

M
E
M
B
E
R
S
H
I
P

3. UN Membership and Organizational Issues

a. Problems of Growth and Composition

By the end of 1963, UN membership had more than doubled -- 113 as against 51 in 1945. Thirty new members had been admitted to the UN in the 1960s alone -- all except one (Outer Mongolia) newly independent states and all except five from Africa. This proliferation, which began during World War II and peaked in 1960 with attainment of independence in that one year by 16 African states and Cyprus, continued with the result that total UN membership reached 124 by mid-1968. Forty of these members were from the African area as compared with an original African membership of four (Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and South Africa). Africa thus superseded Latin America as the largest regional group in the UN. Asian membership more than tripled -- from 9 in 1945 (China, Philippines, India, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia) to 29 in 1968 -- all of these additions, except for Japan, Thailand, and Outer Mongolia, newly

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 96-333
By ing NARA, Date 3-1-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

independent or newly created states. Asian membership was by 1968 roughly equivalent to that of Europe if the "other states", i.e., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand which caucus with the West European members, are included, whereas originally it was only about half as large. From a predominantly "Western" organization, the UN grew into one in which the Africans and Asians together constituted a majority and new states far outnumbered the developed nations.

With the expanding UN membership came a dilution of US influence in the Assembly. This stemmed in part from the fact that the primary concerns of new members were not those of older members, and in part from the resistance of many new members to any Western influence. But more basically it derived from the gap between real power and voting power in a body that operates on a one state-one vote principle. As they have experienced the heady effect of their majority position in the GA and learned the tricks of the parliamentary trade, the new members have been tempted to use their majority irresponsibly with little regard for Charter provisions,

established parliamentary rules, or the views of those developed states on whose cooperation the successful implementation of an Assembly recommendation often depends. Unrealistic action of this character by the Assembly served to detract from its prestige and from the moral force of its resolutions. It was most conspicuous at the 20th GA in 1965, but there have been striking instances since.

The Department of State saw two courses of action open to the United States: (a) to try to solve the problem institutionally, i.e., through introduction of some form of weighting in Assembly procedures so as to reflect real power positions, and (b) to seek to educate the new members in the futility of the Assembly's adoption of unrealistic resolutions and disregard for orderly procedures. Weighting could be introduced either in the voting procedure, which would require a Charter amendment, or in the composition of the Assembly's committees. The Department concluded that, given the amendment procedure, which requires ratification by two-thirds of the members, including the five permanent

~~SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

members of the Security Council, Charter amendment did not offer a realistic solution.^{1/} It has however sought -- so far unsuccessfully -- to gain acceptance of the weighted committee idea in the very limited field of peacekeeping.

The Department has also sought on specific issues to bring home to the new members the futility of adopting substantive resolutions without the support necessary to make them effective, and there are indications that a more realistic and mature approach is gradually developing.^{2/} With respect to Assembly action contrary to Charter provisions and established parliamentary practice, the Department undertook extensive bilateral consultations in 1966 supporting the observance of Charter stipulations and GA rules of procedure. While disregard of orderly procedures still occurs, particularly where highly emotional issues are involved, it

^{1/} Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 89th Congress, 1st Session, on Executive A, 89th Congress, 1st Session, April 28 and 29, 1965, page 40.

^{2/} See Section on South West Africa, below.

has never since been as flagrant as it was in 1965 at the
20th GA. ^{3/}

The increasing number of UN members brought two other problems to the fore. One was resolved through enlargement of the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) by Charter amendment and enlargement of UN sub-organs by the parent bodies -- for example, the Assembly's General (steering) Committee and the ECOSOC commissions. This was necessary to give the new members an equitable voice in the work of the Organization. The other problem -- the relationship of exceptionally small new states (ministates) to the UN -- remained unresolved.

b. Charter Amendments

The General Assembly on December 17, 1963, the final day of the 18th session, adopted the first amendments to the

^{3/} Department of State Circular Airgram CA-7187, January 17, 1966, to all American Diplomatic Posts (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE); UNP Briefing paper for Goldberg-Sisco Talks in London, March 3-4, 1966 (CONFIDENTIAL); from London Telegram 4186, March 5, 1966 to the Department, Section 1, paragraph 4 (CONFIDENTIAL); Department of State Circular Airgram CA-10856, May 3, 1966, to all Latin American Diplomatic Posts (CONFIDENTIAL).

UN Charter. These amendments when ratified would increase non-permanent members of the Security Council from 6 to 10 and the majority required for SC action from 7 to 9, and would increase the membership of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) from 18 to 27. They were adopted by votes of 97 to 11, with 4 abstentions in the case of the SC and 96 to 11, with 5 abstentions in the case of ECOSOC. The resolution incorporating the amendments also provided for the geographic allocation of seats on the enlarged Council but not as Charter amendments.

Adoption of these amendments was a direct outgrowth of the substantial increase in UN membership. The question of enlarging the Councils had been before the Assembly since 1956 after UN membership had grown from 60 to 80 in 2 years. Half of the new members were newly independent states from Asia and Africa, and there were clearly more to come -- particularly from Africa. It was obvious that greater opportunities for representation on the Councils than were available under the traditional geographic allocation of

seats would have to be provided, either by Council enlargement or at the expense of older UN members. The Assembly's discussions over the years had favored a reasonable enlargement of both Councils, particularly the Economic and Social Council. Action, however, had been discouraged by the Soviet Union's position that no Charter amendment was possible in the absence of the Chinese Communists and that it would therefore itself not ratify any amendment in their absence. In this situation, no agreement had been reached on either the size of the enlargement or the geographic distribution of seats on the enlarged Councils.

In the vote in the General Assembly on December 17, 1963, the five permanent members of the Security Council, whose ratification is necessary for any Charter amendment to become effective, voted as follows: The Soviet Union and France voted against the amendments; the United States and the United Kingdom abstained; and China voted affirmatively regarding the Security Council but abstained regarding ECOSOC. US abstention was due not to any opposition to the principle of

enlargement of the Councils, but to the circumstances of the vote, which had not permitted time for adequate consultation. In explaining the United States position, Ambassador Plimpton reiterated that the United States strongly favored Council enlargement "to make possible adequate African and Asian representation". The abstention, he stated, was "without prejudice to our final attitude on the proposed amendments, which we will determine after further consultations with other Member States and in accordance with our administrative and constitutional processes."^{4/}

The British and French took a similar position, the French, however, referring specifically to the majority requirement in the Security Council. They preferred a majority of 10 -- a preference apparently shared by the British.^{5/} The Chinese Representative was concerned that the wording of the resolution regarding allocation of seats on ECOSOC might

^{4/} USUN Press Release 4351, Rev. 1, December 18, 1963.

^{5/} Department of State, UNP Memorandum, "Voting Majority in a Security Council of 15 Members" January 16, 1964 (CONFIDENTIAL).

prove discriminatory against China as among the five permanent SC members. (Except for China, which lost its seat in 1960, all the permanent members have always been represented on ECOSOC.) The Soviet Representative, in a note of December 23, 1963, to the UN Secretary-General, transmitted a December 21 statement of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The statement quoted an editorial from the Chinese Communist press to the effect that if Charter amendment was necessary to meet Afro-Asian demands for greater representation on UN organs, the Chinese Communists would support such amendment. The Soviet statement declared that if this position received official confirmation from the Chinese Communists "the situation will be completely changed," and that had this position been made known officially while the matter was being discussed by the Assembly "the Soviet Union would of course have voted for the resolutions" enlarging the Councils.

While the Department of State would have preferred to see the increase in number of seats held to two in the Security Council and to six in the Economic and Social Council or, for

that matter, no action at all by the 18th GA, it concluded that the United States, and the West generally, had not come off badly.^{6/} However, the Department decided not to submit the amendments to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification during the current session of Congress.^{7/} Agreement among the regional groups on the final text of the resolution had come so late in the Assembly session that there had been no time for the United States to consult sufficiently with friendly UN members. Moreover, there had been no time for adequate discussion with the Senate.^{8/} The Department did not wish to move toward ratification until it was clear what other permanent members of the Security Council

-
- ^{6/} UNP Memorandum of December 16, 1963, presumably prepared for Assistant Secretary Cleveland's meeting with certain Senators that day, cited below (UNCLASSIFIED); UNP Memorandum, presumably that referred to in Cleveland's December 19, 1963 Memorandum to the Secretary (UNCLASSIFIED).
- ^{7/} Department of State Circular Airgram CA-7536 to Rome, January 29, 1964 (CONFIDENTIAL); Letter to Senator Fulbright, July 17, 1964 (UNCLASSIFIED).
- ^{8/} Department of State Telegram 2621 to USUN, April 7, 1964 (CONFIDENTIAL); Memorandum to the Secretary from Assistant Secretary Cleveland, December 19, 1963 (UNCLASSIFIED).

intended to do, and it did not wish to present the amendments to the Senate if there was no chance of their ever coming into effect. The resolution itself had set September 1, 1965, ^{9/} as the target date for completion of the ratification process.

The Department also anticipated that submission to the Senate of the first Charter amendments to be adopted would precipitate a general debate on US policy toward the United Nations, and it wished to see such a debate in as favorable circumstances as possible. In the Department's view, these circumstances would be improved by some progress on the Article 19 issue and the question of future peacekeeping operations. The Department also saw US ratification of the Charter amendments as a possible bargaining counter in current negotiations on these latter questions. ^{10/} The USSR's

^{9/} Department of State Telegram 2002 to Geneva, May 19, 1964 (CONFIDENTIAL).

^{10/} Department of State Telegram 2832 to USUN, May 2, 1964 (CONFIDENTIAL); Memorandum from Assistant Secretary Cleveland to Ambassador Stevenson, June 13, 1964 (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE); Department of State Telegram 3375 to USUN, June 23, 1964 (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE); Letter from the Acting Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 17, 1964 (UNCLASSIFIED).

announcement in June of its intention to ratify "in due time"
brought no change in the Department's position. ^{11/}

The Department continued to be sufficiently concerned about ratification of the Charter amendments in the context of the Article 19 controversy and the UN's future peacekeeping role to try to persuade the British in December 1964 and in early January 1965 to postpone any announcement of their intention to ratify the amendments. The 19th GA, which was almost exclusively concerned with the financial and peacekeeping issues, was still in session, and the Department feared that such an announcement by the British would increase pressure on the United States to ratify while these issues were still unresolved and might be interpreted as a split between the United States and the United Kingdom on the Article 19 question. ^{12/}

^{11/} Department of State Telegrams 3332 to USUN, June 10, 1964 (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE), and 3370 to USUN, June 22, 1964 (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE); Letter to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 17, 1964, cited above.

^{12/} IO Memorandum of Conversation, December 17, 1964 (CONFIDENTIAL); Department of State Telegram 1717 to USUN, January 8, 1965 (CONFIDENTIAL).

The USSR had already ratified on December 18.^{13/}

Following recess of the 19th GA on February 18, 1965, without headway toward breaking the Article 19 impasse, the Department undertook extensive Congressional consultations on the UN situation. As a result the Department concluded that somewhere in Congress a "general debate" of US policy in and toward the United Nations was inevitable that year. The Department preferred that this debate take place in connection with the Charter amendments rather than in the appropriations context.^{14/} On March 9, therefore, Assistant Secretary Cleveland sent Secretary Rusk a proposed memorandum for the President recommending transmittal of the amendments to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. By that time the British had announced their intention to ratify, the Chinese were expected to do so, and, though there had been no indication of French intentions, it was assumed they would go along in

^{13/} UNP Briefing Memorandum, January 8, 1965 (CONFIDENTIAL).

^{14/} IO Memorandum to the Secretary, March 5, 1965 (CONFIDENTIAL).

view of African pressures for enlargement.^{15/}

The President met with the Secretary, Ambassador Stevenson, Assistant Secretary Cleveland, and Deputy Assistant Secretary Sisco on March 19 to discuss submission of the amendments to the Senate.^{16/} In the meantime, Cleveland had arranged for Senate consultations,^{17/} and on March 25 Secretary Rusk met with the Senators and Representatives comprising the "World Peace Through Rule of Law" group to discuss the amendments. On April 5, the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations sent to the White House a favorable progress report on the consultations with the Senators.^{18/}

The President transmitted the Charter amendments to the Senate on April 6, 1965, George Reedy of the White House and

^{15/} IO Memorandum to the Secretary, March 9, 1965, with attachments (CONFIDENTIAL).

^{16/} IO Memorandum to the Secretary, March 11, 1965 (CONFIDENTIAL).

^{17/} IO Memorandum to H-Ambassador MacArthur, March 16, 1965 (CONFIDENTIAL); IO Memorandum to H-Ambassador MacArthur and O/CPO-Ambassador Hand, March 18, 1965 (CONFIDENTIAL).

^{18/} IO Memorandum to the Secretary, March 23, 1965 (UNCLASSIFIED); H Memorandum of April 5, 1965.

Assistant Secretary Cleveland briefed the press and the Department authorized our Embassies in all UN member states to inform the respective Foreign Offices. The Department instructed our Embassy in Taipei to ascertain Chinese intentions and pointed out that, in view of the importance attached by the great majority of UN members to enlargement of the Councils, the GRC's position in the United Nations would be seriously jeopardized if its failure to ratify should delay the coming into effect of the Charter amendments. ^{19/}

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the Charter amendments on April 28 and 29, at which the Secretary, Ambassador Stevenson, and Assistant Secretary Cleveland appeared. The Department had in the meantime continued its consultations with individual Senators. ^{20/} On May 5, the Foreign Relations Committee reported favorably on the amendments and recommended that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification.

^{19/} Department of State Circular Telegram 1891, April 6, 1965 (CONFIDENTIAL).

^{20/} IO Memorandum to the Secretary, April 22, 1965 (CONFIDENTIAL), with set of contingency papers.

This the Senate did unanimously on June 3, by a vote of 71 to 0.

By this time the United Kingdom had ratified, and early ratification by France and China was anticipated. On June 4, however, the Secretary-General had called attention to another problem -- the legality of any action taken by the two Councils once the amendments came into effect but before elections could be held to fill the new seats on the Councils. This problem and the related one of the terms of office of those elected to fill the new seats had been foreseen by the Department's Legal Adviser in May. As a result the United States delayed deposit of its instrument of ratification until August 31.^{21/} The Department on June 16 informed our UN Mission that it believed the best course would be for the Secretary-General to try to obtain a consensus among the delegations that: (a) if the amendments came into effect before January 1, 1966, they would be interpreted as permitting

^{21/} Memorandum from the Legal Adviser to Assistant Secretary Cleveland, May 21, 1965 (CONFIDENTIAL).

the Councils to operate with their original membership;
(b) the original voting requirement for a Security Council decision would apply until the end of the year; and (c) the additional members would be elected during the 20th GA and take office on January 1, 1966, when the other newly elected members of the Councils did.^{22/} Following a similar expression of views by a legal officer in the Secretariat, the Department on July 3 asked our Mission to seek Secretariat agreement to this procedure.^{23/}

After a further exchange of views, the Secretariat agreed. On August 31, 1965, Ambassador Goldberg deposited the US instrument of ratification, thus meeting the Assembly's target date of September 1, 1965, for bringing the amendments into force -- the other four permanent SC members having already deposited their instruments of ratification -- and the

^{22/} Department of State Telegram 2957 to USUN, June 16, 1965 (CONFIDENTIAL).

^{23/} From USUN, Telegram 10 to the Department, July 1, 1965 (CONFIDENTIAL); Department of State Telegram 25 to USUN, July 3, 1965 (CONFIDENTIAL).

Secretary-General made a statement along the lines suggested by the United States. Subsequently, on September 27 the Secretary-General circulated the "Protocol of Entry into Force" of the amendments.

c. The Problem of Ministates

The problem of how to accommodate in the UN, without seriously undermining its prestige and usefulness, the very small remnants of empire that achieve independence reached an acute stage on August 26, 1965 with the application of the Maldives Islands for UN membership.^{24/} This problem had been of increasing concern to the Department since the late '50s, particularly after the Assembly's adoption in 1960 of the "Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples" which specifically states that "Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness^{25/} should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence."

^{24/} UN Document S/6645, September 1, 1965 (UNCLASSIFIED).

^{25/} GA Resolution 1514(XV) (UNCLASSIFIED); IO Memorandum of March 16, 1962 (CONFIDENTIAL); UNP Memorandum of April 16, 1962 (CONFIDENTIAL).

The criteria for UN membership established by the Charter are very broad. To be eligible, an applicant must be a state, be "peace-loving," accept the obligations of the Charter, and "in the judgment of the Organization" be "able and willing to carry out these obligations."^{26/} According to the report of the Rapporteur of the relevant committee of the San Francisco Conference in 1945, it was clear that "the admission of a new member would be subject to study" and the Committee's decision not to "recommend the enumeration of the elements which were to be taken into consideration...does not imply...that in passing upon the admission of a new member, considerations of all kinds cannot be brought into account."^{27/} Admission under the Charter is by a two-thirds vote of the GA on the recommendation of the Security Council, which is subject to the veto.

^{26/} Article 4(1) of the UN Charter (UNCLASSIFIED).

^{27/} Report of Rapporteur (Membership) of Committee 1/2 to Commission I, "The United Nations Conference on International Organization," Selected Documents, Department of State Publication 2490, Conference Series 83, GPO 1946, page 505 (UNCLASSIFIED).

Rule 59 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council provides for a standing committee on membership composed of all Council members, to which all applications for membership shall be referred unless the Council decides otherwise. All applications were referred to this committee through 1949, but in 1950 the Council decided not to refer the Indonesian application in view of the UN's role in Indonesia's achievement of independence. Since then the committee has been inactive. With the breaking of the membership deadlock in 1955, which had prevented the admission of any new members after 1950, admission became almost automatic. The few exceptions (the divided states, Guinea, Mauritania, Outer Mongolia, and Kuwait) have arisen from political differences. While willingness to carry out Charter obligations has on occasion been argued, ability to do so has not. The new states have come to regard UN membership as the ultimate symbol of independence. The membership generally is disposed to favor universality, and only the Soviet Union and China (once), among the permanent members, have used their veto in the Security Council to prevent the admission of an applicant.

Shortly after the Maldives Islands attained independence on July 26, 1965, the Department made clear to the US Embassy in Colombo its reservations about possible UN membership for the new state, primarily from the standpoint of the precedent admission of a state as small in area, population, and resources as the Maldives would create.^{28/} Subsequently the Department sought unsuccessfully in a series of exchanges with the British, including a discussion by the Secretary with the British Ambassador, to persuade them to defer any action on the Maldives application for UN membership.^{29/} The Department did not wish

^{28/} Department of State Telegram 83 to Colombo, August 13, 1965 (CONFIDENTIAL); INR Document, Geographic Note on the Maldives Islands, August 10, 1965 (UNCLASSIFIED).

^{29/} See UNP Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with British Embassy, August 28, 1965 (UNCLASSIFIED); Department of State Telegram 1076 to London, August 27, 1965 (CONFIDENTIAL); from London Telegram 937 to the Department, August 31, 1965 (CONFIDENTIAL); from USUN 612 to the Department, September 2, 1965 (CONFIDENTIAL); Department of State Telegram 1195 to London, September 2, 1965 (CONFIDENTIAL); from London Telegram 986 to the Department, September 3, 1965 (CONFIDENTIAL); Department of State Telegram 1225 to London, September 3, 1965 (CONFIDENTIAL); from Colombo Telegram 166 to the Department, September 4, 1965 (CONFIDENTIAL); IO covering memorandum to the Secretary, September 4, 1965 (CONFIDENTIAL); and further series of telegrams, September 5-10, 1965.

to use the US veto for the first time to prevent admission of the Maldives and wanted to avoid a public US-UK confrontation in the Security Council. It therefore decided to limit itself to a brief discussion of the problem in the US statement to the Council on the admission of the Maldives.

Speaking in the Security Council on September 20, 1965, the Deputy US Representative pointed out that the Charter provides that applicants for UN membership must not only be willing but also "able" to carry out their Charter obligations and expressed the view that many of today's small emerging states, "however willing, probably do not have the human or economic resources" to meet the second criterion. He urged "early and careful consideration" of the problem "in an effort to arrive at some agreed standards -- some lower limits -- to be applied in the case of future applicants for United Nations membership", and suggested reactivation of the Council's standing committee on membership both to review the general problem and to examine future applications. Declaring that the United States was not for a moment suggesting "the exclusion

of small, new states from the family of nations", he also urged "early and careful consideration" of some form of "accommodation that would permit their close association with the United Nations and its broad range of activities."^{30/}

During the same Security Council meeting, the French also referred indirectly to the ministate problem, suggesting re-activation of the Council's committee on membership "which offers supplementary possibilities for reflection and judgment, from which it seems essential for us to benefit from now on if we do not wish to see the long-range effectiveness of the Organization diminish."^{31/} That same day, the Secretary-General in the Introduction to his Annual Report called attention to "the phenomenon of the emergence of exceptionally small new States" and the "difficult problem" posed by their limited size and resources with respect to "the role they should try to play in international life." The time had come, he thought, "when Member States may wish to examine more closely the criteria

^{30/} USUN Press Release No. 4643, September 20, 1965 (UNCLASSIFIED).

^{31/} UN Document S/PV.1234, September 20, 1965, page 26 (UNCLASSIFIED).

for the admission of new Members in the light of the long-term implications of the present trend."^{32/}

Over the next two years the Department of State sought, through extensive informal consultations in Washington, at the UN, and with Foreign Offices abroad, to obtain agreement on reactivation of the SC committee on membership to study the ministate problem. These efforts were unsuccessful, primarily because of British opposition.^{33/} The Secretary-General again raised the problem in the Introduction to his 1967 Annual Report and the reaction to his comments among UN delegations, including that of the USSR, was generally sympathetic.^{34/} There was, however, no more concrete response. Ambassador

^{32/} UN Document "Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization", (June 16, 1964-June 15, 1965), A/6001/Add.1, (Reissue)* September 20, 1965, page 6 (UNCLASSIFIED).

^{33/} From USUN, Telegram 4387 to the Department, March 14, 1967 (CONFIDENTIAL); UNP Briefing Memorandum, March 20, 1967 (CONFIDENTIAL).

^{34/} UN Document A/6701 Add.1, September 15, 1967 "Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization", June 16, 1966-June 15, 1967, pages 59-61 (UNCLASSIFIED); from USUN, Telegram 1373 to the Department, October 12, 1967 (CONFIDENTIAL).

Goldberg, therefore, in a letter of December 13, 1967, requested the Security Council President to consult other Council members on the possibility of reconvening the membership committee to examine "the issues outlined by the Secretary-General with a view to providing the members and the Security Council with appropriate information and advice."^{35/} While this request resulted in further consultations, it produced no tangible results.

^{35/} USUN Press Release 236, December 13, 1967
(UNCLASSIFIED).

S
Y
G

SERVICE 811

4. Reappointment of U Thant as Secretary-General

U Thant's first term of office as Secretary-General expired November 3, 1966. The Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council, over which the five permanent SC members each has a veto. Their inability to agree had required interim action in 1950, when Trygve Lie's original term of office expired, and again in 1961 following Dag Hammarskjold's death, when Soviet insistence on the "troika" concept had resulted in the appointment of U Thant as Acting Secretary-General for the remainder of Hammarskjold's term. When U Thant was appointed Secretary-General in 1962, the normal 5-year term of office as set by the First General Assembly was adjusted to meet his desire that his term date from the time of his appointment as Acting Secretary-General.

Against this background, there was general agreement in the Department of State that reappointment of U Thant would offer the simplest and most acceptable solution to the problem

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 85-255

By ing NARS, Date 11-6-85

~~SECRET~~

of filling the vacancy; but it was not at all certain he would be available.^{1/}

Soundings taken with the British and French in March and April of 1966 showed that both countries shared the US view that U Thant had on the whole proved to be a good Secretary-General and that there appeared to be no acceptable alternative to him. The Soviet Union, it was learned, also held the view that U Thant should serve a second term. Therefore, on April 23 the President, upon the Department's recommendation, wrote to U Thant assuring him of US support for a second term as Secretary-General. Subsequently the British, French and Soviets also urged him to accept another term in office.

Despite these urgings, U Thant throughout most of the summer remained undecided. On September 1, however, in a letter to all UN members, the Secretary-General announced he had decided not "to offer myself for a second term." He said

^{1/} UNP Briefing Memorandum, January 13, 1966 (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~); from USUN, Telegram 2700, January 15, 1966 (UNCLASSIFIED).

the considerations underlying his decision were "personal, official and political," and he referred specifically to certain continuing UN problems, i.e., financing and peace-keeping, and the "extremely serious" world situation, mentioning particularly the "state of affairs in South East Asia." U Thant's statement, however, was so worded that most UN delegations believed he would be amenable to a draft.

Ambassador Goldberg, having expressed the US Government's "profound regrets" at U Thant's decision, at once began intensive consultations with other UN delegations on how best to persuade the Secretary-General to reverse it. The Latin American group, meanwhile, urged U Thant to remain, and the British Prime Minister, in his capacity as Chairman of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference then meeting in London, wired the Secretary-General of the unanimous desire of the Conference that he reconsider his decision.

At a press conference on September 15, the Secretary-General, while indicating his appreciation of the many expressions of confidence he had received, reaffirmed his

decision. He said he continued "to believe that the best interests of the Organization would be served if the Member Governments would direct their efforts to the finding of a suitable and acceptable successor." By this time, 41 names had been "floated" as possible successors to U Thant, but the United States had avoided any discussion of other candidates so long as it saw a chance of U Thant's remaining. At his press conference on September 19, the Secretary-General said that if agreement on his successor were not reached within the next few weeks he might consider serving until the end of the 21st GA, since he did not consider a change in office during a GA session desirable. He again urged the Security Council, however, to get on with the task of finding a suitable and acceptable successor. On September 29 the Security Council welcomed the Secretary-General's statement of the 19th that he would consider serving until the end of the GA session and stated that should he be willing to serve another term, this "would fully meet the desires of the members of this Council." Earlier, in his General Debate statement to

the 21st GA on September 22, Ambassador Goldberg had paid tribute to U Thant and again expressed "our earnest hope that he will heed the unanimous wishes of the membership and permit his tenure of office to be extended."^{2/}

Meanwhile, Secretary Rusk discussed the problem with Foreign Ministers present^{3/} in New York for the opening of the General Assembly and, subsequently, with the Iranian and British Foreign Ministers in Washington.^{4/} On October 17 the Department approved the draft of a proposed SC resolution, reportedly acceptable to U Thant, recommending to the Assembly the extension of the Secretary-General's term until the end of the 21st GA. The Department's approval was made conditional on general acceptance, including acceptance by the Secretary-General and the GA President, of the Secretariat interpretation

^{2/} USUN Press Release No. 4917, September 22, 1966 (UNCLASSIFIED).

^{3/} Memoranda of Conversation between the Secretary and the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Italy, Denmark, France, Yugoslavia, and Iran on September 19 and 22, and on October 3, 6, 13, 1966 ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ except that of October 6 which was ~~SECRET~~/LIMDIS).

^{4/} Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary Rusk and the British Foreign Secretary, October 14, 1966 ~~(SECRET)~~/LIMDIS).

that the 21st session could not come to an end until a Secretary-General had been appointed.^{5/} This draft resolution was adopted by the Security Council without debate in a closed meeting on October 28, and on November 1 the General Assembly unanimously endorsed the extension of U Thant's term until the end of the 21st session. Replying to the remarks of the GA President following the adoption of this resolution, U Thant said that the Secretary-General question would be settled "finally, well before the end of the 21st GA," and that his final decision would have to take into account various considerations, "including of course the long-term interests of the Organization and the outlook for peace in Asia and elsewhere in the world."

On November 25 the Canadian Foreign Minister, after seeing U Thant, told Secretary Rusk he was sure the Secretary-General would agree to reappointment.^{6/} Ambassador Goldberg

^{5/} From USUN, Telegrams 1492, October 12 ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~, and 1601, October 15 ~~(CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS)~~; Department of State Telegram 67582 to USUN, October 17, 1966 ~~(CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS)~~.

^{6/} Memorandum of Conversation between the Secretary and the Canadian Foreign Minister, November 25, 1966 ~~(SECRET)~~.

obtained the same impression. As SC President for that month, he called a series of meetings of SC members which resulted, on November 29, in the presentation to the Secretary-General of an informal oral statement expressing the unanimous wish of the Council members that he continue for another term in office.

The Secretary-General's response was non-committal, but he agreed to defer any public statement on his future plans until later in the week.^{7/} A series of consultations by SC members among themselves and with Dr. Bunche of the Secretariat, acting as intermediary between them and U Thant, resulted, on December 1, in agreement on the texts of a Security Council statement and reply by the Secretary-General.^{8/} These were officially exchanged late that day. On December 2, at a closed meeting, the Security Council adopted

^{7/} From USUN, Telegram 2793, November 30, 1966
(~~SECRET/LIMDIS~~).

^{8/} From USUN, Telegrams 2816 and 2822, November 30, 1966, and 2845, 2846, 2847 and 2848, December 1, 1966
(~~ALL CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS~~).

a resolution recommending the reappointment of U Thant to the General Assembly. At the same time the members of the Council appealed to the Secretary-General to accept another term, declaring that "they fully respect his position and his action in bringing basic issues confronting the Organization and disturbing developments in many parts of the world to their notice, as he has done in his statement of 1 September 1966 to which they accord their closest attention." In his reply, contained, together with the appeal, in the Council's communique of December 2, the Secretary-General noted this statement "with particular appreciation." That same day, the General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution reappointing U Thant for another term of office ending December 31, 1971.

Both the President and the Secretary wrote U Thant to congratulate him on his reappointment. The President assured him of "my continuing closest personal attention to the problems confronting the Organization in its search for peace." Ambassador Goldberg also issued a statement pledging him full US support.

U.
N.

SERVICE SET

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 96-333
By ing, NARA, Date 3-1-97

5. Chinese Representation in the UN

Since 1963, the Communist countries and some others that recognize Communist China ^{1/} have continued the effort begun in 1950 to replace the representatives of the Republic of China (GRC) with those of Communist China in the major forums of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and other international organizations. The United States has taken the lead in firmly and successfully countering

-
- 1/ The following 46 UN Members have recognized the People's Republic of China: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussia, Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Laos, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Somalia, Sudan, Southern Yemen, Sweden, Syria, Tanzania, UAR, Uganda, UK, Ukraine, USSR, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia (62 UN Members recognize the Republic of China).

~~SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

~~SECRET~~

these efforts.^{2/}

The United States has regarded the Government of the Republic of China, a charter member of the United Nations, as the only rightful government representing China and has given full support to the position and to all the rights of that government in the United Nations or any other international organization or conferences. In a statement on March 16, 1966, Secretary of State Rusk described US policy on China in the UN as follows:

2/ From 1950 until 1961 substantive debate on this issue in the General Assembly was avoided each year by the adoption of the so-called "Moratorium Formula" whereby the General Assembly decided for the duration of the session "not to consider any proposals to exclude the representatives of the Government of the Republic of China or to seat representatives of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China." Since 1961, the United States has not opposed inscription and debate of items on Chinese representation.

~~SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

~~SECRET~~

"We will continue our efforts to prevent the expulsion of the Republic of China from the United Nations or its agencies. So long as Peiping follows its present course it is extremely difficult for us to see how it can be held to fulfill the requirements set forth in the charter for membership, and the United States opposes its membership. It is worth recalling that the Chinese Communists have set forth some interesting conditions which must be fulfilled before they are even willing to consider membership:

The United Nations resolution of 1950 condemning Chinese Communist aggression in Korea must be rescinded;

There must be a new United Nations resolution condemning US "aggression";

The United Nations must be reorganized;

The Republic of China must be expelled;

All other "imperialist puppets" must be expelled.

One can only ask whether the Chinese Communists seriously want membership, or whether they mean to destroy the United Nations. We believe the United States must approach this issue with the utmost caution and deliberation." 3/

3/ Statement made before the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 16, 1966. Text published in Department of State Bulletin, Vol LIV, No. 1401, May 2, 1966.

~~SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

~~SECRET~~

Procedurally, the Chinese representation issue in the General Assembly has (since 1961) taken the form essentially of debate and voting on two resolutions: a resolution (generally referred to as the "Albanian-style" resolution) introduced annually by supporters of Communist China, calling for the expulsion of the GRC and the seating of Chinese Communist representatives and a resolution (referred to as the "important question" resolution), co-sponsored by the United States and certain other supporters of the GRC, which reaffirms that any proposal to change the representation of China is an important question under Article 18 of the

~~SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

UN Charter,^{4/} requiring a two-thirds majority for adoption. Since 1966, a third resolution calling for the establishment of a committee to study the question of Chinese representation has also been introduced annually.

4/ Article 18 of the UN Charter:

1. Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the election of the members of the Economic and Social Council, the election of members of the Trusteeship Council in accordance with paragraph 1(c) of Article 86, the admission of new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions.

3. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

~~SECRET~~

Critical situations developed in the Chinese representation issue in the 20th General Assembly in 1965 and the 21st Assembly in 1966, resulting in a US decision to accept the introduction of a new approach to the problem, i.e., the "Study Committee" proposal. Although the new approach was shaped by circumstances at the 21st Assembly, the Chinese representation debate and the voting results in 1965 were an important factor in the US decision.

When the General Assembly convened in the fall of 1965, the US estimate was that, due to shifts in positions of some countries and additions to UN membership since the previous vote on Chinese representation in 1963,^{5/} there would be reduced support for the position of the GRC, but that a slim majority still would reject an "Albanian-style"

^{5/} Between the Chinese representation votes in 1963 and 1965, UN membership increased by 6 (Kenya, Malawi, Maldive Islands, Malta, Singapore and Zambia) to a total of 117. UN membership now totals 126.

~~SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

resolution.^{6/} However, because of the possibility that the shift of a few votes would give the Peking supporters a majority on their resolution, serious consideration was given to various tactical and substantive policy alternatives. As the debate approached, it was decided that the United States should continue actively to oppose an Albanian-style resolution, fall back on the important question procedure if necessary and defer any study committee idea for consideration at subsequent assemblies.^{7/}

Contrary to previous years, debate on the question opened before a draft resolution had been submitted. Speaking on November 8, the US Representative, Ambassador Goldberg, stated that the US Government had thoroughly

^{6/} Information memorandum from the Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs to the Secretary of State, August 7, 1965, Subject: Chinese Representation at the 20th Session of the UN General Assembly.

^{7/} Department of State Telegram 1130 to USUN, November 9, 1965 (~~SECRET~~).

~~SECRET~~

reviewed world developments since 1963 and had been strengthened in its conviction that the General Assembly should not reverse its past decision on the question of Chinese representation. He pointed out that a reversal now would be "yielding to undisguised blackmail" in view of the following conditions which Peking had stipulated: (a) expulsion of the Republic of China from the United Nations, (b) cancellation of the UN resolution condemning Communist China and North Korea as aggressors in the Korean war, (c) adoption of a UN resolution condemning the United States as the aggressor in Korea, (d) revision of the UN Charter, and (e) expulsion from the United Nations of "all imperialist puppets," and inclusion of all "independent" states. The US Representative then quoted recent Chinese Communist statements to show that admission of Peking would bring into the United Nations a force determined to destroy the orderly and progressive world that the United Nations has been helping to build over the past 20 years. As a third reason for opposing the admission of Communist China,

~~SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

~~SECRET~~

he contended that in the light of its announced goals, admission would only encourage Peking to pursue its present policies of violence and would increase the likelihood of war in Asia. Turning to Viet-Nam, he noted Communist China's rejection of unconditional negotiations and of peaceful settlement based on the principle of self-determination. In conclusion, he urged the General Assembly not to "take a backward step that would encourage a new imperialism which demands conformity with its views, which rejects peaceful coexistence and propounds violence and warfare as a principle of international concourse." ^{8/}

The "important question" resolution was introduced by the United States and nine other co-sponsors on November 15. ^{9/} Later the same day Albania and eleven other co-sponsors introduced the usual "Albanian-style" resolution calling

^{8/} UN General Assembly Document A/PV.1369, November 8, 1965.

^{9/} UN General Assembly Document A/L.468, November 15, 1965.

~~SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

for the Assembly "to recognize the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China⁷ as the only lawful representative of China to the United Nations" and "to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy" in the UN and all its subsidiary and affiliated organizations.^{10/}

Mauritania appealed to the sponsors of the Albanian resolution to delete the second operative paragraph calling for the expulsion of representatives of the Republic of China, so as to allow more delegations to vote in favor of the draft resolution. Ceylon then introduced an amendment which would have replaced the two operative paragraphs with one paragraph merely calling on the General Assembly to seat the Chinese Communists in the United Nations and all its organs without specific mention of the Republic of China. On November 17 the General Assembly proceeded to vote on the two draft resolutions before it. Immediately prior to the

^{10/} UN General Assembly Document A/L.469,
November 15, 1965.

~~SECRET~~

vote, Ceylon withdrew its amendment to the Albanian resolution and Mauritania also withdrew its request for a separate vote on the second operative paragraph of the resolution; both explained that they were doing so in light of appeals from the resolution's sponsors, as well as from some of the resolution's opponents, who believed the changes might result in misinterpretations and lack of clarity.^{11/}

The "important question" resolution was adopted on November 17 by a vote of 56 in favor, 49 opposed with 11 abstentions. The Albanian resolution was then rejected by a vote of 47 to 47 with 20 abstentions.

Although the 47 to 47 tie vote was considerably short of the two-thirds that were necessary for adoption it was nevertheless very disturbing to the supporters of the GRC

^{11/} Apparently US opposition to the amendment, expressed to the Ceylonese representative in a private informal conversation just before the plenary meeting, was a key factor in Ceylon's decision to withdraw its amendment. USUN Telegram 2117 to the Department of State, November 19, 1965 (CONFIDENTIAL).

~~SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

~~SECRET~~

because it (1) reflected the steadily weakening support for the GRC's position and (2) more ominously, implied a possible defeat the following year. This was particularly so because of the general estimate that if the proponents of Peking succeeded in obtaining a simple majority, there might be pressure on wavering states or those such as the UK, which recognize Peking but which have supported the important question principle, to accept the will of the majority and thus abandon support for or vote against the important question resolution on subsequent occasions. (Adoption or rejection of the important question resolution is by a simple majority.)

The closeness of the 1965 vote at the UN and, equally important, other events in Asia in the same general period (e.g. the Viet-Nam conflict and the Chinese "Cultural Revolution") generated greater public and congressional interest in and debate about US China policy and the question of China in the UN. Extensive hearings on US policy toward Asia were held, for example, early in 1966 in the House of

~~SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

Representatives.^{12/}

At the same time, with events and the public debate as contributing factors, a thorough policy review also took place within the State Department. With specific reference to the question of Chinese representation, renewed and more urgent consideration was given to possible changes in policy and tactics designed to protect the position of the GRC in the United Nations. Illustrative of the studies made was that undertaken by the Department's Policy Planning Council (draft paper produced April 28, revised May 13) suggesting a three-phase course of action: ^{13/}

(1) A period of possibly two or three years during which we would defend the status quo while the way was being

^{12/} Committee point: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, April 1966.

^{13/} Policy Planning Council (S/P) draft paper Annex IX China and the United Nations, May 13, 1966 (~~SECRET~~).

14

~~SECRET~~

prepared for a shift, placing our emphasis, however, on the GRC's right to a seat in the UN rather than on the need to exclude the Chinese Communists.

(2) Adoption by the Assembly of a resolution that, while not disputing the view of both Taipei and Peking that China is a single state, would decide that the purposes of the UN would be best served by temporarily treating each claimant as a "state" for purposes of UN membership and would offer both a seat in the General Assembly. (It is assumed that the GRC would remain in both the Assembly and the Security Council but that the Chinese Communists would refuse the invitation to take a seat in the Assembly.)

(3) Moderation over a longer period of time of the views of both Taipei and Peking, resulting in Peking's entering the Assembly, Taipei's remaining there, and the seat of China in the Security Council being declared "temporarily" vacant.

Although concluding that maintenance of the status quo in the UN would be the most advantageous for the United

~~SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

States, the study recognized that this position was becoming more and more difficult to sustain and proposed that we prepare to move to a "double representation" approach as our next preference. It noted the danger of making this move either too soon or too late and suggested the best course was not to alter our public position now but to tell the GRC (1) that we would defend its exclusive right to represent China in the UN only as long as we could do so without destroying or crippling the organization, and (2) that we believed a fall-back to a "two claimants" policy would be necessary in from one to three years in order to prevent expulsion of the GRC and seating of the Chinese Communists.

As a second step the study proposed that we encourage some friendly UN member, such as Canada or Japan, to prepare the way for a double representation solution, insisting that it be based on the two claimants approach. We would, however, plead for time, pointing out that we had to avoid misleading friend and foe alike concerning Viet-Nam, and that we needed time to convince the GRC of the absolute necessity

~~SECRET~~

of compromise along the lines suggested.

At approximately the same time, the US Mission to the United Nations (USUN) forwarded its recommendations for use by our Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg, in a memorandum to the President. ^{14/} The Mission proposed that the United States take the initiative in urging a third party such as Canada to take the lead in developing a "successor state" resolution in the UNGA with the two-fold purpose of protecting the seat of the GRC and of shifting the responsibility for any non-participation by the Chinese Communists to the latter.

The Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, Joseph J. Sisco, in a memorandum to the Secretary on April 27, noting that the President had "expressed his desire to find a way of handling the Chinese problem, including the Chinese representation issue at the next General Assembly", outlined the principal alternatives on Chinese representation, concluding with the recommendation that the Secretary convene an early meeting

^{14/} USUN UNMIS Telegram to the Department
27 April 1966 (~~SECRET/NODIS~~)

~~SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

~~SECRET~~

including Ambassador Goldberg, Mr. Bundy (Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs), Mr. Meeker (the Legal Adviser) and himself for "a preliminary discussion of Chinese representation. . . .with a view to arriving at a consensus which could be discussed with the President." ^{15/}

Following review of USUN's recommendations, Assistant Secretary Sisco addressed a second memorandum to the Secretary on May 2 which, unlike the USUN memorandum, made no specific policy recommendation, but rather posed a series of questions on which he felt it important to get agreement at the meeting proposed in the earlier memorandum:

- "1. Are the dangers of defeat at the next General Assembly so great and the costs of adhering to our past tactics so high that we should shift to a new approach?
- "2. If you agree that a new approach is necessary, is the most desirable alternative a resolution declaring that there are two successors to China, each of whom is entitled to representation in the United Nations?

^{15/} Memorandum from Assistant Secretary Sisco to the Secretary, April 27, 1966, Subject: Alternatives on Chinese Representation in UN - ACTION MEMORANDUM (~~SECRET~~)

~~SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

- "3. Are there any other feasible alternatives, such as the study committee approach, which might at least buy time?
- "4. If new tactics are required, should the United States stimulate others to take an initiative, or should we merely acquiesce in the anticipated desire of others, such as the Canadians, to strike out on a new course?
- "5. If there is a two-China resolution at the next General Assembly, how should the United States vote?
- "6. If we decide to change our traditional stance, when and how do we inform the GRC?" 16/

The meeting was held on May 6 and culminated in a memorandum for the President with the following recommendation:

"As you requested, Ambassador Goldberg and I have reviewed the problem of Chinese Representation at the next United Nations General Assembly to see whether the onus can be shifted more clearly to the Chinese Communists for their exclusion.

16/ Memorandum from Assistant Secretary Sisco to the Secretary, May 2, 1966. Subject: Meeting May 5 on Chinese Representation - BRIEFING MEMORANDUM ~~(SECRET)~~

~~SECRET~~

"We agree that adhering to our previous approach would be too costly and that, after informing the Republic of China of our shift in tactics, we should no longer oppose a "two-Chinas" approach by other countries such as Canada.

"We recommend that you authorize us to acquiesce in a two-Chinas approach by third parties at the 21st General Assembly along the lines indicated in the discussion below."

The "discussion section of the memorandum ended with the following suggested scenario:

"Our plan would be to have Ambassador McConaughy, shortly after he arrives, take up the question with the Chinese, inform them of our decision to shift our policy as the best way to protect the position of the Republic of China in the Assembly, and explain to the Chinese that the best way to continue to exclude Red China would be for the Republic of China to hold on to its seat in the Assembly. In addition, we would ask Governor Harriman some time in June to make a supplementary approach along the same lines. I intend to be in Taipei in early July and I could do any follow-up work necessary to tie this down.

"Ambassador Goldberg and Assistant Secretary Sisco will be in Ottawa on May 16 to have a full day's discussion on UN

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

matters. The Canadians are very anxious to be "unleashed" on this question, and the Pearson statement of the other day, for all practical purposes, puts the Canadians publicly in favor of a two-China solution. Ambassador Goldberg and I are agreed that we should hold off the Canadians from launching a new tactic until we have had fuller discussions with the Chinese in Taipei. However, the indications are that the Canadian ideas are already reasonably well developed. Rather than run the risk of the Canadians developing a new tactic inconsistent with our objectives, Ambassador Goldberg and I are agreed that he should indicate great interest on our part to consult fully with the Canadians on the details of a new strategy on the understanding no new move will be launched by them pending our discussions in Taipei in June.

"Congressional consultations would await further exploration with Taipei." 17/

Circumstances in the immediately ensuing months somewhat altered the scenario outlined in the Secretary's memorandum. On June 24 Ambassador McConaughy was instructed to initiate consultations with the Chinese. He was to follow the line that Assistant Secretaries Sisco and Bundy had taken with the Chinese Ambassadors to the UN and the United States about ten

17/ Memorandum from the Secretary of State for the President, May 14, 1966. Subject: Need for New Tactics on Chinese Representation. (SECRET)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

days earlier ^{18/}, leaving the presentation of any new tactical proposal for the Secretary himself to make on his visit to Taipei in July. ^{19/}

In his meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wei Tao-Ming on June 29 Ambassador McConaughy reaffirmed, as had Sisco and Bundy, strong US support of the GRC position in the UN and opposition to the entry of Communist China. At the same time he reiterated that there was a danger of a serious reverse if we continued to rely on the previous tactics on Chinese representation in the UN, citing various factors which might produce an unfavorable vote, among which were the possibility that African members might vote as a bloc and unfavorably as a reaction to unrelated issues (such as Rhodesia or South Africa), an unsympathetic GA president, unhelpful statements by the Secretary-General and "strong restiveness" among certain countries (particularly Canada) who might seek some new formula different from the traditional

^{18/} Department of State Telegram 2901 to USUN, June 16, 1966 (SECRET/LIMDIS)

^{19/} Department of State Telegram 1383 to Taipei, June 24, 1966 (SECRET/EXDIS)

~~SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

pattern. He said it was important that the United States and the GRC devise a procedure to assure their common objective and that the Secretary would wish to discuss this when he arrived. 20/

In a meeting the following day, Ambassador McConaughy covered the same points with President Chiang Kai-Shek.

In response both President Chiang and Foreign Minister Wei made a strong pitch for a continuation of previous tactics, asserting that as long as the United States remained firm in its traditional position, they did not doubt that the outcome at the UN would be favorable. President Chiang also asserted that if an adverse resolution were to be adopted, the GRC would withdraw from the UN 21/

When the Secretary met with Foreign Minister Wei and other ranking GRC officials several days later, the Chinese pressed for a continuation of past tactics in handling the question in the UN, i.e., efforts to defeat any Albanian-type

20/ From Taipei, Telegram 1523 to the Department, June 29, 1966 (~~SECRET/EXDIS~~)

21/ From Taipei, Telegram 22 to the Department, July 1, 1966 (~~SECRET/EXDIS~~)

23

~~SECRET~~

resolution and to reaffirm the "important question" formula, on the basis that "it is impossible to find any new tactic which does not mean a retreat and consequently is detrimental to our common interest". The Foreign Minister appealed for an early public US statement reiterating continued US support for the membership of the GRC in the UN, opposition to the admission of Peking and reaffirmation of the "important question" formula. 22/

In response, the Secretary stressed that the basic policy objectives of both the United States and the GRC were essentially identical and that handling of the issue at the UN should be looked at as a tactical problem. The uncertainties of the situation required that various contingency plans be carefully studied and coordinated. He noted, for example, that initiatives by Canada or Italy might create circumstances that would require careful tactical planning if a defeat were to be

22/ Memorandum of Conversation, US/MC/8, July 3, 1966, Part IV of IV, Subject: Chinese Representation in the UN (~~SECRET/EXDIS~~)

~~SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

avoided. 23/

In a resumption of the talks the following day, the Chinese again asked for a public US statement, asked the United States to oppose any "two-Chinas" formula which might be put forward at the UN and restated their estimate that the voting situation in the forthcoming UN General Assembly had improved over the previous year. The Secretary was less optimistic and said it would be difficult for the United States to commit itself to specific tactical moves without a better idea of the outcome. They concluded that it would be necessary to keep in close touch as the situation developed. 24/

In the period between these conversations and the opening of the UN General Assembly in September, the Department of State continued to assess likely developments and to seek to develop a policy best designed to preserve

23/ Ibid.

24/ Memorandum of Conversation, US/MC/11, July 4, 1966, Part I of II, Subject: Chinese Representation in the UN (~~SECRET/EXDIS~~)

US/GRC objectives with a minimum risk of outright defeat (i.e., the expulsion of the GRC and the seating of Peking in the General Assembly).

In August, the Secretary approved an interim position which authorized Assistant Secretary Sisco to inform Chinese Ambassador Chow that: 25/

- "(1) We have every intention of indicating to other governments that we will strongly oppose any efforts to substitute Communist China for the GRC in the UN;
- "(2) We are ready for a detailed exchange of vote counts with the GRC, giving both our estimate of the ostensible balance, which seems just barely favorable, as well as an explanation of the danger of sudden erosion which might occur from extraneous factors or third country efforts to explore alternative tactics;
- "(3) In view of this unstable prospect, we must reserve our final decision on the best tactics for ensuring continued GRC membership;

25/ Memorandum from Asst Secy Sisco to the Secretary, Subject: Chinese Representation at the UN General Assembly, August 6, 1966 (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) and Department of State Telegram 49101 to USUN and Taipei, September 16, 1966 (~~CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS~~)

~~SECRET~~

"(4) We cannot therefore indicate precisely what additional points we will make in our representations."

At the same time, several plans of action were considered at the Bureau level to meet the contingencies of (1) an unfavorable change in the General Assembly atmosphere which could have nullified the voting estimates or (2) the introduction of a two-Chinas resolution. One such plan recommended a "dual representation" formula that would have the GRC retain its seat in the General Assembly and invite the Peoples Republic of China also to occupy a seat "on a basis of sovereign equality with all other UN members". The suggested resolution however would have dealt only with the General Assembly (thus avoiding the problem of China's seat on the Security Council) and would not pass judgment on Peking's and Taipei's rival claim to sovereignty. 26/

A later draft position paper recommended that "we should make it very clear publicly and privately that we are strongly

25/ Draft Memorandum from Assistant Secretaries Sisco and Bundy to the Secretary, August 15, 1966 ~~(SECRET)~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

opposed to the so-called Albanian resolution. . . . that we should defer any final decision on contingency alternative steps until we are nearer the actual vote in the Assembly. . . . and that we must be prepared to shift our tactics when necessary." The paper concluded that "a shift to a dual representation approach would be far less costly than a straight defeat on our present stand" and that the US should not therefore interfere with "any responsible effort on the part of other countries to probe or possibly even to introduce a dual representation resolution." 27/

27/ Draft Memorandum prepared for submission to the Secretary from Assistant Secretaries Sisco and Bundy, drafted by William H. Gleysteen, September 2, 1966 ~~(SECRET)~~

~~SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

~~SECRET~~

While none of the memoranda were formally submitted to the Secretary, the views and questions contained therein were discussed with him. However, in the context of reviewing the language on the U.S. attitude toward Peking contained in the draft speech to be delivered by Ambassador Goldberg in the UN general debate, and in considering the instructions to be sent to posts overseas on the question, the Secretary decided that circumstances were such that a continuation of previous policy and tactics would be the best course. Accordingly, a circular was sent on September 16 instructing overseas posts to inform host governments of the U.S. position, and specifically that there had been no change in U.S. policy: the United States would strongly oppose an Albanian-style resolution, would seek reaffirmation of the "important question" formula, and was seeking support for these positions.^{28/}

In the opening days of the General Assembly the issue remained relatively quiescent. This calm was shattered however by a series of quick developments beginning on October 27.

28/ Department of State Circular Telegram 49274, Sept 16, 1966
~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

~~SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

~~SECRET~~

On that date Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani in a foreign policy statement in Parliament mentioned a possible Italian study committee initiative.^{29/} On the same day, Belgian Foreign Minister Harmel told Ambassador Knight in Brussels that Belgium was considering joining the Canadians and the Italians in drafting a study committee resolution and that Belgium would have to reconsider its support for the U.S. position unless such a study proposal was introduced.^{30/}

The following day, October 28, the Canadian Ambassador called on Acting Secretary Katzenbach to deliver a letter from Canadian Foreign Minister Martin to the Secretary which stated that the Canadian Cabinet had decided to go on record in the General Assembly "to the effect that we see the most equitable interim solution to be representation of both /Chinese/ governments in the United Nations", adding that since he was departing for Europe on November 4, he did not believe they would have an opportunity personally to discuss the matter until his (Martin's) return on November 16. The Under Secretary stressed the desire that further discussions be held before the Canadian position was frozen and immediately reported these developments--transmitting the text of Martin's letter as

29/From Rome, Telegram 2287 to the Department, Oct 28, 1966 (CONFIDENTIAL) and Department of State Telegram 75416 to Rome, October 28, 1966 (CONFIDENTIAL)

30/From Brussels, Telegram 2028 to Department, Oct 28, 1966

~~SECRET~~

~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

~~SECRET~~

well--to the Secretary, who was at the time in the Far East. ^{31/}

On November 2, Assistant Secretary Sisco informed the Chinese Ambassador in general terms of the Italian, Belgian and Canadian approaches, indicated we had asked all three governments to take no initiative pending further consultations and promised to consult promptly with the Chinese following the Secretary's return. ^{32/}

On November 3, the Canadian Ambassador again called on Under Secretary Katzenbach, this time to deliver the text of a Canadian draft resolution, which, the Ambassador explained, was a "possible early initiative" by Canada at the UN, designed to permit the Canadian and other like-minded governments to express their view on Chinese representation and at the same time continue to oppose an Albanian-type resolution. Although the operative paragraph of this draft resolution simply requested the President of the General Assembly "to explore the possibilities" of finding an "interim solution" to the Chinese representation question, the preambular paragraphs were so worded as to prejudge the outcome of such exploration. These paragraphs, inter alia suggested that the following arrangements

31/ Department of State Telegrams 75499 and 75516 to Bangkok, October 28, 1966 (SECRET/EXDIS)
32/ Department of State Telegram 77981 to Taipei, November 3, 1966 (SECRET/EXDIS)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

might provide a basis for such an interim solution:

"(A) The participation in the United Nations General Assembly of the People's Republic of China as the member representing the territory of China over which it exercises jurisdiction;

"(B) The participation in the United Nations General Assembly of the Republic of China as the member representing the Island of Taiwan and other islands over which it exercises jurisdiction;

"(C) The participation of the People's Republic of China in the Security Council as one of the permanent members mentioned in Article 23 of the Charter." 33/

The Ambassador pointed out that Canadian Foreign Minister Martin was departing the following day for Europe where among other things he planned to consult with a "few key countries", including the United Kingdom, on the Canadian proposal, and thus there was little time for direct consultation with the Secretary. Under Secretary Katzenbach asked that the Canadian Government give him the opportunity at least to consult with the Secretary before discussions were held with 34/ other governments.

33/ Department of State Telegram 78933 to Ottawa and USUN, November 4, 1966 (SECRET/NODIS)

34/ Department of State Telegram 78934 to Ottawa, November 4, 1966, (SECRET/NODIS)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The Secretary was able to talk briefly by telephone with the Canadian Foreign Minister before the latter's departure for Europe. He said that the United States considered the Canadian proposal [was] both unacceptable and unnecessary and obtained Martin's agreement not to table the Canadian proposal pending further consultations. United States opposition to the Canadian proposal was based on the fact that the proposal prejudged the issue in favor of a "two Chinas" or, more accurately, "one China, one Taiwan" solution, including Communist Chinese membership in the Security Council. Moreover, from a tactical standpoint, it upset the traditional procedure for handling the question in the UNGA debates, jeopardizing the estimate recently arrived at that a narrow favorable voting margin existed on both the Important Question

~~SECRET~~

and Albanian-type resolutions.^{35/}

Assistant Secretary Sisco informed the Chinese Ambassador of the Canadian plan on November 7.^{36/}

Since US efforts to persuade the Canadians to abandon their proposal were not immediately successful, it appeared vital to find some alternative means to deal with it to preserve the interests of both the United States and the GRC. It soon became clear that the only way to persuade the Canadians to reconsider their initiative was to offer a substitute proposal which would both satisfy Canadian objectives and meet the needs of the United States and the GRC. The President approved a recommendation by the Secretary that steps be taken to persuade the Canadians and others that a study committee proposal which did not

^{35/} Department of State Telegram 81500 to Ottawa, November 8, 1966 (SECRET).

^{36/} Department of State Telegram 80627 to Taipei, November 7, 1966 (SECRET/EXDIS).

prejudge the ultimate solution should be introduced.^{37/}

Consequently, on November 8, the Under Secretary called in the Canadian Ambassador, urged that as an alternative to their draft resolution the Canadian Government consider whether a study committee on Chinese representation might not meet the Canadian need for steps which would signify progress but which would have the additional advantage of broad backing within the General Assembly and the support of the United States, and handed the Ambassador a draft resolution of the type which we could support.^{38/} The suggested draft noted that the GRC was a founding member of the UN, that Peking had attached conditions to its representation and that "the complexities involved in this question required the most searching consideration." In the operative

^{37/} Memorandum from the Secretary to the President approved November 8, 1966, Subject: Chinese Representation (~~SECRET~~); Memorandum for the Secretary and the Under Secretary from Assistant Secretary Sisco, November 7, 1966, Subject: Follow-Up Action on the President's Decision on Chinese Representation (~~SECRET/LIMDIS~~).

^{38/} Department of State Telegram 81500 to Ottawa, November 8, 1966 (~~SECRET/LIMDIS~~).

paragraph it called for the establishment by the UNGA of a committee to study "all facets" of the problem and to make recommendations to the 22nd General Assembly "for an equitable and practicable solution" consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter.^{39/} The following day a personal letter from the Secretary was sent to Canadian Prime Minister Pearson seeking Canadian acceptance of our request.^{40/}

On November 8 and 10, the Chinese were also informed of the US initiative,^{41/} after which other governments most closely concerned were also informed and given the suggested draft proposal (including Italy, Belgium, Britain, Japan,

^{39/} Department of State Telegram 82254 to London and other capitals, November 9, 1966 (~~SECRET~~).

^{40/} Department of State Telegram 81612 to Ottawa, November 9, 1966 (~~SECRET/EXDIS~~).

^{41/} Department of State Telegram 81502 to Taipei, November 8, 1966 (~~SECRET/LINDIS~~).

~~SECRET~~

Australia and New Zealand).^{42/} In all cases it was stressed that the United States would have preferred no new initiatives, that basic US policy remained unchanged but faced with Canadian persistence in pressing an initiative, which we opposed, we felt that a simple, non-prejudicial study committee proposal (which we would not co-sponsor) was the only acceptable alternative. Through this means, the United States sought to prevent desertions from the ranks of the opponents of the Albanian resolution and the supporters of the important question formula, including previous co-sponsors such as Italy.

In the ensuing two weeks, intensive consultations took place among, notably, but not exclusively, Canada, Italy, Belgium, Chile, and the United States, and separately

^{42/} Department of State Telegram 82106 to Canberra and Wellington, 82111 to Brussels, 82247 to Tokyo, November 9, 1966 (~~SECRET/LIMDIS~~); Department of State Telegram 82445 to London, November 10, 1966 (~~SECRET/LIMDIS~~); Department of State Telegram 81463 to Rome, November 8, 1966 (~~SECRET~~).

~~SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

~~SECRET~~

between the United States and the GRC, to arrive at a mutually satisfactory draft study committee proposal.

Various modifications of the US proposal were considered ^{43/} before the version ultimately worked out was submitted on November 21, with Italy, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Trinidad and Tobago as co-sponsors. The resolution finally tabled read as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of the representation of China,

^{43/} Texts of Italian, Chilean, Italian-Chilean, Italian-Canadian-Belgian composite, and other study committee proposals are contained in the following telegrams: USUN 2284 to Department of State, November 12, 1966 (~~SECRET~~); USUN Nos. 2167, November 9, 1966, 2210, November 10, 1966, 2335, November 14, 1966, 2403, November 17, 1966, 2454, November 18, 1966 and 2455, November 18, 1966 (~~ALL CONFIDENTIAL~~).

~~SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

Believing that a solution of the question of Chinese representation, which accords with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the aim of universality, would further the purposes of the United Nations and strengthen its ability to maintain international peace and security,

Believing that the complexities of this question require the most searching consideration in order to pave the way to an appropriate solution, taking into account the existing situation and the political realities of the area,

1. Decides to establish a Committee of ... Member States, to be appointed by the General Assembly, with the mandate of exploring and studying the situation in all its aspects in order to make the appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session for an equitable and practical solution to the question of the representation of China in the United Nations, in keeping with the principles and purposes of the Charter;

2. Appeals to all Governments concerned to give assistance to the Committee in its search for such a solution.

The GRC of course strongly opposed the Canadian proposal and any other which suggested a "two-Chinas" solution. Although also opposed to any new approach as unnecessary from a tactical standpoint and to the study committee proposals on the ground they called into question the GRC's representation in the UN, GRC representatives initially gave the impression that they could "live with" a simple and completely non-

~~SECRET~~

prejudicial study group proposal and would oppose it only passively.^{44/} To GRC requests that the United States not support the study committee proposal, the United States responded that it felt it necessary to do so, however objectionable in principle to the GRC, in order (1) to prevent more far-reaching proposals from being made and possibly adopted and (2) to prevent the loss of key voting support on the important question and Albanian resolutions. In consultations with the Italians and others, the United States had committed itself to support the proposal in return for commitments of continued support of the US/GRC positions on the critical Albania and important question resolution. However, we assured the Chinese that our support would be passive.^{45/}

^{44/} Department of State Telegram 85359 to Taipei, November 15, 1966 (~~SECRET~~); Taipei Telegrams to Department Nos. 1439, November 16, 1966, and 1456, November 17, 1966 (~~SECRET/EXDIS~~).

^{45/} Department of State Telegram 83437 to Taipei, November 10, 1966 (~~SECRET-EXDIS~~).

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

At the eleventh hour, however, the GRC position changed to strong opposition to the study committee proposal, including the threat -- made to the United States privately -- to withdraw from the UN if any such proposal should be adopted. The changed position was apparently initiated by President Chiang himself, and conveyed to Ambassador McConaughy in Taipei by Acting Foreign Minister Sampson Shen (Foreign Minister Wei was in New York) on November 21. Shen told McConaughy that GRC now considered that if the Italian resolution calling for a study committee were to pass in the General Assembly, GRC rights in the UN would be called into question, and therefore the GRC had decided that the moment such a resolution should be adopted, the GRC would announce its withdrawal from the UN.^{46/}

Intensive efforts were then made to convince President Chiang and other GRC leaders that withdrawal from the UN

^{46/} From Taipei, Telegram 1484 to the Department, November 21, 1966 (~~SECRET-EXDIS~~).

SECRET

SERVICE SET

under these circumstances would give Peking a major victory which would enable them to pose as the sole representative of China in the eyes of the world, deprive the GRC of the international understanding and support on which the fulfillment of its basic policies depends, deal a blow to the effectiveness of the UN, make the position of the United States and GRC allies in Asia more difficult and encourage Peking's militancy. The approaches also reaffirmed US support for the GRC and reiterated the reasons for the tactical approach the United States had taken.^{47/} The effort culminated in letters to President Chiang and Foreign Minister Wei from President Johnson and Secretary Rusk respectively.^{48/} The Secretary's letter included a reaffirmation that the United States would use the veto on any attempt to seat Peking on the Security Council, if a veto would be effective, but that

^{47/} From Taipei, Telegrams 1542, November 25, 1966, 1548, November 26, 1966 and 1568, November 28, 1966 (all ~~SECRET/EXDIS~~).

^{48/} Department of State Telegrams 91771 and 91772, November 26, 1966.

~~SECRET~~

if the GRC withdrew from the UN the possibility of a veto would be far less relevant "and indeed would in all probability no longer exist." The final appeal requested the GRC to take no withdrawal action -- should the study committee proposal be adopted -- until the December visit of the Secretary to Taipei.

On the morning of the day of the voting on the Chinese representation resolutions, the GRC informed us that as a result of the letters from the President and the Secretary and of Ambassador McConaughy's representations to President Chiang, and on the basis of the close relations existing between the GRC and the United States, the GRC had decided it should not take a position at the UN which the United States considered would be detrimental to US interests, and had therefore decided "with difficulty" that it would not terminate its UN membership if the Italian resolution were passed.^{49/} Instead, the GRC delegation was

^{49/} From Taipei, Telegram 1587 to the Department, November 29, 1966 (~~SECRET/EXDIS~~).

~~SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

instructed, if the study committee resolution were adopted, to make a strong statement of the Chinese position, including an announcement that they intended temporarily to suspend their participation in the Assembly.^{50/} Since, as will be seen below, the Italian resolution was defeated, this statement was never made.

In the meantime, debate on Chinese representation had opened in the General Assembly plenary on November 18, two proposals having already been submitted: the Important Question resolution submitted on November 14 by Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Gabon, Japan, the Malagasy Republic, New Zealand, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Thailand and the United States (later joined by Italy and Togo), and the "Albanian-type" resolution submitted on November 16 by Albania, Algeria, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville), Cuba, Guinea, Mali, Pakistan, Romania and Syria (later joined by Mauritania).^{51/} As noted previously, the Study Committee

^{50/} From Taipei, Telegrams 1588 and 1589, November 29, 1966 (~~SECRET/EXDIS~~).

^{51/} UN General Assembly Document A/L.494, November 14, 1966; UN General Assembly Document A/L.496, November 16, 1966.

~~SECRET~~

Resolution subsequently was submitted on November 21.

On November 21, Ambassador Goldberg said that the United States would vote for the important question resolution since the action proposed "holds important and far-reaching implications for the United Nations, vitally concerns the maintenance of international peace and security, and is directly connected with the rights and privileges of membership." He stated that the present "important question" resolution would simply affirm the continuing validity of the Assembly's prior decision on this vital point.

In opposing the Albanian resolution he contrasted Communist China's activities, its goals, and its hostile attitude toward the United Nations with the constructive record of the Republic of China, and pointed out that the proposed expulsion of the Republic of China ran counter to the aim of universality which the sponsors claimed to favor. He said, further, that the United States would vote for the study committee resolution because "it does not in any way

~~SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

~~SECRET~~

prejudice and undermine our commitments, nor indeed does it prejudice the results of the study to be made." 52/

After 12 plenary meetings during which 70 delegations expressed their views, the General Assembly on November 29 voted on the three draft resolutions in the order in which they had been submitted. The 15-state proposal affirming the continuing validity of the important question decision of 1961 was adopted by a vote of 66 to 48, with 7 abstentions.

The 11-power "Albanian" resolution to replace the representatives of the Republic of China with the Chinese Communists was then rejected by a vote of 46 to 57, with 17 abstentions.

Prior to the vote on the study committee resolution, Syria, supported by Congo (Brazzaville) and Pakistan, proposed that in light of the "important question" resolution already adopted, the study committee resolution should also

52/ 1471st Plenary Meeting of UNGA, November 21, 1966.

~~SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

~~SECRET~~

require a two-thirds majority for adoption. The Italian Representative opposed this on the ground that the study committee resolution would merely establish a committee, clearly a procedural matter requiring only a simple majority for adoption. He stated that there was a clear difference between a decision to establish the committee and a decision to approve any proposal submitted in due time by such a body. The Assembly, however, approved the Syrian proposal by a vote of 51 to 37, with 30 abstentions, and then rejected the draft resolution by a vote of 34 to 62, with 25 abstentions.

The US decision to vote against the Syrian proposal was made at the last moment in the light of the tactical situation and the judgment that the Study Committee resolution would not in any case obtain a simple majority. The primary substantive consideration was that since we had argued that the study committee resolution did not prejudice the solution to the question of Chinese representation, it should be treated as a matter requiring a simple majority.^{53/}

^{53/} Department of State Telegram 92048 to USUN, November 28, 1966 (~~SECRET~~).

~~SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

~~SECRET~~

In retrospect, it seems clear that the US decision to acquiesce to the submission of the study committee proposal (and to support it passively) was a factor in preserving and slightly increasing the favorable vote on the important question resolution and in increasing the margin of opposition to the Albanian-type resolution. Other factors undoubtedly included the generally adverse reaction to the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, the uncertainty of the Moscow-Peking relationship, mostly favorable votes by new members, favorable improvements in the political climate in some countries (e.g. Indonesia) and opposition to the expulsion of the GRC. The major crisis in 1966 having been faced and dealt with successfully, the same three-resolutions pattern (i.e., important question, Albanian-type and study committee) in subsequent annual debates in 1967 and 1968 yielded results which reaffirmed the validity of the tactical approach for

~~SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

~~SECRET~~

the attainment of the US objectives. 54/

54/ Votes in 1967 and 1968 were as follows:

1967

Important Question: Yes - 69, No - 48, Abstained - 4
Albanian Resolution: Yes - 45, No - 58, Abstained - 17
Study Committee: Yes - 32, No - 57, Abstained - 30

1968

Important Question: Yes - 73, No - 47, Abstained - 5
Albanian Resolution: Yes - 44, No - 58, Abstained - 23
Study Committee: Yes - 30, No - 67, Abstained - 27

~~SECRET~~

SERVICE SET