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4/22/81

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
draft bill	re: provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 with SECRET attachments OPEN NW 79614, 12/20/84 * Documents filed behind this Pink Sheet. This Material was declassified by the National Declassification Center (NDC). The original order of this Material was lost during NDC's declassification process and return of the documents to the Library. - CTS, 12/20/84	c. 1/8/51	A

FILE LOCATION

Pre-Presidential Confidential File
"Preparedness Subcommittee"

RESTRICTION CODES

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(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

____ CONGRESS
____ SESSION

S. _____

(NOTE.—Fill in all blank lines except those provided for the date and number of bill.)

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. **JOHNSON** of Texas _____

introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on _____

A BILL

(Insert title of bill here)

- 1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
- 2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

Notwithstanding the provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, or the provisions of any other law, no battleship, carrier, cruiser, destroyer, or submarine of the United States which has not been stricken from the Navy Register as provided by Section 2 of the Act of August 5, 1882 (22 Stat. 296), as amended, or any interest of the United States in any such vessel, shall hereafter be sold, transferred or otherwise disposed of unless hereafter authorized by the Congress.

(NOTE.—Fill in all blank lines except those provided for the date and number of bill.)

----- CONGRESS }
----- SESSION } S. -----

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(Insert title of bill here)

By Mr. -----

-----, 19-----—Read twice
and referred to the Committee on

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..... CONGRESS }
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NAVY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID

PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300

(PMGC)

Mr. Walter Jenkins
Office of Senator Lyndon Johnson
United States Senate
Washington 25, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

8 January 1951

Dear Mr. Jenkins:

Pursuant to our telephone conversation this morning, I enclose herewith a draft of language restricting disposals of certain Naval combatant vessels. This is the matter discussed by Admiral Sherman in conference with Senator Johnson on December 20th.

As I mentioned during our telephone conversation this morning, Mr. Vinson has incorporated this language in a bill which he has introduced this afternoon to authorize certain constructions and conversions of Naval vessels.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Ira H. Nunn", is positioned above the typed name.

IRA H. NUNN
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Assistant and Aide to
Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. Walter Jenkins
Office of Senator Lyndon Johnson
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Washington

Op-271/dmh
Serial 2471P27

13 December 1950

My dear Senator Johnson:

This is in response to your letter of December 7th regarding a proposed sale of cruisers to certain American Republics.

As a result of the Havana Conference of 1940, and conversations resulting therefrom held in 1941, it was determined as a matter of policy that in order to enhance the security of the Western Hemisphere, the United States would assist American Republics in acquiring armaments, in training their personnel, and in providing assistance of advisors.

Almost all of the American Republics were our allies in World War II. Their effectiveness, however, was limited by reason of the heterogeneous character of their armaments, much of it coming from European sources.

During World War II, the desirability became apparent of standardizing the organization, equipment, and training of the armed forces of the Western Hemisphere. Standardization was found to be necessary if the South American Republics were to contribute in substantial degree to the defense of the Hemisphere.

A program was formulated, therefore, to promote standardization. Some progress was made toward implementation of the program by sales of surplus property to the South American Republics after the war. The Surplus Property Act, however, expressly forbade sales of surplus battleships, cruisers, aircraft carriers, destroyers and submarines.

The pattern of naval defense of the Western Hemisphere required that certain of the South American Republics receive and operate former United States vessels of the cruiser class and smaller. Accordingly, on March 3, 1946, eight excess cruisers were earmarked and held in a "deferred disposal" category pending the time when some or all of them might be sold to American Republics in accordance with law. These ships were not made a part of the Reserve Fleet. They have been preserved and maintained, however, in the same manner as vessels of that fleet to the present date. Funds have been expended in their preservation and maintenance and they have been occupying valuable dock space at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard. Had it not been for the desire to sell some or all of these ships to our Western Hemisphere neighbors, the Navy would have sought other means for this disposal.

There existed no legal means by which major combatant ships could be sold to the American Republics until enactment of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (Public Law 329 - 81st Congress, approved October 6, 1949). This statute would have permitted sales at the full cost of the ships. The South American Republics were unwilling to purchase the cruisers at full cost because they could either purchase or construct similar ships for less money.

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On July 26, 1950, the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 was amended (Public Law 621 - 81st, Approved July 26, 1950) so that sales can now be made at fair value.

The President now has authority under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, as amended, to provide procurement assistance to nations which have joined with the United States in a collective defense and regional arrangement by transferring to such nations any arms or implements of war, except merchant vessels, for a price which shall include rehabilitation costs plus ten per cent of the original gross cost. It is required that the Armed Services and Foreign Affairs (Relations) Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives be notified of transfers. Only excess equipment may be transferred. The excess referred to is an excess of the mobilization reserve which is the quantity determined by the Secretary of Defense to be required to support mobilization of the armed forces of the United States in the event of war or national emergency until such a time as adequate additional quantities of such equipment can be procured.

It is proposed to sell two cruisers each from the deferred disposal category to Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. These nations are signatories with the United States and others of the Rio Pact, a hemispheric defense and regional agreement. There has been no transfer as yet. The contracts have been prepared but have not as yet been signed by any of the parties. Consequently, no reports to the Committees of the Congress have been made.

The original average gross cost of the cruisers proposed to be sold was approximately \$17,000,000. The rehabilitation costs average approximately \$2,300,000 per ship. The recipient nations, therefore, will receive these ships at an average cost of \$4,000,000.

In order to place these ships into condition for service in the United States Fleet extensive modernization of armament and equipment would be required at an approximate cost of more than \$10,000,000 each. The estimated value of the ships as scrap is \$350,000 each.

The cruisers to be transferred are in excess of our mobilization needs. The exact figure of our required mobilization reserve is classified but it may be said that in the cruiser category (all types) we have an excess in the order of approximately fifteen ships.

In addition, to the foregoing, it is considered, particularly at this time, that our interests of national defense require the strengthening of the South American Republics so that they may successfully undertake their share of the defense of this hemisphere. It is best that their equipment be of United States origin and conform to our standards. The desires of our South American neighbors in their choice of naval armament include smaller ships of the destroyer and 5" destroyer escort types. We do not have a surplus of such anti-submarine vessels, so it is to our advantage to retain what we have in the smaller ships and to provide prospective allies in this hemisphere with ships which are surplus.

Op-271/dmh
serial 2471P27

In connection with this whole matter, it should be noted that the Navy Department's plan to sell cruisers and other vessels to the South American Republics was discussed in a letter of the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee of the Senate under date of September 8, 1949, at which time the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 was pending before the Congress.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Francis P. Matthews
FRANCIS P. MATTHEWS

Honorable Lyndon Johnson
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

Op-00/mfc
Serial 212P00

16 December 1950

My dear Senator Johnson:

This is in response to your letter of December 15, 1950, in which you requested further information concerning the six excess cruisers which it has been planned to sell to certain South American Republics.

You wished assurance that the proposed sale is based upon determinations reviewed in the light of conditions now existing. I can assure you that the present situation has been considered most carefully, and the decisions reached are based on an up-to-date estimate of the situation. As was pointed out in my letter of December 13, 1950, the cruisers to be transferred have been and are in excess of our mobilization needs which means that they are in excess of the present and current computation of our required mobilization reserve.

Actually the most important consideration in connection with the disposition of these old cruisers is that the alignment of the South American countries with us is more important now than at any time in our history. Any determination by Congress should weigh carefully this aspect of the problem.

Representatives of the Navy Department will meet with you on Tuesday at 10:30, as you have requested, for a full and complete discussion of this matter. Because of relationships with the South American countries, I am glad that the discussion will be in executive session.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Francis P. Matthews
FRANCIS P. MATTHEWS

Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

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ENCLOSURE



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

Op-00/dm
Serial 0012P00

~~SECRET~~

20 DEC 1950

My dear Senator Johnson:

Pursuant to our conversation this morning, there is transmitted herewith a highly classified memorandum regarding a proposed sale of cruisers to certain South American Republics. The memorandum answers, I believe, the inquiries you made concerning the proposed transaction. Should you desire further information, I will be glad to provide it.

Cordially yours,

Forrest Sherman
Forrest Sherman
Admiral, U. S. Navy

Honorable Lyndon Johnson
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Enclosures

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4
NW 79614
By DF/SP Date 8/8/2024

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

Op-00/dm
Serial 0012P00

20 DEC 1950

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Cordially yours,

Forrest Sherman
Admiral, U. S. Navy

Honorable Lyndon Johnson
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Enclosures

20 December 1950

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

The Navy Department proposes to sell two surplus light cruisers each to Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.

The history of negotiations leading to this proposed sale and the legal basis for its consummation are contained in the Secretary of the Navy's letters of 13 and 16 December 1950 to the Chairman of this Committee. A copy of each is attached hereto for your convenience.

The cruisers are 10,000 ton hulls with 6 inch main batteries. They were completed in 1937-1939. They are in excess of the Navy's mobilization needs.

The Navy's mobilization requirements are computed in the following manner:

Our war plans provide for a build-up to a maximum of 53 cruisers in commission, 42 of which would be deployed in theatres of action.

We now have 13 cruisers in the active fleets, 55 in the reserve fleets, 10 awaiting disposal (the 6 ships proposed to be sold are included in this group), and 2 in building (the ships in building are prototypes).

Therefore, excluding the 10 which we are holding for disposal, we have 70 ships from which to build to 53 in commission,- a surplus of 17 ships.

It is our practice to assume that during the first year of total war, we would lose 4 cruisers, during the second year 6 more, and during the third year 5 more, for a total during the first three years of war of 15 ships. This estimate of losses is almost surely greatly in excess of what actual losses would prove to be.

Upon the outbreak of total war, we would commence building cruisers so that such replacements as became necessary could be made by modern ships. We would want to replace our FARGO class, for example, with ships of a class more similar to the improved WORCESTER class. During the first two years of war, we would complete 7 modern cruisers. During the next year we would complete 8 more,- for a total of 15 during the first three years. Replacements with modern ships would keep pace with estimated losses. We could and would maintain a surplus of something in the order of 15-20 cruisers.

- 1 -

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 5.4
ENCLOSURE
NW 79614
By DP/BD Date 5/2/2024

~~SECRET~~

20 December 1950

It is my opinion that at no time in the history of our country has it been more vital both for political and military reasons that we strengthen the Latin American Republics. The events of the past few days have greatly enhanced this belief. You perhaps noted that on Saturday of last week (December 16th) the United States requested a conference of the twenty-one American Republics' foreign ministers to coordinate efforts in meeting "the aggressive policy of international communism." It is hoped that such a conference will be held in Washington in mid-February.

The Republics to whom it is proposed to sell these cruisers are amply equipped to man and operate them. They have in the past operated ships of comparable size and power with complete success. Many of their officers have received training in similar ships in our own operating fleets.

For many years Argentina, Brazil, and Chile have each had a quota of three midshipmen at the Naval Academy. These countries have also had a quota of five each at the Naval Line Postgraduate School. In addition, we have for more than two years past admitted their naval officers in limited numbers to other naval schools and to periods of training on board our operating ships. At the present time, seven officers of Argentina, twenty of Brazil, and ten of Chile are engaged in these training activities. Enlisted men are also admitted to certain of the fleet schools in which we train our own enlisted men. At present three men from the Argentine Navy and twenty-five from the Chilean Navy are students in our fleet schools.

It is fortunate that we have surplus cruisers which can be sold to Argentina, Brazil, and Chile without weakening our own naval arms. These countries are also desirous of obtaining smaller ships of the destroyer and 5 inch destroyer-escort type. These are anti-submarine classes in which we do not have a surplus. Consequently, we cannot sell them. It is expected, however, that cruisers will be extremely useful to our South American neighbors in patrolling the South Atlantic and preventing the establishment of enemy submarine bases in that area.

It is my firm conviction that any further unnecessary delay at this time from any source in the sale of the cruisers as proposed would do great harm to our relations with the entire Latin American bloc of nations. The harm would result not only from our failure to strengthen three of these countries militarily when the opportunity was open to do so, but also from our failure to perform as promised with resultant loss of international prestige.

~~SECRET~~

COPY

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum for the Preparedness Committee Files:

In a telephone conversation January 8, 1951, it was called to the attention of Captain Ira Nunn that an item from the Washington Star of January 6 stated that 3 destroyer escorts were being transferred to the Italian government and that this was not consistent with a statement contained in the secret memorandum handed Senator Johnson December 20 by Admiral Sherman.

Captain Nunn stated that the newspaper item referred to destroyer escorts by mistake and that it should have stated patrol vessels. He said the ships being transferred to Italy on Wednesday are 3-inch patrol vessels of which this government has quite a surplus. In fact, according to Captain Nunn, we don't even use the 3-inch patrol vessels any longer except in reserve training, and no future use for them is contemplated.

The destroyer escorts of which we are short are 5 1/2 inch DE's and Captain Nunn says we are not disposing of any of this type vessel to anybody.

~~SECRET~~

Dictated by Walter Jenkins:dj

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 5.4

By SP/IR Date 8/8/2024

U.S. Navy Command

Navy to Turn Over 3 Ships To Italians at Portsmouth

By the Associated Press

PORTSMOUTH, Va., Jan. 6.—The Navy announced today that plans have been completed for turning three destroyer escorts over to the Italian government under the terms of the Mutual Defense Assistance Pact. The transfer will be made Wednesday at the Norfolk naval shipyard in Portsmouth.

The Italian Ambassador, Dr. Alberto Tarchiani, will fly here for the ceremony. He will be accompanied by a party of approximately 40 Italian and American officials.

The three ships are the Gandy, Thornhill and Wesson. All were built in 1943 at costs in excess of \$2 million each. They are now part of the Atlantic Reserve fleet.

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Here and Over the Nation

Soundscriber Disc No. 1, 9/11/50, 1:15

Conversation between Gene Zuckert and Lyndon Johnson

Re: Pyote AF Base Airplanes - B-29's

Transferred to the Vault, to be placed with other recorded conversations located there.

Pre-Presidential Confidential, "Preparedness Subcommittee"

Processing Note:

2/25/2025

There are 2 copies of the following two-page document. Only one copy has been scanned.

Robert Mar

Digitization Technician

safe

Message from Don Cook.

He started out by telling me he had called the Senator about the matter and that he was glad ~~xxxx~~ I came over to talk about it. He did not stop there; he just kept right on talking.

He went on to indicate that the committee was doing a great piece of work and started reminiscing about his work with the Truman Committee and told me how, when he was handling that work, he used to come over and see the then President and the President would give him encouragement and how helpful it was, etc.

He finally switched over to what the main purpose of the conversation was and told me there was a plant called the LAKE CITY PLANT. Apparently Lake City is the name of a little community in Missouri which is to the east of Independence. There is another plant southwest of Kansas City, but very close to Kansas City. He thought it was located at a place called ENDORA. He did not seem to know who was operating these plants or what they were doing, but it developed that he must have gotten word through his brother, because he said, "You know, my brother Vivian is head of a housing agency out there." I take it he meant Kansas City. X "A lot of people come to him and talk to him about various things." He said, "Now I understand there is a lot of labor hoarding going on at these two plants and that everybody is bidding for labor and just accumulating it in advance of its necessary use, and as a result other industries aren't able to get the labor they ought to get." He went on to indicate how he had run into the same thing during the last war so that this did not come as a surprise. He suggested that if somebody wanted to talk to his brother, his brother would be glad to give them the necessary information.

This is when I got the impression he got the information from his brother, was passing on what he knew, but he didn't know much. He said he thought it would be a good idea to look into it, because if word got around that that kind of an investigation was being made, it would have a prophylactic effect generally. He said other plants needed this labor.

file

Don's recommendation:

When the President of the United States takes the time to call the Senator and ~~xxxxxxx~~ see one of his associates and to suggest that maybe it would be worth while to talk to his brother, the least we can do is pick out some worthwhile fellow and send him out there. I have been trying to think who would be the right fellow to go. Of the people we have available here, perhaps Tyler might be all right, or I could temporarily detach these two fellows -- or one of them -- who are in Indianapolis and have them go down. If I were to pick one of them, I think Ginsburg would be the better man. The other possibility -- if the Senator would have no objection to taking him away from the tungsten report -- would be Larry Sherfy. Larry would be first-class.

Larry & Tyler
H.C. Lee ✓
✓ Earl J. ms
of J. P. or
M. bi mat 6
J-

RICHARD B. RUSSELL, GA., CHAIRMAN
HARRY FLOOD BYRD, VA.
LYNDON B. JOHNSON, TEX.
ESTES KEFAUVER, TENN.
LESTER C. HUNT, WYO.
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RALPH E. FLANDERS, VT.

WILLIAM H. GARDEN, CHIEF CLERK

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

December 20, 1951

Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator Johnson:

Enclosed is a copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Air Force transmitting drafts of a proposed Agreement and Exchange of Notes that require the approval of the Committee on Armed Services.

Unless objection is received by January 3, 1952, it is the Chairman's intention to notify the Air Force that the Committee interposes no objection to the execution of the Agreement.

Your attention is invited to the classification of the enclosures.

Respectfully yours,

Bill Garden

MAILED 3 1952

Senate Preparedness Subcommittee

ROUTING SLIP

S. E. C. Bldg.:

✓ Cook _____ Devlin
_____ Tyler _____ Martin
_____ Rice _____ Melchior
_____ Ginsburg _____ Freed
_____ Horner _____ Kaplan
_____ McGillicuddy _____ Engle
_____ Gilman _____ Miller

Senate Off. Bldg.:

_____ Jenkins _____ Mr. _____
_____ Reedy _____ Mrs. _____
_____ Wildenthal _____ Miss _____

Remarks: Do you see any
reason why Senator
should not clear this?

From: WT

United States Senate

MEMORANDUM

4/5

Walter -

I think this should
be in the Senator's
personal files of
his own office -

Dorothy?

I agree. Tyler
please handle
wd

safe

MEMORANDUM: Visit at White House

Senator Johnson related the policies of the subcommittee, asked for advice and assistance, discussed staff leadership, pitfalls, and received an invitation to bring the full committee to the White House at any time.

The President had read the earlier statements and approved them heartily as some of the finest ever to be made by a Senate committee.

He said committee leadership was most important and that a very good staff man was essential.

He said everybody on the committee was his friend, except Bridges -- and Bridges could be handled by "buttering 'em up" and letting him get some headlines.

He said he had talked with Louis Johnson and told him that he was "crzy" -- "He is crazy," you know.

He said not to worry about David Lawrence.

He said go right ahead, on the charted course; if anything is wrong, come and tell him about it and it will be remedied.

Senator said it was "the finest meeting" that could possibly be had."

-- August 8, 1950 -- 1:25

(Visit -- 12-12:30. Earlier, visited with Connelly, who praised the statement and promised to help.)

SECRET DOCUMENT RECEIPT (SIGN ORIGINAL AND RETURN BY ROUTING SLIP)		DATE DISPATCHED BY OFFICE MAIL FACILITY	CONTROL NUMBER
TO: Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee		FROM: Directorate of Legislation and Liaison, OSAF	
TYPE OF COMM.	DATE	SUBJECT: SHORT TITLE (Include other unclassified identifying data)	NUMBER OF INCLOSURES
Charts	5/27/52	See attached Summary of Enclosures	97
RECEIVED BY			DATE

SUMMARY OF ENCLOSURES

Confidential chart - Air Force Aircraft Production Plan, USAF, 95 Wings
Plus MDAP and Army. 12 copies

Secret chart - Air Force Aircraft Production Plan, USAF, 126 Wings (now)
Plus MDAP and Army. 13 copies

Unclassified chart - USAF, Effects of HR 7391. 12 copies

Secret chart - Total and Modern Combat Wings. 12 copies

Unclassified chart - Air Force Military Personnel Projects. 12 copies

Secret chart - Summary of Major Air Force Units. 12 copies

Unclassified chart - Air Force Increases in Personnel Compared to Increase
in Forces. 12 copies

Unclassified chart - Department of the Air Force, Analysis of Air Force
Estimates, House Action, and as Presented to the
Senate Fiscal Year 1953. 12 copies

FUTURE RELEASE

PLEASE NOTE DATE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION
Washington 25, D. C.

HOLD FOR RELEASE
UNTIL DELIVERY OF ADDRESS
EXPECTED AT 8:00 P.M. (PST), 11:00 P.M. (EST)
THURSDAY, MARCH 20, 1952

NO. 66-52S

ADDRESS BY
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE THOMAS K. FINLETTER
AT THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD
AT THE ST. FRANCIS HOTEL, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
THURSDAY, MARCH 20, 1952 -- 8:00 P.M. (PST), 11:00 P.M. (EST)

I shall talk this evening about the military budget for Fiscal Year 1953 now up before the Congress.

This budget calls for \$52.1 billion for the Army, Navy and Air Force. In addition, there is about \$5.4 billion of military aid in the Mutual Security Program. This is a total of \$57.5 billion for armament which Congress is being asked for.

This is a lot of money. It is an understatement to say that anyone who has anything to do with such a budget has a duty to explain as clearly as he can why he supports it.

* * * *

The concern over spending so much money for military purposes has already shown itself in various ways. It has shown itself in the meticulous examinations of the budget which have been made by the Secretary of Defense and his staff, by the Bureau of the Budget, and by the committees of Congress. It also has shown itself in a feeling that we can get the same amount of striking power for less money. It also shows itself in proposals for over-all horizontal slashes, the purpose of which is said not to be to cut the striking power but to produce the same strength for less money.

If we could produce the same striking power for less money nobody would be more in favor of it than those in charge of the military departments and the Mutual Security program. I fail to see how this can be done. Any horizontal slash most surely will cut into the striking power of our military forces. And to cut the striking power of our forces would be to take quite a chance, with the world the way it is.

First, though, let me point out that this budget is less than the budget for last year. The figures for the three military departments are these: In Fiscal Year 1950, that is before the Korean War started, \$13.1 billion. In Fiscal Year 1951, \$48.4 billion; in Fiscal Year 1952, \$59.4 billion; and for the coming Fiscal Year 1953, \$52.1 billion. This is \$7.3 billion less in the current budget now before Congress than was appropriated last year. And this despite the fact that the Fiscal Year 1953 figures include an increase in the striking power of the Air Force by about 50%.

MORE

Why then is there this particular concern about the Fiscal Year 1953 military budget? A similar concern was not shown for the Fiscal Year 1952 budget. The reason is, I think, that for the first time we are facing up to the cost of the extraordinarily difficult task upon which the United States is embarked.

What is this task? It is that the United States has determined to have a military force in being whose primary purpose is to be so strong that it will persuade the Communists not to start a war - and to use the breathing space so gained to try to work out a peaceful solution which will make all these huge expenditures for arms unnecessary.

Putting it in money terms, the policy is to spend money now to avoid the geometrically bigger spending that would come if we got into an all-out war.

Putting it in the more important terms of saving our civilization, we are spending this money to prevent the destruction of everything that this country has built up since it was founded.

It is hard to grasp the significance of this grand policy. This is the first time in history that a nation, seeking only peace, has determined to build a military establishment of anything like the striking power of this one. Aggressors in the past have built up great military strength, but never has a peacefully inclined nation gone in for such an ambitious military program.

One reason for this is that never before has it been so vital to the survival of a country that it have this kind of military power. War has now become intolerable. These modern weapons of destruction are so terrible that we can no longer accept the possibility of war. Not only must we reject any idea that war is inevitable, but the very safety of our civilization depends on our making every sacrifice to try to get rid of war as an institution and to get rid of it forever.

This is the purpose of our military program. It is a great ideal. But if the ideal is great, it is also an enormously difficult one to sustain. I suppose that an objective observer, looking at what is going on in the world from a great distance, would wonder whether this great venture of the United States will succeed. Our impartial observer, if he lacked faith, would say that one cannot change the historical way of doing things. He would say that peacefully inclined nations never can sustain a strong force such as we are now planning. The impatience at the sacrifices involved, he would say, will make us waver in our task, will make us yield to every pretext we could find to avoid having to sustain so heavy a burden for so long a time.

Our objective observer would be right in stating the issue in these terms. It is not an open and shut case that we are going to do what we say we are going to do. We have to ask ourselves some very searching questions. Have we the patience and endurance and character to carry out this great ideal of building a shield back of which we can work for peace? Will we not grow impatient with the burdens put upon us?

For all these very real questions, I cannot help but believe that our impartial observer would be wrong if he prophesied that we would fail. I do believe that if we fully understand the problem before us we will decide that these sacrifices are worth while. We will recognize that this is the only chance for peace and we will believe that peace is worth any sacrifice except the loss of freedom. We will not yield to arguments that will say that we can have these things without making the sacrifices. We will maintain a force which will make the Communists lay off and, I venture to hope, eventually agree to some decent solution which will eliminate war.

This is the basic issue in the present budget. All the arguments which you hear about fat as opposed to muscle, waste, over-complexity of machines or under-complexity of machines - or whatever the argument is - are but the outward manifestation of an unwillingness to pay the cost of our great policy.

Particularly do I object to proposals for over-all slashes in the military budget of such and such a percentage of the amount approved by the Executive Branch. Proposals for an over-all slash are nothing but an admission that there is nothing specific to be found to which an objection can be taken. I do not think it right to say that one has been unable to find any specific items which can be eliminated without interfering with the striking power of our military force and at the same time to say nevertheless one has a hunch that it can be done and that our hunch is better than all the exacting examinations that have been made by the Executive Branch and Congress.

The Department of Defense has done its best to find where fat exists and to eliminate it from this budget. So has the Bureau of the Budget and the Committees of Congress. All would welcome being shown something they have overlooked; and the Department of Defense would be the first to cut it out. But over-all slashes do not even pretend to this kind of constructive criticism. Just as surely as we are sitting here tonight, an over-all slash would cut into the striking power of our military force and, to the extent of the cut, increase the chance of war and the failure of our great policy.

* * * *

Let me be specific about this in terms of the Air Force. I am sure that what I am saying about the Air Force would apply to the other Services, for their budgets have been subject to as exacting a scrutiny as has ours. Also, the same thing applies to the Mutual Security program. The Mutual Security program - the program of military aid to our friends in the free world - is inextricably tied into our own military program and is an integral part of it. Any idea that cutting into Mutual Security aid does not cut into the defense of this country is a fallacy.

What good, for example, would it do to have well equipped American divisions fighting side by side with inadequately armed Allied divisions? What good would it do to have American air equipped with good planes fighting jointly with our Allies in the battle for air supremacy when the Allies did not have the proper planes or properly trained crews? It is a Western force we are creating in NATO--not just a United States force--and any idea

of cutting Mutual Security aid just because it happens to be in the form of aid to our friends rather than in direct building of our own strength is very definitely not good thinking.

To return to the Air Force - and here I am trying to make clear to you the planning for the Air Force which justifies me in saying to you that any cut in the Air Force budget will pro tanto reduce the Air Force's striking power.

The Air Force budget is a very closely tailored budget. We have concentrated to the greatest extent possible on creating three D-Day striking forces on the most economical basis possible. When I describe these three striking forces I think you will agree that the jobs they are supposed to do are indispensable to the security of this country and to this great policy of **detering war.**

First is the Air Defense operation - that is, the job of defending this country against enemy bomber attack - and an enemy bomber attack carrying atomic bombs. Has anybody any doubt that this is indispensable? And I assure you that in the planning of this Air Defense force the most exacting standards have been used. The force as planned will be adequate but it will contain no fat whatsoever.

The second is the Strategic Air operation - that is to say the planes and men who would deliver the atomic bomb on any enemy who might attack us. I wish I could explain in detail the elaborate studies which have led us to the conclusion that the Strategic Air Command as presently planned is closely tailored, and no more, to the task which it has to perform. And since I think you will agree that a passive defense is not enough of itself, it follows that this counter-offensive, carrying the greatest weapon in the possession of the West, must be right.

The Communists have been concentrating intensely on their own air defense against our Strategic Air operation. We are aware of this and we have built into the Strategic Air operation in our planning what we conceive would be the proper force to handle the Communist air defense. This Strategic operation is nevertheless an extremely difficult one and I ask you to accept it that what we are asking for simply cannot be cut without really playing recklessly with its effectiveness. And if you play with the effectiveness of this operation you are really raising questions about the national security.

The Tactical Air job is mainly centered on providing the air to work with the ground and sea forces in the defense of Europe under the NATO arrangement. What I have said about the other two commands applies with equal force to the Tactical Air operation. You cannot cut into the striking force which is being prepared for this operation without running the risk of not being able to control the skies over Europe in the event war should be forced upon us.

I have offered you no detailed facts to persuade you that these three operations as presently planned have been closely tailored and cannot be cut without impairing the national security. I have, however, taken part, in the most intimate detail, in the planning that has been done for these three operations and I assure you that any cut in them would be most harmful.

I can be specific, however, in some respects about our planning for the so-called 126 combat wing force - the force called for by this budget.

In the first place there is nothing left over in our planning for anything but these three operations I have described. There is nothing left over in our planning for anything except the basic tasks I have just described. You would not be able to take any wings from our 126 combat wing force, when and if we get it, to do some job other than the three I have described, without interfering with the Air Force being able to do the three basic and absolutely indispensable jobs. You can't take planes away from the Air Defense Command without interfering with the defense of the country; you can't take planes away from the Strategic Air Command without interfering with its ability to strike a counter-offensive blow; and you can't take planes away from the Tactical Air Command without interfering with our having air supremacy over the skies of Europe. This is really a tightly tailored force.

It is tightly tailored in one other respect, and a very important one. There are no reserves for combat attrition. Under normal circumstances a military force would plan on keeping its power going on an even keel after taking casualties at the outset of a war. When a force goes into battle, it will take losses, and heavy losses, during the early days of the operation. The ideal thing would be if we had additional aircraft and additional crews to take the place of those who become casualties. There are no such reserves in this program. We have concentrated everything we have and will get on maximum striking power on the day hostilities occur. We want to be able to have the most on hand the moment a war starts - all with the high purpose of not having a war start at all.

This failure to provide for combat reserves - for the planes and men to take the place of casualties - until our mobilization production of planes and men can get under way - is a definite risk. If we had some fat of that kind into which you could cut by a slash in the budget, that might be something to think about. But there isn't any fat of that kind there.

Next, we have cut our personnel to the bone. We are jumping, in the present budget, from 80 combat wings to 126 combat wings, or an increase of over 50% in striking power, and we are planning to do it with a total increase in personnel, both military and civilian, of 17%. A 50% increase in striking power for a 17% increase in personnel to handle it. This may prove to be too tightly tailored, but we have always had in mind to make this the most muscle-like force that we could create, with the reservation in our minds that if we have miscalculated we would ask for additions later on.

The 126 combat wing force will not come into full modernized form until well into 1955. It could be speeded up somewhat if we were to have total mobilization, and if we were to pay considerably higher taxes it could be done faster. But instead the requested appropriations and expenditures in the next year have been cut for the purpose of maintaining as even and level a strain upon

our economy as possible. This too is tightly tailored, and - with what we know of Communist air and atomic power - has come to about the limit of what is right. A slash in the Air Force budget will certainly push the readiness day beyond 1955; indeed a slash will do more. It will cut the number of wings. And there aren't any wings to be cut - unless you want to take a chance which, to me, would be most imprudent.

We are attempting to justify this program before the Congress and we are giving them the utmost in details to sustain the statements I have just made to you. I hope that you will agree with me that one should be extremely cautious in encouraging the idea that cuts can be made without interfering with striking power. I hope that if any of you do believe that there should be cuts you will face up to the inevitable conclusion of such cuts and accept the responsibility of urging a diminution of our air power to protect this country and the free world.

* * * * *

This is the main thing I have to say to you tonight, and you can see that I feel it very deeply indeed. I now have one or two more detailed points that I would like to make.

First about production. What is the matter with our production? Why are we not building as many planes as the Russians? Why are the planes not rolling off the lines now?

I suggest that we stop worrying about the ability of our great American industry to produce. Nothing has happened to American industry. There are reasons why planes are not rolling off the lines now and why our present figures do not compare favorably with current Russian production.

As to why the planes are not rolling off the lines now. The main reason for this, as we have tried to explain on many occasions, is that it takes a certain amount of time to build a plane.

We did not start our build up in plane construction until after the Korean war started. There were four appropriations during Fiscal Year 1951. They can be said to average about January 1, 1951 as a starting point. It takes at least two years or more from the time you get an appropriation to the time the planes start to roll. This means that nobody expected the planes to start rolling off the lines until January 1953, and roughly speaking that is about the date that our production will get really going.

For the Air Force this refers to the build-up to 95 wings. But the build-up from 95 wings to the 126 combat wings (or the 143 total wing force) has not yet been authorized by Congress. We are hoping to get the appropriations by the beginning of the next fiscal year, namely on July 1, 1952. So you cannot expect the planes for this build-up from 95 to 143 wings to begin to roll until well into 1954.

* * * * *

I do think, however, that there is something to worry about in the quality of our production.

By this I don't mean that our American planes are not very good indeed. They are. But I think there is a certain tendency to be smug about the quality of our American military machines.

It came as quite a surprise to those who believed the Russians weren't much good at engineering that they were able to build a plane as good as the MIG-15. It is well for us to recognize the fact that the Russians have exploded an atomic bomb; that they have produced the MIG-15; and that they are capable of very high manufacturing, engineering, and scientific performance. It is also well to recognize that we are in the middle of the greatest revolution in arms in history, which means that emphasis on quality is indispensable.

Quality is extremely important in deciding the relative striking power of planes in this complicated technological age. We should refuse to listen to arguments which say that we should not improve our equipment just as much as we possibly can improve it. There are some few functions of air power where lower quality and high quantity production may be in order, but these cases are rare when you are dealing with air power and atomic weapons.

It is possible that scientific and engineering developments will be made by the Communists which will seriously alter the power - relationship between them and us. Now our quality is better and - if we got the money I am talking about - we will improve our relative strength. But it is a matter of grave concern whether through some smugness, over-confidence, or some mistaken philosophy that we don't have to worry about quality, we may allow the Communists to make developments which will seriously and even radically shift the preponderance of strength from us to them.

There ought to be more emphasis on research and development. I can think of no better way to spend money than on seeing to it that we have the best and most powerful military machines and weapons possible.

Research and development may save money; indeed one of its purposes is to do just that. There is such a thing as making improvements which will cost less. I know that usually when you improve these military things they cost more, but this is not always the case. You can sometimes take an improvement costing X and cut out things that cost many times X. Or you can find a way, through research and development, of getting something you want in the cheapest way.

But much more important than the question of cost is the point that I have been trying to emphasize that the production of certain types of new vehicles and weapons could alter the relationship or even shift the military balance of power between the Communists and ourselves.

Another point is the argument that the military establishments have a lot of unspent money available and therefore why do they need more. This is, I think, a simple matter to explain.

If you spent in Fiscal Year 1952 all of the money that was appropriated in Fiscal 1952, there would be no carry over of unspent funds. And such is the case in certain types of items. The pay of

personnel and the subsistence of personnel appropriated in Fiscal Year 1952 is all spent in Fiscal 1952. But the money which is appropriated to buy airplanes is not all expended in Fiscal Year 1952. The planes themselves sometimes take as long as two to three or more years to build, and we only pay for those planes over the years in question, with most of the money coming in the latest year. There is therefore nothing particularly startling in having money which has been appropriated in 1951 not spent until 1952 or 1953 or 1954.

The reason for this misunderstanding about unspent funds is the failure to understand just what an appropriation consists of. An appropriation is merely the determination by Congress which authorizes a department or agency - in this case the Air Force - to obligate the United States Government for a certain amount of money. So that when we say that there were appropriations in Fiscal Year 1951 to the Air Force of \$16 B, we mean that the Air Force was authorized to commit the United States Government to the extent of \$16 B during that year. It does not mean that the Air Force was authorized to spend \$16 B during that year. On the contrary, the \$16 B of obligations which the Air Force put out in Fiscal Year 1951 were and will be spent over the years 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, and even 1955. Once we understand this principle I think this argument about unspent balances can be disposed of.

* * * * *

All these questions I have just been talking about are in a sense details. I could go on with many more of them. I could talk about the charges that there are lots of cases of waste in procurement, construction, management, etc. in the Air Force. I could answer the arguments that our planes are too complex on the one hand and not complex enough on the other. I could meet the argument that the MIG-15 is better than the Sabre F-86 by giving you the figures of comparative losses - more than 7 to 1 in our favor. I could talk about a lot of similar other arguments which are currently the subject of discussion in the newspapers and elsewhere.

But there would be no profit in doing this because all of these arguments are in fact but the reflections of a malaise, an uneasiness among the people about the great program on which this country has embarked.

There is nothing remarkable about this uneasiness. There ought to be hesitation and debate before we take on such a great and difficult task. Anyhow, right or not, there is bound to be a good deal of resistance to the irritations and burdens this rearmament puts on us.

It is terribly important that we make the right decision and stick to it.

This is a turning point in history. The great civilizations of the past when they reached the apex of their power, have misused, or failed to use to good ends, the power they had. They therefore have gone on to decay and destruction. Military strength, unless it is used to build the institution of peace, is militarism, and can produce only disaster.

The United States is trying to use its power and position of world leadership to make a new pattern - something not yet tried in history. We are trying not to follow the usual dismal course. We are trying to use our power to preserve our way of life and leave this great heritage to our descendants. We are trying to use our strength to get rid of the institution of war.

We are trying to do this by what seems to be a paradox, by building up our military power with the end in mind of being able, some day and as soon as we can, to make a world in which we can do without military power. This paradox is not easy to grasp. It adds to the hesitations that afflict some of us when we look at this grand policy and when we begin to feel the cost of it. But it is not arguable that the indispensable first step in doing away with war is to arm heavily and, to our possible enemies, persuasively.

I said at the beginning that I think that an impartial objective observer, looking at what is going on in the world from a distance, would have doubts whether we are going to succeed. There are doubts. But I have an idea that when the people of this country really put their minds to the challenge which is before them and realize fully the greatness of the opportunity, they will willingly bear the burdens that will fall upon them in order to do this great good for the generations which will come after them.

E N D

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

11 October 1950


Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
Chairman, Preparedness Subcommittee
Senate Armed Services Committee
United States Senate

Dear Senator Johnson:

Inclosed herewith you will find the answers of the three Services and the Marine Corps to question four in your letter of 13 September 1950. These pages should be inserted in the designated places in the report which has already been transmitted.

The Air Force is still working on its portion of the answers to questions one and three. I shall forward this material to you immediately upon its receipt by me.

Sincerely,



F. Shackelford
Department Counselor

1 Incl
Report

CC Secretary of the Army
Department of Defense Liaison Representative
Navy Department Liaison Representative
Air Force Department Liaison Representative

Handwritten signature

Mr. Zuckert said: "Sure. Sure. OK. I
will look into it and call you."

*Put in
Safe*

Processing Note:

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There are 6 copies of the following one-page document. Unique information appears on 2 of the copies. These copies have been scanned.

Robert Mar

Digitization Technician

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It is reported to me that the Air Force has contracted with the Texas Railway Equipment Company to disassemble 129, ~~or thereabouts~~, B-29 aircraft now located at Poyote Field in Texas.

After having disassembled the planes they are to supply certain parts specified ~~to~~ the Air Force. Under the contract, the contractor will receive cost plus \$32,000 fixed fee for the contract. Under the terms of the contract it is reported that the contractor is required to divert the balance of the parts to a smelter and to notify the Air Force ~~that~~ that the parts have been so diverted. However, if any parts are considered desirable to retain for sale by the contractor, they will be sent to Clinton (presumably New Jersey) for sale and the Air Force notified when and if any sales are made.

However, it is further understood that a representative of the contractor has made arrangements to call in some parts brokers in the guise of technical consultants to supervise the disassembling but in fact to select the parts for which they have a ready sale. Having made that selection, all parts will ostensibly be diverted to a smelter, but arrangements have been made with a smelter so that when the parts have been diverted to the smelter they will not in fact be smelted ~~by the smelter~~ but the smelter will in turn resell the parts to these brokers who will in fact sell for the account of the contractor to the considerable profit of the contractor.

Therefore, I ~~suggest~~ ^{*respectfully request*} that you make a prompt and complete investigation of all the circumstances surrounding this contract and then report to this committee your findings in detail.

Pending completion of this investigation you should, in my opinion, delay disassembling any of these aircraft. Please advise me promptly when this action has been taken.

*Senator called M. C. on 9-11-50
He said he would investigate promptly & call back.
XCC 9-11-50*

COPY

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Therefore, I suggest that you ~~make~~ ^{furnish me} a prompt and complete investigation of all the circumstances surrounding this contract and then report to this committee your findings in detail.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

22 September 1950

Dear Senator Johnson:

In my letter to you of 22 September 1950, I indicated that we would send to you in a few days our proposed form of answer for Question No. 3 in your letter of 13 September 1950 to the Secretary of Defense. Since that time, we have had conferences at which all of the Services have been represented by an officer familiar with training programs and policies. These conferences have convinced us that it is not feasible to establish a master format which could be used to advantage by each Service in answering Question No. 3. The differences in the programs envisaged and the problems faced by each Service are sufficiently substantial so that the presentation of the training picture to your Subcommittee in a common form would require oversimplification. Consequently, we are planning to have each Service submit separately an explanation of its training periods or cycles. These separate explanations will be submitted to your Subcommittee along with the rest of the report, and they should, when taken together, provide you with an answer to Question No. 3 which is sufficiently detailed to be of value to your Subcommittee.

After conferring with the appropriate representatives of the various Services as well as with the representatives of General Services Administration, we have adopted the enclosed form as a basis for answering Question No. 4. I might add that the GSA representatives have been most helpful in furnishing information in connection with this problem.

Sincerely yours,

F. Shackelford
F. Shackelford
Department Counselor

Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
Chairman, Preparedness Subcommittee
Senate Armed Services Committee
United States Senate

CC Secretary of the Army
Department of Defense Liaison
Preparedness Subcommittee Liaison
Navy Department Liaison
Air Force Department Liaison
Administrator, General Services Administration

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May 17, 1956

Senator Johnson

Walter Jenkins

I have looked into the matters related in a letter written by Miss Edith Sircom to the Minority Members of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee. The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth the facts as I have obtained them. This information is either of my own knowledge or is based on statements made to me by Gerald W. Siegel, former Acting Chief Counsel of the Preparedness Subcommittee; John D. Cofer, present Chief Counsel; or Wallace Engle, member of the Committee Staff.

Generally the information Miss Sircom sets forth with reference to the history of the Subcommittee since you again became its Chairman in January 1955 is accurate. The problems which we had with reference to a Chief Counsel are well known to all the members of the Subcommittee. Miss Sircom does not mention, however, that Mr. Cook had previously been Chief Counsel on the Subcommittee and with his background in the field was able to accomplish more in two days than a new person would likely have been able to accomplish in a week.

I have checked on Miss Sircom's references to "guessing games" and "checker games" and I am informed reliably that no activities of this type have taken place in the Subcommittee since you returned to its Chairmanship. I am told that during the last few months prior to your returning to the Chairmanship of the Subcommittee, the workload was almost non-existent and that the Chief Counsel at that time stated he would not make work that did not need to be done. During that period there was, I understand, a good deal of time wasted.

I have been to the offices of the Preparedness Subcommittee on very few occasions. Mr. Siegel has been there many times, particularly during the period when Congress was not in session last year. Mr. Cofer has been there daily since his assumption of the position as Chief Counsel. None of us have ever witnessed any lack of work on the part of the Preparedness Subcommittee staff and it is reported that for the most part at least all of the staff members have been quite busy ever since January, 1955.

While Miss Sircom is correct that there have been no hearings held, it should be pointed out that eight Subcommittee reports were published during this period, one report is ready immediately and several others are near to the publishing stage. This is true even though a period of several weeks was required to get the Subcommittee organized and a realistic program worked out for it upon your assumption of the Chairmanship. A number of these reports required many, many hours of research on the part of staff members. In addition, literally dozens of minor investigations took place which did not and will not reach the report stage.

I have learned that Miss Sircom discussed her personnel problems with Mr. Cook, with Mr. Rus Kelly, with Mr. Siegel and with Mr. Cofer. At no time did she allege any of the charges contained in her letter. As far as I can determine she never requested an opportunity to present any complaints to you or to me.

Her general problem seems to be that while she is a qualified stenographer and typist she has been ambitious to hold a more responsible position for which she was not qualified. I think her inability to be assigned greater responsibilities than purely stenographic ones has caused her to become frustrated and it has been difficult for other members of the staff to work with her for many months. Although a year ago Mr. Cook wanted to discharge her because of the difficulty she was creating in the office, other members of the staff prevailed on him not to do so because she was considered to be the ablest stenographer on the staff.

On May 11 or thereabouts she approached Mr. Cofer and stated that she wished to resign. Being familiar with the problems Miss Sircom had raised in the past, Mr. Cofer said that he would be glad to assist her in locating other employment and would try to work out a way in which she could be continued in our employ for a sufficient period to enable her to work out something else. She did not present Mr. Cofer any of the complaints contained in her letter other than she had had difficulty with Mr. Friedenberg when he would ask her to take dictation in preference to working on the Ninth Report. Since Miss Sircom had been employed as a stenographer Mr. Cofer felt that Mr. Friedenberg was correct in asking her to do stenographic work whenever needed.

(3)

Summarizing: I believe Miss Sircom to be a disgruntled employee who has become frustrated by her inability to obtain assignment to responsibilities beyond her capacity and who now endeavors to take out her failures on those with whom she worked.

W J:ms

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Robert Mar

Digitization Technician

MEMORANDUM

May 16, 1956

TO : Senator Johnson

FROM : G. W. Siegel

and was not
I have read Miss Sircom's confidential memorandum on the staff operations of the Preparedness Subcommittee. Since ~~it~~ ^{she} was not, during the period that I acted as counsel for the Subcommittee, physically situated in their offices, I am unable, naturally, to speak with complete positive certainty on all of the matters listed in the memorandum.

On the other hand, on frequent occasions I spent time at the Committee office and followed closely the activities of the staff. I must state unequivocally that Miss Sircom's charges are extravagant and, to the best of my knowledge, largely unfounded.

While the staff has been small at all times, it has been made up of personnel employed largely either during the time that you were Chairman originally or during the Chairmanship of Senator Saltonstall. I found the people competent, diligent, and fully cooperative. Although no hearings were held during the period, eight reports have been published, a ninth is in a state of near readiness, and several more are approaching that stage.

Shortly after you became Chairman, Miss Sircom approached me with the complaint that her talents were being ignored and that she was being treated as a secretary and file clerk and that she was capable of more important things. I spoke to her and tried to be as understanding as possible and suggested that she speak to Mr. Cook about her working relationship with any member or all members of the staff. To the best of my knowledge, she did this and shortly thereafter indicated to me that the situation was satisfactory.

On a number of later occasions I asked Miss Sircom how things were going and while she didn't express complete satisfaction, she did not seem inclined to complain.

Several weeks ago, Miss Sircom sent me a letter marked confidential and specifically asking that I do nothing and that I destroy it, after reading, which I did. In this letter, Miss Sircom raised similar complaints about her working relationships with the staff and the fact that her study of surplus property sales and new procurement was not receiving the attention and encouragement that it should. She did not ask me to do anything and, as a result, I did not reply or attempt to speak to her about it.

I feel sure that subsequent to this I have seen Miss Sircom in the offices when she would have had an opportunity to speak to me about this letter if she had desired, but she did not do so. I must conclude that Miss Sircom has permitted a personal sense of frustration to distort her judgment. The Subcommittee staff is competent and has performed its duties in a thoroughly satisfactory manner.

United States Senate

MEMORANDUM

21 Feb 61

COPY

May 17, 1956

Senator Johnson

Walter Jenkins

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Generally the information Miss Sircom sets forth with reference to the history of the Subcommittee since you again became its Chairman in January 1955 is accurate. The problems which we had with reference to a Chief Counsel are well known to all the members of the Subcommittee. Miss Sircom does not mention, however, that Mr. Cook had previously been Chief Counsel on the Subcommittee and with his background in the field was able to accomplish more in two days than a new person would likely have been able to accomplish in a week.

I have checked on Miss Sircom's references to "guessing games" and "checker games" and I am informed reliably that no activities of this type have taken place in the Subcommittee since you returned to its Chairmanship. I am told that during the last few months prior to your returning to the Chairmanship of the Subcommittee, the workload was almost non-existent and that the Chief Counsel at that time stated he would not make work that did not need to be done. During that period there was, I understand, a good deal of time wasted.

I have been to the offices of the Preparedness Subcommittee on very few occasions. Mr. Siegel has been there many times, particularly during the period when Congress was not in session last year. Mr. Cofer has been there daily since his assumption of the position as Chief Counsel. None of us have ever witnessed any lack of work on the part of the Preparedness Subcommittee staff and it is reported that for the most part at least all of the staff members have been quite busy ever since January, 1955.

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While Miss Sircom is correct that there have been no hearings held, it should be pointed out that eight Subcommittee reports were published during this period, one report is ready immediately and several others are near to the publishing stage. This is true even though a period of several weeks was required to get the Subcommittee organized and a realistic program worked out for it upon your assumption of the Chairmanship. A number of these reports required many, many hours of research on the part of staff members. In addition, literally dozens of minor investigations took place which did not and will not reach the report stage.

I have learned that Miss Sircom discussed her personnel problems with Mr. Cook, with Mr. Rus Kelly, with Mr. Siegel and with Mr. Cofer. At no time did she allege any of the charges contained in her letter. As far as I can determine she never requested an opportunity to present any complaints to you or to me.

Her general problem seems to be that while she is a qualified stenographer and typist she has been ambitious to hold a more responsible position for which she was not qualified. I think her inability to be assigned greater responsibilities than purely stenographic ones has caused her to become frustrated and it has been difficult for other members of the staff to work with her for many months. Although a year ago Mr. Cook wanted to discharge her because of the difficulty she was creating in the office, other members of the staff prevailed on him not to do so because she was considered to be the ablest stenographer on the staff.

On May 11 or thereabouts she approached Mr. Cofer and stated that she wished to resign. Being familiar with the problems Miss Sircom had raised in the past, Mr. Cofer said that he would be glad to assist her in locating other employment and would try to work out a way in which she could be continued in our employ for a sufficient period to enable her to work out something else. She did not present Mr. Cofer any of the complaints contained in her letter other than she had had difficulty with Mr. Friedenberg when he would ask her to take dictation in preference to working on the Ninth Report. Since Miss Sircom had been employed as a stenographer Mr. Cofer felt that Mr. Friedenberg was correct in asking her to do stenographic work whenever needed.

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Summarizing: I believe Miss Sircom to be a disgruntled employee who has become frustrated by her inability to obtain assignment to responsibilities beyond her capacity and who now endeavors to take out her failures on those with whom she worked.

WJ:ms

September 11, 1950.

Telephone conversation between Secretary John McCone at the
Air Force and Senator Lyndon B. Johnson

Secy. McCone: You called and I was out of the office, and I have just talked to Zukert about this matter in Texas which I am alarmed to hear because it would be a shameful thing and I am delighted to get the tip on it. I am going to have our Inspector General make an immediate check into it and I will report to you in a matter of hours or at the most a day or two. We will see just exactly what the situation is. Did your information come from an authentic source?

Johnson: It appears to be from people who knew what they were talking about. I thought in the light of the circumstances that (1) an investigation should be made immediately, and (2) pending completion of that, in my opinion, delay on disassembling the aircraft itself -- and order should be issued.

McCone: Is your question about the logic of disassembling or on this other?

Johnson: It may be both. We haven't reached a conclusion. We think we ought to have the facts

McCone: If there is going to be any time involved in getting the facts, then I think we ought to stop the operation, but if we can get the facts immediately it is very disrupting to lay off the men. I am not prepared to say what the circumstances will be. You will hear from us today or tomorrow.

Johnson: You agree it should be investigated and that if any Then we can go into the wisdom. For instance, one of the men said we are short of B-29s. Why don't we put gasoline in them and get them out there? I assumed that the best brains had gone into the matter and decided that we should disassemble them.

McCone: The situation is that we have some 1800 or 2000 B-29s in storage in addition to those in actual use. Some of the very early ones were surveyed out and cannibalized. The decision was made by the Air Staff the process is going on. That decision was made some time ago before I

came into office. We will review it again immediately, but as far as being short of B-29s to fly to the Pacific or any other place, we are not short of them because of this reserve of B-29s and we are withdrawing about 200 of them at the present time (something about disassembling when the cost of bringing them up to date was more than it was worth - they were too obsolete), and fully replacing them and modernizing them.

Johnson: I am not qualified to judge. Would it not be quicker and easier to put gasoline in them. Or if we can't get the parts, if that is impossible, and we are going to have an arrangement like this, should it not be taken with a little more precaution than appears?

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~~McGone~~

Johnson: You have seen this report that we ~~gsk~~ got out. We may be in error. We felt though that the Inspector General on the Georgia matter left much to be desired from our viewpoint. We are pursuing that further, and I hope if that same Inspector General goes into this one he will be cautioned at least that not everything be timely and adequate -- we think it is a little inconsistent.

McCone: I will report back to you today or tomorrow.

United States Senate
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