

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#8 letter	Barry Zorthian to Leonard Marks Confidential 3 p <i>open 12-15-92 NLS 92-97</i>	9/2/66	A
#13 memo	Leonard Marks to Nicholas Katzenbach Confidential 3 p <i>open 3-25-92 NLS 92-98</i>	8/1/67	A
#13a extract	Barry Zorthian to General Westmoreland Confidential 2 p <i>open 12-15-92 NLS 92-97</i>	6/24/67	A
#9a letter	Leonard Marks to Barry Zorthian Confidential 2 p <i>open 3-31-00</i>	11/2/66	A

FILE LOCATION

Papers of Barry Zorthian [Material on JUSPAO, Vietnam]

RESTRICTION CODES

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DRAFT LETTER TO CARL ROWAN

EYES ONLY

File 1
J

Dear Carl:

I have held off answering your letter on the press problem in anticipation of the possibility that you might have come out on the McNamara visit. However, we received a list of the members of the party today and I gather USIA will not be aboard. Separate from this, we have been getting rumors that you will be out here soon, but ~~again~~ again since this has not been confirmed, I thought I had better go ahead with this response.

By now you will have seen our answer to the incoming EXDIS and I hope it meets your needs. Actually, the message was a result of several drafts and discussions and while I have a few lingering doubts about the fallback position stated in it, it pretty much is a product of our shop. I hope it is sufficient to put the issue at rest for the time being. Incidentally, one reason our response was a little ~~delay~~ delayed was that I kept dragging my feet in anticipation of receiving your letter which finally came in on Monday, July 5. By then our draft was pretty well complete and since there was no major conflict I let it go.

Actually, the message does not fully reflect my views. Your letter confirmed our own analysis and sounded almost like our drafts on the reasons behind the AP campaign. I think there are some very serious disadvantages in USIA as such being split off from the press operations. It may well have been worked separately if it had started that way, but by now the press aspect is so integrated within our ~~job~~ ^{work} that trying to divide it would be quite disruptive. However, even if we had

worked that out, I think the separation of the two functions would definitely affect the USIS status within the Mission and would also weaken at the same time the role of the press operations. The two functions interact and very often one role serves as an entre to the other. A separate press operation with no operational base and without being in the Mission Council (which the Ambassador definitely does not want to expand) would become a staff role with very little authority, particularly over the military. Furthermore, it is virtually impossible to get USIS completely out of the press business -- either in terms of operations or public relations advice --
you
and /would end up with really a two-headed monster plus the possibility of a third in terms of the military.



DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

June 23, 1965

Dear Barry,

I write to give you more information than could be given in the telegram about the discussions going on here relating to the charge that USIA is propagandizing the American public because a USIA man heads the press operation in Viet Nam.

First, I am bootlegging you a copy of Palmer Hoyt's letter to the President as well as copies of the attachments. Hoyt has admitted to me indirectly that he is being pushed by Wes Gallagher of Associated Press. United Press is also in the act. I tangled with two of their executives recently at a Sigma Delta Chi meeting.

You will note that the clamor is for a "military man," and part of this obviously springs from their belief that military men just talk a bit more loosely than do you civilians. You will also be interested in knowing that Sylvester has been plumping for a decision that would leave you in charge of the "regular" USIA program and put a military man (General Casey or Colonel Bankson) in the job of overall press co-ordinator. I shot this down in a meeting with McNamara and Cy Vance, with McNamara going along because "we never had a guy out there who did as effective a job as Zorthian, and I am just damned leary of giving up Zorthian for some untried military guy. The fact is, I don't believe we have got a guy in the military who's got the kind of ability in this field that Zorthian has."

My view is that the danger of a major and destructive flap on this issue is far less than Palmer Hoyt thinks, but he is the kind of guy who will push this argument, at Gallagher's behest, until he gets the President in a high state of agitation.

Mr. Barry Zorthian
Public Affairs Officer
American Embassy, USIS
Saigon

~~SECRET~~

Determined to be an
administrative marking
By jc On 6/4/15

~~SECRET~~ - 2

Another development within the last few hours is the fact that sources in Sylvester's shop are now leaking to selected correspondents here rumors that foul-ups in the information picture re Viet Nam are the blame of State and USIA, and that the only solution is to have a Defense Department man in charge. These reporters are being told that McNamara and the President insist on this. The truth is that McNamara wants it, but not the President. Rowland Evans has tipped me off on this little back-stabbing game.

You ought to know, Barry, that I have tentatively taken a negative position on the whole business, arguing that we ought not take such a disruptive move until we know beyond a doubt that it is necessary. I must say, however, that my three conversations with Palmer Hoyt indicate that there is no way to talk sense to these guys, and we shall have to take some kind of action.

It would seem to me that a better solution than the one proposed in the telegram would be for you to retain your ministerial rank and control of the broad USIA program, giving up all responsibility for press briefings. We would then designate Kaplan Counselor for Press Relations and detail him and the USIA back-up members of his briefing staff to the State Department. This would be salable back here, I think, only if the Ambassador came in with a strong recommendation along this line and some strong words in behalf of Kaplan's ability to handle the whole job. I don't need explain that Kappie is at a disadvantage because McNamara et al know you personally, have a high regard for you, and have continued to give you the credit for whatever has gone well even though Kaplan may have been the one directly involved and deserving of some credit.

In any event, I am emphasizing that the President is deeply interested in this because he is concerned about anything that threatens to erode his public support back here. I think you will understand this.

We look forward to your reply -- and I know that you will make it as frank and thorough as you can.

Meanwhile, be prepared for a few complications that may arise if and when newsmen begin to write back here on the basis of these Pentagon rumors.

If and when some action is taken along this line it may be wise to have you come here for some consultation.

Knowing

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Knowing this, we all thought that we ought explore with you there a few organizational or bureaucratic devices that will rob the critics of this new "propaganda" gambit that they have seized upon.

The whole Far East crowd here joins me in sending you and the crew there warmest regards.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Carl".

Carl T. Rowan

P. S. I understand Oliver Quayle of New York may visit Saigon. I have asked him to give you a call, so be on the lookout.

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Recd: Jul 8, 64
1430

FROM: DEPARTMENT

NO : 59, July 7, 8 pm

ACTION SAIGON 59 INFO CINCPAC UNN

SUBJECT: Public Affairs Policy Guidance for Vietnam

This guidance is effective this date and supersedes all previous messages on this subject except:

1. Joint State/DOD/USIA/AID message to Embassy SAIGON 2192 dated 6 June, 1964 /Subject: Country PAO will assume responsibilities of over-all press counselor.

Broad American Public and Congressional support are a requisite for the success of United States policy in Vietnam. Such support cannot be maintained in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust which would be created by a denial to the media of full coverage. It is therefore essential that the public affairs activities of all elements of the Mission to Vietnam be aimed at maximum candor and disclosure consistent with the requirements of security. It is the responsibility of the Country PAO to ensure that this policy is reflected in the information activities of all elements of the Mission.

Adequate coverage requires timely information as well as full information. To avoid delay in the flow of information to the media it is expected that decisions regarding disclosure will normally be made in Saigon. The Mission may, however, refer to home agencies matters of unusual sensitivity upon which a Washington decision is desired. It is believed that such referrals can be infrequent and it is therefore essential that the Mission keep Washington informed fully of

information made available in Saigon so that Washington agencies can coordinate their information activities accordingly.

Credibility is the key to the successful discharge of the Mission's responsibility to provide a full and accurate understanding of the US involvement in Vietnam. This guidance is intended to give to the Mission the flexibility required to meet media queries and interests in such a way as to establish firmly the credibility of the Mission's information activities. There will, of course, be occasions in which the mission will be unable to provide information desired by media representatives. However, as a priority matter of great importance the Mission should refrain from any information activity which would tend to mislead the media, or which would otherwise be damaging to mission credibility.

Mission information activities should emphasize the special problems posed by the fact that the struggle is not a conventional war of the type experienced by the US in the past, but an extended guerrilla struggle in which political, economic and social factors are as important as military and security factors. All decisions concerning US information policy should give due regard to the views of the civilian and military leadership of the GVN.

BALL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 7, 1965

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Dear Dan:

The attached letter to Len Marks is in response to a communication from him of September 27 on the report of the Stanton Committee.

If it meets with your approval, will you please pass it on to him.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

Barry Zorthian
Country Public Affairs Officer

Enclosure:
As stated

Mr. Daniel E. Moore
Acting Assistant Director (Far East)
U. S. Information Agency
Washington, D. C.

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administrative marking

By jc On 6-4-15

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

October 7, 1965

EYES ONLY

Dear Len:

Thank you for passing on the report of the Stanton Committee which I have reviewed thoroughly. We will undertake action on those items which are within our control.

In general, I certainly see nothing to object to. Quite the contrary, I think the Committee has been very perceptive and identified most of our serious problems.

Specifically, let me make the following comments:

1. Press Relations.

a. As you know, I have pressed both here and in Washington for raising the MACV PIO position to a General officer level. General Westmoreland has taken the position that he would not take the initiative on this, but would accept it if Washington requested it. At the same time, he wants to keep Colonel Legare until the end of his tour next March. My hope is that Colonel Roger Bankson can come out here at that time as a Brigadier General, but this needs Washington initiation. I expect to discuss this with Phil Goulding, Art Sylvester's deputy, this week.

b. I can only concur on the recommendation for greater autonomy from Washington, but this too is a problem than can be solved only from the Washington end.

The Honorable
Leonard Marks
Director
U. S. Information Agency
Washington, D. C.

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NARA, Date 6-4-85

By je

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2. General Psychological Problems.

a. We are certainly conscious of the need for coordination in our efforts in the psychological field and are making every effort to insure that there is no duplication or overlapping. We have to make greater progress in this area but I think the record to date is reasonably good. The Lansdale Group gives us some problems but I am hopeful that this too can be straightened out. Insofar as coordination at the Deputy Ambassador level is concerned, Ambassador Porter is starting twice weekly meetings for heads of Agencies for just such a purpose. I suspect that the meetings will eventually become daily and I would hope they meet the requirement. At any rate, we will keep a close eye on this.

3. Personnel.

a. There has been some discussion here of the possibility of selective return of dependents. I do not think such a decision is likely in the foreseeable future. However, the Mission is right now engaged in drawing up recommendations to Washington for equal treatment of all personnel on travel to safe havens, housing, etc. I think this will help improve morale although there is no doubt that the readmission of wives would be even better.

b & c. These have to be solved in Washington, but we are pushing our field officers particularly to continue their Vietnamese language training. The major problem here has been the need for getting our personnel aboard as soon as possible. Once we are up to strength in this initial build-up, there should be more time to provide language training for replacements. I agree that a language capability is important, and I would hope the Agency will pursue this type of training vigorously.

4. Materiel.

a. The paper problem for the military presses at corps level has been a serious one. We have been on top of

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this and MACV PolWar tells me that it is now resolved. We will continue to keep an eye on it. Insofar as our general paper problem is concerned, I have asked our people to give me a more detailed reading which will be transmitted to Jim Tull in response to a query from him on this same point.

b. I think the leaflet bomb problem is well on the way to solution. Jim Tull is well aware of the details on this.

c. JUSPAO transportation continues to be a problem. However, we have made considerable progress, particularly on shipping to the field. The two Otters assigned to us by MACV have given us a capability under our own control. We expect to get one more which will satisfy much of our needs. In addition, we have now stationed Lou Ross out at Tan Son Nhut Airport where he can take advantage of excess capabilities on regular flights going to points where we want to make deliveries. Lou was able to get out 50 tons in his first week, and at the moment, we have cleaned up our backlog. However, as our output increases, we may need more capability and we are working with MACV and USOM to that end now. The other half of the transportation problem is the personal travel of our Field Reps. This one will continue to plague us largely because there is a shortage of aircraft for all personnel throughout the country. MACV has been cooperative but there are limits on what it can do. We have been promised five choppers in due time, but I suspect it will be a number of months before we get these. Meanwhile, as aircraft, particularly choppers, become increasingly available, our own access to them will improve. The solution here would be a long-range one unless you can obtain from DOD an early commitment of five choppers specifically for JUSPAO.

d. The intelligence collection problem is a very real one on which we have made almost no start. I expect to have lunch with the MACV J-2, General McChristian, on this problem next week and perhaps we can get some new concepts moving. I do not think that progress will be fast but we will do the best we can.

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5. Radio.

a. The problem of obtaining peak use of the present radio equipment is a very real one. However, now that the new VTVN decree has been signed, we hope to make some progress. When we get the VOA technical training team out here I think we can anticipate some improvement, but this is not going to be an overnight process. We will do our best.

b. I have sent a message on the proposal for the airborne radio transmitters here but hope to discuss it at greater length with George Jacobs in the course of his survey.

c. The question of the high powered transmitter will depend to a great extent on George's judgment.

6. Television.

a. You are well aware of the situation on AFRTS Television.

b. We are waiting for the arrival of specialist personnel to undertake the GVN television project.

c. The proposal for 10,000 television receivers presents a real problem in financing. Washington will have to stimulate Japan and Germany to see if there are prospects for obtaining the receivers from them. If not, we will be facing the problem of financing from AID. I will discuss this with Charley Mann this week, but it will also require a good deal of push from the Agency. I think our specific needs and the problems involved will become more clear when we have gone through the initial phase of our talks with the GVN on the whole television project.

7. Miscellaneous.

a. By the time you get this letter, you will know that the use of tear gas has been authorized. I hope we handle the press relations aspect better this time.

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b. The Committee's comments on Chieu Hoi are very accurate. We still have not been able to stimulate GVN enthusiasm for the program and, in fact, pending the arrival of George Jacobson, the Mission's interest has also slackened somewhat. I would suggest a needle on this from the White House might be the best way to revive Mission pressures on the GVN. This is not one within the unilateral control of JUSPAO. It needs the active interest of all elements of the Mission.

c. We agree with the proposal and are in the process of drawing up a message to Washington on a number of technical items which must be developed for our use.

Over and above all these specific comments, I would raise one or two points that I hope will be pursued in Washington:

1. I still feel the need for either a re-statement or a modification of the June 6, 1964 message on press responsibilities. The DepTel number is 2192. There is the inevitable tendency to spin away from the spirit and concept of this message. The latest is word from Hew Ryan that USOM is talking about having its own press spokesman. This is not the type of thing where Ambassador Lodge would take real initiative, and I think we should fish or cut bait on the issue, by either reissuing the old directive or modifying it. Right now, I have responsibility on paper, but the authority is being diffused.

2. The diplomatic titles for Kappie and myself still haven't arrived, and although we are functioning in the new set-up, i. e. Kappie heads the Office of Press Services and reports directly to me, we are not able to formalize this until the new titles are on hand. If you could push this, it would be helpful. Incidentally, once the formal change is made, I think all telegrams on press relations involving American correspondents should be sent in the State Department series rather than in the USIA series in order to reflect the new situation.

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3. We are still desperate for manpower on board, particularly in Field Services. Anything you can do to push this along will help. I hope you have a chance to consider thoroughly the long letter I did on our future outlook in personnel. Sandy will be prepared to discuss this at greater length on his return.

There are probably other items, but I will be passing these on to Dan Moore as they come up. The ones listed, however, are important enough so that I wanted to take advantage of the opportunity of writing to you to raise them for your personal attention.

I might add, incidentally, that the situation with Sandy has improved tremendously since the Stanton visit, and that the personal problems have been resolved to an extent where the team is operating extremely well. I hate to see Sandy go, but I am hoping that Harry will be a more than adequate replacement.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

Barry Zorthian
Minister-Counselor for
Public Affairs

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year
intervals. Not automatically
declassified.

CONFIDENTIAL



UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON

[Handwritten signature] 36

DIRECTOR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 27, 1965

Dear Barry,

I have now received the written report of the Starzel Committee and I am enclosing a copy for your confidential reference. We have not released it to other interested agencies and I would suggest that you retain it for your own personal reference.

I have asked Hew Ryan to carry out the recommendations that have been made and he will be in touch with you on individual items. Needless to say, I would be interested in your reaction to the various points covered by the report.

Recent press publicity has focused on the weakness of the Chieu Hoi program. The enclosed clipping from the Baltimore SUN is an indication of this attitude. The Starzel Committee reported facts similar to these. Obviously if these reports are accurate something must be done to change the conditions promptly. Will you let me have your views on this so that I can be prepared to answer the criticisms if and when I have to.

By the time you receive this letter, you should have recovered from the "Hello Dolly" visit which I hope was successful.

Let me hear from you when you get the time to write.

Sincerely,

[Handwritten signature]
Leonard H. Marks

Enclosures

Mr. Barry Zorthian
Minister-Counselor
American Embassy
Saigon

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By *jc* NARA, Date *6-4-85*

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CONFIDENTIAL

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UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

WASHINGTON

September 16, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Marks

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Observations and Suggestions
on U.S. Information Policies and Programs in
Viet-NamFROM: U.S. Advisory Commission on Information
Viet-Nam Group

The following observations and suggestions resulting from a visit to South Viet-Nam by this group are submitted for your consideration:

1. Press Relations: Press coverage of the Viet-Nam situation is made extremely difficult because there is no clear-cut fighting front, because of the great barriers of cultural and linguistic differences, because the conflict is not entirely military in nature and because on the U.S. side our people must work by and through a local partner who is simply not prepared physically or mentally to work with an aggressive and free press corps.

The principal mechanical difficulties and complaints of the U.S. press corps are shortages of transportation and communication circuits. On the substantive side the press has its bitterest complaints for what they generally feel to be a lack of candor on the part of U.S. military briefers.

Suggestions: (a) That every effort be made to raise the caliber of military personnel assigned to press briefing in Viet-Nam and that the principal military public affairs position be filled by an officer of general's rank.

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NARA, Date 6-4-15By pc

- (b) That greater autonomy from Washington control be accorded the military briefing staff in Saigon.

2. General psychological problems: It is the consensus of the group that the two basic psychological problems which continue to confront the free world operation in South Viet-Nam are:

- a. Physical security particularly in the hamlets and villages.
- b. The lack of confidence in, and subsequent lack of loyalty to the central government.

While the psychological effort seems to be well directed in support of U.S. Government objectives in Viet-Nam, the group feels there is grave potential for duplication on the civilian side, particularly among the field operations of JUSPAO, USOM and other government agencies.

Suggestion: That particular emphasis be given the coordination of these efforts at the very highest level of the Mission, probably at the Deputy Ambassador level.

3. Personnel: The general level of JUSPAO personnel is excellent, the field representatives in particular. The need for personnel prepared for direct person-to-person confrontation with the Vietnamese, for which there is no substitute, in their own language is of prime importance.

The relatively short tour of duty (18 months) makes the maintenance of a general high level of competence most difficult.

The evacuation of dependents has placed a severe strain on morale.

The need for language competence (French in the urban areas, Vietnamese in the countryside) is of prime importance.

Suggestions: (a) That the possibility for selective return of dependents (i. e., wives without children) be considered.

(b) That every effort be made to provide language training for officers assigned to Viet-Nam.

(c) That a complete check of officers with Vietnamese language capability in both the Department of State and USIA be made to assure their utilization in Viet-Nam where possible.

4. Materiel: Shortages of paper appear to be slowing the publication of district newspapers and leaflets.

Air drops of leaflets are severely restricted by shortages of leaflet bombs.

The general transportation shortages, particularly of aircraft and helicopters, limits flexibility and speed in JUSPAO operations.

The lack of intelligence on impact of all our programs -- military, psychological and economic -- is still a major difficulty.

Suggestions: (a) That every effort be made to speed paper shipments and to assure a long-range pipeline of paper supplies.

(b) That further efforts be made to speed production and shipment of leaflet bombs and that possible modification of existing bombs of other types be studied.

(c) That the general problem of JUSPAO transportation needs be given high priority.

- (d) That intelligence collection and speedy dissemination be made a priority objective of all operations so that programs and products may be tailored to real program needs.

5. Radio: The group found VTVN inadequate in facilities and programming.

Implementation of the recommendations of the JUSPAO Radio Report are still delayed in Vietnamese Government channels despite continuing JUSPAO efforts.

The group has doubts about the real need for a 250 KW transmitter.

- Suggestions:
- (a) Every effort should be made to obtain peak use of present radio equipment and to obtain GVN approval of the JUSPAO VTVN reorganization plan.
 - (b) That the use of a U. S. Navy airborne radio transmitting facility be presented to JUSPAO for consideration.
 - (c) That a VOA radio engineer be sent to Saigon to study and recommend on the need for a high powered transmitter.

It is the group's view that a 50 KW transmitter would be sufficient.

6. Television: The group feels that the introduction of television in Viet-Nam should be given a high priority and that television could be an important factor in moulding political unity in South Viet-Nam.

- Suggestions:
- (a) That an AFRTS television operation with certain hours reserved for the GVN and a simultaneous Vietnamese language radio sound track for AFRTS troop entertainment programs be initiated at the earliest possible moment.

- (b) That at the same time the U. S. Government lend maximum assistance to the GVN in the initiation of a Vietnamese television operation.
- (c) That a minimum of 10,000 tropicalized TV receivers be made available for placement in hamlets and villages in the Saigon/Can Tho area for mass audiences.

7. Miscellaneous:

- (a) The group feels that a change in the present policy on the use of riot control gas would be in order and that, with proper handling, U.S. editorial support could be obtained for its use against VC bunkers.
- (b) The group found the GVN attitude toward the Chieu Hoi concept to be more in the form of lip service than active support. High GVN military commanders still fail to understand the importance of this program.
- (c) The group feels that U.S. military R&D should give high priority to the development of high-level, high-gain loudspeaker systems for both airborne and man-carried use.

APPROVED:

Palmer Hoyt
Frank Starzel



April 8, 1966

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Ambassador

You will recall that last week in a talk with you, I made the point that without your confidence and complete support, neither our Mission press relations effort nor I as an individual could be successful. You assured me at that time that both would be provided in full measure.

Unfortunately, the trends which I discussed with you at that time have continued. I have not been on distribution for messages which either directly or indirectly deal with press relations. I have not had access to important substantive messages. The situation reached a climax Thursday morning when I was specifically excluded from an important meeting of senior members of the Mission dealing with the present political situation. As a reflection of this trend, there has been an increasing tendency on the part of other elements in the Mission to ignore or circumvent my responsibilities in this field.

I cannot serve you effectively either as an individual or in operational terms without complete access to information and participation in senior Mission councils. Certainly, as a matter of personal dignity and in terms of functional responsibilities, I cannot function waiting in anterooms, begging members of the staff for bootleg reading of important cables, receiving directives second or third hand or being dependent on friends in court to establish my role in the general operation of the Mission. I do not want to be tolerated or patronized. Nor do I want to spend half my energies battling for the means to do my job.

I believe it is essential that we agree on a concept and modus operandi for the press relations effort. My concept is a clear one and I thought I had your concurrence. It can be

EYES ONLY

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stated simply: we must undertake a creative, active, positive press effort in order to encourage a knowledgeable and balanced press output that will help keep the American people as fully informed as the circumstances and national security permit. I need hardly tell you that an informed American public support is absolutely essential to the continuation and success of the program here in which we both believe we have such a vast national stake. There are implications in such a press philosophy on which there can be disagreement in detail but it is essential that we agree on the basic concept.

I realize you have been displeased about various specific items of press coverage of recent events. You have been too long in public life not to be aware that you cannot achieve a perfect record in press coverage; that in fact if you get sixty or seventy percent constructive and favorable coverage, you are doing well; and that, in certain circumstances, the real test is how much you can cushion a story which is inherently negative.

I do not intend to become defensive. I simply state that over the past year and a half, I think we have made tremendous strides in the calibre and tone of press coverage from this country. In the specific case of the present political situation, I think the coverage has been more balanced than we have any right to expect-- and I attribute this specifically to our press relations effort.

However, this effort is in clear jeopardy if the present trend in my status within the Mission continues. I do not want to stand by and see it deteriorate. This is not a matter of personal pride, though that is clearly involved. It is rather a matter of deep conviction as to what is important for our country's interests.

I want to continue to do an effective job for the Mission. But I need your renewed endorsement of these concepts and your active support in providing the means necessary to enable me to function properly to do so.

Barry Zorthian

BZ/def

~~SECRET~~

May 6, 1966

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ambassador William J. Porter

In further development of the comments I made Wednesday morning on the current political situation and the U.S. role in the interim period before the holding of national elections, I submit the following thoughts.

I believe our basic American policy should be predicated on the following considerations (which obviously represent judgments on the nature of the current situation):

1. A reassertion of central government authority is essential both to blunt the image of weakness created by the government during the past several weeks and to provide the necessary continuity and momentum for the war effort during the period prior to elections and formation of a new government. This reassertion must be undertaken skillfully but nevertheless forcefully and must have the encouragement and backing of the American establishment in this country.
2. Elections in principle must be endorsed but we must undertake an active role--although not blatant--to ensure that the outcome of the elections is as much in keeping with American interests as possible.
3. Election of a constituent assembly dominated by the Vien Hoa Dao would not be in American interests and may well be calamitous for Vietnam.
4. There is at present sufficient concern on the part of special-interest groups in Vietnamese society about the motives and intentions of the Vien Hoa Dao to provide a basis for countering the pressures of the Institute. These groups must be mobilized both to provide support for government reassertion of authority during the interim period and a majority control in the future constituent assembly.

~~SECRET~~

By JC

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
NARA, Date 6-4-15

To pursue the objectives implied in these considerations, I would propose that the Mission initiate preparation of a comprehensive plan of action for presentation to Washington and prepare to execute it under the active direction of the Ambassador. This plan should include the following elements:

1. Reassertion of government authority: I believe that the recent reaction to the Vlen Hoa Dao successes primarily by the VNQDD, Dai Viets and Catholics may have encouraged most members of the Directorate to recognize that they have prospective assets within the country if they undertake firm steps. I believe the Directorate should be encouraged to take steps in this direction through frank talks between Ambassador Lodge, you and the Generals. I should think that at least five of the six Directorate Members in Saigon and the III and IV Corps Commanders would be responsive to encouragement from us for reassertion of authority. I would list Vinh Loc as somewhat doubtful and General Dinh an even less likely supporter. General Chieu might also have reservations about a firm challenge to the authority of the Vlen Hoa Dao. The key factor is the Prime Minister and he needs both encouragement and promise of solid support from the U. S. if he is to make the necessary decisions and follow up with action. I am not talking about an extreme show of force or a bloodbath. I am talking about the government firmly reasserting itself on such issues as control of Radio Hue, adherence to its orders, control of the Buddhist chaplains, and punishment of military participants in the struggle movement.

2. I think an essential contribution to achieving the goal stated in the above paragraph is a clear expression of American support to leaders of various groups, both within and outside the government. Again, this need not be conspicuous nor public--although we should anticipate that our efforts will become known. Our position can be stated most appropriately when the Ambassador returns fresh from conferences with the President through a series of meetings with carefully selected representatives of groups whose natural interests are opposed to the Vlen Hoa Dao. We should make clear to them both our support for an election in an orderly manner and our insistence on the authority of the central government, particularly in regard to the war effort, during the interim period.

3. Looking further ahead, I believe that a carefully synchronized effort by all elements of the Mission which have channels of communication should be undertaken towards the young, progressive elements in Vietnamese society who represent the best hope of establishing a responsible, moderate and constructive representation in the Constituent Assembly. I believe this offer of support should be made inconspicuously but, nevertheless, clearly and positively. Unless we are not really concerned about the outcome of the election, our influence in the country should be used to ends consistent with U.S. interests. Those interests require the eventual direction of the country by the younger, progressive elements of the Vietnamese society. Unfortunately, these elements are now diffused, disorganized and weak. Only we may have the capacity to stimulate them into pulling together.

4. I believe we must undertake on our own behalf, and encourage the Vietnamese government to carry out in its own interest, a vigorous public information program both now in justifying firm government action for reassertion of its authority and in encouraging the election of moderate, responsible elements to the Constituent Assembly in the weeks ahead. The Prime Minister must be strongly pressed to utilize his available channels of communication and his own potential appeal to tell his government's story to the country. To do this, he needs a vigorous, completely committed Minister of Information or else a mechanism that circumvents the Ministry in order to meet the basic needs of the situation. Less blatantly, but nevertheless just as energetically, the U.S. should make its own motives and intentions in this country crystal-clear. I believe this can be done on both a face-to-face basis by carefully instructed officers of all elements of the Mission and through the few channels we have of direct communication with the Vietnamese people.

5. I believe one urgent, immediate step in this direction is a flat declaration of support for elections by the highest levels of our government. The opportunity for such a statement would be at the time of the completion of conferences between the President and Ambassador Lodge. The Buddhists are working vigorously to present themselves as proponents of a freely-elective government in this country and to cast the Americans in the role of opposition to a democratic process. The initiative and enterprise of the Buddhists, and our own inaction in this regard, provide a vacuum which they are

filling rapidly. We must establish ourselves as clearly in favor of democratic elections in this country. Our other activities to encourage desirable results in such elections should, of course, be undertaken without the benefit of public statements.

* * * * *

I recognize that the above thoughts would tend to imply a visible flexing of American muscle which runs counter to some of the current thinking and guidance we are receiving. I submit that the results of the elections are of crucial importance to our entire posture in Vietnam and that if we adopt a passive attitude towards the present weakness of the government apparatus and the forthcoming events of the next few months, we will place our entire effort here in jeopardy. It seems to me that we cannot maintain on one hand that our investment of a quarter of a million men and many billions of dollars in this country justifies our insistence on full partnership in the decision-making process and then pull back from this role when such a vital development as national elections is involved. To a great extent, the image we have in the world right now is one of manipulating a controlled Vietnamese government and showing a reluctance to get involved in a democratic process because we are not sure of the nature of the government that will result. We are in effect already receiving the opprobrium without the benefit of our supposed influence. I would propose we seek to modify this picture by endorsing publicly the whole process of democratic elections and then seeking to use our influence actively but quietly to encourage those whose election will be in our interest. We are not going to divest ourselves of the mantle of control in Vietnam by standing on the sidelines during the election process. Let us at least get the benefit of whatever leverage we can apply.

I would make clear that these suggestions do not call for heavy-handed tactics. Obviously, all our efforts must be carefully synchronized and skillfully executed. But we should not be fuzzy to ourselves about our objectives. We should and we must have an active role in the next few months on the Vietnamese political scene if U.S. interests are to be safeguarded.

Barry Zorthian
Director JUSPAO

BZ/def

SECRET



JOINT U.S. PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE

EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
SAIGON, VIETNAM

17 June 1966

MEMORANDUM TO: MR. BARRY ZORTHIAN, DIRECTOR, JUSPAO

SUBJECT: Comments Upon Completion of Assignment with JUSPAO

1. PREFACE.

a. The following comments, prepared in response to your request, reflect the experience gained during my service with JUSPAO in the past twelve months. This paper has been presented in the direct and dispassionate language of the soldier, which you would expect and recognize. It is completely devoid of innuendoes or intended ambiguities. It is submitted with constructive intent, in the hope that it will prove useful in the continuing development and exploitation of the JUSPAO concept as tailored to meet the environment in Vietnam.

b. Thematically, this memorandum is divided into two parts. Paragraph 2, "GENERAL," relates to several observations concerning the personnel with whom it has been my pleasure to associate. The remainder of the paper regards my assessment of our progress and related aspects, including organization, manning, and relationships with other US and Vietnamese agencies engaged in psychological operations.

2. GENERAL.

a. The past year has afforded a most revealing and interesting experience. It has also provided the opportunity to establish a number of valued friendships - particularly among the fine, high-caliber, young men who have constituted the real strength of my organization. The younger element in Field Services - and, to the best of my ability to judge, throughout all JUSPAO - is strongly motivated to establish high standards of performance; they are also imaginative and flexible. Their duties are difficult, and they operate in an unrelenting environment of pressure and frustration. They generally live under conditions far inferior to those available for the headquarters staff, and are often subjected to considerable hazard. They

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fight daily battles with local red tape, ignorance, and fear; they struggle endlessly for transportation, and are ever beset with problems of communication. Field representatives, in particular, should, upon completion of their tours of duty in Vietnam, be given preferential treatment in the selection of their follow-on assignments.

b. Several times during the past year, outstanding young men have come to my attention - young men who are capable, ambitious and strongly motivated to expand their range of capabilities. There is a small, but significant, percentage of bright young men in the service of the Agency who have the capacity, self-discipline, and desire to absorb graduate-level schooling. The aspirations of these men are largely ignored, and there is almost a premeditated effort made in some cases to take the men of unusual caliber and beat them back into the mold of the average. The details of one particular case could be readily provided upon request. In spite of the small size of the Agency, it would appear to be foresighted, at this time, to establish a graduate-level, civil-schooling program (leading toward advanced degrees) for specially selected applicants, with emphasis upon those area and technical fields of specialization most vital to the long term needs of the USIA.

3. EVALUATION AND COMPLEMENTARY CONCLUSIONS.

a. A number of years of my service have been focused upon the preparation of objective studies - assignments in which primary duties have involved complex analyses in a great variety of fields. The "evaluation" presented herein, as well as the conclusions which follow, can all be substantiated in detail, if desired. Since certain of the elements presented undoubtedly correlate with detailed information available to you, and since other elements, when viewed from your perspective, may be of marginal significance, detailed substantiating evidence in support of each conclusion, though amply and readily available, has not been provided in this report.


b. OVERALL ASSESSMENT.

It may be correctly deduced, on the basis of objective JUSPAO reports provided on both a weekly and monthly basis, that JUSPAO has made great strides during its first year in being. There has literally been an order of magnitude change in our capacity to cope with psychological problems in the GVN and contiguous areas. Unfortunately, from an evaluation standpoint, it has become the practice to measure our progress

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in "gross" terms with respect to our starting point in June '65, rather than in "net" terms. An evaluation of our progress is only meaningful if it is examined with respect to the changing requirements for psychological operations to which we should respond. In short, it is not enough to look at what we have done; it is fundamentally necessary to examine what we have done with respect to what must be done. By examining only what JUSPAO has done, our record appears excellent; by examining what JUSPAO has done with relation to the requirements at hand, our progress has been unsatisfactory. In fact, when viewed from the standpoint of what is produced in support of our field operations, we are falling further and further behind each month. (A partial insight into this situation is presented in paragraph (d), page 6.)

Graphically, this situation may be presented as follows:



This graph is simply a tool to assist in the visualization of our circumstances. "Requirements," as well as "JUSPAO capacity," include all facilities and personnel resources relating to all of our media. It is in no way intended to imply that:

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(1) "Requirements," as well as "JUSPAO capacity," can be presented as linear progressions.

(2) That the degree or rate of divergence between "requirements" and "JUSPAO capacity" at any point in time can be measured in absolute terms.

(3) That requirements can be extrapolated to increase indefinitely.

However, the implication that JUSPAO capability today corresponds to what was required at a considerably earlier date and is far short of current requirements is indeed intended.

c. COMPLEMENTARY CONCLUSIONS.

GENERAL.

(1) There is a pressing requirement to re-examine and to redefine the relationship between JUSPAO and MACV. The circumstances attendant one year ago (from the standpoint of personnel and facilities resources available to JUSPAO vs MACV, the requirements in support of military forces and civilian populations, the character of the government of the RVN, and the national status, militarily, economically, politically, psychologically) are vastly different from those existing today. There are many indicators suggesting that what was designed basically for the earlier environment will, at the very least, require some modification to meet the requirements of the current and projected environments.

(2) A much closer relationship must exist between the US and Vietnamese personnel engaged in psychological operations. This is an area of major deficiency. The only operating psyops agency today at the working level which includes representation from all the primary psyops agencies (Vietnamese Armed Forces, Ministry of Information and Chieu Hoi ((MICH)), MACV PolWar and JUSPAO) is the Quality Control Group, established by the undersigned in Oct '65. This group meets once per week to screen new materials prior to their production for mass distribution. To exploit effectively the available psyops potential, serious consideration should be given to the colocation of Vn/US planning, research and analysis, and development elements. The Advisory Division of the MACV PolWar

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Advisory Directorate is physically integrated with the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) of the RVNAF High Command. On 2 June 1966 the GPWD established a Psywar Coordinating Center manned with a combined RVNAF/MACV staff. This center, once it becomes fully operational, will be available around the clock in order to:

(a) Maintain contact with units in the field and Vietnamese and US psywar and information agencies and media in Saigon.

(b) Respond rapidly to requirements for military psywar support and news releases.

The addition of MICH, COMUSMACVIO, and JUSPAO representation in this new center would be of great value as an initial step to tie these agencies together in a fully coordinated and resonant operation.

(3) JUSPAO has serious organizational deficiencies which preclude the effective accomplishment of its current mission.

(a) Fragmentation of command. The direction of the JUSPAO effort (including planning, programming, research and analysis, development, media distribution, coordination and the control of field operations) is most time consuming and demanding. We have long since passed the time when one man can undertake this assignment on a part time basis. This is a full time job. One individual must be given the task of Director of JUSPAO Psychological Operations, with complete responsibility for the day-to-day operations (including operational control over both the personnel and facilities resources available.) He must also have direct access to all US and Vietnamese agencies engaged in psychological operations. This would not preclude the establishment of a higher echelon to provide overall supervision and guidance for psychological operations, cultural activities and press services.

(b) JUSPAO manpower and facilities resources now available are substantially below the levels required to accomplish the mission as currently interpreted. The current personnel ceiling essentially represents the maximum (or near maximum) level which experienced, "career" personnel in JUSPAO believe can reasonably be drawn from the overall Agency strength, rather than that which is necessary to do the job. It is questionable whether the current JUSPAO resources are even adequate to support the growing Revolutionary Development program alone. The remedial alternatives are

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either to retain comprehensive missions and find the additionally sources of qualified manpower to perform them, or to delimit the JUSPAO missions to conform to the capabilities of the personnel now available.

(c) The Office of Field Services is not organized properly to perform its currently prescribed mission. This office, with its Field Representatives Division and Development Division, is by far the most important JUSPAO source of information relating to the psychological needs, reactions and characteristics of the people, as well as for the development, distribution, and personal contact measures for responsive actions. However, there is not a single space in this office to perform the vital functions of correlation, analysis, research, or short range planning. It was discovered and reported as early as September '65 that the "Planning Staff," operating directly under the Director of JUSPAO, could not respond to the requirements of Field Services and, during the recent field representatives meeting in May, the Chief of the Planning Staff highlighted the inability of his organization to respond to the needs of Field Services during the past year--as well as the reasons therefor. The Assistant Director for Field Services must have this type capability directly under his control to perform his mission coherently.

(d) Both divisions of Field Services are understrength. The Field Representatives Division is only moderately effective at its present strength; the Development Division is completely unsatisfactory. In the latter case, this is not a reflection upon the personnel assigned; this division is not even a skeleton of what it should be. To make a quick check upon this conclusion, it might be of interest to examine the development output during the past several months in the following vital areas:

1. Chieu Hoi Campaign. (No time or capacity for originality.. have drawn largely upon slightly modified materials developed for the Tet Campaign. This campaign has produced far less printed media (almost exclusively on DOD presses) than the Tet Campaign and with more than twice the lead time. There has been no manpower available to effect any significant media integration.)

2. Bounty Campaign. (Approved by Mission Council weeks ago..nothing out yet.)

3. Tape Operation. (Far below requirement.)

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4. Expanded emphasis on US presence. (Nothing.)
5. Saigon Campaign. (Have not scratched the surface.)
6. Exploitation of joint US/Vn military operations. (Very, very little.)
7. Exploitation of joint US/Vn civic action programs. (Nothing.)
8. Exploitation of RD progress, aside from posters. (Marginal results with respect to requirement, but first priority emphasis is now going into this area.)
9. Centralized assistance for provincial newspapers--cliche' program. (Just beginning to move.)
10. Hero Program. (Stalled since Tet.)
11. Original development work, such as the wordless leaflets. (No project officer available..completely inadequate.)
12. New projects. (No time, no project officers..plenty of ideas available.)
13. Poster layouts in response to field request. (Very substantial response. Much of this is in support of the RD effort.)
14. Leaflet reorder operations in response to field requests. (Very substantial response.)
15. Development of new leaflets in support of priority themes. (Completely unsatisfactory.)

This check list is by no means exhaustive, but will provide a quick basis for assessment of conclusion validity. About 90% of the development effort is now being channeled into RD, which will leave very little residual capability for all the other programs.

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(e) The authority and responsibilities vested in the Office of the Assistant Director for Field Services during the past year do not substantiate a requirement for a general officer. Although a brigadier general in this position becomes the most senior military psy-warrior in Vietnam, he is completely divorced from any direct contact with the heart of the psychological operations effort--the establishment of policy, direction of research and analysis, planning, programming, coordination with and monitorship of the MACV effort. This office has not even had a Vietnamese counterpart during the entire year. From a substantive standpoint in the field of psychological operations, the Chief of the MACV PolWar Advisory Directorate has considerably greater responsibilities and authority than does the JUSPAO Assistant Director for Field Services. In addition to having operational control over manpower and facilities resources, which dwarf those of JUSPAO by comparison, the Chief of MACV PolWar has a Vietnamese major general (Chief GPWD) as counterpart, and authority to coordinate with JUSPAO in the vital areas of policy, research and analysis, planning, and programming.. areas excluded from the purview of the JUSPAO Assistant Director for Field Services. MACV PolWar is also a partner in the out-of-country leaflet operations, which, from a JUSPAO standpoint, have always been handled outside Field Services, directly under the Deputy Director of JUSPAO.

(f) From a substantive standpoint within JUSPAO, the Chief of the Planning Staff has, under current guidelines, greater responsibility and authority than does the Assistant Director for Field Services.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS. It is recommended that:

a. A joint group be established -- as a matter of first priority-- to re-examine and redefine the relationship between JUSPAO and MACV in the field of psychological operations, both in the current and projected environments. The primary objective of such study should be to maximize the effectiveness of the US contribution to psychological operations in Vietnam. Resultant roles and missions must be feasible of accomplishment, reflecting the qualitative and quantitative resources available to both agencies.

b. JUSPAO now provide representation in the Psywar Coordinating Center, established by the RVNAF GPWD, and exert its influence in also promoting representation in this body by the MICH, JUSPAO's counterpart agency.

c. JUSPAO initiate action fostering closer integration of the US and Vietnamese psychological operations agencies. Particular consideration should be given to the colocation of Vn/US planning, research and analysis, and development elements.

d. A Director of JUSPAO Psychological Operations be established with complete responsibility for JUSPAO's day-to-day operations, including operational control over both the personnel and facilities resources available. This would be a full time job.

e. The general officer assigned to JUSPAO be designated either the Director or Deputy Director of JUSPAO Psychological Operations. If designated as Director, his deputy should be a civilian. To preclude the possibility of the deputy becoming a desk-bound, glorified executive officer, and to enhance his substantive participation in the psychological effort, it is further recommended that an administrative executive be assigned to the office of the Director of JUSPAO Psychological Operations.

f. JUSPAO be reorganized and manned in a manner compatible with the accomplishment of the mission defined as a result of recommendation a.

g. The position of the chief of the organization responsible generally for the functions of the current Office of Field Services be downgraded to the rank of colonel.

5. CLOSING REMARKS.

a. We have reached, in my opinion, a point of decision in the evolution of JUSPAO in Vietnam. Please allow me to direct your priority attention to the three major conclusions in this paper:

(1) There is a pressing requirement to re-examine and to redefine the relationship between JUSPAO and MACV.

(2) A much closer relationship must exist between the US and Vietnamese personnel engaged in psychological operations.

(3) JUSPAO has serious organizational deficiencies which preclude the effective accomplishment of its current mission.

b. Please do not allow minor details in this paper, such as personal evaluations of the degree of progress in specific projects of the Field Services

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Development Division, to becloud basic conclusions. In the foregoing example, while there may be many differences in shading possible with respect to each of the few projects selected, there is no doubt in the minds of our development personnel that they are grossly understaffed to accomplish their assigned missions.

c. You will also recognize in reading this paper that nothing of substance mentioned therein is at variance with my views as expressed directly to you in the course of the past year.

d. The past year with JUSPAO has been an educational experience which has substantially broadened my horizons. It has been particularly interesting to have had the opportunity to be associated with a man of your capability and stature.


JOHN F. FREUND
Brig Gen, Army



EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
SAIGON, VIETNAM

JOINT U.S. PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE

July 24, 1966

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Barry Zorthian
Director

FROM : Harry S. Casler
Acting Director *HS*

SUBJECT : General J. F. Freund's Completion
of Tour Memorandum

I have studied the 12 June draft of Fritz Freund's memorandum and I consider it necessary to make the following observations for the record in order to put his memo into proper perspective.

First, there is an assumption made in his paper that JUSPAO's role is fundamentally operational; that JUSPAO and its material output must automatically grow in size relative to the increase in the U.S. commitment and that our mission is primarily technical and concerned with production.

This is not the case. Our mandate, stemming from the President and the National Security Council, charges us basically with policy and substantive supervision and coordination of all in-country U.S. psychological operations. It may, and indeed does, include production of materials, but obviously limited to our capabilities and to our primary job of "energizing" the psyops effort through pilot projects, new campaign ideas, with a particular focus on civil-oriented programs such as Chieu Hoi, refugees, revolutionary development, U.S. presence and the VIS advisory effort.

In practice, over the past year's buildup, JUSPAO has provided guidance and field expertise where asked and needed. As the U.S. military tactical psyops capacity has increased, JUSPAO has withdrawn as prime operators in tactical psywar. This is as it should be. It is simply not feasible, given our primary mandate and our limited resources, to compete in terms of output or productive capacity with

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
NARA, Date *6-4-15*

By *jc*

the vastly larger U.S. Army. Nor is it our intent to compete. The Army has the capacity; we should supply the ideas and guidance. Thus, there is no critical need, as the memo suggests, to expand indefinitely--adjustments yes, but total control of all psyops from beginning to end, no!

Flowing from a proper appreciation of our true mission and realistic capacity to perform, there seems to be no requirement to re-evaluate our relationship to MACV, any more than there is a requirement to redress our relationship with AID or the Embassy. Our responsibility is policy and our action programs catalytic in nature. This relationship remains firm. We surely wish to confirm our position vis-a-vis MACV; perhaps even to refine it in terms of the past year's experience, but to change or modify it calls JUSPAO itself into question. This we are not prepared to do.

The problem of JUSPAO-GVN relationships is a real one. We must constantly seek closer relationships and more effective means of understanding. We must work toward a community of effort and a joint approach to common psyops problems. A first attempt has been made, described in the draft memo as the "Quality Control Group." It is the general opinion of those involved directly in the workings of the group that it has not succeeded. The Vietnamese relegate it to a low level of coordination; they are reluctant to pass on our materials, and they make no effort to show us their materials. While this has aided in contacts, it has not met the need. Efforts are now going forward to reconstitute the board in a more effective and workable manner. Co-location is not basic to the problem, it is an accidental, a nice touch. It has not worked especially well for MACV, and the PsyWar Coordinating Center has so far shown nothing new or dramatic. Mutual respect and confidence make for a joint effort, not co-location.

There are of course various inadequacies in any organization which has expanded as rapidly as has JUSPAO. But to suggest that the organization is seriously deficient is unfair, and more reflective of misconception than it is of constructive criticism.

A reorganization of Field Services to respond to field needs and to reflect more adequately our advisory effort has been, as you know, under consideration for some time. The problem is one of restoring autonomy to the field, where the action is, rather than over-centralizing in Saigon in a highly structured bureaucracy.

It would also seem in order to observe, at least parenthetically, that the workability of JUSPAO depends upon the ability of its senior officers

to lead rather than command. JUSPAO is by definition a joint staff quite unlike the normal army command structure.

Tightening up of an organization is always a preferred managerial technique rather than to lean to indefinite expansion of personnel "to meet needs." JUSPAO in FY '67 is being staffed to meet its authorized mandate. It is making no attempt to staff itself to take over the mechanical aspects of production and distribution which can and should be the function of army psyops units and personnel. They are equipped logistically to do this; we are not. JUSPAO is staffed to create ideas and to advise psyops; the army is not.

With regard to the organization of Field Services, let me say most emphatically that the answer, as General Freund constantly argued, is not to absorb JUSPAO into Field Services. To increase the effectiveness of the Planning staff requires attention to Planning, not its transfer. Senior officers in Field Services do not want the planning function on the solid ground that it would permit them to judge and evaluate their own output. Rather, they prefer assignment of one competent policy officer, able to seek out facts, correlate them and turn them to use.

Staffing of Field Development Division is proceeding apace. A new USAF special projects officer has arrived, and four additional positions have been requested to meet increased legitimate program demands. A concurrent increase in both the headquarters and field staffs of the Field Representatives Division is also contemplated.

Programming is moving forward at a measured pace. The critique is inaccurate in certain instances as indicated below.

1. While leaflets give high visibility and provide good material for reports, their proved effectiveness is not nearly as high as radio or airborne messages. On radio, our output, for example, in two priority areas--Chieu Hoi and Revolutionary Development--went from 53 hours in 1965 to 133 hours to date in 1966. More than 3900 tapes are in use in the field.

2. The Chieu Hoi program is progressing satisfactorily. There has been originality, there is a strong local program in effect, the media are integrated (radio, leaflets, cultural drama teams, armed propaganda teams, face-to-face contact, press input and indoctrination coupled to a highly professional US Chieu Hoi team headed by a presidential selectee and a JUSPAO officer detailed to AID). Additional details are to be found in FM 5 dated 7/19/66 (attached). The fact is the Freund memo basically implies that only leaflets can do the

job; this is not the case. The memo also reflects a general lack of knowledge as to details of the national Chieu Hoi psyops program and its underlying problems.

3. The Bounty Program is a prototype to be developed by JUSPA O and implemented by MACV/PolWar. The original campaign materials have been prepared and submitted to the Ministry for approval. At present, MICH still sits on a decision as to whether to approve the campaign or not. Over a dozen representations have been made in an effort to obtain a decision. The change in Ministers should facilitate a reply. The Freund memo seems to have overlooked these facts.

4. The national tape operation, in our opinion, is proceeding on schedule. We have about 4000 tapes in use; each week one basic tape is being designed, approved and produced. The question of how much is enough is one which General Freund never quite understood.

5. A decision was taken, based on Mission Council orders, to concentrate on Chieu Hoi and Revolutionary Development. American presence has suffered correspondingly due to strained resources. This does not mean that nothing is being done; programs are constantly in motion locally; we have simply not implemented a new national campaign.

6. Saigon Campaign: We are deeply involved in the support of AID projects, security, VIS backup and the "cleanup" campaign. We have a senior field rep assigned full-time to this task and he has a fully developed program in hand coordinated through the Mission Liaison Group. This is not a question of "scratching the surface," it is a question of moving forward in step with solid achievements. Propaganda does not get out ahead of policy.

7. Civic Action: This is a marginal program--a military favorite (candy, chewing gum, a smile, and a paint job for the schoolhouse); it is handled as such and left up to our Field Representatives to judge and exploit those effective actions deserving of attention.

8. Revolutionary Development: The General has no idea of the scope of this campaign, nor of the need for caution in jumping the gun on work in progress. RD is being very heavily supported with hundreds of thousands of posters, millions of printing impressions, hours of radio time, and days of VIS training seminars. We are entirely abreast of RD progress.

9. Provincial Newspapers: The memo seems to overlook the fact that in the past 14 months JUSPAO has created 20 provincial newspapers (to a total of 33), assisted over 100 district newspapers and has pre-empted over 50% of the space in each issue of the province papers. This is a record second to none. A province paper is just that--it should not be centrally handled. We do, however, provide photo, cartoon and cliché service to the provinces.

10. Hero Program: Vietnamese officers have been very frank in their conversations as to why they did ^{not} want the "hero" program. It is not in their culture. The General was told this but rejected it; his intent was to build a military image and culture be damned. The fact is we depend on Vietnamese sources and they do not produce--purposely.

11. Original Work: The memo errs. Original work rates heavy priority. I cite the excellent thinking done by Field Development on elections. Freund's "wordless wonders" have failed. Surveys have shown that they do not come across. A new tabloid for VC areas has just been developed--completely original.

Quite obviously, if we had more people we would have more ideas and more coverage. We are aware of this deficiency and there are, as discussed above, plans to redress the situation. Priority projects are being satisfactorily covered and we still have some room for new notions. This indictment is terribly unfair and reflects rather dismally on the memo's inability to grasp the reality of psyops in action.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A. A joint group be established to re-examine the JUSPAO/MACV relationship

Only the Secretary of Defense, the Director of USIA and the President can change JUSPAO. What is needed locally is not another committee but a MACV commitment to carry out its function in the same spirit that JUSPAO wishes to carry out its own mission. Any effort to permit MACV policy and monitoring control of psyops should be resisted as a violation of presidential directive.

B. JUSPAO provide representation in the PsyWar Coordinating Center

We would be happy to cooperate in PCC if our function of policy advisor is clearly understood by MACV.

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6)

C. JUSPAO unify US/GVN psyops agencies

Steps are under way to reinforce the joint US-Vietnamese coordination effort.

D. A Director of JUSPAO psyops be established

The Director must take this decision on reorganization. I personally would not appoint a czar and, if I did, it would be a civilian. Let's be frank: Generals are soldiers; they are not diplomats and they are not usually sensitive psywarriors.

E. A General Officer should be Director of Psyops

Not necessary if office functions properly.

F. The Reorganization of JUSPAO

The recommendation is valid only if this paper's premise is accepted.

G. Office of Field Services to be headed by a Colonel

A colonel is too junior. On the rank/^{list}he is at most a junior R-3.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7)

COMMENT

When Fritz comments on the advisability of assigning a general officer to Field Services, he mirrors his own frustrations and lack of joint staff experience. It is lamentable but true that the General failed to direct and lead his office. He tried to command and failed. He had a completely open door to policy considerations, but the fact was if he couldn't rule, he didn't want to play and so his frustrations. A personal observation: Freund was very impressed with his star; he did not accept civil authority gracefully.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8
September 2, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~OFFICIAL-INFORMAL~~

Dear Leonard:

Your letter of August 23 on your appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was extremely useful in providing us some background and evaluation of the exchange of views.

I am certainly pleased to know that you intend to continue the sponsorship of visits here, since our own evaluation is that this has been one of the most useful programs in obtaining more balance and perspective in coverage of Vietnam by correspondents from other countries. We will continue to support the program from this end as required.

I am a bit confused, however, by your instruction that "all USIA employees are to restrict their activities to the dissemination of non-military news to foreign journalists."

While Jack Stuart and I are on the Embassy staffing pattern, the rest of the employees working with the press remain on the JUSPAO/USIS payroll. This includes the four officers working with Jack Stuart, as well as Bob Collinge and those of his staff in the AID Information Office who deal with correspondents.

All of these officers work with American correspondents as well as foreign journalists and, in fact, I would think that the bulk of their work involves Americans. Furthermore, of course, JUSPAO provides logistical support for these activities and thus we have additional resources that could logically be said to be supporting press efforts for American correspondents.

Honorable Leonard H. Marks
Director
U. S. Information Agency
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-97
By ing, NARA, Date 12-15-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

I assumed this situation was clearly understood in Washington and, in fact, endorsed.

I find nothing unusual in our practices here, since our press attaches in every country in the world work with American correspondents as well as with foreign journalists. I try to meet the potential problem here by describing my job as two-hatted--one hat being Director of JUSPAO, the other hat being Minister-Counselor of Information in behalf of the Ambassador. I also state that Jack Stuart and his press people are technically outside of JUSPAO but obviously work very closely with the JUSPAO organization. We have never had any questions or complaints about either our actual operating arrangements or this organizational relationship since the time of the Palmer Hoyt questions in the summer of '65.

I would hope we can continue with our present system since it works fine and does not seem to involve a potential problem from the correspondents here.

If we are to apply your instructions literally, then all four officers working with Jack Stuart and at least two of the four working with Bob Collinge would have to be shifted to the Embassy staffing pattern and payroll.

Please let me have your thoughts.

Insofar as the Paul Nevin television program is concerned, we here were of course aware of the program and the news stories which emerged from it. I have not, however, ever seen a full transcript of the program and, to the best of my knowledge, have not received a request of yours for a response. I tried to find a transcript here but I am unable to do so. If you could send one out to me promptly we will, of course, prepare a reply for your use.

The coverage of your appearance before the Foreign Relations Committee was quite positive from where we stand and the clippings you have given me indicate that this impression is accurate. However, we may find differently when we get the news stories on Art Sylvester's appearance.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Everything is going as well as can be expected here. While we have our full quota of daily operating problems, we have no major headaches on which we need your assistance at this point. Part of the reason is that you and the Agency have given me an outstanding staff and the pros we have on hand here are taking hold and carrying out our mission with tremendous vigor and imagination. You should be very proud of them. That applies to the military people assigned to us as well as the civilians.

My best regards.

Sincerely,

Barry Zorthian
Minister-Counselor for Information

BZorthian/def

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON

80
HSC

August 23, 1966

Dear Barry,

As you have read from newspaper accounts, I appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week to testify about our program of sending foreign journalists to Viet Nam.

The press reports were good and I feel quite satisfied since a majority of the Committee enthusiastically endorsed the program and urged me to expand it. Senator Fulbright expressed some doubt as did Senator Case.

I have informed the Area Directors that we will continue on the same basis as previously and that there is to be no diminution of our effort. However, I cautioned all Area Directors about sending representatives of newspapers which could afford to send their own correspondents. However, if there are circumstances which justify paying transportation of a correspondent for a large financially-able newspaper, I will consider such.

During the time that I was questioned about our news policies, I emphasized that we are responsible for the dissemination of non-military news to foreign journalists. As head of JUSPAO you have wider responsibilities but I want to emphasize that all USIA employees are to restrict their activities in this fashion.

I was specifically questioned about a one-hour television program conducted by Paul Niven in which Dean Brelis, Malcolm Browne and two others participated. They were quite critical of information officers generally, but did not refer to USIS in any fashion.

I assume that you have seen the script of the program and are familiar with the criticism. I had previously requested a response to

Mr. Barry Zorthian
Director
JUSPAO
American Embassy
Saigon

each of the critical comments but have not yet received such. Accordingly, I am writing to you at this time with the request that you attempt to furnish me with a reply which can be used in the event that further inquiry is made. For your further guidance, I want you to know that I found the Committee courteous and considerate but genuinely concerned about the news and information policy. As I have told you many times in person, I feel strongly that we must at all times maintain a policy of telling the truth and making widest dissemination of facts available to us, keeping in mind security considerations. I know that you share this view.

Several clippings are enclosed showing the nature of press comment.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'Leonard H. Marks', written over a series of horizontal lines.

Leonard H. Marks

November 12, 1966

PERSONAL~~CONFIDENTIAL~~OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Dear Leonard:

This letter constitutes a quick response to your letter of November 2nd on the Bartholomew/Starzel report. I would assume that the substantive points raised will be the basis of further discussions with both Dan Oleksiw and Ed Brooke and Ben Posner when they arrive, and I would hope that my comments below can be developed further at that time.

With reference to your various numbered paragraphs, let me make the following observations:

1. It probably would be in bad taste to take issue with their comments about me in view of the complimentary nature of their evaluation. But I really do not feel I have lost either my objectivity or enthusiasm for this job although, as you and I have often discussed, I think the completion of my third year here is more than long enough and the transfer by the end of the present academic year is very much in order. As to the comment on my "objectivity," I would simply note that we were laboring at that time under the very sobering influence of what we thought was a budget cut of one-third in our program--an assumption that has since been clarified by the Agency and which relieves us of much of the disappointment and despair which we undoubtedly reflected in our talks with the visitors.

2. It is true that we have had a considerable proliferation of activities in Saigon and I would agree that some are possibly of doubtful value. I would simply note that

Honorable Leonard H. Marks
Director
U. S. Information Agency
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By je NARA, Date 6-4-15

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-2-

our proliferation reflects the broader proliferation of the Mission's activities and, while I would not endorse this diffusion of Mission efforts, since it has taken place JUSPAO has no choice but to provide the essential information support necessary to the execution of the various programs. Actually, I think we have been one of the voices within the Mission calling for concentration on fewer programs which, in turn, would permit a greater focus of our own efforts. But the facts of life are that we must follow the Mission and, therefore, the proliferation we have becomes inevitable in view of the Mission's proliferation.

I would also agree that "the time has come for a searching and comprehensive reappraisal of the Agency's position and proper functions." As you are well aware, I have some very firm thoughts on this particular subject but also recognize there is much to be said to the contrary. I have urged that the Agency undertake just such a reappraisal for a long time. I would like to present my views in such a process but I think the basic point, that a definitive decision must be made, is a very well taken one. Their comments on various aspects of media operations are much to the point, although I would raise questions about the implications of their questions. The trouble is that we deal in such qualitative phrases as "absolutely essential." It is hard to justify much of our programming throughout the world as "absolutely essential" and, if you ask me to say every piece of printing we do meets the yardstick of essentiality, I would fall flat on my face. On the other hand, if you ask are the activities worthwhile or are the potential returns from the amount invested a justifiable expense on the part of the U. S. Government, then I think the answer is quite different. We tend to get into the trap of applying to our operations standards and yardsticks which, applied in other areas, would result in savings that could pay for the JUSPAO budget several times over. Certainly, I do not think the volume of printing we undertake is generated by the presence of production capacity. As a matter of fact, one of our most critical shortcomings in resources is the lack of production capacity and the task of printing at the province level is a major undertaking that is pursued only because of the feeling on the part of our field representatives that the product is essential.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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-3-

A question like the merits of "actualities" in VOA broadcasts is something best answered by the Voice itself. But I would note that this question is as old as radio itself and, as a personal viewpoint, I believe an actuality is far preferable to a studio-originated reportage. The cost of these VOA language feeds is about \$12,000 a year and, to me at least, represents a highly worthwhile investment of funds.

I am not quite sure about the significance of the question on our motion picture division output. If one accepts the JUSPAO basic mission in Vietnam, then I would think that supporting films are justified. If one does not, then the question of whether this effort is "essential" is a real one.

Again, the question of research by a commercial firm is a valid one. Do we have the funds or can we get the funds to undertake work through commercial outputs? We still would need a research officer to provide the guidance and coordination and, therefore, would not save much in the way of personnel but, presumably, could get a much broader base for our research efforts here. I should note that we are already using commercial firms through arrangements with MACV in a number of areas. ARPA has provided the services of people from Simulmatics and we work closely with the Rand operation. We seek no duplication but, overall, I would agree that perhaps more can be diverted to commercial channels if funds are available.

3. I certainly agree on "the need for a definitive appraisal of output in printed and voice media." For me to argue that all our product is effective would be foolhardy. We are learning every day. I am not sure which officer is quoted about "appealing to the Vietnamese to support the government" but I suspect this is a new officer. We do not issue much that appeals for GVN support in a vacuum. The Vietnamese peasant has grown sensitive to propaganda and what he wants to see are concrete results. So most of our output is based on actual visible product; not on philosophical appeal. That we have fallen down in execution of this principle on occasion is something I would find hard to deny. But to propose that we have a study of what

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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-4-

motivates people shows a lack of appreciation of how much we know. We are aware that the peasant is motivated by some very basic desires--security, a "just" government, medical facilities, educational opportunities, more product from the land. Our real task here is to get the Vietnamese Government, with our assistance, to produce results in these areas and then to exploit them through the Vietnamese and JUSPAO mechanisms.

An answer even at this length to such basic and legitimate questions as those you have listed is unsatisfactory in many ways. I wish I had an opportunity to discuss these points at greater length. I have no question about the value of such questions and about the need for constant reappraisal and adjustment in our operations, but I also believe that the answers to these questions must come from thorough and considered judgments based on experience and on-the-scene requirements. I do not assure you we have a one hundred percent effectiveness out here. I do believe that we are much more discriminating than perhaps seems to be the case.

Let me add as a footnote that the Agency's cable making clear your desire to maintain present program levels has come as a great relief to all of us. The passions and heat of the past three weeks were based on a very depressing feeling that we would have to cut back by fifty percent an operation all of us--the Agency and ourselves--had worked so long and hard to develop. We have no argument with the merits of maintaining our present program levels until our Agency fiscal situation is clarified. But the vote of confidence expressed by the Agency in keeping us going at our present rate has served to reverse the deteriorating morale which we have faced.

My very best personal regards.

Sincerely,

Barry Zorthian
Minister-Counselor for Information

BZorthian/def

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DIRECTOR

90
November 2, 1966

PERSONAL

Dear Barry,

I have now received the report from Frank Bartholomew and Frank Starzel based upon their recent visit to Viet Nam and their study of the JUSPAO operations.

I wanted to share with you some of their comments and conclusions as follows:

1. "Barry Zorthian is undoubtedly one of the Agency's best officers and has done a job that few people could do, given the limited means with which he has to work. But he has been charged with these responsibilities for nearly two years and may have lost some of his objectivity, a human reaction under the stresses and strains of the situation. Zorthian himself is aware of this and we understand so informed some Agency officials. Without wanting to become involved in Agency personnel assignment, we feel it would be to the Agency's advantage if he were reassigned as soon as is practicable to another post where his tremendous energy and capacity can be used to optimum advantage."

2. "There has developed in Saigon a proliferation of activities and functions some of which seem of doubtful value. This is inevitable in a war-time atmosphere and is an understandable element of waste resulting in these circumstances.

"The time has come for a searching and comprehensive reappraisal of the Agency's position and proper functions.

"For example, how much of the immense printing work is absolutely essential? How much of the volume is generated by the presence of production capacity?"

Mr. Barry Zorthian
Director
JUSPAO
American Embassy
Saigon

DECLASSIFIED

Authority USIA Guidelines 10-17-95

By fw, NARA, Date 5-22-00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - PERSONAL

- 2 -

"What priorities should be assigned to such functions as special reports to the Voice of America on news events which are fully covered in the services received in Washington? Do the so-called 'actualities' (recordings of statements by witnesses or the like) add enough to the Voice output to justify staff, equipment and communications expense involved in the process?

"The motion picture division is superbly equipped and can do magnificent work but how essential is this to the Agency's basic purposes?

"Specialized research has produced some commendable results but, in general, could the same be accomplished by referring the problem or need to commercial firms with greater facilities?"


3. "Similarly, there is a need for a definitive appraisal of output in printed and voice media. Officers in the field have raised questions respecting the applicability and effectiveness of leaflets, posters and similar material. As one officer put it, 'appealing to Vietnamese to "support your government" is an exercise in futility;' instead he suggested a study of what motivates the people to whom these appeals are directed and what leaves them unmoved."

4. "There were virtually no complaints from correspondents respecting the handling of non-military news; in fact, Barry Zorthian was commended frequently for his intelligent and capable briefings and assistance."

After you enjoy the compliments, I would appreciate your reflecting on the questions which have been raised and providing me with your response. Needless to say, this report is a very vital one and will lead to action on my part on each of the subjects studied.

It was good to talk with you in Manila and to exchange views on both personal and official problems. I do hope that we can resolve them to our mutual satisfaction.

Sincerely,



Leonard H. Marks

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - PERSONAL

B3 Chron
10

Saigon, Vietnam
November 14, 1966

UNCLASSIFIED
OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Dear Dan:

Enclosed are carbons of letters sent recently to Mr. Murray Dyer, Executive Secretary of the Ad Hoc Committee on Army Psychological Operations.

In preparing these letters, I am speaking only for myself of course and not for the Agency, but I thought you ought to have copies on file. As far as I am concerned, the contents can be used by Mr. Dyer as he wishes but you may want to put further restrictions on them, in the sense of labeling them purely as informal, off-the-record comments for the attention of the committee. In any event, I leave that to be worked out between you and Mr. Dyer.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

Barry Zorthian
Minister-Counselor for Information

Enclosures: A/S

Mr. Daniel P. Oleksiw
Assistant Director (Far East)
U. S. Information Agency
Washington, D. C.

COPY TO: Mr. Murray Dyer

BZorthian/def

UNCLASSIFIED

COPY FOR: Col. Johnston/Planning Office

B3 Chron
IDc

November 12, 1966

Dear Mr. Dyer:

Under separate cover, I am submitting to you a response to your letter of October 18th asking for comments on psychological operations in Vietnam. The letter was prepared by my staff and has my full endorsement. However, I do want to add one or two personal notes of my own.

I really believe the issue in our psychological operations field is less one of jurisdiction than of qualified personnel. I recognize that both my Agency and the Army, and other organizations involved, express a very natural concern about who has responsibilities and who pays the tab. My feeling is that the heart of the JUSPAO concept--which is based on a U. S. Government approach to this problem on a functional, unified basis--provides a formula that permits contribution by all agencies as their personnel and resources permit.

Essentially, it seems to me that the agency with the greatest pertinent experience, namely USIA, lacks the fiscal resources to underwrite the task, while the military, which has the fiscal and technical resources, lacks the qualified personnel in sufficient numbers to assume full-fledged responsibility for the job. The problem is how to combine these two assets in a manner that will facilitate the greatest possible impact in behalf of the U. S. Government.

I believe a JUSPAO-type organization, with appropriate refinements based on experience, is entirely rational and justified and that potential situations in the future will demand such an

Mr. Murray Dyer
Executive Secretary
Ad Hoc Committee on Army
Psychological Operations
5010 Wisconsin Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20016

approach rather than mitigate against it. I also believe that USIA must seek appropriate resources from Congress to assume its natural overall responsibilities in this field and that the military must undertake an aggressive program of personnel training in order to develop sufficient personnel resources to carry out its end of the task. While it may be unorthodox, it seems to me that financial contributions as available should be made to a joint pool for support of on-the-spot programs which carry out the joint concepts described above.

I would wish very much that I had an opportunity to talk directly to your committee, since I have given a great deal of personal thought to this problem and since our experiences in JUSPAO are extremely pertinent to your study. All our parent agencies have a great deal to learn about this vital task of communications in the world of today and we have not solved all the problems here in Vietnam. But I am convinced we are on the right path and that the formula for the future lies in an adaptation of the JUSPAO concept.

I would hope you have an opportunity to read Colonel Louis Waple's post-duty report on the JUSPAO concept. As is inevitable in a detailed document of this type, there are some specifics with which I would disagree--but I certainly endorse the thrust of Lou's paper in concept and principle.

I recognize that there are many critics of the JUSPAO concept and, in some cases, these include people who have served with JUSPAO. I respect their views, but also disagree fundamentally with their arguments against what seems to me to be a pioneering effort, breaking new bureaucratic ground in Uncle Sam's approach to problems.

I am not sure of the dimensions of your committee's inquiry, but I think it would be well worthwhile if one or two of your representatives could come out to Vietnam and talk to people on the scene. I don't say you will find a consensus from our operators here, but I do feel you will see a functioning organism doing a job which holds much promise for our government's future approach to this problem.

Mr. Murray Dyer

Page Three

I wish I could discuss with your committee, informally and directly, many of the real issues involved but, unfortunately, I see no prospect of my getting to Washington in the foreseeable future and I will have to let my comments rest on this incomplete and indefinite basis.

Sincerely yours,

Barry Zorthian
Minister-Counselor of Embassy
for Information

BZorthian/def

Bz Chron
10b

November 13, 1966

Mr. Murray Dyer
Executive Secretary
Ad Hoc Committee on Army
Psychological Operations
5010 Wisconsin Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20016

Dear Mr. Dyer:

Thank you for your letter of October 18th. I welcome the opportunity to pass on to you some of our reflections here concerning a coordinated employment of human and material psyops resources in countering insurgency situations.

This important and complex fourth dimension of warfare, instigated and exploited by the communist opposition, is with us for good. Our response must be equally as professional, timely, imaginative and long range if we are to overcome the communist "People's War" menace.

Having had the chance to observe at close range the work of Army officers in our Joint U. S. Public Affairs Office over the past year I cannot fully subscribe to the view that a shotgun marriage between the brains and experience of USIS and the hardware plus technicians that Army psyops is best equipped to provide is the best way to combat future insurgencies in developing countries. There is some truth in this contention but it is a dangerous half truth on which to base future policy. The actual situation is far more complicated and requires planned coordination and integration with indigenous psyops to prevent the communists from gaining control of insurgencies in the early stages.

By and large the senior military officers I have worked with have the same talents and professional accomplishments as my civilian colleagues. There are outstanding people among them, officers I would be proud to have serve with me in any country. The trouble lies in the fact that heretofore most of these officers have not had a chance to test their potential in the psyops field against actual

situations. They have not been able to develop their skills, to build up their experience in the real world of communicator-audience relations and to deal with live problems instead of training exercises.

As it is now organized, the Army Psyops establishment does not in my view afford enough first class Army officers the opportunities needed to develop their talents or professionalism in this important area, primarily because there are no career incentives that help bring out the best in every man. In general, it seems to me the military psyops personnel train fitfully and in a schoolbookish sort of way against the dreaded contingency that the military establishment would have to take over psychological operations in a major conventional war.

I have no quarrel with the concept that in a war for survival the psychological operations of our government, all of them, and together with every other form of activity need to be subordinated to the final objective -- victory. And winning a conventional or nuclear war is the task of the military. Conversely, rightly or wrongly, in situations short of general war I believe it is current U. S. policy that the civilian establishment is primarily charged with the direction of the effort to achieve national objectives. In our age of limited warfare and insurgency this effort also involves the employment of the military as well as resources of other agencies operating overseas.

What I object to and what I feel needs some basic re-thinking and revision is the mutual exclusiveness that has grown up over the years between the military and civilian establishments in the matter of psychological operations. Sub-surface frictions have evolved in consequence. The core of the problem is that USIS measures its skills against real communications problems in a real world -- with an inconsistent batting average I might add, but never short on bustle and activity -- Army psyops on the other hand appears to be submerged to a junior level to plan, train, and farm out motivational research to a bevy of Ph. Ds; it evolves "doctrines" and generally works in the vacuum of theory, or spends its time ruminating over critiques of past wars, derided by senior officers and line commanders and regarded at best with perfunctory indulgence by civilian colleagues. It is small wonder that patience gets stretched both ways and psyops has not received the attention it deserves in the US arsenal.

The logical division between the general and less than general war roles assigned the military and the civilian parts of the government must not in the future as they have in the past inhibit full cooperation between the two establishments nor lessen the high level attention it needs. Preventing insurgency or countering it, is too important to be left wholly either to the generals, or to civilians. Constant psyops teamwork is needed. We have much to learn from each other, we have to contribute to each other's operational capabilities, and it is in the direct interest to the missions assigned to each of our organizations that our experience, skills, and specialized personnel are made available to one another.

Army overseas psywar staffs could benefit from the assignment of USIS officers -- preferably former country PAOs with military experience -- who would contribute their overview of actual communications problems and techniques to maintain military planning on a realistic keel. A first step in this direction was the assignment of a USIA liaison officer with the Psywar school at Ft. Bragg, N. C. Army psyops personnel should have an opportunity to be assigned with USIS establishments overseas, particularly in developing countries where pre-insurgency situations prevail. They will thus obtain the measure of the problem, acquire the mass media and area skills of USIS officers in dealing with them, and have the umbilical cord of experience to guide them should a full-blown insurgency develop. Secondly, the military has great assets which should be fully used in integrated USIS-MAAG-JUSMAG operations. The army must eagerly provide the technicians for the implementation of such operations and programs. Thirdly, the Department of Defense has a great reservoir of people, equipment and funds for one of the three major missions of the US Armed Forces, i.e. combatting insurgencies. Accordingly it should properly provide the administrative and logistical support for overseas psychological operations while USIA provides the operational guidances.

Our JUSPAO operation is the start of a successful pilot project of this kind of cooperation, and we are proud of it. But the JUSPAO concept is a mere beginning, it has yet to win the unqualified institutional concensus of both establishments. Our joint action in Vietnam is an unorthodox response to an unorthodox situation, and unless your committee can sell the decision makers on the continuing utility of psyops cross-fertilization, it is likely to be dismantled when "normalcy" returns. I have put normalcy under quotation marks as I am sure you will agree that the conventional pattern of relationships between power manipulators and the manipulated in developing countries which bred conventional foreign and informational policy responses on our part has run the course and is not likely to return. JUSPAO

therefore does not now go far enough. It should win institutional acceptance and become a model for USIS-military relationships in other countries. Of course our operation is larger here than would be required in a pre-insurgency situation without a massive U.S. military commitment, but the concept of personnel exchange for on-the-job training, and the availability of military psyops facilities when required, remains valid.

Army psyops personnel must have greater career incentives than are now being offered in order to attract and keep top quality officers. I view this as the crux of the problem facing the military in Vietnam. Action must be taken to demonstrate clearly that psyops experience is an asset not a detriment to career officers. In World War II there existed a separate branch of the Army, I believe, known simply as Psychological Warfare. It was abolished soon after the end of the war and its key cadre dissipated by attrition. Now officers assigned to psyops staff functions come and go in unending succession. Experience is lost and professionalism is not developed in a very complex area of conflict. Without an in-service identity, recognition and status, there was and is little incentive for the competent officer to remain in Army psyops assignments. More than most staff as against line duties, psyops assignments are not helpful and may actually be detrimental to an officer's chances for promotion and advanced schooling. I say more than most staff assignments, because the other specialized army functions -- Chemical Corps, Engineers, Judge Advocate, Medical Corps, the Corps of Chaplains even, have their own functional identity and built-in advancement opportunities. The army psyops specialization does not to my knowledge enjoy this sort of professional status. Until it does an important military instrument for prevention and defeat of insurgencies before they become costly major burdens on U.S. resources will be lacking.

With the Army engaged in a multiplicity of functions in the nation-building process -- psyops is one of the most important of these -- and insurgency here to stay, the organization of a special career branch grouping the professional skills that are included in the psyops and civic actions specializations stands as the most prudent way to profit from our counterinsurgency experiences thus far.

Recognizing the importance of the name of such a branch, it might be advisable to change the name. It might be called Foreign Service Corps or Counterinsurgency Assistance Corps. Its carefully selected

officers, highly motivated and with advanced degrees, should have the opportunity to serve on-the-job training tours according to their specialization and in an ostensibly civilian role with USIS and USAID missions throughout the underdeveloped world.

Besides having their primary military careers mapped out with status and advancement opportunity in their specialized field up to and including general officers rank, these officers would have the post-retirement incentive to seek lateral entry into the AID and USIA establishment. These two agencies should be encouraged to give lateral entry preference to qualified military officers who have had tours with them on detached service during their active careers.

To maintain a continuing fruitful contact with the active psyops service of the military, USIA (and possibly USAID) should in my view maintain a permanent liaison officer with the Department of Defense and Department of the Army staff in which the psyops planning function is vested. This could best be done by having a Senior Army Officer experienced in psyops detailed to USIA Washington. I would conceive the function of this officer to include the factoring of the Agency's geographical area and professional knowledge and experience into the planning precepts of Army Psywar. At the same time I would have this man seek to channel DOD funds, psyops research and hardware development of the military establishment into areas of direct applicability to current operations of interest to both the military and USIS. Additionally, consideration might be given to detailing a USIA officer to DOD to insure complete cross-fertilization of ideas. I understand this type exchange of officers has worked out well in practice with State and CIA.

These are some very frank and rather general observations on a thorny problem. I wish you all the luck in the world in getting the ear of the people who can solve it by using the expertise you will certainly put at their disposal. At the risk of the obvious, I have found that communicators have their greatest difficulty in communicating, particularly among themselves. And the problem seems to get worse as our communications techniques get better. If you can get an honest to goodness dialogue started among communicators in government and can make sure that it keeps going, your committee will deserve the gratitude of bureaucrats in khaki and flannel alike.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Barry Zorthian
Minister-Counselor of Embassy for Information

ColWJohnston, USA/Planning:ejl

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December 22, 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Dear Dan:

The letter from Bob Komer came in to Ambassador Porter this morning. I talked to the Ambassador later in the morning and presented our Agency position. He told me his reaction was still the same as when he initially received a copy of the memorandum from Bill Leonhart and that he intended to go back to Komer with an essentially negative reaction.

I have done the best possible in accordance with Director Marks' instructions, but I am afraid the result is not quite what you were asking. I do want to ensure that the Director is aware of my adherence to his instructions as transmitted by you.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

Barry Zorthian
Minister-Counselor for Information

Mr. Daniel P. Oleksiw
Assistant Director, USIA
(East Asia and the Pacific)
Washington, D. C.

BZorthian/def

Determined to be an
administrative marking
By jc On 6-4-15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY ATTACHMENTS

11a

December 21, 1966

EYES ONLY

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

Dear Dan:

The enclosed letter to the Director is a result of your request for additional constructive ideas. I would be grateful if you would pass it on to him.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

Barry Zorthian
Minister-Counselor for Information

Enclosure: A/S

Mr. Daniel P. Oleksiw
Assistant Director, USIA
(East Asia and the Pacific)
Washington, D. C.

BZorthian/def

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

December 21, 1966

EYES ONLY

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OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Dear Leonard:

Your memorandum of December 7 to Bob Komer on the USIA involvement in Vietnam, along with Dan's covering note asking me to support it "as vigorously as possible at the right opportunity," has just arrived.

As I told you and Dan on the telephone, unfortunately the memorandum had already arrived in Saigon through the medium of Bill Leonhart and Ambassador Porter had already drafted a fairly negative response before I caught up with it. At your request, I asked him to hold up transmittal of his answer until receipt of the responding memorandum from Bob Komer. Ambassador Porter has held back most reluctantly and, if the Komer answer does not come in the next few days, I am afraid he intends to proceed with transmittal of his message. By the time you get this letter, we will know one way or another.

At the same time, your memorandum and this ensuing situation lead me to undertake what will be a rather lengthy communication in the hope that we can perhaps bring the problems of JUSPAO to some semblance of order and also solve the problems of the Agency in supporting JUSPAO in a manner that will achieve the objectives you desire.

As you might suspect, I wish I had had an opportunity to review your memorandum before submission to Komer, since there are many statements in it which I think need clarification

The Honorable Leonard H. Marks
Director
United States Information Agency
Washington, D. C.

CC: Mr. Daniel P. Oleksiw
Assistant Director, USIA
(East Asia and Pacific)

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By jc

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
NARA, Date 6-4-15

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and perhaps more consideration. If the problems the Agency faces in terms of personnel and funds were specifically determined, I would much rather have tried to solve them on the scene here with appropriate adjustments in our modus operandi than to be given a predetermined concept that I believe has many flaws.

Furthermore, the concepts outlined in your memorandum of December 7 present still one more solution to the JUSPAO situation which leaves us even further off balance. We are facing certain ideas that have been raised by the Chernoff group, other ideas forwarded by Dan Oleksiw, still other ideas which have been formulated by the inspectors and still further ideas which are arising out of the new reorganization of the Mission. We have the auditors' report, the AID budget, our own budget readjustment and various operational changes under way within the Mission. All of these inspections, reviews, reorganizations and re-programming exercises make it extremely difficult to maintain an orderly organization with any semblance of morale and attention to our program and mission, just at a time when our efforts are needed most.

I recognize that I have not been the easiest person to work with in undertaking some of the changes which you obviously want to make. On the other hand, most of these proposed changes and reorganizations have seemed to reflect a groping for instant solutions to what are clearly difficult and complicated problems which require considered answers.

I am assuming in all this that the essential problem is manpower and funds. I believe we can solve this problem one way or another. If the question, however, is one of philosophy--i.e., the JUSPAO concept of a functional, integrated approach to the whole problem of communications in this country--then I would ask that you reconsider any retreat on the part of the Agency.

What we are trying to develop here is something that is not USIA or MACV or AID but a combination of all three; and I believe our experience to date has underlined the merits of this concept. If the present execution of the concept raises problems

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of resources, then the solution is to find the resources from any possible source rather than discard the concept.

Your December 7 memorandum is not clear on continued acceptance of this concept. In various places you talk about USIA withdrawing from activities which are not part of its basic mission. At the same time, while you raise the question of the propriety of USIA engaging in some of the current activities here, on page 3 in the last paragraph you restate the responsibility of USIA to give direction and leadership in psychological operations, and on page 4 you restate USIA's readiness to produce media products for support of what you describe as psychological warfare.

I recognize that much of what we are doing here is admittedly not USIA's basic mission, but would note that this is part of the built-in characteristic of the JUSPAO concept--a combined operation incorporating appropriate functions of USIA and AID and MACV.

Thus, I would hope that you would reaffirm the responsibility of JUSPAO for overall direction of all activities in the field of communications in this country--whether it be information, psychological warfare, propaganda, communications or what have you.

I would raise questions also with the distinction made in your memorandum of a difference between information and psychological warfare. I am not sure that such a distinction is valid outside the classroom. The fact is that JUSPAO is engaged in psychological operations which cover the range from purely cultural programs to the inducement of Viet Cong to return to the fold. On the scene, an artificial line between psychological warfare and information does not stand up to examination. We do try to make a distinction between support of tactical military operations, which is essentially a MACV-financed and executed program, and the entire pacification/revolutionary development/nation-building program in which there are grey areas shared by MACV and JUSPAO and also white areas which clearly would fall within USIA's purview.

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Actually, most of what you might describe as "psywar" is already financed by other agencies. By far the bulk of leaflet printing is done by the military, with backstopping from JUSPAO and USIA resources as needed. All the Americans and most of the Vietnamese employees of the JUSPAO printing plant are financed by AID. AID additionally provides some 65 percent of the paper used in our operation. USIA resources invested in printing consist essentially of 35 percent of the paper supplies (a total that I think can well be justified if the proportions of our printing were divided into the artificial categories of "information" and "psywar"). Additionally, of course, we use a certain proportion of our impressions at RSC for what you would describe as "psywar." But, even here, except for such situations as the election and Tet campaigns, the amount of "psywar" printing at Manila is limited. The major exception is the "VC Newspaper" and we are reviewing that as a result of questions raised by the inspectors. The greatest portion of our RSC impressions is used for pamphlets and publications and posters and such materials as the cartoon book for the elections. All of these I assume you would identify as products in support of "information" rather than "psywar."

Given this situation, I believe your desire that "psywar" support be largely executed and funded by the military or AID is already being met. We can make further adjustments, of course.

But having made those adjustments, I would urge that we maintain the present broad framework of our operations here with USIA continuing to provide a substantial increment of field representatives and resources on a sensible pro rata basis. The mix of civilian and military field representatives can be adjusted, of course, but I do not believe it would be wise to turn over the entire field operation to military personnel--even under our direction. We are seeking to establish an integrated operation here and we should not set up artificial distinctions.

Furthermore, we are trying to steer this country towards a civilian leadership and we are trying to achieve pacification of the countryside under a civilian umbrella through the new Office of Civil Operations. Our field representatives work with VTS, which is a

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civilian organization and which must be encouraged and improved if the Vietnamese are ever to assume the primary task of communicating with the people.

Finally, it seems to me, the Agency is developing human resources through this type of field experience which will stand it in good stead in many other situations and countries.

I believe our experience here demonstrates that the most effective approach to the broad problem of communications in this type of situation lies in such an integrated arrangement. An artificial division of functions recreates the very walls which we have sought to break down, not only on our side but on the Vietnamese side, to whom we should also serve as a model. It should be said that the Vietnamese to whom we are addressing ourselves have a deep-rooted suspicion of all things military.

All of this does not mean that the savings in funds and personnel which you desire cannot be achieved. For instance, it might be possible to persuade AID to finance the ceiling for all field representatives' positions as part of its overall nation-building effort. And it should also be possible to obtain increased contributions from DOD for this joint operation. But I think the essential ingredient of talent which the Agency possesses must continue to be present and involved. This need not necessarily be in terms always of veteran USIA officers. Given ceilings established and funded by others, I think our ability to absorb, orient and direct both military personnel and civilian field representatives who are brand new to the Agency demonstrates that the job can be done with a combination of veterans and newcomers. I would also note that the hurt to the Agency in having many of its officers in Vietnam has now reached the peak and that for every new officer invested here one will come back to the Agency with experience that should be highly useful elsewhere.

I also recognize, as the inspectors and auditors have underlined, that our management here needs considerable improvement. Certainly there are areas in which we can increase our efficiency and we are already taking steps toward that end on the

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basis of informal comments from the inspectors and the auditors. We will do even more once we get their formal reports, but I would hope that these reports are not issued as edicts to us but, rather, as guidances establishing goals to be achieved.

The key to all of this is a determination by you as to the specific levels of manpower and funds which you wish to invest in Vietnam and then an opportunity on our part to propose the specific allocation of these resources with the additional requirements made up from AID and DOD sources.

I recognize that this letter deals largely in generalities and that the proof of the pudding lies in the detail. Dan informs me that you do not feel I should return to Washington after the first of the year to review this situation. I would ask for reconsideration of this position. I feel enough pieces of the picture will be in place by then--the inspection report, the OCO operation, the AID budget, the level of available Agency resources and our own needs for the remainder of the fiscal year--to make a review with you and the appropriate elements of the Agency highly worthwhile. I would hope you would agree.

Please be assured that whatever decision you make I will seek to carry out as loyally as possible but, at the same time, I feel an obligation to you to present my reactions and evaluation of the various events which have taken place in the past two or three months affecting the JUSPAO operation here.

My very best wishes to you and Mrs. Marks for the holiday season.

Sincerely,

Barry Zorthian
Minister-Counselor for Information

BZorthian/def

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UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

WASHINGTON 20547

December 8, 1966

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EYES ONLY


Dear Barry:

Attached for your personal information--and specifically not for further dissemination--is a copy of a memo which the Director sent to the White House today. Bob Komer will support the proposal.

Leonard asked me to get a copy to you to enable you to support his plans as vigorously as possible at the right opportunity. In the meantime, we would be interested in hearing any additionally constructive ideas which would help us in accomplishing the objectives outlined in the memo.

With highest personal regards.

Sincerely,


Daniel P. Oleksiw
Assistant Director, USIA
(East Asia and Pacific)

Enclosure:

As stated.

Mr. Barry Zorthian
Minister-Counselor for Information
American Embassy
Saigon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - EYES ONLY

Determined to be an
administrative marking

By je On 6-4-15

EYES ONLY

11d
December 7, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Honorable
Robert W. Komer
Special Assistant to the President

SUBJECT:

USIA Support to Saigon Mission's
New "Office of Operations"

USIA has been fully committed to the reorganization of the Saigon Mission and is cooperating vigorously in the establishment of Bill Porter's new Office of Operations. It is my judgment that the reorganization is imperative and that USIA's part in it is critical.

JUSPAO, which we have staffed and continue to staff with our best officers, has two roles to play: information and psywar.

The first role is vital and JUSPAO manages it extremely well.

The second role, equally vital, was assigned to it by NSAM 200--which we continue to accept, of course--and relates to JUSPAO's responsibility in psywar matters. It is my intention that JUSPAO will continue to exercise policy guidance in psywarfare at the highest levels in Viet Nam and that it will involve itself in content input at all levels; I do not intend to allow JUSPAO to involve itself deeply and visibly in the operational aspects of psywarfare, however, because these are properly the function of the military. Indeed, USIA has become more deeply involved operationally than is proper, basically because the military needed assistance. With the Porter reorganization, the time is right for USIA to begin to hand back to the military those psywar functions in the field which are properly DOD's primary responsibility.

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Toward this end, I recommend the following:

1) The 55 Field Representative positions formerly within JUSPAC and now moving over into Porter's shop consist of 34 civilian slots and 21 military slots. As the 34 civilians complete their tours of duty, they will be replaced by military officers (list with dates attached; one of the civilian slots is vacant at the moment).

2) In view of the special skills, background, and experience possessed by some USIA officers, the four "Senior Field Reps" (one for each of the four Corps) will continue to be USIA officers until the military develops an adequate backlog of qualified officers to take over these key functions.

3) To assist in specialized training for the officers who would be designated to take over from the civilian Field Reps upon the expiration of the latter's tours of duty, USIA will detail as many as eight of our best Viet Nam returnees to Fort Bragg or any other place the DOD chooses for training.

4) Within Bill Porter's organization, USIA will provide up to four (one for each Corps) skilled and experienced officers who will assist in the evaluation of field efforts and accomplishments. I am convinced that this needs to be one of the strongest, best staffed, and most purposeful elements within the new set-up, and our people will make an important contribution toward that end.

From the above, you can see that I plan to reduce the number of USIA officers directly involved in field work from the present 34 positions to a total of 16 positions (four Senior Field Reps, eight officers to train military replacements, and four officers to assist in the evaluative process). I have told the President and Secretaries McNamara and Rusk on many occasions

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of the inordinate drain which our staffing of JUSPAO has placed on USIA's limited resources; we accepted this drain, of course, because there is no higher priority in our consideration than the need to do the job in Viet Nam. Nevertheless, looking toward the immediate future, the point has been reached where we simply cannot continue to provide so many USIA officers for non-USIA type functions.

There is a parallel question regarding JUSPAO support for the field operators in Porter's organization. We will address ourselves to that question when we have more specifics on how the organization will function. I will agree at this time, however, that in principle we will support people and programs properly within USIA's purview, that we will try to accommodate any other important requests which we can handle better than other organizations can, but that we cannot continue to provide support unrelated to our primary responsibilities except on an emergency and ad hoc basis.

At the same time, within the larger framework of the whole psychological warfare problem in Viet Nam, I recommend a firm agreement aimed at a realignment of functions and responsibilities which will recognize both USIA's limitations (despite some impressions to the contrary, JUSPAO now does not manage the majority of psychological warfare in Viet Nam) and USIA's special qualifications to provide certain types of psywar support. Specifically, we should formalize the following:

- 1) Psywarfare is a military function which DOD must staff, equip and fund.
- 2) USIA has the responsibility to provide, in given situations such as the present one in Viet Nam, policy direction in psywar programs, to participate fully in the formulation of decisions regarding the strategic and tactical employment of psywar, and to assist in the evaluation of psywar efforts and accomplishments.

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3) USIA will cooperate in the design and production of the content of psywar products (we will write pamphlets, prepare film treatments, do radio scripts, and tape messages for loudspeaker planes).

4) DOD--and specifically not USIA--is responsible for all of the production of psywar products and their delivery to the audiences for which they are intended. (It is highly inefficient, duplicative, and wasteful for both USIA and DOD to be involved in the printing of leaflets, for instance, and I intend to get USIA out of the printing of psywar material and out of similar efforts just as soon as that can be arranged with DOD.)

Be aware that my underlying concern remains in doing what we can as efficiently as possible to assist the President in his many and great responsibilities everywhere. We are totally committed to giving maximum support to the job in Viet Nam, and I believe that the Porter reorganization is a big step in the right direction. I have instructed Dan Oleksiw to do everything he can to assure that our work with anyone you designate and with anyone designated by DOD to represent the Secretary in this matter. Pursuant to your conversation with Dan last Friday, he has begun gathering material from DOD and others regarding the totality of psywar investment in Viet Nam; the information should be extremely helpful in the sort of agreement which I recommend herein.

I suggest we discuss the situation at your earliest opportunity.

Leonard H. Marks
Director

Attachment:

As stated.

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TOUR-OF-DUTY EXPIRATION DATES

JULPAC FIELD REPS, VIET NAM

<u>Tour Ends</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Location</u>
12/2/67	Sherwin P. Helms	FSCR-3	ICorps - Senior Field Rep
9/18/68	L. Clyde Slaton	FSCR-2	IICorps - Senior Field Rep
5/11/67	John K. Eney	FSLR-4	IIICorps - Senior Field Rep
3/16/68	Aldo D'Alessandro	FSCR-2	IVCorps - Senior Field Rep
7/30/67	P. Warren Simpson	FSCR-3	CMZ/Gia-Dinh
2/3/68	Blake W. Robinson	FSCR-4	Gia-Dinh
8/10/67	Robert J. Kelly	FSLR-4	ICorps - Quang-Nam
2/4/67	Alvin Perlman	FSCR-5	ICorps - Thua-Thien, Quang-Tri
2/26/67	Phillip F. Thomas	FSLR-5	ICorps - Quang-Ngai
6/12/67	John L. Sandstrom	FSLR-4	IICorps - Deputy Regional Director
3/24/68	Lawrence S. Fein	FSCR-6	IICorps - Binh-Thuan, Ninh-Thuan
10/7/67	John J. Curtis	FSLR-4	IICorps - Khanh-Hoa
6/16/67	Ross Petzing	FSLR-8	IICorps - Phu-Yen, Phu-Bon
6/16/67	John Keller	FSCR-7	IICorps - Tuyen-Duc
4/28/67	Paul Bingham	FSS-3	IICorps - Lam-Dong, Quang-Duc
2/12/67	James H. DeCou	FSCR-5	IICorps - Darlac
6/13/67	Leslie G. Smith	FSLR-5	IICorps - Pleiku, Kontum
8/14/67	Raymond Spencer	FSLR-4	IIICorps - Advisor to Field Forces II
1/30/67	Alfred J. Waddell	FSCR-5	IIICorps - Vung-Tau, Phuoc-Tuy
1/28/68	Frank B. Dean	FSLR-4	IICorps - Advisor to Field Forces I
3/19/67	Donald G. Besom	FSCR-6	IIICorps - Long-An
9/31/67	Donald Boyd	FSCR-4	IIICorps - Binh-Tuy, Long-Khanh
10/12/67	Joel Rochow	FSCR-6	ICorps - Quang-Tin
7/8/67	Angelo Smeraldi	FSLR-5	IIICorps - Bien-Hoa

<u>Tour Ends</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>Location</u>
10/12/67	James Culpepper	FSCR-4	IVCorps - Phong-Dinh
3/5/68	Thompson A. Grunwald	FSCR-6	IVCorps - An-Giang
12/30/67	Louis E. Polichetti	FSLR-4	IVCorps - Ba-Xuyen, Chuong-Thien
10/17/67	John Richotte	FSCR-6	IVCorps - Vinh-Binh
5/8/67	C. Robert Dickerman	FSCR-6	IVCorps - Dinh-Tuong, Kien-Tuong
3/6/67	Paul J. Bennett	FSO-5	IVCorps - Kien-Hoa, Go-Cong
7/8/67	Paul J. Turner	FSLR-5	IVCorps - Kien-Giang
8/19/67	John Twitty	FSLR-4	IVCorps - Bac-Lieu, An-Xuyen
2/5/68	Bernie T. Marquis, Jr.	FSLR-5	IVCorps - Chau-Doc

June 16, 1967

Dear General Tri:

As an outgrowth of our talk Monday and at your request, my staff has prepared a list of recommendations and a timetable for accomplishment for your consideration. Based on these recommendations, may I propose some areas for your attention on which important decisions will have to be made. Decisions which may determine whether or not future objectives can be achieved.

As you and I both recognize, the responsibilities of the Ministry of Information and Chieu Hoi are enormous and complex. They are designed to achieve complete communication between the people of Vietnam and their government and to create a climate of mutual understanding and support for the ultimate purpose of unifying the nation and its government. In pursuit of this objective one deals not only with intricate and sophisticated equipment but with the most sensitive instrument of all -- man -- his mind and his heart.

The development of a broad communications capability in Vietnam through your Ministry has reached the point where the physical systems are moving ahead; where more and more of the Vietnamese population is being reached. Adequate program levels are being maintained.

Now that the physical ability to reach the people exists, another measurement becomes equally important: the reaction of the people. Do they believe what is said? Above all, do they respond actively? It is at this point that well-trained professionals become vital to the operation. The development and training of these program professionals is an area which deserves serious and immediate attention.

Major General Nguyen Bao Tri
Ministry of Information and Chieu Hoi
Saigon

The development of competent technical specialists is another area of concern. Effective maintenance systems will serve to preserve and expand present operational levels and it is through a comprehensive technical training program that these specialists can be developed.

Not only have training demands become apparent because of MICH's expansion of facilities but current responsibilities are taking on new dimensions. Because of the improved ability to reach more of the population, MICH will be in a better position to evaluate and assess the people's reaction to GVN programs and provide specific guidance and program support to the other GVN ministries for the purpose of enhancing the psychological effectiveness of the total GVN effort. It is in this advisory and program support role that I feel MICH can make its greatest contribution.

Lastly, in order to cope more effectively with this expanding operation, I would suggest a thorough review be undertaken of administrative and organizational procedures to insure that there is sufficient flexibility. A joint GVN-US task force would be mutually beneficial in determining those budget, program and organizational procedures which should be revised in that it would form the base upon which to draw up new requirements and future plans.

The information program in Vietnam has grown appreciably from its early beginning. There is still a great deal to be done. In a spirit of cooperation and dedication I would hope that this progress will lead to an even brighter future.

Sincerely,

Barry Zorthian
Director, JUSPAO

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE MICH INFORMATION PROGRAM

1. IMMEDIATE PRIORITY PROJECTS:

The next year of MICH operations is going to be an extremely important and telling one. The initiation of certain innovations are viewed as vital to the future efforts of the Ministry.

The implementation of those projects listed here is considered to be essential for the effective minimum operation of an information program.

A. MAINTENANCE SYSTEM:

CURRENT STATUS: JUSPAC and the MICH Foreign Aid Office have completed a joint countrywide inventory of all VIS equipment to determine quantity and condition. Mutual agreement has been reached on a set of tables of equipment on a minimum basis for six different levels of VIS units, amplified by additive tables to insure support to RD, Chieu Hoi and refugee centers. However, on the basis of the countrywide inventory it has been determined that a disproportionate percentage of the equipment is not operational. Regional Repair Centers are not fully staffed or equipped to handle all repair work and extreme delays are encountered with equipment sent to Saigon for repair. Without continuous maintenance, the field information program is at a standstill.

The Ministry is about to assume full responsibility for television receiver maintenance. If the present inadequate staffing and equipping of facilities continues the television program may be jeopardized. The major program elements of the Ministry -- THVN, VTVN, National Printing Center, National Motion Picture Center -- all suffer from the lack of an adequate maintenance system and an inflexible budgetary system which does not allow for the immediate spot purchase of even the smallest repair parts. This will be discussed later.

RECOMMENDATION: That immediate steps be taken to establish a viable and effective countrywide maintenance system capable of maintaining and repairing information program equipment to the extent that minimum equipment levels constantly remain operational. The Ministry should set up immediately a training program for maintenance and repair technicians to staff such a system. One solution would be a contract negotiated with local firms to maintain and repair equipment until such time as the Ministry's own maintenance system is operational.

B. ADMINISTRATION:

1. Budgetary

CURRENT STATUS: Current budgetary procedures are inadequate to handle the present level of operation. In view of the planned expanded facilities and program capability which will soon be a fait accompli the present inflexibility of the budget system is an obstacle as much as insufficient funds.

RECOMMENDATION: That a joint GVN-US committee be appointed to study the problem, Ministry needs and make recommendations to the Minister.

2. Personnel

CURRENT STATUS: There is a real need at this time to consider broad qualitative improvements in MICH operations. The contribution of MICH employees to the total program can be significantly improved.

RECOMMENDATION: That special emphasis be given to improving personnel administration within the Ministry and throughout provincial and regional operations by developing a system of increased incentive pay, promotion and recognition based on professional and technical competence (with a corresponding system for demotion or loss of pay in the case of consistently inadequate performances) in addition to increased attention to the training for these personnel.

C. REORGANIZATION:

1. VIS

CURRENT STATUS: The VIS field programs are viewed as the backbone of MICH's informational and motivational efforts. This widespread operation is made even more diffuse by the lack of undivided operational direction which should represent VIS within the Ministry, insure that its requirements are being met by all MICH elements and provide broad policy and program guidance to VIS field operations in support of all GVN programs.

RECOMMENDATION: That the VIS organization be re-aligned to provide for a Directorate within the Ministry to coordinate and integrate all aspects of VIS provincial operations and program requirements.

2. Chieu Hoi

CURRENT STATUS: The autonomous operations of Chieu Hoi and Information within the Ministry itself and particularly at provincial levels are creating a strain on MICH's resources and personnel. Whereas MICH has an acknowledged responsibility to provide informational and psychological support of all GVN programs, Chieu Hoi conversely requires support from other GVN ministries for the success of its operations.

RECOMMENDATION: That the Chieu Hoi element within the Ministry be re-created into a special staff division under the direction of the Prime Minister incorporating responsibility for Doan Ket. That the Ministry provide support to this staff element just as to other GVN Ministries' programs.

3. Liaison

CURRENT STATUS: Unknown.

RECOMMENDATION: That the Ministry in its position of advisor to other GVN ministries undertake to strengthen its coordination with these ministries by the appointment of a Senior Liaison Officer with responsibility for informing himself fully about on-going programs and identifying their information needs so that MICH elements can provide media support.

II. SHORT RANGE PROJECTS: Six months to one year for completion.

1. Receiver Production: That the Ministry institute commercial production of low cost television and radio receivers in Vietnam through encouragement to privately-owned companies.

2. Motion pictures: That the Ministry initiate a planned series of motion picture documentaries for use in Vietnam on major programs (Public Safety, RF, PF, ARVN, RD, Chieu Hoi, Doan Ket, Refugees, Elections, Free World Military and Economic Assistance). That a second series be completed for use in the Vietnamese overseas information program. Devise means to encourage the growth of private production of entertainment feature length films.

3. Overseas Information Program: That increased funds, personnel, training, and media materials be infused into this important program for the purpose of telling Vietnam's story to the world and enlisting additional Free World support for her objectives.

4. Press: That the Ministry devote increased attention and resources to providing further assistance to the Saigon press and developing a responsible provincial press. That attention and resources also be aimed at improved servicing of the international press in terms of increased physical and facilitative assistance.

III. CONTINUING PROJECTS:

1. Nationwide Radio: Construction and operation of a 12 station national network reaching 95% of the population. Two years to completion.

2. Nationwide Television: Construction and operation of four stations, *one* in each Corps area reaching 85% of the population. Four years to completion.

3. Quarterly Conferences: That the Ministry institute quarterly Workshop Conferences for mixed regional groups of provincial, including Capital City, VIS chiefs (preferably 15 at a time) and representatives of each MICH and other GVN Ministry program element to review plans, programs, policy, techniques of operations, progress, problems. Such conferences would serve to integrate VIS efforts, provide an opportunity to exchange views, revitalize program operations, achieve closer coordination and allow for firsthand evaluations of all provincial operations during the course of the year.

4. National Printing Plant: The presses and auxillary equipment and the building need improvement in order to make this a model printing plant. Its development should be spread over a four-year period with the goal of assuming all major printing requirements for all GVN Ministries.

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IAF

**NOT SENT
TO MR. K**

August 1, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
 Nicholas Katzenbach
 Under Secretary of State

Dan Oleksiw, who directs USIA's East Asia and Pacific area, tells me that he was invited to an inter-Agency meeting called by Phil Habib to develop some answers to questions you had after your recent trip to Viet-Nam. One of the questions had to do with psychological warfare, and Dan was asked to prepare a paper on the subject.

While I am always interested in doing what we can to improve the impact of psychological warfare, I think it might save time all around if I can tell you directly and exactly how I feel about psywar in Viet-Nam and what my recommendations have been. As you know, I was in Viet-Nam just before you arrived, and Oleksiw and I spent a great deal of time reviewing our operational and policy support for this extremely important element of the American effort.

NSAM 330 gave us the responsibility for policy direction of psywar in Viet-Nam. Because of the nature of the American build-up, however, JUSPAO also became heavily engaged in the operational aspects of psywar from the beginning, and an extremely effective job has been accomplished under Barry Zorthian's direction. Nevertheless, eventually, we realized that our involvement placed an inordinate drain on USIA human resources, jeopardizing the effectiveness of USIA programs in other parts of the world where Viet-Nam needs to be explained and where understanding of or support for American policies needs to be assured.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-98
By ing, NARA. Date 3-25-92

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I have told the President and Secretaries Rusk and McNamara several times that USIA could not continue the degree of involvement we had assumed for an indefinite period without damage to urgent programs elsewhere. Several months ago I recommended to Ambassadors Lodge and Porter that military personnel needed to assume more responsibility for operating psywar programs at the provincial level, but that in accordance with NSAM 330 we would be able to retain responsibility for policy direction. I have also informed Ambassadors Bunker, Locke, and Komer that in addition to responsibility for policy direction we are prepared to assume responsibility for the design and content of psywar products, but that the military must accept responsibility for the production and delivery of psywar programs both in North Viet-Nam and to enemy controlled areas of South Viet-Nam. In a very recent exchange of memoranda between Barry Zorthian and General Westmoreland the principles of such an arrangement have been spelled out and a task force has been formed to put a reorganized effort into effect. I am attaching to this memorandum an excerpt of a memorandum from Zorthian to General Westmoreland spelling out in detail what is underway.

As soon as the task force completes its work and psywar functions and responsibilities are rearranged more advantageously, we will be able to shift some of our experienced and specially-trained people from provincial level assignments to Corps Headquarters and to Saigon to enhance the capability of the extremely weak Vietnamese Information Service and to assist in, coordinate, and evaluate the work of Provincial Representatives, who should be military personnel.

Additionally, I am prepared to assign any reasonable number of qualified Viet-Nam veterans to the important job of helping train military personnel for psywar responsibilities. I think it must be basic in our Government's concept of operations in present and future insurgency situations that psywar is a military responsibility and function for which the military must train, equip, and fund itself.

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USLA officers have developed certain expertise in this field which we must share with the military to guarantee the most effective utilization of our Government's human resources.

I hope the foregoing is useful to you. I will be pleased to discuss it further with you at any time.

Leonard H. Marks
Director

Attachment:

As stated.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-97

By ing, NARA, Date 12-15-92

Excerpt of June 24, 1967. Memorandum from Barry Zorthian,
Director, JUSPAO, to General Westmoreland, COMUSMACV

Maintain JUSPAO's overall responsibility for planning and policy direction but delegate operational responsibility for all efforts towards the enemy to MACV. I would include in such a delegation responsibility for all leaflets directed towards the VC (including both Chien Hoi and Northern leaflets), all airborne loudspeaker activities and any media projects directed exclusively towards the enemy such as mobile radio transmitters. MACV would presumably unify these responsibilities within one organization and JUSPAO would recover some of the positions invested in CORDS/POD. JUSPAO would continue to allocate civilian personnel for field operations but on a gradually reduced scale. This would place JUSPAO in much the same relationship to CORDS as the agriculture, health and education divisions of AID. JUSPAO would continue to be a joint operation with a military increment both because of its planning and policy responsibilities and because of MACV interests and responsibilities in non-"paywar" aspects of the overall effort, but JUSPAO's operation would focus increasingly on informational efforts towards the population under GVN control, on the advisory effort with the Ministry of Information, on coverage of Vietnam for dissemination through other USIS posts and on press relations. JUSPAO would keep its planning office to provide policy direction, most of its field development division to provide informational materials for national campaigns and its technical personnel and printing plant to provide necessary production support, but all these elements would provide general support to MACV as required. An 0-7 Deputy Director would be added to the JUSPAO staff to insure coordination of military and civilian efforts. MACV would provide personnel, facilities and funds for all psychological operations towards the enemy and AID would continue to finance the national-building elements of the JUSPAO program. We would eliminate the various anomalies and inconsistencies described earlier in this memorandum. The virtues of this alternative are a more logical assignment of operational responsibilities along lines of basic missions of organizations involved, a clearer and more realistic distribution of

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responsibilities for funding and personnel, an increased effectiveness in performance through more appropriate use of available talent, and a continuation of the basic principle of unified policy direction and planning in U.S. psychological operations. The drawbacks are that policy and operations are separated in one important segment of the effort and that simple unity of command is not established. But these same factors have been present in our structure for the past two years and we have demonstrated that they need not be a hindrance to effective operations.

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March 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE AMBASSADOR

I believe the situation in South Viet-Nam is extremely grave. The Viet Cong have skillfully executed a well-planned campaign designed to force the pace of the war and to bring about a conclusion favorable to them in the foreseeable future. Failing this, they will still have the options of negotiation or reversal to guerrilla warfare. Meanwhile, by forcing us to concentrate our strength in the cities and in outpost strong points, they have gained relative freedom in the countryside for their cadre. A second wave of considerable strength is within their capability and the decisions on the future course of the war is in their hands at this time.

This situation requires a determined and aggressive response by us and our allies. The key to our success is performance by the Vietnamese government and army, which so far has been inadequate. But before we can demand improvement from the Vietnamese it would be well for us to set our own house in order by re-examining our assumptions and by establishing our priorities. Towards this end, I would suggest the following:

(1) Re-examination of our basic political/military strategy by a small group of Mission officials selected for ability and knowledge of Viet-Nam rather than organization or rank. I would suggest that this small group be divorced from immediate operational responsibilities for whatever period is required and meet in relative isolation - with or without Washington participation by a similarly selected group - to review and reassess our present program.

(2) I would personally hope that such a group would evolve a strategy somewhat along the following lines:

Since the VC seem to be pressing for a resolution of the conflict in the foreseeable future, we should adjust our present program to short-term objectives - designed perhaps for a one year or 18-month span. Our emphasis should be placed on security with all available resources devoted to this one single overriding objective - security in main force terms, security in regional force terms, security in local terms. Subordinate to this first priority would be a limited number of second priority programs. I would adopt those already evolved by the GVN - reorganization of ARVN, reorganization of the civil service, elimination of corruption, prevention of inflation, relief and recovery in urban centers. I would continue the refugee and medical programs since people cannot be permitted to starve or suffer. I would subordinate or eliminate all other programs - nation-building, education, agriculture, the whole range of "do good" efforts. These constitute the prize at the end of the rainbow and I would hold them out as the rewards of victory. I would adjust - meaning reduce - our American effort and presence accordingly.

Having done all this - and virtually simultaneously - I would approach the Vietnamese leadership and inform them of our decisions and the need for them to carry their share of the load. I would tell them in blunt terms that the success of our joint effort depends on their performance and I would warn them that their failure would - not could - lead to a reassessment of our involvement here. I would inform them that we have adopted their priorities and will modify all our programs accordingly - but that in return, they must pursue their objectives promptly and vigorously. I would tell them that we expect swift and effective action on a mutually agreed upon program in each of these priority areas - ARVN, civil service, urban centers, inflation and corruption - and above all, I would tell them that they must contribute more than they have to date in the area of security.

Finally, I would tell the President and Vice President in a personal talk that we believe the key to a successful Vietnamese effort is a sense of national unity and cohesiveness which can best be established through the example set by them. I would inform them that they must subordinate their personal differences in the greater interest of the nation and that they must eliminate members of their individual coteries who are obstacles to this effort. I would tell them that we would assist and contribute in any to this effort on their part but that we would have no patience with a return to the status quo ante or with a failure to pursue these goals energetically and without reservation. I would state that if they feel they are unable to provide leadership to the country in this way, then we would expect them to step aside and turn over real government power to a Prime Minister

acceptable to us who would provide the leadership the country needs. I would get the same message across to the politicians, the legislators, the intellectuals, the military, the civil servants. I would use every element of leverage we can mount - including selective withholding of assistance to recalcitrant officials to show that we mean business and I would make clear that withdrawal or an accommodation with Hanoi and the NLF is a distinct possibility.

The course I outline is difficult, but I believe the present and foreseeable future requires just such a bold course of action.

Barry Northian
Special Assistant to the Ambassador