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III. EUROPE

A. OVERVIEW

The interaction of the United States with the countries of Europe -- in concert with some, in contest with others -- has decisively influenced the course of world affairs since the Second World War. The continents of North America and Europe constitute the world's great reservoirs of economic, military and technological resources. No part of the earth remains impervious to their influence. World peace is most critically threatened by the artificial division of Europe. The manner in which the nations of North America and Europe manage relationships among themselves and with third countries fundamentally affects the perspectives of all peoples everywhere.

During most of the period 1963-68 relative stability and promising evolution characterized Europe and the Atlantic

area. The invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces in August 1968 starkly emphasized how much remained to be done to build enduring peace in Europe. The repercussions of that repressive act were profound, above all in their impact upon relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The relationship between those world powers is the decisive political reality of the third quarter of the twentieth century. Their ability to maintain a stable relationship stands between mankind and nuclear holocaust.

In the period of 1963-68 a stable relationship was maintained and, in limited measure, strengthened. The United States' steadfast opposition to all forms of Communist imperialism and subversion helped weaker nations retain control of their fate. There were no Communists conquests in the years 1963-68.

Limited agreements were achieved between the United States and the Soviet Union, particularly in the area of international arms control. These formed the basis of

significant forward steps of the international community toward a peaceful world order.

The United States and Western Europe broadened their peaceful cooperation during the five years, to the advantage of both communities. Together, they made a beginning of coordinated efforts to help meet the urgent needs of less advanced peoples.

In managing its relations with the 26 nations of Europe and with Canada during this period the United States pursued two complementary objectives. It strove for peaceful and constructive relations with the Soviet Union and the Communist-ruled countries of Eastern Europe. And it patiently built on to the edifice of cooperation raised since 1945 by the nations of the Atlantic system. The years 1963-68 were marked by advances toward those objectives, and by setbacks; on balance, the United States moved forward toward its goals.

The peoples of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe showed increasing restiveness under uninspired Communist rule.

Throughout Soviet-dominated Europe, governments found themselves under pressure to become more responsive to the needs of individual citizens.

The response varied from country to country. All Communist regimes felt compelled to attempt economic reforms. All reform programs featured relaxation of centralized bureaucratic controls in favor of greater autonomy for individual enterprises.

During these years Communist leaders also strove to control mounting pressure for a larger measure of personal freedom and of popular influence on government policy decisions. In some countries, including the Soviet Union, these pressures were contained by stern repression. In Czechoslovakia, a reform Communist leadership sought to reconcile Party dictatorship with democratic practice. In August, 1968 the Soviet Union harshly intervened against this bold experiment. Its armies, supported by those of its orthodox allies, occupied Czechoslovakia. Moscow dictated the terms of a restoration of authoritarian control over the lives of the

Czechoslovak people.

Repression in Czechoslovakia gravely set back a gradual liberal evolution in Eastern Europe toward which the United States and its Western allies had peacefully contributed. It did not vitiate this country's policy of building bridges of cooperation with nations on the far side of the line which still divides Europe. The policy of reconciliation and detente was enunciated by President Johnson on October 7, 1966. It was embraced by all members of the North Atlantic Alliance a year later in NATO's Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance.

In the historical perspective the Soviet Union's anachronistic reversion to the politics of force may well hasten the day when Communist authority recognizes the need to come to terms with the irrepressible demands of the human spirit. But the short-term consequences were severely adverse, both to Soviet interests and to those of the West.

The abrupt return to Stalinist practice by the Soviet Union shocked the world. It reduced the stature of Moscow's

leaders in the eyes of men everywhere. It shattered -- perhaps irreparably -- the solidarity of the international Communist movement. In terms of the Marxists' own dialectic it immeasurably sharpened the contradiction between ruling orthodoxy and the aspirations of the subject masses.

Before the tragedy in Czechoslovakia the United States had by patient negotiation widened the area of mutually advantageous agreement and accommodation with the Soviet Union. In the area of international agreement directed at securing the peace, the treaty on the peaceful uses of outer space was signed in 1967. A treaty on the rescue and return of astronauts was opened for signature in April, 1968. A treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons was signed July 1, 1968. In the five preceding years a number of constructive bilateral agreements were achieved. The prospect of slowing, or even ending, a costly and destructive arms race was opened. In the summer of 1968 the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to open bilateral discussions of

measures to limit the deployment of offensive and defensive missile systems.

The years 1963-68 were characterized by the consequent striving by the United States to organize a just and durable international order in the face of immense inertia and resistance on the part of the Communist hierarchy. The task was far from completed. The pace of progress was brought nearly to a halt in August 1968. It remained to be seen whether the setback would be prolonged.

In its relations with Western Europe the United States made significant achievements in creative cooperation.

The Kennedy Round of negotiations on tariff and trade barriers, completed in 1967, was an historic step forward in the freeing of international commerce from national restrictions. In its steady internal development the Common Market passed a milestone on the road to full integration with the achievement of a customs union on January 1, 1968.

The United States and Western Europe similarly attained a new level of constructive cooperation in monetary affairs.

The leading financial powers, organized informally as the Group of Ten, worked together to contain potentially destructive effects of payments difficulties of member countries, notably the United Kingdom and the United States. In 1967 they contributed decisively to the adoption by the International Monetary Fund of measures to supplement increasingly inadequate reserves of gold and dollars as means of international exchange.

The institution through which the United States and 14 Allies organized an effective system of integrated defense survived a critical hour in its existence. In March, 1966 France informed its Atlantic Treaty allies that it was withdrawing from participation in the military activities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It required the international military headquarters and all Allied military forces to depart France within one year. The Fourteen responded within days with a declaration of continued commitment to the Alliance and to NATO.

Within twelve months they reorganized the NATO command system, establishing Supreme Allied Headquarters at Casteau

in Belgium. All Allied facilities and personnel were repositioned outside France by April 1, 1967. The Fourteen took advantage of the event to modernize the NATO structure and update its strategic doctrine. A searching study of the future of the Alliance as it neared its 20th year of existence resulted in December 1967 in a declaration affirming the continued essential role of NATO. The declaration defined the twin functions of the Alliance as defense of the member nations against external threat and promotion at the same time of a stable peace in Europe. As the Alliance neared its 20th anniversary its continuation appeared to be assured. Its potential as an instrument of security and of peace-making remained great.

In the years 1963-68 Western Europe experienced a continued period of social progress and rise in economic potential. Its recovery of vigor and purpose in the political field did not keep pace. President de Gaulle's obdurate resistance effectively blocked progress toward European political union,

as it frustrated the evident desire of other Common Market countries to broaden their Community to embrace the United Kingdom and other countries ready to accede.

The leadership of Western Europe was similarly loath to engage the continent in international affairs outside a narrowly construed European sphere. The United Kingdom undertook to dismantle its historic power position East of Suez. Our Western European allies lent only token support to the United States effort in Southeast Asia. They played a passive role in the Near East crisis of May-June 1967. They cherished their cooperative relationship with the United States but demonstrated reluctance to invest in that relationship either the resources or the political effort commensurate with their potential.

At the end of 1968 it appeared clear that the future development of the Atlantic relationship would be largely shaped by the character of Western Europe's response to the challenge to rise to its potential for beneficent influence on world affairs.

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B. UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH NATO

1. The Changing International Background to NATO and Atlantic Political and Military Cooperation

At the time when President Johnson took office in November 1963 the North Atlantic Alliance and its institutions constituted an established and successful instrument for military and political cooperation. At the same time, NATO faced many problems. These involved relations among the Allies as well as issues growing out of changes in military technology, international finance, and the overall international situation. In some cases, the problems had built up over a period of years.

Thus, President Johnson's policy had to deal with two continuing needs: (a) continuity in our security relations with Western Europe and (b) the requirement for adaptation in NATO to take account of the changing international situation. Increasingly, important segments of opinion in Western Europe and in the United States argued that the Cold War was rapidly receding, that East-West tensions had relaxed, and that their further relaxation should be a major element

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in Western policies. Some, albeit a minority, began to question NATO's utility and raison d'etre with the waning of the Cold War.

This emphasis on detente stemmed from many factors. The shock produced by the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 had passed. The Cuba missile crisis of October 1962 had convinced much of Western opinion that a fundamental milestone had been reached, making all-out nuclear conflict improbable to the point at which such conflict could be virtually disregarded as a realistic contingency. The deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations, and increasing signs of pluralism throughout the communist world, added to the movement toward relaxation of tensions in Europe.

Yet there were important differences of emphasis among the Allies as to the meaning and reality of detente. The United States, though strongly in favor of improved East-West relations, tended to come down on the side of prudence in assessing the implications of detente for security planning.^{1/}

^{1/} Secretary Rusk's remarks to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 14, 1966, reported in TONNAT CA-4960, January 6, 1967.

The NATO Governments largely succeeded, in 1967 and 1968, in reconciling their differences on this subject, although views were still far from uniform.

Among the Western countries, a number of long-standing strains had also begun to manifest themselves overtly against the background of the changing East-West situation. These included specific areas of dispute, such as the sharp Greek-Turkish confrontations over Cyprus and reciprocal displeasure between many of the Allies and Portugal over that nation's African policies.

Changes in the East-West atmosphere, together with the increasingly rapid liquidation or transformation of European colonial commitments, also tended to bring about a change in outlook as between Western Europe and America. As the Europeans were becoming increasingly preoccupied with problems of relations among themselves, the United States was endeavoring to secure their cooperation in problems involving other parts of the world. This was the case in regard to Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and, increasingly

throughout the Johnson Administration, Viet-Nam.

In its dealings with the Allies, moreover, the Johnson Administration was faced with significant problems of resource allocation and foreign exchange. Western European parliaments were becoming more reluctant than ever to put up money for large defense establishments. The British had a chronic balance-of-payments problem, and our own balance-of-payments deficit became a source of deep concern throughout the period of this Administration. Thus, the question of burden-sharing which had plagued NATO for years reached new proportions with the acute problem of "offset" -- the problem of neutralizing the foreign exchange costs of stationing US and British forces in Germany. A crisis was forestalled by tripartite (US-UK-FRG) discussions in 1966-67, and the problem was settled provisionally in the succeeding year.

Above all, President de Gaulle's long-standing position of dissatisfaction with NATO caused concern, inhibited Allied decisions in various fields and, ultimately, led to a crisis

in Western relations. The French Government's dissatisfaction embraced such elements as the unavoidable preponderance of American influence and leadership in NATO; United States emphasis on Atlantic military integration and European political integration; the postwar Anglo-Saxon "monopoly" in the nuclear field; and, at least by implication, fear of a US-Soviet deal at Western Europe's expense.

While no other NATO government shared de Gaulle's policy objectives, many attached great importance to minimizing frictions with France. They wished to avoid steps that might harden France's position or give it a pretext to act against the Alliance. Moreover, within certain countries, especially, the Federal Republic of Germany, substantial segments of opinion were ambivalent: They attached great importance to good relations with France and had some sympathy for stated French objectives even though they refused to accept or support France's specific policies and methods. The issues were seriously complicated by (a) intra-European disputes on the organization of Europe, including Britain's search for

membership in the European Communities which de Gaulle had harshly blocked with his celebrated veto in January, 1963; and (b) by lack of Alliance agreement on nuclear policy and strategic doctrine -- "flexible response" or "massive retaliation."

France brought the question to a head in 1966 by withdrawing from integrated NATO military activities. With the United States playing the leading role, the Allies successfully resolved the France-NATO crisis by the end of the year. They agreed on relocating their key institutions, and evolved practical arrangements for continued political cooperation and military liaison with the French.

NATO also made good progress over the next two years in settling the old disputes over strategic doctrine and in creating and utilizing new means for nuclear consultations -- in both cases as the result of United States initiatives. Moreover, by the end of the Johnson Administration NATO had advanced significantly in strengthening its political role -- in improving the Alliance as a forum for consulting on East-

West and other international problems. This was the case notably for issues involving US-USSR negotiations such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty where Allied views and differences were ironed out through the North Atlantic Council.

In November 1963, as at the end of President Johnson's tenure, there were in any case fundamental elements of continuity in the situation -- the political will to hold the Alliance together and to improve NATO arrangements wherever possible. With the exception of France, and despite whatever dissatisfaction may have been felt by others in particular cases, all NATO governments remained firmly committed to the concepts of collective security, close ties with the United States, and NATO's integrated command arrangements.

The first NATO Ministerial Meeting after President Johnson took office was held December 16-17, 1963, in Paris. In the communique the Ministers "welcomed a message from President Johnson renewing previous United States pledges to support the Alliance with all its strength and maintain

its forces in Europe."^{2/}

Despite the increasing emphasis in Allied countries on lessening tensions and improving relations with the Warsaw Pact nations, all recognized that the fundamental issues of a divided Europe remained and that the Atlantic Alliance -- and the American strength underlying it -- were essential to European stability and freedom from coercion. The NATO Ministers in their December 1963 meeting^{3/} reaffirmed their 1958 declaration to defend and maintain the freedom of West Berlin and its people and "expressed the hope" that Soviet policy would permit progress toward solving the problems of Berlin and Germany. This note of continuity on the German problem and European security persisted throughout the 1963-68 period.^{4/} The Allies gave continual backing to the Federal Republic's efforts to improve its relations with Eastern

^{2/} Verbatim record, NATO Ministerial Meeting, Paris, December 16-17, 1963, NATO Document C-VR(63)73.

^{3/} ibid

^{4/} See, for example, Communique of NATO Ministerial Meeting, Reykjavik, June 24-25, 1968.

Europe, a policy that the CDU/SPD coalition intensified when it succeeded the Erhard Government in late 1966.

United States policy toward NATO throughout the Johnson Administration was conditioned primarily by the circumstances and problems outlined above. Its overriding objectives were the maintenance of the fabric of the Alliance and the improvement and modernization of its machinery in both military and non-military fields.

The United States between 1963 and 1968 took a number of specific initiatives to strengthen NATO. These included, notably: creation of the Nuclear Planning Group; improved force planning procedures and modernized strategic doctrine; better communications and crisis consultation arrangements; renewed emphasis on political consultations; and arms control studies and suggestions including a special NATO declaration on mutual force reductions in June, 1968.^{5/} The United States also vigorously supported other initiatives aimed at improving the Alliance, such as the Harmel Study on the Future Tasks of the Alliance. Lastly, as already noted, the United States played a crucial role in holding the

^{5/} ibid

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Alliance together and adapting it following France's 1966 withdrawal from the integrated military system.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia by forces of the Soviet Union plus four Warsaw Pact members on August 20, 1968, transformed the atmosphere in NATO during the final months of President Johnson's Administration. The United States took the lead in organizing a series of extraordinary meetings to forge an Allied response to the invasion, culminating in the Ministerial Meeting in Brussels on November 14-16, which was advanced from the normal December date.^{6/}

In the Communique of this meeting the Ministers condemned the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia and denounced the "Socialist Commonwealth" doctrine. Noting the uncertainty aroused by the use of force in Czechoslovakia and the expansion of Soviet activity in the Mediterranean,

^{6/} Department of State Telegram 239442 for a summary of the US initiatives and the logic behind them
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the Allies warned that "any Soviet intervention directly or indirectly affecting the situation in Europe or in the Mediterranean would create an international crisis."

The Ministers of the Fourteen, meeting in the Defense Planning Council, took an important series of decisions to improve the NATO force and readiness posture to meet this uncertainty. The Fifteen made it clear, however, that although the Soviet actions necessitated these moves, the long-standing goals of progress in disarmament and arms control in Europe and the settlement of the problems dividing East and West remained fundamental to the Alliance.

The Ministerial Meetings also marked at least a temporary improvement of France's attitude toward NATO. Even though basic French policy, reflected in the 1966 decisions, remained unchanged, the French Foreign Minister was more positive (a) in giving a warning to the Soviet Union, and (b) in affirming the necessity of the continued existence of the Alliance.^{7/}

^{7/} See USNATO Telegrams 5845 and 5916 (both ~~SECRET~~).

President Johnson enunciated his policy toward NATO on many occasions, including two major statements in 1966.^{8/} A joint statement issued by the President and NATO Secretary General Brosio in February 1968, on the occasion of the latter's visit to Washington, said in part: "They considered the maintenance of NATO's strength, including the US commitment, as necessary to continuing stability and security in the North Atlantic area. This stability and security provides the basis for exploring with the USSR the possibility of mutual force reductions."^{9/} On September 10, 1968, President Johnson publicly emphasized the continuing

^{8/} See remarks of the President to the Foreign Service Institute, White House press release, March 23, 1966; also his remarks at the National Conference of Editorial Writers, Carnegie Endowment Building, New York (White House Press Release, October 7, 1966).

^{9/} See statement by the President following call by NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio (White House press release, February 19, 1968).

US commitment to NATO and European security.^{10/}

The main NATO issues and United States policies between 1963 and 1968 are described in more detail below. American leadership during this period played the key role in meeting NATO's crises and adapting the Alliance to change. While critical problems may remain or arise in the next few years, the Alliance approached its twentieth anniversary (April 4, 1969) with solid policies and improved machinery.

^{10/} See White House press releases for the texts of the President's speeches to the American Legion and the B'nai B'rith on this date.

2. The Troop Problem and Burden-Sharing

a. New Planning of NATO Forces

Upon assuming office in 1963, the Johnson Administration faced a problem that had plagued NATO for years. This was the disparity between force "requirements" or "goals" set by military authorities and actual Allied forces in being. This disparity derived from two main factors. First, the size of the threat in terms of hostile divisions and numbers of men was overestimated by NATO members, including the United States, until about 1961. Second, and more important, goals were based almost exclusively upon military considerations which did not adequately reflect the political and economic factors operating upon member governments. At the December 1962 NATO Ministerial Meeting, Secretary Rusk called for an effort "to close the gap between NATO military requirements and national force programs." ^{1/}

^{1/} NATO Document C-VR(62)60, December 14, 1962,
p. 25 (COSMIC TOP SECRET)

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In a series of initiatives, the United States attempted to obtain NATO agreement to rationalizing Alliance force planning by balancing political commitments, strategy, forces and resources. First, the United States pointed out that the conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact were not overwhelmingly superior to those of NATO, as was widely believed to be the case. At the December 1964 Ministerial Meeting, Secretary of Defense McNamara said "I believe that the present force structure is broadly adequate. I believe that, except for a few countries, large increases in defense budgets are not needed..."^{2/} At the Defense Ministers' meeting in May 1965, Mr. McNamara elaborated by citing specific figures to show that NATO's conventional capabilities might, in fact, be superior to those of the Warsaw Pact.^{3/}

Second, the United States recommended that the focus of the then-current NATO debate over strategy be shifted from an abstract level to one of consideration of the specific

^{2/} NATO Document C-VR(64)56, page 17. (COSMIC TOP SECRET)

^{3/} NATO Document C-VR(65)26, Page 8 (COSMIC TOP SECRET).

military problems facing the Alliance. At the Defense Ministers' Meeting in the spring of 1965, Secretary McNamara proposed that NATO's further study of force goals be guided by "an analysis of the forces required to respond effectively to typical situations representative of the full spectrum of likely contingencies. This would seem to be a far more useful purpose than a continuation of debates over strategic concepts." ^{4/}

A third US initiative was designed to reinforce the role of member governments, as compared with that of NATO's military authorities, in the determination of requirements for forces. This move was to break the pattern in which military planners proposed force levels which member countries failed to provide. In the fall of 1965, the United States proposed that each member government submit by May 1966 a detailed force plan (including manpower, cost and logistics data) which it was clearly willing and able to achieve by 1970. The NATO military authorities concurrently followed

^{4/} Ibid, page 11.

the old pattern of developing force goals and presented these goals in the customary fashion to the December 1965 Ministerial Meeting. Ministers "accepted" the military commanders' goals as a "basis for further study and planning." ^{5/} In fact, however, these goals were to serve only as general guidelines for the development of realistic national force plans, which would then be compiled and adopted as NATO's official force plan. At their meeting in July 1966, the Defense Ministers adopted as a minimum NATO force plan through 1970 the force structure actually planned by countries. ^{6/}

A fourth US initiative, taken in October 1965, was to recommend new procedures to plan NATO forces in two-year cycles preceding five-year periods to be covered by the plan, with participation by responsible ministers at each significant stage in the cycle. The US initiative was adopted at the December 1965 Ministerial meeting. ^{7/} Consequently, NATO

^{5/} NATO Document C-M(65)139 (Final), December 16, 1965 (SECRET)

^{6/} NATO Document C-M(66)72, July 26, 1966, p.2 (SECRET)

^{7/} NATO Document C-M(65)139 (Final), December 16, 1965 (SECRET)

forces are now planned over a two-year period, with the following steps: 1) before the December Ministerial meeting which is to begin the cycle, the Military Committee issues an appreciation of the military situation as it will affect NATO over the next seven years; 2) at the December Ministerial meeting, ministers issue political guidance for the preparation by the NATO Military Authorities (Military Committee and Major NATO Commanders) of force proposals for the five-year period under consideration (the last five years in the Military Committee's "appreciation" mentioned in 1) above;) 3) during the summer of the first year of the cycle, the Major NATO Commanders prepare force proposals relating to each member country's defense effort consisting of a detailed statement, by region or operational area, and submit these proposals for study by the Military Committee; 4) during the fall of the first year, the Defense Planning Committee further refines the force proposals forwarded to it by the Military Committee, and submits these proposals for consideration by Ministers at the December meeting; 5) Ministers adopt agreed NATO force goals for the five-year period under

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consideration and submit these goals to each member country through the Defense Planning Committee; 6) during the winter and spring of the second year of the cycle, member governments submit force and financial plans covering the forces they plan to provide; 7) during the summer and fall of the second year, the DPC's subordinate Defense Review Committee, along with NATO military and civil representatives, conducts reviews of each country's plan in an attempt to reconcile this plan quantitatively and qualitatively with the force goals adopted by Ministers; 8) at the December ministerial meeting at the end of the second year of the cycle, the collated country force plans are adopted by Ministers as a NATO Force Plan. Each country is considered bound to provide the forces it promises for the first year of the Force Plan, which begins in the January immediately following the ministerial meeting.

There are two essential points to be noted. First, responsible national ministers are involved in each important stage in the force planning process, and take responsibility for any risk of not providing sufficient forces. Second,

countries pledge the forces they are actually prepared to provide. Thus, at US initiative, NATO finally broke with the tradition of calling for forces that national members are unwilling or unable to make available.

Ministers adopted the first five-year Force Plan developed under the new procedures and covering the years 1968 through 1972 at the December 1967 Ministerial meeting.^{8/} The following year a plan for 1969 through 1973 was being developed for adoption by Ministers in December 1968.

b. Trilateral Agreements on Costs

Throughout its term of office, the Johnson Administration faced financial and political problems arising from the stationing of US forces in Europe. Balance of payments problems were particularly acute for the United States and Great Britain with regard to their troops in Germany. Arrangements made with the Germans to "offset" the balance of payments costs through German purchases of American and British military and other goods broke down over the period

^{8/} NATO Document C-M(67)69, December 18, 1967 (SECRET).

1965 to 1966, when the Federal Republic ran into serious financial difficulties.^{9/}

In the fall of 1966, British and German disagreements and difficulties over "offsetting" balance of payments costs of British troops in Germany threatened to bring on drastic withdrawals from the British Army on the Rhine. Such large withdrawals could have led to other national troop drawdowns and an "unravelling" of the NATO defense structure.^{10/}

It was in an effort to examine the problem of "burden-sharing," or the appropriate level of national contributions to the NATO common defense, as well as to avoid a dangerous and uncoordinated unravelling of NATO's forces in the European Central Region, that the United States proposed Trilateral Talks between itself and the UK and FRG. On October 7, 1966, the President asked Mr. John J. McCloy to recommend measures to meet the impending crisis and to

^{9/} Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the Combined Subcommittee of Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on the subject of United States Troops in Europe, April 26, 1967, p. 5.

^{10/} Letter dated May 17, 1967, to the President from the Honorable John J. McCloy (SECRET)

represent him in the Talks.^{11/} On March 1, 1967, in asking Mr. McCloy to continue his discussions with British and German representatives, the President directed that the US approach to the negotiations be guided by three basic principles: "Force levels should be determined through agreement among the Allies on the basis only of security considerations, broadly construed; Germany should decide what levels of procurement in the US and Britain it wishes to undertake in order to bring its military forces up to appropriate strength levels; simultaneously, the Allies should deal with the remaining balance of payments consequences of allied troops stationed in Germany by cooperation in the management of monetary reserves or by other agreed means."^{12/}

On April 28, 1967, the Trilateral Talks were concluded and the negotiators issued their Final Report, appending to it a series of Agreed Minutes and documents constituting the

^{11/} Letter from the President to Mr. McCloy, October 7, 1966.

^{12/} Letter from the President to Mr. McCloy, March 1, 1967.

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agreements reached. The first was an Agreed Minute on Strategy and Forces. It stated that in order to deter aggression, the Alliance required a full spectrum of military capabilities ranging from conventional forces through tactical nuclear weapons to strategic nuclear forces. It further stated that the existing level of NATO forces appeared adequate for deterrence, but that the question of imbalances in these forces remained to be discussed. Also remaining to be discussed was the question of where these forces should be located, in the light of various factors, including the prospect of political and military warning preceding an attack, capacity and speed of reinforcement, economic considerations, and the political impact of any new deployments on NATO and the Warsaw Pact.^{13/}

A second Agreed Minute between Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany set forth financial arrangements to offset the costs of stationing British forces in Germany. It also forecast the withdrawal of one British brigade group

^{13/} Attachment to letter to the President from Mr. McCloy, May 17, 1967 (SECRET).

and two tactical air force squadrons to Britain and their continued commitment to NATO.^{14/}

A third agreement was between the United States and Great Britain for an increase of American military orders and payments.^{15/}

A fourth agreement was between the United States and Germany. It forecast the redeployment from Germany to the United States of up to 35,000 military personnel and four tactical aircraft squadrons, and their continued commitment to NATO. The Army redeployment plan involved the 24th Infantry Division. One brigade of that division would be in Germany at all times. The other two brigades and an appropriate share of divisional and non-divisional support units would be removed from Germany to the United States. Once a year, all three brigades would return to Germany for exercises involving the entire division. The three brigades would succeed each other in Germany, each brigade in turn remaining

^{14/} Ibid.

^{15/} Ibid.

there on temporary duty for a period of six months. Forces redeployed to the United States would be maintained in a high degree of readiness. Equipment would be maintained in Germany in sufficient quantity and readiness to ensure that the forces could be redeployed to that country within 30 days, and the US would endeavor to shorten this time.^{16/}

The US redeployment of air units involved four tactical fighter squadrons out of nine in Germany. The United States undertook to maintain these forces committed to NATO and in a high state of readiness. It also promised to return them to Germany once a year for exercises.^{17/}

This Agreed Minute also contained financial provisions for the continued German procurement of military goods and services in an amount which would be decided by the FRG Government but which in any case would be significant in relation to the German defense effort. Since these purchases would not be sufficient to offset the balance of payments costs of stationing US military personnel in

16/ Ibid.

17/ Ibid.

Germany, the FRG would invest during FY 1968 the sum of \$500 million in special, medium-term US Government securities, constituting a real import of capital into the United States. In the Minute, the governments noted the undertaking by the German Bundesbank to continue its practice of not converting dollars into gold from the US treasury.^{18/}

The final Trilateral undertaking involved the procedures to be followed in NATO and the Western European Union with regard to the Trilateral Agreements.^{19/}

The United States described the Trilateral Agreements in a Department of State press release of May 2, 1967.

In his May 17, 1967, letter to the President, Mr. McCloy summed up the results of the Trilateral Talks as follows:

In these talks I believe that we have come a considerable distance from the unpromising situation we faced last autumn. One result was to forestall the drastic troop withdrawals which the British were then threatening to make, which could have stampeded our other NATO Allies into making comparable cuts and have led to rapid unravelling of the NATO defense structure. We must recognize, however, that the process of disintegration could start again if our

^{18/} Ibid.

^{19/} Ibid.

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Allies were to gain the impression that the US troop rotation proposals are but the first of a series.

The Talks also obtained from the Germans and the British acceptance of the concept of rotation and the procedures for rapid response. The system can now be tested and -- with skillful handling -- can be made militarily and politically convincing to our Atlantic Allies.

In addition, the Germans recognized that in this instance the United States consulted them fully and faithfully. They were particularly gratified by your willingness to modify the number of aircraft to be redeployed. As a result, I noted a distinct improvement in the political atmosphere at the conclusion of the talks. The visits to Bonn by you and the Vice President and your frank exchange of views with Chancellor Kiesinger certainly contributed greatly to improving relations and overcoming the German feeling of concern bordering on distrust that followed the collapse of the Erhard Government.

Another wholesome result of the Talks is the new US policy on handling the offset problem by monetary measures rather than simply and solely by arms sales. The results, in my view, are impressive: (1) the "gold letter" from the German Bundesbank is truly significant. It protects US gold stocks against much more than defense expenditures in Germany; and the German commitment should help to create a favorable worldwide impact. Moreover, this German cooperation with us was undertaken deliberately although bound to irritate Paris; and (2) the offer to purchase and hold \$500 million in US Government medium-term securities.

Last, but probably as important as anything, was the fact that the three governments agreed that the foreign exchange problems resulting from the stationing of troops in a foreign country for the common defense should be recognized as the common responsibility of all the Allies.

The financial arrangements made in the Trilateral Talks, along with other bilateral arrangements, helped to alleviate US balance of payments problems caused by the stationing of troops in Europe. At the December 1967 Ministerial Meeting of the Defense Planning Committee, Secretary Rusk expressed appreciation for this Allied cooperation. He continued, however, that the US hoped all the Allies would recognize that "foreign exchange windfalls resulting from military expenditures undertaken under the Alliance are rather different from gains resulting from trade and capital flow and other types of transactions." He hoped all would agree that "the financial consequences of military expenditures between the members of the Alliance are a matter of common concern and should be dealt with in a manner that reflects our community of interests."^{20/}

^{20/} NATO Document DPC-VR(67)29, page 33 (SECRET)

Congressional, especially Senate, pressures for drastic US troop reductions in Europe ranged from moderate to heavy during the years of the Johnson Administration. In late 1966, the Senate Majority Leader, Senator Mansfield, along with 43 co-sponsors, introduced a resolution calling for a "substantial" reduction of US military forces in Europe. Senator Mansfield chaired hearings on this resolution in April and May 1967 and took testimony from Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and Under Secretary Katzenbach, who maintained that it was not in the security or political interest of the US to remove from Europe more than the "up to 35,000" military personnel involved in the Trilateral Agreements.^{21/}

Although the Mansfield resolution did not come to a vote, Congressional pressures for drastic drawdowns of US forces in Europe continued into 1968. On January 10, Senator Mansfield announced that he would re-introduce his resolution. On

^{21/} Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services print of "Hearings before the Combined Subcommittee of Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on the Subject of US Troops in Europe" April 26 and May 3, 1967.

April 19, Senator Symington of Missouri proposed, withdrew, and announced his intention to reintroduce the following amendment to the Defense Appropriations Bill: "After December 31, 1968, no appropriation authorized by this or any other Act may be used to support more than 50,000 members of the Armed Forces of the United States on the continent of Europe." Before this amendment or the Mansfield resolution came to a vote, however, the USSR and some of its Warsaw Pact allies invaded Czechoslovakia. Senator Mansfield then announced that this was not the time to remove troops from Europe. Hence it appeared that the Administration would be successful in maintaining a substantial US military presence in Europe while attempting to induce its Allies to shoulder more of the burden of the common defense.

3. The NATO Nuclear Problem

a. Background

Over the years, the United States has approached the problem of nuclear sharing in NATO with several major objectives in mind: (1) to strengthen NATO unity and cohesion; (2) to satisfy legitimate political and security needs of allies to participate meaningfully in Alliance nuclear affairs; (3) to inhibit proliferation of independent national nuclear weapons programs; and (4) to meet NATO military requirements for effective nuclear capabilities.

During the decade of the 1960s, NATO examined (and, in some cases, adopted) a number of nuclear sharing proposals -- ranging from the Multilateral Force (MLF) concept to the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).

b. The Multilateral Force (MLF)

The MLF concept was first suggested by Secretary of State Herter, at the NATO Ministerial meeting in December 1960. As eventually developed, the MLF concept envisioned a naval fleet of approximately 25 merchant-type ships armed with some

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200 POLARIS A-3 missiles, which would be owned, controlled, and manned multilaterally by a group of as many NATO nations as might wish to participate. The force would be under the direction of a council or commission composed of representatives of the participating nations. The charter establishing the force would be open-ended, making it possible for any NATO member to participate if it assumed a fair share of the costs and responsibilities. No member's share could exceed 40 percent. As one of its unique features, ships of the force would be mixed-manned by personnel from at least three nations, with no nation providing more than 40 percent of the personnel in any ship. Control and release of the weapons would be by decision of an agreed number of participants; US concurrence would be required.^{1/}

In early 1963, President Kennedy appointed a Multilateral Force Negotiating Team to develop the MLF concept and to discuss it with NATO Governments. Subsequent to

^{1/} Department of State Circular Airgram CA-8624, February 17, 1964 (CONFIDENTIAL).

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these discussions in the spring of 1963, interested countries formed an ad hoc group (the so-called Paris Working Group) to examine the MLF concept in greater detail, but on a "no-commitment" basis. The Paris Working Group was composed of the Permanent Representatives to NATO of Germany, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Belgium, Netherlands, UK and US. It met about 60 times, commencing in October 1963 and continuing into 1966. The Working Group established sub-groups to deal with the military, legal, nuclear safety and security, financial and administrative aspects of the MLF.

c. The Mixed-Manning Demonstration

Since the MLF concept contemplated mixed-manning, President Kennedy offered to provide a US guided missile destroyer to be used for a practical test of this principle. Because the ship remained a unit of the US Navy, the posts of commanding officer, executive officer, and several other key billets were filled by Americans. However, the FRG, UK, Italy, Greece, The Netherlands and Turkey provided approximately 50 percent of the crew. Thus, the USS Claude V. Ricketts (DDG-5) was formally designated at a Washington

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ceremony in October 1964. During the following months, the USS Ricketts participated in fleet operations and visited Italy, Malta, Sicily, Greece, The Netherlands, England, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States. The demonstration terminated with a ceremony in Norfolk, Virginia, on December 1, 1965. A NATO board of naval review headed by a US Admiral, concluded that the mixed-manning exercise "was worthwhile and highly successful from all viewpoints; it provided extensive experience which could be used in the development of a NATO common force." ^{2/}

d. Differing Views on MLF

As the Mixed-Manning Demonstration made the MLF appear closer to reality and as the Paris Working Group continued its discussions, NATO members' positions on the MLF began to crystalize. In March 1964 during a series of talks with President Johnson and other US officials, Mr. Harold Wilson, the leader of the British Labor Party then out of

^{2/} Paris Working Group, Report on Progress of the Mixed-Manning Demonstrations, WG/Document 97, February 1, 1966 (CONFIDENTIAL).

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power, expressed strong opposition to a mixed-manned nuclear force. The United States had been the leading proponent of the MLF. On April 20, 1964, the President stated his support for the MLF during an address in New York City. And on May 9, 1964, Secretary of State Rusk, during a speech in Brussels, urged rapid progress on the MLF. Germany likewise continued its full support. In June 1964, Chancellor Ludwig Erhard and President Johnson expressed agreement that the MLF would contribute significantly to the political and military strength of NATO and that efforts should be continued to insure an MLF treaty by the end of 1964. Nevertheless, although Italy and The Netherlands were favorably inclined, other European nations still refrained from official acceptance of the MLF largely because of the unsettled, sensitive issue of a US veto over the release of the fleet's nuclear weapons.

While Mr. Wilson continued to express opposition to the MLF, the French suddenly began to attack the concept. On November 5, 1964, Premier Georges Pompidou criticized the MLF as a German-American effort not representing

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European policy. French opposition intensified in the next six months, and German reluctance to risk a serious confrontation with France created doubts about the MLF in the Federal Republic as well. On November 23, 1964, Harold Wilson, now the British Prime Minister, strongly attacked the proposed fleet and in December discussed the matter with President Johnson in Washington. The Soviet Union had continually assailed the MLF plan because it would "permit a German finger on the nuclear trigger." There was opposition also in the United States. Some opposed the MLF because it would make it difficult to gain Soviet acceptance of a nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). There were increasing doubts in Congress, although a true test of Congressional sentiment never took place.

Finally, the MLF question was further complicated by a British proposal in early 1965 for an Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) -- i.e., that existing strategic nuclear resources of the Alliance, as well as any newly-created MLF, be united under a single unified control system.^{3/} The

^{3/} Department of State Airgram CA-6737, February 4, 1965 (CONFIDENTIAL).

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ANF would have the following components: (1) the existing British V-Bomber force and the British Polaris submarine force when it became available; (2) at least an equal number of US Polaris submarines and possibly some minute-man missiles in the US; (3) some kind of mixed-manned and jointly-owned force in which the non-nuclear powers could take part; and (4) any forces which France might decide to contribute.

e. New US Approaches to Problem

In reassessing the MLF question, a particularly important consideration was to find alternative ways for satisfying the desire of our NATO Allies for a voice in nuclear planning. As steps in this direction, the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Ottawa May 22-24, 1963, had approved assignment to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) of the UK V-Bomber force and three US POLARIS submarines; establishment of a Nuclear Deputy for SACEUR; arrangements for broader participation of non-US officers in nuclear planning on NATO military staffs; creation of a SHAPE Liaison Group at the Joint Strategic Targeting Planning Staff in Omaha; and initiation of a fuller flow of

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nuclear information to political and military authorities. In the light of these developments, the President on December 17, 1964, signed National Security Action Memorandum No. 322 redefining US policy aims. NSAM 322 provided that no NATO nuclear defense agreement could be made that did not take account of the interests of all European states. It also cautioned against giving the impression that the US was attempting to force its own views upon Europe.^{4/} Since European views remained at variance one with the other as well as with US views, the issuance of NSAM 322 in effect reduced the impetus, and therefore the prospects, for achieving the MLF.

In mid-1965 a new initiative with respect to nuclear-sharing was taken by the United States which eventually led to the creation of the Special Committee of NATO Defense Ministers and subsequently to the establishment of a permanent Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee and Nuclear Planning Group in NATO. In National Security Action Memorandum No. 345

^{4/} National Security Action Memorandum No. 322, December 17, 1964 (SECRET).

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of April 22, 1966, President Johnson directed a further review of the nuclear-sharing problem and asked for recommendations from the Secretaries of State and Defense for enlarging participation of our NATO Allies in nuclear planning. He asked for consideration of two alternative approaches -- one which assumed creation of a NATO Nuclear Force and one which did not. He stipulated, however, that any NATO Nuclear Force plan would not include mixed-manning of submarines or a surface fleet capable of delivering nuclear weapons.^{5/} In responding to NSAM 345, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara discussed a number of alternatives and recommended that the United States propose to meet allied desires for a greater role in the nuclear affairs by the establishment of a permanent consultative body of Defense Ministers within the NATO structure.

f. The Special Committee of NATO Defense Ministers

(1) Establishment of SPECOM

Foreshadowing NSAM 345 at the NATO Ministerial

^{5/} National Security Action Memorandum No. 345, April 22, 1966 (CONFIDENTIAL).

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Meeting in Paris on May 31, 1965, Secretary of Defense McNamara cited various arrangements that had encouraged Allied participation in nuclear planning and then proposed that a "Select Committee of four to five Ministers of Defense" examine ways of improving allied participation in nuclear planning and of insuring expeditious consultation on decisions to use nuclear forces.

Subsequent discussion of this proposal in the North Atlantic Council led to the creation of an open-ended Special Committee of NATO Defense Ministers (SPECOM), chaired by the NATO Secretary General, Manlio Brosio.^{6/}

The US, UK, Canada, Germany, Turkey, Italy, Denmark, Netherlands, Greece and Belgium decided to join. Later Portugal and Norway also attended some Special Committee meetings.

At its first meeting on November 27, 1965, the Special Committee created three Working Groups to examine matters reflected in its terms of reference: Intelligence/Data

^{6/} NATO Document PO/65/411, July 21, 1965 (NATO SECRET).

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Exchange, Communications and Nuclear Planning. Each Working Group was composed of representatives from five different countries belonging to the Special Committee.

The Ministers of Defense were the principal members of the Working Groups and each Minister designated a Deputy to carry on work when the Minister himself was not participating.

Although some sessions of the Working Groups were attended by Ministers of Defense, most of the Working Group activities in Intelligence/Data Exchange and Communications were carried out by the Deputies or staff assistants. Secretary McNamara was the US representative on each of the three Working Groups but personally participated only in the Nuclear Planning Working Group (NPWG). The US Ambassador to NATO and a State Department representative also attended NPWG meetings.

(2) Conclusions Reached by Working Groups

Working Group I on Intelligence and Data Exchange met five times and reached the conclusion that NATO should improve its means, communications and otherwise, for identifying and assessing developing situations and for making such assessments available to NATO's decision-making

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institutions at the political and military level.^{7/}

Following its study of six different communications schemes, Working Group II on Communications concluded that NATO's facilities for rapid, secure, Alliance-wide communications should be modernized and expanded. The Working Group also proposed a system for effecting such improvements.^{8/}

Working Group III, Nuclear Planning, met four times. In July 1966 the NPWG published a comprehensive summary of its activities and a compilation of the documents which it considered.^{9/} At the conclusion of its final meeting in Rome in September 1966, the Group recommended the formation of a Nuclear Planning Group and Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee

^{7/} Special Committee Document SCD I/R.7, May 10, 1966 (NATO SECRET).

^{8/} Special Committee Document SCD II/Rep 4; May 12, 1966 (NATO SECRET).

^{9/} Special Committee of NATO Defense Ministers, Nuclear Planning Working Group, Country Papers and Working Group Documents, July 1966 (TOP SECRET).

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and outlined the proposed organization and procedures.^{10/}

The proposed organization was based on conclusions that:

(1) personal participation of key governmental officials, particularly Ministers of Defense, in the discussion of nuclear planning matters, is vital; (2) sharing of basic information on nuclear weapons and plans is essential to meaningful consultation; (3) discussion in small groups with very limited numbers of persons in attendance is essential to substantive and frank exchange of views; and (4) adequate preparations by participants, including preliminary staff work in preparing the ground for Ministerial meetings, is an important ingredient in meaningful consultation.

g. The NDAC and the NPG

On December 15, 1966, the North Atlantic Council/Defense Planning Committee accepted the Special Committee's recommendations for a permanent organization responsible for

^{10/} Letter from Robert S. McNamara, Chairman, Working Group III, to Manlio Brosio, Chairman, Special Committee, September 23, 1966, with enclosed Recommendations to the Special Committee. (SECRET).

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proposing general policy on nuclear defense affairs of the Alliance.^{11/} The newly-created structure consisted of a policy body in the form of an open-ended ministerial-level committee, the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee (NDAC), and a subordinate body, the seven-member Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), charged with making detailed studies and framing policy proposals for consideration by the NDAC. All NATO countries except France, Iceland, and Luxembourg have joined the NDAC. A formula for membership in the smaller NPG was achieved only after considerable negotiation. It was finally agreed that the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy would be de facto permanent members, and that the other interested allies would occupy the remaining three positions according to a separate rotational scheme based on an 18-month cycle. Under this "gentleman's agreement," Turkey, Canada and the Netherlands were given initial terms and were succeeded in due course by Greece, Belgium and Denmark. NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio was designated

^{11/} DPC/D(66)39, December 7, 1966 (NATO SECRET).

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Chairman of both the NPG and NDAC.

Although it is technically the subordinate body, the NPG has been the forum in which the important discussions and work have taken place. NPG Defense Ministers have gathered for three sessions -- at Washington in April 1967, at Ankara in September 1967, and at The Hague in April 1968. Following each meeting, the Ministers published minutes describing the matters discussed and agreements reached.^{12/} In addition to these meetings, the NPG has met regularly at the Permanent Representative and staff levels.

The NDAC has convened at the Ministerial level twice in Brussels for brief meetings to ratify decisions taken at the NPG Ministerial Meetings, first in December 1967 and then on May 10, 1968.^{13/}

The matters which have occupied the attention of NDAC/NPG thus far can be grouped into three general categories:

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- ^{12/} NPG Minute, Washington, April 1967 (NATO SECRET);
NPG Minute, Ankara, September 1967 (NATO SECRET);
NPG Minute, The Hague, April 1968 (NATO SECRET).
 - ^{13/} NDAC(67)D/2, January 12, 1968 (NATO SECRET);
NDAC/D(68)2, May 16, 1968 (NATO SECRET).

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strategic nuclear weapons, tactical nuclear weapons, and national participation in nuclear planning.

(1) Strategic Weapons

Having agreed at its first Ministerial Meeting that the existing and programmed strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance remain adequate for the deterrence of large-scale attack by the Soviet Union, the NPG has since focussed its attention in the strategic field on anti-ballistic missiles (ABM).^{14/} The NPG concluded that the implications for NATO Europe of an ABM in the United States would probably be minimal so long as the deployment was limited and that in the present state of ABM technology, an ABM deployment in Western Europe would not limit damage from a Soviet attack in any meaningful sense. The Ministers agreed that "in the light of current and foreseeable technological circumstances, the deployment of ABMs in NATO Europe is not at present

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- ^{14/} a. NPG(67)D/1, September 8, 1967 (COSMIC TOP SECRET);
b. NPG/D(68)1, March 26, 1968 (NATO SECRET).

warranted." European members insisted, however, that the underlying factors which led to this decision should be kept under continuing review.^{15/} These conclusions were endorsed by the NDAC and the DPC on May 10, 1968.

(2) Tactical Weapons

In their first session in April 1967, the NPG Defense Ministers also agreed that, while the tactical nuclear weapons available to SACEUR and SACLANT appeared to be sufficient in quantity, both the mix of weapons and the circumstances in which they might be used required further detailed study. Thus, specific studies on the use of tactical weapons systems in both the central and southeastern fronts were initiated, looking toward the eventual development of a general "concept" for the use of such weapons. One such weapons system -- Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADMs) -- has received considerable attention. Both the Turks and SACEUR^{16/}

^{15/} NPG Minute, The Hague, April 1968 (NATO SECRET).

^{16/} NPG/TU/1-67(Revised), March 22, 1967 (COSMIC TOP SECRET); SHAPE/ATOMAL/212/67, January 15, 1968 (COSMIC ATOMAL TOP SECRET).

completed studies on the possible military advantages of their use in creating barrier defenses along potential Soviet invasion routes into Turkey. However, the Turks' original enthusiasm for ADMs cooled as they became aware both of the improbability of obtaining pre-delegated authority for the release of such weapons and, to a lesser extent, of the cost of installing them. Moreover, publicity about Turkish interest in ADMs ran counter to the limited detente which Ankara and Moscow had been seeking to promote. The Germans, who undertook studies^{17/} of the use of such weapons on the central front, also remained skeptical of the feasibility of utilizing them there.

The Greeks, who replaced the Turks on the NPG following the September 1967 Ministerial meeting, conducted a study of the use of ADMs for the defense of Hellenic Thrace.^{18/} Because

17/ German Study, Thoughts on the Possibilities of Employing ADM in the Area of Central Europe, 21-08-3/2285/67, June 1967 (NATO SECRET); Interim Report on German Study of Relevance of ADM to the Defense of the Central Region, April 1, 1968 (COSMIC TOP SECRET).

18/ NPG/Greece No. 1, October 20, 1967 (COSMIC TOP SECRET).

of problems uncovered and acknowledged explicitly by the Germans and implicitly by the Turks in their own studies, the Ministers at the Hague in April 1968 decided to hold in abeyance further study of the use of ADMs in Greece pending completion of a study by the NPG Permanent Representatives of the time factors involved in the use of ADMs. Although this decision was not popular with the Greeks, political damage was limited by prior discussions undertaken by the Department of State with the Greek Ambassador to Washington.

The NPG Ministers in April 1968 also discussed the development of a "concept for the use of tactical nuclear weapons," a task originally outlined in April 1967. They agreed that work should begin on preparation of tentative guidelines for the NATO Military Authorities for possible initial use by NATO of tactical nuclear weapons in four selected circumstances.^{19/} They requested member countries

^{19/} NPG Minute, The Hague, April 1968 (NATO SECRET).

to prepare the following papers for the October 1968 NPG meeting in Bonn: (1) the United States -- use for demonstrative purposes; (2) Italy -- use of defensive systems (i.e., ADMs and air defense weapons); (3) the UK -- use at sea; and (4) the FRG -- selective use against battlefield targets in a limited conflict. It was recognized that the guidelines might well be tentative and would be subject to modification and amplification as the work of the NPG progressed.

(3) National Participation in Nuclear Planning

Although considerable emphasis has been given in the NPG to studying and understanding the substantive issues involved in dealing with nuclear weapons, a basic objective of the NDAC/NPG machinery for many members has been to devise improved mechanics for injecting national views during the nuclear planning process on both the political and military levels.

The non-nuclear Allies have argued that they are unable to participate adequately in the detailed nuclear planning

accomplished by the NATO Military Commanders. (Certain steps to improve this situation were discussed above.) Since previously-adopted measures had applied only to international military staffs, they did not completely satisfy European desires for improved national participation. As a result, the NPG Ministers at their first meeting in April 1967 invited the NATO Military Committee to submit its views on ways to increase national participation at all levels of NATO nuclear planning. Since the Military Committee's response^{20/} dealt largely with the role of the Military Committee itself, the NPG asked it also to examine ways to improve national participation at the level of Major and Subordinate NATO Commands.

The Military Committee's report, presented at The Hague meeting^{21/} described several possible ways for governments to participate appropriately in the military nuclear planning process both at the level of the major NATO commands and at

^{20/} MCM-25-67, August 25, 1967 (NATO SECRET).

^{21/} MCM-16-68, March 27, 1968 (NATO SECRET).

subordinate levels. Among these were suggestions to increase the use of national military representatives in those commands, to convene nuclear planning conferences, and to make nuclear plans available to representatives of defense ministries for analysis at NATO headquarters. These recommendations were agreed to by the NPG ministers and subsequently approved by the NDAC and the DPC.^{22/}

A related problem of particular concern to the Germans has been that of defining the role and rights of host countries in the release of nuclear weapons to be launched from or used on their own territory. The Germans raised this issue initially in a paper^{23/} circulated for the April 1967 NPG Ministerial Meeting. A year later, in April 1968, Ministers at The Hague agreed to the general principle, espoused by the Germans, that

^{22/} NDAC/D(68)2, May 16, 1968 (NATO SECRET).

^{23/} FRG Memorandum 21-08-3/903/67, March 1967 (NATO SECRET); FRG Memorandum 21-08-3/1226/68, April 1968 (NATO SECRET); NPG Minute, The Hague, April 1968 (NATO SECRET).

in nuclear consultations "special weight should be given to the views of the NATO countries most directly affected."

(4) NPG Membership

Before the most recent NPG Ministerial session, there were indications that Canada and the Netherlands, whose term of membership expired on June 30, 1968, might seek to maintain continued access to the NPG at all levels. In the end, however, the desire to keep the ministerial group reasonably small and thus more effective prevailed. It was agreed at The Hague, ^{24/} however, to allow ex-members of the NPG to participate in NPG activities at the Permanent Representative and staff levels if they had submitted a substantive paper on the subject while an NPG member or if they were directly involved on account of geographical position or force contribution.

The establishment of the NDAC and the Nuclear Planning Group represents a major development in Alliance affairs during the Administration of President Johnson. Not only did it

24/ NPG Minute, The Hague, April 1968 (NATO SECRET).

provide a forum for detailed high-level consideration of the most sensitive elements of NATO nuclear policy but it provided needed momentum at the time of the French withdrawal from NATO. Additionally, it provided a needed, "non-hardware" alternative to European nuclear requirements at a time when prospects for progress on a non-proliferation became brighter. Time alone was to tell, however, whether the NDAC/NPG would provide a solution to the NATO "nuclear problem" over the longer term.

h. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Since 1945, the United States had actively sought to restrict to as few as possible the number of nations having independent control over nuclear weapons. As a function of this policy, the United States attempted to limit the number of NATO nuclear weapons powers by providing assurances within the Alliance and through the United Nations guaranteeing the NATO states that the use of Soviet nuclear forces against them could be deterred or defended against without the Europeans'

developing their own national nuclear-weapons capabilities. In this regard, it could be recalled both that the Europeans faced a substantial nuclear threat from the Soviet Union, and that several of NATO's non-nuclear weapons states possessed the resources required for producing nuclear weapons.^{25/}

There have been discussed, above, two vehicles through which the United States sought to meet Allied concerns in the nuclear defense field. Remaining to be discussed is the reconciliation of these concerns with the objective of achieving a non-proliferation treaty which would foreclose for NATO non-nuclear weapon states the option of creating their own independent nuclear forces. This reconciliation (insofar as it had been achieved by late 1968) was one of the

^{25/} In its memorandum to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee provided during hearings on the NPT, the AEC listed Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium and The Netherlands among the "near-nuclear weapons" states. 90th Congress, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, page 31.

more sensitive aspects of the NPT negotiations and constituted one of the major achievements of political consultation within the Atlantic Alliance.

(1) US-Soviet Conversations

Renewed negotiations on a proposed non-proliferation treaty began in September 1966 during Secretary Rusk's conversations with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at the opening of the 21st UN General Assembly. During these initial conversations, Secretary Rusk made it specifically clear to Gromyko that arrangements in NATO for planning, deploying and manning the Alliance's nuclear forces did not in any way constitute proliferation of nuclear weapons as the United States defined the term. He pointed out that if the Soviets insisted on interpreting the concept of non-proliferation otherwise, there could be no agreement on treaty language. The Secretary assured Gromyko that we had never intended to provide nuclear weapons, or to abandon United States control over them, to our Allies under the cover of a mixed-force

such as the MLF. He added, however, that we could not treat our Allies as if nuclear war was none of their business and exclude them from those elements of nuclear defense that do not constitute proliferation.^{26/}

(3) Negotiations in NATO

The details of these early bilateral exchanges with the Soviets were presented to the North Atlantic Council on October 19, 1966. Our Allies were generally favorable to the US presentation, the Federal Republic of Germany alone questioning the impact of a Non-Proliferation Treaty on possible steps toward European unity and a European nuclear force.^{27/} This concern remained one of the major elements in German, and later in Italian, thinking as Allied consultations on the NPT progressed in NATO.

Following the initial US-Soviet dialogue and NAC consultations on draft treaty language, the United States undertook

^{26/} Rusk-Gromyko Memoranda of Conversation dated September 24, 1966 (SECRET/EXDIS) and October 10, 1966 (CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS).

^{27/} USNATO Telegram 5823, October 19, 1966 (SECRET).

an extensive series of bilateral negotiations with its Allies on matters of concern to them. These were directed at allaying specific concerns. During this phase of the negotiations, however, the Non-Proliferation Treaty was also reviewed on a regular basis in the North Atlantic Council.

On February 1, 1967, the North Atlantic Council discussed draft language for all articles of the treaty with the exception of the preamble and Article III on safeguards. Although, as before, the majority of NATO members expressed satisfaction with the draft formulations, the Germans insisted that interpretations binding on the Soviets be cited in the treaty, or elsewhere, guaranteeing that the NPT: (1) dealt only with what is prohibited, not what is permitted; (2) did not interfere with NATO nuclear consultation and planning; (3) did not affect deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe; (4) would not affect European unification if a nuclear weapon state was one of the constituent members. Furthermore, the Germans wanted guarantees that would protect their nuclear

industry against espionage, their programs for international nuclear cooperation, and Europe's right to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system. The FRG also wished to reserve the right to suggest changes in the draft language. The Italians voiced similar concerns.^{28/}

On February 8, 1967, we informed the North Atlantic Council that we wished to resume discussions on draft treaty language with the USSR and that we would keep our Allies informed of developments. Although Germany and Italy still had strong reservations about certain aspects of the treaty, they did not object to NATO Secretary-General Brosio's assessment that Alliance discussions on the NPT had been thorough and fruitful and that there were no objections to the United States' pursuing negotiations on a basis which did not commit the European states.^{29/}

Following these consultations, US negotiators continued their efforts to accommodate European concerns within the

^{28/} USRO/Paris, Telegram 11599, February 1, 1967 (SECRET/LIMDIS).

^{29/} USRO/Paris, Telegram 12000, February 8, 1967 (SECRET).

framework of ongoing bilateral discussions with the Soviets and other interested parties. By the end of March 1967, a revised draft treaty had been formulated to include both preambular language and a proposed text of a safeguards article. The revised treaty and a summary of US interpretations responsive to the German concerns cited above was presented to selected NATO Allies on March 31 and discussed in the NAC on April 4. Again the Germans expressed serious reservations and asked both for provisions in the treaty creating a balance of responsibilities between nuclear and non-nuclear signatories and for guarantees against nuclear "blackmail." The Germans further wanted a treaty article on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, less "discriminatory" treatment under the treaty's safeguards provisions, a clause limiting the treaty's duration and new treaty language on the amendment procedure and review conferences. In stating that Germany could not accept the draft text at that time, the FRG asked for more consultations on these subjects.^{30/}

^{30/} USRO/Paris, Telegram 15438, April 4, 1968 (SECRET).

In a further presentation to the NAC on April 20th, the United States suggested a series of textual changes designed to meet Allied concerns. Added to the treaty text was preambular language on next steps to be taken in the disarmament field and textual revisions intended to meet European fears about the NPT's safeguards provisions. Formal US interpretations were also given defining nuclear weapons and explosive devices and the meaning of control over nuclear weapons. In summarizing the April 20 NAC deliberations, Secretary-General Brosio observed that although certain reservations remained, none of the NATO Allies wished to prevent the public tabling of a draft NPT text. Brosio voiced general Allied agreement that the United States should continue to work with the Soviets on treaty language that would meet members' concerns and which the United States could, again on its own responsibility, table as a Co-Chairman of the UN Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC).^{31/}

^{31/} "Brosio Summation of NAC Action on NPT Draft Treaty", April 20, 1967 (SECRET).

Further US-Soviet discussions indicated that agreement could not be reached on the amendments and safeguard provisions of the treaty in time to permit the joint tabling of a draft text at the resumption of the ENDC on May 18, 1967. It was decided, therefore, to seek Allied approval to table a draft treaty on that date with the safeguards and amendment Articles blank. Although reluctant to proceed on this basis, the Italian and German Governments informed the NAC on May 17 that they acquiesced in this procedure but emphasized ^{32/} that they were not committed to the draft treaty.

During further negotiations, the US and Soviet representatives worked out two alternatives on the NPT's amendments clause and these were presented by Secretary Rusk to his NATO counterparts at the NATO Ministerial Meeting on June 14, 1967. With the exception of the FRG, the other NATO members agreed ^{33/} that they could accept either of the alternative provisions.

^{32/} USRO/Paris, Telegram 18005, May 10, 1967 (SECRET);
USRO/Paris, Telegram 18563, May 18, 1967 (SECRET).

^{33/} USRO/Paris, Telegram 20212, June 15, 1967 (SECRET).

Subsequently, the Germans too agreed to the United States' suggesting to the Soviets that both of the alternative formulations were acceptable.

Resolution of the safeguards provisions (Article III) remained the major outstanding obstacle to tabling of a complete draft treaty. Negotiations with the Soviets and within EURATOM and NAC were therefore actively undertaken to develop agreed safeguards language. In the fall of 1967, the Soviets proposed a compromise draft which drew in part on an earlier NATO formulation. This suggestion was presented to our Allies, and on October 31, 1968, the North Atlantic Council agreed on a compromise draft for presentation to the Soviet Union.^{34/} This draft formulation, presented to the USSR on November 2, 1968, was ultimately accepted by the Soviets and was incorporated in the completed NPT draft submitted to the ENDC on January 18, 1968.

^{34/} USNATO Telegram 193 of October 31, 1967 (SECRET).

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As the chronology set forth above indicates, the North Atlantic Council provided a key forum for crucial NATO decisions on the draft Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was opened for signature on July 1, 1968. Although the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia delayed German and Italian signatures on the NPT, those two countries and Turkey were the only NATO members which had not signed the treaty by late 1968.

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4. Revision of NATO Strategy

When the Johnson Administration took office in 1963, the "official" strategy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization still prescribed immediate resort to nuclear weapons in case of Warsaw Pact aggression, regardless of the level and means of attack. This was so despite the fact that the United States, leader of the Alliance and its major professor of nuclear weapons, had adopted a defense strategy of balanced and flexible response over two years previously.

The "official" NATO strategy prevailing in 1963 reflected US strategic and economic concepts of the 1950's and was embodied in a 1956 Directive to the NATO Military Authorities from the North Atlantic Council,^{1/} together with an Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area^{2/} approved by the Council in 1957. The Directive stated that the USSR would not deliberately launch

^{1/} NATO Document C-M(56)138(Final), December 13, 1956 (SECRET).

^{2/} NATO Document MC 14/2(Rev)(Final), May 23, 1957 (SECRET).

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a general war if it knew the West was "prepared to retaliate with nuclear weapons in sufficient strength to devastate the USSR." War could still occur, however, because of a change in the Soviet attitude, underestimation of Western resolve, or unexpected escalation of limited military operations. Should war occur, NATO should count on "the use of nuclear weapons from the outset." In a concluding paragraph on resources, the Directive reflected a "cost-consciousness" on the part of Allies similar to that which lay behind the US decision of the 1950's to rely heavily on nuclear capability -- rather than on costly conventional forces -- for security. Economic stability is "in itself...an essential element of... security", the Directive said.

US strategic doctrine had been evolving since the late 1950's. The Korean War had demonstrated the need for adequate conventional forces to deter and defeat aggression below the nuclear "threshold". The Soviet launching of the first Sputnik in October, 1957, indicated that the USSR would

become capable, more quickly than had been expected, of inflicting extensive damage on US territory. Understanding of the implications of nuclear warfare and of the rapidly-evolving technology of weapons and delivery systems was becoming increasingly sophisticated.

The evolving strategic facts led to major US policy changes at the time of the 1961 inauguration of the Kennedy-Johnson Administration. The United States discussed its revised views bilaterally with the British and West Germans and multilaterally with all the Allies in the North Atlantic Council. Speaking to the Council in December, 1962, just after the Cuban Missile Crisis, Secretary Rusk stressed the need for "a thorough-going re-examination of the strategic doctrines of the Alliance". He continued: "We believe that the Alliance must progress beyond what is, practically speaking, an automatic reliance upon the use of nuclear weapons from the outset and toward a capability for a wide range of responses to provide the military force needed to do the job

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that must be done at a bearable and rational cost, if enemy decisions, in fact, make it possible." ^{3/}

Secretary McNamara also maintained that, implicitly or explicitly, Alliance strategy should permit a full range of forces in order to make possible flexibility of response. Effective nuclear capability was still essential for deterrence, but conventional forces were at least equally important. It was therefore necessary to build up NATO's conventional strength as a matter of highest priority, so that the Organization would be strong enough to force a pause in the event of substantial Soviet conventional aggression, during which a final try at diplomatic negotiation might be made before resort to nuclear weapons. ^{4/}

The Allies initially reacted coolly to the new US strategic concepts. Their reservations were based upon economic considerations, i.e., the cost of maintaining large

^{3/} C-VR(62)60, December 19, 1962, page 25,
(COSMIC TOP SECRET).

^{4/} NATO Document C-VR(63)27, May 22, 1963 (SECRET).

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conventional forces (exemplified by the British position); security considerations concerning the devastating effect of a prolonged conventional conflict (exemplified by the German position); and politico-military considerations based upon a desire for increased independence and freedom of action through possession of a national nuclear force (exemplified by the French position). Various attempts to find a formula of Allied agreement to some revision or reinterpretation of NATO strategy came to naught during 1963 and 1964, because France indicated it would recognize no possibility of a limited war.

In the discussions leading up to the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting in May 1965, there were three divergent points of view. The United States advocated the first, which was generally shared by Great Britain, Norway, Canada, Greece, Turkey and the Netherlands. This held that the security of the Alliance must be maintained at a price members were willing to pay. In selecting priorities, the Allies should assess the enemy's intentions, not only his capabilities. The nuclear forces of the Alliance were likely to continue to

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provide an effective deterrent to war. Credibility of NATO's deterrent strength would be maintained if its forces were adequate to present the potential aggressor, if he planned only a limited conventional attack, with the prospect of defeat by conventional means or the risk of escalation to nuclear war. NATO should increase the ability of its forces to deter hostile action at the lower end of the spectrum of aggression.

At the May 1965 meeting, Secretary McNamara stated the US belief "that the soundest strategy for the defeat of aggression is one that includes strong non-nuclear forces as well as strong nuclear forces." He cited figures on the numbers of nuclear weapons the US had placed and continued to bring into Europe to show that there was nothing of de-nuclearization [of Europe] or nuclear disengagement underlying the US position. He recommended "that further study of [the force goals under consideration] be guided by an analysis of the forces required to respond effectively to typical situations representative of the full spectrum of likely contingencies. This would seem to me to be a far more

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useful purpose than continuation of the debates over strategic concepts." ^{5/}

The FRG, Italy and Portugal generally shared another view, which maintained that in the allocation of their resources the Allies should give overriding priority to the needs of NATO defense. Even a limited aggression would almost certainly have to be met by a limited but adequate employment of some nuclear weapons from a very early stage.

The third view was France's alone. It held that the number of divisions available to the Alliance was not an essential factor. What mattered was possession of nuclear weapons and the declared will to use them if necessary.

On March 10, 1966, President de Gaulle informed the Allies of France's intention to withdraw from the military organization of the Alliance. France's withdrawal from the Defense Planning Committee in the summer of 1966 made progress possible toward resolving the strategic debate in the Alliance.

^{5/} NATO Document C-VR(65)26, May 31, 1965, pp. 10 and 11 (COSMIC TOP SECRET).

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The vehicle for this effort was the preparation by the Defense Planning Committee of political guidance for the NATO Military Authorities in preparing their force goal proposals for 1968 through 1972.^{6/} This Ministerial Guidance, issued by NATO Defense Ministers on May 9, 1967, was in effect a compilation of paragraphs from various documents on which the Fourteen Allies had already achieved some consensus. Importantly, it contained concepts proposed by the US and agreed to by the UK and FRG in the Trilateral Talks on November 9, 1966. The Trilateral Talks' Agreed Minute on Strategy and Forces had stated: "In order to deter aggression, the Alliance needs a full spectrum of military capabilities ranging from conventional forces through tactical nuclear weapons to strategic nuclear weapons." The Minute had gone on to describe Alliance strategic nuclear forces, "with their ability to inflict catastrophic damage on Soviet society even after a surprise nuclear attack" as the "backbone of NATO's military capabilities."

^{6/} Annex II to NATO Document DPC/D(67)23, May 11, 1967 (SECRET).

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It continued that the tactical nuclear capabilities of the Alliance "constitute an additional necessary component of the deterrent." But the Minute also noted that the "Alliance needs sufficient conventional forces to deter and counter a limited non-nuclear attack and to deter any larger non-nuclear attack by confronting the Soviets with the prospect of non-nuclear hostilities on such a scale as to involve for them a grave risk of escalation to nuclear war." ^{7/}

The Ministerial Guidance paper was a consensus document not wholly satisfactory to any NATO Member, including the United States. It did go quite far, however, in adjusting NATO strategy to American concepts, since it called for balanced nuclear and conventional forces. There remained the task of replacing the formal NATO strategy of "massive retaliation," embodied in the 1957 Strategic Concept, with an up-to-date document. Upon receipt of the Ministerial Guidance,

^{7/} Agreed Minute on Strategy and Forces in Final Report on the Trilateral Talks, forwarded to the President by the Honorable John McCloy in a letter dated May 17, 1967 (SECRET).

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the Military Committee set about revising the earlier document. As in the case of preparation of the Ministerial Guidance, the United States was concerned to move the Allies as closely as possible into accord with its strategic concepts, while avoiding calling into question US commitments to use nuclear weapons in defense of Europe.

The new Strategic Concept paper,^{8/} like the Ministerial Guidance upon which it was based, lent itself to some latitude in national interpretations. The essential point, however, was that it embodied the basic concept of flexible response. It was formally adopted at the December 1967 Meeting of the DPC in Ministerial Meeting.

^{8/} NATO Document MC 14/3, (Military Decision),
September 22, 1967 (SECRET).

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5. French Withdrawal and NATO Counter-Measures

French President Charles de Gaulle had long been dissatisfied with NATO, seeing it as an instrument of American "hegemony", a constraint on France's national freedom of action, and an impediment to his goal of dissolving the two "blocs" confronting each other in Europe. At the same time, he desired the protection inherent in the US nuclear guarantee and Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty. His fundamental attitude antedated the Johnson and perhaps even the Kennedy Administration.

As a result of these views, De Gaulle progressively reduced France's active participation in NATO affairs over a period of time. He also endeavored conceptually to draw a sharp distinction between the Treaty as such and the subsequent arrangements the Allies developed to carry it out -- i.e., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the military and political arrangements underlying it.

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For the Johnson Administration the situation was clear: Despite repeated urging from the United States and other NATO countries, France refused to sit down with her allies and make proposals for adapting NATO to meet special French concerns. Paris either ignored or turned aside efforts by others to draw De Gaulle out on this matter. Therefore, the United States as the leading North Atlantic power had no choice but to concentrate on the fundamental issue for the West -- maintaining cohesion of the Alliance and the credibility of its deterrent, regardless of the course France might choose to follow.

President de Gaulle hinted at the action he expected to take in a press conference of February 1, 1966. On March 7, following, he formalized his intentions with a letter to President Johnson and simultaneous or subsequent messages to other NATO member governments. In these messages, France spelled out its intention to remain a Treaty signatory, its

decision to withdraw from NATO military activities, effective July 1, 1966; and its decision to request the removal from France by April 1, 1967, of all US and other Allied military units and headquarters.

De Gaulle, moreover, qualified his statement of intent to remain a party to the Treaty. His letter to President Johnson included the following passage: "France therefore plans, as of now, to remain, when the time comes, a party to the Treaty signed on 4th April 1949 in Washington. This means that, unless in the three coming years events change the basic facts directing East-West relations, she would, in 1969 and beyond, be determined, as today, to fight on the side of her allies in the event that one of them should be the object of an unprovoked aggression."

President Johnson acknowledged De Gaulle's letter briefly on March 7, the day it was received. The President stated that "your action raises grave questions regarding the whole relationship between the responsibilities and benefits of

the Alliance." The President further indicated that he would be undertaking consultations with the other Allies. He followed up with a fuller reply to de Gaulle's letter on March 22.^{1/} In this more definitive response the President took issue with General de Gaulle's arguments about the implications of NATO and the Alliance for national sovereignty and concluded with the following passage:

The other fourteen member nations of NATO do not take the same view of their interests as that taken at this moment by the Government of France. The United States is determined to join with them in preserving the deterrent system of NATO -- indeed, in strengthening it in support of the vital common purposes of the West. We do not intend to ignore the experience of the past twenty years.

Indeed, we find it difficult to believe that France, which has made a unique contribution to Western security and development, will long remain withdrawn from the common affairs and responsibilities of the Atlantic. As our old

^{1/} See "The Crisis in NATO", Hearings before European Sub-Committee, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Eighty-Ninth Congress, Second Session.

friend and ally her place will await France whenever she decides to resume her leading role.

The President publicly spelled out American views and policy the day after dispatching his letter to General de Gaulle. He did this in a speech to the Foreign Service Institute^{2/} on March 23 in which he outlined US determination to back NATO. Following the President's address to the Foreign Service Institute, Secretary Rusk further spelled out American views in an interview with Paris Match on April 12.

While these initial US-French exchanges were under way, many of the other Allies were making official and public responses to De Gaulle's action. The United States had moved vigorously with the support of the other NATO Allies to begin sorting out the issues for the Alliance raised by France's action.^{3/} The first official NATO reaction was a declaration

^{2/} Text, White House Press Release dated March 23, 1966.

^{3/} Memorandum of Conversation, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Under Secretary Ball, Dean Acheson, and Assistant Secretary Leddy, April 4, 1966 (SECRET).

on March 18, 1966, subscribed to by the fourteen other Alliance members. The governments concerned reaffirmed their faith in the North Atlantic Treaty and in the Organization. They stated "We are convinced that the Organization is essential and will continue. No system of bilateral arrangements can be a substitute."

Internally, the United States called on former Secretary of State Dean Acheson to head an inter-agency group to make recommendations about adjusting NATO to the French withdrawal and strengthening and improving the Organization.^{4/} From the beginning, despite some differences of view within the US Government as to how sharp a response we should make to France, all policy officials were agreed on several broad

^{4/} Secretary Acheson submitted his main findings in a series of SECRET and TOP SECRET memoranda to the President. See particularly the following memoranda: March 26, 1966, "Broad Lines of Approach toward the France-NATO Crisis"; May 13, 1966, "Broad Lines of Approach toward Negotiations with France in NATO Crisis"; May 24, 1966, "The Nuclear Problem in NATO"; June 3, 1966, "Measures to Increase Cohesion of NATO, Final Response to NSAM 345"; June 27, 1966, "Bilateral Negotiations with France on Re-entry Rights and Facilities."

principles.^{5/} These included the following: no matter how much we might regret France's actions, we must accept them; the Alliance must be maintained; quite apart from the immediate problem of making necessary military and political adjustments in the Alliance occasioned by the French decisions, positive steps were also needed to strengthen it.

During the remainder of the year, the Allies other than France formed themselves into a group known as the "Fourteen" to distinguish themselves from the "Fifteen" (the full roster of Treaty signatories including France.)

Working with the NATO military authorities, and with the United States exerting the main leadership, the Fourteen rather quickly worked out solutions for most of the problems raised by the French withdrawal. Before the end of 1966, the acute phase of the France-NATO crisis was already ended. On the political side, the Fourteen and France worked out a

^{5/} Department of State Circular Telegrams 2296, January 21, 1966 (SECRET); and 75415, October 28, 1966 (SECRET).

pragmatic solution under which France continued to participate in the North Atlantic Council and its subordinate bodies. The Fourteen on November 2, 1966 agreed that the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) originally set up in 1963 to supervise force planning matters, would henceforth broaden its responsibilities to deal with all defense-related subjects in which France did not contribute. France does not sit in the Defense Planning Committee. This decision in effect set up two "councils" for the Alliance. Even though the understanding was never formalized by an explicit decision of the Allies, it subsequently worked well in practice.^{6/}

Another major area of difficulty arising from France's withdrawal from the integrated military system concerned movement of NATO installations and headquarters from France to other countries. Belgium agreed to accept SHAPE, and SACEUR

^{6/} See State Department position paper prepared for December 1966 NATO Ministerial Meeting entitled "France/NATO: The Constitutional Issue." NATO/P-3, December 3, 1966 (SECRET).

proceeded to establish headquarters at Casteau near Mons, Belgium. Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) moved to the Netherlands from Fontainbleau. The NATO Defense College moved from Paris to Rome.

This left the question of the Council itself and the International Staff which were headquartered in a building at the Porte Dauphine in Paris. The French Government had not, of course, insisted that the Council leave Paris since France remained a full participant in NATO political and civil activities. The United States, however, strongly favored transfer of the Council out of France.^{7/} The Johnson Administration considered it highly inappropriate for the Council to remain in France in light of that country's reduced participation in the Alliance. Moreover, the United States thought there would be major advantages to having the Council move to Brussels where it would be close to SHAPE. This view was strengthened by the fact that the Fourteen had

^{7/} Memorandum of Conversation, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, April 4, 1966 (SECRET).

also decided to move the NATO Military Committee from Washington to Brussels. In short, the United States concluded that the advantages of co-locating NATO's supreme military and political bodies in the same city, with close proximity to SHAPE, would be overriding. Several of the Allies -- Canada, Denmark and to some extent Germany -- were reluctant to see the Council leave Paris since they feared this might tend to provoke a further French move against the Alliance, even denunciation of the Treaty. The matter was amicably resolved, however, when the doubters finally joined in a unanimous decision to move to Brussels^{8/} and construct a new, temporary headquarters building to house both the Council and the Military Committee and their respective international staffs.

General de Gaulle's decision resulted in French withdrawal from all military commands and the Military Committee, although France established liaison missions in most important cases.

^{8/} See NATO CONFIDENTIAL Document C-M(66) 140, December 9, 1966.

France continued its full participation in the NATO Air Defense Early Warning System (NADGE). It also maintained liaison with and limited participation in the SHAPE Technical Center and SACLANT's Anti-Submarine Center at La Spezia, Italy. Lastly, France maintained its participation in certain subordinate bodies of the Military Committee, primarily in the intelligence and technical fields such as communications. (A number of other military-related questions involving France's relationship with the United States, e.g. overflights, are treated under US-French bilateral relations, below.)

The most politically-sensitive military question turned out to be relationships between the Allied forces in Germany and French forces stationed there. France's withdrawal left two divisions of that country's troops in Germany, but they were no longer committed to SACEUR. This immediately raised the twin questions of regularizing the status of these troops and defining their mission. The first US and German positions on this subject were stiff: the two questions would have to be resolved in a manner satisfactory to NATO, or French troops

would have to leave. In the May 1966 Ministerial Meeting, the Fourteen stood firm on the necessity for an agreed political framework for discussions between SACEUR and the French Chief of Staff on French forces in Germany. French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville agreed to this arrangement in a private conversation with Secretary Rusk and NATO Secretary General Brosio. Attempts to solve the problem on this basis proved fruitless, however, because General de Gaulle repudiated the commitment made by his Foreign Minister. Faced with this situation, Germany and certain of the other Allies fell back repeatedly. As a result of domestic pressure, German Chancellor Erhard approved a French-German bilateral agreement on the status of these troops, and the United States of course adjusted its position accordingly.

Meanwhile, the Fourteen and France agreed that SACEUR and the French Chief of Staff, General Ailleret, should begin talks on an exploratory basis and without political guidance. This was done. The result was a paper which defined the limits of French cooperation with NATO forces in the event that France

should decide to join her allies in case of conflict.^{9/} France then insisted that this document, which was intended to be passed to subordinate commanders on both the French and NATO sides, be covered by a letter describing it as an "agreement" between France and NATO. The Germans again decided to go this route, and the United States finally went along in July 1967, as did the other Allies.^{10/}

The financial consequences of De Gaulle's decisions have not yet been finally settled. The French Government agreed to buy back from NATO the old headquarters building in Paris. The Fourteen established a special group to work out various financial claims to be presented to France. As of late 1968, work was still proceeding in this field, and formal negotiations between the parties remained for the future.

During 1966 and subsequently, all the pressing problems resulting from the French withdrawal were solved, largely to

^{9/} See NATO Documents Annex IV to GF(67)D/8 (SECRET), March 21, 1967; GF(67)D-21 (SECRET), August 10, 1967; and GF(67)D/22 (SECRET), October 23, 1967.

^{10/} Department of State Telegram 11190, July 21, 1967 (CONFIDENTIAL).

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the mutual satisfaction of all the parties concerned. More importantly, NATO's political and military fabric was effectively maintained, as was the credibility of the deterrent. The Fourteen proceeded to take a number of decisions to strengthen and improve Alliance machinery. These included such steps as establishment of the Nuclear Planning Group; improved force planning procedures; formal agreement on the strategic concept of "flexible response" and improved communications systems. What was clear, however, was that the France-NATO question constituted the most acute test of the Johnson Administration's European and Atlantic policies. A combination of US firmness and restraint resolved the crisis in a manner that minimized the damage to US and Western interests, and provided a basis for new initiatives to strengthen NATO.

6. NATO Political Consultations -- The Harmel Exercise

As the 1960's progressed, a number of Allied Powers showed growing interest in and concern regarding NATO's political role. There had been a long tradition of consultations through the North Atlantic Council and the Committee of Political Advisors. During President Johnson's tenure, however, several factors tended to highlight the need for redefinition of the organization's objectives, tasks, and approach to political consultations. For one thing, there had been no such comprehensive examination since the 1956 NATO Wise Men's Report on Non-Military Cooperation. Frictions between the Allies, growing attention to detente in East-West relations, and crises around the world underscored the need for the Allies to harmonize their broad policy views -- or at least limit their differences -- as a counterpart to their cooperative defense effort.

One step taken by the United States was a major effort to encourage meetings of senior officials from capitals between the semi-annual meetings of Foreign Ministers. As

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part of this effort, Under Secretary of State George W. Ball undertook several such consultations in the Council, covering such subjects as Viet-Nam and the Dominican Republic.

Meanwhile, several other countries (Canada and the Netherlands, for example) suggested that basic studies be undertaken in an effort to improve NATO political consultations. Thus, the communique of the spring 1965^{1/} Ministerial Meeting stated that "Ministers welcomed the continuing progress in political consultation within the Alliance. They observed with satisfaction that the practice had become more frequent of Ministers and high officials from capitals attending regular meetings of the Council --- They also noted that the Council in permanent session had embarked on the study of the state of the Alliance which it had been directed, at the last Ministerial Meeting, to undertake."

Relatively little came of these study efforts in the 1963-65 period, however. The overriding problem for NATO

^{1/} Communique of NATO Ministerial Meeting, London, May 11-12, 1965.

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was the growing estrangement between France and the other Allies; as a consequence, the anticipated difficulties in getting unanimous agreement on any new findings; and unwillingness on the part of a number of countries to risk an open break with the French.

By the late summer of 1966, things had changed. France had withdrawn from the integrated military system, and the Fourteen were prepared to resume their attempts to strengthen the Alliance's political side. Since France continued to participate in non-military activities, the Fourteen hoped that France would also participate in this effort.

After informal consultations with the United States and several other countries, Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel took the initiative. In the fall of 1966 he proposed a broad new study of the future tasks of the Alliance.

Following an initial examination in the Bureau of European Affairs, and with Under Secretary Eugene V. Rostow playing the leading role, the United States enthusiastically endorsed the Harmel proposal. It saw a number of purposes

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to be served by an in-depth look at NATO's future tasks.^{2/}
There was the fact of Western Europe's recovery and increased strength; the importance of defining Alliance doctrine on the balance between deterrence and detente; the need to explain Alliance purposes to a new generation; the desire to modernize the political side of the Alliance just as the military side was being improved; the need to create a positive approach to Alliance affairs following the France-NATO crisis; and the need to reaffirm NATO's continuing validity as the North Atlantic Treaty approached its twentieth anniversary in 1969.

At the December 1966 Ministerial Meeting in Paris, the Ministers agreed unanimously to commission the study. In a brief resolution annexed to the communique^{3/} they agreed

^{2/} See Tokyo's Telegram 4988, January 17, 1968 for Under Secretary Rostow's personal expression of support; also the remarks of Secretary Rusk to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, December 15, 1966, welcoming the Harmel proposal (CA-4961 TONNAT of January 6, 1967).

^{3/} Communique of NATO Ministerial Meeting, Paris, December 15-16, 1966.

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that the Council should undertake "to study the future tasks which face the Alliance, and its procedures for fulfilling them, in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor for a durable peace." There seemed to be a degree of skepticism or at least doubt on the part of some governments regarding the content, specific purposes and utility of the exercise. The resolution was nevertheless accepted with remarkably little difficulty by all member countries, including France.

Looking at the problems involved, the United States rapidly came to the conclusion that the study should be wide-ranging, subject only to the major qualification that it not duplicate detailed military work on force planning, strategic or nuclear affairs going forward in other contexts.^{4/} Throughout the exercise the United States and Belgium maintained close contact, concerting their views in NATO and bilaterally.^{5/}

^{4/} To Paris, Telegram 117710, January 12, 1967 (Secret); To Paris, Telegram 147037, March 2, 1967 (Confidential).

^{5/} See particularly the Department's Circular Telegrams 135657, February 11, 1967 (Confidential), and 48343, October 4, 1967 (Secret).

NATO worked out procedures and substantive areas for study pragmatically. The Permanent Council, with senior participants from a number of capitals, adopted a further resolution on February 22, 1967.^{6/} Its main effect was to set up a Special Group under Secretary General Brosio's chairmanship to carry out the Harmel Study. The Special Group in turn divided its work into four general areas, with sub-groups and rapporteurs corresponding to each subject: East-West Relations; Inter-Allied Relations; General Defensive Policy of the Alliance; and Developments Outside the NATO Area. Most participants in the Study acted under instructions or general guidance from their governments. Nevertheless, the rapporteurs all submitted their findings in a personal capacity and without formal commitments by governments.

The sub-group on East-West relations had two rapporteurs to provide political balance -- Ambassador Adam Watson of

^{6/} See NATO document C-M(67)11, February 22, 1967 (Unclassified).

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the UK and State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Klaus Schutz of Germany. The group on inter-Allied relations was headed by former Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak. US Deputy Under Secretary of State Foy Kohler served as rapporteur on defense policy. Following a search in which several countries turned down the job, the Netherlands agreed to supply a rapporteur for the group on developments outside the Treaty area. It chose Professor C. L. Patijn, of the University of Utrecht.

Work proceeded throughout the spring and summer with little friction or drama. In September and October, however, a number of major substantive issues and diplomatic problems, inherent from the beginning, began to surface. The report on East-West relations proved to be relatively non-controversial, since it broke little new ground. The Kohler report on defense policy was universally well-received. It complemented the report on East-West relations by arguing the case for the fundamental compatibility of NATO's role in deterring aggression, on the one hand, and serving as a framework for

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the pursuit of improved East-West relations on the other hand. The Kohler report also laid the basis for NATO's subsequent emphasis on arms control and mutual force reduction studies.

Professor Patijn's report on extra-Alliance issues proved to be rather far-reaching in terms of suggestions that the NATO countries concert their policies to a high degree on issues around the world. Though the germ of this idea -- something we strongly supported -- survived in the final report, most of the specific ideas were put aside.

A mini-crisis developed over Spaak's report on inter-Allied relations. The document was frank to the point of severity in commenting on France's attitude toward European and Atlantic relations. The French representative in the sub-group flatly refused to take it as a basis for discussion even for purposes of amendment. At the same time, the French Government began voicing its opposition to the kind of overall results that the United States, Belgium, and most other Alliance members wished to achieve from the Harmel exercise. Couve de Murville and President de Gaulle both expressed warnings in private talks with Secretary General Brosio.

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Nevertheless, all four sub-group reports were completed. In a meeting held at Ditchley Park, England, on October 11-12 the rapporteurs submitted their reports to Brosio. At US urging, and in substantial part on the basis of work by State Department Counselor Robert Bowie, the rapporteurs also forwarded a distillation of their reports in a single resume.^{7/}

The Special Group held two meetings in Brussels, on November 7-8 and November 22-23 to complete the Harmel Study. In a series of difficult negotiations, the Special Group hammered out a short report to Ministers which, with slight amendment, was unanimously adopted at the December 1967 meeting.^{8/} The United States delegation, led by Under Secretary Rostow, and including Counselor Bowie and NATO Ambassador Harlan Cleveland, played a major role (a) in

^{7/} For texts of sub-group reports see NATO Secret document AC/261-N13, November 2, 1967 and NATO Confidential document AC/261-N13 (Rev), November 16, 1967. For Ditchley Park resume see NATO Secret document PO/67/770, October 17, 1967.

^{8/} For text see annex to Communique of NATO Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, December 14, 1967.

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withstanding French pressures to delay or gut the report, and (b) in finding acceptable compromises on specific issues.^{9/}

Despite its brevity, the Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance accomplished many of its original objectives. It thus constituted another milestone in NATO's political work. The document is broadly divided into two parts: a statement of principles or doctrine and an identification of future tasks or areas of study.

From the standpoint of principle, the Report clearly established the concept of "two pillars" for NATO -- military security and a policy of detente. Thus, even though significant differences of emphasis among the Allies remained, the long debate as to whether NATO should be primarily a military or a political organization in the late 1960's had been formally resolved by a balanced approach.

In addition, the Ministers outlined several continuing areas for follow-up work, including: general improvement of

^{9/} For US instructions for the Special Group meetings see Secret Telegram 65069 to US Mission NATO, November 4, 1967; and Secret Telegram 71795, to US Mission NATO, November 18, 1967.

East-West relations; Germany and European security; arms control and disarmament; and security problems of the Mediterranean area -- this last point at United States urging given the increasing Soviet presence in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

Lastly, the Report established the important political and procedural point that NATO governments could consult on problems involving any part of the world, even if one or more countries wished to abstain from participation; i.e. no government was obliged to associate itself with such consultative efforts, but neither did it have the right to prevent others from going ahead. The United States attached major importance to this point.

In 1968, the NATO Council and its subordinate bodies began carrying out the mandate contained in the Harmel Report, concentrating their attention initially on three areas: general East-West relations; arms control; and Mediterranean security. These resulted in two concrete actions by NATO governments at the June Ministerial Meeting in Reykjavik, a

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public declaration on mutual force reductions^{10/} and a series of instructions for improved surveillance and force dispositions in the Mediterranean.^{11/} The NATO governments also reviewed their overall policies designed to improve the East-West atmosphere through political contacts, trade, and cultural exchanges.^{12/}

Partly within the framework of the Harmel Report, and partly within the framework of its normal activities, NATO undertook intensive exchanges of views and consultations on a wide range of issues during President Johnson's tenure. The United States took the lead more than any other country. This was true not only for subjects considered by the European members of primary interest to the US, such as Viet-Nam and the Dominican Republic, but for areas in which there was a more direct European interest, notably the Middle East. The United States took the initiative on several occasions to arrange for special meetings of the North Atlantic Council

^{10/} See communique of NATO Ministerial Meeting, Reykjavik, June 24-25, 1968.

^{11/} See NATO Secret document PO/68/373, July 5, 1968.

^{12/} Ibid

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at which senior officials from capitals were present. Under Secretary Ball participated in several of these sessions. Similarly, the US was the moving force behind the annual special council meeting held prior to the opening of the UN General Assembly, for a review of UNGA agenda items and problems of special interest to NATO. A further example of US efforts in this general field were the periodic appearances before the Council of the Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. William Foster, to lead discussions of disarmament matters in the light of his position as one of the co-chairmen of the 18 Nation Disarmament Conference. During the 1963-68 period of the United States succeeded to a considerable degree in buttressing the NATO consultative process, in improving procedures, in defining broad areas of agreement, and in limiting inter-Allied disagreements so as to minimize adverse effects on NATO.

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