

AIDE MEMOIRE

1. India's forcible seizure of Goa, in open defiance of the U.N. Charter and the Western powers, has served to confirm Pakistan's conviction that despite her protestations of non-violence and peaceful intentions, India has been, and will continue to be, an aggressive force in South Asia. The slogan of non-violence is not, as Western opinion has mistakenly believed, a creed with Indian leaders; it is a cloak which serves to hide their real intentions.

Today Mr. Krishna Menon unabashedly declares: "We have never abjured violence against any country when it is to our interest."

2. The forcible seizure of Goa is not the first instance of Indian aggression. Previous instances of aggressions are: Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir. With convenient disregard of logic, justification offered by India for the military capture of the two former states was reversed in the case of Kashmir.

3. Speaking in the Security Council, Mr. Nehru's spokesman, Mr. Jha, said that the capture of Goa was a matter of faith with India, "Charter or no Charter, Council or no Council."

In an attempt to explain away the forcible seizure of Goa, Mr. Menon has said that it was a mistake to consider the Indian capture of Goa "a military operation." He said, "It was just a measure to return Goa to the motherland and the matter is finished."

4. For Pakistan, these statements and the fact that India has been able to get away with her grab of Goa, while the great powers have merely looked on or contented themselves with verbal admonition is a matter for very serious concern.

5. The Goan drama has two disconcerting implications for the smaller nations. First, India's successful capture of Goa has demonstrated that these nations could not look to the United Nations for help in the event of aggression by a larger country enjoying Soviet support. Any U.N. counter action would become a cold war issue and be frustrated by a Soviet veto.

Second, such an aggressor country may in future assume that in the event it committed aggression, the allies of the victim would not come to its assistance for fear of getting involved in an atomic war with Russia.

Encouraged by considerations such as above and his success in the case of Goa, Mr. Nehru might well one day, having achieved overwhelming superiority in armour, decide "to return Pakistan to the motherland." According to his spokesman, Mr. Menon, it would be a mistake to consider that a military action.

6. There exist in India strong militant organisations with "Akhand Bharat" (Indivisible India") as their proclaimed objective, to be achieved, if necessary, by force.

Indian leaders, from Mr. Nehru downwards, have repeatedly referred to Pakistan (not China) as India's main adversary and proclaimed that Pakistan was guilty of aggression so long as it continued to occupy Kashmir territory.

As Pakistan's President said during talks with President Kennedy, what really matters is not the immediate intentions of the Indian Government but its military capability. Intentions can change when an aggressive country considers that the appropriate time has arrived.

During his recent visit to the United States, Mr. Nehru spoke of India's "passion for peace." Less than 6 weeks later, he seized Goa by force.

7. The real purpose of the Indian military build-up is to intimidate or absorb smaller neighbours.

India has no intention of fighting China, as demonstrated by the disposition of her forces and by her steadfast refusal to settle the Kashmir dispute and seize Pakistan's proffered hand of cooperation in defence against China.

Despite her recent pronouncements against China, the bulk of India's forces continues to be massed on Pakistan's borders. India is exploiting the Chinese issue to extract the maximum aid from the West for the purpose aforesaid.

8. In such a situation, the strength of Pakistan is a major, perhaps a decisive, factor in the maintenance of balance of power in that region.

In order to maintain stability in that region action, therefore, should be taken urgently to strengthen Pakistan's position, vis-a-vis India, as a Western

ally.

9. In view of these facts Pakistan must take all the measures necessary to safeguard its territorial integrity and independence. Pakistan further urges consideration of the following courses of action by the United States:

(1) The 1951 U.S. agreement to supply military equipment to India should be terminated, since India has violated its terms.

India should not receive any military equipment until such time as there is truly reliable evidence that she has in fact abjured aggressive intentions and needs the equipment only to fight the Chinese in defence of her territory. It is presumed that in such an event Pakistan would be consulted.

(2) Massive U.S. economic aid has enabled India substantially to build up her armed forces, thus materially altering the already considerable military imbalance against Pakistan. So long as Indian intentions remain suspect, as evidenced by her refusal to settle the Kashmir dispute and develop a co-operative relationship with Pakistan, economic aid should be limited to a level that would not enable her to divert an unduly large part of her own resources to build up her military machine.

(3) Since the U.N. has proved ineffective and the Goan adventure might encourage India to conclude that Pakistan's allies too might hesitate to intervene effectively and promptly should she decide to attack, action should be taken that would deter India from committing aggression against Pakistan

(i) by taking a suitable opportunity to issue a public statement that the United States would come to Pakistan's assistance promptly and effectively if Pakistan was attacked - similar to the assurance that was secretly given to the Pakistan Government in 1959 (United States' official note dated April 15, 1959); and

(ii) by stepping up military aid to Pakistan.

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