

DRAFT STATEMENT ON THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN PROBLEM

This Government is still considering what instructions it should give Ambassador Arthur Dean for his return to Geneva a few days from now.

We are weighing both technical and political questions in an effort to find the position which best serves our interest and the interests of all.

We have completed discussion with Ambassador Dean
we have had an
~~New data from the VELA project, and a continuing and intensive~~
review of all that we know about the problem of seismic detection,
have provided us with ^{the} new assessments of the technical capabilities
of different kinds of possible test detection systems. The essential
character of these new assessments was promptly and carefully
released on July 7th.

There are hasty and easy attitudes toward such new evidence which it is important to avoid. One is the attitude which supposes that any improvement in our technical capabilities can be used to justify a complete abandonment of all the carefully designed safeguards which we have heretofore thought necessary. Those who think this way are allowing themselves to be guided by only one of the hazards which

face us -- the hazard of the nuclear arms race. On the other hand, there are a few who look at all improvements in our detection capabilities with suspicion, and who regard any change in our position as "a concession." These people are also concerned with only one part of the problem: the hazard that another country might secretly violate a test ban agreement.

The truth is that what we have to do is to find a position which takes account of all the risks involved. On the one hand, the uncontrolled continuation of testing carries unknown dangers, both in the context of the arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States, and in the wider and even less predictable context of the gradual spread of nuclear technology all around the world. On the other hand we cannot accept an agreement in which cheating would be dangerously easy and profitable. This is the hard balance of hazard on which we have been working in recent days.

Our new assessments give real promise that we can ~~now~~ work toward a system of detection and verification for underground testing which will be substantially less large and cumbersome than the system which was contained in the treaty which we tabled in Geneva in April 1961.

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identification

also practical matter will be more efficient & economical

substantially simpler & more economical

Before making precise proposals in these matters, Ambassador Dean will probably wish to arrange for careful exchange of technical information for a general review of the complex data upon which any system must be based.

Meanwhile, I must emphasize that our new assessments do not affect the requirement that any system ^{must} include ~~some~~ provisions for on-site inspection of unidentified underground events. ~~It is~~

~~probable that we shall not need as many as we have needed in the~~
past, but in the light of our very best assessment of the technical capabilities, there is no justification for accepting a comprehensive treaty on the basis of the present Soviet insistence that ~~any~~ inspections ^{for the Soviet claim that a treaty can be effective without on-site inspections!} ~~whatever~~ be allowed.


We have been conducting a most careful and intensive review of our whole position, with the object of bringing it squarely in line with the technical realities ~~as we understand them~~. I must express the hope that the Soviet Government will reexamine its position on this matter of inspection. In the past it has accepted the principle, and if it ~~would~~ return to this earlier position, we for our part would be able to engage in an attempt to reach agreement on the ~~relatively~~ small number of on-site inspections which are still essential.

Meanwhile, I must emphasize that these new assessments do not affect the requirement that any system must include provision for on-site inspection of unidentified underground events. It is probable that we shall not need as many as we have needed in the past, but in the light of best assessment of the technical capabilities, there is no justification for the Soviet claim that a test-ban treaty can be effective without on-site inspection.

We have been conducting a most careful and intensive review of our whole position, with the object of bringing it squarely in line with the technical realities. I must express the hope that the Soviet Government too will reexamine its position on this matter of inspection. In the past it has accepted the principle, and if it would return to this earlier position, we for our part would be able to engage in an attempt to reach agreement on the smaller number of on-site inspections which are essential.

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We are completing a careful review of the technical problems associated with an effective test ban treaty. This review is stimulated by important new technical assessments. These assessments give promise that we can now work toward an internationally supervised system of detection and verification for underground testing which will be ~~essentially~~ simpler and more economical than the system which was contained in the treaty which we tabled in Geneva in April 1961.



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Meanwhile, I must emphasize that these new assessments do not affect the requirement that any system must include provision for on-site inspection of unidentified underground events. ~~It is probable that we shall not need as many as we have needed in the past, but in the light of past assessment of the technical capabilities, there is no justification for the Soviet claim that a test-ban treaty can be effective without on-site inspection.~~

We have been conducting a most careful and intensive review of our whole position, with the object of bringing it squarely in line with the technical realities. I must express the hope that the Soviet Government too will reexamine its position on this matter of inspection. In the past it has accepted the principle, and if it would return to this earlier position, we for our part would be able to engage in an attempt to reach agreement on the smaller number of on-site inspections which are essential.

Press Conference
8/1/62 - TCS

*straight
forward*
Ambassador Arthur Doan is returning to Geneva this week after an extensive review of this Government's position on a nuclear test ban treaty and recent scientific developments concerning the detection of underground tests. His instructions might be summarized as follows:

1) This Government remains determined to reach an effective treaty halting nuclear tests and thereby slowing down the nuclear arms race and the proliferation of such weapons to many other nations.

2) This Government remains determined in its opposition to any treaty which would not protect the security of the Free World against secret violations of such a treaty. *to obtain C*

3) This Government will continue to insist that any treaty provide for a sufficient number of international on-site inspections to ascertain whether unidentified *seismic* (or underground) events are caused by tests in violation of the treaty.

4) As ~~new scientific~~ developments make possible a substantial reduction in the number of suspicious events as well as an increase in the range of detection instruments, we will be prepared to discuss with the Soviet Union, once it accepts the necessity of on-site inspection, an internationally supervised system of detection and verification for underground testing which would be ~~no less effective but far more efficient and economical~~ -- and *Can be* underway far more quickly -- than the ~~somewhat cumbersome and expensive~~ arrangements contained in the draft treaty we offered in April of last year.

5) Until the Soviet Union accepts the necessity of such inspections, any discussion of the precise number which now appear to be required would be premature and the outlook for such a treaty very bleak indeed. We ~~can~~ ~~not~~ hope that the Soviet leaders will re-examine their position on this point in the light of the very real risks continued testing holds out for as all.