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CH. 5, Sec. A	Overview <i>open 4-15-97 NLJ 96-333</i> Secret <i>sanitized 4-20-86</i> <i>NLJ 83-135</i>	22 p	A
CH. 5, Sec. B	President Johnson's New Aid Strategy for Africa Confidential <i>Open 2-12-88 NLJ 83-135</i>	11 p	A
CH. 5, Sec. C1	The Congo Secret [OPEN 1/18/85, NLJ 85-308]	23 p	A
CH. 5, Sec. C2	Ghana <i>sanitized 1-20-89 NLJ 88-183</i> <i>open 4-15-97 NLJ 96-333</i> Secret Downgrade to Secret per NLJ 88-183	9 p	A
CH. 5, Sec. C3	Nigeria Secret <i>open 1-20-89 NLJ 88-183</i>	18 p	A
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CH. 5, Sec. C6	Francophone Africa 1963-1968 " secret	14 pp	A
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CH. 5, Sec. C8	Southern Africa " Secret <i>sanitized 4-20-86</i> <i>NLJ 83-135</i>	26 pp	A

FILE LOCATION

~~NATIONAL~~ Administrative History of the Dept. of State, Vol. I
Chapter 5

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V. AFRICA

A. The Place of Africa in US Foreign Policy

1. US Interests

We have fewer formal treaty or special commitments in Africa than in any other area of the world. Our interests in the continent are, however, substantial.

Politically, it is an essential US interest that the African states remain independent and free from excessive influence of blocs or power systems hostile toward us. As a corollary it follows that the maintenance of internal political stability and the achievement of satisfactory rates of economic development, as shields against disorder and chaos that could invite outside interference, are equally important.

Strategically, from a global perspective Africa is not an area of primary importance to the United States. Nevertheless we do have definite strategic interests in the area, although those interests do not always relate directly to Africa. North Africa is one of the flanks of Europe and we maintain valuable strategic facilities in Libya and Morocco,

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By 118, NARA, Date 3-1-97

although the post-World War II air bases in Morocco were relinquished some years ago. Our communications facilities in Ethiopia are also important. The airfields and ports of Liberia and South Africa are potentially valuable, although the system of apartheid in the latter country has caused us to suspend the use of its ports for US naval visits. Over-flight and landing privileges, in connection with military traffic to the East, are important on a continental basis.

The space age has also heightened the strategic importance of Africa. The most effective trajectory for the testing of missiles from Cape Kennedy ends near the tip of southern Africa. That same part of Africa is also important to NASA, which has Space Tracking and Acquisition Network and Deep Space Network facilities in both South Africa and Madagascar.

Economically, it is in the US interest to maintain access to the mineral and agricultural products of Africa, many of which are of great value and in some cases essential to the American economy and to our defense industry. Access to trade and investment opportunities on the continent are also

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desirable even though, in world terms, these opportunities are at present in some instances more potential than actual.

It is also in the US interest to seek the evolution of a sense of community between the United States and Africa, to develop that kind of racial relationship which will enhance our own influence and head off international confrontations and hostile alignments on a racial basis. This is of major importance because of the implications of the racial confrontation in Africa and the deep African interest in the US civil rights struggle.

Finally, while perhaps not classifiable under the category of "hard" interests, the US has a humanitarian interest in the welfare and progress of Africa growing out of our own feelings of anti-colonialism and from the relationship of one-tenth of our population to the continent.

2. The Situation in 1963

a. U. S. Policy vis-a-vis the new States

Addressing Africa in December 1963, President Johnson said:

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We in the United States are dedicated to the same goals as the peoples of Africa -- justice, freedom and peace. Under our late President, John F. Kennedy, the United States made significant advances toward the attainment of those goals. We will continue to work toward those same objectives under my Administration. We want to help build a world in which all men have a better opportunity to improve their lives, both spiritually and materially. Thus, we will continue to press for equal rights for all -- both in my country and abroad -- and we will continue to assist the world's new and emerging nations in their efforts to strengthen their foundations of freedom and independence.

The great tide of independence movements in Africa had passed its peak in 1963, with 31 countries then in being. The United States had established diplomatic relations with all of those countries and, as President Johnson had indicated, was doing everything possible to help them in the difficult task of nation-building.

Our policies toward these new countries had to be tailored to the different situations that had emerged with independence. In most of the former French territories, for example, historic relationships and French capability of offering substantial economic and other assistance made

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France the primary natural source of political and cultural inspiration. Our missions in those countries were necessarily limited to establishing an American presence, engaging in small technical assistance programs, and in "educative diplomacy." In certain respects, the continued French presence in these new countries was more of a liability than an asset from the US point of view. In Guinea we faced a different situation, in the shape of President Sekou Toure with his leftist leanings and uneconomic undertakings. Here our policy had to be one of riding with the tide and patiently waiting for some kind of leveling off to take place, which did occur in early 1967.

The situation in the former British territories was almost opposite. These new states showed much more of an inclination to reduce their dependence on the former metropole. A weakened Britain was at the same time starting, at least psychologically, to withdraw from its world-wide commitments. Our policy with regard to these countries was consequently directed at both ends of the problem: topping off British assistance to the greatest

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extent feasible, while continuing to remind the British in London of their primary responsibility for the welfare of their former territories. In the first we were reasonably successful; the second brought diminishing returns as British fortunes continued to decline.

Our task was particularly difficult in Ghana, where Nkrumah's leftist ambitions and dealings with the Communists had given the Soviets a West African foothold. This was balanced to some degree by our financial and technical support of the Volta River Project. Our approach to Ghana in this period had to be a patient holding operation, one designed to limit Soviet penetration and looking to the day when more moderate elements would regain control of the government. In Tanzania (then Tanganyika) we were faced with the mercurial Nyerere; our attitudes and reactions had to give proper appreciation to his views of the new Africa. We were reasonably successful in restraining his forays into Socialist-Communist undertakings, at least to the extent of occasionally stimulating balancing actions on his part.

Insofar as the former Belgian territories were concerned, our activity was primarily centered on Congo (K). The Katangan secession had been ended in 1963 but the internal security

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situation in the country was still precarious. U.S. policy remained one of giving full support to the United Nations in the maintenance of the integrity of that country. At the same time considerable effort was directed toward a rationalization and modernization of Belgo-Congolese relations in their various aspects.

b. U. S. Assistance

By the early 1960's, US assistance to the new African countries was relatively substantial. Net obligations and loan authorizations in the economic and assistance fields for fiscal year 1963, for example, amounted to \$473.2 million. This was made up of AID technical assistance, Food for Freedom, Export-Import Bank loans, and other programs (mainly Peace Corps). AID figures for subsequent years were lower. The US assistance programs were primarily bilateral ones. The rationale behind our aid policy was that a soundly conceived and well-administered basic economic development drive was the most effective long-range defense against Communist penetration, in addition to serving other fundamental US objectives.

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c. Communist Activities

The Soviets and the Chinese Communists were both active in Africa in 1963. The Soviets, having burnt their fingers by their intervention in the Congo in 1960, were becoming more conservative in their approach to the Africans, looking more to the establishment of long-term assets and the acquisition of an image of greater respectability than to immediate and smashing victories over the West. The Chinese Communists, on the other hand, were showing signs of greater aggressiveness toward and wider interest in the Africans. It was at this time, in December 1963, that Chinese Communist Premier Chou-en-Lai started his African tour, in the course of which he made the ill-advised remark that "revolutionary prospects are excellent throughout Africa," a remark which he later claimed was misunderstood by the African leaders.

The Soviets in 1963 had economic cooperation agreements (often involving credits) with twelve African countries. That did not mean, however, that they necessarily enjoyed a position of influence in those countries. Actually, they

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represented a force to a greater or lesser degree only in the so-called "radical" states: Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Tanzania. The Chinese Communists, in turn, were primarily established in the same "radicals": Guinea, Mali, Ghana, Congo (B), and, to a lesser degree, Algeria. Both the Soviets and the Chinese Communists also engaged in military assistance programs. These programs were much more acceptable and successful in East Africa than in West Africa.

d. Problems of Southern Africa

Lastly, the problems of southern Africa were already with us in 1963. Representatives of the African Bureau of the Department of State held a number of conversations with the British, urging that steps be taken to ensure that African representation be adequately provided for before independence was given to Southern Rhodesia. The objective in this instance was to avoid the addition of a racial confrontation in Southern Rhodesia to that which already existed in South Africa. The British listened sympathetically but were not convinced of the seriousness of the situation ahead and took no real action. With regard to South Africa, the

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United States continued during 1963 to make both public and private representations urging the South African Government to change its apartheid policy, with no success. Relations between the two countries hardened still more when on August 2, 1963, the US Representative at the United Nations informed the Security Council that the United States expected to end the sale of all military equipment to South Africa by the end of that year "in order to further contribute to a peaceful solution and to avoid any steps which might at this point directly contribute to international friction in the area." With regard to the Portuguese African Territories, the United States continued its efforts to influence developments toward self-determination for those areas and was largely instrumental in bringing about a limited dialogue between Portugal and the United Nations on the issue. However, those talks broke down before the end of the year.

Our basic policies with regard to Africa were for all intents and purposes fixed by the beginning of the Johnson Administration. While we looked to the Africans to solve

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African issues, we were clearly involved in the future of the continent and in its problems. This was so not only because of our national interest or our humanitarianism, but also because of the relationship of more than ten percent of our own population to that continent.

3. General Trends, 1963-1968

a. Political Growth - Leadership Developments

In the middle and later 1960's, the tide of independence slowed down. Eight more nations gained their freedom, as compared with twenty-four during the previous five-year period. The hard problems of consolidating political control, achieving national unity and developing regional cooperation now dominated the efforts of the African leaders. The fragile nature of political institutions and the instability inherent in experimentation led to some fourteen military take-overs and at least an equal number of other major changes in the structure of governmental power.

The cornerstone of our national policy toward Africa during these years continued to be that expressed by the President in December 1963. In working for the development

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of stronger African nations we were obliged, many times, to be judicious and patient, using political exhortation or economic assistance to keep developments headed in the right direction. The effectiveness of economic assistance was greatly limited in the majority of cases simply by the scarcity of resources. In spite of the many difficulties involved, we were successful in helping the leaders of most of the African nations achieve a growing cohesion. The dramatic example was Congo (K), where after eight years of effort to maintain the integrity of the country and to assist in nation building, internal opposition and mercenary disruption were overcome. Another, if somewhat less spectacular, example of progress related to Sekou Toure of Guinea. The maintenance of a patient and at times acrimonious dialogue with that charismatic but mercurial leader resulted in slow but substantial achievement in reducing Communist influences. The same thing could be said about our dealings with Nyerere of Tanzania.

Our relations with the traditionalist leaders such as Emperor Haile Selassie, King Hassan and President Tubman were on a more even basis. Because of the importance of the

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United States of these countries, we necessarily added considerable economic assistance to our political support. At the same time we were aware of the growing demand for modernization in these societies and discreetly pressed -- not always with success -- for needed political and social reforms. The same thing could be said with regard to the leading moderate leaders such as Bourguiba of Tunisia and Kenyatta of Kenya, although these leaders were in general more aware of the need for modernization.

In dealing with the take-over military regimes, US progress was generally on the tenuous side. In most cases these military regimes represented no improvement over the civilian ones they replaced and our efforts were necessarily directed at maintaining a dialogue and good relations while anticipating, in our negotiations and discussions, eventual return to democratic processes. An exception was Ghana, where the military-controlled National Liberation Council was working hard to restore normalcy after excesses. The United States gave the Council full support in its undertakings.

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In summary it can be said that during the period 1963-68, most nations of Africa became stronger and more realistic in their aspirations. In all of these instances the United States played a distinct role. The notable exceptions were Nigeria, with its tragic civil war, and the Sudan, where the dissidence in the south continued unabated. Moreover, three countries -- Algeria, Sudan and Mauritania -- broke relations with the United States as a result of the 1967 Middle East War. In the absence of appropriate subsequent admissions from the leaders of those countries that Nasser's "big lie" concerning participation on the side of the Israelis by the US had not been true, relations remained broken in 1968. These exceptions were largely the outcome of ethnic, tribal or emotional forces that transcended rational politics.

b. Regional Developments

The encouragement of regional political and economic cooperation became one of the hallmarks of US support for Africa during this period. Politically, the wisdom of placing primary responsibility for the solution of African problems upon African organizations seemed obvious.

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Economically, a cooperative or multinational approach was clearly needed in order to respond to the endemic problems of low productivity, poor training and wide-spread disease, all of which crossed national boundaries. While there were other factors involved, US interest and support contributed substantially to the remarkable growth of regional cooperation during these years:

(1) The Organization of African Unity was founded in 1963. While it still had its weak points in the later 1960's, it had steadily increased in stature. Certainly one of the elements in its development was strong and steady US support. While the Administrative Secretary General of that organization was at times a thorn in our side, our policy was to strengthen the organization as a body that would endure long after the tenure of Diallo Telli.

(2) The Organization of African States and Malagasy (OCAM) came into being in 1965, and served as a catalyst for the French-speaking states. Again full US support was forthcoming.

(3) The African Development Bank opened its doors

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in 1966, with a US commitment in principle to contribute \$60 million to the bank's capitalization.

(4) The East African Community was inaugurated in 1967, with our encouragement and support.

Meanwhile, other challenges were being met by river basin groupings, transportation authorities, and commodity arrangements, with the result that in the economic field alone there were in 1968 more than forty-five organizations in existence. While the United States took formal part in only a few of these bodies, it supported their goals, helped finance some of their activities and encouraged them to respond to Africa's many needs.

The new US AID strategy, tailored to the need for assistance to regional institutions, will be described further on.

c. Communist Activities

During the period 1963-68, the balance of Communist activities shifted, but long-range dangers were not eliminated. As was true in 1963, the Soviets five years later tended to be conservative (except in the cases of the arms build-up

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in Algeria and the UAR), while the Chinese Communists were more aggressive in looking for opportunities for penetration. The Soviets lost influence in various countries, such as the Congo, Ghana and Kenya, and were forced to adopt more conventional programs. At the same time they gained military influence in Algeria, the UAR and the Sudan as a result of the Arab-Israeli hostilities of 1967. Our basic policy in this regard was related to our desire to avoid the development of arms races, and of costly military structures which would inhibit economic development. From a practical point of view, however, the very limited resources at our disposal would have made it impossible to compete with the Soviets in this regard should we have wanted to do so. From a policy point of view the only option open to the United States has been that of discreetly reminding the countries concerned, when feasible, not to barter their independence for military hardware.

The Chinese Communists, during the same period, lost credibility in much of Africa but retained a position of some strength in selected countries, e.g., Guinea, Mali and Congo (B), and expanded their efforts in East Africa

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through an agreement to begin work on the Tan-Zam railroad. In West Africa, Peking expressed an interest in building a Guinea-Mali railroad, a project which the Soviets had considered in the early 1960's but which was dormant thereafter. The West, including the United States, studied the Tan-Zam project but declined to get involved because to them it seemed an uneconomical proposal when contrasted with the improvement of an existing highway. We nevertheless made the two countries concerned well aware of the political dangers inherent in the presence of hundreds of Chinese technicians. As for the Guinea-Mali project, the United States was not invited to become involved. Hence the only option open to us there was also one of doing our best to limit the potential overspill of the presence of Chinese technicians. Owing to the "radical" character of the two states concerned, this task did not promise to be easy.

The two railroad projects mentioned were typical of Chinese Communist aggressiveness in Africa. However, the projects were not scheduled to be completed for a number of years and in the meantime the political maturity and caution

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of the countries concerned could be expected to increase. In a period during which US resources for deployment in Africa continued to shrink while the demand for faster development on the part of the Africans increased, there was no room for complacency with regard to the Communists. Nonetheless US policy of supporting African independence without seeking the Africans' adherence to our exact philosophy, of strengthening moderates while still encouraging peaceful change, and of aiding governments against subversion without providing unlimited military support helped the African nations to retain their identity in the face of Communist overtures.

d. Strategic Interests

Faced with political transition and uncertainty in Africa, it was US policy to seek to maintain French, Belgian and British involvement in African military problems. Our success in this has been limited. At the same time we assisted the defensive capability of key African countries through a program representing less than five percent of our world-wide military assistance. While US efforts to maintain Western naval and air superiority

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over and around North Africa were the object of Soviet political attack and also felt the impact of the Arab-Israel War, we were nevertheless able to retain informal use of Kenitra Communications Center in Morocco, to survive a challenge to our use of Wheelus Air Base in Libya, and to continue our use of the Kagnev Communications Center in Asmara, Ethiopia.

During this same period the United States was also able to use and expand its military and NASA tracking stations in southern Africa -- even though for sound political reasons we discontinued arms assistance to South Africa and restricted the visits paid to South African ports by US Naval vessels.

The remarkable thing about this period is that the United States conserved as much as it did of its strategic facilities, in view of the small amount of US assistance extended and the divergence that has often existed among political pressures, political objectives and strategic requirements. US military and economic assistance undoubtedly helped in the case of Morocco and Ethiopia, the firm political relationships built up over a period of many

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years having proved stronger than sudden emotions or outside pressures. In the case of South Africa one can only attribute such US success as we have had to South African acceptance of a firm US policy (i.e., of not tolerating apartheid) as being more in the interests of that country than would be a further estrangement from the United States.

e. Southern Africa

During the period 1963-68, the question of white minority domination of black majorities in southern Africa emerged as the most difficult problem facing US policy in Africa. The effects of this question on our relations are treated at length below.

4. Conclusion

As the United States surveyed the scene in 1968, it could be reasonably satisfied that, within the limits of the resources available, recent US policies toward Africa had generally been effective. In some cases they had been more so than we had any right to expect.

In the main, the United States succeeded in limiting Communist expansion. There was little that we could do about

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the two railroad projects of the Chinese, and time alone would determine the political effectiveness of those projects. Given the newness and weakness of most of the African governments, instability was to be expected. However, in the midst of that instability, most of the nations became stronger and matured in their aspirations.

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B. President Johnson's New Aid Strategy for Africa

1. Genesis

As seen above, our policy at the beginning of the Johnson Administration was to discourage an excessive fragmentation of Africa as well as to remove risks of great-power confrontations there. By encouraging authentically African regional political and economic organizations, spanning rival states and including radicals and moderates as well as English- and French-speaking countries, we hoped to encourage a harmonious continental state system which would provide channels for consultation, reducing the likelihood of sudden escalation of disputes. We had welcomed the emergence of the OAU, and we encouraged the further development of the UN Economic Commission for Africa.

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Meanwhile the organizational progress made by the Alliance for Progress in Latin America, and especially the inter-American arrangements for multilateral consultations on aid and economic development, suggested to some US policy planners that a similar arrangement might be desirable for Africa. In early 1965 Walt W. Rostow, Chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, examined the possibility of organizing countries which gave aid to Africa into a joint institutional arrangement which would also group all African countries receiving aid.

Attractive as this idea was, it was much more difficult in the case of Africa than in Latin America because of the diversity of donors and donor interests in Africa, ranging from the French desire to retain special influence in former colonial areas to the Chinese Communists' interest -- at that time -- in seeing Africa "burn," i.e. overthrowing existing post-colonial governments in favor of radical revolutionary regimes. The Africans themselves did not appear ready to

entrust the allocation of foreign aid to a mixed body but preferred to bargain as individual independent countries with a range of donors for the best possible results.

The years 1965 and 1966 also saw a rash of coups in Africa. A common element in most of these was dissatisfaction with economic progress or with the sharing of economic benefits. When the Nkrumah regime in Ghana fell, the successor caretaker regime abandoned subversive activities against other African countries and turned its attention to trying to restore economic growth at home. With the gradual development of an African consensus that self-restraint in disputes between African states was desirable, it seemed clear that the United States was on the right policy track. (Soviet interest in avoiding serious confrontations with the United States in Africa also became increasingly evident between 1963 and 1965.) By 1965 the tide in Africa was swinging toward political moderation and constructive efforts toward economic development. The risk of Balkanization appeared to be receding.

2. The President's Address of May 26, 1966, and the Korry Study

President Johnson's remarks at a White House reception celebrating the third anniversary of the Organization of African Unity on May 26, 1966, publicly affirmed a reinforced US policy of supporting a continental African state system, without saying so in these exact words. The President announced that he had instructed the Secretary of State and other American officials to review US policy and programs in Africa.

One part of this review was a study by Edward M. Korry, our Ambassador to Ethiopia. The report of Ambassador Korry and his working group was issued on July 27, 1966, and approved by the President in August.^{1/}

The Korry Report, as the 151-page study was called informally, called for the following:

^{1/} Ambassador Edward M. Korry, Review of Development Policies and Programs in Africa, Washington (Department of State/AID), July 27, 1966
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- The development and strengthening of multilateral donor coordination mechanisms for dealing with African development.
- The concentration of assistance to Africa on functional sectors of fundamental importance and on programs around which regional and sub-regional institutions and activities could be built or reinforced in such fields as infrastructure development, agriculture, education, and health.
- Concentration of major economic assistance in those countries where it could be used most effectively.
- A modest annual increase in AID development assistance to Africa, as well as an increase in the total resources available to the International Development Association (IDA), an affiliate of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).
- Support for arms limitation and control in Africa.

3. Shift to a New AID Strategy

Many of the detailed recommendations of the Korry study^{2/} were translated into an action program.

The salient feature of the new policy in action was the fact that the US Agency for International Development placed a moratorium on new bilateral projects in all but ten African countries, which were designated "development emphasis countries." This rigorous restriction of new bilateral aid projects to ten of the nearly forty African countries was precipitated by unrequested new Congressional legislation, limiting the numbers of countries (outside Latin America) to which AID could make new development loans or supply grant technical assistance.

For the majority of African countries no longer qualifying for new bilateral AID assistance, new AID support could be

^{2/} See Memorandum of December 17, 1966, from Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to the President, entitled, "Action Program to Carry out the Recommendations of the Korry Report on African Development Policies and Programs" ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~.

provided only through regional or multilateral projects, arrangements, and organizations and by the continuing use of a small self-help fund.

While AID rigorously applied the new policy, and the Department of State pledged to give this approach a loyal and hard try, many officers in the Bureau of African Affairs and elsewhere in the Department were concerned at the loss of flexibility in the use of AID assistance as a foreign policy tool in promoting bilateral US objectives in individual African countries.

The implementation of the new policy between 1966 and 1968 also coincided with necessary US budgetary and balance of payments disciplines and progressively-reduced appropriations for AID assistance. It was thus difficult to answer the fears of some African leaders that the new emphasis in aid to regional projects was not a device for partial US disengagement from Africa.

Progress in increasing the flow of US aid through multi-lateral donor channels and to regional African projects was slower than expected. A conditional US offer of a \$60 million contribution to the African Development Bank (contingent upon necessary Congressional action) did not progress beyond a detailed proposal to the Bank made in October 1967. As of November 1968 the Bank was still trying to use the US proposal to elicit proposals from other prospective donors. (The strict provisions for tying gave the Bank pause as a precedent for tied contributions by other countries; furthermore proposed contributions to special funds of the Asian Development Bank had encountered difficulty in committee in the Senate, where the proposed Asian Bank legislation was still lodged in November, 1968.)

In 1967 and 1968 the World Bank (IBRD) set up Consultative Groups for Morocco and East Africa, and improved the Group for Tunisia. The World Bank also became active in coordinating economic assistance to Ghana and Congo (K), where Consultative Groups are also likely.

Other adverse aspects of the US role in Africa included a slowing down in the rate of increase in new US private investment in Africa in 1967; and in January 1968 the United States adopted a foreign investment control program calculated to limit US investment in less developed countries to not more than 110 percent of the 1965-1966 base. In 1967 the dollar values of US exports to Africa stopped growing and dropped for the first time in many years. Projections of US exports to Africa for 1968 suggested little improvement over 1967 and did not exclude the possibility of a further absolute drop.

An international cocoa agreement to put a floor under prices, which the Korry report had recommended that the United States conclude, was discussed at negotiating conferences in 1967 and 1968 but did not result in the signing of an accord. The United States was reluctant to proceed quickly with a generous agreement because of anticipated opposition by US industry and Congress. Meanwhile cocoa prices continued to improve into 1968, relieving the African

cocoa producers of any urgent need to press for an early agreement. Indeed, as of September, 1968, it was an African cocoa producing country, not the United States, which was holding up further negotiating progress.

Although Africa for its part had made further progress toward regional economic cooperation between 1966 and 1968, and although AID was diverting an increasing share of its African program to regional projects, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Palmer, concluded in July 1968 that "we will face a real crisis of responsiveness if we are not able within a year or two to at least restore past levels of aid and to restore more bilateral flexibility with respect to our programs in Africa." Assistant Secretary Palmer noted particularly that the United States continued unable to respond in all but a few instances to the present African emphasis on agricultural production, a priority which the United States had encouraged the Africans to adopt. He stated, "We must rationalize our own policies in such a way as to

restore flexibility in this general field."

The situation late in 1968 was that the negative aspects of the 1966 policy revision had been implemented much more sweepingly than the positive aspects, as a result of unanticipated AID appropriations cuts, general US budgetary stringency, and essential US balance of payments disciplines. The result of these restraints was to limit sharply US policy options in Africa outside of the nine or ten "development emphasis" countries where new bilateral AID starts were possible.