinion against the union and for a legislative proposal directed at the airlines. The airlines want such legislation and believe it is the only hope for an economically stable settlement.

4. At your press conference, you would merely say that Wirtz was handling the matter and you had nothing to add to his statement earlier in the day, along with a reference to your earlier statements.

Nothing else sent to
Central Files as of 5/18/67

RECEIVED
JOE CALIFANO, JR.

1966 JUL 22 PM 5 13

*cc sent
to Ackley.*

*Put this in
Ackley's folder*



OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20428

EXECUTIVE

LA6/Airline
FG 211
FG 11-3

July 22, 1966

MEMORANDUM

TO: The President
The White House

FROM: Charles S. Murphy
Chairman

SUBJECT: Report on Airline Strike

Herewith in summary form is information relating to developments in the airline strike to date. Also attached are documents giving more detailed information as to certain aspects.

1. Scope of Struck Airline Service.

The five struck airlines in 1965 accounted for almost 60% of the revenue passenger miles of the domestic operations of the certificated industry. Further, almost 40% of international and territorial revenue passenger miles were flown by the struck airlines in 1965.

The five struck carriers provided the bulk of the service in more than 260 markets in which at least 25 passengers per day were moving. Of the top domestic 100 city pairs (based on revenue passenger miles), 24 are served exclusively by the struck airlines. Seventy one cities in the domestic U.S. which had scheduled trunk-line service are without such service. Of these cities 20, accounting for 1321 passenger enplanements per day, are served exclusively by one or more of the five carriers.

On the foreign scene, 11 countries in Europe, Africa and Asia serviced by the struck airlines are without U.S. flag scheduled service. These 11 countries are serviced through 14 foreign cities.

2. Lost Wages.

The five struck airlines employ about 101,000 people whose total annual payroll is some \$839 million. If the strike continues and the struck airlines lay off all personnel, lost wages will amount to \$2,298,000 daily.

July 28, 1966

FOR Gardner Ackley

FROM Joe Califano

FYI.

Attachment -

The initial impact on lost wages will not be as great as the impact if the strike continues. This is due to the different policies that each of the struck airlines followed in laying off personnel. We estimate the initial impact of lost wages to be about \$1.4 million daily.

Analysis by Airline

<u>Airline</u>	<u>Maximum Loss of Wages</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Initial Impact</u>
Eastern	\$506,000	22	\$308,000
National	120,000	5	70,000
Northwest	162,000	7	98,000
TWA	667,000	29	406,000
United	843,000	37	518,000
Total	\$2,298,000	100	\$1,400,000

3. Lost Revenues.

The five struck airlines are currently losing an estimated \$8.2 million daily in transport revenues, of which domestic revenues are about \$7 million. Projected through July 21, 1966 (for the first two weeks of the strike), the struck carriers have lost \$116 million in transport revenues. These amounts reflect peak demand and were determined for July 1966 consistent with 1965 seasonality.

Analysis by Airline

<u>Airline</u>	<u>Daily Transport Revenues</u>
Eastern	\$1,234,000
National	528,000
Northwest	939,000
TWA	2,573,000
United	2,906,000
Total	\$8,180,000

4. Substitute Service.

(a) CAB Actions. On July 9, 1966, the Board issued orders designed to permit the non-struck carriers to provide additional services to the traveling public during the strike. In sum, the

orders permitted (a) the certificated combination route carriers to provide unrestricted services between any pair of points on their respective systems in which the struck carriers, singly or in combination, provided 25% or more of the total scheduled flights; (b) the supplemental carriers to provide (1) individually-ticketed passenger service, pursuant to arrangements with certificated route carriers; (2) individually-waybilled cargo services, on an available space basis, on commercial charters and flights for the military establishment; and (3) to wet-lease aircraft to scheduled air carriers; and (c) all air carriers to fulfill existing charter contracts of any of the struck carriers.

In a separate order issued the same day, the Board granted antitrust immunity to the non-struck air carriers to permit carrier discussions of service adjustments designed to facilitate their ability to rationalize and spread services to meet critical needs during the emergency.

On July 15, 1966, the Board issued a further order expanding the authority of the supplemental air carriers to engage directly in individually-ticketed passenger services, without prior arrangement with the combination carriers, in 98 of the country's major passenger markets where 50% or more of the existing capacity had been provided by the struck carriers.

The Board has also issued 15 special exemptions to various carriers to enable them, in particular situations not covered by the broader Board orders, to provide needed emergency services during the strike. In large part, these actions permit the carriers to provide services in markets which would otherwise have been without any air service during the strike.

(b) Response of the carriers.

After some original hesitation, the non-struck carriers have on the whole responded affirmatively and vigorously to the Government's request for additional air services. They have canceled vacations, increased the duty time of ground employees (in some instances reservations personnel have been working 10 and 12-hour days, 6 days a week; some supervisory personnel have worked longer hours on a 7-day a week schedule). They have hired additional personnel where available; added telephone lines; utilized the services of supplemental and cargo carriers for passenger service; entered into arrangements with other non-struck carriers in competitive markets to eliminate wasteful competition, in order to

make additional service available in more critical markets; and have advertised to the public the new availability of services where appropriate. The non-struck carriers have indeed strained their resources to meet the public's service needs. Many of the carriers have taken these steps without anticipation of significant profit benefit. In this connection, the disruption of the air transportation system occasioned by the strike has vitally affected the flow of interline traffic which makes up anywhere from 30% to 40% of the total traffic carried by individual carriers. The loss and instability of interline traffic have added to the great increase in volume of "no shows" reported by the non-struck carriers. In fact, while many routes served during the strike have experienced extraordinarily high load factors, the system load factors of many of the non-struck carriers are in fact lower, rather than higher than would be anticipated were the total system in operation.

5. Extent of Substitute Service.

The attached summary sheets showing the major markets affected by the strike also reveal the markets in which the non-struck carriers have placed the major portion of the substitute service. We estimate that as of today the non-struck carriers are providing approximately 44% of the capacity on a seat mile basis that would have been provided by the total system without the strike. This means that the non-struck carriers have increased their service by approximately 10% -- or about 7% of the capacity of the struck carriers. In addition to the seats on these added services, the non-struck carriers have seats on their regular services that would not be occupied if there were no strike. We estimate that this would be about 40% of the capacity of the non-struck carriers -- or about 27% of the capacity of the struck carriers. This means that the total seats offered by the non-struck carriers to passengers in addition to the passengers these non-struck carriers would normally carry is about 34% of the capacity of the struck carriers. If each of these seats were offered at the place it is most needed and they were 100% utilized, the non-struck carriers could carry about 47% of the passengers the struck carriers would normally carry. However, it is obviously impossible to utilize 100% of the capacity offered by the non-struck carriers, and the useable capacity fills far less than 47% of the gap in service resulting from the strike.

6. Limiting Factors.

It should be noted that the strike took place at the period of peak demand over most of the air transportation system.

Under such circumstances, there is only a limited ability in the non-struck portions of the system to provide services over and above that previously scheduled.

From the outset, it was recognized that for the non-struck lines to be able to maximize their service contribution, it would be necessary to secure the cooperation of their employees. This was particularly true of the flight crews. Under many carrier pilot contracts, for example, work rules sharply restrict the hours that may be flown below the 85 hours authorized by law. On July 11th when it became clear that an early settlement of the strike was not in sight, the Board sought the cooperation of the various pilot groups in waiving for the period of the strike emergency those provisions of the contract which precluded the pilots from flying 85 hours per month.*/ Such relief from the contract, which incidentally would have entailed substantial additional compensation for the pilots, would have added substantially to the ability of the non-struck carriers to serve the public. In a few instances, we have been advised by the carriers that their pilots have agreed to fly at the maximum hours authorized by law. However, most of the carriers have not been able to make such arrangement with their pilot groups. In this connection, it may be noted that the president of the largest pilot organization, the Air Line Pilots Association, has not as yet taken what he earlier advised us**/ was a necessary poll of his board of directors in order to permit the individual carrier Master Executive Councils to negotiate this matter with the carriers.

The serious nature of this matter is highlighted by the fact that some of the non-struck carriers, which have been providing extra services during the strike, are now in a position where, because of flight crew limitations, they are beginning to curtail their services. Moreover, as we draw closer to the end of the month, there is an increasing likelihood that the non-struck carriers will become so limited with respect to crew time availability as to require further curtailment of operations.

A further limiting factor will be the unavailability of aircraft as a result of inability on the part of some carriers to complete necessary maintenance. Most air carriers program maintenance to meet forecast equipment utilization. Utilization of equipment in a manner different from that forecast places a substantial and cumulative burden on programmed maintenance. This

*/ For example, telegram dated July 11, 1966, to Charles Ruby, attached.

**/ Telegram from Charles Ruby, copy attached.

is particularly true, since many carriers contract out, on a reciprocal basis, a substantial portion of their downline maintenance to other carriers. A significant portion of this downline maintenance was, in fact, being provided prior to the strike by the five struck carriers. Moreover, increased aircraft utilization accelerates the date for overhauls; and the carriers' capacity to perform overhauls is limited. Consequently, a backup in aircraft overhaul and increased downtime may be anticipated. Under these circumstances, it is clear that lack of aircraft availability due to maintenance delays will be an increasingly important factor to be weighed in determining the ability of the non-struck carriers to service the system.

7. Outlook.

Finally, it is to be noted that American Airlines is the only major transcontinental carrier remaining in service. Normally, American provides approximately 16% of the total domestic airline capacity. Should the TWU strike American on July 27th, therefore, there would be approximately 76% of the total domestic air transportation system out of service. In addition, 57 of the top 100 domestic city pairs would be without certificated scheduled service if American were to join the current struck group. As we have previously noted, this would take place at a point in time at which the remaining carriers would be beyond their ability to expand their services. The implications of such a development to the total transportation system are obvious.

Even assuming that American remains operational throughout July, there will be a decreasing volume of service as we move towards the end of the month. And should American be closed down, east-west air service would be reduced to token proportions, and service in many other markets served by American would be virtually non-existent. The over-all situation would then be far more critical than at present.

Attachments

Charles S Murphy

CARRIER STRIKE REPORT
PREPARED - JULY 12, 1966

GROUP 1 STRIKING CARRIERS FLY 100 PERCENT OF FLIGHTS

CITY - PAIR		PERCENT OF MARKET	AVERAGE DAILY PASSENGERS	AUTHORIZED CARRIERS			REGULAR AUTHORITY	CARRIERS ON STRIKE	EXEMPTIONS - E23928
				BN	NO	OZ		EA NW UA	
CHICAGO	WINNEBAGO	100	1751						
CHICAGO, ILL.	CLEVELAND, OHIO	100	1271	AA	LC	NO		EA NW TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	PHILADELPHIA, PA	100	1014	AA	DL			EA NW TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	1004	AA	LC			EA NW TW UA	
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	682	BN				EA NW TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	SEATTLE, WASH.	100	629					NW UA	
DENVER, COLORADO	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	594	BN				TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	COLUMBUS, OHIO	100	507	AA	DL	LC		EA TW UA	
DETROIT, MICH.	LOS ANGELES, CAL	100	492	AA	DL			TW UA	
BALTIMORE, MD.	CHICAGO, ILL.	100	475	AA	DL	LC		EA TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	DAYTON, OHIO	100	466	AA	DL	LC		TW UA	
DETROIT, MICH.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	461	AA	AL	DL	LC	EA NW TW UA	
INDIANAPOLIS, IND	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	458	AA	DL			EA TW UA	
SAN FRANCISCO	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	447	AA	DL			EA TW UA	
PITTSBURGH, PA.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	444	AA	AL	LC		EA NW TW UA	
DETROIT, MICH.	PHILADELPHIA, PA	100	434	AA	AL	DL		EA NW TW UA	
KANSAS CITY, MO.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	433	BN	DL			TW UA	
MILWAUKEE, WIS.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	433					EA NW UA	
DAYTON, OHIO	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	414	AA	DL			TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	OMAHA, NEBRASKA	100	413	BN	NO	OZ		UA	
NEW YORK, N.Y.	TAMPA, FLORIDA	100	403	DL				EA NA NW TW UA	
NEW YORK, N.Y.	SEATTLE, WASH.	100	385					NW UA	
CHARLOTTE, N.C.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	378	DL				EA UA	
MIAMI, FLORIDA	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	377	DL	NE			EA NA NW TW UA	
CLEVELAND, OHIO	PHILADELPHIA, PA	100	371	AA	AL			EA NW TW UA	
BOSTON, MASS.	SAN FRANCISCO	100	351	AA				EA NW TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	DES MOINES, IOWA	100	349	BN	OZ			UA	
NEW YORK, N.Y.	NORFOLK, VA.	100	349					EA UA	
CLEVELAND, OHIO	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	320	AA	AL	LC		EA NW TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	LAS VEGAS, NEV.	100	309	DL				TW UA	
MIAMI, FLORIDA	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	303					EA NW TW UA	
DETROIT, MICH.	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	296	AA	AL	LC	MO	EA NW TW UA	
LOS ANGELES, CAL	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	295	AA				TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	PORTLAND, OREGON	100	294					NW UA	
JACKSONVILLE	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	285	DL				EA NA UA	
PHILADELPHIA, PA	SAN FRANCISCO	100	285	AA	DL			EA TW UA	
HARTFORD, CONN.	CHICAGO, ILL.	100	283	AA				EA TW UA	
DENVER, COLORADO	SEATTLE, WASH.	100	283	WA				UA	
GREENSBORO, N.C.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	263					EA UA	
DETROIT, MICH.	MILWAUKEE, WIS.	100	262	NO				EA NW UA	
NEW YORK, N.Y.	RALEIGH, N.C.	100	254					EA UA	
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	247	BN				EA NW UA	
DETROIT, MICH.	SAN FRANCISCO	100	243	AA	DL			EA TW UA	
CLEVELAND, OHIO	MIAMI, FLORIDA	100	237					EA NW TW UA	
MILWAUKEE, WIS.	MINNEAPOLIS, MINN	100	237	NO	OZ			EA NW TW UA	
CLEVELAND, OHIO	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	235	AA	AL	LC	MO	EA NW TW UA	
ST. LOUIS, MO.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	235	AA	BN	DL		EA NW TW UA	
NEW YORK, N.Y.	RICHMOND, VA.	100	228					EA TW UA	
SAN FRANCISCO	ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	226	AA	DL			EA TW UA	
NEW YORK, N.Y.	ORLANDO, FLORIDA	100	225	DL				EA NA	
FRESNO, CALIF.	LOS ANGELES, CAL	100	224	PC				UA	

CARRIER STRIKE REPORT
 PREPARED - JULY 12, 1966
 GROUP 1 STRIKING CARRIERS FLY 100 PERCENT OF FLIGHTS

CITY - PAIR		PERCENT OF MARKET	AVERAGE DAILY PASSENGERS	AUTHORIZED CARRIERS			REGULAR AUTHORITY	CARRIERS ON STRIKE			EXEMPTIONS - E23928
LOS ANGELES, CAL	MIAMI, FLORIDA	100	222	DL				NA	TW	UA	
DETROIT, MICH.	MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.	100	220	NO				EA	NW	UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	ROCHESTER, MINN.	100	219	BN	OZ			NW			
PHILADELPHIA, PA.	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	216	AA	AL	MO		EA	TW	UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	TOLEDO, OHIO	100	215	DL	LC			EA	UA		
CHICAGO, ILL.	SALT LAKE CITY	100	210					UA			
HARTFORD, CONN.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	209	AA	AL	NE		EA	TW	UA	
COLUMBUS, OHIO	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	207	AA	DL	LC	PI	EA	TW	UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	NASHVILLE, TENN.	100	207	SO				EA	TW		
DETROIT, MICH.	ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	204	AA	DL			EA	TW		
ALBUQUERQUE, N.M.	LOS ANGELES, CAL	100	201	CO				EA			
CHICAGO, ILL.	SAGINAW, MICH.	100	199	NO				TW			
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	198					UA			
DAYTON, OHIO	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	184	AA	DL	LC		EA	NW	TW	UA
BUFFALO, N.Y.	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	181	AA	AL	LC	MO	TW	UA		
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	CLEVELAND, OHIO	100	181					UA			
MIAMI, FLORIDA	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	100	178	DL				EA	NW	TW	UA
DENVER, COLORADO	OMAHA, NEBRASKA	100	174	UN	FL			EA	NA	UA	
RALEIGH, N.C.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	175	PI				EA			
SPOKANE, WASH.	PORTLAND, OREGON	100	173	WC				EA	UA		
BUFFALO, N.Y.	PHILADELPHIA, PA.	100	171	AA	AL			NW	UA		
LAS VEGAS, NEV.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	170	DL				UA			
LOUISVILLE, KY.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	170	AA	DL	PI		NA	TW	UA	
BUFFALO, N.Y.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	169	AA	AL	LC		EA	TW		
CHICAGO, ILL.	CEDAR RAPIDS, IA	100	168	OZ				UA			
CHICAGO, ILL.	RALEIGH, N.C.	100	166					EA	UA		
DENVER, COLORADO	PORTLAND, OREGON	100	165	WA				EA			
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	165	DL				EA			
NASHVILLE, TENN.	CHICAGO, ILL.	100	163	AA	BN	OZ		EA	TW		
LOS ANGELES, CAL	OMAHA, NEBRASKA	100	160					EA	TW		
NEW YORK, N.Y.	TOLEDO, OHIO	100	158	DL				UA			
CHICAGO, ILL.	CHARLOTTE, N.C.	100	157	DL				EA	UA		
CHICAGO, ILL.	FORT WAYNE, IND.	100	155	DL				EA	UA		
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	GREENSBORO, N.C.	100	149	PI				UA			
CHICAGO, ILL.	JACKSONVILLE	100	149	DL				EA	UA		
NEW YORK, N.Y.	W. PALM BEACH	100	147	DL				EA	NA	UA	
FARGO, N.D.	MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.	100	146	NO				EA			
NEW YORK, N.Y.	OMAHA, NEBRASKA	100	145	BN				NW			
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	RALEIGH, N.C.	100	144	PI				UA			
INDIANAPOLIS, IND	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	142	AA	DL	LC		EA	UA		
BALTIMORE, MD.	DENVER, COLORADO	100	142					EA	TW	UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	WICHITA, KANSAS	100	141	BN	CO			TW			
ALBUQUERQUE, N.M.	CHICAGO, ILL.	100	141	CO				TW			
HOUSTON, TEXAS	SAN FRANCISCO	100	139	AA	DL			NA			
DAYTON, OHIO	LOS ANGELES, CAL	100	138	AA	DL			TW	UA		
INDIANAPOLIS, IND	ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	137	AA	DL	OZ		EA	TW		
BALTIMORE, MD.	KANSAS CITY, MO.	100	134	DL				EA	TW		
CLEVELAND, OHIO	INDIANAPOLIS, IND	100	133	AA	LC			EA	TW		
BALTIMORE, MD.	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	131	AA	AL	LC		EA	TW	UA	
BALTIMORE, MD.	ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	131	AA	DL			EA	TW		

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

CARRIER STRIKE REPORT
PREPARED - JULY 12, 1966

GROUP 1 STRIKING CARRIERS FLY 100 PERCENT OF FLIGHTS

EXEMPTED - E23928

CITY - PAIR		PERCENT OF MARKET	AVERAGE DAILY PASSENGERS	AUTHORIZED CARRIERS		REGULAR AUTHORITY	CARRIERS ON STRIKE	
COLUMBUS, OHIO	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	131	AA	LC		EA	TW UA
CHICAGO, ILL.	LANSING, MICH.	100	131	NO			EA	TW UA
HARTFORD, CONN.	CLEVELAND, OHIO	100	129	AA	AL MO		EA	TW
PHILADELPHIA, PA.	ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	126	AA	DL		EA	TW
PITTSBURGH, PA.	ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	124	AA			EA	UA
CHICAGO, ILL.	MUSKEGON, MICH.	100	124	NO			EA	UA
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	MOBILE, ALABAMA	100	124	SO			EA	UA
AKRON, OHIO	CHICAGO, ILL.	100	123	LC			EA	UA
NEW YORK, N.Y.	YOUNGSTOWN, OHIO	100	123				EA	NW UA
CLEVELAND, OHIO	MILWAUKEE, WIS.	100	123	NO			EA	NW UA
CLEVELAND, OHIO	TAMPA, FLORIDA	100	122				EA	TW UA
DENVER, COLORADO	LAS VEGAS, NEV.	100	119	WA			EA	UA
BALTIMORE, MD.	MIAMI, FLORIDA	100	116	DL			EA	UA
HUNTSVILLE, ALA.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	116				EA	UA
LOUISVILLE, KY.	ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	113	AA	DL OZ		EA	UA
CHICAGO, ILL.	SPOKANE, WASH.	100	113				EA	UA
CHICAGO, ILL.	GREENSBORO, N.C.	100	110				EA	UA
CHARLESTON, W.VA.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	110	AA			EA	UA
GREENVILLE, S.C.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	108				EA	UA
PITTSBURGH, PA.	TAMPA, FLORIDA	100	108				EA	NW UA
MILWAUKEE, WIS.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	105				EA	NW UA
AKRON, OHIO	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	104				EA	UA
ROCHESTER, N.Y.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	103	AA			EA	UA
PHILADELPHIA, PA.	ROCHESTER, N.Y.	100	103	AA			EA	UA
DAYTON, OHIO	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	101	AA	LC		EA	UA
CHARLESTON, W.VA.	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	99	AA	LC		EA	UA
BALTIMORE, MD.	DETROIT, MICH.	100	99	AA	AL DL LC		EA	UA
JACKSONVILLE	TAMPA, FLORIDA	100	99	DL	MK		EA	UA
BOISE, IDAHO	SALT LAKE CITY	100	98	WC			EA	UA
TAMPA, FLORIDA	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	98	DL			EA	UA
HOUSTON, TEXAS	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	98	AA	BN DL		EA	UA
CHARLESTON, S.C.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	98	DL			EA	UA
MOBILE, ALABAMA	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	100	97	SO			EA	UA
NEW YORK, N.Y.	KNOXVILLE, TENN.	100	97	AA	DL		EA	UA
BALTIMORE, MD.	CLEVELAND, OHIO	100	95	AA	AL LC		EA	UA
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	NORFOLK, VA.	100	95	PI			EA	UA
PHILADELPHIA, PA.	SYRACUSE, N.Y.	100	94	AA			EA	UA
ALBUQUERQUE, N.M.	LAS VEGAS, NEV.	100	92				EA	UA
NEW ORLEANS, LA.	TAMPA, FLORIDA	100	92	DL			EA	UA
JACKSONVILLE	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	92	DL			EA	UA
BIRMINGHAM, ALA.	CHICAGO, ILL.	100	88	DL			EA	UA
LOS ANGELES, CAL.	TAMPA, FLORIDA	100	86	DL			EA	UA
BALTIMORE, MD.	NORFOLK, VA.	100	85	PI			EA	UA
DES MOINES, IOWA	OMAHA, NEBRASKA	100	84	BN	OZ		EA	UA
ALBUQUERQUE, N.M.	PHOENIX, ARIZONA	100	83	CO	FL		EA	UA
NEW YORK, N.Y.	NEWPORT NEWS, VA	100	82				EA	UA
ALLEN TOWN, PA.	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	82				EA	UA
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	CHARLESTON, W.VA.	100	81	PI			EA	UA
BOSTON, MASS.	TAMPA, FLORIDA	100	81				EA	UA
MIAMI, FLORIDA	ORLANDO, FLORIDA	100	81	DL			EA	UA
* SALT LAKE CITY SEATTLE		100	92	WA WC			EA	UA

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

CARRIER STRIKE REPORT
PREPARED - JULY 12, 1966

GROUP 1 STRIKING CARRIERS FLY 100 PERCENT OF FLIGHTS

CITY - PAIR		PERCENT OF MARKET	AVERAGE DAILY PASSENGERS	AUTHORIZED CARRIERS			REGULAR AUTHORITY	CARRIERS ON STRIKE			EXEMPTIONS - E23928
FORT WAYNE, IND.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	77	DL				UA			
PITTSBURGH, PA.	LOUISVILLE, KY.	100	76	AA				EA	TW		
ORLANDO, FLORIDA	WASHINGTON, D.C.	100	75	DL				EA	NA		
BOISE, IDAHO	PORTLAND, OREGON	100	73	WC				UA			
INDIANAPOLIS, IND.	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	71	AA	LC			EA	TW		
EVANSVILLE, IND.	ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	71	DL				EA			
MADISON, WIS.	MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.	100	71	NO	OZ			NW		UA	
MILWAUKEE, WIS.	PHILADELPHIA, PA.	100	70					EA	NW	UA	
HARTFORD, CONN.	PITTSBURGH, PA.	100	69	AA	AL	MO		EA	TW	UA	
NOFOLK, VA.	PHILADELPHIA, PA.	100	68					EA	NA		
CHICAGO, ILL.	HUNTSVILLE, ALA.	100	67					EA	UA		
INDIANAPOLIS, IND.	PHILADELPHIA, PA.	100	67	AA	DL			EA	TW		
ST. LOUIS, MO.	TAMPA, FLORIDA	100	66	DL				EA	TW		
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.	PORTLAND, OREGON	100	66	WA				EA	NW	UA	
NEW ORLEANS, LA.	PENSACOLA, FLA.	100	63					EA	NA		
CLEVELAND, OHIO	FORT WAYNE, IND.	100	63					UA			
BIRMINGHAM, ALA.	MOBILE, ALABAMA	100	63	SO				EA	UA		
KANSAS CITY, MO.	PHOENIX, ARIZONA	100	62	CO	FL			EA	TW		
NEW ORLEANS, LA.	SAN ANTONIO, TEX.	100	62	BN	TT			EA			
NASHVILLE, TENN.	ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	61	AA	BN	OZ		EA	TW		
JACKSONVILLE	PHILADELPHIA, PA.	100	58	DL				EA	NA	UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	INDIANAPOLIS, IND.	100	57	DL				EA	TW		
CHARLOTTE, N.C.	MIAMI, FLORIDA	100	57	DL				EA	UA		
PORTLAND, OREGON	SALT LAKE CITY	100	57	WA	WC			UA			
CLEVELAND, OHIO	GRAND RAPIDS	100	57	LC	NO			UA			
DETROIT, MICH.	GRAND RAPIDS	100	55	LC	NO			UA			
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	W. PALM BEACH	100	54	DL				EA	UA		
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	TALLAHASSEE, FLA.	100	53					EA			
HUNTSVILLE, ALA.	ST. LOUIS, MO.	100	53					EA			
CLEVELAND, OHIO	DENVER, COLORADO	100	53					EA			
COLUMBUS, OHIO	INDIANAPOLIS, IND.	100	52	AA	DL	LC		TW	UA		
HUNTSVILLE, ALA.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	100	51					EA	TW	UA	

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CARRIER STRIKE REPORT
PREPARED - JULY 12, 1966

GROUP 2 STRIKING CARRIERS FLY BETWEEN 51 AND 99 PERCENT OF FLIGHTS

CITY - PAIR		PERCENT OF MARKET	AVERAGE DAILY PASSENGERS	AUTHORIZED CARRIERS				REGULAR AUTHORITY	CARRIERS ON STRIKE				EXEMPTIONS - E23928	
BOSTON, MASS.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	68	5476	AA*	AL	MO	NE*		EA	NA	TW	UA		
LOS ANGELES, CAL	SAN FRANCISCO	65	5083	AA*	DL	PC	WA*		NA	TW	UA			
CHICAGO, ILL.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	64	4578	AA*	BN	DL			EA	NW	TW	UA		
NEW YORK, N.Y.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	78	4463	AA*	AL	BN*	DL	NE	EA	NA	NW	TW	UA	
MIAMI, FLORIDA	NEW YORK, N.Y.	90	3208	DL	NE*				EA	NA	NW	TW	UA	
LOS ANGELES, CAL	NEW YORK, N.Y.	60	2416	AA*	DL				NA	TW	UA			
DETROIT, MICH.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	54	2125	AA*	AL	DL	MO		EA	NW	TW	UA		
CHICAGO, ILL.	LOS ANGELES, CAL	51	2106	AA*	CO*	DL			TW	UA				
NEW YORK, N.Y.	SAN FRANCISCO	67	1784	AA*	DL				NA	TW	UA			
CLEVELAND, OHIO	NEW YORK, N.Y.	77	1635	AA*	AL	MO			EA	NW	TW	UA		
NEW YORK, N.Y.	PITTSBURGH, PA.	91	1603	AA*	AL	MO			EA	NW	TW	UA		
CHICAGO, ILL.	SAN FRANCISCO	65	1476	AA*	DL				TW	UA				
SEATTLE, WASH.	SAN FRANCISCO	71	1253	WA*	WC				UA					
BOSTON, MASS.	CHICAGO, ILL.	55	1031	AA*					EA	TW	UA			
LOS ANGELES, CAL	SEATTLE, WASH.	60	1025	WA*					UA					
CHICAGO, ILL.	DENVER, COLORADO	68	971	BN	CO*				TW	UA				
CHICAGO, ILL.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	56	953	AA*	BN	DL	LC		EA	NW	TW	UA		
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	NEW YORK, N.Y.	64	921	DL*					EA	NW	TW	UA		
NEW YORK, N.Y.	ST. LOUIS, MO.	76	840	AA*	BN	DL			EA	TW				
CHICAGO, ILL.	MIAMI, FLORIDA	65	796	DL*					EA	NW	TW	UA		
PORTLAND, OREGON	SAN FRANCISCO	68	757	PC	WA*	WC			UA					
LOS ANGELES, CAL	SACRAMENTO, CAL.	56	695	PC	WA*				UA					
PHILADELPHIA, PA	WASHINGTON, D.C.	62	648	AA*	AL*	DL	NE*		EA	NA	NW	TW	UA	
KANSAS CITY, MO.	ST. LOUIS, MO.	82	641	BN*	CN	DL	OZ		TW					
LOS ANGELES, CAL	WASHINGTON, D.C.	60	609	AA*	DL				NA	TW	UA			
NORFOLK, VA.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	76	601	PI*					NA	UA				
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	CHICAGO, ILL.	54	586	DL*					EA	NW	TW	UA		
RENO, NEVADA	SAN FRANCISCO	89	580	PC	WA*				UA					
DENVER, COLORADO	SAN FRANCISCO	78	572	WA*					TW	UA				
HOUSTON, TEXAS	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	73	564	BN	DL*	TT			EA	NA				
BALTIMORE, MD.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	83	552	AA*	AL	DL*			EA	NA				
PORTLAND, OREGON	SEATTLE, WASH.	70	535	WA*	WC*				NW	UA				
HOUSTON, TEXAS	NEW YORK, N.Y.	60	522	AA	BN	DL*			EA	NA				
COLUMBUS, OHIO	NEW YORK, N.Y.	60	487	AA*	DL				EA	NA	TW	UA		
MIAMI, FLORIDA	PHILADELPHIA, PA	83	474	DL	NE*				EA	NA	NW	TW	UA	
LOS ANGELES, CAL	KANSAS CITY, MO.	60	470	CO*	DL				TW	UA				
LAS VEGAS, NEV.	SAN FRANCISCO	60	469	DL*	PC	WA*			NA	TW	UA			
NEW YORK, N.Y.	PHILADELPHIA, PA	58	467	AA*	AL*	DL*	NE		EA	NA	NW	TW	UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	LOUISVILLE, KY.	83	464	AA	DL*	OZ			EA	TW				
LOS ANGELES, CAL	PORTLAND, OREGON	75	461	PC	WA*				UA					
HOUSTON, TEXAS	LOS ANGELES, CAL	56	446	AA	CO*	DL			NA					
MIAMI, FLORIDA	TAMPA, FLORIDA	87	445	DL*	MK				EA	NA	NW	TW	UA	
NEW ORLEANS, LA.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	53	439	BN	DL*				EA	NA	UA			
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	MIAMI, FLORIDA	61	436	DL*					EA	NW	TW	UA		
LOS ANGELES, CAL	ST. LOUIS, MO.	83	426	AA*	DL				TW					
SAN FRANCISCO	SALT LAKE CITY	70	410	WA*	WC				UA					
DENVER, COLORADO	SALT LAKE CITY	81	367	FL	WA*				UA					
SPOKANE, WASH.	SEATTLE, WASH.	73	363	WC*					NW	UA				
BOSTON, MASS.	MIAMI, FLORIDA	75	318	NE*					EA	NA	TW	UA		
NEW YORK, N.Y.	LOUISVILLE, KY.	67	303	AA*	DL				EA	TW				

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GROUP 2 STRIKING CARRIERS FLY BETWEEN 51 AND 99 PERCENT OF FLIGHTS

CITY - PAIR		PERCENT OF MARKET	AVERAGE DAILY PASSENGERS	AUTHORIZED CARRIERS	REGULAR AUTHORITY	CARRIERS ON STRIKE	EXEMPTIONS - E23928
CHICAGO, ILL.	TAMPA, FLORIDA	71	297	DL*		EA NW TW UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	JACKSONVILLE	57	295	DL* SO		EA UA TW UA	
CLEVELAND, OHIO	DETROIT, MICH.	74	290	AA AL LC* MO NO*		EA NW TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	GRAND RAPIDS	81	279	LC NO*		UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	MOLINE, ILLINOIS	88	273	OZ*		UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	TAMPA, FLORIDA	67	265	DL*		EA NW TW UA	
CHICAGO, ILL.	SOUTH BEND, IND.	55	252	LC NO*		UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	CHARLOTTE, N.C.	74	248	DL* PI SO		EA UA TW UA	
BALTIMORE, MD.	LOS ANGELES, CAL	67	240	AA* DL		EA NA UA	
JACKSONVILLE	MIAMI, FLORIDA	75	233	DL* MK		EA NA UA	
NEWPORT NEWS, VA	WASHINGTON, D.C.	94	231	PI*		EA NA UA	
BALTIMORE, MD.	BOSTON, MASS.	83	230	AA* AL		EA NA TW UA	
FRESNO, CALIF.	SAN FRANCISCO	67	216	PC*		EA NA UA	
RICHMOND, VA.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	79	210	PI*		EA NA UA	
LOS ANGELES, CAL	TUCSON, ARIZONA	67	182	AA* CO		EA NA UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	HOUSTON, TEXAS	64	171	DL*		EA NA UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	ORLANDO, FLORIDA	57	161	DL*		EA NA UA	
* GREENSBORO, N.C.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	93	158	PI*		EA NA UA	
BALTIMORE, MD.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	56	146	AA AL* DL* LC* PI*		EA NA UA	
MIAMI, FLORIDA	W. PALM BEACH	63	141	DL* MK*		EA NA UA	
CINCINNATI, OHIO	ST. LOUIS, MO.	67	136	AA* DL		EA NA UA	
CINCINNATI, OHIO	PITTSBURGH, PA.	75	129	AA* LC		EA NA UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	GREENVILLE, S.C.	85	127	SO*		EA NA UA	
CHARLESTON, W. VA	WASHINGTON, D.C.	60	115	AA* LC PI		EA NA UA	
CHARLOTTE, N.C.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	60	111	DL* PI		EA NA UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	BALTIMORE, MD.	57	109	DL* PI		EA NA UA	
BAKERSFIELD, CAL	LOS ANGELES, CAL	63	104	PC*		EA NA UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	MONTGOMERY, ALA.	55	98	DL* SO		EA NA UA	
KNOXVILLE, TENN.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	56	97	AA* DL PI CN		EA NA UA	
OKLAHOMA, OKLA.	ST. LOUIS, MO.	67	92	AA* BN		EA NA UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	LOUISVILLE, KY.	55	-86	DL* PI		EA NA UA	
RENO, NEVADA	SACRAMENTO, CAL.	89	83	PC WA*		EA NA UA	
BIRMINGHAM, ALA.	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	67	64	DL* SO		EA NA UA	
CLEVELAND, OHIO	TOLEDO, OHIO	85	58	LC*		EA NA UA	
BIRMINGHAM, ALA.	MEMPHIS, TENN.	67	57	DL* SO		EA NA UA	
STOCKTON, CALIF.	SAN FRANCISCO	70	50	PC*		EA NA UA	
* CLEVELAND	ST. LOUIS	60	153	AA*		EA NA UA	

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

CARRIER STRIKE REPORT
PREPARED - JULY 12, 1966

GROUP 3 STRIKING CARRIERS FLY BETWEEN 25 AND 50 PERCENT OF FLIGHTS

CITY - PAIR		PERCENT OF MARKET	AVERAGE DAILY PASSENGERS	AUTHORIZED CARRIERS				REGULAR AUTHORITY	CARRIERS ON STRIKE				EXEMPTIONS - E23928
LAS VEGAS, NEV.	LOS ANGELES, CAL	25	2023	BL*	DL	PC	WA*		NA	TW	UA		
CHICAGO, ILL.	DETROIT, MICH.	31	1535	AA*	DL	LC	NO		EA	NW	TW	UA	
BOSTON, MASS.	WASHINGTON, D.C.	29	1162	AA*	AL	NE*			EA	NA	TW	UA	
LOS ANGELES, CAL	SAN DIEGO, CALIF	44	1085	AA*	BL	DL*	PC*	WA*	NA	UA			
CHICAGO, ILL.	KANSAS CITY, MO.	48	1011	BN*	CO*	DL	OZ		TW	UA			
CHICAGO, ILL.	MILWAUKEE, WIS.	34	827	NO*	OZ				EA	NW	UA		
LOS ANGELES, CAL	PHOENIX, ARIZONA	25	797	AA*	BL	CO*	WA*		TW				
NEW YORK, N.Y.	ROCHESTER, N.Y.	29	791	AA*	MO				UA				
DENVER, COLORADO	LOS ANGELES, CAL	44	769	CO*	WA				TW	UA			
HARTFORD, CONN.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	46	765	AA*	AL*	MO	NE*		EA	TW	UA		
NEW YORK, N.Y.	PROVIDENCE, R.I.	26	720	AA*	AL*	MO			EA	NA	UA		
CHICAGO, ILL.	INDIANAPOLIS, IND	42	686	AA*	DL*	LC	OZ		EA	TW			
BOSTON, MASS.	PHILADELPHIA, PA	50	682	AA	AL	NE*			EA	NA	TW	UA	
PHILADELPHIA, PA	PITTSBURGH, PA.	34	605	AA	AL*				EA	NW	TW	UA	
BOSTON, MASS.	LOS ANGELES, CAL	50	503	AA*					NA	TW	UA		
LOS ANGELES, CAL	PHILADELPHIA, PA	50	444	AA*	DL				NA	TW	UA		
BUFFALO, N.Y.	CHICAGO, ILL.	50	417	AA*	LC				UA				
DALLAS, TEXAS	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	27	408	BN	DL*	TT			EA				
CHICAGO, ILL.	PHOENIX, ARIZONA	50	374	AA*	CO				TW				
CHICAGO, ILL.	MADISON, WIS.	43	371	NO*	OZ				NW				
HOUSTON, TEXAS	SAN ANTONIO, TEX	33	357	AA*	BN	CO*	TT*		EA				
CLEVELAND, OHIO	LOS ANGELES, CAL	38	355	AA*					TW	UA			
SACRAMENTO, CAL.	SAN FRANCISCO	47	334	PC*	WA	WC*			UA				
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	WASHINGTON, D.C.	47	302	DL*	PI				EA	NW	TW	UA	
BOSTON, MASS.	CLEVELAND, OHIO	44	286	AA*	AL	MO			EA	TW	UA		
BOSTON, MASS.	DETROIT, MICH.	25	272	AA*	AL	MO			EA	TW	UA		
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	45	263	DL*	SO				EA	UA			
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	BIRMINGHAM, ALA.	47	259	DL*	SO*				EA	UA			
PHOENIX, ARIZONA	SAN FRANCISCO	33	257	AA*	WA				TW				
DETROIT, MICH.	MIAMI, FLORIDA	50	249	DL*					EA	NW	TW	UA	
HARRISBURG, PA.	PITTSBURGH, PA.	35	217	AL*					TW	UA			
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	PHILADELPHIA, PA	50	213	DL*					EA	NW	TW	UA	
SALINAS, CALIF.	SAN FRANCISCO	48	211	PC*					UA				
LOS ANGELES, CAL	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	40	209	DL*					NA	UA			
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	COLUMBUS, GA.	33	204	DL*	SO*				EA				
CORPUS CHRISTI	HOUSTON, TEXAS	37	198	BN*	TT*				EA				
LOS ANGELES, CAL	OKLAHOMA, OKLA.	50	195	AA*	CO				TW				
CLEVELAND, OHIO	CINCINNATI, OHIO	29	188	AA*	LC				EA	TW			
NEW YORK, N.Y.	PHOENIX, ARIZONA	50	176	AA*					TW				
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	ASHEVILLE, N.C.	44	175	DL	PI*				UA				
WICHITA, KANSAS	KANSAS CITY, MO.	40	170	BN*	CN	CO			TW				
LOS ANGELES, CAL	SANTA BARBARA, CAL	44	152	PC*					UA				
BIRMINGHAM, ALA.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	50	146	DL*					EA	UA			
CINCINNATI, OHIO	WASHINGTON, D.C.	33	144	AA*	DL	LC	PI		EA	TW			
HARRISBURG, PA.	NEW YORK, N.Y.	33	137	AL*					TW	UA			
ST. LOUIS, MO.	TULSA, OKLAHOMA	40	119	AA*	BN	CN	OZ		TW				
ALBANY, NEW YORK	BOSTON, MASS.	25	109	AA*	MO				TW				
DENVER, COLORADO	GRAND JUNCTION	33	107	FL*					UA				
BALTIMORE, MD.	NEW ORLEANS, LA.	25	99	DL*					EA	NA	UA		
ATLANTA, GEORGIA	CHATTANOOGA, TENN	36	97	DL*	SO				EA	UA			

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

CARRIER STRIKE REPORT
PREPARED - JULY 12, 1966

GROUP 3 STRIKING CARRIERS FLY BETWEEN 25 AND 50 PERCENT OF FLIGHTS

CITY - PAIR	PERCENT OF MARKET	AVERAGE DAILY PASSENGERS	AUTHORIZED CARRIERS	REGULAR AUTHORITY	CARRIERS ON STRIKE	EXEMPTIONS - E23928
CINCINNATI, OHIO LOUISVILLE, KY.	27	92	AA* DL* PI		EA TW	
ALBANY, GEORGIA ATLANTA, GEORGIA	33	91	SO*		EA	
HUNTSVILLE, ALA. MEMPHIS, TENN.	44	89	SO*		EA UA	
CHARLOTTE, N.C. PHILADELPHIA, PA	33	84	DL*		EA UA	
CINCINNATI, OHIO TAMPA, FLORIDA	50	80	DL*		EA TW	
BEAUMONT, TEXAS HOUSTON, TEXAS	47	80	DL* TT*		EA	
MEDFORD, OREGON SAN FRANCISCO	50	79	PC* WC		UA	
ATLANTA, GEORGIA MACON, GEORGIA	31	78	DL*		EA	
NASHVILLE, TENN. LOUISVILLE, KY.	36	74	AA* OZ		EA TW	
MINNEAPLIS, MINN. ROCHESTER, MINN.	47	73	BN* OZ*		NW	
HARTFORD, CONN. BOSTON, MASS.	29	70	AA* AL* MO* NE		EA TW UA	
BATON ROUGE, LA. NEW ORLEANS, LA.	32	69	DL* SO*		EA	
HARRISBURG, PA. WASHINGTON, D.C.	29	58	AL*		TW UA	
BALTIMORE, MD. PHILADELPHIA, PA	26	57	AA* AL* DL*		EA NA TW UA	

- NOTES:
- (1) Schedule data is as of May, 1965.
 - (2) "Authorized carriers" are those carriers with certificate authority to provide service in the listed market, as well as those carriers who could provide service as a result of the Board's grant of emergency authority under E-23928.
 - (3) Asterisked carriers are the non-struck carriers providing service as of May 1965.
 - (4) The number of passengers are as shown in the "Competition Study" for the 3rd quarter of 1965 recomputed to an average number per day.
 - (5) The city pairs include all markets, in terms of passenger density, from the largest and ranging down to 50 passengers per day, in each category shown.



CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

IN REPLY REFER TO:

COPY OF TELEGRAM

JULY 11, 1966

MR. CHARLES RUBY
PRESIDENT
AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION
55TH STREET & CICERO AVENUE
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

TO PROVIDE NEEDED AIRLINE SERVICES DURING THE PRESENT
STRIKE EMERGENCY, IT IS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT TO PERMIT
PILOTS ON THE OPERATING AIRLINES TO FLY UP TO THE 85
HOURS PER MONTH AUTHORIZED BY LAW. I URGENTLY REQUEST
THAT YOU TAKE SUCH STEPS AS WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR
EACH OF THE MASTER EXECUTIVE COUNCILS OF THE AIR LINE
PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THESE RESPECTIVE AIRLINES TO WAIVE
OR MODIFY SUCH CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY
TO ACCOMPLISH THIS PURPOSE.

Charles S. Murphy

CHARLES S. MURPHY
CHAIRMAN

**

CLASS OF SERVICE

This is a fast message unless its deferred character is indicated by the proper symbol.

WESTERN UNION

TELEGRAM

W. P. MARSHALL
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

R. W. MCFALL
PRESIDENT

SYMBOLS

DL = Day Letter

NL = Night Letter

LT = International
Letter Telegram

The filing time shown in the date line on domestic telegrams is LOCAL TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is LOCAL TIME at point of destination

RBA302 707P EDT JUL 12 66 (54)CTA530 MC653

C KNA259 DL PD FAX KN CHICAGO ILL 12 534P CDT

CHARLES S. MURPHY, CHAIRMAN

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD WASHDC

REURTEL JULY 12, 1966 URGING THAT THE MASTER EXECUTIVE COUNCILS OF OPERATING AIRLINES TAKE ACTION TO WAIVE OR MODIFY CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS TO PERMIT PILOTS TO FLY UP TO 85 HOURS PER MONTH, SUCH ACTION WOULD INVOLVE GRAVE DILUTION OF SAFETY AND WORKING STANDARDS LABORIOUSLY BUILT UP OVER MANY YEARS AND MUST, AS YOUR TELEGRAM RECOGNIZES, BE THE SUBJECT OF CONSIDERATION BY THE ASSOCIATION TOGETHER

WITH THE MASTER EXECUTIVE COUNCILS. THIS REQUIRES SERIOUS REVIEW BEFORE COMMENT ON YOUR REQUEST CAN BE MADE

CHARLES H. RUBY, PRESIDENT AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION

12 1966 85

(36).

SF1201(R2-65)

FOR
INFORMATION

FOR INFORMATION

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

July 18, 1966

TO: The Board
FROM: Director, Bureau of Operating Rights
SUBJECT: Strike Emergency Service

Today, and in subsequent reports, we will try to provide the highlights of the preceding day's activity. We are receiving, and are keeping on file, a more complete summary received from the carriers.

American reports that, in addition to its own extra sections, it arranged with Capitol for a New York City-Chicago jet flight for 180 passengers. American also reports departure delays adversely affecting aircraft utilization. 1/

Braniff reports system no-shows at 21 percent; it has added to its payroll 23 furloughed airline personnel, added telephones, etc.

Frontier reports that on July 14 all special flights had an 87.1 percent load factor, and that system load factor was 65.1 percent. Frontier reports that TIA, on July 14, picked up a Las Vegas-Denver load without Frontier's permission.

West Coast has added some additional Salt Lake City-Seattle flights but because of time limitations had to schedule same for arrival in

1/ Mr. Sadler just advised by telephone that the American Pilot Ass'n had voted not to extend flight hours to the 85 authorized by law. In American's case this would have been merely a token increase because the pilots are already flying, by special arrangement, at 82 hours a month.

now has installed a total of 114 new telephone lines, primarily at New York City, Washington, Dallas, Kansas City, Chicago, Denver, San Antonio and Houston. Telephone volume on July 15 continues to be the same as past few days without the usual Saturday drop-off.

FOR JULY 17th

American and Continental report several extra sections operated over the weekend.

Northeast reports an virtual 100 percent load factor in the Florida market. 3,415 passengers were carried on July 16th to and from Florida, 455 in DC-6's, 788 on jet extra sections and the balance on regular services.

Delta reports no change in its extra section pattern for July 16th. Among its planned July 17th services is a New Orleans-Tampa-Miami roundtrip under the Board's exemption order.

Trans-Caribbean reports July 17 flights operating without delays. Reservations office continues to be swamped with calls. One round trip extra section New York-San Juan planned for July 17.

Caribair and Panagra had nothing new to report.

Frontier's load factor for July 16 on all special flights was 72.8 percent. Still experiencing a great many no-shows. Loads Omaha-Denver are off somewhat; however, Denver-Omaha loads continue to hold up well.

Unable to obtain space from West Coast Airlines July 16 for 27 passengers to the Pacific Northwest.

On July 16, FL's Denver station alone handled 64,000 pounds of cargo. Frontier reports no backlog of mail, express or freight anywhere