

United States Senate

MEMORANDUM

Oct. 31, 1957

Senator:

A "background" memorandum to use
with Rollie Evans and Stewart Alsop.

GER

X

MEMORANDUM

1. The funeral services held for the Democratic Party by so many columnists following the Little Rock incident were definitely premature. No one claims that Little Rock -- like an attack of ileitis -- makes the Democratic Party healthier and more prosperous. But if the Democratic Party is going to be permanently divided by it, so will the country.
2. Little Rock should be recognized for what it actually is -- one incident in a long and continuing struggle over an issue that divides the country along regional, rather than party, lines. It is surprising that the incident should take place in Little Rock which is not truly a "deep South" southern city. But if it had not been Little Rock, it would have been Vicksburg or Atlanta or somewhere along the line.
3. The segregation-integration issue will be with us for many years to come. It will be solved only when voting patterns change in the South (or possibly when integration hits a Southern State that has passed a law requiring the closing of the public school system and Southerners are faced with the full impact of depriving their children of an education.) There is nothing that can be done at the present time except to try to deal as justly as possible with each incident as it arises and seek whatever areas of agreement are possible. Meanwhile, Northern representatives and Senators will run on pro-integration platforms and Southern representatives and Senators will run on anti-integration platforms and to believe that Manny Celler will be defeated because of Jim Davis or that Jim Davis will be defeated because of Manny Celler is simply to ignore the facts of life.
4. Meanwhile, the Democratic Party can concentrate on the truly national issues -- issues which cut across even civil rights. These issues have a stark reality that gives them a vitality which will survive even Governor Faubus and Attorney General Brownell. They include:
 - (a) The cost-of-living and the "tight money" policy.
 - (b) National defense which has been dramatized by the Sputnik.
 - (c) Foreign policy which has been dramatized by the current fumbling in the Middle-East.

(more)

5. This is not to imply that the Democratic Party could or should make purely "partisan" issues out of those that have been listed. There are no votes in proving that the Republican Party was "wrong." Everybody who is attracted by such an approach is in the Democratic camp already -- in fact, probably never left it. But there are votes in presenting solid, constructive proposals around which people can rally. Out of the next session there should emerge:
 - (a) Constructive proposals on credit to help small businessmen and consumers.
 - (b) Constructive proposals to step up the country's level of technology and the country's research into guided and ballistics missiles.
 - (c) Constructive cooperation with the Administration (which must remain our foreign policy spokesman until the end of 1960) to build American strength in the world.
6. It is possible that this may result in reversing Republican policies. But if the Democratic Party uses as its goal reversing Republican policies, it will attract few followers. Strangely enough, the only intelligent partisan politics at the present time is to forget partisan politics and present only programs that will make a genuine contribution to the Nation's strength.
7. There will, of course, be considerable heated oratory over Little Rock and civil rights. But this oratory is not very likely to disrupt the session too much because there is little scope for it in terms of legislation.
 - (a) There is not the faintest possibility that the Southerners can bring to the floor any legislation that will reverse the current trend toward integration.
 - (b) The ardent civil righters will be hard pressed to devise any legislative enactment that is more drastic than the steps already taken by the President.

#

MEMORANDUM

1. ~~The~~ widespread "third party" discussion in the South requires some careful analysis. It is understandable that Southerners would desire a political party that expresses their point of view on segregation--a viewpoint which has been repudiated by both major parties. ~~But it is~~ highly questionable that they would gain anything by breaking with the two national parties and going off on an independent tack.
2. In America, a political party has only one reason for existence. It is an organization to persuade the electorate to vote the members of the party into control of the government. Of course, the party can exist only if the members generally ascribe to the same point of view. But if the party does nothing but represent a point of view and has no prospects of being elected, it is worse than useless--it is disastrous.
3. The South can expect no significant non-Southern support for a party based solely on "states rights" and segregation. States Rights has no vitality as an issue unless it is linked to segregation and outside the South, segregation does not arouse sufficient interest for people to break with the major parties.
4. A "third party" would enable the South to present its views to the nation in a precise form. But it would at the same time cut off the only channel through which a presentation of those views can be effective. The nation as a whole is not going to listen to a sectional viewpoint. But the Democratic Party will listen to the sectional views of the South as long as the South maintains its traditional ties with the Democratic Party.
5. This does not mean that the Democratic Party will accord the South everything that it wants any more than it will accord any other section of the country everything that it wants. The Democratic Party has NOT swallowed whole the views of Democrats who want the Taft-Hartley Act repealed. The Democratic Party has not swallowed whole the views of those who want immigration barriers relaxed. The Democratic Party has not swallowed whole the views of the all-out civil rights advocates. But it has listened to each group and it has listened to the South and taken its viewpoint into account.

(more)

6. The practical value of this "listening" was dramatically illustrated during the recent Congressional debate on civil rights. As far as the Republicans were concerned, the pleas of Southern Senators for reason and logic fell upon ears that were deaf. Only a handful of Republicans supported the amendments desperately sought by the South. But a series of amendments of tremendous importance to the South were adopted solely through the support of non-Southern Democrats.
 - a) Senator Clinton P. Anderson, of New Mexico, a Democrat, made the motion that struck from the bill the authority to use troops to enforce every conceivable type of "civil right."
 - b) Senators Joseph C. O'Mahoney, Wyoming, Frank Church, Idaho, Henry M. Jackson, Washington, John F. Kennedy, Massachusetts, --all Democrats-- sponsored the amendment to assure jury trials in criminal contempt cases. One of the most brilliant speeches in favor of the amendment was made by Sen. John O. Pastore, a Rhode Island Democrat who ran a considerable political risk by taking such a position.
7. By leaving the Democratic Party, the South would be turning its back on these men and forever cutting any ties that it would have with them. Not only would these men regard themselves as deserted but the position of the Northern extremists in the Democratic Party would be strengthened. They would not be able to hold out against the Douglas-Morse group without the help of the Southerners.
8. The so-called "bargaining power" a third party would give the South is completely illusory. It represents nothing but a mathematical exercise to calculate that the other two parties would split the vote between them and throw the election of the Presidency into the House of Representatives. The only conceivable result would be that other sections of the country would become so aroused that the election of a Republican President and a Republican Congress would be assured. The entire national administration would then be in the hands of a political party that had no obligations to the South whatsoever. The South would be the nation's stepchild--not even getting the "leavings" from the table.
9. There are plenty of ways in which the South can express its viewpoint without leaving the Democratic Party. Those ways have been resorted to in the past and will be resorted to again in the future. Southern Representatives and Southern Senators have been effective in salvaging much for the South. It will not help them to cut them off from the reasonable Democrats of the North and the West. It is futile to talk of a third party unless there are some prospects of that party electing a President. And the prospects of the South alone electing a President at the present time are completely nonexistent.

###

MEMORANDUM

1. The widespread "third party" discussion in the South requires some careful analysis. It is understandable that Southerners would desire a political party that expresses their point of view on segregation--a viewpoint which has been repudiated by both major parties. But it is highly questionable that they would gain anything by breaking with the two national parties and going off on an independent tack.
2. In America, a political party has only one reason for existence. It is an organization to persuade the electorate to vote the members of the party into control of the government. Of course, the party can exist only if the members generally ascribe to the same point of view. But if the party does nothing but represent a point of view and has no prospects of being elected, it is worse than useless--it is disastrous.
3. The South can expect no significant non-Southern support for a party based solely on "states rights" and segregation. States Rights has no vitality as an issue unless it is linked to segregation and outside the South, segregation does not arouse sufficient interest for people to break with the major parties.
4. A "third party" would enable the South to present its views to the nation in a precise form. But it would at the same time cut off the only channel through which a presentation of those views can be effective. The nation as a whole is not going to listen to a sectional viewpoint. But the Democratic Party will listen to the sectional views of the South as long as the South maintains its traditional ties with the Democratic Party.
5. This does not mean that the Democratic Party will accord the South everything that it wants any more than it will accord any other section of the country everything that it wants. The Democratic Party has NOT swallowed whole the views of Democrats who want the Taft-Hartley Act repealed. The Democratic Party has not swallowed whole the views of those who want immigration barriers relaxed. The Democratic Party has not swallowed whole the views of the all-out civil rights advocates. But it has listened to each group and it has listened to the South and taken its viewpoint into account.

(more)

6. The practical value of this "listening" was dramatically illustrated during the recent Congressional debate on civil rights. As far as the Republicans were concerned, the pleas of Southern Senators for reason and logic fell upon ears that were deaf. Only a handful of Republicans supported the amendments desperately sought by the South. But a series of amendments of tremendous importance to the South were adopted solely through the support of non-Southern Democrats.
 - a) Senator Clinton P. Anderson, of New Mexico, a Democrat, made the motion that struck from the bill the authority to use troops to enforce every conceivable type of "civil right."
 - b) Senators Joseph C. O'Mahoney, Wyoming, Frank Church, Idaho, Henry M. Jackson, Washington, John F. Kennedy, Massachusetts, --all Democrats-- sponsored the amendment to assure jury trials in criminal contempt cases. One of the most brilliant speeches in favor of the amendment was made by Sen. John O. Pastore, a Rhode Island Democrat who ran a considerable political risk by taking such a position.
7. By leaving the Democratic Party, the South would be turning its back on these men and forever cutting any ties that it would have with them. Not only would these men regard themselves as deserted but the position of the Northern extremists in the Democratic Party would be strengthened. They would not be able to hold out against the Douglas-Morse group without the help of the Southerners.
8. The so-called "bargaining power" a third party would give the South is completely illusory. It represents nothing but a mathematical exercise to calculate that the other two parties would split the vote between them and throw the election of the Presidency into the House of Representatives. The only conceivable result would be that other sections of the country would become so aroused that the election of a Republican President and a Republican Congress would be assured. The entire national administration would then be in the hands of a political party that had no obligations to the South whatsoever. The South would be the nation's stepchild--not even getting the "leavings" from the table.
9. There are plenty of ways in which the South can express its viewpoint without leaving the Democratic Party. Those ways have been resorted to in the past and will be resorted to again in the future. Southern Representatives and Southern Senators have been effective in salvaging much for the South. It will not help them to cut them off from the reasonable Democrats of the North and the West. It is futile to talk of a third party unless there are some prospects of that party electing a President. And the prospects of the South alone electing a President at the present time are completely nonexistent.

###

MEMORANDUM

1. The most important single point about Sputnik is what it reveals about the level of Russian technology. This is far more serious even than the prospects of the Russians having a practicable Intercontinental Ballistics Missile.
2. If the missile were the only thing involved, the answer would be simple. This country could institute a "crash program" of tremendous magnitude and produce its own missile--or possibly an "anti" missile, missile of some sort.
3. Unfortunately, there is more involved than that. The simple fact is that we can no longer consider the Russians to be behind us in technology. It took them four years to catch up to our atomic bomb and nine months to catch up to our hydrogen bomb. Now we are trying to catch up to their satellite. We can no longer consider ourselves as having a lead in anything other than industrial production.
4. We could, of course, concentrate solely on the ballistics missile. But if we concentrated on that and nothing else we could find it outmoded by the time we reach it. This may sound fantastic since the missile has been described as an "ultimate" weapon. But with the whole universe opening before us, it is presumptuous to think of anything made by humans as being "ultimate."
5. The investigation into the satellite and the guided missile program must take this factor into account. We cannot be content by merely gathering facts upon one weapon or upon one weapons' system. There must be a starting point and the satellite is as good as any. But the objective must be to determine what we can do to raise our level of technology and place ourselves in a position where we can meet any Soviet challenge.

##

M E M O R A N D U M

1. On the basis of the Pentagon briefing and the information that has been made available to the Preparedness Committee, it would appear that two conclusions would be justified:
 - a) The plans of the men who are conducting the missile programs appear to be imaginative and adequate and the technicians appear to be competent men who are alert to the problems.
 - b) But the target dates for achievement appear to be grossly inadequate when measured against the tremendous stakes.
2. The top officials of the Pentagon apparently have the feeling that they are doing all right because in general they are keeping up with their own schedules. Unfortunately, their schedules do not match the Soviet schedules and this is the real point at issue. Our problem is not just to be best but to be best in time to protect ourselves.
3. Therefore, the objective of the Preparedness Committee boils down to finding ways and means by which the target dates for achievement can be advanced. This is a very difficult objective because it involves judgments on questions of applied science and production by men who are not technicians.
4. Men who are NOT technicians cannot be converted into scientists and production engineers overnight. But if they can get the "feel" of a problem, they can question the scientists and production engineers and arrive at reasonable conclusions.
5. To get the "feel" of the problem, the Chairman and the Ranking Republican member should tour the centers where the missiles are actually being made. They should observe at first hand the actual "hammer and nails" problems of putting the missiles together, testing them and firing them. This will not qualify them to build missiles but it will give them a sympathetic understanding of the problems of the men who are qualified.
6. It is therefore recommended that the Chairman and the Ranking Republican Committee member visit such installations as Patrick Field in Florida, Los Angeles, Huntsville, Ala., and any other installations where they can observe at first hand the techniques of those who are making the missiles. Such visits should definitely precede the actual Committee hearings.

#

MEMORANDUM

1. In the forthcoming investigation into the satellite and missiles program, the Senate Preparedness Committee is neither a Board of Strategy nor a Weapons Evaluation Group. It is not to assume the character of a "Committee on the Conduct of the War." For the time being, its objectives are necessarily limited and must be to determine:
 - a) Whether serious consideration has been given to all Responsible proposals for the defense of our country.
 - b) Whether the present programs can be stepped up so the target dates for achievement will coincide with our needs.
2. The first objective can be achieved only by questioning those men generally recognized by the scientific and military communities as having the knowledge and ~~xx~~ imagination necessary to make responsible proposals. A list of such people (largely scientists) should be prepared as rapidly as possible.
3. The second objective can be achieved only by exhaustive questioning of those who have worked on the satellite and the missiles projects. These should include Federal officials, former Federal officials, recognized scientists and production engineers. It is obvious that an acceleration of these programs can be achieved only through exploring certain fields:
 - a) Has enough money been appropriated?
 - b) Has unnecessary duplication held up progress?
 - c) Is there any shortage in raw materials?
 - d) Is there any shortage in plant capacity?
 - e) Is there any shortage in skilled manpower?
 - f) Is there a need for reorganization of our Federal programs for missiles?
 - g) Is there a shortage of intelligence on Soviet capabilities?

###

MEMORANDUM

When the United States decided to put up a satellite during the International Geophysical Year, we had two choices as to how we would proceed. We could have treated the project as a military problem entitled to high priority. On the other hand, we could have treated it as a scientific problem to be resolved within the limits of the I G Y period.

In view of the wholly scientific character of the I G Y program, the decision was made to treat the satellite program solely as a scientific project, and to keep it divorced from our military programs.

We were informed that had we made the decision to move on a high priority basis we had both the know-how and the ability to launch a satellite some time ago.

#

Austin, Texas

October 30, 1957

My dear Friend:

MEMORANDUM

I am sorry that it took me so long to prepare this article.

Oct. 29, 1957

TO : LBJ

FROM : CER

The Democratic Advisory Council statements forwarded to you by Paul Butler consist of a series of dull, routine polemics. In general, they represent the efforts of men who are trying to place themselves in a position of opposition to someone else. The style is reminiscent of old-time German philosophers--about as graceful as a troupe of elephants doing the Swan Lake ballet. The criticisms of the Administration are justified--with a few exceptions--but have little impact because they are too heavy-footed. The statements break down as follows:

1. Foreign policy--This statement is notable only because it contains no reference to bipartisanship or to Democratic willingness to place the nation ahead of party. This may seem like a routine precaution but because the rest of the statement lambastes the administration all over the lot, the overall impression is that of snarling and snapping. In general, it says that the administration has weakened our ties to our allies and has not shouldered the burdens of leadership.
2. Defense policy-- A statement that the administration has subordinated the defense of the country to budgetary considerations.
3. Economic policy--A direct rehash of Calbraith's conversation with you. Its great weakness is that it finds the cure to inflation and accompanying evils in an "active, firm and broadly-based policy to insure price stability. It calls for "strong and positive action" by the President and the Executive branch. It says that "firms with large powers to increase their prices must be told, in terms that admit of no uncertainty, that sound public policy requires price stability." It says that "collective bargaining must proceed within the framework of present prices." These words are sufficiently strong to scare the devil out of some people but sufficiently meaningless that they could not possibly attract any support.
4. Civil rights--This is not a bad statement from the standpoint of the DAC. It blames Little Rock on President Eisenhower's failure to take an early and firm position and then criticizes him for failing to appoint members to the Civil Rights Commission and for failing to appoint the new Assistant Attorney General. There is, of course, trouble in such a statement but at least it will make somebody besides the author happy.

RECOMMENDATION: Thank Butler politely and then forget it ever happened.

063

L

November 20, 1957

MEMORANDUM

TO: Senator

FROM: George

SUBJECT:

I approve

LBH

Jim Rowe suggested that I call Sid Hyman and try to get him primed to write a few articles. It strikes me as being a fairly good idea. Sid will never be any good as a speech writer simply because he falls to pieces when the chips are down and he'll never be a clinch-hitter. But he does do a beautiful job when he has time to think and if you approve I think I should call Sid and try to pep him up. We've become fairly good friends even though I've never been able to get anything out of him but a few paragraphs.

MEMORANDUM

1. Under the American system of government, bi-partisanship in foreign policy is not really possible simply because we do not operate under the British type of cabinet system. Only the President can speak for the Nation and there is no way in which he can divide his responsibility.
2. Nevertheless, at the present juncture of world affairs, there is no real justification for partisanship in foreign policy. There are disagreements over some very important details but the country is not divided by the deep controversies that preceded World War II.
3. The answer to this situation is not bi-partisanship but non-partisanship. The distinction between the two is not academic. It has a very real application.
4. Under the concept of bi-partisanship a member of a minority party would be brought into the formation of foreign policy as a representative of his party. Under non-partisanship, the question of party affiliations would be ignored completely and men would be selected solely on the basis of their ability and their willingness to serve.
5. The public will not be impressed particularly with the fact that a man has been selected to help in foreign policy because he is a member of a minority party. The public will be impressed by the fact that a man has been selected in spite of the fact that he is a member of the minority party. This is the type of action that will really promote national unity.
6. There have been some Democrats who have objected to Adlai Stevenson's roll in the current foreign policy situation. Their objections are without foundation and could, if expressed too loudly, hurt the Democratic Party. The fact is

-- more --

that no man can turn down a genuine call to serve the United States when he is needed. The American people do not understand a partisan refusal to work for the country.

7. There can be no objections to Adlai Stevenson's conduct providing that he maintains his independence of thought and action and makes it clear that he is not trying to act as the spokesman for the Democratic Party but is just an American citizen working for the good of his country. As long as this central thought is grasped firmly and kept in mind, he has a sure course which will guide him through the difficult seas.

8. It would be natural, of course, for him to keep his fellow Democrats advised on an informal basis of what he is doing. But such an exchange should have no formality to it and should exist merely as the normal exchange of views that goes on between like-minded men who are friends.

#

MEMORANDUM

1. The funeral services held for the Democratic Party by so many columnists following the Little Rock incident were definitely premature. No one claims that Little Rock--like an attack of Fleitis--makes the Democratic Party healthier and more prosperous. But if the Democratic Party is going to be permanently divided by it, so will the country.
2. Little Rock should be recognized for what it actually is--one incident in a long and continuing struggle over an issue that divides the country along regional, rather than partisan, lines. It is surprising that the incident should take place in Little Rock which is not truly a "deep South" southern city. But if it had not been Little Rock, it would have been Vicksburg or Atlanta or somewhere along the line.
3. The segregation-integration issue will be with us for many years to come. It will be solved only when voting patterns change in the South (or possibly when integration hits a Southern state that has passed a law requiring the closing of the public school system and Southerners are faced with the full impact of depriving their children of an education.) There is nothing that can be done at the present time except to try to deal as justly as possible with each incident as it arises and seek whatever areas of agreement are possible. Meanwhile, Northern representatives and Senators will run on pro-~~integration~~ integration platforms and Southern representatives and Senators will run on anti-integration platforms and to believe that Manny Celler will be defeated because of Jim Davis or that Jim Davis will be defeated because of Manny Celler is simply to ignore the facts of life.
4. Meanwhile, the Democratic Party can concentrate on the truly national issues--issues which cut across even civil rights. These issues have a stark reality that gives them a vitality which will survive even Governor Faubus and Attorney General Brownell. They include:
 - a) The cost-of-living and the "tight money" policy.
 - b) National defense which has been dramatized by the Sputnik.
 - c) Foreign policy which has been dramatized by the current fumbling in the middle-East.

(more)

5. This is not to imply that the Democratic Party could or should make purely "partisan" issues out of those that have been listed. There are no votes in proving that the Republican Party was "wrong." Everybody who is attracted by such an approach is in the Democratic camp already--in fact, probably never left it. But there are votes in presenting solid, constructive proposals around which people can rally. Out of the next session there should emerge:
 - a) Constructive proposals on credit to help small businessmen and consumers.
 - b) Constructive proposals to step up the country's level of technology and the country's research into guided and ballistic missiles.
 - c) Constructive cooperation with the administration (which must remain our foreign policy spokesman until the end of 1960) to build American strength in the world.
6. It is possible that this may result in reversing Republican policies. But if the Democratic Party uses as its goal reversing Republican policies, it will attract few followers. Straggly enough, the only intelligent partisan politics at the present time is to forget partisan politics and present only programs that will make a genuine contribution to the nation's strength.
7. There will, of course, be considerable heated oratory over Little Rock and civil rights. But this oratory is not very likely to disrupt the session too much because there is little scope for it in terms of legislation.
 - a) There is not the faintest possibility that the Southerners can bring to the floor any legislation that will reverse the current trend towards integration.
 - b) The ardent civil righters will be hard pressed to devise any legislative enactment that is more drastic than the steps already taken by the President.

###

MEMORANDUM

1. On the basis of the Pentagon briefing and the information that has been made available to the Preparedness Committee, it would appear that two conclusions would be justified:
 - a) The plans of the men who are conducting the missile programs appear to be imaginative and adequate and the technicians appear to be competent men who are alert to the problems.
 - b) But the target dates for achievement appear to be grossly inadequate when measured against the tremendous stakes.
2. The top officials of the Pentagon apparently have the feeling that they are doing all right because in general they are keeping up with their own schedules. Unfortunately, their schedules do not match the Soviet schedules and this is the real point at issue. Our problem is not just to be best but to be best in time to protect ourselves.
3. Therefore, the objective of the Preparedness Committee boils down to finding ways and means by which the target dates for achievement can be advanced. This is a very difficult objective because it involves judgments on questions of applied science and production by men who are not technicians.
4. Men who are NOT technicians cannot be converted into scientists and production engineers overnight. But if they can get the "feel" of a problem, they can question the scientists and production engineers and arrive at reasonable conclusions.
5. To get the "feel" of the problem, the Chairman and the Ranking Republican member should tour the centers where the missiles are actually being made. They should observe at first hand the actual "hammer and nails" problems of putting the missiles together, testing them and firing them. This will not qualify them to build missiles but it will give them a sympathetic understanding of the problems of the men who are qualified.
6. It is therefore recommended that the Chairman and the Ranking Republican Committee member visit such installations as Patrick Field in Florida, Los Angeles, Huntsville, Ala., and any other installations where they can observe at first hand the techniques of those who are making the missiles. Such visits should definitely precede the actual Committee hearings.

###

MEMORANDUM

1. The widespread "third party" discussion in the South requires some careful analysis. It is understandable that Southerners would desire a political party that expresses their point of view on segregation -- a viewpoint which has been repudiated by both major parties. But it is highly questionable that they would gain anything by breaking with the two national parties and going off on an independent tack.
2. In America, a political party has only one reason for existence. It is an organization to persuade the electorate to vote the members of the party into control of the government. Of course, the party can exist only if the members generally ascribe to the same point of view. But if the party does nothing but represent a point of view and has no prospects of being elected, it is worse than useless -- it is disastrous.
3. The South can expect no significant non-Southern support for a party based solely on "states rights" and segregation. States rights has no vitality as an issue unless it is linked to segregation and, outside the South, segregation does not arouse sufficient interest for people to break with the major parties.
4. A "third party" would enable the South to present its views to the Nation in a precise form. But it would at the same time cut off the only channel through which a presentation of those views can be effective. The Nation as a whole is not going to listen to a sectional viewpoint. But the Democratic Party will listen to the sectional views of the South as long as the South maintains its traditional ties with the Democratic Party.
5. This does not mean that the Democratic Party will accord the South everything that it wants any more than it will accord any other section of the country everything that it wants. The Democratic Party has NOT swallowed whole the views of Democrats who want the Taft-Hartley Act repealed. The Democratic Party has not swallowed whole the views of those who want immigration barriers relaxed. The Democratic Party has not swallowed whole the views of the all-out civil rights advocates. But it has listened to each group and it has listened to the South and taken its viewpoint into account.

(more)

6. The practical value of this "listening" was dramatically illustrated during the recent Congressional debate on civil rights. As far as the Republicans were concerned, the pleas of Southern Senators for reason and logic fell upon ears that were deaf. Only a handful of Republicans supported the amendments desperately sought by the South. But a series of amendments of tremendous importance to the South were adopted solely through the support of non-Southern Democrats.
 - (a) Senator Clinton P. Anderson, of New Mexico, a Democrat, made the motion that struck from the bill the authority to use troops to enforce every conceivable type of "civil right."
 - (b) Senators Joseph C. O'Mahoney, Wyoming, Frank Church, Idaho, Henry M. Jackson, Washington, John F. Kennedy, Massachusetts, -- all Democrats -- sponsored the amendment to assure jury trials in criminal contempt cases. One of the most brilliant speeches in favor of the amendment was made by Senator John O. Pastore, A Rhode Island Democrat who ran a considerable political risk by taking such a position.
7. By leaving the Democratic Party, the South would be turning its back on these men and forever cutting any ties that it would have with them. Not only would these men regard themselves as deserted but the position of the Northern extremists in the Democratic Party would be strengthened. They would not be able to hold out against the Douglas-Morse group without the help of the Southerners.
8. The so-called "bargaining power" a third party would give the South is completely illusory. It represents nothing but a mathematical exercise to calculate that the other two parties would split the vote between them and throw the election of the Presidency into the House of Representatives. The only conceivable result would be that other sections of the country would become so aroused that the election of a Republican President and a Republican Congress would be assured. The entire national administration would then be in the hands of a political party that had no obligations to the South whatsoever. The South would be the Nation's stepchild -- not even getting the "leavings" from the table.

9. There are plenty of ways in which the South can express its viewpoint without leaving the Democratic Party. Those ways have been resorted to in the past and will be resorted to again in the future. Southern Representatives and Southern Senators have been effective in saivaging much for the South. It will not help them to cut them off from the reasonable Democrats of the North and the West. It is futile to talk of a third party unless there are some prospects of that party electing a President. And the prospects of the South alone electing a President at the present time are completely nonexistent.

#

MEMORANDUM

1. ~~The~~ widespread "third party" discussion in the South requires some careful analysis. It is understandable that Southerners would desire a political party that expresses their point of view on segregation--a viewpoint which has been repudiated by both major parties. But it is highly questionable that they would gain anything by breaking with the two national parties and going off on an independent tack.
2. In America, a political party has only one reason for existence. It is an organization to persuade the electorate to vote the members of the party into control of the government. Of course, the party can exist only if the members generally ascribe to the same point of view. But if the party does nothing but represent a point of view and has no prospects of being elected, it is worse than useless--it is disastrous.
3. The South can expect no significant non-Southern support for a party based solely on "states rights" and segregation. States Rights has no vitality as an issue unless it is linked to segregation and outside the South, segregation does not arouse sufficient interest for people to break with the major parties.
4. A "third party" would enable the South to present its views to the nation in a precise form. But it would at the same time cut off the only channel through which a presentation of those views can be effective. The nation as a whole is not going to listen to a sectional viewpoint. But the Democratic Party will listen to the sectional views of the South as long as the South maintains its traditional ties with the Democratic Party.
5. This does not mean that the Democratic Party will accord the South everything that it wants any more than it will accord any other section of the country everything that it wants. The Democratic Party has NOT swallowed whole the views of Democrats who want the Taft-Hartley Act repealed. The Democratic Party has not swallowed whole the views of those who want immigration barriers relaxed. The Democratic Party has not swallowed whole the views of the all-out civil rights advocates. But it has listened to each group and it has listened to the South and taken its viewpoint into account.

(more)

6. The practical value of this "listening" was dramatically illustrated during the recent Congressional debate on civil rights. As far as the Republicans were concerned, the pleas of Southern Senators for reason and logic fell upon ears that were deaf. Only a handful of Republicans supported the amendments desperately sought by the South. But a series of amendments of tremendous importance to the South were adopted solely through the support of non-Southern Democrats.
 - a) Senator Clinton P. Anderson, of New Mexico, a Democrat, made the motion that struck from the bill the authority to use troops to enforce every conceivable type of "civil right."
 - b) Senators Joseph C. O'Mahoney, Wyoming, Frank Church, Idaho, Henry M. Jackson, Washington, John F. Kennedy, Massachusetts,--all Democrats--sponsored the amendment to assure jury trials in criminal contempt cases. One of the most brilliant speeches in favor of the amendment was made by Sen. John O. Pastore, a Rhode Island Democrat who ran a considerable political risk by taking such a position.
7. By leaving the Democratic Party, the South would be turning its back on these men and forever cutting any ties that it would have with them. Not only would these men regard themselves as deserted but the position of the Northern extremists in the Democratic Party would be strengthened. They would not be able to hold out against the Douglas-Morse group without the help of the Southerners.
8. The so-called "bargaining power" a third party would give the South is completely illusory. It represents nothing but a mathematical exercise to calculate that the other two parties would split the vote between them and throw the election of the Presidency into the House of Representatives. The only conceivable result would be that other sections of the country would become so aroused that the election of a Republican President and a Republican Congress would be assured. The entire national administration would then be in the hands of a political party that had no obligations to the South whatsoever. The South would be the nation's stepchild--not even getting the "leavings" from the table.
9. There are plenty of ways in which the South can express its viewpoint without leaving the Democratic Party. Those ways have been resorted to in the past and will be resorted to again in the future. Southern Representatives and Southern Senators have been effective in salvaging much for the South. It will not help them to cut them off from the reasonable Democrats of the North and the West. It is futile to talk of a third party unless there are some prospects of that party electing a President. And the prospects of the South alone electing a President at the present time are completely nonexistent.

###

MEMORANDUM

1. In the forthcoming investigation into the satellite and missiles program, the Senate Preparedness Committee is neither a Board of Strategy nor a Weapons Evaluation Group. It is not to assume the character of a "Committee on the Conduct of the War." For the time being, its objectives are necessarily limited and must be to determine:
 - a) Whether serious consideration has been given to all responsible proposals for the defense of our country.
 - b) Whether the present programs can be stepped up so the target dates for achievement will coincide with our needs.
2. The first objective can be achieved only by questioning those men generally recognized by the scientific and military communities as having the knowledge and ~~xx~~ imagination necessary to make responsible proposals. A list of such people (largely scientists) should be prepared as rapidly as possible.
3. The second objective can be achieved only by exhaustive questioning of those who have worked on the satellite and the missiles projects. These should include Federal officials, former Federal officials, recognized scientists and production engineers. It is obvious that an acceleration of these programs can be achieved only through exploring certain fields:
 - a) Has enough money been appropriated?
 - b) Has unnecessary duplication held up progress?
 - c) Is there any shortage in raw materials?
 - d) Is there any shortage in plant capacity?
 - e) Is there any shortage in skilled manpower?
 - f) Is there a need for reorganization of our Federal programs for missiles?
 - g) Is there a shortage of intelligence on Soviet capabilities?

###

United States Senate

MEMORANDUM

11/19

Geo :

Enclosed is copy of
roughdraft of opening
statement — and of letter
to Senator on present plans
for 15¹ three days of
hearings.

Gunny

November 16, 1957

Dear Senator:

We are progressing, I think satisfactorily, although this is unquestionably a complex and major investigation. I am confident that we will be able to have three productive days of hearings, for which we will be ready.

At this time I believe it will be necessary either to continue some hearings in Washington the 29th and 30th, etc. or to send task forces to hold hearings in the field to get the more detailed information from special missile projects which the record should have. This can be decided when you are up here.

It is not quite definite but we believe that the witnesses for the first three days will be as follows:

Monday

1. Dr. Vannevar Bush
2. Dr. Edward Teller
3. Dr. John Hagen
4. Dr. Gerald Wiesner

These witnesses will testify as competent scientists to the general significance of satellites and missiles, and give that testimony which can be given in open hearings on our satellite and missiles programs, without going into any detail on causes of delay or recommend cures. These witnesses also are intended to lay the foundation as objective nonpartisan scientists that it is necessary to have closed hearings on this subject matter in order to ascertain fully all the facts without misleading the public.

On Tuesday, or late Monday, in closed sessions the witness will be Allen Dulles to brief the Committee on our best intelligence information as to what the Russians have. In addition Dulles will be questioned on the history of what this country has generally done with respect to accurately estimating Russian military achievements.

We underestimated them consistently, according to John Lane, McMahon's former lawyer.

Either Tuesday afternoon or Wednesday McElroy and Quarles, who will be examined in detail in closed session on the specific shortcomings of the missile-satellite programs.

In closed sessions it may be possible, and we should strive to, to release the transcript as in the MacArthur hearings as early as possible ~~after~~ censorship. On the other hand, because of the nature of the subject matter such releases may be impractical or totally impossible and another device to furnish cleared information to the public will have to be employed. I refer to a synopsis of testimony which could be perhaps prepared by scientific and military personnel competent to do so, with ultimate approval perhaps by the Committee itself.

I look forward to seeing you next week in Washington.

Sincerely,

OPENING STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE

We are beginning today an inquiry of the highest importance. Historians convincingly and often remind us that nations -- even whole civilizations -- can decline and fall if they do not remain ever vigilant.

Free societies are particularly vulnerable to the threats of ~~American~~ ^{military} extinction or enslavement. In a world, which includes a powerful totalitarian state, militantly aggressive, and ruthless in its determination to achieve its ends, free countries cannot relax or become complacent.

Early last month, the Russians launched an earth satellite and became the first nation to cross the barrier into the space age.

Early this month, the second Russian satellite entered its earth circling orbit, and the full realization of the magnitude of the Russian achievements and the seriousness of the situation confronting the free world became firmly and widely established.

Almost immediately, the American people began to ask questions reflecting their concern. Why didn't we launch the first earth satellite? What did Russia's victory mean in terms of their scientific development, ~~and~~ their technology, ~~and~~ their military capabilities, ~~and~~ our national security?

They asked, if Russia is ahead of us in satellites, are they also ahead of us in ~~the~~ ballistic missile military weapons? In short,

are we still able to deter any potential Russian attack by our present military strength and by the future strength which we plan to have as our new weapons come into being?

These and many more questions, some openly expressed, some held only in the fearful confines of the individual hearts of the people, reflected the real concern of the peoples in the free world. This Subcommittee launched an immediate preliminary inquiry, and after a comprehensive briefing by the Defense Department officials determined that a full investigation was desirable.

The President of the United States has now spoken to the people twice on the subject of the Russian sputniks and what they mean to American defense and freedom. Newspapers and periodicals have been flooded with stories reporting interviews with various scientists and officials, some closely and some not so closely connected with the United States missile and satellite programs. Television interviews on the subject have become legion.

All of this has been good and has been for the purpose of informing the American people of the facts about this dreadfully important matter. Unfortunately, however, many of the items of information reported are in conflict. Many so called facts appear to be wholly or at least partially inaccurate. The net result has been to compound confusion almost to the same extent as there has been a dissemination of information.

It will be the purpose of this investigation to determine as

best we can all the true facts relating to the United States missile and satellite programs. As legislative representatives of the people of the United States, the members of this Subcommittee must try to inform themselves so that they in turn can inform the Senate, the Congress, and within the limits of security, the whole people of the United States just where we are and what we must do to improve our situation. ⁴ Because one of the primary purposes of this investigation is to bring the facts to the people, we are beginning our inquiry with open hearings. We recognize that because of the highly classified nature of much of the information related to this subject matter, that completely open public hearings cannot always be used. In fact, there is grave danger, which we also recognize, that people will be misled by being furnished that information which can be spoken openly in hearings since they will not have all of the facts necessary to form sound, final conclusions.

Because of this, we have asked the witnesses who will appear in our public sessions, to speak as freely and fully as they can on the subject matter without, at the same time, saying things which, ~~without,~~
~~at the same time, saying things which~~ without further information that is necessarily classified, would be deceptive and misleading. We have urged all witnesses, public officials and private citizens, to put as much on the open public record as they can. That information which the Committee must receive behind closed doors, will be carefully screened so as to permit ~~a further early~~ release of such factual data as can safely be made public *as soon as possible.*

We open this investigation without prejudgments ^{and} ~~but~~ with a determination to get all possible facts and opinions bearing on the subject matter. ^{We will} ~~to~~ analyze this information carefully with the aid of experts, ~~to~~ formulate our conclusions and then ~~to~~ make recommendations of what we believe the United States must do to insure constantly adequate defenses and to recapture and maintain our lead in the vitally important field of science. ¶ We live in a period of our earth's history when scientific progress is made in an ever increasingly rapid rate. In but a few years, we have moved from the air age to the atomic age to the nuclear age to the space age.

The space age is still too new for most of us to comprehend. But make no mistake, it is here; and the United States and the other free nations of the world must not be laggards in entering it. It is not the purpose of this investigation to find fault or level accusations of blame. Rather it is our purpose to investigate thoroughly ^{ly} ~~and thoroughly~~ the rate of our progress so that we can, in conjunction with the Executive branch of our government, take whatever action is necessary to quicken that pace of progress and to insure that it is always adequately maintained.

In this spirit, let us proceed.

The Subcommittee is extremely fortunate in having the services of an eminent lawyer and citizen, Mr. Edwin L. Weisl, to assist in this investigation. I know that Mr. Weisl would not have undertaken these arduous duties, if he did not share with this Committee the firm conviction that the task before us is of the highest magnitude of importance to the welfare of the United States and the free world.

(Chairman's statement on first witness)

MEMORANDUM

TO : IBJ

FROM : GER

GWS called with following:

1. Pentagon will be ready for complete briefing of you, Senator Bridges and Senator Russell on Friday morning. Briefing will take at least two hours from each of services and may last into Saturday. It can be held either in the Pentagon or in the Senate Armed Services Committee. Gerry recommends that it be held Friday as Dr. Holiday, principal scientist on the Vanguard project, will be leaving for California the following week to testify at hearings that will be held by Rep. Mahon. Bridges is in Florida on two week vacation but conceivably could be brought back. Russell has been ill but may be well enough by then to go to Washington for briefing. Three of the four questions asked in Solis' letter have been answers in writing but the fourth--involving the missile itself--cannot be answered until the briefing.
2. Col. Reynolds leaves Friday for Europe and will be there a month with Senator Saltonstall's group. He is temporarily holding a plane for Thursday in case you want to come to Washington.
3. Senator Frear cannot go to Italy. Gerry would like to contact Senator O'Mahoney but cannot get in touch with Bobby Baker and feels he should touch base with Bobby first.
3. Gerry needs names for NATO and suggests Lausche, Ervin or Hill. He will need one of the three if you go--two if you do not go.

###

MEMORANDUM
October 29, 1957

TO: Senator Johnson

FROM: George Reedy

Here are the reactions of the various people checked on the border fence at El Paso.

Representative Kilgore: It is all right as long as it is cleared with local officials and does not involve any other construction along the Rio Grande.

Representative Rutherford: I have no objections as long as it is constructed in accordance with the explanation that was made to my assistant. I would suggest that the Senator specify, in the event that he has no objections, that it is all right so long as it is constructed in accordance with the understanding of the Mayor of El Paso and the Mayor of Juarez.

Mayor Telles: There is no objection whatever in this area to the construction of the fence. The officials of Juarez are completely in accord with us that the fence should be built and I am confident that they have checked with higher authority.

Bill Hooten: The fence should be built, by all means.

Ed Pooley: That couple of miles is all right, but be sure that Commissioner Swing realizes he is not putting anything over on the local officials.

It seems that there are no objections to this particular fence because it surrounds the city's garbage dump. Young Mexicans have been crossing the border at this point, and it has been used extensively as an area for prostitution, drug peddling, and general mischief. A local policeman, a few months ago, killed a Mexican boy by accident when he fired a warning shot to scare off a bunch of juvenile delinquents. Consequently everyone is in agreement that this area should be fenced off. However, only Bill Hooten favors a longer fence. The others are all opposed to any extension of the fence at this time, because they claim that it would lead to very bad relations between the United States and Mexico.

October 29, 1957

My dear Mr. Commissioner:

With reference to your letter concerning the construction of 2.7 miles of border fence on the northern and eastern sides of Cordova Island in El Paso, Texas, I would have no objection provided that the fence is constructed in accordance with the understanding of Congressman Rutherford, Mayor Telles of El Paso, and Mr. Mascarenas, the Municipal President of the city of Juarez.

It is my information that your El Paso district director has discussed the 2.7 miles of border fence, ^{with them} and that ~~they~~ ^{they} ~~of you~~ are in agreement. I appreciate your informing me of your intentions, and hope that you will continue to keep me informed of any future projects along such lines.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Commissioner
Immigration and
Naturalization Service
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D.C.

LBJ:GER:cs

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

PLEASE ADDRESS REPLY TO

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER

AND REFER TO THIS FILE NO.

CO 764 P

Dear Senator Johnson:

Consideration is being given to the erection of about 2.7 miles of border fence on the northern and eastern sides of Cordova Island, El Paso, Texas. However, I would like to be assured of your concurrence in the advisability of the project before proceeding further at this time. For convenience there follows a brief review of the events leading up to this request.

The idea of enforcement fence at strategic points along the southern border is not new. About 19 miles of such fence already exists, consisting of sections located at Nogales, Naco, Douglas and San Luis, Arizona, Calexico and San Ysidro, California, and Columbus, New Mexico. During our extensive efforts to regain control of the southern border during the fiscal year 1955, the necessity for additional fencing became clearly apparent. The need is demonstrated most forcibly at border cities where women and children constitute 22% of the total apprehensions of Mexican aliens. A number of these individuals are juveniles entering solely for petty theft, wanton destruction of property, and other crimes which harass the local citizenry and create problems of law enforcement for the local police. These conditions led to inclusion in the budget estimates for the fiscal year 1957 of an item covering some 34 miles of additional fencing, including sections to be located at Calexico, San Ysidro and Andrade, California, and El Paso and Brownsville, Texas.

Local opposition with respect to the section of the fence proposed at Brownsville, Texas led to deletion of the entire item by the House Appropriations Committee. You will recall that about a year ago you and I had a conversation on that subject. To refresh your memory, the following exchange occurred at a hearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee on May 10, 1956:

SENATOR JOHNSON. " * * * You concluded after the House action that you would not ask for the fence this year. As I understand it, you did that not because you don't think you don't need a fence but because you think that you want to get better public acceptance before you go into that. Is that it?"

GENERAL SWING. "I think it is my job to educate the people who object to it as to the need for it. I have had something to do with the Mexican side. As you know, the

Commission appointed by the Mexican Government and our own Government has made that one of the recommendations for control -- to extend the fence in certain areas. I think it should be properly presented."


SENATOR JOHNSON. "I think that is a wise course to pursue and I want to commend you for it. I have not heard testimony on the merits. I think it is a very good public approach to it."

I am now being requested to erect the section of fence on the northern and eastern sides of Cordova Island at El Paso. On July 11, 1957 the City Council of the city of El Paso adopted a resolution that the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service be requested to erect this section of fence. By letter of July 16, 1957, Mayor Raymond L. Telles, Jr. transmitted the resolution and expressed hope for immediate approval of the project and erection of the fence at an early date. Our El Paso District Director, Mr. Marcus T. Neelly, in company of Mr. William Boyd, American Consul in Juarez, Chihuahua, Mexico, discussed the fence proposal with Mr. Rene Mascarenas, the Municipal President of the city of Juarez. Mr. Mascarenas stated that he is in sympathy with the project and that he and his Government have no objection to it. District Director Neelly also has discussed the proposal with the editor of the El Paso Times, who has given his assurance that he favors the fence and has said so editorially in his publication of June 12, 1957. By letters of March 5 and June 14, 1957, Congressman Rutherford confirmed his removal of objections to this section of fence.

A detailed map showing exact location of the proposed fence is enclosed. Incidentally, this particular section does not involve the Chamizal, where land ownership has been in dispute for many years.

Enforcement advantages to be gained from the proposed section of fence fully justify its erection. I await your views before proceeding further.

Sincerely,


Commissioner

Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Enclosure

Dear Senator Johnson:

Consideration is being given to the erection of about 2.7 miles of border fence on the northern and eastern sides of Cordova Island, El Paso, Texas. However, I would like to be assured of your concurrence in the advisability of the project before proceeding further at this time. For convenience there follows a brief review of the events leading up to this request.

The idea of enforcement fence at strategic points along the southern border is not new. About 19 miles of such fence already exists, consisting of sections located at Nogales, Naco, Douglas and San Luis, Arizona, Calexico and San Ysidro, California, and Columbus, New Mexico. During our extensive efforts to regain control of the southern border during the fiscal year 1955, the necessity for additional fencing became clearly apparent. The need is demonstrated most forcibly at border cities where women and children constitute 22% of the total apprehensions of Mexican aliens. A number of these individuals are juveniles entering solely for petty theft, wanton destruction of property, and other crimes which harass the local citizenry and create problems of law enforcement for the local police. These conditions led to inclusion in the budget estimates for the fiscal year 1957 of an item covering some 3 $\frac{1}{4}$ miles of additional fencing, including sections to be located at Calexico, San Ysidro and Andrade, California, and El Paso and Brownsville, Texas.

Local opposition with respect to the section of the fence proposed at Brownsville, Texas led to deletion of the entire item by the House Appropriations Committee. You will recall that about a year ago you and I had a conversation on that subject. To refresh your memory, the following exchange occurred at a hearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee on May 10, 1956:

SENATOR JOHNSON. " * * * You concluded after the House action that you would not ask for the fence this year. As I understand it, you did that not because you don't think you don't need a fence but because you think that you want to get better public acceptance before you go into that. Is that it?"

GENERAL SWING. "I think it is my job to educate the people who object to it as to the need for it. I have had something to do with the Mexican side. As you know, the

Commission appointed by the Mexican Government and our own Government has made that one of the recommendations for control -- to extend the fence in certain areas. I think it should be properly presented."

SENATOR JOHNSON. "I think that is a wise course to pursue and I want to commend you for it. I have not heard testimony on the merits. I think it is a very good public approach to it."

I am now being requested to erect the section of fence on the northern and eastern sides of Cordova Island at El Paso. On July 11, 1957 the City Council of the city of El Paso adopted a resolution that the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service be requested to erect this section of fence. By letter of July 16, 1957, Mayor Raymond L. Telles, Jr. transmitted the resolution and expressed hope for immediate approval of the project and erection of the fence at an early date. Our El Paso District Director, Mr. Marcus T. Neelly, in company of Mr. William Boyd, American Consul in Juarez, Chihuahua, Mexico, discussed the fence proposal with Mr. Rene Mascarenas, the Municipal President of the city of Juarez. Mr. Mascarenas stated that he is in sympathy with the project and that he and his Government have no objection to it. District Director Neelly also has discussed the proposal with the editor of the El Paso Times, who has given his assurance that he favors the fence and has said so editorially in his publication of June 12, 1957. By letters of March 5 and June 14, 1957, Congressman Rutherford confirmed his removal of objections to this section of fence.

A detailed map showing exact location of the proposed fence is enclosed. Incidentally, this particular section does not involve the Chamizal, where land ownership has been in dispute for many years.


Enforcement advantages to be gained from the proposed section of fence fully justify its erection. I await your views before proceeding further.

Sincerely,

Commissioner

Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Enclosure



MEMORANDUM

When the United States decided to put up a satellite during the International Geophysical Year, we had two choices as to how we would proceed. We could have treated the project as a military problem entitled to high priority. On the other hand, we could have treated it as a scientific problem to be resolved within the limits of the I G Y period.

In view of the wholly scientific character of the I G Y program, the decision was made to treat the satellite program solely as a scientific project, and to keep it divorced from our military programs.

We were informed that had we made the decision to move on a high priority basis we had both the know-how and the ability to launch a satellite some time ago.

MEMORANDUM

We received a very thorough and detailed briefing on the progress of the missile program and the satellite. The three services presented the facts on the projects which are under their control.

It is far too soon for us to make judgments on the various projects which were presented. But in our opinion, ways must be found to speed up the program and convert some of the plans into concrete achievement at earlier dates than are now anticipated.

The Preparedness Subcommittee will conduct a searching inquiry into the whole field.

We hope to have hearings before the end of the month. Whether the hearings will be open or closed will be decided at a later date and will depend upon the character of the testimony.

The Subcommittee's objective will be to determine ways and means of strengthening the security of the United States. It is not our purpose to fix blame or to put anyone on trial.

If there have been errors, our only interest in those errors will be to find out how they can be corrected.

The information that we received does not lead us to any conclusions of helplessness or despair. We are lagging in both the satellite and missile programs. But there is no reason to believe that we cannot catch up if we apply the necessary determination and will power to the problems that are involved.

###

MEMORANDUM

1. In the forthcoming investigation into the satellite and missiles program, the Senate Preparedness Committee is neither a Board of Strategy nor a Weapons Evaluation Group. It is not to assume the character of a "Committee on the Conduct of the War." For the time being, its objectives are necessarily limited and must be to determine:
 - a) Whether serious consideration has been given to all Responsible proposals for the defense of our country.
 - b) Whether the present programs can be stepped up so the target dates for achievement will coincide with our needs.
2. The first objective can be achieved only by questioning those men generally recognized by the scientific and military communities as having the knowledge and ~~xx~~ imagination necessary to make responsible proposals. A list of such people (largely scientists) should be prepared as rapidly as possible.
3. The second objective can be achieved only by exhaustive questioning of those who have worked on the satellite and the missiles projects. These should include Federal officials, former Federal officials, recognized scientists and production engineers. It is obvious that an acceleration of these programs can be achieved only through exploring certain fields:
 - a) Has enough money been appropriated?
 - b) Has unnecessary duplication held up progress?
 - c) Is there any shortage in raw materials?
 - d) Is there any shortage in plant capacity?
 - e) Is there any shortage in skilled manpower?
 - f) Is there a need for reorganization of our Federal programs for missiles?
 - g) Is there a shortage of intelligence on Soviet capabilities?

#

→ (g) 9 - 61 H. L. 1
E L 3 X

MEMORANDUM

- 1) The success of the Soviet Union in putting a satellite into the air has grave implications in terms of missiles and rocket weapons. But there is an even more serious implication in what it reveals about the state of Soviet technology.
- 2) The Soviet Union is superior to the United States in terms of manpower (205,000,000 people in the USSR; 175,000,000 people in the United States). Its resources are roughly equal to ours. We have maintained our power only on the basis of superior technology and superior industrial capacity.
- 3) Superior industrial capacity in the modern world is NOT a decisive factor. It does not matter if the United States can produce more steel, more electric power and more automobiles than the Soviet Union. The simple fact is that the Soviet Union has enough industrial capacity to produce any weapons that its technicians can devise.
- 4) A nation that is capable of producing the satellite can produce anything else that is conceivable. If the Soviet Union has a satellite and we do not have a satellite, that means that we have slipped behind in our level of technology. And technology is the decisive factor that has enabled us to maintain our freedoms in the face of communist aggression.
- 5) It may be that the United States could produce an Intercontinental Ballistics Missile through a "crash" program. But this alone is not the solution to our problems. Modern technology is developing so rapidly that by the time it is produced, it might be obsolete. We must produce the missile because it is the most destructive thing that is now conceived. But it could easily become another "Maginot line" which would lull us into a false sense of security.
- 6) From a strategic standpoint, the Soviet Union possesses one tremendous advantage -- the initiative. If there is to be a war it will be at a time and a place chosen by the communists. If to that advantage is added a superior level of technology, then the United States will lose.
- 7) There is only one method by which we can recover our lost lead in technology. It is to train our gifted young people in the sciences. We must find ways and means of stepping up our supply of mathematicians, physicists, astrophysicists, chemists, metallurgists and engineers. We must assure them the education that will allow them to make their contribution to our country. In the fields of science and engineering, no amount of brilliance is sufficient unless the brilliant person has the necessary mental tools.
- 8) This means that we must face up to the issue of subsidizing education in those fields. We must find ways and means of increasing not only the number of students but the number of teachers. There is no other way in which we can assure ourselves the flexibility that we need to survive.
- 9) The immediate problem is to produce a "family" of missiles that will safeguard our country. But that is not nearly as important as producing a "family" of scientists and engineers because without them our destruction is certain.

MEMORANDUM

- 1.) One thing is clear. A conservative approach to the space age will not insure American leadership.
- 2.) The recent Russian achievements are truly remarkable. The Russians are ahead of us. This does not mean we must panic over our own lagging program. Panic holds no answer. Progress will result only from a vigorous application of bold decisions taken by cool heads.
- 3.) The Russians have handed us both a technological defeat and a propaganda defeat. Feeble denials of this fact will not strengthen us.
- 4.) We must hasten action that will assure our friends in the world that a free society can retain its leadership in the space age. We can lead in adherence to the fundamental principles of democratic government. We can lead in scientific achievement.
- 5.) Americans need to take a new look at our attitude towards education and educators. It is often said that our greatest resource is our young people. This is true only if each of them is given full opportunity to train and develop his mind. I am more concerned about our failure to keep pace with the Russians in the training of engineers and scientists than I am with our failure to launch an earth satellite before they did. The most significant feature about the Russian satellite is the knowledge and application of technological skills that they reflect.
- 6.) Those of us who investigate the missile program may be critical -- if criticism is called for -- of the Defense Department and of the Administration leaders who have set policy for this program. But we will never be unmindful of the difficulty and complexity of the problems with which they have been confronted. To say that they have been wrong is not to say that they have been stupid, negligent or hostile to the national interest.

#

MEMORANDUM

1. In the forthcoming investigation into the satellite and missiles program, the Senate Preparedness Committee is neither a Board of Strategy nor a Weapons Evaluation Group. It is not to assume the character of a "Committee on the Conduct of the War." For the time being, its objectives are necessarily limited and must be to determine:
 - a) Whether serious consideration has been given to all reasonable proposals for the defense of our country.
 - b) Whether the present programs can be stepped up so the target dates for achievement will coincide with our needs.
2. The first objective can be achieved only by questioning those men generally recognized by the scientific and military communities as having the knowledge and imagination necessary to make responsible proposals. A list of such people (largely scientists) should be prepared as rapidly as possible.
3. The second objective can be achieved only by exhaustive questioning of those who have worked on the satellite and the missiles projects. These should include Federal officials, former Federal officials, recognized scientists and production engineers. It is obvious that an acceleration of those programs can be achieved only through exploring certain fields:
 - a) Has enough money been appropriated?
 - b) Has unnecessary duplication held up progress?
 - c) Is there any shortage in raw materials?
 - d) Is there any shortage in plant capacity?
 - e) Is there any shortage in skilled manpower?
 - f) Is there a need for reorganization of our Federal programs for missiles?
 - g) Is there a need for stepping up testing for development programs?
 - h) Is there a shortage of intelligence on Soviet capabilities?

###

MEMORANDUM

- 1.) One thing is clear. A conservative approach to the space age will not insure American leadership.
- 2.) The recent Russian achievements are truly remarkable. The Russians are ahead of us. This does not mean we must panic over our own lagging program. Panic holds no answer. Progress will result only from a vigorous application of bold decisions taken by cool heads.
- 3.) The Russians have handed us both a technological defeat and a propaganda defeat. Feeble denials of this fact will not strengthen us.
- 4.) We must hasten action that will assure our friends in the world that a free society can retain its leadership in the space age. We can lead in adherence to the fundamental principles of democratic government. We can lead in scientific achievement.
- 5.) Americans need to take a new look at our attitude towards education and educators. It is often said that our greatest resource is our young people. This is true only if each of them is given full opportunity to train and develop his mind. I am more concerned about our failure to keep pace with the Russians in the training of engineers and scientists than I am with our failure to launch an earth satellite before they did. The most significant feature about the Russian satellite is the knowledge and application of technological skills that they reflect.
- 6.) Those of us who investigate the missile program may be critical -- if criticism is called for -- of the Defense Department and of the Administration leaders who have set policy for this program. But we will never be unmindful of the difficulty and complexity of the problems with which they have been confronted. To say that they have been wrong is not to say that they have been stupid, negligent or hostile to the national interest.

#

MEMORANDUM

- 1) It is not possible at this time to pass judgment on the various weapons that were described in the briefing yesterday. About all that can be said is that the technicians who conducted the briefing appeared to be highly competent men who are alert to the situation and who seem to understand all the implications of ballistics missiles and the satellite.
- 2) But there is a very real question of whether enough money has been spent and enough manpower poured into the projects. There is also a very real question of whether the top policy makers have made the hard decisions with sufficient toughness of mind and heart.
- 3) The one thread that tied the briefing together was the continuous refrain "these are very difficult decisions and we are not certain whether we have enough information to make them at this time." In every case, the statement was justified. But the decisions were equally difficult for the Russians and they made them in time to put a satellite into the air.
- 4) There is no concrete evidence at this point that inter-service rivalries have actually slowed the missile program. But it is impossible to avoid the impression that there is a very real contest between the services and the Defense Department. There were broad hints that the Department has withheld the decisions that would have permitted the technicians to go ahead and has set target dates for achievement that fall short of the capabilities of the technicians.
- 5) This means that the first task before the Preparedness Subcommittee is to determine whether the target dates could be advanced and what it would take to advance them. This can be done only by lengthy and careful questioning of the technicians working on the projects and through checks with independent experts.

###

11-7-57

MEMORANDUM

- 1.) The Russian achievements are remarkable. They are ahead of us in some respects. This is no reason to panic for there is no solution in panic. Progress will result only from bold decisions by cool heads.
- 2.) The question before us is not who is to blame but what is to be done.
- 3.) One thing is clear. A timid approach to the bold new age of space will not achieve American leadership.
- 4.) The Russians have handed us a technological and a propaganda defeat. Feeble denials of the stern facts of life will not strengthen our position.
- 5.) There is no reason to believe that we cannot catch up with the Russians. But we will not catch up with them unless we first face the fact that we are behind and must come together in unity to find ways and means of recovering our leadership.
- 6.) We must find whatever errors have been made so they can be corrected. But this does not mean a search for a scapegoat. We must exercise hindsight if we are to have any foresight. But if hindsight reveals that a decision was wrongly made, this is not to say that the wrong decision was stupid, negligent or hostile to the national interest.

* * *

United States Senate

MEMORANDUM

Memorandum given to only few people.

MEMORANDUM

- 1) It is not possible at this time to pass judgment on the various weapons that were described in the briefing yesterday. About all that can be said is that the technicians who conducted the briefing appeared to be highly competent men who are alert to the situation and who seem to understand all the implications of ballistics missiles and the satellite.
- 2) But there is a very real question of whether enough money has been spent and enough manpower poured into the projects. There is also a very real question of whether the top policy makers have made the hard decisions with sufficient toughness of mind and heart.
- 3) The one thread that tied the briefing together was the continuous refrain "these are very difficult decisions and we are not certain whether we have enough information to make them at this time." In every case, the statement was justified. But the decisions were equally difficult for the Russians and they made them in time to put a satellite into the air.
- 4) There is no concrete evidence at this point that inter-service rivalries have actually slowed the missile program. But it is impossible to avoid the impression that there is a very real contest between the services and the Defense Department. There were broad hints that the Department has withheld the decisions that would have permitted the technicians to go ahead and has set target dates for achievement that fall short of the capabilities of the technicians.
- 5) This means that the first task before the Preparedness Subcommittee is to determine whether the target dates could be advanced and what it would take to advance them. This can be done only by lengthy and careful questioning of the technicians working on the projects and through checks with independent experts.

#

11-23-57

M E M O R A N D U M

1. One of the most distressing aspects of the current satellite-missile situation is the manner in which responsible officials of the executive agencies are pussy-footing around the issue of telling the people the facts. This attitude appears to be based upon two assumptions of what would happen if the facts were available:
 - a) We would be deserted by our allies.
 - b) Our own people would panic.
2. There is no doubt that the facts are sufficiently depressing to produce both reactions if they are improperly presented. But to assume that they cannot be presented properly is to betray a complete lack of understanding of the psychology of people and of the basic facts of the American system of government.
3. So far, there have been only two types of presentations. They are:
 - a) The "soothing syrup" approach which promises "the rough with the smooth" but concentrates far more on the "smooth."
 - b) The "prophet of doom" approach taken by a few people outside of the government who happen to be in possession of at least some of the facts and who are shouting as loudly as possible that all is lost.
4. The proper approach would be to state frankly that we have lost a battle and to present that loss as a challenge to the American people. They need not be told that the Russian missile developments are meaningless or that they have been defeated. Neither statement is correct. What they do need to be told is that they will be defeated--and freedom will be defeated--unless they respond to the Soviet challenge. They will not respond unless they know what they must respond to.

(more)

5. Sputnik is not the first battle lost in the history of the United States. It has been less than 16 years since our naval power was crushed at Pearl Harbor. Following that battle, we did not have enough strength to make our power felt anywhere in the Pacific. But we raced against time and recovered from the savage loss that was inflicted upon us. We lost the battle but we won the war.
6. The present situation differs only in degree. We do not have as much time as we had after Pearl Harbor. But we still have time. As long as SAC has any retaliatory capacity whatsoever, it is unlikely that we will be attacked by the Soviets. Even Krushchev is unlikely to trade Moscow for New York, Chicago, Seattle and Los Angeles put together. We must assume that the Russians would prefer to wait--in the atomic age--until we have no retaliatory capacity whatsoever.
7. This means that we have time. It may be only two years, one year or even six months. But it is time--time in which our country can be saved. Throughout their history, the American people have demonstrated a tremendous capacity to meet such a challenge. This is their greatest challenge and it should be a call to action instead of a summons to a siesta. If confident leadership presents the facts, they will neither yawn with disinterest or become paralyzed with fear. They can be--and should be--trusted.
8. If the Senate Preparedness Committee does nothing but lay the facts on the table against that kind of a background, it will have performed a service that this country desperately needs.

###

COPY

November 20, 1957

MEMORANDUM

TO: Senator

FROM: George

SUBJECT:

Jim Rowe suggested that I call Sid Hyman and try to get him primed to write a few articles. It strikes me as being a fairly good idea. Sid will never be any good as a speech writer simply because he falls to pieces when the chips are down and he'll never be a clinch-hitter. But he does do a beautiful job when he has time to think and if you approve I think I should call Sid and try to pep him up. We've become fairly good friends even though I've never been able to get anything out of him but a few paragraphs.

at

November 20, 1957

MEMORANDUM

TO: Senator

FROM: George

SUBJECT:

Jim Rowe suggested that I call Sid Hyman and try to get him primed to write a few articles. It strikes me as being a fairly good idea. Sid will never be any good as a speech writer simply because he falls to pieces when the chips are down and he'll never be a clinch-hitter. But he does do a beautiful job when he has time to think and if you approve I think I should call Sid and try to pep him up. We've become fairly good friends even though I've never been able to get anything out of him but a few paragraphs.

at

implied - working -
Robert
Hyman
11/20/57

November 20, 1957

MEMORANDUM

TO: Senator

FROM: George

SUBJECT:

Jim Rowe suggested that I call Sid Hyman and try to get him primed to write a few articles. It strikes me as being a fairly good idea. Sid will never be any good as a speech writer simply because he falls to pieces when the chips are down and he'll never be a clinch-hitter. But he does do a beautiful job when he has time to think and if you approve I think I should call Sid and try to pep him up. We've become fairly good friends even though I've never been able to get anything out of him but a few paragraphs.

22

Wm. H. Teller

Shipman - read by Helen

George

M E M O R A N D U M

- 1) The inquiry into Sputnik and the guided missile is tremendously complicated. It will be successful only if two fundamental rules are observed:
 - a) Although technicalities must be understood, it would be a basic error to get bogged down in them. Technicalities are for the technicians-- not for policy makers.
 - b) Decisions as to the course of the investigation should be avoided until they are necessary and until the path ahead is clear.
- 2) It is not really necessary for a Congressional inquiry to spend too much time determining the physical characteristics of the ballistics missile and of Sputnik. It is fairly well established that practically any scientific achievement is possible today, providing that enough time, enough effort and enough money are put into it. The objective of the inquiry is solely and simply to find out what can be done to raise the nation's technology to a level where we are at least equal to and preferably superior to the Soviet Union. This does not require a group of men who must make policy decisions to become physicists, astro-physicists, or any other type of esoteric "ists".
- 3) There is no point at this time of deciding who should conduct the investigation. The issue of whether it should be the Armed Services Committee or the Preparedness Subcommittee is entirely academic. ~~In~~ In the long run it would probably be best to have the Preparedness Subcommittee conduct it for the following reasons:
 - a) The full Senate Armed Services Committee would probably be too unwieldy to handle the hearings that would be necessary. A small group would be preferable.
 - b) It would be best to have as chairman of the committee someone who has not been placed in a position where he has had to criticize the Armed Services too violently because of Little Rock.
- 4) At the conclusion of the briefing, the chairman of the Preparedness Subcommittee should see the press. Everybody knows he is here and there might be some hard feelings if he doesn't. If the briefing lasts into the evening hours, perhaps seeing the press should be put off until tomorrow, but at any rate it should be done and a statement along the lines of the one attached should be made as modified by whatever is developed at the briefing.

MEMORANDUM

1. On the basis of the Pentagon briefing and the information that has been made available to the Preparedness Committee, it would appear that two conclusions would be justified:
 - a) The plans of the men who are conducting the missile programs appear to be imaginative and adequate and the technicians appear to be competent men who are alert to the problems.
 - b) But the target dates for achievement appear to be grossly inadequate when measured against the tremendous stakes.
2. The top officials of the Pentagon apparently have the feeling that they are doing all right because in general they are keeping up with their own schedules. Unfortunately, their schedules do not match the Soviet schedules and this is the real point at issue. Our problem is not just to be best but to be best in time to protect ourselves.
3. Therefore, the objective of the Preparedness Committee boils down to finding ways and means by which the target dates for achievement can be advanced. This is a very difficult objective because it involves judgments on questions of applied science and production by men who are not technicians.
4. Men who are NOT technicians cannot be converted into scientists and production engineers overnight. But if they can get the "feel" of a problem, they can question the scientists and production engineers and arrive at reasonable conclusions.
5. To get the "feel" of the problem, the Chairman and the Ranking Republican member should tour the centers where the missiles are actually being made. They should observe at first hand the actual "hammer and nails" problems of putting the missiles together, testing them and firing them. This will not qualify them to build missiles but it will give them a sympathetic understanding of the problems of the men who are qualified.
6. It is therefore recommended that the Chairman and the Ranking Republican Committee member visit such installations as Patrick Field in Florida, Los Angeles, Huntsville, Ala., and any other installations where they can observe at first hand the techniques of those who are making the missiles. Such visits should definitely precede the actual Committee hearings.

###

MEMORANDUM

- 1) Timid minds will not produce bold ideas and hesitant souls will not win the contest to control outer space.
- 2) It took the Soviets four years to catch up with the atom bomb. It took the Soviets nine months to catch up with the hydrogen bomb. Now we are unable to set an exact date upon which our satellite program will be on a par with the Soviet satellite program.
- 3) There is no witchcraft or black magic involved in the satellite or the missile programs. They are simply questions of determined men applying knowledge, brainpower and resources to the solution of physical problems. I do not concede that our knowledge, brainpower and resources are inferior to the Soviets.
- 4) Our resources and our industrial system are superior to the Soviet in every respect. We have slipped behind only because we did not make the decisions that would keep us ahead.
- 5) The central fact which all of us must grasp is that the communists have a foothold in outer space. Sputnik may be a primitive gadget as some would have us believe. But the airplane that the Wright brothers flew at Kitty Hawk in 1903 was also a primitive gadget. In this modern age, a first step could be decisive.
- 6) We outstrip the world in every form of industrial production. But shiny chrome trim and windshield wipers are not essential components of either the satellite or the missile. The issue is not whether we have enough productive capacity but how we are going to use it.
- 7) In 1955 we had 575,000 graduate engineers and the Soviet Union had 550,000. But in that same year, the Soviet schools graduated nearly three engineers for every one of ours. It is not difficult to forecast the future if we permit that trend to continue.
- 8) It is unquestionably true that we were not engaged in a race to put the satellite into the air. But we were engaged in a race in which the stakes are human freedom. And we cannot win that race if we suffer a series of technological and propaganda defeats. I do not subscribe to the theory that defeats are good for you.

#

4005

M E M O R A N D U M

1. Timid minds will not produce bold ideas and hesitant souls will not win the contest to control outer space.
2. It took the Soviets four years to catch up with the atom bomb. It took the Soviets nine months to catch up with the hydrogen bomb. Now we are unable to set an exact date upon which our satellite program will be on a par with the Soviet satellite program.
3. There is no witchcraft or black magic involved in the satellite or the missile programs. They are simply questions of determined men applying knowledge, ~~and~~ brainpower and resource to the solution of physical problems. I do not concede that our knowledge, brainpower and resources are inferior to the Soviets.
4. Our resources and our industrial system ^{are} ~~is~~ superior to the Soviet in every respect. We have slipped behind only because we did not make the decisions that would keep us ahead.
5. The central fact which all of us must grasp is that the communists have a foothold in outer space. Sputnik may be a primitive gadget as some would have us believe. But the airplane that the Wright brothers flew at Kitty Hawk in 1903 was also a primitive gadget. In this modern age, a first step could be decisive.
6. We outstrip the world in every form of industrial production. But shiny chrome trim and windshield wipers are not essential components of either the satellite or the missile. The issue is not whether we have enough productive capacity but how we are going to use it.
7. In 1955 we had 575,000 graduate engineers and the Soviet Union had 550,000. But in that same year, the Soviet schools graduated nearly three engineers for every one of ours. It is not difficult to forecast the future if we permit that trend to continue.

(more)

8. It is unquestionably true that we were not engaged in a race to put the satellite into the air. But we are engaged in a race in which the stakes are human freedom. And we cannot win that race if we suffer a series of technological and propaganda defeats. I do not subscribe to the theory that defeats are good for you.

#

M E M O R A N D U M

1. The forthcoming investigation of the satellite and missile programs requires an unusual degree of attention to public relations problems--not from the standpoint of glorifying the committee but from the standpoint of assuring against a popular reaction of either panic or futility.
2. Once the facts become known, there are two courses which the public can take:
 - a) An angry--and self-destructive--search for a scapegoat.
 - b) A determination to unite and assure the preservation of the country while there is still time to assure that preservation.
3. The second reaction is obviously the desirable one. But it can be obtained only if the committee conducts itself in a true spirit of non-partisanship and concentrates on constructive--rather than critical--moves.
4. The right tone has already been set by the chairman when he said that the issue is "NOT who is to blame ~~xxx~~ but what is to be done." That must remain the keynote of the entire inquiry.
5. It was right and proper to state and stress the keynote in the early stages. But now it has been impressed upon the consciousness of newspapermen, it should not be repeated again in verbal form unless some absolute necessity arises. This is a situation in which what the committee does will be louder than anything it can possibly say. The public will judge the committee by its actions and not by its claims.
6. The first and absolute prerequisite is that partisanship be eliminated from the committee's deliberations. It is not possible to eliminate politics because politics and government are inseparable. Inevitably, the public will make certain judgments. But those judgments will run against anyone who approaches the inquiry from the standpoint of the votes that will be produced in 1958 or 1960. Anybody who counts the ballots from the committee rostrum will be counted out in the next election and that goes for both the committee members and the witnesses.

(more)

7. The second and also absolute prerequisite is to avoid fighting with the Republicans. This should not be much trouble where the committee members are concerned but it is an unfortunate fact that administration Republicans tend to be more "partisan" than Republican members of the committee. In case the Republicans start any partisan fights the reaction should be one of "more in sorrow than in anger."
8. The best way to start the hearings on the proper tone is through a carefully prepared statement of objectives by the Chairman. This should be made at an open hearing--preferably one with the Secretary of Defense or an official of equally high standing and it should be the first hearing. The statement of objectives:
 - a) Should state positive and constructive goalsx which, by their implications, eliminate partisanship and any effort to find a scapegoat.
 - b) Should not make any direct claims of avoiding partisanship and a hunt for a scapegoat (simply because it would have the flavor of "the lady doth protest too much.")
9. Throughout the course of the hearings, there should be no effort whatsoever to "make" any news. The Committee should be cooperative with the press and in a mood to reveal every scrap of information that is legitimate. But under no circumstances should news events be "staged" or news forced upon newspapermen. The subject matter of the inquiry is sufficiently dramatic that any effort to gild the lily will backfire. The committee will be under close and constant scrutiny by the ablest members of the press corps. If the committee sticks to its objectives and does a competent job, it will have good public relations. If the committee is snarling, divisive and partisan, the best "public relations" man in history cannot get it a good press.
10. Whenever the Administration conducts itself admirably, the committee should lean over backwards to praise it. The objective is to win a race for human freedom--not to win an election. The race can be won only if the Administration is willing to do the things that must be done. To that end, the Administration must be cajoled, pampered and petted, if necessary, because it is the only force that can produce the needed weapons. Of course, the Administration must realize that the Committee has a potent club in the closet which will be used if everything else fails. But it must not be put in the position of defending past errors against partisan attacks. The Administration must be imbued with a sense of urgency and this requires spurring the horse, not shooting him.

(more)

11. There should be at least one hearing devoted solely to demonstrating that America's air power is still a tremendous deterrent. This is necessary so our people will not give way to despair and so the Russians will not have any false illusions. The objective here is to make it plain that we do not have much time but that we do have some time. (And if it turns out that we don't, we can all put in a reservation for the next spaceship to Mars.)
12. There is a very difficult mechanical problem involving the press which will have to be solved. It involves a method of keeping them informed of hearings that involve highly technical subjects all of which are classified. There are three possible solutions as follows for executive hearings:
 - a) The MacArthur method--In these hearings, it was accomplished by having an "on-the-spot" censor who censored the transcript immediately and fed it to the press. It is highly unlikely that this would work in this instance because the subject matter is so highly classified that it would look like a player piano role. The MacArthur hearing involved far more unclassified generalities.
 - b) Summaries-- If there are a series of closed hearings, it might be possible to release summaries prepared and agreed to from a security standpoint by both committee members and official witnesses. This would be clumsy but might be the only solution if too many closed hearings are held in a row.
 - c) Summations by Chairman--If the closed and open hearings are mixed in a fair proportion, a summary briefing of the press by the Chairman and the ranking Republican (maybe with the whole committee present) after closed hearings should be adequate. On the whole, this is the best arrangement if the hearings can be planned to fit. If there were an open hearing every three or four days with the closed hearings interspersed, it would be entirely adequate.

#

MEMORANDUM

In view of the shortness of time for the preparation of hearings on November 25, I am putting on paper some random thoughts as to how these hearings should be prepared and conducted.

The country is alarmed over the successful launching by Russia of two satellites. They are asking themselves, how was Russia able to accomplish this unprecedented scientific feat ahead of us?

People have been led to believe by official pronouncements and otherwise that in the field of scientific weapons we were ahead of Russia and that Russia would have a long time in catching up.

It is, therefore, essential to produce witnesses of ability who can testify concerning these matters. It seems to me that some expert must in plain language describe a satellite. He must also testify as to the scientific and military significance of these satellites now traveling in the air. Someone must testify how the Russians were able to accomplish this feat. Was it because they have better scientists than we have? Was it because they started on the projects earlier than we did? Was it because there is less red tape in Russia? Can they convert a theoretical plan into a practical product without going through all the bureaus and departments and budgets, and appropriations, etc.? How much information do we have concerning what is going on in Russia? What would we do about the information if we did have it? Why are we so complacent? Why did we not prepare our people and our allies for the launching of the Sputniks if we knew they would be launched ahead of ours? Where do we stand with respect to missiles? What missiles do we now have? What missiles will we have, and when will we have them? Why are we so behind? Is it because of economy? Is it because of intra-service rivalry? Is it because of the lack of utilization of scientific and engineering range?

How can we speed up our missile development? We are told that the problem is not a scientific one because all the scientific know-how is available. We are told that the problem is an engineering and testing problem. Why can't the engineering problem be expedited? Why can't the testing problem be expedited? Should we have a Manhattan project such as we had in the last World War? Should we have a missile czar with full power? Should we pool engineering and scientific brains with those of our allies?

What is our present, immediate weapon of retaliation to deter an enemy attack? We have the Strategic Air Command, Naval aircraft, submarines, aircraft carriers, etc. Since this is the only present force that we possess, should we not strengthen it? Should we not look into the question of getting more and better bombers into immediate production? more and better personnel, etc.? All these issues must be discussed and explained by competent witnesses. Who should these witnesses be? Should we not look into the organization of the whole defense structure of the United States? Should we not get someone to explain how this structure operates? It may be that the defense structure is so complicated and so huge that the very size and complexity of it is responsible to some extent for our lag in missile development. How can this structure be streamlined?

MEMORANDUM

1. If a Congressional inquiry into the satellite situation is to have any effect, there are two points which must be drummed into the public consciousness with the same monotonous technique used in soap commercials. Both sound like truisms but it is doubtful whether they have "sunk in" so far. They are:
 - a) The extreme importance of the satellite.
 - b) The fact that this country could have had the satellite but did not do so because of a leadership decision.
2. The Russians are likely to provide some help on the first point. But as long as the sputnik does nothing but go "beep" it will soon lose its terrors. It has a name which implies affection and coziness. Already the radio impulses that it sends out have been used to light a whiskey advertising sign. The columnists, unless they get some help, will soon run out of scare stories about mapping the earth with infra-red rays. A streak in the skies does not look very menacing under any circumstances. If the Russians pull something spectacular on November 7th, it may provide the necessary emotional reaction to make concern over Sputnik permanent. But the really terrifying potentialities of the satellite involve too many technicalities and difficult concepts to hold public interest for an extended period.
3. The second point involves a subtle aspect of human psychology. There is still a tendency to regard such things as the sputnik as a form of witchcraft. It is no longer fashionable to believe in witches but the 20th Century form of such a belief is that the Sputnik was produced by "brilliant" scientists stolen from Germany who conceived and launched it in a virgin flash of genius or by communist spies who somehow stole the "secrets" from the United States. It is the failure to take this psychology into account that has made brilliant writers like the Alsops generally ineffective with the public at large. They appeal to intellectuals and their beautiful writing style assures them space in the newspapers. But the large majority of the people have yet to be emancipated from the "witchcraft" psychology and the Alsops are completely over their heads.

(more)

4. The reality of modern scientists and science is that results are predictable. There may be an occasional "flash of genius" and it is conceivable that spies may occasionally steal something useful. But basically, atom bombs, hydrogen bombs, satellites and even a rocket ship to the moon are merely a question of granting so many scientists so much money and so much time and facilities. The greater the amount of scientists, money, and facilities, the shorter the time. This means that the leadership of a country possessing the facilities and resources of the United States can decide whether the country will be in a position to defend itself and should be held accountable for the decision. It is actually easier for political leadership to manipulate scientific "miracles" than it is for political leadership to manipulate the nation's money supply.
5. In order to make the realities clear to the people, it is necessary that a Congressional inquiry approach the following points one point at a time.
 - a) A simple, clear understandable explanation of the potentialities of the satellite based upon a consensus of the top experts.
 - b) A simple explanation of the efforts made by the Russians to produce the satellite based upon the best intelligence obtainable. If possible, an effort should be made to detail the number of scientists assigned to the project and the amount of money that was spent.
 - c) A simple time chart showing that the United States could have produced the satellite so many months earlier by consolidating efforts, ~~expanding~~ assigning more scientists or spending more money. It would be well to prepare a number of charts based on different numbers of scientists and different amounts of resources.
 - d) A projection into the future of how soon the United States can have the satellite providing that it takes the necessary steps.
6. No argumentative points should be made until all of the reports outlined above have been presented to the public in understandable terms. It is not possible to challenge the decisions that were made by the administration until the people understand clearly that decisions were possible and that we are not dealing with witchcraft or magic.

#

11-19-57

MEMORANDUM

1. The Symington Committee hearings were thorough, comprehensive and informative. They should be studied on a line-by-line basis by the technicians of any future committee that studies the issue of defense. But they failed to have sufficient impact simply because the committee majority adopted some assumptions which:
 - a) Inevitably produced a majority and minority report divided along partisan lines.
 - b) Reached conclusions which in some cases were at best arguable and in other cases untenable.
 - c) Allowed valid criticisms to be cancelled out by opening the way to valid counter criticisms by the minority.
2. The basic error of the committee majority was to adopt the assumption that the defense of the United States is secured only when the military leaders are granted all their requests. This is not stated directly in the hearings or in the report but it is the obvious basis for practically every conclusion that is reached. This assumption ignores:
 - a) The fact that military leaders--for entirely patriotic reasons--are as prone to ask for the moon with a fence around it as any other agency head.
 - b) The fact that our government assumes that civilians are dominant over the military.
 - c) The fact that ~~the~~ military preparedness is only one aspect of the struggle against communism and cannot be allowed to exclude all others.
3. Since military leaders disagree, the committee majority then took the next step of adopting the views of one set of military leaders. In effect, they became lobbyists for General LeMay and ~~THE~~ SAC. The overall effect of such an attitude was to turn civilian Senators into "armchair generals" making firm statements about military strategy and looking just a touch ridiculous.

(more)

4. Furthermore, the Committee went out of its way to throw some sharp challenges at President Eisenhower--sharp challenges which, under the circumstances, were unnecessary. For example:
 - a) Conclusion # 2 of the report says that our present strength in strategic air power is due in large measure to "weapons designed, money appropriated and contracts let many years ago.....". These phrases serve no constructive purpose other than to tell the people that the present administration has laid down on the job.
 - b) Conclusion #23 of the report states: "The public has failed to receive from official sources complete, accurate and timely information which it has the right to know." This may be true but it is arguable, unnecessary and makes it impossible for any self-respecting Republican to sign the report.
5. The focus of the committee's investigation was the period beginning in 1953. This automatically gave all of its conclusions and recommendations a partisan tinge and made them suspect.

RECOMMENDATIONS

On the basis of the experiences of the Symington Committee, it is recommended that the Preparedness Committee:

1. Avoid setting any firm date (like 1953) for the beginning of its investigation.
2. Avoid sweeping statements about defense strategy and, where they are unavoidable, cite the military authority upon which they are based.
3. Make all criticisms of the present administration specific and factual rather than general and vague. (For example, leave out phrases such as "lack of leadership" and "failed to receive from official sources information which the people are entitled to know.")
4. Recognize that a nation's strategy is not solely a question of bombers and guided missiles. To be strong, a nation must have skilled diplomacy, a sound economy and a high productive capacity. It is NOT the responsibility of the Committee to investigate such things but it is the Committee's responsibility to recognize that they exist.
5. Recognize publicly that an error of judgment is not ~~equivalent~~ equivalent to treason or blindness but can simply represent the conclusion of men who had to make a decision on the basis of facts available to them at the time.
6. Refuse to be drawn into the inter-service rivalries in such a way that the Committee becomes a lobbyist for a particular set of military leaders.

COMPARISON SHEET

American Missile:	.	Range:	.	Destructive Capacity:	.	Operational Date:	.
Soviet Counterpart:	.	Range:	.	Destructive Capacity:	.	Operational Date:	.

STEPS THAT MUST BE TAKEN TO ADVANCE OPERATIONAL DATE OF AMERICAN MISSILE.

Money:

Eliminate duplication:

Raw materials:

Plant capacity:

Skilled manpower:

Project reorganizations:

Acceleration of testing
and development programs:

###

MEMORANDUM

1. Timid minds will not produce bold ideas and hesitant souls will not win the contest to control outer space.
2. It took the Soviets four years to catch up with the atom bomb. It took the Soviets nine months to catch up with the hydrogen bomb. Now we are unable to set an exact date upon which our satellite program will be on a par with the Soviet satellite program.
3. There is no witchcraft or black magic involved in the satellite or the missile programs. They are simply questions of determined men applying knowledge, brainpower and resources to the solution of physical problems. I do not concede that our knowledge, brainpower and resources are inferior to the Soviets.
4. Our resources and our industrial system are superior to the Soviet in every respect. We have slipped behind only because we did not make the decisions that would keep us ahead.
5. The central fact which all of us must grasp is that the communists have a foothold in outer space. Sputnik may be a primitive gadget as some would have us believe. But the airplane that the Wright brothers flew at Kitty Hawk in 1903 was also a primitive gadget. In this modern age, a first step could be decisive.
6. We outstrip the world in every form of industrial production. But shiny chrome trim and windshield wipers are not essential components of either the satellite or the missile. The issue is not whether we have enough productive capacity but how we are going to use it.
7. In 1955 we had 575,000 graduate engineers and the Soviet Union had 550,000. But in that same year, the Soviet schools graduated nearly three engineers for every one of ours. It is not difficult to forecast the future if we permit that trend to continue.

(more)

8. It is unquestionably true that we were not engaged in a race to put the satellite into the air. But we are engaged in a race in which the stakes are human freedom. And we cannot win that race if we suffer a series of technological and propaganda defeats. I do not subscribe to the theory that defeats are good for you.
9. One thing is clear. A conservative approach to the space age will not insure American leadership.
10. The recent Russian achievements are truly remarkable. The Russians are ahead of us. This does not mean we must panic over our own lagging program. Panic holds no answer. Progress will result only from a vigorous application of bold decisions taken by cool heads.
11. The Russians have handed us both a technological defeat and a propaganda defeat. Feeble denials of this fact will not strengthen us.
12. We must hasten action that will assure our friends in the world that a free society can retain its leadership in the space age. We can lead in adherence to the fundamental principles of democratic government. We can lead in scientific achievement.
13. Americans need to take a new look at our attitude towards education and educators. It is often said that our greatest resource is our young people. This is true only if each of them is given full opportunity to train and develop his mind. I am more concerned about our failure to keep pace with the Russians in the training of engineers and scientists than I am with our failure to launch an earth satellite before they did. The most significant feature about the Russian satellites is the knowledge and application of technological skills that they reflect.
14. Those of us who investigate the missile program may be critical --if criticism is called for-- of the Defense Department and of the Administration leaders who have set policy for this program. But we will never be unmindful of the difficulty and complexity of the problems with which they have been confronted. To say that negligent or hostile to the national interest.
