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C. SPECIAL PROBLEM AREAS

1. The Congo

a. The American Objectives

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams reported in a speech in April 1965 that "The Congo, along with Cuba and Viet-Nam, has been a top US foreign policy headache for five years. It has provoked serious crises for the United Nations. It has at times created differences between ourselves and some of our friends. It has brought US policy in Africa both praise and criticism. It has both united and caused divisions among African nations. It has complicated the problem of self-determination in southern Africa and is used by white supremacists there to justify their reactionary positions. It has for several years contained the seeds of a major East-West confrontation."

Although at the end of 1968 US objectives concerning the Congo (K) and its relation to the rest of Africa and the world still required much attention, much had nonetheless been achieved. New crises could occur, but for the time being

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the Congo had gone off the list of critical foreign policy headaches.

During the eight years in which the Congo had experienced political independence, US policy objectives in that country remained constant. Briefly, they were: maintenance by the Congo of its national independence and territorial integrity; strengthening of cooperation with the United States and other friendly non-Communist states; resistance to external aggression; improvement of internal security; and a reasonable increase in the rate of economic and social development.

The United States was motivated in large part by the size and geographic position of the Congo in the heart of Africa, and by its immense potential. Politically, a stable Congo can be expected to have important influence on any of its nine immediate neighbors and ultimately in the highest African councils. Economically, its highly diversified mineral and agricultural resources and its relatively large population give promise that the Congo may, in the foreseeable future, reach an important level of development.

b. Background, 1960-1964

During almost all of the first four years of Congolese independence, beginning on June 30, 1960, United Nations military forces and UN economic and technical assistance programs tried to cope with the nationwide problems of political and economic disintegration. The Congo and the world witnessed, one after the other, the mutiny of the Congolese National Army (ANC) on July 5, 1960; the precipitate and massive departure of Belgian military, administrative, and private personnel and their families; the overthrow of the Lumumba Government; the secessionist attempts of Katanga and Kasai Provinces; the establishment of the Communist and radical African-backed Gizenga regime in Stanleyville; the reintegration of the Stanleyville and Kasai regimes into the Central Government in Leopoldville; the defeat by UN forces of the Katangan secession in January 1963; the suspension of parliamentary government in the fall of 1963; and finally the renewed outbreak of rebellion against the central government by primitivist rural youth led by radical political "outs."

Few subjects caused more turbulence at the United Nations than the Congo. The UN peacekeeping effort of 1960-64 was one of the most important and difficult ever mounted. That effort, however, because it ultimately offended the Soviet Union, provoked both the Russian "troika" proposal and ultimately precipitated a real financial and constitutional crisis in the United Nations. The United States supported the United Nations in the Congo wholeheartedly because we were unwilling to commit our own resources to a unilateral effort or to establish a large US presence in the midst of Africa. We particularly desired to avoid a Cold War confrontation there. We hoped, by avoiding a direct US commitment, to forestall a Soviet, and, later Chinese, initiative in response. In this we largely succeeded. The United States contributed 42 percent of the \$480 million for the peacekeeping operation and \$14.4 million to the UN technical assistance program.

Problems of internal security remained paramount, but unfortunately the UN and the Congolese Central Government under Premier Cyrille Adoula could not come to an agreement

on the training of the ANC, and, as a result, the army was not able to cope with a new rebellion that flared up early in 1964. As the December 31, 1963, expiration date for the UN peacekeeping force drew near, the Department of State strongly recommended to the White House that the United States actively support a six-months extension of the force.^{1/} Acting on this recommendation, the United States played a key role in persuading the United Nations to accept the Congolese Government's request for a six-months extension. A further extension was impossible, however, and the last UN forces pulled out by June 30, 1964 -- just before the 1964 rebellion reached its zenith. Their departure required the United States to seek other means in pursuit of its objective of helping the Congolese to cope with their security problems.

A modest bilateral military assistance program was undertaken beginning in Fiscal Year 1964, and a military

^{1/} Department of State Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, The White House, from Edmund A. Gullion, American Ambassador to the Congo (L), dated August 29, 1963; to USUN, Department of State Telegram 544, August 24, 1963. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

mission (COMISH) was attached to the US Embassy in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa). The main purpose was to supply vehicles, some aircraft and communications equipment and necessary spare parts. Training of the Congolese Army was undertaken by a Belgian military mission. Italy commenced a modest air force training program and Israel began training paratroopers. Of these, we considered the Belgian effort to be of primary importance. It was, and remained, US policy to encourage Belgium to take the leading role in providing military and technical assistance to the Congo.^{2/} The United States had no desire to replace the former metropole as the leading foreign influence for stability and economic development, nor was it feasible for us to do so.

^{2/} Memorandum from G. Mennen Williams to the Secretary of State on the subject of Ambassador Gullion's consultation, dated August 13, 1963; Politico-Military Contingency Plan for the Congo (K), December 5, 1966; Department of State Telegram 181958 to American Embassy Kinshasa, April 25, 1967 (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~).—

c. UN Withdrawal and Renewed Rebellion

Unfortunately, as the anticipated withdrawal of the United Nations troops in 1964 drew near, new tribal fighting and rebellious uprisings broke out. The first stage of rebellion came in the form of an anti-government uprising by bands of rural youth in Kwilu Province. That insurgency, begun in late 1963, had flared by February 1964 into a full-scale ravaging of numerous villages. The leader, Pierre Mulele, was a member of the early Lumumba Government who later had been trained in insurgency in Communist China.

A second series of revolts broke out in Sud Kivu Province in the eastern Congo in April 1964 after months of isolated incidents against government authorities and foreigners. The outbreaks were triggered and sustained by various congolese tribal factions, particularly the Bafulero fighting among themselves, Rwandan refugees, and other disaffected political and youth groups that moved about ransacking villages and cities where the authority of the central government and the provincial government had never been strong. The Communist Chinese embassies in Brazzaville

and Bujumbura provided Congolese rebel leaders with advice, instructional materials, and money. Very large amounts of Chinese and Russian military equipment were eventually captured by Congolese military forces. Peking publicly hailed the "excellent revolutionary situation" in the Congo and expressed hope that it would follow the pattern of the war in South Viet-Nam. A defector from the Chinese Embassy in Bujumbura attributed to Mao Tse Tung the saying, "If we can hold the Congo, we will take the whole of Africa." The cold war had returned to the Congo.

By mid-May 1964 it became clear that the Adoula Government could not rally widespread popular support. The Congolese National Army was too poorly led at almost every level to deal with the rebels, now called Simbas ("lions" in Swahili) who literally scared the ANC into retreat, principally by the invocation of traditional magic.

In March 1964, Ambassador-at-Large Harriman visited the Congo and upon his return recommended to the President that the United States give increased military assistance to the Congo.^{3/} The recommendations were approved and the additional

^{3/} Department of State Memorandum for the President signed by W. Averell Harriman, April 20, 1964 ~~(SECRET)~~

US-supplied equipment, particularly T-28 aircraft, arrived in the Congo just in time to help the Congolese army repulse the rebel attacks on Bukavu in the summer of 1964. Over the next two years, the T-28's, piloted by anti-Castro Cubans, played a key role in the Congolese Government's long and successful drive to crush the rebellion.

d. Defeat of the Rebellion: US C-130 Aircraft

The mandate of the Adoula Government ended on June 30, 1964, and President Kasavubu dramatically turned to the exiled Tshombe for his new Prime Minister. We were not privy to this decision. As the former leader of secessionist Katanga, Tshombe's relations with a number of African leaders, as well as with us, were less than cordial. Nonetheless, consistent with our policy of support for the Central Government, the Department of State recommended to the White House that "...we should support Tshombe in his efforts to promote unity, security, and internal stability. Our existing economic and military aid programs should be quietly continued.^{4/}" This was

^{4/} Department of State Memorandum to Mr. McGeorge Bundy, The White House, signed by W. Averell Harriman, July 11, 1964 (CONFIDENTIAL).

the same measure of support and cooperation as we had given predecessor governments and became US policy toward the Tshombe Government. Tshombe, meanwhile, declared his willingness to work to preserve the integrity, independence, and unity of the Congo.

As the rebellion increased in intensity, the Congolese requested additional military assistance. Secretary Rusk cabled to Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Henri Spaak on August 6, 1964, that "...we must concert urgently on tangible, specific measures to save the Congo." ^{5/} Harriman arrived in Brussels shortly thereafter, and in meetings with Spaak it was decided that substantially increased US and Belgian assistance, the latter particularly, in the form of ordinance, should be provided the Congolese. ^{6/} The US contribution consisted of three unarmed C-130 transport aircraft, their aircrews, maintenance personnel and plane guards. These planes

^{5/} Department of State Telegram 164 to Brussels, August 6, 1964—(CONFIDENTIAL).

^{6/} From Brussels, Telegram 200, August 8, 1964—(CONFIDENTIAL).

were sent to meet an urgent need to ferry Congolese troops and material to short and poorly maintained airstrips near the rebel-infested areas. A Joint Task Force was set up in Leopoldville to run the air lift and maintain liaison with the Congolese Chief of Staff. Two or three officers, in addition to the Task Force provided certain Congolese commanders with informal tactical advice as well. One of these contributed importantly to the second successful defense of Bukavu in August 1964, a defense which had a strongly demoralizing effect on the rebel leadership. It was a significant turning point in the rebellion, assured that the rebel regime would not be accorded diplomatic recognition by the Communist countries and radical African states which were already providing material and financial support to the rebels.

On August 5, 1964, Stanleyville fell to the rebels. Five American consular personnel almost immediately became prisoners and, soon after, hostages. Tshombe, meanwhile, had significantly reinforced the strength of the ANC by hiring foreign mercenaries at no small political cost to himself. Encouraged by the successful August defense of Bukavu and the recapture of

Albertville, and strengthened by the mercenaries and by the T-28's, the ANC now began to turn the tide. As the rebels were pushed back, the situation of the Europeans and loyal Congolese at Stanleyville and other localities progressively worsened. Many hundreds of Congolese were killed, and the Europeans everywhere in rebel-controlled territory became hostages.

By November 1964, their plight was desperate. Diplomatic efforts to achieve their release, culminating in a confrontation between the American Ambassador at Nairobi and the rebel "Foreign Minister," Thomas Kanza, on November 23, failed. Kanza could not assure the safety of the hostages and wished only to negotiate broad political questions concerning Congolese internal affairs which were beyond the competence of the Ambassador.^{7/} The following day, a battalion of Belgian paratroopers were flown to Stanley ville in 12 US C-130's. They occupied the city quickly, but not before rebel guns were turned on a column of helpless Europeans,

^{7/} From Nairobi, Telegrams 1406 and 1413, November 23 and 24, 1964 ~~(SECRET)~~.

killing a number of them including the heroic American Missionary, Dr. Paul Carlson. The paratroopers turned the city over to a mercenary column from Kindu, then repeated the performance at Paulis two days later. Three additional days later, they and the C-130's departed the Congo midst a rising chorus of attacks from Communist and African countries on Belgium and the United States for the alleged use of imperialistic force -- attacks which Ambassador Stevenson successfully countered in the Security Council debate.

The decision to employ the rescue force was reluctantly taken by the President, the Belgian Prime Minister and the Congolese Prime Minister only when it became clear that negotiations would be unsuccessful and that the lives of the hostages could no longer be assured under the increasingly unstable rebel regime.^{8/} The final decision awaited the one last effort at Nairobi.

The success of the operation and then the ANC's overall defeat of the rebels by mid-1966 removed the American role in

^{8/} Department of State Circular Telegram 1014, November 24, 1964 (UNCLASSIFIED).

the Simba rebellion as a real international issue, and by 1968 it was scarcely ever cited in international debate as an example of "American imperialism."

e. Strain in US-Congo Relations

Stanleyville proved to be only the beginning of the end for the rebels; another 18 months were required before the revolt was finally effectively crushed. Meanwhile, the Tshombe Government came to an end in October 1965 during a period of high political tension involving Tshombe and Kasavubu. Kasavubu dismissed Tshombe at that time, and appointed Evariste Kimba in his place. Kimba was unable to form an effective government and finally, on November 24, General Mobutu executed a bloodless coup d'etat by dismissing Kasavubu and installing himself as President. He has remained in power since that time, gradually consolidating his position as time has passed.

Some of his early actions, however, led to a brief period of strain in US-Congolese relations which became evident during the second half of 1966 but which did not receive wide attention in either the United States or the Congo. As one of his chief

moves, Mobutu adopted a program for "economic independence." In support of the program, he took certain steps which the US Mission considered unwise--e.g., nationalization of the insurance companies, cancellation of all existing mining concessions, a 10 percent increase in the gasoline tax without an increase in prices. None of these measures caused the United States to take direct action. However, when it was announced that as of June 30, 1966, the Benguela Railroad through Angola, the main carrier of Katangese copper, would be closed to traffic and thus require the mines to use the inadequate and greatly over-burdened rail and river National Route through Port Francqui, we judged that such action would cost the Congolese at least \$100 million annually in lost foreign exchange and nullify any benefits which our economic assistance was providing. We therefore made it clear to Mobutu not only that we would not make up the deficit but that we might have to terminate our assistance entirely. Against this background a new revolt at Kisangani broke out in July 1966 involving Katangan gendarmes of the ANC. Mobutu's request for the use of T-28's against the mutineers was turned

down by the United States. This refusal, added to the concern about the future of aid, led to a temporary cooling in relations. Eventually Ambassador Godley, who bore the brunt of Mobutu's displeasure, was called to Washington on consultation and did not return. Embassy Kinshasa remained under a Charge d'Affaires for several months.

f. The Union Miniere Crisis

When the crisis over the eventual Congolese Government expropriation of the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga broke out in December 1966, the United States maintained a strict neutrality. Even the Belgian Government tried to maintain a hands-off posture.

The situation became so serious, however, that the Belgian Government had to take a public position against the uncompensated seizure on January 1, 1967, of largely Belgian-owned property. At this point, Charge d'Affaires Robert Blake and the staff of the US Embassy began to play a more active behind-the-scenes role in urging the Congolese Government to avoid precipitate ultimata or further property seizures. Blake described our role as being "a friend in court." Eventually

the dispute simmered down, and an arrangement for continuing production was made with an affiliate of Union Miniere. By the latter part of 1968, definitive settlement of the nationalization and expropriation dispute under the mediation and conciliation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development seemed to be on next year's horizon.

g. US Economic Assistance

Increased government expenditures, resulting from the suppression of the Simba Rebellion and general lack of budgetary restraint, resulted in a continuing inflationary spiral and debasement of Congolese currency as well as a check on attempts to increase Congolese agricultural exports. Despite its resources and economic growth-potential, the Congo did not, therefore, qualify as a country of development emphasis under the new AID criteria for Africa adopted in 1967. However, because of our historical involvement in the Congo since its independence, and because there was no other country prepared to take the leading role in meeting the Congo's obvious needs for continuing assistance, the United States

decided to consider the Congo to be a "country of special interest." ^{9/}

The decision to go ahead with the actual negotiation of a Fiscal Year 1967 Supporting Assistance Loan of \$17.5 million was contingent on the Congolese Government's willingness to adopt an economic stabilization program under the guidance of the International Monetary Fund. On June 24, 1967, President Mobutu took the politically courageous step of announcing a 67 percent devaluation of the currency, stringent limitations on government expenditures, a limitation in the increases of government workers' wages, curtailment of private credit and National Bank advances to the National Treasury, and an almost complete liberalization of imports.

The overall success of the economic stabilization program during the first twelve months enabled the US Government to look forward to moving ahead gradually from this kind of emergency balance of payments and budgetary support

^{9/} AID Policy Paper, "Proposed US Aid Policy for Africa, November 17, 1966; Joint Department of State/AID Circular Airgram CA-4356, December 9, 1966 ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~.

assistance (with counterpart funds) to Development Loan Assistance in the fields of transportation beginning in Fiscal Year 1970.^{10/} Influence was also brought to bear on the IBRD to mount a sizeable development assistance program which should get underway in 1969.

h. The Mercenary Mutiny

On July 5, 1967 a group of about 150 European mercenaries and 1000 Katangese troops of the ANC mutinied and seized several towns in the eastern and northeastern Congo including Bukavu and Kisangani. President Mobutu viewed the mutiny as a serious threat to his government and requested assistance from the United States on the day of the outbreak. He told Ambassador Robert H. McBride that he feared the mercenaries intended to try to overthrow the central government. The next day he made a specific request for C-130 transport aircraft.

In assenting to President Mobutu's request, the United States took very much into account the danger that the actions

^{10/} Program Memorandum FY 1970, Congo (Kinshasa)
July 1968 ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~.

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of European mercenaries directed against Congolese citizens could lead to increasing bloodshed and perhaps to racial strife. It was decided by President Johnson on advice of the State and Defense Departments that the presence of the C-130's, the first of which arrived on July 10, would strengthen the central government, show the interest of the West in helping to suppress the mutiny, and prevent the outbreak of widespread racial strife in the Congo.^{11/}

The last of the three C-130 aircraft originally sent to the Congo was withdrawn with President Mobutu's assent on December 10, 1967. These planes assisted in the evacuation of refugees and provided logistics support to the Congolese Government, including the army.

The United States was not alone in these 1967 efforts to help preserve the Congo. The Congolese Government appealed to other African nations for assistance, and the Ethiopian and Ghanaian Governments provided military aid. Four Ethiopian Air Force F-86's were sent to the Congo as well as a number

^{11/} Department of State Memorandum to the President signed by Eugene V. Rostow, July 6, 1967. ~~(SECRET)~~

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of Ghanaian pilots.

The mercenaries and Katangese were finally forced out of Bukavu and sought refuge in Rwanda on November 5, 1967. The Congo later broke diplomatic relations with Rwanda over the latter's refusal to extradite the mercenaries. The Katangese returned to the Congo under considerable fear for their lives, but the International Committee of the Red Cross reported in July 1968 that they had not been mistreated. On April 24, 1968, two Dutch DC-6's, chartered by the ICRD, flew out the remaining 119 mercenaries and a sprinkling of African wives and children.

In the end, the frantic urgency of the mercenary problem, which held through early January, was replaced by quiet diplomacy. This came about chiefly because Mobutu finally gave way to the extent of indicating his willingness to accept repatriation of the mercenaries, provided adequate assurances were forthcoming from parent governments that the mercenaries would be prevented from returning to Africa.

The United States was able to play a constructive role

while keeping out of the direct line of fire by constantly urging a peaceful and humanitarian solution on all concerned, particularly Mobutu.^{12/} The ICRC and the Organization of Africa Unity, particularly Sudanese President Al Azhari, deserved high praise, but without patient US interest it is doubtful that these organizations would have persisted.

i. Outlook

At the end of 1968, US-Congo relations were excellent. Not only President Mobutu but also more radical elements of the young elite, who could be expected to be critical, generally recognized that the United States had been the only country which had steadfastly supported Congolese independence and territorial integrity against foreign-inspired enemies from the right as well as the left. During their 1968 visits to the Congo, Vice President Humphrey and Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Palmer II had emphasized the cordiality of these relations as well as United States confidence in the Congolese ability to bring stability and

^{12/} Department of State Telegram 065312 to Kinshasa, November 6, 1967 ~~(SECRET)~~.

growth to their country.

That the Congo was no longer the pariah of Africa was illustrated by the decision of the Organization for African Unity to hold its annual Chiefs of State Meeting in Kinshasa in September 1967 and elect Mobutu to the Presidency. Improved relations between the Congo and Belgium, for which the United States had consistently but quietly worked, were symbolized in Mobutu's visit with King Baudouin in June 1968, and by the first formal Belgian assistance agreement of August 1968. Although the Congo maintained a position of non-alignment and the Soviets were allowed to re-open their Embassy in mid-1968, the Congolese Government's disapproval of Soviet methods was demonstrated by its unequivocal condemnation of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.

In summary, with a minimum of expense and political and military involvement, but with continuing well-received counsel, the United States helped the Congo to reach a level of political and economic stability which orderly economic growth and a respected position in the councils of Africa and the world.

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2. Ghana

a. Symbol of Change

For overall US policy in Africa, Ghana until the middle of the Johnson Administration was important as a trouble-maker because of its ambitious dictator, Kwame Nkrumah.

Despite its small size, limited resources and minor strategic significance, Ghana in recent years had played a political role disproportionate to its power base. It was an important bellwether of radical Pan-Africanism, and its revolutionary influence was felt strongly throughout the continent. Under President Nkrumah, who was chronically distrustful of the West and especially the United States, Ghana acted as a leading member of the Asian-African group at the United Nations and frequently voted with the Communist Bloc against the United States. Nkrumah alarmed and alienated his neighbors by stirring up intrigues in their countries and by plotting the overthrow of their governments.

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Relations with the United States in 1963 were far from healthy. Nkrumah apparently believed we had decided to destroy his regime and thwart Pan-Africanism. Potential Communist influence in the country was considerable because of the large group of Bloc personnel, numerous visits in both directions, the studying of Ghanaian students in the Bloc countries, and Communist manipulation of the Government-controlled press and radio to influence the trade unions, youth and other groups.

b. US Commitments and Aims

The United States had an official presence in Ghana of about 290 persons who, in addition to staffing our Embassy, operated AID, USIS, National Institutes of Health, Peace Corps and cultural programs. Our greatest involvement, however, was in our commitment to lend Ghana \$37 million for the construction of the Volta River dam and \$110 million for the VALCO aluminum smelter. The commitment on the dam had been made in 1961.

The main US policy objectives at that time were (1) to convince the Ghana Government and people that the United States supported the maintenance of their independence, (2) to persuade the Government of Ghana that Ghana's best interests would be served by close or at least friendly relations with the West, (3) to prevent Ghana's incorporation into the Communist bloc, and (4) to induce Ghana to deny ^{1/} military bases to the bloc.

Relations between the United States and Ghana remained strained during 1964 and 1965 as Western influence in Ghana progressively diminished and the Government and information ^{2/} media reflected stronger Communist influences. The outlook for change favorable to the United States while Nkrumah remained in power was dim. US leverage on Ghana was largely limited to the possibility of terminating our financing of

^{1/} Department of State, National Policy Paper for Ghana, January 20, 1964 (SECRET).

^{2/} From Accra, Airgram 260, November 25, 1965.

the Volta Dam and hydroelectric project as well as the VALCO aluminum amelter. Termination of these programs and projects, however, would have entailed the almost complete loss of any US influence in Ghana. We therefore decided to maintain our limited presence and programs in Ghana and meet our commitment to help finance the dam and smelter plant. Formal ground-breaking for the dam, Sub-Sahara Africa's largest, took place in 1964, and the dam was formally dedicated on January 22, 1966, one month before Nkrumah's overthrow, in the presence of an estimated 15-20,000 Ghanaians.

c. The Overthrow of Nkrumah

On February 24, 1966, the Ghanaian army and police forces, acting in concert, deposed President Nkrumah and took over effective control of Ghana. At the time of the coup, Nkrumah was in Peking, en route to Hanoi. The new leadership of Ghana consisted of four senior military and four senior police officers constituted as the National Liberation Council (NLC). This action resulted in few deaths, mainly

among Nkrumah's palace guard. The populace was jubilant over the change, and order was quickly restored.

The stated cause of the take-over was the oppressive, dictatorial and prodigal rule of Nkrumah. The more basic causes included the desperate financial plight of the Ghanaian economy, food shortages, severe import controls, and Nkrumah's foreign adventures.

With the downfall of Nkrumah and the assumption of power by the NLC, relations between Ghana and the United States as well as other Western countries changed immediately. The basic reservoir of goodwill toward the US on the part of most of the people still remained and there was an immediate receptivity to Western ideas and institutions in Ghana. Although the NLC had a declared policy of "balanced neutrality," many Chinese and Soviet aid technicians were expelled and the staffs of Communist embassies were cut. Our Embassy in Accra established immediate and close contact with the NLC.

d. US Economic Assistance

While Nkrumah had been deposed, the difficult task of achieving economic and political stability remained ahead. There were serious food shortages in Ghana which were expected to worsen during the following months as the commercial pipeline dried up in April. To help meet this crisis, the NLC formally asked the United States for assistance eight days after the coup.^{3/} Four days later, our Ambassador presented 90,000 pounds of powdered milk through the Catholic Relief Services to the National Relief Committee for distribution among the detainees released from political imprisonment. Twenty-five days after receipt of the Ghanaian request for assistance, two US Air Force C-130's touched down at Accra Airport and unloaded 25 tons of canned milk.^{4/} Upon presentation by Ambassador Williams of this partial delivery of

^{3/} From Accra, Telegram 932, March 4, 1966

^{4/} From Accra, Telegram 1112, March 30, 1966

500 tons promised, General Ankrah, Chairman of the NLC, expressed "to President Lyndon B. Johnson and to the American people our greatest appreciation for giving such a quick response to our appeal for assistance." This delivery was followed by the arrival of 225 tons by sea on April 23, with the balance arriving in late May.

A PL 480, Title I agreement for \$7.46 million was signed April 1 for deliveries during June-December to provide rice (20,000 tons) and cotton (25,000 tons) with lesser amounts of tobacco, corn, sorghum and edible oils. This was followed by an agreement to provide under Title II 10,000 tons of corn for price stabilization and 4,000 tons of corn for development of the pig and poultry industry in Ghana. Additionally, the funding of the Special Self-Help and Development Fund was increased from \$50,000 to \$100,000.

This immediate emergency assistance was followed by a regular long-term program at a yearly level of about \$30 million aimed at giving substantial help to Ghana in its successful

attempt to achieve economic stability after Nkrumah's ruinous extravagances. Although Ghana still faced serious economic problems as of 1968 it was able to begin shifting from the quest for economic stability to that for economic development.

e. Soviet Military Equipment Obtained From Ghana

Assistance has not been a one-way street in US-Ghanaian relations. Shortly after the coup which deposed Nkrumah, the NLC offered to make available to the United States certain military equipment of Soviet origin. This equipment, which had been provided to Ghana by the Soviet Union for use by Nkrumah's personal guard regiment, included a number of items of great interest to US intelligence. We accepted Ghana's offer of the equipment and, based on a mutually agreed value for that equipment, provided Ghana with spare parts and uniforms which the NLC requested in exchange.

Among the items of Soviet equipment received were an advanced type of weapon which the United States expected

would appear later in Viet-Nam. These weapons were consequently deemed of great value for study in coping with the threat they posed.

General Ankrah, Chairman of the NLC, presented the first of these to the President as a personal gift. The entire transaction was handled in secret and remained very closely held in Ghana.

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3. Nigeria

a. Background

In November 1963 US-Nigeria relations were excellent. Nigeria was basically in accord with the US position on most important foreign policy issues, while maintaining its basic nonalignment. The high importance the United States attributed to Nigeria was manifested by the implementation of the \$225 million aid commitment to the 1962-68 Nigerian Development Plan (NDP) made by President Kennedy in 1961.

Nigeria seemed destined by its size, relative wealth, and the drive of its large population to play a leading part in Africa. Nigerian leaders also had been pursuing generally constructive policies at home and abroad.

b. Establishment of US Policy

Basic US policy toward Nigeria was set forth in a National Policy Paper early in the Johnson Administration, which summarized US long-term objectives: ^{1/} (1) the

^{1/} Department of State, National Policy Paper: Nigeria, May 15, 1964 (~~SECRET/NOFORN~~).

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development of Nigeria as a united and genuinely independent nation attached to democratic principles; (2) the assurance of a steady pace of economic development; and (3) the maintenance of support by the Nigerians of Free World policies and objectives.

The United States was mindful of some risks involved in backing the Nigerian Federation. Nigeria's prospects depended on an intact Federation, and a break-up would also adversely affect the stability and security of all West Africa. The indigenous roots of Nigeria's political problems, and Nigerian sensitivity to external interference, limited US ability to influence political developments. On balance, it was concluded that a political crisis would probably not break up the Federation and that US support might assist in the development of Nigerian unity.

The United States thus decided that our diplomats should continue to emphasize the importance of a consolidation of the Federation. The United States would encourage a constructive

Nigerian role on African issues through regular consultations with the Nigerian Government. It would discreetly support the formation of a national government including all major parties, if considerable support for this became evident. The United States also would continue to implement the \$225 million commitment to the NDP, made under the Kennedy Administration, and through the IBRD would discreetly encourage the participation of other Western aid donors.

c. November 1963 - December 1965

US-Nigeria ties multiplied, as our AID, Peace Corps, USIS and labor activities increased. The Nigerians were reassured by the new US President's effective resumption of leadership in the liberal mold of his predecessor and were pleased with the passage of the Civil Rights Bill of 1964. Although the crisis over the Nigerian Federal election of 1964 warned that US policy involved risks, the period generally confirmed the correctness of US policy guidelines.

Until the end of 1965 the development of a united Nigeria attached to democratic principles seemed a definite possibility.

The disputed election of 1964 severely strained national unity and political institutions, but a last minute compromise between the Prime Minister and the President gave renewed evidence that Nigerians had a basic national commitment.

Western influence in Nigeria increased. By the end of 1965 there were almost 700 US Peace Corps Volunteers in the country, the largest contingent in Africa. American trade grew, and private investment soared to approximately \$200 million. US ties with the Nigerian labor movement multiplied because of activities of the African American Labor Center. Although Soviet labor activities intensified, the Communists failed in their efforts to manipulate the results of the general strike of 1964.

Gross national product rose at a rate close to 5 percent, higher than the 4 percent estimated in the Development Plan, despite problems of population growth and the weakness of the central and regional planning mechanisms. Foreign capital, both private and government, substantially reduced Nigeria's

foreign deficit. US obligations under our aid commitment rose to well over \$100 million at the end of 1965.

Nevertheless, the annual assessments by our Embassy in Lagos expressed caveats about Nigeria's future.^{2/} Because of the internal nature of Nigerian political problems, the assessments reiterated that US policies could not be a decisive or major factor in Nigerian unity. The United States believed that US official and private investment, used positively, could influence Nigerian policy toward national unity and development. Barring a major conflagration, Nigeria's commitment to democracy and free enterprise under the rule of law appeared to provide a base on which the United States could build solid relationships.

d. From Coup to Civil War, January 1966 to July 1967

In 1966 Nigeria's parliamentary structure was destroyed and its national unity jeopardized by two military coups. In

^{2/} From Lagos, Airgrams A-568, March 26, 1965 (~~SECRET~~) and A-447, April 2, 1966 (~~SECRET~~); Nigeria: Annual Politico-Economic Assessment, 1964; and Nigeria: Annual US Policy Assessment, 1965 (~~SECRET~~).

the resulting atmosphere of hatred and misunderstanding, angry mobs slaughtered thousands of Eastern Nigerians (predominantly Ibos) resident in the Northern Region. The survivors streamed back to the East. These events precipitated a secessionist movement by the Eastern Region. A compromise agreement was reached between Major-General Gowon, the head of the Federal Military Government (FMG) and Colonel Ojukwu, the Eastern leader, at Aburi, Ghana, in January 1967. Neither side implemented the agreement, however, and the crisis escalated into mutual economic sanctions. On May 31, 1967, Colonel Ojukwu proclaimed the independence of Eastern Nigeria as the "Republic of Biafra." Civil war broke out on July 6.

US relations with Nigeria in 1966 were not severely affected. Both successor governments announced their intention to continue past basic foreign policies. During the crisis periods Nigerian leaders listened to advice given in confidence by American representatives. Unfortunately, some northerners

and a few Westerners came to believe that the United States favored the Ibos and the East because of American oil investments and strong missionary and educational ties.^{3/}

In November 1966 the United States drew up a contingency plan. If an Eastern declaration of independence brought Federal invasion, we would evacuate US citizens as required, encourage OAU and Commonwealth states to press for a ceasefire, and support the introduction of British and Commonwealth forces to separate the combatants. The United States would support the FMG as the only lawfully-constituted Government, turning aside the East's bid for recognition. If the drift toward de facto independence continued without Federal military action, the United States would attempt to discourage a formal Eastern declaration of independence and Federal armed action. In conjunction with the UK the United States would continue efforts to find a compromise. The United States was

^{3/} From Lagos, Airgram A-407, February 12, 1967,
Nigeria: Annual US Policy Assessment, 1966
~~(SECRET)~~.

willing to accept a very loose political structure for Nigeria in the hope that continued economic unity would eventually restore closer political ties.^{4/}

The United States encouraged the holding of the Aburi meeting in January 1967. Our Ambassador subsequently made clear the US concern about the erosion of the Aburi agreement, and encouraged Gowon to seek a peaceful solution.^{5/} Our Consul in Enugu urged Ojukwu to accept Gowon's limited implementation of that agreement, and on several occasions appealed to him to avoid the use of force or provocative actions. In April, Ambassador Mathews flew to Enugu, where he attempted unsuccessfully to persuade Ojukwu of the disastrous consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence.^{6/}

^{4/} Department of State, Nigeria: Contingency Study, November 1966 (~~SECRET~~).

^{5/} Department of State Telegram to Lagos 148032, March 3, 1967 (~~SECRET/LIMDIS~~); From Lagos, Telegram 6739, March 4, 1967 (~~SECRET/LIMDIS~~).

^{6/} Memorandum from Roy M. Melbourne to Assistant Secretary Palmer, "Foreign Activity in Search for Peace in Nigeria," April 20, 1968 Enclosure 1 (~~SECRET~~).

Until the eve of the fighting, US representatives argued against the use of force and counselled restraint by both sides.

The most difficult US decision prior to the fighting concerned proposed FMG arms purchases in the United States. At the end of 1966 the FMG renewed a long-standing request for US approval of the sale of some 106 mm recoilless rifle and .50 caliber ammunition. The United States had not regularly supplied arms for Nigeria, but in 1964 had sold 24 106 mm recoilless rifles for training purposes. On February 21, 1967, the Interdepartmental Regional Group (IRG) decided not to approve the sale despite the Ambassador's recommendation.^{7/} In an Aide-Memoire to the Nigerian Ambassador on July 3, the United States declined an FMG request for approval of the purchase of US jet aircraft,

^{7/} Memorandum from Roy M. Melbourne to Assistant Secretary Palmer, "African IRG Meeting on Nigeria February 21, 1967," February 20, 1967 ~~(SECRET)~~; Memorandum from Ambassador W.C. Trimble to the Acting Secretary of State, "IRG Meeting on Nigeria," February 21, 1967 ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

defense boats, and anti-aircraft guns on the ground that we wished to maintain our position of non-intervention in Nigeria's internal affairs.^{8/} These decisions were bitterly resented by the FMG, which construed them as a lack of support for Nigerian unity. It was the US belief, however, that our continuing Nigerian aid program and our stated support for a single Nigeria acquitted us of this charge, and that the decisions would avoid embroiling the United States in fratricidal bloodshed.

e. Outbreak of War

When war broke out in July 1967, the United States formally adopted a policy of non-interference and declined to recognize Biafra. Approximately 2000 American citizens were evacuated from the war area by plane and ship. All AID projects in the war area were halted. In the rest of the country

^{8/} Department of State Aide-Memoire, July 3, 1967; Memorandum from Roy M. Melbourne to Assistant Secretary Palmer, "Comments on Lagos' A-469 (Postscript to Annual Policy Assessment)," April 18, 1968 (~~SECRET~~).

projects already in progress continued, but no new projects were undertaken.^{9/} The US Consulate at Enugu, Eastern Nigeria, was evacuated October 6. The Consul and his staff remained for 10 days in Port Harcourt urging the departure of all American citizens and arranging for their evacuation. When the Consul himself departed, only an estimated 38 Americans, who had made the decision to stay, still remained in the former Eastern Region.

In August the Soviet Union delivered 10 MIG jet aircraft to the FMG. Fearing an internationalization of the war, the Department issued a statement on August 21 deploring the Soviet action. Although the Soviet deliveries were criticized elsewhere in Africa, the United States came under severe Nigerian press attack in August and September. The campaign

^{9/} US assistance through AID during the Plan period through June 30, 1968 totalled \$175,569,000 including \$19,318,000 committed during Fiscal Year 1968 in support of existing projects. (Agency for International Development, Project Budget Submission FY 1970 Nigeria, September 1968.)

subsided and then revived in November in the form of a campaign against US Peace Corpsmen. For a moment it appeared that the Peace Corps would be phased out, but the furor abated, and US-Nigerian relations improved.

US representatives retained throughout the conflict good access to many high Nigerian officials. Surprisingly, when the United States deobligated \$1.8 million in US loans in May 1968 because of "sophisticated" military purchases under the terms of the Conte-Long Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act of 1967, there was scarcely a ripple in our relations.^{10/} Though arms deliveries increased Soviet influence, most Nigerian leaders appeared wary of Communist motives. The FMG and public came to respect the motives for US actions, and by the autumn of 1968 relations were once more on an excellent basis.

^{10/} Memorandum from Roy M. Melbourne to Assistant Secretary Palmer, "IRG Agenda Item, May 17 -- Application of the Conte-Long Amendment to Nigeria," May 15, 1968 ~~(SECRET)~~.

The United States consistently supported all OAU and Commonwealth initiatives for ending the war, in the belief that these bodies were in a better position to influence both sides than any others. The OAU established a Consultative Mission to Nigeria in September 1967. During two months of abortive efforts in the fall of 1967 to arrange a conference of the OAU Committee on Nigeria, US officials emphasized the importance of an early meeting to African heads of state visiting the United States. In April 1968, backing Commonwealth Secretariat efforts to get talks started, the US Ambassador in Lagos encouraged the FMG to engage in peace discussions without pre-conditions. When the FMG adopted this position, a US official in London urged a Biafran envoy to encourage Ojukwu to take up the offer. US diplomats provided behind the scenes support for the peace efforts of President Obote, President Diori and Emperor Haile Selassie, who made valiant efforts to bring about agreement on peace and relief for victims of the war during the spring and summer

of 1968. Several times during the war US officials met in a private capacity with a number of Biafran representatives. Though most of the meetings were on a "listen only" basis, on occasion the Biafrans were urged to appeal to Ojukwu to adopt a more flexible negotiating position.^{11/}

After a Biafran walkout ended peace talks sponsored by the Commonwealth Secretariat in Kampala, Uganda, Assistant Secretary of State Palmer in the course of a six-week visit to Africa in June and July pressed the US view that the key to a solution was a more flexible Biafran position. He argued that the African states, particularly those four recognizing Biafra, had a special responsibility to encourage the Ibos in a more conciliatory direction. In Lagos Mr. Palmer reaffirmed to Gowon the US desire for Nigerian unity and urged a pause in

^{11/} Memorandum from Roy M. Melbourne to Assistant Secretary Palmer, "Foreign Activity in Search of Peace in Nigeria," Enclosure 2, April 20, 1968; *ibid.*, Supplement 1: "Diplomatic Activity Relating to Peace in Nigeria Since April 1968," July 17, 1968 (~~SECRET~~).

military operations to encourage peace talks. ^{12/}

f. Relief Activities

The United States was the major contributor to the international relief effort for Nigerian war victims on both sides, mounted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in coordination with many voluntary agencies. On May 26, 1968, the US Charge d'Affaires in Lagos declared Nigeria a disaster relief area to permit the allocation of AID relief funds to the area. As of October 1 the US Government had contributed more than \$10.1 million to the relief effort, including \$1.1 million in cash to the ICRC, \$8.7 million in surplus foods, \$350,000 to the USAID Mission in Lagos, and the balance in transportation costs for relief supplies donated by American voluntary agencies.

Throughout the relief crisis the Department of State maintained close liaison with the ICRC. Assistant Secretary

^{12/} From Lagos, Airgram A-735, July 20, 1968. Following Palmer's return to Washington, an Inter-Agency Nigeria Task Force was established at the request of Under Secretary Katzenbach to review and make recommendations regarding our policy. In November it began an urgent reexamination of possible US actions to meet the growing Nigerian-Biafran relief crisis.

Palmer visited ICRC headquarters in Geneva on July 15 to discuss measures for stepping up the relief effort. Deputy Assistant Secretary C. Robert Moore spent two weeks in Geneva in August participating in talks between ICRC officials and representatives of other agencies involved in the relief effort. Ambassador Moore became convinced that the ICRC was taking energetic steps to organize the relief effort on an adequate scale. US support for the ICRC as the most appropriate instrument for the international relief effort was reaffirmed.

US officials agonized over the plight of the Biafran refugees but recognized that the main factor delaying an adequate relief effort to the needy in the rebel area was political i.e., the failure of the parties in conflict to agree on relief routes. Some in the United States suggested US leadership in a massive international airlift of food to Biafra even if it violated Nigerian sovereignty. The US Government was convinced that such action would constitute

direct intervention on the rebel side in the political dispute underlying the war. This intervention could have had a decisive impact on the outcome of the war and would have outraged most of the African states. While not opposed to UN consideration of the issue, as proposed by many, the Department learned that even a mild humanitarian resolution had little chance of passage there because of strong African and other third world opposition.^{13/}

The United States continued to support nightly ICRC flights into Biafra and OAU and ICRC efforts to gain agreement to land and air relief corridors, while occasionally appealing directly to the parties. On July 11 President Johnson appealed publicly to both sides to permit the conveyance of relief. Secretary Rusk made a similar appeal on July 30. In a message to Emperor Haile Selassie at the opening of peace

^{13/} Memorandum from Assistant Secretaries Palmer and Sisco to Under Secretary Katzenbach, "Nigeria and the UN," September 4, 1968
(CONFIDENTIAL).

talks in Ethiopia, President Johnson called for a speedy resolution of the relief impasse and stated that the United States was willing to continue to assist the relief effort in every possible way. In October, Assistant Secretary Palmer again visited Lagos to urge improved Federal cooperation with the ICRC and renewed OAU involvement in the crisis.

Throughout the conflict the Department gave thought to US policies in the postwar period.^{14/} In the event of Federal victory, which appeared the most likely outcome, the United States planned to act to encourage national reconciliation by urging humane Federal treatment of the Easterners. Depending on Federal magnanimity, the United States planned to assist in the economic recovery and reconstruction of Nigeria within the limits of available aid funds. The Administration believed that Western influence could flourish best in a united and prosperous Nigeria.

^{14/} Department of State, Nigeria: Contingency Study, March 21, 1968 (~~SECRET~~).

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4. The Horn of Africa

a. Role in US Policy

The importance of the Horn of Africa to the United States stems primarily from three factors: (1) the strategic location of the area in relation to the Red Sea and as a bridge between Arab and Black Africa; (2) the importance of Ethiopia, the largest nation in the region, as a moderating and generally pro-Western influence in African and international councils, and (3) the location in northern Ethiopia of a major US communications facility, Kagnaw Station. Consequently Ethiopia is the keystone of our policy in the Horn. That policy was re-examined during 1963-64 and restated in a National Policy Paper.^{1/}

While our diplomatic relations with Ethiopia date from 1903, it was not until the early 1950s that the United States began to assume the role of a quasi-metropole in the economic development and military assistance programs of the country.

^{1/} National Policy Paper on Ethiopia, approved November 10, 1964 (~~SECRET~~). Part One revised March 5, 1965.

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Unlike the newly-emerging nations of Africa, Ethiopia had no European metropole to which to turn. Our economic assistance program was intended to help it overcome tremendous economic backwardness and develop its potential as an important agricultural country. Our military assistance program was the tacit quid pro quo for Kagnev Station. By mid-1963 cumulative US economic assistance to Ethiopia totalled \$107 million, while military assistance totalled \$57 million. In addition, as a result of a series of agreements, we had undertaken to equip and support a 40,000-man Ethiopian military force.

Despite periodic Ethiopian dissatisfaction with the rate and amount of our military assistance, US-Ethiopian relations were basically friendly. Symbolic of the close ties between the two nations was Emperor Haile Selassie's immediate decision to fly to the funeral of President Kennedy.

b. The Arms Race

After 1960, when Somalia gained its independence, Somali irredentism threatened the peace and security of the

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Horn. Somalis are united by race, language, religion, and culture but separated by inherited colonial boundaries. For over one hundred years unification has been a persistent Somali dream. Up until 1966, all Somali Governments accordingly pressed aggressively their claims to the French Territory of Afars and Issas (formerly French Somaliland) and to large areas of Kenya and Ethiopia.

Continued Ethiopian pressure upon us for increased military assistance was due in large part to security fears regarding Somali intentions, the traditional hostility of other Moslem neighbors (Sudan, UAR) and widespread internal dissidence among the minority peoples in peripheral areas of the Empire.

At the same time, to maintain an armaments balance in the area, Somali Prime Minister Abdirashid Ali Shermarke was assured by President Kennedy during a visit to Washington in November 1962 that we would equip and train a Somali Army in cooperation with the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Italy.^{2/}

^{2/} President's Talking Paper, SPM D/s, November 23, 1962 (~~SECRET~~).

The Somalis broke relations with Great Britain in March 1963 because the British, against the wishes of the people in the Northern Frontier District, permitted the latter to remain part of an independent Kenya. In November 1963 the Somalis rejected our offer to finance a 6,500-man Army in favor of an offer by the Soviet Union to train and equip a 20,000-man military force.

The first serious policy issue concerning Ethiopia to confront the Johnson Administration was the Ethiopian request in late November 1963 for additional arms.^{3/} The basis for the request was the growing frustration on the part of the Imperial Ethiopian Government at its inability to contain the growing dissidence among the Somalis in the Ogaden, the eastern part of the empire.

The US response to this request was a series of discussions with the Ethiopians aimed at pinpointing the deficiencies of the Ethiopian military and working out solutions for improved

^{3/} From Addis Ababa, Telegram 509, November 25, 1963,
~~(CONFIDENTIAL).~~

training and use of equipment at hand. We also agreed to general discussions on the desired force levels for the Ethiopian security forces based on evaluation of the internal and external threats to Ethiopia.^{4/}

In early 1964, during the parliamentary election campaign in Somalia, the security situation worsened rapidly in the Ogaden culminating in clashes between Ethiopian and Somali regulars. Representations were made to both governments by our Ambassadors in Mogadiscio and Addis Ababa, urging the restoration of peace. A cease fire was agreed to in April 1964.

Meanwhile the Somali Youth League (SYL) had again won a substantial majority in the March 1964 National Assembly elections. The SYL majority recommended to President Aden Abdull Osman that Shermarke be reappointed Prime Minister. We discreetly urged the appointment of SYL Deputy Abdirazak Haji Hussein rather than Shermarke. Abdirazak was judged

^{4/} From Addis Ababa, Telegram 655, January 14, 1964
~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~.

a moderate on the irredentist issue, and pro-American. (His attitude towards Americans was in part the result of an operation to remove a TB-infected lung, which saved his life, at Walter Reed Hospital in 1963.) President Aden concurred in our high opinion of Abdirazak and, declining to accept the SYL recommendation of Shermarke, nominated Abdirazak Prime Minister.^{5/} Abdirazak won a vote of confidence for his proposed Government from the National Assembly on his second attempt in September 1964.

Because of Ethiopian fears of a shortage of ammunition in the event of renewed hostilities, the United States airlifted replacement ammunition to Ethiopia after the actual fighting had subsided. We also agreed to involve the MAAG more directly with the training of the Ethiopian ground forces.^{6/} At the same time we cautioned the Ethiopian Government against a purely negative policy towards Somalia and expressed the

^{5/} From Mogadiscio, Airgram A-665, June 13, 1964
~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~.

^{6/} From Addis Ababa, Telegram 1200, May 25, 1964
~~(SECRET)~~.

opinion such a policy would only insure continued hostilities. Our Ambassador warned the Ethiopian Government against the use of US MAP-supplied equipment outside of Ethiopia, and specifically referred to the air surveillance of Somali territory and the bombing of the Hargeisa airfield in May 1964 using US-supplied planes.^{7/}

Throughout the year discussions continued between US and Ethiopian officials on the nature of the security threats to Ethiopia and the appropriate means of countering them. In brief, the Ethiopians saw the threat as primarily external, to be countered by additional equipment; the United States viewed the threat as internal, to be countered by more training, improved organization and greatly accelerated economic development. In a letter dated December 28, 1964, from the Ambassador to the Prime Minister, we reviewed our previous contributions to Ethiopia and gave assurances of continued concern for the country's security and development. The Ambassador specified

^{7/} From Addis Ababa, Telegram 1013, April 4, 1964
(CONFIDENTIAL).

concrete steps the United States was taking to meet the security threat -- e.g., delivery of one squadron of F-5 aircraft, expedited delivery of military equipment and a large special training team.^{8/}

c. Ethiopia and the Congo Question

It was also during 1964 that troubles again broke out in the Congo. President Johnson outlined the US position on the Congo in a letter to Emperor Haile Selassie dated August 21: support for the unity of the Congo, and our desire to see a solution reached within an African framework.

During efforts by the Canadian Government and the International Red Cross to enlist the Emperor's assistance on humanitarian grounds on behalf of the Stanleyville hostages, our Embassy in Addis Ababa played an important background role.^{9/} Despite a peaceful student march upon the Embassy, Ethiopian reaction to the eventual US-Belgian rescue operation

^{8/} From Addis Ababa, Airgram A-364, December 30, 1964
(~~SECRET/NODIS outside of the Department~~).

^{9/} From Addis Ababa, Airgram A-279, November 25, 1964
(~~SECRET~~).

was relatively mild.

d. The Chicom Question

During 1964-65 the Chinese Communist drive for influence in Africa was at its peak. Chou En-lai visited Ethiopia in January 1965, and the Ethiopians seriously considered formally recognizing Peking. On May 25 Governor Harriman conferred with Emperor Haile Selassie to convey President Johnson's deep concern lest Ethiopia recognize the Peking Regime.^{10/} As a quid pro quo for non-recognition, Ambassador Korry met with the Ethiopian Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance a week after the Harriman visit to discuss steps the United States might take to ease the Imperial Government's budgetary situation. A 20,000-bale Title I PL 480 Cotton Agreement was the means agreed upon and was signed August 17, 1965.

e. Defection of the Ethiopian Ambassador

A potential irritant in our relations was the decision by the Ethiopian Ambassador to the United States, Berhanu Dinke,

^{10/} From Addis Ababa, Telegrams 1648 and 1649, May 25, 1965 ~~(SECRET)~~.

to resign his post and denounce the Emperor. This he did at a press conference in Washington June 13, 1965. However, our Ambassador in Addis Ababa assured the Imperial Government of the US position in this matter and the incident was relatively quickly surmounted.

f. The Emperor's Visit to the United States

In February and March 1966 Ethiopia again raised the question of additional military assistance. In response, we offered an overall security package stressing the need of a more rational, coordinated approach to police and military development.^{11/} Its main features were an upgrading of the police and a recommendation for a 4,000-man reduction in the army.

After numerous discussions of this with the Emperor, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense,^{12/} it was clear that there remained basic US-Ethiopian differences in assessing

^{11/} From Addis Ababa, Telegram 26, July 5, 1966
~~(SECRET)~~.

^{12/} From Addis Ababa, Telegrams 1353, October 11, 1966
(SECRET), 545, August 9, 1966 (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~),
641, August 15, 1966 (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) and 1500,
October 24, 1966 (~~SECRET/LIMDIS~~).

the threat to Ethiopian security and the need for additional military equipment. With these basic differences in mind, the Emperor requested an urgent meeting with President Johnson.

The President and the Emperor met in Washington on February 14, 1967. The Emperor explained his concern over the threats to his country. These were discussed further in subsequent talks with Secretary of Defense McNamara and Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach. Our response was to assure the Emperor of our continued interest in Ethiopia and dedication to its security and development. We promised that additional military equipment would be forthcoming and that delivery schedules for equipment already programmed would be accelerated. Details of all this were conveyed at Addis Ababa ^{13/} by Ambassador Korry in March.

In addition to seeking US arms, the Ethiopians also approached the British and the French in the spring of 1967. When the United States learned of an Ethiopian intention to purchase

^{13/} From Addis Ababa, Telegram 3298, March 15, 1967
(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~).

Canberra bombers from the British Aircraft Corporation, we voiced strong opposition on three grounds: the bombers were obsolete and militarily unnecessary; they were a luxury which Ethiopia could not afford; and, most importantly, their acquisition would frighten the Somalis into seeking additional arms. ^{14/} Nevertheless, despite our strong representations, four Canberras were purchased in June.

In May 1967 the Emperor returned to the United States on a private visit to participate in the Founders Day Ceremonies at UCLA and to receive an honorary doctorate. As a gesture of goodwill, President Johnson offered his personal aircraft to fly the Emperor from Bermuda to California.

g. Katzenbach's Visit

Under Secretary of State Katzenbach visited Ethiopia and Somalia in May 1967 on his 12-nation African tour. It was in Addis Ababa, the seat of the OAU and the UNECA, that he

^{14/} From Addis Ababa, Telegrams 4159, May 23, 1967
~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ and 4528, May 24, 1967 ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~.

renewed on May 26 President Johnson's assurances given in his statement exactly one year before, of continued US interest in and assistance to the countries of Africa.

h. The Djibouti Crisis

In December 1965 President Aden and Prime Minister Abdirazak met with President Kenyatta and other Kenyan officials at Arusha, Tanzania, to discuss the Northern Frontier District. After one day, Kenyatta walked out of the meeting. Moreover, Somali relations with Ethiopia continued tense. Discouraged by the lack of any progress in Somalia's border disputes with its neighbors, Somali leaders began early in 1966 to give covert support to Somali dissidents in Ethiopia and Kenya. Moreover, Soviet arms provided under the 1963 agreement began to flood into Somalia.

Prospects were dim for accommodation between Somalia and its neighbors, but an arms race in the Horn threatened any hope for peace as well as all efforts toward economic development in the area. Therefore in our talks with Somali and

Ethiopian leaders we urged a limitation on arms.^{15/} At our suggestion, friendly diplomatic colleagues in Addis Ababa and Mogadiscio urged an end to the arms race.^{16/} Several African leaders also called at this time for a limitation on arms shipments to African states. In addition we spoke to Somali leaders of the imperative need to stop support to dissidents in Kenya and Ethiopia and to disband guerrilla training camps in Somalia.^{17/} Nevertheless, despite the strong views we expressed to Somali officials on the need to stop the arms race, we did not abandon Somalia. Our economic assistance program continued at about the same level.

Meanwhile riots by ethnic Somalis seeking self-determination erupted during French President De Gaulle's visit to Djibouti in September 1966. In November De Gaulle announced a referendum to be held the next March 19 to determine the territory's

^{15/} Department of State Telegram 363 to Mogadiscio, June 29, 1966 (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~).

^{16/} Department of State Telegram 13085 to Mogadiscio, July 22, 1966 (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~).

^{17/} From Mogadiscio, Telegram 509, August 30, 1966 (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~).

future.

Djibouti is Ethiopia's major port; and at the same time French Somaliland is one of three "missing territories" in Somalia's irredentist dreams. Somalia and Ethiopia girded for conflict over the territory. Somalia added 3,000 irregular troops to its 9,000 man army in December.

Fearing open conflict, the United States urged moderation in Somalia and Ethiopia whatever the result of the referendum vote. During a visit to Somalia in December, Assistant Secretary Joseph Palmer, 2nd, had urged an end to the arms race, concentration on economic development, and moderation concerning the Djibouti referendum.^{18/}

Nevertheless, the Somalis tried to move a portion of their Russian-supplied tanks from the south to the northern border with French Somaliland. But the tanks broke down in the effort to negotiate the steep, rocky roads, and the Army found it did not have the capability to support such a movement.

^{18/} From Mogadiscio, Airgram A-217, December 18, 1966
(CONFIDENTIAL).

On March 19, 1967, the voters of the Djibouti territory (with considerable French contrivance) elected by a 60 percent plurality to remain with France, thus ending the crisis.

i. New Arms Demands

In the meantime Moslem-led insurgency in Eritrea was reaching serious proportions. The Ethiopian Government therefore asked for accelerated delivery of the full amount of US arms and equipment programmed for the 40,000 ground force. Again the United States responded favorably and took steps to speed delivery of a number of items.

In the summer of 1967 during the mercenary-led uprising in the Congo, President Mobutu asked Ethiopia to supply jets as a back-up to efforts of the Congolese National Army to rid the country of the mercenaries. The United States lent its support to this request and Ethiopia sent 4 F-86's and 1 C-54 to the Congo.
19/

19/ From Addis Ababa, Telegram 1377, November 6, 1967
~~(SECRET)~~; Department of State Telegrams 3962, 3963,
July 10, 1967, and 3449, July 9, 1967 ~~(SECRET)~~.

j. Detente

On June 10, 1967, former Prime Minister Abdirashid Ali Shermarke was elected President of Somalia. In July Shermarke named Egal Prime Minister and on August 6 the Egal Government was confirmed by the largest majority in Somali history.

Egal told US officials the day after Shermarke's election that he believed the Somali people were ready for a change.^{20/} Soviet economic assistance was a disaster and even Soviet military assistance, so prized by the Somalis, had proved ineffective in the Djibouti crisis. Somalia must put aside its irredentist ambitions and concentrate on economic development. Security expenditures, especially funds to the Army, must be cut. Somalia would seek improved relations with its neighbors. Egal asked for our support for his new policy. We promised to help when and as we could.^{21/}

^{20/} From Mogadiscio, Telegrams 2951, June 12, 1967 ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~, and 2957, June 13, 1967 ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

^{21/} Department of State Telegram 21655, August 16, 1967 ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

At the OAU meeting in Kinshasa in September, Egal asked President Kaunda of Zambia to help him improve relations with Ethiopia and Kenya. Kaunda arranged for and served as mediator at talks Egal held there with Haile Selassie and Kenyan Vice President Moi. The three leaders agreed to work for better relations. On his return to Somalia, Egal halted Somali Government support to dissidents in Kenya and Ethiopia. Senior Somali officials went to Ethiopia in September to discuss mutual problems. At Arusha, Tanzania, Egal and Kenyan President Kenyatta agreed in October to establish diplomatic relations and re-open trade. US representatives in Nairobi and Addis Ababa spoke favorably to host country officials of Egal's efforts. In December Egal released from the Army the 3,000 irregulars recruited during the Djibouti crisis.

Largely to demonstrate US support of Somalia's initiatives, Vice President Humphrey visited Somalia during his African tour, December 1967-January 1968, and was warmly received in Somalia. In talks with the new Somalia leaders, the Vice President praised the detente policy and pledged our support.

He concluded his visit by extending an invitation to Prime Minister Egal on behalf of President Johnson to visit Washington in March 1968.^{22/}

As a result, Egal paid an official visit to Washington March 14-15. He was warmly received. President Johnson, the Vice President and the Secretary of State all commended Egal publicly for his effort to improve Somalia's relations with its neighbors. Vice President Humphrey signed a PL-480 program for Somalia worth one million dollars. AID agreed to consider additional assistance in terms of regional projects.^{23/} (Under AID's new policy for Africa Somalia was not included among the 9 countries eligible for continued bilateral economic assistance.)

In July, 1968 President Shermarke, accompanied by Prime Minister Egal, made a state visit to Kenya where he was warmly welcomed. Further trade expansion between Somalia and Kenya was planned, a Mogadiscio-Nairobi air link was re-established

^{22/} From Mogadiscio, Airgram A-213, January 11, 1968
~~(CONFIDENTIAL).~~

^{23/} From Mogadiscio, Airgram A-278, March 28, 1968
~~(CONFIDENTIAL).~~

and joint construction of a road between the two countries was agreed to.

Meanwhile, however, things were going less well with Ethiopia. An exchange of captured vehicles did not occur because the vehicles presented by the Ethiopians were not in running order. Also in mid-1968 it became widely known in Somalia that Ethiopia was receiving additional tanks, F-5s and helicopters from the United States and had purchased Canberra bombers from the British. Somali hawks urged that Somalia accept MIG-21s or SAM missiles proffered by the Soviets. We warned top Somali officials of the prohibitions in our Foreign Assistance Act against acquiring additional amounts of sophisticated military equipment. Prime Minister Egal decided to defer a decision on accepting additional weapons from the Soviet Union until December 1968.^{24/}

We had been concerned at the lack of positive response by Ethiopia to Somalia's detente initiative; but at length our

^{24/} From Mogadiscio, Telegram 3932, August 12, 1968
(CONFIDENTIAL).

many representations produced results. The Ethiopian Government invited Egal to Addis Ababa September 1, 1968, and assured him, in advance, of its willingness to take steps to reduce tensions in the area.

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5. The Sudan

a. Situation at the End of 1963

Following independence in January 1956 the political situation in the Sudan had become increasingly chaotic under a succession of weak parliamentary governments. In November 1958 a coup d'etat brought to power a military regime under Lt. General Abboud. By the end of 1963 this regime had proved to be relatively benevolent, well intentioned and moderate in outlook. While officially non-aligned, and maintaining correct relations with the Soviets and other Communist countries, the regime was basically pro-Western. It was largely preoccupied with Sudanese internal affairs and in promoting economic development under a ten-year plan launched in 1961.

The Sudan, in this period, had no significant foreign policy problems with any country, though it was wary of the UAR. Relations with Ethiopia, which it saw as a balance to the influence and aspirations of the UAR, were -- despite

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historical differences -- basically cordial. The regime supported the United Nations in the Congo.

The United States had established diplomatic relations with the Sudan shortly after independence. General Abboud had made a state visit here in 1961. Our relations with the Sudan were cordial. Our position was bolstered by direct US economic assistance to the Sudan (over \$50 million since 1958) and by our influence with such international assistance agencies as the World Bank.

Within our overall African policy the Sudan was important to us because of its vast size (the largest country in Africa), strategic location, and important potential for agricultural production. US policy toward Sudan was based on a guidelines paper issued in January 1963.^{1/}

The basic US short-term objectives were: to assist the Sudan (in concert with other Western donors) to carry out in an orderly way its economic development, to try to ensure that

^{1/} Sudan: Department of State Guidelines for Policy and Operations, January 1963 (SECRET).

the Free World remained the principal market for Sudanese cotton, to make sure of continued Sudanese support of the UN in the Congo, and to prevent the development of significant Soviet influence. Our long-term objectives were: an independent and stable Sudan responsive to the aspirations of the Sudanese people for more democratic institutions, friendly to the West and able and willing to resist UAR and Sino-Soviet domination; a Sudan which might serve as an example of cooperation with the West in the orderly development of potential for social and economic growth. We hoped in time to encourage the Sudan to assume a more active international role, in view of the moderate and constructive outlook it held at that time on African issues. We sought the continued availability of US military overflight and landing rights. Key tools in achieving these goals were our aid program (including participant training) and a small training program in the United States for Sudanese military officers.

A political assessment prepared by our Embassy in Khartoum in January 1964 cited these Guidelines and stated that "in

general, nothing which transpired in 1963 raised serious doubts about the continuing validity of our basic approach or objectives."^{2/}

At that juncture, however, a major problem for the regime was an insurrection in the three southern provinces which had begun in earnest in September 1963. This insurrection became increasingly serious and contributed to an erosion of the cordial relations between Sudan and the United States which took place during the next two years.

b. Rebellion in the South

Government operations against the dissidents escalated sharply in early 1964 as a result of dissident raids on key towns. On February 27 the Government announced the immediate expulsion of all foreign missionaries from the southern provinces, charging that they were encouraging the dissidence. By mid-March over 300 had departed; the order affected 47 US nationals. The expulsion caused us grave

^{2/} From Khartoum, Airgram A-221, January 26, 1964:
The Sudan: Political-Economic Assessment

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concern, particularly as it failed to distinguish between those who allegedly had engaged in improper political activities and those who had not. We expressed our concern vigorously, and our Embassy assisted the orderly departure of the Americans.

As military sweeps continued and reports of mass murders and atrocities in the south became public, resentment against Khartoum was expressed by many Americans. Stories appeared in the US press unfavorable to the Sudan, and Congressional mail concerning the situation grew heavy. Many Americans asked why we continued to provide aid to a country which they considered to be engaging in genocide.

c. Deterioration in US Relations

In October 1964 the military regime was ousted and replaced by a Communist-dominated transitional government. US-Sudan relations dramatically worsened. In November, Communist-led demonstrators accused the United States of machinations to restore the military regime. On November 24 the Government rescinded the existing blanket overflight authorization for US and UK military aircraft. At the same

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time, the US-Belgian rescue mission to Stanleyville provoked marked Sudanese sentiment against "American imperialism" and led to large anti-American demonstrations in Khartoum. Reflecting that attitude, the Government precipitously abandoned the Congo policy of the military regime and embarked on a course of support for the Congolese rebels. This included allowing overflights of planes carrying arms. Ambassador Rountree's representations against this course were turned aside by the Sudanese who maintained that they were merely providing food and medicine to rebel refugees and permitting the delivery by air of similar supplies from other countries.^{3/} By the end of 1964 the Embassy reported that the political climate was more receptive to the overtures of the Communist countries than at any previous time in Sudanese history.

d. Parliamentary Regime Re-Established

The Sudanese Communists, heady from their unexpected success, finally went too far. Concerted pressure by the

^{3/} From Khartoum, Telegram 349, December 5, 1964 (SECRET) and others; Department of State Telegram 266, December 5, 1964 (SECRET), expressing grave concern over clear evidence of growing Sudanese support for the Congolese rebels and giving advice as to talking points for Ambassador Rountree in his meetings on the subject with the Foreign Minister and Prime Minister.

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traditional political parties, which included the threat of the use of paramilitary force, brought the resignation of the first transitional government in February 1965.

Following the April parliamentary elections, in which the Communists did poorly, a coalition government was formed under Prime Minister Mohammed Mahgoub. However, the gradual improvement in US-Sudanese relations which followed was soon jeopardized by a renewed propaganda campaign in Khartoum alleging that the United States was aiding the rebels in the south. On August 7, 1965, the Prime Minister told Ambassador Rountree that he had documentary proof of this (never produced). The allegations were flatly denied. When, one week later, Mahgoub urgently asked Ambassador Rountree for US help in evacuating wounded Sudanese soldiers from the Southern Sudan, our response was immediate. The White House on August 17 approved the despatch of two C-130's to the Sudan, each with a helicopter aboard. Even though the men had already been evacuated when the planes arrived, we had given concrete evidence of our readiness to help with a problem directly

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connected with the Sudan's public security and territorial integrity.

In May 1966 the Sudan asked for credit terms to purchase helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft for internal security purposes. We responded positively. The Sudanese, however, did not finally accept the package (which included unarmed helicopters) which we offered. Nevertheless relations with the Sudan continued to improve during 1966, particularly after Sadiq el Mahdi became Prime Minister in August; and Sudanese interest in more US aid continued strong. Under the new AID Strategy for Africa, Sudan was declared eligible for continued bilateral assistance and new Development Loans and PL 480 commodity projects were approved during 1966 and early 1967. Operations in the south had settled into a deadlock which gave rise to few dramatic incidents and no further accusations of US interference.

e. Diplomatic Relations Broken

As a result of the Arab-Israeli war and Nasser's accusation that the United States provided aerial support for

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Israeli forces, the Sudan broke diplomatic relations with the United States on June 6, 1967. This was done despite the most formal high level US assurances that the UAR charges were false.

The Netherlands became the protecting power for us in Khartoum, and the Somali Republic assumed a similar role for the Sudan in Washington. US aid to the Sudan was suspended and all project work was stopped. A small American Interests Section remained in Khartoum, as did a similar Sudanese office in Washington. The USIS Cultural Center and library in Khartoum was reopened in September 1967. We made clear to the Sudanese through various informal channels that we were prepared to discuss the restoration of relations with authorized government representatives, but that we expected that this would be at Sudanese initiative and not our own.

As a result of the Mid-East crisis the Sudan concluded agreements for military assistance with the USSR, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The Soviet Sudanese Arms Agreement provided for approximately \$35 million worth of tanks, MIG jets, and other materiel.

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6. Francophone Africa -- 1963-1968

a. The Situation in 1963

In 1963 the Organization of African Unity was formed, ending the open competition between the Casablanca "radicals" and the Monrovia "moderates," a step greatly welcomed by the United States. Greater pragmatism in Africa followed, as many of the new countries began to realize and understand the magnitude of their problems. US relations with francophone Africa were good, although there were occasional strains with some of the "radicals," particularly Guinea.

b. The French Role

France exerted the predominant external influence in francophone Africa, with the exception of Guinea. The latter, in voting "no" in the 1958 referendum, lost all support of the De Gaulle Government, and Mali, which later followed it out of the franc zone, also tried to cut the ties which bound it to France. The remainder of the francophone

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countries opted for a continuing and sometimes even closer relationship with France, which was their chief trading partner, the major donor of monetary and technical assistance and the guarantor, through military and security arrangements, of their security.

The subsequent period saw little diminution of French influence, but there was a growing realization among the francophone African countries that their dependence upon France was too restrictive and reduced their options for action or policy which they might otherwise choose. Reduction in French aid, or an important political crisis in France, as in the spring of 1968, had almost automatic repercussions in francophone Africa.

c. US Relations

Essentially, American policy toward and relations with francophone Africa had two general aspects: our relations with the "radicals," and those with the moderates.

When Guinea was cut loose by France and turned to the Soviet Union for major foreign aid, the United States chose to extend limited aid to Guinea in the hope that the latter would be able to retain its independence and not become subject to domination.^{1/} This despite the fact that, the overwhelming majority of the time, Guinea has supported Communist positions in the UN and elsewhere. Events have proved the wisdom of that policy. Guinea is increasingly more cautious in its relations with the USSR and other Communist countries and has committed itself to no domination. In the meantime, US economic interest in Guinea has grown, especially in the form of Olin Mathieson's investment in the FRIA aluminum development with an investment of \$61 million.

Our relations with Guinea were not always smooth, however. In October 1966, several Guinean officials, including the Foreign Minister, transiting Accra on a regular Pan American

^{1/} US Programs in Guinea, Tasca Working Group, April 11, 1961 (CONFIDENTIAL); Department of State Telegram 13362, May 25, 1961 (SECRET); Department of State Guidelines For Policy and Operations: Guinea, April 1962 (SECRET).

flight were removed from the plane and detained by the Ghanaian Government for some weeks. In a spasm of violent reaction, because of the nationality of the airline, the Guinean Government held our Ambassador under house arrest for 24 hours, invaded his residence, and expelled the Peace Corps. Our relations were clouded for a considerable time but by carefully avoiding over-reaction and accepting Guinean regret over the incident, we eventually achieved balanced relations and were subsequently on very good terms with Guinea.^{2/}

With Mali we also followed a policy of providing assistance which would prevent Mali from becoming completely dependent

^{2/} From Conakry Telegrams 1117, November 8, 1966 (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE), 1229, November 8, 1966 (CONFIDENTIAL), and 1244, November 14, 1966 (CONFIDENTIAL); Department of State Telegrams 82414, November 9, 1966 (CONFIDENTIAL), 90099, November 23, 1966 (CONFIDENTIAL), and 93282, November 29, 1966 (CONFIDENTIAL); Memorandum to S/S-S on Guinea Policy, December 2, 1966 (CONFIDENTIAL); Letter from Secretary Rusk to Beavogui transmitted in Department of State Telegram 89582, November 11, 1966 (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE); Memorandum of Conversation of Rusk-Bangoura talk, November 21, 1966 (CONFIDENTIAL); Memoranda of Conversation of March 8, 10 and 11, 1967 of Rusk-Beavogui (CONFIDENTIAL).

upon Communist powers.^{3/} France followed a more moderate policy in Mali than in Guinea and found its efforts successful when Mali rejoined the franc zone in 1968.

Congo (Brazzaville), which became perhaps the African state most nearly Communist-dominated, was a different case. After the revolt of 1963 which deposed President Youlou, Congo (Brazzaville) became more aggressively radical with the influence of the Soviet Union, Mainland China and even Cuba (which at one time supplied up to 1200 technicians and security forces) reaching alarming proportions. Brazzaville gave support to the leftist Congo (K) rebels in 1964-65 and bitterly attacked the United States on the Stanleyville rescue mission of November 1964. In August 1965 as a result of the mistreatment of US officials on three occasions, we withdrew our personnel and closed our Embassy, without, however, formally breaking diplomatic relations -- an action

^{3/} Department of State, Guidelines for Policy and Operations: Mali, May 1962 (SECRET)

reciprocated by Congo (B). ^{4/} After that time there were various third party approaches to re-open the Embassy. We indicated that we would be prepared to consider that step if our rights of legation were assured. Nothing further developed.

Our relations with Mauritania, a somewhat radical member of the Arab league, were correct and cordial until the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 when Mauritania broke diplomatic relations with the United States. There subsequently were sporadic indications that it would like to resume relations, but the situation was quiescent at the end of 1968.

From the moderate francophone states we had general support for our international position, sometimes even in opposition to the position of France. However, in African councils the moderates tended to be somewhat disorganized and unable

^{4/} Department of State Telegram 79, August 13, 1965 (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE); From Brazzaville, Telegram 111, August 13, 1965 (SECRET/EXDIS); Department of State Press Statement, August 13, 1965.

effectively to resist the better organized and more aggressive "radical" states. During the Congolese crisis of 1964 the francophones, probably at French initiative, established the Common African-Malagasy Organization (OCAM) and invited the Congolese Government, then headed by Tshombe, to join. This represented a moderate counter-weight to the vehement radical African attacks on US policy which supported the legitimate Congolese Government.

An important element of friction with the moderates was their disenchantment with US aid to such states as Guinea, Mali, Algeria and the UAR. In their view this US attitude served to reward enemies who consistently voted against us in the United Nations and elsewhere, and to ignore friends.

Two of the moderate African states were of some strategic importance to us: Chad, which served as a base for the geodetic and 12th parallel surveys, and the Malagasy Republic, which renewed in 1967 the previous agreement for the maintenance of a NASA tracking station, a post of increasing importance in

our space program.^{5/}

An exception to the generally close and cordial relations existing between the francophone moderates and the United States was Gabon, with which our relationships fluctuated widely. Gabon was of particular interest to France because of its deposits of uranium, manganese and iron ore. When an abortive coup was suppressed by direct French military intervention in January 1964, many Gabonese and French residents of Gabon accused the United States of being behind the coup. Eventually our Ambassador was recalled and was not replaced for over a year.^{6/} Relations gradually improved until the death in November 1967 of President M'Ba, at which time, after initially approving the designation of our

^{5/} From Tananarive, Telegram 495, December 12, 1967 (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE).

^{6/} Memorandum from Governor Williams to Secretary Rusk, June 17, 1964, Appointment with Gabonese Ambassador (CONFIDENTIAL); Memorandum from Governor Williams to AFC-Mr. O'Sullivan, July 17, 1964, Return of Ambassador Darlington (CONFIDENTIAL); Memorandum from Governor Williams to Governor Harriman, July 22, 1964, Public Relations Aspects of the Recall of Ambassador Darlington (CONFIDENTIAL).

Ambassador to the Congo (K) as US representative to the funeral ceremonies in the absence of our Ambassador to Libreville, the Gabonese Government refused to allow him to enter the country. Some days later Gabon summarily abrogated the Peace Corps agreement without the stipulated 90-day notice and required the departure of 57 Peace Corps volunteers and staff within eight days.^{7/} Much of the blame for this discourteous and unilateral action was attributed to the French, who, mindful of their special economic and political position in Gabon, never viewed the Peace Corps' presence in Gabon as beneficial to their interests.

d. Economic Policy and Assistance

Our assistance policy by and large supplemented the French effort, but the francophone states tended to view relations with the United States almost exclusively in terms

^{7/} From Libreville, Telegrams 598, December 22, 1967 (CONFIDENTIAL), 600, December 22, 1967 (CONFIDENTIAL), and 605, December 22, 1967 (CONFIDENTIAL); Department of State Telegrams 89215, December 23, 1967 (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE), 96462, January 10, 1968 (SECRET), and 97651, January 12, 1968 (SECRET).

of US assistance. The modest bilateral aid which we were able to offer was welcome and provided us with some influence and leverage in the area. However, the switch to regional assistance in FY-68 brought about a gradual change in our relations with francophone Africa. These countries subsequently questioned our interest in their future. They were especially concerned over the fact that, just at that time when they were casting about for ways to decrease their dependence on France, and were thus turning automatically to the United States, no concrete result was likely to be forthcoming. They accepted our rationale about regional assistance but did not like it. As of late 1968 there had been no serious erosion of our relations; but, unless we could return to a policy of selective bilateral assistance and move forward much more vigorously on concrete regional projects, it seemed likely that they would be less amenable to US positions

in international affairs. ^{8/}

However, the United States made significant contributions to development in the area. In a multi-donor effort with France and the European Economic Community we lent Cameroon \$19.2 million to construct the Trans-Cameroonian railway, aimed at opening north Cameroon for the development of its bauxite fields and agriculture. The Export-Import Bank loaned Ivory Coast \$36 million as part of the \$100 million Bandama hydroelectric project which was also expected to develop agriculture and ancillary activities in the interior

8/ Memorandum of Conversation, April 19, 1967, Cameroonian Ambassador Owono and Hendrik van Oss, Country Director, AFCW, New US Aid Policy and Cameroon (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE); Memorandum of Conversation, June 21, 1967, Ambassador Owono and Assistant Secretary Palmer: Item C on Aid includes a discussion on the new policy (CONFIDENTIAL); Memorandum to Assistant Secretary Palmer from AFCW-Mr. van Oss, July 3, 1967, Disquieting State of our Relations with Cameroon, pp. 2-3 (CONFIDENTIAL); Memorandum to Assistant Secretary Palmer from AFCW-Mr. Schaufele, March 6, 1968, US Relations with AFCW Countries (CONFIDENTIAL); Assistant Secretary Palmer's African Trip, May 30 to July 18, 1968 (CONFIDENTIAL); From Fort Lamy, Telegrams 1094, February 16, 1968 (SECRET), and 1107, February 19, 1968 (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE).

of the country. ^{9/}

In Guinea, we planned in 1968 that, should the IBRD grant Guinea a foreign currency loan of \$64.5 million, we would supply up to \$21 million in local currency as a loan for the Boke aluminum project being developed by an international consortium, HALCO, with majority US interest through ALCOA, ALCAN and Harvey Aluminum.

US private investors only belatedly became interested in francophone Africa, which had been considered a French fief and which was associated by treaty with the European Economic

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- 9/ Memorandum from S/S-Mr. Read to Walt W. Rostow, July 9, 1966 forwarding political arguments in support of Mr. Gaud's recommendation to the President on the proposed loan on the second phase of the Transcameroon Railroad (CONFIDENTIAL); Background paper for AF discussions with AID on funding of the loan for the second phase of the railroad, November 6, 1967 (CONFIDENTIAL); From Abidjan, Telegram 2246, April 6, 1967, Bandama Dam (CONFIDENTIAL); Memorandum from AFCW-Mr. van Oss to Assistant Secretary Palmer, April 8, 1967, Bandama Dam (CONFIDENTIAL); Memorandum from Under Secretary Katzenbach to Walt W. Rostow, May 11, 1967, Bandama Dam (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE); Letter from Harold Linder to President Houphouet-Boigny transmitted in Department of State Telegram 213194, July 20, 1967 (CONFIDENTIAL); Department of State Telegram 90941, December 29, 1967 (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE).

Community, the latter granting certain trade preferences to the African associates. Francophone relationships with France and the EEC resulted in discrimination toward US trade which we sought continuously to eliminate, without much success. This was understandable since the benefits derived from trading arrangements with France and other European countries and economic assistance from them and the EEC far outweighed any short-term advantages which these countries would have obtained by lowering their trade barriers with the United States. Nevertheless the Ivory Coast at our urging reduced some tariffs, and other francophone countries are keenly aware of our concern, especially those which have significant exports to the United States.^{10/}

^{10/} Department of State Telegram 02713, October 6, 1965, about our concern over the discriminatory effects of the UDEAC Common External Tariff (CXT) (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE); Letter from the American Embassy to Secretary General of the UDEAC enclosing memorandum of "Observations" on the CXT, text sent to the field for transmittal by Department of State Circular Airgram CA-4696 of October 28, 1965 (UNCLASSIFIED); From Abidjan, Telegrams 3088, May 15, 1968, Tariff Reductions (CONFIDENTIAL), and 3369, June 8, 1968, Tariff Reductions (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE); Department of State Airgram A-369 to Abidjan, June 18, 1968, Tariff Reductions (CONFIDENTIAL).

e. Cultural Events and Visits

Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson served as honorary Chairman of the United States Committee for the First World Festival of Negro Arts held at Dakar, Senegal, April 1-24, 1966. With the support and assistance of the Department of State, the US Information Agency and the National Collection of Fine Arts, Smithsonian Institution, the Committee sponsored participation by an outstanding group of scholars and creative or performing artists. Also during this period Presidents Tsiranana of the Malagasy Republic, Senghor of Senegal, Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast, Diori of Niger, Ahidjo of Cameroon and Tombalbaye of Chad made highly successful visits to the United States. Vice President Humphrey and Under Secretary Katzenbach visited Ivory Coast on their trips to Africa.

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7. North Africa

a. US Interests and Policies

Ever since World War II US policymakers have had to take into account the strategic and political importance which geography has given North Africa. This vast area, stretching across the top of the African continent from the Atlantic to the Egyptian border, has a Mediterranean coastline which matches that of Europe from Spain to Turkey. Morocco is less than eight miles from Spain at the Strait of Gibraltar and, with modern means of communication, North Africa is nowhere more than an hour's flight from southern Europe.

In the early fifties, as the Cold War intensified and NATO countries organized their defenses against the Soviet menace, US interest in North Africa was focused mainly on the acquisition of certain military facilities, particularly airfields. Political and economic interests were left mainly to European powers.

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As the sixties approached, the need for military bases had diminished, and by 1963 we were in fact able to relinquish our most important military complex in the North African area, the air bases in Morocco. Meanwhile, however, as a world power with both NATO and Middle East responsibilities, the United States had become involved in a more fundamental way with the welfare of the North African area. The decolonization processes had brought independence to the North African countries, and we were now for the first time dealing with them directly rather than through a European intermediary.

Given our traditional support for the right of self-determination, we welcomed the independence of the North African nations and responded to their early needs with both political sympathy and economic support. It was moreover clear that the Mediterranean basin of which North Africa is an integral part would become an increasingly critical area for the survival of freedom. We were thus anxious to see preserved and strengthened the independence of these newly

liberated nations, and to enjoy their friendship or, at least, neutrality. North Africa in hostile hands would represent a threat to our European allies as well as to the freedom of communications in the Mediterranean. Thus our own security was involved.

The general aim of US policy in North Africa during the Johnson Administration was to encourage stability and progress in the area and, as a means to this end, to help the four North African states, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, in their efforts at nation-building.

In the early 1960s we assumed that our interests in this region could be safeguarded by a relatively modest bilateral effort, which we intended generally to be supplementary to that of France, the former colonial power in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, and to that of Great Britain in Libya. The British had guided Libya to independence in 1951 and had signed a defense treaty with Libya in 1953. However, the growth of US interests and responsibilities in the area, in

part related to French and British problems and Soviet initiatives there, considerably expanded the American role throughout North Africa.

b. The Situation in 1963

In 1963 the United States might have regarded the North African scene with greater satisfaction than at almost any time in the preceding ten years. Good relations with Morocco were manifested in the state visit of King Hassan II in March 1963. Algeria had won its independence from France (July 3, 1962), and the last of the North African independence struggles -- which had poisoned the political life of the region for ten years -- was over. Furthermore, the sympathy that President Kennedy, while Senator, had extended to the Algerian combatants, was fresh in the minds of Algeria's new leadership. A brief outbreak of fighting between Algeria and Morocco over their contested border ended with a cease-fire on November 1, and France withdrew from Bizerte on October 3.

c. Algerian Trends, 1964-68

In an early policy pronouncement, the Government of Algeria declared its commitment to non-alignment, Maghrebian unity and strengthened ties with the "Socialist Camp." However, unsettled internal politics strained its relations with Maghrebian neighbors and with the United States. In June 1965 Prime Minister Ben Bella was overthrown by Colonel Houari Boumediene. Meanwhile, mindful of the pummeling received from Morocco in 1963, Algeria turned to the Soviet Union for the expansion and massive re-equipment of its armed forces. The doctrinaire socialism of Algeria's leaders, and their view of Algeria's seven and a half-year struggle for independence as essentially similar to that of the Viet Cong in Viet-Nam, gave further momentum to this adverse trend.^{1/}

US-Algerian relations reached their nadir at the time of the Arab-Israel war in June 1967. At this time the Algerian

^{1/} US Policy Toward North Africa: NSC Meeting, February 8, 1967 (SECRET).

Government, in a show of solidarity with the UAR and Jordan, broke diplomatic relations with the United States, nationalized certain US oil operations in Algeria, and placed others under "custodianship"^{2/}. (An American-staffed US-Interest Section, including US consular officers, remained in Algiers attached to the Swiss Embassy there, with the permission of the Algerian Government.)

From 1963 to 1967 the United States had maintained an aid program in Algeria. It consisted of substantial shipments of surplus agricultural commodities under PL-480, technical assistance from AID, and medical assistance under the auspices of CARE-MEDICO. All direct US Government aid activities were suspended upon the rupture of US-Algerian relations, but American voluntary agencies continued to provide Algerians with some humanitarian relief assistance.

Algeria's weak and faction-ridden government did not seem eager to resume diplomatic relations with the United States.^{3/}

^{2/} AID Memorandum, September 13, 1968, drafted by E.W. Wendt (UNCLASSIFIED).

^{3/} From Algiers, Airgram A-366, April 1, 1968 (SECRET).

d. Morocco From 1964

In 1964-68, as the liquidation of US SAC bases whose presence had so dominated our relations with Morocco in the 1950s receded into the past, US interests in Morocco tended to become those inherent in a more normal bilateral relationship with a strategically important and traditionally friendly power.

The status of the Voice of America relay station in Tangier was confirmed in a confidential bilateral agreement dated December 31, 1963. That exchange of notes continued to provide the basis for our presence at that important facility.^{4/}

Continued US tenure at the Kenitra communications complex was confirmed in President Kennedy's conversations with the King in March 1963. In 1965, an informal and confidential agreement was reached on the allocation of a number of radio frequencies to Kenitra.^{5/} Given the absence of written

^{4/} CONFIDENTIAL Note 340, December 31, 1963.

^{5/} From Rabat, Airgram A-398, June 2, 1967 (CONFIDENTIAL).

Moroccan agreement to our continued use of Kenitra, the 1965 frequencies agreement took on particular importance.

The US aid relationship with Morocco, paralleling policy considerations related to the liquidation of the air bases, evolved from a program dominated by project - and sector - oriented assistance. In step with worldwide efforts to combat hunger, US assistance focused on Morocco's agricultural self-help efforts.

US assistance to Morocco in the military field stemmed primarily from Morocco's continuing concern over the intentions of Soviet-armed Algeria. Under a 1965 agreement, the United States furnished twelve F-5 aircraft, and nine more were to be added under a 1968 arrangement. While seeking to meet Morocco's security concerns, the United States sought to allay Moroccan fears through frank, confidential exchanges with senior Moroccan officials in October 1964.^{6/} Similar, though less

^{6/} From Rabat, Airgram A-131, September 30, 1964
(SECRET).

formal, exchanges took place in 1966 and 1967 in an effort to reduce regional tensions.^{7/}

In July 1967, partly in response to widespread Arab criticism of the United States during the Arab-Israeli war, but more importantly because of Morocco's desire to "hedge its bets" and its feeling that US military aid was being subjected to excessive delays, Morocco concluded an \$18 million arms deal with Czechoslovakia, permitted the USSR to open a Consulate General in Casablanca, signed expanded aid and trade agreements with the Soviet Union and subsequently agreed to its first Soviet naval visit. While these developments did not alter Morocco's fundamental pro-Western orientation, they clearly had implications for its relationship with the United States.

e. Tunisia

Tunisia's foreign policy during this period continued to be constructive and moderate on several key subjects of

^{7/} From Rabat, Telegrams 3130, January 6, 1967 (SECRET), and 3262, January 14, 1967 (SECRET).

importance to the United States. For example, President Bourguiba assured Vice President Humphrey, during the latter's visit to Tunis in January 1968, that Tunisia supported US policy on Viet-Nam and was concerned about the growing Soviet presence in the Middle East and the Mediterranean.^{8/}

A modest military assistance program for Tunisia commenced in 1967 on the basis of a survey by a US military team in 1966. The program, requested by the Tunisians, was designed to increase Tunisian capabilities to resist a possible unprovoked attack by the Soviet-armed Algerian forces.^{9/} The effective launching of the program was delayed by the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 and the consequent stoppage of all US shipments of arms to the area in the aftermath of the fighting. The Tunisians preferred that the US personnel administering the program in Tunisia be called a US Liaison

^{8/} From Tunis, Telegram 2575, January 11, 1968 (CONFIDENTIAL).

^{9/} Report of US Military Survey Team - TUNISIA - Clowes Report, 1965-1966 (SECRET).

Group rather than a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) and that the agreement covering their activities be confidential.^{10/}

The cordial relations of the United States with Tunisia were symbolized and strengthened by the state visit of President Bourguiba to Washington May 15-17, 1968. The invitation had been issued in 1966, but the visit had thrice had to be rescheduled because of international events such as the Arab-Israel war or the convenience of the two Presidents.^{11/} In his confidential conversations with President Johnson and Secretary Rusk on May 15 and 16, Bourguiba expressed wholehearted support for the US role in world affairs.^{12/}

In Tunisia during the years from 1964 through 1968 our economic assistance program, consistent with our continuing

^{10/} From Tunis, Airgram A-187, November 30, 1967, enclosing agreement establishing Military Liaison office in Tunisia (SECRET).

^{11/} Scope paper for Bourguiba's visit, PBT/G-1, May 8, 1968 (SECRET).

^{12/} Memoranda of Conversation of May 15 and 16 (SECRET/EXDIS).

close and friendly relations, was maintained at a level of about \$50 million annually. This major contribution, combined with aid from other donor nations, the IBRD, and other international organizations, reinforced Tunisia's serious and successful development efforts. The aim, as stated in program reviews, was to assist in the development of a viable, self-sustaining Tunisian economy, one which would encourage and support the emergence of a modern society capable of producing responsible leadership. It was assumed that this leadership would be friendly to the United States, would support Free World interests, and would have a generally moderating influence in the Arab World and Africa. This assumption has so far proved valid.^{13/}

f. Libya

In February 1964, the Government of Mahmoud al-Muntassir was shaken when Nasser asked in a televised speech,

^{13/} AID Program Memorandum, FY-1970, Tunisia Part II, pages 24-41 (CONFIDENTIAL).

"What guarantees are there for us that American and British bases in Libya will not be used against the Arabs in the event of a clash with Israel?" Public and parliamentary pressure mounted for US withdrawal from Wheelus Air Force Base and in the summer of 1964 led to several negotiating sessions between US and Libyan representatives.^{14/} By fall 1964, The Government of Libya, valuing the reassurance provided by the American base, felt it could allow negotiations to lapse. The outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967, however, reawakened Libyan demands for negotiations over Wheelus and led to further sessions between US and Libyan representatives.^{15/} Once again, however, as internal pressures against Wheelus abated, the talks were indefinitely suspended. Training proceeded normally at Wheelus and the Libyan Government implicitly made US withdrawal conditional

^{14/} Department of State Circular Airgram CA-944, August 2, 1967, to Tripoli and London (SECRET).

^{15/} From Tripoli, Airgrams A-44 and A-48, August 21 and August 25, 1967 (SECRET).

upon development of its own self-defense capability.^{16/}

Closely interwoven with the case for our continued presence at Wheelus Air Base was the US program for developing the Royal Libyan Air Force. The RLAF is US-trained and equipped, and maintains its headquarters in a corner of Wheelus Air Base. In May 1967, the Libyan Government purchased ten F-5s from the United States; half of these were delivered in July 1968, and the remainder were to be delivered by the end of the year.^{17/}

In 1964 it was decided that aid to Libya, which had amounted to \$200 million through 1963, should henceforth be phased out, in view of Libya's rapidly rising petroleum revenue.^{18/} In 1968, oil revenue was expected to exceed \$860 million. Libya, however, continued to need American

^{16/} From Tripoli, Airgram A-193, December 19, 1967 (SECRET).

^{17/} Memorandum of AID Director W.S. Gaud to the President, April 6, 1967 (SECRET), and Presidential Determination, April 8, 1967 (SECRET).

^{18/} Memorandum for the Secretary, February 26, 1964, signed by David Bell (CONFIDENTIAL).

technical assistance, and it fortunately was possible to maintain an American presence in the development of this important country.^{19/}

The Libyan Government's relationship with US oil companies over the years has been generally good. The two main periods of stress between the companies and the Government were in 1965 when Libya established a new pricing structure for the "independent" oil companies,^{20/} and during the 1967 war when Libya suspended all petroleum exports for over a month.

Throughout the 1963-68 period, as before, US-British cooperation in Libya was close. Both we and the British were deeply concerned about maintaining stability and order in Libya. In pursuit of these goals, we tended to give precedence to the British at the beginning of the period, but

^{19/} Department of State Background Paper, August 16, 1968, drafted by H. Horan and H. Buller (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE).

^{20/} From Tripoli, Airgram A-341, January 26, 1966, (CONFIDENTIAL).

gradually moved to a position of parity with the UK. This changing relationship was reflected in 1965 by a letter from President Johnson to King Idris affirming US concern for Libya's security.^{21/}

g. Conclusion

US policies in North Africa from 1963 to 1968 were in the main successful. The Tunisian, Moroccan and Libyan Governments maintained cordial political and economic relationships with each other. On the debit side of the ledger, the United States suffered a setback in Algeria, and -- as a result of increased Soviet activity -- to a degree in Morocco. In Libya it was realized that the favorable position of the United States could be shaken by a renewed outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities, and was liable at least to modification after the death of 78-year old, staunchly pro-Western King Idris.

^{21/} Memorandum of Conversation, November 9, 1965, drafted by H. Horan (SECRET/LIMDIS); Presidential Letter to King Idris, September 1, 1965.

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8. Southern Africa

a. General Background

Southern Africa in 1963 was a mosaic of countries and territories at various stages of development. The British-controlled territories of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were on the eve of independence -- attained the next year with the new names of Zambia and Malawi. Southern Rhodesia -- with the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland in dissolution by the end of 1963 -- was reverting from the status of dominant partner to that of a self-governing colony dominated by the white minority. In the Portuguese-ruled "provinces" of Angola and Mozambique, and in the mandated territory of South West Africa, as well as South Africa itself, large African majorities had no present prospect of significant participation either in government or in the upper levels of society and the economy.

In this complex situation the United States sought to encourage peaceful accommodations in the direction of non-discrimination and self-determination. We tried to help

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new countries to achieve higher educational, social and economic standards, and we encouraged other developed countries and international bodies to help also.

The deterioration in race relations in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa during the 5-year period covered by this history, and outbreaks of guerrilla activities in the Portuguese "provinces" as well as in Rhodesia and South West Africa, all showed the great obstacles in the way of achieving US aims of peaceful change.

Despite the growth of political tensions in the region, our relations with countries and territories of southern Africa were generally correct during this period -- particularly commercial relations, except for sanctions against Rhodesia after the unilateral declaration of independence and tightening of the arms embargo against South Africa. "Correct" relations included periodic representations by US officers at higher levels about the impracticality and discriminatory impact of South Africa's policy of apartheid. Relations with Portuguese territories in Africa, and with Portugal

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respecting its African possessions, did not change significantly. The United States continued to press Portugal to recognize the principle of self-determination in its African territories. The major developments were in relations with South Africa over its reactionary racial system, and over its policy of intensifying apartheid in South West Africa while integrating the Territory's administration with that of the Republic and rejecting UN supervision. With the emergent and new states of Southern Africa the United States established friendly relations.

(1) South Africa: Overall Relations

South Africa, and the corollary issue of South West Africa, loomed in these years as our most acute policy problem in the subcontinent. Worsening race relations and increasing repression in South Africa throughout the period and the dispute over South West Africa, which was contested in both the UN and the International Court of Justice, together greatly affected US-South African relations. In several respects relations remained good, although sensitive;

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in other respects, they deteriorated sharply. Many critics in the United States and elsewhere considered the existence of both good and bad relations as contradictory and pressed for either much closer or more distant relations.

Relations were best in the economic and scientific fields. US trade with South Africa and investment there each amounted to about half a billion dollars and was very profitable. Many strategic minerals were imported from South Africa, although our stockpiles had ended dependence on these sources in an emergency. Both NASA and the US Defense Department maintained space stations in South Africa, and it was the terminus of the Atlantic Missile Range extending southeast from Cape Kennedy. Throughout the period South African airfields were much used by American planes taking part in or supporting space and missile activities. South Africa had joined our Atoms for Peace program in 1957, and during the period obtained a research reactor from the United States. The Atoms for Peace agreement with South Africa was renewed in 1967.

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Mutually beneficial relations were offset by liabilities as well as a profound disagreement about elemental human relations.^{1/} By 1963, after the Sharpeville massacre and the intensification of repression and apartheid, South Africa had become a significant liability to the West.^{2/} Its racial policies were under strong attack in the UN and other bodies. Its refusal to accept UN supervision of its administration of South West Africa and its policy of apartheid became a

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- 1/ For graphic statements of US opposition to apartheid, see Memorandum of Conversation, Under Secretary Harriman and South African Ambassador W. C. Naude, January 9, 1964 (CONFIDENTIAL); and Memorandum of Conversation prepared by G. Mennen Williams, April 21, 1964, regarding discussion in South African Embassy, Washington, including high-ranking officials of the State Department and White House (CONFIDENTIAL).
- 2/ Public statement by G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, in Hearings on US-South African Relations Before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, Part 1, p. 3; and Department of State National Policy Paper (NPP) on South Africa, p. 10, January 18, 1965 (SECRET/NOFORN).

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club with which to beat the "imperialistic, neo-colonial and anti-Socialist" West, particularly the United States, as accomplices of apartheid. While under attack, the US Government sought to persuade South Africa to moderate its domestic policies and accept UN supervision over South West Africa. An important part of this policy was the US refusal to accept the application of apartheid dogma to our own operations, such as Embassy entertaining.

The importance of the South African problem in the view of the State Department may be judged by the many memoranda of conversation during these years, at all levels, with South African diplomats, officials and private citizens. Secretary Rusk and others gave precious time to delving into the complexities of the South African problem, possible solutions and the repercussions of South African issues on international relations.

(2) South West Africa

The South West Africa issue during these years affected the climate of our relations significantly. It was

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mainly contested in the UN context, and is described in detail in Chapter X, below. Views on the timing of a possible UN-South African confrontation were important. Estimates on the timing were closely linked to the slow progress of the cases brought by Liberia and Ethiopia against South Africa in the International Court of Justice in 1960. Those two states charged that South Africa was violating its obligations as Mandatory over the former German colony, mainly by the intensification of apartheid in the territory and by refusal to accept supervision by the UN. For several years the judgment of the Court was expected from year to year, although it was not delivered until July 1966.

The Department had expected that the judgment would be at least partly against South Africa, probably in the form of support for the advisory opinions of the Court in 1950, 1955 and 1956 that the administration of the territory was subject to supervision by the UN General Assembly. Since South Africa was obligated to obey the judgment but was intensely opposed to UN activities in Southern Africa, a confrontation

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appeared probable. This prospect greatly influenced thinking in the State Department throughout the period.^{3/} South Africa's domestic affairs appeared to be a deeply rooted, long-term problem; but South West Africa, due to its international status and the authority of the Court, was an immediate one.

b. Tightened Arms Embargo

The first policy development of the Johnson administration regarding South Africa itself was the vote for the resolution in the UN Security Council on December 4, 1963, calling on states to cease the sale and shipment of equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in South Africa. This was an extension of the comprehensive arms embargo the United States had announced the preceding August. In subsequent years the arms embargo

3/ National Security Action Memorandum NSAM 295, April 24, 1964 (SECRET), and National Policy Paper on South Africa (SECRET/NOFORN), January 18, 1965, are the major evidences of this factor.

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was strictly observed by the United States, far more strictly than by France, and somewhat more than most other previous major suppliers. An inter-departmental Gray Areas Committee established by the State Department in 1964 considered borderline cases. By the close of the Administration, a most complex problem was: How far could we carry the policy of barring the use of American components in third country products which might end up in South Africa? Deadlocks in the Committee had to be resolved by higher levels. Differences of opinion stemmed partly from varying weights given such imponderables as principle, commercial and balance of payments considerations, credibility in the UN and elsewhere, relations with allies and effectiveness,^{4/} but not from any intention to weaken the embargo.

^{4/} For complexity of the issues and conflicting views, see Department of State Telegram 1950 (13698) to Pretoria, May 23, 1966 (CONFIDENTIAL); and Katzenbach memorandum to Bohlen, January 15, 1968 (CONFIDENTIAL). The six-page telegram brought up to date the Guidelines drafted by G/PM in early 1964.

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c. Other Military Cooperation

The arms embargo was a manifestation of the US desire not to contribute to the enforcement of apartheid in southern Africa, as well as a means of impressing upon the South African and other governments our strong rejection of apartheid. During the period, much of the previous cooperation between the defense forces of the two countries was discontinued by us as not being in accord with the spirit and aims of the embargo. Visits by South African military personnel were limited severely.^{5/}

d. NSAM 295

Interaction between the South African apartheid issue and the South West African question stimulated a comprehensive formulation of US policy toward South Africa in these years. Other factors were the rapid increase in the

^{5/} See National Policy Paper on South Africa, January 1965 (SECRET/NOFORN), page 48, item 22; and Department of State Telegram to Pretoria, December 23, 1964, 1030 (11563) (CONFIDENTIAL).

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number of independent African states and increasing public awareness of the issues, particularly as highlighted by our own civil rights movement.

For several years, National Security Action Memorandum No. 295, of April 24, 1964, defined several major policies toward South Africa. While drawn up primarily to deal with the situation growing out of the prospective judgment of the International Court of Justice regarding South West Africa, the instruction reaffirmed our arms policy and suspended action on applications for loans or investment guarantees. It also launched the programs of the Defense Department and NASA to provide standby tracking and other facilities alternate to those in South Africa, should evacuation become necessary on six months' notice. Development of such facilities was accomplished quietly over a period of several years. The series of memoranda from the State Department's Executive Secretary, Benjamin Read, to McGeorge Bundy in the White House on "US Policy Toward South Africa - Status Report on NSAM 295" shows in detail US policy in action, enforcing our arms embargo, blocking US Government loans and investment

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guarantees, building alternate space facilities, and exerting diplomatic and other pressures on the South African Government.^{6/}

NSAM 295 included an instruction to the Department of State to prepare an analysis of possible sanctions if South Africa did not accept the prospective Court judgment on South West Africa. An Inter-Bureau Study Group was established in the State Department on June 11, 1964.^{7/} The Department of Commerce cooperated with the Group in some studies of possible sanctions. The Group also assisted the United States Representative on the United Nations Expert Committee on Measures, which was set up in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution S/5773 of June 18, 1964. Both groups analyzed sanctions in general, not sanctions occasioned by

^{6/} Status Report on NSAM No. 295, April 24, 1964 - South Africa (SECRET/NOFORN).

^{7/} For the final revision of its detailed study, "Sanctions Against South Africa: Their Feasibility, Effectiveness and Implications," see the version of December 14, 1966 (SECRET).

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a particular situation, such as enforcement of a Court judgment on South West Africa or action against countries supporting Rhodesia. It was assumed that the studies would be useful in the event some future situation called for further consideration of such steps. The Expert Committee, in its report submitted to the Security Council on February 27, 1965, emphasized that, although South Africa was not readily vulnerable to economic sanctions, it was not immune to damage from such measures.

e. Williams' Statement to House Subcommittee

The interests of the United States in South Africa, and US policy towards that country, were stated at length by Assistant Secretary G. Mennen Williams to the "O'Hara" Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, on March 1, 1966. This statement on "US Policy Towards South Africa" had been cleared throughout those departments and agencies concerned with South Africa, after meetings of interested parties with Williams had worked out differences of view and alternative texts of controversial sections. It

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recognized that South Africa "poses one of the most difficult policy problems faced by the United States Government." The statement was intended to be the most comprehensive and forthright statement of US policy toward South Africa hitherto published. This aim was a recognition both of growing Congressional interest in Southern African issues and of increasing concern evinced by private groups -- religious, civil rights, labor, student, law and foreign affairs. The four volumes of transcripts of these hearings document a broad range of opinion, official and private, with the initial statement by Governor Williams comprising the summation of official policy as well as a frank description of contradictory US interests in the region.^{8/}

f. National Policy Papers

Coming midway in the Johnson Administration, the public statement to the "O'Hara" Subcommittee was the visible part of the iceberg of US policy formulations. Classified

8/ Hearings, United States-South African Relations, 1966, Part 1, pages 2 and 3 ff.

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documents provide more detail about background and contingencies, without detracting from the Williams' statement as the best over-view of policy.

The Williams statement was the outgrowth of a comprehensive program of appraisal of existing policy and pulling-together of policy formulations on South Africa, which were scattered in various State Department documents and guidelines of other departments and agencies.

In 1963 a team had been appointed to draft a National Policy Paper on South Africa. The paper was signed by Secretary Rusk on January 18, 1965. Part I, in 59 pages, summarized US objectives, interests and proposed courses of action. It stressed that "the probable long-range effects on US security interests of the Nationalist Government's repressive apartheid policy in South and South West Africa require that every reasonable effort be made to improve the situation there and to mitigate its repercussions abroad." ^{9/} An

^{9/} NPP on South Africa, January 1965, page 1
(SECRET/NOFORN).

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extensive background section set forth the reasoning behind this statement of aims. The volume thus became not only a definition of policy and interests, but also a handbook of official analyses of South African conditions and problems, including South West Africa and the British High Commission Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland.

The prospective successor-paper to the first NPP on South Africa -- a regional formulation designed also to supplant NSAM 295 -- was in advanced draft in late 1968. It also covered the Portuguese territories, Rhodesia, Zambia and Malawi. The regional framework recognized the fact that racial politics in the subcontinent had spilled across the frontiers and was tending toward a white-black confrontation in some respects, with white-dominated countries collaborating in resistance to pressures, internal and external, for change. The US emphasis on regional projects in AID projects was another reason for the broader scope of the new policy paper.

The National Policy Paper and the 1968 draft were not

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essentially different. US policy toward South Africa keeps in shifting balance a complex combination of often contradictory interests and aims. At the end of the period, as at the beginning, the United States was cooperating with South Africa in many respects - economic, scientific, cultural - while refusing to conform in other respects, such as practicing apartheid ourselves at our posts or exposing our naval personnel to apartheid.

g. Visa Cases

Differences over visas and passports aggravated relations throughout the period. ^{10/} The Department repeatedly made representations in Washington and Pretoria against restrictive visa policies. ^{11/} Those against Peace

^{10/} For an illuminating series of Department of State Telegrams to Pretoria on this problem, see 44016, September 27; 54834, October 17; 85694, December 16; and 87598, December 21, 1967 (CONFIDENTIAL).

^{11/} For a top-level representation, see Memorandum of Conversation of the Secretary's meeting with Ambassador Naude, October 8, 1964 (CONFIDENTIAL).

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Corps Volunteers were somewhat lessened by 1968, at least for administrative personnel. A new substitute device of "laissez passer," which the Foreign Office proposed in 1967, appeared to have been warded off, and single-entry restrictions on Foreign Service staff personnel in the High Commission Territories in mid-1968 were relaxed after repeated high-level representations. In some visa cases for private citizens, South Africa responded to discreet pressure, in others she was adamant, particularly regarding her own African citizens.^{12/}

h. Relations with New States: Ex-High Commission Territories

The US Government has been mindful of the importance of the emerging African states in Southern Africa - Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland - both as new nations grappling with

^{12/} See Embassy Pretoria Telegram 571, October 23, 1964, describing representations by Ambassador Satterthwaite to Foreign Minister Muller (CONFIDENTIAL).

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difficult economic, social and political problems of modernization, and as enclaves of nonracialism within white-ruled countries (enclaves except for the quadripoint on the Zambezi where Botswana has contact with Zambia as well as with Rhodesia and South West Africa). Anticipating the trend toward independence, the United States opened its first consulate for the British High Commission Territories at Mbabane, Swaziland, in August 1964, and consulates in Gaberones, Bechuanaland, and Maseru, Basutoland, in April and September 1966, respectively. By sending able, energetic mid-career foreign service officers to these posts, the US Government demonstrated graphically its interest in these countries and its desire to help in the difficult transition to fully independent status. Although small AID budgets limited the US capacity to help, significant contributions to the development of these nascent countries were made by means of private and public exchange programs, AID assistance to the university of the three countries, famine relief, self-help grants for roads, schools, clinics, water supply and community centers, and aid contributed through various

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international organizations. The Peace Corps entered Botswana in late 1966 and Lesotho at the end of 1967, and in 1968 was preparing its Swaziland contingent.

i. Zambia and Malawi; the Oil Airlift

Early in 1960 the United States had established Resident Consuls in Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia, and Blantyre, Nyasaland. When the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland expired on the last day of 1963, the United States moved immediately to establish consulates in Lusaka and Blantyre. In 1964, when Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland became independent as Zambia and Malawi, the United States immediately opened embassies in both capitals. We continued to have close and friendly relations with both countries, which established embassies in Washington upon achieving independence. The Peace Corps has been active in Malawi since 1963.

Not long after Zambian independence, and with the unilateral declaration of independence by the Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia in November 1965, the cutting off of the

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normal supply route for petroleum products through Southern Rhodesia threatened land-locked Zambia with a dire shortage of fuels. The United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom responded by providing emergency POL airlifts. After the President approved an AID request for \$2 million in contingency funds, Pan American World Airways and Trans World Airlines put two Boeing 707s into service under charter by the US Government. From early January to the end of April 1966, while the Zambians worked to develop emergency alternative supply routes, these planes made more than 500 round-trip flights between Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) and Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi) in the Congo, carrying nearly 4 million gallons of petroleum products. From Elisabethville the fuels were trucked and railed to Zambia. The total cost to the United States of the operation came to \$4.5 million. British and Canadian airlifts provided another 4.8 million gallons of fuels to Zambia.

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j. Southern Rhodesia ^{13/}

Even before the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963, the United States had vigorously affirmed its opposition to a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) and the entrenchment of minority rule in Southern Rhodesia. Despite these US moves and a Presidential message to Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith on October 29, 1965, stressing US support of a settlement satisfactory to the entire population of the colony, the Smith regime on November 11, 1965, unilaterally declared Southern Rhodesian independence.

During the following days, the United States supported resolutions in the United Nations condemning UDI. Following a meeting with the President at the Texas White House, Secretary Rusk deplored Smith's action and announced that the President had instructed him to inform the UK that the

^{13/} For details of US decisions regarding Southern Rhodesia, see Chapter X, Part C, below.

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United States did not recognize the rebel regime. ^{14/} We recalled our Consul General from Salisbury, closed our USIS office, reduced the Consulate General staff, and announced a policy of discouraging private American travel to Southern Rhodesia.

The United States supported the British oil embargo against Southern Rhodesia and announced an airlift of petroleum products to Zambia. The Department of Commerce announced restrictions on the shipment of petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia. In early 1966 the State Department announced it had requested American importers of Rhodesian chromite to comply with British restrictions on exports of chromite from Southern Rhodesia. ^{15/} In February similar action was taken with respect to tobacco imports to the United States from Southern Rhodesia and restrictions were placed on all US exports to Southern Rhodesia. ^{16/}

^{14/} Department of State Circular Telegram 893, November 11, 1965 (UNCLASSIFIED).

^{15/} Department of State Press Release No. 4, January 10, 1966 (UNCLASSIFIED).

^{16/} Department of State Circular Telegram 1623, February 26, 1966 (UNCLASSIFIED).

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During the remainder of 1966, the United States and Great Britain held frequent high-level talks in efforts to increase the coordination of the policies of the two governments and to discuss the feasibility of a Security Council resolution imposing mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. ^{17/} These talks resulted in US support of and adoption by the Security Council of a resolution imposing selective mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia on December 16, 1966. This action followed the breakdown of talks between the UK and Smith in early December at which the two parties attempted to reach a settlement. The British had proposed a settlement on the basis of the following "Six Principles," which the United States fully supported:

(1) The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961 Constitution (of Southern Rhodesia), would have to be maintained and guaranteed.

^{17/} Department of State Telegram 42780, September 8, 1966 (SECRET).

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(2) There would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendments to the Constitution.

(3) There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population.

(4) There would have to be progress towards ending racial discrimination.

(5) The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

(6) It would be necessary to ensure that, regardless of race, there was no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority.

The United Nations resolution was implemented in the United States by a Presidential Executive Order (No. 11322) issued on January 5, 1967. Following the execution of five African political prisoners by the Smith regime in March 1968, the Security Council in May unanimously adopted a resolution imposing comprehensive mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. Presidential Executive Order 11419

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was issued July 29, implementing the mandatory provisions of the resolution. The Department had earlier decided to maintain our small consular post in Salisbury. ^{18/} New instructions to all posts concerning the granting of visas to residents of Southern Rhodesia were issued in July. ^{19/}

US policy throughout this period was to support the effort of the UK and the United Nations toward restoration of constitutional authority in the colony and toward the finding of a peaceful settlement of the dispute. The United States followed the British lead in dealing with Rhodesia, since the problem was one which the United States considered to be primarily a British responsibility. The United States recognized British authority in the colony, and our small consular staff served in Salisbury under authority of exequaturs issued by the Queen.

^{18/} Department of State, IO/AF Memorandum to the Secretary, June 10, 1968, S/S No. 8524 (CONFIDENTIAL).

^{19/} Department of State Circular Airgram CA-9647, July 25, 1968 (CONFIDENTIAL).

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