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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE DURING THE ADMINISTRATION
OF PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON

NOVEMBER 1963 - JANUARY 1969

VOLUME I

ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

PART I

[Chapters 1, 2,
first part of 3]

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DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING;
BY DH ON 12-15-81

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FOREWORD

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Direction of Foreign Affairs Under President Johnson

The history of the Department of State during the Administration of President Lyndon Johnson takes as its starting point that day of shock in November 1963 when the change of Presidents occurred suddenly and in tragic circumstances. The shock was felt in our foreign relations no less than at home. Within three days of President Johnson's assuming office the heads or leading representatives of most states of the world assembled with him in Washington at the burial of his stricken predecessor. They came with questions in their minds as to how America's foreign policy might be affected by the change of leadership. The new President could assure them that our course would remain steady.

The President made this clear in his address to the Congress that same week, in which he said this nation would keep its commitments, "from South Viet-Nam to West Berlin;" would be unceasing in the search for peace; resourceful in

pursuit of areas of agreement, even with those with whom it differed; and generous and loyal to those who joined with it in common cause. He stated:

From this chamber of representative government, let all the world know and none misunderstand that I rededicate this Government to the unswerving support of the United Nations, to the honorable and determined execution of our commitments to our allies, to the maintenance of military strength second to none, to the defense of the strength and the stability of the dollar, to the expansion of our foreign trade, to the reinforcement of our programs of mutual assistance and cooperation in Asia and Africa, and to our Alliance for Progress in this hemisphere.

The President strongly reiterated this determination to keep America's world policy advancing in the direction already charted, in his address of December 17, 1963, to the United Nations. Among other things, he specified:

We favor the steady improvement of collective machinery for helping the less developed nations build modern societies. We favor an international aid program that is international in practice as well as purpose. Every nation must do its share.

Regarding peace, "the greatest of our common tasks," he said the United States wanted to see the cold war end, once and

for all; wanted to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons to nations not now possessing them; and wanted to press on with arms control and reduction.

Further reaffirmation of the established goals of our foreign policy was given by the President early in his administration, on such occasions as a meeting with Latin American delegates attending the funeral of President Kennedy, in talks with Chancellor Erhard of Germany, and in the first State of the Union message. In the latter, in addition to stressing our well-known commitments to our alliances and to the defense of Free World security, the President called for increased use of food for peace, expansion of world trade, strengthening of the ability of free nations everywhere to develop independence and raise their living standards, and development with our allies of new means of bridging the gap between East and West.

The continuity thus asserted in foreign policy was also reflected in the Department of State under the new President. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, whom the President knew and trusted from their three-year association in the preceding Administration, stayed on as head of the Department and was to remain President Johnson's right-hand man in foreign relations throughout his Presidency. Important changes in the upper ranks of the Department were to occur from time to time in due course, with effects more on the ways in which policies might be implemented than on the policies themselves. The earliest instance, reflecting the President's special concern for inter-American affairs, was his decision at the outset to consolidate the handling of our Latin American relations under one Departmental officer who would be simultaneously his Special Assistant, Assistant Secretary of State, and Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress. The second-ranking position in the Department, that of Under Secretary, was to change hands once, half way through the Administration; while most of the regional and functional

Bureaus experienced from one to three normal replacements of the Assistant Secretaries heading them, over the five-year period. Five ranking State Department officers who were to serve the President in special fields as Ambassadors-at-Large were men all of whom had carried top foreign affairs responsibilities under preceding Presidents.

Against this background of continuity, an important innovation during this Administration was a mechanism to improve the coordination of our foreign affairs. Through the "Senior Inter-Departmental Group" system, the President for the first time formally assigned to the Secretary of State the authority and responsibility for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of United States Government activities abroad.

The Pattern of Foreign Policy, 1963

The major and continuing aims of US policy around the world, which President Johnson had already reaffirmed in his initial pronouncements as Chief Executive, were spelled out in further detail by Secretary Rusk in his own first public

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statements under the new Administration. Among these were his speech of December 10, 1963, at St. Paul, and his news conference of January 2, 1964. In his speech, the Secretary enumerated five basic elements of US foreign policy: (1) to protect the Free World against aggression; (2) to build Free World strength by enlarging and improving our partnerships with the other economically advanced nations of the Free World; (3) to assist the less developed nations in advancing economically, socially, and politically; (4) to improve and strengthen the organizations and institutions which enable the nations of the world to work together more effectively -- above all the UN; and (5) to search earnestly and untiringly for areas of common interest with our adversaries. Secretary Rusk summed up the US objectives abroad in the words:

The central purpose of our foreign policy, as of our military forces, is to maintain an environment in which we can 'secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.' When we were children we felt safe in our continental home behind ocean barriers. Today we cannot find security apart from the rest of our planet. In these days of intercontinental missiles and thermonuclear warheads we can be safe only if our total environment is safe. By

'total environment' we now mean not only the land and the waters and the air of the earth but the adjoining areas of space as far out as man can project himself and his instruments.

In political terms, we seek a peaceful world of independent nations, each free to choose its own institutions so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others and all free to cooperate in their common interests and in the welfare of mankind. That if the kind of world described in the Charter of the United Nations. And that is the kind of world to which we committed ourselves in those days when we had been purified by the sacrifices of a terrible war and we were thinking long and hard about the purposes of man.

The basic aims of our postwar foreign policy, already tested over a decade and a half when President Johnson took office, went back to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan -- to hold aggression in check, and to help build strong, free, friendly countries everywhere as a bulwark for peace.

By 1963 the United States could look back with reassurance regarding the rightness of these fundamental goals -- even where success in pursuing them had been less than complete. But the American people had come to realize that the task was a longer one than originally envisaged, with no final end

in sight and with new complexities from year to year.

Over the years, our pursuit of the main goals had taken a dozen different but interconnected roads. By 1963 the balance of achievements along each of these roads was a mixed though in the main a hopeful one.

Our approaches to our world-wide responsibilities had included:

-- Containment of aggression, with efforts to find detente.

We had earlier helped check Communist expansionism, from Greece to Korea, from Laos to Berlin. In the recent Cuban missile showdown we could hope to have helped the opposing power draw a lasting lesson on the need for caution. Some hints had followed of his readiness for a period of at least partial detente. But in Laos, in Viet-Nam, and in the Caribbean, other Communist penetration efforts had continued with no sign of ending.

-- Support for the Atlantic Alliance. We had seen NATO develop and achieve its basic purpose. Problems remained of

keeping it strong and united. Since 1961 the question of its role in control of nuclear arms had become a leading unsolved issue.

-- Support of the European Movement. We had lent our encouragement to West European unification as a factor in Free World strength. Dramatic progress in unification had occurred, particularly in the last half-dozen years. But nationalistic and divisive trends had also arisen. Ten months before President Johnson took office, President De Gaulle had issued his stark challenge to the unification movement by vetoing Britain's admission to the Common Market.

-- The Alliance with Japan. Though Japan remained a junior ally, not yet carrying its share of initiative and responsibility in Free World defense and construction, we could take satisfaction in its postwar revival and development

into a strong, free nation with our help.

-- Decolonization and aid to developing nations. The surge of former colonies toward independence and statehood had received our understanding and support. We wanted to see such nations develop into satisfied, self-sustaining, stable members of the world community as a guaranty of peace. The same goal motivated the massive development aid that we had extended to new or developing countries over the preceding decade. By 1963 a majority of former colonies or dependencies were free. In some places the accompanying political turmoil had been serious and was still giving us concern, as in the Congo and even more in war-torn former French Indo-China. Despite our aid, India and Indonesia had not yet solved their economic problems or their territorial troubles with their neighbors, nor was Indonesia's political course encouraging. In the field of aid, the most monumental United States program,

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the Alliance for Progress, had gotten off to a dramatic start two and a half years earlier but had soon bogged down in a failure of most Latin American countries to get on with the necessary "revolution from above." On the other hand the clear successes of aid in such diverse cases as Mexico, Pakistan, Venezuela, Iran, and Korea had confirmed that this instrument was indeed a prime key to the attainment of our basic foreign policy goals. In the process, we had begun to see that a much larger effort, a world-wide drive on hunger, would be necessary.

-- Liberal trade policy. The postwar recovery efforts, along with the new struggles of backward lands, had made it increasingly clear that freer flow of trade was among the keys to world peace. By the 1960s, the West European integration movement, which had resulted in formation of the European Common Market and the European Free Trade Area, posed the problem of how to ensure freer trade with the larger

economic units such as these which were now coming into being. A US response was the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which envisaged multilateral bargaining with the world's chief trading nations to bring about a far-reaching reduction of tariff levels. The stage had thus been set for the so-called Kennedy Round of world trade negotiations, which were still in the preparatory stage at the time when President Johnson took office.

-- International monetary cooperation. This had been one of the fundamentals of our foreign relations since the war. It had grown in importance as a key to world economic growth and full employment, the maintenance of an open world system of trade and investment, and the prevention of depression or inflation in any one country.

-- Arms limitation and control of nuclear weapons. As a subject of US concern and a goal of our policy, arms limitation antedated the war. It had become a much greater and more central US concern, however, with the nuclear age. We had led the search for practical steps towards arms control, had set up a separate executive agency (ACDA) in our government for this purpose, and had used the Eighteen Nation

Disarmament Commission as a forum for the proposal of systematic arms limitation measures. Progress, however, had remained microscopic in the face of a basically opposite approach to the problem on the part of the Soviet Union. In the nuclear field the one major breakthrough had been Soviet agreement in 1963 to the treaty limiting the testing of nuclear weapons.

-- Support of the United Nations. We had taken the lead in creation of the UN and had labored faithfully, energetically and on the whole successfully over the years to make it serve world peace and development. Despite its shortcomings, in 1963 we stood committed to continue working through the UN to the full extent possible.

Facing a Changing Foreign Affairs Environment

If the main lines of US policy abroad were fixed and familiar at the moment when Lyndon Johnson succeeded to the Presidency, the world to which they applied was growing steadily less so. Changes were accumulating in the world context -- changes which had not affected our basic foreign policy aims but which were posing new questions as to how best to achieve those aims. The situation was obscured, but only partly so,

by the fact that 1963 had been a relatively calm year, a year without major international crises. In a rapidly evolving world, such a lull could hardly last. Storms and challenges loomed ahead which were to make the Johnson years in some respects the most difficult yet faced by our postwar foreign policy. One of their effects was to stir up unprecedented controversy at home and, among other trends, to revive a widespread, partly isolationist desire to escape from the costs and risks of our worldwide commitments. Both our foreign policy and our public opinion were, in other words, in transition.

The pressure or change was not to be concentrated in any single, dramatic climax during this Administration but was spread over a series of crises and problems across the five Johnson years:

- There was to be an intensification and widening of aggression in Asia.
- There was a steady increase and eventual flare-up of the long-smoldering fire in the Near East.

- There was an increase in the scale and scope of Castro's attempts to export revolution through guerrilla warfare, complicating the efforts of the Western Hemisphere to achieve stability and growth.
- There was an accelerating race throughout the developing world between population and food supply -- a contest that only now came into full focus as a crucial foreign policy issue of our time.
- There was a continued burgeoning of new states, changing the composition of the United Nations and sometimes complicating international relations and the task of maintaining peace.

Offsetting the disturbing elements in the picture, some developing countries began in this period to adopt more practical economic programs and, in certain cases, were to achieve notable breakthroughs that demonstrated the impressive results which were possible in this direction.

In Europe, meanwhile, the historic Powers continued their process of withdrawal from worldwide colonies and former spheres

of interest, concentrating on their own new goals of national development and European integration. In the process, power vacuums were left in parts of the developing world, and new strains were caused in the Atlantic Alliance.

On the other side of the globe, Japan continued to grow in strength but to lag in its participation in the Free World's political processes and responsibilities.

The US Response to Foreign Policy Challenges, 1963-69

As the Administration's right arm in foreign relations, the Secretary of State and the Department were in the front line in the task of finding and applying the right means of coping with our changing problems around the world. The Department was directly and deeply involved at the three key stages of every problem: ascertaining the facts, deciding how to deal with them, and then implementing a plan of action. During the five Johnson years the Department's involvement took distinctive -- sometimes novel -- forms in each of the chief areas of our international relations.

The main directions in which our foreign policy attempted to move during this period included the following:

- Against expansive Communism, continued use of defensive force wherever necessary, but with a new emphasis on helping construct built-in social and economic bulwarks in threatened countries against external aggression and internal weakening. (Viet-Nam, Latin America.)
- Systematic efforts to blunt the dangerous confrontations between the Free World and the Communist world, by finding and where possible institutionalizing areas of agreement. (Treaties with the Soviet Union.)
- Toward our principal Allies, efforts to minimize our differences and promote greater cooperation, and to draw them into greater support of Free World political and economic tasks.
- Toward the developing world, greater stress on regional cooperation and on multilateral programs, so as to draw the participating nations into more autonomous and active forms of self-help.

- Expanded use of international mechanisms and agreements to help bring about freer trade and greater monetary dependability.
- Increased attention to new ways opened up by international scientific cooperation for defeating hunger and harnessing the environment.
- Forward pressure in new efforts to control nuclear weapons.
- Continued support of the United Nations as a means of controlling local conflicts and preventing wider ones, and as an instrument of needed social and economic change.

A main concern during this Administration was the necessity of finding a practicable middle road between US over-involvement in foreign problems, on the one hand, and isolationism on the other. This aim led the United States to put increasing stress on multilateral programs and institutions, with the object of getting allied or recipient nations to share more of the leadership and cost of their own security

and development -- and on regional planning and cooperation as a means of creating natural groupings of nations for joint development and common defense.

A balance sheet of our foreign relations for the period 1963-69 shows major achievements in most areas, though not without setbacks and frustrations commensurate with the scale and difficulty of the US objectives:

1. Coping with the Communist World:

In this, the main danger-area of our foreign relations, aggressive Communist expansionism was countered and held in check on a number of fronts, and Free World gains were registered in certain peaceful agreements.

The Communist world continued throughout the Johnson years to present the clearest threat against the kind of world we were seeking. At the same time, the threat was becoming increasingly complex owing to the transition through which the international Communist movement and the Communist regimes themselves were passing. Their former world-wide unity had now largely given way to factionalism and national rivalries, and the disintegration continued. As a result, Communist

military expansionism and subversion, whether Soviet, Chinese, North Vietnamese or Cuban, far from being coordinated, was to a high degree mutually competitive during the period 1963-69. And since there no longer was a single center of Communist militancy -- Moscow, Peking, Hanoi, P'Yongyang and Havana all representing independent centers of trouble-making for their neighbors -- US and Free World counter-actions necessarily were as varied in form as they were far-flung in scope.

Our own efforts during this period to hold the line against aggression included such varied but interrelated policies as remaining on guard at Berlin and at the Taiwan Straits; repelling North Korean infiltrations southward; extending counter-insurgency aid in such places as Thailand and in Latin America; intervening preventively in Santo Domingo against a possible Castroite takeover; using diplomatic pressure to try to restore peace in the Near East and to hold the power-balance there against Soviet encroachment; and using our military forces for full-scale warfare against Communist invaders in Viet-Nam. In addition, when the Soviet Union sent its troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968 in an effort to restore Communist unity by force, the United States and NATO strengthened their common military

posture so as to warn Moscow of the risks of further enlarging its armed camp directly facing us in Europe.

In the one area of the world where Communist expansionism reached the stage of outright armed struggle -- Viet-Nam -- the US military commitment to prevent a Communist takeover early became the overshadowing foreign policy issue of the Administration. The commitment was fully honored, and before the Administration's end the combination of our military action and our peace-seeking efforts finally brought the enemy to the conference table. The State Department was deeply involved, throughout this period, in the decisions to intensify the military defense of South Viet-Nam and to carry out, at the same time, a program of constructive internal pacification. It likewise had a leading role in the US peace-seeking moves that were repeatedly made and that ultimately brought results.

In contrast to the head-on US confrontation with Communist military power in Southeast Asia, our engagement with Soviet expansionism was more diffuse and indirect. The Soviets, in their recoil from the 1962 missile crisis, refrained from

direct military challenges to the United States for the next several years. An additional reason was that they were increasingly harassed by the mounting dissension in their own camp, particularly from the Communist Chinese -- though this problem may in some connections have inclined them to assume a tougher rather than a more moderate posture toward us. But Soviet pressures against the West never actually ceased; they only assumed new forms. In the Near East they took the form of arms shipments that spurred Arab military adventures and threatened to bring about a power shift in Moscow's favor. Even in Viet-Nam, without directly fighting against the United States, Moscow supplied arms and encouragement. In Berlin, showdowns of a more dangerous type, such as those of a few years earlier, were avoided; but this did not relieve Americans of the consciousness, throughout the Johnson years, of being in indirect confrontation with the Soviet Union in Viet-Nam, the Near East and elsewhere. This consciousness was painfully sharpened by the latest Soviet move, the military occupation of Czechoslovakia, which heightened existing tensions and lengthened the defensive front along which we and our Allies

directly faced strong Soviet forces in Europe.

The other major Communist power, Mainland China, meanwhile showed its determination to become a nuclear power as rapidly as possible -- in rivalry, first of all, with the Soviets -- and likewise gave rival support to the war which the Vietnamese Communists were pursuing. The fact that the world's two principal Communist countries were deeply at odds with one another, even in their simultaneous support of the Vietnamese Communists, added to the complexity of the US defensive task against both. In our defense of South Viet-Nam, as of all Asian areas, we kept a wary eye on Peking and sought to avoid any widening of the war through direct Chinese involvement.

Meanwhile the Administration felt that it was essential to keep equally in view the other side of our relations with the Communist world -- the need to find areas of peaceful contact and cooperation, however limited they might be. There were at least two compelling reasons for such a policy:

(1) The risks of war being nowadays so tremendous, it was

imperative as never before to see whether coexistence was a feasible alternative, and, if it was, to cultivate it to the extent possible. There was evidence that the Soviets likewise sensed this need to some degree. (2) Current changes within Communism and the loosening up of the community of Communist states invited our effort to exploit these changes in the interests of peaceful compromise.

It accordingly became the avowed policy of President Johnson to seek detente and to "build bridges" between ourselves and the Communist world wherever possible. The intention was to widen the areas of contact and agreement, in the belief that to this extent we could narrow the areas which bred conflicts. Efforts were made in this direction throughout the five Johnson years, with limited but still worthwhile results:

- (1) Toward the Soviet Union -- in addition to our (largely unsuccessful) efforts to enlist Moscow's cooperation in settling actual conflicts in Viet-Nam and the Near East, the United States pressed for an eventually obtained agreement on the draft of the vital Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1967, a major gain for peace.

Other important achievements with Moscow in this same crucial sphere were the Outer Space Treaty, the Agreement on Astronauts and Objects in Outer Space, and the beginning which we made toward talks on Strategic Arms Control.

In addition, in less vital but still important fields we sought and achieved a number of other agreements with the Soviets. They included a broad consular convention; a civil aviation agreement; exchange of satellite weather data; cooperation in space biology and medicine; promotion of cultural exchanges; some increase in trade; cooperation on de-salting; and regulation of fisheries. In the US view, all of these steps represented progress, modest but still hopeful, away from East-West tensions and toward greater world stability.

- (2) Toward the small but strategically placed Communist states of Eastern Europe we pursued a similar policy of peaceful engagement. The US initiatives during the Johnson years included the expansion of trade and cultural exchanges with Romania; appointment of our first Ambassadors to Bulgaria and Hungary; broadening of our trade-fair participation to include

Hungary and Bulgaria as well as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia; and support of Yugoslavia's GATT membership and conclusion of a Fulbright Agreement with the Yugoslavs. The Administration also announced a policy of seeking freer trade relations with the East European countries generally, though it failed to obtain the legislation necessary for carrying this through.

- (3) Toward Communist China, the Administration let it be known that we hoped for the possibility of normal relations some day, and that for our part we intended to keep the future open in this regard. As a sign of such hope, the United States took certain limited measures relaxing trade and travel restrictions, though Peking refused to cooperate with these. Meanwhile we continued the long-established ambassadorial talks at Warsaw, which for a decade had been the only point of official contact between us and the Communist Chinese Government. Though these bore no immediate fruit, they were regarded by both sides as a useful way of keeping the door open. For the Department, the talks were a useful means of sounding out the Chinese as well as conveying the US

viewpoint to them.

The Administration's two-pronged policy toward the Communist world -- checking Communist aggression, while pressing for peaceful cooperation with Communist states wherever possible -- aroused controversy on the one hand among Americans who disliked our burdensome military commitments abroad, and on the other among those who were suspicious of any peaceful dealings with enemy regimes. But it could be shown on balance that both parts of the policy were necessary and that both showed successes -- on the military side, in preventing any further inroads upon the Free World; on the bridge-building side, in helping to reduce dangerous tensions.

2. Building Western Strength and Solidarity

If coping with the Communist world remained the United States' most perilous foreign-policy task in this as in previous Administrations, the other side of the task, and one of comparable importance, was that of keeping strong allies and friends. Throughout the Johnson years a very large part of the work of the Department of State centered on problems

of strengthening the North Atlantic Alliance, encouraging European integration, and improving the international economic mechanisms in which our European allies and Japan shared with us the leading role.

President Johnson described the primacy of our bonds with Europe in his speech of October 7, 1966, in which he said that our ties with our Atlantic partners provided the strength on which the world's security depended. "Our interdependence is complete," the President said; and he went on to assert that our first concern was to keep NATO strong and abreast of the times. He called for "a new thrust for the Alliance." "We know", he said, "that the world is changing. Our policy must reflect the reality of today -- not yesterday. In every part of the world, new forces are at the gates; new countries, new aspirations, new men."

The President's appeal reflected not only his hopes but also the difficulties that his Administration had encountered in our European policy: strains within NATO, French divisiveness, the failure of the Europeans to find a role in world affairs corresponding to their inherent strength, the widespread West European impulses favoring withdrawal, isolation,

and self-containment.

With specific regard to NATO, the Administration's strategy in seeking new vitality and new confidence in the Alliance was one of confronting one problem after another, and finding cooperative solutions for them. This strategy had already borne fruit at the time the President spoke, and was to bear more, though the process bristled with difficulties:

- (1) French Withdrawal: France's decision in 1966 to withdraw from the military organization of NATO was a major test of the strength of the Alliance. With US leadership the other Allies regrouped effectively in the wake of the French decision, preserving the integrated system of military defense which had proved so effective since 1949. Both the military and the political arms of NATO were transferred to Brussels. And both were actively developed and reformed in the process.
- (2) The Nuclear Issue: President Johnson had inherited a US policy of trying to meet the desires of our Allies for a suitable nuclear role by means of the

Multilateral Force scheme; but the Allies increasingly disagreed on this. A fresh approach by the Administration, toward establishment of new NATO organs for nuclear consultation and planning, succeeded in gaining Allied agreement and in improving NATO's effectiveness in this direction. It was the United States, furthermore, which carried out the difficult negotiations with the Soviets on the one hand and with our Allies on the other to obtain the draft of a Non-Proliferation Treaty acceptable to both sides.

- (3) Inter-Allied Conflicts: In addition to bringing the Alliance through the strain of the French military withdrawal, the Administration mediated and solved the grave crisis between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus which threatened war between these two of our NATO Allies. US influence was likewise brought to bear on our Portuguese ally in an effort to get it to adopt a more realistic African policy.

- (4) Burden-Sharing: The equitable and realistic distribution of defense burdens among the Allies required new agreements. The Administration proposed new ways of planning NATO military goals and requirements, which the Allies accepted. It also dealt with dangerous pressures to reduce NATO's military strength for financial reasons -- the foreign exchange consequences of the Allied troop presence in Germany -- by working out a Tripartite agreement with Germany and the UK.
- (5) NATO Strategy: The revision of strategic planning which the United States felt was essential was pressed for and largely achieved during this Administration.
- (6) Political Consultation: We supported a year-long allied study of the future political tasks of the Alliance and concurred in the decision that the political aspects of NATO's work should take on a new dimension and importance. In keeping with this decision, the United States took a lead in consultations

within NATO not only on such European issues as East-West relations and Mediterranean security but on more distant issues involving individual Allies or affecting NATO itself, such as the Middle East and Viet-Nam.

While our participation in the Alliance was our main means of promoting West European strength and unity, the Administration also lent US support, by every appropriate means, to the movement for European integration. In our view, the European Communities that had been founded over the preceding decade were a main road to such integration, offering the promise of a stronger Europe in the future, and hence deserved our full cooperation. This we gave, consistently yet discreetly, attempting to avoid any involvement in intra-European disputes. Thus we favored and supported the merger in 1967 of the executives of the three existing European Communities. We likewise encouraged the British in their plans to seek full Common Market membership. The policy of the Administration, as expressed by President Johnson in his speech of October 7, 1966, was to seek "a stronger, increasingly united but open

Europe - with Great Britain a part of it - and with close ties to America." We were for enlargement of the European Economic Community through addition of the UK and other European countries, but we opposed association or any other tie short of full membership as constituting a discriminatory trade grouping without the compensatory political benefits of enhanced European unity. While progress continued to be held up by the French opposition to British entry and other factors, we believed that time would vindicate our goal.

Another leading instrument of European unity which the United States participated in and encouraged during the Johnson Administration was the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. This institution, which we had helped transform in 1961 from an exclusively European group into a broad Atlantic forum (eventually including Japan, Finland and Yugoslavia as well), we regarded as an important means of stimulating European cooperation in solving world-wide economic problems. The Administration used it, for example, in 1966 to focus European attention on the world food crisis;

and in the following year we resorted similarly to the OECD to concert measures for avoiding an oil crisis growing out of the Arab-Israeli War. We also encouraged this primarily West European organization to explore closer East-West economic relations; President Johnson in his October 7 speech called upon the OECD to seek ways of inviting Moscow and the East European countries to cooperate in tasks of common interest and benefit. Though a start was barely made in this direction, it seemed to offer future promise.

Our bilateral relations with individual allied or friendly European nations during the Johnson years reflected these larger US concerns for all-European progress toward strength and unity and for greater West European participation in world-wide responsibilities. Thus with Great Britain, in addition to favoring the British bid for EEC membership, we sought -- unsuccessfully -- to deter the UK from unshouldering its security burdens in the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia. With Germany, while seeking to reassure Bonn of our abiding support on Berlin and on eventual German reunification, we encouraged the Federal Government's new policy of rapprochement

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with Eastern Europe. With France, the Administration's efforts were focussed on counteracting the disruptive effects of French policy toward NATO, but at the same time taking care to avoid from our side any actions that could widen the breach De Gaulle had created or militate against friendlier future relations. Thus France found its US ally sympathetic and prepared to cooperate in the common interest when the French economy and currency faced crisis in 1968. With Italy, the Administration proposed (though it failed, due to Congressional opposition) to give economic support to the 1966 Fiat deal between Rome and Moscow, as a means of encouraging what we regarded as an Italian East-West initiative that would be in the overall interest of the West. The record of our bilateral relations with Benelux, Austria, Portugal, Spain, and the Scandinavian states during these years shows different but basically similar US efforts to act in the interest of West European unity and strength.

3. Strengthening the Free-World Economy

In this third crucial area of our foreign relations, the record of the Johnson years shows the Department of State

involved, together with other leading agencies of the United States Government, in a series of history-making policies abroad. The Administration aimed at building new strength and openness into the structure of the world economy; and the years 1963-69 saw a number of successes in this direction. The President's goal was to enlarge the flow of trade and capital, and to speed the development process throughout the world in a setting of full employment. Though the US balance of payments deficits were a restraining factor in our foreign economic policy, they did not seriously limit the US capacity to proceed with long-term programs abroad, designed to improve the stability and dynamism of the world economy.

The most important of the Administration's international economic projects were the reform of the International Monetary Fund; the Kennedy Round of international tariff reductions; and the launching of several new programs of regional economic cooperation, assisted by newly-created Regional Development Banks -- including the initiative for a Latin American Common Market, agreed at the Punta del Este Meeting in 1967. In addition, in the field of world trade, the Administration carried out a major shift in US policy on

the issue of preferences -- away from our traditional doctrinaire opposition, toward a position of US leadership in developing a workable system of trade preferences for all developing countries.

- (1) The reform of the IMF with creation (1967) of Special Drawing Rights in the Fund -- aimed at freeing the world's monetary system from exclusive dependence on the availability of gold as a monetary reserve -- was a forward step which the Administration sought over a period of four years, and one which seemed likely to make a major, permanent contribution to economic progress. The Department of State participated in the planning and policy reviewing within the US Government that preceded and accompanied the international initiative which we took in this field. Its recommendations -- especially on ensuring the participation of the less developed countries in any plans for increased monetary liquidity -- were reflected in the eventual

US position in the negotiations. The resultant international agreement on Special Drawing Rights gave the central bankers a valuable long-range weapon for maintaining an economic environment favorable to growth both in the industrial world and among the developing countries.

- (2) Completion of the Kennedy Round in 1964-67 gave the world the largest and most comprehensive set of tariff reductions ever achieved. Its success, in the words of President Johnson, was a victory of Atlantic cooperation, in which for the first time the United States negotiated successfully with the European Community as an institution. Its object was a major freeing and mutually beneficial expansion of world trade, which would at the same time contribute to the interdependence of nations and thereby to peace. The Department of State played a leading role, even prior to the Johnson Administration, in helping plan the US objectives and strategy in the Kennedy Round. In the actual negotiations during the Johnson years, representatives

of the State Department had a key part.

- (3) A third outstanding feature of our strategy for world economic development during the period 1963-69 was the Administration's strong emphasis on regionalism. President Johnson explained this by saying: "Political unity is neither required nor expected. But the resources available for development are too scarce to scatter among many countries when greater promise lies in joint action." The Administration's concept, of extending US aid to other countries through national economies linked within coherent regional groupings, was given concrete application in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. US support of the incipient Asian and African Development Banks, and later of the Latin American Common Market, became a marked feature of our policy particularly from the time of President Johnson's Johns Hopkins University speech of 1965. In the case of Latin America, the President pledged substantial US aid for its efforts

to push toward an integrated regional economy -- an economy that would at last lay "the physical basis of Simon Bolivar's vision of continental unity." Although many of the world's regional undertakings were still in the trial and error stage by the end of 1968, the Administration was convinced that they pointed toward a realistic solution of the problems of backward areas.

- (4) The question of trade preferences for developing countries was a new issue in US foreign policy. During the Johnson Administration it became one of the major issues of our world economic relations. Throughout previous US history, we had adhered to a trade policy of most-favored-nation treatment. Present-day needs and trends suggested to the Administration the urgency of a new position, particularly in view of our concern for a successful integration of the backward lands into the world economic system. The basic reexamination of our policy regarding preferences was initiated by the Department of State in 1965, and the Department was the prime mover in obtaining agreement within the US Government. The result was the President's

announcement at Punta del Este in April 1967 that the United States was ready to explore the possibility of temporary preferences for all developing countries; and this, in turn, quickened the pace of international consideration of the proposal. Because of the new US position, the way was open for working out a generally acceptable international scheme of preferences.

4. Helping Shape the Developing World

In this fourth fundamental area of our foreign policy, the Johnson Administration sought to make the goals of US aid increasingly realistic. The goals themselves could not be seriously challenged; our national interest required that for the sake of stability and peace, dissatisfied and backward nations should be helped to find the road to progress which we had pioneered, without falling prey to communism, and that the polarization into rich and poor nations should be ended. The Administration could take satisfaction in the part we had played in such successes as those of Mexico, Pakistan, Venezuela, Korea, Iran, Israel, and Taiwan, to name the outstanding examples of recent social and economic progress. But

the job still largely remained to be accomplished in most of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The realization that the United States neither could nor ought to carry the aid burden alone led to a restructuring of our development programs under President Johnson's leadership, so as to reflect the lessons we had learned over two decades of giving aid abroad.

Administration policy was based on a long-range view of US development tasks around the world. The idea was to strive for a cooperative international framework within which development could be promoted globally, on a sound basis. President Johnson made self-help the first principle of the US development assistance program -- not only because there are limits on the resources the US can offer, but because self-help, to the extent it is feasible, is a sounder basis for a nation's progress generally. Under the Presidential policy, the Administration reduced or suspended aid to countries unwilling to pursue policies and programs essential to their own progress. There was some resultant realization among developing nations that responsibility for progress rests first of all with them.

At the same time, the President made it clear throughout his term of office that the growth of the "Third World" has to be a collective responsibility of all the developed countries, not just the responsibility of the United States. We sought increasingly, during the period 1963-69, to spur West European and Japanese participation in the burden-sharing.

President Johnson, out of a conviction that joint action is the most effective action in present-day circumstances, sought during his Administration to encourage international habits of collective action, by supporting great coalitions for specific tasks. With this viewpoint, he pledged US support to the regional banks and regional undertakings in Asia and Africa and (within the framework of the Alliance for Progress) in Latin America, and maintained our policy of strongly supporting the aid consortia organized by multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

In managing the United States' own aid program abroad, the Administration sought to concentrate our assistance in order to make a maximum impact in key countries. A leading example of this trend was the President's revision of our

aid strategy for Africa, on the basis of a study which he had Ambassador Korry carry out.

In general, the President's concern was to see that the US resources for aid -- which are not unlimited -- should be concentrated on the tasks that were fundamental: food, education and health. During this Administration, the War on ~~hunger~~ became a special Presidential concern, and likewise the world population problem. The priority which we came to give both to food production abroad and to family planning programs during this five-year period were reflected in the policy studies of the Department of State and in the creation of the Department's Office for Population Matters.

Finally, an important aspect of the Administration's position regarding foreign aid was the President's emphasis on the fact that the developmental task is not a task for governments alone. The large needs of the developing world for capital and expertise posed a demand on the business and professional communities of the advanced countries for the resources and experience which only they could supply. Hence our policy during the 1963-69 period included efforts to increase the flow of private resources and talents to the developing countries.

The following chapters present a detailed account of the principal ways in which the Department of State served as the President's instrument in the carrying out of the broad foreign policy tasks outlined above.