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C. THE POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL

1. Origin and Role

The establishment of the Policy Planning Council (the name was originally Policy Planning Staff) grew out of Secretary of State George C. Marshall's involvement in the Moscow Conference in 1947. It is said that he saw that the Soviets were operating from a long-range plan. He believed that the United States, on the other hand, was meeting problems on an ad hoc basis. S/P (the symbol which has always been applied to policy planning in the Department, whether Policy Planning Staff or Council) has never been burdened with the formalities of organization. Its Chairman (originally Director) has always been free to communicate directly with the Secretary of State, to initiate his own projects, and to select his own team. S/P has played the role of adviser, innovator, adversary, and US planning coordinator over the years. The latter function was not precisely defined until early in the Johnson Administration.

S/P's principal task was and during the Johnson years continued to be the examination of problems and developments which

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may affect American policy over the middle term and the long run. It evaluates current policies in order to decide on their effectiveness and formulates for top level consideration middle range and long term plans for achieving national objectives. S/P shares this arduous task with other agencies and serves as the principal coordinator. Perhaps the best description of S/P's role is provided in the following excerpt from the book by its former Chairman, Walt W. Rostow, entitled "The Planning of Foreign Policy":

In a highly fragmented and specialized government, the Policy Planning Council, no matter how pragmatic its day-to-day efforts, remains one of the few places where there is a chance to observe and assess the nation's position along the whole front of military and foreign policy--to place what we are doing and trying to do in the long sweep of history. Moreover, this job is done in a setting where members of the Council are each engaged on a few critical issues and do not have to bear the heavy burden of full-scale day-to-day operations...

At best the PPC can contribute marginally to the nation's foreign policy in two dimensions. At a time in history when events press upon us relentlessly, pinning down much of our talent and resources in counter-action, it can provide a tactical reserve of energy and creative initiative. In a period of rapid change, when the nation is engaged in every quarter of the globe, it can help develop perspective and clarify the longer-run objectives towards which the flow of policy should move us from day to day.

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S/P is assisted in the planning process at various levels inside the government and by consultants from outside the government. Members of the Council coordinate with the individual regional and functional bureaus of the Department on an informal basis. The Chairman and Vice Chairman coordinate with the Secretary, Under Secretaries and Deputy Under Secretaries.

The most important interdepartmental mechanism for the coordination of planning is the Interagency Planning Group which meets weekly under the Chairmanship of the head of the Policy Planning Council to discuss papers prepared agency-wide. It was formed in 1961 to fill part of the vacuum left after President Kennedy's decision to abolish the National Security Operations Coordinating Board. It operates outside the framework of the Senior Interdepartmental Group and the Interdepartmental Regional Groups, but coordinates with both.

2. Innovations during the Johnson Administration

In the latter part of 1964, S/P joined in a major effort to bring about a gradual improvement in State/Defense planning. The record would show that the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs had the leading role in this effort.

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However, S/P stimulated many of the actions taken and had a leading part in each of the major organizational decisions made to effect a closer State/Defense planning relationship. The new arrangement resulted in the creation of a Special State/Defense Study Group similar in nature to the old Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the NSC.

In addition, S/P was instrumental in establishing the need, made arrangements for, and helped draft the charter of the Contingency Coordinating Committee. This was an inter-departmental mechanism designed to anticipate crises and to coordinate preparation of lines of action and procedures of a politico-military nature to handle these crises when they occur and if possible to prevent them from occurring. S/P was one of the first to recommend the incorporation of this activity into the work of the Senior Interdepartmental Group and the Interdepartmental Regional Groups established by President Johnson on March 2, 1966 (NSAM 341) for the coordination of foreign affairs. S/P, incidentally, played an important informal role in stimulating the formation of these two bodies.

S/P began in 1964 extending its planning relationship with foreign planning offices. As early as 1958, S/P had

developed informal contacts with the British Foreign Office which led to joint planning talks on various important international problems. Similar arrangements were made with the Germans in 1962. In 1964 Japan set up a policy planning staff and S/P has been meeting on a semi-annual basis with Japanese planners since that time. S/P established contacts with the Brazilian planners in February 1966. All these informal arrangements exist in addition to the NATO Atlantic Policy Advisory Group, a formal planning body in which S/P also participates. This group meets twice a year.

3. S/P Staffing and Operation

The total complement of the Policy Planning Council is not fixed. It has fluctuated freely over the years, drawing on talent both from inside and from outside the Department. Its membership has varied in numbers from 6 in 1947 to 14 in 1968. The Council also utilizes the services of a number of outside consultants who give advice on various issues and who are sometimes hired on a temporary basis to work on National Policy Papers or on other special projects. There is in addition the "Board of Consultants", a group of 12 eminent individuals from outside the Government who meet from

time to time with the Chairman to review the work of the Council and to advise on the planning agenda.

An important innovation was made at the suggestion of the Secretary in April, 1967. He asked the Chairman of S/P to see whether he could devise procedures that would elicit new policy ideas from younger officers in the Department and the Embassies which for any reason they were reluctant to put forward.

S/P's first response was to invite all the Bureaus to solicit such ideas from their personnel. Some 80 ideas were forthcoming. Its second step was to ask five or ten junior officers from different parts of the Department to join with Policy Planning Council members to work out procedures for screening and processing the ideas already received and any which might follow. The result of this endeavor was the formation of what was called the Open Forum Panel, a loosely organized group of arbitrarily selected individuals from various offices in the Department under S/P chairmanship.

Stimulated by the group, a call for ideas over the Secretary's signature was publicized in the Newsletter and subsequently in the Foreign Service Journal.

A report on the activities of the Open Forum Panel with comments was prepared and submitted to the Secretary on May 10, 1968, and received a responsive reply from the Secretary on May 20.

Subsequently on the recommendation of the Open Forum Panel, the Secretary sent a number of suggestions for the American Revolution Bicentennial Celebration and arranged for the responsibility for follow-up on this celebration to be allocated to S/P.

On August 12, 1968, S/P in conjunction with the Open Forum Panel recommended to the Secretary that the role of OFP be expanded to become that of a generator of ideas and a link between the political planning process and dissenting views both inside and outside the Department; and that three or four junior Foreign Service Officers and one person from outside the Department be assigned full time to S/P as associate members to be the permanent core of the expanded Open Forum Panel. The Secretary approved this proposal on September 10.

4. Policy Papers

S/P produces three types of policy planning papers:

(1) National Policy Papers, (2) special policy papers usually initiated in S/P and (3) planning memoranda.

a. National Policy Papers

The concept of the National Policy Paper grew out of a mandate contained in Secretary Rusk's memorandum of February 8, 1963, which stated that "S/P as the Department's representative in the planning community, shall, in close consultation with the regional bureaus and AID monitor and seek to control the proliferation of planning exercises and study missions." Initially called "National Strategy Papers" or "Strategic Country Studies", the title for these unified intra-agency papers was changed to "National Policy Papers" at the outset of the Johnson Administration in November 1963. These are essentially unifying instruments serving as a point of departure for US policy and action in various countries and specialized international agencies. By National Security Action Memorandum No. 281 of February 11, 1964, to the Secretary of State and heads of Treasury, Defense, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, Budget, CIA, ACDA, AEC, USIA, AID, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, President Johnson gave full backing to Secretary Rusk's efforts to control country planning and minimize duplicatory

planning on both the department and interdepartmental level. This memorandum stated among other things that "in keeping with the responsibilities for the coordination of foreign policy the President today fixed in the Secretary of State responsibility for the promulgation of certain National Policy Papers." These papers were to form a "deep and more sophisticated policy base than the old NSC-OCB type paper and should ease the transition of US diplomacy from old style liaison, negotiating and reporting, to more active influence in manipulating change through the application of US resources."

The object of the National Policy Papers is to (1) look several years ahead; (2) embrace in a coordinated way political, economic and military action programs (including internal defense); (3) provide agreement by the relevant agency in Washington and the country teams in the field as to policy objectives and (4) form the initial base for continuing country team work in Washington under the leadership of the Department's regional bureaus.

A principal procedural difficulty arose with the initiation of the National Planning Paper: What authority would these papers have? At the meeting of the Interagency Planning

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Group on November 12, 1963, where the authority, procedures and implementation of actions stemming from these papers was discussed, McGeorge Bundy and Ralph Duncan emphasized the positive interest that the President had in obtaining a policy paper which outlined specific lines of policy to which the entire government could be tied. There was a consensus at that meeting that the Secretary of State had the authority to sign these papers as the final approving authority primus inter pares. NSAM 281 of February 11, 1964, delegated to the Secretary of State this authority.

S/P acts as the Secretary's principal coordinating agent for the National Policy Papers. Since November 1963, S/P, in conjunction with various other governmental agencies and departmental groups, has produced through September 1968 19 National Policy Papers that have received the approval of the Secretary and have since become basic foreign policy documents. These are as follows:

Africa

Ethiopia
Ghana
Guinea
Kenya

Liberia
Nigeria
South Africa

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Europe

Portugal

Far East

Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore Subregion

Korea

Philippines

Republic of China

Latin America

Brazil

Chile

Colombia

Near East/South Asia

India

Iran

Pakistan

UAR

Functional

UNESCO

b. Special Planning Papers

Since President Johnson entered office, S/P has initiated or cooperated in the preparation of numerous papers other than National Policy Papers on practically every aspect of US foreign policy.

The range of subject matter is evident from the list of these papers, testifying to the versatility of the Council and to S/P's unusual role as originator of policy concepts and anticipator of issues and opportunities. S/P has explored such functional questions as English language teaching as an important tool of foreign policy, the world food problem, arms control in various parts of the world, exploration of the sea, specific country and regional problems such as China, Western Europe and NATO, the Communist challenge in the third world, isolationism, and changes in the Soviet system. A few of the more basic issues were dealt with as follows:

(1) Functional Topics

Armaments Control and Non-Proliferation

In April 1964 S/P took an initial look at the potential policy implications of the Indian nuclear weapons problem along with Project CANE (Control of Arms in the Near East). This represented one of the earliest efforts to grapple with proliferation, not as an issue, but in the context of specific causes and implications. At S/P's suggestion, NEA established an interagency working group which, with the help of S/P, produced a paper entitled the "Indian Nuclear

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Weapons Problem - Proposed Courses of Action". The paper was approved and circulated by the Thompson Committee on Proliferation on October 14, 1964, two days before Communist China exploded its first nuclear weapon. The fact that the US had already decided on initial courses of action vis-a-vis India provided a framework of policy analysis of major import to the handling of the various issues arising out of Communist China's first successful nuclear weapon.

India has continued to present the most urgent case of potential proliferation. An S/P paper of May, 1966, provided the basis for a National Security Council discussion of the matter. As a result specific recommendations were requested by the President. S/P drafted the Report for the President In Response to NSAM No. 351: The Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem (Secret). The recommendations of this report were approved by NSAM 365.

A broader look at proliferation was taken in an S/P paper entitled "The further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Problems for the West" (Secret). This was one of the principal papers discussed in the Allied Policy Advisory Group Meeting in the first part of 1967.

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Strategic Armaments

Looking toward the possibility of discussions with the Soviets on strategic issues the US needed a specific proposal to put forward. At the beginning of 1967 S/P made a principal contribution to a Top Secret sensitive paper entitled "Questions Related to a Possible Freeze - Agreement on Strategic Forces." The paper surfaced inter alia the issues of an ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) freeze and a MIRV (Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle) prohibition. It provided an important initial airing of questions which would become pressing in 1968 after the Soviets agreed to talk about strategic armaments.

Although prior concern about Soviet ABM deployment had been inflated new concerns arose respecting increases in Soviet strategic offensive forces. S/P prepared a paper in February 1968 entitled "The Strategic Nuclear Balance: An Outline of Alternative Approaches" (Secret) to provide a basis for discussion the issues.

Science and Technology

Outer Space

S/P began exploring major policy issues

confronting the nation of the scientific and technological advancements in outer space. The first paper on this subject, entitled "Space Goals after the Lunar Landing" (Secret) was sent informally to the Vice President. The debate over space goals was intensified in February 1967 when the President's Science Advisory Committee published a report on "The Space Program in the Post Apollo Period". On May 22, 1967 Secretary Rusk sent the Vice President a memorandum of comments prepared by S/P on this question.

S/P's interest in science and technology has gone well beyond its initial focus on outer space. It began in 1967 to search for a means of probing foreign policy implications of other emerging scientific and technological developments. This search led to planning meetings with the Commission on Science and Public Policy of the National Academy of Science. Developments were explored in a number of major fields. Private discussions with Dr. Harvey Brooks, COSPUP's Chairman, yielded the idea of an international council on the human environment which was put forward by the President in his Glassboro Speech on June 4.

Military Assistance Program

S/P studied the problem of how, in the light of declining funds available for the military assistance program, the foreign policy and security objectives of the United States could continue to be served by the program. A paper dated November 20, 1967 was prepared which made recommendations for a reorientation of the purposes of the MAP and a reorganization of the governmental machinery for developing MAP policy. These recommendations paralleled separate action by AID. Thereafter the Secretary of State on January 2, 1968, formally reassigned the delegation of his authority over the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 from the Director of AID to the Under Secretary of State for "coordinating the economic assistance and military assistance and sales programs at home and abroad to best serve the foreign policy of the United States."

World Development Charter

In a paper entitled "The Future of Foreign Aid" completed December 13, 1967, the proposal was made that the US should host a conference in San Francisco in 1970 on the 25th Anniversary of the United Nations San Francisco Conference. The work of the Conference would be to agree on a

World Development Charter. The Charter would enjoin the lesser developed countries to self-help and would bind the rich countries to a formula for aid to last for five years, with the expectation of renewal for subsequent periods if successful. The Charter would establish a World Development Council to monitor performance of the Charter. Secretary Rusk authorized S/P to continue staffing out this idea. Meanwhile the Dutch proposed a somewhat similar idea in the UN.

Private Investment Corporation

A paper entitled "Supplements to Foreign Aid Appropriations" was completed in S/P in July 1967 which considered a variety of ways of obtaining resources for the less developed countries that would avoid annual appropriations.

Among these was a proposal for a public corporation -- a separate government body to take over the job of stimulating the flow of US private investment to the less developed countries. A special task force was established on August 11, 1967, to study this idea. There was general agreement by the Katzenbach Task Force on Foreign Aid that 1968 was not the year to make major changes in the AID program in the face of the special efforts to reduce the US

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balance of payments deficit. Nonetheless, in 1968 a number of influential people including Members of Congress were pushing the idea of an investment corporation.

US Balance of Payments

An S/P paper of October 27, 1967 entitled "A New Look At An Old Friend -- The US Balance of Payments" recommended a series of measures which, with one exception, were all adopted by the US Government. A unique conclusion of this paper was an optimistic forecast for the US balance of payments for 1970. This was sharply criticized at the time of writing, though a year later it seemed increasingly likely that the forecast would be realized.

(2) Country and Regional Topics

Vietnam

Early in 1964 S/P among others observed a steady increase in North Vietnam's political and military efforts to seize control over South Vietnam's land and people. The S/P assessment, not universally shared within the US Government, was that these efforts would succeed unless the United States acted to alter North Vietnam's motivations or capabilities. At the instigation of S/P an interdepartmental planning group

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was established which formulated and analyzed several alternative ways by which the United States might change North Vietnam's attitudes through application of a program of mounting pressures. Although the resulting recommendations and analyses were not acted upon immediately, many of the elements were applied piecemeal over a protracted period. S/P was also instrumental in the drafting of a number of papers on other Vietnam issues. These included inter alia the question of a settlement in Vietnam, South Vietnamese constitutional issues, backup for elections in Vietnam, concepts for dual and triple negotiations, political development in South Vietnam, and long range economic planning for South Vietnam, a concept which eventually led to the establishment of the Lilienthal Project.

France and NATO

France's behavior in early 1964 suggested that de Gaulle might attenuate the connection with NATO. S/P originated a study on this issue, dated May 8, 1964 which suggested the parameters of US policy should this become an active threat. The study quite directly contradicted the standard judgment that NATO absolutely required bases in

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and lines of communications across France. It recommended that in a new political-military environment, NATO could readily survive the denial of French territory. The study urged for the first time the feasibility of a NATO location in the low countries and contingency planning toward such a goal. The policy lines proposed were those which the US in due time pursued.

Persian Gulf

S/P in October 1965 completed a study entitled Alternatives for the US in Persian Gulf-Arabian Sea Area Stemming from UK Defense Review calling attention to the strategic alternatives which would face the US whenever the British should withdraw from the Persian Gulf. When this withdrawal was suddenly announced in early 1968 the considerations in the paper became immediately relevant. The study facilitated prompt US Government examination of several strategy alternatives and advanced thinking as to the preferred courses.

Arab-Israeli Conflict

S/P's studies and policy papers in the Middle Eastern field have had to be composed under the shadow of the

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unsettled Arab-Israeli conflict. So long as the US Government has fixed its sights on a settlement of that conflict by negotiation it has not found it possible to go ahead with other lines of policy which might upset the delicate negotiating situation. Accordingly the policy papers which have been or are being worked out in S/P on the reduction and eventual solution of the Arab refugee problem and on policy toward certain Middle Eastern states in the absence of a settlement have to wait the moment when the US Government is willing to go ahead. They are therefore in the nature of papers for future use rather than contributions to current US policies. The main project has been a paper on US policy in the Middle East for the coming five years. It may have some importance as having grown out of or superseded the Holmes Study on this situation.

c. S/P Memoranda to the Secretary

Over 400 memoranda have been sent to the Secretary from S/P since the beginning of the Johnson administration. It is principally through such memoranda that S/P maintains its privileged advisory channel to the Secretary. It is thus exempt from the sometimes overly critical and sometimes

conservative eye of the "committee" approach so evident in the day-to-day operations of complex government. S/P memoranda have offered the Secretary a variety of material. Some simply bring to his attention important articles, essays and books to be read in conjunction with his day-to-day activities. Others have provided material for or advice on the Secretary's speeches. A number take a critical look at various current issues such as Viet-Nam, youth and dissent, NATO strategy, disarmament, peacekeeping, the Arab-Israeli conflict, detente with the Soviet Union, the China problem, foreign aid, etc. Here S/P plays its part as an unbound adversary, a freedom which it has enjoyed since its inception. A number of S/P memoranda have presented off-beat ideas. They are meant to stir the imagination and are offered in fulfillment of another S/P role -- that of the stimulator of innovation. Very few of these ideas ever reach fruition nor are they really expected to. The Department nonetheless thereby maintains an open line to possibilities of change.

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D. EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A UNIFIED FOREIGN AFFAIRS
PERSONNEL SYSTEM

1. Background

a. Postwar Studies and Recommendations

The modification of personnel systems to meet current and anticipated changes in the field of foreign affairs has been the subject of repeated studies over the past two decades. Since World War II at least ten major studies have been conducted, varying from those concerned only with the Foreign Service of the Department of State to those covering all parts of our governmental machinery involved in the conduct of foreign affairs, and points between.

This machinery itself has reflected many variations in both organization and focus of responsibility for foreign affairs programs. Immediately after World War II

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a proliferation of war-time agencies and activities in the foreign affairs field were transferred to and consolidated within the Department of State. For several years thereafter the great majority of Federal employees engaged in foreign affairs activities was under the direction of the Secretary of State, one notable exception being the establishment of the Economic Cooperation Administration to carry out the Marshall Plan. By 1954, however, the United States Information Agency had been established as a separate agency and the Foreign Agricultural Service had been reestablished as a separate organization within the Department of Agriculture. Other semi-autonomous agencies with their own personnel systems now include the Agency for International Development, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Peace Corps. Thus some of the study groups have examined the foreign affairs personnel systems in quite different environmental settings and have been required to consider questions of organization and broad management as well as those dealing directly with personnel management.

Inquiries have been pursued under a variety of auspices and arrangements; a Presidential staff agency (Bureau of the Budget - report submitted 1946); an internal Foreign Service group (the Chapin-Foster study - 1946); a Presidential-Congressional Commission (the first Hoover Commission - 1949); committees appointed by the Secretary of State (the Rowe Committee 1950, and the Wriston Committee - 1954); an outside group engaged by a Presidential staff agency (a report by the Brookings Institution prepared for the Bureau of the Budget - 1951); a Presidential ad hoc group (the Du Flon study - 1954); outside groups under contract with a Congressional Committee (the Brookings Institution - 1959, and Syracuse University - 1959); and an outside group with private support organized at the request of the Secretary of State (the Herter Committee - 1962).

The various studies have exhibited a wide area of agreement on many fundamental issues.^{1/} The following summary

^{1/} Arthur G. Jones, Foreign Affairs Personnel Study No. 1, The Evolution of Personnel Systems For US Foreign Affairs (Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 1965)-an excellent review and analysis of each of the studies up to the Herter Committee and other events concerning the development of foreign affairs personnel systems.

from the cited monograph covers those studies up to the Herter Committee, but does not include that report:

(1) They have generally agreed that in staffing the career Foreign Service, recruitment at all levels -- not only at the bottom -- is necessary, subject to a careful qualifying process. Lateral intake enables the Service to meet quantitative and qualitative skill shortages, more easily offsets the dangers of inbreeding and the development of caste spirit, and makes available fresh viewpoints, experiences, and talents. Except for the Wriston Committee's integration proposals, the general view has been that lateral recruitment should be limited and distinctly supplementary to entry at the bottom level.

(2) The groups that have studied the dual systems under which the Department of State is obligated to administer its Civil Service and Foreign Service personnel have clearly favored a consolidation of staff under a flexible personnel system outside the Civil Service system. Whereas the Rowe Committee and the White House Task Force would have established a single foreign affairs service to accommodate all

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employees under the command of the Secretary of State, the other groups have favored only a partial but nonetheless substantial merging of domestic and overseas staffs. All would have used the Foreign Service personnel system for this purpose, but would have adjusted and improved many of its features to accommodate a larger and more diversified body of employees.

(3) The studies have agreed that the career Foreign Service must give greater scope and meaning to specialization on the one hand and to a growing need for managerial and executive talent on the other. While approaches to the problem of the specialist and generalist have differed in details, there has been general consensus that the classical concept of the diplomatic generalist is insufficient to meet today's foreign service needs. The increased magnitude, complexity and programatic character of foreign affairs have evoked widespread support for greater emphasis on specialization and on the development of executives and administrators.

(4) Virtually none of the study groups has been satisfied with the variety of personnel categories and corresponding

differences in status and emolument. There has been no agreement, however, on how to deal with the category question. Thus the Rowe Committee and the White House Task Force favored a single foreign affairs service composed of foreign affairs officers supported by an auxiliary staff group, all under a single salary schedule and retirement system. The Hoover Commission would have divided officers into generalist and specialist branches and retained a reserve officer category, with a supporting staff for both categories. The Wriston Committee sought to expand the role of the Foreign Service officer and sharply curtail that of the Foreign Service Staff. Despite these differences there has been a common ground, namely, the need to modify the personnel structure along more rational lines and eliminate unwarranted distinctions in status and emolument. Moreover, all groups recognized the need for a vehicle analogous to the Foreign Service Reserve to help meet requirements for specialized skills, staff temporary programs, and enable other agencies to assign personnel abroad within the general framework of the Foreign Service.

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(5) By 1950, organization and management issues relating to internal administration of the Foreign Service had been largely resolved as a consequence of the Hoover Commission proposals. Departmental and Foreign Service administrative units had been consolidated and the authority to administer the Service had been clearly placed with the Secretary of State. The later study groups have called for greater continuity in top management, organization of the central personnel office on functional lines, an elevated status for the training function, establishment of a system for projecting personnel needs five to ten years ahead, and various other management improvements.

(6) The studies that dealt with more than the State Department and the Foreign Service, such as the White House Task Force study, have generally favored an "umbrella-type" foreign affairs personnel system outside of, but administered in harmony with, the Civil Service merit system. Agencies concerned primarily with foreign affairs, such as the State Department, the United States Information Agency, and the agency responsible for programs of foreign assistance would

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SERVICE SET

come under this umbrella. Although they would have considerable autonomy in selecting, assigning, promoting, and separating their personnel, they would be subject to over-all policy direction and inspection by a central personnel staff attached to the Executive Office of the President. As for departments that are concerned primarily with domestic affairs but also conduct overseas activities with foreign affairs implications, the weight of opinion has favored utilizing the Foreign Service to meet their overseas personnel needs.

b. Results of Past Proposals

A number of significant improvements in personnel systems and programs were effected over the years up to 1961, primarily through administrative action. Many of these changes followed the recommendations of the study groups. A major reorganization of the Department of State in 1949, as a result of the Hoover Commission proposals, included the establishment of a single Office of Personnel responsible for all personnel programs for both Departmental and Foreign Service personnel. A reorganization of the Office of Personnel in 1953 combined

most of the Departmental and Foreign Service personnel programs under a functional pattern of organization and personnel operations and procedures were modernized.

As a result of the Wriston Committee recommendations of 1954 a large-scale integration program was carried out, resulting in the appointment of 1147 Civil Service, Foreign Service Reserve and Foreign Service Staff officers as Foreign Service officers over a three-year period. Also junior officer appointments were increased substantially, an improved personnel inventory system was installed, a formal career development program was established for the projection of assignments and career counselling of Foreign Service officers and the training program was increased substantially.

The Wriston Report, however, is the only report of a major study group which was fully accepted and implemented by the Department. Most of the other reports before 1961 required comprehensive personnel legislation for their full implementation, particularly the Hoover Commission and Rowe Committee reports. In both instances the Department chose to effect more limited changes through administrative action with a minimum of legislation.

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c. Situation at End of the Kennedy Administration

Secretary of State Rusk appointed a committee of distinguished private citizens in 1961 to conduct a comprehensive study of the personnel systems of the major foreign affairs agencies -- the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, and the United States Information Agency. The Committee, under the Chairmanship of the Honorable Christian A. Herter, submitted its report in December, 1962.^{2/}

The Herter Committee's findings on the problems and underlying issues were very similar to those of previous groups. Its comprehensive recommendations, covering all aspects of the personnel systems and programs of the three agencies, were along the lines of those of the Hoover Commission, the Rowe Committee and the White House Task Force. The most fundamental recommendation was that there should be established a uniform statutory framework for a foreign affairs personnel system applicable to the domestic and overseas

^{2/} Personnel for the New Diplomacy, New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962.

employees of the three agencies. Within this framework each agency would have separate career services constituting a "family of compatible services", with substantial uniformity in personnel policies and equality in conditions of service, joint conduct of personnel operations wherever desirable, systematic interchange of personnel and provision for lateral transfer, and consideration of senior personnel of all three services in filling top executive positions in foreign affairs.

Interagency task forces were appointed early in 1963 to evaluate the many recommendations. There were also inter-agency steering and executive committees to formulate final recommendations. Drafting was begun on a new foreign affairs personnel act. Many of the recommendations were accepted, some with modification. Action was initiated to implement those which did not require legislation.

In August 1963 some important decisions were reached:

1. The recommendation for merging the Civil Service components of the three agencies into a foreign affairs personnel system should be deferred pending further study of the many problems involved.

2. The Administration should not propose legislation establishing a family of compatible services.

(Mr. William J. Crockett, then Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, proposed an alternative whereby USIA and AID officers would be appointed as Foreign Service officers under the concept of a single Foreign Service of the United States.)

3. The approved recommendations would be carried out through administrative action rather than by new legislation.^{3/}

2. Efforts and Achievements - 1964-1968

a. Action on the Herter Report

Administrative implementation of Herter Committee recommendations continued through 1964 and into 1965. Inter-agency coordination of programs and policies was stressed.

A joint State-USIA junior officer examination was announced in 1964, with special options for public affairs, economics and administration. Improved procedures were

^{3/} Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Committee on August 8, 1963 and memorandum from Deputy Under Secretary William J. Crockett to the Secretary of State, September 11, 1963.

established to reduce time lags in the examination and selection processes. A closely coordinated State-USIA recruitment program for junior officers was initiated.

A joint State-AID-USIA board was established to achieve maximum uniformity of personnel policies and regulations and to eliminate differences in benefits and conditions of service at home and abroad insofar as it is feasible.

Exchange assignments of personnel among the agencies were increased.

A new performance evaluation system was developed jointly by the three agencies. It was installed in 1964 with identical forms for State and USIA and only slightly modified forms for AID.

State and USIA operated joint selection boards in 1965 and 1966, with USIA Career Reserve officers competing with State FSO's and Reserve officers for promotion. Joint precepts have been developed for use by separate selection boards for the past two years.

In May, 1965 President Johnson signed Executive Order 11219 authorizing the transfer of career Foreign Service

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SERVICE SET

employees to the Civil Service system on a career basis without competitive examination. Under this authority the Department of State concluded an interchange agreement with the Civil Service Commission for inter-service transfers of personnel. USIA has since concluded a similar agreement.

Other implementation actions involved only the Department of State. A system of functional competition for promotion was introduced into the selection boards for Foreign Service officers and Reserve officers in 1964. This permitted the promotion of some officers in the mid-level classes on the basis of competition only within a functional field, while others continued to be promoted on the basis of class-wide competition.

State also introduced the concept of career stages, as proposed by the Herter Committee, into its assignment, career development and promotion systems.

A separate program for junior officers was established with close central coordination at headquarters in their initial training, assignment, development, evaluation and promotion. Separate quarterly selection boards were set up,

and the promotion rate for junior officers was speeded up in order to make their rate of advancement more comparable to that of management interns and other junior professionals in other Federal Departments and agencies.^{4/}

b. Rusk-Rowan Agreement

It will be recalled that Mr. Crockett, Deputy Under Secretary of State, had proposed in 1963 that in lieu of the family of compatible services approach, USIA and AID officers be appointed as Foreign Service officers under existing authority for lateral entry appointment.

This proposal was formalized in the "Rusk-Rowan Agreement", signed on September 2, 1964, by Secretary of State Rusk and the Director of the US Information Agency, Carl T. Rowan. Under the agreement USIA Career Reserve Officers, who had been selected for such appointments by joint State-USIA examining boards, would be nominated for appointment as Foreign Service officers. Henceforth, junior

^{4/} For other actions taken, see Department of State Summary Report of Action Taken on Herter Committee Recommendations (Revised June 20, 1968).

USIA officers selected through the joint junior officer examination would be nominated for appointment as junior Foreign Service officers. USIA Foreign Service officers would be under the administrative control of the Director of USIA, and certain authorities of the Secretary of State under the Foreign Service Act would be delegated to the Director for this purpose. Other provisions were included for interagency coordination and administration of the expanded Foreign Service Officer Corps as proposed.^{5/}

On April 13, 1965, President Johnson forwarded to the President of the Senate a nomination list of 760 USIA Career Reserve officers for appointment as Foreign Service officers. In the hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee questions were raised with Administration witnesses about the size of the list proposed for lateral entry appointment, whether the framers of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 ever envisaged such wholesale lateral entry, and whether similar proposals might be made later for officers of AID,

^{5/} Letter of agreement between Dean Rusk and Carl Rowan, dated September 2, 1964.

the Peace Corps and other agencies. The hearings also reflected concern about the effect the proposed appointments would have on the Foreign Service retirement fund. The Committee called several of the USIA officers on the nomination list as witnesses and questioned them concerning their backgrounds and their views on the proposal. Although the Committee eventually voted for approval of the nomination list, no action was taken by the Senate that year.^{6/} However, the first group of USIA junior Foreign Service officers selected through the joint State-USIA examination was nominated and approved for appointment in 1965.

c. The Hays Bill

By early 1965 most of the actions that could be taken administratively to unify or coordinate the personnel programs of the foreign affairs agencies had been taken or initiated. If unification was to proceed further legislation was clearly needed. In March 1965 Representative Wayne Hays,

^{6/} United States Information Agency Nominations, Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 89th Congress, 1st. Sess., April 27 and May 18, 1965 (Washington: GPO).

Chairman of the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, introduced H.R. 6277, following discussions with Administration officials.

The Hays bill authorized the establishment of a single, unified foreign affairs personnel system to embrace the overseas and home-based personnel of the Department of State, the US Information Agency, and the Agency for International Development. (The original version authorized the President to designate the foreign affairs personnel of other agencies to be included in the system, but this provision was removed during the course of the hearings.)

A new personnel category, Foreign Affairs officer, would be created, primarily to accommodate the home-based (Civil Service) employees of the three agencies. Foreign Affairs officers would be appointed and compensated under a class and salary structure paralleling that for Foreign Service officers and Reserve officers. Foreign Affairs officers in classes 1, 2 and 3 would be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Those in classes 4 through

8 would be appointed by the President alone or by the Secretary when directed by the President.

The President was authorized to provide for the transfer of all employees of the three agencies to an appropriate foreign affairs personnel category and class without examination and at no loss of salary. (This section originally provided for the mandatory transfer of employees within three years after enactment. It was later amended to make transfer completely voluntary. Another amendment provided that no officer or employee who transferred to the new system could be required to serve abroad without his consent.)

Selection-out authority would be extended to cover Foreign Affairs officers and Foreign Service Staff officers and employees. Those employees transferring into the new Service as Foreign Affairs officers or Foreign Service Staff officers or employees, and persons appointed to the Staff before date of enactment would become participants in the Foreign Service retirement system. Persons appointed for worldwide service as Foreign Affairs officers or as Staff

officers or employees after date of enactment would come under Foreign Service retirement after ten years of service with one of the three agencies. (The first ten years of service would be under Civil Service retirement.)

Thus the Hays bill was intended to provide career services for AID and USIA Foreign Service employees within the framework of a single personnel system applicable to all employees, domestic and Foreign Service, of the three agencies. The bill also contained a number of other provisions relating to employee benefits and allowances and internal management.^{7/}

In addition the Director General was to be appointed by the President with Senate confirmation, and the memberships of the Board of the Foreign Service and the Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service were to be expanded. It was envisaged that the Director General would serve the foreign affairs agencies in a capacity similar to that of

^{7/} H.R. 6277, 89th Cong., 1st. Sess., Mar. 15, 1965.

the Civil Service Commissioners for the Civil Service agencies.^{8/}

President Johnson strongly endorsed the concepts of the Hays bill in letters to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate dated May 6, 1965.^{9/} Letters of endorsement were also submitted by several former members of the Herter and Wriston Committees and others.

Veterans organizations and Federal employee unions were strongly opposed to the provisions exempting employees of the Foreign affairs personnel system from provisions of the Veterans Preference Act, authorizing the transfer of Civil Service employees to the new Service, and extending selection-out authority to cover them.

^{8/} Foreign Service Act Amendments of 1965, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House Report No. 830, 89th Congress, 1st. Sess., Aug. 19, 1965 (Washington: GPO), p. 13.

^{9/} See Foreign Service Act Amendments of 1965, Hearings before the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 89th Cong., 1st. Sess. (Washington: GPO), pp. 2-4.

H.R. 6277, with modifications taking into account the objections of veteran and union organizations and many other amendments to the original bill, was reported favorably by the full Committee on Foreign Affairs on August 19, 1965 and was passed by the House on September 9, 1965.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee took up the Hays bill during the Second Session of the Eighty-Ninth Congress. The President had also resubmitted early in the Session an up-dated and somewhat smaller nomination list of USIA Career Reserve officers for appointment as Foreign Service officers. The two proposals were obviously related, even though none of the provisions of the Hays bill had any direct effect on the Foreign Service Officer Corps.

The Foreign Affairs officer category proposed in the Hays bill could have been used to provide career tenure and Foreign Service retirement coverage for the officers of USIA and AID. It was planned by the Administration, however, that the Foreign Affairs officer category would be used primarily for home-based officers in the three agencies. Also this category would have provided a status for USIA

career officers somewhat different than that of Foreign Service officers. It was the view of the Administration that the career officers of USIA serving abroad should have equal status in every way. (With regard to AID there was no agreement at that time as to what types of positions in AID should serve as a permanent base for establishing a career cadre of Foreign Service officers.) President Johnson, in his letter to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House dated May 6, 1965, had identified the appointment of USIA officers as Foreign Service officers and enactment of legislation along the lines of the Hays bill as separate steps in the plan to improve and strengthen the administration of personnel in the foreign affairs agencies.^{10/}

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee appointed a Special Subcommittee under the chairmanship of Senator Albert Gore to consider both measures. In his opening remarks at the hearings on April 19, 1966, Senator Gore explained that, "Since the confirmation of the USIA nominations would have increased the ranks of the Foreign Service

^{10/} op. cit.

Officer Corps by 20 percent, it was the full committee's view that the matter should be reexamined in the context of the proposed new system.^{11/} This Committee also noted the administration's intention to nominate as Foreign Service officers, through the lateral entry process, employees of the Agency for International Development."^{12/}

In addition to officials of the Department, USIA and AID, the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and a representative of the Bureau of the Budget testified in favor of both measures. They were also endorsed by the Foreign Service Association.

The Budget Bureau proposed that the provision for appointment of the Director General by the President be changed either to remove the restriction on the President's

^{11/} Establishment of a Single Foreign Affairs Personnel System and Nominations of USIA Officers as Foreign Service Officers, Hearings before a Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., April 19, 21 and 28, 1966 (Washington: GPO), p. 1.

^{12/} The basis for this reference to the "administration's intention" is not clear.

selection authority, or to continue the provision for appointment by the Secretary. (The latter was later agreed to.) The Bureau also proposed that the statutory provisions for the Board of the Foreign Service and the Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service be removed from the bill, since both boards had been reestablished by Executive Order in 1965 following their abolishment as statutory boards by Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1965. (This amendment was also agreed to.)

The questioning by some members of the Subcommittee reflected their concern about wholesale lateral entry of USIA officers, and perhaps AID officers later, as Foreign Service officers; the use of the FSO corps as the career category for USIA officers, rather than some other personnel category; and the effect on the organizational independence of USIA if its career officers became Foreign Service officers.

Questioning on the provisions of the Hays bill centered around the effect on Civil Service employees of the provisions for their transfer to the new system with a new status, where they would be subject to selection-out and would

no longer have the protections afforded by the Veterans Preference Act. There was much discussion about how the selection-out system works and the absence of any provision for appeal procedures. The total number of employees who would eventually be transferred from the Civil Service to the Foreign Service retirement system and the additional cost involved also received attention.

The veterans organizations and employee unions again raised strong objections to the transfer of Civil Service employees to a Foreign Service system, to the selection-out provisions, and to the exemption of employees of the new system from veterans preference.

The Subcommittee was not convinced. The length and complexity of the Hays bill and the fact that it was being considered along with the USIA nominations no doubt left some confusion and misunderstanding.

Senator Pell proposed a group of amendments designed to upgrade the status of the Foreign Affairs officer category, including a career minister class, so that it might serve as a career officer category for USIA and AID world-

wide officers in addition to the home-based officers of the three agencies.^{13/}

Although the Pell amendments might have been acceptable as the only alternative to the USIA nominations, neither the Subcommittee nor the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had acted on the nomination list. Therefore the Administration refrained from formal reaction to the proposed amendments.

Late in the Session Senator Pell introduced a new bill, S.3730, providing for a separate career service for USIA officers serving worldwide and creating the category of Foreign Service Information officer with classes, salaries, benefits and perquisites fully comparable to those of Foreign Service officers.^{14/}

^{13/} An analysis of the purposes and effects of the Pell amendments is included in a memorandum of June 24, 1966, from the Deputy Director General of the Foreign Service to the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration.

^{14/} S.3730, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., Aug. 16, 1966.

No further official action was taken on the USIA nominations or the provisions of the Hays bill relating to the foreign affairs personnel system. Both measures expired with the end of the Eighty-Ninth Congress without being reported out of Committee. No hearings were held on S.3730.

d. USIA Career Service Legislation

With the death of the Hays bill and the USIA nomination list the prospects for any kind of legislation authorizing a single foreign affairs personnel system or a family of compatible services appeared bleak indeed.

While the three foreign affairs agencies could continue to operate under dual personnel systems, USIA still had no authority for career appointment of its officers serving on a world-wide basis. The Agency had been unsuccessful in several previous attempts to obtain career service legislation since becoming an independent agency in 1953. It appeared, however, that the introduction of S.3730 by Senator Pell offered some encouragement toward another effort, at least in the Senate.

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Early in the First Session of the Ninetieth Congress Senator Pell introduced a bill, S.633, which was identical to S.3730, on which no action had been taken in the previous Session.

USIA was already engaged, however, in drafting and obtaining Administration approvals of its own version of a similar bill providing for a separate career system. In June, 1967, this bill, S.2002, was introduced by Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at the request of the Administration. It had the endorsement of the Bureau of the Budget, the U. S. Civil Service Commission, and the Department of State.

The two bills were very similar. Whereas Senator Pell's bill dealt only with the Foreign Service Information officer category, the Administration bill had additional provisions extending Foreign Service retirement coverage to USIA's Foreign Service Staff officers and employees under the same conditions as Staff employees of State. Also the Administration bill included the class of career minister as the highest class for USIA officers, while Senator Pell's bill

included both the career minister and career ambassador classes. Other differences were minor.

An ad hoc Subcommittee under Senator Pell's chairmanship held hearings on both bills on September 28, 1967. As a result, S.633 was amended, primarily by changing its provisions to conform to the Administration bill, and was reported favorably by the Subcommittee and the Foreign Relations Committee in October, 1967.^{15/} S.633 was passed by the Senate on November 13, 1967.

In the House the bill was referred to the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Congressman Hays' Subcommittee held hearings on April 4, May 20, and June 26, 1968. The first two days of hearings were devoted to testimony by Administration witnesses and representatives of employee unions and veterans organizations. On June 26 officials of the Department of State and USIA were called

^{15/} USIA Foreign Service Personnel System, Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Report No. 715, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., Nov. 1, 1967 (Washington: GPO).

back to testify on some amendments being considered by the Subcommittee.

No changes were proposed in the bill as passed by the Senate, but amendments were being considered that would change the authorities for appointment of Foreign Service Reserve officers in the Department of State and USIA. It developed in the hearings that the Subcommittee was thinking of the need for uniform authority for the use of Reserve officers, who were originally intended to be hired as specialists to meet temporary needs. Over the years, however, Congress had approved changes authorizing initial appointments of Reserve officers for up to five years, subject to extension for an additional five years. AID had obtained authority for unlimited appointment of Reserve officers.

It was the feeling of the Subcommittee that State and USIA should either terminate Reserve officers at the end of an initial limited appointment or convert them to a permanent appointment. For this purpose authority for unlimited

Reserve officer appointment for State and USIA was being considered.^{16/}

Following the hearings amendments to S.633 were approved providing that:

(1) Any Reserve officer appointed after date of enactment may serve for not more than five years, except that specialized officers assigned from other agencies as Reserve officers may be extended for an additional five years when needed.

(2) During the third to fifth year of service, Reserve officers are to be appointed as a Foreign Service officer, Foreign Service Information officer, Foreign Service Reserve officer with unlimited tenure, Foreign Service Staff officer, or shall be terminated as a Reserve officer.

(3) Reserve officers appointed before date of enactment may be extended for up to five years following date of enactment and may be appointed as unlimited Reserves upon

^{16/} See USIA Foreign Service Personnel System, Hearings before the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington: GPO).

completion of three years' service beginning three years prior to date of enactment.

(4) Reserve officers given unlimited appointments will be subject to selection-out and will become participants in the Foreign Service retirement system.

(5) These provisions are applicable only to the Department of State and the US Information Agency.

S.633, with amendments, was reported favorably by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 3, 1968. It was considered and passed by the House on August 2, 1968. The Senate concurred in the House amendments the same day. Public Law 90-494 was signed by the President on August 20, 1968.

The passage of this law represented an achievement of major significance in improving and strengthening the foreign affairs personnel systems. The act provides for the establishment within the USIA of a Foreign Service Information Officer Corps almost identical in character to the Foreign Service Officer Corps of the Department of State. In addition the provisions governing the appointment of Foreign Service Reserve officers authorize additional flexibility in utilizing

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this personnel category to meet increasing requirements for specialists in the two agencies.

President Johnson, in his statement on signing the law, said,

This law brings overdue recognition to the foreign service personnel of the US Information Agency, and to their mission. In 1955 President Eisenhower made the first proposals to give the Agency a career foreign service. President Kennedy's administration and then my own continued to work toward that goal. Approval of the act today culminates the determined efforts of three administrations, numerous members of Congress, advisory committees and private citizens who have understood that the United States needs a professional career service for this new arm of its diplomacy.

For the first time, USIA will have a career foreign service system with a permanent statutory base. This legislation provides for the establishment of a Foreign Service Information Officer Corps under the Director of USIA. Career officers of USIA will meet the same high standards, and be subject to the same requirements of competitive merit, which mark the career Foreign Service Officer Corps of the Department of State. The two career officer systems will be administered under compatible policies and regulations.

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